NAMUN2015 Joint-Crisis Committee THE XINJIANG REGION Background Guide DEAR DELEGATES, Welcome to the Xinjiang Region Joint Crisis Committee, here at the North American Model United Nations 2015 conference! One of our main goals in designing the Joint Crisis committees for this year, and indeed what we see as one of Model UN’s greatest values, is to provide a forum for engaging with issues both from today and in the future. More than an opportunity to consider such problems and potential solutions, we hope the committees allow you as delegates to apply your critical thinking, teamwork, and rhetorical skills to them in a dynamic environment. At the same time, we want this to be equally as enjoyable an experience as it is intense. Please do not hesitate to communicate with any of us should any questions or concerns arise during your time here at NAMUN 2015. In addition, we very much welcome any ideas for improvement you may have—NAMUN has always been the beneficiary of the outstanding delegates that have participated in it, and we believe that listening to them can only improve the conference. In the spirit of Model UN and meeting delegates from a great diversity of schools and places, we look forwards to seeing you at NAMUN! Signed, Benjamin Pan Director of Joint Crisis Committees Colin McEwen Vice Director, The Xinjiang Region Maddy Torrie, Masa Latif Committee Chairs 1 Introduction By estimates of the International Monetary Fund, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now the largest economy on Earth, measured by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Its security challenges are therefore relevant to countries both large and small. None can afford to overlook how these challenges will affect such a global power, and Xinjiang ranks among the greatest domestic threats to China’s national security. Xinjiang, formally known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, is the PRC’s largest province, located in the far northwest. It borders Russia, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and India.1 Xinjiang is a major source of petroleum for the PRC due to the existence of several oil and gas pipelines that connect Xinjiang with Central Asia. Its population of about 20 million consists of thirteen different ethnic groups,2 with the two most prominent ethnicities being the Uyghurs and Han Chinese. 1 James Millward, “Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment,” Washington: East-West Center, 2004. 2 Preeti Bhattacharji, “Uighurs and China’s Xinjiang Region,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 29, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/china/uighurs-chinas-xinjiang-region/ p16870. 2 The former speak a Turkic language and are predominantly Muslim, forming around 45% of the population. The Han Chinese, the largest ethnic group in China, form approximately 40% of Xinjiang’s population.3 Increasingly since the 1990’s, the Uyghurs are participating in several movements for independence as their sense of nationalism has risen. This has been mainly attributed to the immigration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang, which the Uyghurs claim is a form of imperialism on the part of China.4 A handful of rebel groups, such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), have also emerged in promoting their cause by violent means. The main reason for this dispute is the Uyghur concern that they no longer predominate in Xinjiang, viewing themselves as part of a lower class and thus fearing that the Han will have major control over economic and political systems. This is also known as socio-economic and political stratification.5 Additionally, considering the differences in culture and behaviour between the Uyghurs and Han, such as in religion, it is possible that Uyghurs might suffer from a loss of national identity. All of these causes have led to escalated tensions between the two ethnic groups, and there have been several instances of violent outbursts occurring as a result of ethnic unrest in the Xinjiang area. Driven by this centuries old conflict and violence, this committee asks you, as delegates on both sides of the debate: is Xinjiang’s Autonomous Region position and its present day status as a part of the People’s Republic of China sustainable indefinitely, or can the East Turkestan independence movement achieve its dreams? Is either outcome possible in the face of escalating violence and terrorism, and mounting Chinese political pressure for a decisive solution? Historical Background The Uyghurs of Xinjiang have not always desired independence. In the 18th Century the Uyghur inhabitants of the Tarim Basin sent a request to the Qing Emperor Qianlong asking for military assistance against the Dzungar Mongol 3 “Xinjiang Profile - Overview,” BBC News, October 14, 2014, http://www.bbc. com/news/world-asia-pacific-16860974. 4 Bhattacharji, “Uighurs and China’s Xinjiang Region.” 5 Rémi Castets, “The Uyghurs in Xinjiang—The Malaise Grows,” China Perspectives (2003): 34-48. 3 people. The Qing Empire, who subsequently vassalized the Uyghurs and set about repopulating the empty farmlands of Dzungaria, greatly damaged the Dzungar as a people.6 From this point until the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1912, the Uyghurs stayed within the Chinese sphere of influence. The subsequent Chinese Civil War (1927-1950) eventually led to the proclamation of a First East Turkestan Republic (1933-1934), but Kuomintang forces quickly destroyed this.7 The idea of a Uyghur state in Xinjiang was expanded upon by the Soviet Union, which funnelled nationalistic propaganda into the region during the civil war. This eventually led to the creation of a second East Turkestan Republic, lasting somewhat longer than its predecessor (1944-1949). Admittedly, the Second East Turkestan Republic was essentially a Soviet satellite state geared towards the extraction of Xinjiang’s massive natural resources.8 The Soviet propaganda did, however, give birth to a larger Uyghur independence movement. While the first hints of Uyghur nationalism existed before then, most Uyghurs lived and thought along family or tribal lines.9 Source: Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization 6 Hassan Nader, “China’s Forgotten Dissenters”, Harvard International Review, Vol. 22 Issue 3 (2000): 38. 7 “Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment.” 8 “China’s Forgotten Dissenters.” 9 Ibid. 4 Despite its distance from more prominent Cold War flashpoints like Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam, Xinjiang saw its fair share of conflict. A one-month war in 1962 between India and China saw the latter seize the region called Aksai Chin, disputed to this day but administered by China as part of Xinjiang province. It was also in Xinjiang that China conducted its first nuclear weapons test, having received significant Soviet technological assistance. The Sino- Soviet split less than five years later saw skirmishes along the border and highlighted the difficulty of projecting power so deep into Central Asia. However, Deng Xiaoping’s economic liberalization was no panacea for these security challenges. While there is no longer any risk of Soviet interference, the uneven economic development of the region has added a second dimension to the ethnic and religious unrest, as the richer cities feature proportionately more Han than the poorer countryside. Migrants to urban areas looking for work thus face extra barriers to advancement and can easily become frustrated. In recent years, China has been and is accused of carrying out a resettlement policy in Xinjiang. Various incentives exist for Han Chinese, who compose 91% of China’s population, to move to Xinjiang.10 The majority of these migrants are settling in Dzungaria, the northern half of Xinjiang. These efforts by Beijing are mirrored by assimilation efforts aimed at the Uyghurs, whose language and culture are slowly being replaced by Han language and culture.11 As one might expect, this is a profound grievance amongst the Uyghur population, and undoubtedly is a key force behind periodic unrest. Source: Howell and Fan, “Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang.” 10 “The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, Accessed January 12, 2015, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2075.html. 11 “China’s Forgotten Dissenters.” 5 Issues The Right of Self-Determination / State Sovereignty The desire for independence is an objective that many distinct groups give thought to as they consider their national identity and how to govern themselves. It is widely covered in the media with stories ranging from Quebec and Scotland, to South Sudan and Chechnya. Xinjiang’s attempts to gain independence from the PRC are little different in this regard. Self-determination is a principle recognized by the United Nations as well as several tenets of international law. It suggests that peoples, based on respect for the principle of equal rights and fair equality of opportunity, have the right to freely choose their sovereignty and international political status with no external compulsion or interference.12 This idea, as one might expect, conflicts with Westphalian sovereignty—the notion that a state has the right to maintain its territorial integrity. These fundamental principles, both entrenched in the UN Charter, have varied enormously in their success in different times and places, but often fail to co- exist amicably. The Xinjiang region is an instance of this conflict, but notable examples can be seen in Tibet and Catalonia as well. The Chinese and Spanish governments, respectively, are not willing to allow the secession of these peoples to form