THE ROLES OF GROUP IDENTITY AND IDEOLOGY IN EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF

SOCIAL CONSENSUS ON WEIGHT BIAS

Amanda Gumble

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green

State University in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

August 2012

Committee:

Robert Carels, Advisor

William O’Brien

Dara Musher-Eizenman

Nancy Orel

© 2012

Amanda Gumble

All Rights Reserved iii

ABSTRACT

Robert Carels, Advisor

Weight bias is strongly influenced by multiple sources, including attributions of blame, social consensus, and ideological beliefs. Social consensus interventions have shown promise in reducing weight bias, especially when the consensus information comes from an in-group. No research has looked at the effects of social consensus when coming from an individual’s in-group based on weight status. Given that overweight and obese individuals appear to lack a strong in- group identity, it is possible that social consensus could be less effective in reducing bias for these individuals compared to normal weight individuals, who appear to possess a strong in- group identity. This study sought to determine the effects of social consensus based on weight status on both explicit and implicit weight bias for normal weight and overweight individuals.

The study also sought to determine whether Protestant work ethic and just world beliefs would moderate these effects and lessen the effects of social consensus. Participants included approximately 110 students at Bowling Green State University. The current study found an impact of social consensus feedback on positive explicit bias, as well as negative explicit bias when covariates were not controlled for. Group identification, just world beliefs, and Protestant work ethic beliefs did not moderate the relationship between social consensus feedback and explicit and implicit bias. However, individuals receiving feedback from their in-group demonstrated decreased implicit bias whereas individuals receiving feedback from their out- group demonstrated increased implicit bias. Further research is needed to learn about the impact of social consensus on explicit and implicit bias, as well as the moderators of this relationship.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I would like to thank my advisor, Robert Carels, for his continuous support throughout this project. Without his guidance, encouragement, and help, it would not have been possible to complete this dissertation. I would also like to thank my committee members,

William O’Brien, Dara Musher-Eizenman, and Nancy Orel for their support, advice, and input.

Finally, I would like to thank my friends and family for their love and support. I would especially like to thank my fiancé, Rob Quinby, for his love, support, understanding, and encouragement, all of which has been greatly appreciated during this time.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………. 1

Overview…...………………………………………………………...... 1

Assessment of Weight Bias……………...…………………………………………… 2

Sources of Weight Bias……………………………………………………………….. 2

Consequences……………...………………………………………………………….. 4

Attribution Theory………………..…………………………………………………… 5

Social Ideologies and Weight Bias……………………………………………...... 8

Social Consensus Theory and Social Identity…………………………………...... 9

Social Consensus Theory and Weight Bias……………………………...……...... 13

Current Aims……………………..……………………………………………...... 19

Hypotheses……………………………………………………………...... 19

CHAPTER II: METHODS……………………………………...………………………...... 22

Participants…………………………………………………………………………….... 22

Study Design……………………………………………………………………………. 22

Measures………………………………………………………………………………... 23

BMI………………………………………………...... …... 23

Demographic Questionnaire…….……………………………………………… 23

Obese Persons Trait Survey (OPTS)………………….………………………. 24

Implicit Associations Test (IAT)………..…………………………………… 24

Group Identification Scale……..………..…………………………………… 26

Protestant Ethic Scale………….………..…………………………………… 26 vi

Global Belief in a Just World Scale (GBJWS)………..…...………………… 27

Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale………..………………………… 27

Data Analysis…………………………………………………………………………. 28

CHAPTER III: RESULTS…………………..……………………………………………...... 30

Descriptive Statistics………………………………………………………………...... 30

Demographics………...……………………………………………………………...... 30

Pre-Test Correlations………………………….……………………………………….. 31

Hypothesis #1…………………………………………………………………………… 32

Hypothesis #2…………………………………...... 33

Hypothesis #3………………………………………………………………………...…..36

Hypothesis #4……………………………………………………………………..…….. 38

CHAPTER IV: DISCUSSION……………….…………………………………………………40

Hypothesis #1………………………………………………………………..…………...40

Hypothesis #2………………………………………………………………….……….. 42

Hypothesis #3……………………………………………………..…………………….. 45

Hypothesis #4…………………………………………………………….……………....47

Limitations and Implications…………………………………………………………….49

Future Research………………………………………………………………………….50

REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………………. 52

NOTE……………………………………………………………………………………….....…61

APPENDIX A. OPTS………………………………………………………………………….. 62

APPENDIX B. IAT……………………………………………………………………………...63

APPENDIX C. GIS……………………………………………………………………………... 64 vii

APPENDIX D. PES………………………………………………………………..………….. 65

APPENDIX E. GBJWS……………………………………………………………………….. 66

APPENDIX F. Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability Scale…………..……………………….. 67

APPENDIX G. Consensus Feedback Form #1……….……………………………………….. 68

APPENDIX H. Consensus Feedback Form #2…………………………………….………….. 72

APPENDIX I. Consensus Feedback Form #3…………………………………………..…….. 76

APPENDIX J. Post-Hoc Analyses…………..…………………………………………..…….. 80

APPENDIX K. HSRB Approval...... 83

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LIST OF FIGURES/TABLES

Figure/Table Page

1 Differences in explicit bias between time 1 and time 2 without covariates……….…... 83

2 Differences in implicit bias between time 1 and time 2 without covariates…………... 84

3 Interactions between weight status, feedback form, and bias for the

motivated/lazy trial…………………………………………………………………….. 85

4 Baseline variables……….……………………………………………….……………. 86

5 Pearson correlations among baseline variables.……...………………………………..... 87

6 Effects of weight status and feedback form on bias………...…………………………...88

7 Hierarchical regression of group identification on explicit and implicit

weight bias…………..…………………………………………………………………...89

8 Hierarchical regression of Protestant ethic beliefs on explicit and implicit

weight bias………………….…………………………………………………….……...92

9 Hierarchical regression of just world beliefs on explicit and implicit

weight bias….……………………………………………………………………………94

1

INTRODUCTION

Overview

Obese individuals are highly stigmatized in the US, and they face multiple forms of prejudice (i.e., bias), mistreatment, and discrimination. Weight bias consists of negative attitudes toward and beliefs about others because of their weight. These attitudes and beliefs often lead to the mistreatment and discrimination of obese individuals. Examples of mistreatment and discrimination are being avoided or stared at, being subjected to the negative comments of others, or being passed over for a promotion because of one’s weight (Puhl and Brownell, 2006).

Unlike other forms of discrimination, which have remained stable over the past ten years (i.e., gender, race, age, ethnicity), weight discrimination has increased. For example, between 1996 and 2006, people’s perceived weight discrimination increased from 7% to 12% (Andreyeva,

Puhl, and Brownell, 2008).

A review of the literature on weight stigma will begin by discussing multiple sources and consequences of weight bias, as well as common assessment tools for assessing weight bias.

Common theories used to explain weight bias (i.e., attribution, social ideology, social identity, and social consensus) and interventions designed to reduce weight bias will also be noted.

Finally, the role of social consensus in increasing or decreasing weight bias will be explained.

This investigation sought to determine whether the effects of social consensus information on explicit and implicit weight bias for normal and overweight individuals is differentially influenced by group identity based on weight status as well as ideological beliefs in the

Protestant work ethic and just world beliefs.

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Assessment of Weight Bias

Weight bias may be conceptualized in a number of ways and assessed using a variety of methods. Most common is the assessment of explicit attitudes. Explicit attitudes, which are commonly assessed with self-report measures, reflect attitudes of which individuals are consciously aware. In addition to strong explicit anti-fat attitudes, there is considerable evidence that most individuals possess strong implicit anti-fat attitudes. Implicit attitudes are conceptualized to be outside of individuals’ awareness and conscious control (Greenwald and

Banaji, 1995). Relative to explicit attitudes, implicit attitudes often differentially predict stigmatizing behavior toward individuals. Whereas explicit attitudes more often predict deliberative responses, such as written evaluations of individuals, implicit attitudes more often predict spontaneous and nonverbal behaviors, such as the amount of time spent looking at someone during a conversation (Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, and Howard, 1997).

Sources of Weight Bias

One of the most prevalent and surprising sources of weight bias is parents and family members. In one study, 13% of obese individuals were stigmatized by a parent, 10% by a spouse, and 9% by another family member (Puhl, Moss-Racusin, Schwartz, and Brownell, 2007).

Children experience this stigma as well, with 47% of overweight girls and 34% of overweight boys reporting weight-based teasing by family members (Puhl and Latner, 2007). Parents tend to view obese children has having low self-esteem, low self-concept, and least likely to be successful.

Overweight and obese pre-adolescents and adolescents are at an increased risk of victimization from their peers as their BMI increases (Janssen, Craig, Boyce, and Pickett, 2004).

This victimization includes verbal (e.g., being called names), physical (e.g., being hit), and 3 relational victimization (e.g., being left out of group activities), and it occurs as much as a few times a week for some individuals. Approximately 30% of girls and 24% of boys report weight- based teasing, and these rates jump to 63% of girls and 58% of boys for those with the highest

BMI (Puhl and Latner, 2007). These children are often seen as unlikeable, ugly, selfish, lazy, and stupid.

Overweight and obese children experience stigmatization and discrimination from their teachers as well as their peers. Approximately one-fifth of teachers believed that obese individuals were less likely to succeed than normal weight individuals and 50% believed that lack of self-control and psychological problems are major contributors to obesity (Puhl and

Latner, 2007). Physical education students held similar beliefs, believing that obese individuals lack willpower and having higher expectations for normal weight individuals in physical education courses.

Education of obese individuals may be affected at the college level as well. Thinner men and women are more likely to receive financial support from their parents than heavier individuals, even when taking into consideration socioeconomic status, parental education, parental income, ethnicity, family size, and other children in college, which may make it more difficult for these individuals to attend college (Crandall, 1991). It has been shown that compared to national norms, thin individuals are overrepresented and heavier individuals are underrepresented in the college population, particularly for women (Crandall, 1995).

Discrimination shown toward obese individuals in the workplace may be stronger than other biases such as gender (Roehling, 1999). An increasing number of employers are not hiring or are firing overweight individuals through justifications such as higher health costs and worker’s compensation claims (Puhl and Townsend, 1995). Over 30% of overweight people 4 have said that they have been denied promotions or raises (McEvoy, 1994). Also, normal weight individuals show the most desire to work with thin individuals and the least desire to work with obese individuals (Klassen, Jasper, and Harris, 1993). They often see obese individuals as disagreeable, not emotionally well adjusted, lazy, less conscientious, less competent, sloppy, less healthy, less likely to work well with others, lacking self-discipline, and more likely to be absent

(Roehling, 1999).

This stigmatization also occurs in the health care setting. Health care professionals specializing in obesity demonstrated explicit beliefs that obese individuals are lazier and less motivated than thin individuals (Teachman and Brownell, 2001). They also demonstrated implicit beliefs that obese individuals are bad and lazy. These attitudes and beliefs can deter obese individuals from seeking health care treatment (Drury and Louis, 2002). For example, obese women were significantly more likely than normal weight individuals to delay clinical breast examinations, gynecological examinations, and Pap smear testing, all of which are important preventive health care measures (Fontaine, Faith, Allison, Lawrence, and Cheskin,

1998).

Obese individuals themselves also exhibit a strong anti-fat bias. When given the Implicit

Association Test (IAT), these individuals answered more items correctly when ‘fat people’ and

‘bad’ were associated than when ‘fat people’ and ‘good’ were associated, demonstrating negative biases toward obese individuals (Wang, Brownell, and Wadden, 2004). When explicit measures are given as well, individuals evidence weight bias, albeit at lower levels.

Consequences

Because of the great amount of weight stigmatization, obese individuals suffer a number of psychological consequences. These individuals often see themselves as fat, ugly, and 5 unattractive and experience embarrassment, anger, and frustration over their weight (Boyd,

1990). They tend to engage in ineffective dieting practices and believe that their weight controls their happiness. Overweight and obese children have higher levels of body dissatisfaction than normal weight individuals (Puhl and Latner, 2007). They are rejected more by their peers, suffer greater isolation, and are more dissatisfied with their dating status. They have a significantly lower quality of life that is comparable to that of children with cancer and also have greater suicidal ideation.

Obesity stigmatization may have important social and economic consequences.

Overweight adolescent and young adult women, ages 16-24, completed fewer years of school, were less likely to be married, had lower household incomes, and had higher rates of poverty than normal weight women after controlling for socioeconomic status and aptitude-test scores

(Gortmaker, Must, Perrin, Sobol, and Dietz, 1993). Overweight men were also less likely to be married than normal weight men. In contrast, individuals with chronic illness (e.g., diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis, sickle cell anemia) did not suffer these effects, indicating discrimination against obesity but not chronic illness.

Attribution Theory

There are several theories that attempt to explain the existence of weight bias and its prevalence in society today. One of the most widely used theories in the explanation of weight bias is attribution theory, which states that individuals make judgments about the causes of outcomes, and these judgments lead to different evaluations of people (Heider, 1958). One type of attribution that has significantly and consistently been associated with prejudice across a range of areas, such as alcohol dependence, HIV/AIDS, mental illness, and sexual orientation, is controllability (Brownell, Puhl, Schwartz, and Rudd, 2005). The more that a person is 6 considered to be in control of their negative outcomes, the more they are judged harshly, and the more discrimination and stigmatization that they experience.

It is a common belief that being overweight is due to a lack of self-discipline and control over one’s behaviors, despite significant evidence that obesity is determined by both biological and environmental factors. Researchers propose that these beliefs about controllability have led to the negative attitudes and opinions toward overweight and obese individuals who are viewed as being impulsive and irresponsible (Brownell et al., 2005; Puhl and Brownell, 2003). For example, Crandall (1994) found that individuals who scored high on a scale of Willpower, indicating beliefs that weight is under a person’s control, also scored higher on a scale of Dislike, indicating negative attitudes toward overweight and obese individuals. It is important to note that some researchers suggest that it is not the attributions per say, but rather the social ideologies (discussed in greater detail below) that frame the problem, thus contributing to attributions of personal responsibility.

Interventions to reduce weight bias based on attribution theory have had mixed results.

Some studies have focused on providing individuals with information about the biological and medical causes of obesity with the goal of reducing blame placed on overweight individuals. For example, providing information about the medical causes of obesity led third through sixth grade children to assign fewer faults to obese children. However, the information had no effect on the willingness of younger children to share activities with obese peers, and it actually decreased willingness for older children (Bell and Morgan, 2000). This effect has been found for adults as well. Individuals who were told that obesity was primarily due to genetics demonstrated no less explicit and implicit bias than individuals who were not given that information (Teachman,

Gapinski, Brownell, Rawlins, and Jeyaram, 2003). At the same time, bias actually increased for 7 individuals who were told that obesity was primarily due to behavior, providing evidence for the ease of increasing bias and the difficulty of decreasing bias.

In contrast, Crandall (1994) found that individuals who were persuaded that weight is due to metabolism and genetics showed less dislike toward overweight individuals than people who did not receive this information. In another study, individuals expressed negative attitudes toward obese people when the obesity could not be attributed to a medical condition, but these negative attitudes were not present when obesity was attributed to a glandular disorder (DeJong,

1980; DeJong, 1993). However, participants’ changed attitudes were directed toward the individuals presented in the study, and the possibility exists that anti-fat bias would still exist toward other obese individuals with whom the causes of obesity were unknown.

One educational intervention also based on attribution theory was shown to be effective in reducing bias in medical students (Wiese, Wilson, Jones, and Neises, 1992). This intervention consisted of a videotaped interview with an obese person discussing her difficulties with obesity and medical staff, educational materials on the genetic and environmental components of obesity, and role-playing activities. Students who completed the intervention were more likely to focus on the genetic causes of obesity and less likely to endorse negative stereotypes of obese individuals at the end of the intervention and one year later.

Another study focused on influencing attributions of controllability by increasing empathy. The authors hypothesized that increasing empathy for obese individuals would result in diminished beliefs about the controllability of weight (Teachman et al, 2003). Participants read a first-person account of an obese woman experiencing prejudice and social rejection, and they then engaged in a writing exercise to express their feelings about the account. No reduction in weight bias was found after this exercise. 8

Social Ideologies and Weight Bias

In the case of weight bias, some researchers have suggested that weight bias is due to social ideologies that reflect societal values, such as the Protestant work ethic and just world beliefs, which emphasize the importance of control, self-discipline, and responsibility and focus on the idea that people get what they deserve in life (Crandall, 1994). Several research studies support these ideas, providing evidence for the association between the belief in the Protestant work ethic, just world beliefs, and greater weight bias. Crandall found that conservative politics, beliefs in a just world, poverty control, Protestant work ethic, modern racism, authoritarianism, and being a Republican were all associated with greater dislike toward overweight individuals

(1994). Other studies have replicated these findings. For example, among overweight/obese weight loss participants, individuals who demonstrated greater just world beliefs evidenced greater implicit and negative explicit weight bias (Carels, Young, Wott, Harper, Gumble, Hobbs, and Clayton, 2009). Those who demonstrated greater beliefs in the Protestant work ethic also evidenced greater negative explicit weight bias. In one study, authoritarianism and political conservatism predicted negative attitudes toward obese individuals (Crandall and Biernat, 1990), while in another, just world beliefs and authoritarianism predicted dislike toward overweight individuals through ratings on a social distance scale and rejection of mock teachers pretending to be applying for jobs (Crandall and Cohen, 1994). Crandall even found that parents provided less financial support for overweight than thin daughters, and the best predictor of this differential treatment was parental attitudes about responsibility for one’s own outcomes (1991;

1995). While social ideologies are often silent on why one group is maligned over another, they nevertheless reveal the mechanism by which certain maligned groups are blamed.

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Social Consensus Theory and Social Identity

Another prominent theory that has been used to explain weight bias is social consensus theory. Social consensus theory finds its roots in theories examining the ways in which stereotypes and prejudice are developed and changed (Sechrist and Stangor, 2001). Original researchers on this topic theorized that stereotypes and prejudice developed from direct observations and interactions with the targeted group. Although some research supported this theory, other research found stereotypes and prejudiced formed in the absence of (or minimal) contact with the stigmatized group. For example, Katz and Braly found great uniformity in stereotypes despite lack of exposure to the stereotyped groups (1933). Further research was conducted, providing evidence that attitudes and stereotypes are more influenced by others’ perceptions and attitudes than direct contact with stigmatized groups (Festinger, 1954; Gibbons,

Gerrard, Lando, and McGovern, 1991; Goethals and Darley, 1977; Lewin, 1952; Orive, 1988).

Therefore, social consensus theory was derived to account for instances of prejudice and discrimination that were evident despite minimal contact with targeted groups.

Broadly speaking, social consensus theory states that individuals’ expression and endorsement of beliefs and attitudes are influenced by the perception of others’ beliefs and attitudes (Puhl and Brownell, 2003). This social influence can be either informational or normative (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955). Informational social influence occurs when individuals look to others for information and cues on how to act, think, or feel due to doubt or uncertainty of what the correct behavior, thought, or emotion should be. In contrast, normative social influence occurs when individuals adapt the thoughts and behaviors of others out of the desire to be liked and accepted. By sharing opinions with others, whether these opinions are negative or positive, individuals gain acceptance, attention, and support from others (Puhl, Schwartz, and 10

Brownell, 2005). They are also likely to gain more confidence in their opinions and attitudes the more that others support these opinions and attitudes.

Social consensus theory also states that individuals’ attitudes are likely to be the most influenced when feedback that they receive comes from other members of their in-group, a social group with which a person identifies and values (Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, and Turner, 1999;

Haslam, Turner, Oakes, Reynolds, Eggins, Nolan, and Tweedie, 1998; Puhl et al, 2005).

According to Tajfel’s social identity theory, an in-group is defined by three components: cognitive, evaluative, and emotional (1978). The cognitive component involves knowing that one belongs to a group because of a certain trait or characteristic that one possesses. For example, an African-American who possesses this cognitive component would have the cognitive knowledge that they are African-American and therefore belong to a group consisting of African-Americans. The evaluative part involves the extent to which someone values their membership in the group, with positive evaluation indicating greater identification with the group. For an African-American, this evaluative component might involve believing that one’s race is an important part of one’s life. Lastly, the emotional part involves the positive or negative emotions that someone experiences because of their membership in the group, with more positive feelings again indicating greater identification. For example, an African-American might feel proud about being part of that in-group. These three components of awareness, value, and emotional significance of membership in an in-group make up part of an individual’s self- concept.

Despite Tajfel’s original definition of social identity, researchers have conceptualized and operationalized the construct of social identity in many different ways, resulting in extremely mixed results regarding the impact of social identity on variables, such as bias, self-esteem, and 11 cooperation (Jackson and Smith, 1999). For example, some researchers have disagreed on the three-dimensional structure of social identity. Karasawa described social identity as two- dimensional, consisting of the components of member and group (1991), whereas Luhtanen and

Crocker described social identity as four-dimensional, consisting of membership, private, public, and identity (1992). While other researchers have agreed on the three-dimensional structure, they have not always agreed on what these dimensions are. Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone, and

Crook retained the cognitive and emotional components but replaced the evaluative component with individual-group opposition (1989). Although Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade, and

Williams retained all of Tajfel’s components, they measured social identity using a unidimensional scale (1986).

More recent research has provided increased support for a three-dimensional view of social identity (Deaux, 1996; Ellemers, Kortekaas, and Ouwerkerk, 1999; Jackson, 2002;

Cameron, 2004). The structure receiving the most statistical support is that of Cameron (2004), who defines social identity as consisting of cognitive centrality, in-group affect, and in-group ties. Cognitive centrality is defined as how often group membership comes to mind, as well as subjective importance of group membership to the individual. In-group affect consists of emotions that are experienced as a result of group membership. In-group ties is defined as the extent to which a person feels stuck with or part of their group, as well as perceived similarities with group members. This specific three-dimensional structure has been supported in studies of community and social identification (Obst, Zinkiewicz, and Smith, 2002), gender and race identification (Boatswain and Lalonde, 2000; Cameron and Lalonde, 2001; Obst and White,

2005), and identification with particular interest groups (Obst and White, 2005). 12

Only a few studies have examined the formation and alteration of stereotypes based on social consensus theory. The few studies that exist have demonstrated that others’ stereotypic beliefs influence one’s own beliefs. In a study by Wittenbrink and Henly, response scales were altered to reflect either more negative or positive views of African Americans (1996). For example, one question included “Out of 100 black males between the age of 16 and 24, how many do you think have spent time in prison?” In the positive response condition, options included less than one, 1-3, 4-6, 7-9, and 10 or more. In the negative response condition, options included less than 30, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, and 45 or more. All participants had similar initial beliefs about African Americans. The scale manipulations led to higher scores on the Modern

Racism scale for those who were given negative feedback and lower scores on the Modern

Racism Scale for those who were given positive feedback. While alternative explanations are plausible (i.e., participants believed the response options provided accurate information on trait prevalence), the authors argue that these results provide evidence that people rely on information provided from others to evaluate their own stereotypic beliefs. In the same study, after completing the questionnaires with the scale manipulations, participants were given a vignette about an African American defendant in a mock jury trial. Individuals in the negative feedback condition were more confident about the defendant’s guilt, gave a sentence that was on average eight months longer, and reported a significantly more negative impression of the defendant than individuals in the positive feedback condition.

Stangor, Sechrist, and Jost’s study examined the impact of social consensus on racial beliefs as well (2001). Participants were first asked to estimate the percentage of African

Americans who possess a number of different stereotypical traits. One week later, they received feedback supposedly documenting the average ratings provided by other students on their college 13 campus. In reality, an average of twenty points had either been added or subtracted to the participants’ initial scores, creating both positive and negative feedback conditions. The researchers found that when participants were led to believe that others held more favorable attitudes toward African Americans than themselves, their endorsement of negative stereotypes decreased and their endorsement of positive stereotypes increased. Second, they found that ratings of African Americans were significantly more positive when favorable feedback was provided by an in-group (a social group with whom one identifies and values) compared to an out-group. Third, they found that beliefs were more resistant to change when participants believed that their own beliefs were shared by others.

Social Consensus Theory and Weight Bias

Social consensus theory appears to play an important role in the perpetuation of weight stigmatization. A study conducted by Puhl, Schwartz, and Brownell included sixty undergraduate students enrolled in introductory psychology courses at Yale University (2005).

These participants were told that they were participating in a study that examined the perceptions of different social groups. At the fist session, participants completed the Obese Persons Trait

Survey (OPTS). This measure has participants rate the percentage of obese people they believe possess ten positive and ten negative stereotypical traits. Participants also completed the Beliefs about Obese Persons Scale (BAOP), in which individuals rated how much they agree or disagree with statements about the causes of obesity. At a second session a week later, participants were given feedback supposedly documenting the average ratings of other students. In reality, the feedback for each student was constructed based on each student’s own responses. In the positive feedback condition, an average of twenty points was added to the person’s score for the positive scale and subtracted from the negative scale. In the negative feedback condition, an 14 average of twenty points was subtracted from the positive scale and added to the negative scale.

Participants then completed the OPTS and BAOP a second time. The results showed that individuals who received positive consensus feedback increased their endorsement of positive traits and decreased their endorsement of negative traits. They also increased their scores on the

BAOP, indicating greater beliefs that obesity is not under personal control.

The same researchers conducted a second experiment that was identical to the previous study except for a few manipulations. First, participants were told that the feedback had either come from an in-group (Ivy League students) or an out-group (community college students).

Second, given that negative feedback had no impact in the first study, and due to concerns about increasing negative attitudes, only positive feedback was provided. Last, although the OPTS was used at the first session, a different outcome measure was used, and students reported to a different location with a different experiment, in order to ensure that participants believed that the two sessions were unrelated. At the second session, participants completed a survey that asked them to make judgments and report their feelings towards five different, often stigmatized, groups, including gay men and lesbians, senior citizens, African Americans, obese individuals, and Mexican Americans. Only ratings toward obese individuals were analyzed, and the other groups were included to mask the purpose of the study. The results found that individuals who received feedback from the in-group had more positive feeling ratings toward obese individuals than individuals who received feedback from the out-group.

In a third study by Puhl, Schwartz, and Brownell, receiving consensus feedback from an in-group was compared to four other types of feedback. These included: 1) information purportedly documenting the true prevalence of traits of obese people based on research, 2) information about the genetic and biological causes of obesity, 3) information about causes of 15 obesity that are under person control such as overeating and lack of exercise, and 4) a control group that received no information. Participants completed the BAOP at each time point. For both the social consensus and trait prevalence conditions, positive ratings increased while negative ratings decreased. The other three conditions were unsuccessful in increasing positive ratings, although the uncontrollable causes condition decreased negative ratings.

These findings are promising in the role that social consensus specifically that of an in- group could play in reducing weight bias compared to other bias reduction interventions.

However, further research on social consensus and weight bias is needed. For instance, no previous research has looked at whether in-groups other than the college population that individuals belong to have the same impact on weight bias, especially one’s in-group in regards to weight (i.e., normal weight or overweight). Social identity theory states that belonging to an in-group consists of cognitions that one belongs to the group, either negative or positive evaluations of this group, and emotional reactions that accompany these cognitions and evaluations (Tajfel, 1978). This theory also states that individuals will remain in or seek out groups that promote a positive social identity or try to leave groups that do not promote a positive social identity. If difficulties exist in leaving the group, individuals will either reframe their perspective to view the group in a positive light, or the person will accept that the group promotes a negative identity and engage in behavior aimed at leaving the group despite the difficulties that are present.

Research has demonstrated that overweight and obese individuals are members of a group that is unlikely to result in positive experiences, and there is little evidence that the group is working to establish positive aspects of its social identity. It is possible that receiving continuous negative messages related to their size makes it particularly difficult for obese 16 individuals to develop a positive social identity. Therefore, individuals would normally leave the group to join one that promotes a positive identity. However, as research suggests, despite being perceived as a controllable condition, it is often extremely difficult for overweight and obese individuals to lose weight. Therefore, leaving the obese group and joining the normal weight group which has a positive identity is not an option for many obese individuals. While overweight and obese individuals would typically attempt to reinterpret the attributes of the group so that they are justified or acceptable, there is little evidence that obese individuals see their attributes as justifiable or even acceptable. As indicated earlier, overweight and obese individuals’ evidence a strong anti-fat bias. Again, perhaps, because most people view weight as controllable, they view their membership in the group as temporary. This may account for group members’ constant attempts to lose weight in an attempt to leave the in-group despite tremendous difficulties in doing so.

These considerations raise an important issue of whether obese individuals identify with being obese or whether they actually see themselves as normal weight (albeit with a highly reversible and unpleasant condition). Some research evidence suggests that obese individuals may not always view themselves as obese. For example, Grover, Keel, and Mitchell (2003) found that although overweight men explicitly evaluated themselves as overweight, they implicitly identified themselves as normal weight. In contrast, overweight women both explicitly and implicitly identified themselves as overweight. However, in a study of college students, normal weight and overweight men and women all had weight identities that were congruent with their actual weights (Gumble & Carels, 2012).

Although these studies demonstrated that most individuals accurately identify the weight category that they belong to, this identification seems to have been purely cognitive with the 17 studies not addressing the affect component and ingroup ties. No studies have looked at whether individuals identify with the overweight group on all three dimensions of social identity (i.e., cognitive centrality, ingroup affect, ingroup ties). Although these components of social identity have not been directly assessed among overweight individuals, it seems that overweight individuals devalue their group membership and experience a myriad of negative emotions regarding their membership, given the extent of weight bias and internalized weight bias among members of this group (Durso and Latner, 2008). These negative emotions seem to be directed toward both members of their ingroup (i.e., other overweight individuals), as well as themselves.

Therefore, it is possible that social consensus information from normal weight individuals may have a greater effect on the attitudes of normal weight individuals, who most likely identify with all three components of social identity, than consensus information from overweight individuals on the attitudes of overweight individuals who seem to either identify with their in-group only through cognitive centrality or not identify with their in-group at all. If overweight individuals are less affected by the opinions of their own in-group, it may further indicate a lack of cohesion among overweight individuals. Low in-group cohesion would likely prevent future attempts to empower their group or fight against the discrimination that they experience. It may also suggest greater difficulties in reducing weight bias among overweight individuals using in-group feedback and experiences.

In addition, previous studies have not examined the effects of social consensus on implicit weight bias. Given that explicit and implicit attitudes are qualitatively distinct and often uncorrelated, it is possible that social consensus may affect implicit attitudes differently than explicit attitudes. Research shows that implicit attitudes are developed through past experiences and that knowledge about the impact of these experiences on attitudes is unconscious 18

(Greenwald and Banaji, 1995). Although individuals may be unaware of these past experiences, the effects of these experiences continue to operate on attitudes and behaviors. In contrast, explicit attitudes appear more open to evaluation and criticism given their conscious nature.

Because of this, it seems likely that implicit attitudes would be more resistant to change in response to social consensus feedback than explicit attitudes.

Recent research has shown that the most effective way of changing implicit attitudes may be through exposure to counter-stereotypic portrayals of members of a stigmatized group, leading to modifications in assumed characteristics of these groups (Conrey, Sherman, Gaw- ronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). For example, people exposed to well-known positive African-American figures (e.g., Martin Luther King) and well- known negative White figures (e.g., Al Capone) demonstrated less implicit bias toward African-

Americans one week later (Dasgupta and Greenwald, 2001). However, social consensus interventions attempt to alter beliefs of others about a stigmatized group rather than direct counter-stereotypic portrayals of stigmatized members. Given this information, as well as the unconscious nature of implicit attitudes, it seems that a social consensus intervention would have a greater influence on explicit attitudes than implicit attitudes.

Beyond social consensus, despite the strong evidence that social ideologies play in prejudice and discrimination, including anti-fat attitudes, no research has looked at whether social ideologies such as just world beliefs and the Protestant work ethic potentially moderate the relationship between social consensus and weight bias. Weight bias is formed in a number of ways, such as messages received from the media, lack of exposure to the stigmatized group, beliefs inherited from family and friends, and social ideologies. Weight bias may be more resistant to change when it is reinforced by social ideologies such as the Protestant work ethic 19 and just world beliefs. Given that these beliefs make up individuals’ worldviews, people tend to be committed to them, and when challenges to these beliefs occur, individuals create explanations to justify and maintain their worldviews, which results in further rejection and discrimination of others (Puhl and Brownell, 2003). Due to the stability of these beliefs, it is possible that individuals with beliefs in a just world and the Protestant work ethic are less influenced by stigma-reduction interventions compared to individuals who may discriminate for other reasons, such as a lack of contact with the stigmatized group. Therefore, it seems likely that individuals with strong beliefs in a just world and Protestant work ethic will show a lesser reduction in weight bias after receiving social consensus compared to those without these ideological beliefs.

Current Aims

The present study sought to examine potential moderators of social consensus feedback on weight bias. First, the study sought to examine whether receiving favorable feedback from one’s in-group based on weight status would decrease explicit and implicit weight bias more than receiving favorable feedback from an out-group based on weight status or a control group that received feedback from the general population. Second, the study sought to determine whether strong versus weak in-group weight identity would moderate the impact of consensus feedback on attitude change. Finally, the study sought to examine whether personal social ideologies, such as beliefs in a just world and the Protestant ethic, would moderate the effects of social consensus feedback on changes in explicit and implicit weight bias.

Hypotheses

1) In previous research, individuals who received feedback that others had more

favorable opinions toward obese people than themselves increased their endorsement 20

of positive traits, decreased their endorsement of negative traits toward obese

individuals, and increased agreement that obesity is not under personal control (Puhl,

Schwartz, and Brownell, 2005). Therefore, it was hypothesized that individuals

receiving favorable consensus feedback would increase their endorsement of positive

traits and decrease their endorsement of negative traits toward obese individuals.

Because of the unconscious nature of implicit attitudes, it was hypothesized that

social consensus feedback would be less effective in influencing implicit attitudes

compared to explicit attitudes.

2) Favorable feedback had an even greater impact when it was believed that it came

from an in-group (i.e., Ivy League students) rather than an out-group (i.e., community

college students; Puhl, Schwartz, and Brownell, 2005). Therefore, it was

hypothesized that both normal weight and overweight individuals receiving feedback

from their respective in-group based on weight would show greater increased

endorsement of positive traits and decreased endorsement of negative traits than

normal weight and overweight individuals receiving feedback from their out-group

based on weight or the general population. Again, it was hypothesized that social

consensus feedback would be less effective in influencing implicit attitudes than

explicit attitudes.

3) Research has shown that obese individuals may not have a strong in-group identity

(Grover et al. 2003). Therefore, it was hypothesized that overweight individuals

would evidence weaker in-group social identity than normal weight individuals.

Nevertheless, it was hypothesized that social consensus would have a greater impact 21

on normal and overweight individuals with a stronger in-group weight identity

compared to individuals with a weaker in-group weight identity.

4) Previous research has shown a significant association between beliefs in a just world,

the Protestant work ethic and greater weight bias (Crandall, 1991; Crandall, 1995;

Crandall and Biernat, 1990). Therefore, it was hypothesized that beliefs in a just

world and the Protestant work ethic would moderate the relationship between social

consensus and weight bias. Specifically, favorable consensus feedback would be less

effective in reducing explicit and implicit weight bias for individuals with greater

beliefs in a just world and the Protestant work ethic.

100

80

60 Strong Ideology

40 Weak Ideology 20

0 Baseline Post-Feedback

22

METHODS

Participants

Participants included 110 students enrolled in courses at Bowling Green State University.

One-hundred and two students were necessary to detect a moderate effect size using a two-tailed test, a power of 0.95, and an alpha of 0.05 for a 2 (participant normal weight, participant overweight) X 3 (normal weight, overweight, no identified weight) X 2 (pre-test, post-test) between and within subjects ANOVA. Eligible students were either normal weight (BMI between 18 and 26.9 kg/m2) or overweight (BMI greater than or equal to 27 kg/m2). Informed consent was obtained from participants before they began the study, and participants received either extra credit or $10 for their participation.

Fifty-nine participants (53%) were normal weight and fifty-one participants (46%) were overweight. BMI ranged from 18.6 to 49.5 with a mean of 27.2 (SD = 6.2). Thirty-six (33%) participants were male and seventy-four (67%) were female. Participants’ mean age was 20.8

(SD = 5.1). Thirty-four (31%) participants were freshman, twenty-nine (26%) were sophomores, eighteen (16%) were juniors, seventeen (15%) were seniors, five (5%) were fifth year students, and five (5%) were graduate students. Eighty-one (74%) participants were Caucasian and 29 were non-Caucasian (26%). Fifty-four individuals (49%) were single, twelve (11%) participants were dating, forty (36%) were in a relationship, and four (4%) were married or living with a partner.

Study Design

Participants were run in groups of 2-8 individuals and were told that the study examined perceptions of different social groups. At the first session, participants filled out the questionnaires and completed the IAT, and the order of the measures was counterbalanced. One 23 week later, participants returned for a second session. At the second session, participants were given surveys documenting the supposed beliefs of other people who had completed the same survey. For the in-group and out-group conditions, participants were told that the results were from a group of either normal weight or overweight college students, depending on the group to which the participant was randomized. In-group and out-group weight status was determined by participants’ subjective weight identity, assessed through the multiple choice question, “Would you consider yourself: a) underweight, b) normal weight, c) overweight, or d) obese.” For the control condition, participants were told that the results were from a sample of the general population. Participants were then given information supposedly documenting the average ratings of either their in-group or out-group, or the general population, who believed that overweight/obese people possess certain positive and negative traits. Each participant received unique feedback based on the participant’s own original ratings. An average of 20 points was added to positive ratings and subtracted from negative ratings. After receiving the feedback, participants then completed the questionnaires and IAT for a second time. Their height and weight was also assessed, and they were then debriefed about the study.

Measures

BMI. Body weight was assessed using a digital scale (BF-350e; Tanita, Arlington

Heights, IL) to the closest 0.1 lb, and height was measured in inches to the closest 0.5 inch using a standard balance beam scale height rod. Height and weight were converted to kilograms and meters to calculate BMI (kg/m2).

Demographic questionnaire. Participants completed a basic questionnaire assessing age, gender, race, year in school, relationship status, height, weight, and perceived weight status. 24

Obese Persons Trait Survey (OPTS). The OPTS is designed to measure explicit attitudes toward obese individuals (Puhl, Schwartz, and Brownell, 2005). The measure consists of 20 items listing stereotypical traits, 20 of which are negative (e.g., lazy, undisciplined) and 20 of which are positive (e.g., honest, generous). Individuals are asked to estimate the percentage of obese persons who possess each of these traits. Higher scores on each subscale indicate stronger negative and positive traits. The scale has been found to be reliable for both subscales with an alpha of 0.83 for the positive subscale and 0.73 for the negative subscale. In the current study,

Cronbach’s alpha was 0.86 for the positive subscale and 0.89 for the negative subscale. The scale is based on a racial trait survey developed by Stangor et al. (2001) and has an identical format to this scale. A list of 42 traits was originally pilot tested on a group of college students, who were asked to identify ten positive traits and ten negative traits that best represented obese individuals. These traits were the ones chosen for the final version of the OPTS.

Implicit Associations Test (IAT). The IAT is a widely used measure of implicit attitudes in which participants are expected to categorize stimuli more quickly when the categories are paired in a way that is consistent with their conceptions of the categories (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz, 1998). Each trial consists of four categories in which two categories are placed on the top left side of the computer screen and two categories are placed on the top right side.

Participants begin with a practice trial which consists of the four categories good, bad, flower, and insect. During the first part of the task, good and flower are paired together on one side of the screen and bad and insect are paired together on the other side. Attribute words then appear in the middle of the screen, and participants are asked to press one key if the attribute word is synonymous with good or flower and another key if the attribute word is synonymous with bad or insect. During the second part of the task, the categories are switched so that good and insect 25 are paired together and bad and flower are paired together. The mean response time for the participant is then calculated for each trial.

The strength of a participant’s implicit association is measured by the difference between mean response times for the two parts of the task. Following the practice trial, new categories are presented to the participants. The two pairs of categories are paired once in a way that matches stereotypical attitudes and again in a way that does not match stereotypical attitudes.

Participants are then asked again to categorize attribute words into the respective categories.

Participants are expected to categorize the attribute words more quickly and accurately when the categories are paired in a way that matches their implicit attitudes. Two trials were presented to participants in this study. For measurement of weight bias, participants were first asked to categorize attribute words into the categories of good/thin and bad/fat followed by good/fat and bad/thin. Participants were then asked to categorize attribute words into the categories of motivated/thin and lazy/fat followed by motivated/fat and lazy/thin.

The IAT has shown acceptable reliability across formats with an average internal consistency of 0.79 across fifty studies (Lane, Banaji, Nosek, and Greenwald, 2007). Test-retest reliability has been somewhat weaker with a mean and median test-retest reliability of .50 across

20 studies with higher reliability evidenced with improved scoring algorithms. The research on the convergent validity of the IAT has been mixed with some studies showing correlations with priming tasks and other studies showing no correlations with priming tasks. However, correlations appear to be more likely when reliability is taken into consideration. The research on the discriminant validity of the IAT has also been mixed with some studies showing correlations between conceptually distinct IATs and other studies showing no correlation between divergent IATs. The IAT has demonstrated acceptable criterion validity with its ability 26 to distinguish between members of different groups and to predict differences in individual behaviors and judgments. It should be noted that different studies often use different formats of the IAT, and IATs intended to measure the same construct may have multiple different formats.

Therefore, reliability and validity may vary across formats and makes it more difficult to determine overall reliability and validity of the measure.

Group Identification Scale (GIS). This Group Identification Scale consists of twelve items in a seven-point Likert response question format, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7

(strongly agree; Cameron, 2004). Four items assess cognitive centrality, another four assess ingroup affect, and the last four assess ingroup ties. Scores are averaged across all three dimensions to form one measurement of social identity with higher scores indicating a stronger social identity. Internal reliability is adequate to good with alpha coefficients ranging from .83 to .91 for the total scale, .75 to .85 for cognitive centrality, .70 to .82 for ingroup affect, and .78 to .87 for ingroup ties (Obst and White, 2005). In the current study, Cronbach’s alpha was 0.75 for the total scale, 0.72 for cognitive centrality, 0.92 for ingroup affect, and 0.79 for ingroup ties.

All three factors have shown strong correlations with the total scale, ranging from .60 to .88.

Confirmatory factor analysis has demonstrated adequate construct validity for the scale with a three-factor model providing a better fit for the data than both one- and two-factor models. In one study, all items loaded at .50 or above. In two other studies, only two items loaded below

.50 with factor loadings for these two items ranging from .41 to .48.

Protestant Ethic Scale (PES). This scale consists of nineteen items in a six-point Likert response question format that measure the extent to which individuals believe that hard work and responsibility lead to positive outcomes (Mirels and Garrett, 1971). Higher scores indicate greater beliefs that hard work is valuable in being successful. The scale has evidenced 27 acceptable reliability and validity. The reliability coefficient found during the development of the scale was found to be .79, whereas other studies have shown coefficients ranging from .54 to

.75 (Waters and Zakrajsek, 1991). In the current study, Cronbach’s alpha was 0.74. The scale is significantly correlated with several subscales of the of the Survey of Work Values scale with correlations ranging from .29 to .42. The scale is also significantly correlated with the pro-

Protestant Ethic Scale (Blood, 1969), another scale measuring beliefs in the Protestant work ethic, with a correlation of .60.

Global Belief in a Just World Scale (GBJWS). This scale consists of seven items in a six- point Likert response question format that measure the extent to which individuals believe that individuals get what they deserve in life (Lipkus, 1991). Higher scores indicate greater beliefs in a just world. The scale has evidenced good reliability and validity (O’Connor, Morrison, and

Morrison, 1996). Cronbach’s alpha has ranged from .79 to .81 and factor loadings have ranged from .51 to .85. In the current study, Cronbach’s alpha was 0.83. Compared to other just world scales (e.g. Just World Scale, Just World Scale Revised) with alphas ranging from .64 to .68, the

GBJWS has one of the highest internal consistency reliabilities.

Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. This scale consists of 33 items in a true-false format measuring socially desirable response tendencies and the effects of these tendencies on responses to other measures of the study (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960). Higher scores indicate greater social desirability. The scale has shown acceptable reliability and validity with an internal consistency coefficient of .88, a test-retest correlation of .89, and a correlation of .35 with the Edwards Social Desirability Scale. In the current study, Cronbach’s alpha was 0.78.

Although it is not a main focus of the current study, social desirability was assessed for all 28 participants to determine whether it influences the variables of interest and control for it if need be.

Data Analysis

T-tests, one-way ANOVA, and correlation analyses were used to compare individuals’ explicit bias, implicit bias, Protestant work ethic beliefs, and just world beliefs on age, race, gender, year in school, and relationship status. Correlational analyses were also used to determine associations among explicit and implicit weight bias, Protestant work ethic beliefs, and just world beliefs.

For the first hypothesis, t-tests were used to test the hypothesis that favorable consensus would increase endorsement of positive traits, decrease endorsement of negative traits, and decrease implicit bias.

For the second hypothesis, a 2 (normal weight, overweight) X 3 (normal weight, overweight, no identified weight) X 2 (pre-test, post-test) repeated measures ANOVA was used to test the hypothesis that individuals receiving feedback from their respective in-group based on weight status would show greater increased endorsement of positive traits, decreased endorsement of negative traits, and decreased implicit weight bias than individuals receiving feedback from their out-group based on weight or the general population.

For the third hypothesis, a t-test was used to test the hypothesis that overweight individuals would evidence weaker in-group social identity than normal weight individuals.

Hierarchical regression was used to determine the effects of favorable consensus feedback and group identity on explicit and implicit weight bias.

For the fourth hypothesis, hierarchical regression was used to determine the effects of favorable consensus feedback and just world beliefs on explicit and implicit weight bias. 29

Hierarchical regression was also used to determine the effects of favorable consensus feedback and the Protestant work ethic on explicit and implicit weight bias.

30

RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

Mean scores were 62.0% (SD = 11.9) for positive explicit bias and 57.5% (SD = 15.9) for negative explicit bias at pre-test, indicating that participants estimated that obese individuals possess about as many negative traits as positive traits (Table 1). Mean group identification was

4.5 (SD = 1.0), indicating moderate levels of identification given a possible range of 1 to 7 and means ranging from 4.01 to 5.41 in previous studies (Cameron, 2004). The mean score for the

Protestant ethic scale was 74.9 (SD = 10.3), indicating relatively weaker beliefs in the Protestant work ethic with a possible score of 114 and normative data indicating means of 85.5 to 85.7

(Mirels & Garrett, 1971). The mean score for the Global Belief in a Just World Scale was 21.7

(SD = 6.1), indicating moderate belief in a just world with a possible score of 42 and a normative mean of 23.83 (Lipkus, 1991). Mean social desirability was 15.9 (SD = 5.3), indicating average social desirability with a possible score of 33 and a normative mean of 13.72 (Crowne &

Marlow, 1960). Mean scores for implicit measures at pre-test were -0.36 (SD = 0.43) for the good/bad trial and 0.27 (SD = 0.46) for the motivated/lazy trial. Mean scores for implicit measures at post-test were -0.28 (SD = 0.42) for the good/bad trial and 0.21 (SD = 0.40) for the motivated/lazy trial. Negative scores for the good/bad trials and positive scores for the motivated/lazy trials indicate greater negative bias toward overweight people. Scores have ranged from .07 to .49 above and below zero in previous studies (Lane et al., 2007).

Demographics

ANOVA, t-tests, and correlation analyses were used to examine the association between individuals’ BMI, explicit and implicit weight bias, protestant ethic, global belief in a just world, and group identification, and the demographic variables of age, gender, race, relationship status, 31 and year in school, as well as social desirability. Race was significantly associated with negative explicit weight bias at pre-test, F = 4.90, p = .009, indicating that Caucasian participants demonstrated significantly greater negative explicit weight bias than African-American participants. Year in school was significantly associated with the PES, r = -0.21, p = .032, indicating that younger participants demonstrated greater belief in the Protestant work ethic than older participants. Weight status (normal weight; overweight/obese) was significantly associated with pre-test negative explicit bias, t(108) = 2.60, p = .011, group identification, t(108) = 4.21, p

 .001, and the pre-test good/bad trial, t(108) = -2.04, p = .044, indicating that overweight individuals demonstrated less negative explicit bias at pre-test, weaker group identification, and less negative implicit bias at pre-test than normal weight individuals.

Pre-Test Correlations

Correlational analyses among baseline measures were also used to determine associations among explicit and implicit weight bias, group identification, Protestant work ethic beliefs, and just world beliefs. Group identification was associated with the good-bad trial, r = -0.192, p =

.044, indicating that individuals with greater group identification demonstrated greater implicit bias through the good/bad trial. Protestant ethic beliefs were associated with negative explicit bias, r = 0.329, p  .001, and just world beliefs, r = 0.348, p  .001, indicating that individuals with greater Protestant ethic beliefs demonstrated greater negative explicit bias and greater beliefs in a just world. Just world beliefs were associated with negative explicit bias, r = 0.227, p

= .017, and the good/bad trial, r = -0.258, p = .006, indicating that individuals with greater just world beliefs demonstrated greater negative explicit bias and greater implicit bias through the good/bad trial. Positive explicit bias was associated with the good/bad trial, r = 0.211, p = .027, indicating that individuals who demonstrated greater positive explicit bias also demonstrated 32 greater positive implicit bias (Table 2). Negative explicit bias was associated with the motivated/lazy trial, r = 0.200, p = .036, indicating that individuals who demonstrated greater negative explicit bias also demonstrated greater implicit bias through the motivated/lazy trials.

Hypothesis #1

Paired t-tests were used to test the hypothesis that favorable consensus would increase endorsement of positive traits, decrease endorsement of negative traits, and decrease implicit bias. Mean positive explicit bias significantly increased from 62.0% (SD = 11.9) at time 1 to

65.5% (SD = 12.7) at time 2, t(109) = -3.41, p = .001 (Figure 1). Mean negative explicit bias significantly decreased from 57.5% (SD = 15.9) at time 1 to 51.2% (SD = 19.9) at time 2, t(109)

= 5.18, p  .001. Mean implicit bias for the good/bad trial significantly decreased from -0.36

(SD = 0.43) at time 1 to -0.28 (SD = 0.46) at time 2, t(109) = -2.45, p = .016 (Figure 2). Mean implicit bias for the motivated/lazy trial did not significantly decrease from time 1 to time 2, t(109) = 1.38, p = .172.

The hypothesis was retested while controlling for covariates using repeated measures

ANOVA. Race and actual weight status were controlled for in negative explicit bias analyses and the good/bad trial analyses, and social desirability was controlled for in the motivated/lazy trial analyses. The change in positive explicit bias from time 1 to time 2 was still significant,

F(1, 109) = 11.64, p = .001. However, the changes in negative explicit bias, F(1, 107) = 0.34, p

= .569, and the good/bad trial, F(1, 107) = 0.05, p = .817, were no longer significant. For negative explicit bias, only race, F(1, 107) = 9.86, p = .002, and weight status, F(1, 107) = 11.22, p = .001, were significant. Caucasian individuals (M = 5.9, SD = 11.5) decreased their bias significantly more than African-American participants (M = 4.4, SD = 20.0), and overweight individuals (M = 8.6, SD = 12.5) decreased their bias significantly more than normal weight 33 individuals (M = 4.3, SD = 12.7). For the good/bad trial, only weight status was significant, F(1,

107) = 5.07, p = .026. The change in the motivated/lazy trial remained non-significant, F(1, 108)

= 2.91, p = .091. Only social desirability was significant, F(1, 108) = 7.89, p = .006.

Hypothesis #2

A 2 (normal weight, overweight) X 3 (in-group, out-group, no identified weight group) X

2 (pre-test, post-test) repeated measures ANOVA was used to test the hypothesis that individuals receiving feedback from their respective in-group based on weight status would show greater increased endorsement of positive traits, decreased endorsement of negative traits, and decreased implicit weight bias than individuals receiving feedback from their out-group based on weight or the general population.

For positive explicit bias, pre-test and post-test positive explicit bias were added as within subject variables, and weight and feedback form were added as between subject variables (Table

3). There was no main effect of change in bias, F(1, 108) = 1.89, p = .172. There were no significant interactions between weight status and change in explicit bias, F(1, 108) = 2.00, p =

.160; ingroup, outgroup, or control group feedback and change in explicit bias, F(2, 107) = 0.62, p = .538; or weight status, ingroup, outgroup, or control group feedback, and change in explicit bias, F(2, 107) = 0.38, p = .685. The same set of analyses were run using perceived weight instead of actual weight as a between subjects variables. There was no main effect for change in bias, F(1, 108) = 1.68, p = .198. There were no significant interactions between weight status and change in explicit bias, F(1, 108) = 0.57, p = .452; ingroup, outgroup, or control group feedback and change in explicit bias, F(2, 107) = 0.65, p = .523; or weight status, ingroup, outgroup, or control group feedback, and change in explicit bias, F(2, 107) = 0.83, p = .440. 34

For negative explicit bias, pre-test and post-test negative explicit bias were added as within subject variables, weight status and feedback were added as between subject variables, and race was added as a covariate. There was no main effect for change in bias, F(1, 108) =

2.14, p = .146. There were no significant interactions between weight status and change in explicit bias, F(1, 108) = 2.94, p = .089; ingroup, outgroup, or control group feedback and change in explicit bias, F(2, 107) = 0.36, p = .701; or weight status, ingroup, outgroup, or control group feedback, and change in explicit bias, F(2, 107) = 0.42, p = .656. The same set of analyses was run using perceived weight instead of actual weight as a between subjects variable. There was no main effect of bias, F(1, 108) = 2.20, p = .141. There was no significant interaction between weight status and change in explicit bias, F(1, 108) = 2.86, p = .094; ingroup, outgroup, or control group feedback and change in explicit bias, F(2, 107) = 0.54, p = .586; or weight status, ingroup, outgroup, or control group feedback, and change in explicit bias, F(2, 107) =

0.15, p = .862. When the same analyses were run without the covariate of race, a main effect of bias became significant when using both actual weight status, F(1, 104) = 28.16, p  .001, and perceived weight status, F(1, 104) = 27.91, p  .001, indicating a significant decrease in weight bias from time 1 to time 2.

For the good/bad trial of the IAT, the pre-test and post-test good/bad trials were added as within subject variables, weight and feedback form were added as between subject variables, and race was added as a covariate. There was no main effect for change in bias, F(1, 108) = 0.31, p

= .581. There were no significant interactions between weight status and change in implicit bias,

F(1, 108) == 0.003, p = .959; ingroup, outgroup, or control group feedback and change in implicit bias, F(2, 107) = 0.39, p = .678; or weight status, ingroup, outgroup, and control group feedback, and change in implicit bias, F(2, 107) = 0.80, p = .452. The same set of analyses was 35 run using perceived weight instead of actual weight. There was no main effect for change in bias, F(1, 108) = 0.34, p = .564. There were no significant interactions between weight status and change in implicit bias, F(1, 108) = 0.27, p = .602; ingroup, outgroup, or control group feedback and change in implicit bias, F(2, 107) = 0.24, p = .791; or weight status, ingroup, outgroup, and control group feedback, and change in implicit bias, F(2, 107) = 1.59, p = .208.

When the same analyses were run without the covariate of race, a main effect of bias became significant when using both actual weight status, F(1, 104) = 5.76, p = .018, and perceived weight status, F(1, 104) = 6.74, p = .011, indicating a significant decrease in bias from time 1 to time 2.

For the motivated/lazy trial of the IAT, the pre-test and post-test motivated/lazy trials were added as within subject variables, weight status and feedback form were added as between subject variables, and social desirability was added as a covariate. There was no main effect for change in bias, F(1, 108) = 2.17, p = .144. There was a significant three-way interaction between weight status, feedback, and change in implicit bias, F(2, 107) = 3.53, p = .033 (See

Figure 3). For normal weight individuals, receiving feedback from other normal weight individuals significantly reduced their weight bias from time 1 (0.45, SD = 0.41) to time 2 (0.26,

SD = 0.36), whereas receiving feedback from overweight individuals (0.19, SD = 0.40 to 0.26,

SD = 0.38) or the general population (0.38, SD = 0.40 to 0.45, SD = 0.46) slightly increased their weight bias. For overweight individuals, receiving feedback from normal weight individuals had little effect on their weight bias from time 1 (0.05, SD = 0.46) to time 2 (0.07, SD = 0.37), whereas receiving feedback from overweight individuals (0.36, SD = 0.61 to 0.20, SD = 0.32) or the general population (0.15, SD = 0.29 to -0.03, SD = 0.32) reduced their weight bias from time

1 to time 2. 36

The same set of analyses with covariates was run using perceived weight instead of actual weight. There was no main effect for change in bias, F(1, 108) = 1.85, p = .177. Similar to the previous set of analyses, there was a significant three-way interaction between weight status, feedback, and change in implicit bias, F(2, 107) = 5.17, p = .007. For normal weight individuals, receiving feedback from other normal weight individuals significantly reduced their weight bias from time 1 (0.39, SD = 0.46) to time 2 (0.20, SD = 0.41), whereas receiving feedback from overweight individuals (0.18, SD = 0.32 to 0.26, SD = 0.35) or the general population (0.37, SD

= 0.40 to 0.45, SD = 0.47) slightly increased their weight bias. For overweight individuals, receiving feedback from normal weight individuals had little effect on their weight bias from time 1 (0.01, SD = 0.41) to time 2 (0.11, SD = 0.29), whereas receiving feedback from overweight individuals (0.40, SD = 0.72 to 0.18, SD = 0.35) or the general population (0.18, SD

= 0.40 to 0.001, SD = 0.34) reduced their weight bias from time 1 to time 2.

Hypothesis #3

A t-test was used to test the hypothesis that overweight individuals would evidence weaker in-group social identity than normal weight individuals. Overweight individuals (4.16,

SD = 1.02) did evidence weaker group identification than normal weight individuals (4.90, SD =

0.82), t(108) = 4.21, p =  .001. Among overweight individuals, 14 of the 51 (27.5%) perceived themselves as normal weight. Those that perceived themselves as normal weight (5.26, SD =

0.59) had a stronger group identification with normal weight individuals than those perceiving themselves as overweight (3.75, SD = 0.82) had with the overweight population, t(49) = 6.25, p

 .001. Among normal weight individuals, 7 of the 59 (11.9%) perceived themselves as overweight. Those that perceived themselves as overweight (3.79, SD = 0.54) had weaker group identification with overweight individuals than individuals perceiving themselves as normal 37

(5.05, SD = 0.73) weight had with the normal weight population, t(57) = 4.40, p  .001. A chi- square analysis indicated that overweight individuals were significantly more likely to identify as normal weight (27.5%) than normal weight individuals were to identify as overweight (11.9%), p

 .001.

A one-way ANOVA was used to examine the differences in group identification between overweight individuals perceiving themselves as overweight and normal weight individuals perceiving themselves as normal weight, as well as differences between overweight individuals perceiving themselves as normal weight and normal weight individuals perceiving themselves as overweight. The results were significant, F(3, 106) = 29.09, p  .001. Normal weight individuals perceiving themselves as normal weight (5.05, SD = 0.73) demonstrated greater group identification than overweight individuals perceiving themselves as overweight (3.75, SD

= 0.82). Overweight individuals perceiving themselves as normal weight (5.26, SD = 0.59) demonstrated greater group identification than normal weight individuals perceiving themselves as overweight (3.79, SD = 0.54).

Hierarchical regression was used to determine the effects of group identity on post-test explicit and implicit bias. For the first step in each model, demographic variables, feedback form, and pre-test variables were added to the model. For the demographic variables, race was added to the negative explicit bias models and the good-bad trial models, and social desirability was added to the motivated/lazy trial. For feedback form, the three feedback forms were dummy coded into two dichotomous variables. These two dummy coded variables were entered into the regression. For the second step, weight status and group identification were added to the model.

For the third step, the interaction between weight status and group identification was added to the model. The overall model for positive explicit bias was significant, F(6, 103) = 12.51, p  .001. 38

Only pre-test positive explicit bias was significant in the model, t(103) = 8.19, p  .001. The overall model for negative explicit bias was significant, F(7, 102) = 23.36, p  .001. Only pre- test negative explicit bias was significant, t(102) = 10.38, p  .001. The overall model for the good/bad trial was significant, F(7, 102) = 11.93, p  .001. Only race, t(102) = 2.09, p = .039, and the pre-test good/bad trial, t(102) = 7.74, p  .001, were significant. The overall model for the motivated/lazy trial was significant, F(7, 102) = 11.55, p  .001. Only weight status, t(102) =

-2.62, p = .010, social desirability, t(102) = -3.86, p  .001, and the pre-test motivated lazy trial, t(102) = 6.07, p  .001, were significant. The same set of analyses was also run without covariates. Although the results for positive and negative explicit bias and the motivated/lazy trial did not differ in significance, group identification became significant for the good/bad trial without the covariate of race, t(103) = -2.10, p = .038. Individuals with stronger group identification demonstrated greater decreases in implicit bias.

Hypothesis #4

Hierarchical regression was used to test the hypothesis that favorable consensus feedback would be less effective in reducing explicit and implicit weight bias for individuals with greater beliefs in a just world and the Protestant work ethic. For the first step of the models, demographic variables, weight status, feedback form, and baseline bias were added. For the demographic variables, race was added to the negative explicit bias model and the good-bad trial model, and social desirability was added to the motivated/lazy trial. For feedback form, the three feedback forms were dummy coded into two dichotomous variables. These two dummy coded variables were entered into the regression. For the second step, either Protestant ethic beliefs or just world beliefs were added to the models. 39

For Protestant ethic beliefs, the overall model for positive explicit bias was significant,

F(5, 104) = 17.85, p  .001. Both baseline positive explicit bias, t(104) = 8.48, p  .001, and

Protestant ethic beliefs, t(104) = 3.07, p = .003, were significant, indicating that individuals who had stronger Protestant ethic beliefs were more likely to rate overweight individuals more positively at post-test. The overall model for negative explicit bias was significant, F(6, 103) =

27.47, p  .001. Weight status, t(103) = -2.12, p = .036, and baseline negative explicit bias, t(103) = 9.70, p  .001, were significant. The overall model for the good/bad trial was significant, F(6, 103) = 13.40, p  .001. Only race, t(103) = 2.09, p = .039, and the pre-test good/bad trial, t(103) = 7.82, p  .001, were significant. The overall model for the motivated/lazy trial was significant, F(6, 103) = 13.39, p  .001. Weight status, t(103) = -3.17, p

= .002, social desirability, t(103) = -4.01, p  .001, and the pre-test motivated lazy trial, t(103) =

6.05, p  .001, were significant.

For just world beliefs, the overall model for positive explicit bias was significant, F(5,

104) = 14.98, p  .001. Only baseline positive explicit bias, t(104) = 8.23, p  .001, was significant in the model. The overall model for negative explicit bias was significant, F(6, 103)

= 28.25, p  .001. Weight status, t(103) = -2.00, p = .048, and baseline negative explicit bias, t(103) = 10.12, p  .001, were significant. The overall model for the good/bad trial was significant, F(6, 103) = 12.96, p  .001. Race, t(103) = 2.29, p = .024, and the baseline good/bad trial, t(103), p  .001, were significant. The overall model for the motivated/lazy trial was significant, F(6, 103) = 13.68, p  .001. Weight status, t(103) = -3.07, p = .003, social desirability, t(103) = -3.97, p  .001, and the baseline motivated/lazy trial, t(103) = 6.12, p 

.001, were significant (See Note for exploratory post hoc analyses).

40

DISCUSSION

The present study examined whether receiving social consensus feedback based on one’s weight status would decrease explicit and implicit weight bias. The study also sought to examine whether weight identity and personal social ideologies, such as beliefs in a just world and the

Protestant ethic, would moderate the effects of social consensus feedback on changes in explicit and implicit weight bias. A discussion of the findings follows.

Hypothesis #1

It was hypothesized that individuals receiving favorable consensus feedback would increase their endorsement of positive traits and decrease their endorsement of negative traits toward obese individuals. It was also expected that social consensus would be more effective for explicit bias than implicit weight bias. Consistent with previous research (Puhl et al., 2005;

Stangor et al., 2001), individuals who received feedback that others had more favorable opinions toward obese people than themselves increased their endorsement of positive traits. These results are promising in that individuals appeared responsive to at least changing their attitudes about overweight people in response to positive feedback. Interventions promoting a more positive view of overweight and obese individuals may be more successful in reducing weight bias by using social consensus feedback compared to other interventions that have been found to be less successful using other methods (e.g., empathy). Also consistent with prior research demonstrating that implicit attitudes are less open to evaluation and modification, there was no effect of social consensus on implicit bias (Conrey et al., 2005; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001;

Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Greenwald and Banaji, 1995). It has been suggested that because implicit attitudes are outside of individuals’ awareness and conscious control, they are 41 less susceptible to feedback from others compared to explicit attitudes which are under one’s awareness and control (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995).

Contrary to previous research (Puhl et al., 2005), individuals who received social consensus feedback did not decrease their endorsement of negative traits toward obese individuals after controlling for covariates. This is surprising given that the current investigation’s design was nearly identical to Puhl et al.’s (2005) previous investigation.

However, a few differences existed between the two studies that may have influenced the results.

First, Puhl et al.’s (2005) study only included 30 individuals, whereas the current study included

110 individuals. While the current study had greater statistical power to detect changes, small samples are more easily influenced by statistical outliers and more likely to be disconfirmed upon replication. Similarly, in Puhl’s sample, race and BMI were not related to bias, perhaps secondary to her sample size and therefore not used as covariates in her analyses. In the current study, although African-American individuals had significantly lower levels of bias then

Caucasian individuals, being Caucasian and overweight were associated with greater changes in weight bias and seemed to account for any significance in change in weight bias from time 1 to time 2, possibly reducing the effect of social consensus. It is notable that when race and overweight were no longer controlled for in certain analyses, the change in bias from time 1 to time 2 became significant. It would be interesting to see if Puhl’s findings changed after controlling for race and weight status. The differences in mean change were somewhat similar between studies. Specifically, in Puhl et al.’s (2005) study, negative bias decreased from 61.3 to

53.5, a difference of 7.8, and in the current study, negative bias decreased from 57.5 to 51.2, a difference of 6.3. Therefore, mean differences in change were consistent between the two studies. However, variation of scores for negative bias in the current study were greater with

42 standard deviations of 15.9 and 19.9 for pre-test and post-test, compared to those in Puhl et al.’s study of 10.1 and 13.9. The slightly smaller change in attitudes coupled with greater variation in change may have also contributed to the null findings. It would appear that the Ivy League students were somewhat more consistent in their attitudes relative to the public school students in this study.

Second, participants in Puhl et al.’s study also completed the Beliefs About Obese

Persons (BAOP) Scale at both time points, and individuals who received positive feedback also increased their beliefs that obesity is not under personal control. Individuals in the current study did not complete the BAOP. While remote, it is possible that completing the BAOP at both time points primed subjects to believe that obesity is not under personal control, thereby resulting in more consistent responding to social consensus feedback (i.e., reducing variability in participant’s responses).

Hypothesis #2

It was hypothesized that both normal weight and overweight individuals receiving feedback from their respective in-group based on weight would show greater increased endorsement of positive traits and decreased endorsement of negative traits than normal weight and overweight individuals receiving feedback from their out-group based on weight or the general population. In this investigation, receiving social consensus feedback from one’s in- group based on weight had no impact on participants’ endorsement of explicit weight bias.

Again, these findings are in contrast to previous research (Puhl et al., 2005). However, the differences between studies are likely secondary to the impact of social influences, such as in-group versus out-group factors. First, in Puhl et al.’s study, the in-group and out-group (i.e.,

Ivy League students versus community college students) were very different than the current

43 investigation’s in-group and out-group (i.e., same weight status versus different weight status).

For example, Ivy League students are more likely to identity strongly with and value more the beliefs and attitudes of their Ivy League peers relative to community colleges students. In contrast, researchers suggest that group identity is likely to be very weak among obese individuals (Durso & Latner, 2008, Grover et al., 2003). The current study supports this speculation in that normal weight individuals demonstrated greater group identification than overweight individuals. Stigmatized groups with boundaries that are perceived to be highly permeable are unlikely to develop strong within group identity. Specifically, overweight individuals may view themselves as normal weight and/or temporary members of a devalued group. This is consistent with research indicating that different components of social identity may influence the strength of within group ties (Deaux, 1996; Ellemers, Kortekaas, and

Ouwerkerk, 1999; Jackson, 2002; Cameron, 2004). Permeable boundaries and desire to leave the group is likely to diminish overweight individuals’ group identities, which may lessen the impact of feedback from their current group.

Second, neither study looked at whether participants responded to informational (i.e., looking to others for information due to uncertainty about “correct” behaviors or attitudes) or normative social influence (i.e., adapting the thoughts and behaviors of others out of the desire to be liked and accepted). For example, in Puhl’s study the impact of Ivy League student’s attitudes (i.e., in-group) on weight bias had a much great impact on other Ivy League student’s attitudes toward weight bias than the impact of community college students’ (i.e., out-group) attitudes toward weight bias. The comparison between Ivy League and community college students in Puhl et al.’s study may have been secondary to informational rather than normative social influence, given the perceived intelligence and elite status of Ivy League students

44 compared to community college students. Also notable is that in Puhl et al.’s study, all of the participants taking the study were Ivy League students. Although the study did not specify if participants were run individually or in groups, if they were in groups, the immediacy of other

Ivy League students may have enhanced normative social influence by reminding participants of the group that they value and want to be accepted by (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955). In the current study, the room always consisted of both in-group and out-group participants, which may have diluted the impact of having in-group members in the room and lessened the immediacy effect.

Third, Puhl et al.’s study examining in-group versus out-group effects did not use the

OPTS as a dependent measure. Instead, the authors used one item, asking participants to rate their feelings toward obese people on a 9-point scale, ranging from “not at all favorable” to “very favorable.” This item was used to determine participants’ explicit bias. It is possible that the comprehensive nature of the OPTS and its reliance on trait attributions made it less likely that change would occur, compared to the one-dimensional affective nature of the measure that Puhl et al. used. Specifically, the measure in Puhl et al.’s study examined participants’ feelings, whereas the measure in the current study asked about participants’ beliefs and knowledge about overweight individuals’ traits. Given the fluctuating nature of emotions, it may be that an emotional response was more easily influenced by social consensus feedback than a cognitive response.

This study was also unique in that it looked at the impacts of social consensus based on one’s weight status on implicit bias. In contrast to the findings on explicit weight bias, there was a significant interaction effect between weight status, feedback, and change in implicit bias. For normal weight individuals, receiving feedback from other normal weight individuals significantly reduced their weight bias from time 1 to time 2, whereas receiving feedback from

45 overweight individuals or the general population slightly increased their weight bias. For overweight individuals, receiving feedback from normal weight individuals had little effect on their weight bias from time 1 to time 2, whereas receiving feedback from overweight individuals or the general population reduced their weight bias from time 1 to time 2. These findings are interesting given that implicit ratings are generally considered to be less conscious and deliberate and therefore less likely to be influenced by reflection on feedback. It is plausible that in-group members may perceive out-group members to be unreliable sources of information or as having an alternative agenda, giving in-group members greater influence than out-group members.

However, this level of source evaluation would seem unlikely to influence evaluations of implicit attitudes. Given that recent research has shown that implicit evaluations may be easily influenced by contextual factors (Blair, 2002), it is possible that attitudes may have been primed based on the in-group versus out-group feedback. However, it is unclear how in group versus out-group primes would differentially affect implicit attitudes.

Hypothesis #3

It was hypothesized that overweight individuals would evidence weaker in-group social identity than normal weight individuals. This hypothesis was supported. Normal weight individuals demonstrated greater group identification than overweight individuals. In addition, overweight individuals perceiving themselves as normal weight demonstrated greater group identification than normal weight individuals perceiving themselves as overweight. These results are consistent with prior research demonstrating that weight identity is not always consistent with actual weight (Grover et al., 2003), as well as research demonstrating a more complex view of group identification that includes affective, cognitive, and relational components rather than only an objective component (Deaux, 1996; Ellemers et al., 1999;

46

Jackson, 2002; Cameron, 2004). For overweight individuals, a weaker group identity may stem from the belief that weight is controllable and the stigma that is associated with being overweight

(Crandall, 1994). These individuals may view themselves as temporary members of their group while believing that they will eventually become part of the normal weight group. In addition, those who view themselves as normal weight may use a weak group identification as a defense mechanism to protect themselves from the low self-esteem and poor body image that are associated with being overweight (Muth and Cash, 1997; Monteath and McCabe, 1997; Forrest and Stuhldreher, 2007; Watkins, Christie, and Chally, 2008).

However, contrary to the hypothesis that social consensus would have a greater impact on normal and overweight individuals with a stronger in-group weight identity compared to individuals with a weaker in-group weight identity, strength of in-group identity had no impact on participants’ explicit or implicit weight bias. The current study used Cameron’s (2004) definition of social identity, which was defined as consisting of cognitive centrality, in-group affect, and in-group ties. Although this definition has been supported in studies of gender, race, and interest groups, it is never been previously used in studies of weight. In the current study, although group identification for normal weight individuals (M = 4.56) was comparable to studies that looked at gender (M = 4.39, M = 4.53), nationality (M = 5.41), and university identification (M = 4.52), group identification for overweight individuals was much lower (M =

4.16) (Cameron, 2004). Interestingly, these findings suggest that normal weight individuals have comparable group identity to gender, nationality, etc. while overweight individuals have lower identity. However, it would appear that that this identity was unrelated to their change in attitudes. Whereas Ivy League students in Puhl et al’s study is a rare and select sample, normal weight individuals is a much larger and broader population. It may be that feedback from a

47 larger, broader more non-descript population has a weaker impact on opinions than feedback from a small circumscribed, group.

While it is likely the case that overweight individuals have lower group it identity than normal weight individuals, it is possible that overweight individuals do have strong group identity, but that definition of social identity used in this investigation is not appropriate for weight identity. Given the numerous ways of defining social identity (Brown et al., 1986;

Cameron, 2004; Deaux, 1996; Ellemers et al, 1999; Hinkle et al., 1989; Jackson, 2002; Jackson

& Smith, 1999; Karasawa, 1991; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; Tajfel, 1978), it may be that it is necessary to determine the conditions by which weight identity is developed and strengthened. It may be important in assessing weight identity to assess for individuals’ perceptions of the controllability of weight, as well as their beliefs about and intentions for either losing or gaining weight.

Hypothesis #4

It was hypothesized that beliefs in a just world and the Protestant work ethic would moderate the relationship between social consensus and weight bias due to research showing that when challenges to ideological beliefs occur, individuals create explanations to justify and maintain their worldviews, which results in further rejection and discrimination of others (Puhl and Brownell, 2003). Specifically, it was hypothesized that favorable consensus feedback would be less effective in reducing explicit and implicit weight bias for individuals with greater beliefs in a just world and the Protestant work ethic. In the current investigation, beliefs in a just world had no impact on ratings of weight bias, and higher Protestant ethic beliefs were actually associated with increased positive explicit ratings of overweight/obese people. The latter is especially surprising given previous research showing that greater weight bias is often associated

48 with higher Protestant beliefs and when the beliefs of individuals with high Protestant ethic beliefs are challenged, these beliefs are often solidified rather than questioned or changed (Puhl

& Brownell, 2003). However, it is not clear whether receiving information about other individuals’ attitudes would be perceived as a challenge to beliefs. Also, while possessing

Protestant ethic beliefs may be associated with greater bias, it can’t be assumed that holding

Protestant ethic beliefs is also a barrier to changing those beliefs in response to social consensus feedback. After all, the current study did find an association between baseline Protestant ethic beliefs and baseline negative explicit bias, as well as just world beliefs and baseline implicit bias, which is consistent with prior research (Crandall, 1991; Crandall, 1995; Crandall and Biernat,

1990). In addition, post-hoc analyses indicated that associations between ideological beliefs and negative explicit bias and implicit bias at pre-test were predictive of these same relationships at post-test. It is possible that although these attitudes are associated with greater bias, they play little role in beliefs changing in response to social consensus feedback.

Finally, more recent research has suggested that Protestant work ethic beliefs do not always promote prejudice consistently and vary based on social factors, such as age and race

(Rosenthal, Levy, & Moyer, 2011). Specifically, researchers found that younger individuals compared to older individuals demonstrated a weaker association between Protestant ethic beliefs and negative attitudes towards other social groups. The researchers also found that this association among younger individuals was associated with significant changes in attitudes over time, and that attitudes and behaviors were especially amenable to change under experimentally induced conditions (Levi, West, Ramirez, Karafantis, 2006). Given that the participants of the current study were all young college students, it may be that weaker associations between

49

Protestant ethic beliefs and negative attitudes led to greater susceptibility to social consensus feedback.

In addition, many of the studies examining the impact of social ideologies on weight bias examined prejudicial behaviors or participants’ predictions of their behaviors rather than prejudicial attitudes (Crandall, 1991; Crandall & Cohen, 1994; Crandall, 1995), and those looking at both, have often found inconsistencies between attitudes and behaviors (Bell &

Morgan, 2000). In the current study, only prejudicial attitudes were measured. Given the common inconsistency between attitudes and behaviors (Dovidio & Kawakami, 1997), it may be that different results would have emerged if predictions of prejudicial behaviors had been examined.

Limitations and Implications

There are several limitations of the current study. First, the sample consisted of college students, and therefore it would be beneficial to replicate this study with a community sample consisting of a larger age range to see if the findings apply to populations other than college students. Second, the diversity of this college sample was limited with 74% of the participants being Caucasian, whereas multiple universities today have populations with much greater diversity. It would also be beneficial to replicate this study with a more diverse population to see if the findings apply to a population with greater variation in ethnicity.

Undergraduate students also acted as research assistants in the data collection process, and several errors were made by them in collecting the data. Given these errors, it is also possible that errors were made in the protocol for presenting the study participants, possibly making the study less believable or valid to the participants. Also, several participants commented at the time of debriefing that they had been able to guess the purpose of the study,

50 which may have significantly altered their post-test ratings in order to comply with the purpose of the study. It may be that other participants had also guessed the purpose of the study, even if they did not directly say so at the time of debriefing. The fidelity of the mild deception in this study was not assessed, and there was no check for the manipulation of the reference groups of the feedback forms.

As stated earlier in the discussion, the Group Identification Scale may not have accurately captured the critical components of weight identity. Therefore, it may be helpful for future studies to create a measure of weight identity that accurately measures the components of weight identity that are important for group identification within this area. The current study also only looked at attitudes as the dependent variable. It may be helpful for future studies to look at participants’ actual behaviors or predictions of these behaviors to see if these differ from attitudes in anyway due to social consensus.

Future Research

This is one of the first studies in which social consensus has had less of an impact on weight bias when covariates were used. It would be helpful to replicate this study to see if further research supports the conclusion that social consensus has less of an impact than originally thought under certain conditions and to further understand the conditions under which consensus is diminished. It would also be important to discover whether some of the factors involved in this study reduced the overall effects, such as the larger sample size, lack of the BAOP, and inconsistency with measures in previous studies.

Weight bias is a prominent issue in today’s society, and there have not been consistent findings in effective methods to reduce weight bias. Given the inconsistency of effectiveness of weight bias reduction programs, it is important to determine what factors lead interventions to be

51 effective versus ineffective. Social consensus interventions have shown some effectiveness in reducing weight bias, but the current study emphasizes the need to determine which conditions impact the effectiveness of these interventions. The current study also emphasizes the complicated nature of weight identity, and further research is needed to examine the components of weight identity, as well as the effect of weight identity on weight bias. Overall, more research is needed to examine the impact of social consensus on weight bias and the moderators of this relationship to determine whether it is a consistent method for weight bias reduction.

52

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61

Note

Exploratory post-hoc analyses were conducted. Hierarchical regression was used to examine separately the effects of group identity, Protestant ethic beliefs, and just world beliefs on explicit and implicit bias at pre-test and post-test. Protestant ethic beliefs were significant at pre-test for negative explicit bias and at post-test for positive and negative explicit bias. Just world beliefs were significant at pre-test for the good/bad trial and at post-test for negative explicit bias and the good/bad trial. See Appendix J for the full results.

62

APPENDIX A

Obese Persons Trait Survey

For each of the following traits, please estimate the percentage (any number between 0 and 100) of overweight/obese people whom you think possess this particular trait. Afterward, please indicate how confident you are in your estimate by marking a number. There are no right or wrong answers. Please give your best estimate. 2. OPTS 1. Please estimate the percentage of overweight/obese people whom you think possess each trait. (0-100%)

HUMOROUS LAZY SELF-INDULGENT GENEROUS SOCIABLE UNDISCIPLINED FRIENDLY GLUTTONOUS OUTGOING INTELLIGENT UNHEALTHY HONEST SLUGGISH PRODUCTIVE LACK OF WILLPOWER UNCLEAN WARM INSECURE ORGANIZED UNATTRACTIVE

63

APPENDIX B

Implicit Associations Test

Good Bad Wonderful Terrible Terrific Disgusting Awesome Awful Thin Fat Slim Overweight Skinny Chubby Thin Plump Motivated Lazy Self-control (Eager) Weak-willed (Slow) Willpower (Hard working) Uncontrolled (Sluggish) Determined Lazy (Idle)

64

APPENDIX C

Group Identification Scale

Please indicate the extent to which each of the following statements pertains to you personally.

Strongly disagree Strongly agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1. I often think about being average weight / overweight. 2. Being average weight / overweight has little to do with how I feel about myself in general. 3. Being average weight / overweight is an important part of my self-image. 4. The fact that I am average weight / overweight rarely enters my mind. 5. In general I’m glad to be average weight / overweight. 6. I often regret being average weight / overweight. 7. Generally I feel good about myself when I think about being average weight / overweight. 8. I don’t feel good about being average weight / overweight. 9. I have a lot in common with other average weight / overweight people. 10. I feel strong ties to other average weight / overweight people. 11. I find it difficult to form a bond with other average weight / overweight people. 12. I don’t feel a strong sense of being connected to average weight / overweight people.

65

APPENDIX D

Protestant Ethic Scale

Please rate how much you agree with the following statements on a scale of 0 to 5 where 5 means that you strongly agree with the statement and 0 means that you strongly disagree with the statement.

Strongly disagree Strongly agree 1 2 3 4 5 6

1. Most people spend too much time in unprofitable amusements. 2. Our society would have fewer problems if people had less leisure time. 3. Money acquired easily (e.g., though gambling or speculation) is usually spent unwisely. 4. There are few satisfactions equal to the realization that one has done his best at a job. 5. The most difficult college courses usually turn out to be the most rewarding. 6. Most people who don’t succeed in life are just plain lazy. 7. The self-made man is likely to be more ethical than the man born to wealth. 8. I often feel I would be more successful if I sacrificed certain pleasures. 9. People should have more leisure time to spend in relaxation. 10. Any man who is able and willing to work hard has a good chance of succeeding. 11. People who fail at a job have usually not tried hard enough. 12. Life would have very little meaning if we never had to suffer. 13. Hard work offers little guarantee of success. 14. The credit card is a ticket to careless spending. 15. Life would be more meaningful if we had more leisure time. 16. The man who can approach an unpleasant task with enthusiasm is the man who gets ahead. 17. If one works hard enough he is likely to make a good life for himself. 18. I feel uneasy when there is little work for me to do. 19. A distaste for hard work usually reflects a weakness of character.

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APPENDIX E

Global Belief in a Just World Scale

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements.

Strongly disagree Strongly agree 1 2 3 4 5 6

1. I feel that people get what they are entitled to have. 2. I feel that a person’s efforts are noticed and rewarded. 3. I feel that people earn the rewards and punishments that they get. 4. I feel that people who meet with misfortune have brought it on themselves. 5. I feel that people get what they deserve. 6. I feel that rewards and punishments are fairly given. 7. I basically believe that the world is a fair place.

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APPENDIX F

Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale

Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you personally.

1. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates. 2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble. 3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. 4. I have never intensely disliked anyone. 5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life. 6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way. 7. I am always careful about my manner of dress. 8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant. 9. If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen I would probably do it. 10. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my ability. 11. I like to gossip at times. 12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I knew they were right. 13. No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener. 14. I can remember “playing sick” to get out of something. 15. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. 16. I’m always willing to admit when I make a mistake. 17. I always try to practice what I preach. 18. I don’t find it particularly difficult to get alone with loud mouthed, obnoxious people. 19. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 20. When I don’t know something I don’t at all mind admitting it. 21. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. 22. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way. 23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things. 24. I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my wrongdoings. 25. I never resent being asked to return a favor. 26. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own. 27. I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car. 28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. 29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off. 30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. 31. I have never felt that I was punished without a cause. 32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved. 33. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings.

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APPENDIX G

Consensus Feedback Form #1

Name: ______

Extensive testing at Bowling Green State University has revealed the beliefs that AVERAGE WEIGHT STUDENTS have about OVERWEIGHT/OBESE PEOPLE. For each of the following traits, AVERAGE WEIGHT STUDENTS believe that the indicated percentage of OVERWEIGHT/OBESE PEOPLE possess this particular trait.

We are interested in YOUR reaction to this information. Therefore, for each of the TRAITS, please CIRCLE A NUMBER to indicate how surprised you are by that percentage. There are no right or wrong answers. Please give your best estimate.

1. Percent who believe that overweight/obese people are HUMOROUS: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

2. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are LAZY: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

3. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are SELF-INDULGENT: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

4. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are GENEROUS: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

5. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are SOCIABLE: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

69

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

6. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are UNDISCPLINED: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

7. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are FRIENDLY: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

8. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are GLUTTONOUS: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

9. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are OUTGOING: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

10. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are INTELLIGENT: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

11. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are UNHEALTHY: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

70

12. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are HONEST: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

13. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are SLUGGISH: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

14. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are PRODUCTIVE: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

15. Percent who believe overweight/obese people have LACK OF WILLPOWER: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

16. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are UNCLEAN: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

17. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are WARM: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

18. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are INSECURE: _

How surprised are you by the above information?

71

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

19. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are ORGANIZED: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

20. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are UNATTRACTIVE: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

72

APPENDIX H

Consensus Feedback Form #2

Name: ______

Extensive testing at Bowling Green State University has revealed the beliefs that OVERWEIGHT STUDENTS have about OVERWEIGHT/OBESE PEOPLE. For each of the following traits, OVERWEIGHT STUDENTS believe that the indicated percentage of OVERWEIGHT/OBESE PEOPLE possess this particular trait.

We are interested in YOUR reaction to this information. Therefore, for each of the TRAITS, please CIRCLE A NUMBER to indicate how surprised you are by that percentage. There are no right or wrong answers. Please give your best estimate.

1. Percent who believe that overweight/obese people are HUMOROUS: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

2. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are LAZY: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

3. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are SELF-INDULGENT: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

4. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are GENEROUS: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

5. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are SOCIABLE: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

73

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

6. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are UNDISCPLINED: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

7. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are FRIENDLY: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

8. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are GLUTTONOUS: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

9. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are OUTGOING: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

10. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are INTELLIGENT: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

11. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are UNHEALTHY: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

74

12. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are HONEST: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

13. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are SLUGGISH: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

14. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are PRODUCTIVE: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

15. Percent who believe overweight/obese people have LACK OF WILLPOWER: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

16. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are UNCLEAN: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

17. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are WARM: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

18. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are INSECURE: _

How surprised are you by the above information?

75

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

19. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are ORGANIZED: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

20. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are UNATTRACTIVE: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

76

APPENDIX I

Consensus Feedback Form #3

Name: ______

Extensive testing at Bowling Green State University has revealed the beliefs that the GENERAL POPULATION has about OVERWEIGHT/OBESE PEOPLE. For each of the following traits, the GENERAL POPULATION believes that the indicated percentage of OVERWEIGHT/OBESE PEOPLE possess this particular trait.

We are interested in YOUR reaction to this information. Therefore, for each of the TRAITS, please CIRCLE A NUMBER to indicate how surprised you are by that percentage. There are no right or wrong answers. Please give your best estimate.

1. Percent who believe that overweight/obese people are HUMOROUS: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

2. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are LAZY: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

3. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are SELF-INDULGENT: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

4. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are GENEROUS: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

5. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are SOCIABLE: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

77

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

6. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are UNDISCPLINED: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

7. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are FRIENDLY: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

8. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are GLUTTONOUS: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

9. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are OUTGOING: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

10. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are INTELLIGENT: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

11. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are UNHEALTHY: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

78

12. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are HONEST: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

13. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are SLUGGISH: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

14. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are PRODUCTIVE: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

15. Percent who believe overweight/obese people have LACK OF WILLPOWER: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

16. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are UNCLEAN: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

17. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are WARM: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

18. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are INSECURE: _

How surprised are you by the above information?

79

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

19. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are ORGANIZED: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

20. Percent who believe overweight/obese people are UNATTRACTIVE: _%

How surprised are you by the above information?

Not at all Extremely Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Surprised

80

APPENDIX J

Post-Hoc Analyses

Post-hoc analyses were run to examine separately the effects of group identity on pre-test and post-test explicit and implicit bias in order to further explore the data given the lack of findings in this area. For the first step in each model, demographic variables were added to the model. Specifically, relationship status was added for the positive explicit bias models, and race was added to the negative explicit bias models and the good-bad trial models. For the second step, feedback form was added to the model. For the third step, weight status and group identification were added to the model. For the fourth step, the interaction between weight status and group identification was added to the model. The overall models for pre-test positive explicit bias, F(6, 103) = 0.61, p = .722, good/bad trial, F(6, 103) = 1.11, p = .363, and motivated/lazy trial, F(5, 104) = 0.97, p = .442, were insignificant. The overall model for pre- test negative explicit bias was significant, F(6, 103) = 3.57, p = .003, but the only significant variable in the model was race, t(103) = -2.57, p = .011. The overall model for post-test positive explicit bias, F(6, 103) = 1.19, p = .319, was insignificant. The overall models for post-test negative explicit bias, F(6, 103) = 4.57, p  .001, the good/bad trial, F(6, 103) = 2.50, p = .027, and the motivated/lazy trial, F(6, 103) = 3.05, p = .013, were significant, but the only significant variable in the negative explicit bias model was race, t(103) = -2.88, p = .005, and no individual variables were significant in the good/bad trial or the lazy/motivated models.

Post-hoc analyses were also used to examine separately the effects of just world beliefs and the Protestant ethic beliefs on explicit and implicit bias. Separate regressions were run for pre-test and post-test. For the first step of the models, demographic variables were added.

Specifically, relationship status was added for the positive explicit bias models, and race was

81 added to the negative explicit bias models and the good-bad trial models. For the second step, weight status and feedback were added to the model. For the third step, either Protestant ethic beliefs or just world beliefs were added to the models.

For Protestant ethic beliefs, the overall models for pre-test positive explicit bias, F(5,

104) = 0.56, p = .729, the good/bad trial, F(5, 104) = 1.11, p = .360, and the motivated/lazy trial,

F(5, 104) = 1.62, p = .174, were insignificant. However, the overall model for pre-test negative explicit bias was significant, F(5, 104) = 7.43, p  .001. Race, t(104) = -2.22, p = .029, weight status, t(104) = -2.99, p = .003, and Protestant ethic beliefs, t(104) = 3.67, p  .001, were all significant, indicating that Caucasian individuals, normal weight individuals, and those with greater Protestant ethic beliefs demonstrated greater negative explicit bias at pre-test.

The overall model for post-test positive explicit bias was significant, F(5, 104) = 2.32, p

= .048. Protestant ethic beliefs was significant, t(104) = 2.56, p = .012, indicating that individuals with greater Protestant ethic beliefs rated overweight individuals more positively.

The overall model for post-test negative explicit bias was significant, F(5, 104) = 7.47, p  .001.

Race, t(104) = -2.59, p = .011, weight status, t(104) = -3.67, p  .001, and Protestant ethic beliefs, t(104) = 2.87, p = .005, were all significant, indicating that Caucasian individuals, normal weight individuals, and individuals with greater Protestant ethic beliefs demonstrated greater negative explicit weight bias. The overall models for the post-test good/bad trial, F(5,

104) = 2.44, p = .039, and the motivated/lazy trial, F(5, 104) = 3.30, p = .014, were significant.

Weight status was the only significant variable in both the good/bad model, t(104) = 2.11, p =

.038, and the motivated/lazy model, t(104) = -3.48, p = .001, indicating that normal weight individuals demonstrated greater weight bias.

82

For just world beliefs, the overall models for pre-test positive explicit bias, F(5, 104) =

0.70, p = .627, was insignificant. The overall model for pre-test negative explicit bias, F(5, 104)

= 5.06, p  .001, was significant. Race, t(104) = -2.62, p = .010, and weight status, t(104) = -

2.49, p = .014, were both significant, indicating that Caucasian individuals and normal weight individuals demonstrated greater negative explicit bias at pre-test. The overall model for the pre- test good/bad trial was significant, F(5, 104) = 2.32, p = .048. Just world beliefs was significant, t(104) = -2.59, p = .011, indicating that individuals with great just world beliefs demonstrated greater implicit bias. The overall model for the pre-test motivated/lazy trial F(5, 104) = 0.96, p =

.431, was not significant.

The overall model for post-test positive explicit bias, F(5, 104) = 1.36, p = .247, was not significant. The overall model for post-test negative explicit bias, F(5, 104) = 6.80, p  .001, was significant. Race, t(104) = -2.92, p = .004, weight status, t(104) = -3.22, p = .002, and just world beliefs, t(104) = 2.36, p = .020, were all significant, indicating that Caucasian individuals, normal weight individuals, and those with greater just world beliefs demonstrated greater negative explicit bias at post-test. The overall model for the post-test good/bad trial was also significant, F(5, 104) = 2.78, p = .021. Race, t(104) = 2.04, p = .044, and just world beliefs, t(104) = -2.11, p = .037, were both significant, indicating that Caucasian individuals and those with greater just world beliefs demonstrated greater implicit bias. The overall model for the post-test motivated/lazy trial was significant, F(5, 104) = 3.58, p = .009. Weight status was significant, t(104) = -3.31, p = .001, indicating that normal weight individuals demonstrated greater implicit bias.

APPENDIX K 83 84 85 86 87

Figure 1.

Differences in explicit bias between time 1 and time 2 without covariates.

***p  .001

88

Figure 2.

Difference in implicit bias between time 1 and time 2 without covariates.

*p  .05

89

Figure 3.

Interactions between weight status, feedback form, and bias for the motivated/lazy trial.

90

Table 1.

Baseline Variables.

Total Normal Weight Overweight

Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD

Positive explicit bias 62.03 11.89 61.82 12.21 62.26 11.63

Negative explicit bias* 57.49 15.90 61.06 14.81 53.36 16.26

Group identification*** 4.56 0.98 4.90 0.82 4.16 1.02

Protestant ethic beliefs 74.88 10.26 74.49 10.10 75.33 10.53

Just world beliefs 21.68 6.10 22.32 5.79 20.94 6.43

Social desirability 15.94 5.28 15.97 5.29 15.90 5.32

IAT good/bad trial* -0.36 0.43 -0.44 0.36 -0.27 0.49

IAT motivated/lazy trial 0.27 0.46 0.34 0.41 0.18 0.50

*p  .05 ***p  .001

91

Table 2.

Pearson correlations among baseline variables.

OPTSpos OPTSneg GIS PES GBJWS Good/Bad Motivated/

Lazy

OPTSpos

OPTSneg .068

GIS -.089 .152

PES .047 .329** .090

GBJWS -.059 .227* .160 .348**

Good/Bad .211* -.169 -.192* -.094 -.258**

Motivated/Lazy -.072 .200* .107 .154 .074 -.500**

*p  .05 **p  .01 OPTSpos = positive explicit bias; OPTSneg = negative explicit bias; GIS = group identification; PES = Protestant ethic beliefs; GBJWS = just world beliefs; Good/Bad = IAT good/bad trial; Motivated/Lazy = IAT motivated/lazy trial

92

Table 3.

Effects of weight status and feedback form on bias.

Total Sample Normal Weight Overweight Normal Weight Overweight Control Group

Feedback Feedback Feedback

Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post

Positive 62.03 65.51 61.82 63.92 62.26 67.35 62.04 66.13 62.03 66.74 62.00 63.79

Bias

Negative 57.49 51.19 61.06 56.75 53.36 44.75 52.93 45.22 62.02 55.84 55.77 52.72

Bias

Good -0.36 -0.28 -0.44 -0.35 -0.27 -0.19 -0.36 -0.32 -0.33 -0.24 -0.40 -0.27

Bad

Motivated 0.27 0.21 0.34 0.33 0.18 0.07 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.23 0.28 0.24

Lazyd a = significant change in bias b = significant interaction between weight status and bias c = significant interaction between feedback form and bias d = significant interaction between weight status, feedback form, and bias a, b, c, d = p  .05 aa, bb, cc, dd = p  .01 aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, p  .001

93

Table 4.

Hierarchical regression of group identification on explicit and implicit weight bias.

Beta t p R2 ∆R2

Positive explicit bias

Step One .40

In-group feedback form .11 1.20 .234

Out-group feedback form .12 1.38 .170

Baseline bias .62 8.19 .000

Step Two .42 .02

Weight status .11 1.31 .193

Group identification .24 .90 .372

Step Three .42 .00

Weight status/Group ID interaction -.30 -1.11 .271

Negative Explicit Bias

Step One .60

In-group feedback form -.09 -1.19 .239

Out-group feedback form -.03 -.43 .665

Baseline bias .70 10.38 .000

Race -.09 -1.44 .154

94

Step Two .62 .02

Weight status -.12 -1.76 .082

Group identification -.03 -.11 .913

Step Three .62 .00

Weight status/Group ID interaction .06 .27 .790

Good/Bad Trial

Step One .42

In-group feedback form -.08 -.91 .366

Out-group feedback form .02 .23 .819

Baseline bias .59 7.74 .000

Race .16 2.09 .039

Step Two .44 .02

Weight status .03 .41 .684

Group identification -.50 -1.87 .064

Step Three .45 .01

Weight status/Group ID interaction .41 1.54 .127

Motivated/Lazy Trial

Step One .38

In-group feedback form -.02 -.22 .828

Out-group feedback form -.03 -.39 .699

Baseline bias .46 6.07 .000

95

Social desirability -.30 -3.86 .000

Step Two .44 .06

Weight status -.21 -2.62 .010

Group identification .11 .41 .686

Step Three .44 .00

Weight status/Group ID interaction -.04 -.16 .872

96

Table 5.

Hierarchical regression of Protestant ethic beliefs on explicit and implicit weight bias.

Beta t p R2 ∆R2

Positive explicit bias

Step One .41

In-group feedback form .11 1.27 .208

Out-group feedback form .13 1.60 .113

Baseline bias .61 8.48 .000

Weight status .11 1.56 .123

Step Two .46 .05

Protestant ethic beliefs .22 3.07 .003

Negative Explicit Bias

Step One .62

In-group feedback form -.08 -1.09 .279

Out-group feedback form -.02 -.29 .773

Baseline bias .69 9.70 .000

Weight status -.14 -2.12 .036

Race -.09 -1.41 .160

Step Two .62 .00

97

Protestant ethic beliefs .03 .44 .661

Good/Bad Trial

Step One .43

In-group feedback form -.08 -.90 .373

Out-group feedback form .01 .06 .953

Baseline bias .59 7.82 .000

Weight status .08 1.05 .297

Race .16 2.09 .039

Step Two .44 .01

Protestant ethic beliefs -.11 -1.40 .164

Motivated/Lazy Trial

Step One .44

In-group feedback form -.01 -.14 .885

Out-group feedback form -.03 -.31 .757

Baseline bias .46 6.05 .000

Weight status -.24 -3.17 .002

Social desirability -.31 .401 .000

Step Two .44 .00

Protestant ethic beliefs .00 .06 .955

98

Table 6.

Hierarchical regression of just world beliefs on explicit and implicit weight bias.

Beta t p R2 ∆R2

Positive explicit bias

Step One .41

In-group feedback form .08 .93 .354

Out-group feedback form .11 1.32 .191

Baseline bias .62 8.23 .000

Weight status .11 1.50 .136

Step Two .42 .01

Just world beliefs -.08 -1.00 .318

Negative Explicit Bias

Step One .62

In-group feedback form -.08 -1.13 .263

Out-group feedback form -.03 -.44 .659

Baseline bias .68 10.12 .000

Weight status -.13 -2.00 .048

Race -.09 -1.45 .149

Step Two .62 .00

99

Just world beliefs .09 1.41 .162

Good/Bad Trial

Step One .43

In-group feedback form -.07 -.77 .446

Out-group feedback form .02 .28 .778

Baseline bias .59 7.52 .000

Weight status .07 .91 .364

Race .17 2.29 .024

Step Two .43 .00

Just world beliefs -.05 -.68 .497

Motivated/Lazy Trial

Step One .41

In-group feedback form -.01 -.14 .890

Out-group feedback form -.03 -.39 .697

Baseline bias .46 6.12 .000

Weight status -.23 -3.07 .003

Social desirability -.30 -3.97 .000

Step Two .41 .00

Just world beliefs .07 .99 .323