PRQXXX10.1177/10659129114145 41459090Murray et al.Political Research Quarterly Political Research Quarterly 65(3) 529 –543 Why Are Gender Quotas Adopted? © 2012 University of Utah Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Party Pragmatism and Parity in France DOI: 10.1177/1065912911414590 http://prq.sagepub.com Rainbow Murray1, Mona Lena Krook2, and Katherine A. R. Opello3 Abstract The passage of electoral gender quotas raises questions about why male elites would support policies that seemingly go against their self-interests. Recent work on France suggests that quota adoption is self-interested because male legislators benefit from alleged voter bias against female candidates. This article evaluates this explanation as a means for understanding quota adoption globally. It argues that the key actors are not legislators but political parties. Developing an alternative causal story centered on “party pragmatism,” it finds that decisions to introduce quotas are rational and consistent once a range of incentives—ideological, electoral, and strategic—are taken into account. Keywords comparative politics, elections and voting behavior, political organizations and parties, women and politics In recent years, gender quotas regulating the candidate consolidate control over rivals (Chowdhury 2002), and selection process have been adopted in more than one respond to international pressures (Krook 2006). These hundred countries. Although varied in format, these poli- accounts offer important insights into motivations cies stipulate that women constitute a minimum proportion behind quota policies. However, all three explanations of candidates and/or representatives. Quotas have been jus- remain at the macro level: they address influences and tified on the grounds that women constitute a small minor- determinants but do not closely explore actual decision- ity of elected officials—on average, only 19 percent of making processes. The result is that relatively little is known parliamentarians worldwide (Inter-Parliamentary Union about how these incentives have been translated more con- 2011). Strikingly, the vast majority of these measures have cretely into action. been passed nearly unanimously by male-dominated An interesting advance in this regard is a recent analysis political parties and legislatures. Alongside their global dif- by Guillaume R. Fréchette, François Maniquet, and Massimo fusion, this fact implies widespread consensus behind Morelli (2008; hereafter FMM). In an article on France, the goal of increasing women’s representation. Yet given they attempt to explain these processes at the micro level, women’s low numbers, implementing quotas necessitates using game theory to model the calculations of individual a reduction in the proportion of men. This raises the ques- legislators leading to reform. Their answer is simple: quota tion: why would party elites and legislators—who are adoption is in male legislators’ self-interest. While their overwhelmingly male—support a policy that appears to finding is counterintuitive, FMM propose that the induce- go against their own self-interests? ment to adopt quotas emerges from a “male advantage” Existing research on gender quotas offers three primary in French elections, whereby women are easier to defeat explanations. One highlights electoral incentives, suggest- ing that parties tend to pursue quotas when seeking to cap- 1 ture women’s votes (Davidson-Schmich 2006; Kittilson University of London, London, UK 2Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA 2006; Meier 2004). A second emphasizes ideological 3City University of New York—Kingsborough Community College, incentives, attributing adoption to congruencies between Brooklyn, NY, USA quotas and principles informing party and national models of inclusion (Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires 2009; Meier Corresponding Author: 2000; Opello 2006). A final set of arguments points to Rainbow Murray, School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary, University of London, Mile End Road, strategic incentives, contending that elites support quotas London E1 4NS, United Kingdom to sustain an existing regime (Howard-Merriam 1990), Email: [email protected] 530 Political Research Quarterly 65(3) than men. According to this logic, male incumbents stand a Placing parties at the center of analysis also enables us greater chance of being reelected if they face a female chal- to link the question of quota reform to the broader literature lenger. This prospect of reelection, FMM suggest, provided on political parties and their reasons for adopting new pol- a rational incentive to incumbents to support a parity law, icy positions. This work is concerned with theorizing the which would boost their chances of facing a female oppo- trade-offs that parties face when devising their electoral nent. However, to ensure that they would not be at risk of strategies and party programs, requiring them to balance deselection, deputies also introduced a lenient financial vote-seeking and policy-seeking objectives (Przeworski penalty, creating a loophole whereby parties could violate and Sprague 1986; Spoon 2011; Strom 1990). These dilem- the law to protect male incumbents. FMM argue that this mas are ongoing, fueled by shifting internal and external self-interested motivation for introducing parity explains conditions generated by struggles for power within par- the law’s low effectiveness, with the proportion of women ties (Schofield and Sened 2006) and the rise of new chal- in the French National Assembly rising only marginally lenges within the broader political environment (Adams from 10.9 percent in 1997 to 12.3 percent in 2002. and Ezrow 2009; Harmel and Janda 1994). Drawing on While FMM’s study reflects a much-needed effort to this work, we introduce a theory of “party pragmatism” connect incentives to the decision to approve quotas, the arguing that parties engage in balancing acts across three game-theoretic model can be valid only if it operates with types of potentially conflicting incentives—electoral, ide- correct assumptions—in this instance, an accurate assess- ological, and strategic—that have been only partially ment of legislator motivations. Closer examination of the incorporated within existing frameworks. French case, however, reveals two key errors. First, while We begin by discussing FMM’s model and its limita- men win a greater number of seats than women, FMM tions for explaining the passage of the parity law in France. misattribute the nature and origins of male advantage. We focus on their claim of voter bias in favor of men, argu- They conclude that it is rooted in voter bias against female ing that it does not hold. In the second section, we explore candidates, yet do not control adequately for seat effects, reasons for male advantage through two new statistical that is, the relative “winnability” of various districts. If models. The first discredits the theory of voter bias, while such a control is introduced, the premise of voter bias in the second—in line with an account centered on parties— favor of men no longer holds. Rather, inferior outcomes for indicates elite bias to be a more plausible cause. In light women are the direct result of seat placement by parties of these findings, the third section introduces party prag- rather than discrimination by voters. Second, FMM assume matism as an alternative explanation. We suggest that the that legislator incentives guide party policy, when in fact seemingly bizarre decision to introduce the law and then the opposite is true. The central role of parties in policy breach it at considerable cost may be considered rational making in France means that when parties have prefer- once a range of conflicting incentives are taken into account. ences distinct to those of legislators, they are in a position We argue, furthermore, that reasons for quota reform can- to compel legislators to vote in particular ways because not be treated in isolation from political institutions. This of mechanisms of party discipline reinforced by party con- offers a more holistic yet parsimonious model of quota trol of candidate selection processes. Thus, while legisla- adoption, linking together incentives, actors, and institu- tors made the immediate decision to pass the quota, they tions through a focus on the role of political parties. After were heavily influenced by parties, whose independent making the case for party pragmatism as the most plau- motivations are wholly absent from FMM’s account. sible and comprehensive theory, we conclude with reflec- With this model rendered invalid, an alternative expla- tions on what this case offers for understanding patterns of nation is needed to understand dynamics of quota adoption quota adoption around the world. globally. The French case offers a useful starting point. In 2000, the electoral law was reformed to require that par- ties field an equal number of male and female candidates in The FMM Thesis: Male most elections. The policy is unusual in mandating “parity” Advantage, Voter Bias, rather than the lower proportions established elsewhere.1 and Parity Reform In addition, the percentage of women in parliament in France has long been below the world average. This com- FMM’s account of quota reform differs from other expla- bination of features—the high level mandated by the new nations focused on strategic incentives because of their law and the low numbers of women in parliament at the attention to micro-level incentives