BRIEFING PAPER Number 7944, 6 March 2019

South Sudan: March By Jon Lunn

2019 update

Contents: 1. Events between 2015-17 2. Developments since December 2017: peace at last? 3. Future prospects

www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | [email protected] | @commonslibrary 2 : March 2019 update

Contents

Summary 4 1. Events between 2015-17 6 A peace agreement but implementation soon falters 6 Salva Kiir obdurate as the humanitarian crisis deepens 7 International responses 8 2. Developments since December 2017: peace at last? 10 December 2017: 2015 peace agreement reaffirmed 10 June-September 2018: negotiations make progress 10 Efforts to implement the September 2018 revitalised peace agreement 11 3. Future prospects 14

Cover page image copyright South Sudanese flag by Martha Heinemann Bixby. Licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0 / image cropped

3 Commons Library Briefing, 6 March 2019

Source: Alex de Waal and Victor Ndula,“South Sudan: the price of war, the price of peace”, Tufts University/Justice and Security Research Programme/World Peace Foundation/Cartoon Movement, 2016 [reproduced with permission] 4 South Sudan: March 2019 update

Summary

In August 2015, under strong pressure from the international community, President (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement) and his former Vice-President Riek Machar (Sudan people’s Liberation Movement In-Opposition) signed a peace agreement which, it was hoped, would end a ruinous and brutal civil war that had raged between forces allied with the rival men since December 2013. What began as an elite political crisis had begun to take on an ethnic dimension: Salva Kiir is Dinka, South Sudan’s largest ethnic group; Machar is Nuer, its second largest group. Over the following months, with trust in short supply, progress towards implementing many parts of the peace agreement was painfully slow. Then, in mid-July 2016, fighting again broke out between them in the capital. Machar and his troops rapidly fled Juba; soon afterwards, he went to Khartoum. Salva Kiir, who some have accused of deliberately initiating the fighting, declared that Machar had vacated his position and later in the same month unilaterally replaced him. In September 2016, Machar declared that he had returned to armed rebellion. Fighting erupted again in many parts of the country, accompanied by a mounting humanitarian crisis. At the end of 2017 there was another potential turning-point when key parties to the conflict – including Salva Kiir and Riek Machar – recommitted themselves to implementing the 2015 peace agreement (or ARCSS) and agreed a ceasefire. This is known as the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. This ushered in renewed efforts to revive the 2015 peace agreement’s power-sharing arrangements. Negotiations culminated in Salva Kiir and Riek Machar signing an updated peace agreement in Addis Ababa called the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) on 12 September 2018. The revitalised peace agreement sets out political and security benchmarks to be met before a transition to a comprehensive peace could begin. That transition will begin once a new TGNU has been established. The R-ARCSS is officially viewed as a major step along the way to a comprehensive final deal. But the omens remain mixed. The ceasefire that came into effect at the end of June has often not been honoured. Although the overall trend has been towards reduced violence, there have been numerous spikes and the downward trend could easily go into reverse permanently. There has been fighting between signatories to the R-ARCSS, as well as between government forces and rebel groups outside the agreement. A new and disturbing factor has been attacks on official ceasefire observers. In December 2018, the International Crisis Group called the R-ARCSS the latest in a series of failed peace efforts in South Sudan, amounting to no more than “peace on paper.” It added: “a broader political 5 Commons Library Briefing, 6 March 2019

settlement that shares power across the country’s groups and regions is needed.” There are growing concerns about the lack of implementation of key elements in the R-ARCSS. The new TGNU is supposed to be in place by May 2019 but that deadline looks increasingly likely to be missed. A new Boundaries Commission intended to address the issue of South Sudan’s future federal character has not yet been established. In early March, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres reported to the Security Council that the ceasefire was largely holding but that the “situation remains fragile”. He said that 400,000 people had died since civil war broke out in 2013. He added that more than seven million

people (just under two-thirds of the population) are “severely food insecure” – a worse humanitarian situation than a year ago. The persistent failure of peace efforts to date in South Sudan raises questions about whether the main protagonists believe, despite their protestations to the contrary, that they ultimately have more to gain from continuing violence and conflict. There remains much scepticism about the intentions of these protagonists amongst Western countries, which have pushed in recent years for targeted sanctions against some (but not all) of those viewed as obstructing peace efforts. After several years of attempts, they have also been successful in securing a UN arms embargo on South Sudan. A better future for South Sudan depends on more than a political change of heart by its leaders –or even a change of leaders. Most experts argue that South Sudan’s rentier political economy, which remains heavily reliant on oil revenues and foreign aid, must change too. Reconfiguring such a political economy to one in which the relationship between state and citizen is based on a degree of trust and accountability will take a long time to achieve. In the meantime, even if current peace efforts do persist, the temptation will remain considerable for South Sudanese dissatisfied with their lot – whether motivated by greed, grievance or a combination of both – to resort to violence in pursuit of their goals. The expert Alex de Waal has argued that this sort of ‘permanent emergency’ has been the norm in both Sudans for decades. Given all this, South Sudan is likely to see continued violence and instability for years to come, although (as has been seen in Darfur) the degree of intensity may wax and wane over time.

6 South Sudan: March 2019 update

1. Events between 2015-17 A peace agreement but implementation soon falters In August 2015, under strong pressure from the international community, President Salva Kiir Mayardit (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement) and his former Vice-President Riek Machar (Sudan people’s Liberation Movement In-Opposition) signed a peace agreement, known as the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS), which, it was hoped, would end a ruinous and brutal civil war that had raged between forces allied with the rival leaders since December 2013. What began as an elite political crisis had taken on an ethnic dimension: Salva Kiir is Dinka, South Sudan’s largest ethnic group; Machar is Nuer, its second largest group.1 The agreement – which was brokered by the regional body, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – was meant to bring an immediate end to fighting; a demilitarisation of the capital, Juba, where the civil war had first broken out; the creation of a transitional government of national (TGNU), which would govern for 30 months, towards the end of which elections would be held; allocation of the position of ‘First Vice-President’ to Riek Machar; and the establishment of institutions to address issues of justice, truth and reconciliation across the country. Over the following months, with levels of trust between the main parties to the conflict low, progress towards implementing many parts of the peace agreement was painfully slow. Riek Machar was cautious about returning to Juba but eventually did so and was sworn in as First Vice-President in late-April 2016. Shortly afterwards, a TGNU was established. But instead of Juba being demilitarised, pro-Machar forces returned to the capital as discrete units, cohabiting uneasily with those loyal to the President. Meanwhile, in some parts of the country, fighting continued. New armed groups emerged, over which Salva Kiir and Machar often had little control. This was fuelled in part by a unilateral move by Salva Kiir to increase the number of states from 10 to 28. Civilians continued to bear the brunt. Not even UN protection could be counted upon. In February 2016, a UN civilian protection camp was attacked in , allegedly by pro-government forces. Within weeks of those apparently positive steps forward taken in April 2016, there were growing signs that the agreement was not going to work. Clashes between SPLM and SPLM-IO forces increased outside Juba. Then, in mid-July 2016, fighting again broke out between them in the capital. Machar and his troops rapidly fled Juba; soon afterwards, he went to Khartoum.

1 For more about the events of the period 2013-15, see Library Briefing Paper 7532, War and Peace in South Sudan: March 2016 update. 7 Commons Library Briefing, 6 March 2019

Salva Kiir, who some have accused of deliberately initiating the fighting, declared that Machar had vacated his position and later in the same month unilaterally replaced him with , a colleague of Machar’s – but most members of the SPLM-IO initially rejected his appointment. In September 2016, Machar declared that he had returned to armed rebellion. Salva Kiir obdurate as the humanitarian crisis deepens The president insisted that he remained committed to the August 2015 peace agreement, pointing to the fact that the TGNU remained in place. Over time, he was able to build bridges with some parts of the SPLM-IO. Salva Kiir periodically proposed a ceasefire (in May 2017 he unilaterally declared a unilateral one but it made little difference on the ground) and launched a ‘national dialogue’, but he refused to include Riek Machar or his supporters in the process. All this left Machar looking more politically marginalised. Improved relations between South Sudan and Sudan led to his expulsion by Khartoum at the end of 2016. He moved to South Africa. In early 2017 a new rebel armed group, the National Salvation Front, was formed by a combination of government defectors and disillusioned supporters of Machar. But Machar still had substantial fighting forces operating in his name, making it difficult for those seeking peace simply to ignore him. There were also growing fractures in Salva Kiir’s own support base. In early 2017, Salva Kiir sacked the powerful army chief of staff Paul Malong, who subsequently set up his own anti-government armed group. To complicate matters yet further, neighbouring Sudan remained involved. In pursuit of its own interests, it oscillated unpredictably between appearing supportive of Salva Kiir and his opponents. The Government showed no appetite for addressing the endemic official corruption afflicting South Sudan, which was causing Western donors growing concern. A US-based NGO, the Enough Project, published a report in January 2017 alleging that high-level corruption was fuelling the civil war. Meanwhile, the economy was flat on its back. Oil revenues plummeted as global prices fell. The country was reported to have the world’s highest inflation rate. In October 2016 it was reported to be 835%.2 The Government struggled to pay its soldiers – always a recipe for instability. By 2017 South Sudan was experiencing a massive, multi-dimensional, ‘man-made’ humanitarian crisis. At the start of the year, a third of the population – about 3.9 million people – were in need of humanitarian assistance.3 By mid-March, that figure had risen to nearly half – 7.5 million.

2 “A scorched earth peace”, Africa Confidential, 6 January 2017 3 “A scorched earth peace”, Africa Confidential, 6 January 2017 8 South Sudan: March 2019 update

In March 2017, the UN announced that South Sudan was the world’s fastest growing refugee crisis, with 1.6 million people displaced since June 2016. Fears of famine were realised in mid-February 2017 when the South Sudan Government and the UN declared one in parts of Unity State, which has been heavily affected by fighting. An estimated 100,000 people were affected. The Government harassed and expelled foreign aid workers. In March 2017 it announced that the cost of work permits for them would increase from US $100 to up to $10,000. However, the move was heavily criticised and was eventually suspended. Aid workers – particularly local ones – continued to be targeted by armed groups. For example, in late-March 2017 six aid workers were killed in an ambush by unidentified attackers. The UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, accused the Government of showing indifference towards the victims of famine. International responses In July 2015, the UN Security Council introduced asset freezes and travel bans against six designated individuals under Security Resolution 2206 (2015) – although not against the top leaders. In August 2016, the UN Security Council mandated the creation of a 4,000-strong regional protection force to stabilise the situation in Juba, the capital, but Salva Kiir – along with some neighbouring governments (Kenya and Uganda) – was obstructive and the first units did not arrive until August 2017. With one senior UN official warning that there was a real risk of genocide, Western efforts to introduce a UN arms embargo on South Sudan and targeted sanctions against three senior leaders of parties to the conflict – including Riek Machar – were stymied in late-December 2016 by the abstention of permanent members China and Russia, along with six other members of the Council (Angola, Egypt, Japan, Malaysia, Venezuela and Senegal).4 International patience with President Salva Kiir had worn thin by this point. The extent to which relations between the Government and former allies like the US had deteriorated was illustrated in February 2017 when Salva Kiir accused it of pursuing regime change. The Government made similar accusations against foreign aid workers. He also complained that his country had been “treated with contempt” by the UN.5 Despite having a more proactive mandate, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) continued to be accused of failing to do enough to

4 “A scorched earth peace”, Africa Confidential, 6 January 2017; “Power before food”, Africa Confidential, 3 March 2017 5 “Power before food”, Africa Confidential, 3 March 2017; “Storm over $10,000 permit”, Africa Confidential, 17 March 2017 9 Commons Library Briefing, 6 March 2019

protect civilians; its personnel were denied access to areas affected by the fighting. The UK deployed 400 troops to UNMISS during 2017. The UK (along with Norway and the US) also remained part of a ‘Troika’ of countries working to end the conflict in South Sudan. The August 2015 peace agreement included provision for the establishment of a hybrid court to be established under the auspices of the African Union (AU) Commission to investigate and try those responsible for grave human rights abuses since 2013. Under the agreement, the court was to consist of South Sudanese and other African judges and staff. However, no meaningful progress was made towards setting up this court between 2015 and the end 2017. Under the ARCSS, if the South Sudan Government take the steps necessary to set up the court, the AU has the power to do it by itself. Shortly after fighting broke out again in Juba in July 2016, a UN Human Rights Council-backed Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan began investigating continuing abuses. Its Chair, Yasmin Sooka, made a statement at the March 2017 session of the Council to which it presented its full report. Sooka said: South Sudanese civilians have been deliberately and systematically targeted on the basis of their ethnicity by government and government-aligned forces, for killing, abduction, unlawful detention, deprivation of liberty, rape and sexual violence, the burning of their villages, and looting […] Opposition forces too have been responsible for human rights abuses although to a lesser extent. The Government has also conducted a brutal campaign of repression to silence civil society […] The extent and scale of sexual violence in South Sudan is so horrifying that the consequences of doing nothing are unthinkable. It estimated that more than half of women aged between 15 and 24 years old had experienced gender-based violence, with those in camps for the internally-displaced particularly badly affected. 10 South Sudan: March 2019 update

2. Developments since December 2017: peace at last?

December 2017: 2015 peace agreement reaffirmed At the end of 2017 there was another potential turning-point when key parties to the conflict – including Salva Kiir and Riek Machar – recommitted themselves to implementing the 2015 peace agreement (or ARCSS) and agreed a ceasefire. This is known as the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. IGAD took the lead in mediating between the parties. This ushered in renewed efforts to revive the 2015 peace agreement’s power-sharing arrangements. But Salva Kiir continued to object to reinstating Machar to the Vice-Presidency. He threatened to go ahead and hold unilateral presidential elections during 2018 if the talks foundered. Many ceasefire violations continued to be reported during the first quarter of 2018 but there was some reduction in the violence. This made it easier to tackle elements of the humanitarian crisis and the threat of widespread famine faded – although levels of food insecurity remained alarmingly high. UN investigations into war crimes continued. Russia and China continued to obstruct efforts to get a UN arms embargo agreed by the Security Council but further leaders were made subject to asset freezes and travel bans. IGAD worked with the South Sudan Council of Churches to sponsor further negotiations through a High Level Revitalisation Forum (HLRF). They involved a wider range of rebel armed groups, including the South Sudan United Front, led by former army chief of staff Paul Malong. But while Salva Kiir now agreed that Riek Machar could return to the country, he remained adamant that he should not resume his official role. Western countries looked for ways to put further pressurise on the parties to reach a comprehensive deal. At the end of May, the Security Council was reported to have agreed a list of six more government officials that might be subject to asset freezes and travel bans at the end of June if insufficient progress had been made in the negotiations by then. June-September 2018: negotiations make progress In June-July 2018 there was an apparent breakthrough in negotiations. An important factor in helping to bring this about was Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir, who had become more directly involved in IGAD’s mediation efforts in tandem with Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni. Since 2016 Bashir had been cultivating improved relations with Salva Kiir. In the past, the Khartoum regime had been a sponsor of Riek Machar. This meant that, unlike Museveni, who has been very much on Salva Kiir’s side, he had the ear of both figures. 11 Commons Library Briefing, 6 March 2019

On 20 June, Salva Kiir and Riek Machar met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for the first time since 2016. Seven days later they met again, this time in Khartoum, Sudan, once again agreeing a ceasefire, to take effect on 30 June. They also agreed to sign a further agreement within a fortnight setting out the composition of a new TGNU, which would stay in place until elections in 2021. On 8 July, they met for a third time in Entebbe, Uganda, but the two-week deadline was missed. One of the last areas of contention was how many vice-presidential positions should be established in the new unity government, with rebel groups wanting four – two pro-opposition figures and two pro-government figures. Outside pressure on the government to agree a deal increased dramatically on 13 July, when the UN Security Council finally voted, albeit by the narrowest of margins, to introduce an arms embargo on South Sudan. Nine countries voted in favour. China and Russia were amongst six countries which abstained. In addition, two new names were added to the UN’s asset freeze/travel ban list, making eight people in total; one was a senior government official, the other was Paul Malong. The day beforehand, the South Sudan Parliament had passed a government-sponsored bill unilaterally extending Salva Kiir’s presidential term to 2021. On 25 July, a deal was finally reached establishing five vice-presidents – one of them Riek Machar. A 35-member TGNU was agreed, with 20 members coming from the previous unity government, nine from the SPLM-IO and the rest from other anti-government groups. Over three months of negotiations culminated in Salva Kiir and Riek Machar signing an updated peace agreement in Addis Ababa called the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) on 12 September. The revitalised peace agreement set out political and security benchmarks to be met before a transition to a comprehensive peace could begin. The transition would begin when the new TGNU was established. Efforts to implement the September 2018 revitalised peace agreement The R-ARCSS is officially viewed as a major step along the way to a comprehensive final deal. But the omens remain mixed. The ceasefire that came into effect at the end of June has often not been honoured. Although the overall trend has been towards reduced violence, there have been numerous spikes and the downward trend could easily go into reverse permanently. During the second half of September and into October, there were violent clashes. Some were between rival rebel armed groups, several of which remained outside the R-ARCSS, including the National Salvation Front. International concern about the ongoing volatility of the situation on the ground led to UN officials wondering whether additional peace- keeping troops were needed. A side agreement on security arrangements has committed all sides to moving their forces out of population centres, basing them at agreed 12 South Sudan: March 2019 update

locations and eventually reintegrating rebel groups into the national army. But so far, not much progress has been made on this front. As talks have continued, other difficult issues have been placed on the agenda, such as the future federal character of South Sudan. The SPLM- IO and other opposition groups have always rejected Salva Kiir’s unilateral 2016 move to create 18 more states. In late-October, the national dialogue body established by Salva Kiir unexpectedly proposed that the country revert to the three provinces that had existed in the South during the colonial period. At the end of 2018 there was a spike in the violence. Fighting between signatories to the R-ARCSS, as well as between government forces and rebel groups outside the agreement increased in parts of the country. A new and disturbing factor was attacks on official ceasefire observers. There are growing concerns about the lack of implementation of key elements in the R-ARCSS. The new TGNU is supposed to be in place by May 2019 but that deadline looks increasingly likely to be missed. A new Boundaries Commission intended to address the issue of South Sudan’s future federal character has not yet been established. There were fewer clashes between signatories to the R-ARCSS in January 2019 but no reduction in those between signatories and non- signatories. Then in February there was an escalation of conflict in the southern Equatoria region, with government forces allying with forces loyal to Riek Machar against National Salvation Front fighters allied with local leader Thomas Cirillo. Uganda is alleged to be providing support to the pro-agreement forces on the ground in violation of the UN arms embargo.6 The Troika, which includes the UK, issued a statement expressing alarm about the escalating conflict and the humanitarian crisis it had caused in the region. IGAD is trying to persuade Cirillo and other non-signatory leaders to sign up to the R-ARCSS. Not all of the clashes currently taking place are directly linked to the main fighting forces. Some are primarily local expressions of intercommunal violence and banditry, highlighting just how widespread violence has become in South Sudan after over five years of civil war. Once again, Western countries find themselves warning South Sudan’s leadership that their patience is not infinite. On 13 December, US National Security Advisor John Bolton called the national leadership “morally bankrupt” and announced that the US would review its aid programme to the country. On 20 February 2019 the UN Human Rights Council-backed Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan published a third report – following on from its previous reports in 2017 and 2018 – in which it provided further evidence of continuing human rights violations in the country that could amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. There is still no sign of the hybrid court provided for under the 2015

6 “Bumps on the road to peace”, Africa Confidential, 22 February 2019 13 Commons Library Briefing, 6 March 2019

peace agreement. Instead, Salva Kiir has suggested that there should be amnesty for all the parties involved in the civil war since 2013. In August 2018, he theatrically granted amnesty to Riek Machar (a gift that was not accepted. The AU still shows no inclination to act by itself to establish the court. Human Rights Watch has been suggesting for some time that if the hybrid court is not established soon, South Sudan should be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) by the UN Security Council. But while China and Russia may have shifted position last year on the UN arms embargo, they show no sign of wanting to do the same when it comes to involving the ICC. South Sudan is not a state party to the 2002 Rome Statute, which established the ICC. In early March, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres reported to the Security Council that the ceasefire was largely holding but that the “situation remains fragile”. He said that 400,000 people had died since civil war broke out in 2013. He added that more than seven million people (just under two-thirds of the population) are “severely food insecure” – a worse situation than a year ago. There are also significant shortfalls in humanitarian funding. For example, UNICEF’s programme is said to be only 15% funded. The mandate for the 17,000-strong UNMISS mission is set to be extended for another year within the next week or so. Guterres wants to strengthen its mandate further to assist the current peace process. The UK continues to provide over 300 troops to the mission. Meanwhile, the size of the regional protection force, created to provide security in Juba, has increased to over 1000. IGAD wants it to increase to 1600 over the coming period. But although it is officially under the command of UNMISS, there remain unresolved tensions over what role it should play.

14 South Sudan: March 2019 update

3. Future prospects

In December 2018, the International Crisis Group called the R-ARCSS the latest in a series of failed peace efforts in South Sudan, amounting to no more than “peace on paper.” It added: a broader political settlement that shares power across the country’s groups and regions is needed. The persistent failure of peace efforts to date in South Sudan raises questions about whether the main protagonists believe that they have had more to gain from continuing violence and conflict. Certainly, all parties have taken little heed of former UN Secretary-General Ban ki- Moon’s plea in February 2016 to “put peace above politics. Pursue compromise. Overcome obstacles.” With the signing of the R-ARCSS, has this calculus now changed? Or is the latest push for peace simply another stratagem by leaders endlessly manoeuvring for advantage? The introduction of a UN arms embargo and the extension of targeted sanctions, the change in posture of Khartoum and the disillusionment of Western governments with the country’s entire political elite suggests that South Sudan’s leaders are under more pressure than before to compromise. But there are still no strong grounds for confidence that the current peace effort will be sustained. Arms embargoes and sanctions are unlikely to be decisive in the South Sudanese context. The Khartoum regime is currently under massive internal challenge and cannot be viewed as a reliable partner. In the absence of viable alternatives, Western countries may feel that they cannot afford to push South Sudan’s leaders too hard. A better future for South Sudan depends on more than a political change of heart by its leaders –or even a change of leaders. Most experts argue that South Sudan’s rentier political economy, which remains heavily reliant on oil revenues and foreign aid, must change too. Alex de Waal said in 2014: South Sudan obtained independence in July 2011 as a kleptocracy – a militarized, corrupt neo-patrimonial system of governance. By the time of independence, the South Sudanese “political marketplace” was so expensive that the country’s comparatively copious revenue was consumed by the military-political patronage system, with almost nothing left for public services, development or institution building. The efforts of national technocrats and foreign donors produced bubbles of institutional integrity but the system as a whole was entirely resistant to reform. Little has happened in the intervening five years to challenge this prognosis. Indeed, not long after the R-ARCSS was agreed in September 2018, experts warned that, unless the deal is sufficiently lubricated by oil revenues or donor funds, the main parties would eventually abandon it. 15 Commons Library Briefing, 6 March 2019

Reconfiguring such a political economy to one in which the relationship between state and citizen is based on a degree of trust and accountability will take a long time to achieve. In the meantime, even if current peace efforts do persist, the temptation will remain considerable for South Sudanese dissatisfied with their lot – whether motivated by greed, grievance or a combination of both – to resort to violence in pursuit of their goals. Alex de Waal has argued persuasively that this sort of ‘permanent emergency’ has been the norm in both Sudans for decades. Given all this, South Sudan is likely to see continued violence and instability for years to come, although (as has been seen in Darfur) the degree of intensity may wax and wane over time.

About the Library The House of Commons Library research service provides MPs and their staff with the impartial briefing and evidence base they need to do their work in scrutinising Government, proposing legislation, and supporting constituents. As well as providing MPs with a confidential service we publish open briefing papers, which are available on the Parliament website. Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in these publicly available research briefings is correct at the time of publication. Readers should be aware however that briefings are not necessarily updated or otherwise amended to reflect subsequent changes. If you have any comments on our briefings please email [email protected]. Authors are available to discuss the content of this briefing only with Members and their staff. If you have any general questions about the work of the House of Commons you can email [email protected]. Disclaimer This information is provided to Members of Parliament in support of their parliamentary duties. It is a general briefing only and should not be relied on as a substitute for specific advice. The House of Commons or the author(s) shall not be liable for any errors or omissions, or for any loss or damage of any kind arising from its use, and may remove, vary or amend any information at any time without prior notice. The House of Commons accepts no responsibility for any references or links to, BRIEFING PAPER or the content of, information maintained by third parties. This information is Number 7944 provided subject to the conditions of the Open Parliament Licence. 6 March 2019