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An Emergentist Coalition Model for the Origins of Word Learning Author(S): George J Breaking the Language Barrier: An Emergentist Coalition Model for the Origins of Word Learning Author(s): George J. Hollich, Kathy Hirsh-Pasek, Roberta Michnick Golinkoff, Rebecca J. Brand, Ellie Brown, He Len Chung, Elizabeth Hennon, Camille Rocroi and Lois Bloom Source: Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, Vol. 65, No. 3, Breaking the Language Barrier: An Emergentist Coalition Model for the Origins of Word Learning (2000), pp. i-vi+1-135 Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Society for Research in Child Development Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3181533 Accessed: 16-05-2016 20:50 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Wiley, Society for Research in Child Development are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development This content downloaded from 128.175.197.251 on Mon, 16 May 2016 20:50:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOCIETY FOR RESEARCH IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT Serial No. 262, Vol. 65, No. 3, 2000 BREAKING THE LANGUAGE BARRIER: AN EMERGENTIST COALITION MODEL FOR THE ORIGINS OF WORD LEARNING George J. Hollich Kathy Hirsh-Pasek Roberta Michnick Golinkoff IN COLLABORATION WITH Rebecca J. Brand Ellie Brown He Len Chung Elizabeth Hennon Camille Rocroi WITH COMMENTARY BY Lois Bloom This content downloaded from 128.175.197.251 on Mon, 16 May 2016 20:50:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms II This content downloaded from 128.175.197.251 on Mon, 16 May 2016 20:50:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOCIETY FOR RESEARCH IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT Serial No. 262, Vol. 65, No. 3, 2000 CONTENTS ABSTRACT v I. WHAT DOES IT TAKE TO LEARN A WORD? 1 II. THE EMERGENTIST COALITION MODEL 17 III. THE INTERACTIVE INTERMODAL PREFERENTIAL LOOKING PARADIGM Camille Rocroi 30 IV. LEARNING NOVEL NOUNS: CHILDREN USE MULTIPLE CUES Rebecca J. Brand 41 V. WHAT DOES IT TAKE FOR 12-MONTH-OLDS TO LEARN A WORD? Elizabeth Hennon, He Len Chung, and Ellie Brown 62 VI. IS 12-MONTH-OLD WORD LEARNING DOMAIN-GENERAL, SOCIALLY DETERMINED, OR EMERGENT? 85 VII. GENERAL DISCUSSION 101 REFERENCES 115 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 123 COMMENTARY PUSHING THE LIMITS ON THEORIES OF WORD LEARNING Lois Bloom 124 CONTRIBUTORS 136 STATEMENT OF EDITORIAL POLICY 138 This content downloaded from 128.175.197.251 on Mon, 16 May 2016 20:50:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms IV This content downloaded from 128.175.197.251 on Mon, 16 May 2016 20:50:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms ABSTRACT HOLLICH, GEORGE J.; HIRSH-PASEK, KATHY; and GOLINKOFF, ROBERTA MICHNICK; in collaboration with BRAND, REBECCA J.; BROWN, ELLIE; CHUNG, HE LEN; HENNON, ELIZABETH; and ROCROI, CAMILLE. Breaking the Language Barrier: An Emergentist Coalition Model of the Origins of Word Learning. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 2000, 65(3, Serial No. 262). How do children learn their first words? The field of language de- velopment has been polarized by responses to this question. Explana- tions range from constraints/principles accounts that emphasize the importance of cognitive heuristics in language acquisition, to social- pragmatic accounts that highlight the role of parent-child interaction, to associationistic accounts that highlight the role of "dumb attentional mechanisms" in word learning. In this Monograph, an alternative to these accounts is presented: the emergentist coalition theory. A hybrid view of word learning, this theory characterizes lexical acquisition as the emergent product of multiple factors, including cognitive con- straints, social-pragmatic factors, and global attentional mechanisms. The model makes three assumptions: (a) that children cull from multi- ple inputs available for word learning at any given time, (b) that these inputs are differentially weighted over development, and (c) that chil- dren develop emergent principles of word learning, which guide sub- sequent word acquisition. With few exceptions, competing accounts of the word learning process have examined children who are already vet- eran word learners. By focusing on the very beginnings of word learning at around 12 months of age, however, it is possible to see how social and cognitive factors are coordinated in the process of vocabulary devel- opment. After presenting a new method for investigating word learning, the development of reference is used as a test case of the theory. In 12 experiments, with children ranging in age from 12 to 25 months of age, data are described that support the emergentist coalition model. This V This content downloaded from 128.175.197.251 on Mon, 16 May 2016 20:50:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms HOLLICH ET AL. fundamentally developmental theory posits that children construct prin- ciples of word learning. As children's word learning principles emerge and develop, the character of word learning changes over the course of the 2nd year of life. VI This content downloaded from 128.175.197.251 on Mon, 16 May 2016 20:50:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms I. WHAT DOES IT TAKE TO LEARN A WORD? Before children can tie their shoes, they have mastered thousands of words. At the outset (around 12 months of age), the character of word learning is slow and laborious with infants producing, on average, only two words per week (Carey, 1978). By approximately 19 months of age, however, children's vocabulary rapidly expands as they transform into what Pinker (1994) referred to as "vacuum cleaners" for words, acquiring up to nine new words per day (Bloom, 1973; Clark, 1973; Nelson, 1973; Tem- plin, 1957). The challenge for developmental psychology is to understand how chil- dren break the language barrier with their first words and turn into mas- ter word learners within a year's time. There have been a number of responses to this challenge. The constraints/principles theories empha- size the importance of cognitive heuristics in word acquisition (e.g., Mark- man, 1989; Merriman & Bowman, 1989; Waxman & Kosowski, 1990). Children operate with a set of word learning biases that assist them in link- ing words to objects, actions, and events. The social-pragmatic view, in stark contrast, highlights the role of parent-child interaction in priming word learning. Parents attuned to the child's intent supply the word for the rel- evant object, action, or event, thereby facilitating the child's lexical devel- opment (Nelson, 1988). Furthermore, the social-pragmatists assert that children are fundamentally social creatures and do not come to the word learning task "blind" to the essentials of communication (Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998). Rather, the children's driving need to communicate is the force that propels them to understand the meaning of a novel word (Bloom, 1993). Finally, the newest response to the word learning chal- lenge is an associationistic account that highlights the role of "dumb at- tentional mechanisms" and memory processes. Children attach labels to the items that recruit their attention and stand out from the context. Cal- culating the frequency of co-occurrence between words and referents, chil- dren form the associations that constitute vocabulary acquisition (Plunkett, 1997; Smith, 1995, in press; Smith, Jones, & Landau, 1996). 1 This content downloaded from 128.175.197.251 on Mon, 16 May 2016 20:50:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms HOLLICH ET AL. While each of these potential answers to the word learning challenge seems plausible, we believe they are flawed in two ways. First, each em- phasizes a single mechanism that is responsible for lexical develop- ment. Second, despite the fact that the character of word learning changes over the 2nd year of life (e.g., Clark, 1993; Golinkoff, Mervis, & Hirsh-Pasek, 1994), data in support of these theories are often from chil- dren who have already amassed a large number of words. Mechanisms used by expert word learners might not be characteristic of those used by novice learners. To address these issues, in chapter 2, using these theories as a base, a new theory of word learning is presented, the emergentist coalition theory. The emergentist coalition theory offers a developmental account that ex- plains the shift in word learning from the 1-year-old to 2-year-old as a change in the weighting of multiple factors, including attentional, social, and linguistic factors. In subsequent chapters, we offer a new method for testing this theory (chapter 3), data that substantiate the theory for the development of the "principle of reference" (Golinkoff et al., 1994) (chap- ters 4-6), and a discussion of how this theory can further a more com- plete understanding of word learning by embracing a hybrid view of this complex process (chapter 7). The remainder of this chapter contains an overview of the various approaches and the polarizing effect they have had on the field. THEORIES OF WORD LEARNING Current theories of word learning have been polarized by emphasiz- ing a single word learning strategy to the relative exclusion of others (Golinkoff, Hirsh-Pasek, & Hollich, 1999; Hirsh-Pasek, Golinkoff, & Hol- lich, in press; Hollich, Hirsh-Pasek, Tucker, & Golinkoff, 2000; Woodward & Markman, 1998). Much of this polarization occurred in response to a philosophical conundrum introduced by Willard Quine (1960).
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