NAMUN2015 Joint-Crisis Committee THE XINJIANG REGION

Background Guide DEAR DELEGATES, Welcome to the Xinjiang Region Joint Crisis Committee, here at the North American Model United Nations 2015 conference!

One of our main goals in designing the Joint Crisis committees for this year, and indeed what we see as one of Model UN’s greatest values, is to provide a forum for engaging with issues both from today and in the future. More than an opportunity to consider such problems and potential solutions, we hope the committees allow you as delegates to apply your critical thinking, teamwork, and rhetorical skills to them in a dynamic environment. At the same time, we want this to be equally as enjoyable an experience as it is intense.

Please do not hesitate to communicate with any of us should any questions or concerns arise during your time here at NAMUN 2015. In addition, we very much welcome any ideas for improvement you may have—NAMUN has always been the beneficiary of the outstanding delegates that have participated in it, and we believe that listening to them can only improve the conference.

In the spirit of Model UN and meeting delegates from a great diversity of schools and places, we look forwards to seeing you at NAMUN!

Signed, Benjamin Pan

Director of Joint Crisis Committees

Colin McEwen

Vice Director, The Xinjiang Region

Maddy Torrie, Masa Latif

Committee Chairs

1 Introduction By estimates of the International Monetary Fund, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now the largest economy on Earth, measured by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Its security challenges are therefore relevant to countries both large and small. None can afford to overlook how these challenges will affect such a global power, and Xinjiang ranks among the greatest domestic threats to China’s national security.

Xinjiang, formally known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, is the PRC’s largest province, located in the far northwest. It borders Russia, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and India.1 Xinjiang is a major source of petroleum for the PRC due to the existence of several oil and gas pipelines that connect Xinjiang with Central Asia. Its population of about 20 million consists of thirteen different ethnic groups,2 with the two most prominent ethnicities being the Uyghurs and Han Chinese.

1 James Millward, “Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment,” Washington: East-West Center, 2004. 2 Preeti Bhattacharji, “Uighurs and China’s Xinjiang Region,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 29, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/china/uighurs-chinas-xinjiang-region/ p16870.

2 The former speak a Turkic language and are predominantly Muslim, forming around 45% of the population. The Han Chinese, the largest ethnic group in China, form approximately 40% of Xinjiang’s population.3

Increasingly since the 1990’s, the Uyghurs are participating in several movements for independence as their sense of nationalism has risen. This has been mainly attributed to the immigration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang, which the Uyghurs claim is a form of imperialism on the part of China.4 A handful of rebel groups, such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), have also emerged in promoting their cause by violent means.

The main reason for this dispute is the Uyghur concern that they no longer predominate in Xinjiang, viewing themselves as part of a lower class and thus fearing that the Han will have major control over economic and political systems. This is also known as socio-economic and political stratification.5 Additionally, considering the differences in culture and behaviour between the Uyghurs and Han, such as in religion, it is possible that Uyghurs might suffer from a loss of national identity. All of these causes have led to escalated tensions between the two ethnic groups, and there have been several instances of violent outbursts occurring as a result of ethnic unrest in the Xinjiang area.

Driven by this centuries old conflict and violence, this committee asks you, as delegates on both sides of the debate: is Xinjiang’s Autonomous Region position and its present day status as a part of the People’s Republic of China sustainable indefinitely, or can the East Turkestan independence movement achieve its dreams? Is either outcome possible in the face of escalating violence and terrorism, and mounting Chinese political pressure for a decisive solution?

Historical Background The Uyghurs of Xinjiang have not always desired independence. In the 18th Century the Uyghur inhabitants of the Tarim Basin sent a request to the Qing Emperor Qianlong asking for military assistance against the Dzungar Mongol

3 “Xinjiang Profile - Overview,” BBC News, October 14, 2014, http://www.bbc. com/news/world-asia-pacific-16860974. 4 Bhattacharji, “Uighurs and China’s Xinjiang Region.” 5 Rémi Castets, “The Uyghurs in Xinjiang—The Malaise Grows,” China Perspectives (2003): 34-48.

3 people. The Qing Empire, who subsequently vassalized the Uyghurs and set about repopulating the empty farmlands of Dzungaria, greatly damaged the Dzungar as a people.6

From this point until the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1912, the Uyghurs stayed within the Chinese sphere of influence. The subsequent Chinese Civil War (1927-1950) eventually led to the proclamation of a First East Turkestan Republic (1933-1934), but Kuomintang forces quickly destroyed this.7 The idea of a Uyghur state in Xinjiang was expanded upon by the Soviet Union, which funnelled nationalistic propaganda into the region during the civil war. This eventually led to the creation of a second East Turkestan Republic, lasting somewhat longer than its predecessor (1944-1949). Admittedly, the Second East Turkestan Republic was essentially a Soviet satellite state geared towards the extraction of Xinjiang’s massive natural resources.8 The Soviet propaganda did, however, give birth to a larger Uyghur independence movement. While the first hints of Uyghur nationalism existed before then, most Uyghurs lived and thought along family or tribal lines.9

Source: Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization

6 Hassan Nader, “China’s Forgotten Dissenters”, Harvard International Review, Vol. 22 Issue 3 (2000): 38. 7 “Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment.” 8 “China’s Forgotten Dissenters.” 9 Ibid.

4 Despite its distance from more prominent Cold War flashpoints like Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam, Xinjiang saw its fair share of conflict. A one-month war in 1962 between India and China saw the latter seize the region called Aksai Chin, disputed to this day but administered by China as part of Xinjiang province. It was also in Xinjiang that China conducted its first nuclear weapons test, having received significant Soviet technological assistance. The Sino- Soviet split less than five years later saw skirmishes along the border and highlighted the difficulty of projecting power so deep into Central Asia.

However, Deng Xiaoping’s economic liberalization was no panacea for these security challenges. While there is no longer any risk of Soviet interference, the uneven economic development of the region has added a second dimension to the ethnic and religious unrest, as the richer cities feature proportionately more Han than the poorer countryside. Migrants to urban areas looking for work thus face extra barriers to advancement and can easily become frustrated.

In recent years, China has been and is accused of carrying out a resettlement policy in Xinjiang. Various incentives exist for Han Chinese, who compose 91% of China’s population, to move to Xinjiang.10 The majority of these migrants are settling in Dzungaria, the northern half of Xinjiang. These efforts by Beijing are mirrored by assimilation efforts aimed at the Uyghurs, whose language and culture are slowly being replaced by Han language and culture.11 As one might expect, this is a profound grievance amongst the Uyghur population, and undoubtedly is a key force behind periodic unrest.

Source: Howell and Fan, “Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang.”

10 “The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, Accessed January 12, 2015, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2075.html. 11 “China’s Forgotten Dissenters.”

5 Issues The Right of Self-Determination / State Sovereignty The desire for independence is an objective that many distinct groups give thought to as they consider their national identity and how to govern themselves. It is widely covered in the media with stories ranging from Quebec and Scotland, to South Sudan and Chechnya. Xinjiang’s attempts to gain independence from the PRC are little different in this regard.

Self-determination is a principle recognized by the United Nations as well as several tenets of international law. It suggests that peoples, based on respect for the principle of equal rights and fair equality of opportunity, have the right to freely choose their sovereignty and international political status with no external compulsion or interference.12

This idea, as one might expect, conflicts with Westphalian sovereignty—the notion that a state has the right to maintain its territorial integrity. These fundamental principles, both entrenched in the UN Charter, have varied enormously in their success in different times and places, but often fail to co- exist amicably.

The Xinjiang region is an instance of this conflict, but notable examples can be seen in Tibet and Catalonia as well. The Chinese and Spanish governments, respectively, are not willing to allow the secession of these peoples to form their own state as an absolute adherence to the idea of self-determination might obligate. Economic and Geographic Importance The Xinjiang region plays a large role in improving the economic and political effectiveness of the PRC. Economically, the Xinjiang region is rich with natural resources like oil and natural gas, and is one of the country’s largest producers of oil and natural gas. Estimates suggest that the region could potentially produce around 20-40 billion tons of oil and 12.4 trillion cubic metres of natural gas.13 Geographically, Xinjiang is the barrier between China and neighbouring countries, acting as a ‘buffer’ for China wherein it shields the core of China from any potential foreign interference. As such, the region is of vital importance in the Chinese formation of national security strategies.

12 “United Nations Charter,” United Nations, October 24, 1945, http://www. un.org/en/documents/charter/. 13 Li Woke, “Xinjiang hoping oil will fuel region’s economic growth,” Global Times, April 8, 2010, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/519915.shtml

6 Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

There have been many ethnic policies implemented by China in order to bring confidence back into the Uyghur community. Still, the Uyghurs feel that their cultural development is repressed, and have thus far been unsatisfied with China’s attempts to improve relations. As a result, rebel groups have been formed to protest their dissatisfaction and to more effectively support their cause of independence from the PRC. The most prominent rebel group is the ETIM, which China, the United Nations, and the European Union have already identified as a terrorist organization. Stemming from the formation of such groups, there have been countless acts of terrorism in Xinjiang that have produced a sense of insecurity among the civilians of China as a whole, in addition to causing numerous civilian casualties.

7 Multiple PRC officials, including President Xi Jinping, have emphasized the need to maintain stability in Xinjiang for security and economic purposes. This is where the role of unity would intervene to minimize the rift between the Uyghurs and the Han. President Xi has suggested the strategy of ‘reverse migration’, where Uyghurs would migrate to Han-dominated provinces and gaining from their educational system and working opportunities. According to President Xi, this would not only provide Uyghurs with a richer lifestyle, but also create a mutual understanding with other ethnicities, eventually leading to a healthier relationship with the Hans.14 The President has also urged schoolteachers to learn the Uyghur language, in an attempt to stress that the Uyghur culture is respected in Xinjiang. This could reduce Uyghur fears of a Han-dominated Xinjiang. Terrorism and the Present Situation The beginning of the 1990’s introduced a new wave of Uyghur protests within the Xinjiang region, but recently the conflict has been heading into a new direction as it has become more volatile and frequent. In the past year alone, approximately 300 deaths were attributed to the Xinjiang conflict caused by the several other similar attacks and riot clashes.15

Xinjiang has experienced multiple violent riots, but none were as severe as the July 2009 riot where Han Chinese and Uyghurs clashed, causing the deaths of 197 and more than one thousand injured. It was deemed the most violent incident of civil unrest to occur in China for years.16

Other than riots, Xinjiang has also experienced a number of attacks by Uyghur extremists with the intention of terrorizing civilians and promoting their cause. One of the prominent recent attacks was a railway station attack in Urumqi in April 2014, when identified religious extremists carrying knives set off explosives and invaded the station with the purpose of wounding innocent civilians. Three people were killed, and 79 were injured.

Occurring merely one month later, two SUV’s drove through a shoppers market in Urumqi, driving over people and throwing explosives as they went by. Eventually the two SUV’s collided with each other and one of them exploded. This event caused the deaths of 31 civilians and injured more than 90. Even

14 Edward Wong, “China Moves to Calm Restive Xinjiang Region,” The New York Times, May 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/31/world/asia/chinas- leader-lays-out-plan-to-pacify-restive-region.html?_r=0. 15 Calum MacLeod, “Reports: 50 Were Killed in China Clash,” i, September 26, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/09/26/china-xinjiang- terrorism-50-dead/16249969/. 16 Austin Ramzy, “A Year After Xinjiang Riots, Ethnic Tensions Remain,” i, July 5, 2010, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2001311,00.html.

8 though this incident hasn’t officially been linked to a Xinjiang organization, both cars were said to have had black flags with Uyghur language attached on them.17

Source: The Wall Street Journal, July 29, 2014

Another issue of concern to China is that Xinjiang borders Afghanistan, which is also dealing with its own terrorist groups - primarily the Taliban. Officials in China are alarmed by the fact that the Taliban could become a source of information for rebel groups in Xinjiang and provide them with the tools necessary to further their cause though violence. “Strike First” Strategy As a result of the violence, President Xi Jinping has declared that China would handle these attacks by implementing a “strike first” strategy, and would not be tolerant towards any acts of terrorism. Consequently, the People’s Liberation Army in Xinjiang is undergoing extreme training towards counter-terrorism. Moreover, in June 2014, as a result of the attack on the shopper’s market, China started implementing a year-long “Terrorist crackdown” strategy to

17 Simon Denyer, “​Terrorist Attack on Market in China’s Restive Xinjiang Region Kills More than 30,” The Washington Post, May 22, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost. com/world/terrorist-attack-on-market-in-chinas-restive-xinjiang-region-kills- more-than-30/2014/05/22/06fab2dc-93d4-4cda-ae78-caa913819e15_story.html.

9 confront the increased terrorism in the Xinjiang region. The results of the first six months of this strategy were released and have thus far been encouraging for the Chinese government. It was reported that so far, 115 terrorist cells have been eliminated.18 Chinese Territorial Disputes In addition to internal conflict, China is also in dispute with neighbouring countries including Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia over the South China Sea territory. In summary, the territorial dispute is mainly due to the suspected existence of natural resources within the South China Sea— estimated at 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.19 Moreover, the South China Sea is a prominent trade route taken by ships from multiple countries and accounts for an estimated 5.3 trillion US Dollars passing through.20 While external disputes such as this may not seem directly connected, Xinjiang policy is not made in a vacuum, and the potential effects on or influence of foreign powers should be carefully considered.

People’s Republic of China: Key People

Source: BBC News

18 Shannon Tiezzi, “Chinese Media: 115 Terror Cells Eliminated in Xinjiang,” The Diplomat, November 26, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/chinese-media-115- terror-cells-eliminated-in-xinjiang/. 19 “South China Sea,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, February 7, 2013, http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/South_China_Sea/. 20 “Press Briefing By NSA For Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes And Admiral Robert Willard, U.S. Pacific Command,” The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/13/press- briefing-nsa-strategic-communications-ben-rhodes-and-admiral-rober.

10 Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China: President Xi, who is of Han ethnicity, became President of the PRC in March 2013. President Xi is also the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. As the current holder of the aforementioned three positions, President Xi was awarded the title of “Paramount Leader”. As President, Xi Jinping has made his major focus the prevention and elimination of corruption among the officials of the PRC government, while also promoting the idea of limited government intervention to allow more freedom for the public. With respect to Xinjiang, President Xi has released statements stating that China’s current foreign policy rulings in Xinjiang are sufficient and should be maintained for the long-run. Li Keqiang Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China: Within the PRC’s government structure, the Premier is second in command after the President. Premier Li is noted as a humble leader owing to his modest upbringing as well as the hard work he has put in from starting as a manual laborer to eventually becoming the Premier of China. The Premier mostly focuses on his responsibility over China’s domestic affairs, such as economic policy. Guo Shengkun Head of the Ministry of Public Security: Guo Shengkun is responsible for law enforcement in China and has direct control over the People’s Armed Police (PAP). Liu Qibao Head of the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party: As head of the Propaganda Department, Mr. Liu’s task is to control, monitor, and censor all media outlets in China including the internet, films, newspapers, the radio etc. in order to represent a certain ideology. Nur Bekri Governor of Xinjiang: A Uyghur who was born and raised in Xinjiang, Nur Bekri became the Governor of the Xinjiang province in 2008. As governor, he is provided with direct influence on the Xinjiang region in terms of implementing state laws and overseeing its civilians. Mr. Berki is characterized as a loyal servant of the government and a supporter of its ethnic policies.

11 Nur Bekri could be viewed as the direct contact between the Uyghurs and the government, and could be an asset in reaching a consensus that interests both parties.

Uyghur Rebels: Key People Abdullah Mansour Leader of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement: The ETIM is an Islamist group designated a terrorist organization by China, the United Nations, the United States, and the European Union. Having successfully organized and carried out terrorist attacks in Beijing itself, he is both a highly wanted man and an experienced guerilla commander. Nominally, he is the highest-ranking military official among the rebel coalition, but the coalition’s military command is somewhat fragmented. Anwar Yusuf Turani Leader of the Government in Exile: Mr. Turani is nominally the political leader of the rebels and a free Uyghur state. However, the rebels are a disparate group, and the people of Xinjiang vary in how much they would support his leadership. He has few personal resources, but does have numerous capable allies, each with their own specialties. Rebiya Kadeer President of the World Uyghur Congress: The World Uyghur Congress is a group that represents the Uyghur global diaspora. This position lends itself well to international appeals for material aid and recognition, but she is most familiar with this task in the United States, where she has spent much time living in exile. While it is unlikely that the United States will outright recognize Xinjiang as a separate nation, even a small amount of aid or logistical assistance would help greatly in organizing the rebels into a coherent fighting force. However, this in turn may colour the perception of her amongst Han Chinese as an agent working for foreign interests. Abdujelil Karakash Head of the East Turkestan Information Center: The East Turkestan Information Centre is an NGO which has a loose network of informants who practice what might be called guerilla journalism. Catching police abuses on cellphone video, arranging ways to get around the Great Firewall, and distributing propaganda are only some of the skills developed over years of dangerous

12 work. While the activists working for the organization are good, they are not invincible, and causing too much of a disturbance all at once can easily bring the Ministry of State Security knocking at their door. Dilxat Raxit Representative of the World Uyghur Congress to Europe and Asia: While this job appears similiar to that of Rubiya Kadeer, the different setting changes the range of opportunity greatly, for several of China’s neighbours have disputes of one sort or another that can be potentially leveraged to the Uyghur’s advantage. Whether it be with India in Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, Vietnam in the Spratly Islands, or Japan in the East China Sea, it will be his task to coax assistance out of them in the spirit of realpolitik. Discovery of any such help, of course, will greatly inflame tensions, and such conflicts tend to spiral beyond anyone’s control. Bo Guagua Bo Guagua is an adventurous and slightly amoral venture capitalist who is concealing hisidentity for safety reasons. Nevertheless, he has decided that the opportunities for profit in this conflict are too good to resist, and has loosely affiliated with the rebels for purely selfish reasons. With significant investments in oil as well as mining, a conflict could greatly inflate prices and therefore profits. Equally, war has the potential to destroy his investments or land him in prison if Beijing discovers his identity.

Protestors with the Kök Bayraq, the flag of East Turkestan

13 Bibliography BBC News. “Xinjiang Profile - Overview.” October 14, 2014. http://www.bbc. com/news/world-asia-pacific-16860974.

Bhattacharji, Preeti. “Uighurs and China’s Xinjiang Region.” Council on Foreign Relations. May 29, 2012. http://www.cfr.org/china/uighurs- chinas-xinjiang-region/p16870.

Castets, Rémi. “The Uyghurs in Xinjiang-The Malaise Grows.” China Perspectives (2003): 34-48.

Central Intelligence Agency. “The World Factbook.” Accessed January 12, 2015. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ fields/2075.html.

Denyer, Simon. “​Terrorist Attack on Market in China’s Restive Xinjiang Region Kills More than 30.” The Washington Post, May 22, 2014. http://www. washingtonpost.com/world/terrorist-attack-on-market-in-chinas- restive-xinjiang-region-kills-more-than-30/2014/05/22/06fab2dc- 93d4-4cda-ae78-caa913819e15_story.html.

MacLeod, Calum. “Reports: 50 Were Killed in China Clash.” USA Today, September 26, 2014. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ world/2014/09/26/china-xinjiang-terrorism-50-dead/16249969/.

Millward, James. “Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment.” Washington: East-West Center. 2004.

Nader, Hassan. “China’s Forgotten Dissenters.” Harvard International Review. Vol. 22 Issue 3 (2000): 38.

Ramzy, Austin. “A Year After Xinjiang Riots, Ethnic Tensions Remain.” Time, July 5, 2010. http://content.time.com/time/world/ article/0,8599,2001311,00.html.

Tiezzi, Shannon. “Chinese Media: 115 Terror Cells Eliminated in Xinjiang.” The Diplomat, November 26, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/ chinese-media-115-terror-cells-eliminated-in-xinjiang/.

United Nations. “United Nations Charter.” October 24, 1945. http://www. un.org/en/documents/charter/.

U.S. Energy Information Administration. “South China Sea.” February 7th, 2013. http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/South_China_Sea/.

14 The White House: Office of the Press Secretary. “Press Briefing By NSA For Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes And Admiral Robert Willard, U.S. Pacific Command.” 2014. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- office/2011/11/13/press-briefing-nsa-strategic-communications-ben- rhodes-and-admiral-rober.

Wong, Edward. “China Moves to Calm Restive Xinjiang Region.” The New York Times, May 30, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/31/world/ asia/chinas-leader-lays-out-plan-to-pacify-restive-region.html?_r=0.

Woke, Li. “Xinjiang hoping oil will fuel region’s economic growth.” Global Times. April 8, 2010. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/519915.shtml.

15