MASARYK UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES Department of International Relations and European Studies
Comparison of Czech and Austrian Foreign Policies and their Politics towards South Asia Diploma Thesis Bc. David Minařík
Supervisor: PhDr. Břetislav Dančák, PhD. UČO: 74920 Field: MVES Matriculation year: 2006 Brno, 2008
I hereby profess that I have written the diploma thesis Comparison of Czech and Austrian Foreign Policies and their Politics towards South Asia alone, using only the literature and resources given in the list. Bc. David Minařík
On this place I would like to thank the supervisor of my diploma thesis PhDr. Břetislav Dančák, PhD. for his advice and guidance during my work. I would like to thank as well Univ. Prof. Ottmar Höll for his advice during my research stay at the University of Vienna and to the Czech Embassy in New Delhi for providing me with the opportunity of a research internship there and all the employees there for sharing their knowledge with me. Last but not least, I want to thank Andrea Ruthardt for her advice and support.
Abstract: Diploma thesis “Comparison of Austrian and Czech Foreign Policies and their Politics towards South Asia” first examines general principles and fundaments of Czech and Austrian foreign policy, identifies and analyzes main aspects of foreign policies of both countries – the historic developments, political, economic and security aspects, position in the international organizations, promotion of human rights and provided development cooperation. The comparison of these aspects is not just the first task of the thesis but also together with overview of basic developments in South Asia and of the role of the EU in this region provides broader frame for analysis and comparison of the foreign policies of both countries towards South Asia. Comparing Czech and Austrian politics towards South Asia the author works with the same aspects of the foreign policy as in the general part and identifies common things and differences in the attitudes of both countries and the reasons for it. Anotace: Diplomová práce „Srovnání české a rakouské zahraniční politiky obecně a vůči jižní Asii“ nejdříve zkoumá obecné principy a východiska české a rakuské zahraniční politiky. Identifikuje a analyzuje hlavní aspekty zahraniční politiky obou zemí – z hlediska historického vývoje, politických, ekonomických a bezpečnostních aspektů, pozice v mezinárodních organizacích, podpory lidských práv a poskytované rozvojové spolupráce. Srovnání těchto aspektů slouží jako první ze dvou cílů práce a zároveň, spolu s nastíněním základních vývojů v jižní Asii a role Evropské Unie v tomto regionu, poskytuje širší rámec pro analýzu a srovnání zahraniční politiky obou zemí vůči jižní Asii. Při srovnání politik ČR a Rakouska vůči jižní Asii autor pracuje se stejnými aspekty zahraniční politiky jako v obecné části a snaží se identifikovat shody a rozdílnosti v přístupech obou zemí a důvody, proč tomu tak je. TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...... 1
1 CZECH AND AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICIES ...... 6
1.1 CZECH FOREIGN POLICY ...... 6 1.1.1 Foreign policy developments after the 1989 revolution ...... 6 1.1.1.1 Czechoslovakia after the revolution ...... 7 1.1.1.2 Czech Republic´s “early years” the right centre governments ...... 10 1.1.1.3 Foreign policy under the Social democracy lead governments ...... 13 1.1.1.4 The developments after 2006 – ODS lead governments ...... 16 1.1.2 Ideological and political fundaments of Czech foreign policy ...... 17 1.1.2.1 Legacy of eastern block relations ...... 20 1.1.3 Political and economic position in the world ...... 21 1.1.3.1 Czech Republic and EU ...... 22 1.1.3.2 Czech Republic in other international organizations ...... 23 1.1.4 Czech security position ...... 25 1.1.5 Human rights ...... 26 1.1.6 Development aid ...... 28
1.2 AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICY ...... 31 1.2.1 Foreign policy developments of the Second Austrian Republic ...... 31 1.2.1.1 Journey to the state sovereignty ...... 31 1.2.1.2 Second Republic’s early years ...... 33 1.2.1.3 Austrian foreign policy emancipation ...... 34 1.2.1.4 The decline of Austrian world activism 1980s ...... 36 1.2.1.5 Foreign policy in the 1990s ...... 38 1.2.1.6 Foreign policy after 2000 ...... 41 1.2.1.7 The developments since 2007 ...... 42 1.2.2 Ideological and political fundaments of Austrian foreign policy ...... 43 1.2.3 Political and economic position in the world ...... 45 1.2.3.1 Austria and the EU ...... 46 1.2.3.2 Austria in other international organizations ...... 49 1.2.4 Austrian security position ...... 50 1.2.5 Human rights ...... 52 1.2.6 Development aid ...... 54
1.3 CONCLUSION OF THE CHAPTER ...... 56
2 THE SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES AND THE EU ROLE IN SOUTH ASIA ...... 60
2.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES ...... 60 2.1.1 India ...... 61 2.1.2 Bangladesh ...... 64 2.1.3 Bhutan ...... 65 2.1.4 The Maldives ...... 66 2.1.5 Nepal ...... 67 2.1.6 Sri Lanka ...... 69
2.2 BASIC FRAMEWORK OF THE EU´ S ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH ASIA ...... 70 2.2.1 EU activities in the South Asian countries ...... 73 2.2.1.1 EU and India ...... 73 2.2.1.2 EU and Bangladesh ...... 75 2.2.1.3 EU and Bhutan ...... 76 2.2.1.4 EU and The Maldives ...... 76 2.2.1.5 EU and Nepal ...... 76 2.2.1.6 EU and Sri Lanka ...... 77 2.2.2 Impact of the EU role on the country’s policies ...... 78
2.3 CONCLUSION OF THE CHAPTER ...... 79
3 CZECH REPUBLIC AND AUSTRIA IN SOUTH ASIA ...... 81
3.1 CZECH REPUBLIC IN SOUTH ASIA ...... 81 3.1.1 Relations towards India ...... 83 3.1.1.1 Historical development of the relations with India ...... 83 3.1.1.2 Current political relations ...... 85 3.1.1.3 Economic relations ...... 87 3.1.1.4 Security issues ...... 89 3.1.2 Relations towards other South Asian countries ...... 90 3.1.2.1 Bangladesh ...... 90 3.1.2.2 Bhutan ...... 91 3.1.2.3 The Maldives ...... 92 3.1.2.4 Nepal ...... 93 3.1.2.5 Sri Lanka ...... 94
3.2 AUSTRIA IN SOUTH ASIA ...... 96 3.2.1 Relations towards India ...... 98 3.2.1.1 Historical development of the relations with India ...... 98 3.2.1.2 Current political relations ...... 98 3.2.1.3 Economic relations ...... 99 3.2.1.4 Security relations ...... 101 3.2.2 Relations towards other South Asian countries ...... 101 3.2.2.1 Bangladesh ...... 101 3.2.2.2 Bhutan ...... 102 3.2.2.3 The Maldives ...... 103 3.2.2.4 Nepal ...... 103 3.2.2.5 Sri Lanka ...... 104 3.3 CONCLUSION OF THE CHAPTER ...... 105
4 CONCLUSIONS ...... 107
5 LIST OF LITERATURE AND RESOURCES ...... 113
5.1 LIST OF DOCUMENTS ...... 113
5.2 LIST OF INTERNET RESOURCES ...... 119
5.3 LIST OF LITERATURE ...... 123
6 APPENDIXES ...... 131
6.1 LIST OF TABLES ...... 131
6.2 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...... 132
INTRODUCTION
Austria and the Czech Republic 1 are countries with similar geography, demographic factors, and political systems. They share long years of common history, their fates have always been interconnected to each other. Although both countries had taken different routes through the “short 20 th century”, their ways got back together in the new millennium – both countries are members of the EU, sharing the same economic, political and mainly value space together. Despite all the similarities and common things the two countries share, Austria and the Czech Republic do not use the possibilities for cooperation to the full potential; their relationship rather reminds of two people some time after their divorce – fighting about small things with lots of emotions, despite of the fact that it would be much more useful for both to solve the problems efficiently and to cooperate with each other better. Whether because of these emotions or because of some other reasons, Austria is in the Czech political science in general, and in the field of International relations in specific, an under used, under researched matter. (See also Hloušek – Sychra 2004: 7) And that in spite of all the common points the two countries share in the international relations and despite the fact that Austria and the Czech Republic are probably the most similar countries in central Europe (Hloušek – Sychra 2004: 7) and as such just perfectly fit for their comparison. In this work I will try to add my piece in filling this gap in the state of research on Austria and its foreign policy in Czech International Relations field, as well as I will try to add my piece to the state of research on Czech foreign policy, where especially the further “area research” is needed. (See e.g. Introduction in Handl – Pick 2004) The same area research need is valid also for Austria, as there the state of research of its foreign relations towards South Asia is similarly underdeveloped. Coming out from these research gaps,
1 Although the official name for Austria is „Republic of Austria“, I use the short version „Austria“ as it is the common, generally used name. „Republic of Austria“ is used e.g. by the office of the President; Chancellor and the ministries use „Austria“. For the same reason I use „Czech Republic“ for the title of the country (as there is no generally accepted short noun) and „Czech“ as the adjective covering activities of the Czech Republic.
1 together with my interest in Austria and in South Asia, I chose to write this comparison of Austrian and Czech foreign policies with the target region of South Asia. Thus I can combine both analysis of Austrian and Czech foreign policies as such and their concrete foreign politics in the particular geographic area. In my work, I proceed from the hypothesis that Czech and Austrian foreign policies have as democratic and geographically and historically close countries similar normative basis of their foreign policies and similar, although not the same, priorities of their foreign policies. I assume that the countries differ not in their general foreign policies but on the ground of different concrete projects and different concrete activities. As the South Asian region is not any kind of priority region for neither of the countries, there are no established and worked out foreign policy strategies for the region. And as there are no policy strategies, the activities of the countries are in a majority of the cases ad hoc driven and problem solving oriented. The remaining minority of the cases is then based more on personal interconnection and interests (in the meaning of a hobby interest of the person) than on power and influence interests of the country. The first goal of my thesis is the analysis of the foreign policies of both countries, as understanding the foreign policies of the selected countries in general is fundamental for understanding their politics towards South Asia. Afterwards, as the second goal of my thesis, I analyze the particular foreign relations towards the region of South Asia. Coming out from these assumptions, I will structure my work this way: In the first part of my work I analyze the general foreign policies of the countries, in the second part I provide the overall view on the area of my research and on the role of the EU. These should provide the framework and background for setting in the actual foreign policies of Austria and the Czech Republic in the region, which constitute the third part of my work. I analyze the general foreign policies of both countries first for they are the first goal of my thesis and for I find it an essential step before analyzing the particular foreign relations towards the region of South Asia. The depth of this analysis is based on the need to provide otherwise lacking background for the developments, main long time topics and issues as well as normative and ideological purposes of foreign policies of both countries. I describe and analyze the foreign policies of the countries in general, focusing on the
2 process of the foreign policy as a dynamic agenda of unlimited number of actors, (See Kořan 2007: 20) leaving the analysis of the structure and the actors itself (as well as their interests) on the side. Next to fulfilling the first focal point of my work comparison of general foreign policy developments and priorities this chapter provides the general framework for consequent analysis of the countries´ concrete foreign policies towards South Asia done in the third part of the work. Comparing Austrian and Czech foreign policies arises the problem of the time delimitation of the analysis. Due to the different historical paths in the after Second World War developments continuity of developments in both countries has different starting points. Austrian foreign policy has been continually developing since the creation of the Second Republic in 1955 (respectively 1945), whereas the Czech foreign policy is continually developing just since 1989/90, respectively 1993. This time gap makes it difficult to produce classic synchronic analysis. On the other hand, Austrian foreign policy analysis would be just hardly understandable if I started it with the end of the Cold War. It is better to start the analysis of Austrian foreign policy at the time of its construction, in the years 1945/1955. However, the analysis of Czech foreign policy starting in the post Second World War years would be just of a historical meaning and filling in the empty pages as the very normative and ideological basis of the policy totally changed with the revolution in 1989. For these reason I start the analysis of Austrian foreign policy in 1945/1955 and describe it with less focus on conceptual and policy plans details compared to the part on Czech foreign policy, which covers just the last 18 years, but with more focus on the inner political developments as these were crucial for the newly created foreign policy. Although through a bit different ways, both these sub parts should lead to the provision of a detailed insight into the foreign policies of both countries in the areas of ideological, political, economic and security issues and developments. Besides the time delimitation comes the problem of content delimitation what segments of the foreign policy should be emphasized, on what issues should the focus be given? As it is impossible to describe everything (and as a foreign policy issue could be, in a wide perspective, taken nearly anything) I decided after the preliminary research to focus on the main segments of the foreign policy political, economic, security and to join them with the analysis of main issues of foreign policies of both countries: multilateral
3 relations, human rights and development cooperation issues. These play the major role in foreign policy agendas of both countries. And although there could be other issues chosen such as export and business promotion, investment issues or cultural representation I find the chosen issues the most relevant for a work written at our department. The second chapter of my work provides a short overview of the subject countries of my thesis and of the role of EU in the region. This chapter is done with the aim to give a better view on and broader picture of the foreign relations of Austria and the Czech Republic. Regarding the individual countries, I outline their last developments and their current situation for I find it useful as the supportive information for later analysis of Czech and Austrian foreign policies towards these countries. Regarding the EU, I focus on issues directly connected with the countries´ foreign policies. I do not want to offer any detailed analysis of the developments, as it is not the topic of my work (and as it is itself a topic for a thesis). What I try to do is to give an insight into European Union’s and especially European Commission’s role and activities in the region, – with the sole aim of providing better picture of the framework for the activities of Austria and the Czech Republic in the region. In the third chapter and second focal part of my work, I focus my attention towards the concrete foreign policy steps and actions of the countries in South Asia. I focus naturally on their relations towards India as the regional great power, nevertheless I will have a look on neighboring countries as well – Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal, the Maldives and Sri Lanka. I leave Pakistan out of my work although it is sometimes included into the South Asian region as well. The reason for focusing just on India and the “small around” is the structural division on both foreign ministries. The countries examined in my thesis are all served by the responsible Embassies in New Delhi. Pakistan has then common Embassy with Afghanistan and is generally placed in the structures of the ministries to this more western region. The conclusions and analysis of points of concurrence and of divisions between Austrian and Czech foreign policies both in general and in concrete towards South Asia should then enlighten strong and weak points of foreign policies of both countries. It should bring conclusions about the state of Czech foreign policy after just some 18 years of its development in the relation to the country mostly suitable as a reference point, as well
4 as about the state of the Austrian foreign policy in comparison with its northern neighbor. Who is active in what field and how? What are the priorities of both countries and how much they differ or resemble? Then focusing on South Asia, I will try to answer these questions: Are there any worked out policies for the region or is my assumption of ad hoc policies given in the hypothesis correct? What are their activities in the region? And why these? Is it just a coincidence based on external developments or are these the strategic decisions of the country? How much do the activities of both countries differ (or resemble)? And what are the reasons for it? The answers to these questions should then provide the proof whether my hypothesis and assumptions in it were right or wrong.
5 1 CZECH AND AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICIES
In this chapter I will describe and analyze foreign policies of the countries in general – how they developed through the years (with CR starting at 1993, with Austria starting at 1955). I will focus on the frameworks, policy topics and main issues of the policies of the countries. This will then provide the frame for comparison between the general foreign policies of the countries, as well as for setting in the South Asian foreign policies into the wider picture. Without knowledge of general foreign policy developments, analysis of South Asian actions and policies would be just partial and invaluable – providing the wider picture is thus essential for my work.
1.1 Czech foreign policy
Czech foreign policy as well as its policy in general comes out from the radical division of the policies from the pre revolutionary period of Czechoslovakia 1948 1989. Although some patterns and even many persons stood on the ministries, the system change was such, that the ideological basics completely changed and brand new tasks and goals, radically different from the old ones, were made up. 1989 revolution can be as such seen as the first brick in the creation of Czech foreign policy with the pre revolutionary period being of a meaning of keeping the good offices and contacts, but using them with the new perspective and ideological background.
1.1.1 Foreign policy developments after the 1989 revolution
The Czech Republic appeared on the world map on 1 st January 1993. Of course, it did not appear from nowhere and as such it followed with its policy, foreign policy principles included, on the former Czechoslovakia and its reform efforts being performed since the velvet revolution of November 1989 and the handover of powers. Czechoslovakia proclaimed its wish to become the integral part of the “west”, its wish to introduce democracy, free capitalist economy, rule of law and all other aspects of developed democracies. As the concrete symbol for these steps, a kind of lighthouse where the
6 country wanted to get, were seen the international organizations of the west, with then European Community and NATO standing at the top of hopes and wishes 2.
1.1.1.1 Czechoslovakia after the revolution
The first Minister of Foreign Affairs after the November revolution Jiří Dienstbier had anything but an easy position in the situation. Despite getting the new boss the bureaucratic apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been there since the pre revolution time. As it would have been both unwise and impossible to make all the stuff redundant, the minister had been dependent on the information from the people who got their position from the old regime. Internal personal reorganization flowing from the screening law (lustrační zákon) and mistrust especially to the graduates of soviet diplomatic schools brought major personal changes. (See Ort 2005: 269) Nevertheless these changes were complicated by the situation in the society. There was a general mistrust to the foreign affairs and nobody, apart from the staff in Ministry of Foreign Affairs and several “foreign business enterprises” 3 all people that had to be loyal to the foreign regime had much clue about foreign policy. Neither dissent had any clear idea, for his attention was naturally focused on internal social and political developments. (See Pick 2004: 252) The lack of specialists was general. In fact all institutions anyhow connected on foreign policy, whether newspapers, scholarly institutions or foreign ministry, had lack of specialists. And there was an even bigger lack of specialist not defiled during the fallen regime. This lack was then compensated by the enthusiasm and fresh wind coming to the structure with the new employees. (See Pick 2004: 252) At the time, everybody simply wanted “back to Europe” although nobody really knew in what Europe do we want to. Shortly after being designated to the position Jiří Dienstbier presented the very first principles on which the foreign policy would be build: Czechoslovakian diplomacy should focus especially on negotiating the leave of occupational armies to be able to freely draft its activity. As a country in the middle of Europe Czechoslovakia should participate in the process of improving security and cooperation, especially under the frame of Conference
2 Czechoslovakia officially announced its wish for being integrated into these structures already in December 1989. Compare Dienstbier (2007: 22). 3 Enterprises that had official permission to deal with the import export business.
7 on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process. It was necessary to improve the relations with neighbors and to give them normal, friendly and cooperative character and further it was needed to start contacts with the European Community and to aspire for membership in the Council of Europe. (See Ort 2005: 269) These issues made the content for the activities of the ministry till the general election held in July 1992, with the relatively quick leave of the Soviet armies from the country being a big success of diplomacy. The revolution brought up on the light, apart from freedom and democracy, several problems that were suppressed or put under the carpet during the communist totalitarian rule 4 – the main one of such being the Slovakian national emancipation. Czechoslovakia was officially a federation since 1968, with rules set the way, that one nation had in fact a veto over the other in the Federal chamber (See Vodička – Cabada 2003: 116). This did not cause any problem in the communist state the decisions in the Parliament were accepted unanimously anyway as the real decisions were made in the Communist party internal processes. Yet in democracy, this constitutional setting brought major problems. 5 Czechs and Slovakians had different views on the revolution and on the developments following it – mainly due to the different historic developments the Czechs were more oriented on quick economic transformation and privatization, whereas the Slovakians were doubtful about these. Czech political scene was more and more dominated by pro reform, economically liberalist forces, Slovakian scene was dominated by leftist and nationalist forces. During the years 1990 92, the party systems totally separated from each other. (Vodička – Cabada 2003: 118) The problems fully showed up after the elections held on 5 th and 6 th June 1992. The elections were won by ODS (Civic Democratic Party) lead by Václav Klaus and HZDS (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) lead by Vladimír Mečiar, who had the most MP´s in the national chambers of the Parliament and stepped into the heads of respective national
4 As a result of changes in the system which was once totalitarian, Linz and Stepan (1996: 316) describe Czechoslovakia of the eighties as post totalitarian, in its case as frozen post totalitarian regime, which has established, at least to a certain extent, some of the arenas established in a democracy (civil society, political society, rule of law, state apparatus and economic society), but without any evolvement and with almost all control mechanisms of the state still in place. 5 The regime after its collapse bequeathed institutions prone for impasse by its nature to the new state, and too less attention was given to formal institutional matters. “Specifically, without the impasse creating mechanisms of Czechoslovakia’s Soviet style federal system, we doubt that historical, cultural, and economic differences between the Czech lands and Slovakia would have resulted in the division of Czechoslovakia.” See Linz and Stepan (1996: 330).
8 governments. On the federal level though, the only possible efficient coalition was ODS and HZDS – the biggest rivals to each other and direct antipodes. The coalition negotiations of the two parties were soon dominated about negotiating status of Slovakia in the federation. After the impossibility of finding a compromise and Klaus´s reproach, that HZDS wanted Slovakian independence on Czech account, Mečiar replied “each on his own”. This happened on 12 th June and since then the negotiations were based just on solving technical problems of the country’s division. (See Vodička – Cabada 2003: 127) With the negotiations about the state division, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by a Slovakian Jozef Moravčík, was naturally fully occupied with dividing federal offices and institutions. (See Ort 1995: 281) The Czech government established in fact immediately after the parliamentary elections in June 1992 the Czech Ministry of International Relations, headed by Josef Zieleniec from ODS, who got the simple main task: “to safeguard division of foreign policy executive and of properties of the department” (Kotyk 2000: 50) and “to prepare international public for the possibility of emergence of an independent Czech Republic.” (Programové prohlášení vlády ČR, 13. 7. 1992: 4) It is natural that in such conditions the best thing what could happen in the foreign policy area was to maintain the state of the things and try to keep up with the pace of developments. The division of Czechoslovakia was not a result of emancipation efforts of Slovakian people – nor would it be probably agreed by them in a referendum. The pulling force were Slovakian politicians, especially HZDS. As Vodička and Cabada (2003: 121) put it, the division was a result of social and state problems lasting since 1918, heritage of communist rule and uncontrolled adaptation crisis during the transformation to pluralist democracy and market economy. By 31 st December 1992, Czechoslovakia perished; by 1 st January 1993, the Czech Republic and Slovakia started its existence as sovereign countries.
9 1.1.1.2 Czech Republic´s “early years” - the right-centre governments
The first government of independent Czech Republic was compound from ODS, KDS (Christian Democratic Party), KDU ČSL (Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovakian People´s Party) and ODA (Civic Democratic Alliance) and it was a fluent continuation of the Czech government in Czechoslovakian federacy with Prime minister Václav Klaus and ODS being the leading party in the government. The coalition divided the seats in manner somehow similar to giving tenures 6 (Mareš 1999: 8), the tenure of foreign policy was kept by ODS Josef Zieleniec continued to be the foreign minister. Foreign policy questions were not on the top of government’s priorities as the main focus was given to fast economic transformation and “the invisible hand of market” was seen by the Prime minister Klaus as the best mean for in fact everything, (See Ort 2005: 283) at least rhetorically. A new foreign policy conception was created with the effort to make difference from the previous concept set by foreign minister Dienstbier, 7 to make it more “realistic” and get it rid of so called idealistic, naive or dissent elements. (See Kunštát 2004: 84) The government’s program called for new and clearer defining of national interests of CR: continuous building of legal and democratic state, radical economical transformation and integration into European and world institutions. (Programové prohlášení vlády ČR 1992: 1) Main strategic priorities were put as at first to “build up balanced, conflict less and partner relations and cooperation with the neighborhood countries”, at second “to co create the conditions for CR´s integration into the main European economic, political and defense organizations” and at third “to watch the development in eastern and south eastern Europe.” (Zieleniec 1993: 2) Economic focus of most of the foreign policy activities, accent on national interests and gains and certain over confidence towards other post communist countries were somehow marking points of the new attitude. (See Ort 2005: 285) General position of CR towards the non European regions was presented in two short paragraphs of Zieleniec´s speech to the House of Deputies: “The relations with 6 This situation lead to the virtual absence of any critique of individual ministers as any „attack“ on a minister from a coalition party was seen as the attack on the party itself. Together with just weak opposition unable to control the government, this made all but a good mixture. See Mareš (1999: 8). 7 Pehe (1999: 69) describes the difference between the two concepts in these words: “Dienstbier´s foreign policy was ambitious in its content, but austere in its form, Zieleniec´s foreign policy content was narrowed on necessary minimum, but its form was marked with the ideology of Czech exceptionality.
10 countries outside the Euro Atlantic area are neither among existential interests nor a strategic or specific priority of CR in the nearest period. Nevertheless, the relations in North South axis can in global scale grow into a conflict problem same as some other world problems overlapping the frame of one region or continent. Therefore the Czech foreign policy will give permanent attention to both relations to the non European countries and to the global problems such as migration, environmental questions, illegal drug traffic, fight against terrorism and organized crime.”(Zieleniec 1993: 2) “CR should focus on developments of business and trade relations especially with the countries that have influence in the given region, are perspective from the point of business and trade cooperation, have traditional relations to our country, are politically stable and respect the human rights” (Zieleniec 1993: 6). On multilateral arena, CR declared its support for those programs and initiatives, “which boost up the consciousness of CR with western civilization, and in cooperation with other countries and considering our possibilities, we will join the programs of technical and humanitarian aid” (Zieleniec 1993: 6). These points can be given as the main criteria for CR´s bilateral relations towards the remote regions. It can be said that such has been the basic attitude of CR towards the non European countries also in the latter years, definitely till joining NATO and EU and obtaining new liabilities through these. The government held back with taking any bigger responsibilities outside the frame of immediate gain – and this is true both for Euro Atlantic affairs, where it can be especially seen in no wish for any cooperation with “weaker” countries as well as in no wish for developing relations with non Euro Atlantic countries without a vision of economic gain. In June 1996 the second parliamentary elections were held. ODS won, but just with tiny difference ahead of ČSSD (Czech Social Democratic Party). The parties were not able nor willing to create a majority government and a situation close to the matt was finally solved by a gentlemen agreement between ODS and ČSSD, through which ČSSD got position of the chairman of House of Deputies for Miloš Zeman (its leader) and ODS was, through leave of ČSSD MPs, able to get confidence of the House for its coalition government (other parties in the government were KDU ČSL and ODA). The foreign policy of the new government, as explained in its program, was meant to be kept unchanged compared to the former government. Continuity was guaranteed also through the same personal cast of the seat of foreign minister. Policy focused on promoting Czech national interests, with main goals seen in the fastest possible integration into the European
11 Union and NATO and “keeping and further developing good relations with the neighbors as well as with other democratic states and nations”. (Programové prohlášení vlády ČR 1996: 3) The year 1997, and especially its end, was full of dramatic developments on internal political scene of the Czech Republic. Among others, lengthy economic problems followed by unpopular “budget packages” and “tightening of belts” and reveals of dubious sponsors of coalition party ODA lead to the government crisis 8. President Havel, after lengthy and complicated negotiations, decided to name Josef Tošovský as the new prime minister, till then governor general of the Czech National Bank. He set up a government mixed from politicians and non party members, whose main task was to bring the country to the new elections due to in summer. The position of foreign minister was given to Jaroslav Šedivý.9 Government’s program did not put down any major differences in the field of foreign policy – the main goals and priorities remained the same. Yet the foreign minister tried to give to the foreign policy more a conceptual framework then was a habit of former governments. Šedivý in his article given to Mezinárodní politika (Šedivý 1998: 4 8) pointed out that former governments had as their task to “walk through the wide tracks” – to define and concretize the place of CR in the international system, to improve bilateral relations and to promote economic interests. Though the government lead CR to many international organizations and CR itself was co founder of several platforms and organizations, CR has had problems with defining its position in these organizations (e.g. OECD, Council of Europe) and did not use them very efficiently – what should be improved. (See Šedivý 1998: 4). The foreign policy of the new cabinet was also supposed to become more active in bilateral relations, especially with European big powers, but also with smaller countries. Much more attention was supposed to be paid to foreign business interests of CR, as well as to the cultural presentation of the country. (See Ort 2005: 302)
8 That was started by the demission of till then close co worker of prime minister Klaus, foreign minister Zieleniec on the 23rd October 1997, Klaus managed to find a new foreign minister during one day the seat was occupied by former ambassador in Brussel, Jaroslav Šedivý. Despite this obvious success of Václav Klaus the coalition problems lasted and finally lead to the demission of the government on the 30th November. 9 Before the government career he was ambassador to Belgium and Luxembourg, also authorized to represent interests of the country at NATO and WEU. See (http://www.mzv.cz/wwwo/mzv/default.asp?id=10441&ido=7970&idj=1&amb=1).
12 The mandate of this provisional government finished in June 1998. The elections were won by ČSSD, followed by ODS, KSČM (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia), KDU ČSL and US 10 (Freedom Union). The elections resulted in a very complicated distribution of mandates again, with no party having enough votes for majority government. The only possible coalitions were refused by party leaders for ideological or personal reasons and the situation finally led to another agreement between ČSSD and ODS on a certain form of cooperation. This time it was a written agreement, giving ČSSD the government for ODS getting positions of the House of Deputies and Senate chairmen and promise to be consulted in important policy questions. This political solution became to be known as “the opposition agreement”.
1.1.1.3 Foreign policy under the Social democracy lead governments
The new social democratic minority government was lead by Prime minister Miloš Zeman, with foreign ministry being entrusted to Jan Kavan, the former head of ČSSD´s foreign commission. 11 The government priorities in the field of foreign policy were in basic principles outlasting: EU and NATO membership and the neighborhood relations. The government was generally much more pro EU then the one of Václav Klaus. Much higher importance was also given to the foreign economic and business relations of the country as well as promoting inflow of foreign investments. The government appealed in its program to strengthen multilateral relations as well as bilateral relations with other countries and to take up on traditional cooperation with developing countries. (Programové prohlášení vlády 1998b: 21) As the Czech Republic was approaching full NATO membership, the defense questions were becoming even more interconnected with the foreign policy questions and the government naturally focused on joining NATO on 12 th March 1999 and on from that coming new acute responsibilities, especially due to the Kosovo crisis. Minister Kavan tried as well to give a better organizational framework to the economic dimension of diplomacy – to improve the coordination of activities of Ministry of Industry and Trade and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to get maximal utilization from foreign journeys of all
10 A party created shortly after the 1997 political crisis mainly by former ODS members unsatisfied with the leadership of Václav Klaus. 11 Jan Kavan did not have a really successful beginning in the position as one of the first things with which he caught attention were suspicions that he cooperated with StB (secret police of communist regime) and a car accident after which he refused the alcohol test using his MP´s immunity. See Tabery (2006: 150).
13 state representatives regarding “oiling the wheels” for Czech businessmen getting into the foreign markets. (Ort 2005: 329) The Social democratic governments showed itself to be much fonder in creating conceptual documents than its right and centre predecessors. Foreign ministry prepared the ”Conception of foreign policy of the Czech Republic” and the “Defense strategy”, laying down the basic attitudes and views of the government. “Conception of foreign policy of the Czech Republic” presented mainly general facts, positions and attitudes already present in the foreign politics, just collected and summarized. It also laid down priorities (still the same three – EU, transatlantic and neighborhood relations) and a list of interests, divided into life and strategic interests: life interests are naturally safeguarding country’s existence, it’s sovereignty, land integrity, legal order, democracy and security of its citizens. Strategic interests are promoting favorable international environment, integration into stable international security and economic organizations, creating outer conditions for economic growth and welfare of the country and maintaining and strengthening comparative advantages of Czech economy. (Koncepce zahraniční politiky ČR 1999: 4) During the years 2000 2002 activities on the ministry were negatively influenced by dealing with discrepancies in its accounts, which came into sight and reached scandalous proportions. Although these affairs took place mainly in the administrative department of the ministry, working morale of the employees as well as public opinion about the ministry were damaged. (Pick 2004: 253) Everyday diplomatic activity of the government was focused mainly on continuing preparations for joining the EU and, after 11 th September 2001, on dealing with the new security situation in the world. Terrorist attacks of 11 th September 2001 were immediately condemned by all leading Czech representatives and they unambiguously expressed their support for the United States efforts against terrorism. All the previous diplomatic activities were touched, many were put behind due to the terrorist attacks and response on them. (Ort 2005: 349) Minister Kavan was also preparing and campaigning for the vote for the UN General assembly chairman, which was held on 8 th July 2002. He succeeded in it and from 10 th September became the assembly chairman for one year. This was a personal success as well as it had some positive effects on prestige of the CR in the UN.
14 In June 2002 the next regular elections to the lower chamber of the Parliament were held. Electoral results, with victory of ČSSD, followed by ODS, KSČM, and “Coalition” 12 lead to creation of a coalition government of ČSSD, KDU ČSL and US DEU, having just very tight majority of 101 out of 200 seats. Vladimír Špidla, chairman of ČSSD, became the Prime minister, the post of foreign minister was given to Cyril Svoboda from KDU ČSL. Government’s program was naturally more or less concurring on activity of previous government, with strategic goals still the very same. It pointed out the need for improving outer economic relations and creating better conditions for access of Czech products on foreign markets as well as a more active attitude towards the international economic system. The government also pledged itself to create territorial foreign economic priorities and to strengthen economic and business aspects of Czech representative offices in foreign countries. (Programové prohlášení vlády 2002: 12) Year 2002 was also the last year of presidency of Václav Havel. In his traditional New Year speech, he evaluated 10 years existence of the Czech Republic. By his words, the Czech Republic became a “trustworthy and respected country” on the international scene. (See Ort 2005: 363) In February 2003 Václav Klaus was elected as the new president. This shaped considerable change in presidency’s view on foreign policy – from liberal humanism and pro Europeanism of Václav Havel to liberal economism and euro skepticism of Václav Klaus. By the end of the year 2002, CR finished the last chapter of pre entry negotiations and it was confirmed in Copenhagen in December that it will, together with other countries, join the EU on 1 st May 2004. CR´s global activities have been put into brand new position through the EU membership. For the first time in modern history, CR became a full member of integrated institutions of developed democratic countries, which provide efficient security guarantees to their members – NATO – and create single economic and to certain level also political space – EU. (Handl – Pick 2005a: 13) More to this, through EU foreign policy it can seek to influence issues far behind the power limits of a ten million country. But for doing this, it needs a clear strategy of what it wants to reach, whether it will be able to get wider popular support for the issue and whether it will manage to coordinate activities of governmental and non governmental subject for realization of this strategy. (Handl – Pick 2005a: 13) 12 Electoral coalition of KDU ČSL and US DEU They effectively separated their activities after the elections.
15 The government of Prime minister Špidla lasted till 4 th August 2004, when Prime minister delivered his demission to president Klaus after loosing much of the support in his own party. He was superseded on the Prime minister position by Stanislav Gross (former Minister of Interior Affairs) who “reconstructed” the cabinet from the same parties and mostly from the same people. This government fully continued with previous government’s work, just adapting the program to the fact that CR already has been a member of the EU. Continuity of foreign policy was also personal – Cyril Svoboda remained to be the foreign minister. However, the government lasted just a bit over 8 months till 15th April 2005 when Prime minister Gross delivered his demission as a result of the lengthy scandal about financing his flat. He was immediately exchanged by Jiří Paroubek, till then Minister for Regional Development. Paroubek again just reconstructed the government, keeping the coalition with KDU ČSL and US DEU. Though he did more personal changes on the ministers´ posts, he kept Cyril Svoboda as the foreign minister of his government and also the majority of foreign policy plans, given in the Governments program, stood the same active and balanced international politics, support for the European integration process, deepening allied relations in NATO and support of UN and international society in prevention from armed conflicts and wars. (Programové prohlášení vlády 2005: 27 30)
1.1.1.4 The developments after 2006 – ODS lead governments
The elections in June 2006 brought victory of ODS, but also the distribution of mandates between left and center right 13 100:100. Together with sharp pre election campaign and Jiří Paroubek´s election night speech,14 it was extremely difficult to create a majority government or any viable government at all. The situation was at first solved by creating minority ODS government. Though this government did not have high, if any, chances to survive vote on its confidence. Mirek Topolánek as the head of the winning ODS just wanted to exchange Jiří Paroubek in the Prime minister seat as soon as possible. During the existence of this government, negotiations about stable governmental settlement were processing, leading to a coalition of center right parties ODS, KDU ČSL and SZ (Green Party, new force in the parliament). Despite the coalition has had just 100 13 Left is represented by ČSSD and Communists, center right by ODS, KDU ČSL and the Green party. 14 Jiří Paroubek very aggressively attacked ODS, infirmed regularity of the elections, called ODS´s future government as „threatening blue totality“ and compared it to the times after February 1948. See “Povolební projev Jiřího Paroubka” at (www.ihned.cz).
16 mandates out of 200, it managed to get the majority through 2 then social democratic MPs 15 who have kept to support the government in exchange for adapting the laws also to their suggestions. 16 Mirek Topolánek as the Prime minister divided the powers over foreign affairs between two men – Karel Schwarzenberg (nominated by SZ) got the seat of the foreign minister, Alexandr Vondra (ODS) got the seat of vice prime minister for European affairs. Despite this solution brings some administrative problems, it seems to work fine thanks to the good personal relations of both men. The new government program speaks about active, realistic and functional foreign politics respecting geopolitical realm of CR, however still showing enough own action, e.g. at defending the human rights. (Programové prohlášení vlády 2006: 15) The government wants especially to prepare properly for Czech presidency in EU in the first half of 2009 and to generally improve the coordination of European affairs (for this purpose Vondra´s seat was created). First priority outside the framework of EU is to create an efficient model of economic diplomacy – coordinating export and investment support, presentation of CR abroad as well as efficient development, humanitarian aid and cooperation system. (Programové prohlášení vlády 2006: 18)
1.1.2 Ideological and political fundaments of Czech foreign policy
Since the republic’s appearance on the world political scene as an independent country Czech foreign policy has had two basic strategic goals: active integration into the Euro Atlantic world and strengthening good neighborhood relations, (Handl – Pick 2004: 5) with the first seen mainly through obtaining membership in NATO and EU. These goals were the leading points and motors for the most of the foreign policy as well as internal actions and reforms in the Czech Republic through all the years. It can be said that the Czech Republic was efficient in fulfilling its strategic tasks it has become a member of NATO, EU and other Euro Atlantic organizations, it has generally good relations with all its neighbors. It actively participates in multilateral organizations and is a strenuous promoter of human rights. All these things can without any doubts be seen as successes. 15 Both were suspended/left at first MPs club of ČSSD and then also the party itself. Now they are officially „independent MPs“. See (www.psp.cz) and (www.cssd.cz). 16 This is at least the official version. There has appeared lot of theories and suspicions about buying these two MPs.
17 Majority of the main political parties – ČSSD, ODS, KDU ČSL, US DEU, SZ have been supportive of the main goals and priorities of foreign policy through the years – integration into EU, NATO, good relations with the neighbors. Nevertheless they have been more divided in concrete details how to reach these goals, respectively how to behave after reaching these goals. Political parties have also often changed their proclamations depending on what they thought could bring electoral points – this has been just eased by rather uninterested Czech public, what allowed the parties to change or just vaguely define their foreign policy visions and opinions. (See Mareš 1999: 8) From the organizational point of view, Czech foreign policy has three main centers of power. The main role in the foreign policy is given to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, important role is played also by the Prime minister (and the government as whole) and the president. Apart from these three main centers, other important actors are the Parliament, Ministry of Industry and Trade and of course regional actors as well. 17 Government is the highest executive organ and as such it is responsible for Czech foreign policy. Ministry of Foreign Affairs is then the responsible organ directly executing the decisions of the government. The third main actor, the president has by the constitution mainly a representative role – from the legalistic point of view he should be playing just a side role to the governmental actors. This has never been the truth though and both Czech presidents have been active and important players. (See Hrabálek 2007: 32) The constitution does not set any rules for conducts of nor does it clearly divide the competences between the government (resp. Prime minister, foreign minister et al) and the president the coordination of their activities is thus based on their ability to communicate with each other. Different ideological backgrounds of presidents and “their” Prime ministers and foreign ministers were for most of the cases focused on internal political and economic problems and on strategy of transformation than on foreign policy relations. (Foltýn – Hřích 2004: 169) Still cases like disputes over Czech role in EU, support for NATO´s Kosovo operation and many other showed this problem often enough. Regarding the values of the foreign policy, “main values of Czech foreign policy come from the heritage and values of European civilization – they are based in general international law, the principal of rule of law and the principle of inalienable human
17 For detailed analysis of the individual actors see Kořan – Hrabálek (eds., 2007).
18 rights.” (Koncepce zahraniční politiky ČR 1999: 5) “Democracy is seen not just as an internal political thing of a country, but also as a predisposition for peaceful relations among the countries. The Czech Republic, aware of its global importance, promotes international cooperation based on mutual benefits, though it is also aware of significance of principle of shared responsibility and international solidarity.” (Koncepce zahraniční politiky ČR 1999: 6) The policy is oriented on those actors and powers that are supporting peace, stability, predictability and continuity. (Koncepce zahraniční politiky ČR 1999: 4) Czech foreign policy roots are usually described as following on traditions of the First Republic and Masaryk´s world views, taking also the good from relations of communist Czechoslovakia – traditional and good relations with most of the countries of former “Eastern block.” As aspects influencing the policy can be also taken the idealistic views and “memories” on the First Republic as well as the widespread feeling of being a victim of big power interests, being betrayed by the western allies at the dawn of Second World War. These feelings are still sometimes present, they are mirrored in the images on geopolitical position of the Czech Republic and in the skepticisms to the foreign guarantees of Czech security. (See Pick 2004: 252) The values and ideas are naturally influenced by the general political culture of the country as well. In the case of CR, this is based on the fact that there had been no Czech political elite for some 300 years – from 1620 Battle on the White Mountain (Bílá hora) and defeat of the Czech lords by the Habsburgs till mid 19 th century, when some Czechs started to assert themselves in Austrian, resp. Austro Hungarian politics. (Pehe 1999: 64) Czechs ruled themselves for just about 30 years, when they were put again to the position of a province of larger power entity. This historic experience leads then to strong batch of provincialism and strong feeling of self centrism inherent to the Czech political thinking. Political actions are thus often taken without wider international context. (Pehe 1999: 64) Other typical characteristics are kind of plebeian attitude – Czechs as the nation did not use to have own elites and have always seen the elites with quite a lot of skepticism and suspicion. 18 This is then connected with very intensive tradition of “fractioning”, when political parties care more about their own problems and little fights then about the general good of the people or problems the state is facing. This “fractioning” combined with the
18 In addition to that the elites in real were and are „suspicious“ as also the elites come out from the plebeian environment without any long lasting values and hierarchic structures. The mistrust to the elites is intensified also by the weakness of the elites in the critical situations (e.g. Beneš in 1938 and in 1948, communist elites after the Warsaw armies invasion in 1968). Compare Pehe (1999: 65).
19 plebeian and provincial political culture and general mistrust of people to the elites form the basic negative features of the Czech political environment. To the positive features of these Pehe puts the natural level of pragmatism and mistrust to big ideologies. (Pehe 1999: 66) The experience of peaceful transformation from authoritative regime to democracy and of peaceful division of the country can be further put to the positive aspects of the Czech foreign policy. Czechs and part of Czech elites in specific know how it is to live under an authoritarian regime and how important is the foreign support of the opposition. Focus on human rights questions is thus kind of a natural comparative advantage that Czech foreign policy does use and should continue to use. A positive aspect for itself has been also a personality of Václav Havel. He was “the most important political `export` of the country” (Pehe 1999: 66), his world wide respect and his activities had invaluable contribution for the Czech Republic and its role and position in the world.
1.1.2.1 Legacy of eastern-block relations
Important fact which has to be taken into account in analysis of the Czech foreign policy towards non Euro Atlantic countries is relations of communistic Czechoslovakia with “friendly” countries. Under the logic of Cold War, the non European countries were divided into four categories depending on their ideological orientation: “non European socialistic countries”, “countries of preferential interest”, “countries of interest from view of development of long lasting political and economic relations” and “other development countries”. Under the first category were ranked Cuba, Mongolia, North Korea, North Viet Nam/Viet Nam and later also Laos and Cambodia. Countries of preferential interest were in beginning of sixties Ghana, Guinea and Mali, in eighties also Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Mozambique, in latter half also Nicaragua. As countries with which Czechoslovakia wanted to develop mutually advantageous economic relations were taken many development countries that were politically not in opposite to the Eastern block and which often applied some components of planned economy. In eighties Syria, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, India, Congo, Benin, Venezuela, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria and Iran were counted to this category. The last category was reserved for the countries “under the thumb of imperialism” and with these countries Czechoslovakia did not evolve any intensive cooperation. (Jelínek 2004: 201)
20 Development aid as such was provided just to the countries in the first two categories; towards the third category principles of mutual expedience of the relations were applied. The relations took various forms from technical support of developing countries, various national liberation movements over providing skilled experts to giving scholarships for studying 19 in Czechoslovakia. (Jelínek 2004: 202) Nevertheless, contacts and tradition of mutual relations have been established and in many cases they outlasted the changes and revolution/s.
1.1.3 Political and economic position in the world
Czech Republic is just a tiny state on the world map. Its area covers 78 864 km 2, what is just about 0,0052 % of the world land mass (148 939 063 km 2). It has a population of 10,2 mil – ranks 74 th in the world is about 0,015 % of world population (totaling at approx. 6,5 bil. in 2006). Its GDP, reaching in 2006 141 801 mil USD 39 th place in the world represents just 0,03 % of the world GDP (totaling 48 244 879 mil USD in 2006) (http://worldbank.org). In the UN Human development index it is ranked at the 30 th place in the world. (http://hdr.undp.org) What are these numbers saying? They are just illustrating the position of a small country with not many inhabitants but still doing quite well in the world regarding its economy and welfare in general. There are many countries doing better than CR, but way too more countries doing worse. CR is the member of all organizations it wanted to join and it is certainly one of the “top countries” in the world. After the November 1989 revolution, first Czechoslovakia, then the Czech Republic strived to join the “elite” democratic countries clubs, mainly EU and NATO, but also OECD and other organizations. In the first years CR actively participated in CSCE and was present by many rather euphoric proposals for the ideal of the new security system of unified Europe. (See Kotyk 2000: 47 48) CR´s international efforts after this initiatory euphoric phase were oriented especially on three topics: economic relations, human rights and democracy. CR has been participating on efforts liberalizing the world trade, while keeping it fair also for poor countries (though the latter part was not always on the top, as Lebeda (2004:197) puts it). (See Foltýn – Hřích 2004: 167 168) Still human rights 19 Till 1990 some 20 000 students from “friendly” countries have finished their studies in Czechoslovakia. See Jelínek (2004: 202).
21 promotion have always been a strong side of Czech foreign policy, and in this respect personality and moral example of Václav Havel played crucial role. For a small country like CR, membership in international organizations is one of the most efficient ways how to promote its interests and how to exert its influence. CR with its size, population and economy has only limited possibilities to independently influence international environment and as such, multilateral cooperation and membership in international organizations or groupings are a tool for balancing relative power and economic asymmetries in relations with bigger countries. (Koncepce zahraniční politiky ČR 1999: 4) From the international organizations CR joined, prominent role has been played by the European Union, which also from this perspective (but not just) gives CR vast ground of possibilities and opportunities.
1.1.3.1 Czech Republic and EU
Czech Republic’s membership in EU gave it possibilities to pursue its interests in much wider and global scale than it could ever do on its own. Membership of CR in the EU also increased CR´s value for both current and potential partners. (Dienstbier 2007: 23) Nevertheless, promoting Czech foreign policy interests through the EU´s foreign policy and multiplying their influence with help of this organization needs to have set detailed priorities, road maps and goals, as well as potential partners and possible spoilers. As Vondra (2006: 17) puts it, “it is important to define as precise as possible what we want to do in the EU and where we want it to go.” Nevertheless, conceptual documents do not deal with Czech position in the EU as a platform for broadening CR´s foreign policy influence and they tend to stay rather on general level. Proposal of conception of Czech direction in the EU (Návrh koncepce směřování ČR v EU 2004) speaks about “active participation on CFSP... in accordance with its main thematic and territorial priorities” (Návrh koncepce směřování ČR v EU 2004: 15) It wants special focus on defense of human rights (Návrh koncepce směřování ČR v EU 2004: 16) Regarding outer economic relations and development aid, it will, following “thematic and territorial priorities”, support the EU strategy. (Návrh koncepce směřování ČR v EU 2004: 17) These are not the points which would make the Czech position much clearer. What is clear is the top position of the human rights on Czech agenda in the EU foreign policy discussions. CR has in three years of its membership earned strong
22 reputation for promoting human rights. “Czech officials regard their newly minted EU membership as a chance to influence a club with global clout, and throw Europe’s weight behind democrats everywhere from Myanmar to Belarus, Moldova and Cuba (a particular Czech obsession)” (The Economist 2007: 26) “Some other countries sometimes confront dictators as well, especially when it does not cost them too much. But it is the Czechs who ask uncomfortable questions about democratic values, even in the internal EU exchanges on issues such as Taiwan or the Balkans that never become public.” (The Economist 2007: 26) Regarding the regional distribution of Czech activities in the EU´s foreign relations, Czechs, as has been already mentioned, have been especially interested in the situation on Cuba. CR continues to have the same attitude as before joining the EU and it is in this topic respected partner and negotiator (though often in fight especially with Spain (Compare The Economist 2007: 26). Second regional hot topic of Czech activities has been the area of Middle East – especially CR´s activities in resolving Israeli Palestinian conflict. (See Svoboda 2005: 21) The Czech Republic will be presiding the EU Council in the first half of 2009, following on France’s presidency and precedent the Swedish. The preparations for the presidency are coordinated by the Minister for European Affairs Alexander Vondra. Current government presented motto of the presidency “Europe without barriers” with competition, four freedoms and liberal trade politics as the main program areas. Other focal issues will be safe and sustainable energy; budget review and reform of the Common Agricultural Policy; transatlantic relations, western Balkans, eastern Europe; further development of freedom, security, and justice; institutions and their reform, election of the President of the European Commission and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. (See Euroskop.cz – Priorities of the Czech Presidency) The more precise program of the whole Troika should be then presented in July 2008.
1.1.3.2 Czech Republic in other international organizations
CR´s foreign policy efforts regarding the international organizations20 were mostly oriented on membership in European or Euro Atlantic structures: apart from the NATO and the EU, it focused especially on activities in the OSCE, Council of Europe and other
20 Czech Republic is member in totally 56 international organizations and in hundreds other is anyhow active or committed. See Foltýn – Hřích (2004: 167).
23 regional or sub regional agreements; in economic field, CR tried hard to obtain membership in OECD. From the global organizations the biggest concerns were naturally given to the United Nations and its agencies. Though UN has been especially in recent years target of frequent and common critique, it is still the most important universal international organization. CR´s biggest successes in UN are its position of non permanent Security council member in 1994 1995 and Chairmanship of General Assembly in 2002 2003.21 From policy issues, CR´s clear focus was on promoting and protecting human rights activities, especially when CR was member of the UN Commission on human rights.22 After the reform of this UN institution to the Council of human rights, the Czech Republic became the vice presiding country of the council, where it is trying mainly to improve the UN procedures for dealing with human rights violations. (See Zpráva o zahraniční politice 2006: 341) CR has been a member of most of UN´s specialized agencies, in which it was usually able to follow on activities of Czechoslovakia. To biggest achievements in these special agencies can be put chairmanship of UNESCO general conference held by Jaroslava Moserová, as well as active work in International Atomic Energy Agency, where CR was promoting programs increasing nuclear safety and security as well as internationalizing discussions about Temelín atomic power plant. (Bílková 2004: 183) Still generally more focus was given to membership in economic organizations such as WTO and World Bank than to the political ones. CR as a country with an open economy, vitally dependent on development of outer economic and political environment is mostly interested in proceedings in these global economic institutions. After joining the EU, CR is in the WTO represented by the EU and has to promote its interests in this field on the EU level. Nevertheless, this had no influence on Czech promotion of liberalization of the world trade and on creation of general rules of the world trade. (See Zpráva o zahraniční politice 2005: 18 19)
21 One of the biggest successes of the Chairmanship was successful finish of negotiations about resolution on conflict prevention (Resolution 57/337, accepted in June 2003) defining role of various actors (states, regional organizations, UN...) in conflict prevention and calling for creating a complex strategy for conflict prevention. See Bílková (2004: 181 182). 22 CR was a member of Commission on human rights in the years 1997 1999 and 2000 2002. The Czech Republic was as its member repeatedly author or co author of resolutions calling for improving human rights on Cuba and of resolution dealing with thematic procedures See Bílková (2004: 182).
24 The positions of all the governments towards the CR´s positions in international organizations were very stable. Apart from consensus on main goals, this was given also by relatively low interest of Czech political representation in international political organizations lead to the absence of this issue from hot inter party debates. (Bílková 2004: 179)
1.1.4 Czech security position
CR´s security position has been since its existence’s beginning very good. It has been bordered by stable countries and it is relatively far from the nearest instable or conflict areas. This position got even better by joining NATO and EU. This, of course, does not mean that it should sleep in peace on these not well earned laurels. To CR´s revere can be said, that it has always been a rather active party both in close (Balkan) and more remote (Middle East, Afghanistan) problem areas. CR´s security situation went through two main milestones one conscious and one imposed. The first one is NATO membership which CR obtained in 1999 and which represented one of the strategic goals of Czech foreign policy. NATO membership significantly changed security guarantees of the country – it has become a member of respected, efficient and trustworthy security organization. Currently, CR´s geopolitical security position is close to ideal – all its neighbors are members of EU and apart from Austria, it is surrounded by NATO members. Despite of the fact that Austria stays outside of NATO, it is still taking part in wider transatlantic security system and can be and is taken as a friendly country and ally. (See Dančák 2005: 186 187) CR does not have to be anyhow afraid of being attacked by some kind of traditional land invasion. Danger that CR would get into a war with another country is negligible. The second milestone is represented by 11 th September 2001 attacks and consequent influence on security environment. Threat of terrorism, organized international criminal groups as well as civil and intra state conflicts are on the top of the agenda today. Not that they would suddenly appear with 11/09, but they have certainly proved themselves to be enough perilous to get much higher attention since then. Despite of the fact that CR, as mentioned above, can feel secure before a state to state war, “new threats, new dangers and new wars are appearing and current situation is not more stable than that one we knew
25 in the times of Cold War” (Vondra 2006: 18) Just that current threats are not so visible, without clear borders between a battlefield and a civil rear and nobody really knows how to cope with them. Czech Republic has been active in multilateral peacemaking and peacekeeping operations and it is an active security and stability “exporter”. (Handl – Pick 2005a: 14) From beginning of its existence it has been active on the field of UN and OSCE, later also in the framework of NATO and EU activities and operations. CR´s activities and missions on Balkan and in Afghanistan were above the standards expected from countries of its size. Czech soldiers and policemen have been regularly serving outside Europe as military observers in the UN missions 23 in as well as in OSCE missions.24 (Khol 2004: 42) Current biggest displacements in abroad are in Kosovo (KFOR Joint Enterprise mission – 550 soldiers), Afghanistan (ISAF – 150 soldiers), Iraq (NATO Training mission – currently 2 officers, in overall 99 soldiers) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA – currently 2 soldiers, in overall 400 soldiers) (See Zpráva o zahraniční politice 2006: 404 and http://www.army.cz) With US proclaiming the war on terror, the Czech Republic decided to participate in these efforts first just with humanitarian units. 25 CR sent a field hospital to Afghanistan in 2002. In 2004 it sent there a special forces unit into the first combat mission in Afghanistan. During second Iraq war it provided a special chemical unit for non combatant support and one field hospital.
1.1.5 Human rights
The promotion of human rights has been a stable issue in Czech foreign politics. CR is predestinated for this kind of international activism at first by its own traumatic experience under two totalitarian regimes and at second by its wish to belong among “traditional democracies” (Pštross 2004: 211) and human rights could be in this context 23 Czechoslovakia sent after 1989 men on UN missions in Angola (UNAVEM), Namibia (UNTAG), Iraq (UNSCOM and UNGCI), Somalia (UNOSOM), as well as to the missions in former Yugoslavia. See Khol (2004: 42). Czech Republic participated on missions in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), Liberia (UNMIL), Georgia (UNOMIG), Congo (MONUC), Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and between Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) See Kohl (2004: 42). 24 Missions in Georgia, Moldavia or in Upper Karabachos. See Kohl (2004: 42). 25 The reason for this were controversies among Czech political representatives over the issue. Humanitarian units represented „the lowest common denominator“ and as such it was easiest to send those. Compare Khol (2004: 42).
26 seen as a field where CR has a competitive advantage on international field. CR has been active on the field of human rights in multilateral relations (UN, OSCE, EU) as well as in bilateral relations and support of NGOs defending human rights in areas of special interest (this is applicable especially on Belarus, Caucasus and Balkan countries). Immense influence on the world stage has had the personality of former Czech president Václav Havel who as a world wide known and respected man has been assiduously promoting and defending human rights. As Vondra puts it, CR´s support of human rights is not just idealistically driven, but it comes from the believe based in democratic theory – that democracies just sparely wage war against each other. Development and humanitarian aid is also a kind of moral imperative for a country in which most population still remembers their own lack of freedom. (Vondra 2006: 19) Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a special department for Human Rights that coordinates the activities and manages Czech interests and efforts in the human rights promotion on the international scene, especially in the international organizations. Ex dissidents (e.g. European affairs minister Alexandr Vondra) and long time human rights defenders (e.g. Jiří Pojar, former director of People in Need outfit and now First deputy of Minister of Foreign Affairs) filled many key government positions, notably in the higher ranks of the foreign ministry. Also Czech non governmental organizations are active in the field of promoting human rights and democratic developments in the world. People in Need foundation is well credited even by mostly skeptical EU diplomats for taking “great risks” in helping democrats in places like Belarus. (See The Economist 2007: 26) As it was mentioned already above in the chapters on the EU and other international organizations, human rights promotion has been the main topic CR has been working on. Though CR is not always consistent in this and it sometimes prefers economic or other interests over the human rights, CR builds the credit of a country intensively working on human rights promotion.
27 1.1.6 Development aid
CR transformed itself through the post 1989 years from the net recipient of foreign aid to the net provider. As well Czech popular support changed from aversion to any development aid, and especially that organized by the state,26 to the support and acceptance of a need for the development aid. In the beginning of 1995, the government approved a document called “Guides for providing the foreign aid” where it admits that CR is “a democratic and economically developed country” and as such “it takes its share of responsibility at solving the global problems.” (Příloha k Usnesení vlády ČR ze dne 15. března 1995 č. 153: 1) The main criteria for providing the foreign aid is that it “is provided in compliance with interests and needs of CR, within possibilities of Czech economy and in accordance with the positions of international community given in the UN resolutions and in policies of OECD.” (Příloha k Usnesení vlády ČR ze dne 15. března 1995 č. 153: 2) A hard core idealist must be mad about this proclamation, nevertheless it can be hardly surprising, given the economic focus of in fact all activities of that time government. The document sets also the main aims of the foreign aid: support of democracy and human rights and building of market economy. These aims are followed by conditions for providing it, with efficiency as the basic condition, ensued by necessity and relations to the CR. The document did not set any regional priorities, which then lead to projects accepted not by given priorities but by individual initiatives. Projects were realized in too many different countries,27 which lead to the decreased efficiency of foreign aid. (Jelínek 2004: 203) The conception was re made in 2002, with main points staying same or similar and rather technical and organizational points being improved. “Foreign development aid (FDA) increases prestige of CR on international scene and add to the development of mutual political and economic relations with receiving countries. Providing FDA is further indirectly displayed e.g. in following areas: global security, prevention of local conflicts, lowering risks of illegal migration, fight against organized crime, prevention of terrorism, environmental security, support of export, getting to new markets, usage of Czech subjects and experts etc.” (Koncepce rozvojové pomoci 2002: 1) This definition of FDA as part of
26 This was a consequence of dirigative and ideology oriented international politics and type development aid former regime was practicing. Compare Jelínek (2004: 202). 27 Between 1996 2000 larger projects in over 40 countries were realized. See Jelínek (2004: 203).
28 foreign policy is perfectly illustrating above mentioned ambivalence between realistic and idealistic ideological principles. FDA, something what one could see as an altruistic principle, a tool for increasing international equality through solidarity is even at a social democratic government, which should have solidarity and equality deeply in blood, limited to side effects of improving economic and political position of CR. Above mentioned comments on Klaus´s governments attitude towards this topic loose their political party directness as in fact same principles drive also social democratic attitudes. A realist can smile over persistence of the main principles and victory of self interests. The document mainly defined the objectives of the development aid more precisely the donor programs should be oriented in that fields, where CR has comparative advantages: health care, education, energetics, sectors of engineering and environmental protection. (Koncepce rozvojové pomoci 2002: 4) As area priorities were defined 6 regions, in which 20 countries 28 were picked up to be the principal receiving countries. New and positive thing appearing was also declaring non governmental organizations as partners of the state in organizing developmental aid. (Jelínek 2004: 204) In 2002, NGOs active in the field organized themselves into a platform called “Forum for the development cooperation” (Fórum rozvojové spolupráce, FORS). This platform should increase cooperation between the organizations and consequently lead to higher efficiency of provided resources. Nowadays based on the “Principles of development cooperation after joining the EU“ and on the actualized “Conception of development aid for years 2006 2010” the priority countries are even more limited to target the aid better. The priority countries are Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Mongolia, Serbia; Montenegro, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia; Afghanistan and Iraq are medium term priorities. (See Adamcová 2006: 8 and Zpráva o zahraniční politice 2006: 30) Since 2005, transformation cooperation as a new issue has been added to the general framework of the development cooperation. Transformation cooperation focuses on the support of developing and transforming countries not just from the point of economic development, but from the general development including respect to law, human
28 Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia; Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Kazakhstan; Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen; Vietnam, Mongolia, Afghanistan; Namibia, Angola, Mali, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia; Nicaragua, El Salvador, Bolivia. See Koncepce zahraniční rozvojové pomoci (2002: 4 5).
29 rights and good governance. 29 (See Zpráva o zahraniční politice 2005: 21) The key goals of the Czech development cooperation include poverty reduction, economic and industrial development, gradual integration of partner countries into the world economy, agricultural development, promotion and consolidation of democracy, human rights and good governance, introduction of principles of lawful conduct, migration control, sustainable development with a focus on environmental protection, and post conflict reconstruction. (Adamcová 2006: 6) Apart from the national development cooperation projects, CR participates also in the projects and activities of international institutions such as EU, UN and world financial institutions. It also provides the humanitarian aid, which was worth 80 mil. CZK in the year 2006 30 with most important activities being done in Afghanistan, Lebanon and Vietnam. (Zpráva o zahraniční politice 2006: 146). In 2006 the Czech Republic joined the “Good humanitarian donorship” principles and joined through that the developed donor countries. The central coordinating authority for the ODA is Ministry of Foreign Affairs with its Department of Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid. Ministry also founded the Development Center as its advisory body and institution promoting the awareness of development issues in the Czech Republic. (See Adamcová 2006: 12 13) Czech Republic spends 0,12 % of GNI (3,5 bil. CZK. in 2006) on the official development assistance, (Zpráva o zahraniční politice 2006: 145) which is not much compared with the EU targets of spending 0,17 % GNI in 2010 and 0,3 3% GNI in 2015. The Czech Republic is in the lower third of the EU members (Austria spends 0,23% GNI), nevertheless it is on the top among the new EU members. (See Adamcová 2006: 10)
29 Transformation cooperation as an interest field of Czech development cooperation focuses on developments in Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iraq, Cuba, Moldavia, Myanmar, Serbia and Ukraine as the priority countries. See Zpráva o zahraniční politice (2006: 147). 30 The main target countries were Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Kenya, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Vietnam. See Zpráva o zahraniční politice (2006: 30).
30 1.2 Austrian foreign policy
Austria used to be a great empire, then a fallen state, and in 1938 it disappeared from the map at all. After the Second World War it struggled to be an independent country again, it struggled to get the full authority over its land and also, it struggled to build a national identity. Somehow similarly to the case of the Czech Republic, just even in more intensive way, Austrian policies, including foreign policy, radically snipped from their past. The main building stones after the war were to do things differently than before, to do it better than during the interwar period to manage to build a viable state, the state that wants to be viable.
1.2.1 Foreign policy developments of the Second Austrian Republic
After the breakup of the Habsburg empire following the defeat of Austria Hungary in the World War I., an unstable new state was built. The Austrian First Republic of the 1920s was “a state that no one wanted” (Andics in: Timms 1998: 48), where political and economic sovereignty was restricted to a minimum by massive pressure and intervention on the part of foreign powers. The only foreign policy which the government in Vienna actively pursued in that times was the Anschluß with Germany. (See Kramer 1998: 162) The state was stuck between unfriendly neighbors to the south and east and torn between Italy and Germany. And as it failed to negotiate quasi independent course during the interwar period, it was finally absorbed by Hitler´s Nazi Germany in 1938. (See Gehler – Bischof 2006: 1)
1.2.1.1 Journey to the state sovereignty
After the war, Austria was in an ambiguous position – it was already in the Moscow declaration of 1943 called the “first free country to fall victim of Hitlerite aggression” 31 (See Timms 1998: 64) and also the Allied armies were promoting “liberating Austria” 31 This statement, later changed into a kind of myth on which Austrian handling of the World War II past was based for sure till the Waldheim affair in mid 1980s was originally formulated by the Allies in order to support Austrian resistance movement. See Weinzierl (1998: 5).
31 rather than “fighting and defending Austria.” Still, by international law Austria was an integral part of Germany during the war and for that it was also taken as a defended aggressor and occupied country and treated like that at first. The failure to build a national identity was one of the main problems of the pre war Austria; on the other hand after the Second World War Austria was in a completely different position. The experience of Nazi occupation stirred the desire among many Austrians and the will among the Allies fighting Hitler to re establish a viable Austrian state and to try to build a “nation.” (See Gehler – Bischof 2006: 1) There was a general political will to create the national identity and to create an independent, sovereign and sustainable state. During the first sixteen post war years, the ÖVP (Austrian People´s Party) and SPÖ (Social Democratic Party of Austria) Grand Coalition’s main goals were to get rid of the occupation regime and to establish and stabilize an independent and sovereign state. (Gehler – Bischof 2006: 2) They tried to get as much independence on the allies as possible and, in the position of extreme weakness and powerlessness, to practice an unconventional diplomacy. In any case, both Austrian foreign policy and diplomacy were primarily geared towards the goal of building a bearable relationship with all four occupation powers. (Gehler – Bischof 2006: 3) By reacting flexibly to the negotiating positions (and the disagreements among) the Allied powers in Austria, the government in Vienna managed gradually to restrict the extensive control, which the Western powers and the Soviet Union exerted as occupying authorities. 32 (See Kramer 1998: 164) Austria received the independence on 15 th May 1955 with signing of the “Treaty for the re establishment of an independent and democratic Austria”, generally known as the “State Treaty”. The Moscow memorandum of April 1955 – the main political breakthrough leading to the final political rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the Western powers on the question of Austrian independence – specified that, after signing the State Treaty, Austria would have to make a declaration that would commit it to “permanent neutrality as practiced by Switzerland” (Stourzh in: Kramer 1998: 164) Through its neutrality Austria had promised to stay neutral in all future wars, not to enter any military alliance, not to allow any foreign country’s military bases on its territory and also to follow 32 For example Austria became the only country under partial Soviet control to receive European Recovery Program funds of the US Marshall Plan. Indeed, it received the highest per capital allocation of all the countries benefiting from the Marshall Plan. See Kramer (1998: 164).
32 other norms of neutrality law. (See Kramer 2006: 807) The State Treaty, apart from neutrality, also specified that Austria would never join nor build a political or economic union with Germany and that it would protect Hungarian and Slovenian minorities. And although the state independence was not in legal connection with the neutrality, neutrality was certainly a price paid for the Soviet acceptance of the State treaty. (Gästner – Rendl 2001: 193)
1.2.1.2 Second Republic’s early years
From 1955 until the late 1970s Austria was successful in its main foreign policy goals. It achieved a relatively high level of international acceptance, became a member of the club of the economically most prosperous states of the world and witnessed a strengthening of political cohesion between its political subcultures, inter alia through the development of an overarching Austrian national identity. (See Kramer 1998: 163) During the fifties, a natural process of alienation and detachment from the previous occupiers, who were still acting as tutors, slowly transpired. Still the former occupation powers continued to exert some control over Austria resulting from their “responsibility” as signatories to the state treaty. (See Gehler – Bischof 2006: 4) For the Austrian neutrality was proclaimed by Austria itself in the form of constitutional law and not by the Allied countries, the definition of its neutrality always lied fully in the competence of Austria. (See Pelinka – Rosenberger 2003: 244) And its foreign policy makers decided from the very beginning that they would follow a policy of neutrality that “would take more risks and be more dynamic than the Swiss policy.” (Bonjour in: Kramer 1998: 164) In contrast to Switzerland, Austria became a member of the United Nations just in December 1955, in March 1956 it was admitted to the Council of Europe and became a signatory of its European Convention on Human Rights. From the beginning, it was clear that neutrality does not mean equidistance between the blocks. The uprising of the Hungarian population against the communist regime in autumn 1956 and its bloody repression by the Soviet army were to become the first major test 33 of Austrian neutrality. Through its harsh and open critique of the Soviet actions in this 33 As Hakovirta (cited by Kramer 2006: 811) puts it in his study on European neutrals in East West conflict, East West crisis provided not just threats, but also unique chances for the neutral countries to demonstrate what neutrality means for them in real. For details of this concept see Hakovirta, Harto. 1988. East West Conflict and European Neutrality. New York: Oxford University Press.
33 uprising, Austria showed itself as indeed neutral country, but with clearly pro Western, anti communist and anti Soviet positions. 34 (Rathkolb 1998: 72) The Soviet Union at the time accepted Austrian open pro Western tendencies. They, however, opposed any closer ties of Austria to Germany, including the economic integration. 35 (See Rathkolb 1998: 73 74) Austria had to keep out from the membership in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) because of its neutrality status and Soviet repulsion to such efforts.36 This left the fledgling and export dependent republic with very little maneuvering space in terms of foreign trade policy. (Gehler – Bischof 2006: 4)
1.2.1.3 Austrian foreign policy emancipation
In the sixties, Vienna gradually set itself further free both from the tutelage of the signatory powers of the State Treaty and the “Swiss model” of neutrality. In the 1960 Austria, together with six other non EEC countries, found the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) to at least decrease the disadvantages rising from the impossibility (coming from its neutral status and following internal disputes about this step as well as from objections of USSR to this step) to enter the EEC itself. (See Luif 2006: 864) At the time, foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky (1959 1966) and Chancellor Josef Klaus (1964 1970) and his foreign minister Kurt Waldheim were intensively emancipating Austrian foreign policy. Especially Austria’s foreign policy towards rapid EEC rapprochement 37 and its diplomacy towards the neighborhood states 38 indicated further deviation from the cautious and passive (=Swiss) model of neutrality. (See Gehler – Bischof 2006: 5 6). The foreign policy was based on “attaining maximum confidence in 34 This can be said particularly in light of Austrian government’s open official protest against Soviet intervention in Hungary and the role which the government (and the people) took in taking care of all the refugees. See Rathkolb (1998: 72). 35 Both USA and USSR backed at the time the primacy of neutrality over economic considerations and Soviet objections in this matter were accepted by other powers. See Rathkolb (1998: 76). 36 The Soviet Union was able to block Austrian western integration both legally, through Occupation status, and in real – through its military presence. This gave basis for the Austrian integration policy: integration, but limited. Austria was allowed to participate on Marshall Plan, though it was not allowed to take part on ECSC. See Pelinka – Rosenberger (2003: 231). 37 So called „Alleingang“, when Austria tried to make with EEC an „arrangement of special kind“ to get closer relations. This was finally blocked by Italy due to the problems over South Tirol. See Luif (2006: 866). 38 Kreisky´s development of economic relations with eastern countries was made possible i.e. by changing the rules for Austrian trade relations with Eastern countries by USA. Kennedy’s administration liberated conditions of Austrian trade set in COCOM (Coordinating Committee ) COCOM was a list of goods and services which were not to be exported into the communist orbit. See Rathkolb (1998: 73 76).
34 the West – i.e. in America – and minimum distrust in the East – i.e. in Russia.” (Kreisky in: Kramer 1998: 165) 1970s were characterized by the culmination of the much vaunted Austrian welfare state, by strengthening of Austrian identity and nationhood and, from the personality point of view, by Socialist governments of Bruno Kreisky. At the time, Austrian “eternal neutrality became both dogma and a myth, falling into Austrian’s comfort with and growing prosperity of the Second Republic”. (Gehler – Bischof 2006: 6) Austria was shining itself at the heat of the favor as also its perceptions abroad were remarkably positive. The myths of Austria as a “bridge between East and West”, as well as Austria as an “island of the blessed” were frequently bandied about. Foreigners´ praise fed into a self deceptive Austrian pride and a somewhat hyperbolic view of Austrians own accomplishments. If Austria was no longer a great power, it became a darling of the world. (Gehler – Bischof 2006: 6) Foreign affairs went through an increasingly international and global turn, particularly as a result of Kreisky´s departures in “active neutrality” policy and “bridge building” efforts in the East West conflict.39 Kreisky´s maverick policy of reducing tensions within the framework of the CSCE helped to shape and strengthen East West détante in Europe. Austrian peace keeping forces played a very active role in the United Nations´ peace efforts from the 1960´s to the 1990´s. (See Gehler – Bischof 2006: 6 7) During the SPÖ single governments in 1970s, Austria tried to play a role of a „good cop“ in the international relations (parallel to the bad cop, the USA) and that in several fields North South relations, Regional conflicts, Terror and liberation organizations. (See Hödl 2004: 89) Kreisky tried to make Austria the “problem solver” in several different areas,40 with the main focus given to the effort to solve the Israel x Palestine conflict.41 Austria also nettled USA with its contacts with Libyan dictator Gaddafi and its non participation on embargo against Iran, proclaimed by US president Carter in 1978. (See Kramer 2006: 819) And despite of the fact that the politicians
39 This strive for being a „world broker“ was nicely expressed in Kreisky´s government program from 1971, where he speaks about „continuous effort for good relations with all the countries, no matter their social political order.“ See Politik für Österreichs zukunft (1971: 34). 40 Kreisky´s „world politics“ had been always under a critique of ÖVP. E.g. in 1979, ÖVP chairman Mock (In Hödl (2004: 96 97) used these words: “It is false self confidence and arrogance when a permanently neutral small country in the position of Austria thinks that it must play a mechanic for conflict situations in all the edges and ends of this world.“ 41 This Austrian efforts and activities, connected with the critique of US behavior in the area lead to worsening relations between Austria and the USA for some time. See Kramer (2006: 818 819).
35 rhetorically criticized the human rights situation and developments in Iran over the years, the economic relations were successfully developing. (See Hödl 2004: 144 145) But Bruno Kreisky´s at times feverish foreign policy activism went far beyond the real political significance of the country in Europe and the world. Since Austria never developed an adequate equivalent in military strength to buttress its security policy and since its resources were limited due to the economic difficulties, combined with the changing international environment providing less space for Austria’s small state foreign policy 42 and for its foreign policy activism, its injection into world politics came to an end in the 1980´s. (See Gehler – Bischof 2006: 7) The “Kreisky era” of Austrian foreign policy formally came to the end as a consequence of parliamentary elections in 1983, in which Kreisky´s SPÖ lost its absolute majority and was replaced by “small coalition” of SPÖ and FPÖ, which lead to more “Europe friendly” foreign policy. 43 (See Luif 2006: 868)
1.2.1.4 The decline of Austrian world activism - 1980s
In the 1980´s, Austria’s positive image suffered both abroad and at home. The change in Austrian foreign policy from the mid 1980s is in part attributable to the problems within the country’s domestic arena crucial arena concerned economic developments. By international standards, Austrian economy was very successful during the 1960s and 1970s. From 1983, however, Austria was faced with recession, rising unemployment and a structural crisis in the nationalized industries. (See Kramer 1998: 171) The myth of “the island of the blessed” was replaced by the perceptions of the “corruptible republic” and the “scandal republic”. 44 (Gehler – Bischof 2006: 9) The worsening of the economic performance lead to the loosing of the absolute majority of SPÖ and, after elections in 1983 to the creation of coalition government of SPÖ and FPÖ. Prime minister Sinowatz´s government focused mainly on solving internal problems.
42 The new tension in the relationship between the Soviet Union and US under Reagan very much limited space for maneuvering as well as opportunities to create „good offices“ which could be filled by the Austrians. See Kramer (1998: 170). 43 FPÖ was strenuously promoting the EEC/EC entry from the 1960s till end of 1980s, when it made an ideological grand circle and became energetic opponent of the EC/EU. For details see Luif (2006: 868). 44 Similar scandals as such that appeared in Austria in that times (Lucona affair, Noricum arms smuggling scandal being the biggest) were happening in other countries as well, nor were they new in Austria. Their suddenly hyperbolic size was mainly a result of the new media age and investigative journalists bringing the scandals up on the light. See Gehler – Bischof (2006: 9).
36 Regarding foreign policy, they decreased international activism and focused more on Europe and on closer problem. Kurt Waldheim´s election as President and Jörg Haider´s crowning as the leader of the Freedom Party in 1986 rang to the end of the generous Socialist policies of the “long seventies”. (Gehler – Bischof 2006: 7) Waldheim´s election whirled up intensive discussion about his activities during the World War II and about the role of Austria in WW II in general. The Waldheim debate, along with Austria and Austrians facing their difficult war past, unleashed a serious crisis domestically and a grave loss of prestige abroad. Most of the heads of states were distancing from him, high state visitors from abroad frequented the provincial capitals in order to avoid making contact with the internationally ostracized Waldheim. 45 (See Gehler – Bischof 2006: 8) Austria’s image in the world was quite damaged during this era, especially compared with the heights of the 1970s. In 1986, old “grand coalition” arrangements recurred and under Socialist Chancellors Franz Vranitzky and Viktor Klima survived till 1999. Alois Mock of the People’s Party took over the foreign ministry in 1987.46 Alois Mock, ÖVP party leader since 1979, made a clear conceptual and programmatic break with Kreisky´s globally oriented foreign policy and provided a new definition of Austria’s foreign policy guidelines. These included “realistic neutrality policy” based on “Austria’s real interests” and “natural self restraint”. The central aim was now “to assert regional, rather than global line of vision” (Luchak in Kramer 1998: 170) with the emphasis on Europe (and especially EC) and on Austria’s neighbors. (Kramer 1998: 170) The new conception was a step from “idealistic” world view of Kreisky to the view of Mock who personally defined the international relations in the best way of realistic International relations tradition as “basically a jungle, a sort of wilderness in which still the right of the stronger rules” (Mock in: Kramer 1998: 171) and where a foreign policy without military dimension and strong defense of the country cannot be efficient. 45 Waldheim received during his six years in office invitations only from Jordan, Pakistan and the Holy See. See Gehler – Bischof (2006: 8). 46 This represented also a change of power balance between the prime minister’s office and the foreign ministry. Kreisky kept in his governments the influence over the foreign policy and the foreign ministry was moved more to the position of an administrator of Prime minister’s ideas. In the grand coalition arrangement with Prime minister being from SPÖ and foreign minister from ÖVP, the powers over the foreign policy were executed mainly by the ÖVP held foreign ministry.
37 (See Kramer 2006: 822) Austrian foreign policy was going through the “identity crisis”, as the new regionally oriented concept of Alois Mock was being permanently infirmed by the coalition partner (SPÖ). (See Kramer 1998: 171) New priorities concentrated on the strengthening of Austria’s orientation towards western Europe and on launching of its formal membership in the European Communities. Mock´s “Western Europeanization” culminated in the “letter to Brussels” in 1989, the first step in the EC membership application process. Austria wanted to get to the EC for the hopes of solving its economic problems through that (See Luif 2006: 871) as well as for getting out of increasingly marginalized position due to Waldheim´s election (Gehler – Bischof 2006: 10). Apart from the EC, environmental questions and their international promotion appeared as the foreign policy topic. (See Erklärung der Bundesregierung... 1987: 33)
1.2.1.5 Foreign policy in the 1990s
The dramatic European and world developments that started in 1989 brought a further fundamental change in Austria’s international environment. For Austria and other European neutrals, the collapse of the communist regimes had more fundamental effects than for members of the Western block, if less sweeping than for the previously communist states. In former communist countries, both their internal regimes and their foreign policies were about undergoing a radical transformation. By contrast, the Western block countries maintained their domestic political and economic systems, as well as their international orientation, albeit in a different, less directly hostile environment (at least at the first sight). The neutrals also saw no reason to modify their internal structures. However, the foundations of their international status were called into question and they had to adapt to the new environment. (See Neuhold 1998: 203) The end of the East West conflict, in the context of which Austrian neutrality had been developed, led to the adoption of a looser and more flexible interpretation of Austria’s neutrality status. (See Kramer 1998: 173) Austria, which was a non permanent Security Council member in 1991 and 1992, took part not only in the economic sanctions against Iraq 47 but also allowed the US led alliance to transport war material across the country. Giving precedence to UN law over the law of neutrality signified a substantial change in Austria’s neutrality policy from an “integral” to a “differential” concept of
47 Austria did not join e.g. the US sanctions against Iran in 1978 nor did it join any other „power struggles“ of this type during the Cold War. See Hödl (2004: 144 145).
38 neutrality. (See Kramer 1998: 173) Together with the deconstruction of East West division, Austria geopolitically moved from “the edge of the West into the centre of Europe” (Klestil in Kramer 1998: 173) where it started to play influential regional role both regarding the political and economic influence. The end of the Cold War lead as well to further increase of Austrian orientation on the neighborhood countries and on Europe in general. Development of friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the neighbors in fact immediately became the policy priority and Austria was actively supporting the transformation processes of the “Eastern” countries on several levels. 48 With the down of the Cold War, Austria could also finally realistically work on its EC/EU membership. Austria showed its serious interest already in July 1989 by handing in an application for membership. This brought Austria some critique from the rest EFTA countries, which were seriously thinking about proposal of Jacques Delors on creation of European Economy Space. 49 (Luif 2006: 872) Nevertheless short time after Austria also Sweden, Finland, Switzerland and Norway handed in their applications. The membership negotiations between Brussels and Austria, Finland and Sweden 50 started in February 1993 (with Norway joining the process in April) and by the end of 1993 the agreement between Austria and the EU on most of the important questions was reached, and a compromise formula was devised regarding the issue of neutrality.51 On the “Jumbo meeting” held from 26 th February to 1 st May 1994 also the problematic questions of agriculture and transit were solved. And after the referendum on 12 th June 1994, resulting with two thirds popular support for the entry, Austria entered the EU on 1 st January 1995. This was “the beginning of a new chapter of Austrian history.” (Mock cited in Kramer 2006: 829) Partly with the time of, partly by the entrance to the EU, two core elements of the Second Republic’s political bargains and Austria’s identity wobbled and crumbled. The controversy over Waldheim effectively ended the postwar “doctrine” of Austria as an
48 For details on the Austrian politics towards the Czech Republic and other central European countries see Poláčková (2004) and other chapters in Hloušek Sychra (eds. 2004). 49 This was taken from the Austrian side as just a transitory step; Austria was not seriously concerned about it. See Luif (2006: 872). 50 Switzerland refused the EC application in referendum in December 1992. See Luif (2006: 872). 51 Austria would not have to participate on military operations and would not have to accept foreign armies on its territory; yet Austria would actively participate on further developments in this area. For details see Luif (2006: 873).
39 exclusive victim of Nazi policies. And as the Cold war came to the end and the East West conflict abated, Austria’s international position as a neutral became increasingly scrutinized. “Permanent neutrality” seemed an obsolete policy at the time when Austria’s formerly communist neighbors flocked into NATO. (See Pelinka 1998: 114) A great issue of importance for post 1990 Austria was the break up of Yugoslavia, with a lot of attention assigned to this extremely close crisis, and later conflict.52 It was again (after 1956) that Austria was the direct neighbor to the open conflict situation. The government tried hard to limit the destabilization of the region and promoted proposals and initiatives for conflict solving. (See Kramer 2006: 827) Federal government and also federal lands Carinthia and Styria developed intensive communication with Slovenia and Croatia and foreign minister Mock pressed hard for quick recognition of both countries – Austria recognized the countries shortly after the official recognition from the EC countries, on 15 th January 1992. Austria continued to play an active role in the Balkans also during 1992 and 1993 and kept trying to help with conflict solving and easing the humanitarian situation in Bosnia – Herzegovina. The Yugoslavia conflict led to the change of position of foreign minister Mock, who entered the office with critique of Kreisky’s active idealistic politic in the Yugoslavia conflict, Mock got very close to the active interventionist foreign policy style of Kreisky. (Kramer 2006: 828) Austria’s role was nevertheless not limited just on “high politics” negotiations. Both the government and the people were spending huge sums of money on aid programs and Austria also became the target country for bulk of refugees both from Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina. 53 Second half of 1990s was characteristic with continuous infighting between the SPÖ and ÖVP over foreign policy positions, especially in security policy, and on the role of neutrality in the evolving European security system. Fierce disputes persisted also between the Social democratic chancellor, the ÖVP foreign minister and the Austrian president (an ÖVP nominee) concerning their respective political and constitutional responsibilities in the field of foreign policy making and the representation of Austria in the EU. (Kramer 1998: 175) The lack of consensus on a dynamic interpretation of Austrian
52 As then Political director on foreign ministry Ernst Sucharipa (cited from Die Presse 2.9.1993 in Kramer 2006: 827) puts it, „Yugoslavia made for sure 30 35 % of our work, if not more.“ 53 By the end of 1992, Austria hosted 66 000 refugees coming from the conflict countries. See Kramer (2006: 828).
40 foreign policy interests – as apparent in the ambivalent attitude of government representatives towards Austria being a “small state” corresponded with a pessimistic and – in many sectors of Austrian population – distinctively xenophobic view of the Austrian public on large scale immigration, organized crime and other types of non military threat in the Europe of the 1990s. (See Kramer 1998: 175)
1.2.1.6 Foreign policy after 2000
The Schüssel government formed in February 2000 quickly dissipated the “EU high” of the late 1990s. The grand coalition was not possible due to the lack of will mainly from SPÖ. After forming government consisting of ÖVP and FPÖ, the fourteen EU countries embraced the sanctions against Austria, 54 freezing bilateral relations to minimum of diplomatic contacts in Vienna and Brussels. From one day to the next, “the EU darling Austria became the Community’s pariah.” (Gehler – Bischof 2006: 12) Austria paid a price in its foreign policy clout as a result of its isolation in 2000, when its leverage within Europe was significantly curtailed. On the top of this, its quaint neutrality status was limiting its maneuvering space in the international arena. (Gehler – Bischof 2006: 16) First Schüssel government oriented itself primarily on gaining acceptance from other European countries after the EU sanctions. And then generally in the framework of government program, it focused on promoting Austrian interests, especially in the frame of EU, and on promoting Austrian interests towards enlarging the EU. Regarding outer EU field, Austria proclaimed to participate actively in the UN and that it will participate “to its possibilities” on the security missions. Government also promised new law covering foreign aid problematic, which would clarify the conditions and priorities of Austrian foreign aid politics. (See Österreich neu regieren 2000: 5) It wanted to actively participate in the European and world security as the EU and UN member and in the EU framework, it wanted to fully participate in all planning and decision making processes and in the case, that this activities would anyhow be in conflict with its neutrality status, it could think about changing the neutrality law and adapting it for the new state of things. (See Österreich neu regieren 2000: 96 98)
54 EU threatened Austria on 31 st January about such sanctions in the event that ÖVP embraces Haider´s “right wing” FPÖ to the government and to the power. EU countries made to their words on 4 th February, after forming the government, even though Haider himself was not included among the government members and stood aside as governor of Carinthia. See Gehler – Bischof (2006: 12).
41 The government also prepared the new security conception. The conception was based on preventive security concept under the principle of European solidarity, nevertheless Austria would be defined as the “non committed” country. (See Skuhra 2006: 855) The effort to make the country’s security system more efficient was showed also by creating a “national security council” by the Chancellor office, which should ease and speed up the decision making processes in this area. Second Schüssel´s government in 2003 came with the new program,55 nevertheless in the foreign policy sections it brought just minor content changes. Austria wanted to promote its interest in and through European Union, supported EU enlargement and also the internal EU changes connected with the enlargement process. It also specially pointed out protection and care of German speaking minorities – especially of those in South Tyrol. (Regierungsprogramm 2003: 4 5) Regarding security cooperation, it further supported deeper security cooperation under the EU framework and fulfilling of the security goals set – mainly the Petersberg tasks – as well as further deepening of cooperation between Austria and NATO, with entry after positive referendum being one of the options. (Regierungsprogramm 2003: 5) As was in the previous program, government put high influence on environmental protection and promoting environmental protection also outside the country borders. (Regierungsprogramm 2003: 27)
1.2.1.7 The developments since 2007
The grand coalition government of Alfred Gusenbauer was formed after the elections held in October 2006 after lengthy negotiations just in January 2007. Gusenbauer´s government program puts big focus on further economic growth of Austria and on guaranteeing highest possible internal as well external security for the citizens of the country. Also the membership in the EU should be used for highest possible gain for Austrian citizens. (See Regierungsprogramm 2007: 3 4). Austria should use its foreign activities, including the development aid, for improving the image of Austria in the world and through that improving the chances of Austria to promote its own interests. (Regierungsprogramm 2007: 13) In the international affairs, it puts peace as the highest goal on which it will be actively working, with the main topics being security, economic development, migration
55 The elections brought important strengthening of ÖVP and weakening of FPÖ, which naturally lead to reduction of FPÖ´s influence in the government coalition. See Luif (2006: 877).
42 and diversification of energy sources (Regierungsprogramm 2007: 5 6) Also it wants to focus on promoting its position as a place of dialogue, especially as a place of multi cultural dialogue and on promoting gender equality as a hot topic. (See Regierungsprogramm 2007: 12) From the regional point of view, the western Balkan stays the priority.
1.2.2 Ideological and political fundaments of Austrian foreign policy
Austria is a small state that was deadlocked for some 44 years in between two competing blocks, where it grew to be one of the richest and most developed countries in the world. After end of the Cold War, which created for Austria certain stable environment in which it mastered its foreign policies and its image as a deal broker and summit host, Austria had to strive for accommodation to the new conditions in the world. Austrian modern history lacks moments of great victories or big successful revolutions on which national identity could be built all the turning points were mostly taken as losses by some relevant part of the population till the independence in 1955, which constructs one of the main point of identity. 15 th May 1955, when the State Treaty was signed, was the first time all Austrians were able to experience a common, unifying success. This event created the first pillar of Austrian national identity, with permanent neutrality approved by the Parliament on 26 th October 1955 being the second. (See Bruckmüller 1998: 84) Austria does not have any unifying “Austrian myth” bar the independence and neutrality which were constructed as such. (Bruckmüller 1998: 85) Further, as Austrian historian Friedrich Heer said, “no country in Europe has been shaped more dramatically by outside forces and factors than Austria.” (Heer in Gehler – Bischof 2006: 2) These factors influence the Austrian foreign policy the way that it tries to distinguish itself from its 1914/1918 – 1945 past – the foreign policy was built on securing the then already appreciated state independence the best it could and with any means it could. From that comes the international activism and wish to accommodate as many international organizations and meetings in Vienna as possible – all this can be seen as the tool for guaranteeing the independence, when not by military means (what was impossible to manage) then by political means and doubtless international recognition and status.
43 Austria has, as is in a parliamentary democracy common, more sources of foreign policy power. By the law, the foreign policy lies in the competence of the federacy. The coordination role and therefore also the leading position has the Federal Chancellor; the foreign ministry exerts the “traffic with the abroad” and the Parliament fulfills its control function. (Gärtner – Rendl 2001: 196). The Federal President has through his representative role and through his position as the highest commander of the army influence on foreign policy of the state as well. The “Bundesländer” play an important role in the field of cross boarder working communities or in the minorities´ questions and they have also the right to make the international legal agreements. As advisory body for the government the Council on foreign matters was made up, composed from members of the government, high officers and parliament members. Nevertheless, the real competences are of course a bit different from legal texts: the main role is by the foreign ministry and the Chancellor (the power fights are daily bread especially at the times when these positions are held by different party members), with president keeping his rather representative role and the Council for foreign matters having due to rare meetings rather less significant role. The Parliament fulfills its role of the control organ of the executive. (See Gärtner – Rendl 2001: 197) It can be said that Austria’s foreign policy makers since 1945 have generally succeeded in actively probing the international environment and utilizing it for the successful realization of national foreign policy goals. This meant attaining and safeguarding national independence, satisfying basic social and economic needs and strengthening political cohesion and national identity. This worked perfectly fine till the 1980s. From the end of the 1970s, however, as the international constellation changed and closed some of the former windows of opportunity for neutral small states in Europe and in global politics, Austria’s politics of neutrality and its small state foreign policy perspective faced growing difficulties. (Kramer 1998: 163) With the end of the Cold War, Austria had to adapt to the new environment and safeguard its interests in the new international order. Again, its leaders did quite well.
44 1.2.3 Political and economic position in the world
Austria is a country of 8,2 mil inhabitants covering area of 83 870 km 2. Its GDP in purchasing power parity is 319,7 bil. USD (per capita it is 39 000 USD) and in the UN Human development index it ranks 15 th in the world. (http://hdr.undp.org) Austria has diplomatic relations with 156 non European states, 117 non European countries have their representative offices in Vienna; Austria has embassies in 43 non European countries. (www.bmeia.gv.at) Generally, Austria is taken as a successful and respected country and it can be said, that it managed to build a position outreaching standard country of its size and population. Austria was, especially during the Cold war, profiting from its small state neutral status and it was effectively band wagoning on the international system setting. After the fall of the Berlin wall, it had to adapt itself – what it did quite successfully. Austria’s success in squaring several political circles during the Cold war can be best demonstrated by several aspects of its international status. (See Neuhold 1998: 204 207) Austria was a `permanently neutral` country, however, this did not anyhow impeded its Western ideological orientation. Neutrality also did not prevent the country from developing intensive economic relations with their main partners in the Western Europe. Nevertheless, this ideological, political and economic ties to the West did not prevent it from pursuing an active neutrality policy for which the term “bridge building” was often used. Austria’s offers of good offices and mediations were appreciated both by the West and by the East and Vienna was often a place of inter block meetings.56 Austria tried and managed to somehow stand aside both East West conflict and North South conflict. (See Hödl 2004: 73) Nevertheless, despite its rhetoric and proclamations it was always clear, that it is on the side of West and North. Austria learned to live comfortably as the easternmost bastion of the Western camp in the shadow of the Iron curtain and to profit from this position.57 Austrian understanding of neutrality has meant, from the economic point of view, to be able and willing to trade with everybody without any outer bindings. (See Hödl
56 Among others it were the US Soviet summits in 1962 and 1979, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks between NATO and WTO from 1973 to 1989. See Neuhold (1998: 205). 57 Including `free riding` on the given security system. It was tacitly assumed that, if the country was attacked by one bloc, more probably by Warsaw Treaty Organization, the other alliance would come to its rescue to prevent the aggressor from upsetting the precarious overall balance. See Neuhold (1998: 206 and 208).
45 2004: 88) Austria did not participate in the sanctions against the various regimes, with the most famous being not acceding to the US sanctions against Iran in 1978 and general ignorance of sanctions against apartheid Republic of South Africa. Austria has always wanted to include and negotiate also with the „evil“ regimes and countries, proclaiming that it is better to speak with them than to let them do what they want. Still, these proclamations also included developing business contacts with these states, including exports of weapons.58 (See Hödl 2004: 98 99) Also for Austria the fact that small countries can promote their interest best on the ground of multilateral organizations is valid. In this respect, Austria has been extremely active and also extremely successful. Vienna is the seat of several international organizations or their offices including the UN, OSCE and OPEC and a regular place of important meetings and conferences. Austria also managed to get the prominent positions in the international organizations, such as the Secretary General of the UN (Kurt Waldheim, in office 1972 1982).
1.2.3.1 Austria and the EU
Austria could not join the European integration process during the Cold war due to its neutrality status and indignation of USSR for any closer economic or political connections with Germany. Nevertheless it kept the closest possible contacts and its economy was intensively interconnected with the EEC economies and especially with the German economy. Austria tried to lower the economic costs from its non membership in the EEC through its activities in the EFTA, where it was the pulling power for closer contacts between EFTA and the EEC. (See Hloušek Sychra 2004: 22) Austria tried to join the enlargement process in 1961, when it handed in its application for the association, together with the membership applications of UK, Denmark, Ireland and Norway. These all were vetoed by the French president de Gaulle in 1963, as well as in 1967 in the second application trial of these countries. In the 1970s, after the leave of Charles de Gaulle from the president office, the discussions between the EFTA and EEC countries moved to direction of negotiating the trade agreements and creation of the free trade zone between both parties. (See Hloušek Sychra 2004: 23). Together with the ending Cold War and economic stagnation of Austria, it showed its
58 Austria was an important exporter of weapons – in 1978 it became the 7th biggest in the world, with most of the weapons going to the third world countries. See Hödl (2004: 145 147).
46 interest again in joining the EC it was the first country of this enlargement round to hand in the application, on 17 th July 1989. The entry negotiations were problematic especially in the sectors of transit transportations, in keeping the neutrality status and in agriculture, but were successfully closed on the 1 st March 1994 and Austria joined the EU, after a successful referendum, 59 on 1 st January 1995, together with Finland and Sweden. With joining the EU, Austria as economically well developed country became directly the “net payer” to the European budget. Austria has been participating on all economic and political projects of the EU, but it has been reluctant on EU´s security projects due to its neutrality status: it joined the EMU at its start on 1 st January 1999, but it did not join the CSFP at first; although it started limited participation in it with the Amsterdam Treaty. In the second half of 1998, Austria had its first experience of the Council of EU presidency. Its priorities were the introduction of common currency, employment, EU enlargement process, environmental questions and solving the problems of youth. (Hloušek Sychra 2004: 28) It strived to be a “fair broker” (Gärtner Redl 2001: 195), although sometimes it just left the conflict issues to the next half year, on German presidency. In 2000, Austria got under the “quarantine” from the rest EU countries after the creation of ÖVP FPÖ government, what lead to dramatic decrease of support for the EU at the Austrian citizens as well as to the disenchant at the Austrian political elite. It took some time till the Austrian bitterness about the EU´s procedure reduced. Austria has been an active EU member participating in its projects and co building the ever more unite EU, still on the probably main project of the EU of that time – the Eastern enlargement, it was somehow inconsistent in its positions. Austria, together with Germany, was clear biggest beneficiary of the enlargement, as well as it would be influenced by most of the negative impacts of the transformation processes connected with the joining of its eastern neighbors (such as uncontrolled inflow of cheap labor force, lowering life standard of the Austrians or issues as agriculture and transport were the main fears) (See Poláčková 2004: 41 42) Austria did not really use its political potential to be the “good example” for the countries and focused on bringing up more ideologically problematic issues on which domestic voters hear 60 rather then on technicalities or real
59 The referendum was held on 12 th June 1994 and 66,4 % of the voters (voter participation 81,3 %) were for the membership. See Kaniok (2003: 122). 60 Beneš´s decrees and Temelín issue being the brightest example of this, but also labor market limitations were based more on domestic fears than any research of potential dangers for Austrian labor market.
47 problems which should be solved. Still all the problems were either solved or buried under the carpet of old news and Austria supported the enlargement, although it chose to have the longest possible transitory period for opening its labor market for the citizens of the new countries. Since November 2004, Benita Ferrero Waldner has been the Commission member responsible for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy. Apart from this prestigious post, Austrian citizens provided also more than proportional share of all posts in the European Commission. 61 (See Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2006: 12) After the EU entrance of the ten countries in 2004, Austria supported entry of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU, but with several temporary restrictions on the EU freedoms. Austria also supports the entry of Croatia; with Turkey, the other candidate, its position is rather tepid. Regarding the process of EU internal reform and planned “EU constitution”, Austria was one of the first countries that ratified the “Treaty on the Constitution for Europe” (See Außenpolitische Bericht 2005: 5 7). After the failure of ratification process, Austria has been one of the countries pulling the reform process initiatives further. In the first half of 2006, Austria was the presiding country of the EU Council for the second time. It had a busy half a year trying to solve appearing risk situations such as illness of Ariel Sharon, election victory of Hamas and following questions about the future development of Near East process as well as it had to still the situation after the “Mohammed caricatures” affairs and situation around Iran. Over these issues, Asia did not get into sight of Austria during its presidency half year. (See Tichy Fisslberger 2007: 173) During its Council presidency, two new missions under the EU´s ESDP were established– the EU Planning Team in Kosovo and EU military operation to support the UN´s mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. (See Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2006: 27) Main general success of the Austrian presidency of the first half of 2006 was agreeing on the financial perspective for the next years. Austria also wanted to breake the deadlock with the constitutional treaty. In this respect they did not really succeed though, but the EU countries managed to agree on a compromise solution of continuing working on basis of current legal grounds in the so called “Europe of projects” with parallel efforts to ratify the new legal document. (See Zpráva o zahraniční politice 2006: 7)
61 By the end of 2004, Austrians held 2 % of the posts with the population accounting just 1,78 % of the total EU population. See Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook (2006: 12).
48 1.2.3.2 Austria in other international organizations
After the trauma of the disappearance of Austria from the world map in 1938, membership of Austria in the international organizations played a central role in its foreign policy. Austria wanted to be not just a member, but tried to be an active member as it wanted to constitute its function in the international system and through that guarantee its independence as a small state. (See Michal Misak – Quendler 2006: 910) Austria struggled to become part of the newly made UN system as soon as possible – it applied for membership already in 1947, what was first vetoed by the USSR, but it received at least the status of an observer. As a full member it was accepted in December 1955. Austria’s active role in the UN and other international organization was increasing its influence and its status in the international politics and Austrian governments tried hard to establish Vienna as the seat of international organizations and as the place of important international conferences and meetings.62 (Michal Misak Quendler 2006: 914) As was said above, this was seen as an important contribution to the security of Austria and guarantee of its independence. Austria has been immensely active on the international field, especially from 1955 till late 1980s. It successfully carried out its small state foreign policy both on the bilateral level through its active “diplomacy of state visits”, as well as through its active participation in the multilateral organizations, especially in the UN, where it played active and prominent role. Austrian diplomat Kurt Waldheim was elected Secretary General in 1971 and reappointed for another term in 1976. Austrian representatives served as chairpersons of important UN commissions and Vienna was developed into the third seat of UN headquarters in the 1970s.63 This, of course, elevated Austria’s international reputation and helped mobilize international support for Austria’s own foreign policy interests. Austria’s activity in, and support for, the UN could even be regarded as an investment designed to safeguard and strengthen national security. 64 (Kramer 1998: 168)
62 Among others SALT I. talks in 1970 1972, MBfR negotiations from 1973 to 1989, signing of SALT II. from Carter and Brezhnev in 1979. See Michal Misak – Quendler (2006: 914). 63 As Skuhra (2006: 843 844) puts it, „the costs for the UNO City building during the 1970s were one of the best security investments Austria has ever made.“ 64 As Zemanek puts it (in Kramer 1998: 168), Austria seeked through its multilateral activism recognition, in a political and not just legal sense, as a useful and indispensable member of the international community – what was again motivated by craving for difference from the pre World War II regime and status.
49 UN also played a central role in the Austrian relations towards the third world because of, apart from other reasons, the simple possibility of contacts with the countries on the ground of the UN, as the limits of small state and its budget create a hurdle to vast contacts all over the world. (Hödl 2004: 71) Despite Bruno Kreisky´s active foreign politics, oriented on the support of the third world and participation on many meetings of the non allied movement, Austrian role in the UN as well as its material support for the third world stood marginal. (Michal.Misak – Quendler 2006: 917)
1.2.4 Austrian security position
Austria’s neutrality has lost with the end of Cold War its principal “conflict of reference” and the crucial geo strategic functions on which its vital acceptability depended. The world has since 1989 not witnessed “the end of history”, let alone of international conflicts. The number of conflicts in Europe and elsewhere has dramatically increased and consequently the need for the third party “bridge building” has also grown. For the neutrals, however, this mounting demand has gone hand in hand with the loss of their privileged position in this area. Nowadays, good offices, mediation and similar services are performed more frequently by countries that belong to military alliances than by “independent” neutrals. (See Neuhold 1998: 208) The Gulf War meant first direct change in the neutrality position. Austria allowed the UN anti Iraq allies air and land transit over the Austrian territory and it fully participated in called UN sanctions against Iraq, including the military sanction.65 (See Skuhra 2006: 847) The neutrality was getting the new content. The argument went that the Gulf War was not a war in a classical meaning, but rather an action in the meaning of a police action of collective security system built under the framework of the UN. Austria has been active in the Balkans, participates on various UN mission, is a member of the EU and it participates on the civilian and military operations of the EU 66 in the Balkans. (Kramer 2006: 833) It is a member of NATO program Partnership for 65 During former economic UN sanctions against Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977 Austria was pointing at its neutrality and did not fully respect the sanctions. See Skuhra (2006: 847). 66 Austria did not join the EU´s CSFP at the Maastricht Treaty at first, but since the Amsterdam Treaty, Austria joined the CSFP and participates on Petersberg aims, crisis and conflict solving and Austrian troops can be sent under the EU flag to the missions varying from peace keeping to peace enforcement. See Filzmaier et al. (2006: 23).
50 Peace,67 although it chose to participate just on two out of three levels 68 of its activities: in peace keeping, humanitarian operations, missions at catastrophes and rescue and help operations. (See Skuhra 2006: 850) Despite all this, legally seen, Austria is still a neutral country and it does not seem this would change. In the late 1990s and early 2000s a wider debate about Austria’s neutrality and about possibility of entering NATO developed, but this debate did not lead to the breaking change and Austria, despite connections and cooperation, continues to be outside NATO (See Skuhra 2006: 852 853) and continues to proclaim itself neutral. The reason for this is that neutrality is more part of the national and state identity than active and influential foreign policy basis. Neutrality has always been seen as the identification feature and as the guarantee for Austrian security and economic development. To this counts also the fact, that neutrality has not been seen, and was not, just a price for Austrian independence but the way for reaching it and for reaching the territorial integrity. (Flizmaier et al. 2006: 15 16) And as such, it is still vastly popular. 69 Still the concept of neutrality can also bring some hot moments for Austrian diplomacy. The terrorist attacks of 11/09 2001 were immediately condemned by Austria and Austria expressed its support to the USA. Nevertheless the following Iraq war lead to problematic tacking from the Austrian foreign ministry: then foreign minister Ferrero Waldner declared at first Austrian neutrality in the conflict – what was shortly after taken back not to make the impression that Austria is equidistant to USA and Hussein’s Iraq. (See Skuhra 2006: 856) Austrian security policy is directly linked to the NATO PfP and – as member state – to the European Union (Hauser 2006: 212) and although its neutrality can seem like an anachronism (Hloušek Sychra 2004: 15), Austria will probably keep this status even if it should be just a political declaration. But there is still the identity problem of Austrian neutrality, coming from the fact that neutrality, whether permanent or not, cannot be declared and practiced in a political vacuum. It requires a conflict in which it is practiced. (Neuhold 1998: 208) And in the time
67 It joined the program in February 1995. 68 The three levels are humanitarian actions, peace keeping actions and military actions. See Skuhra (2006: 850). 69 In a survey in January 2000, 73 % of respondents were against entry to NATO. In a survey done after 11 th September 2001, 81 % of respondents were against entry to NATO (and at the same time, 74 % of the same respondents said that that think neutrality does not protect against terrorism). See Filzmaier et al. (2006: 18).
51 when main security threats are terrorism, intra state conflicts and international organized crime, towards what should one be neutral? Austria is currently not threatened by any of its neighbors and the danger of being territorially attacked is an outdated picture. The dangers it is now facing are indirect; the biggest danger being economic and social instability in the close countries (mostly Balkan countries). (See Pelinka – Rosenberger 2003: 248) Current main security perspectives are crisis prevention, practiced mainly through economic, social, cultural and generally foreign politics, and crisis containment through peace making and peace keeping activities. The problem regarding the Austrian peace making and peace keeping activities is that Austria has an unsuitable structure of the army for fulfilling these goals. Austrian army, das Bundesheer, was established in 1955 for the purpose of general country defense and it is still based on conscription. The relatively big size of the army, the conscription principle and the lack of needed material (e.g. transport technique) lay down serious obstacles for the role of the army in the crisis prevention or crisis containment operations. (See Pelinka – Rosenberger 2003: 251) But even with these obstacles Austria has taken part in more then 30 missions with circa 40 000 persons (soldiers, policemen and civil experts) since 1960. (Gärtner – Rendl 2001: 198) It participated in operations i.e. in Congo (1960), Cyprus (1972), Sinai (1973 74), Golan Heights (1974), in 1990s in Balkan missions IFOR, SFOR (since 1996), KFOR (since 1999) and currently is active in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA 108 soldiers), Kosovo (KFOR – 553 soldiers), on the line between Israel and Syria (UNDOF 373 soldiers) and in Tschad (EUFOR Tschad 154 soldiers), as well as on other 13 spots where it has under 10 soldiers. (See http://www.bmlv.gv.at/ausle/index.shtml)
1.2.5 Human rights
Austria has been active in the promotion of human rights ever since the establishment of the Second Republic and with the growing international activism it declared their abidance as one of the important points of its foreign aims. The problem with promoting human rights is that the state should follow its principals in every kind of situation, that it “keeps to be principal, which means to be as far from selective politics and
52 “double standards” as possible.” 70 (Pštross 2004: 211) Austria has been in this dilemma rather on the realistic side, with rhetorically intensively proclaiming importance of human rights and their observance, but at the same time saying how important it is to include also the problematic countries and their leaders to the international arena “to influence them”. And during speaking with them, they were also making business with them. (See Hödl 2004: 98 99) Austria was choosing with whom it will make business and who it will press hard on its own. It criticized Iran after 1978 for not observing the human rights, but it did continue making business with it. On the other side, Austria harshly criticized Pol Pot´s regime and Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, as well as the regime based on the Thai invasion of the country and refused to recognize the regimes. (See Hödl 2004: 101) Clearly, the different importance of economic interests did matter. In the second half of the 1980s, with the foreign minister Mock, the international pressure of Austria on observance of the human rights got fresh breath. Austria proclaimed, that „expressions of concern that human rights are not observed in a certain state cannot be considered as interference in the domestic affairs of that particular state“ (Mock in Hödl 2004: 120) on what followed increased pressure on regimes in South Africa, Iraq and Libya. During the 1990s, Austrian focus on human rights questions was naturally mainly in the Balkans. Austria was a very active actor and tried hard to help to solve the conflict as well as to improve the life situation of the inhabitants, including accepting tens of thousands of refugees. Austria was also host to series of big conferences on human rights. (See Kramer 2006: 833) Nowadays the promotion of human rights is an “integral part of Austrian foreign policy” (Außenministerin Plassnik: Menschenrechte zentrales Anliegen der österreichischen Außenpolitik, 10/12 2004) and as such it was planned as one of the central topics of the latest Austrian EU presidency. The issues in which Austria is mostly engaged are the protection of minorities, the rights of women and children, the world wide enforcement of prohibition of torture and fight against racisms,
70 Here we get again to the conflict of realism and idealism – Austria (and CR as well) should follow proposing and defending human rights in every situation and in every kind of relations. So far from idealism. But should it then pay for this with no economy contacts with countries violating human rights? Where is the fine balance between this? And is there any optimal solution for this dilemma?
53 xenophobia and anti Semitism. (See Grundsätze der österreichischen Menschenrechtspolitik at http://www.bmeia.gv.at)
1.2.6 Development aid
Austria was a major receiver of foreign aid after the Second World War although this was not called development aid but “European Recovery Program” or Marshall Plan. With the start of 1960s, Austria moved to the position of stable net giving country. Main motivations for providing foreign aid were at the time anticommunism, foreign policy reasons and economic calculations and humanitarian motivations, (Hödl 2004: 198) main proclaimed motivation was „to give our part for making this world of tomorrow a world of freedom“ (Mahnert in Hödl 2004: 200) The first time when foreign development aid appeared in the governmental program as part of foreign policy was in Kreisky´s government in 1971, though this step seemed rather like an effort to improve the image of Austria in the world than a strive to improve the life conditions in the poor countries. (See Politik für Österreichs Zukunft 1971: 48 49) Kreisky joined in the growing Western appreciation of the problems of the North South conflict and the third world problems, but the foreign aid budgets itself spoke to the fact, that he did not put his money where his mouth were. (Gehler – Bischof 2006: 7) Kreisky’s governments continued to show interests in the third world throughout all their years at the helm, yet these were always connected to the image of Austria and to the improved chances of Austrian exporters. This can be said in general about the Austrian relations to the third world countries during the Cold war and also after. Foreign aid as it was, was more a lobby tool for Austria and Austrian industry than a sincere effort to improve the life conditions in the target countries. (See Hödl 2004: 202 204) As Kreisky put it already in 1963, „Austria should use its three advantages in the relation towards the third countries: as a small state, as a neutral state and as a non post colonial state.“ (Kreisky in Hödl 2004: 76) Austria used its status for its economic and political gains and supported the decolonization and development of the third world – more with words than money though. As any western country during the Cold war did, also Austria had clear preferences in the dilemma between following its proclaimed principles
54 for support to the developing countries and the potential rise of the Soviet influence: if the decolonization was anyhow connected with the rise of Soviet influence, then Austria always stood on the side of the west European countries. (Hödl 2004: 77) After 1989 breaking of the Soviet block, dissolving of the USSR and break up of Yugoslavia had the full attention of Austrian foreign ministry and the North South relations were naturally put to the backyard of interest and humanitarian and development aid was focused mainly on the Balkans. The focus points of Austrian development cooperation at the crossing of the millenniums were support of democracy, equal rights and environmental protection. (See Gärtner – Rendl 2001: 198) The main aims are the reduction of inequality between the rich and the poor, safeguarding peace and security and protecting the environment. Gusenbauer´s government promised in its government program to increase the figure reserved for foreign development aid in 2010 on 0,51 % of GDP. In 2007 this figure rose from 0,47 % to 0,49 % and the government is thus approaching its goals. (http://www.bmeia.gv.at) ODA should be thematically focused on cluster education in medicine, technologies for small and medium enterprises, education and energy. The development aid should focus more on participation of women as managers of the aid received as well as to secure that the aid provided fulfills interests of women. (See Regierungsprogramm 2007: 14) For the coordination and more efficient execution of the development cooperation the Austrian development agency (ADA) was founded as a governmental institution (under foreign ministry) managing this area. The general priorities of ADA are water and hygiene, rural development, energy supply, private development, education and good governance, (http://www.ada.gv.at) with the leading lines of development cooperation as such being the good governance, human rights and securing the peace and conflict prevention. (OEZA Leitlinien at http://www.ada.gv.at) For support of the development aid the Austrian Research Foundation for Development Aid (Österreichische Foschungsstiftung für Internationale Entwicklung – ÖFSE) was founded which provides the information service and scientific research connected with the development cooperation.
55 From the regional point of view, there are 14 priority countries and other 18 partner countries: Tab. 1: Target countries of Austrian development cooperation
Region Priority countries Partner countries
Central America Nicaragua Guatemala, El Salvador
West Africa / Sahel Cap Verde, Burkina Faso Senegal
Kenya, Burundi, Tanzania, East Africa Ethiopia, Uganda Rwanda
Zimbabwe, Namibia, Republic South Africa Mozambique of South Africa
Himalaya / Hindukush Bhutan Nepal, Pakistan
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, South Europe Moldavia, Montenegro, Serbia
South Caucasus Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia
Other priority countries Palestinian lands
Special programs Afghanistan, Iraq, West Sahara
Source: Austrian Development Agency (http://www.ada.gv.at/view.php3?f_id=8305&LNG=de&version=)
1.3 Conclusion of the chapter
General policies of the Czech Republic and Austria are very much resembling each other, even though both countries had different modern history developments. Still, in basic frames both were coming out from analogous situations during the forming years of their policies – both wanted to establish themselves as stable democratic countries, to guarantee their independence and territorial integrity and safety and to facilitate the economic development and growth. Both countries also chose similar strategy to achieve this – they focused on multilateralism and on guaranteeing their independence and democratic developments through their membership in international organizations. Austria
56 at first mainly through the UN (as it was the most important international organization it was allowed to enter during the Cold War), CR mainly through NATO and EU. As small countries, they tried to increase their influence via multilateralism and promoting their interests in international organizations. Both countries show similarities in several fields of their foreign policy – next to their orientation on multilateralism also in their “idealistic” activities to promote world peace and world developments, in their orientation on human rights, as well as in their “realistic” promotion of their own economic wellbeing and its own interests, even for the price of laying aside the idealistic ideas promoted in the speeches of its leaders. Both Austria and the Czech Republic have based their foreign policies very much on multilateralism – as it is the best way to promote the interests of the small countries on the international stage. In this field, Austria has been more active and more successful than the Czech Republic due to unequivocal agreement of all main political forces on the good brought by Austrian active role in the international organizations and on the good of international organizations having their offices in Austria. In this respect, Czech political elite has not been that positive about the international organizations, nor was there the broad political consensus like in Austria. Although the Czech Republic managed to get a stable position in the international organizations system, Austria has established itself better. Of course, this position is a subject to change in time as CR has been building its position for just 14 years whereas Austria has had 52 years to establish itself on the international scene. Regarding the “idealistic” positions of both countries and their promotion of human rights, both countries have been strenuous rhetorical promoters of democracy and human rights. Regarding the real political decisions taken on account of this promotion, both countries had their lighter and darker moments, depending on their general national interests – with Austria being clearly on the “realistic” side of the realistic x idealistic dilemma. Austria was doing business with dubious countries, but then it accepted thousands of refugees from the nearby conflict countries. The Czech Republic did not have these individualistic approaches to dubious regimes as Austria did, mainly due to its bindings to NATO and from that consequential need to follow the US rules (e.g. famous case of Tamara radar sales). But it also never provided that huge aid effort as Austria did during the Balkan conflict. Both countries have had their favorite regions of interest in their democracy promotion efforts– in case of Austria it is at first the Balkans and then
57 central and eastern Europe in general. The Czech Republic’s favorite regions for human rights promotion are Cuba and Belarus and then the Balkans. In the security field, both countries come out from different institutional guarantees and bases, still in fact both have the same real security position. Territorial security of both countries is guaranteed through NATO and EU and their position in this respect is very good. Regarding their world activism, the position of the countries differs on the basis of Austrian neutrality and Czech NATO membership. Outside Europe Austria takes part just in the UN and EU missions, whereas CR has deployments also under the NATO flag (e.g. in Afghanistan). Both Austria and the Czech Republic have their soldiers and military or police personnel in the Balkan missions; Austria has then deployment on Golan Heights whereas Czech soldiers are in Afghanistan. Again, it can be said that both countries have rather analogous position in this field and that their differences are more “thematic” (different areas of deployments) than fundamental – as both countries have their security based via EU and NATO (although Austria as a neutral is just band wagoning on surrounding NATO countries and keeps the neutrality label even with very limited real content). Regarding human rights, Austria has taken more “realistic” position, whereas the Czech Republic keeps more of the “idealistic” values influencing its foreign policy in this respect. Austria has been appealing on human rights just in cases and in the way that it would not anyhow threaten its economic interests. The business has always been clearly superior to the moral issues. Compared to that Czech promotion of human rights is more based on the believes than money – Czech representatives promote human rights even in the situations when it is not the best for Czech economic interests and when it is not widely accepted even by its allies (e.g. case of Cuba). Of course, in many cases the economic interests get clear priority, but this priority is not a rule as in case of Austria. In development cooperation both countries follow rather similar ways – focusing recently on a smaller group of recipients to make the money provided being spent in more efficient way. The countries naturally differ in their priority areas – depending on their interests (and their institutional interests). Austria is orienting on the Himalayan countries (Bhutan and Nepal), CR has important projects on Sri Lanka. In both countries, the development cooperation is becoming more and more recipient oriented that donor oriented. The projects are more focusing on what is needed in the countries that what is best to provide. Still, national business interests keep to be influential influential.
58 How is the South Asia touched in the general foreign policy views and plans? Hardly at all. None of the countries has any important mentions of South Asia in their foreign policy plans or governmental programs. The only thing they do, and they do it both, is to proclaim developing good mutual relations, especially good economic relations. None of the countries has created foreign policy strategies going outside Europe, USA and main international organizations. As such, South Asia is in general foreign policy plans seen as just a marginal focus area. In case of Czech policy, the only interests are in fact economic relations with India, Austria, next to economic connections with India, has interest also in human developments in Bhutan and Nepal as the priority countries of its development assistance.
59 2 THE SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES AND THE EU ROLE IN SOUTH ASIA
In this chapter I will try to provide general overview over the South Asian countries as the target countries of my work as well as over the role and activities of the European Union in the region. Insights to the countries´ political, economic, as well as security developments and positions should give better light on the relevance of these countries in the world as well as on their relevance and importance for Austria and the Czech Republic and their foreign policies. Insight to the EU´s role in South Asia should then provide view on relevance of the European Union in the region as well as on its relevance for countries´ foreign policies in the region.
2.1 General overview of the South Asian countries
South Asian countries are very diversified in their size and population and economic strenght. India is the biggest economy, stable democracy (even though far from a perfect one) and definite regional power. Bangladesh is the second most populated country in the region but due to its poverty and internal problems, it is more focused on itself than anything else. Nepal is in the midst of the transformation process, as well as Bhutan. Sri Lanka could be fast growing and prosperous country, however it is ocupied with a civil war that takes lots of its resources. And the Maldives slowly move towards fairer democracy and better distribution of incomes from tourism.
60 Tab. 2: Some basic indicators of the countries researched
GDP 2006 GNI per GDP HDI 2007 Area Population Country (billions capita growth (of 177 (sq km) 2006 (mil) USD) 2006 2006 (%) countries)
Bangladesh 144 000 144,3 62 480 6,7 140
Bhutan 47 000 0,64 0,93 1 410 4,3 133
India 3,3 mil 1 100 906,3 820 9,2 128
The Maldives 300 0,34 0,92 2 680 18,7 100
Nepal 147 200 27,7 8,1 290 1,9 142
Sri Lanka 65 610 19,8 27 1 300 7,4 99
Austria 83 870 8,2 322,4 39 590 3,1 15
CR 78 870 10,2 141,8 12 680 6,1 32
Source: World Bank Country Profiles (http://web.worldbank.org) and UNDP Human Development Report Country Statistics (http://hdr.undp.org)
2.1.1 India
India 71 is the second most populous country in the world, with nearly 1,1 bil. inhabitants (in 2006). Its economy is the 12 th largest in the world measured in nominal US dollars and third when measured at purchasing power parity exchange rates. (Economist.com: Country Briefings India) But India is a country “occupying two worlds simultaneously” (India Country Strategy Paper 2007 2013: 1) – the first is the one changing fast into a modern capitalist, high tech based society, the second one stays landlocked in the poverty, illiteracy, hunger and no hope for better future. India is an emerging world power country with nuclear weapons program, space program, one of the best IT companies and home of 3 out of 10 richest men in the world (Forbes.com – Billionaires). But it is also home of one third of the world’s poor (India Country Strategy
71 Official name in English is “The Republic of India”, in Hindu it is “Bhárat Ganradžja“.
61 Paper 2007 2013: 1) and a place of disparity of opportunity and harsh discrimination based on sex 72 , caste and income. India loves to call itself the biggest democracy in the world 73 it has the tradition of democracy since its independence in 1947. Despite its democratic grounds, the country is still heavily burdened with corruption, nepotism and predominating self interest of an individual regarding public matters as well as with outright dominance of money on political influence, including police and courts. Apart from these, communal, caste and regional tensions continue to haunt Indian politics, sometimes threatening its long standing democratic and secular ethos. (See BBC News Country Profile: India) Indian economy has been growing fast in the last two decades, since the economic liberalization started in 1991. The growth is based mainly on the services sector although India has several major industrial companies as well. Although business processing, information technology, telecoms and manufacturing have been booming, India’s economy remains in general mostly agricultural. The caste system limits economic mobility, major parts of the country are cut off from the benefits of free trade and limits on foreign direct investments make growing businesses difficult. (See Economist .com – Country Briefings India) The fast growth in some regions of the country (e.g. Mumbai and Bangalore being the brightest examples) is creating ever bigger inequalities between the “winners” and the “losers”. Indian middle class 74 of something between 150 millions and 300 mil. people is slowly approaching the western standard of living (still only some 20 25 mil people can afford the western consumption life style), but the other hundreds of million inhabitants stay stuck in their poverty and misery. And the governments do not really succeed in narrowing the growing inequality despite several programs for fighting the poverty. The inequality is showed off also through few persons being one of the richest in the world, but national GDP per capita being just 741 USD in 2006. India is a nuclear weapons holder, it launches its own satellites and plans to send a spacecraft to the moon, but still the vast mass of rural populations remains illiterate and impoverished.
72 Among other discriminations, India has also one of the worst female male rations of the population, with 94 women for 100 men. With growing prosperity, this ratio is even worsening as the pre natal gender determination and interruption become affordable for more people. For details this and other gender discrimination problems in India, see Sen (2006: 220 251). 73 India has 655 mil. registered voters. See India Country Strategy Paper 2007 2013 74 There is a problem with what is defined as the middle class. Generally, Indian middle class is just hardly comparable with what is in Europe taken as the middle class – including its incomes and values. The broad definition of the middle class in India is based on ability to afford three meals a day (poverty line is defined as being under the basic nutrition income needed for survival). See Tharoor (2007: 8 10).
62 In 2003 India decided, with the growing economy and self confidence to change its position as the receiver of development aid and proclaimed that it stops receiving the aid from all the countries bar the “Big Six” – Japan, Germany, USA, UK, Russia and the EU. Further the central government, state governments and government controlled companies and organizations stopped receiving the aid as well as the government stopped setting the priorities for developing aid. Everything should be dealt through the NGOs and the universities. In 2004, India changed the “Big Six” on all G 8 countries plus the EU 75 other countries can provide the aid to the NGOs, universities etc. (See STI Indie 2007: 22 23) From the security point of view, India is a stable country although it deals with several external as well as internal security problems. Among the internal ones the biggest threat is the Naxalist Maoist movement trying to disrupt the unity of the country. This movement is responsible for hundreds killings each year and it in fact controls vast areas on the east and north east of the country on place of the federal and state institutions (as the federal institutions lack interest in these areas for they are neither economically important nor interesting). This kind of threat coming up from the growing inequality among the people is directly linked with the failure of the government to fight the poverty and it could be even bigger threat than traditional controversies with Pakistan. External risks for Indian security are disputes over border lines with China and Pakistan. India and Pakistan have been in several conflicts since their appearance in 1947 and current turbulent situation in Pakistan offers many questions about the future developments in the region. Currently, India is supportive of Palestinian efforts to re establish democratic form of government 76 and to assure state security and integrity (as failed and instable Pakistan would be immense danger for India and for the stability of the region). India is a member of several international organizations including UN, IMF, WTO, Commonwealth, G 77, G 20, SAARC where it is profiling itself as the South Asian regional power and also as the strong defender of interests of developing countries – especially at the floor of the world economic institutions such as WTO. India is growingly
75 The non G 8 EU countries can provide bilateral aid if the minimal sum is over 25 mil EUR. See STI Indie (2007: 22 23). 76 In this regard, it is worthy to mention that after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto there appeared no theory of any Indian role in this event; nor was there any kind of India’s stirring into internal Pakistani affairs after her killing.
63 assertive and self confident in all the international matters and it also starts to be appreciated and desired by the established powers.
2.1.2 Bangladesh
Bangladesh 77 is an extremely poor country situated in the Ganges and Brahmaputra delta. It was founded in 1971 through the bloody secession from Pakistan, which succeeded with the help from India. 78 Bangladesh is an ethnically pretty homogenous country (with 97,7 % of the population being Bengalis) and it is a predominantly Muslim country (88 % of the population) . The main characters of Bangladeshi political and economic system are poverty and unstable and corrupted political system. Bangladesh has been ever since its independence in 1971 going through turbulent political developments characterized with changes between corrupted governments made up by political parties after more or less fair elections and military governments made up after coups. The political environment is characterized by existence of two main rival parties and a strong influence of the army. The main parties Awami League and Bangladesh Nationalist Party – are both lead by a daughter, resp. widow after a murdered former leaders 79 with very strong personal hostilities. Both parties have rather similar economic policies, but they differ mainly in their policy orientation with BNP having a more nationalistic policy with promoting the Islamic basis of Bangladesh national identity than AL does. Currently, the country is in the phase of military supported and supervised government with elections postponed from January 2007 to November 2008. (See STI Bangladéš 2007: 7) With GDP per capita USD 456 and with about 40 % of the population in 2006 it was 147,4 mil. 80 living from less then 1 US dollar per day, eradication of poverty has been the proclaimed aim of every government since independence. Still they did not succeed. In recent years, apart from repeating catastrophic floods, Bangladesh economy 77 Official name in English is “The People´s Republic of Bangladesh. In Bengali, the official language, it is „Gana Prajatantra Bangladesh“. 78 The country originated through the separation from Pakistan in 1971, which lead to war in which India supported Bangladesh and in fact ensured its independence through its military and other help. 79 Awami League (AL) is lead by S. Hasina Wajeed, daughter of Bangladesh first president Mujibur Rahman, who was killed in 1975. Bangladesh National Party (BNL) leader Begum Khaleda Zea is a widow after the president general Ziaur Rahman, murdered during the military coup in 1981. See STI Bangladéš (2007: 7). 80 Bangladesh is the most densely populated country in the world with 1000 inhabitants per 1 km 2 in 2006. See Bangladesh Country Strategy Paper 2007 2013, p. 5.
64 has been under pressure from growing prize of oil and increasing competition in textile production 81 through other Asian countries. Bangladesh is a receiver of the development aid, but the tendency of the dependency on it is decreasing, 82 especially as the country manages to solve the post floods situation better and also as the country’s economy is improving slightly thanks to the foreign investments. 83 From the foreign policy point of view, the country has been growingly orienting itself against India and getting closer to Pakistan and China, Indian main opponents.84 Bangladesh has been more orienting itself on being a part of group of Muslim countries then of following secular orientation of the country and its economic interests. The current plan of political developments is that there should be elections in November 2008 – the question is whether these will take place, and if they would provide the political stability and improve the situation.
2.1.3 Bhutan
The Kingdom of Bhutan 85 is a tiny landlocked country of some 635 000 inhabitants, stuck in the Himalayas between the two powers – India and China. Bhutan is a small Buddhist monarchy, for ages completely cut off, but now trying to modernize itself gradually. Bhutan gained its modern sovereignty on 8. August 1949, when it got independence from India. But the line of rulers – Wangchuk hereditary monarchy, goes
81 Textile production makes 80% of Bangladesh exports. See Bangladesh Country Strategy Paper 2007 2013, p. 5. 82 In 1999/2000 the aid made up 2,5% of GDP, in 2006 it was just 1,6%. In absolute numbers, the received aid was worth 1241 mil. USD coming mainly from the World Bank, IMF and Asian Development Bank, from the countries then Japan, UK, Germany and USA playing the leading role. See STI Bangladéš (2007: 14). 83 The investments go mainly to the confection and knitting industry. Bangladesh is supported its income also through creating relatively friendly environment – regarding the quality of investment environment measured by the World Bank, it was ranked on 65th place in the world, ahead of Sri Lanka (75th) as well as India (116th). See STI Bangladéš (2007: 11). 84 This developments are naturally seen negatively from the Indian side as Bangladesh is suspected to suffer terrorist training camps of groups fighting against the unity of India as well as activities of Pakistan secret service ISI and drug channels going from Myanmar over northeastern India to the Maoist terrorists in Nepal. Bangladesh refuses to cooperate with India on solving these problem points as well as on developing mutually beneficial economic relations (main areas being transfer of gas from Myanmar and transfer of goods from Bangladesh ports). See STI Bangladéš (2007: 9). 85 Bhutanese call it „Druk Yul“, which means „Land of thunder dragon“. See BBC News Country Profile: Bhutan.
65 further back, to the 1907. Current ruler, Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuk 86 is an enlightened monarch who tries to follow up his father in the modernization efforts and in the transformation into parliamentary democracy. He wants to gradually modernize the country under the principle of improving “Gross National Happiness”, 87 taking what he finds good from the world with keeping the domestic Buddhist traditions still alive at the same time. On 24th March 2008 the first parliamentary elections were held in the country with which the country made another step towards democracy. With modernization and relative opening of the country to the world, compared to previous centuries, 88 the country is successfully developing itself from one of the poorest countries in the world to hopeful leaving of the LDC country category soon. The country’s GDP per capita has risen from 239 USD in 1980 to 1523 USD in 2006 – what is one of the highest numbers in South Asia. The growth is based mainly on hydroelectric power and electricity export to India and on tourism. Still the country faces serious problems as 32% poverty rate and 40% illiteracy rate (See Bhutan Country Strategy Paper 2007 2013: 1) – but at least it seems to be on a good way. Despite its relative opening, Bhutan has still very limited diplomatic relations – with just 21 countries and the European Union. It has six diplomatic missions in abroad, located in New Delhi, New York, Geneva, Bangkok, Dhaka and Kuwait. It is more active on the field of international organizations as it is member of the UN, SAARC, IBRD, IMF and ADB, as well as it participates on several international agreements.
2.1.4 The Maldives
The Republic of Maldives is a country made up of a chain of nearly 1 200 islands lying off the Indian sub continent. As just 200 of these islands are inhabited and just two thirds of these with more then 500 people, the population of some 340 000 is extremely dispersed and fragmented. The Maldives are a relatively well off country, especially in comparison with other South Asian countries, with GNI per capita 2 390 USD (in 2006) (BBC News Country Profile: The Maldives) and adult literacy rate of over 97 % (in 2003) 86 He is a young ruler – he succeeded his father, Jigme Singye Wangchuk in December 2006 after the abdication of the former. See BBC News Country Profile: Bhutan. 87 This concept is based on sustainable and equitable economic growth and development, preservation and sustainable use of the environment, preservation and promotion of cultural heritage and good governance. See Bhutan Country Strategy Paper 2007 2013 p. 1. 88 For history of Bhutan see e.g. Vavroušková (2003) in Filipský et al. (2003).
66 (The Maldives Country Strategy Paper 2007 2013: 26). But despite this, still a large part of population in the more remote regions lives in poverty. The Maldives economy is heavily dependent on tourism and fisheries, and as such very vulnerable. As the country does not have any mineral resources, it must import in fact everything needed for its economy. In 2004 the Maldives were graduated by the UN from the LDC category – but as the result of less favorable trade conditions due to this and especially the tsunami catastrophe 89 , it has been struggling in the new position. Politically, the Maldives have been a republic since 1968, with laws following the Shari´ah law. Its political system has had clear prevalence of executive powers, what is currently under slow process of change. In March 2006 a Road Map for pro democratic changes has been adopted and in 2008 elections should be held under the new multi party electoral system. Still the main problem what it is facing now is the danger of total disappearance due to the climate change as it lies no more than 1,8 m above the sea level.
2.1.5 Nepal
State of Nepal 90 is a poor mountainous country of 28,2 mil. inhabitants (in 2005) of whom just 9 % live in the cities and 51,6 % live in the mountain and alpine areas, the rest lives in villages in valleys and lowlands. Nepali population consists of about 100 different ethnics and caste groups, with Hinduism and Buddhism being the most widespread religions. Nepal has been isolated and under the sway of hereditary monarchy for most of its history. Nepal is officially a constitutional democracy with elected parliament and pluralist political system. Democratic policies were introduced in 1991 after the popular protests, but they were extremely fractionalized and the current monarch assumed the executive powers twice, in 2002 and 2005. For ten years, Nepal has been struggling, apart from poverty, also from the Maoist rebellion that fights the monarchy and aims to set up a republic. (BBC News Country Profile: Nepal). However the state was struggling in inner
89 Financial damages of the tsunami wave were estimated on 62% of GDP. Due to following decrease of coming tourist, the Maldives have been facing further financial problems. See The Maldives Country Strategy Paper 2007 2013, p. 1. 90 Till 18/5 2005 the official name was „Kingdom of Nepal“.
67 political instabilities due to the efforts of the king to limit the parliament. 91 In 2007 a peace agreement was signed and the Maoist representatives joined the provisional government, which lead the country to the elections held on 10 th April. The elections were overwhelmingly won by the Maoists (getting app. 2/3 of the seats in Parliament), the other main parties pro Indian “Nepali Congress”, anti Indian and partly pro Chinese “Communist Party of Nepal – United Marxist Leninist” and “National Democratic Party” close to the royal palace had to face the loss. Nepal’s GDP per capita was in 2005/2006 just 350 USD, with agriculture and services (esp. tourism) being the most important sectors and by the official statistics, 30% of the population live under the level of poverty. 92 Nepal’s economic and political life is concentrated in its capital – Katmandu – with a relatively small elite influencing the developments. As the personal interests of the country’s elite are clearly superior to the interests of the country, its economy is characterized by mismanagement, corruption and high dependence on the foreign aid. Apart from that, Nepal’s economy is linked to India through a free trade agreement (and clear and natural importance of India for Nepal). (See STI Nepal 2007: 4) Nepal has been going through a steady economic growth since the democratic reforms in 1991, however the inner political conflict going on since the end of the 1990s has slowed this down. Currently Nepal is somewhere between deconstruction of monarchy and build up of republic and it struggles in the power fights and Maoist insurgency. Naturally, the economy has been just in a very slow growth or decline. Nepal is a receiver of development aid, but its distribution suffers from the inefficient state administration and corruption same as the country in whole.
91 The King dissolved the lower chamber of the parliament in 2002; in February 2005 he dissolved the government as well and took over the executive powers. This lasted till April 2006 when, after public protests, the government was created again and the parliamentary session was made up again. See STI Nepál (2007: 7). 92 This is in case of Nepal that they receive less than 2124 calories per day what in financial terms means less then 86 USD per year. See STI Nepál (2007: 13).
68 2.1.6 Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka 93 is a republic of 20,2 mil inhabitants of whom 74 % are Sinhalese, 12,7 % Sri Lankan Tamils, 5,5 % Indian Tamils and 7 % Moors (Muslims of Arabian origin). Regarding religions, most of the people are Buddhists (76,7 %), followed by Muslims (8,5 %), Hinduists (7,9 %) and Christians (6,8 %). (STI Srí Lanka 2007: 2) Sri Lanka is a presidential republic 94 with relatively stable system of democratic power handover. The main political parties are Sri Lanka Freedom Party, from whose structures comes the current president M. Rajapaksa, and United National Party, which is seen as more conservative with more neo liberal economic attitude. Currently it is the strongest opposition party. Further relevant parties are People’s Liberations Front, which is nationalistic Marxist party and currently it is a member of the government coalition, and Tamil National Alliance – political representation of Tamil separatists. Military “representation” of Tamil separatist movement is “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam” (LTTE), shortly called “Tamil Tigers” and it is a separatist / terrorist organization fighting against the Sinhalese dominated central administration for separation of North and North eastern part of the island. 95 The conflict seemed to head to peace in the beginning of this decade, but the negotiated cease fire has been being broken intensively by both parties in the last year and now the fights are on their “normal” level. Sri Lankan economy has been developing well in the last years (GDP growth in 2006 was 7,4 %; total GDP per capita was in 2006 USD 1 355) despite the growing prices of oil and escalation of the conflict. Sri Lankan government tries to reform the economy into a freer market one with simultaneous keeping of high social standards especially in education and health areas. (See STI Srí Lanka 2007: 9) It has a high potential of economic growth and development due to the stable political system and a good level of education of society; still it could grow even faster if it managed to solve the military conflict which takes major part of country’s resources and holds down its development.
93 Official name in English is „Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka“. 94 The President is elected in general elections for 6 years and names the prime minister, can dissolve the parliament from her will and is the highest commander of the army. Univameral parliament is elected every 6 years using the proportional system. See STI Srí Lanka (2007: 6). 95 LTTE are in many countries incl. India, USA and EU taken as terrorist organization. Nevertheless without the total lack of will of central (Sinhalese) administration to provide even limited autonomy to the Tamil dominated region the military conflict would not take place or would not be at least so bloody and unsolvable as it is. Both parties – LTTE and the government – are responsible for the long lasting conflict and both use brutal methods of fight. For actual information on the conflict see e.g. Economist.com.
69 2.2 Basic framework of the EU´s activities in South Asia
The EU´s relations towards South Asia are generally constituted from three main parts: Common commercial policy as the tool for economic relations with the countries outside the EU internal market Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the tool for EU “high foreign politics” Common development cooperation and economic, financial and technical cooperation. From these, EC has powers in part of the commercial policy – regarding the trade in goods – and in the development cooperation, where it is operating with community budget. In the rest, the balance of powers of the decisions made lies on the side of the member countries. Common commercial policy as defined in the Title IX, Articles 131 134 of the TEC 96 gives the framework for the relations of the EU member countries outwards the common market. As it is put in the Article 133, the EC has an exclusive competence in commercial policy, including external trade negotiations. However, the trade negotiations are to be conducted by the Commission, „in conjunction with a special committee appointed by the Council“. This committee, called the Article 133 committee, consists of senior civil servants of the member states who monitor the position taken by the Commission at the every stage of trade negotiations to ensure that it is in the line with a negotiating mandate laid down by the Council of Ministers. Once an agreement has been reached, it has to be ratified by the member states meeting in full Council, using QMV. Nevertheless this fully applies just to the trade in goods – in other kinds of trade the Commission formally does not have full competence: decision making about the trade of services and intellectual property stay with the Council. (See Bache – George 2006: 494). The Commission plays an important role, and has a certain autonomy over the conduct of trade negotiations under the articles of the original Treaty dealing with the common commercial policy. But they are the member states that have to agree on the
96 The treaties cited in this chapter are those revised in the Treaty of Nice – what is the state in force at the time of writing.
70 negotiating mandate within which the Commission works; 97 and they have to secure sufficient domestic support before their representatives dare to vote for the ratification of the agreements,98 which acts as a further constraint on the Commission’s room for making deals. (Bache – George 2006: 495) Common development cooperation is defined in the Title XX, Articles 177 – 181 TEC, whereas economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries is defined in the following Title XXI, Article 181a TEC. The EC carries out its development policy, “which shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States” (Art. 177 TEC) with focus on sustainable development, gradual integration into the world economy and the campaign against poverty, contributing to the general objectives of developing and consolidating democracy, the rule of law, respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Community and the member states will comply and coordinate their activities, both regarding their activities in the international organizations and towards the third countries. The EC will also take these goals into account in the policies it implements (Art. 178 TEC) Added to this, the EC will carry out economic, financial and technical cooperation measures complementary to those carried out by the member states and consistent with its development policy. (Art. 181a TEC) Main tools how to reach these goals are arrangements for community cooperation (as by the Art. 181 TEC) or world wide actions (Cihelková 2003: 70) These are apart from the General system of customs preferences covered under the Common commercial policy humanitarian aid, food aid, financial and technical aid and various agreements with the Asian (and Latin American) countries. 99 (Cihelková 2003: 71 72) The humanitarian aid includes both single shot and longer term financial and other necessary aid, and that partially from the common (EU budget, emergency funds) and from the states´ resources. The long term programs are coordinated by the Directorate General 97 The bargaining on the external trade subjects is, by Bache and George, a three level game: 1) The government of each of the member states has to find a negotiating position that reflects the domestic constraints. 2) All the governments then have to negotiate around these positions in determining the negotiating mandate for the Commission in the wider trade talks. 3) The Commission then has to negotiate in the wider talks within the tight parameters of this mandate. In such a situation, it is completely necessary that the government has clear position regarding interests of the country in the question negotiated. See Bache – George (2006: 495). 98 Main categories of the agreements covering EU´s relations with the rest of the world are multi lateral free trade agreements, bi lateral free trade agreements, agreements with other European states, the Euro Med agreements with non European states of the Mediterranean basis and the Development Cooperation Agreements. See Bache – George (2006: 489). 99 Africa is covered under the ACP system.
71 for Development and Humanitarian Aid, the relief funding is channeled through the Humanitarian Aid Office of the European Commission (“ECHO”).100 Food aid includes direct (directly to the hungering areas) and indirect (via specialized organizations like World Food Program) supplies and it is financed from the EU budget. Financial and technical aid provides co financing of NGOs projects in the development countries via nonrefundable grants and loans served by the Program of financial and technical help for Asia and Latin America and from the European Investment Bank. Last tool of this area are the agreements with the Asian and Latin American countries. These are, in contrast with the regional agreements, non preferential and they include mostly commodity agreements on access of the common market for the specific product (e.g. textiles, grains etc.) Common Security and Foreign Policy of the EU (covered by Title V, Art. 11 – TEU) has been developed “to enable the EU to take joint action when the interests of the Union as a whole are at stake” (http://ec.europa.eu). The main tools for common defending of Union’s interests are the defined general guidelines and principles of the CSFP, common strategies, joint actions, common positions and systemic cooperation between the Member States. (Art. 12 TEU) General principles and guidelines are defined by the European Council which also decides about the common strategies,101 which are recommended by the Council. The Council adopts, based on the principles defined, the joint actions and operational actions 102 to deal with the problems appearing and it also adopts the common positions which “define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature”. (Art. 15 TEU) Generally, a government has two basic options: it can have its own policy towards the region and promote it on both in and via EU channel and in the region for itself. Or it does not have own strategy and it bandwagons on the CSFP framework initiated by the others and make use from what comes.
100 ECHO was funded in 1992 as specialized organization for organization of relief funding after natural or man made catastrophes. From its budget of more than 500 million EUR a year, ECHO funds medical teams, mine clearance experts, transport and logistical support. For the delivery of the aid to its place, it cooperates with humanitarian partners – NGOs, UN agencies and the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement. See A world player (2004: 15 16) and ECHO web page [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/index_en.htm]. 101 Common strategy expresses EU´s attitude towards concrete geographic or thematic problematic. See Fiala – Pitrová (2003: 564). 102 Joint actions commit the member states in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity (Art. 14 TEU) at dealing with the problem causing the action.
72 For direct contacts and information from the region the European Commission has established its delegations in New Delhi (responsible for India, Bhutan and Nepal), in Dhaka (Bangladesh) and in Colombo (Sri Lanka and The Maldives). The EC delegations – as is their job everywhere else as well – also promote the EU in the region via various cultural and other actions.
2.2.1 EU activities in the South Asian countries
2.2.1.1 EU and India
The India EU relationship has been growing steadily since 1962 when diplomatic relations were established with the European Economic Communities. A regular political dialogue has been boosted through the first Summit held in 2000. Since the 2004 Summit, the relationship is taking the shape of a Strategic Partnership, making India one of the EU’s main global partners. (See India Country Strategy Paper 2007 2013: 2) For the implementation of the Strategic Partnership at the following EU India summit held in September 2005 in New Delhi The Action Plan was adopted, defining concrete areas of activities. 103 The highlight issues of the contacts and areas with intensive cooperation and information exchange are environmental issues, clean development and climate change and energy security – even with these issues being important part of the relations, the dominant issue are the trade relations and economic ties. EU is India's largest trading partner and the largest source of foreign direct investment the EU accounted for 18.9 % of India's exports and imports in 2005. India ranks as EU's 9th trading partner accounting for 1.8 % of EU exports and imports. In 2006, the EU imports from India amounted to €22.4 billion (covering mainly textiles/clothing, agricultural products and chemicals) while EU exports to India reached €24 billion (covering mostly machinery and chemical products). Just during the year 2006 EU India trade increased by almost 16%, between 2002 and 2006 it has increased with an annual average of 13.6%. Bilateral trade in services has grown substantially in recent years as well, and in 2004 India's exports of commercial services to 103 The Action Plan focuses on strengthening dialogue political cooperation, as well as cultural and economic ties and developing trade and investments. For details see The India EU strategic partnership Joint Action Plan (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/india/sum09_05/05_jap_060905.pdf). Summary of this Joint Action Plan is available also in The EU and India (2006: 3 6).
73 the EU amounted to €3.8 billion (up from €3.0 billion in 2003), while the EU's exports to India amounted to €3.3 billion in 2004 (up from €2.7 billion in 2003). (Trade Issues: Bilateral Trade Relations India 2007 ) The legal ground for the business relations with India is given in the agreements between the EU and India. The most important one is „Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of India on Partnership and Development“, in effect since 1/8 1994. This agreement is a non preferential agreement of third generation giving the framework for mutual business and economic relations. To further ease and support the mutual trade and investment flows, negotiations about a broad based Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 104 were opened in June 2007, which should, when adopted, further increase and intensify mutual business and trade contacts. So far these negotiations are in the beginnings, “conducted in a constructive fashion”. (India EU Joint Action Plan: Implementation Report 2007: 6) As the EU Trade Commissioner put it at the EU India Business summit held in New Delhi at the end of November 2007, the “ambitious Free Trade Agreement could provide a big boost to both economies”, it would also support India’s effort to build up, next to strong service sector, also significant manufacturing sector 105 by providing easy access to EU´s 450 mil. wealthy consumers and ease further inflows of investments to India. 106 This FTA should, together with successful finish of the Doha WTO negotiations round improve and increase the trading relation of both subjects. The EU and its Member States are collectively the biggest bilateral donor to India’s development programs, they contribute nearly as much as the USA and Japan together. Since 1976 the European Commission has committed 2 billion EUR to India in development assistance. Since 1990s, EU cooperation strategy has focused on supporting the Indian authorities´ work in priority sectors of primary education and healthcare. This sectoral approach has been complemented by support for focused projects in the fields such as rural development, irrigation, forestry, environmental rehabilitation and integrated watershed management. EU–India cooperation also supports new initiatives such as HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention, drug abuse, strengthening human rights and 104 The FTA is expected to be fully WTO compatible, comprehensively covering not only trade in goods and services, but also investment and it should pay special attention to non tariff barriers, and to rules and regulations such as Intellectual Property Rights, competition, government procurement, and transparency. See Trade Issues: Bilateral Trade Relations India 2007. 105 By 2007, India´s manufacturing sector provides bare 7 million Indians with jobs. See Mandelson (2007). 106 In comparison with its main regional rival India receives just a tenth of FDI flows going to China. See Mandelson (2007).
74 democracy. (The EU and India 2006: 37 38) The long term development programs107 are further supplemented by humanitarian assistance from the EU’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) 108 in the event of natural or man made disasters. The European Commission’s Country strategy paper for 2002–06, devoted 225 million EUR to development and economic cooperation. The new Country Strategy Paper for India for the years 2007 2013 counts with the amount of 470 million EUR dedicated for the funding of co operation activities in India. For the years 2007 2010 260 mil. EUR has been set aside for the programs in the health sector, elementary education and for the implementation of the Joint Action Plan.
2.2.1.2 EU and Bangladesh
Relations between the European Commission and Bangladesh date back to 1973. The EC Bangladesh Commercial Co operation Agreement, signed in 1976 was in March 2001 replaced by a third generation co operation agreement. This agreement broadened the cooperation into new areas, including political dialogue, further developing the relationship. The most important part of mutual relations is the development aid provided by the EC since 1976. In 2001 also a new framework for EU´s development assistance to Bangladesh was adopted, where cooperation was broadened to include dialogue on development, trade and Governance issues. To date Bangladesh has received some €1.7 billion of EC support and is the EC’s second largest commitment in Asia. After years of focusing the aid on basic health and education provision, the CSP 2002 2006 has led to a broader mix of interventions, embracing social, as well as economic and governance issues. This strategy continues also in the CSP 2007 2013, with 403 mil EUR allocated for this period, despite the problems with efficiency of the money provided.
107 In the years 1994 2002, the European Commission supported several major programs including the Indian government’s “District primary education program” (DPEP) with a grant of 150 mil. EUR. In 2001, the European Commission made available 200 mil. EUR over seven years for the Indian government’s Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) program which is the new national initiative for universalisation of elementary education. In the health care, the EU has put 240 mil EUR into India’s health and family welfare sector investment program (SIP) over the period 1998–2004. This program aims to reform the Indian healthcare system by focusing on primary healthcare services and, in particular, to enhance the quality of healthcare services for disadvantaged groups. See The EU and India (2006: 39). 108 Between 2000 and 2005, ECHO made a number of emergency interventions across India to assist victims of floods and drought, to a total value of 39 million EUR. See (The EU and India 2006: 42). For further details on ECHO, see (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/index_en.htm).
75 2.2.1.3 EU and Bhutan
EU´s relation with Bhutan is based on the providing of the development assistance. This started in 1982 – till 2006 the EC provided 61 mil EUR. The assistance is based on supporting Bhutanes efforts in reaching “Gross National Happiness” – what is reflected in focus on programs dealing with renewable natural resources, rural development, health and education and good governance. (See Bhutan Country Strategy Paper 2007 2013: 12 13) In the new CSP for the years 2007 2013 trade facilitation has been added as focus area as well. Generally the EC seems in the report to be satisfied with the developments in Bhutan and with the appreciation of the money provided – what cannot be said about some other countries such as Bangladesh.
2.2.1.4 EU and The Maldives
The EU´s relations with the Maldives focus on the promotion of economic development and democracy and on tackling the dangers coming from the climate changes. (The Maldives Country Strategy Paper 2007 2013: 18 19) In current CSP program, 10 mil. EUR was set aside for the programs on the Maldives. Apart from these projects, EC has contributed with significant amount of money for the post tsunami reconstructions.
2.2.1.5 EU and Nepal
EC´s official relations with Nepal date back to 1977 and from then the EC/EU provided till 2003 109 over 130 mil EUR, with more than the half of it committed from 1994. The activities of the EU focus naturally on development projects for poverty reduction, economic growth, social sector development, good governance and decentralization and on targeted programs in favor of socially disadvantaged people. (Nepal Country Strategy Paper 2002 2006: 6) The areas mainly covered are irrigation and watershed management, animal health, reproductive health, primary education, refugees, and institutional capacity building.
109 Nepal is one of very few countries for which there is not the actual EC Strategic paper for years 2007 2013 published at the time of writing this thesis. Just the old one, for the years 2002 2006 is available. One reason for this could be also the expectations how (and if) the prospective elections in April will run, the other reason could be institutional capacity of the EC Delegation in New Delhi preparing these papers.
76 Despite its huge tourism and hydro energetic potential, and despite the development assistance efforts, Nepal has remained one of the poorest countries in the world – and with current instable political situation it is the question whether it falls down into more communal violence or whether it starts more successful path towards better life for its people. The main event in this year being the elections on 10 th April and following creation of Constitutional Assembly are intensively monitored from the side of the EU (it sent there tens of long term and short term observers to watch the elections and post election developments).
2.2.1.6 EU and Sri Lanka
Co operation between the EU and Sri Lanka dates back to 1975 when the European Commission and the Government of Sri Lanka concluded a Commercial Co operation Agreement. Now the relations are governed by the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development (CAPD) between the European Community and Sri Lanka which came into force in April 1995. The EU´s activities intensified after the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement and the support provided to Sri Lanka, as well as the trade with Sri Lanka, increased. Sadly, the civil war escalated again since 2006, which makes any efforts regarding Sri Lankan development more complicated. Even more as the aid has mostly focused on the North and East of the country where poverty and under development are most acute, particularly among war affected populations. The EC provided between 2000 and 2006 assistance worth 262 731 mil EUR (Sri Lanka Country Strategy Paper 2007 2013: 31) with 95 mil EUR allocated just for tsunami reconstruction programs. In the budget for the years 2007 2013 there are 112 mil EUR reserved. (Sri Lanka Country Strategy Paper 2007 2013: 3) The aid is nevertheless conditioned on the development of the conflict, with three options being worked out in the plan. With development towards peace, the EC will distribute the aid through normal channels and support both government and NGOs. If the developments are towards insecurity and low intensity conflict, the EC will try to keep the vulnerable communities on place and direct the aid preferably via non state actors. If the developments are towards high intensity conflict with major displacements, the scenario will be focusing on the uprooted communities and people and it will be channeled exclusively via NGOs and the private sector. The EC aid should also work as a “peace dividend” for the country, with more aid provided in case of a peaceful solution. Nevertheless, one can cast serious doubts
77 about the influence of the EU on the conflict development. Apart from the direct development and humanitarian aid, the EU tries to promote the Sri Lankan development also through trade and provision of favorable conditions for Sri Lanka. All the aid and efforts are nevertheless conditioned on the internal Sri Lankan developments and resolving/escalating the conflict. As the most needed areas for development are North and East, torn by the conflict and tsunami waves, the peace conditions are needed for even just efficient distribution of the aid provided.
2.2.2 Impact of the EU role on the country’s policies
EU as such exercises its powers and its interests in many areas, but still the EU´s interests are based on the interests of its member countries. National ministers contribute to the shaping of common foreign policy against the background of the domestic audiences to whom they are politically responsible, their careers depend on them remaining attuned to domestic preoccupations. The weight of authority on foreign policy remains clearly at the national level, within 27 diverse member states. (Wallace 2007: 10 11) All foreign policy functions other than trade are jealously guarded by the member states, likewise the business relations itself are one of the major fields of internal competition among the member states. (See Stumbaum 2007: 57 58) 110 Directly in South Asia, the EC has its delegations that promote the EU label and EU interests as whole. They serve as kind of end line input output institution, both as the main institution for providing analysis about the countries developments and for promoting the EU interests as whole. Apart from the work of the delegations – which represent the European Commission the regular meetings of EU countries diplomats are taking place (as kind of local grass roots level of the Council of the EU structure). These meetings serve as the ground information level for both coordination of the positions of the countries directly at the place and also for the countries´ administrations and national representation at the EU institutions – they are informed and can promote their interests in the EU structures (if they have some interests to promote).
110 Stumbaum writes about the relations with China; these assumptions can be nevertheless put to the foreign relations in general with emerging markets being especial inducement for such a behavior.
78 2.3 Conclusion of the chapter
As it was already said in the introduction to my work, India has the dominant role in the region and as such it is the most important country to deal with – in every field of the mutual relations. It is the regional power and behaves as such – what gives just a limited space for small countries such as Austria and the Czech Republic. For India the main partners to talk to are USA, Russia and China. The European Union is a good thing to deal with in political matters, but business is done with Germany or UK or France, sometimes also with Italy; the rest is just small and unimportant. Austria and the Czech Republic are just unknown countries for the poor and middle class and tourist destinations for the richest.111 In relations with other countries the size and population disparities are smaller – but also the markets are smaller (and usually interconnected with the Indian market anyway) and the political situation more unclear and unstable. Still I think that they provide enough good opportunities for active foreign policy leading to economic gains and certain political influence (seen e.g. in possibility to influence the government for better environmental behavior, good governance etc.), as well as security contacts (which can then, apart from other, serve the economic ties as well as both Austria and CR have important defense industry companies). Regarding the role of the EU for the foreign policies of the countries, the main point is that it gives the same conditions for both: the only first pillar issues of EU´s foreign relations being the trade relations (and even in this group has the EC exclusive powers just in trade with goods issues) and development aid – the main topic of EC´s strategies towards the region, the community role in the region is very limited. It is the final institution setting the trade rules (still the member countries influence the EC´s negotiation position and as such can promote their interests there) and it is the important donor of development assistance. Nevertheless, this does not anyhow impede the national interests and their promotion. The most important thing on the EU foreign policies regarding my work is the fact that the same rules are given for both Austrian and Czech exporters, as well as for importers to both Austria and the Czech Republic. Single set of trade rules,
111 Austria is usually exchanged for Australia; the Czech Republic is known in fact just by football fans (of whom are not many as sports No. 1 and No. 2 are cricket and field hockey).
79 a single tariff and a single set of administrative procedures simplifies dealings with and for third country operators. EU provides the “same rules for all the players in the game” and it is just on national authorities and country’s entrepreneurs what results they will get in this “game” – in the relations with South Asia. From this regard, the national interests of the countries, their political and economic relations, their image and influence play the key role EU is just on the side trail. The field in which the EU level has the key role is in the political relations towards India. For India, both Austria and the Czech Republic are just uninteresting small countries somewhere in Europe (supposing they do not mix Austria for Australia and they know at all what the Czech Republic is). As such, they have just minor influence on India and its politics – not just trade issues but also things like environmental protection, global warming, CO 2 reduction, security issues et al. In all these thing Czechs and Austrian can proclaim what they want, but India will not be listening or taking it anyhow seriously. The only way how to influence it is via the EU channels. Although the power ration with the “small around” is much better, the EU channels are useful also for influencing these countries. Austria and the Czech Republic are just small and globally unimportant countries – if they manage to put issues important for them on the EU foreign agenda,112 they can be more successful in promoting their interest then if they try to deal it the on country to country level.
112 In this respect, Austria has obvious advantage over the Czech Republic in the position of the EC Commissioner for External Affairs Ferrero Waldner.
80 3 CZECH REPUBLIC AND AUSTRIA IN SOUTH ASIA
3.1 Czech Republic in South Asia
Czech diplomatic relations in the whole region are managed by the Czech Embassy in New Delhi – that is responsible for India, Bangladesh, The Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka. There are no official Czech offices in the other countries – just Honorary consulates in Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka (responsible also for the Maldives). With Bhutan, Czech Republic does not have diplomatic relations. General framework of Czech official activities in South Asia is given in the Conception of foreign policy: Czech Republic wants to develop bilateral and multilateral relations with the Asian countries (as well as with African and Latin American countries and with Australia) on basis of mutually profitable cooperation, especially in the economic area. “CR will support all the initiatives leading to maintenance or increase of stability and security of the region and it will actively participate on them as good as it can.” (Koncepce zahraniční politiky, 2003: 13) “As an important part of the political dialogue the human rights are taken as a kind of measure of credibility and of long term perspectives of economic relations with the countries. CR will give special focus to the business and investment opportunities in the countries, with which former Czechoslovakia had developed economic contacts and where is a row of experts, who received their education in our country.” (Koncepce zahraniční politiky ČR 2003: 13) Development of relations with Asian countries will follow the frameworks applied to this area by EU. CR itself will focus especially on “following up on deeper tradition of our relations”, focusing especially on ASEAN member countries 113 in the economic field and on involvement in multilateral framework Asia Europe Meeting 114 in the political field. (Koncepce zahraniční politiky, 2003: 13)
113 ASEAN member countries are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam. (http://www.aseansec.org/) India is „full dialogue partner.“ See (http://www.businessinfo.cz). 114 The Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) is an informal dialogue process initiated in 1996. Now, the twenty seven EU Member States, the European Commission and thirteen Asian countries (Brunei, Burma/Myanmar,
81 South Asia was and is not an object of any strategic importance for CR, nor has it been mentioned in the government programs in any more detailed way than as an area included into general mentions about developing good economic and political relations with non European countries and about the will of CR to provide humanitarian and development aid. This changed recently, when India has been rated as one of priority interest countries 115 in “Czech export strategy 2006 2010” and Ministry of Industry and Trade has even created special export strategy for India. This export strategy, called “Strategy of promoting business economic interests of CR in India” (Strategie prosazování obchodně ekonomických zájmů ČR v Indii at http://www.businessinfo.cz) aims “to create conditions for growth and optimal development of Czech export into Indian market.” “Further it wants to put basis to such intensive economic relations which would stimulate inflow of Indian investments into CR.” The government officials already acknowledge the importance of the fast growing economic potential of the region, or more precisely to say, of India. Former Prime minister Jiří Paroubek expressed his views on the newly growing power this way: “Centre of gravity of world events has been dynamically moving to Asia, where especially China and India enter the game more and more as the new global players. Asian dimension of international events has to be reflected and practically projected into our foreign politics.” (Paroubek 2005: 17) Further he mentioned the potential of tourism: “If there come 1 million people from India to Europe, it is a huge potential of local middle classes which we should prosper from. Of course CR cannot make it all alone, it must cooperate e.g. with Austria, but also with other middle European countries in the effort to attract the tourists.” (Paroubek 2005: 19) China, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam) participate in the process. See (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/asem/intro/). 115 Priority countries are non EU countries in which CR is especially interested in as business partners. They include, apart from India, these countries: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Egypt, Mexico, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, , Serbia and Monte Negro, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arabian Emirates USA, Vietnam. See Exportní strategie ČR 2006 2010.
82 Tab. 3: Diplomatic relations of CR with South Asian countries
Country Year of est. Office of CR responsible Office of the country (with CS) for the country for CR
Embassy in New Delhi, Honorary consulate in Bangladesh 1993 (1972) Dhaka Embassy in Berlin
Bhutan not established not established not established
Embassy in New Delhi, Consulate General in Mumbai Honorary consulate in India 1993 (1947) Calcutta Embassy in Prague
The Maldives 1993 (1975) Embassy in New Delhi not assigned
Embassy in New Delhi, Embassy in Berlin, Honorary consulate in Honorary consulate in Nepal 1993 (1959) Kathmandu Prague
Embassy in New Delhi, Embassy in Vienna, Honorary consulate in Honorary consulate in Sri Lanka 1993 (1957) Colombo Prague
Source: Přehled o diplomatických stycích České republiky. Appendix to Zpráva o zahraniční politice (2006: 389 399).
3.1.1 Relations towards India
3.1.1.1 Historical development of the relations with India
The relations and contacts between CR and India have surprisingly deep historical roots – first documents mentioning India appeared already in the Middle Ages. 116 Most information and ideas about India and the region were in that times (and also long centuries after) of course mostly hazy stories and fantasies. 117 From the other side, Indian
116 Main reasons for Czech interests and fantasies about India were gems and spices brought to Europe. Main sources of information about India in early Middle ages were the works of antique writers like Arian Flavius, Herodotus etc. For more information see Strnad et al. (2003: 861). 117 Despite some works of serious information content (e.g. Cronica Boemorum of Giovanni Marignolli, written in the 14th century on basis of many years stay in Asia), most information about India was provided
83 educated elites got to know Czechs sometime in the 18 th century via their interests in the Husits movement and in the works of Jan Amos Comenius. (Strnad et al. 2003: 861) Since early 17 th century, first missionaries coming from Czech lands were arriving to India to stay there. India became subject of serious and intensive interest during 19 th century, when lots of Czech intellectuals 118 made researches on Indian language, literature and culture. Since mid 19 th century Sanskrit has been lectured at the Prague University. Naturally, with development of travel possibilities, more and more Czechs made journeys to India, as well as some Indian rajas spent their holidays in Bohemian spa resorts. (Strnad et al. 2003: 870 872) Czechoslovakia was after its creation interested in further developing the relations, especially in the economic field and in 1921 Czechoslovakian consulate in Bombay was founded. Economic relations were flowering, with Baťa 119 and Škoda the most active companies in India. Also cultural and interpersonal relations were deepening, to a big part thanks to the Oriental institute and developing Indology studies in Prague. During the World War II the contacts naturally felt on minimum. The consular affairs were held under the control of Beneš´s exile government and the active relations with the country, both economic and cultural,120 restored shortly after the end of the war. Czechoslovakia was one of the anterior countries that established the diplomatic relations with India after its independence on 15 th August 1947, that on 18th November 1947. In February 1948 Czechoslovakian Embassy in Delhi was established, by the end of the year India established the Embassy in Prague.121 With Czechoslovakia becoming part of the Soviet influence zone, its foreign politics towards India were directly influenced by the positions taken in Moscow. Stalin was till his death disdaining India, taking it for a country ruled by “mixture of national bourgeoisie and feudal elements.” (See Strnad et al. 2003: 881) But post Stalin Soviet Union leaders found out that India is an interesting country for them from both geopolitical and economic perspective and started to develop deeper contacts – this lead to the improvements of Czechoslovakian contacts as well,
through „bestsellers“ full of fantasies and blathers such as Jean Mandeville´s sham travelogue. See Strnad (2003: 864). 118 Among others Josef and Antonín Jungmann, Karel Hynek Mácha, Jan Evangelista Purkyně, Karel Havlíček Borovský. See Strnad (2003: 869). 119 Baťa is still present and very active in India. I did not find any statistics proving this, but from personal experience I would say that it is the biggest chain of brand shops with shoes in India – present in „every“ little city. 120 Cultural contacts included i.a. intensive communication of Czech literary elite with the Bengali Nobel price holder Rabinandrah Tagore. See Strnad (2003: 874). 121 This was the first Indian Embassy in the Central European region.
84 which were pointed out by the state visit of Jawaharlal Nehru with his daughter Indira Gandhi in Prague in June 1955. The state contacts were since then developing in rather normal rhythm, with reciprocal visit of leading politicians. Economic contacts were based on Czechoslovakian participation on industrialization of India, with several major heavy engineering projects carried out, and on military supplies. (for details see Strnad et al. 2003: 883) Cultural contacts flourished especially during the Khrushchev era, when both countries showed intensive interests in each other department of South Asia at the Oriental Institute of Czechoslovakian Academy of Sciences became at that times one of the leading Central European institutions of Indian studies. This fore position of Czechoslovakian Indology was terminated by the Warsaw Treaty Organization invasion to Czechoslovakia in August 1968, which lead to major personal leaves through emigration or bans of work of leading personalities. But as India was “friend” of USSR, the official contacts and cultural, research and education exchanges were further developing also during the period of “normalization” in Czechoslovakia. With the November 1989 revolution in Czechoslovakia, mutual contacts declined as the Czechoslovakian, resp. Czech side had completely different priorities and interests and did not have enough capacity to maintain relatively high level of contacts.
3.1.1.2 Current political relations
India was one of the very first countries acknowledging the Czech Republic, already to 1 st January 1993. During the visit of Indian foreign minister in Prague on 15 th February 1993 both countries confirmed the continuity of mutual relations and reviewed the business opportunities. Despite exchanges of state visits – of president Havel in India in February 1994 and reciprocal visit of president Chankar Dajal Charma in September 1996; of Chairman of House of Deputies Klaus in June/July 2000 and reciprocal visit of G.M.C. Balajogim, the intensity of mutual relations did not reach the levels of 1970s and 80s. Yet the relations have been improving again in the last years on the level of economic as well as ministers contacts. From the important visits the visit of Indian Minister for heavy industries B.V. Patil in 2002 and Minister of energetic A. Geeteh in 2003 can be mentioned; from the Czech side it were then the visit of Minister of Industry and Trade J. Rusnok and Minister of Defense J. Tvrdík in 2003 and visit of Minister of Transportation in 2005 w. In November 2005 V. Klaus visited India again, now in the position of the Czech president.
85 Growing mutual contacts were influenced also by the Czech entry into the EU. With the EU entry, CR joined also the ASEM 122 association, which lead to bigger intensity of the contacts with Asian countries in general, and with India in specific. (See Zpráva o zahraniční politice 2006: 14) Still the region has not become political priority area – and most probably it will never be one. However, in 2005 it became economic priority area India has been included among the priority countries of Czech foreign business activities and Strategy for promotion of business economic interests of the Czech Republic in India with the aim of improving the conditions for Czech business interests in India has been prepared and accepted in 2005. This strategy puts India on the fore place among the countries with which business contacts should be developed – and this new definition of Indian importance lead also to doubling of the economic department personnel at the Embassy in Delhi (from one to two persons). Last important official impulse for mutual contacts was the state visit of Czech Prime minister Paroubek in January 2006. During this visit more contacts on the level of Deputy foreign ministers as well as common working groups on the ministries of Defense and of Industry and Trade of both countries were founded and the problem of Indian debt from the times of Czechoslovakia was solved – paid by India. (See Zpráva o zahraniční politice 2006: 306) In 2007, deputy foreign minister Helena Bambasová visited India, followed in November 2007 by the foreign minister Schwarzenberg and in December 2007 by the Chairman of Senate Přemysl Sobotka. Minister Schwarzenberg was dealing with his counterpart Mukherjee about the situation in Myanmar, about general political interests of the Czech Republic, as well as about the economic and investment interests in India and development of education and research cooperation. Přemysl Sobotka´s visit was more narrowly oriented on economic issues. Regarding the development aid, India was among the top ten recipient countries of the Czech ODA in the years 2002, 2003 and 2005, with approx. 1 mil USD spent every year on various projects. (See Adamcová 2006: 78) Nevertheless the last Czech intergovernmental development project in India was finished in November 2004 and currently there is no new one in plan as the Indian government prefers to work with the big 122 ASEM (Asia Europe meeting) is an institutionalized dialogue between EU and Asian countries founded in the 1990s. On the last ASEM meeting in Helsinki in September 2006, CR presented itself with pointing out the need for respecting the human rights in Myanmar and conditioned with that the presence of Myanmar on this meeting. See Zpráva o zahraniční politice (2006: 14).
86 donors only, what currently is done by the EU. Small projects are still carried out by the NGO´s though. (See Strategie prosazování obchodně ekonomických zájmů v Indii 2005) Czech Republic also offers few scholarships for Indian students under the Erasmus Mundus program (in 2006 three students studied in the Czech Republic under this scholarship). (Zpráva o zahraniční politice 2006: 307) Good mutual relations are supported also by increasing knowledge about the other country through the information and cultural events. Czech Republic was presented on several such occasions in India, including the Film festival of the European Union countries or concerts of Czech artists. In 2007 this was further endorsed by organizing several actions for celebrations of 60 years of mutual diplomatic relations taking place in New Delhi and in Mumbai.
3.1.1.3 Economic relations
Economic relations have been growing steadily in the last years together with growing economies of both countries and increasing knowledge about economic potential of India for Czech entrepreneurs as well as with increasing foreign activities of Indian entrepreneurs in CR. These developments have been also the reason for including India among the priority countries in the “Export strategy of the Czech Republic for years 2006 2011” and for preparing “Strategy of promoting business economic interests of the Czech Republic in India” with the aim of further improving the conditions for Czech business activities in India. The Czech Republic can follow up on the good tradition of the business relations from the times of Czechoslovakia; especially “Škoda” is very well known in various industry fields. By the EU entry the Czech Republic even strengthened its position and the name as the European quality supplier and became to be seen from the Indian side as the good point for their entry into the EU market.123 All this positive developments should be then used for economic gains of the Czech Republic – and as the table of trade balance shows, they are. Trade balance with India is positive and trade amounts of both exports and imports are steadily increasing. The main part of trade is nevertheless done by two main companies – Škoda Auto and Tatra that import to India parts for the assembly of the cars in their factories in India. 123 E.g. in the IT sector – Indian top company Infosys has its branch in Brno.
87 As it was mentioned above, the cooperation with India got important official impulse through the state visit of Prime minister Paroubek in January 2006. After his visit, a contract worth 1 bil. USD on the project of harbor modernization in Nizampatam (state Andhra Pradesh) was signed.124 During the year Indian companies made also some major investments in the Czech Republic (Ashok Leyland in Avia, Tata Tea bought Jemča Jemnice, Glenmark Pharmaceuticals invested in Medicamenta) Tab. 4: Trade exchange of CR with India (in thousands EUR)
Ranking 2004 2005 2006 2007 (2007)
Turnover 307 865 405 367 529 067 695 736 29.
Export 161 950 211 432 317 113 401 519 25.
Import 145 915 193 934 211 954 294 217 32.
Balance 16 035 17 498 105 159 107 302
Source: Czech Statistical Office (http://czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/i/zahranicni_obchod_ekon) Regarding the turnover of mutual economic relations, India ranks for CR on place 30 and it is the third most important Asian territory, after Japan and China and from these it is the only one with which CR has positive trade balance. (See STI Indie 2007: 33) Main Czech exports to India include the parts for Tatra and Škoda 125 automobiles for the finish of their production in factories in India, textile and electronic machines and other industrial products. Main imports are shoes, clothes and other textiles as well as cotton and products from skin, various electronic devices and pharmaceutical products. Several Czech companies are directly active in India – Škoda (India), Škoda Power, Strojimport Marcopia, Škoda Auto India, Tatra Vectra Motors, UniControls Electronics Czech and Omnipol; several other trade with India. (for list See STI Indie 2007: 37) As it was mentioned above, Czech companies can build on a good tradition of mutual business relations especially in the heavy industries field as well as in some consumption goods (e.g. glass, beer), even though the direct contacts built in pre revolution period of more intensive mutual relations were from major part lost due to Czech inactivity after post 124 This contract has later been cancelled by the government and currently it is about going to the court. 125 Tatra has two factories in India: in Hosur (Tamil Nadu) and in Bangalore (Karnataka). Škoda Auto India has the factory in Aurangabad (Maharashtra). Škoda Auto started production of Octavia and Superb models in the factory in India in 2001; in 2008 it starts also production of Fabia. For details see Ihned.cz. (http://ekonomika.ihned.cz/c4 10070860 22731440 001000_d skodovka chce v indii zdvojnasobit vyrobu).
88 revolution period. India has a huge potential for Czech companies, especially in the sectors of energetic, oil and gas processing, infrastructure and generally in industry, in tourism as well as in ecological technologies. Despite the big potential of India, it is very demanding to make business here and start up of a business cooperation needs really lots of finances and time – but when a business is started, it can last for generations. In development cooperation the bigger projects were finished due to the Indian decision from 2004 to limit the aid donor countries and currently there is just one small project 126 carried out – “Emancipation of socially disadvantaged girls and handicapped persons” in Karnataka state. (STI Indie 2007: 39)
3.1.1.4 Security issues
The Czech Republic does not have any special security interests in India so it follows the general framework of EU security relations towards the country, without a need to promote its interests either on the EU level or in India directly. Still the Ministry of Defense keeps in New Delhi two attaches (responsible for India, Sri Lanka and Thailand) to keep updated with the newest developments in the region. The main area where the security questions touching both countries are dealt with are the United Nations. Two main topics are Indian wish to get a permanent seat in the reformed Security Council and Indo US nuclear deal. The Czech Republic supports the reform of the Security Coucil and expressed its support for India and the permanent member. Regarding the agreement between USA and India on deliveries of civil nuclear material – “American Indian initiative for the civil nuclear cooperation.” the Czech Republic also expressed “its readiness to participate in opening the business with India in the field of peaceful utilization of nuclear energy” (Zpráva o zahraniční politice 2006: 130) on the plenary session of the Nuclear suppliers group. 127 Influence of this on the Czech Indian relations cannot be however anyhow overestimated it is on the level of Czech
126 CR provided 200 000 CZK for buying the sewing machines and materials for re qualification courses. See STI Indie (2007: 39). 127 The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a group of nuclear supplier countries which seek to contribute to the non proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear related exports. CR is the vice chairman of the working group for exchange of information in licensing and customs control. See Nuclear Suppliers Group web page at (http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/).
89 Embassy following the news about developments of this issue, mainly to inform responsible people at the IAEA and at other institutions and delegations.
3.1.2 Relations towards other South-Asian countries
The Czech Republic does not have anyhow more intensive inter governmental relations with any of the other South Asian countries. As was mentioned above, the Embassy responsible for them is the one in Delhi; with Bhutan the Czech Republic does not even have any diplomatic relations at all. Regarding the general contacts, the Czech Republic is the most active on Sri Lanka as several humanitarian aid projects and development cooperation projects, especially after the Tsunami catastrophe of 2004 have been carried out. It can be said that humanitarian and development activities of Czech NGOs, together with some economic activities and tourism are the main points of Czech relations towards the countries. The (non)importance of the countries for Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs is expressed also through their absence in the list of bilateral relations in ministry’s yearly reports on foreign relations. Just India is mentioned in these reports. The main open sources of information about Czech relations towards countries are the “Aggregate territorial information” (Souborná teritoriální informace) provided by the Embassy in Delhi for Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. For Bhutan and the Maldives no such information is provided.
3.1.2.1 Bangladesh
The Czech Republic is officially present in Bangladesh just through the Honorary consulate. There are no other official Czech institutions (e.g. Czech Center, CzechTrade, CzechInvest, CzechTourism) present in the country. Mutual bilateral contacts are on a minor level, with no important events taking place. Main area of contacts (but still just small and unimportant) is the economic field – as the Czech Republic does not have any security interests in Bangladesh and as the development aid for Bangladesh is provided via the EU mechanisms (there is no solely Czech managed project in Bangladesh) it is actually the only direct field of contacts.
90 Tab. 5: Trade exchange of CR with Bangladesh (in thousands EUR)
Ranking 2004 2005 2006 2007 (2007)
Turnover 36 067 39 646 64 522 73 290 65.
Export 12 494 11 461 16 590 15 779 90.
Import 23 574 28 185 47 932 57 511 55.
Balance 11 080 16 724 31 342 41 732
Source: Czech Statistical Office (http://czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/i/zahranicni_obchod_ekon) The main export areas are machines, industrial and electronic devices mainly for the textile industry; main imports are textile products and confection. There have been several projects in the energetic industry carried out as well and a major project of Czech participation on building a factory for carmabide production has been under negotiations. (See STI Bangladéš 2007: 22 23) Currently there are no joint companies with Czech participation, nor there is no Czech company active in the country. The main problem of developing any further contacts is internal political insecurity in Bangladesh with unclear situation, it is hard and risky to start up businesses.
3.1.2.2 Bhutan
The Czech Republic does not have established diplomatic relations with Bhutan – or rather Bhutan did not establish diplomatic ties with CR as it has the diplomatic relations with just 21 countries. This makes Bhutan interesting topic for the Czech diplomacy as it is a matter of prestige to establish the official diplomatic contacts with the country (as well as it makes easier esp. the consular affairs with growing number of Czech tourists visiting the country) – this is under dealing and as Bhutan is preparing to establish a new Embassy in Brussels responsible for several EU countries, the Czech Republic is said to be one of these. As there are hardly any contacts, the relations are naturally without any problems. The mutual trade is just negligible – there was no export from CR to Bhutan in 2007, import was worth 635 000 CZK – this made then negative trade balance of same amount. The imported goods were cables and electric wires and iron and steel screws. With Bhutan changing to constitutional democracy, it will maybe open itself to the world a bit more and
91 CR will be able to develop further contacts (e.g. more intensive economic exchange, tourism) In 2007, Embassy in New Delhi started a project 128 in cooperation with a Bhutanese and other European countries NGOs. The goal of the project is to empower and improve equality of economically and socially disadvantaged rural women. This project has budget of 500 000 CZK and part of this project is shooting a documentary movie (serving then as information and fundraising aid tool). Tab. 6: Trade exchange of CR with Bhutan (in thousands EUR)
Ranking 2004 2005 2006 2007 (2007)
Turnover 33 17 5 23 208.
Export 2 0 4 0 210.
Import 31 17 1 23 184.
Balance 29 17 4 23
Source: Czech Statistical Office (http://czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/i/zahranicni_obchod_ekon) 3.1.2.3 The Maldives
The Czech Republic has diplomatic relations with the Maldives, but has no official liaison office there. Mutual contacts are very spare, there have been no important event happening in the last years except for official visit of foreign minister Schwarzenberg in November 2007, done as a short stop after his visit in India. The only area of mutual contacts is the economic exchange – the turnover is nevertheless small (17,3 mil CZK), with positive balance of 15,6 mil CZK on the Czech side. The main export commodities are spare parts for telecommunications and for consumption goods. Main imports are frozen and fresh fish.
128 The project was finalized during the official visit of deputy foreign minister Helena Bambasová in March 2007, which this was the only official visit in last years.
92 Tab. 7: Trade exchange of CR with the Maldives (in thousands EUR)
Ranking 2004 2005 2006 2007 (2007)
Turnover 29 146 140 654 172.
Export 21 135 132 624 151.
Import 8 11 8 30 180.
Balance 13 124 124 594
Source: Czech Statistical Office (http://czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/i/zahranicni_obchod_ekon) 3.1.2.4 Nepal
Mutual contacts between CR and Nepal are also just marginal. Regarding the official institutions, the Czech Republic has just a Honorary consulate of Czech origin in Nepal. There has not been any important event in the last years. The main area of contacts is the economic field – nevertheless there are minor other activities as well: Czech branch of International Need Foundation NGO is active in Nepal, supporting education of some 30 children and the Czech Embassy in New Delhi provided 2 mil CZK for Nepalese Red Cross on a project on rehabilitation of areas hit by floods. Regarding the economic relations, Nepal is for CR 146th country regarding the size of trade turnover. The trade was worth 48 mil. CZK, with main exports being glass products and printing machines and main imports carpets and other textiles and fabrics. Tab. 8: Trade exchange of CR with Nepal (in thousands EUR)
Ranking 2004 2005 2006 2007 (2007)
Turnover 1 603 1 566 1 267 1 751 146.
Export 819 647 566 832 143.
Import 784 918 701 919 136.
Balance 35 271 135 87
Source: Czech Statistical Office (http://czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/i/zahranicni_obchod_ekon)
93 Currently the main problem of developing more intensive contacts is political instability in Nepal and unclear possible developments. With improved political stability there would be good potential also in the energetic and infrastructure sectors as well as in export of machines and industrial devices and Škoda automobiles (as Nepal has free trade agreement with India, Škoda cars produced in India will not have to pay high custom duties – still they will be affordable just for tiny part of Nepalese population). Business expansion is nevertheless at first conditioned with the improved security and political environment in the country. (See STI Nepál 2007: 18 19)
3.1.2.5 Sri Lanka
Czech relations with Sri Lanka are without any problems and the Czech Republic has a very good name on Sri Lanka. 129 There is a Honorary consulate responsible for Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Apart from this, also an office of ČSA Czech Airlines is located in Colombo – despite that the direct flights between Prague and Colombo are currently not on the flight plan. The Czech Republic is active in Sri Lanka, apart from business, also through security cooperation and through various activities of Czech NGO´s. As usual, main mutual activities are done via economic contacts. Sri Lanka is in the region the third biggest market – after India and Bangladesh. The mutual trade is steadily increasing; main export commodities are airplane components, rubber (caoutchouc) and rubber products, machines and machine components. Main import commodities are textile products, rubber and rubber products and coffee, tea and spices. (STI Srí Lanka 2007: 20) There is a good potential of development of Czech business interests on Sri Lanka especially in the fields of machinery, infrastructure and energetic solutions. The problem is complicated, small, interconnected administrative and business environment on Sri Lanka that make the business start up complicated – as is actually the case everywhere in South Asia. Apart from export import of goods, Sri Lanka is also an attractive holiday destination with increasing number of Czech tourists spending there time on the beach or traveling around the island.
129 What should be, next to traditional ties of the countries, result of Czech military equipment support of Sri Lankan armed forces during their successful offensive on Jaffna peninsula in 2001, leading to weakening of LTTE positions and consequent start of peace agreement negotiation under Norwegian leadership.
94 Tab. 9: Trade exchange of CR with Sri Lanka (in thousands EUR)
Ranking 2004 2005 2006 2007 (2007)
Turnover 13 571 13 974 21 093 24 418 92.
Export 2 375 1 785 5 949 4 560 114.
Import 11 196 12 189 15 144 19 858 69.
Balance 8 821 10 404 9 195 15 298
Source: Czech Statistical Office (http://czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/i/zahranicni_obchod_ekon) Next important field of mutual relations has been Czech provision of development assistance and humanitarian aid after the disastrous tsunami wave in December 2004. NGOs Charitas and People in Need and other are active in the region, with projects focusing on post tsunami reconstruction and on provision of drinking water. The provision of the aid has been nevertheless complicated, apart from “classic” problems like providing that what is need instead of that what is easy to deliver, by the insecurity on the eastern coast of Sri Lanka due to the conflict between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government.
95 3.2 Austria in South Asia
Austrian diplomatic relations in the whole region are managed by the Embassy in New Delhi – that is responsible for India, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka. This is thus the same structure as in the case of CR. Apart from the Embassy, other official institutions in New Delhi are Austrian foreign trade office (Österreichische Außenhandelsstelle New Delhi), Austrian promotion office (Österreich Werbung) and the office of the Austrian Airlines and the Cultural forum. Apart from that, there are Honorary consulates in Calcutta, Chennai, Goa and Consulate General in Mumbai. In Bangladesh, Nepal, the Maldives and Sri Lanka there are Honorary consulates in the capitals. In Bhutan (in Thimphu) is the Office for coordination of the development cooperation. The foreign policy towards South Asia is neither driven by any grand strategy nor by any strategy action plans – rather it is a day to day reaction on the events and developments. The pattern of Austrian own actions is then “where the companies go, the politics follow” – as the Austrian companies with global interests moved to the region, the political interests grew as well. In the last year four high level official visits took place. In 2005 Austrian president Fischer visited India. It was the first visit of an Austrian president in India. In 2007 foreign minister Ursula Plassnik went to an official visit to India (and Pakistan) in March, having met with leading politicians and „opening door“ for a trade delegation accompanying her. In November 2007 Minister of Science and Research Johannes Hahn visited India where he signed an agreement on scientific cooperation. (http://www.austria.gv.at) In December 2007 Minister of Economics and Labor Martin Bartenstein paid a visit to India, accompanied by a delegation of leading Austrian companies specializing in the areas of energy, railways, road construction, municipal infrastructure and environment. (http://advantageaustria.org) There has never been such a high intensity of Austrian officials going to India. Apart from economic interests – targeted mainly on India – the main political interests are in keeping the good relations and providing the development cooperation Bhutan, Nepal and Indian Himalayan areas being the target regions. Bhutan is the priority country, Nepal is the partner country. The choice for these regions was driven by the fact, that the development cooperation provided to these countries will have influence as the countries are small and so the relatively small amounts that Austria can provide are more
96 focused. This is then supported with the fact that Austria has good knowledge of alpine agriculture, alpine forestry, environmental management etc., which are all the types of know how mostly useful for these mountainous regions. The third reason is then the simple fact that the last two foreign ministers were personally interested in these areas, especially in Bhutan. 130 Tab. 10 : Austrian diplomatic relations with South Asian countries
Austrian office responsible for the Office of the country Country Year of est. country for Austria
Embassy in New Delhi, Bangladesh dnf Honorary consulate in Dhaka Embassy in Berlin
Embassy in New Delhi Development cooperation Bhutan 1989 coordination office in Thimphu Embassy in Geneva
Embassy in New Delhi, Consulate General in Mumbai Honorary consulate in Calcutta, India 1949 Chennai, Goa Embassy in Vienna
The Embassy in New Delhi Honorary consulate in Maldives 1978 Honorary consulate in Malé Vienna
Embassy in Berlin Embassy in New Delhi, Honorary consulate in Nepal 1959 Honorary consulate in Kathmandu Vienna
Embassy in Vienna Embassy in New Delhi, Honorary consulate in Sri Lanka 1954 Honorary consulate in Colombo Graz, Salzburg
Source: (http://www.bmeia.gv.at/aussenministerium.html)
130 This information was provided to me by an Austrian diplomat in New Delhi who wanted to stay in anonymity.
97 3.2.1 Relations towards India
3.2.1.1 Historical development of the relations with India
The relations of Austria with India go back to the middle ages, though their more intensive development came just with the 18 th and 19 th century. Through all the past times main areas of contacts were kept by the journeys of Austrian businessmen, scientists and monks. Many Austrian scientists worked at the Indian universities and made there successful careers. 131 With the opening of the Suez channel in 1869 the business contacts blossomed, even a direct ship connection between (then Austrian) Trieste and Bombay was operating. In 1893 the first official visit took place when the archduke Franz Ferdinand came to (then still British) India for a three month journey. With the end of the 19 th century Austria was present in India through three Consulates and about 4000 Austrian were living there. (See Franz: Österreich – Indien) In the interwar period, the new little Austria was more occupied with itself and its internal problems than with developing contacts with remote India. This of course changed by the end of the Second World War and successful reconstruction and development of Austria. With Indian independence, the countries could develop mutual official contacts – on 9 th December 1949 the first Austrian ambassador in India was delegated. Both countries followed up on mutual historic good relations, which was then just further supported with friendly relationship between Bruno Kreisky and Indira Gandhi. Kreisky´s third world activism and its foreign policy orientation were close to the Indian interests and the countries often supported themselves on various international meetings whether it was the UN or the Non allied movement meetings. And with good political relations also the economic contacts were developing through the whole Cold War period.
3.2.1.2 Current political relations
After the end of the Cold War and re orientation of Austria in the new environment the mutual relations got the new touch through Austrian entry into the EU in 1995. The high points of political contacts came then in 1999 with the official visit of Indian 131 E.g. Jesuit Josef Tieffenthaler made the basic cartographic researches and measurements of Ganges and put grounds to the modern Indian Geography, Gottlieb William Leitner was one of the founders of Punjab University in Lahore, Alois Sprenger was a director of Anglo Arabian College in Delhi. See Franz: Österreich – Indien.
98 president K.R. Naranyanan in Austria and with the official visit of Austrian president Heinz Fischer in India in 2005. The visit of Heinz Fischer marked the growing importance of India for Austria – also as the visit was followed with the group of businessmen and science and culture representatives. In 2007 this visit was followed by three ministerial visits – of foreign minister Plassnik, science and research minister Hahn and economy minister Bartenstein. Both Plassnik and Bartenstein were accompanied by a suit of Austrian businessmen and these visits gave good impetus for intensifying the economic contacts and for promoting Austria in India. The politics clearly follow the economic interests – as Austria is for India just a small unimportant country (the name is usually exchanged for Australia), there is not much space for promoting Austrian world views – although the foreign minister Plassnik clearly stated the Austrian reluctance to the usage of nuclear power and the need for more focus on environmental issues during her visit in India. However, the question remains what impact her statement had in real.
3.2.1.3 Economic relations
With the growing economy and Indian internal reforms the Austrian companies with the global interests became interested in the market and since the late 1990s started to invest in the country. In 2006 India was defined as a “future destination for Austrian direct investment”, which was followed by a series of seminars about the investment possibilities. Automatization, control and industrial renewing were chosen as the focus areas. In the economic field Austria is very active in India, with more than 60 existing joint ventures and about other 100 companies holding technical agreements with Indian companies. The trade volume in 2006 cut the 2005 record of 577,29 mil EUR per year. Austrian exports to India got to 372,38 million EUR (23,3 %), imports got to 310,47 million EUR (12,8 %). A total of Foreign Direct Investment worth around 18,3 million EUR from Austrian companies was approved for the period April 2000 October 2007, which is 0.06% of the total inflows to India. (http://www.indianembassy.at) The main export commodities to India are machines and vehicles, chemical products, minerals, metal wares, measure tools, steel and iron, paper and textiles. In the opposite direction it is mainly clothes, carpets, shoes, machines, coffee and tee, chemical products and jewels. Important is also the travel industry. Altogether more than 500
99 Austrian companies are somehow business involved in India. The developments in recent years go in the direction of technology transfer and outsourcing to India, especially in the field of railway systems (Plasser und Theurer) and automobile industry (AVL, Magna) as well as in energetic and iron and steel industry (VA Tech, Corex Werk, MECON,) and computer spare parts (AT&S). Wienerberger, the brick producer, also sets up its factories in India. (See http://www.aussenministerium.at/newdelhi). For promotions of the Austrian investments and exporters the Austrian Foreign trade office (Aussenwirtschaft Österreich) was established. It is a sub part of Austrian chamber of commerce, 132 just vaguely connected with the Embassy. Tab. 11: Austrian trade exchange with India 133 (in thousands EUR)
2004 2005 2006 2007
Turnover 520 143 577 298 682 852 865 848
Export 276 744 302 004 372 379 527 862
Import 243 399 275 294 310 473 337 986
Balance 33 345 26 710 61 906 189 876
Source: WKO (http://ahstat.bilateral.wko.at/Frontend/Statistics.aspx?iso=IN&lang=en US) Austria has its strategy for promoting its name and its “brand” (specialized agency Österreich Werbung was established for this purpose; it has its office in New Delhi), with the main goal to bring more tourists to Austria and to widen knowledge about the country. The promotion strategy is globally based on Austrian tourism opportunities and beauties and on classical music and culture – which however do not work in South Asian region so well as elsewhere as the group of educated elite interested in outside world and classical (European) culture is just tiny. What however works well is the “Bollywood tourism” – Austrian state Tyrol successfully beguiled Indian movie producers to shot their movies there (the main competitor being Switzerland). On that follows also the inflow of Indian
132 Austrian chamber of commerce is a state institution with mandatory membership. 133 Austria does not publish separate ranking for the South Asian countries – therefore I do not state it in the tables.
100 affluent class that can afford to travel to Europe 134 – and that wants to see the exotic mountain sceneries showed in their favorite movie.135
3.2.1.4 Security relations
As is the case for CR, also Austria does not have any important security stakes in the region which it could influence for itself. As such, the main field for security issues are the multilateral organizations. Austria is watching the developments of Indo US nuclear agreement from its long term anti nuclear perspective and will try to influence the deal at the floor of the Nuclear suppliers group. Other current security issue is related to Indian effort to gain the permanent seat in the UN Security Council India promotes the so called G4 proposal, giving seats to Brazil, Germany, India and Japan. Austria wanted to balance between Germany (that obviously wants to get the seat) and Italy (that would feel neglected after Germany obtaining the seat and it not), it chose to support the option of the EU seat in the Security Council 136 and thus not offending neither Germany nor Italy – and to India it explained that it supports its effort, but it cannot openly support the current plan.
3.2.2 Relations towards other South Asian countries
3.2.2.1 Bangladesh
Austria has with Bangladesh friendly relations, although the economic contacts, which make the biggest part of the mutual contacts, have been in decrease recently due to the political instability in Bangladesh. The main export commodities are chemical products, pharmaceutics, machines and paper; the import commodities textiles and clothes (97 %) and then skin products. Currently approximately thirty Austrian companies are active in Bangladesh and it is the second most important market in the region, after India. 134 Although this class is just a minor ration of the population, it is estimated to be currently around 20 25 millions – it is, as the Austrian diplomat I spoke with put it „still half the Italy“. 135 About 60 Indian movies have been so far produced in Tyrol; the inflow of Indian tourists doubled since 2000 and reaches about 20 000 overnight stops – Tyrol is thus second most visited federal land after Vienna. See (http://www.austriatourism.com/xxl/_site/uk/_area/477931/_subArea/712240/_id/757642/index.html). 136 As the Austrian diplomat I spoke with nicely characterized the chances of this plan and Austrian attitude towards it: „This plan is easy to support. It can never happen.“
101 Tab. 12 : Austrian trade exchange with Bangladesh (in thousands EUR)
2004 2005 2006 2007
Turnover 137 268 128 927 192 385 187 309
Export 16 220 10 905 16 927 11 302
Import 121 048 118 022 175 458 176 007 164 Balance 104 828 107 117 158 531 705
Source: WKO (http://ahstat.bilateral.wko.at/Frontend/Statistics.aspx?iso=BD&lang=en US)
3.2.2.2 Bhutan
Austria is one of the few countries that have diplomatic relations with this country, and that through the Bhutanese Embassy in Geneva and Austrian Embassy in Delhi the diplomatic relations were started in April 1989 on the basis of friendship and cooperation. Bhutan is a priority country of Austrian Development Agency (ADA), there has been a coordination office for its projects in Thimphu since 1994 to watch over the projects. The development cooperation with Bhutan nevertheless differs from other countries in the way that in Bhutan the projects are carried out directly by the Bhutanese government, 137 and not by the NGOs as usual. The projects are generally oriented on supporting the legal state and democracy and to fight the poverty in the country. The working primary fields for projects are energetic, tourisms, culture and high mountain ecology. (Bhutan – Länderinformation 2007: 7) In energy it is especially the construction of the water power plants (in Rangjung and Basochhu) and building up of the electric capacities, in tourism it is the support of the conception of ecological and sustainable tourism and construction of the hotels as well as training of the personal and in the culture field it is the support of the government at the reconstruction of national heritage sites (e.g. renovation of Trongsa Dzong monastery). Austria supports also education of Bhutanese students, especially in the technical and agricultural fields (such as alpine forestry), as well as in tourism industry. 138
137 This is caused by the Bhutanese way of development directed by the „enlightened king“ leading the country towards „gross national happiness.“ On its development way, Bhutan chose Austria in the 1980s as the „advisor“ and developed country to help it with its developments. 138 Four scholarships for a hotel and tourism management school in Klessheim, one scholarship for hydrogeology at the University of Graz and two scholarships for „Master in mountain forestry“ at the
102 Tab. 13 : Austrian trade exchange with Bhutan (in thousands EUR)
2004 2005 2006 2007
Turnover 8 595 278 748 476
Export 8 284 257 740 456
Import 311 21 8 20
Balance 7 973 236 732 436
Source: WKO (http://ahstat.bilateral.wko.at/Frontend/Statistics.aspx?iso=BT&lang=en US)
3.2.2.3 The Maldives
Diplomatic relations of Austria with the Maldives date back to 1978 and Austria has a Honorary consulate in Malé. The relations are non problematic and consist mainly of inflow of Austrian tourist to the Maldives. Apart from tourism, there is just a marginal business exchange between the two countries. Tab. 14 : Austrian trade exchange with the Maldives (in thousands EUR)
2004 2005 2006 2007
Turnover 1 300 776 1 546 2 740
Export 1 242 749 1 526 2 526
Import 58 27 20 214
Balance 1 184 722 1 506 2 312
Source: WKO (http://ahstat.bilateral.wko.at/Frontend/Statistics.aspx?iso=MV&lang=en US)
3.2.2.4 Nepal
The diplomatic relations between Austria and Nepal were established in 1959. The responsible Embassy for Nepal is the one in New Delhi, in Katmandu sits an Honorary consulate.
University of Agriculture in Vienna are provided. Austria also finances several study places at the Bangkok Asian Institute of Technology which are reserved for Bhutanese students.
103 Nepal is a favorite travel destination for many Austrians, which is supported also by the fact that the Austrian Airlines are the only European carrier to have the direct flight to Nepal. Other economic contacts include then export of glass, IT products and chemical products and imports of paper, carpets, clothes, jewel pieces and silver wares. Nepal is a Cooperation country of Austrian development cooperation, on basis of what Austrian and Nepalese NGOs cooperate on various projects and programs. Austria is active in the fight against poverty and improvement of the life situation for the people in rural areas. It also supports the tourism industry and the development of its infrastructure as well as education of the guides and other personnel. Austria offers several scholarships in tourism and hotel management and in mountain forestry, agriculture and limnology and finances several places for the Nepalese students at the Asian Institute of Technology in Bangkok. With the worsening of the political and security situation in Nepal in 2002 also the conditions for the development cooperation work worsened, but the projects keep running even under this situation though the stability in the country is the main condition for successful development of the country and improvement of the life situation of its citizens. Tab. 15 : Austrian trade exchange with Nepal (in thousands EUR)
2004 2005 2006 2007
Turnover 3 388 3 172 2818 2610
Export 1 403 1 342 1 020 886
Import 1 985 1 830 1 798 1 724
Balance 582 488 778 836
Source: WKO (http://ahstat.bilateral.wko.at/Frontend/Statistics.aspx?iso=NP&lang=en US)
3.2.2.5 Sri Lanka
Diplomatic relations between Austrian and Sri Lanka were established in April 1954 and are described as without frictions. Austria is represented in Sri Lanka with an Honorary consulate, Sri Lanka opened its Embassy in Vienna in 1995 in an effort to improve the contacts.
104 Austria provided substantial humanitarian and other aid and support to Sri Lanka after the Tsunami catastrophe in December 2004, over 54 mil. EUR of private origin was collected. This was further supported with 28 mil. EUR provided for Sri Lanka from its region re construction aid package (totaling 49 mil EUR for the whole region). Tab. 16 : Austrian trade exchange with Sri Lanka (in thousands EUR)
2004 2005 2006 2007
Turnover 47 256 47 102 47 048 50 955
Export 27 536 27 880 21 189 19 096
Import 19 720 19 222 25 859 31 859
Balance 7 816 8 658 4 670 12 763
Source: WKO (http://ahstat.bilateral.wko.at/Frontend/Statistics.aspx?iso=LK&lang=en US) In the economic sector, the biggest projects and interests are in the sectors of energetic, ecology and tourism. Approximately thirty Austrian companies are active in Sri Lanka. The trade nevertheless does not have any stable broad basis and is more project based then continuous
3.3 Conclusion of the chapter
Both countries have had similar pattern of their relations with the region. Naturally, the main partner and the most important country has been India. The relations of both countries have good historic ties with India – whether for participation in non allied movement (Austria) or for including it into wider socialist block (Czechoslovakia).In both countries their contacts on India decreased immediately after the 1989 revolution for having other, more pressing issues on agenda. With growing Indian economy and with successful development of central Europe the countries started to put their focus on this country. First came the companies, then followed the politician – and now both countries take India as an important market which will even further grow and as such it is important for the countries´ globally oriented companies to be present there.
105 However, apart from the economic ties, the relations remain limited – mainly for the difference in power of the actors. Neither Austria nor the Czech Republic are anyhow important actors for India – and for that it is not interested in dealing any high politics issues with them. As such, the countries can (and do) promote their business interests and their name – but that is actually all what they can do. The rest – trade negotiations, security issues, development cooperation etc. – is done by the bigger powers and the EU. In this respect the role of EU and promoting country’s interests on the field of EU institutions comes to fore for the whole South Asia. The EU provides the space to promote interests of the small members far outreaching their actual geopolitical importance, supposing that they manage to push their issue through the EU institutions to the priority position. For that the first condition is to have defined the issue of this interest – as otherwise that is nothing to push through. As neither of the countries have any specific political goals related to South Asia they do not use this possibility and just keep pace with the developments, time to time pointing out their issue of interest (e.g. human rights in case of CR, environmental protection or anti nuclear position in case of Austria). Going back to the region and the “small countries around”, the economic interests play the primary role also there – yet the relations have second important issue in the development cooperation and humanitarian aid. Austria has Bhutan as its development cooperation priority country and Nepal as its partner country (= second level priority country) and carries out several project in these countries. Austria is one of few countries on the world to have actually the diplomatic relations with Bhutan. The Czech Republic does not have any country in the region defined as a country of importance for its development cooperation – still it is active especially on Sri Lanka and several NGOs have long term projects running there. Bangladesh is neglected by both countries. In economic field, the importance of the trade with the countries is just limited. Bangladesh is naturally the second biggest market in the region – still the turnover of the mutual trade is minor. Trade with Sri Lanka is then worthy mentioning, trade with other countries is just insignificant. Generally the trade is based more on the ad hoc project of few companies and on projects connected with the development cooperation efforts provided by the countries and other donors.
106 4 CONCLUSIONS
In first part of my hypothesis I stated that the Czech and Austrian foreign policies have as democratic and geographically and historically close countries similar normative basis of their foreign policies and similar, although not the same, priorities. I assumed that the policies of the countries differ not on the basis of general policies but on the ground of different concrete projects and different concrete activities. Were these assumptions correct or wrong? Was the first part of my hypothesis right? What are the similar fundaments and aspects of the foreign policies? And in what they differ? As I have shown in the first chapter of my work and in the conclusion to this chapter, both countries have their foreign policies based on safeguarding their sovereignty and independence, on safeguarding their democracy and their economic interests. Both countries also chose similar ways for reaching these goals – active multilateralism as the main strategy for guaranteeing security and sovereignty, promotion of human rights as the moral basis of their actions (at least rhetorically) and development cooperation as a tool of global solidarity (and of promotion of economic interests). Foreign policies have been, besides guaranteeing the life interests of the countries, focusing on economic wellbeing of the citizens. Export promotion and other tools for improving economic position of the countries have been an inherent part of the foreign policies of both countries. In the political field, both countries come out from promotion of democracy, peace and world stability. Both countries chose – as is the best option for small countries – to promote their interests on international forums where they can better eliminate the power disadvantages coming from their size than in bilateral contacts. Austria has been very much focusing on the United Nations (especially during the Cold War) and it managed to build an extraordinary position on its floor for a country of its size. CR, on the other hand clearly focused on NATO and EU as its priority organizations with UN being put a bit behind these two this nevertheless does not mean that CR would ignore UN or not be active there. CR succeeded in building itself a stable position in the international system and to become a respected partner. Both countries have as the key aspects of their foreign policies support of democracy and human rights – nevertheless they differ in the form and intensity of promoting these issues. Austria has always been rhetorically promoting human rights and
107 democracy where it was without any costs, but when and where human rights appeals should anyhow threaten its economic interests, Austria usually stood silent. Further, the rhetorical promotion has not been always followed by the congruous actions (it has not been rare that Austria criticized some regime but kept making business with it). In official terms, this has been done under the statement of trying to integrate also the dubious regime into the system and influence them through this. From the idealistic point of view, this is a hypocritical position (to speak about human rights but support the regimes not respecting human rights by trading with them); from the realistic point of view, this is following the self interests of the country. In the dilemma between idealistic promotion of human rights on all sights against the realistic following of country’s various interests, Austria has been clearly on the realistic side of the line. The Czech Republic is on the other hand renowned for its strenuous promotion of human rights even in the situations when and where this could limit its economic interests. CR has been, due to its historic experience and due to the personal cast on the foreign ministry, very active in criticizing regimes offending human rights, and that on various levels such as UN, EU, and OECD or on bilateral meetings. Both countries have promotion of economic interest as the other main point of their policies – as small open economies, it is necessary for them to try to create the best possible conditions for their companies in the world. In this respect, Austria is in advantage because of its longer established market economy, strength of its economy and of its companies. Despite of these general economy development factors, it cannot be said that the policies of the countries would significantly differ in other aspects than in the organization structures of the institutions promoting their foreign trade – what cannot be however seen as any significant difference in the foreign economy politics. Foreign policies of both countries have the promotion of their business interests as one of the guiding points economic diplomacy is clearly one of the top priorities for both countries. Security is the field where the two countries come out from different structural backgrounds – Austria is the neutral country, the Czech Republic is the NATO member – but even despite this institutional difference, their policy basis is again in fact the same. Both countries have their territorial security guaranteed through USA and NATO, and to lesser degree through the EU. Both countries participate on the security activities in the world and provide their piece to the peace efforts in the world. As neither of the countries is in danger of a territorial attack from any country, the main threats are terrorism, organized crime and especially in the case of Austria, potential instability in the Balkans.
108 Austria is much more sensitive about the development in the Balkans than CR is for in the case of any conflict it becomes the target country of a vast number of migrants. The Balkan is the priority region for Austrian security interests. The Czech Republic is also interested in the developments in the Balkans and it has been active there, still Prague is further from the region than Vienna and for that the perception of insecurity coming from the Balkans is not that strong (added to this, CR is not that popular country for the Balkan migrants as Austria is). This does not mean that CR is not interested in the Balkans, it is just that Austria is more interested as it has bigger stakes in the Balkan developments. As I have shown above, the foreign policies of the Czech Republic and Austria are coming from the same normative basis – democracy, multilateralism, guaranteeing the country security and promotion of its interests. They have also similar priorities of the foreign policies promoting their economic interest, promoting the human rights and democracy, development cooperation, efforts supporting global peace and stability. However the concrete realization of these policy priorities differs, with the most visible differences being the Austrian neutrality and the Czech NATO membership, the Czechs more solid position in the human rights questions (whereas Austria is in this field more driven by its economic interests), some different security missions (Czechs have a significant mission in Afghanistan and the Austrians at the Golan Heights) or different development cooperation priority countries. Thus I can conclude that the first part of my hypothesis and assumptions were correct as the countries do differ in different concrete projects and activities, but at the same time they do come out from the similar normative basis and similar priorities of their foreign policies. Moving to the comparison of their foreign policies towards South Asia, the main questions given in the introduction were: Are there any worked out foreign policies for the region? Or are the policies just ad hoc driven? What are the activities of Austria and the Czech Republic in the region? And why these? First and foremost I have to say that there are no foreign policy strategies towards South Asia. There are no grand plans, no concrete goals to reach. Nonetheless both countries have some plans regarding the development of economic relations with India, but these cannot be however taken as the leading documents of their policies. Both countries have recently upgraded the economic importance of India CR by putting it as the priority
109 country for its export strategy, Austria defined it as the future destination for Austrian direct investments. Following on growing importance of India are not just new definitions of the country’s importance but also more frequent political visits. As was already mentioned above, the pattern is “where the business goes, the politics follow.” The new definitions mentioned mark the growing importance of India, yet they do not set any grand strategy the fact that Czech export strategy wants to increase the exports to India cannot be overestimated for a grand plan. As economic area has some documents, but, despite their names, rather of a non strategic nature and as other areas, apart from Austrian development cooperation in the region, do not have any strategies at all, it can be concluded that the politics towards the region are predominantly ad hoc driven. The main activities are limited to economic contacts and development cooperation, with some marginal other activities such as cultural promotion taking place as well. Economic contacts are clearly focused on India as the by far biggest market in the region and a driving force of growing interests of both countries in the region. Czech and Austrian globally oriented companies come to India with the view of getting into the big Indian market – this is bigger motivation than the cheap labor force. To this corresponds also the structure of companies going to India, the dominating fields are automobiles industry, engineering and energetics. Due to the bigger size of Austrian economy compared to the Czech one, Austria naturally has bigger turnovers of trade with India as well as with the other countries in the region. Other countries of the region are by far not that important as India is – Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are potentially interesting from the economic point of view, but first they need to solve their internal problems. Trade with Bhutan and Nepal is just negligible – yet there is potential for growing tourism. Regarding the political and security issues, the countries are predestinated by their size to just a very limited influence. India does not take them as relevant partners to talk to about important issues as these are to be solved with big powers. As was already pointed out in the conclusion of the third chapter, this predisposition can be efficiently limited by promoting the important issues via EU. However, this is not done for the countries do not have any regional interests or goals defined. The political departments of the Embassies serve then mainly as the source of actual information for Prague/Vienna and for the respective offices and missions depending on the latest information about actual issues. In “small countries around” the relative power position of Austria and the Czech Republic is better and they can better promote their political goals – human rights
110 promotion and development cooperation. In the development cooperation, Austria is more active in the region as Bhutan is for it the priority country and Nepal the second level priority country. CR does not have any country in the region stated as important receiver of its development cooperation. Still, Czech NGOs are active especially on Sri Lanka and they get the support from the Embassy. Apart from supporting the development projects, the main role of the embassies is again to provide the center with the most actual information. Why the countries have these main activities in the region? The main frame is given by the geopolitical setting – Austria and CR as tiny countries in the middle of Europe, far from the region. For that, the interest of CR and Austria in the region is not that big. On the other hand, even if their South Asian interests were on the top of their agenda, their position is just very limited due to their relative size and influence – neither CR nor Austria can compare with India. In addition, even the small countries in the region prefer to deal with high policy problems on the EU level than bilaterally with Austria or CR. This geopolitical setting must be necessarily taken into account as the main factor influencing the policymaking. The second important factor are then the institutional interests – Czech ties to Sri Lanka are based on long time contacts and bindings; Austrian development cooperation to Bhutan and Nepal is based more on the wish of important actors on the ministry to help these mountainous countries than by the comparative advantages it has in the development efforts towards these countries. Similar comparative advantages could be applied to other small mountainous countries as well. Generally it can be said that activities of both countries in the region differ more than they do on their general level – however that is for the general foreign policies of both countries are so similar, not for there would be any major conceptual differences in their politics towards South Asia. India is economically important for both countries and Bangladesh is somehow sidetracked and neglected– although because of its population it is the second biggest regional market for both countries. The main difference is in the interests towards the “small around minus Bangladesh”: Austria is focusing its development cooperation on the Himalayan countries of Bhutan and Nepal, the Czech Republic has the biggest interests in Sri Lanka. Following on this, I can conclude that also the second part of my hypothesis is correct. There are no established and worked out foreign policy strategies for the region. The activities of the countries are in majority of cases ad hoc driven and problem solving
111 oriented and in the rest of the cases they are then based on personal interconnections and interests. By means of testing my hypothesis in this analysis I wanted to fill in the research gaps I identified at the beginning. I have provided a comprehensive analysis of Czech and Austrian foreign policies and of their foreign policies towards a particular region. I have added my piece to the state of Czech research on Austria and its foreign policy and to the “area research” of foreign policies of both countries, as well as to the state of research on South Asia.
112 5 List of Literature and Resources
5.1 List of Documents
A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy . 2003. Brussels, European Commission, on line version (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf). Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2006. Vienna, Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, on line version (http://www.aussenministerium.at/up media/4813_foreign_policy_year_book_2006.pdf). Außenministerin Plassnik: Menschenrechte zentrales Anliegen der österreichischen Ausßenpolitik . 10. 12. 2004. Wien, Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten, on line version (http://www.aussenministerium.at/view.php3?f_id=7099&LNG=de&version=). Außenpolitische Bericht 2005. Wien, Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten, on line version (http://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/bmeia/media/2 Aussenpolitik_Zentrale/2751_apb_2005.pdf). A world player. The European Union’s external relations . 2004. Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, on line text (http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/move/47/en.pdf). Arbeitsübereinkommen zwischen SPÖ und FPÖ über die Bildung einer gemeinsamen Bundesregierung 1983 1986. Transcript available at the Library of the Austrian Parliament, Vienna. Bangladesh European Community Country Strategy Paper 2007 2013 . Brussels, European Commission, on line text (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/bangladesh/sp/csp_07_13_en.pdf).
113 Bhutan – Länderinformation . 2007. Wien, OEZA, on line text (http://www.ada.gv.at/up media/2708_bhutan_l_nderinformation_feb__2007.pdf). Bhutan Country Strategy Paper 2007 2013 . Brussels, European Commission, on line text (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/india/csp/index.htm). Bundeskanzler Dr. Franz Vranitzky Erklärung der Bundesregierung vor dem Nationalrat. Wien, am 13. März 1996 . 1996. Wien, Bundespressedienst. Bundeskanzler Mag. Viktor Klima Erklärung der Bundesregierung vor dem Nationalrat. Wien, am 29. Jänner 1997 . 1997. Wien, Bundespressedienst. Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community. 2002. Brussels, Official Journal of the European Communities 24.12.2002. Erklärung der Bundesregierung vor dem Nationalrat von Bundeskanzler Dr. Franz Vranitzky 28. Jänner 1987 . 1987. Wien, Bundespressedienst. Erklärung der Bundesregierung vor dem Nationalrat von Bundeskanzler Dr. Franz Vranitzky 18. Dezember 1990 . 1990. Wien, Bundespressedienst. Erklärung der Bundesregierung vor dem Nationalrat von Bundeskanzler Dr. Franz Vranitzky 30. November 1994. 1994. Wien, Bundespressedienst. EU China and EU India Summits. EU27 trade with China grew by 150% between 2000 and 2006 . 2007. Brussels, Press Release Reference STAT/07/160 from 26.11. 2007, on line text (http://www.europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=STAT/07/160&format=H TML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en). EU India: Ferrero Waldner makes first bilateral visit. 2007. Brussels, Press Release Reference IP/07/182 from 14.2. 2007, on line version.
114 (http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/182&format=HTML&age d=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en). EU India Summit: setting the path for a growing partnership . 2007. Brussels, Press Release Reference IP/07/1810 from 29.11. 2007, on line version (http://www.europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1810&format=HTM L&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en). Exportní strategie ČR 2006 2010. 2005. Praha, Ministerstvo průmyslu a obchodu ČR, on line version (http://www.businessinfo.cz/cz/rubrika/exportni strategie cr 2006 2010/1001404/). Federal Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel Statement made by the Austrian federal government to the Nationalrat. Vienna, 9 February 2000 . 2000. Wien, Federal Press Service. Franz, Margit: Österreich Indien . Year not stated. New Delhi, Österreichischen Botschaft New Delhi , on line text (http://www.aussenministerium.at/view.php3?r_id=3592&LNG=de&version=. Für ein modernes Österreich. Regierungserklärung, abgeben von Bundeskanzler Dr. Bruno Kreisky am 27. April 1970 vor dem Nationalrat . 1970. Wien, Klub sozialistischer Abgeordneten und Bundesräte. ICP Regional Strategy: South Asia. 2005. Washington, The World Bank, on line text (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ICPINT/Resources/ICPregionalsummaries_SAR.doc). India Country Strategy Paper 2007 2013 . Brussels, European Commission, on line text (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/india/csp/07_13_en.pdf ). India EU Joint Statement . 2007. New Delhi India EU Summit, 30 November 2007, on line version (http://www.delind.ec.europa.eu/en/political_dialogue/summits/eighth/8_joint_statement.pdf).
115 India EU Joint Action Plan: Implementation Report . 2007. New Delhi India EU Summit, 30 November 2007, on line version (http://www.delind.ec.europa.eu/en/political_dialogue/summits/eighth/8_jap_imp rep.pdf). Koncepce zahraniční politiky České Republiky na léta 2003 2006. Praha, Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR. Koncepce zahraniční rozvojové pomoci České republiky na období let 2002 až 2007. Praha, Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR, on line version (http://www.mzv.cz/servis/soubor.asp?id=1559). Listina základních práv a svobod . 1992. Praha, Česká národní rada, on line version (http://www.psp.cz/docs/laws/listina.html. Mandelson, Peter. 2007. Europe and indispensable India . Speech made at the EU India Business Summit in New Delhi, 29 November 2007, on line text (http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/769&format=HTM L&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en). Návrh koncepce směřování ČR v EU . 2004. Praha, Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR, on line version (http://www.mzv.cz/servis/soubor.asp?id=6996). Nepal Country Strategy Paper 2002 2006 Nepal European Community Co operation Strategy . Brussels, European Commission, on line text (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/nepal/csp/csp_02_06_en.pdf). Politik für Österreichs zukunft. Bundeskanzler Dr. Bruno Kreisky: Regierungserklärung vom 5.11. 1971 . 1971. Wien, Klub sozialistischer Abgeordneter und Bundesräte. Programové prohlášení vlády ČR . 1992. Praha, Vláda ČR. Programové prohlášení vlády ČR . 1996. Praha, Vláda ČR. Programové prohlášení vlády ČR . 1998a. Praha, Vláda ČR.
116 Programové prohlášení vlády ČR . 1998b. Praha, Vláda ČR. Programové prohlášení vlády ČR . 2002. Praha, Vláda ČR. Programové prohlášení vlády ČR . 2004. Praha, Vláda ČR. Programové prohlášení vlády ČR . 2005. Praha, Vláda ČR. Programové prohlášení vlády ČR . 2006. Praha, Vláda ČR. Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Dr. Bruno Kreisky am 5. November 1975 (1975): Wien, Bundespressedienst. Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Dr. Bruno Kreisky am 19. Juni 1979 . 1979. Wien, Bundespressedienst. Souhrnná teritoriální informace Bangladéš . 2007. Zpracováno a aktualizováno zastupitelským úřadem ČR v Dillí (Indie) ke dni 1.10.2007, on line text (http://services.czechtrade.cz/pdf/sti/banglades 2007 10 01.pdf). Souhrnná teritoriální informace Indie . 2007. Zpracováno a aktualizováno zastupitelským úřadem ČR v Dillí ke dni 1.10. 2007, on line text (http://services.czechtrade.cz/pdf/sti/indie 2007 10 01.pdf). Souhrnná teritoriální informace Nepál . 2007. Zpracováno a aktualizováno zastupitelským úřadem ČR v Dillí (Indie) ke dni 1. 10. 2007, on line text (http://services.czechtrade.cz/pdf/sti/nepal 2007 10 01.pdf). Souhrnná teritoriální informace Srí Lanka . 2007. Zpracováno a aktualizováno zastupitelským úřadem ČR v Dillí (Indie) ke dni 1.10. 2007, on line text (http://services.czechtrade.cz/pdf/sti/sri lanka 2007 10 01.pdf).
117 Strategie prosazování obchodně ekonomických zájmů České republiky v Indii. 2006. Praha, Ministerstvo průmyslu a obchodu ČR, on line text (http://www.businessinfo.cz/cz/clanek/indie/strategie prosazovani obchodne ekonomick/1000422/38417/). The European Union and India: a strategic partnership for the 21st century . 2006. Brussels, European Commission, on line text (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/library/publications/25_india_brochure.pdf). The India EU Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan . 2005. Brussels, European Commission, on line version (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/india/sum09_05/05_jap_060905.pdf). The Maldives European Community Country Strategy Paper 2007 2013. Brussels, European Commission, on line text (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/maldives/csp/csp_07_13_en.pdf). Usnesení vlády ČR ze dne 15. března 1995 č. 153 + P: k zásadám poskytování zahraniční pomoci . 1995. Praha, Vláda ČR. Zieleniec, Josef. 1993. Projev na 8. schůzi Poslanecké sněmovny Parlamentu ČR dne 21. dubna 1993. Stenografický zápis . Praha, Poslanecká sněmovna Parlamentu ČR. Zpráva o zahraniční politice 2005 . Praha, Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR. Zpráva o zahraniční politice 2006. Praha, Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR. Zukunft im Herzen Europas. Österreich neu regieren. Das Regierungsprogramm . 2000. Wien, Bundeskanzleramt.
118 5.2 List of Internet resources
Armáda České Republiky URL:
119 Das Aussenministerium: Bundesministerium für europäische und internationale Angelegenheiten URL:
120 URL:
121 Parlament České republiky Poslanecká sněmovna URL:
122 5.3 List of Literature
Adamcová, Nicol, ed. 2006. International Development Cooperation of the Czech Republic . Praha: Institute of International Relations. Bache, Ian – George, Stephen. 2006. Politics in the European Union. Second Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bellers, Jürgen – Benner, Thorsten – Gerke, Ines M., eds. 2001. Handbuch der Außenpolitik. Von Afghanistan bis Zypern. München und Wien: Oldenbourg. Bischof, Günter – Pelinka, Anton – Gehler, Michael. eds. 2006. Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers. Bílková, Veronika. 2004. „Česká republika v mezinárodních organizacích.“ In: Zahraniční politika České Republiky 1993 2004. Úspěchy problémy a perspektivy. Eds. Handl, Vladimír – Pick, Otto . Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů. Bruckmüller, Ernst. 1998. „The Development of Austrian National Identity.” In: Austria 1955 1995. Fifty years of the republic. Eds. Luther, Kurt Richard – Pulzer, Peter. Aldreshot, Brookfield, Singapore and Sidney: Ashgate. Casarini, Nicola – Musu, Costanza, eds. 2007. European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System. The Road Towards Convergence. London and New York: Palgrave Mackmillan. Cihelková, Eva. 2003. Vnější ekonomické vztahy Evropské unie . Praha: C.H. Beck. Dachs, Herbert – Gerlich, Peter – Gottweis, Herbert – Kramer, Helmut – Lauber, Volkmar – Müller, Wolfgang C. – Tálos, Emmerich, eds. 2006. Politik in Österreich. Das Handbuch. Wien: Manzsche Verlags und Universitätsbuchhandlung.
123 Dančák, Břetislav. 2005. „Česká zahraniční politika a priority v roce 2004.“ In: Politika v České republice 2004. Eds. Balík, Stanislav, Dančák, Břetislav, Hloušek, Vít. Brno, Masarykova univerzita – IIPS. Dienstbier, Jiří. 2007. „Mezi kontinuitou a novými výzvami“ Mezinárodní politika , Vol. 31, No. 2., pp. 22 23. Fiala, Petr – Pitrová, Markéta. 2003. Evropská unie. Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury. Fiala, Petr – Pitrová, Markéta, eds. 2003. Rozšiřování ES/EU . Brno: Mezinárodní politologický ústav MU v Brně. Filzmaier, Peter – Gewessler, Leonore – Höll, Otmar – Mangott, Gerhard. 2006. „Österreichische Politik. Supplement zu Internationale Politik.“ In: Internationale Politik . Filzmaier, Peter – Gewessler, Leonore – Höll, Otmar – Mangott, Gerhard. Wien: Facultas. Gärtner, Heinz – Rendl, Andreas. 2001. „Österreich“ In: Handbuch der Außenpolitik. Von Afghanistan bis Zypern. Eds. Bellers, Jürgen – Benner, Thorsten – Gerke, Ines M. München and Wien: Oldenbourg. Gehler, Michael. 2006. „Sources on the Diplomacy of the Ballhausplatz“ In: Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context. Eds. Bischof, Günter – Pelinka, Anton – Gehler, Michael. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers. Gehler, Michael Bischof, Günter. 2006. „Introduction. Austrian Foreign Policy after World War II“ In: Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context . Eds. Bischof, Günter – Pelinka, Anton – Gehler, Michael. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers. Handl, Vladimír – Pick, Otto, eds. 2004. Zahraniční politika České Republiky 1993 2004. Úspěchy problémy a perspektivy. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů. Handl, Vladimír – Pick, Otto. 2005a. „Česká zahraniční politika 1993 2005 od „návratu do Evropy“ k evropeizaci.“ 1. část. Mezinárodní politika, Vol. 29, n. 8., pp. 13 15.
124 Handl, Vladimír – Pick, Otto. 2005b. „Česká zahraniční politika 1993 2005 od „návratu do Evropy“ k evropeizaci.“ 2. část. Mezinárodní politika, Vol. 29, n. 9., pp. 20 22. Hauser, Günther. 2006. „ESDP and Austria: Security Police between Engagement and Neutrality“ In: Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context. Eds. Bischof, Günter – Pelinka, Anton – Gehler, Michael. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers. Hödl, Gerald. 2004. Österreich und die Dritte Welt. Außen und Entwicklungspolitik der Zweiten Republik bis zum EU Beitritt 1995 .Wien: Forschung ProMedia. Hloušek, Vít – Sychra, Zdeněk, eds. 2004. Rakousko v evropské a středoevropské politice . Brno: Masarykova univerzita v Brně, Mezinárodní politologický ústav. Hrabálek, Martin. 2007. „Prezident jako aktér zahraniční politiky“ In: Česká zahraniční politika: aktéři, struktura, proces . Eds. Kořan, Michal – Hrabálek, Martin. Brno: Masarykova univerzita, Mezinárodní politologický ústav. Hřích, Jan. 2004. „Vývoj ekonomické dimenze zahraniční politiky České republiky jako reakce na vývoj vnější pozice české ekonomiky“ In: Zahraniční politika České Republiky 1993 2004. Úspěchy problémy a perspektivy. Eds. Handl, Vladimír – Pick, Otto. Praha. Ústav mezinárodních vztahů. Hřích, Jan – Foltýn, Jaroslav. 2004. „Cíle sledované Českou republikou na půdě mezinárodních organizací ekonomického zaměření“ In: Zahraniční politika České Republiky 1993 2004. Úspěchy problémy a perspektivy. Eds. Handl, Vladimír – Pick, Otto. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů. Jelínek, Petr. 2004. „Česká rozvojová spolupráce“ In: Zahraniční politika České Republiky 1993 2004. Úspěchy problémy a perspektivy. Eds. Handl, Vladimír – Pick, Otto. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů. Kaniok, Petr. 2003. „Čtvrté rozšíření: Rakousko, Finsko, Švédsko“ In: Rozšiřování ES/EU . Eds. Fiala, Petr – Pitrová, Markéta. Brno: Mezinárodní politologický ústav MU v Brně.
125 Kavan, Jan. 1998. „Zahraniční politika České republiky“ Mezinárodní politika , Vol. 22, No. 9., pp. 4 6. Kavan, Jan. 1999. „O koncepci zahraniční politiky České republiky“ Mezinárodní politika , Vol. 23, No. 7., pp. 4 7. Khol, Radek. 2004. „Česká bezpečnostní politika 1993 2004“ In: Zahraniční politika České Republiky 1993 2004. Úspěchy problémy a perspektivy. Eds. Handl, Vladimír – Pick, Otto. Praha. Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, pp. 31 44. Kirt, Romain. 2006. „Foreign Policy in the Age of Globalization: Does Globalization Constrain Nation States´ Sovereignty in Conceiving and Maintaining their Foreign Policy?“ In: Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context. Eds. Bischof, Günter – Pelinka, Anton – Gehler, Michael. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers. Kořan, Michal. 2007. „Struktura a proces zahraniční politiky” In: Česká zahraniční politika: aktéři, struktura, proces . Eds. Kořan, Michal – Hrabálek, Martin. Brno: Masarykova univerzita, Mezinárodní politologický ústav. Kořan, Michal – Hrabálek, Martin, eds. 2007. Česká zahraniční politika: aktéři, struktura, proces . Brno: Masarykova univerzita, Mezinárodní politologický ústav. Kotyk, Václav. 2000. „Stručná bilance vývoje české zahraniční politiky“ Mezinárodní vztahy , Vol. 35, No. 1., pp. 47 60. Kramer, Helmut. 1998. „Austrian Foreign Policy from the State Treaty to European Union Membership (1955 1995)“ In: Austria 1955 1995. Fifty years of the republic. Eds. Luther, Kurt Richard – Pulzer, Peter. Aldreshot, Brookfield, Singapore and Sidney: Ashgate. Kramer, Helmut. 2006. „Strukturentwicklung der Außenpolitik (1945 2005)“ In: Politik in Österreich. Das Handbuch. Eds. Dachs, Herbert et al. Wien: Manzsche Verlags und Universitätsbuchhandlung.
126 Kunštát, Miroslav. 2004. „Česko rakouské paralely: sbližování sousedů, které není přímočaré“ In: Zahraniční politika České Republiky 1993 2004. Úspěchy problémy a perspektivy. Eds. Handl, Vladimír – Pick, Otto. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů. Lebeda, Petr. 2004. „Přístup České republiky k výzvám globalizace“ In: Zahraniční politika České Republiky 1993 2004. Úspěchy problémy a perspektivy. Eds. Handl, Vladimír – Pick, Otto. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů. Linz, Juan J. – Stepan, Alfred. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post Communist Europe. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press. Luif, Paul. 2006. „Österreich un die Europäische Union“ In: Politik in Österreich. Das Handbuch. Eds. Dachs, Herbert et al. Wien: Manzsche Verlags und Universitätsbuchhandlung. Luther, Kurt Richard – Pulzer, Peter, eds. 1998. Austria 1945 1995. Fifty Years of the Second Republic. Aldreshot, Brookfield, Singapore and Sidney: Ashgate. Mareš, Miroslav. 1999. „České politické strany a zahraniční politika“ Mezinárodní vztahy , Vol. 34, No. 1., pp. 7 20. Michal Misak, Silvia – Quendler, Franz. 2006. „Österreich in internationalen Organisationen“ In: Politik in Österreich. Das Handbuch. Eds. Dachs, Herbert et al. Wien: Manzsche Verlags und Universitätsbuchhandlung. Neuhold, Hanspeter. 1998. „Austria in search of its Place in a Changing World: From Between the Blocks to Full Western Integration?“ In: Austria 1955 1995. Fifty years of the republic. Eds. Luther, Kurt Richard – Pulzer, Peter. Aldreshot, Brookfield, Singapore and Sidney: Ashgate. Nowotny, Eva. 2006. „Diplomats: Symbol of Sovereignity become Managers of Interdependence: The Transformation of Austrian Diplomatic Service“ In: Austrian
127 Foreign Policy in Historical Context. Eds. Bischof, Günter – Pelinka, Anton – Gehler, Michael. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers. Ort, Alexandr. 2005. Česká zahraniční politika. Plzeň: Aleš Čeněk. Paroubek, Jiří. 2005. „Projev z pravidelné porady českých velvyslanců 29. srpna 2005 v Praze” Mezinárodní politika , Vol. 29, No. 10., pp. 16 19. Pehe, Jiří. 1999. „Souvislosti domácí a zahraniční politiky“ Mezinárodní vztahy , Vol. 34, No. 2., pp. 64 73. Pelinka, Anton. 1998. „Austrian Political Culture: From Subject to Participant Orientation“ In: Austria 1955 1995. Fifty years of the republic. Eds. Luther, Kurt Richard – Pulzer, Peter: Aldreshot, Brookfield, Singapore and Sidney: Ashgate. Pelinka, Anton – Rosenberger, Siegelinde. 2003. Österreichische Politik. Grundlagen, Strukturen, Trends. 2., aktualisierte Auflage. Wien: WUV. Pick, Otto. 2004. „Úspěchy, problémy a perspektivy: co se podařilo a co ne“ In: Zahraniční politika České Republiky 1993 2004. Úspěchy problémy a perspektivy. Eds. Handl, Vladimír – Pick, Otto. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů. Poláčková, Klára. 2004. „Česká republika v rakouské zahraniční politice“ In: Rakousko v evropské a středoevropské politice . Eds. Hloušek, Vít – Sychra, Zdeněk.Brno: Masarykova univerzita v Brně, Mezinárodní politologický ústav. Pštross, Tomáš. 2004. „Problematika lidských práv v české zahraniční politice“ In: Zahraniční politika České Republiky 1993 2004. Úspěchy problémy a perspektivy. Eds. Handl, Vladimír – Pick, Otto. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů. Rathkolb, Oliver. 1998. „Superpower Perceptions of Austrian Neutrality Post 1955“ In: Austria 1955 1995. Fifty years of the republic. Eds. Luther, Kurt Richard – Pulzer, Peter. Aldreshot, Brookfield, Singapore and Sidney: Ashgate.
128 Sen, Amartya. 2006. The Argumentative Indian. Writings on Indian Culture, History and Identity. London: Penguin Books. Skuhra, Anselm. 2006. „Österreichische Sicherheitspolitik“ In: Politik in Österreich. Das Handbuch. Eds. Dachs, Herbert et al. Wien: Manzsche Verlags und Universitätsbuchhandlung. Strnad, Jaroslav et.al. 2003. Dějiny Indie. Praha: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny. Stumbaum, May Britt. 2007. „Engaging China – Uniting Europe? EU Foreign Policy towards China.” In: European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System. The Road Towards Convergence . Eds. Casarini, Nicola – Musu, Costanza. London and New York: Palgrave Mackmillan. Svoboda, Cyril. 2005. „Projev z pravidelné porady českých velvyslanců 29. srpna 2005 v Praze” Mezinárodní politika , Vol. 34, No. 2., pp. 19 21. Šedivý, Jaroslav. 1998. „Stav české zahraniční politiky a její výhledy pro rok 1998“ Mezinárodní politika , Vol. 22, No. 1., pp. 4 8. Tabery, Erik. 2006. Vládneme, nerušit. Opoziční smlouva a její dědictví. Praha and Litomyšl: PASEKA. Tharoor, Sashi. 2007. The Elephant, the Tiger and the Cellphone. Reflections on India in the Twenty first Century. New Delhi: Penguin Books. The Economist. 2007. Czechs with few mates , Vol. 384, No. 8544. (September 1st 2007), p. 26. Tichy Fisslberger, Elisabeth. 2007. “Die österreichische EU Ratpräsidentschaft im Überblick“ Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft (ÖZP) , Vol. 36, Iss. 2., pp. 167 184.
129 Timms, Edward. 1998. „Austrian Identity in a Schizophrenic Age: Hilde Spiel and the Literary Politics of Exile and Reintegration“ In: Austria 1955 1995. Fifty years of the republic. Eds. Luther, Kurt Richard – Pulzer, Peter. Aldreshot, Brookfield, Singapore and Sidney: Ashgate. Vodička, Karel – Cabada, Ladislav. 2003. Politický systém České republiky . Praha: Portál. Vondra, Alexandr. 2006. „Česká zahraniční politika: tři principy, trojí směřování a tři témata.“ Mezinárodní politika , Vol. 30, No. 11., pp. 16 19. Wallace, William. 2007. „European” Foreign Policy: A Realistic Aspiration, or an Unattainable Goal?“ In: European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System. The Road Towards Convergence . Eds. Casarini, Nicola – Musu, Costanza. London and New York: Palgrave Mackmillan. Weinzierl, Erika. 1998. „The Origins of the Second Republic: A Retrospective View“ In: Austria 1955 1995. Fifty years of the republic. Eds. Luther, Kurt Richard – Pulzer, Peter. Aldreshot, Brookfield, Singapore and Sidney: Ashgate.
130 6 Appendixes
6.1 List of Tables
Tab. 1: Target countries of Austrian development cooperation ...... 56 Tab. 2: Some basic indicators of the countries researched ...... 61 Tab. 3: Diplomatic relations of CR with South Asian countries ...... 83 Tab. 4: Trade exchange of CR with India ...... 88 Tab. 5: Trade exchange of CR with Bangladesh ...... 91 Tab. 6: Trade exchange of CR with Bhutan ...... 92 Tab. 7: Trade exchange of CR with the Maldives ...... 93 Tab. 8: Trade exchange of CR with Nepal ...... 93 Tab. 9: Trade exchange of CR with Sri Lanka ...... 95 Tab. 10: Austrian diplomatic relations with South Asian countries ...... 97 Tab. 11: Austrian trade exchange with India ...... 100 Tab. 12: Austrian trade exchange with Bangladesh ...... 102 Tab. 13: Austrian trade exchange with Bhutan ...... 103 Tab. 14: Austrian trade exchange with the Maldives ...... 103 Tab. 15: Austrian trade exchange with Nepal ...... 104 Tab. 16: Austrian trade exchange with Sri Lanka ...... 105
131 6.2 List of Abbreviations
ADA Austrian Development Agency AL Awami League ASEM The Asia Europe Meeting BJP Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People’s Party) BNP Bangladesh Nationalist Party CMEC Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation CSCE Conference on cooperation and security in Europe ČSSD Česká strana sociálně demokratická (Czech Social Democratic Party) EC European Commission / European Community ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EEC European Economic Community EFTA European Free Trade Association ESDP European Security and Defense Policy EU European Union EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community FDA Foreign Development Aid FPÖ Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austrian Freedom Party) FTA Free Trade Agreement GDP Gross Domestic Product GNI Gross National Income HZDS Hnutí za demokratické Slovensko (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) IMF International Monetary Fund INC Indian National Congress KDS Křesťansko demokratická strana (Christian Democratic Party) KDU ČSL Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová (Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovakian People’s Party) KSČM Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia) LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non governmental organization
132 OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ODA Občanská demokratická aliance (Civic Democratic Alliance) ODS Občanská demokratická strana (Civic Democratic Party) OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries ÖVP Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian People´s Party) SPÖ Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (Social Democratic Party of Austria) STI Souborná teritoriální informace (Aggregate territorial information) SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SAFTA South Asia Free Trade Agreement SZ Strana zelených (Green Party) TEC Treaty on European Communities TEU Treaty on European Union UN United Nations US Unie svobody (Freedom Union) US DEU Unie svobody Demokratická unie (Freedom Union Democratic Union) QMV Qualified Majority Voting WB World Bank WTO World Trade Organization
133