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Book Review: on Self-Determination, Statehood, and the Law of Negotiation: the Case of Palestine by Robert P

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Book Review: on Self-Determination, Statehood, and the Law of Negotiation: the Case of Palestine by Robert P Palestine the palestine Yearbook of Yearbook of international law 20 (2019) 191–196 International Law Book Review: On Self-Determination, Statehood, and the Law of Negotiation: The Case of Palestine by Robert P. Barnidge, Jr. Diana Buttu* This year marks the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Principles, launching the negotiations process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and culminating in the signing of several interim agreements between Israel and the PLO, collectively dubbed the Oslo Agreements after the name of the capital in which Israeli security officials and PLO members secretly met. The thousands of pages of these agreements1 signed between 1993 and 2000, had, at their core, a few main prin- ciples: (i) Palestinian recognition of Israel; (ii) Israeli redeployment from parts * Diana Buttu is a Palestinian-Canadian lawyer who served as a legal advisor to the Palestinian negotiating team from 2000–2005. 1 These agreements include the following: – 1993: Israel-PLO Letters of Recognition. In these letters, the PLO affirms that it: (i) rec- ognizes Israel’s right to exist in peace and security; (ii) accepts UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338; (iii) agrees to engage in negotiations with Israel; (iv) renounces terrorism and (v) agrees to amend the Palestinian National Covenant. Israel, in exchange, recognizes the PLO and agrees to commence negotiations. See: http://unispal.un.org/ UNISPAL.NSF/0/36917473237100E285257028006C0BC5. – 1993: Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (“DOP”). This Agreement outlines the permanent status issues to be negotiated: Jerusalem, borders, set- tlements, water, security and refugees. The DOP spells out that the “transitional period” is to last no more than 5 years and lead to the implementation of UN Resolutions 242 and 338. The DOP also calls for elections and outlines the first redeployment. See: http://avalon.law .yale.edu/20th_century/isrplo.asp. – 1994: Gaza-Jericho Agreement. This Agreement outlines the limited powers and re- sponsibilities of the Palestinian Authority and specifies the redeployment of the Israeli army from parts of Gaza and Jericho city. It also launches the start of the five-year tran- sitional period and the transfer of limited power to the Palestinian Authority. Part of this Agreement includes the Paris Protocol on Economic relations which integrates the Palestinian economy into that of Israel. See: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ transfer_powers.asp. – 1995: The Interim Agreement: This agreement was superseded by the Oslo II Accord, ex- cept for Article XX (Confidence-Building Measures). Article XX dictated the release or © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/22116141_020010009 192 Buttu of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the concomitant division of the West Bank into Areas A, B and C, (iii) the establishment of the Palestinian Authority to govern Palestinians in those areas, while simultaneously entrenching secu- rity collaboration with Israel to ensure that Palestinians would not carry out armed attacks against Israeli civilians, settlers and even soldiers; and (iv) the entrenchment of the “two state” framework, with negotiations as the means of ending Israel’s military rule. In addition to the stated principles of these Agreements, the Oslo Agreements also had side effects – intended by Israel – namely the rapid pace of settlement expansion. Due primarily to massive Israeli government sub- sidies, the total Jewish settler population nearly doubled from 1993 to 2000, increasing from 210,000 to 380,000 including East Jerusalem and the number of housing units rose by 50 percent (excluding East Jerusalem). During these “peace process” years, settler activity proceeded at a faster pace than under any other period that preceded it. Today, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics re- ports that there are 610,000 settlers in the West Bank including East Jerusalem, nearly tripling the settler population. The starkest rise in settlement growth was in the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, which witnessed a rise in the settler population from 52,000 in 1993 to over 399,000 at the end of 2016. Illegal under international law and built on land illegally seized from Palestinians, these settlements now control nearly 60 percent of the land surface of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.2 Alongside the scarring of Palestine’s landscape and its political decision- making, the Oslo process ushered in new language – a language that persists today. For example, the word “anti-imperialism” was replaced with “conflict” requiring “logframes”; the word “Palestine” replaced with the oddly-phrased and awkwardly capitalized “occupied Palestinian territory”; and, for the pur- poses of this book, the words “revolution” and “liberation” were replaced with the term “negotiations.” In addition to changing terminology, “negotiations” for some became a “way of life” (for example as outlined in Saeb Erekat’s book Life is Negotiations), with Palestinian leaders such as Mahmoud Abbas, Saeb Erekat, Nabil Sha’ath and others viewing negotiations as “sacred.” So entrenched have negotiations become in the psyche of the above-mentioned individuals (and others not named) that talk of negotiations by the current Palestinian leadership persists, turn over of Palestinian detainees and prisoners by Israel. The Paris Protocol was incorpo- rated in Article XXIV of Oslo II. 2 See OCHA, Humanitarian Factsheet on Area C of the West Bank (July 2011), https://www .ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_area_c_fact_sheet_july_2011.pdf..
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