A Thesis
entitled
Implications of Self for Content and Process Models of Stereotypes
by
Heather Haught
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Master of Arts Degree in Psychology
______
Jason P. Rose, Ph.D., Committee Chair
______
Yeuh-Ting Lee, Ph.D., Committee Member
______
Andrew L. Geers, Ph.D., Committee Member
______
Patricia Komuniecki, Ph. D., Dean College of Graduate Studies
The University of Toledo
May 2013
An Abstract of
Implications of Self for Content and Process Models of Stereotypes
by
Heather Haught
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts Degree in Psychology
The University of Toledo May 2013
The current study examined whether self-construal—independent vs. interdependent—moderates intergroup judgments within the Inductive Reasoning Model
(IRM). Participants (N=144) were placed into groups using a crossed-categories minimal group paradigm and asked to make judgments about their own and other groups. It was hypothesized that participants with an independent self-construal (IndSC) would project independent attributes to the ingroup whereas participants with an interdependent self- construal (InterSC) would project interdependent attributes to the ingroup. Results support this hypothesis, but only with regard to momentarily activated self-construal.
Chronic self-construal did not moderate projection. Furthermore, and in accordance with the IRM, it was hypothesized that participants would view construal-consistent attributes more positively than construal-inconsistent attributes and that groups perceived to possess the greatest number of construal-consistent attributes would be viewed most positively. These hypotheses were generally not supported. Overall, the current findings provide only partial support for the IRM. Additionally, they shed light on various possible sources of variation in stereotype content and development which have not yet been discussed within the literature. iii
Table of Contents
Abstract iii
Table of Contents iv
List of Tables vi
List of Figures viii
I. Literature Review 1
A. Content Models 2
a. Cubic EPA Model 2
B. Process Models 4
a. Social Identity Theory 5
b. Inductive Reasoning Model 6
C. Self-Construal 9
D. Current Research 12
II. Method 14
A. Participants 14
B. Materials 14
C. Procedure 17
III. Results 19
A. Hypothesis 1 19
a. Traits 19
b. Behaviors 21
B. Hypothesis 2 24
a. Traits 24
iv
b. Behaviors 25
C. Hypothesis 3 27
a. Traits 27
b. Behaviors 29
D. Hypothesis 4 31
IV. Discussion 33
A. Projection to Ingroups, Mixed Groups, Outgroups (H1) 33
B. Self-Construal and Projection (H2) 35
C. Self-Construal and Perceived Positivity (H3 and H4) 37
D. Implications and Limitations 39
E. Conclusions 42
Footnotes 43
References 45
Appendices
A. Self-Construal Scale 50
B. Self-Judgment Task (Stimuli) 53
C. Group Feedback Sample 56
D. Other-Judgment Task (Stimuli) 57
E. Positivity Judgment (Stimuli) 60
F. Chronic vs. Momentary Construal 63
G. Momentary Construal and Positivity 66
H. Momentary Construal Moderates Projection 68
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List of Tables
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for trait………………………………………… 20
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for group………………………………………. 20
Table 3 Descriptive statistics for the Trait X Group interaction……………… 21
Table 4 Descriptive statistics for behavior……………………………………. 22
Table 5 Descriptive statistics for the Behavior X Group interaction…………. 23
Table 6 Descriptive statistics for self-construal………………………………. 25
Table 7 Descriptive statistics for the Group X SC interaction………………... 27
Table 8 Descriptive statistics for trait (positivity)……………………………. 28
Table 9 Descriptive statistics for the Trait X SC interaction…………………. 29
Table 10 Descriptive statistics for behavior (positivity)……………………….. 30
Table 11 Descriptive statistics for self-construal………………………………. 30
Table 12 Descriptive statistics for the Behavior X SC interaction……………... 31
Table 13 Self-attributions of independence and interdependence by
self-construal (as assessed during the prescreen session)…………….. 63
Table 14 Summary correlation table for self- and group-attributions of
independent and interdependent traits during the test session………... 65
Table 15 Correlation between self-attributions of independence and
interdependence during the test session and trait positivity ratings…... 66
Table 16 Correlation between self-attributions of independence and
interdependence during the test session and group positivity ratings… 66
Table 17 Correlation between positivity ratings of independent and
interdependent traits and group positivity ratings……….……………. 67
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Table 18 Descriptive statistics for the Trait X Group X SC interaction…………71
Table 19 Descriptive statistics for the Trait X SC interaction………………….. 72
vii
List of Figures
Figure 1 Cubic EPA Model…………………………………………………... 3
Figure 2 A Conceptual Representation of the Inductive Reasoning Model …. 9
Figure 3 Attribution of independent and interdependent traits by group…….. 21
Figure 4 Attribution of independent and interdependent behaviors by group.. 23
Figure 5 Overall attribution of behaviors by group and self-construal………. 27
Figure 6 Positivity ratings of independent and interdependent traits by
self-construal………………………………………………………... 29
Figure 7 Positivity ratings of independent and interdependent behaviors by
self-construal………………………………………………………... 31
Figure 8 Self-attributions of independence and interdependence for people
with IndSC and InterSC during prescreen and test sessions………... 64
Figure 9 Global positivity ratings for each group by self-construal (as
assessed in the prescreen session)…………………………………... 67
Figure 10. Attribution of independent and interdependent traits by group and
self-construal (as assessed during the test session)………………..... 70
Figure 11. Positivity ratings of independent and interdependent traits by
self-construal (as assessed during the test session)………………..... 72
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Chapter One
I. Literature Review
Classically, content and process models of stereotypes have been studied separately. Though the two are conceptually distinct, they are intimately intertwined.
Content models describe the dimensions of an already formed stereotype. For instance, the Cubic EPA model (discussed in more depth below) suggests that stereotypes consist of three dimensions – evaluation, potency, and accuracy (Lee, Bumgarner, Widner &
Luo, 2007; Lee, Vue, Seklecki, & Ma, 2007). By contrast, process models describe stereotype development – that is, they focus on how stereotypes are formed rather than on content, per se. The two process models discussed in this thesis, Social Identity Theory
(SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; discussed in more depth below) and the Inductive
Reasoning Model (IRM; DiDonato, Ullrich, & Krueger, 2011; discussed in more depth in below), propose different pathways by which stereotypes are formed. Though these processes have implications for content models, such implications are rarely discussed.
This thesis articulates the implications of both frameworks for content models
(specifically the Cubic EPA model).
The sections that follow are divided into three main sections. The first focuses on content models, specifically the Cubic EPA model. The second section shifts focus to process models, SIT and the IRM are discussed in turn. Particular attention is paid to the implications of assuming a SIT or an IRM perspective for the prediction and interpretation of content models. The final section offers variation in self-construal as a possible moderator of stereotype content from an IRM perspective.
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A. Content Models
As mentioned earlier, content models of stereotypes provide frameworks for understanding the various dimensions that, in combination, constitute a stereotype – a person’s attitudes and beliefs about a specific group of people (Ottati & Lee, 1995;
Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994). Early definitions of ‘stereotype’ held that stereotype content was necessarily negative and baseless (Katz & Braly, 1933; Lippmann, 1922).
This, coupled with the negative connotation given it currently in society, has made the creation and advancement of content models difficult. However, there exist a handful of content models which have persevered. One such model is the Cubic EPA model (Lee,
Jussim, & McCauley, 1995).
a. Cubic EPA Model
The Cubic EPA Model conceptualizes stereotypes as consisting of three separate and continuous dimensions (Lee et. al, 1995; Lee et al 2007; Lee, Albright, & Malloy,
2001; Osgood, 1974; 1979). The first, denoted by “E,” is evaluation or valence meaning that a stereotype can be either positive or negative. The second dimension, “P,” represents potency or latency of activation which ranges from low to high. The final dimension is accuracy, denoted by “A,” which suggests that stereotypes can range from accurate to inaccurate. The following example taken from Lee and colleagues (2007) illustrates the relations between and among each of the dimensions.
After the 9-11 attack, innocent “Arab-looking” Muslims may have automatically
been identified with potential acts or attempted acts of terrorism, which is related to
potency or activation [“P”]. The degree to which the terrorists were Arab and
Muslim is a matter of accuracy [“A”]. The association between certain group
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members and terrorism or violence is more negative than positive, which is a matter
of valence [“E”] (p. 99).
Each dimension – evaluation, potency, and accuracy – is thought to be synchronously responsible in determining the influence of social stereotypes on behavior and intergroup judgment. A visual representation is offered in Figure 1.
Activation
Positive Accurate
Inaccurate Negative
Inactivation
Figure 1. Cubic EPA Model (Lee, Jussim, McCauley, 1995)
The processes assumed to underlie the Cubic EPA model have particular consequences for its dimensions. Specifically, the potency dimension is conceptualized along a continuum in which an individual has either high or low knowledge activation with regard to certain groups. This variation in the intensity of activation is assumed to contribute to differences in intergroup judgment and behavior. The evaluation dimension is similarly conceptualized. Variation in evaluation is assumed to result from differences
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in the valence, positive vs. negative, attributed to a category or group. It can be argued, however, that simple differences in valence or the intensity of activation are insufficient to capture the meaning of the observed variation in stereotype content. Other sources of variation become apparent when one considers content and process models in relation. In the following section I discuss two process models, SIT and the IRM. Emphasis is placed on each theory’s basic tenets and their respective implications for stereotype content.
B. Process Models
Three findings dominate the literature on stereotyping and intergroup relations.
First, people tend to accentuate differences between groups, perceiving them as different when they are similar– intergroup differentiation (Krueger 1992; Jetten, Spears, &
Manstead 1998). Second, people tend to favor ingroups over outgroups both perceptually and behaviorally attributing more positive characteristics to groups of which they are a member – ingroup favoritism (Brewer, 1999; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). Finally, people possess more accurate perceptions of ingroups compared to outgroups – differential accuracy (Ryan & Bogart, 2001; Judd & Park, 1993). The challenge for process models is to identify the mechanisms which underlie these phenomena. A particular point of contention among theorists is whether these phenomena occur as a function of group- or individual-based cognitions. SIT and the IRM represent each side respectively. The assumption that intergroup phenomena do or do not occur as a function of individual cognitions results in theoretical divergence regarding the most likely sources of variation in stereotype content.
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a. Social Identity Theory
SIT (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) was originally developed out of the intergroup conflict that characterized the 20th century (e.g., both World Wars). Its purpose was to further the understanding of intergroup discrimination. Since then, it has grown into arguably one of the most influential social psychological theories to date. The theory’s basic tenets are derived from research using the minimal group paradigm (MGP;
Tajfel, 1970), in which individuals were grouped based upon a set of arbitrary criteria
(e.g., tendency to overestimate or underestimate the number of dots on a screen) and asked to make judgments concerning their own and other groups. Because no actual group differences existed, there was no reason to prefer one group over the other.
However, individuals consistently judged and treated ingroup members more favorably
(e.g. were more likely to trust them or give them needed resources) even when doing so came at a personal cost. As a consequence of these findings, Tajfel and his colleagues assumed that the process of categorizing oneself as a group member gave peoples’ perceptions and behavior a meaning distinct from their perceptions and behaviors as individual actors.
It was this assumption that led Tajfel to posit that the self-concept consists of two mutually exclusive selves, or what he refers to as the personal and social identities. The relationship between these two identities is viewed as antagonistic – that is, there is no correlation between an individual’s personal perceptions and behavior and his or her perceptions and behavior as a group member. The relationship is conceptualized along a continuum with interpersonal (“I” vs. “other”) behavior on one end and intergroup (“us” vs. “them”) on the other. Interpersonal behavior and perception is defined by the
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character and motivation of individual actors while intergroup behavior and perception is derived from group membership. While self-categorization into one group but not others is sufficient to explain intergroup differentiation, another mechanism is necessary to account for ingroup favoritism. For this purpose, Tajfel turned to motivation. He held not only that people form a social identity upon joining a group, but that people are motivated
(inherently or otherwise) to see their own group as different from and superior to other groups.
It is easy to see that SIT makes no explicit claims concerning stereotype content other than that of valence. However, SIT does have implications for stereotype content.
SIT holds that the personal and social identities gain and lose relevance as a consequence of a person’s context. In an interpersonal context, the personal identity takes center stage, dictating a person’s perceptions and behaviors whereas in an intergroup context, this is left to the social identity. Because stereotypes implicate an intergroup context, the social identity can be understood as the only viable source of variation in stereotype content.
Variation in the personal self should be seen as irrelevant, an idea which stands in stark contrast to that of the IRM (described next).
b. Inductive Reasoning Model
Various researchers in social cognition have called to question the necessity of motivation in explaining intergroup phenomena. It has been suggested that in the context of the minimal group paradigm, social identities cannot be derived from group knowledge, and must, therefore, be assembled from knowledge of the self (“personal identity”; Otten, 2005). In contrast to motivational approaches, proponents of the cognitive perspective argue that both the personal and social identities originate in the
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self, which moderates intergroup relations and stereotyping through intragroup processes
– inferences from the personal self to the group as a whole or what is referred to more generally as social projection (e.g., Alicke, Dunning, & Krueger, 2005).
In particular, DiDonato and colleagues (2011) proposed and tested a model of inductive reasoning which places the self and differential social projection at the center of intergroup relations and stereotyping. The model is an extension of Tajfel’s (1959) original work on perceptual categorization. It suggests that people project from the self to others, but that this projection is flexibly inhibited due to social categorization (the classification of individuals into groups; Allport, 1954; Tajfel, 1969) resulting in stronger projection to the ingroup compared to other groups (Robbins & Krueger, 2005). A visual representation can be seen in Figure 2.
As is also true of SIT, the inductive reasoning model (IRM) suggests that intergroup differentiation is the result of categorization. Ingroup favoritism is understood differently, however. It is not motivation to see “us” as better than “them” that results in ingroup favoritism, but the combined product of differential projection and a positive view of the self (Alicke et al., 2005). That is, people tend to view themselves favorably.
They, then, project themselves differently to their ingroup than other groups. As a result, the ingroup and its members are viewed more favorably than other groups and their members, implying that the derogation of outgroups is a social problem (e.g., environmentally derived through resource deprivation rather than a cognitive bias). From this perspective, differential accuracy results from the logical and empirical assumption of the self as a valid cue for social judgment (Hoch, 1987). It is the idea that any two
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individuals of the same group are more likely to be similar than are any two individuals of different groups (Krueger, 2005).
Two experiments using a modification of Tajfel’s original MGP corroborated the model’s predictions. Participants were placed into arbitrary groups, but were told that group assignments were the result of their responses to a prior set of tasks in which participants provided their preference for pairs of paintings and estimated the number of dots appearing on a screen. After they were placed into groups, participants used 20 items from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 to make judgments about their own and other groups. Intergroup differentiation, ingroup favoritism, and differential accuracy were found to be interrelated, becoming stronger as differential projection increased. Social categorization was identified as the common root cause, flexibly inhibiting projection as a function of group type.
The IRM has significant implications for content models which do not exist with
SIT. From a SIT perspective, only the social identity (social self) is implicated in intergroup contexts, making it unnecessary for content models to account for variation in the personal identity (personal self). By contrast, the IRM places the personal self at the center of stereotype development and intergroup relations. From this perspective, it becomes necessary to account for variation in the personal self in order to fully understand the content of stereotypes and their influence on intergroup judgment and behavior. The following section discusses one such opportunity for variation in the personal self, self-construal (Markus & Kitayma, 1991).
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Desirability
Self
Ingroup Outgroup
Figure 2. A Conceptual Representation of the Inductive Reasoning Model (derived from DiDonato, Ullrich, & Kreuger, 2011)
c. Self-Construal
Self-construal is defined as how a person sees the self in relation to others
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Specifically, it has to do with the extent to which elements of the social context (e.g., close others, group memberships, contexts for behavior) are incorporated into the self. For instance, people from collectivist cultures (e.g., China and
India) tend to think of themselves as interdependent with close others and as defined by important social roles whereas people from individualist cultures (e.g., England and the
United States) tend to think of themselves as separate from others, independent of social relationships and obligations (Triandis, 2001). Similar patterns appear within cultures as well. For instance, members of the working-class tend to be more interdependent than their middle-class counterparts, perceiving themselves as fundamentally connected to close others and the social context (Stephens, Markus, & Townsend, 2007). These differences in self-construal have important consequences for perception and cognition. 9
Specifically, they influence how one thinks about the self and whether the focus of perception is on objects or the relations among them.
People with an interdependent self-construal (InterSC) see the self as fundamentally connected to others and defined by relationships. By contrast, people with an independent self-construal (IndSC) see the self as fundamentally discrete and separate from others (Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). As a result, people with an InterSC weigh others’ expectations and subjective norms more heavily when evaluating their goals and behavior than do people with an IndSC who place more weight in their personal attitudes (Torelli, 2006; Ybarra & Trafimow, 1998).
Additionally, people from collectivist cultures and those who have been primed with an
InterSC report more social and group-oriented self-descriptions than do individualists and people primed with an IndSC (Kanagawa, Cross, & Markus, 2001; Oyserman & Lee,
2008). In general, people with an IndSC view the world from the “inside-out”
(Hamaguchi, 1985), defining the self in terms of internal traits that are stable across situations (e.g, intelligent, ambitious) or that demonstrate their individual uniqueness
(e.g., creative, especially athletic). On the other hand, those with an InterSC view the world from the “outside-in”, defining the self in terms of important relationships (e.g., friend, parent, sibling) or group memberships (e.g., student, activist; Cross et al., 2011;
Markus & Kitayama, 1991).
Undoubtedly, this difference in self-definition can be linked to broader discrepancies in information processing. Objects are the focus of perception for people with an IndSC whereas the interrelations among objects (rather than the objects themselves) are the focus of perception for people with an InterSC. Support for this
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assertion can be found throughout the cross-cultural and cross-cultural neuroscience literatures (for reviews see Ambady & Barucha, 2009; Park & Huang, 2010). For instance, Chua, Boland, and Nisbett (2005) found differences in the pattern of eye movements and fixations between individualists and collectivists. When viewing a complex scene, people from individualist cultures fixate for long periods on objects. In comparison, people from collectivist cultures fixate for shorter periods, rapidly shifting their gaze between objects and background. Furthermore, when classifying objects, individualists group objects by category (e.g., cow-chicken) whereas collectivists group objects by relationship (e.g., cow-grass). Priming manipulations yield similar results. For instance, when completing a compound letter task in which a series of small letters are contained within a larger letter, people primed with IndSC focused on the small letters whereas people primed with InterSC focused on the larger letter (Lin, Lin, & Han, 2008).
In light of these data it can be argued that people with an InterSC define the self relatively more in terms of relationships and group memberships because they are focused on the relations between the self and its social context rather than the self itself
(sorry!).
Such fundamental differences in self-definition and information processing are of particular importance when assuming an IRM perspective. The IRM places the self at the center of projection and therefore intergroup judgment. Because self-construal influences how people process information about the self and how the self is defined, it is likely to produce qualitative differences in the type of knowledge recruited during projection
(described below).
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d. Current Research
To ascertain whether there exist qualitative differences in projection and intergroup judgment as a function of self-construal, we conducted a study similar to that of DiDonato and colleagues (2011). Participants were placed into arbitrary groups, but were told that group assignment was based upon two criteria (i.e., painting preference & dot estimation). This resulted in an ingroup (matched the participant on both criterion variables), two mixed groups (matched the participant on one criterion variable, but not the other) and an outgroup (did not match the participant on either criterion variable) about which participants made various judgments. Judgments were made using sets of independent and interdependent traits and behaviors.
In accordance with DiDonato and colleagues (2011), we expected that participants would project more traits and behaviors to their ingroups than to other groups overall. Because the IRM assumes that people project self-related attributes to their own but not other groups, we argue that the type (i.e., independent vs. interdependent) of traits and behaviors projected to the ingroup vs. other groups should vary as a function of self- construal. Specifically, participants with an IndSC should project independent attributes most strongly to the ingroup, moderately to the mixed group, and little to the outgroup.
Whereas, participants with an InterSC should project interdependent attributes most strongly to the ingroup, moderately to the mixed group, and little to the out group.
H1: Participants will project more traits and behaviors to the ingroup than to other
groups.
H2: Participants will show differential projection of construal-consistent traits and
behaviors as a function of group type.
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Additionally, the IRM argues that people favor the ingroup because they project positive self-related characteristics onto their own but not other groups. In line with this reasoning, it was hypothesized that people with differing self-construals would rate construal-consistent traits and behaviors more positively than construal-inconsistent traits and behaviors. Specifically, participants with an IndSC should rate independent traits and behaviors more positively than interdependent traits and behaviors whereas participants with an InterSC should rate interdependent traits and behaviors more positively than independent traits and behaviors. Moreover, we expected that groups perceived to possess a greater number of construal-consistent attributes would be rated more positively than groups perceived to possess a greater number of construal-inconsistent attributes.
H3: Participants will rate construal-consistent traits and behaviors more positively
than construal-inconsistent traits and behaviors.
H4: Individuals will rate groups who are perceived to have a greater amount of
construal-consistent traits and behaviors more positively while groups perceived
as having fewer construal-consistent traits and behaviors will be viewed less
positively.
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Chapter Two
II. Method
A. Participants
144 University of Toledo introductory psychology students (36 males) participated for partial course credit. Participants had a mean age of 19.63 (SD = .42). Of those who provided their race, 76.2% of participants identified as Caucasian, 16.9% as
African American, 6.2% as Asian American, and .7% indicated other racial groups.
B. Materials
Self-construal. The Self-Construal Scale (SCS; Singelis, 1994; Appendix A), a common measure of self-construal, was collected during a pre-screening session prior to the test date. The SCS consists of two 12-item sub-scales measuring IndSC (α=.76; e.g.,
“I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects.”) and InterSC. (α =.63; e.g., “I will sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of the group I am in.”). The two sub- scales were moderately correlated (r=.38, p<.01). The mean rating for each sub-scale was calculated. As per convention, participants whose mean rating on the IndSC sub-scale exceeded their mean rating on the InterSC sub-scale were classified as having an IndSC
(n=38). Participants whose mean rating on the InterSC sub-scale exceeded their mean rating on the IndSC sub-scale were classified as having an InterSC (n=83).1 Participants who did not complete the pre-screen or who had equivalent ratings on both sub-scales were excluded from relevant analyses (n=11).2
Categorization Task. The categorization task consisted of two parts: a preference task and an estimation task. In the preference task, participants indicated which of two digitized paintings they preferred (one by Klee, the other by Kandinsky) for ten pairs.
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The paintings were presented side by side with no indication of artist or title and they appeared with equal frequency on the left and right side of the screen.
Participants then estimated the number of dots shown in ten images – the estimation task. A fixation point was displayed in the center of the screen for 1000ms followed by a dotted image appearing for 500ms. Participants estimated the number of dots displayed for each of the ten images by selecting one of four options displayed on the screen. None of the options presented were representative of the actual number of dots, but were chosen to be close approximations.
Self-Judgment Task. After the estimation and preference tasks were completed, a series of 16 personality traits and 16 behaviors were displayed on the computer screen one at a time. Each of these traits and behaviors were previously validated (Sedikides et al., 2003 tables 1 &2) as descriptive of independence (e.g., unique original, self-reliant) and interdependence (e.g, loyal, compromising, self-sacrificing). Using a 7-point likert scale (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) participants indicated the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that a particular trait or behavior described them (Appendix B).
In this sample, reliabilities for the independent and interdependent traits (α =.71, α =.80, respectively) and behaviors (α =.78, α =.71, respectively) were adequate. However, correlations between independent traits and behaviors (r=.17, p<.05) and interdependent traits and behaviors (r=.17, p<.05) were surprisingly low. Because of this, separate analyses were run for traits and behaviors (note that particular attention is paid to this issue in the Discussion).
Group Feedback. Upon completion of the self-judgment task, group membership was arbitrarily determined. However, participants were told that group assignments were
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the result of their aesthetic preferences and dot estimates. A text screen appeared providing feedback about the participants’ performance on the preference and estimation tasks relative to fictitious others (i.e., UT students who have previously participated;
Appendix C). Specifically, the feedback places the participant within a social context made up of four groups. Supposedly, these groups matched the participants’ responses to the preference and estimation tasks to differing degrees, clearly defining an ingroup
(matched on both criteria), two mixed groups (matched on one criterion, but not the other) and an outgroup (didn’t match on either criteria). Participants were reminded of their group membership throughout the remainder of the experiment.
Other-Judgment Task. Participants then made a series of judgments about the three types of groups (the order in which each group was judged was randomized and it is notable that participants only made judgments concerning one of the mixed groups) using the same criteria presented in the self-judgment task (Appendix D). In addition, participants made global judgments concerning the perceived positivity and negativity of each group using a 7-point likert scale (1 =not at all, 7 = extremely). Global positivity and negativity ratings were highly correlated (ingroup: r=-.47, p<.001; mixed group: r=-
.49, p<.001; outgroup: r=-.59, p<.001). Therefore, the negativity ratings were reverse scored and combined with positivity ratings (Cronbach’s alpha for the combined ratings are as follows, ingroup: α =.63; mixed group: α =.66; and outgroup: α =.74). Afterward, participants made positivity judgments about each of the 32 attributes and behaviors used to make self and other judgments (Appendix E).
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C. Procedure
Self-construal was determined during a pre-screening survey prior to the testing session. Upon arrival, consent was obtained and participants were shown to a private computer. During the testing session, participants completed materials on computer terminals running Medialab experimental software. Participants were informed that the purpose of the study was to explore aesthetic preference and perceptual style. The research assistant asked participants to read and follow the instructions on the computer screen carefully and respond as efficiently and accurately as possible.
Participants progressed from one screen to the next reading the instructions and completing the categorization task. Responses were required in order to move forward.
After the categorization task was complete, a screen appeared with the words “Please wait for matching.” During this time, participants completed the self-judgment task.
Following this, they received feedback placing them in a social context consisting of four groups which varied in similarity to participants’ (supposed) responses on the preference and estimation tasks. Specifically, this feedback identified an ingroup, which matched participants’ responses on both the preference and estimation tasks; two mixed groups, which matched on one task, but not the other; and an outgroup, which did not match participants’ responses on either task. Participants then made judgments about each of the three types of groups using the same traits and behaviors used in judging the self. For each judgment, instructions specified the target and asked participants to respond as quickly as possible. The order of target appearance was randomized across participants.
Finally, participants rated how positively they viewed each group, trait, and behavior.
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The final screen thanked the participants and directed them to see the experimenter who answered any questions and debriefed them.
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Chapter Three
III. Results
Manipulation Checks. At the conclusion of the study, participants answered a few questions regarding their supposed performance on the preference and estimation tasks as well as their group membership. When asked “Did your aesthetic profile reveal that you prefer Klee or Kandinsky paintings?”, 95.8% of participants chose correctly.
When asked “Did your aesthetic profile reveal that you were an over-estimator or an under-estimator?”, 97.9% of participants chose correctly. When asked “What group where you in?”. 98.6% of participants chose correctly. Together, these results suggest that the minimal group manipulation was successful. Participants who answered any of the questions incorrectly were removed from further analyses (n=11).
A. Hypothesis 1
a. Traits
A 2 (Trait: Independent vs. Interdependent) X 3 (Group: Ingroup vs. Mixed group vs. Outgroup) Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (Within-subjects ANOVA) was run to assess whether participants attributed more traits (independent and interdependent)
to the ingroup compared to other groups. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for the main effect of Group, χ2(2)=52.62, p<.001 and the
Trait X Group Interaction, χ2(2)=6.35, p=.04, therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using the Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε=.76, ε=.97, respectively).
The main effects of Trait (F(1, 132) = 29.61, p < .001, η² = .18) and Group
(F(1.52, 200.16) = 80.13, p < .001, η²=.38) were significant. Overall, participants attributed more interdependent traits to groups than independent traits. Further, they
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attributed more traits to the ingroup than the mixed group (t(132)=9.86, p<.001), and more to the mixed group than the outgroup (t(132)=5.68, p<.001). Descriptive statistics for these effects can be seen in Table 1 and Table 2.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for trait
Mean SD Independent Traits 4.76 0.76 Interdependent Traits 5.01 0.74
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for group
Mean SD Ingroup 5.53 0.74
Mixed group 4.85 0.84 Outgroup 4.28 1.22
Importantly, the main effects of Trait and Group were qualified by a significant
Trait X Group interaction, F(1.94, 255.68) = 6.11, p = .003, η² = .04. As can be seen in
Figure 3, the nature of this interaction was such that participants attributed significantly more interdependent traits than independent traits to the ingroup (t(132)= -4.83, p < .001) and the mixed group (t(132) = -5.56, p< .001). However, there was no difference in the attribution of interdependent and independent traits to the outgroup (t(132)= -.58, p =
.57). Further, participants’ attribution of independent traits differed significantly between the ingroup and mixed group (t(132) = 8.74, p < .001), the ingroup and the outgroup
(t(132)=8.56, p<.001), and the mixed group and the outgroup (t(132) = 3.57, p = .001).
Similarly, participants’ attribution of interdependent traits differed significantly between
20
the ingroup and mixed group (t(132)=7.33, p<.001), the ingroup and the outgroup (t(132)
= 10.15, p < .001), and the mixed group and the outgroup (t(132) = 6.25, p = .001).
Descriptive statistics for this interaction can be seen in Table 3. These data support
Hypothesis 1. Participants attributed more traits to the ingroup than to other groups.3
6
5
4
Attribution Independent Traits 3 Interdependent Traits 2 Ingroup Mixed group Outgroup
Figure 3. Attribution of independent and interdependent traits by group
Table 3
Descriptive statistics for the Trait X Group interaction
Independent Traits Interdependent Traits Mean SD Mean SD Ingroup 5.39 0.81 5.66 0.80 Mixed group 4.64 0.98 5.07 0.92 Outgroup 4.25 1.31 4.31 1.37
b. Behaviors
A 2 (Behavior: Independent vs. Interdependent) X 3 (Group: Ingroup vs. Mixed group vs. Outgroup) within-subjects ANOVA was run to assess whether participants attributed more behaviors to the ingroup compared to other groups. Mauchly’s test 21
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for the main effect of Group
χ2(2) = 20.68, p < .001 and the Behavior X Group Interaction, χ2(2) = 16.54, p < .001, therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using the Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε=.88, ε=.91, respectively).
The main effect of Behavior was significant, F(1,132) = 34.42, p < .001, η² = .21, indicating that participants attributed more interdependent behaviors to the groups overall than independent behaviors (Table 4). However, critically and unlike the traits, the main effect of Group was non-significant F(1.78, 233.19) = 1.19, p = .30, η² = .01.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics for behavior
Mean SD Independent Behaviors 3.78 0.76 Interdependent Behaviors 4.39 0.77
These effects were qualified by a significant Behavior X Group interaction,
F(1.81, 239.04) = 10.16, p < .001, η² = .07. As can be seen in Figure 4, participants attributed more interdependent behaviors than independent behaviors to the ingroup
(t(132)= -5.95, p < .001) and the mixed group (t(132)= -6.07, p < .001). However, there was no difference in the attribution of independent and interdependent behaviors to the outgroup, t(132)= -.23, p = .82. Further, participants’ attribution of independent behaviors did not differ significantly between the ingroup and the mixed group (t(132) = 1.39, p =
.17), or between the ingroup and the outgroup (t(132) = -1.82, p = .07; though, this effect is approaching significance). However, it did differ between the mixed group and the outgroup t(132) = -3.31, p = .001. Participants’ attribution of interdependent behaviors
22
showed a slightly different pattern. Attribution differed significantly between the ingroup and the outgroup (t(132) = 3.38, p = .001), and between the mixed group and the outgroup (t(132) = 3.21, p = .002), but not between the ingroup and the mixed group
(t(132) = .75, p = .45). Descriptive Statistics for the Behavior X Group interaction can be seen in Table 5. In contrast to the traits, the data reported here only partially support
Hypothesis 1. While participants differentially attributed behavior to the ingroup vs. the outgroup, they did not differentiate between the ingroup and the mixed group.
6
5
4 Attribution
3 Independent Behaviors
Interdependent Behaviors 2 Ingroup Mixed group Outgroup
Figure 4. Attribution of independent and interdependent behaviors by group
Table 5
Descriptive statistics for the Behavior X Group interaction
Independent Behaviors Interdependent Behaviors Mean SD Mean SD Ingroup 3.74 1.09 4.58 1.03 Mixed group 3.56 1.21 4.50 1.14 Outgroup 4.05 1.44 4.09 1.26
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B. Hypothesis 2
a. Traits
A 2 (Trait: Independent vs. Interdependent) X 3 (Group: Ingroup vs. Mixed group vs. Outgroup) X 2 (Self-construal: IndSC vs. InterSC) Multivariate Analysis of Variance
(MANOVA) was run to assess whether participants’ projection of independent and interdependent traits differed as a function of Group and Self-construal (SC).
Specifically, it was hypothesized that participants would attribute more construal- consistent traits to the ingroup than the mixed group, and more to the mixed group than the outgroup. As was the case in the above analyses, Trait and Group were within- subjects factors. SC was added to this original design as a between-subjects factor.
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for the main effect of Group χ2(2) = 45.77, p < .001,therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using the Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε=.77).
As reported above, the main effects of Trait (F(1,121) = 20.49, p<.001, η² = .15) and Group (F(1.55, 187.12) =65.02, p < .001, η² = .35), as well as the Trait X Group interaction (F(2, 242)=5.14, p=.007, η²=.04) were significant. The main effect of SC
(F(1,121) = 5.00, p = .03, η² = .04) was also significant, revealing that participants with an IndSC attributed more traits to groups overall than did participants with an InterSC, t(121) = 2.24, p = .03 (Table 6).
24
Table 6
Descriptive statistics for self-construal
Mean SD IndSC 5.08 0.85 InterSC 4.79 0.59
Unexpectedly, however, the Trait X SC (F(1,121) = .47, p = .49, η² = .004),
Group X SC (F(1.55, 187.12) = .05, p = .91, η² < .001), and Trait X Group X SC (F(2,
242) = .09, p = .92, η² = .001) interactions were non-significant. This data contrasts with
Hypothesis 2, suggesting that SC does not predict qualitative differences in trait attribution within a minimal group context.
b. Behaviors
A 2 (Behavior: Independent vs. Interdependent) X 3 (Group: Ingroup vs. Mixed group vs. Outgroup) X 2 (Self-construal: IndSC vs. InterSC) MANOVA was run to assess whether participants’ projection of independent and interdependent behaviors differed as a function of Group and SC. Specifically, it was hypothesized that participants would attribute more construal-consistent behaviors to the ingroup than the mixed group, and more to the mixed group than the outgroup. Behavior and Group were treated as within-subjects factors whereas SC was treated as between-subjects. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for the main effect of Group
χ2(2) = 16.26, p < .001 and the Behavior X Group Interaction, χ2(2) = 9.82, p = .006, therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using the Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε = .91, ε = .95, respectively).
25
As reported above, the main effect of Behavior (F(1,121) = 23.26, p < .001,
η²=.16) and the Behavior X Group interaction (F(1.90,229.60) = 9.47, p < .001, η² = .07) were significant whereas the main effect of Group (F(1.81,219.55) =.90, p = .40, η² =
.007) was non-significant.
Critically for Hypothesis 2, the Group X SC interaction was significant,
F(1.81,219.55) = 4.17, p = .02, η² = .03. As can be seen in Figure 5, participants with an
InterSC attributed more behaviors to the ingroup than the mixed group (t(83)=1.80, p=.07) and the outgroup (t(83)=2.08,p=.04). Though, attribution did not differ between the mixed group and the outgroup (t(83)=.89, p=.37). For participants with an IndSC, attribution did not differ significantly among the ingroup, mixed group, or outgroup
(t(38) = .39, p = .70; t(38) = -.72, p = .09; t(38) = -1.50, p = .15). Descriptive statistics for this interaction can be seen in Table 7. The main effect of SC (F(1,121) = 1.96, p = .16,
η²=.02) and the Behavior X SC (F(1,121) = .17, p = .68, η² = .001) and Behavior X
Group X SC (F(1.90,229.60) = .44, p = .63, η² = .004) interactions were non-significant.
As was the case with traits, these data contrast with Hypothesis 2, suggesting that SC does not predict qualitative differences in behavior-based attribution within a minimal group context.
26
6 IndSC InterSC
5
Attribution 4
3 Ingroup Mixed group Outgroup
Figure 5. Overall attribution of behaviors by group and self-construal
Table 7
Descriptive statistics for the Group X SC interaction
IndSC InterSC Mean SD Mean SD Ingroup 4.12 0.64 4.19 0.71 Mixed group 4.06 0.86 4.05 0.73 Outgroup 4.40 0.86 3.95 0.73
C. Hypothesis 3
a. Traits
A 2(Trait: Independent vs. Interdependent) X 2 (SC: IndSC vs. InterSC)
MANOVA was run to assess whether positivity ratings for independent and interdependent traits differed by self-construal. Specifically, it was hypothesized that construal-consistent traits would be rated more positively than construal-inconsistent traits. Trait was a within-subjects factor whereas SC was a between-subjects factor.
27
There was a significant main effect of Trait, F(1,121) = 26.72, p < .001, η² = .18.
Overall, participants rated interdependent traits as more positive than independent traits
(Table 8). The main effect of SC was non-significant, F(1,121) = 2.01, p = .16, η² = .02.
Table 8
Descriptive statistics for trait (positivity)
Mean SD Independent Traits 5.68 0.83 Interdependent Traits 6.08 0.82
Importantly, this was qualified by a significant Trait X SC interaction, F(1,121) =
4.59, p = .03, η² = .04. As can be seen in Figure 6, participants with an IndSC rated independent and interdependent traits as similarly positive, t(38) = -1.94, p = .06
(although there was a marginal leaning toward rating interdependent traits more positively). By contrast, participants with an InterSC rated interdependent traits as significantly more positive than independent traits, t(83) = -6.33, p < .001. Descriptive statistics for this interaction can be found in Table 9. While the expected Trait X SC interaction was significant, the nature of the interaction was not as expected. That is, although participants with an InterSC did, in fact, rate interdependent traits more positively than independent traits, participants with an IndSC did not rate independent traits more positively than interdependent traits. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was only partially supported.
28
7
6
5 IndSC
InterSC Mean Positivity Rating Mean Positivity 4 Independent Traits Interdependent Traits
Figure 6. Positivity ratings of independent and interdependent traits by self-construal
Table 9
Descriptive statistics for the Trait X SC interaction
IndSC InterSC Mean SD Mean SD Independent Trait 5.90 0.68 5.56 0.82 Interdependent Trait 6.11 0.73 6.06 0.80
b. Behaviors
A 2(Behavior: Independent vs. Interdependent) X 2 (SC: IndSC vs. InterSC)
MANOVA was run to assess whether positivity ratings for independent and interdependent behaviors differed by self-construal. Specifically, it was hypothesized that construal-consistent behaviors would be rated more positively than construal-inconsistent behaviors. Behavior was a within-subjects factor whereas SC was between-subjects.
There was a significant main effect of Behavior, F(1,121) = 41.03, p < .001, η² =
.25. Overall, participants rated interdependent behaviors as more positive than
29
independent behaviors (Table 10). The main effect of SC (F(1,121) = 3.06, p = .08, η²
=.03) and the Behavior X SC interaction (F(1,121) = 2.04, p = .16, η²=.02) were marginally significant. As can be seen in Figure 7., the nature of the Behavior X SC interaction was similar to the Trait X SC interaction reported in the section above. While both participants with an IndSC and an InterSC rated interdependent behaviors as significantly more positive than independent behaviors (t(38)=-3.90, p=.004; t(83)=-6.87, p<.001, respectively), this pattern was more marked for those with an InterSC (Table 11).
While the expected Behavior X SC interaction was present, the nature of the interaction was not as expected. That is, although participants with an InterSC did, in fact, rate interdependent behaviors more positively than independent behaviors, participants with an IndSC did not rate independent behaviors more positive than interdependent behaviors. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was again only partially supported.
Table 10
Descriptive statistics for behavior (positivity)
Mean SD Independent Behaviors 3.34 1.06 Interdependent Behaviors 4.50 1.05
Table 11
Descriptive statistics for self-construal
Mean SD IndSC 4.06 .46 InterSC 3.86 .49
30
6
5
4 IndSC
3 InterSC Mean Positivity Rating Mean Positivity
2 Independent Behaviors Interdependent Behaviors
Figure 7. Positivity ratings for independent and interdependent behaviors
by self-construal.
Table 12
Descriptive statistics for the Behavior X SC interaction
IndSC InterSC Mean SD Mean SD Independent Behavior 3.64 .99 3.20 1.06 Interdependent Behavior 4.47 1.07 4.52 1.03
D. Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4, that groups perceived to possess a greater number of construal- consistent traits and behaviors would be rated more positively than groups perceived to possess a fewer number of construal-consistent traits and behaviors, is a natural derivation of Hypothesis 3 (assuming an IRM perspective). The IRM holds that ingroup favoritism results from the projection of positive views of the self to the ingroup but not other groups. It was hypothesized, therefore, that participants would view self-related
31
(i.e., construal-consistent) attributes more positively than other attributes (Hypothesis 3) and that these self-related attributes would be projected onto the ingroup, but not other groups (Hypothesis 4). Because the data did not support Hypothesis 3, Hypothesis 4 is no longer tenable and is not reported. This issue is given additional consideration below in
Chapter 4.
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Chapter Four
IV. Discussion
A. Projection to Ingroups, Mixed Groups, and Outgroups (H1)
The current study examined how differences in self-knowledge influence intergroup judgments. Previous research has shown that the self moderates projection within a minimal groups context such that people project self-related attributes more strongly to ingroups than to outgroups (DiDonato et al., 2011; Robbins & Kreuger,
2005). Consistent with previous research and in support of Hypothesis 1, participants in the current research attributed more traits to the ingroup than to the mixed group, and more to the mixed group than the outgroup (see Figure 3). Critically, however, this pattern did not hold for behavior. While attribution differed between the ingroup and the outgroup and between the mixed group and the outgroup, there was no difference in attribution between the ingroup and the mixed group (see Figure 4)4.
This difference in the attribution of traits vs. behaviors can be interpreted in different ways. One possibility is that people perceive traits to be central aspects of group
identity whereas behaviors are perceived to be relatively more peripheral. In such a case, one might expect participants to make more rigid distinctions between groups when traits, rather than behaviors, are the criteria for judgment. Unfortunately, the viability of this interpretation is difficult to discern as little (if any) research exists comparing the centrality of traits vs. behaviors in personal or group identity formation. Though, there is some research to suggest that traits and behaviors differ in important ways (e.g., Mischel
& Shoda, 1995). For instance, when asked to describe themselves, they are more likely to
33
spontaneously report traits than other types of information about the self, including behaviors (Cross et al., 2011; Markus & Kitayama, 1991).
Another possibility is that attribute ambiguity changes how flexibly the trait can be applied to the self (and through projection to other targets) in a way that is consistent with motivations (e.g., Dunning & McElwee, 1995). For instance, Dunning et al. (1989) showed that when people made judgments using ambiguous traits, people self-enhanced substantially more than when using unambiguous traits. This is because unambiguous traits are more strictly defined and, therefore, more difficult to construe to the benefit the self. Similarly, in an intergroup context it may be easier to construe ambiguous attributes
(i.e., traits) to benefit the ingroup than it is to construe unambiguous attributes (i.e., behaviors). If this is the case, ingroup favoritism should be more pronounced when people make judgments using ambiguous attributes as opposed to unambiguous attributes. It should be noted that this latter explanation contrasts with recent claims that it is unnecessary to posit motivational mechanisms in explicating ingroup favoritism
(DiDonato et al., 2011). The very idea that people construe standards for self and ingroup benefit seems to suggest a motivational explanation.
Unfortunately, none of the data presented here can speak to this issue. Further research is needed to discern the nature of the discrepancy between trait- and behavior- based attributions. Previous research has focused almost exclusively on differences in the attribution of various trait types (e.g., DiDonato et al., 2011; Robbins & Kreuger, 2005).
It is unclear, therefore, what additional commentary can be made regarding behavior- based attribution. In order to avoid making unsound inferences and for ease of
34
comparison, the remaining discussion is confined strictly to trait-based results. However, all behavior-based results are presented in Chapter 3.
B. Self-Construal and Projection (H2)
As was mentioned above, research on social projection suggests that people project self-related knowledge to ingroups but not to outgroups (DiDonato et al., 2011).
Consistent with this reasoning it was argued that differences in self-knowledge should lead to qualitative differences in social projection. Specifically, it was hypothesized that self-construal would moderate social projection. In particular, we expected that participants with an IndSC would show stronger projection of independent traits to the ingroup than to other groups whereas participants with InterSC would show stronger projection of interdependent traits to the ingroup than to other groups.
Contrary to this hypothesis, however, self-construal did not moderate social projection. Participants with IndSC and InterSC showed similar patterns of attribution.
There was stronger attribution of traits (independent and interdependent) to the ingroup than to the mixed group, and to the mixed group than to the outgroup. Furthermore, the attribution of interdependent traits was significantly higher than that of independent traits for each group except the outgroup, which was attributed similar levels of independence and interdependence (Figure 3).
One explanation for this result is that people may project only self-related knowledge that is immediately accessible. Self-construal can be conceptualized in terms of both chronic and momentary activation. In the current study self-construal was assessed in a prescreening session prior to the test date. It may be the case, therefore, that participants construed the self differently on the test date than during the prescreen
35
session (presumably due to contextual demands). Because participants’ momentary self- attributions of independence and interdependence were not immediately relevant to our hypotheses they were not included in the results (Chapter 3). However, further analyses were conducted in order to more clearly interpret the extent to which the current data are consistent with this explanation and with prior research. Detailed analyses can be seen in
Appendix F.
As can be seen in Figure 8, participants with an InterSC (as determined in the prescreen session) attributed significantly more interdependence than independence to the self in both the prescreen and test sessions. By contrast, participants with an IndSC attributed significantly more independence than interdependence to the self in the prescreen session, but more interdependence than independence to the self during the test session. This is consistent with the idea that there was a shift in self-construal from the prescreen to the test session for those with an IndSC. Furthermore, self-attributions of independence and interdependence were correlated with group attributions in the expected direction. Specifically, self-attributions were most strongly correlated with ingroup attributions, moderately with mixed group attributions, and uncorrelated with outgroup attributions (Table 14). Indeed, when self-attributions of independence and interdependence during the test session are used to determine self-construal, self- construal moderates projection such that participants with an IndSC projection more independent than interdependent traits to the ingroup whereas participants with an
InterSC project more interdependent than independent traits to the ingroup (Appendix H).
Though a more direct test of the chronic vs. momentary construal hypothesis is desirable, the current findings are consistent with previous research by Krueger and
36
colleagues (Alicke et al., 2005; DiDonato et al., 2011; Robbins & Krueger, 2005) showing that people use self-related knowledge to make intergroup judgments. Though as the current data suggest, the specific knowledge recruited during intergroup judgment may be limited to knowledge which is made highly accessible as a function of the social context. Priming manipulations would be especially helpful in providing direct evidence for this assertion. If it is the case that momentary shifts in self-construal activation moderate social projection, it may also be the case that momentary activation of other self-aspects will moderate social projection. This is an important issue for content-based researchers as it suggests that stereotypes may vary to a greater or lesser degree as a function of the social context.
C. Self-Construal and Perceived Positivity (H3 and H4)
The final two hypotheses deal with recent claims that ingroup favoritism occurs as a function of social projection and a positive self-view (DiDonato et al., 2011).
Consistent with this idea it was hypothesized that self-construal would moderate trait positivity ratings such that those with an IndSC would rate independent traits more positively than interdependent traits whereas participants with an InterSC would rate interdependent traits more positively than independent traits. However, this hypothesis was only partially supported. Participants rated interdependent traits as significantly more positive than independent traits regardless of self-construal. When self-construal was considered, the Trait X SC interaction was significant. However, the nature of the interaction was not as originally anticipated. As can be seen in Figure 5, participants with an IndSC rated independent and interdependent traits as similarly positive whereas
37
participants with an InterSC rated interdependent traits as significantly more positive than independent traits.
Given the context of this study, one might expect that people with an InterSC would rate independent and interdependent traits similarly positive as a consequence of the macro-culture of independence common within the United States. As mentioned, however, this was not the case. Instead, it was those with an IndSC that rated independent and interdependent traits as being similarly positive. While this is contrary to the original hypothesis, it is not inconsistent with the explanation provided in Section A (this chapter) that contextual demands caused a shift in momentary self-construal activation. This shift in self-construal may have subsequently led participants with IndSC to endorse interdependent traits to a greater extent than they might have otherwise. Further analyses revealed that self-attributions during the test session were moderately correlated with mean positivity ratings for independent and interdependent traits. These data can be seen in Table 15 (Appendix G). It is unclear, however, to what extent these data support or refute this explanation as the correlations only indirectly assess the relationship between momentary activation and positivity. Additionally, when self-construal is determined using self-attributions of independence and interdependence during the test session, there is no difference in the pattern of positivity ratings from those originally reported
(Appendix H). Future research would benefit from a direct test of this hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4, that groups perceived to possess a greater number of construal- consistent traits would be rated more positively, is a derivative of Hypothesis 3. Because
Hypothesis 3 was not supported, Hypothesis 4 was not reported in the results. However, as discussed above in Section A (this chapter), there is reason to believe that momentary
38
self-construal activation may moderate intergroup judgments. Indeed, it was shown that self-attributions of independent and interdependent traits were correlated highly with ingroup attributions, moderately with mixed group attributions, and uncorrelated with outgroup attributions. Furthermore, it seems that self-attributions of independence and interdependence are at least moderately correlated with trait positivity ratings.
Considered in this light, it is worth analyzing whether participants’ self-attributions of independent and interdependent traits during the test session were similarly correlated with group positivity ratings as well as whether trait positivity ratings were correlated with group positivity ratings. Results can be found in Appendix G.
Participants’ self-attributions of independence and interdependence during the test session do not appear to be meaningfully associated with positivity ratings for any group
(Table 16). Additionally, mean positivity ratings for independent and interdependent traits do not appear to be meaningfully associated with positivity ratings for any group
(Table 17). Critically, however, participants rated the ingroup as more positive than the mixed group, and the mixed group as more positive than the outgroup (Figure 9). The reason for this discrepancy is not clear. However, it may be the case that people project a sort of global positivity to their ingroups which is not grounded in any specific set of self- related attributes.
D. Implications and Limitations
There are several important implications of the current study. First, some contention has arisen within the area of intergroup relations as to whether intergroup judgment results from individual psychological processes. It has been argued that within a minimal group context, people cannot use group-based knowledge to make judgments
39
and therefore must use knowledge of the self during intergroup judgment (Otten, 2005).
The current results seem to partially support this assertion. Participants’ self-attributions of traits were highly correlated with ingroup, but not outgroup ratings on those same traits. Critically, this contrasts with a social identity perspective in which it is argued that people do not use idiosyncratic information about the self when making judgments or when behaving in intergroup contexts (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
It is notable, however, that the current data do not seem to support claims by proponents of the IRM that ingroup favoritism is reducible to purely cognitive mechanisms (DiDonato et al., 2011). Differences in trait- vs. behavior-based attribution closely resemble prior research on self-enhancement (Dunning et al., 1989), suggesting that ingroup favoritism is at least partially the result of motivational mechanisms in which people construe judgment criteria to benefit the self (and through projection to the ingroup). Additionally, group positivity ratings did not seem to be related to mean trait positivity ratings or self-attributions of independence or interdependence during the testing session. In light of this, it may be more useful for researchers to consider the ways in which cognitive and motivational (and social, affective, and behavioral) systems interact to produce ingroup favoritism rather than attempting to reduce ingroup favoritism to purely cognitive or motivational mechanisms.
Additionally, the current research points to two possible sources of variation in stereotype content, attribute ambiguity and chronic vs. momentary self-aspect activation.
As has been mentioned throughout the discussion, the ambiguity of the attribute used for judgment may dictate the extent to which the attribute can be construed to benefit the ingroup. This may result in both quantitative and qualitative variation in stereotype
40
content. Specifically, when the attribute is ambiguous, the ingroup is likely to be viewed as possessing the attribute to a greater extent (if desirable) than when the attribute is unambiguous. Furthermore, to the extent that ambiguous attributes are differentially construed to benefit the self, people will project qualitatively different conceptualizations of the attribute to their ingroups.
Too, contextual demands may make certain types of self-related knowledge more accessible than others, resulting in both quantitative and qualitative differences in stereotype content intra-individually. The current study seems to suggest the momentarily-activated knowledge impacts social projection (and therefore intergroup judgment) to a greater extent than chronically-activated knowledge. Though, it is possible that chronic and momentary activation may interact to produce differing effects. While this study focused mainly on self-construal, in principle this idea can be broadly applied to include any number of self-aspects. To the extent that the level of activation of self- aspects is dependent upon the social context, specific contexts may produce differences in the type of attributes projected to the ingroup and the extremity of that projection.
That being said, the current data do not provide direct evidence of momentary vs. chronic self-construal variation nor do they directly test the ambiguity hypothesis. With regard to the former, the same measure was not used to assess independence and interdependence during the prescreen and the test sessions. It may be the case that the two measures are tapping slightly different constructs. Though, this seems unlikely when considered in light of previous research (Singelis, 1994; Sedikides, 2003). With regard to the latter, there is no direct evidence attesting to the level of ambiguity of the specific traits and behaviors used in the current study. However, self-enhancement researchers
41
generally define the ambiguity of a trait by asking participants to rate whether the trait can be represented by “one and only one behavior” or whether the trait can be represented by “various behaviors in various domains of life” (Dunning et al., 1989). This operationalization would suggest that behaviors are inherently less ambiguous than traits.
E. Conclusion
This research was motivated by the need for content and process models of stereotypes to be considered in relation. The recent introduction of the IRM only makes the issue more apparent. Over the past half century, theory and research related to stereotype development has advanced rapidly. Advancement in the area of stereotype content only pales in comparison. Though the reasons for this are various, one is undoubtedly the failure by researchers to consider how content and process models influence one another. The current research sheds light on this issue suggesting multiple sources of variation in stereotype content, including differences in self-knowledge (i.e., self-construal) and context (i.e., momentary knowledge activation, ambiguity). Future research related to both content and process would benefit from further exploration in these areas.
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Footnotes
1Additional analyses reveal no differences in mean ratings on the independent and interdependent sub-scales of the SCS by sex (t(127) = -1.49, p = .77; t(127) = .90, p =
.37, respectively.) or race (F(3, 119) = 1.20, p = .31; F(3, 119) = .85, p = .45, respectively.) It is notable that mean ratings on the independent sub-scale of the SCS differs by parent education (F(2, 124) = 3.24, p = .04). Specifically, participants who reported that neither parent attended college had higher ratings than participants who reported that both parents attended college. Participants who reported that only one parent attended college did not significantly differ from either group.
2 Though the relatively higher endorsement of interdependent attributes may come as a surprise to some given that the current study was conducted within Western culture, it should be noted that this is not necessarily unexpected given the nature of our sample.
75% were female, 23.8% were minorities, and over 50% grew up in households in which neither parent attended college. All of these factors have been associated with interdependence (e.g., Cross et al., 2011). Though, none of these factors (singly) accounted for differences in mean ratings on the interdependent sub-scale of the SCS (see footnote 1).
3 Additional analyses were conducted controlling for sex and parent education.
There was no significant difference in the reported pattern of results. For ease of interpretation these analyses are not included here, but are available upon request.
4 It should be noted that the standard deviations for outgroup judgments were markedly larger than those of the ingroup or mixed group for both traits and behaviors.
This suggests that people may be less confident in their assessments of outgroups
43
compared to ingroups or mixed groups. If it is the case that outgroup judgments are more ambiguous, they may also be relatively more vulnerable to motivational biases (e.g.,
Dunning et al., 1989).
44
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49
A. Self-Construal Scale
Please Read Carefully:
Please consider each statement. Indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of these statements.
InterSC Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree
1. I have respect for authority figures with 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 whom I interact.
2. It is important for me to maintain harmony 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 within my group.
3. My happiness depends on the happiness of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 those around me.
4. I would offer my seat on a bus to my 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 professor.
5. I respect people who are modest about 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 themselves.
6. I will sacrifice my self-interest for the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 benefit of the group I am in.
7. I often have the feeling that my relationships 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 with others are more important than my own accomplishments.
8. I should take into consideration my parents’ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 advice when making education/career plans.
9. It is important to me to respect decisions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 made by the group.
10. I will stay in a group if they need me, even 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 when I’m not happy with the group.
11. If my brother or sister fails, I feel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 responsible. 50
12. Even when I strongly disagree with group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 members, I avoid an argument.
51
IndSC Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree
1. I’d rather say “No” directly than risk being 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 misunderstood.
2. Speaking up in class is not a problem for 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 me.
3. Having a lively imagination is important to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 me.
4. I am comfortable being singled out for 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 praise or awards.
5. I am the same person at home that I am at 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 school.
6. Being able to take care of myself is a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 primary concern for me.
7. I act the same way no matter who I am with. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. I feel comfortable using someone’s first 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 name soon after I meet them, even when they are much older than I am.
9. I prefer to be direct and forthright when 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 dealing with people I’ve just met.
10. I enjoy being unique and different from 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 others in many respects.
11. My personal identity independent of others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 is very important to me.
12. I value being in good health above 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 everything.
52
B. Self-Judgment Task (Stimuli)
Please consider the traits below. Indicate how strongly you agree or disagree that each trait describes you.
Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree
1. Free 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Agreeable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Independent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Compromising 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Leader 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Cooperative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Original 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. Good listener 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. Self-reliant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. Loyal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. Separate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. Patient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. Unconstrained 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. Respectful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. Unique 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
16. Self-sacrificing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
53
Please consider the behaviors below. Indicate how strongly you agree or disagree that each behavior describes you.
IndSC Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree
1. Engage in open conflict with 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 your group
2. Desert your group when the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 group does not represent you anymore
3. Scream at your group when you 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 believe your decision is right and the group’s decision is definitely wrong.
4. Argue for your position and 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 against your group
5. Put yourself before your group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Express open dissatisfaction with 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 your group when you feel you are right.
7. Disagree with your group when 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 you believe the group is wrong.
8. Trust your own instinct rather 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 than the group’s instinct.
54
InterSC Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree
1. Follow the rules according to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 which your group operates.
2. Defend your group’s decision. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Do anything for your group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Avoid open confrontation with 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 your group.
5. Conform to your group’s 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 decision.
6. Avoid conflict with your group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 at any cost.
7. Engage in socially undesirable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 behavior that will ultimately benefit your group.
8. Go along with your group’s 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 decision even when you believe the decision to be wrong.
55
C. Group Feedback Sample
Matching Complete
Aesthetic Preference: Klee Paintings Aesthetic Style: Over-estimator
The responses you offered during the categorization task indicate that you have a preference for Klee paintings and tend to over-estimate the number of objects appearing on the screen.
Please proceed to the following screen to see how you compare to others participating in this study.
Your Results Group A Aesthetic Preference: Klee Paintings Aesthetic Style: Over-estimator
Each participant (including you) has been placed into a group based upon his or her aesthetic preference and style. Below you will find a description of your relation to each group.
Group A is most similar to you. Participants in this group preferred Klee paintings and tended to over-estimate the number of objects appearing on the screen. Group B is both similar & different from you. Participants in this group preferred Klee paintings, but tended to underestimate the number of objects appearing on the screen. Group C is both similar & different from you. Participants in this group tended to over-estimate the number of objects appearing on the screen, but prefer Kandinsky paintings. Group D: is different from you. Participants in this group preferred Kandinsky paintings and tended to underestimate the number of objects appearing on the screen.
56
D. Other-Judgment Task (Stimuli)
Please consider the traits below. Indicate how strongly you agree or disagree that each trait describes (INSERT GROUP).
Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree
1. Free 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Agreeable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Independent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Compromising 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Leader 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Cooperative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Original 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. Good listener 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. Self-reliant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. Loyal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. Separate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. Patient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. Unconstrained 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. Respectful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. Unique 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
16. Self-sacrificing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
57
Please consider the behaviors below. Indicate how strongly you agree or disagree that each behavior describes (INSERT GROUP).
IndSC Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree
1. Engage in open conflict with your group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Desert your group when the group does 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 not represent you anymore
3. Scream at your group when you believe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 your decision is right and the group’s decision is definitely wrong.
4. Argue for your position and against your 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 group
5. Put yourself before your group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Express open dissatisfaction with your 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 group when you feel you are right.
7. Disagree with your group when you 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 believe the group is wrong.
8. Trust your own instinct rather than the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 group’s instinct.
58
InterSC Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree
1. Follow the rules according to which 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 your group operates.
2. Defend your group’s decision. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Do anything for your group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Avoid open confrontation with your 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 group.
5. Conform to your group’s decision. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Avoid conflict with your group at any 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 cost.
7. Engage in socially undesirable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 behavior that will ultimately benefit your group.
8. Go along with your group’s decision 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 even when you believe the decision to be wrong.
59
E. Positivity Judgment (Stimuli)
Please consider the traits below. Indicate the positivity of each trait.
Extremely Negative Extremely Positive
1. Free 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Agreeable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Independent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Compromising 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Leader 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Cooperative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Original 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. Good listener 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. Self-reliant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. Loyal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. Separate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. Patient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. Unconstrained 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. Respectful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. Unique 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
16. Self-sacrificing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
60
Please consider the behaviors below. Indicate the positivity of each.
IndSC Extremely Extremely Negative Positive
1. Engage in open conflict with 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 your group
2. Desert your group when the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 group does not represent you anymore
3. Scream at your group when you 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 believe your decision is right and the group’s decision is definitely wrong.
4. Argue for your position and 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 against your group
5. Put yourself before your group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Express open dissatisfaction with 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 your group when you feel you are right.
7. Disagree with your group when 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 you believe the group is wrong.
8. Trust your own instinct rather 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 than the group’s instinct.
61
InterSC Extremely Extremely Negative Positive
1. Follow the rules according to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 which your group operates.
2. Defend your group’s decision. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Do anything for your group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Avoid open confrontation with 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 your group.
5. Conform to your group’s 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 decision.
6. Avoid conflict with your group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 at any cost.
7. Engage in socially undesirable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 behavior that will ultimately benefit your group.
8. Go along with your group’s 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 decision even when you believe the decision to be wrong.
62
F. Chronic vs. Momentary Construal
A 2 (Self-construal: IndSC vs. InterSC) x 2 (Independence: Prescreen vs. Test) x
2 (Interdependence: Presecreen vs. Test) Repeated Measures ANOVA was run in order to ascertain whether participants’ self-attributions of independence (Ind) and interdependence (Inter) shifted from the prescreen session to the test session. The first factor was between subjects while the latter two were within subjects.
The main effects of independence (F(1, 121)=19.92, p<.001, η²=.14) and interdependence (F(1, 121)=77.98, p<.001, η²=.39) were significant. Overall, participants attributed more independence and interdependence to the self during the test session than during the prescreen. The main effect of self-construal (F(1, 121)=2.88, p=.09, η²=.02) was marginally significant. Participants with an IndSC (as determined in the prescreen) attributed more traits to the self overall than did participants with an InterSC. Descriptive statistics for these effects can be seen in Table 13.
Table 13
Self-attributions of independence and interdependence by self-construal (as assessed during the prescreen session)
Prescreen Test IndSC SD InterSC SD IndSC SD InterSC SD Independence 5.24 .60 4.50 .70 5.54 .65 5.13 .74 Interdependence 4.62 .49 5.29 .66 5.80 .57 5.63 .86
The SC x Ind interaction was significant (F(1,121)=63.45, p<.001, η²=.34) and the SC x Inter interaction was marginal (F(1,121)=3.29, p=.07, η²=.03). These effects
63
were qualified by a significant SC x Ind x Inter interaction (F(1,121)=63.39, p<.001,
η²=.34). The nature of this interaction was such that people with an InterSC attributed significantly more interdependence than independence to the self in both the prescreen session (t(83)=-11.87, p<.001) and the test session (t(83)=-5.87,p<.001). Though, both attributions of independence (t(83)=6.87, p<.001) and interdependence (t(83)=3.40, p=.001) were more extreme in the test session than in the prescreen. By contrast, participants with an IndSC attributed significantly more independence than interdependence to the self during the prescreen session (t(38)=8.93, p<.001), but more interdependence than independence to the self during the test session (t(38)=-2.40, p=.02). Both ratings of independence (t(38)=2.80, p=.008) and interdependence
(t(38)=11.40, p<.001) were more extreme in the test session. A visual depiction of this interaction can be seen in Figure 8. These data support the idea that self-construal shifted from the prescreen session to the test session for those with an IndSC.
6 6
5.5 5.5
5 5
4.5 4.5
4 4 Trait Endorsement Trait
IndSC Endorsement Trait 3.5 InterSC 3.5
3 3 Independence Interdependence Independence Interdependence
Figure 8. Self-attributions of independence and interdependence for people with IndSC and InterSC during the prescreen and test sessions. 64
Bivariate correlations were run to discern whether participants’ self-attributions of independence and interdependence during the test session differentially correlated with group attributions. As can be seen by Table 14, participants’ self-attributions during the test session were most strongly correlated with ingroup attributions, moderately with mixed group attributions, and uncorrelated with outgroup attributions. This suggests that participants did use self-related knowledge to make intergroup judgments.
Table 14
Summary correlation table for self-and group-attributions of independent and interdependent traits during the test session
Ingroup Mixed Group Outgroup
(Self-Attribution) Independent Traits .60*** .36*** .07
Interdependent Traits .51*** .24** .16 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001
65
G. Momentary Construal and Positivity
Table 15
Correlation between self-attributions of independence and interdependence during the test session and trait positivity ratings
Self-Attribution: Self-Attribution: Positivity: Positivity: Ind Traits Inter Traits Ind Traits Inter Traits Self-Attribution: 1 .54*** .43*** .21* Ind Traits Self-Attribution: 1 .17* .34*** Inter Traits Positivity: Ind 1 .65*** Traits Positivity: Inter 1 Traits *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001
Table 16
Correlation between self-attributions of independence and interdependence during the test session and group positivity ratings
Self-Attribution: Self-Attribution: Mixed Ingroup Outgroup Ind Traits Inter Traits Group Self-Attribution: 1 .54*** .07 .19* .08 Ind Traits Self-Attribution: 1 .16† .13 .19* Inter Traits Ingroup 1 .25** -.02
Mixed group 1 .42*** Outgroup 1 †<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001
66
Table 17
Correlation between positivity ratings of independent and interdependent traits and group positivity ratings
Pos: Ind Pos: Inter Ingroup Mixed Outgroup Traits Traits
Pos: Ind Traits 1 .65*** .17* .19* .13
Pos: Inter 1 .17* .09 .15† Traits Ingroup 1 .25** -.02
Mixed group 1 .42*** Outgroup 1 †<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001
6
5
4
IndSC 3 InterSC
2 Global Positivity Positivity Rating Global
1 Ingroup Mixed group Outgroup
Figure 9. Global positivity ratings for each group by self-construal (as
assessed during the prescreen session)
67
H. Momentary Construal Moderates Projection
Identical analyses to those presented for Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 were run in order to assess whether self-construal as assessed during the test session (as opposed to the prescreen session) produced the hypothesized results. Participants’ self-attributions of independent and interdependent traits (see Chapter 2 “Self-Judgment Task”) were used to determine their self-construal. Those whose mean rating on independent traits exceeded their mean rating on interdependent traits were classified as possessing an IndSC (n=31).
By contrast, participants whose mean rating on interdependent traits exceeded their mean rating on independent traits were classified as possessing an InterSC (n=94).
A. Hypothesis 2
A 2 (Trait: Independent vs. Interdependent) X 3 (Group: Ingroup vs. Mixed group vs. Outgroup) X 2 (Self-construal: IndSC vs. InterSC) Multivariate Analysis of Variance
(MANOVA) was run to assess whether participants’ projection of independent and interdependent traits differed as a function of Group and Self-construal (SC).
Specifically, it was hypothesized that participants would attribute more construal- consistent traits to the ingroup than the mixed group, and more to the mixed group than the outgroup. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for the main effect of Group, χ2(2) = 53.15, p < .001, and the Trait X Group
Interaction, χ2(2) = 9.91, p = .007, therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using the
Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε=.75 and ε=.95, respectively).
As was true of the original analyses, the main effects of Trait (F(1, 123) = 17.19, p<.001, η² = .12) and Group (F(1.50, 184.98) = 60.03, p<.001, η² = .33), as well as the 68
Trait X Group interaction (F(1.90, 233.40) = 7.57, p = .001, η² = .06) were significant.
The main effect of SC (F(1, 123)=1.83, p = .18, η² = .02) and the Group X SC interaction
(F(1.50, 184.98) = 1.25, p = .28, η² = .01) were non-significant. Critically and in contrast to the data reported in Chapter 3 (section B), the hypothesized Trait X Group X SC interaction was significant, F(1.90, 233.40) = 9.83, p < .001, η² = .07. As can be seen in
Figure 10., participants with an IndSC attributed significantly more independent traits than interdependent traits to the ingroup (t(31) = 2.44, p =.02), but more interdependent than independent traits to the mixed group (t(31) = -4.60, p <.001). There was no difference in the attribution of independent and interdependent traits to the outgroup, t(31) = -.62, p =.54. Additionally, those with an IndSC attributed more independent traits to the ingroup than the mixed group (t(31) = 7.84, p <.001), and more to the mixed group than the outgroup (t(31) = 2.18, p =.04). The pattern for interdependent traits differed such that they attributed more interdependent traits to the ingroup than the outgroup
(t(31) = 3.20, p =.003), and to the mixed group than the outgroup (t(31) = 3.49, p =.002), but there was no difference in the attribution of interdependent traits between the ingroup and the mixed group (t(31) = .50, p =.62).
By contrast, participants with an InterSC attributed significantly more interdependent traits than independent traits to the ingroup (t(94) = -8.36, p <.001) and the mixed group (t(94) = -3.99, p <.001). However, there was no difference in the attribution of independent and interdependent traits to the outgroup (t(94) = -.20, p =
.841). Additionally, those with an InterSC attributed significantly more independent and interdependent traits to the ingroup than the mixed group (t(94) = 6.16, p <.001; t(94) = 69
8.10, p <.001) and more to the mixed group than the outgroup (t(94) = 2.34, p = .02; t(94)
= 4.81, p <.001). Descriptive statistics for this interaction can be seen in Table 18. This data is consistent with Hypothesis 2. As expected, participants attributed more construal- consistent traits to the ingroup than the mixed group and more to the mixed group than the outgroup. It is notable, however, that those with an IndSC and InterSC showed differences in the pattern of projection for construal-inconsistent traits. Because the projection of construal-inconsistent traits was not hypothesized it will not be discussed.
6 6
5 5
4 4
Attribution 3 3 Independent Traits Interdependent Traits 2 2 Ingroup Mixed group Outgroup Ingroup Mixed group Outgroup
Figure 10. Attribution of independent and interdependent traits by group and self- construal (as assessed during the test session)
70
Table 18
Descriptive statistics for the Trait X Group X SC Interaction
IndSC InterSC Ind Inter Ind Inter SD SD SD SD Traits Traits Traits Traits Ingroup 5.54 .82 5.25 .89 5.32 .80 5.80 .73 Mixed 4.52 .87 5.18 .79 4.67 .99 5.06 .92 group Outgroup 3.94 1.33 4.10 1.51 4.39 1.24 4.41 1.29
B. Hypothesis 2
A 2(Trait: Independent vs. Interdependent) X 2 (SC: IndSC vs. InterSC)
MANOVA was run to assess whether positivity ratings for independent and interdependent traits differed by self-construal. Specifically, it was hypothesized that construal-consistent traits would be rated more positively than construal-inconsistent traits.
As was true of the analyses reported originally, there was a significant main effect of Trait (F(1, 123) = 15.62, p < .001, η² = .11). The main effect of SC was non-significant
(F(1, 123) = 1.87, p = .17, η² = .02). Importantly, this was qualified by a significant Trait
X SC interaction (F(1, 123) = 12.21, p = .001, η² = .09). Participants with an IndSC rated independent and interdependent traits as similarly positive, t(31) = -.30, p = .77. By contrast, participants with an InterSC rated interdependent traits as significantly more positive than independent traits, t(94) = -7.25, p < .001. Descriptive statistics for this interaction can be found in Table 19. While the expected Trait X SC interaction was significant, the nature of the interaction was not as expected. Though, it closely
71
resembled that reported in Chapter 3 (section C). That is, although participants with an
InterSC did, in fact, rate interdependent traits more positively than independent traits, participants with an IndSC did not rate independent traits more positively than interdependent traits. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was only partially supported.
7
6
5 IndSC
InterSC Mean Positivity Rating Mean Positivity
4 Independent Traits Interdependent Traits
Figure 11. Positivity ratings of independent and interdependent traits by self-construal (as assessed during the test session).
Table 19
Descriptive Statistics for the Trait X SC Interaction
IndSC InterSC Mean SD Mean SD Independent Trait 5.70 .82 5.67 .82 Interdependent Trait 5.73 .96 6.19 .76
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