LEGAL NEEDS دراسة حول االحتياجات القانونية in East Jerusalem في القدس الشرقية

December 2016 كانون أول 2016

This report was commissioned by UNDP and authored by Diana Buttu in December 2016 and published in the context of the “Building a Sustainable Legal Aid System in Palestine” Project funded by the European Union through the Sawasya UNDP / UN Women Joint Programme. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of UNDP, UN Women, the United Nations or any of its affiliated organisations, the Government of the Netherlands, the Swedish Government, the Swedish International Development Cooperation or the European Union. Table of Contents

A. Introduction...... 3

B. Engaging the Israeli Legal System...... 4

C. Legal Assistance Needs...... 8

1. Residency, Family Unification, and Child Registration...... 8

2. Limited Political Rights...... 12

3. High Rates of Poverty...... 12

4. Education Shortages...... 15

5. Land and Planning Crisis...... 18

6. WASH and Other Services...... 20

7. The Wall...... 22

8. Violence...... 24

Table 1: Summary areas of legal need in East Jerusalem...... 25

D. Legal Responses...... 26

1. Legal Assistance...... 26

2. More individual cases than public interest cases...... 27 a. Domestic remedies...... 28 b. Inadequate funding structure for public interest cases...... 28 c. Public interest cases not usually within mandate...... 29

3. Advocacy efforts differ across organisations...... 29

4. Lack of political support to legal efforts...... 31

E. Gaps in Legal Assistance...... 32

Table 2: Areas of Legal Assistance by Topic...... 33

F. Recommendations and Conclusions...... 35

ANNEXES...... 38

ANNEX I: Interviews...... 39

ANNEX II: Legal Framework...... 40 1. Occupation of East Jerusalem...... 40 2. Legal System in East Jerusalem...... 41 A. Introduction This legal needs study was commissioned by the UNDP and its Sawasya Joint Programme and funded with support from the European Union under the “Building a Sustainable Legal Aid System in Palestine” Project, to support the development of a strategy tailored to the specific and evolving legal needs of Palestinian residents of Jerusalem. A number of sources were consulted during the research phase, to obtain a comprehensive picture of the legal assistance currently provided, including existing literature and studies on the status of Palestinians in Jerusalem and, their needs in light of their particular legal circumstances, as will be further outlined below. Interviewees included UNDP’s partner organisations, non-partner organisations, academics and scholars, and representatives from think tanks, international NGOs, the international donor community and UN institutions based in Jerusalem and Ramallah. Recommendations were also validated by partner NGOs in workshops. Please see Annex A for a list of those interviewed. For the purposes of this study, the terms “Jerusalem” and “East Jerusalem” refer to the Israeli-defined municipal Jerusalem. Use of this term does not imply legal recognition of the boundaries of Jerusalem; it only illustrates the plethora of political, legal, and social problems caused by the drawing of this boundary, for which legal assistance is needed. The objective of this study is to provide insight into[1]: •• Current legal needs of Palestinians in Jerusalem; •• The legal needs that NGOs and other development actors are addressing; •• The gaps, if any, in legal assistance or coverage; •• The role of the Palestinian Authority in addressing the legal needs of Palestinians in Jerusalem; and •• Potential areas of engagement for the Sawasya programme, successor programmes and partners in East Jerusalem, and potential mechanisms that could be developed to most effectively support these areas of engagement. Each of these questions will be answered in turn below.

[1] Other questions were raised throughout this study, many of which cannot be answered in this study. These include: What is the percentage of Palestinians that turn to private legal assistance in comparison to public legal aid? Why do Palestinians turn to private legal assistance?

3 B. Engaging the Israeli Legal System Before addressing the issues where legal assistance is needed, it is first necessary to examine the utility of engaging the Israeli legal system and the ramifications of doing so.[2] While it is clear that Israel’s annexation of Jerusalem is illegal and that under international law, the extension of Israeli law is illegal (Israel must maintain, “unless absolutely necessary” those laws that were in place prior to the occupation), legal assistance focuses on addressing Israeli action through Israeli domestic law and turns a blind eye to the illegality at the heart of the justice system in Jerusalem. Others take the approach that in case of serious issues (e.g. residency, social benefits, detention etc.) that directly impact the daily lives of Palestinian families and individuals, from a humanitarian perspective Palestinians, do not have the “luxury” of boycotting the ‘justice’ system. There is currently no viable alternative. If, on balance, after accepting the illegality of the current legal regime in East Jerusalem, one considers that there are sufficient humanitarian and pragmatic grounds to engage with the Israeli legal system, one must consider whether the engagement is tantamount to legitimation of an illegal occupation. The legitimation claim, in this context, is that by using the legal system, lawyers and activists are giving legitimacy to Israel’s legal system and its jurisdiction over Palestinians in East Jerusalem.[3] Boycotts of the Israeli legal system have been attempted in the past, unsuccessfully. For example, in 1967, Palestinian lawyers began a protracted strike to protest the occupation and the removal of the Jordanian courts in favour of the Israeli court system.[4] Other strikes, such as the refusal of defendants to engage in the military court system, lasted briefly before external factors – the pressure by families on lawyers and defendants, the increased sentences meted out, and the lack of political support – effectively ended these boycotts.[5] If one accepts the need to engage with the Israeli system on humanitarian grounds or grounds of pragmatism, and for these reasons can ignore the concerns about legitimating an illegal occupation, it is important to then consider whether the engagement results in practical benefits. While petitions often focus on international law, Israel tends to ignore the application of international law[6] and focuses instead on its domestic law. Critics of engaging with the Israeli legal

[2] See Annex II for an overview of the legal framework in East Jerusalem. [3] For an interesting encapsulation of the varying viewpoints on this issue, see, generally, Mada al-Carmel, The Master’s Tools; Jadal Issue 13, May 2012 found at: http://mada-research.org/en/2012/05/22/jadal-issue-13- may-2012/ [4] George Bisharat, Palestinian Lawyers and Israeli Rule: Law and Disorder in the West Bank. 58 (1989). [5] Interview with Sahar Francis, Addameer, 2 September 2010. [6] David Kretzmer, The Law of Belligerent Occupation in the Supreme Court of Israel, 94 Int. Rev. Red Cross (2012).

4 © Ahed Izhiman, UNDP/PAPP image bank

system cite the endless cases and petitions dismissed by the Israeli legal system in general and the Supreme Court in particular. The Israeli human rights NGO B’Tselem which documents and educates the Israeli public and policymakers about human rights violations in the oPt, recently conducted an analysis of 25 years of cases it had filed with the Israeli Military Advocate General (MAG). After examining their cases, B’Tselem concluded that, by design, the Israeli army only investigated the conduct of low-ranking soldiers and not those who issued the orders. This illuminated a systemic flouting of human rights laws and conventions within the Israeli military, whereby individual soldiers are treated as ‘rogue’ elements in an otherwise fair system, instead of their culpable superiors being held responsible. Citing the statistic relating to the second intifada, where only 25 charges were filed after 739 complaints that Israel either killed, injured, or used Palestinians as human shields, B’Tselem’s Director Hagai El-Ad stated, this illusory movement allows officials both inside and outside the system to make statements about the importance of the stated goal of enforcing the law on soldiers, while the substantive failures remain as they were and most cases continue to be closed with no measures taken.[7]

[7] The Occupation’s Fig Leaf: Israel’s Military Law Enforcement System as a Whitewash Mechanism | B’Tselem, http://www.btselem.org/publications/summaries/201605_occupations_fig_leaf (last visited Oct 7, 2016).

5 B’Tselem decided to boycott the MAG and urged both Palestinian and Israeli organisations to do the same.[8] B’Tselem’s position can be extended beyond an analysis of cases taken to the MAG, and applied to all levels of Israeli legal authorities. According to B’Tselem, continuing to resort to any level of court implies that the Israeli system is just. B’Tselem acknowledged that engagement in the Israeli legal system does lead to the occasional, small legal “victory”, over time the system favours the State in terms of number of successes.[9] Looking at the system holistically, B’Tselem believes that while some small singular achievements can be made in specific cases, larger systemic losses are inflicted. Over time, legal challenges merely prolong Israel’s occupation. Interviewees had differing opinions about the efficacy of B’Tselem’s decision. They noted that this was merely one organisation that decided to boycott one element of the Israeli system (the MAG) and should not be undertaken across the board.[10] While all interviewees agreed that the Israeli legal system is highly flawed and did not dispute the statistics proffered by B’Tselem, they also disputed whether, particularly in the case of “necessity” cases (e.g. residency revocation, home demolitions, imprisonment) it would be ethical or reasonable to expect Palestinian families to boycott the Israeli system. In their opinion, while legal action has not been able to stop Israel’s occupation, it has managed to make life marginally more bearable for Jerusalem’s Palestinian residents. They noted that, in certain cases, Palestinians continue to need some form of legal representation, even if the effect is to serve as an ‘analgesic’. For example, in the words of one interviewee: “Yes, we are not always successful but we cannot simply leave people without legal representation, no matter how flawed the system is. To do so is to allow Israel to not face any resistance to its policies.” Another interviewee added that, “The government takes notice when we send them letters or file petitions and tones down their approach.” Specifically, this interviewee noted that, when Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu first indicated in October 2015 that the residents of Shufat should have their residency revoked,[11] the NGO HaMoked, immediately responded by writing to relevant authorities to put them on notice that this would be unlawful and challenged in court. Since then, the government has not renewed its call to revoke the residency of Palestinians in Shufat. Interviewees also raised concerns about viable alternatives to litigation or legal representation. While they acknowledged the importance of legal advocacy and, in particular, international litigation, they remained skeptical about how immediate the impact would be (particularly for those individuals, especially

[8] Interview with Hagai El-Ad, B’Tselem. [9] Interview with Hagai El-Ad. [10] Interview with Adalah, HaMoked, JLAC, St. Yves, PCATI, Addameer. [11] Netanyahu Discusses Revoking Residency Status for Palestinians in East Jerusalem - WSJ, http:// www.wsj.com/articles/netanyahu-discusses-revoking-residency-status-for-palestinians-in-east- jerusalem-1445984685 (last visited Oct 7, 2016).

6 children, facing detention, home demolitions, or residency revocation).[12] In addition, interviewees noted that absent a political decision by the PA, combined with a mechanism to address some of these issues without litigation (e.g. what to do in the event of demolitions) a boycott of the Israeli legal system would be ineffective or impossible.[13] For its part, B’Tselem will now concentrate its efforts on advocacy, in an attempt to try to hold Israel accountable internationally. B’Tselem no longer accepting requests to file complaints and have informed the MAG that they will no longer cooperate with them. Existing files have been transferred to other organisations. This debate can be bridged through a number of different mechanisms, namely: (a) intensifying and coordinating on advocacy; (b) working on international litigation; and (c) continuing to highlight both the illegal annexation of Jerusalem and the associated illegal application of Israeli law. This should be complemented by the creation of a record of the results of engaging the Israeli legal system, to demonstrate that domestic remedies are exhausted when pursuing international litigation.

[12] Interview with Adalah, HaMoked, JLAC, St. Yves, PCATI, Addameer [13] Id.

7 C. Legal Assistance Needs As noted above, this legal needs study focuses on those areas affected by either the imposition of discriminatory Israeli law on Palestinians in Jerusalem or the Israeli idea of maintaining a “demographic balance” in Jerusalem.

1. Residency, Family Unification, and Child Registration

Immediately following the start of the occupation, Israel conducted a census[14] in the annexed areas of Jerusalem and only granted ID cards to residents present at the time of the census. Some 65,857 Palestinians were recorded during the census.[15] Residents of the annexed territory who, for a variety of reasons – including fleeing from war – were not there when the census was conducted lost their right to an Israeli identity card. An estimated 30,000 Palestinians were not registered during the census.[16] Those granted identity cards were granted the status of “permanent residents”[17] rather than citizenship, despite the fact that Palestinians did not “immigrate” to Israel but rather Israel imposed itself on them.[18] Since the annexation of East Jerusalem, Israel has invested in preserving what it describes as the “demographic balance”, which means maintaining a Jewish majority of some 70% by reducing the number of Palestinians living in the city. Israel maintains a series of discriminatory policies designed to encourage or force Palestinians to move away from Jerusalem, including revoking Palestinians’ residency status, the implementation of an unfair permit and zoning system, strict limitations on construction, the failure to provide adequate infrastructure and low budget allocations for education and other public services in East Jerusalem. Palestinians living in East Jerusalem are forced to consistently prove that Jerusalem continues to be their ‘centre of life’ or face losing their residency rights, while Israeli citizens are not subjected to the same requirements. Israel also limits the number of family reunification cases and highly regulates the registration of Palestinian children in the Israel population registry to maintain the desired demographic balance.

[14] For a copy of the 1967 census questionnaire, please see: The Levy Economics Institute at Bard College: http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/1967_census/questionnaire.pdf The Levy Institute at Bard College, The 1967 Census of the West Bank and Gaza Strip: [15] The Levy Institute at Bard College, The 1967 Census of the West Bank and Gaza Strip: A Digitized Version, Volume 6, Table 5, found at: http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/1967_census/vol_6_ tab_5.pdf [16] UNCTAD, ‘The Palestinian Economy in East Jerusalem: Enduring Annexation, Isolation and Disintegration’ (p.5) [17] Residency is governed by the Law of Entry to Israel, 6 LSI 159 (1951/52). [18] Palestinians possessing residency status in Jerusalem are not considered residents of the West Bank or Gaza Strip. The Palestinian Authority, since its inception in 1994, took a decision not to provide residency to those Palestinians whose residency is stripped by Israel as it does not want to facilitate or encourage Israel’s revocation.

8 © Ahed Izhiman, UNDP/PAPP image bank

Furthermore, permanent residency status is not automatically transferred through marriage. A Palestinian resident of East Jerusalem who wishes to reside in the city with a spouse from the remainder of the occupied Palestinian territories must apply for family unification. The application process is onerous and has become virtually impossible since 2003, when Israel introduced the Nationality and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Order).[19] Although stated as “temporary,” the law has been renewed yearly. According to data obtained by HaMoked, 12,500 Palestinians hold temporary residency permits (known as A/5 visas) which grant them social security and health benefits, with no guarantee that their children will

[19] Citizenship and Entry into Israel (Temporary Order) Law, 2003, S.H. 544.

9 also receive such benefits. [20] Permanent residency status is also not passed on to the holder’s children ‘by right’, resulting in difficulties in registering the children of such ‘mixed residency status’ marriages. Between 2004 and July 2013, 17,616 “mixed marriage” child registration applications were submitted to the Ministry of Interior. Of these, 12,247 were approved and 3,933 were rejected.[21] This means that almost 4,000 children live in Jerusalem with no legal status. These children have no ability to enroll in school or obtain health care and their parents cannot receive child benefits for them. Unlike citizenship, permanent residency can be revoked, pursuant to the Entry to Israel Regulations 1974. Regulation 11(c) of this law provides that a permanent residency permit expires if the holder leaves Israel and settles in another country. Regulation 11A stipulates that “a person will be considered to have settled in a foreign country if he or she: (1) lived for more than seven years in a foreign country, (2) received the status of permanent resident in a foreign country, or (3) became a citizen of a foreign country.”[22] Yet, the Israeli Supreme Court has consistently whittled away at these criteria, revoking the residency of Palestinians who have not met any of these three criteria.[23] Freedom of information requests have revealed that Israel revoked the residency of 14,500 Palestinians since 1967.[24] The reasons for these revocations fall into two categories: residing outside of Israel and residing in the occupied Palestinian territories. It should be noted that, when Israel revokes the residency of a Palestinian in Jerusalem, the Palestinian Authority does not provide the individual with a Palestinian identity card or passport because the PA does not want to facilitate Israel’s revocation process by allowing for an “alternative” residency.[25] As a result, it is unknown what happens to these individuals once their residency is revoked, although some undoubtedly become legally stateless. The latest breakdown in the data dates back to 2011, but shows that since 1967, 597 of the total revocations were due to relocation to the occupied Palestinian territories. [26] Data obtained by HaMoked reveals that an estimated 9,900 Palestinians live in Israel with only military stay permits given in the framework of family unification

[20] See, HaMoked, Ministry of Interior data reveals: some 12,500 Palestinians live in Israel by virtue of family unification processes; of them, some 80% are without social security rights or status in Israel, found at: http://www.hamoked.org/Document.aspx?dID=Updates1729 [21] Haitham Al-Khateeb, Palestinian Families Under Threat: 10 Years of Family Unification Freeze in Jerusalem 10 (2013). [22] Entry to Israel Regulations, Article 11A. Found at: http://www.hamoked.org/files/2010/regulation%2011a. pdf. [23] See, for example, the case of Fathiya Shiqaqi v. Minister of Interior, H.C. 7023/94 where Ms Shiqaqi had her residency revoked even though she lived in Syria for six years (not seven years) owing to Israel’s deportation (and later assassination) of her husband. [24] See http://www.hamoked.org/files/2016/1160432_eng.pdf. [25] Interview with Hussein Sheikj, PA Minister of Civil Affairs, June 2010. [26] See, B’Tselem, Statistics on Revocation of Residency in East Jerusalem, updated May 2015, found at: http:// www.btselem.org/jerusalem/revocation_statistics

10 processes, without status or social security rights. Of them, 9,573 are West Bank residents and 327 are Gaza Strip residents.[27] The data does not provide a breakdown of the number of these “stay permit” holders living in Jerusalem. Israel continues to impose restrictions on their ability to travel through the airport, obtain a driver’s license, and work in the city. Since 1 August 2016, Israel has demanded that they pay 27 months’ arrears in health insurance payments in order to be eligible to obtain Israeli health insurance with the imposition of this as compulsory for all stay permit holders.[28] HaMoked and St. Yves are currently challenging this new regulation, particularly for the 2,000 Palestinians who will receive temporary permits in March 2017. In recent years, Israeli authorities have begun to revoke permanent residency of Palestinians for political reasons (such as being elected members of the Change and Reform party)[29] or for not being “loyal” to Israel (cases are currently pending for a number of claimants who are accused of carrying out acts of violence and for whom Israel has already instituted measures to revoke their residency).[30] Legal Needs: Several partner organisations (see overview table in Table 2) continue to work on challenging residency revocations, child registration, the imposition of “stay permits,” the new health regulations imposed on those with “stay permits” and conditions imposed on “stay permit” holders. These conditions include restrictions on driving and travelling through the airport. One area of unmet legal need is for those Palestinians whose residency was revoked for residing in the occupied Palestinian territories. To date, it is unclear what their legal status is; whether they have access to health care, whether their social benefits contributions can be returned, or whether they have the ability to travel both within the West Bank and abroad. Given that the main laws affecting residency have reached the highest levels of adjudication within the Israeli system, it is worth examining international litigation options, namely to challenge the residency revocation of Palestinians and to advocate for the annulment of the Nationality and Entry into Israel (Temporary Order) at the ICJ.

[27] Supra note 36. [28] To see the latest petition on this matter, visit: http://www.hamoked.org/Document.aspx?dID=Updates1784 [29] See, B’tselem, 18 July 2010: In dangerous precedent, Israel revokes residency of four Palestinians affiliated with Hamas from East Jerusalem and acts to forcibly transfer them, http://www.btselem.org/ jerusalem/20100718_revocation_of_residency_of_hamas_mps [30] Ilan Lior, Israel Revokes Residency of Four East Jerusalemites Indicted for Terror Attacks. 21 January 2016, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.698790 On January 21, 2016, the Minister of Interior revoked the permanent residency of four young men from East Jerusalem on the grounds of “breach of allegiance to the State of Israel.” These four are suspected of having carried out attacks against Israelis. The decision, which followed the Israeli Security Cabinet’s resolution to adopt punitive measures against Palestinian assailants or suspected assailants, was made despite the fact that criminal proceedings against the four had been underway for several months now. The four, ages 18-24, come from families long-established in Jerusalem. Three of them, from Sur Bahir, have been indicted over a stone-throwing attack in Jerusalem on September 13, 2015, in which one Israeli citizen was killed. The fourth man, from Jabal al Mukabber, has been indicted over an attack on No. 78 Bus in Jerusalem on October 13, 2015, in which three Israeli citizens were killed. See, HCJ 1635/16 - Abu Kaf et al. v. Government of Israel et al. Petition for Order Nisi

11 2. Limited Political Rights

With the 1967 annexation, Israel extended the application of Israeli law to the Arab areas of Jerusalem, and Palestinians living within the municipal boundaries of the city became subject to Israeli law, despite international condemnations to the contrary. The newly expanded East Jerusalem was joined with West Jerusalem, thereby creating the fiction of an “undivided Jerusalem.” In keeping with this “united” city, the twelve-person elected Arab Municipal Council of East Jerusalem was dismissed. Having political representation is a basic democratic right; under international law, Palestinians residing in occupied East Jerusalem have the same legal status as Palestinians in the rest of occupied Palestinian territories and consequently share the same right to self-determination.[31] Israeli measures aimed at annexing or changing the legal status of East Jerusalem or its residents have no legal validity and do not alter this right to self-determination. The right of Palestinian Jerusalemites to vote in national Palestinian elections is provided for in the Oslo Accords and the Road Map[32]. Palestinians are entitled to vote in Israeli local and municipal elections, however Palestinians mostly refuse to vote in Israeli elections and the municipality refuses to allow Palestinian residents of Jerusalem to hold their own elections.[33] Legal Needs: Given that Palestinians have chosen not to participate in Israel’s elections due to the illegality and illegitimacy of Israel’s occupation there may be a need to support Palestinian candidates in Palestinian municipal elections, or to aid in supporting the reopening of Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem, many of which have been closed for more than a decade. Stronger informal representative bodies may also have some scope here to advocate on behalf of Palestinian residents in the interim, while there’s no formal Palestinian representation

3. High Rates of Poverty

In 2015, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated that the Palestinian population in the Jerusalem Governorate (i.e. the pre-1967 East Jerusalem and the surrounding suburbs and villages) to be about 419,108, of whom 260,324 live in Area J1 (the Israeli annexed area) and 158,784 live in Area J2 (the remaining

[31] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 1, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171 (1966). [32] The U.S.-backed ‘road map’ sets a series of benchmarks designed to move the political situation toward the creation of a Palestinian state that exists in peace with Israel. Both the Palestinian and Israeli governments accepted the basic outlines of the plan shortly after it was formally introduced by President Bush in June 2003. However, there has been little progress toward achieving its goal of a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. [33] Elie Rekhess, The Palestinian Political Leadership in East Jerusalem After 1967, in Jerusalem: Idea and Reality 266 to 282, 268 ( Tamar Mayer & Suleiman A. Mourad eds., )..

12 parts of the governorate).[34] The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies has differing statistics, demonstrative of the different methods of measuring Jerusalem’s boundaries, with 313,350 Palestinians listed as living in East Jerusalem, comprising 36.7% of the overall “municipal Jerusalem” population.[35]

The Palestinian population of East Jerusalem is young, with 64 percent of the city’s Palestinian population under the age of 30, notwithstanding an annual growth rate of 1.84 percent in Jerusalem. According to a UNFPA demographic study, the population of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, will grow from 2.9 million to 3.8 million in 2030, which will have wide-reaching and potentially detrimental consequences.[36] Severe neglect of East Jerusalem in budgeting from the Jerusalem Municipality and central Israeli government have resulted in alarming poverty rates and poor social outcomes, particularly for young people. The outcome of significant under-investment is a floundering labour market that does not match the size or capacities of the population, very limited areas for growth, particularly in the productive sectors, and weakened public services, including education and health systems

[34] PCBS, Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook, 2015 Summary [35] Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, Table III/9 - Population of Jerusalem, by Age, Religion and Geographical Spreading, 2014, found at: http://www.jiis.org.il/.upload/yearbook/2016/shnaton_C0916.pdf [36] UNFPA. Palestine 2030. December 2016. Accessible: http://palestine.unfpa.org/sites/arabstates/files/pub- pdf/Palestine%202030%20Booklet%20%282016%29.pdf

13 In recent years, poverty levels in East Jerusalem have increased significantly. In 2006, 64% of Palestinians in Jerusalem lived below the poverty line[37], whereas by 2014 the rate rose to 81.8%, and 86.6% of children.[38] According to the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), “a key reason for this exacerbation is the construction of the Wall which severed Jerusalem from the West Bank, separated neighborhoods and suburbs that had previously been connected and interdependent and even cut off several Jerusalem neighborhoods from other parts of the city. The severing of economic, commercial, religious, familial and touristic ties has worsened the socioeconomic situation and also hindered access to education, health services, religious institutions and more.”[39] The fragmentation of Jerusalem has also had a severe psychological impact on its residents due to their isolation from the rest of Palestine and the resulting loss of identity and sense of community. In 2014, (the most recent data for labour statistics), the workforce participation rate among Palestinian residents of Jerusalem stood at 68% for men and 13% for women aged 15 or over. By contrast, the average rate in Israel was 71% for men and 60% for women.[40] The staggeringly low female labour participation rate (compared to 19% in the rest of Palestine) is a huge barrier to economic growth and stability within Jerusalem. Comparable workforce participation rates as exist in Israel would inject new growth possibilities into the economy. Interventions to help advance potential growth sectors in Jerusalem, including the productive sectors (industry, agriculture, and manufacturing), tourism, and information technology are necessary, particularly those that could provide employment opportunities for women and youth. Despite immense poverty rates, only 5.5% of Palestinian East Jerusalem households are treated by the welfare services,[41] a similar rate to Israeli Jewish residents even though the poverty rate among the Jewish population is less than a third than that of the Palestinian population.[42] Poverty rates among Palestinian Jerusalemites are particularly acute in those areas behind the Wall.[43] In addition, there are only three welfare offices servicing East Jerusalem’s 260,000 Palestinian

[37] Maya Choshen, Michal Korach, Jerusalem: Facts and Trends 2005/2006 34 (2008). [38] Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, Statistical Yearbook 2016, Table VI\1 - Extent of Poverty1 in Israel, Jerusalem and Districts, 2013, 2014, found at: http://www.jiis.org.il/.upload/yearbook/2016/shnaton_ F0116.pdf [39] ACRI, East Jerusalem 2015: Facts and Figures , found at: http://www.acri.org.il/en/wp-content/ uploads/2015/05/EJ-Facts-and-Figures-2015.pdf [40] Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, 2016, Table VII/1 - Population Aged 15 and Over, and Aged 25-64 (Prime Working-Age Group) in Israel and Jerusalem, by Labor Force Characteristics, Population Group and Gender, 2014 found at: http://www.jiis.org.il/.upload/yearbook/2016/ shnaton_G0116.pdf [41] Id. Table Table VI/17 - Families Recipients of Supplementary Income Benefits in Israel, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv - Yafo and Haifa, 2002-2014 found at: http://www.jiis.org.il/.upload/yearbook/2016/shnaton_F1716.pdf [42] ACRI. 2015. “East Jerusalem 2015: Facts and figures.” [43] Interview with WAC-MAAN.

14 residents while 18 welfare offices service West Jerusalem and the settlements’ 500,000 residents.[44] In addition, micro-financing and small business financing opportunities may not be well-known. Palestinians face difficulty both in establishing businesses due to the lack of funding opportunities (eg. many directed to West Bank businesses), barriers to construction and investment, the permit and zoning system, or due to language restrictions.[45] Palestinian businesses often find themselves facing problems with the tax authorities due to these barriers, often leading to bankruptcy. Legal Needs: Palestinians need assistance to overcome employment-related discrimination, including recruitment discrimination, and obtaining income support that is provided for under the National Insurance Institute. The low rate of families receiving income support in comparison to the high rates of poverty is cause for concern. In addition, Palestinians require legal assistance to establish businesses, to understand the Israeli legal business framework and what services are available to assist small business owners to establish their businesses. Moreover, this assistance must be conducted in parallel with advocacy to encourage the Israeli authorities to approve Palestinian building permits in East Jerusalem and access to basic services. Without these interventions it is almost impossible for the Palestinian business environment in East Jerusalem to grow at the necessary rate to sustain the rapidly growing population.

4. Education Shortages

Palestinian students constitute 57.9% of all students in Jerusalem.[46] Due to the tremendous shortage of classrooms in the official municipal education system in East Jerusalem, only 41% of Palestinian students are enrolled in the official system.[47] The numbers are even lower in the secondary education system: for example, while 16,300 children were enrolled in post-primary education (grades 7-9) in 2010/2011 just 12,900 continued to official high schools, representing a

[44] Prof. Yitzhak Reiter, Israel Kimhi, Lior Lehrs, Ahmad Asmar, Mohamed Nakhal and Naser Abu Leil, The Arab Neighborhoods of East Jerusalem 2. [45] Interview with Nasser Faqih, UNDP. [46] According to the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, there are a total of 190,859 students in Jerusalem, 89,600 of whom are Palestinians. See: Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, 2016, Table XII/9 - Classes and Students in the Arab Educational System in Jerusalem1, 1988/89-2014/15§ and http://www.jiis.org.il/. upload/yearbook/2016/shnaton_L1416.pdf Table XII/14 - Schools, Classes, Students and Average Students per Class, in Israel, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv - Yafo and Haifa, 2013/14 http://www.jiis.org.il/.upload/yearbook/2016/shnaton_L0916.pdf [47] 5 Year “Grace-Period” for Education in East Jerusalem has Ended | Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), http://www.acri.org.il/en/2016/02/01/5-year-grace-period-for-education-in-east-jerusalem-has-ended/ (last visited Oct 8, 2016).

15 21% drop out rate.[48] This is due to the sharp decline in the number of classrooms – from 832 classrooms in elementary school to 723 in high school.[49] This is despite the fact that education until the 12th grade is compulsory under both Israeli and Palestinian law. This dropout rate is high compared to the West Bank where only 1.3% of students drop out of school.[50] School dropouts tend to have lower socioeconomic standing in later life, as the early exit from education can drastically limit their economic choices. A significant portion of existing classrooms in the official education system in East Jerusalem are inadequate. According to ACRI, in 2016 “711 inadequate school classrooms and 109 inadequate kindergarten classrooms are in use in East Jerusalem. These classrooms constitute 43% of the total number of classrooms in the official education system in East Jerusalem.”[51] In 2008, ACRI filed a petition to the High Court of Justice concerning the education system in East Jerusalem. In its ruling, dated February 2011, the High Court of Justice determined that the Ministry of Education and Municipality of Jerusalem must act within five years (by 2016) to address the shortage of classrooms in the official education system in East Jerusalem, a shortage that was estimated at a minimum of 1,000 classrooms[52]. For example, Wadi Joz has no public elementary school and A-Tur has no public girls’ high school.[53] Despite the severe shortage and the High Court ruling, as of 2016 the Jerusalem Municipality has constructed 158 new classrooms in East Jerusalem (from 2011- 2014), but still remains nearly 1,000 classes short.[54] In addition, during this period 157 classrooms were rented; approximately half of those, 78 classrooms, were rented in 2014. The shortage was not addressed by the end of 2016. Access to higher education and the recognition of Palestinian degrees are also concerns. Although in April 2014, the court ruled that medical degrees received from Al-Quds University must be recognised, other areas such as nursing, dentistry, pharmacy, social work, and teaching degrees are not yet officially recognised and

[48] 5 Year “Grace-Period” for Education in East Jerusalem has Ended | Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), http://www.acri.org.il/en/2016/02/01/5-year-grace-period-for-education-in-east-jerusalem-has-ended/ (last visited Oct 8, 2016). [49] Id. [50] PCBS, Repetition and Drop-out Rates by Region, Stage and Sex, 2013/2014 http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/ Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/Education2014-07E.htm [51] 5 Year “Grace-Period” for Education in East Jerusalem has Ended | Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), supra note 47. [52] ACRI, ‘An Urgent Lack of Classrooms in East Jerusalem’, found at: http://www.acri.org.il/en/2014/12/04/ classrooms-ej/ [53] Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, ‘The Arab Neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem’ [54] Prof. Yitzhak Reiter, Israel Kimhi, Lior Lehrs, Ahmad Asmar, Mohamed Nakhal and Naser Abu Leil, supra note___.

16 © Ahed Izhiman, UNDP/PAPP image bank

consequently graduates from these faculties cannot, at least officially, work in East Jerusalem.[55] Moreover, Israeli authorities recently announced that they will impose the Israeli curriculum on municipal schools in East Jerusalem and condition budgets for repairing schools on whether these schools adopt the Israeli curriculum.[56] This is extremely detrimental to the Palestinian identity, culture, and sense of nationality, as bringing in the new Israeli textbooks whitewashes Palestinian culture and history from the curriculum in favour of a curriculum underpinned by Israeli ideological messages. Legal Needs: Palestinians will continue to need assistance to challenge the insufficient and inadequate educational system in East Jerusalem. In addition, thought should be given to challenging the imposition of the Israeli curriculum in East Jerusalem and advocate for the recognition of degrees granted by Palestinian universities.

[55] Court tells state to recognise Al-Quds University medical graduates - National - Haaretz.com, http://www. haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.584183 (last visited Oct 8, 2016). [56] Israel to offer East Jerusalem schools renovation bonus - but only if they ditch Palestinian textbooks - Israel News - Haaretz.com, , http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.735527 (last visited Oct 8, 2016).

17 5. Land and Planning Crisis

Discriminatory housing and zoning policies have limited Palestinians’ ability to construct a safe home environment in Jerusalem. The failure of the authorities to conduct adequate planning and development in East Jerusalem has led to a planning crisis, which has manifested in a housing shortage, threats of house demolitions, fines for construction without an Israeli-municipality issued permit, lack of adequate urban development, and an extraordinary lack of infrastructure and public buildings such as schools, roads, and transportation, basic services such as, water and sewage networks, parks and playgrounds. In general, the outline plans that have been devised over the years for the Palestinian neighborhoods do not conform to the planning level that is considered acceptable in West Jerusalem. The rate of construction is low, the area designated for construction in the plans is limited and vast areas are reserved as open landscapes, thereby preventing any construction within them. In addition, since 1967 Israel has expropriated approximately 26,300 dunams (or 35%) of East Jerusalem for the purpose of building Israeli settlements. Israeli settlements throughout East Jerusalem have expanded steadily since 1967, with 201,000 settlers living in 16 settlements and suburbs within the Wall.[57] These Israeli urban residential settlements and industrial zones, spread around the northern, southern, and eastern borders of the municipality as well as within the heart of Palestinian neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem, have transformed the physical landscape and possibilities for urban planning. They wholly exclude the Palestinian population and scarcely reflect their interests: only 13% of the annexed zone area of East Jerusalem is designated for housing for Palestinians as compared to triple that area designated for Israeli settlers.[58] There is broad international consensus that these settlements constitute an illegal population transfer under international law. Even within designated zones, construction in Palestinian neighbourhoods to accommodate the natural growth of a population under pressure is severely hampered by obstructive and complex permit procedures that result in many Palestinians resorting to “illegal building” that often faces subsequent Israeli demolition orders. Approximately 39% of all houses - 20,000 structures in total - in the Palestinian neighborhoods of Jerusalem are constructed illegally as a result of these discriminatory building procedures.[59]

[57] Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, Statistical Yearbook, 2016, Table III/9 - Population of Jerusalem, by Age, Religion and Geographical Spreading, 2014 found at: http://www.jiis.org.il/.upload/yearbook/2016/ shnaton_C0916.pdf [58] OCHA, East Jerusalem: Key Humanitarian Concerns, 2011 ( 2011). [59] East Jerusalem 2015 – Facts and Figures | Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), , http://www.acri.org.il/ en/2015/05/12/ej2015/ (last visited Oct 8, 2016).

18 Building without a permit exposes residents to the danger of demolition orders and even the loss of their home, legal proceedings, heavy fines, and more. For example, from 2001 to 2006, the Jerusalem Municipality Court collected NIS 153,240,833 in fines for ‘illegal’ Palestinian construction.[60] Due to the exorbitant costs imposed on families when the authorities arrive to demolish their houses, in recent years recipients of demolition orders have increasingly decided to demolish their houses themselves. From 2004 until the end of July 2016, Israel demolished an estimated 638 homes, affecting 2,350 Palestinians in Jerusalem, including 1,293 children.[61] Israel partially demolished an additional 690 Palestinian homes from 2004 to 2014.[62] This planning failure also affects the quality of life of Palestinian children. In 2016 the first public playground in East Jerusalem[63] was developed compared to 6,961.5 dunams of parks allocated to West Jerusalem and the settlements.[64] Israeli municipal services are also erratic in parts of East Jerusalem, yet despite this and the high poverty rates outlined above, parts of East Jerusalem are classified as “Zone A” residential areas, requiring residents to pay high property taxes.[65] According to the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, Palestinians paid 37% of the municipal taxes collected in 2015, yet received a far lower percentage of public spending.[66] In other areas, the authority fails to provide adequate parking areas, thereby subjecting residents to constant parking fines.[67] Legal Needs: Lawyers, partners, and other non-partner organisations continue to challenge Israel’s demolitions, the allocation of land to Palestinians, and press for playgrounds, and other green spaces. Lawyers are currently challenging mass parking fines levied in East Jerusalem (particularly during Friday prayer time). While settlements have been challenged in the past, with petitions dismissed, there may be scope for a wide-scale, domestic, and international challenges on the construction of settlements (both in Jerusalem and in the rest of the West Bank). In particular, current investigations carried out by the International Criminal Court may lead to a full scale prosecution of Israel over settlement building in occupied East Jerusalem (and the rest of the occupied Palestinian territories). The

[60] Emily Schaeffer, No Home, No Homeland 37 ( 2011). [61] Statistics on demolition of houses built without permits in East Jerusalem | B’Tselem, , http://www.btselem. org/planning_and_building/east_jerusalem_statistics (last visited Oct 8, 2016). [62] Id. [63] East Jerusalem community inaugurates first ever playground | The Times of Israel, , http://www.timesofisrael. com/east-jerusalem-community-inaugurates-first-ever-playground/ (last visited Oct 8, 2016). [64] Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, Statistical Yearbook, 2016, Table II/8 - Parks and Green Areas Maintained by the Municipality of Jerusalem, 2010-2015 , found at: http://www.jiis.org.il/.upload/yearbook/2016/ shnaton_B0816.pdf [65] Interview with St. Yves [66] Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, Statistical Yearbook, 2016, able XV/20 - Collection of Arnona on Residential Uses1 in Jerusalem, by Quarter and Sub-Quarter2, 2015, found at: http://www.jiis.org.il/.upload/ yearbook/2016/shnaton_O2016.pdf [67] Interview with Civic Coalition

19 success of any future challenge to settlement construction depends on a greater focus on building an international coalition willing to use genuine pressure to halt Israeli settlement construction and to support Palestinian efforts to prosecute Israeli violations of international law. There may also be scope for challenging the classification of Palestinian areas as “Zone A” within the municipality.

6. WASH and Other Services

In East Jerusalem, tens of thousands of residents are living in houses that were built without a permit and/or in neighbourhoods that were inadequately planned. These homes are forced to endure a haphazard and unofficial connection to water and sewage infrastructure. According to the law, a house that was built without a permit may not be connected to the water and sewage network. Only an estimated 64% of households are connected[68] resulting in tens of thousands of residents installing pirate connections, purchasing water tanks, and operating pumps. Poor connectivity and ad hoc solutions to these problems create an unhealthy environment and expose residents, including the ill, disabled, infants, and the elderly, to infections and disease. According to ACRI:

[68] East Jerusalem 2015 – Facts and Figures | Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), supra note___. See also, EU Heads of Mission Report, 2011, para. 56, found at: http://civiccoalition-jerusalem.org/system/files/2011_ eu_homs_east_jerusalem1.pdf

20 The most severe water problem is in the Jerusalem neighborhoods that are located beyond the Wall. In the area of the Shuafat refugee camp and the Jerusalem neighborhoods surrounding it – Ras Khamis, Ras Shehadeh, and Dahiyat A-Salam – there are approximately 80,000 residents, but only about 300 housing units are legally connected to the water network, which extends over approximately 3 kilometers only.[69] In addition to the poor water access, it is estimated that the Jerusalem Municipality allocates between 5 and 13 percent of its annual budget to Palestinian areas in East Jerusalem.[70] This falls far short of the Palestinian percentage of Jerusalem’s population (37%), and does not address the gross income disparities addressed above. Given this low budget allocation, it is hardly surprising that public WASH infrastructure is wholly inadequate for addressing the needs of the local population. Legal Needs: To date, there has not been any consistent effort to challenge the lack of infrastructure. This may be an area for organisations to consider in future.

[69] Id. [70] Emily Schaeffer, supra note 60 at 21.

21 7. The Wall

Israel’s Wall has negatively affected Palestinian communities on both sides, separating Palestinian communities from one another, restricting access to education, health and other vital services, and threatening the residency of Palestinians on both sides. UNCTAD estimates that up to 55,000 Jerusalemites (a fifth of the East Jerusalem Palestinian population) are now physically separated from the city centre as a result of the Wall.[71] PCBS estimates that 2,900 households in the Jerusalem Governorate area have been displaced by the Wall’s construction and 9,100 dunums of land confiscated to build upon.[72] Approximately 18% of the total West Bank land has been confiscated

[71] UNCTAD, The Palestinian Economy in East Jerusalem: Enduring Annexation, Isolation and Disintegration, March 2013, (pp.6-7) [72] PCBS, 2011

22 for the construction of the barrier. The most affected areas include Kafr ‘Aqab, Shu’fat refugee camp, parts of Anata’, Ras Khamis, and A’Sawahira A’Sharqiyeh. Residents of these areas now need to travel through checkpoints (which are often overcrowded, with significant delays in travel time) to access health, education, and other services to which they are entitled as Jerusalem residents. The 55,000 Jerusalemites directly affected by the barrier that cuts through annexed East Jerusalem are required to pay municipal taxes as they still live within the greater Jerusalem Municipality.[73] However, they do not all enjoy access to the same services (such as water, sewage, road maintenance, postal services, and garbage collection). East Jerusalem residents who live on the West Bank side of the Wall also face difficulties in accessing health care as they must pass through checkpoints to reach health-care providers. At the same time, Palestinians with West Bank identity cards living on the “Jerusalem” side of the Wall face a plethora of different problems, including being required to obtain permits to live in their own homes. Due to their physical separation from East Jerusalem, such areas also suffer from a security vacuum and increased lawlessness[74]. The Israeli police rarely enter the municipal areas outside the Wall while the Palestinian Authority does not have security jurisdiction in these localities, leading to growing crime and drug trafficking in these communities.[75] Furthermore, the Wall causes untold psychological damage on residents whose daily lives have been affected, including a loss of cultural identity due to the fragmentation of Palestinian communities. The sense of lawlessness, high rates of crime, violence, and prevalence of drugs also contributes to this. While there have not been efforts to revoke the residency of Palestinians, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently raised the possibility of revoking the residency of Palestinians living beyond the Wall.[76] While the statement was immediately condemned and no action taken, the future possibility remains. Legal Needs: Little legal assistance is being provided to Palestinians situated on the “other” side of the wall. Thought should be given to: (1) Challenging the lack of infrastructure and services (including community safety and security services) for those Palestinians on the “other” side of the Wall; (2) Providing economic support assistance (social security benefits); and (3) Protecting the residency status of Palestinians.

[73] UNCTAD, The Palestinian Economy in East Jerusalem: Enduring Annexation, Isolation and Disintegration, March 2013, (pp.6-7) [74] Graff, Candace (2014), ‘Pockets of Lawlessness in the “Oasis of Justice”’, Jerusalem Quarterly, Issue 58 [75] Ibid. [76] Haaretz (25.10.2015), ‘Netanyahu Mulls Revoking Residency of Palestinians Beyond E. Jerusalem Separation Barrier’, found at: http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.682276

23 8. Violence

Following the recent upsurge in Palestinian protests against Israel’s occupation and, in some cases, violence, Israel has undertaken a number of measures aimed at repressing demonstrations and, in many cases, punishing perpetrators, their extended families, and the community. The measures include: (i) large-scale closures in parts of East Jerusalem; (ii) using lethal force; (iii) imprisoning minors at higher numbers; (iv) punitive demolitions of homes; (v) revocation of residency; (vi) revoking social benefits, including for children; and (vii) refusing to return the bodies of Palestinians killed by Israel to their families. Legal Needs: While all of these needs are currently being addressed, interviewees indicated that there is an inadequate number of lawyers representing children in detention.[77]

[77] Interview with DCI and UNICEF.

24 Table 1: Summary areas of legal need in East Jerusalem

Area Legal needs

Residency, Family Continue challenging: Unification and Child Registration • residency revocations • child registration • health regulations imposed people with “stay permits” • imposition of “stay permits” • conditions imposed on those with “stay permits” (e.g. inability to drive and the inability to travel through the airport). Explore international litigation options to challenge the residency revocation for Palestinians whose residency was revoked for residing in the oPt. given that domestic remedies have been exhausted in the Israeli system. Advocate for the annulment of the Nationality and Entry into Israel (Temporary Order) at the ICJ.

Political rights Support Palestinian candidates in Palestinian municipal elections.

Advocate for economic support assistance (social security benefits Economic rights and income support that is provided for under the National Insurance Institute) for Palestinians on the ‘other’ side of the Wall. Advocate for and support the reopening of Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem, many of which have been closed for more than a decade. Support Palestinian access to employment opportunities, including challenging employment discrimination. Support Palestinians seeking reductions in property taxes and other dues. Continue to challenge Israel’s demolitions, the allocation of land to Palestinians

Access to land / Potential scope for a wide-scale, domestic and international challenge on planning the construction of settlements (both in Jerusalem and in the rest of the West Bank), including at the ICC. Potential scope to challenge the classification of Palestinian areas as “Zone A” within the municipality. Press for playgrounds and other green spaces.

Education Challenge the insufficient and inadequate schools in East Jerusalem. Challenge the imposition of the Israeli curriculum in East Jerusalem.

Explore scope to challenge lack of services provided to Palestinians in East Access to services and Jerusalem. infrastructure Explore scope to challenge lack of infrastructure of Palestinians on the ‘other’ side of the Wall.

Justice for children Increase the volume of assistance being provided to children in detention and challenge Israel’s long-standing policies of child detention and interrogation methods.

25 D. Legal Responses Given the plethora of legal needs, this section outlines some of the existing legal responses to these needs. The purpose of this section is not to address each case or topic but to provide general observations about the legal responses to current challenges.

1. Legal Assistance

Palestinians, for the reasons specified above, regularly require legal assistance to maintain their presence in East Jerusalem and to challenge Israeli actions. According to a 2012 survey commissioned by the Norwegian Refugee Council, 76% of all East Jerusalem households experienced at least one type of housing, land, or property rights violation in the past 12 years. Of these households, 45.2% obtained legal assistance, and 23.5% hired private lawyers.[78] Among UNDP’s partner organisations, there is a wide array of legal assistance available, ranging from legal awareness raising, advocacy, legal advice, legal support and litigation. For example, some organisations engage solely in advocacy, others provide legal advice/services in the form of assisting with documentation required by Israeli authorities (in Hebrew), while others provide a full range of litigation assistance, whether in tribunals, courts, or at the municipal level. This wide definition of legal assistance responds to the wide range of legal problems faced by Palestinians in East Jerusalem, particularly in their interactions with the Israeli authorities. For example, large organisations such as JLAC and St. Yves provide assistance to Palestinians seeking reductions in their property taxes (arnona) and obtaining social benefits from the National Insurance Institute. Without the basic legal assistance provided to Palestinians, the ability of Palestinians to subsist in Jerusalem would likely be diminished. At the same time, other organisations forward the view that seeking redress from the Israeli authorities simply perpetuates the “myth” that Palestinians can obtain justice from the Israeli legal system or authorities; these organisations instead focus on advocacy to overturn discriminatory laws and policies. Not only is a broad range of legal assistance available, there is also some significant overlap between various organisations. For example, several organisations work on addressing residency revocation, obtaining national insurance benefits and applying for reductions in property tax.

[78] Alsahel “Legal Coverage Assessment of the West Bank including Area C and East Jerusalem” at 19 (2012) (on file with author).

26 © Ahed Izhiman, UNDP/PAPP image bank

Legal support for Palestinians in Jerusalem is a niche area that requires a specialised skill set (legal, social and linguistic). However, there is little legal education for law students - whether continuing legal education or in law schools – on issues relating to challenges faced by Palestinians. While one of UNDP’s partners, the Al-Quds Human Rights Clinic, provides some practical training for students, such education is confined to a limited number of Al-Quds University students.[79]

2. More individual cases than public interest cases

Further to the point listed above, organisations are primarily focused on addressing individual cases, needs, or complaints in domestic Israeli courts rather than cases involving a number of individuals, a community, or the population as a whole. Moreover, as of writing, no cases are currently active in international fora or courts. The majority of individual cases could be considered “necessity” or “survival” cases, such as social benefits or health insurance payout cases and demolition or residency revocation cases. There are, however, a few collective rights or public interest cases being taken up by Adalah, the Civic Coalition, the Norwegian Refugee Council, and HaMoked, including demanding the return of the bodies of Palestinians killed by Israel or obtaining social benefits for West Bank Palestinians living in Jerusalem.

[79] Interview with Munir Nusseibeh.

27 © Ahed Izhiman, UNDP/PAPP image bank

Respondents noted the following factors as reasons for the limited number of collective cases. a. Domestic remedies Partner organisations noted that, after nearly 50 years of military occupation, most of the challenges to Israel’s discriminatory laws have already been exhausted. While they noted that there are new laws in place, the majority of the laws affecting Palestinians in East Jerusalem have been subjected to legal challenges, leaving little room for collective challenges. As a result, lawyers work to “widen the gaps” in existing laws to create better opportunities for existing cases and set a precedent for future cases. b. Inadequate funding structure for public interest cases Partner organisations noted that their current funding structures are not stable enough to sustain a public interest case. By their nature, public interest cases take a long time to pursue and are unpredictable in terms of cost, duration, and outcome in comparison to individual cases. Organisations are granted funds either on a temporary basis or for projects with little or no core funding. As a result, organisations are hesitant to pursue public interest cases, fearing that: (i) they will not have the requisite funds to sustain the case; (ii) that the case may not align with the funded project; (iii) the case is unforeseeable under existing funding arrangements; and, (iv) donors press for quantitative results.

28 c. Public interest cases not usually within mandate A few organisations noted that even without the restrictions noted above, they do not pursue public interest cases because they fall outside ‘core business’ or the mandate of the organisation. Despite these reservations and restrictions, there is currently some discussion underway about pursuing public interest cases in relation to a number of issues.[80] For their part, partner organisations indicated that while many of them would like to see international litigation take place, they indicated that they are currently limited, both in terms of funding, staffing, and expertise in undertaking such litigation efforts. Respondents noted that such litigation efforts require financial backing and support. For their part, donors varied in their responses to supporting international litigation, with some more supportive than others. The “base line” of consensus for donor support for international litigation is centered on two principles: (1) whether the issue salvages the “two-state” solution; and, (2) whether the litigation is not intended to “punish” rather to offer clarity. When pressed further, some donors indicated that they could be supportive of another ICJ case centered on challenging the legality of settlements or on addressing residency.[81]

3. Advocacy efforts differ across organisations

Partner organisations undertake varying degrees of advocacy to supplement the legal assistance they are currently providing. Advocacy is generally geared to two main audiences: local Palestinian audiences (in the form of awareness-raising), and an international audience. For the most part, partner organisations tend not to undertake advocacy aimed at an Israeli audience, with a few exceptions, such as B’Tselem. Instead, organisations indicated that they get more traction by advocating internationally, with the international advocacy affecting domestic practices.[82] Partner organisations indicated that they have, in the past, had to walk a fine line between appearing to support the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement and obtaining donor support. Other organisations indicated that they are frequently subjected to scrutiny[83] that monitor their activities, particularly

[80] Interviewees noted that they are considering pursuing cases relating to: (i) the classification of Beit Hanina as a “Class A” area for property tax purposes; (ii) the lack of municipal services to Kufr Aqab; (iii) the demand by the National Insurance Institute that Palestinians who were recently granted Jerusalem IDs as a result of family unification, must pay 27 months in “arrears” in order to obtain health benefits; (iv) the parking fines issued in areas of East Jerusalem and (v) planning within East Jerusalem. [81] Interview with members of the donor community [82] Interview with B’Tselem, Al-Quds Clinic, Civic Coalition, Adalah. [83] NGO Monitor is a foreign NGO (operating with Israeli support), that aims to challenge and ultimately end the funds that donors provide assistance to support Palestinian human rights and good governance organisations.

29 their advocacy activities. While virtually all partner organisations indicated that they would like to increase their advocacy efforts, organisations also indicated that they confront numerous barriers to increased advocacy efforts, namely restrictions placed upon them by donors and others. Organisations indicated that they receive conflicting suggestions with regards to advocacy with some donors pressing for increased advocacy some years, less or “low profile” advocacy the following years, or with restrictions based on the type of advocacy and messaging that should undertake. For their part, donors indicated that, while they would like to see increased advocacy, from their perspective increased advocacy cannot cross certain “red lines” such as advocating for BDS. Other donors indicated that advocacy efforts cannot be seen as “punishing” Israel but instead pressing others for political action.[84]

[84] Interview with select donors.

30 4. Lack of political support to legal efforts

As noted above, the current focus of legal assistance tends to be in the form of individual cases, with few public interest cases filed. In addition to the reasons listed above, organisations indicated that they are generally operating in a political strategy vacuum, with little support provided to them to undertake their legal advocacy. This criticism was directed both towards donors and the Palestinian Authority. For example, on the issue of use of the Israeli legal system, interviewees indicated that they could not pursue a boycott of the Israeli legal system without a simultaneous decision taken by the Palestinian government and its factions. One interviewee noted that such a boycott had been undertaken in the military court system in the past but was not sustainable without the complete support of the Palestinian government, Palestinian political factions, and detained Palestinians. Similarly, interviewees noted that they would not be able to undertake a boycott of the Israeli legal system in the case of home demolitions or evictions (or other “necessity” cases) without the backing of the Palestinian government. There is a perception of lack of support, applied to boycotts and to existing legal cases. Interviewees noted that the Palestinian government needs to further support post-demolition situations and ongoing litigation. In addition to the perceived limited intervention or support by the Palestinian Authority, respondents noted that they do not obtain the necessary international support to carry out or sustain legal action. . Given this environment, respondents noted that while they obtain quiet support from members of the international community, they also indicate that without sustained and public international support, none of the alternative legal strategies (e.g. abstaining from resorting to the Israeli courts or increased advocacy) can be carried out effectively. In some cases, international support is needed in order to sustain existing legal action. For example, with regard to certain types of cases, namely evictions and demolitions, much of the strategy has focused on “buying time” as all other legal avenues have been exhausted. “Buying time” effectively means delaying the course of Israeli action, with the hope that either the political process will address these issues or that external pressure will be brought to bear upon Israel. This is evidently not a sustainable strategy. In other words, respondents noted that there cannot be a change in their strategies unless and until there is a change in approach by those supporting these organisations.

31 E. Gaps in Legal Assistance Legal assistance appears to be wide-ranging and extensive with organisations, both within UNDP partner organisations or other organisations, supporting Palestinians facing a variety of legal obstacles. Table 2 below lists legal assistance provided by topic and organisation.

32 Table 2: Areas of Legal Assistance by Topic

Legal Category Issue Organisation

Residency revocation St. Yves, JLAC, HaMoked

Child registration St. Yves, JLAC, HaMoked 1. Residency Residency revocation for “loyalty” reasons Adalah

Health insurance benefits and family HaMoked unification applications

2. Political Rights (politically sensitive) none

Health insurance revocation St. Yves, Al Maqdese

Social insurance benefits applications St. Yves, Al Maqdese Poverty and 3 Social Benefits Social insurance revocations for political Adalah purposes

Unemployment insurance benefits WAC-MAAN

Property tax reduction applications JLAC, St. Yves, Al Maqdese Planning and 4. taxation Land classification and planning Bimkom

Lack of classrooms ACRI 5. Education Imposition of Israeli curriculum ACRI

Home demolitions for administrative PA governorate lawyers and NRC reasons

Evictions PA governorate lawyers

Absentee property declarations NRC

6 Property rights Excavations (Silwan) PA governorate lawyers and NRC

Home demolitions for punitive reasons HaMoked

Settlement expansion Bimkom (limited efforts)

NRC (limited), PA governorate Settler takeovers of Palestinian homes lawyers

33 Legal Category Issue Organisation

Extension of water and sewage Unknown

7. Services Extension of postal services Unknown

Extension of health services Unknown

None, though HaMoked sent a letter to the Israeli government Revocation of residency for those behind following its announcement Wall that it would undertake such revocations

Lack of municipal services for those Al-Maqdese and JLAC (for Wall-related behind the Wall garbage collection only) 8. issues Security vacuum in areas behind the Wall -

Lack of infrastructure services for those - behind the Wall

Residency status for non-Jerusalem ID HaMoked holders living in “Jerusalem” side of Wall

Imposition of closures HaMoked, St. Yves

Use of force Unknown

Torture and interrogation DCI, PCATI

9. Violence Refusing to return bodies Adalah, HaMoked

Punitive demolitions HaMoked

Residency revocation HaMoked, Adalah

Revoking social benefits Adalah

Closure of 10. Jerusalem Gap Institution

B’Tselem, Badil, Grassroots 11. Advocacy Jerusalem, Civic Coalition

Divorce, Custody arrangements and enforcement 12. Custody and WCLAC of judgments across WB to EJ Shari’a Courts

34 F. Recommendations and Conclusions This section outlines recommendations to the donors, NGOs, and the Palestinian Authority.

To the donors and international organisations Following 50 years of occupation and with continued legal challenges brought before Israeli courts, it is easy to overlook the fact that Jerusalem remains occupied and that the annexation of East Jerusalem is illegal. Yet, while some legal challenges bring minor relief, overall the city remains illegally annexed with no major gains, and the international community’s position should reflect this. In other words, donors should welcome and encourage partner organisations to challenge Israeli action, rather than solely resorting to the Israeli court system that simply (a) bolsters the false claim that Jerusalem is legally annexed (b) fails to provide redress and (c) legitimates the use of the courts. While partner organisations, undoubtedly, must continue to resort to these domestic courts, they should not be the sole option for redress. As legal avenues for success are increasingly limited, organisations should be encouraged to pursue increased advocacy efforts to highlight the particular complexities of the legal system for Palestinians in Jerusalem and to highlight how these “survival” or “necessity” issues are impacting Palestinian life. Advocacy efforts should be focused on encouraging policy change by international actors. In addition to increasing advocacy efforts, partner organisations may want to consider forming a consortium to focus on combined and/or complementary advocacy efforts and to focus on addressing barriers to effective advocacy (such as responding to organisations such as NGO Monitor). International organisations and donors need to be careful not to push cooperation between organisations where there is no commonality of positions or organisational goals.

To the partner organisations: The creation of a Legal Coordination Committee is recommended. The Legal Task Force, co-chaired by the Norwegian Refugee Council and St Yves, serves as a forum for various legal NGOs to share information on their work. This is complemented by regular discussions between NGOs regarding legal petitions. The work of the Legal Task Force work could be improved by creating a legal coordination committee to better strategise on cases in East Jerusalem. Such a legal coordination committee should include representatives from NGOs, PA representatives or lawyers, Palestinian academics, political figures, and private lawyers working on certain types of cases that may impact on the work of other lawyers (for example, residency, demolitions, and evictions but not confined to these areas).

35 During consultations, NGOs indicated that they are often searching for political guidance on legal cases or that the precedents set by private lawyers affect their work. Coordinating legal efforts to include the PA and provide political guidance will help to ensure the PA’s presence in Jerusalem while also ensuring that partner organisations are working within a political framework. In addition to such a committee it is important to examine mechanisms for sharing consistent data and information across organisations. There is a need to increase legal awareness and education efforts. A number of partner organisations have begun to work on translating Israeli laws into Arabic and to provide online information on various issues affecting residents of East Jerusalem. These legal awareness efforts should be complemented by legal education efforts to increase the demand for quality of legal representation. This may be done through continuing legal education programs, workshops, public information and media campaigns or by reaching out to new legal graduates or students to educate them on some of the legal areas faced by Palestinians.

36 To the Palestinian Authority: There is scope for greater involvement of the Palestinian Authority in East Jerusalem. The Palestinian Authority is not allowed to operate in East Jerusalem, however East Jerusalem is an integral part of the future Palestinian state. While there are a number of different PA bodies devoted to addressing Jerusalem, these bodies overlap in their approach (focused on economy, for example) and are not heavily focused on providing legal assistance. Partner organisations indicated that while they have signed MoUs with the PA, they do not receive many referrals from them. The PA’s legal assistance efforts are primarily focused on supporting individuals who are facing demolitions and not on other areas of need (e.g. residency revocations, child registration and arnona reduction for example). The lack of PA presence in Jerusalem is compounded by the Israeli closure of Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem such as Orient House. In addition, existing PA institutions, such as the Ministry of Justice, do not have any staff working on issues relating to East Jerusalem.

37 ANNEXES

38 ANNEX I: Interviews

Interviewee Date EU Representative, Simona Gallotta and staff 26 July 2016 Diplomat 26 July 2016 Adalah, 26 July 2016 WCLAC, Randa Siniora and staff 2 August 2016 Al Maqdese, Moaz Zaatari 2 August 2016 George Bisharat, Professor UC Hastings 2 August 2016 Amb. Maen Areikat, PLO Ambassador to US 2 August 2016 JLAC, Rami al-Saleh 3 August 2016 BIMKOM, Ma’ayan Turner and staff 3 August 2016 PCATI 8 August 2016 DCI/Palestine 9 August 2016 HaMoked 9 August 2016 PASSIA, Mahdi Abdul Hadi 10 August 2016 Diplomat 10 August 2016 Nur Arafeh, al-Shabaka 10 August 2016 Diakonia 11 August 2016 B’Tselem, Hagai El-Ad 28 August 2016 Addameer, Sahar Francis 28 August 2016 NRC 30 August 2016 Charles Shammas 5 September 2016 Lea Tsemel 5 September 2016 St. Yves 14 September 2016 WAC-MAAN 15 September 2016 LTF Meeting 26 September 2016 OCHA 28 September 2016 UN Women 30 September 2016 CAC – Al Quds University 4 October 2016 Amira Hass 4 October 2016 Quartet 4 October 2016 Civic Coalition 5 October 2016 UNICEF 11 October 2016 Diplomat 11 October 2016 Diplomat 11 October 2016 UNSCO 1 November 2016

39 ANNEX II: Legal Framework

1. Occupation of East Jerusalem

In order to understand the legal needs of Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem, it is first necessary to describe the legal and political environment in which Palestinians reside. Following Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967, Israel immediately annexed more than 71 square kilometres of Palestinian West Bank land to Jerusalem and expanded Israeli-controlled Jerusalem’s city limits to include these illegally annexed portions. Moshe Dayan, then Israeli Defence Minister, proclaimed, [t]he Israeli Defence Forces have liberated Jerusalem. We have reunited the torn city, the capital of Israel… [and vow] never to part from it again.[85] Twenty-two days later, on June 27, 1967, the Israeli government passed the Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) Law, which provided for the extension of Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration to the newly occupied Arab East Jerusalem. The annexation brought 30 Palestinian villages and a refugee camp into Israel’s municipal jurisdiction. With the annexation, Israel extended the application of Israeli law to the area and Palestinians living within the municipal boundaries of the city became subject to Israeli law, despite international condemnation.[86] Under Israeli law, the newly expanded East Jerusalem was joined with West Jerusalem, thereby creating the legal fiction of an “undivided Jerusalem.” In keeping with this concept of a “united” city, the twelve- person elected Arab Municipal Council of East Jerusalem was dismissed. Since then, the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem have remained unrepresented in municipal councils, as they mostly refuse to vote in Israeli municipal elections and the municipality refuses to allow Palestinian residents of Jerusalem to hold their own elections.[87] While the United Nations Security Council[88] and General Assembly[89] have repeatedly condemned Israel’s actions and, in numerous resolutions, have

[85] Facts on File, Vol. XXVII, June 7, 1967. [86] See, United Nations Security Council Resolution, S/Res/252 (1968), 21 May 1968, (Canada and USA abstaining), S/Res/267 (1969), 3 July 1969, (adopted unanimously). [87] Elie Rekhess, The Palestinian Political Leadership in East Jerusalem After 1967, in Jerusalem: Idea and Reality 266 to 282, 268 (Tamar Mayer & Suleiman A. Mourad eds). [88] See generally’ S.C. Res. 267, U.N. SCOR, 24th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/24/Rev. 1 (1969); S.C. Res. 298, U.N. SCOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/10338/Rev.I (1971); S.C. Res. 478, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/14113 (1980). Recently, see S.C Res. 2334 (2016) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7853rd meeting, on 23 December 2016. [89] See generally, G.A. Res. 35/169E, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/35/L.42/Rev.1 (1980); G.A. Res. 41/162C, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/41/L.45, addendum pt. 1 (1986); G.A. Res. 49/36B, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/49/49 (1995); G.A. Res. ES-10, U.N. GAOR, 10th Emer. Sess., U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/L.5/Rev.I (1999).

40 denounced Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem as contrary to international law (in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention), Israeli authorities continue to implement policies designed to integrate occupied East Jerusalem with West Jerusalem. In Resolution 2253 (ES-V) of July 4, 1967, the General Assembly declared all “measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City” to be “invalid.” Furthermore, in Resolution 252 of May 21, 1968, the Security Council proclaimed that “all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel ...which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that status.” Despite these clear expressions of international opposition, Israeli authorities continue to implement policies designed to subsume occupied East Jerusalem into Jewish West Jerusalem, remaining unequivocal that this process “was irreversible and not negotiable.”[90] The passing of Israel’s Basic Law on Jerusalem on July 30, 1980[91] continued this agenda. According to this law, Jerusalem was declared the “eternal” capital of the State of Israel. While the UN Security Council condemned the law and reaffirmed the inadmissibility of this acquisition of territory by force, Israel has continued to pursue policies designed to permanently change the spatial and cultural landscape of Jerusalem including forcing Palestinian migration from the city. Since its unilateral annexation, Israel has invested great effort in preserving what it euphemistically calls the “demographic balance” in Jerusalem, which means reducing the number of Palestinians living in the city and maintaining a Jewish majority of some 70%, although the numbers and figures have varied over the years.[92] Residents of East Jerusalem struggle for their right to continue living in the place where they were born and where their families have lived for generations. Many have been forced to leave the city due to Israel’s ongoing policy which includes: the revocation of residency status; unfair and complex permit and zoning system; strict limitations on construction; the failure to provide adequate infrastructure; low budget allocations for education; and high property taxes. In tandem, the Jerusalem authority only allocates approximately 10% of its budget to East Jerusalem, with the remainder going to West Jerusalem.[93]

2. Legal System in East Jerusalem

Given that Israel occupies East Jerusalem, international humanitarian law (IHL), in particular, the Fourth Geneva Convention, is applicable. Under IHL, there is no difference between the legal status of East Jerusalem and the remainder of the

[90] See, The Status of Jerusalem, U.N. Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, at 25 (1997). [91] Basic Law: Jerusalem, The Capital of Israel, 1980, 34 L.S.I. 209 [92] Menachem Klein, The Jerusalem Problem: The Struggle for Permanent Status 19. Klein notes that by the mid-1990s, this ratio was changed from 75:25 devised in 1975 and serves as the benchmark for Israel’s planning authorities. [93] Thrall, N. 2014. Rage in Jerusalem. London Review of Books. Available at: .

41 West Bank or the Gaza Strip: all are occupied territory under international law. Israel, having ratified the Fourth Geneva Convention, is duty-bound to respect and ensure the rights of Jerusalem’s population as “protected persons”[94] and is required to respect the existing laws in force, even in the case of annexation. Pursuant to the Hague Regulations of 1907, Israel, the occupier, is allowed to derogate from some of its obligations but only insofar as absolutely necessary to ensure the occupier’s ability to carry out its obligations towards the occupied Palestinian population on one side, and to preserve the safety of its troops and satisfy its security needs on the other.[95] Moreover, Israel as the Occupying Power is obliged to respect the laws in force in the occupied territory as long as they are not “absolutely prevented” from so doing.[96] Yet, despite these provisions, upon annexation Israel immediately began extending Israeli law to the annexed areas, thereby forcing Palestinians to come within the ambit of the Israeli legal system and under Israeli laws. It rejected the application of international humanitarian law to the occupied Palestinian territory, adopting the viewpoint (now summarily dismissed by the International Court of Justice) that the occupied Palestinian territory was not occupied.[97] At the same time, the Israeli government declared that it would abide by the humanitarian but not political portions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, without specifying what it views as ‘humanitarian’ or ‘political’.[98] Although Israel denies the application of international humanitarian law to the occupied Palestinian territory, this view is neither shared by the international community[99] nor by the International Court

[94] Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949., 47,https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/6756482d86146898c125641e 004aa3c5. Article 47 provides: Art. 47. Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory. [95] Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907., Regulation 43, http://www.icrc.org/applic/ ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=4D47F92DF3966A7EC12563CD002D6788&action=openDocument (last visited Apr 14, 2014). Obviously, Israel cannot derogate from customary international law obligations such as the illegality of use of torture. [96] Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations provides: The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. [97] Yehuda S. Blum, “The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria”, 3 Isr. Law Rev. 279–301. [98] M. Shamgar, “Legal Concepts and Problems of the Israeli Military Government - The Initial Stage”, in Shamgar, ed., Military Government in the Territories Administered by Israel1967- 1980 (Jerusalem, 1982) 13-60, at 32, 42 and 48. [99] UNSCR 681, 20 December 1990, UNSCR 799, 18 December 1992 and UNSCR 904, 18 March 1994.

42 of Justice.[100] Moreover, the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention also constitute customary international law, making them applicable even when their treaty application is challenged. It is also important to note that under Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, unilateral annexation – whereby the Occupying Power acquires all or part of a territory and incorporates it into its own territory without an authorising peace agreement (or another valid form of acquisition of title over territory) – cannot deprive protected persons from the protections offered by international humanitarian law.[101] In other words, there is international consensus that East Jerusalem is, and remains, under Israel’s control and that the annexation of Jerusalem is illegal. This consensus is expressed in State practice, in international resolutions and by the International Court of Justice. It therefore flows that the application of Israeli law to this territory is also illegal. Despite these clear pronouncements, Israel continues to apply and enforce its own laws in East Jerusalem. As a result of Israel’s continued military occupation, Palestinians in Jerusalem are subjected to a multiplicity of justice systems, both formal and informal, including the following: (i) international humanitarian law; (ii) Israeli law; (iii) Shari’a law for personal status issues; (iv) informal dispute resolution mechanisms; and (v) informal political leadership, in place of the formal Palestinian political leadership. The application of Israeli law (much of which is discriminatory towards Palestinians), and the “demographic balance” that Israel hopes to achieve in Jerusalem, create a situation for Palestinians in Jerusalem in which they are forced to maneuver such laws and systems, in a perpetual struggle to remain in their homes, with limited options available to meet their legal needs.

[100] International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004, para. 101. [101] SASSOLI, Marco& Antoine BOUVIER, How does Law Protect in War? Cases, Documents and Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, Geneva (1999), p. 155.

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