Danish Foreign Policy Review 2018

Home , Anders Samuelsen, Danish Defence, Finlandization, Frederiksen Cabinet, Lene Espersen, Northern Dimension

Edited by Kristian Fischer and Hans Mouritzen

DIIS · DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Danish Foreign Policy Review 2018

Edited by Kristian Fischer and Hans Mouritzen

DIIS · DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES © Copenhagen 2018 DIIS · Danish Institute for International Studies Østbanegade 117, DK-2100 Copenhagen, Denmark Tel: +45 32 69 87 87 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.diis.dk

Editors: Kristian Fischer ([email protected]) and Hans Mouritzen ([email protected]) Managing editor: Anna Pia Hudtloff

Editorial Advisory Board Clive Archer, Manchester Metropolitan University Hans Branner, retired Eric Einhorn, University of Massachusetts Dan Hamilton, Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies Christine Ingebritsen, University of Washington, Seattle Tonny Brems Knudsen, University of Aarhus Henrik Larsen, University of Copenhagen Sverre Lodgaard, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Ove Kai Pedersen, Copenhagen Business School Sten Rynning, University of Southern Denmark Helle Rytkønen, Danish Institute for Study Abroad Bengt Sundelius, University of Uppsala Ben Tonra, University College Dublin

Linguistic Consultant: Jessica Lerche

Graphic design: Mark Gry Christiansen

Printed in Denmark by Tarm Bogtryk a/s

ISBN (print): 978-87-7605-918-7 ISBN (pdf): 978-87-7605-919-4 ISSN: 1397-2480

DIIS publications can be downloaded free of charge or ordered from www.diis.dk

The full text of this book can also be found electronically in EBSCO Publishing’s databases. Contents

Preface 5

Chapter 1: Abstracts in English and Danish 7

Chapter 2: Official articles 13 The international situation and Danish foreign policy in 2017 14 Anders Samuelsen, Minister of Foreign Affairs

The role of Denmark in a more complex security environment 32 Claus Hjort Frederiksen, Minister of Defence

Chapter 3: Academic articles 45 Coping with Russia: past failures, future prospects, and implications for the Baltic Sea region 46 Michael Staack

Theorising post-Cold War Danish foreign policy: the expansion from one dominant to seven distinct approaches 77 Henrik Larsen

Arctic organisations are nations’ special darlings. But who’s whose? 115 Hans Mouritzen

The transformation of Danish foreign aid 138 Lars Engberg-Pedersen & Adam Moe Fejerskov

Chapter 4: Selected bibliography 163

3 4 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 Preface

Danish Foreign Policy Review 2018 addresses Danish foreign policy globally, regionally and domestically. It represents a continuation of Danish Foreign Pol- icy Yearbook that has been published annually since 1997. It is slimmer this year since we have omitted the Selected Documents, Danish Foreign Policy in Figures and Opinion Polls, because these are easily available elsewhere. We have retained the bibliography providing a selection of scholarly books, articles and chapters about Danish foreign policy published in English in 2017. More- over, in addition to the articles by Denmark’s foreign and defence ministers, this Review includes four academic articles, externally peer reviewed, whose authors represent only their own expertise (for details of each author, see the respective articles). Abstracts of these articles in English and Danish can be found at the front of this volume.

According to Michael Staack, relations between the West and Russia are at their worst since the early 1980s, and inadvertent military escalation has become a real risk also involving Denmark. His essay presents a number of proposals that could alleviate the tension in the Baltic Sea area.

Henrik Larsen’s contribution presents the theories or theoretical approaches that have actually been used in studies of post-Cold War Danish foreign policy. A proliferation of approaches has taken place. It is shown that interpretations of events and developments differ according to the theoretical ‘glasses’ worn.

5 6 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 June 2018 DIIS, Copenhagen The editors, astheassistanteditor.has served and dr.scient.pol.Mikkelsen HansMouritzen,whereas Sort stud.mag.Emilie Danish Foreign Policy Review 2018 to globalchanges. reflect short-term domestic political concerns rather than a strategic response Danish development cooperation over thepastdecade and argue thatthey Lars Engberg-Pedersen andAdam Moe Fejerskovin shifts analysethemajor tional wilderness. recommendationsas to howDenmark shouldnavigate in theArcticorganisa - spreading by smallerstates. The essay by Hans Mouritzensome also outlines ed interestsare by beingserved theseorganisations, dependency including the ‘darling’ government.Moreover, –ofoneparticular various vest national - Arctic organisationsinternational and thus – as theinstrument function often hasbeen edited by directorFischer Kristian Chapter 1 Abstracts in English and Danish

This chapter includes abstracts of the academic articles in English and Danish.

7 8 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 and implicationsfortheBalticSearegion Coping withRussia:pastfailures, future prospects, jen vanskelige proces. omgivelserigelighed afde internationale yderligere kankomplicere- den i forve uforuds- vedvarende den at huske, at vigtigt det er modsætninger.Samtidig de nuværen de af administrationenover ud rækker der normal’, ’ny en realisere at til velegnede være ville som forslag præsenteres sidst Til Østersø-regionen. i sikkerhedskonstellationen og konflikten i nøglerolle en spiller som politik, tyske den med sig beskæftige at til videre så går Essayet Europa. i hedsdilemmaet sikker- og integrationen og verden multipolær en for orden internationale den organiseringennemlig lemer, af partnerskabet, af sammenbruddet til førte som er direkte påvirket af disse udviklinger. Dette essay diskuterer de to hovedprob er blevetlation etmere sandsynligt scenarie end dengang. Danmarks sikkerhed eska- militær Utilsigtet 1980ere. tidlige de siden køligste de dag i er De Vesten. Ukraine-konflikten markerer et afgørende brud i relationerne mellem Rusland og difficult process. already this complicate volatilityenvironmentof theinternational could further to keepthe persistent that mind in Attagonism. important is it the sametime, that could forachievingbe suitable beyond a new normality managing the an- the BalticSearegion.in lation The essayby concludes presenting proposals constel security policy, the German and conflict, keythis a roleplaysin which the integrationEurope.dilemma in and security togoes on then It address namely theorganisationship, order ofinternational world and in a multipolar essayproblemsmain the two discusses that ledto thebreakthe partner in that time. Denmark’sis directly security affected by thesedevelopments. The escalationhasbecomeanevenmilitary more likelyadvertent scenariothanat the West. Relationsare currentlyand in- the early1980s since attheirworst and Russia between structuralrelations in break a marks Ukraineconflict The Michael Staack

- - - - ABSTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND DANISH Theorising post-Cold War Danish foreign policy: the expansion from one dominant to seven distinct approaches Henrik Larsen

The number of theoretical approaches used to study Danish foreign policy has multiplied since the Cold War period when just one approach – adaptation theory – was dominant. This article aims to outline the main theoretical approaches after the Cold War. The existence of several approaches is important because the different theories provide different views of what the important elements in Danish foreign policy are. The article shows that the view of significant elements in Danish foreign policy – and what are judged to be significant elements in Danish foreign policy – differs quite considerably according to the theoretical approach drawn on. It presents seven approaches: 1) adaptation theory, 2) constellation theory, 3) Denmark as a smart state, 4) lessons and traditions, 5) discourse analysis, 6) Denmark as a semi-integrated foreign policy actor with the EU, and 7) Denmark as a competition state.

Antallet af teoretiske tilgange til studiet af dansk udenrigspolitik er stærkt forøget efter afslutningen af den kolde krig, da én tilgang – adaptationsteorien – var dominerende. Formålet med denne artikel er at skitsere de teoretiske tilgange, der er blevet anvendt i studiet af dansk udenrigspolitik efter den kolde krig. Anvendelsen af flere forskellige teorier har væsentlige konsekvenser, fordi de forskellige teorier giver forskellige bud på, hvad der er vigtige elementer at studere i dansk udenrigspolitik. Artiklen viser, at synet på væsentlige elementer i dansk udenrigspolitik – og hvad der vurderes som væsentlige elementer – i høj grad afhænger af den teoretiske tilgang, som anvendes. Artiklen præsenterer syv teoretiske tilgange til studiet af dansk udenrigspolitik: 1) Adaptationstilgan- gen, 2) Konstellationsteori, 3) Danmark som smartstat, 4) Lektier og traditioner, 5) Diskursanalyse, 6) Danmark som del af EU’s udenrigspolitik 7) Danmark som konkurrencestat.

9 10 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 But who’s whose? Arctic organisations are nations’specialdarlings. hensigtsmæssigt kannavigere idetorganisatoriske vildnisiArktis. i detteessay formuleresom, hvordan nogle policy-anbefalinger Danmark mest styrkepositionkan de multilateralisere sagerne i en arktisk organisation. Til sidst underlegen en fra ud USA eller Rusland med bilateralt forhandle at for stedet i afhængighedsspredning: i værdi en der ligger småstater stormagts For repræsentanter. højprofilerede med mødes at eller f.eks., informationer, samle at interesser,nationale afmedlemskabetdisseorganisationer: dertilgodeses den vigtigste organisation i Arktis. Herudover er der forskellige mere diskrete land, hvilketfor nogetbestemt eren som af årsagernetildetsubestridtestatus instrument være at ikke ved ud sig skiller Råd baby.Arktisk Danmarks er bejde ’Arktis-5’-samarløsere det mens Finlands, Dimension’ Norges’Nordlige er EUs yndling, f.eks. er Barentsrådet regering. bestemt én for – favorit eller yndling som derfor for,og eresder – instrument fungerersom organisationerneofte at regeringerne og deres respektiveinteresser. nationale Idetteessay argument essante studieobjekterer de arenaer, de stiller tilrådighedmellem forsamspillet inter- til dem gør imidlertid regeringer.der medlemslandenes Hvad af greb fast organisationer,Internationale såvel iArktissomandre steder, bliverI et holdt tic organisational wilderness. recommendationsare offeredto as navigatehow Denmarkshould the Arc in - they canmultilateralisein anArctic issues organisation. Finally, somepolicy stead of negotiatingbilaterally withRussiaorthe US from aninferior position representatives.states maysmaller Also, practice dependency spreading: in- power great high-profile with meet to or instance, for information, collect to interests are by being served these organisations. Statesare members inorder the reasonsone of unrivalledits for Moreover, status. various vestednational Denmark’s baby. The Arcticby Council, contrast, isnobody’s darling,which is Finland’s,is Dimension the EUNorthern while the looseArctic-5 cooperation is government. particular The Barentsfor example,isNorway’s Council, darling; operationsas a‘darling’and thus – as aninstrument often function of one – interests.national their arguedis It essaythis in the organisations/cothat isthe arenaof study that they provide for the interplay ofgovernmentsand governments.member their However, what makes theorganisationsworthy Arcticgovernmental organisationsleveragehold much do not inrelation to Hans Mouritzen

- - - - ABSTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND DANISH The transformation of Danish foreign aid Lars Engberg-Pedersen & Adam Moe Fejerskov

International development cooperation is in a state of flux, put under pressure by shifting political priorities and a changing global context. Traditional donors are challenged by emerging actors and face a triple crisis of identity, ideas and resources. At the same time, the Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Develop- ment Goals provide a strong unifying normative framework, lighting the way for global cooperation and development. This contribution examines how development agencies face this increasingly complex environment by studying one long-term significant donor: Denmark. The major shifts in Danish development cooperation of the past decade are explored, as well as whether these changes are incited by a changing global context or, rather, by other stronger factors. The article concludes that significant policy, thematic and resource shifts have taken place, but that they reflect short-term domestic political concerns rather than a strategic response to global changes. The significant transformation of Danish aid increasingly appears as the withering of a once strong and focused donor.

Betingelserne for det internationale udviklingssamarbejde ændrer sig stærkt i disse år. Traditionelle bistandsdonorer udfordres af nye aktører og står over for markante udfordringer hvad angår deres identitet, ideer og ressourcer. På samme tid udgør den i FN vedtagne Agenda 2030 og verdensmålene en stærk normativ ramme, der viser vejen frem for globalt samarbejde og udvikling. Dette bidrag undersøger, hvordan udviklingsorganisationer agerer under disse kom- plekse omstændigheder ved at studere en historisk set central donor: Danmark. Artiklen analyserer de væsentligste forskydninger i dansk udviklingssamarbejde det seneste årti og spørger, hvorvidt forandringerne er afledt af en ændret global kontekst eller snarere bestemt af andre stærkere faktorer. Artiklen konkluderer, at der er sket væsentlige politiske, tematiske og ressourcemæssige ændringer af dansk bistand, men at disse i højere grad afspejler kortsigtede indenlandske politiske interesser end at de udgør et strategisk svar på en ændret global kontekst. De betydelige forandringer af dansk bistand udgør i stigende grad en svækkelse af et fordums stærkt og fokuseret udviklingssamarbejde.

11 12 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 Chapter 2 Official articles

13 14 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 Danish foreign policy in 2017 The internationalsituation and be done, the EU is no longer in full crisis mode. Rather,crisis full longer in no the EUis be done, theEUmade remark- height oftheself-proclaimedneeds towork still Caliphate. Whilemuch Islamic and nowcontrolslosses fractiona small all but held itatthe of theterritory headway inaddressing the migration and refugee ISIS sufferedcrisis. heavy While there remainsroomno complacency,for the European made Union eral democratic values.as gloomymanyhad was not forecast. But2017 tradea more in protectionistenvironmentinternational and safeguarding lib- wrong.the pessimists challenges remain, Serious promoting including free proved also they caution, prudent justified followed that months twelve the If adoptanewapproach to America’shenceforth role intheworld. daysbefore inauguration, his ready to declareadministration thathis would Netherlands, France andGermany. Finally,then president-elect Trumpstood voices looked poised to make electoral elections inthe gains inthe upcoming terrorismand radicalization toand indeed Anti-EU anti-globalist continent. our claim the livesa starkmanifestation of39civilians, of thethreat posed by still ever gobeyondphase. NewYear’sinitial its Day saw aterror Istanbul attack in enteredations year,a critical whichwoulddecide whether the process would Brexit-negoti- hot. remained Ukraine in conflict The Iraq. and Syria of swaths large across strong stood ISIS levels. 2015 at not albeit significant, mained re- Europe toward migrants irregular and refugees of flow The reason. good Following a disruptivemany held 2016 their breath of2017.Foron thecusp A better 2017 than many had forecast Anders Samuelsen,MinisterofForeign Affairs able progress in the areas such as migration, economic growth and defense THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND DANISH FOREIGN POLICY IN 2017 policy. Anti-globalist proponents fell short of the transformative results they had hoped for in the big elections across Europe. Finally, while we have had our differences across the Atlantic in the first year of the Trump administration, not least on free trade, reality has fallen far short of the transatlantic rift depicted by many on the eve of 2017.

To seize the opportunities and meet the challenges of our ever closer, more turbulent world, the Danish Government launched in June 2017 the Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2017-2018 – the first of its kind for Den- mark. The strategy focuses on five priority areas: 1) migration, instability and terrorism; 2) security in the neighbourhood area; 3) Brexit and the future of the EU; 4) globalisation – economic diplomacy and ‘techplomacy’; 5) The Arctic.

Of course, these priorities far from exhaust the full spectrum of Denmark’s foreign and security interests. That was never the intention. Rather, the aim was to identify five priority areas to which the Danish Government would devote attention and resources in 2017-2018. The priorities reflect the basic recognition that the Western model of open, liberal democracies with market-based economies cooperating within a rule-based international order is under pressure. We cannot take our way of living for granted. We must work hard to ensure that all states, large and small, respect international rules and principles. We must fight for the liberal values that form the foundation of our free and open democracies. We must continue to give Danish companies the best possible conditions to compete on the international market and, finally, we must stay abreast of the risks and possibilities driven by the rapid technological development.

This chapter takes stock of international developments in 2017 through the lens of the priorities laid out in the Danish Foreign and Security Strategy. Final- ly, the chapter sums up and looks ahead at 2018.

Migration, instability, and terrorism

Last year, despite an initial increase across the central Mediterranean route, we witnessed an overall significant decline in the number of refugees and irregular migrants seeking to Europe. Many factors accounted for this. An important

15 16 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 strated willingnessto improve cooperation onreturn andreadmission. approach, have beenmade available toof ademon- on thecondition countries of developmentlocation which, basedona ‘more-for-more’funds, assistance al- specific the by accompanied was 2017 in dialogue intensified The EU. the a procedurereadmitting for with nolegal right tonationals Ethiopian stay in reinforcingmutually track, theEUreached with Ethiopiaon an understanding significantly improved cooperation on return and readmission. In a parallel and Heads of State to cabinet ministers and senior officials, Denmark and Ethiopia with Ethiopiaduringtheyear. Through bilateralfrom discussions thelevel of dialogue their intensified EU the and Denmark instance, For too. front this on the heavyof much While sion. remainslifting progresswitnessed ahead, 2017 forefrontbe devotedmust work. Specialattention of our to returnand readmis - also remainmust with Africancountries atthe Strengthening our partnerships the regional G5 Sahel initiative toand EUR 10million theEUAfrica TrustFund. toamounts moreannually, than EUR70million we provided toEUR 1million developmentstantial Burkina Faso, whichfor assistance, MaliandNigeralone of theEUandUNinLibya. In addition toto sub our theefforts with experts to Operation Triton,tosupplied personnel Frontex and EASO, andcontributed itarian budget reached highestlevelits ever; we deployed a Challenger Plane remainDenmark will engaged acrossthe board. Denmark’s2017, In human- wards Europe. so manyrefugeescausing and migrantsof economicopportunity to seek to- way.address must we And strife humanitarian driversthe conflict, of lack and sustainable and humane effective, an in flows migration with deal to capacity totheir and helpbuild neighbors and Southeastern Southern our work with nal borders. Frontlineremainstates greatunder pressure. Wecontinue must at thetop oftheEU’s agenda. do morestill The EUmust to shoreexter- our up Progressgivenot must riseto complacency, however. remainmust The issue with various AfricanstatesandtheUnion. progressders, return voluntary on and readmission and improved cooperation bor EU’s external the secure traffickers and and smugglers migrant of model Frontex,of impact Operation tosteps Sophia andother the business disrupt cooperationthe continued based ontheEU-Turkey the of 2016, Statement bythe European ures undertaken States. Member and its Union These include of theseveralthe combinedimpact wasundoubtedly ofthestory part meas- - - Another major challenge is the chaotic situation in Libya. Without a functioning THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND DANISH FOREIGN POLICY IN 2017 Libyan state, the country will remain a transit route for migrants trying to reach Europe. Denmark remains a strong supporter of the United Nations effort to advance a peaceful transition to democracy. On migration, EU cooperation with Libya involves a number of efforts, as set out in the Malta Declaration of February 2017. The EU has provided training for more than 200 Libyan coast guards through Operation Sophia, involving basic seamanship as well as international law with a strong focus on respect for human rights. In addition, the EU provides funding for the important work of the International Organisation for Migration, which helps migrants return to their home countries and seeks to alleviate the distressing situation for migrants, who experience shocking human rights abuse in the hands of criminal networks.

Finally, we must not forget that irregular migration is not only a major challenge today; it will remain a strategic challenge in the long-term, with the total population of the African continent projected to double by 2050, reaching 2.5 billion. Unless Africa enjoys the stability and prosperity needed to convince the coming generations of young Africans that their future is best served in their home country, they will seek to make a living elsewhere. Many will embark on a journey towards Europe. Therefore, we must assist African countries ensure their citizens enjoy the basic security and economic opportunity necessary for them to make a living and raise their families in their home country. Among our tools to do this is targeting our development cooperation, opening markets, enticing investments and building trade relationships to advance inclusive and sustainable growth. This was also a central theme of the EU-AU Summit in No- vember 2017 – a Summit, which also helped pave the way for a strengthened dialogue between EU and AU on all aspects related to irregular migration.

In the Middle East, 2017 saw substantial, hard won progress in the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. ISIS lost all but a small fraction of the territory it once held at the height of the so-self-proclaimed Islamic Caliphate, confining it to waging insurgent attacks from pockets of ungoverned desert territory or in urban areas. Denmark played its part as an active member of the US-led international coalition against ISIS. We help train the Iraqi security forces and protect the international military presence on the ground. We were also active in countering terrorism financing and extremist propaganda, and we strengthened our already significant stabilization efforts and humanitarian assistance to Iraq and the conflict in Syria.

17 18 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 parents, youth, municipalities, police and tech companies. This final point is point final This companies. tech and police municipalities, youth, parents, teachers, NGOs, including approach, whole-of-society a requires it approach; lent extremism. An effective response requires not just a whole-of-government while takingatough,assembly clear-eyed approach to thosewhopromotevio- strikemust acarefulbalance betweenprotecting the freedom speech and of a losing battle alongside ISIS in Syria and Iraq. In confronting this challenge, we foreign fighters who have returned to their homes in Europe after having fought ISIS and other fundamentalist groups. This challenge is amplified by the many toParis Brussels, to are Copenhagen– exposedto theextremistdogma of of youngCountless andimpressionableacross minds Europe –from London remain vigilantandengaged. mean lesspotent. less tangibledoesnot But tion of the threat, it can be more difficult to explain to our publics why we must and Iraq, its extremist ideology is thriving online. Without a physical manifesta- Today, we face the paradox thatwhile ISIS hasonefootinthe grave in Syria ization andviolentextremism. the creationin we assist instance, Lebanon, for of localprevention against radicalnetworks and Jordan In violence. and ethnic factionalism of flames the en moderate forces acrossthe region extremist andcounter ideology thatfan the region.state anddestabilise doing whatwecanto Italsoentails strength - Iraqi the supplant to able be again not will actor extremist non-state a that so population, local the for goods public basic and security of level sufficient a provide to necessary capacity the build government Iraqi the helping entails isdefeatedthat ISIS and preventfromothers taking their place. simply This has actually increased in 2017.Wemaintain ourengagement must to ensure senseof false toa orweakenresolve. our comfort of terroristThe number attacks inthe West lead not must ISIS against battlefield the on gains The and themilitantextremism itespoused. to Europe posedby theterror attacksplanned,sponsored and inspired by ISIS reflectedalso unwaveringIt Caliphate. our commitment confrontto threat the Islamic self-proclaimed the by inflicted barbarism the of itself rid population local the help Denmark’s to desire only not reflected engagement strong their every day. Their braverymakes andcontribution meproud. Itold themthat make soldiers our difference big the firsthand experience to opportunity an me gave visit The Iraq. Western in Al-Qaim of city important strategically the of out ISIS pushed offensive military Iraqi another before weeks few a Iraq in OctoberIn deployedsoldiers Danish I visitedour 2017, to theAl-Asad base - one reason, among several, why I appointed the first tech ambassador world- THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND DANISH FOREIGN POLICY IN 2017 wide in 2017 – but let me get back to that later.

Regrettably, developments in the Middle East Peace Process in 2017 was not a tale of steady progress and cautious optimism. On many fronts, the situation remained unchanged; on some, it deteriorated. The political track was deadlocked throughout the year, with little or no direct contact between the parties. Illegal Israeli settlements continued apace and humanitarian strife worsened in Gaza and the West Bank. Moreover, we saw setbacks in terms of human rights violations and the infringement of rule of law also under the auspices of the Palestinian Authority on the West Bank, while Islamic Jihad and ISIS-af- filiated groups stepped up their activities in Gaza. Tensions increased in July following a shooting on the Temple Mount, which left two Israeli police officers dead, prompting Israeli authorities to install enhanced security measures. These measures caused a public outcry among Palestinian leaders and more than a hundred Palestinians were, according to reports, injured in the ensuing clashes with Israeli authorities. It took weeks for the tension to subside.

In December, President Trump announced that the US would henceforth rec- ognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and consequently begin the process of moving the American Embassy to the city. While warmly welcomed by Is- raeli leaders, the response by the Palestinian side was strong. Denmark reaffirmed support for the two-state solution and our position that the status of Jerusalem is subject to the negotiations between the two parties. The Europe- an Union reiterated this position to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as well as president Abbas. However, I also repeatedly made it clear that there can be no sustainable political solution to the Middle East Peace Process without the US. Therefore, I am happy that the EU continued to coordinate closely across the Atlantic.

Security in the neighbourhood area

Tension. In too many ways, this word captures the security development in our neighbourhood this past year. The different drivers of this trend are well known. On the ground in Ukraine, from the air over the Baltic Sea and even online, Russia continued their assertive and indeed belligerent behavior.

19 20 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 the work to keep Ukraine high agenda, on the international including by hosting ofimpressive. Weagendashort cult wasnothing willremain attheforefrontof Tkeshelashvili. Her dedication and commitment to taking the lead on this diffi- the head of the program in Kiev –the former foreignof Georgia, minister Eka in rolling outtheEU’sprogram anti-corruption inUkraine. I therefore met with lead the taken has Specifically, Denmark support. substantial its continue will remainand must Ukraine-led, community Denmark andtheinternational but to Europeanits on continue reformits tain path. effort The reformprocess is levels ofUkrainian society. Mymessage in Kiev wasthatUkrainemain- must energy sectors.heavymuch But rife still is ahead. lies Corruption lifting atall tosteps its including ible, reignand reformspending public in the bankingand process inUkraine. The country’s reform progress since2014hasbeen incred In Kiev, I met an array of government officials and NGOs to discuss the reform conditions, oftensubjectto indirect fire andintimidation by separatists. difficult very under work admirable their conduct They exchanges. prisoner or infrastructure critical of repair the for allow to ceasefires local temporary facilitating in instrumental also are they area; conflict the in community tional These unarmed civilianmonitors are not onlythe eyes and ears ofthe interna monitorsdeployed under theOSCE’s SpecialMonitoring inUkraine. Mission in EasternUkraine,in DonbasandMariupol where I metagroup ofDanish tothrough push hard,necessary, but reforms. I travelled to thelineofcontact Kiev in fight Ukraine’s and Ukraine for Eastern battle in the conflict future:The When IvisitedUkraineI made 2017, a ofseeing both ‘fronts’point in January of ground are notstable.Here, Russiaholdsthekey. progresspolitical willcome,letalone endure,on the conditions ifthe security Ukrainedeliver must Agreements,the Minsk in ontheircommitments no but course, Of army. separatist sizable a equipping and training by and Ukraine byof corner an aggressivethe easternmost initiating in intervention military Crimea, annexing illegally by conflict the started Russia that recalling worth is the feetand Ukraine,Russia ofboth increasingly as someobservers tendto,it at evenly blame the lay to tempted feels one if But forward. way a find to will remained 2014 and2015, in largely deadlocked, ofthepolitical signs withlittle Agreementsdubbed aftertheMinsk hammeredcapital in theBelarussian out to the separatistssupport and arms. of rubles in theform The Process,Minsk Ukraine unabated, enabled by continued steady themeddlingandits of Russia While the conflict may have dropped off the front pages, the fighting in Eastern - - an international ministerial Ukraine reform conference in Copenhagen in June THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND DANISH FOREIGN POLICY IN 2017 2018.

Further to the north, in the Baltic Sea Region, Russia’s assertive policy also remained in full gear. Russia maintained a threatening military posture by land, sea and air, deploying a hybrid of instruments ranging from cyber warfare and disinformation campaigns, nuclear rhetoric as well as snap exercises that flouted arms control regimes. Our response has been multifaceted: Denmark was an active supporter of the steps to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence policy. To this aim, in January 2018 we deployed 200 Danish soldiers to Estonia under the British framework of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in Poland and the three Baltic States. We also pushed avidly for closer EU-NATO cooperation in countering cyber threats and strategic communication. Den- mark also contributed substantially to the Alliance’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and NATO’s Standing Maritime Force.

In 2017, various elections and referenda were targeted by Russian disinformation and influence campaigns. This was especially concerning to meas liberal democratic values are at the core of my political beliefs and essential to our freedom. We will never accept any country undermining our democratic processes using influence campaigns. That is why a new interagency task force was set up to strengthen our work on disinformation and influence campaigns. We will use openness to increase domestic awareness of the threat while also expanding international engagement and cooperation on the issue.

We also aim to do even more in our neighbourhood. In November 2017, I launched a new 5-year Neighbourhood Programme (2017–2021) for Ukraine and Georgia with an indicative budget frame of 860 million DKK. And on 28 January 2018, a new Danish defence agreement was reached with broad parliamentary backing. With a substantially increased defence budget and investments in new capacities, we will step up our contribution to the collective security of NATO, including in the Baltic Sea Region.

Our engagement in Ukraine and our contribution to NATO’s deterrence and defence policy must also be seen in relation to our comprehensive Russia policy, which, at its core, wrestles with a basic dilemma: On the one hand, it is in Den- mark’s interests to cooperate with Russia, be it the Arctic, as a trade partner or in dealing with international security challenges from Syria to North Korea.

21 22 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 OSCE, to provide an alternative to confrontation andto reduce risk. laterally and multilaterally asthrough such the NATO-Russiaor inthe Council tradeanother. is Finally,bi- dialogue open, keepwe must further for channels cooperationareasin further whereinterests our align. The Arcticone area;is and defence policy. At the same totime, we will continue engage and explore NATO’sgal annexation ofCrimea.And towe will continue support deterrence Agreements. Wenon-recognitionour willcontinue towardspolicy Russia’sille- remainunder the Minsk their commitment fully honour Moscow inplaceuntil must Russia against sanctions economic EU’s the Consequently, cost. a at extending an openpalm.WhenRussiabreakscome it must rules, international careful balance betweenpressure anddialogue,betweendrawingand aline tosubmit of large thewill responseOur powers. to todilemma is this strike a must states small and right trumps might which in view world a reflects and hand, Russia’sOn theother behaviorprinciples violates international assertive and obligations, and it must preserve a level playing field and protect the integ- Having saidthat,anyagreementensure withtheUKmust a balance of rights situation. ofthe EU inthe future, making the best ofanunfortunate partner interestis inour to ensure an orderly withdrawal and to keep the UK asa close proach to Brexit willremain unchanged. Weinterests.national willfollowour It ap- Denmark’s in principles core The phase. first the of aspects all on ment second phaseoftheBrexitwe need to negotiations, hammerouta clear agree the enter we as Even done. job mean not does progress sufficient course, Of States stood unitedthroughout thenegotiations. Ireland. the borderof between Ireland issue andNorthern Member The EU27 matter delicate the and rights citizens’ progress settlement, financial the the on achieved sufficient deemed Council European the 2017, December By on 8June2017,thenegotiationsdidnotofficiallybeginuntillate2017. generala snap the callfor by election May,Prime Minister which took place of 50 TreatyArticle under ofthe EuropeanMarchin Union However, 2017. with were set to beginafterthe Kingdom activatedUnited the withdrawal procedure backdropof Brexit. Kingdom between theEUandUnited The negotiations Europeanhigh gearthroughout was in politics the regretfulagainst albeit 2017, Brexit and the future of theEuropean Union - rity of the Single Market. A non-EU member cannot have the same rights as THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND DANISH FOREIGN POLICY IN 2017 a member state and the EU must preserve its decision-making autonomy as well as the role of the Court of Justice of the Union. Whatever agreement we reach in the end, the future relationship between the UK and the EU will shape the European landscape for years to come.

However important, Brexit must not lead us to take our eye off the ball. The EU must remain focused on the main issues that matter most to its citizens – and we must deliver. Migration, economic growth and job creation must be front and centre. If one was ever in doubt that these issues must be at the top of the EUs agenda, look at the election outcomes in the Netherlands, France and Germany. Even though anti-globalist groups did not achieve the transformative result they aspired to, in all three elections they picked up votes in part because of the EU’s perceived lackluster performance on the issues such as migration, security, and job creation.

In 2016, the EU’s Heads of State and Government agreed on the Bratislava Roadmap setting out an ambitious agenda focusing on how to deliver tangible results in the areas that concern our citizens and businesses: Migration and external borders, internal and external security, youth, and economic and social development. In 2017, we started to deliver on Bratislava. We have already covered migration. On security, the EU took a set of historic steps to strengthen the military dimension of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy. The flagship agreement was the Council Decision in December to launch a Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence, providing a new framework for the 25 participating Member States to deepen their defence cooperation and develop defence capabilities jointly. Given the Danish defence opt-out, we are not part of PESCO, but we welcome the initiative as a clear step towards strengthening European security.

As for the European economy, it performed significantly better than expected in 2017, driven in part by private consumption, stronger growth globally, and falling unemployment. The euro area economy grew at its fastest pace in a decade, with a real GDP growth of 2,2% in 2017, and the EU economy as a whole grew by 2,1%. The EU-Canada trade agreement entered into force provi- sionally in September 2017 and three months later, the EU and Japan agreed in principle on a free trade agreement, which would be the EU’s largest to date (some analysists suggest Danish export to Japan could increase by 70-150%).

23 24 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 mark’s interests abroad andensuringourprosperity athome. safeguardingfor platform Den - important the most a doubt without what is strengthen further we will By doingso, small. on small big, EU shouldbebigon European level.agreefully I the Junckerof the slogan with Commission: The er,streamlined andmore effectivedealt withatthe best issues focused on EU, and in the needs concerns of ourcitizens. This leads me to argue fora strong- leaving the family. But as we look to the future, our goals must be firmly rooted that alargenow Member Stateis the EUmaybate on beallthemore important to new ideas, discuss and a forward-looking de es. I welcome opportunities treatyzenschanges or big institutional for the time not expect. Nowis chang- complacency. Westay must focusedondelivering the tangible resultsour citi As hasbeenthe refrain formuchofthischapter,progress our not lead must to toessary react andsendaclearsignal. wayno and in by underpinned and behavior.actions its Therefore,was nec- it processwere contradictoryto andtheircommitment the processlukewarm EU enlargement the on statements official Turkey’s work. their undertaking in difficulties faced have organizations rights human and journalists, jailed of restrictionsjobs, on media freedom have increased, leading to ahighnumber tens ofthousandspeoplehave been either arrested or dismissedfrom their the areaattempt, coup the the aftermathof In rights. law andhuman of rule of we have2016, July in attempt the failed coup in conditions seenworsening away from the EU and European and further values. Particularly,further after a country,with ship whose behavior wereand decisions movingclearly so it Wecontinuation. to founditpointless on EUmember- negotiations continue with negotiations EU accession Turkeytheir dis- for bysupport its announcing the regarding stance firm a took government Danish the 2017, September In Denmark’s ingoods. total export to theSingleMarket, whichreceivesdepend export Danish jobs on our 2/3of 500.000 than economy. More Danish the and Denmark for benefits mendous remembering that theEuropean Marketalso worth Single is It provides tre- - - Globalisation – economic diplomacy and THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND DANISH FOREIGN POLICY IN 2017 techplomacy

Globalisation is now the unquestionable framework in which we navigate. For a small, but innovative and enterprising economy like Denmark’s, globalisation offers a range of opportunities. We continuously support international free trade, we engage in new strategic partnerships with key actors on the global scene and we increase our economic diplomacy on a global scale. We are very dependent on open markets and a rules-based international trading system: Our export goods and services are worth more than DKK 1,1 trillion annually, which supports approximately 730.000 Danish jobs or almost half of the private sector employment in Denmark. As mentioned earlier, anti-globalisation and protectionist sentiments continued to be dominant themes in 2017, threatening to undermine the liberal global trading order that has been in place since the Second World War – to the benefit of all countries. Indeed, trade policy has become high politics in many countries. US trade policy took a turn with the Trump administration withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Part- nership. However, it is perhaps still too early to tell whether this and other US trade policy decisions in 2017 are harbingers of the US retreating from its traditional leadership role on international trade.

In contrast, the ambitious bilateral trade agenda of the EU gained new mo- mentum last year. The EU concluded landmark free trade agreements (FTA’s) with Canada and Japan. The EU also made significant progress in negotiations with the South American Mercosur countries as well as Mexico, with hopes of reaching agreements in 2018. Negotiations with Australia, New Zealand and Chile are expected to start soon. Multilaterally, the EU took on a proac- tive and constructive role in trying to achieve a strong outcome at the WTO’s 11th Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires in December. Regrettably, it was not possible to find consensus on new WTO agreements or even a ministerial declaration on the way forward. However, on a more positive note, the Buenos Aires meeting also demonstrated that large groups of WTO countries are interested in exploring the possibility of plurilateral negotiations on central topics in a modern economy, like e-commerce and investment.

From a Danish trade policy perspective, 2017 was a mixed bag. The conclusion of new EU trade agreements was excellent news for Danish and European

25 26 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 lay thegroundwork foralong-termIndo-Danishpartnership. comprehensiveEU-India Free andambitious Trade Agreement, andseekingto expanding andstrengtheningon focused arguingincluding ties, favor in a of Foreignfor Minister AffairsofDenmark tosevenIndia in visit years.visit My commercial ties, I prioritized a visit to India in November 2017 – being the first developmentand akeen interestadvantageousmutually securing in trade and Finally,Danish andChineseauthorities. on India’s building 80 strong economic than more involving cooperation of fields concrete 58 out sets program Workwhen theJoint Program was agreed. tothe partnership implement The was taken step Mayin 2017 10 years.the past with Chinafor ation Afurther comprehensivehas formedthebackbone ofour cooper- and thepartnership with China. sive strategicThis gives partnership usa comparative advantage level. toDenmark is the only Nordic have country established a comprehen with Indonesiato astrategicPresidentpartnership our JokoWidodolifting sen’sto visit IndonesiainNovemberstatement wasissuedwith a joint 2017, Lars LøkkePrime Minister established, andduring was with Mexico Rasmus KoreaSouth (2008), a strategic (2011) andJapan(2014).In2017, partnership with China During the past tenyears, we have established such partnerships for advancing commercial interests andopensdoorsforDanishcompanies. and promotesauthorities Denmark’s of strength, positions provides platforms engagement involvesOur instruments. a range supportive ally government of approach, whichdrawsa broad on and mutu of Danishexperiences spectrum and Government. thestrategicThis underlines aim andwhole-of-government high-level bilaterallaunched at thelevel strategic ofHead of State partnerships areabeen apriority has mies recent in years. We haveof engageda number in this backdrop, Denmark’s engagement and cooperation withemerging econo- wheretries, wehaveinterestsand economic clearpolitical at stake. Against tocontinues build strong withcoun and long-lasting strategic partnerships provided by thesedevelopments,and economicopportunities litical Denmark ing upinAsia as wellinAfrica and Latin America. In order to seize the po- While global economic and political powersarenew marketsshifting, are open- – firmlybasedinthebelieffree, fairandsustainabletrade. underscore anactive theneed of continuing Danish trade andambitious policy the WTO and the rules-based tradinglinger. still system These developments Atcompanies andconsumers. the about the same futuretime, concerns of - - - - In 2017, the Government decided to launch a new strategic framework for eco- THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND DANISH FOREIGN POLICY IN 2017 nomic diplomacy aiming at creating access to markets and exploiting growth potentials in Danish positions of strength. A part of this is strategic sector cooperation in high-income countries, where Danish and local authorities cooperate in key sectors providing the opportunity for Danish companies to demonstrate state of the art solutions and increase commercial opportunities.

Free trade, export and the attraction of knowledge- and technology-intensive foreign investments are pivotal for all highly-skilled Danish companies, for job creation, innovation, productivity growth and thus for economic growth. Equal- ly, our knowledge and savoir-faire in areas like green technology, renewable energy, health care, food production and safety also make a very important contribution to enhancing sustainable growth at home and abroad and thus supporting the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Being a strong supporter of the SDGs, Denmark also took the first steps to create a sustainable development fund, which links the Danish business strengths to the SDGs, and to establish the green growth and sustainable development engine: P4G – Part- nering for Green Growth and for the Global Goals 2030.

Let me next turn to another area in which Denmark has truly been a first mover.

Today, global technology companies and other digital actors are influencing every aspect of Danish society and the everyday lives of Danish citizens. This influence is increasing and may even surpass many countries’ impact on Den- mark. The fourth industrial revolution challenges existing national and international structures of governance while artificial intelligence, machine learning and cyber security technology are evolving at a stunning pace, rendering it difficult for nation-states and international organisations to keep up. These trends only amplify the need for a foreign policy dialogue on the promises and pitfalls of new technology.

In 2017, the Danish government therefore decided to designate digitalisation and technological development a strategic priority for Danish foreign policy and appoint the world’s first Tech Ambassador. The Office of the Tech Ambas- sador has a global mandate and a physical presence across three time zones – Silicon Valley, Copenhagen and Beijing.

27 28 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 minimize therisksoftechnologyindigital21stcentury. also but benefits the maximize to want we if coalitions and partnerships new interestinitiative. inour since we will need point, to build That isa good starting so far. Everywhere Butitisonlythebeginning. I travel, Imeetanoverwhelming results our of These areTechPlomacyimportant the most of some initiative multi-stakeholder discussiononthesetopics. directionby conference an international hosting tosecurity cyber on a initiate and theprivatesociety civil sector. Denmarkrecently tookexactly this in astep governments, between relationship the strengthen and rethink to us require challenge the free,and disinformation tion and and peacefulcyberspace open area for the of focus TechPlomacy initiative. onlineradicalisaCyber-attacks, of the technological developmentThe policydimension security isalsoa strong humanitarianassistance. with theaimofproviding smarter other substantial result. The project will use big data to predict migration flows so-called ‘predictivean- is Refugeeand theDanish Council IBM with analytics’ stakeholders. In thesphere ofdevelopmenton cooperation,the partnership RevolutionFrancisco.San in involvewill arangeThe partnership Danish of nership withWorld EconomicForum’s Industrial new Center forthe Fourth tangible resultsOne ofthemost of the TechPlomacy- initiativea newpart is and knowledgeontechnologytrends to informpolicyprocesses inDenmark. Danish viewsaswellcollectinginformation a channel forcommunicating malised their dialogue with the tech community. as This new platform serves has providedIt liness. a valuableand for beachhead Danish authorities for time- and relevance its affirm initiativeTechPlomacy the of results initial The Arctic. development economic sustainable securing the in populations the local for to keep the Arcticpartners international ate withour areaa low-tension whilst of theArctic of theKingdomDenmarktopolicy cooper- at theheart lies It keeping tensionlow The Arctic –spurring development and - - The melting of the Arctic sea ice creates great challenges and have brought THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND DANISH FOREIGN POLICY IN 2017 increased attention to the region, including from non-Arctic states, raising concerns of heightened tensions and strategic competition. These concerns are kept in check, however – not least through an active diplomatic effort by the Arctic states to maintain amicable relations despite tensions in other regions around the world. This cooperation is the foundation on which we explore the new economic opportunities that arise as the ice melts, be it in the form of new sailing routes and more effective sea transport, responsible extraction of natural resources, and increased tourism.

Recognizing these new developments, I joined my Foreign Minister colleagues from the Arctic Council in Fairbanks in May 2017 in deciding that the Arctic Council needs its first strategic plan to guide our cooperation in this new reality. The plan is to be adopted in 2019.

The strategic plan should confirm that the Arctic Council remains the primary forum for international cooperation, knowledge-building and governance in the Arctic, focusing on dialogue and promoting shared goals in areas of common interest. It should lead to improvements in the livelihoods of all people living in the Arctic and the right of the Arctic States and peoples to pursue sustainable development, which goes hand in hand with safeguarding the Arctic environment.

In December 2017, with a view to influencing the thinking on the strategy and as part of the Government’s commitment to promoting sustainable development in the Arctic, the Kingdom of Denmark organised an international conference entitled ‘The SDGs in the Arctic – Local and Global Perspectives’. It brought out important insights into the dimensions of sustainable development and their interconnectedness in the Arctic. It further brought to the fore that the SDGs could serve as inspiration for the Arctic Council’s strategic plan, which could set the Arctic Council and its members on the right course to cooperation on concrete initiatives to spur economic growth and sustainable development.

Discussions at the conference also reflected that there is a need for the Arctic Council to find new ways to create ties to the business sector. There is reason to believe that such partnerships, e.g. with the Arctic Economic Council, could bring about a better understanding of how local and global stakeholders see

29 30 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 good cueto lookaheadat2018. about peacefulandresponsibletion cooperation intheArctic. This provides a toMay in Ilulissat to 2018 Declara of theIlulissat anniversary markthe10th - states. Forreason,this DenmarkandGreenland have invitedtheArcticstates We to continue must advance dialogue and cooperation amongallArctic as the first Danish minister since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. colleague,Sergeiwith myRussian Lavrov,March in Russia when visiting 2017 ever Arcticareaffairs Arcticwith discussed met when I including colleagues, Arcticrelations elsewhere.despite tension of emphasiswhen- a point is This Of course, the pre-requisite for sustainable development is peaceful and stable and attract investments to theArctic. initiativestant toimprove frameworkand businesses industry for conditions the Arcticin that couldlead to impor and opportunities and analysetherisks In otherwords, while havingour perspectiveoutlook, aninternational must where we haveour efforts the most atstake and can have the greatest impact. – indeed, – dotheheavywenot shouldnot on allfronts. lifting We focus must and we will strive to defend orderthis for the future. Denmark Of can- course, order,rules-based an international dependent on nation, a small Denmark is dle EastandAfrica,fightingfor ever more free trade all over theglobe. and effectivefocused tocontributing Union; the Mid- in peace andstabilization the Arctic,in dialogue andprosperity;working for on amoreinsisting the EU, in area,bourhood aggressionRussian against up standing allies; our along with of fronts:on a number workwillcontinue neigh in our this important In 2018, an even betterandmore prosperous future. beforeand are us to committed defending liberal our values,haveDenmark will that lie issues If westaythe longterm. in optimistic the important focusedon Even Iamhoweverin 2018, success amount ifweguaranteecannot a certain same abroad. holding freedom and liberal democratic values athome and advocating the committedtoMany challenges lie ahead up- for Denmarkasa small country Conclusion: looking ahead - - always be rooted in Danish interests. This will also form an important start- THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND DANISH FOREIGN POLICY IN 2017 ing point as I, together with my colleagues in the Danish Government, over the course of this year discuss and decide on Denmark’s Foreign and Security Strategy 2019-2020.

31 32 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 complex security environment The role of Denmark in a more Danish defence andpreparedness istheprerequisite forasafe society. ensureof the and nation. A the existence,integritysecurity robustcontinued operationsorderin to protectthe sovereignty oftheKingdom ofDenmarkand of military spectrum inthefull es have strength to the necessary participate is vitalthattheDanishArmed Forcchallenges, it security In viewoftherising - security anddefence policyintheyears to come. the backdropchallenges constitutes this complexsetofsecurity forDanish ber threats have serious security and socioeconomic consequences. Together, we see activity.climate change and increased military cy- cyberspace, Andin Arctic the In terrorism. and flows migration irregular for foundation the ating provides Africa, instability a breedingNorth groundcre Islamism, formilitant - aggressive and continuous ing behaviourfrom and the MiddleEast In Russia. since the end of theColdWar. Towards theEastwe are facing a challeng threatsserious facing themost The KingdomofDenmarkis wehave seen ternational operations andstabilisationefforts. in- in engagement and commitment continued a and aircrafts, fighter new of acquisition on 2016 from decision the of implementation agreement,defence was apivotal2017 year forDanishdefence marked byof anew negotiations Frederiksen, MinisterofDefenceClaus Hjort - Defence agreement 2018 – 2023 THE ROLE OF DENMARK IN A MORE COMPLEX SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

On 28 January 2018 the Danish Government and a broad majority of the Dan- ish Parliament agreed on a six year Defence Agreement for the period 2018- 2023. The Defence Agreement sets the course for the future direction of our Armed Forces and development of international and national defence and emergency preparedness

The new Defence Agreement has a particular focus on strengthening the following areas: 1) Denmark’s contributing to NATOs collective deterrence and defence; 2) The Armed Forces’ ability and capacity to take part in international operations and stabilisation efforts; 3) Contribution to national security, e.g. in the event of terror attacks in Denmark; 4) Protection of Denmark against cyber-attacks; 5) Improvement of the national emergency.

One of the significant parts of the Defence Agreement is the substantial investment in the Danish Defence to protect and defend Denmark. The defence spending in 2018 will growth with DKK 800 million with an increased trend resulting in an annual increased budget of DKK 4.8 billion by 2023. This is an increase in defence spending by more than 20 per cent as well as a significant increase in equipment investment.

As defence expenditure increases over the agreement period, the capacities of the Danish Armed Forces will likewise be substantially strengthened, allowing Denmark to participate in the full spectrum of military operations. This includes an enhancement of personnel with more operational units and troops and a more agile, less top heavy organisational structure, as well as military equipment, such as more modernized battle tanks, additional artillery, ground based air defence, area air defence, anti-submarine capabilities and the recent acquisition of 27 F-35 fighter aircrafts. This gives us the ability to operate with larger army formations within NATO’s territory, as well as more units that can be deployed for international operations outside NATO territory, e.g. in the framework of NATO, UN, or coalitions.

The Armed Forces’ ability to contribute to national security is also strengthened. Resources will be reserved for a stronger National Emergency Manage- ment and a more robust cyber defence. Furthermore, we are strengthening our national military service and mobilisation by increasing the number of conscripts by 500 and focusing national service towards national challenges.

33 34 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 security security Denmark’s contributions to international more ininternational missions. deployed individually thereby also enhancingthe overall ability to participate When notfullydeployed,context. the brigade’scan also be units composite all fighting power and mobility and will enhance the ability to operate in aNATO under a NATO framework. The brigade will strengthen the Armed Forces’ over- defence collective in part take and opponent equal more a deter to contribute the Defence agreementof a deployableis the establishment brigade that can our allies-and ultimately ourselves. This iswhy one ofthe main aspectsin weight, androbustnessto deterandpreventfromcountries other attacking potency, sufficient have must Forces Armed Danish the Allies, with Together a reliable, responsible andactive NATO Ally. to maintainDenmark’sas a core status member ofthe Alliance and to remain nerstoneand theDanishGovernmentpolicy ofDanishsecurity committed is (NATO)has beenacoreDenmark 1949 andsince Ally. NATO remainsthe cor Atlantic the North of member Treatya founding Denmark is Organization NATO – The cornerstone ofDanishsecurity lion to DKK150millionby 2023. increase gradually over the agreement period from approximately DKK 84 mil- Defence’sof the Ministry to contribution the Peace Fund andStabilisation will annually toand increaseannually in2023 DKK 750 million of 50%.Likewise gradually increase over the agreement period from the current DKK 500 million enhanced. toTherefore, be further the reserve operationsfor international will in areasand ations capacity-building where Danish troops are deployed needs the DanishDefencefor The ability oper- international out toand carry stabilise dic Defence Cooperation. NATO,and within countries of a widenumber with and theNor- the EU, the UN, remain inDenmark’s core interest. Therefore,to Denmarkcontinues cooperate legal ternational order, a strong Europe and effective multilateral cooperation GivenDenmark isfacing,a strongsituation the new andcomplexsecurity in- - In 2017, we saw the transatlantic relations and the US commitment to NATO THE ROLE OF DENMARK IN A MORE COMPLEX SECURITY ENVIRONMENT reaffirmed. The US continues to be a core allied for Denmark. We also saw the European allies take more responsibility for European security by increasing their defence spending. This goes hand in hand with the will and ability of allies to meet the capability targets of NATO and contributions to operations. Den- mark will carry a fair share and shoulder the burden of our collective security.

We are now facing a more aggressive and assertive Russia, investing heavily in its military and carrying out large-scale military exercises along the Baltic Sea and the Baltic countries’ borders with disregard for international norms and principles. First of all, Russia has violated obligations to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine with their illegal annexation of Crimea. Secondly, Russia conducted its largest military exercise since the Cold War, without following the rules of the Vienna Document. Thirdly, Russia is continuously challenging its neighbouring countries when Russian fighter aircrafts are flying in aggressive patterns. Such practises raise tension and undermine trust.

It is therefore important that NATO acts clearly and unambiguously towards Russia. There can be no doubt about our willingness or capacity to act in accordance with NATOs article 5. This is why Denmark, together with our NATO allies, decided to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence posture towards an increasingly aggressive Russia at the Warsaw Summit in 2016. With more than 4,000 NATO troops in the Baltic countries and Poland, NATO is sending a clear statement to Russia, that NATO allies stand united. Ultimately this is crucial to Denmark’s own security.

Consequently, in line with the decisions in the Defence Agreement, Denmark will now be establishing a brigade with new and heavier units and enhanced capabilities, including more battle tanks, ground-based air defence, anti-ar- mour weapon systems etc. The brigade will strengthen our overall fighting power and mobility and will enhance the ability to contribute to NATOs collective defence.

Finally, the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan remains NATO’s most important out-of-area mission. Denmark is contributing to NATO’s support to the Afghan government and institutions. In line with the Defence agreement, we are increasing the number of Danish soldiers in Afghanistan from about 100 to 155 at beginning of 2018. Our goal is that Afghanistan will not again become a safe haven for terrorists and extremism.

35 36 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 The Baltic Sea processes or carry outdestructiveprocesses cyber-attacks. Inthese scenarios vitalfunc orcarry political influence information, sensitive leaking of purpose the with attacks states showa more offensive behaviour demonstrating a will to out carry to stealmoneytrying andsecrets fromand thegovernment. companies Some On a we daily basis are attacked by cybercriminalsand foreign hacker groups open societymakes usvulnerable to various cyberthreats. afford to ignore. Denmark’s digitalised andavery of being avery combination great advantages,therebut are darksidesofthedigitalage that wecannot one oftheworld’sDenmark is digitalized most brings Digitalisation societies. Cyber threats 4 F-16fighterjetsandapproximately 60persons fromto April2018. January with time contributes the 6th increasinglywhy Denmarkfor is This important. daily patrollingtheir of Policing. becoming space is the air of The importance Denmark has since 2004 regularly contributed with fighter aircrafts to Baltic Air ence intheBalticSea. taskofmanagingNATO’sthe Navy takesthe importance on presmaritime - NATO(Standing Group Maritime 1). the ArmedForcesThus, particular,and, in Throughoutof NATOsDenmark hascommand 2018 frigate group standing 1 Crimea andaggressive behaviour. the enhanced forward presencea reaction is to Russia’sof illegal annexation reassure NATO’s easternmemberstatesoftheirsecurity. At the same time forward presenceto is reinforce NATOscollective defence andto protectand ward Presencetoup with soldiers. Danish 200 the enhanced of The purpose in NATOs Baltic Searegion.participating Denmarkisin2018 enhanced For- Therefore, we are strongly committedto the deterrencein the and security national normsandprinciples. borderscountries’ Sea andtheBaltic along theBaltic disregardwith inter for outlarge-scale exercisesis investing and carrying heavilymilitary initsmilitary In theBalticregion,activities giveRussian cause forgrowingRussia concern. - - tions of society can be shut down such as electricity, hospitals or financial THE ROLE OF DENMARK IN A MORE COMPLEX SECURITY ENVIRONMENT services. We are in a new digital arms race and the threats are only likely to increase even faster.

In Denmark we have seen very concrete examples of successful hackings: An unclassified e-mail system in the Danish Defence was compromised by hack- ers. Our experts assess that the attack can be traced to a Russian government backed group. Also, in 2017 we saw the so-called ‘WannaCry’ and the ‘NotPet- ya’ attacks that hit targets across the globe. ‘NotPetya’ had a significant impact on the Danish shipping line Mærsk.

Another development is the toxic cocktail we see when cyber espionage is being combined with disinformation and ‘fake news’. This is what happens with ‘hack-and-leak’ campaigns designed to influence and undermine the democratic processes that are the very foundations of our societies.

Dealing with cyber threats is a high priority for the Danish government, and with the new Defence Agreement we will strengthen the fight significantly. We will create a better protection against advanced cyber-attacks by expanding our network of advanced sensors at selected organisations. We will also establish a 24/7 national situation centre to monitor cyber threats, and we aim to increase the preventive capacities at the Centre for Cyber Security and thereby the ability to advise public and private actors about the threats.

Regarding disinformation and misinformation, the Defence Agreement is allocating more resources to the Danish Defence Intelligence Service’s Work in relation to foreign operations intended to influence public opinion, including expanding the Danish Intelligence Service’s analytical capacity.

We will also continue to build a capacity to carry out military operations in cyber space; a so-called Computer Network Operations capacity. Cyber operations will be an integrated part of future warfare – fought in cyberspace, but with very real consequences in the physical world.

37 38 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 Cooperation in the EU a key priorityforDenmark. valueorganisations thatboth tobring thetable.EU-NATO cooperationremains that thetwoorganisationscomplementarity,act infull illustrating theadded has been The premisesupport. sharing andlogistical mation oftheseefforts phia andNATO’s OperationSea Guardian havethrough continued regular infor been held,andcooperationand coordination between theEU’s EUNAVFOR So- has organisations two the between exercise coordinated and parallel first the irregular migrationand hybridthreats have beenimplemented.Operationally, concrete proposalsenhanced cooperation for areasin security,as cyber such declarationthe joint at theNATO Warsawa range2017, In 2016. in summit of dialogue and cooperation between the two organisations sincethe signing of NATOof progressessential. Alot is has beenmade to deepen thepolitical In the current strategic environment,close cooperation between the EUand where possibleto engageinandpositively contributeto thisdevelopment. respectingWhile fully companies. thedefenceDenmark willcontinue opt-out, improvethe Europeanfor theconditions defence industry,Danish including to ter cyberand hybrid attacks. efforts The Danish government alsosupports resiliencebuilding MemberStates’societal and defence capacities to coun helping addressthe root relatedcauses toterrorism and migration well as as that Europe faces. This includescomprehensivemanagement abroad crisis challenges the to respond efficiently to able is EU the that Denmark’sinterest Yet purpose. EU initiativesin amilitary whichserve takecannot in is it part defencetocomplementarity infull NATO. Dueto thedefenceDenmark opt-out, the development the EU’sof Denmark supports cooperation and security ion and makingbetteruseoftheEU’s securityanddefence tool box. refining at aiming 2017 in severalinitiated of initiatives out two just are These and deploymentment of defence been launched. has formally capabilities structured cooperationthe developfor states member (PESCO) between25 - for theEuropeantablish betterconditions defence industry, and a permanent defence. A European Defence Fund (EDF) has beencreated with aviewto es- prepare thegroundstrengthening for theUnion’s cooperationand on security In 2017, EU Member States and EU institutions have taken significant steps to - - Danish counter-terror and stabilisation THE ROLE OF DENMARK IN A MORE COMPLEX SECURITY ENVIRONMENT efforts, including against ISIL

Denmark is contributing to the fight against ISIL on the basis of UN resolutions and a request from The United States to Denmark to support US-led efforts. Throughout 2017 ISIL continued to systematically terrorise the Iraqi and Syrian populations. In the last part of 2017 the international coalition made considerable progress in its fight against ISIL and managed to take back almost all of the territory previously held by the terror organisation. Consequently ISIL’s physical ‘caliphate’ is almost eliminated, thus making it increasingly difficult for its followers to perpetrate their acts of violence against the local populations. However, ISIL continues to pose a threat to Iraq as well as the stability in the region. Moreover, ISIL remains a serious terror threat internationally.

Denmark’s military contribution to the coalition’s fight against ISIL currently consists of 231 deployed forces, with the majority of them taking part in the training of Iraqi forces on the Al Asad air base in western Iraq. Denmark also supports the coalition with mobile radars and personnel that provides airspace surveillance in support of the coalition’s air operations. Recently, the Danish Parliament has approved further military contributions including force protection as well as a C-130J tactical air transport aircraft.

Denmark is also contributing to the fight against ISIL through various stabilisation programmes aimed at for example de-mining efforts, re-establishment of critical infrastructure, security sector reform and reconciliation.

Denmark remains actively engaged in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. The largest military contribution was to the peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA). For six months a Danish military transport aircraft and around 60 staff provided MINUSMA with a critical enabling capability. The transport aircraft performed key tasks for the mission such as transport of passengers and evacuation of sick and injured personnel. In addition Denmark continued to support the UN Truce Supervision Organiza- tion in the Middle East (UNTSO) as well as the UN mission in South Sudan (UN- MISS) with staff officers. Denmark also provided financial support to the UN’s on-going efforts to improve the performance of the peacekeeping missions. In Asia, Denmark supported the UN Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC).

39 40 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 Nordic defence cooperation aligned Nordic neighbours,SwedenandFinland. for Denmarkto workfordeepened relationsnon- between the Allianceandour NATO,Within to continues beaclearinterest andcommitment furthermore it a European high-qualityflaglevel exercise. the developmentengage in also Arcticthe existing of Challenge Exercise into a togetherLetter ofIntent with otherNordicand the Denmark will US, countries practical ways of mutually benefitting cooperation. With the signing in 2017 of toNORDEFCO continues Thus, produce bothconcrete achievements and offer ries duringpeacetime. to assets eachother’smilitary for hanced access sea, landandaerialterrito - (Easy Access) betweennication the Nordicin order countries to ensure en- already agreed measures astherecently such signedagreement oncommu in order workcontinues to consolidate and implement important Furthermore, step-by-step to cover allsituations. the Nordicin region.Moving tois the intention forward, extend theagreement an improvedpeacetime whichwillallowfor in countries awareness situational The agreement enablesanimprovedof radar sharing databetweentheNordic standing regarding anenhanced cooperation (NORECAS). onairsurveillance Novembermeeting in at their ministers signed amemorandum 2017 of under- NordicDefencesignificantly,Cooperationthe Most (NORDEFCO). defence the Together progress hasbeen made within important Nordicwith our partners, defence andsecuritycontinuedto prosper throughout 2017. dialogue The closepoliticalandcooperation between the Nordicon countries - Support for national security THE ROLE OF DENMARK IN A MORE COMPLEX SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

In 2017 we saw an increased role for the Armed Forces to play in contributing to the safety of the Danish population. Throughout the year, Danish Armed Forces and the Home Guard have made extraordinary efforts to support the national police wherever needed. Especially the high level terror threat to Den- mark stretched national police resources to a point where Danish Defence was requested to provide 70 soldiers to take over part of the guard duties in Co- penhagen. Also, because of the irregular migration flows, the Armed Forces delivered 75 soldiers to support border control.

It is important that the Danish Defence contribute to the safety and security of Denmark to an even greater extent, first and foremost through increased support to the Danish National police. Accordingly, the Defence agreement leaves open the possibility that The Armed Forces could fully or partially be responsible for support to border control, including with support from the Home Guard. In addition, a light infantry battalion will be established with up to about 500 troops, ready to assist the police in case of terror attacks etc. Likewise, the Armed forces will establish a permanent helicopter response based in the Co- penhagen area at very high readiness to support the police’s counter-terrorism response.

In 2017, the Danish Emergency Management Agency, in addition to its national tasks, provided international emergency and humanitarian assistance to dis- aster-stricken countries around the world including Iraq, Uganda, Bangladesh and the US Virgin Islands. In the US Virgin Islands DEMA bilaterally assisted the US authorities in the reconstruction of critical infrastructure after the dev- astating hurricane season.

The new Defence Agreement states the importance of having a robust emergency preparedness, ability to prevent and respond to the consequences of disasters both at home and abroad. This is why the Defence agreement increases the operational robustness of the Danish Emergency Management Agency will be strengthened by approximately 125 additional conscripts and Non Commissioned Offers. In addition, a further DKK 25 million will be added for enhanced crisis management capacity and procurement of equipment, e.g. for pollution control or the prevention of natural disasters.

41 42 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 The Arctic tion, and support to thecivilianauthorities. tion, andsupport of sovereignty, search and rescue operations,marine environmental protec- inthe Arctic,and operationalwill becontinued. efforts This includesexercises which strengthens2016, controlcommand, surveillance, and communication, The Defence Agreement emphasisesthattheArcticAgreement ofDecember on ArcticRussia, the frameworkespecially within matters oftheArcticCouncil. tothe dialogandcooperation continue Arcticall other with including nations, areaa low-tension mains is apriority. Therefore,Denmark for itisapriority presencethe Arctic, in safeguardingand atthesametime, the Arctic that re - The Government wishesto ensure the DanishDefence’sstrong continued increasingly significantinthecoming years. ofthe Arctic willbecome These factorsmean that the geopoliticalimportance activity. There activityinthearea. isalsoincreased military scientific and commercial intensified as well as resources natural of traction accessibility,better only not brings also anincreasedbut to attention theex- These years, majorchanges are taking placeintheArctic. Climatechange to Denmark. importance the Arctic inGreenland- including and the Faroe Islands -are naturally ofvital Denmark. Developmentsthe Kingdomof of in The Arcticpart an essential is Conclusion – Denmark prepared to handle THE ROLE OF DENMARK IN A MORE COMPLEX SECURITY ENVIRONMENT the challenges

Denmark is facing an increasingly uncertain and unpredictable security environment: We are facing a challenging behaviour from Russia, global instability causes irregular migration flows and increases the risk of terrorism, and the increased use of cyber-attacks have serious security and socioeconomic consequences. These are challenges we cannot ignore.

The new Defence Agreement shows our determination to protect and secure The Kingdom of Denmark. Our substantial investments in new capabilities underline our desire to maintain our position as a core ally to NATO. We have ensured that Denmark has the necessary capacities to participate in the full spectrum of military operations. We will continue to adapt to the new security environment in close cooperation with our allies. To make it short: we use all our efforts to continuously keeping Denmark a safe, democratic and stabile country.

43 44 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 Chapter 3 Academic articles

45 46 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 for theBaltic Sea region future prospects, and implications Coping with Russia: pastfailures, respect bytocontributed the Balticstates or Russia that has thedeep crisis derstandings, a lack of politicalwill,differingand a perceived priorities, lack of the actualcausesofthisdevelopment gobackalotfurther.misun Mutual ventionUkraineEast in prompted2014, since that hasbeenongoing thecrisis Although Russia’sPeninsulathe Crimean of illegal annexation inter and its has becomeamore likely scenariothanitwasinthe1980s. escalation military developments.amples ofdestabilizing inadvertent sum, In ex- are communication) and identification complicating so, doing by (and, off switched transponders with flights military Russian and side, Russian the on exercises (snap exercises)alert exercises onbothsides,especiallyshort-term neither takenused (Panelnor seriously 2015).Anincreased of military number and crisis-preventiontools the frameworkestablished within oftheOSCEare measures security-building and confidence-building of network the and trol, ards. Additionally,there and self-con a lackofwell-establishedmechanisms is dangerousin ing has beenreduced,situations compared withColdWar stand- tocloser geographical each other in As aresult, terms. early warn- the timefor clashes. At present military resultingrisks sides arethe two from inadvertent proceeded a relativelyin orderly manner,endeavouringsides with both to avoid War Cold The Union. Soviet former the in office took Gorbachev Mikhail fore the otherareon currentlytheythe worst havebe- the early1980s beensince Relations between Russiaontheonehand and theEuropeanand NATO Union Introduction Michael Staack 1 - - - unfolded for a couple of years. Russia’s official criticism of a whole range of COPING WITH RUSSIA: PAST FAILURES, FUTURE PROSPECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALTIC SEA REGION political decisions made by the West has been widely known at least since President Putin’s sensational speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference. These decisions include NATO’s involvement in the Kosovo War, which took place without a UN mandate, the Iraq War, which violated international law, NATO’s eastward enlargement, the establishment of a missile defence system in Eastern Europe, and the approval of a unipolar instead of a multipolar world (Putin 2007). One year later, in August 2008, mutual provocations led to the war between Russia and Georgia and the formal secession of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions from the Georgian state. Although Germany, France and Spain had blocked specific steps to admit Georgia and Ukraine into the Western alliance during the April 2008 NATO summit, this issue remained on the political agenda.

Initial efforts by the Obama administration (2009–2017) to reset relations between the United States and Russia, which had been shattered under his prede- cessor in office George W. Bush (2001–2009), led to the conclusion of a significant arms control treaty (New START) on strategic nuclear weapons. However, the West’s intervention in the change of regime in Libya (2011), which was not conducted as mandated by the UN Security Council, and the ensuing conflict regarding the civil war in Syria (since 2011), soon put an end to these efforts. From a Western perspective, domestic developments in Russia also contributed to further alienation. While it seemed that a window had been opened for liberal reforms under President Dmitry Medvedev (2008–2012), this window was soon closed when Vladimir Putin was re-elected in 2012. Instead, the Rus- sian leadership introduced several measures designed to hamper the activity of oppositional political and civilian forces. When the period of upheaval began in Ukraine in the autumn of 2013, it was evident that the resource of trust, which had certainly still existed between Russia and the West at the beginning of the 21st century, was now exhausted. As a result, a key condition was miss- ing for the coordination of Russian and Western strategies for dealing with the upheavals. At present, confidence in the reliability and consistency of the other side, which is fundamental to stable relations, has completely disappeared on both sides.

This essay presents the view that the Ukraine conflict marks a structural break in relations between Russia and the West. A strategic partnership which, although difficult, both sides wanted (at different times with varying intensity),

47 48 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 cated thesituation. a strategyleadership haschosen The Russian hostile of Russia’s compli behaviour international in thelastthree yearsor four further main challengefortheEU,NATO andRussia. a confrontation,of currentlythe newantagonism management of presents the flict. In view of continuing shared interests and ties, as well as the military risks term. Tothe short in and not tions tovital is end, it this resolve theUkraine con- condi- defined, jointly new, under partnership a achieve alone let tension the relationshipand theWest,between Russia tobe possible will only it alleviate resolution of the Ukraine conflict. Given the fundamental structural break in the I andIIagreements,of theMinsk signing the frameworkform which still a for which wasinEurope’sit, contain partially interest. strategyThis resultedthe in bly Germanyand France, took theinitiative toand manage tothe crisis at least renewed confrontation.Facing nota- leading most EU members, thissituation, the already fragilecame to strategic anendandwasreplaced by partnership transformation into an authoritarian political system. With the Ukraine conflict, as a relevant pole of global politics further intensified this spiral, as did Russia’s of re-establishingFederation theRussian energyof its onthebasis resources mentality, andagrowing lackofempathy. President Putin’sproject successful fuelled by pastburdens,perceptionssecurity determined by aworst-case As aresult, countries. bouring action–reactionan spiral developed, continually ance of interests and respect and beginning withthese a neigh new political ed NATO enlargementpreparedwas not but to becomeinvolvedbal- a true in theseWesternto and position try organisationsagainst Russia.Russiaaccept- Polandrepeatedly andtheBalticstates used theirNATO andEUmembership was possiblewithoutorinoppositionto Russia,butnotwithit. thereof theEU, wasagrowing beliefthatEuropeanparts in as States, security to Western IntheUnited standards asa preconditionpartnership. fora (junior) to demand foreignthat Russiafundamentallyadjust its policy anddomestic ropean security. At the beginning ofthe 21 requirementindispensable pan-Euan for as - and right own its valuein a as ed Westernwith Russiawasregard a strategicthe 1990s In nations. - partnership tionship. This wasdue toin thepoliciesofsomemajor a change of priorities and even favouredbecame increasingly or a confrontationalof accepting rela be said,did it must not takeitics, enough seriously of the the crisis many signs avoided,structural this break severalfor had beenlooming years. Westernpol- was replaced byin 2014 openstrategic rivalry. Althoughitcouldhave been st century, however, the West began - - - activities, spoiling and hybrid warfare to demonstrate its international rele- COPING WITH RUSSIA: PAST FAILURES, FUTURE PROSPECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALTIC SEA REGION vance. Cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, state institutions and private companies, interference in elections processes in the US and France, support of right-wing parties and movements, and distribution of fake information are some of the instruments to achieve this goal. Russia’s military intervention in Syria helped to defeat Da’esh, but at the same time stabilized the Assad regime and, until now, does not support a political settlement of the conflict. In the short run and judged by a short-sighted perspective, the Russian strategy seems to be quite successful. In a mid-term perspective, Russia will damage its reputation further and diminish trust and constructive engagement to manage relations with Western countries in a better way

The deterioration of Western-Russian relations has an important impact on Denmark’s security and foreign policy. The Baltic Sea is not at the centrepiece of confrontation but nevertheless affected by the general trend. Deployment of the advanced missile system Iskander to Kaliningrad and implicit threats to target Denmark even by a nuclear strike by Russia have to be judged as hostile behaviour. Denmark is an active member of the NATO alliance, supports the policy of NATO enlargement and participates in NATO’s missile shield criticized by Russia. It understands NATO as ‘the corner stone of Danish security policy’ and its own status as ‘a core country in the Alliance.’ (Frederiksen 2017: 23). Former Danish Prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen was NATO’s acting Secretary General when the alliance formulated its new strategy towards Rus- sia in 2014 and beyond. Since 2017, Denmark participates in NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence to reassure Poland and the Baltic states, contributes substantially to NATO’s Very High Readiness Task Force and Standing Maritime Forces (Samuelsen 2017: 13). On the other hand, Denmark has no outstand- ing bilateral problems with Russia. Economic and cultural relations are quite good. No nuclear weapons are deployed on Danish soil. In general, Denmark’s security and foreign policy is characterized by a pragmatic approach based on its membership in NATO and the EU. Therefore, Denmark is in a position to support and even initiate steps to de-escalate the present tensions.

This essay first discusses the two main problems that led to the break in the partnership between Russia and the West, namely the organisation of international order in a multipolar world and the integration and security dilemma in Europe. It then goes on to address German policy, which plays a key role in this conflict, as well as the security constellation in the Baltic Sea region. The essay

49 50 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 ronment could further complicatethisalready difficultprocess. ronment couldfurther to keepvolatilitythat thepersistent mind in envi- of theinternational important beyonda new normality managing the antagonism.At thesame time, itis byconcludes presentingproposalsfour achieving for be suitable that could border controls. geographical area throughoutwhich people hadbeenableto travel without economic demise,aof socialsecurity,loss ofa large and the tearing apart differently. In theirview, leaving the empire meant a (collective and individual) society, ofRussian renewed independence. Large parts however, sawthings long historical tradition thathad emerged from the Soviet empire in a state of a with nation a as rather but conflict East–West the of loser the as Russia ed leadership neverpolitical legally succeeded its When Russia the USSR regard- arsenal andnumeroushuge nuclear as wellits agreements.international took– among otherthings overCouncil Security the UN seat in permanent its Federationtobecame thelegalsuccessor Sovietthe former and – Union vaguethe analytically ‘Cold War’.and misleading term In1991theRussian from confrontationto cooperation, antagonistic have since been reduced to ranging phases, development differing widely whose conflict, East–West the States andtheWestThe United asawholesawthemselvesof asthe winners sible. interests,and greatercontainment, regulation were,are, and still generally pos were– arms for and competition relatedwhich abalanceof in dimensions power for competition – conflict the of elements other resolved, be not could authority communist and order Western liberal the between systems of flict of whathereferred to as‘universalinterests’. human the ideologicalcon- While prioritisation the advocated instead and conflict, the of component main the rejected between EastandWest,the ideological competition which had been world order. The conflict came to a peaceful end after Soviet leader Gorbachev – markedUnion and ahalfdecades theendoffourarelatively stable bipolar Berlin Wall toof theWarsaw thedissolution Pact andthecollapseofSoviet The end of the conflict between East and West in 1989/91 – from the fall of the order inamultipolar world Dissent over the organisation of international - Francis Fukuyama’s theory that the end of the East–West conflict also marked COPING WITH RUSSIA: PAST FAILURES, FUTURE PROSPECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALTIC SEA REGION the ‘end of history’, i.e. a global assertion of democracy and capitalism as the best systems of order that could no longer be surpassed in terms of their content and functionality, determined the way the West viewed the world in the 1990s (Cf. Fukuyama 1992). The promotion of democracy and the market economy became the guiding principles of Western foreign policy, albeit with different emphases from country to country. Activation of the United Nations, along with a Security Council that had become increasingly influential since the late 1980s, was also an expression of this new value consensus. The Unit- ed States and its allies were more or less in a position to determine the world politics of the 1990s on their own. Throughout this decade Russia, under the leadership of President Yeltsin, had been largely preoccupied with matters of its own: with the serious economic crisis it faced as a result of the failed transition to a market economy that also led to the rise of a group of profiteers (oligarchs), with the disarmament of its huge military arsenal, with emerging ethnic conflicts, and with disputes about future political order in the face of a flawed democracy, authoritarianism, a mafia state and oligarchy. Neverthe- less, Russia strove to earn respect as an independent pole of world politics and received both formal and to some extent actual support from Western leaders such as Bill Clinton, Helmut Kohl and Jacques Chirac, who maintained bilateral and trilateral dialogue formats.

The Kosovo conflict (1999) signalled the end of this phase of the West’s un- restrained dominance in world politics and must be seen as a break with the past. Keen to counter a military escalation by Yugoslavia in its renegade prov- ince Kosovo, the West decided as early as 1998 in favour of military intervention. The negative experience with the Yugoslav government under President Milosevic in the Yugoslav wars of secession concerning the independence of Slovenia and Croatia (1991) and, most importantly, Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995), played a decisive role in this context. The largest part of the Al- banian majority in Kosovo, an autonomous region within the Yugoslav federation, also demanded independence, and there was a minority among them that even used armed force to this end. Russia invariably supported Yugoslavia in all these conflicts of secession. Based on the long-standing pan-Slavic bond, Russia had precedence to provide direction in this context, and was also keen to avoid encouraging similar secession attempts in its own federation. – for example in the Caucasus republic of Chechnya. For these reasons, Russia – in conjunction with China and other countries – refused to agree to a United

51 52 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 governments– forinstance the German government –regarded the Kosovo had beenexhausted(Panel 2015: The Viewfromthe West: some 22). While prohibitionof forceof theuse a UNmandateifallotheralternatives without regime. To protecttheyrights human considered imperative it toignore the their argument,they pointedto therecentof aggression policy of theMilosevic ventan endtoput or againstthe peopleofKosovo. warcrimes To substantiate of governments. toTheywas necessary pre argued intervention - that military amongthelarge majority support little found viewpoints such although initially These issues have also been the of livelysubject debate in the West itself, of theirsovereigntystrictions aggression. and–asaresultmilitary – potential members. Inparticular,fearedof theGlobalSouth manycountries re similar - was sharedby only not the veto byalso but UN of China, power a majority orderinternational towilling was not it a violation – accept.Russia’sposition West powerto had ignoreused itsmilitary keyof the rules-based principles the it, saw Russia As criticism. strong equally under came – Charter UN the sovereigntyof principles and territorial also guaranteed– states of integrity in the prohibitionforceof the use of Charter.the UN in contained the of Violation war and peace concerning on issuesand Council of the the Security authority Russia’sof view,point Westernacceptable for was not it topowers disregard fundamental dissentbetween Russia and the West inglobal governance. From have been possible without Russian participation), the Kosovo conflict denotes Despite Russia’s involvement(which wouldnot settlement inthediplomatic rangement andalsoretroactively by intervention theWest. mandatedmilitary negotiations. diplomatic agreedCouncil Security The UnitedNations toar- this of part as clarified be to Yugoslavia,was of part a jure de remained law tional around the capital Pristina. The futureof Kosovo, status whichunderinterna restoringin the centralin security sectorled by– Bundeswehr – the German then occupiedby Western forcewereunits Russian contingents. also involved ership to concede defeat. The Yugoslav troopshad to leave Kosovo, whichwas and cooperated with theWestin thepeace efforts to force theYugoslav lead tiative by Germany thatRussiawaseventually persuaded to becomeinvolved againstthepeopleofKosovo.war crimes through Itwasonly ini- adiplomatic to achieve the intended goals ofdefeating Yugoslaviaan end and toof putting began severalstrikesair of months againstYugoslavia. failed These attacks Yugoslavia. The Westveto theimpending dismissed March24 and,on 1999, the Westmandate for Council Security Nations to against take action military - - issue as a ‘special case’ and pointed to the subsequent legitimation by the COPING WITH RUSSIA: PAST FAILURES, FUTURE PROSPECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALTIC SEA REGION Security Council, others – for instance the US administration and the British government – saw Kosovo as a precedent for extending the frontiers of international law to allow a fundamental breach of the prohibition of the use of force in the event of severe human rights violations. Dissent in the international community regarding this policy issue led to an attempt initiated by the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to reach an agreement within the United Nations. While this effort to constitutionalise a responsibility to protect within the framework of the UN system temporarily helped to narrow differences, it remained controversial with regard to some key issues.

Rejection of Western intervention policy and fierce criticism of its legitimacy under international law, a legitimacy that did not even exist in Russia’s view, remained a constant element of Russian foreign policy even after the Koso- vo conflict. In the run-up to the Iraq War (2003) this issue caused a division within the West itself. In the UN Security Council, NATO members Germany and France, in conjunction with the veto powers Russia and China, spoke out against the US-led invasion of the country. The war of aggression in Iraq which violated international law, as well as the entirely unsuccessful occupation policy that followed, made the reasons cited by the United States and their allies for justifying this war seem totally implausible and, moreover, undermined the position of the United States as the leading world power. As a result, support for such unilateral interventions that had not been mandated by the Security Council temporarily faded in the Western community of states. Such support only returned when military action was taken in Libya (2011). A group of leading NATO members – primarily the United Kingdom, France and the United States – ignored a United Nations mandate, on the basis of which a no-fly zone had been established to protect the people of Libya against attacks by the Gaddafi regime, and instead waged a war to change the regime until the regime collapsed. They disregarded not only the UN Security Council but also regional mediation efforts by the African Union. As in Iraq, this short-term military success was followed by a disastrous politico-humanitarian defeat. Rus- sia regarded the intervention in Libya as a clear violation of humanitarian law. This was followed by a firm rejection of new intervention efforts, which since 2011/12 has led among other things to the vetoing of Security Council resolutions on a possible intervention in the escalating Syrian civil war. In September 2015 Russian armed forces intervened directly in this conflict, even alongside the Assad regime which most countries still recognise as Syria’s legitimate

53 54 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 • From Moscow’s perspective, themainissuesorsubjects atstake are: profound dissentover theshapingofworldorder: law.law asanexpressionof international violation saw this Russia moreof international of disregard principles to conflict East–West the of end the after Russia’sof view,point the West supremacy andeconomic military used its foreto right its claiming beinvolved order.the international shaping in From order.the international of issues fundamental concerns that thereis Russia - conflict a also is West the of policy intervention the concerning conflict The conflict (Allison2014). of theUNCharter.51 approachThis wasrepeatedUkraine the 2014 during citizens, and the exercise ofthe right to self-defence in accordance with Article peacekeepingRussian on assaults violence, against state norities forces and by the West in the conflicts mentioned above, which included protection of mi- forward put type the of models justification to resorted too it 2008 in Georgia the West’s intervention policy in Kosovo and in Iraq, in the military conflict with argumentsconvincing law tointernational based on of the legitimacy dispute presented then, until had, Russia While conflicts. Syria and Libya the to prior Dissent between Russia and the West had, however, already intensified further progress wasmadetowards findingapoliticalsolution to theconflict. government.Although Russia’s helped to Assad’s stabilise support regime, no allies; the sole supremacyor Russia) of course, ing, and its States oftheUnited shaped byis politics which international several(includ- countries major structureor unipolar the multipolar order:of the international in a system The Viewfrom Moscow:26) West’swords, respectbut the West’s for competence.’ (Panel 2015: replacedin the trust lost only has not chaos. Russia but with nothing lizedordersstable political system: the international are upended and peace and international security. The West hasirresponsiblydestabi- intoaffairs. ItistheWest’s [sic]internal which are actions threats to – namelystatesovereigntyand stability security and non-interference of international principles haveSpring damaged important the most forthe Arab inAfghanistan,vo, performance poor and open support Koso- of rupture the Libya, Iraq, Yugoslavia, in interventions ‘Western • rigorous application of the United Nations Charter as a central policy doc- COPING WITH RUSSIA: PAST FAILURES, FUTURE PROSPECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALTIC SEA REGION ument of a rules-based international order founded on state sovereignty; • recognition of the Security Council as the sole authority of this international order which can make decisions on exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force; • compliance with the prohibition of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, which rules out the support of opposition groups and the promotion of regime changes; • further development of international law based on a consensus of the international community and not by means of its disruption.

Russia’s understanding of international law and international relations as a whole reflects a traditional state-centred approach, with preferential status granted to great powers (permanent members of the Security Council), a status that it believes entitles them to certain spheres of influence (Mälksoo 2015). This understanding can be best explained in theoretical terms drawing on the neorealist and geopolitical concepts that predominate in the research community and among decision-makers in Russia. In contrast, the increasing significance of the economic and societal world is neglected or perceived as a disruptive factor under Western control. Based on its resources, its nuclear weapons, the country’s size, and also its tradition as a world power, Russia sees itself as an important pole in a multipolar world order that must not be dominated by the West.

The integration and security dilemma in Europe

The end of the East–West conflict in 1989/91 also marked the end of the bipolar structure of European security. In the Two Plus Four negotiations, a settlement was agreed that enabled the unification of Germany to be shaped in a way that was congenial to all neighbouring countries from the perspective of European policy and security policy (Staack 2000: 119-349). The basis for the unification process included the will of all those involved to integrate the former Soviet Union (until the end of 1991) and subsequently Russia into a new pan-European security order. The aim was to strengthen and institution- alise the CSCE, build a partnership between NATO and Russia, and increase

55 56 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 were required to undergo an extensive and prolonged procadapting to the ac- the to procadapting prolonged and extensive an undergo torequired were OSCE’sDocument of1999. Istanbul To jointhe European new members Union, and, more specifically, by the CSCE’s of Paris adopted in 1990 and the Charter arrangementssecurity other or guaranteed is bygenerallaw in international the righttoorganizationinternational an allianceor in choosemembership ofthe West and in thisway resolvepart dilemma. Additionally,their security andtheCzechPoland, Republic)to Hungary become particular (in countries the West wasrespondingto thewishofseveral Central andEasternEuropean policy, new its With interests. Russia’s security of self-defined violation a sent of NATOup Although theopening directed wasnot did repreit againstRussia, - to play amoreropean prominentstarting nations role 513-520): (Staack2000: organisationswith the past, of all Euwas athing not but included many that - tothat theattempt meant create anew,pan-European, architecturesecurity United Statesandby Germany(afterGenscher’s resignation)1993/94, since of NATOThe opening towhich had been advocated newmembers, by the pole ofworldpoliticsthatMoscowwanteditto be. Federation the Russian effectively a regionalconstituted powerratherthe than mid-1990s, and early the considerably. In decreased Russia’sinfluence weak, ed by theUnitedStatesandKingdom.Economicallyand politically reject- invariably were proposals such partner, equal an as Moscow with and of pan-Europeaninstitutionalisation the frameworkwithin security oftheCSCE cooperative a advocated firmly and repeatedly Genscher Hans-Dietrich ister with regard consensus stantial to thisissue.Whilethe German foreign min remained vague. Fromthe West the outset, tohad been unable reach asub integration oftheSovietand Russiainto Union anewEuropeanorder security wereGerman unity on visions precise, very thedeclarationsthe on of intent involvementRussian inapan-Europeanarea. economic proWhile the security - Decalogue.’ to ofthe alltheprinciples observe Statesundertook the participating the document, HelsinkiFinal founding Act of1975.Inthis act, dicts its imbalance tothe disadvantage the OSCE’s of contratasks security - toringWarsaw mainlyinthe former Pact[…] countries. The thematic OSCE todemocratisationon anagencyfocusing and electionmoni aboveIt theWest allstripped reducedIt function. security its of the marginalisationpolitical ‘The on-going [...] of theOSCE proved fatal. - - - quis communautaire of this economic and legal community. As a result, these COPING WITH RUSSIA: PAST FAILURES, FUTURE PROSPECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALTIC SEA REGION countries did not become EU members until 2004. Meeting NATO’s membership criteria, however, was a much easier undertaking, and the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to the North Atlantic Alliance, which was decided in 1997, was completed as early as 1999. The key players in the West at the time, namely US President Clinton, French President Chirac, and German Chancellor Kohl, all agreed that an eastward enlargement of NATO would have to be accompanied by a strengthening of relations between NATO and Russia. On this basis, they gained the support of Russian president Yeltsin for this privileged partnership, whose foundation was to be the NATO–Rus- sia Founding Act. To symbolically demonstrate the consonance between the opening of NATO to new member states and the NATO–Russia partnership, the first round of enlargement was formally decided during the NATO Summit of 8 and 9 July 1997, with the Founding Act having been signed on 27 May 1997.

There was one fundamental difference that this symbolic act could not con- ceal. In future, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were to be part of the Alliance with all its rights and duties, and in particular enjoy its guarantee of assistance. While it was promised the right of consultation and participation, Russia, on the other hand, was not given the right of institutionalised co-determination it sought and, most notably, did not receive the right of co-decision in crisis situations. Moreover, the question of when and how far NATO would expand in future remained unanswered. Although President Yeltsin signed the NATO–Russia Founding Act, Russia regarded this agreement as unsatisfac- tory from the outset and felt marginalised as a security policy actor. Just two years later, during the Kosovo conflict, the NATO countries disregarded Rus- sian opposition and began air strikes against Serbia and Montenegro. From Russia’s point of view, this meant that NATO–Russia cooperation had been rendered more or less worthless. With the decision to expand NATO, two sets of questions were placed on the political agenda, questions that could not be answered unanimously by all European countries before the escalation of the Ukraine conflict: (1) Is there a geographical limit to NATO enlargement? Should membership of the Alliance really be open to all European countries as declared in numerous NATO communiqués? With this in mind, does the Russian Federation belong to Europe? And (2) What form should the Alliance’s relationship with Russia take in order to ensure that the agreed partnership serves the interests of both sides?

57 58 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 1990s, of combining the opening up of NATO with an intensification of re- of intensification an with NATO of up opening the combining of 1990s, changed. with Russia the in pursued seriously still The intention, partnership wasexpanded NATO and by seventhe alliance’s2004, in additionalmembers 2001 with regardpolicy to its in office assumed Bush W. George When the Alliance(Genscher1997:8). createconcept’ wouldonly stability unrestand outside within and insecurity that ‘an eastwardof NATO expansion a comprehensive without pan-European voicingof Germany’s anycriticism foreign policy, pointedoutinFebruary 1997 from refrained had resignation his since years five the in who Genscher, rich NATO enlargement (Open Letter to President Clinton 1997).And Hans-Diet- argumentsand with similar to thosepresented by George F. Kennan against whose fundamental viewsdifferedfrom greatly, bothparties, warned urgently lished in the United States. Politicians in the fields of foreign and security policy McNamara, PaulRobert Nitzeincluding diplomats, was pub and SamNunn, toter President Clintonfrom more senators,ministers, former than40 and top a 1997: 8). fewJust weeks before NATO’s expansionpolicywasadopted, a let- disadvantagesserious the development for democracyof Russian (Kennan entailed and superfluous objectively was it view his In War’. Cold the followed could prove to be the West’s ‘mostfatal mistake [...] in the entire period that Worldafter States United War NATOthat early 1997 warned in II, enlargement George F. Kennan, the architectpolicy adopted ofthe containment by the tition andconfrontation. Union). Shared interest incooperation dwindled and was replaced by compe- later theCollective Security Treaty Organisation and the Eurasian Economic integrationprojects and of Independent States, the Commonwealth (initially was workingtowardsRussia Russia, incorporating into thesecountries own its United States–wanted to integrate all post-Soviet Europeanexcept countries the the Westof resultintegrationthis of particular in – parts dilemma. While in geographicala formofintegrationterms, developed competition as a direct tegrationas athreat. AsNATO (andtheEU)movedto closer Russia’sborders in- widening regard also may they welfare, and security of benefits the in tion however,tions, are - negative facedwith effects.being denied participa While greatermeans this (NATO) security na- andwelfare (EU).Non-participating ropean security.in theintegration For process,participating those countries role towas beginning the shapingofpan-Eu in play- anincreasingly important which dilemma, integration the focus into bring questions of sets two These - lations with Russia ceased to be a priority: ‘Even more so when the West’s COPING WITH RUSSIA: PAST FAILURES, FUTURE PROSPECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALTIC SEA REGION compensation offers became increasingly limited as NATO expanded – before NATO’s first eastward expansion in 1999 the NATO–Russia Founding Act was adopted, before the second expansion in 2004 the NATO–Russia Council was reformed, and the third expansion in 2009 took place without any cooperation offers for Russia’ (Commission 2015: 4). Although resistance from Germany, France and Spain led to the failure of the US administration’s attempt in 2008 to incorporate Georgia and Ukraine into the Western alliance before the end of the Bush presidency, both countries were in principle accepted. From Russia’s perspective, this step pulled the rug from under what had been a substantial relationship of cooperation with NATO. A brief military conflict with Russia, provoked by both sides and then initiated by Georgia, led to a suspension of the partnership. Although the partnership was reactivated in 2009 – primarily on the initiative of Germany but also due to the changed position of the new Obama administration, the relationship remained tense. There was no basis of trust any more. Rather than serving as a starting point for a reconsideration of pan-European security, the proposal presented by President Medvedev for a European Security Agreement was completely ignored (Kühn 2010). The 2014 Ukraine conflict formally marked the end of the ‘partnership’. The view that prevails in Russia is that the relationship failed as a result of continuing neglect and an increasing lack of respect for Russian security interests:

‘Starting with the negotiations on German unification, the West systematically took advantage of Russia’s weakness. The West never acted in the spirit of the Charter of Paris, in which the indivisibility of security was a key concept. The West never tried to address security with Russia, only without it, or against it. The United States instead seized the opportunity to dominate international affairs especially in Europe. The ‘common European home’ failed because the West was unwilling to build new, open security architecture – and to fulfil its promises. The West talked of cooperation and expected cooperation from Moscow, but believed in Russia’s perennial aggressiveness or/ and weakness.’ (Panel 2015: The View from Moscow: 24).

The Russian side also repeatedly argued (most recently after 2014) that the West had promised in the course of the German unification process not to seek an eastward expansion of NATO (For details see Sarotte 2010a, 2010b). This view is false in terms of international law but true to some extent po-

59 Note erikursiv 60 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 Eastern Partnership was designed as analternative toEU some accession, Partnership Eastern create and thus an Union new marketsties. Although the aswellpolitical agreementsassociation Soviet betweentheformer republicsand theEurope - which wasdesigned to facilitate the EUestablisheditsEasternPartnership roundsbetween and 1995 2004. ofexpansion This changed when, in2009, first the to object it did Nor Union. the in interests its promote to order in aly, bilateralismas Germany,such states EU member with major France andIt- advantageeconomic for through cooperation.preferredRussia Nevertheless, the Europeanon thecontrary, but, as anadversary not Union asaplatform had alwaysWhile Russia rejected NATOregardedinitially Moscow expansion, from theWest wereport considerably thantheNATO more important issue. believed that a good relationship with the unified Germany and economic sup ready decided in favourof apeacefulapproach. Gorbachev andShevardnadze hardly behalteda peacefulmanner, in with theSoviet leadershiphaving al- developmentpolitical of the dynamics on impact had amajor tion, could that is that the large majority of East German citizens, who were striving for unifica to point bearinmind remain assumptions mereA further speculation. further (Sarottean arrangement,on such insist did not the USSR 2010a).Since any a demand wouldhavewhich such in had any chanceofsuccess opportunity Two PlusFour negotiations,the Soviethad possibly the Union only window of toprior weeks of1990, approval its and agreement ofGermanunity to the Genscher was willing to ‘overcoming’ consider the alliances. proved an ordeal for Germany. In contrast to ChancellorKohl, Foreign Minister NATO or unity between Having choose unification. to have could membership hinderedseriously States andtheUnitedKingdomthus United Germanre- Demands ofthisnature wouldhave encountered strongfrom opposition the ing NATO, itnever insistedonthisorthe prohibitionof NATO enlargement. of Germanyleavthe possibility out rule did not Although Moscow passim). - saw Pact and (Staack of EastGerman the territory demilitarisation 2000: 286 War- NATO the of and Germany unified a for membership dual as such steps East Germany.former the preceding In had proposedthe USSR negotiations, weapons and the permanentpresence of foreign troops ofthe ontheterritory Accordingly,the TwoFour Plus Agreement the deploymentout ruled nuclear of Soviet Union’san eastwardabout concerns of theWestern expansion alliance. NATO.provisions Specialsecurity were enforced to andtakeof the try account for opted and alliance of choice free a to right the received Germany Unified litically. Therea promise.such is nolegally binding documentthatcontains 2 During the first the During - - members in Scandinavia and Central and Eastern Europe treated it as a prelim- COPING WITH RUSSIA: PAST FAILURES, FUTURE PROSPECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALTIC SEA REGION inary stage to subsequent membership of the EU. At the same time, the EU’s strategic partnership with Russia stagnated. Russia’s official perception was that ‘the EU’s idea of partnership is that Russia should adopt its rules’ (Panel 2015: The view from Moscow). From Russia’s point of view, by offering a partnership geared to adapting to EU standards, the European Union had opened up a second area of competition over integration on post-Soviet territory in the wake of the NATO expansion. During the disputes over Ukraine’s political orientation, which escalated in the Maidan protests in the winter of 2013/14, the EU developed, from Moscow’s perspective, into a strategic rival. Compro- mises that were essentially of interest to both sides, such as a free-trade zone from Lisbon to Vladivostok, which had been a subject of repeated discussion since the early 1990s, or membership of both the EU Association and the Eur- asian Economic Union under Russian leadership, were not explored seriously. In the 1990s a rapid expansion of the EU (which did not take place at the time) would, in terms of peace policy, have been a rational alternative to opening up NATO. However, by the time the Ukraine conflict began this potential had been exhausted. Russia felt cut off from European integration and association. This constituted a second avoidable integration dilemma which, with some strategic foresight, could have been avoided much more easily than the conflict over NATO’s eastward expansion.

Regardless of the precise significance of the various reasons, in retrospect it was undoubtedly a considerable mistake not to have invested more political energy in a truly pan-European peace and security order. Overcoming the points of dissent that have grown and intensified over a period of more than twenty years is now conceivable only as part of a longer-term process that will lead to new structures. To this end, it is necessary to establish ‘essential prerequisites for a long, arduous, and sometimes painful process of de-escalation’, primarily by means of ‘empathy and trust’ (Commission 2015: 2). To settle or contain the existing dissent, a dialogue is necessary on the following subjects:

• interpretation from the perspective of international law of key terms such as ‘prohibition of violence’, ‘sovereignty’, and ‘self-determination’; • the relationship between the state and civil societies; • the institutional organisation of peace and security in Europe, economic cooperation and integration (Commission 2015: 6).

61 62 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 white paper of its policy towards Russiain the 2016 Germany’s key role and the redefinition sometimes actsasanadversary: who and predict to difficult is behaviour whose actor military and political a Russia isnowregarded as a strategicas but challenge as anopponent – not into question’ (GermanGovernment 2016:31): a thing ofthe past because ‘Russia isopenlycallingthe European peace order and Federal ofDefence. Ministry For now, thecurrentis strategic partnership Office, Foreign Federal Chancellery, Federal Germany’s between cooperation PolicySecurity andthe Future of the Bundeswehr and was the result ofclose German on Paper White 2016 the in precisely most specified was policy new and 2016, Germany’s 2014 policy towards Between Russia was Ukraine. fundamentally redefined. and This Russia with negotiations of way by conflict the France – developed the Normandy Format in order to contain and finally settle togetherGermany – Instead, out. ruled was categorically shipments, with force,forcesarms including example –useofmilitary for States, intheUnited accept Russia’s breaches of suchrules.At the same time –unlike political of arules-basedordertolaw madeimpossible it of international the basis on also graduallyGermany’ssanctions. andeconomic political imposing support Western position. This process involved not only maintaininga dialogue but uniform a establishing in part key a played government German the quently, had been resolved, came to anend after the annexation ofCrimea.Subse conflict East–West the since played had it NATO.which and role, EU This the within interests Russian (justified) of advocate of role the assumed also tially nomic relations withRussiathananyotherWestern buthad essen- country the Ukraine conflict Germany had not only maintained closer political and eco- of start the Until Russia. with relations future shaping in and conflict Ukraine the EuropeanWithin and NATO, Union Germanyhasakey role to play inthe power centre withglobalambitions.’ (GermanGovernment 2016:32). rivalry. Internationally,is presentingRussia as anindependent itself withthe West and is placingemphasisonstrategicclose partnership developments.and external internal long-term of rejectingis Russia a in and ‘The surroundingcrisis Ukraine is the concrete manifestation

- ‘This is reflected, for example, by an increase in Russia’s military ac- COPING WITH RUSSIA: PAST FAILURES, FUTURE PROSPECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALTIC SEA REGION tivities along its borders with the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO). In the course of extensively modernising its armed forces, Russia appears to be prepared to test the limits of existing international agreements. By increasingly using hybrid instruments to purposefully blur the borders between war and peace, Russia is creating uncertainty about the nature of its intentions. This calls for responses from the affected states, but also from the EU and NATO.’ (German Government 2016: 32).

This Russian policy needs to be countered with a dual strategy: ‘credible deterrence and defence capability as well as a willingness to engage in dialogue’ (German Government 2016: 66) and ‘the right balance between collective defence and increased resilience on the one hand, and approaches to cooperative security and sectoral cooperation on the other’(German Government 2016: 32). The strategic goal is to reinforce the commonalities with Russia and to regain the country as a partner: ‘Germany continues to support the long-term goal of a strategic partnership between NATO and Russia.’ (German Govern- ment 2016: 66).

Since it is not possible to achieve this goal while the Ukraine conflict is still underway, priority must be given to the dual approach:

‘Without a fundamental change in policy, Russia will constitute a challenge to the security of our continent in the foreseeable future. At the same time, however, Europe and Russia remain linked by a broad range of common interests and relations. As the EU’s largest neighbour and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia has a special regional and global responsibility when it comes to meeting common challenges and managing international crises. Sustainable security and prosperity in and for Europe cannot therefore be ensured without strong cooperation with Russia.’ (German Government 2016: 66).

On the basis of this analysis and these objectives, the German government also played a part in shaping strategic development in the European Union and NATO. Within the alliance, it adhered to the NATO–Russia Founding Act of 1997 and offered a ‘substantial and meaningful dialogue’ (NATO 2016), which

63 64 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 • • • • • not give up. The aimofGermanpolicyremains unchanged: role in foreignpolicy, and security its owninterests which–pursuing –itwill playerEurope’ in (GermanGovernment22) cameto2016: a leading assume key a ‘as Germany conflict, Ukraine the NATO.In and EU of framework the in strategy of dialogue and deterrence, its actions remained firmly anchored with- Preciselyand Eastern European because Germany advocated a dual partners. bilateral specialrelationship ora bilateral policyatthe exclusionCentral ofits considered point at no it purposes, diplomatic for leadership a the Russian Although theGermangovernment repeatedly bilateralused its relationswith bership oftheEUorNATO asithaddonebefore theconflictbegan. of Ukraineand politicalstabilisation votesstill but againstthecountry’s mem- subjectiveperception. security Germanyplays a leading role intheeconomic as apledge of solidarity. Itisalsoanappropriate meansofreinforcing the ratherhas symbolic this relevance thanmilitary should betaken but seriously NATO–Russia Act. Withapproximately per country, personnel 1000military the three othercountries. This deployment took withthe placeincompliance United Kingdom,Canada, and the UnitedStatesleading battlegroupssimilar in was deployed personnel German military imately 450 towith the Lithuania, battalion-sizea German-led, multinational, 2017 battlegroup includingapprox- attack, i.e. Estonia,Russian of apossible Latvia,Lithuaniaand Poland. In early TO’sto determination protectat risk most and allianceterritory thecountries European Alliancemembers. was toThe intention demonstrate to RussiaNA also playedbut Russia an active reassurance rolethe military in oftheEastern of theNATO–Russiations advocatedonly Germanynot Council. dialogue with also ledto aresumptionalbeit rather– unproductiveof thedeliberafar – so - as a partner aftertheconflicthasbeen resolved. as apartner tototerm, the longer and,in dialoguewithRussia maintain regain Russia to thusstrengthen thecredibility ofthepromise ofallianceorsolidarity; to guaranteeNATO; unifiedaction by theEUand to defend therules-basedinternationalandEuropean order; to fullyrestore Ukraine’s territorial integrityandsovereignty; - Baltic Sea security and cooperation COPING WITH RUSSIA: PAST FAILURES, FUTURE PROSPECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALTIC SEA REGION

Since the early 1990s a close cooperation between the states of the Baltic Sea region has developed in the fields of politics, economy, culture and civil society. This cooperation finds its expression in a strong institutionalisation (e.g. Coun- cil of the Baltic Sea States, Northern Dimension). The relationship between Russia and the other Baltic Sea-bordering countries has been damaged and scaled down, but has not been put into question since the Ukraine conflict. Most of the cooperation programmes and connections still exist, especially with the north-west of Russia. However, the security cooperation has suffered. Confrontational strategies and military incidents have increased and they burden relationships and produce a negative effect on other policy areas. Because reliability and predictability are called into question, misperceptions crop up and have negative consequences, even in spheres that are not connected to security politics. Nonetheless, it is not only the differences between NATO and Russia that determine relations in the Baltic Sea region. There are still common interests which continue to exist. The cooperation is mainly determined by the European Union and its strategies of economic and civil society relations.

In general, trust is diminished or has faded away. EU and NATO member countries in the Baltic Sea region:

‘…believe that Russian strategies might pose a security risk to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Baltic states. This assessment is not based on a concrete Russian force accumulation in the Baltic region exceeding force postures existing since the accession of the Baltic states to NATO in 2004. Rather, it is derived from an assessment of Russian strategic intentions and military capabilities, in combination with military activities such as snap exercises. Against this background, two scenarios are viewed as possible: First, a Rus- sian surprise attack […]; second, a hybrid destabilization of the Baltic states.’ (Richter 2016c: 2).

The increased number of land and sea exercises and close-border overflights by both sides have contributed to worst case threat perceptions. Nevertheless, a Russian attack against the Baltic states – that means, against NATO territory – is highly unlikely. There is no convincing political rationale for such an attack: ‘There is no advantage to be gained for Russia by waging hybrid action in two

65 66 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 foreseen inChapterIX. than visits evaluation and inspections frequent more for allow and V,VI) ters particular,in and, Document the currentlower thresholds observation (Chap- cooperation ofneighbouringstatesasforeseen in ChapterXoftheVienna intensified on agree should sides both end, that To observation. and fication thresholdtransparencystrict beconducted under should through earlynoti region,those in particularly border areas, which significantly exceed the above and theKaliningradstates andPskovAdditionally, Oblasts. exercises the in forcescombat of additionalsubstantial stationing the permanent the Baltic in to respect with restraint applying to commitment their confirm should States 2016c: 13-14): (Richter recommended been have proposals following the office, foreignny’s by Germa the frameworkWithin supported Commission oftheDeepCuts principal positions’(Richter2016c:11). could beagreedon abilateral upon multilateral or prejudicewithout basis to but […], States participating VD all by consensus a require not do measures may steps such be agreed a sub-regional within framework:special ‘Such and theOpenSkies (VD) Document Treaty. that of specialimportance is It regional canbe implemented onthe CSBMs basis ofthe Vienna Nevertheless, region. that to applied regime verification and information CFE inclusive the 1990. Therefore, nolegally binding agreement controlon arms exists is nor Unfortunately, to theCFE the Baltic statesare not statesparties Treaty of to othersecurityissues. ed. Confidence and security-building is an aim in itself and should not be linked straint,transparency are contacts and direct urgently military-to-military need re- verifiable warning, early towards Steps escalation. possible and incidents of unintended high risks on bothsidesposes activities of currenttent military and transparency.communication the lackoftrust, but and ex- The number The real problem thathasto attack be addressed military a Russian isnot would endwithadisastrous Russiandefeat. and globalcountermeasures by theWest’case any in which 7), 2016c: (Richter geographically exposedNATO memberstatesandthereby pan-European risk - - - As a further measure, states involved in the region through military activities COPING WITH RUSSIA: PAST FAILURES, FUTURE PROSPECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALTIC SEA REGION should consider establishing an Incident Prevention and Response Mecha- nism (IPRM) in order to avoid miscalculations and escalation. To that end, direct military-to-military communication links are needed. In addition, for patrol flights, a five-mile distance from international borders in the Baltic region and beyond should be maintained and mutually agreed upon.

Russia should particularly address the fears of the Baltic states and formally state that it has no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries. Allies should recommit to relinquishing active pursuance of regime change policies while upholding the OSCE acquis of common norms and standards. Both sides should recommit to the OSCE objective of creating a common area of undivided cooperative security based on shared principles.

All those steps are justified in their own right and in the interest of all states around the Baltic Sea. In particular, they will address Denmark’s security interests in a proper way. The aforementioned measures will enforce stability and build trust in the region. Confidence- and security-building is extremely necessary in critical situations. Unfortunately, it seems to be impossible to isolate the Baltic Sea region from the general trend of bad Western-Russian relations. But it is possible to preserve and strengthen what has been achieved in the fields of regional security and cooperation.

Managing antagonism, containing escalation, gradually building confidence

The following four proposals are aimed at preventing destructive developments and facilitating new cooperation. They can help to peacefully contain the conflict between Russia and the West. Even under the current difficult political circumstances, small steps are better than big words or promises.

Confidence-building measures and arms control

The confrontation between Russia and the West is, among other things, reflected in renewed military tension and risks, for instance in dangerous flight movements and airspace violations, in near misses between warships, in the

67 68 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 controla dialogue essential for to (Richter 2016b).Itisalso take placebe- arms conventional of field the for proposals constructive presented 2016 in that currentlythe newantagonism prevails. chairmanship The GermanOSCE therefore remainsappropriatethe most peaceful strategy, andmost despite also lead ity gapsbut toand countermeasures. newinstabilities Armscontrol to capabil- twopercentofgrossproductnational close certain only would not lead tonecessarily greater security. ANATO-wide increasedefence in budgets areobjectively not interested races. innewarms Increaseddo not armaments There is a will onbothsides.Europeanlack of political inparticular countries 1980s. the or 1970s the in was it than terms qualitative in achieve to difficult fact that cyberspace is (still) difficult to regulate, arms control is currently more tional tasks.Dueto the development ofmodern defence technologies and the fidence levels. It can also help to make limited resources available for other na- measures,curity-building ithelpsto reduceand torisks security increase con- se- and confidence verifiable. Similar to is waythat a in treatybyand systems controlArms instrument. creates predictabilityby weapon or weapons limiting however,ment, of thispolitical of knowledge istheloss about thefunctions iiain em superfluous. seem limitation the defence– in States the United sector,particularly which hasmadearms – West the of superiority qualitative and quantitative the – is still and – was cause main The flagrant. more become has time some for existed has that result,a As question. disregardthe controlarms of instrument political the for into called extent certain a to was existence their and conflict Ukraine the of The existing armscontrol regimes inandforEurope were damaged as aresult seriously andto widelyimplementthesemeasures. conflict East–West the of end the after importantly, most and, before OSCE the within on agreed measures security-building and confidence the take to essential also is It institutionalised. and cybersecurity) (e.g. issues specific of regularbe developedshould contact the basis on personnel betweenmilitary In generalcommunication. andpolitical-diplomatic and reliable military terms, available.it isessentialto incidents, guarantee In thecaseofmilitary rapid and toinstruments cation re-establishif theyinstruments such arelonger no imperative toactivate theavailablecommuni management andcrisis crisis lead tocumstances, and dangerous anunintended thereforeis escalation. It in thepresentcould, collision extremely cir military because aminor seriously additional troopsof ment and weapons. These developmentsbe takenmust returnto majormanoeuvres andmanoeuvres nearborders,the deploy andin - 3 Oneofthereasonsnegativethis for develop - - - tween the United States and Russia on upholding the agreement to completely COPING WITH RUSSIA: PAST FAILURES, FUTURE PROSPECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALTIC SEA REGION abolish land-based nuclear intermediate-range weapons (INF Treaty). Publicly discussed treaty violations must also be clarified as part of this dialogue (Kühn & Péczeli 2017).

Political dialogue with full use of the options provided by the OSCE

The Ukraine conflict immediately led to the reactivation of the OSCE: ‘Following a decade of marginalisation, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe has proven since the spring of 2014 to be the only regional organisation that [...] can help to de-escalate the Ukraine crisis’ (Richter 2016a: 1). With its Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to oversee the Minsk agreements in East Ukraine, the OSCE set up its largest long-term mission to date and again became a key forum for dialogue on European security. With the EU and NATO (as organisations whose members did not include all European nations) having almost completely dominated European security policy for more than two decades, more focus was given to the pan-European perspective as a result of this reactivation of the OSCE (cf. Hauser 2016). The OSCE is essential from a functional point of view because only in this organisation do all participants in a conflict enjoy equal rights (inclusiveness), and decisions can only be made on a consensual basis (principle of consensus). It proved exceptionally fortunate that in 2014 Switzerland’s foreign minister held the presidency of the OSCE and that from March 2014 Swiss diplomacy worked with great dedication to prevent further escalation and to re-establish dialogue. With Serbia (2015), Germany (2016), Austria (2017) and Italy taking up the baton in 2018, Switzerland has been followed by other like-minded states, which have continued this dedication in close cooperation with one another.

The great achievement of the OSCE since 2014 is the decisive role it has played in containing the Ukraine conflict and its initiation and ensuing consolidation of the dialogue on pan-European security. Under the given framework conditions maintaining an inclusive dialogue represents a value in its own right. In addition, the presidencies of Germany and Austria in particular worked to achieve progress in specific projects (e.g. confidence and security-building measures and arms control), albeit without any immediate success. Resistance to these initiatives does not by any means come from Russia alone but – depending on the issue in question – also from Western nations. Some countries are gen-

69 70 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 foreign ordefence ministerlevel. conferences to take placeagain. be heldregularlyalso These should atthe is therefore to necessary reactivate the NATO–Russiait and for regular Council terms, functional In exchange. frequent and open for calls particular in Georgiathe during 2008 conflict. in happened as crisis, crises of handling The is wrongact. It tothe workofNATO–Russia interrupt of times in Council is therefore in theinterest ofallthoseconcernedto preserve and respect this Russia Foundingprovides Act of1997 framework an institutional for this.It The dialogue between NATOalso needs to andRussia berevived. The NATO– • • scape, conflict. As of part the process of bringing about a change in the political land- strongly reminiscent theEast–Westduring within theCSCE factions ofsimilar that haveissues to nothing dowithUkraine. These diverging strategies are on results for or negotiations for precondition a conflict Ukraine the resolving erallyto againstallowingtheOSCE a greater assume role,make whileothers commonalities, for identifying and possibly containing irreconcilablecontaining possibly and identifying for positions commonalities, useful for precisely defining (and where appropriate emphasising) pre-existing eye andare thereforeto open subjects. of all manner Theybe particularly can paring for official talks by means of discussions that are held out of the public in a wide rangeas a and wayof tensioncrisis of situations pre ofsuccessfully which areformats, generallyhaveheld behindcloseddoors, proven effective formats should be designed to cover a specific period and topic. Such Track II fromwith specialists theresearch community, diplomacyandindustry. These cooperationin mented andprepared, between experts withdialogue formats as we have seen inrecent years –they are not enough. They need to be supple West. Toend, bilateral this multilateral or are dialogue formats – but essential As already argued, therea need to is rebuildand the between Russia trust Track IIdialogues nomic cooperation aswellthehumandimension. todegree,a similar areasother include also the HelsinkiFinalAct:eco- of activationbe limitedtonot of theOSCEshould should, but policy security dence andsecuritybuildingpan-European securitycooperation; with particular regard to conflict prevention and crisis management, confi use shouldbemade full of theOSCE’sin instruments, and its potential - - - (agreeing to disagree), and for exploring or preparing options for reaching an COPING WITH RUSSIA: PAST FAILURES, FUTURE PROSPECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALTIC SEA REGION agreement on content or process-related issues below the threshold of formal contact.4 These Track II formats can also help to develop relations of trust between participating actors and thus to facilitate crisis communication. Due to the close cooperation that has existed in the past and that still largely exists particularly between Russia and many EU and NATO members, Track II formats can be useful in various areas, in particular with regard to political relations and security policy.

Eurasian connectivity in the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative as an area of cooperation

Economic relations between Russia (before it the Soviet Union) and important European states have always had a stabilising effect on political relations. More use needs to be made of this function. Although the economic sanctions imposed since 2014 obstruct the Russian national economy in certain sectors, they do not have a detrimental effect on the substance of the existing economic exchange. These sanctions do, however, tend to deter new projects or investments and cause Russia to turn away from the European Economic Area. Such a development is counterproductive. For this reason, new possibilities should be used to promote economic cooperation. One such area of cooperation could be participation in the Chinese ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative (Mayer 2018). This strategically designed initiative is intended to help China, through infrastructure development, strengthen its economic ties with Europe (including Russia), with Central Asia, and with South Asia. The European Un- ion has formulated its own connectivity initiative, which was also introduced into the OSCE under the German presidency. Cooperation in this format would strengthen ties between participants in a subject area that is politically less sensitive than hard security policy.

71 72 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 Conclusions tested intheBalticSearegion. peaceful Prudentstepstowardsis possible. new normality goal this should be orderin dent managementoftheantagonism to keep opentheprospectof a is not conceivable without partnerships resolving the Ukraine conflict, but pru interestscommon that need to begiven greaterA return attention. to strategic policy.curity the European Russia, and NATO Union share still someimportant toability rationalfor basis the essential forms showempathy foreign andse- take only will toside attempts neither placeif force the other.on will its The interestsand respect Such atransformationpossible. the othersideisstill for A peaceful transformationunderstanding fortheotherside’sbased on mutual - Notes COPING WITH RUSSIA: PAST FAILURES, FUTURE PROSPECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALTIC SEA REGION

1 Dr. Michael Staack is a professor at the Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bun- deswehr Hamburg.

2 On 6 January 1990, Germany’s foreign minister advocated converting ‘cooperatively structured alliances into one alliance of joint collective security (…) that is to say, structures need to be created between the alliances that gradually overcome the antagonism of the alliances’ (quoted from Genscher 1995: 712). While addressing the Assembly of the European Union (WEU) on 23 March 1990, he went a step further: ‘They (the cooperatively structured alliances) are creating new security structures in Europe. They are becoming increasingly overarched by these structures and will eventually be able to flourish within them’. In his view, a ‘system of mutual collective security’ was the ‘defini- tive perspective’ for a European order of peace that had been laid down as a fundamental objective both in the German Constitution and in NATO’s Harmel Report (Genscher 1991). Although it was clear what Genscher was saying, his words still left room for interpretation. According to his biographer, the top German diplomat Hans-Dieter Heu- mann, he later regarded it as ‘the most serious mistake (…) to have been made since the end of the Cold War’ and felt that ‘the opportunity to include Russia in the pan-European order’ has been missed (Heumann 2012: 315).

3 August Pradetto (2017: 98) appropriately pointed out that NATO stands for more than half of the world’s defence spending and the political West and its allies nearly 70 per- cent. This situation is likely to be exarcerbated by the military build-up pursued by Presi- dent Trump.

4 A very good example of such a Track II dialogue is the joint expert group of the Amer- ican Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Russian Internation- al Affairs Council. In March 2017, the panel presented a report containing numerous recommendations (relating to cyber-security, cooperation on energy and Arctic matters, the Middle East, Ukraine, arms control/strategic stability, the war against terrorism, and economic cooperation) for future cooperation between the United States and Russia. See CSIS/Russian International Affairs Council 2017.

73 74 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 References Genscher, Hans-Dietrich(1991).‘SpeechattheAssemblyof Penguin. Fukuyama, Francis (1992). Studies. Yearbook 2017 ronment’. In:KristianFischer&HansMouritzen (eds.), (2017). ‘DenmarkinarapidlyFrederiksen, changingsecurityenvi ClausHjort US–Russia Relations’.Washington DC/Moscow. CSIS /RussianInternationalAffairsCouncil(2017)‘A Roadmapfor tion Dilemma’. Survival, Charap, Samuel&Mikhail Troitskiy (2013).‘Russia, theWest andtheIntegra- Russia broke therules’.InternationalAffairs Allison, Roy (2014).‘Russian‘deniable’ inUkraine. intervention Howandwhy Studies Quarterly, 11(1),pp.66–99. Kühn, Ulrich&AnnaPéczeli (2017). ‘Russia,NATO, andINF Treaty’. Strategic pp.1-16. Point Connections,IX(2), ortheEndoftheStory?’. Order: AStarting Kühn, Ulrich(2010).‘Medvedev’s Proposals foraNewEuropean Security 14 February 1997. Kennan, George F. (1997).‘EinFehler mitschlimmen Folge’. DieZeit, Schöningh. Paderborn: Heumann, Hans-Dieter(2012). white-paper-german-security-policy-and-future-bundeswehr icy andtheFuture http://www.gmfus.org/publications/ oftheBundeswehr’. German Government (2016).‘The2016WhitePaper onGermanSecurityPol- spiegel Genscher, Hans-Dietrich(1997).‘EinGesamtkonzept stattHektik‘.Der Tages Genscher, Hans-Dietrich(1995). Berlin: SiedlerVerlag. zurEinheit.RedenundDokumenteausbewegterZeitUnterwegs , pp.257-68. European Unionon23March 1990’.In:Hans-DietrichGenscher (ed.), , 13February 1997. , pp.23-30.Copenhagen:DanishInstituteforInternational 55(6),pp.49–62. The EndofHistory andtheLast Man.NewYork: Hans-Dietrich Genscher. DieBiographie. Erinnerungen. 90(6),pp.1255-1297. SiedlerVerlag: Berlin. Danish Foreign Policy Western

- Mälksoo, Lauri (2015). Russian Approaches to International Law. Oxford: COPING WITH RUSSIA: PAST FAILURES, FUTURE PROSPECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALTIC SEA REGION Oxford University Press.

Mayer, Maximilian (ed.) (2018). Rethinking the Silk Road. China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Eurasian Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

NATO (2016). ‘NATO after the summit in Warsaw: adapting to new security challenges – a German perspective’. Keynote address by Ambassador Hans-Dieter Lucas at the Adenauer Forum in Brussels on 28 September 2016, http://www.nato.diplo.de/Vertretung/nato/de/01/2016-09-28__Keynote__ address__Adenauer__Forum.html

Open Letter to President Clinton (1997). ‘Global Beat. Former Policy-Makers Voice Concern Over NATO Expansion’, 26 June 1997, https://www.bu.edu/ globalbeat/nato/postpone062697.html

Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project, OSCE (2015). ‘Back to Diplomacy. Final Report and Recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project’, Vienna.

Pradetto, August (2017). ‘Der Krieg finanziert den Krieg. Die Transatlantischen Beziehungen vor und mit Trump‘. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 62(4), pp. 97–106.

Putin, Vladimir (2007). ‘Speech and following discussion at the Munich Se- curity Conference’. 10 February 2007, http://en.kremlin.ru/events /president/ transcripts/24034

Richter, Wolfgang (2016a). Neubelebung der konventionellen Rüstungs kontrolle in Europa. Ein Beitrag zur militärischen Stabilität in Zeiten der Krise. Berlin: SWP Aktuell.

Richter, Wolfgang (2016b). German OSCE Presidency 2016. ‘Strategische Herausforderungen’. Berlin: SWP Aktuell.

Richter, Wolfgang (2016c). ‘Sub-regional Arms Control fort he Baltics: What Is Desirable? What Is Feasible?’, Deep Cuts Working Paper, 8.

Samuelsen, Anders (2017). ‘The International Situation and Danish Foreign Policy in 2016’. In: Kristian Fischer & Hans Mouritzen (eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017, pp. 11-22. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for Interna- tional Studies.

75 76 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 enlargement inFebruary 1990’. Genscher, Gorbachev, andtheoriginofRussianresentment toward NATO Elise(2010a).‘Notoneincheastward?Sarotte, Bush,Baker, Mary Kohl, to ‘bribetheSoviets out’andMove NATO in’. InternationalAffairs, Elise(2010b).‘PerpetuatingSarotte, USpreeminence. Mary The 1990deals Sicherheit Staack, Michael(2015).DerUkraine-Konflikt unddiegesamteuropäische einem neueninternationalenSystem. Staack, Michael(2000).HandelsstaatDeutschland.DeutscheAußenpolitik in pp. 110–37. . Berlin; Toronto: Opladen. Diplomatic History, 34(1),pp.119–39. Paderborn: Schöningh. 35(1),

Theorising post-Cold War Danish THEORISING POST-COLD WAR foreign policy: the expansion from one dominant to seven distinct approaches Henrik Larsen1 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY: THE EXPANSION FROM ONE DOMINANT TO SEVEN

Most analysts engaged in the study of Danish foreign policy agree that many elements of Danish foreign policy and its varying contexts have changed significantly after the Cold War. This has led to a profound interest in defining, understanding and discussing seemingly new features such as activism, militarisation, the close relationship to the US and/or the EU and the high, if dimin- ishing, level of Danish development aid. An interest that has also marked the articles of this yearbook over the years since the fall of the wall.

However, this worthy exercise is often carried out without paying attention to one particular contextual element which has clearly changed after the end of the Cold War: the theories employed in the study of Danish foreign policy. The number of theoretical approaches used to study Danish foreign policy has multiplied compared with the Cold War period during which one approach – DISTINCT APPROACHES the adaptation theory – was dominant.

The existence of several approaches to studying Danish foreign policy is important for at least two reasons. First of all, different theories often provide different views of what are important elements to study in Danish foreign policy. The importance and definition of elements in Danish foreign policy vary according to the theoretical approach drawn on. Second, the plurality of theoretical approaches to analysing Danish foreign policy after the Cold War allows a considerable openness in the interpretation of important subjects in Danish foreign policy. Thus, it is not just world politics as a backdrop to Danish foreign

77 78 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 part of the reasonof the plurality for approachesof part drawnarguablyis on an in- tothat Danishforeignnot own theory needs beunderstood.its policy Indeed, ofwider studies ofmoreDenmark. than just countries often aspart The idea is refer to theoriesthathave beenusedto analyseDanishforeign – very policy caveat: whenreferringAn important to Danish foreignabout theories policy,I cisions, so-called‘middle range theory’. long linesina country’s foreign policy rather than the making of individual de ForeignPolicy). andSecurity that aim toI lookattheories Also, the explain the differentcy or areaspolicy oftheEU(withexceptionof theCommon poli- development about theories into specifically look therefore, not, do I icy. which sayon theories is The focus foreignabout something pol- andsecurity • • • • • • • foreign policy: I willpresent seven theoreticalthe article approaches to the study ofDanish In on. drawn approach theoretical the to according considerably quite differs – policy foreign Danish in elements significant be to judged are what and – foreign policy Danish in elements significant of view the that liketoshow also awarenessinterpretationsthe possible about of Danishforeign policy. Iwould foreign policy afterthe Cold War. Ihope that thismay to contribute a greater aim to outlinethe main theoretical approaches drawn oninthe study ofDanish I the analysesarewith theoreticalcarried out often blinkersarticle, this on. In out reference to, ordialogue with, othertheoretical interpretations ofthisfield: Danish foreign topolicy oftenstick theirowntheoretical understandingwith- foreign policy.who draw Analysts theoretical on approaches whenstudying givennot Danish themes in crucial debate toabout rise theory-based anopen, essential features ofDanishforeign policy. Somewhat surprisingly, thishas open through the presence of more theoretical bidsforhowto understandthe the theoretical interpretation ofDanishforeignhas alsobecomemore policy which has becomemorepolicy openandunpredictable after theColdWar; Denmark asa‘competition state’ Denmark asasemi-integrated foreign policyactor withtheEU Discourse analysis Lessons andtraditions Denmark asa‘smart state’ Constellation theory The adaptationapproach - creasing tendency to study Danish foreign policy in a wider theoretical context THEORISING POST-COLD WAR (see below). Moreover, it is not suggested that other theoretical approaches to analysing Danish foreign policy may not be interesting or helpful. While pointing to areas where further theoretical work would be useful, the focus here is on those theories that have been used in substantial analyses of Danish foreign policy (as opposed to theoretical approaches that just mention Danish foreign policy en passant). DANISH FOREIGN POLICY: THE EXPANSION FROM ONE DOMINANT TO SEVEN The article will first present the dominant theory in the study of Danish foreign policy during the Cold War – the adaptation theory. It will then turn to the seven theoretical approaches which have been drawn on since the Cold War. For each theory, it will first present the basic points in the theory and then look at what the theory has to offer in terms of interpretations of such issues as con- tinuity and change, activism, militarisation, the balance between institutions and development aid. Following on from that, some reflections are offered on why the number of theoretical approaches to the study of Danish foreign policy has increased. The conclusion presents some general observations on the theories.

Theory during the Cold War

The adaptation theory became the dominant theoretical approach to the study of Danish foreign policy in the early 1970s (Breitenbauch & Wivel 2004; Due-Nielsen & Petersen 1995: 14). The aim of the adaptation theory was to explain the general line in a country’s foreign policy. The early steps in developing the theory were taken by Rosenau in the US (Rosenau 1966), but subsequently the theory has primarily been developed in Denmark – with Denmark as the DISTINCT APPROACHES case to be explained. According to Petersen, ‘the reason may be that this theory seems especially apt to elucidate the difficult foreign policy options for a country like Denmark and … the traditional historical analyses of Danish foreign policy… lend themselves easily to transformation into the language of adaptation theory’ (Due-Nielsen & Petersen 1995: 14).

Two scholars – Nikolaj Petersen and Hans Mouritzen – have, more than any- body else, been engaged in this work (Due-Nielsen & Petersen, 1995: 14; Lars- en 2005: 25–6). In the following, we will describe Petersen’s use and development of the theory as he has been the most prominent in expanding the theory

79 80 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 active and more based on domestic values. In this field it came close close being came to it field values.this domestic In moreactive on and based towardsand policy policy development theEC.In was morethe line policy ish stress sensitivity.‘giveor Balancing, andtake’,security wasthelinebothin together with the proximityto the Soviethave Union, to also contributed Dan- NATO,Atthe ECandCSCE. samememberships, these very thesametime, ence throughorganisationsof international membership its such astheUN, influ exert to able been has Denmark because is This balancing. by marked Second World War. The generalline from Danishpolicy has been 1945–1989 However,underlying Danishforeign theconditions changed policy after the to beuntenablein1940). was marked period the inter-war byout (which turned of isolationism apolicy while wars world two the during acquiescence of policy a conduct to forced tersen 1977: 236–37). According to Petersen, Denmark has conducted or was (Pe- deterrence as defence and non-confrontation détente, on based policy a conduct group this within countries security, of field the In explicitly). so say determine theirforeignnal andexternalconditions (Petersen policy doesnot vulnerability. Atwe have thesametime, tointer thatboth of course, assume, because theyof states, bothhave the meansandmotivation due to their torelations. international groupthis high for engagement is The international adopt aPolicya ‘givebased on . Balancingis ofBalancing andtake’ approach will country the high, are sensitivity stress and capacity influence both when stressbe aPolicywill high thepolicy is sensitivity Acquiescence. And of finally, and low is capacity influence When isolationism. or Quiescence of be aPolicy foreign policy. If influence capacity and stress sensitivity are low, the policy will be aPolicyshape its of thestate will conditions ofDominance.Theinternal will policy foreign the low, sensitivity stress and high is capacity influence if to world. the outside country leads toThis adaptivepossible four strategies: ability to affect the outside world)and stress(the vulnerability sensitivity ofthe (its capacity influence of combination the by defined is country given a of egy Due-Nielsen & Petersen 1995: 14). According to Petersen, the adaptation strat- also ‘acquiescence’,see mode (the 1977: 30; adaptation (Petersen below) see surroundingstheir reallyis and that‘tilpasning’ of forms of four one out only adaptation toenvironment.external its He stresses adapt to thatallstates Danish foreignon which hastended to policy Denmark’son focus necessary traditionalin ‘tilpasning’ use oftheterm challenges the common scholarship toit and applying DanishforeignWar.the Cold during policy he article a 1977 In - - a dominant policy because Danish stress sensitivity towards the developing THEORISING POST-COLD WAR world was low (Due-Nielsen & Petersen 1995: 16,18–19)2.

Petersen does not specify the conditions and limits for a country’s foreign policy under the balancing mode more than has already been outlined above. Moreover, it appears that the theory relies on a substantial amount of intuition or unspoken assumptions about the nature of the international environment to contextualise the crucial categories of influence capacity and stress sensitiv- DANISH FOREIGN POLICY: THE EXPANSION FROM ONE DOMINANT TO SEVEN ity. As the categories are understood very broadly, it is difficult for the analyst to identify clearly how changes in these two categories affect Danish policy. According to Petersen, Denmark found itself in the balancing category during the period 1945–89: a balancing mode that is defined by ‘give and take’, international engagement and the importance of both internal and external factors. This is a very general framework for an analysis which allows for little in the way of interpreting concrete policies. That is maybe why Petersen adds the word ‘cautious’ to characterise Danish foreign policy under the Cold War as ‘cautious balancing’ (Due-Nielsen & Petersen 1995: 16, 32–35). However, this label seems to be linked to the observation of concrete elements in Danish foreign policy during this period rather than being derived from the conceptual categories of the theory itself.

It should be added that the adaptation theory was not the only theory drawn on to analyse Danish foreign policy during the Cold War. Elements of small state theory were also used. Ole Karup Pedersen’s Udenrigsminister P. Munchs op- fattelse af Danmarks stilling i international politik (1970) contributed to placing discussions about small state theory on the agenda. His action theory was used in several analyses of Danish foreign policy from a small state perspective during the Cold War (Larsen 2017: 35–40). DISTINCT APPROACHES

81 82 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 Theories after the Cold War is possible topossible is governmentswhy Danish understand conduct could after 1989 (Due-Nielsen &Petersen 1995). of adaptationtheory,within the terms Thus, it file’ balancing mode different from the ‘cautious’ balancing during the Cold War pro- ‘high often and clear security, a of in expressed field is the this In system. traditional values inDanishforeignand the dawningEuropean policy security on foreigna newconsensus Ellemann-Jensen, and an overlap policy between to centralsources domestic roleas thedynamic such offoreignUffe minister given thatsuchanincreased scope wouldbeexploited.ButPetersen points a not was It policy. foreign Danish on sources domestic of influence the for tersen 1995:18,34). This reduced stressprovided sensitivity greater scope stress isseenaslowerthan atanytimebefore sensitivity (Due-Nielsen &Pe- increased due to oftheEuropean the openness system. Denmark’s security significantly Denmark) (including Europe in states small of capacity fluence in- the wall, the of fall the After 1995: 16). Petersen & (Due-Nielsen balancing’ ‘cautious as qualify Due-Nielsen and Petersen which strategy, balancing a in accordingDanish foreign towith- was conducted 1945–89 policy the theory mentioned, As policy. foreign general with equated be to tends which policy Danish foreign policy after the Cold War? Petersen mostly focuses on security How doesthetraditional adaptationtheory,the generalexplain then, in lines external environment, thegovernment andtheDanishpoliticalenvironment. Danish foreign policy. He defined this as a triangle the corners of which are the foreignbehaviour, policy to (‘handlerum’)action for on thescope afocus for on adaptation(the cusing balancing mode) as the basic explanationofDanish do see Petersen’sa changein these tenyears. workduring He goesfrom fo- and stressas thebackground sensitivity of anadaptive statestrategy.we But tinuation of the adaptation theory with its basic concepts of influence capacity Nikolaj Petersen’s work during the first ten years after the Cold War was a con- wasalive andkickingaftertheendofColdWar.The adaptationtheory The adaptationtheory icy aftertheColdWar. centralof explanation and its adaptation theory featuresforeignDanish of pol- to analyseDanishforeign policy afterthe Cold War. outwiththe We will start the sevenoutline I will the following In groupsthat haveof theories beenused a policy which on many accounts was more active than during the Cold War – THEORISING POST-COLD WAR not least in the field of security.

According to the adaptation theory, the basic conceptual framework for Dan- ish foreign policy has not changed since the end of the Cold War. Denmark is still in a balancing mode as it has been since 1945. But there is change within the balancing mode from cautious to high profile balancing. Significantly, the strategy does not move into the dominance mode, although Petersen’s use of DANISH FOREIGN POLICY: THE EXPANSION FROM ONE DOMINANT TO SEVEN the term ‘high profile’ suggests that Danish foreign policy has come closer to this mode.

With regard to policy towards the EU, balancing has also been the dominant mode for Danish policy after the Cold War. In fact, most EU member states follow a balancing strategy most of the time (Petersen 1998). But, according to the theory, there will always be significant differences between the member states due to the different balances between influence capacity and stress sensitivity. This also means that states may draw on elements from the three other adaptation strategies while still remaining within the general balancing mode (Petersen 1998: 41). For example, weak states can use ‘bastions’ – elements drawn from the acquiescence or isolationism strategies. For states that do not share the general goals of the integration process, the introduction of bastions is a possible strategy (Petersen 1998: 40–46). The four Danish exemptions of 1993 are examples of such bastions. The overall Danish mode towards the EU is one of (normal) balancing modified with elements of acquiescence and isolationism articulated in a generally sceptical attitude towards the goals of integration and also through the four exemptions. This is the same adaptive mode as Denmark has been in since the start of membership in 1973 (Petersen 1998: 49–50). DISTINCT APPROACHES

One can raise the question of whether the adaptation theory actually has the concepts to give a nuanced interpretation of changes in Danish foreign policy, including the policy towards EU, during and after the Cold War. The very general categories of ‘high profile balancing’ or ‘balancing’ with elements of acquiescence/isolationism are the main theoretical categories to understand the period after the Cold War. It is possibly due to the theory’s high level of abstraction and the accompanying difficulties in interpreting concrete changes that we see a new direction in the development of the theory from the late 1990s. Pe- tersen adds new elements to the theory with more analytical dimensions. The

83 84 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 shows that the Danish scope for action was reducedaction that theDanishscopefor shows the wakein ofthe cri (Petersencrisis He 2006b). 2006a, Muhammed cartoon the 2006 of yses thoroughlyPetersenmost triangle action for the scope anal- uses empirical in level ofambition(Petersen 2013). mayaction for be unalteredstill the government if increases simultaneously its environmentexternal constrainingbecome less the government,for the scope action (as the side ambition ofthe triangle moves inwards). If the internal and a higher level of governmentin foreign ambition policy reduces the scope for lower.that model is action for the scope of implication Asomewhatsurprising the levelat leastineveryday can, ofambition language, be measured as higheror whereas quantify to difficult are values because is this that guess may the levelassessed (Petersenwhich is ofambition We2013). 2006b, 2006a, only is it that so policy’, foreign official in ambitions and ‘values to relegated estingly,in Petersen’s valuesaction, empiricaluseofscopefor are leftout, bysubstantially Petersenthe triangle).Inter other thanasthespacewithin defined not is itself action/handlerum’ for ‘scope term (the action for scope changes on thethree dimensions and thereby expand or reduce the (Danish) The threemovethe triangle of sides inwardsoutwardsor the depending on • • • 2006b, 2013): the triangle, which define the scope for action, are as follows (Petersen 2006a, Fromthe theoretical 2006, action. isonthescopefor focus The three sides of but doesnotexplainthemotivation behindit(Petersen 2013: 195). stress sensitivity. Petersen himselfrecognisestheoretical this development and capacity influence of categories general the through included be must or direct way.adaptation theory, Intheclassic are these dimensions exogenous of decision-makersinclusion in a and moreinternal and external possibilities can beusedto analyseconcrete events. throughbecomes possible This the evenor longer periods ing erasa country’s in foreign to policy amodelwhich is upgraded.concept fromThis isashift amodelwhichisaimed at explain- downplayedof adaptationis concept and the‘handlerum’ (‘scopeaction’) for The values andambitionsofofficialforeign policy The domestic possibilities for and constraints to the official foreign policy. international system constraintsInternational by constituted the policies ofotherstatesand the - - sis as the external environment became less benevolent towards Denmark in THEORISING POST-COLD WAR many parts of the world and because of a reduced domestic consensus on foreign policy. His conclusion was that, if Denmark wanted to continue with the same scope for action, the governments would have to reduce their level of ambition. Petersen has not published analyses of the situation in the years after the cartoon crisis so we do not know how he reads the actual developments in the years following the crisis (though in a book chapter he does outline the general developments of the Danish scope for action in the period DANISH FOREIGN POLICY: THE EXPANSION FROM ONE DOMINANT TO SEVEN 1982–2006 [Petersen 2013]).

Hans Mouritzen – regime adaptation

Another important researcher who has worked with adaptation theory and Denmark is Hans Mouritzen. Mouritzen draws on his book Finlandization: towards a General Theory of Adaptive Politics (1988). An important difference between Mouritzen and Petersen is that Mouritzen is interested in ‘the regime’ as the adapting unit and not ‘the state’ as it is the case in Petersen’s model. By regime Mouritzen understands something more durable than the specific governments of a state. The regime identity varies from state to state, but frequently builds on religious or ideological values (Mouritzen 1996a: 11). The Danish regime identity is ‘protestant democracy’ (Mouritzen 1996b: 69). A regime commits itself to protecting its autonomy (defensive power), regime identity and the control over a given territory including its inhabitants and material values. Most regimes also attempt to influence the world around them (offensive power) and to further the welfare of the population (Mouritzen 1996a: 10). Offensive and defensive power (autonomy) are general values whereas territory, welfare and regime identity are issue-specific values. DISTINCT APPROACHES Mouritzen works with the same four adaptation modes as Petersen. The difference from Petersen is that there is a specific value account associated with each adaptive mode. The value defensive power is the core value whereas the priority given to the other values depends on the country. Under the acquiescence mode the value account will be negative whereas it will be neutral under the balancing mode due to the give and take nature of this mode.

In a contribution to the book, European Integration and National Adaptations, he analyses the Danish value account vis-à-vis the EU during the period 1989–94 (Mouritzen 1996b). He concludes that the value account is characterised by

85 86 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 aptation. The balancingmodeisthebasicadaptive formacross policyareas. However,Mouritzen allinall, andPetersen share thesame viewonDanishad aptation modeiscloseto dominant. mode. In Danishdevelopmentthe value policy is positive, account and thead itive compared with theColdWareven period, the basic if‘balancing’isstill (Mouritzen 1996b: 78–79). The value account on this point appears more pos Denmark’shas too generalinfluence so hence and increasedhave status and as. In terms of participation in military operations he finds that Danish prestige Mouritzen alsohasconsiderationsabout thevalue arein otherpolicy account - itzen 1996b: 84–90). values,the value neutral,is account there but islessexchange of values (Mour welfareits engages andidentity valuein less exchange).furthers Denmarkstill values its also protects but autonomyits where(and thus Denmarkfurthers the introductionthere oftheopt-outs, is a returnto conventional balancing a high level ofvalue exchange due to theDanish‘hyperbalancing’policy. After concerned. Its joint effectjoint concerned. Its was aEuropean atthetimeofwriting for unipolarity mon guidelinesinEuropeand democratic asfarstability are consolidation features: common the idea is thatthey havecom- thepolesetsout important France, Britainand Germany. In spiteofdifferences between the pole states, book) affected by the‘Euro-Atlantic’ pole. This poleis theensembleofUS, Wivel,European most smallstatesare (or were atthe timethey wrote their small stateiswhichpoleorpolesaffect them. According to Mouritzen and individual the for question central The state. the on power relational exercise larity. groupthe stateor the individualstateis The polefor which of states environmentthe environmental– salient which is state the individual of po- Rather,states. the small particularly states, the immediate in the polarity is it alism israrelyrelevant themost whenanalysingtheforeignof individual policy isthatthegeneraltheory constellation powerstructure as describedby neore- understand thebehaviour Europeanof small states. in ofdeparture The point of Euro-Atlanticthe book,The Geopolitics Integration (2005a). The aimisto itzen,1991). developed is The theory by HansMouritzen andAndersWivel in (Mour 1991 in article an in Mouritzen Hans by launched first was theory The realism.of neoclassical the assumptions based on is theory The constellation The constellationtheory - - - - - non-pole states including Denmark. But the authors stress that the environ- THEORISING POST-COLD WAR mental polarity for non-pole states is not a static given. The pole may change (Mouritzen & Wivel 2005b). Currently, it is an open question whether we are still seeing a Euro-Atlantic environmental pole in Europe.

A constellation is the basic set of relations a non-pole state can have to the pole; in Europe that is to the Euro-Atlantic pole. A state’s membership of a constellation provides the broad frame for a state’s position of power and hence DANISH FOREIGN POLICY: THE EXPANSION FROM ONE DOMINANT TO SEVEN its behaviour (Mouritzen & Wivel 2005b: 29). In Europe a state’s location in a constellation is defined by its relationship to the EU and NATO. Membership of both organisations is important in order to be part of the good company, and membership of these organisations gives prestige which is a source of influence across policy areas. Membership of the EU is the most important defining feature for membership of a constellation. There are four constellations for European non-pole states’ relations to the Euro-Atlantic pole (Mouritzen & Wivel 2005b: 35, 37):

• Core insiders. States which are members of both the EU and NATO. • Near-core insiders. States which are members of the EU but not NATO, or states which are members of both organisations but have reservations (legal or others) or opt-outs in the EU. • Would-be insiders. Potential members of the EU including candidate members. • Outsiders. States that do not want to become members of the EU or have no prospect of becoming members within the foreseeable future.

Core insiders have high influence but low autonomy due to their full membership of the two organisations. Near-core insiders have somewhat less influ- DISTINCT APPROACHES ence than core insiders, but more autonomy because of their reservations. They have chosen to stay outside certain EU policy areas and cannot therefore conduct policies with high intensity and influence. Would-be insiders have low influence and low autonomy because they have to give in to all demands for membership of EU. Outsiders have the greatest autonomy, but the influence of outsiders varies (Mouritzen & Wivel 2005b: 35).

The basic logic, then, is that a non-pole state’s foreign policy primarily depends on the present geopolitical context, the environmental polarity for the state in question. In Europe this environmental polarity comes in the form of four con-

87 88 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 competing with theotherNordiccompeting over states prestige andthefavourof the US, the perspective of so-called ‘parallel action’,may Danishactivism bea way of From insiders. core with compared prestige acquire to active) more be (and roletowardsthe policy for outside theEU.Denmarkhasto countries workharder a play also may position near-core The 2005b: 31). Wivel & (Mouritzen fromthe EU tige inside activebeing (militarily) NATOand in the EU outside is issue-neutral,As status position. Denmarkcanregain pressome of thelost - fromarising status itsnear-coreas opposedto insider position a core insider tocan beseenasaDanishattempt elements, of the loss compensatefor tary Danish foreignWar.after theCold policy mili its particular in Danishactivism, The near-coreprovides insider status an interpretation ofseveral aspects of since theColdWar. Denmark’sareas farconstellations position concerned has notchanged with regard to the move towards European integration inthe EU (Miles2005). Warpresumably – reservationsbecause ofits NATOwithin reluctance andits War,that Denmarkwasalsoanear-coresuggests Miles the Cold during insider itzenthe Cold andWivelduring the constellations deal with explicitly donot Atlantic(Miles 2005).AlthoughMour security for seen ascrucial Alliance is grationpeace after theSecondWorld asameansofsecuring War. Rather, the inte- European in belief no is there Also, influence. German much too of feara tofrom lessons by theexperience ofwarandoccupation Germany,there is Europeanof aspects integrationbe linked can toDue theshadowofpast. EU supranationality,‘federo-sceptic’ itwasstill towardsscepticism and this near-coreEven status. iftheDanish elitehad become more disposed towards formalised Denmark’sonly opt-outs the four But EU opt-outs. already existing Denmark isdescribedasanear-corecountries). four insider becauseofits considerationhis in theory constellation Nordicof Denmark(andtheother In choice ofconstellations(Mouritzen &Wivel 2005b: 39–40). of thepresent onthedynamics and itmay constellation alsoaffectinertia the effects ofthepresent constellation. mayThe shadowofthepast work as thus war.the last typically can mitigatetheforeignThe shadowofthepast policy learned of the lessons frompast consists the effects ofpastforeign policy, their basicmodelthatthey call:‘the shadow of thepast’. The shadow of the autonomythe pole.However,vis-à-vis Mouritzen andWivel add anelementto state’s and the influence for framework the sets constellation The stellations. The Geopolitics ofEuro-AtlanticThe Geopolitics Integration (2005)Lee Miles employs the - - given that Denmark is only a near-core insider. Also, the shadow of the past THEORISING POST-COLD WAR may dispose Denmark towards military action with the US – leaning towards the Atlantic part of the Euro-Atlantic pole (Miles 2005).

Within the EU, the near-core insider position and the shadow of the past mean that Denmark cannot be active in the areas of the four Danish opt-outs and that Denmark is sceptical towards a federal development of the EU. Attention is paid to maintaining autonomy. Having said that, Miles characterises Danish DANISH FOREIGN POLICY: THE EXPANSION FROM ONE DOMINANT TO SEVEN policy within the EU as that of a selective near-core insider. Denmark has been active on select policies such as enlargement of the EU and environmental protection while maintaining its reticence in other areas and towards a federal development (Miles 2005).

Small state/smart state

Small state theory is based on the assumption that the size of a state says something important about its behaviour in international politics. Small state quality may be defined by the state’s or others’ perception of the state as small, or by fixed criteria such as population size or BNP. Generally speaking, interest in the study of small states has increased after the end of the Cold War which may, among other things, be linked to the increased number of small states and the idea that these states have a greater scope for action than during the Cold War (Neumann & Gstöhl 2006).

In the context of the analysis of Danish foreign policy after the Cold War, the theoretical interest in small state theory has mainly been in the form of the so-called ‘smart state theory’. Anders Wivel’s work which draws on Joenniemi (1998) and Arter (2000) is central here. For Joenniemi the more open situation DISTINCT APPROACHES after the Cold War increases the relevance of the small state concept as an analytical category since small states are less bound by commitments and find it easier to adapt. For Joenniemi, to be a small state may, after the Cold War, have become synonymous with being smart (he does not define what smart means in this context) (Joenniemi 1998: 62). Based on Joenniemi and Arter, Wivel argues that several conditions make the environment conducive to small states acting as smart states. First of all, there are no conventional threats towards small states and it is therefore less necessary to pay attention to the great powers. This also means that the superpower, USA, has to listen more to the needs of smaller states. Secondly, globalisation and interdependence

89 90 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 theory doesnotprovidetheory theyardstick forwhenageneral policyissmart). suggests thatsuchgeneral (even ifthe can alsobe considered policies smart This 64). 2013a: 59, (Wivel War Cold the after interventions military regarding line Danish active the and War Cold the during line disarmament the profile, Wivel aregeneral about as theDanish thirdsuch policies way development 2013b). However, 2009, (Wivel 2009 manyoftheotherexamplesprovided by Denmark’s preparation ofthe COP15 climateconference in Copenhagen in a relatively concrete character. Wivel illustrates thethreethrough dimensions initiatives statepolicy shouldhaveThese three suggest thatsmart dimensions • • • within thepolicyarea concernedandpossiblybeyond 2013a: 58–59): (Wivel brandedinitiatives.is state policy the small successful, If competent as smart Wivel(2000), forward three puts successful for Inspired conditions by Arter 2013a: 60–66). (Wivel the smart state strategy has gained in significance in the post-Cold War period all threeWhile tion. strategies werestrategiesstate small War, theCold during throughother states about committing is second agreements rules, integraor - The means. military by state’s independence the protecting about is first The small statestrategies: independence diplomacy.diplomacy and commitment strategystate powers. an additionto is prevailingother The smart thetwo However, statestrategy transformcannot a smart such small statesinto great 2013a: 62–63). bigger states(Wivel weakness intotheir astrength becausetheya threatconstitute do not tothe securing influence. under When these acting conditions, smartly they can turn are but the much morenot facinga struggle forsurvival pleasant problem of mote theirvalues intheirforeign policy. small states Under these conditions share the values ofthe US worldorder, which makes iteasier for themto pro- tocontribute Finally,and diplomatic solutions. security European smallstates makesThis tostates important. small less means easier for make it military The stateshouldactasanhonestbroker. preferences. The givestate should strongto priority thisinitiative over othernational solving ageneral problem. proposalof the policy The content shouldbea concrete for suggestion Within the terms of the smart state theory, there is no clear break in Danish THEORISING POST-COLD WAR foreign policy after the Cold War, as Denmark had also been engaged in smart state behaviour during the Cold War through the third way/development aid profile, UN policies, support for disarmament initiatives and peacekeeping. These policies could all be seen as attempts to present Denmark as a peaceful and well-meaning nation (Wivel 2013a: 56–57). Conditions after the Cold War have made the smart state strategy much more accessible to small states, but there is no fundamental change in the Danish activist profile from the Cold DANISH FOREIGN POLICY: THE EXPANSION FROM ONE DOMINANT TO SEVEN War period. However, as smart state strategies are much more accessible, many of the active elements can be interpreted within the framework of this theory. That goes for the continued high level of development aid and military engagement, from the Gulf in 1990 to the bombings of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and the high profile in climate politics (Wivel 2013a: 58–59; Wivel 2009). As mentioned, the concrete initiative in climate politics leading up to COP15 can also be seen as an attempt to act successfully as a smart state, and the same framework can be used to interpret other Danish initiatives. In addition, Grøn and Wivel have also put forward a specific model for analysing smart state behaviour within the EU, giving several illustrative examples of Danish policy: the influence on the EU’s enlargement policy and the EU’s development policy (Grøn & Wivel 2011: 534). But it is, of course, also possible to understand parts of Danish policy as expressions of the two other kinds of small state behaviour – independence diplomacy and commitment diplomacy. Many Danish policy initiatives after the Cold War, such as the support for EU enlargement, could also be interpreted as commitment diplomacy.

Lessons of the past and traditions

We will first deal with lessons of the past and then traditions. The idea in the DISTINCT APPROACHES lessons of the past approach is that certain past events in the history of a country may turn into guidelines for what a country should or should not do in its foreign policy. In the first case they are positive lessons whereas in the latter they are negative. The lessons take effect through the decision-makers and the public’s belief in them. They may be explicit reference points in political debates or tacitly internalised, in which case they are difficult to research (Mouritzen 2014: 81–83,100; Struwe & Rasmussen 2014: 8). The approach draws particularly on political psychology as presented in works such as Er- nest May’s Lessons of the Past from 1973 and Robert Jervis’ Perception and Misperception in International Relations from 1976.

91 92 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 5 4 3 2 1 presents five Danishforeign policylessonsfrom the20 central here (Mouritzen 2014: 84; Mouritzen 1999: 108–112). Mouritzen is (1999) lessons policy foreign Danish on work Mouritzen’s period? War post-Cold of thepasthaveWhat kindoflessons affected Danish foreignin the policy consequences whichconstitutecentral lessonsofthepast. mentioned inrelationto theory, theconstellation itisoftenpastwarsandtheir prevents rational responsesto thedemands of structural circumstances.As cies withinthecoalition. which mayThese lessons workasaforce ofinertia as avariable whichmay affect astate’spoli- andits choiceofconstellation ed above(close tothe shadowofpast whichincludes of thepast) lessons tural factors. present- theory the constellation the casein example, for is, This approaches of the with the past moderatinglessons the effects ofmore struc approachof thepast The lessons arewith other combination oftenusedin as a political and security actor and this is reflected in Danish EU policy. The EU Danish in reflected is this and actor security and political a as According to Mouritzen theelitehave becomemore positive towards theEU and Nordic cooperation. However,towardsthe policy Europe ismore complex. ofNATOthe importance development membership, on theUN aid,thefocus for understandingcentralWar elements ofpost-Cold Danishforeign policy: relevant equally are lessons above the of Several War? Cold the after policy roleWhat play, dothese lessons the interpretationfor then, of Danish foreign peacekeeping. from apart policy foreign Danish in military the for role limited the influenced broader meanshasalso from lesson of military the limitedutility about 1864 cooperation(5) andthehighdevelopment the UN(1). on aid andfocus The Nordic on placed value high the (3+4), TO’s security of field the in significance towardsthe aloofpolicy understanding European cooperation- NA (1 and2), These could,underthe Cold War,lessons ofthe background for as part serve ‘Nordic cooperationa goodthing’(19 is ‘NATO ensures peaceinourvicinity’. tion. Scepticismtowards isolatedneutrality). ‘Never 9Aprilagain’after theGermanoccupa- and just (sedimentedduring (sameperiods). ‘Great powersare dangerous, Germanyinparticular’ ‘We arewe are weak,but and 1933–43). thebest’(sedimented 1864–1918 part ofthe20 part th century). th century,re-emergence the later in th century: - lessons from 1864 (1 and 2 above) mainly live on in the wider population and THEORISING POST-COLD WAR thus, in this way, they continue to constitute a constraint for what the political elite can do (Mouritzen 2014: 99. See also Mouritzen 1999: 112).

The lessons play a very different role for Denmark’s military contributions after the Cold War. In the field of security, the politicians have stressed the break with the lessons of 1864, most clearly under Prime Minister Anders Fogh Ras- mussen. He explicitly distanced himself from what he saw as the adaptive DANISH FOREIGN POLICY: THE EXPANSION FROM ONE DOMINANT TO SEVEN spirit of 1864, the collaboration policy during the occupation and the footnote policy of the 1980s (Mouritzen 2014: 95). Most of the Danish military engagements from 1990 Gulf War onwards can be said to follow from a negation of the lessons of 1864 (Mouritzen 2014: 93–95).

Let’s now turn to the foreign policy tradition approach. The traditions it references are the long historical lines in foreign policy thinking with certain recurrent patterns that are particularly relevant for understanding the character of foreign policy. Foreign policy traditions have a deep and long-lasting character. One therefore must consider whether apparent foreign policy changes are really changes or just different expressions of the same tradition. Foreign policy traditions are particularly observable for bigger states, but they can also be detected in smaller states’ foreign policy. For the smaller states they are often linked to their search for security in the light of threats from a bigger state, a threatening neighbour. According to Hans Branner, Denmark fits this pattern well. There are recurrent elements in Danish foreign policy thinking which dispose the country towards pursuing certain general foreign policy goals, international and national conditions permitting, while balancing them with other concerns at times when the goals cannot be pursued (Branner 2013: 135, 140, 146,152). DISTINCT APPROACHES

What, then, is the content of the Danish policy tradition? In research on the Danish foreign policy tradition after the Cold War, it is seen as having a dual character. Branner thus presents the Danish foreign tradition in terms of two elements. The first element is adaptation which is the necessary response in situations where there are outside threats and a hostile environment. The second element is activism. The activism is aimed at furthering a predictable and rule-based international order. The first element in the tradition is dominant when there is a conflictual international environment with little scope for initiatives that further the consolidation of a rule-bound international order. The

93 94 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 as itis foreignDanish in thedualist element tivist tradition policy to beasprominent circumstanceslier periods;what is newthatthe international allowthe ac- respectsmost after theColdWar therefore is of adifferent not kindfrom ear- in profile policy foreign Danish active more much The 1930s. the in role icant allowed leewaylittle as ithad previouslysmall states–just for played a signif to the bipolar competitive structure and the threat from the Sovietwhich Union the Danishforeignelement in tradition policy had to play afargreater role due vironment. The Cold War periodwasa period where the adaptation/pragmatist benevolent en - and international more open much a of because flourish could ofliberal and egalitarianvalues ist/furthering elementoftheDanishtradition ForBranner and Wivel, War the post-Cold periodhasbeenonewhere the activ- ofliberal andegalitarianvalues 2014). tism andthefurthering (Wivel the Danishforeignin tradition policy of abalancebetweenpragmathe form in orderternational (Branner 2000). Wivel2013, presentsdualism similar a very towardsand open benign toattempts state small strengthen in- arule-bound dominates when environmentsecond element,the activism, international is solely throughsolely organisations, international the Fogh international Rasmussen beforebeforethe period of while the internationalism that is wasconducted dominant. The difference between the Foghperiod and the period Rasmussen Warthe post-Cold ister). During element hasbeen periodtheinternationalist Scavenius’during on oneelement(determinism built tenure asforeign min and Hækkerup),Munch eign ministers foreignothers while in has only policy periods inDanishforeign policy bothelementshave been present (underfor some In and internationalism. between elementsofdeterminism is dualism policy foreign inDanish towhich serves the foreign understand Warof thepost-Cold policy period.His tradition a dualist identifies also (2015) Pedersen a return to thedualisttradition afterFogh 2014:128–129). Rasmussen (Wivel on ideas was sostrong thatthepragmatist elementwasneglected. He sees political reasons (Branner 2013: 148–151). For Wivel this is because the focus theorder,international furthering for the US militarily butrather at supporting dition. For Branneraimed period wasnot at in this is becausetheactivism this as atemporaryperiod (2001–2009) mussen break with theforeigntra policy - Danish foreign policy. However, bothBranner and Wivel considertheFogh Ras- the traditionplayedis theresense that haschanged. this In out change in no is War;the Cold of the waning changed with ratherthe environmentis it which in 3 . Itisthereforethe basicDanishforeign not tradition policy which has - - - - - ism was also conducted through bilateral relationships (e.g. to the US). It was THEORISING POST-COLD WAR kind of maximum internationalism but still within the dualist tradition (Peders- en 2015: 38–42). But, in any case, Pedersen still draws on a dualist foreign policy tradition to explain central elements of Danish foreign policy after the Cold War. It should be mentioned that Pedersen also sees a potential break with the foreign policy tradition in that the Fogh Rasmussen understanding may be considered a challenge to the traditional dualism. This is because it may no longer base itself on an understanding of Denmark as a small state which may DANISH FOREIGN POLICY: THE EXPANSION FROM ONE DOMINANT TO SEVEN sometimes have to adapt (determinism) (Pedersen 2015: 44).

Discourse analysis

Discourse analytical approaches are more explicit about how to study meanings than approaches such as lessons and traditions. Meaning is studied through analysing language and discourse. In discourse analysis lessons and traditions are only salient phenomena in foreign policy if they are articulated as such in the political or popular discourse. There are many different kinds of discourse analysis but the one that has been used in the analysis of Danish foreign policy has been the macro approach drawing on Foucault (1989) and Laclau and Mouffe (1985). Inspired by Foucault, a discourse is understood as limited range of utterances which promote a limited range of meanings. The central point is that discourses do not reflect the surroundings in a neutral way, but rather work actively to create these surroundings; they play a constitutive role. They are therefore an independent point of departure in analysis. Dis- course is articulated by the political actors who both produce and reproduce discourse. Based on Derrida, linguistic meaning cannot be fixed. Any use of words in a new context exposes those words to the risk of a change of meaning (Derrida 1967). Discourse is not a static entity compared with for example DISTINCT APPROACHES ‘the tradition in foreign policy’.

Discourse analysis has been used in the study of foreign policy by several Dan- ish researchers who have studied a number of European states including Den- mark (Larsen 1997,2005; Wæver 1998, 2002; Hansen 2006; Wæver et al. 1991; Hansen & Wæver, 2002). The focus has been on the role of national discursive structures in shaping national foreign policy. Discourse is seen as a fundamental structural dimension which both shapes and constrains foreign policy. Na- tional interests are seen as articulations within discourses. Discourse analysis does not work with national interests outside discourse.

95 96 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 among the political elite haveamong thepolitical adhered tocooperation theessential discourse Danish exemptionsthe four 2009a). (Larsen 1999; because themajority is This cooperation playedhas only discourse a rolerelation in to theintroductionof towardspolicy has shapedDanish discourse tion the interstate and that the EU argues2009a). Larsen 1999; (Larsen state super coopera thattheessential - eignty isacceptable as thiswillbea step towards thecreation ofa European cooperationinterstate the EUshouldbenormal andthatnotransfer ofsover- bership. the cooperationThe interstate other discourse, argues discourse, that desirable) areasin some asatrade-off for thegreater from gains arising mem- Denmark to for accepttransfersary of sovereignty (evennecessarily not is ifit political and economic reasonsinstrumental and argues thatitmay be neces- for Denmark in the for EU ascrucial cooperationsees participation discourse at playdiscourses regardent with politics Danish in toEurope. The essential Hansen (2002)and Larsen (1999;2009a)alsoshowthatthere are two differ- fromis today andstill thebeginningofmembership (Hansen2002).However, basic synthesis. This iswhyDenmarkhas been reticent towards EUintegration this threatening without EU the sovereignty to of transfer elements to difficult sis between the state, the nation and the people. has made This synthesis it 2002). She argues thatthe national Danish‘we’ a discursive synthe- articulates three-layer(Hansen of the1990s an analysis Denmark basedon modelfor Danish foreignafter theColdWar. policy Lene Hansenaddressed2002 In the analytical approachThe discourse offers interpretations ofmanyaspects inEuropeanwhich countriestake cooperation part 2002: 33–43). (Wæver under conditions discursive specific the show TheyEurope. towards policy al ropean cooperation. the third level,These levels, frame particularly thenation Europe. The third levelthe concreteof made up is Europeof concepts and Eu- the state and the nation. The second isthe relationship betweenthis‘we’ and ‘we’, national the of character the is layer first The structure. three-layered a of thenational‘we’ withEuropethe articulation and way in itisarticulated In the studies carried out by Danishresearchers there has been a on focus past/tradition approaches whichtendto take amore staticview. the of lessons the in find you than meaning of view dynamic more a is This course orwhether they are fundamental (Larsen1997). changes of discourse lyst to examine whether discursive changes identified are changes are identified changes discursive whether examine to lyst where some conceptsare more fundamentalthanothers. This allowsthe ana- Discursive structures may be analysed as discursive layers ordiscursive trees within dis- - and still do. The effects of the opt-outs have been encapsulated in the essen- THEORISING POST-COLD WAR tial cooperation understanding. Larsen also argues that the EU, through the strong position of the essential cooperation discourse, has been the pivot for Danish foreign policy, even if the role of the US has increased throughout the post-Cold War period (Larsen 2009a).

On the point about activism in Danish foreign policy, the discourse analytical/ poststructuralist approach has a different take than the other theoretical ap- DANISH FOREIGN POLICY: THE EXPANSION FROM ONE DOMINANT TO SEVEN proaches presented here. From this point of view, it is not interesting to examine whether Denmark has been particularly active after the Cold War based on a given standard. The interesting point is rather how activism (or whatever term is used) is articulated by the political actors. ‘Activism’, in discourse analytical terms, is an empty signifier (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: chapter 3). It has positive connotations in the Danish debate about foreign policy, but its content has been defined by each government in opposition to how the former government defined it. Since the ‘active internationalism’ in 1989, governments have, to a large extent, formulated their foreign policy projects with reference to how they were ‘active’ in a different way than their predecessors. Under Nyr- up Rasmussen it was ‘engaged internationalism’ while it became ‘international activism’ under Fogh Rasmussen. What is interesting from a discourse analytical point of view are the differences between these projects and the way they shape and frame foreign policy (Larsen 2017: 186).

Denmark as a semi-integrated foreign policy actor with the EU

What role does Denmark’s participation in the making of the EU’s foreign policy play for Danish foreign policy? Even if the EU’s foreign policy is formally made through intergovernmental procedures, the intensity of EU foreign policy DISTINCT APPROACHES cooperation may have qualitative implications for national foreign policy that go further than the intergovernmental structure may suggest. Danish foreign policy may be Europeanised. The analyst cannot assume that there is a uniform relationship between EU foreign policy and national foreign policy across policy areas and countries.

On the basis of the work of White (2001), Tonra (2001) and Manners and Whit- man (2000), Larsen puts forward an analytical framework for analysing the extent to which national foreign policy is conducted with the EU and the implications for how to analyse national foreign policy. The framework is based on

97 98 DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 It is the most functional multilateralfunctional the most is It Danish foreignfor forum most in policy ground EUforeignhas becomeakey policy in Danish foreign dimension policy. which takeaspects ofsecurity place within NATOback- andtheUN.On this of Danishagency). The exceptionto developmentis this policy andmilitary above (EU categories policy intensive and resourceful,first frequent or infrequent two articulations the into fell areas policy most that shows 2011) (2005, In thecaseofDenmarkafter Cold War,in Larsen analysis the empirical (Larsen 2005,2009b). on nationalprocedures andactorsand actors outsidetheEU and institutions the EU. of nationalforeignin theanalysis The focus will therefore policy be agency,national of ticulations outside be conducted will policy national most ar- frequent are there and area the in resourceful and intensive not is policy and towardsDanish and EU actions otheractors IfEUforeignand institutions. foreign procedures,national be on will policy the EU decision-making within organisation beyondof national in theanalysis the focus thenation, important cy willbeconductedbothinsideandoutsidetheEU.Wherethe most theEUis area and there are also of frequentnational agency, articulations national poli- sion-making withinthe EU. IfEUhasanintensive and resourceful policyinthe of nationalforeignwill therefore policy proceduresnational beon anddeci will be little nationalpolicyconductedoutsidethe EU. The inthe analysis focus there finds Larsen ‘Denmark’), example (for agency national of articulations If theEUhasanintensive andresourcefulthe areain policy and there are few ample ‘DenmarkandNATO’). organisations with other ‘Denmark throughex- (for as thecountry theEU’),or through theEU(forexample ‘Denmark ‘the and the EU’ orthecountry EU’), just and the EU (forexample (forexample ‘Denmark’), the country the country just ‘we’ are. be anarrowneed not This ‘we’. national The ‘we’ as may bearticulated this of aims and qualities content, the what and question in area policy the in of agency. As for of articulations agency, the crucial question is who the ‘we’ is articulations 2) and, policy strong and identifiable an has EU the considered, country in question. In a given policy area it depends on 1) Whether, in the area icy isinterwoven withEUforeign policydepends areaon the policy and the The frameworktothat theextent assumes foreignstate which member pol- Foreign Policy intheEU: The CaseofDenmark State Small of DanishandEUforeignan analysis in thebookAnalysing policy (Larsen2005,2009b). - areas, if not always the only one. In most areas of Danish foreign policy, the THEORISING POST-COLD WAR analyst will therefore have to include the EU’s foreign policy decision-making in the analysis. The analyst will always have to look at the EU’s policy in the area and Danish articulations of agency.

This resonates with official formulations such as ‘the EU is and will remain the single most important platform for the furthering of Danish interests, whether economic, political or idealist’ (Knudsen 2014) which were very common after DANISH FOREIGN POLICY: THE EXPANSION FROM ONE DOMINANT TO SEVEN the Cold War and different from the four-pillar concept during the Cold War where the EU was only the economic part of the four foreign policy pillars. This suggests a need to include the EU in the analysis of Danish foreign policy after the Cold War in a different way than during the Cold War. Moreover, Larsen’s analysis suggests that Danish foreign policy activism after the Cold War very much depends on the policy area – the Danish articulations of agency in the policy area. It is difficult to talk about one uniform level of activism in Danish foreign policy.

The competition state

The Competition State approach differs from the previous approaches presented here in taking its point of departure in the discipline of International Political Economy. It thus attributes a central role to economic factors in explaining Danish foreign policy, rather than foreign political conditions. Despite that (or maybe because of that), it is the theoretical approach to understanding Danish foreign action which has influenced the public debate most markedly. A central reason for this may be that it links up several social and historical elements in a narrative about Denmark in a globalised world and combines external demands and internal requirements. It provides a vocabulary for views which are DISTINCT APPROACHES already present in the political/economic debate (Madsen 2013: 117).

Ove Kaj Pedersen develops the approach in his 2011 book The Competition State (Konkurrencestaten) which is, amongst other things, inspired by Philip Cerny’s 2007 article ‘Paradoxes of the Competition State’. The point of departure of the book is the change in the international economy since the early 1990s which was fuelled by the end of the Cold War but which had gradually been coming since the 1970s. During the Cold War, Western countries were tied into an international economy. Although there was extensive trade and cooperation between the Western countries, a central aim was still to protect

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 step for EU member states in increasingin states EU member for step capacity to their affectinternational significant a is trade of field the in EU the to sovereignty state of transfer The 2011: 70). (Pedersen Bank World the and IMF the with together Denmark, like liketions the EUand WTO becomekey organisationsfor a European state governanceof globaleconomic rules according toown needs. Organisa its - for itselfasacompetitivetageous conditions toIt attempts unit. shapethe advan - most the create to attempts state the situation this In 2011: 78–90). and totition attractingtocapital and labour international thestate(Pedersen all levels to innovate becomes key to inglobalcompe- beingable to take part of nationalinstitutions. at of nationalinstitutions and ability The adaptability the working becomes competition element of important the most situation labour,movenow can and services goods capital, freely across borders.this In state. Homemarketstion are protected,longer no and theproduction factors as aresourcethe global competition in the (national)competi for taking part national democracy;in rather theyare aimedatpreparing theindividualfor the individualtoof the enabling longer no is education public of aim participate individual isnowconsidered asa primarily neoliberal, economicsubject. The and in thatwaybecome linked. theglobaleconomyand national politics The areels ofsociety competitivemaking thestate includedin the globalarena in that stateshaveis a basic condition competition and lev to- adapt to. Allparts arenathe economic in the centralnow is parameterGlobal global politics. in towould continue callthemselves welfarebetween states Competition states. areern states, evenstates, nowfundamentallycompetition thoughsome Westthe - including states, all economy global the In 2011: 77–80). (Pedersen economy as aglobal realm. articulated was now economy The international a In the new paradigmearly 1990s enteredor discourse the international sen 2011: 77–80). and parcel the welfare of project state was part (Peder society in participant theindividual’sFurthering wellbeingasanactive andcompetentcitizen and as acitizen national democracy. in developmentthat theyso couldparticipate theindividual’swas theidea of furthering these efforts broad educationand providing greater welfare of all measured for Akeyterms. economic in part during the Cold War. The making of the welfare states was not onlyaimed at West and East the between conflict bipolar the during states Western the for creation ofwelfare states wasa keysupport public in ensuring component and providing societalwelfare –central inthecreation ofwelfare states. The the domestic markets. This was seen as protecting the national economies - - regulation according to their own needs. The creation of the internal market, THEORISING POST-COLD WAR begun with the Single European Act in 1986, is a central element in fuelling the transformation of European states from welfare states to competition states and in strengthening their hand in setting the rules for global economic governance (Pedersen 2011: 80–81,7).

The competition state approach offers an interpretation of how the discursive change from welfare state to competition state is expressed in Danish foreign DANISH FOREIGN POLICY: THE EXPANSION FROM ONE DOMINANT TO SEVEN policy after the Cold War. The period immediately after the Cold War coincides with this change of basic discourse on the role of the Danish state. According to Pedersen Danish policy has been marked by how the Danish state is now a competition state. A significant proportion of Danish policy since the early 1990s has been directed towards strengthening Denmark’s ability to compete. Also, policy measures which are not directly related to conditions outside Den- mark can be interpreted as attempts to compete with other countries by creating the right institutional framework for the Danish competition state. For example, the government project entitled Denmark as a model country (Dan- mark som foregangsland) in 1997 can be understood as an attempt to make Denmark attractive as part of the institutional competition. The same can be said about the numerous reforms of the Danish welfare system after the Cold War including the reform of the school system in 2013. Pedersen is particularly interested in Danish economic policy and related areas. He briefly refers to the active Danish policy in the field of security, but he does not attempt to explain it let alone link it to the competition state approach. He is interested in the active international policy in the economic field and how Danish policy in institutions like the EU, the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD has been about shaping the rules that govern global economic competition in order to provide the op- timal conditions for Denmark to compete (Pedersen 2011: 70). For Pedersen DISTINCT APPROACHES the activism in Danish foreign policy which is interesting is in the economic/ regulatory field.

According to Pedersen, from when it joined in 1973 Denmark sought to adapt its political and economic system to the EC. But after 1993 (when the EC became the EU) the Danish policy changed. Denmark began to actively seek to change the international economy through the EU. Expressed in more general terms, there is a change from a reactive policy vis-à-vis the EU to an active policy through the EU and other international organisations (Pedersen 2011: 78, 82, 107, 109).

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 the Danishstatehaschanged. two decades the last (Marcussen,Danish diplomacy the character2017): of argumentsfor whyeconomic an explanation have played an increased role in of a digital/technology ambassador. state approachThe competition provides up andclosureat thesetting diplomacy such ofseveral andtheappointment Danish development aid after the Cold War and concrete decisions inDanish vides aframethe increasedunderstanding for rolein businesses Danish of interestsDanish economic a morein directtowhich aim way.further pro It - providealso aframework elementsofDanishforeignunderstanding for policy WTO and other economicorganisations,state approachthe competition can from providingApart aninterpretationtowards ofDanishpolicies the EU, the aim ofstrengtheningDenmark’s throughglobal competition in position theEU. before)actorsof Danisheconomic mobilisation as aninstitutional with the (the strong role oftheEuropeanpreparatoryand its AffairsCommittee work processdecision-making sees theDanish ersen toinputs policy for the EU interests.states’ member the EU of along thelines the globaleconomy Ped has been aboutaffecting the EU’s global policy withregard to the rules for Fromperspective,state a competition foreignDanish Warthe Cold after policy the European competitionstrategy (Pedersen 2011: 77–80). where the European abilityto competewaslinked to reforms institutional in of theEuropeanas adiscursive1993 Copenhagen in in Council watershed regionalother with competition for up markets. Pedersen seesthedeclaration privatisation ofthisasitput and deregulation onthe agenda and opened part al economy. The creation oftheMarketInternal fromon wasa 1986central der for the organisation to be able to influence the regulation of the internation been central forDenmarkand pressureDenmark hasitselfput on the EU inor- tothe EU The adaptationof competitivethe Warthe Cold after situation has - - Why the move from one dominant theory THEORISING POST-COLD WAR to multiple theories in the study of Danish foreign policy?

The presentation above has shown there has been a move in the theoretical study of Danish foreign policy from the dominance of one theory, adaptation theory, during the Cold War to the use of multiple theories after the end of the DANISH FOREIGN POLICY: THE EXPANSION FROM ONE DOMINANT TO SEVEN Cold War. We can think of different reasons for this change and the opening up of the field to several theoretical approaches: Danish and international developments, developments within the academic field of international relations and foreign policy analysis and developments within the relevant institutions in political science and the broader academic environment in Denmark. In the following I will propose some reasons for the loss of dominance of adaptation theory and for the current configuration of theories.

First of all, the high level of abstraction of adaptation theory may have been seen as less of a problem in the relatively frozen international system during the Cold War than in the more unsettled system after the Cold War. The more static the system was, the more obvious it was to the users of adaption theory inside and outside academia how the categories of the theory should be filled out, and how the conditions framing Danish foreign policy should be understood. The examples given for the use of it worked as lodestars. The more open environment after the end of the Cold War made an intuitive use of the concepts in the theory less obvious and the modest meat on the theoretical bones became a concrete problem4.

Secondly, Danish historical experience and the language that comes with it DISTINCT APPROACHES may have appeared less relevant after the Cold War. Even if the adaptation theory was originally formulated by Petersen to show that adaptation did not only mean acquiescence vis-à-vis the international surroundings, the connotations of adaptation (frequently translated into Danish as ‘tilpasning’) may no longer appear to be the most suitable language to characterise what was seen by many as a new, active, line in Danish foreign policy.

Thirdly, the more open international development which has marked international relations and Danish foreign policy after the Cold War has arguably also furthered the proliferation of different theories of Danish foreign policy. This

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 oretical perspectives. foreignwhose workhasbeenpresented policy here operate within several the- Corresponding tomany ofthewho write about theoriesofDanish authors this, derstand Danish foreign policy can be seen as a reflection of this general trend. and Diez, 2004). (Wiener The movement towards a plurality oftheoriesto un throughof theoretical amultitude approaches –akindoftheoretical mosaic been proposedof European thatthecomplexity Politicscan onlybegrasped has it where Studies European of field research the within parallel a has This phenomena that make up international relations (Dunne et al. 2013a: 416–17). a more comprehensiveunderstanding ofthe complex and multidimensional that theoreticaling understanding differences are resources thatcanfurther their general(Dunne etal.2013a). positions There areof agrow alsosigns - logical andontological perspectiveslengthy debatesabout engaging in without it hasnowbecomemorelations, to common workwithindifferent epistemo- Atbe arguedcan it the sametime, Re International of the discipline within that es onthereflectivist side. ontherationalisttheory constellation analytical approachside and discourse - of Danishresearchthe casewith Relations. International in particularly is This fuelled by Relations of International cipline theincreased internationalisation the study of Danish foreign policy as reflections of the positions within the dis- One mayet al.2013b). seeseveral ofthe newtheoretical approaches within ones,was marked by argumentsDunne 1996; of science (Wæver based on philosophy the previous than more which, a debate was It reflectivists. and rationalists between followed debate fifth a 1990s the In institutions. of role the about between neorealiststhe 1980s in and neoliberalists particularly – realists,liberalists debate and (the globalists third debate) turned into a fourth foreignish policy. processthis In between the 1970s debate of the triangular tional relationswhich may have affected development theory inrelation to Dan- Fourthly, amovement hastaken placewithintheacademic of interna study cial role oftheEUinDanishforeign policy. the backgroundtheoretical for approaches whichhave emphasisedthespe- the politicalandeconomicrole oftheEUafterfallwall hasprovided of way. strengthening clear significant a The in overlapped not has structures thedevelopmentthe same lines, economic and security ofglobalpolitical, andthetradition statetheory approach). Along spacemodel,smart the action to voluntarist theorieswhichcomprise as (such elements applies inparticular - - - Fifthly, since the last part of the Cold War we have seen an expansion of the THEORISING POST-COLD WAR institutions and environments in Denmark where research on international relations and security is carried out. This goes both for university departments, departments linked to other kinds of education and for research centres. The number of Ph.D. students and post docs within international relations has also multiplied since the Cold War. The existence of more environments and more individuals who work within international relations in Denmark may, all things being equal, contribute to the greater variety of theoretical approaches. Con- DANISH FOREIGN POLICY: THE EXPANSION FROM ONE DOMINANT TO SEVEN versely, the more limited number of researchers in this field in Denmark during the Cold War probably increased the importance of personal preferences and research strategies of central individuals in setting the theoretical agenda.

The theoretical landscape in the study of Danish foreign policy: concluding remarks

The adaptation theory in its classical form is no longer the dominant theory in the study of Danish foreign policy. Hans Mouritzen and Nikolaj Petersen have published analyses based on adaptation theory after the Cold War, but Mour- itzen, in his later work, has moved towards the development of the constellation theory and Petersen has, since the turn of the millennium, moved towards the scope for action approach. The range of approaches to the study of Danish foreign policy has also expanded and so has the point of departure of the theories in terms of philosophy of science. The theoretical study of Danish foreign policy is a lot more open and there are more tools in the theoretical toolbox. A choice between approaches can be made – for example on the basis of the topic and the point of departure of the analyst with regard to the philosophy of DISTINCT APPROACHES science. We get different answers to the empirical questions in Danish foreign policy depending on the theory drawn on – and what the central questions are. There is also an openness in the interpretation of Danish foreign policy in a more fundamental sense. From a theoretical point of view, we do not get the same answers to whether there is a fundamental change in Danish foreign policy from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period and whether there have been significant changes within the post-Cold War period. Some theories see the fall of the Berlin Wall as marking a fundamental change in Danish foreign policy. The adaptation theory and the scope for action model emphasize that the changes in the external environment have altered the parameters of Dan-

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 competition state theory alltakestate theory competition intoenvironmentthe accountinternational theory.constellation The adaptationtheory,space modelandthe the action the in find we what is Denmark’sThis constellation. given environment, tional interna the of requirements the from emanates this that and War Cold the active Danish foreignafter er theoriessuggestthattherepolicy is a particularly search for influence or the state following the basic tenets of the tradition. Oth- approachesat thestatelevel:explanations placetheir may it bethestate’s surroundingschanging international have facilitatedDanishactivism. These tradition).a dualist of The interestingfrompoint these perspectives the that is approach).tion as part example (for may Activism as acentury back asfar go statetheory, ofDanishforeignduring the Cold War policy (smart part thetradi was alsoa some theoriesclaimthatactivism concerned, is As farasactivism core even insider), ofthe EU and NATO ifthe relative importance has changed. tals ofDanishforeignremain policy aftertheColdWara near still (Denmark is fromperiod this during perspective.this the fundamen- sense, insider’ this In ing theColdWar.that Denmarkwasalsoa ‘near-core Butitseemsplausible analyse Danishforeign doesnotexplicitly dur- policy theory The constellation the traditionnot but policy itselffromwhich Danishforeign derived.is policy approach;Danish foreignfor thefallofwallaltersexternalpossibilities War.the Cold existed during also policies the traditionthe casefor The sameis greater, state Danish foreign but policyisnotfundamentallychanged as smart statetheory,According statestrategies to smart aresmart for thepossibilities However, seeslessofa change with the fall ofthewall. statetheory smart foreign policyafterthefallofwall. role of the EU inDanishforeignto policyalsopoints a key change in Danish morewhich attributes discourse weightto theEU. the special about The theory the ColdWar,during dominant discourse, has beenreplaced by adominant analyses have thatthisis the shown empirically case: the stones’four corner that therediscourse a change,but the theory is in assumption an apriori not in Danishforeigndiscourses before policy and after thefallofwall. It is has examinedfundamental theory Discourse discourse. state the competition of the wall but rather the consequence of the parallel spread and dominance of mental change in Danishforeign policy;however,a thisisnotresult ofthefall funda- a high-profile sees also mode). balancing theory state competition The Wara balancingmodeaftertheCold in still Denmarkis ory a clearor in (but ish foreign fundamentally. policy However,according to theadaptation- - - and domestic sources in order to explain Danish activism. The competition THEORISING POST-COLD WAR state theory is only interested in activism in the economic field.

The discourse approach is interested in the different articulations of activism rather than whether activism has given Danish foreign policy a new content compared to the Cold War period. ‘Activism’ is understood as an empty signifier with positive connotations. Activism, according to the discourse approach, becomes a phenomenon in Danish foreign policy because it is articulated as DANISH FOREIGN POLICY: THE EXPANSION FROM ONE DOMINANT TO SEVEN such and ascribed meaning by political actors as part of their projects for Danish foreign policy. Neither do we get the same interpretations of whether there is an activism in Danish foreign policy after the Cold War and how and where it should be studied. The same goes for the increased use of military means, the role of development aid and the reason for a possible focus on specific organisations such as the EU, NATO or the WTO. This article will not attempt to evaluate the theories with regard to their explanatory power in the analysis of Danish foreign policy. Apart from the limited space available here, this is difficult exactly because the theories do not always consider the same elements as important.5 Instead it will offer some more general observations on the theories used.

First of all, there is clearly a tendency to draw on theories which consider the study of Denmark in a broader theoretical context than just Denmark. While the adaptation theory (in the case of Petersen) and the scope for action theory took Denmark as the central case to be explained, the other theories presented are theories which are (or are clearly aimed at being) used to study other countries as well. This most clearly goes for the constellation theory, the smart state theory, discourse theory and the theory about the impact of participation in EU foreign policy. The theoretical study of Danish foreign policy is, in other words, about explaining Danish foreign policy as part of a constellation, as a DISTINCT APPROACHES small state, as an expression of a national articulation of ‘we’ or as a member state in European foreign policy.

Secondly, there are some notable absences in terms of the areas of analysis and the approaches used. It is striking that theories like the ones presented here do not seem to be drawn on in the analysis of the North Atlantic dimension of Danish foreign policy including the role of Greenland and the Faroe Is- lands. Moreover, with an eye to international literature, it noticeable that explicit theories within mainstream constructivism are not employed in the study of Danish foreign policy (except by Ingebritsen 2006).

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 policy seemslikely to bewithusforsometimeto come. spreadsit wings. its The pluralismthe theoreticalin of Danish foreign study ver, ifthefallingofduskseems nowhere near, theowlmay taketime before its of International Relations will play a very significant role in this respect. Moreo- War,Cold the after field policy foreignthe developmentstheoreticalwithin the Danish about theorising in developments general the by Judging policy? eign in reconstitutedunderstandings and inDanishfor- new discourses institutions more independence diplomacy)? Or will the emphasis be on the new rules and theory,state smart less new theories, andpossibly theory (constellation policy foreign Danish for economy world conflictual a and geopolitics of importance cal hegemony.we seeastrengthening Will oftheorieswhichemphasisethe change fromwill between thetheories pluralismpower’ to theoretia kindof - kind oftheories;whether the ‘balance of in theemphasisgiven to particular change a to rise give will period this whether is question The policy. foreign disintegrationWarthe post-Cold of surroundings Danish of and institutions trade,keyto some mention elements. reshufflinga possible at and hint These Brexit,the electionof and Crimea, Russia Trumpand thechallenge to free- of consequences the 2014: after politics international and European in trends (or newtheoriesdeveloped) to explainDanishforeign the policy under newest presented howthetheories striking is It riod. have largelybeen employed not strengthsperiod. duringthis WarThe post-Cold pe- one uniform not periodis Warof thepost-Cold periodinwhichthey emerged haveand perhaps their part specific the tolinked clearly are article this in presented theories ing. The when theordertheythat toare the vergeon is explain trying disappear- of dusk. Theories are toonly formulated explainhowtheworldhangstogether words,famous spreadsthe owlofMinerva with thefallingof wings only its ed theories willprobably seemirrelevanta foreseeable within future.Hegel’s In be developedwill landscape. Newtheories andusedsomeofthepresent- Thirdly, thetheoriespresented here offerof thetheoretical onlya snapshot Notes THEORISING POST-COLD WAR

1 The author is Ph.D. and an MSO professor at the University of Copenhagen.

2 For a different categorisation of the time period 1945-49 see Mouritzen (2006).

3 Branner and Wivel were writing before the Russian invasion of Crimea. Branner ends his analysis with the Fogh Rasmussen period

4 For a different take on the popularity of the adaptation theory see Mouritzen (1996c). Mouritzen argues that the popu-larity of the adaptation theory is due to the fact that DANISH FOREIGN POLICY: THE EXPANSION FROM ONE DOMINANT TO SEVEN Denmark experienced all four modes of the theory within a seventy-year period (as he also sees elements of a dominant policy in the present period).

5 For an evaluation of the theories in their own terms see Larsen 2017.

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 manuscript. French andGermanConceptsofState,NationEurope’. Unpublished Wæver, Ole,UllaHolm&HenrikLarsen(1991).‘TheStrugglefor ‘Europe’. of theNordic States & OleWæver (eds.),European Integration andNationalIdentity: The Challenge Wæver, Ole(2002).‘Identity, CommunityandForeign In:LeneHansen Policy’. Studier. Wivel (ed.), Wæver, Ole(1998).‘ExplainingEurope by DecodingDiscourses’.In:Anders positivism andbeyond, pp.149-185.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. In: Steve Smith,Ken Zalewski(eds.),InternationalTheory: Booth&Marysia Wæver, Ole(1996).‘Theriseandthefallofinter-paradigm debate’. 139. Copenhagen:DanishInstituteforInternationalStudies. Hvidt &HansMouritzen (eds.), Policy DoctrinesandtheOrigins ofDenmark’s Pragmatic Activism’. In:Nanna Wivel, Anders(2014).‘StilllivingintheShadowof1864?DanishForeign Explaining European Integration , pp.20-49.London:Routledge. Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2014, . Copenhagen:Forlaget Politiske pp. 109- Arctic organisations are ARCTIC ORGANISATIONS ARE NATIONS’ SPECIAL DARLINGS. BUT WHO’S WHOSE? nations’ special darlings. But who’s whose?1 Hans Mouritzen2

Introduction

International organisations are seldom studied from IR realist assumptions, meaning that we often get a somewhat rosy picture of the workings of the organisations, putting too much emphasis on rhetoric and official purposes. In this piece, however, mushrooming Arctic organisations – mostly intergovernmental (IGOs), but also a few non-governmental ones (NGOs) – are analysed on the basis of realist assumptions. This implies a focus on states’ roles in and benefits from each organisation, which generates research questions like the following: whose ‘darling organisation’ (if anyone’s) is a given organisation? Which other national vested interests are being served? Are there even ‘spoiler states’ involved, trying discretely to limit the progression of the organisation?3

IR realists are right to deny IGOs significant agent properties, notably in security matters or other high politics. States keep them under a tight grip, because they are afraid to lose control (uncertainty avoidance);4 IGO secretariats are weak on autonomy and influence of their own (Jönsson 1986). Nonetheless, IGOs are significant not only as arenas of state interaction, but also as instruments of state policies (James 1976) by being the darlings of a particular state or by serving national vested interests. Therefore, and at odds with the view of leading realists (e.g. Waltz 1979 or Mearsheimer 1995), IGOs are indeed worth studying in their own right.5

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 organisations Arctic Havingwaythis analysedin important whetherand how themost state’s nationalinterests? il vdne n pasbe esnn. o isac b akn te question: effectsof anIGOandits how doestheactualworking the asking by instance For reasoning. plausible and evidence tial such vested interests isnoeasy relymatter and must onsome circumstan of existence the of justification empirical the say, to Needless charter. its in reasonand theyestablished, whyanIGOwasoriginally are hardly mentioned ing othertopicsthan Arctic ones. Suchvested interests are seldom ifever the forded with greatsocialising for informal power representatives and discuss af- the saving2014), or perhapstheopportunity situation, offace in acritical (Rowe status the gainingofinternational information, of useful the obtaining benefitsbut gainedno less byimportant one or more member states, such as ‘Vested interests’,on theotherhand, are here understood to bemore intricate can hardlyganisation bethedarlingofmoreat atime. thanonemember-state charter.its described in have Asstates different interestsand agendas,anor- as purpose official its organisation’s fulfilling the from benefit of amount ate place. first the Compared tostate probably othermemberstatesthis enjoys adisproportion in establishment its for initiative the took that one the ically typ is state this state, specific a organisation’of ‘darling the is IGO an Where Euro-Arctic(BEAC) Council the the end of was establishedimmediatelyafter rough chronological order based on theiryear of establishment. The Barents Arctic organisations be done in will important the most of The belowanalysis The Barents Council:Norway’s darling realist studies of particular Arctic organisations. realist studiesofparticular space available,provideonly can it thegroundmorefor thoroughdepth andin in view of thebroadOf course, of thisessay empiricalfocus inthe limited is itactuallyacollective benefit to theArctic statesandtheArctic asawhole? Or reformed? be should that resources of waste a organisations overlapping lifted to thecollective level: istheArcticorganisational landscape of partially briefly is perspective the Also, organisations. Arctic to relation in safeguarded feringrecommendationssome policy interestshow Danish on be best can 7 serve specific national interests, this essay concludes byof- concludes essay this interests, national specific serve 6 relate to any particular relate to anyparticular - - - - Cold War, consisting of the Barents Sea states (Norway, Sweden, Finland, and ARCTIC ORGANISATIONS ARE NATIONS’ SPECIAL DARLINGS. BUT WHO’S WHOSE? Russia) together with Denmark, Iceland, and the European Commission. In addition, the Barents Regional Council (BRC) became a cooperation structure including the thirteen northernmost regions of Finland, Sweden, Norway and Russia together with representatives of the indigenous peoples. Both organisations were established in 1992 at the initiative of the Norwegian foreign minister Thorvald Stoltenberg in close cooperation with his Russian counter- part Andrei Kozyrev. These organisations are obviously children of the early 1990s when hopes were high for integrating Russia into Western cooperation structures (the strategy of ‘Einbindung’), and when Russian regions could operate with significant leeway vis-à-vis Moscow. In addition to Russian federal centralisation, BEAC and BRC have also suffered from the Ukraine tensions between Russia and the West, and from authoritarian developments in Russia.

BEAC and BRC are obviously the darling organisations of Norway, financing by far the largest part of their projects.8 Without overstating the point, BEAC is a crucial instrument in Norwegian ‘Northern Area’ policy, in which Russia is the core player. It is not only about ‘Einbindung’ though; ‘good neighbourly relations’ in general are crucial for Norway. In addition, as a much more concrete national interest, Norway must pre-empt the nightmare of Soviet nuclear waste polluting the world’s richest fishing grounds in the Barents and the Nor- wegian Seas.

As a non-Barents member, Denmark (together with Iceland) can be characterised as a kind of advanced observer state in BEAC. However, Norway allegedly welcomes Danish membership as a modest multilateralisation of its dependence on the Russian great power, adding to the effects of Sweden and Finland in this regard. According to this interpretation, Denmark’s membership is a quid pro quo for Norway – without a Baltic shore – being a member in the Council of Baltic Sea States.

The International Barents Secretariat in Kirkenes (Norway) assists the rotating chairmanships by offering ‘technical support’ for both the BEAC and BRC meetings (IBS 2018). There are no signs of any independent secretariat influence on policy matters (however, the bigger Norwegian Barents Secretariat, located in the same building and supporting bilateral Norwegian-Russian projects, does exert an obvious influence vis-à-vis its local clients in the Barents region: evaluation and implementation of project applications).9

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 isolation withRussia. in otherwords,context; Finland would innocase risk negotiatinginsplendid have been thattheFinnishinitiative was formulated withintheprotective EU as intheBEAC.as crucial sia wasalmost Onereasondifference forthis may an initiative– Dimension which Rus - in relationin to theNorthern effort such toin the BEACpossible (asa modest counterweight Russia),Finland made no Remarkably,as as much neighbours triedtowhile Norway engage Northern its Dimension’ wasavoided inSwedishofficialstatements. Dimension. in relationnical obligations to term‘Northern The very theNorthern chairmanship of 2006-07 Sweden did no more than to fulfil its minimumtech- Nonetheless, bothduringthe Swedish EU presidency and the in2001 CBSS be an overstatement to characterise Sweden as a ‘spoiler’ as here conceived. itiative in the following years was reluctant,at best (Gebhard 2013). Itwould ‘go italone’ approach, Sweden’sin- Dimension attitude towards theNorthern a secretariatStockholm). in andlaterwith 1992 established in (CBSS of BalticSeaStates of theCouncil The EU Northern Dimension: Finland’sThe EU Northern darling inform, letalonecoordinate, itsinitiative withotherNordic countries. War.the Cold since pursuing However,governmentthe Finnish tochose not view of the almost parallel foreign policies thatFinland and Sweden had been cooperationSwedish-Finnish Close around might haveit beenanticipatedin rateat any den andFinland, should beexpectedto – share aninitiative. such of Swe- countries the northernmost EU (Finland,Swedenor and Denmark)– From a naïve,of view,sense, point common the three Nordic members ofthe as abridge-builderbetweentheEUandRussia. Finland, forobvious geographical and historical reasons, couldpromote itself relaunchedoverwhelminglyactual fact was in 2006, in initiative; anEU-Russia West Russia’ andNorth as wellNorway (Gebhard 387). 2013: The initiative, Europe,Sea region,the Baltic … including the Arctic Sea region Iceland with hensive frameworkNorthern concerning issues all externalpolicy for policy initiativewas designed asa‘compreIt 1995. in gaining EUmembership after - European first Finland’s was 1998, in launched Dimension, Northern EU The context. had wish toalso signalled its keep it independentfrom theEUintegration but toIn allfairness Finland,Sweden had seen regionalisation asimportant, 12 Instead, Sweden had put all its regionalall its Sweden hadput Instead, eggsintobasketthe one 13 For this reason, probably fortified by Finland’s by fortified probably reason, this For 10 11

Not least due to European Commission reluctance, the Northern Dimension ARCTIC ORGANISATIONS ARE NATIONS’ SPECIAL DARLINGS. BUT WHO’S WHOSE? mainly had to draw on existing programmes and budgets (and had no administrative structures of its own). It was quite fluffy on substance: a policy framework with no clear functional objectives other than possibly environmental ones.

The Arctic Council: nobody’s darling

Set up twenty-two years ago, the Arctic Council has established itself as the major IGO in the Arctic. Apart from its state members (the five Nordic ones plus Russia, Canada and the US), the Council has a set of ‘permanent members’ representing the Arctic indigenous peoples and a growing number of observer states from across the world.14 The latter are a fine indicator of the growing importance attached to the Council worldwide. Remarkably, though, the EU has been denied observer status, first due to its seal conflict with Can- ada and, later, its deteriorating relation with Russia.

The Arctic Council was an offshoot of the adoption of the ‘Arctic Environmen- tal Protection Strategy’, decided by the same eight states in June 1991.15 Can- ada, in particular, was in favour of establishing an IGO to handle a wider set of issues within the framework of sustainable development for the Arctic region, and Canada in fact became its first chair, from 1996-98, upon the signing of the Ottawa Declaration founding the council.

Remarkably, the United States worked hard against Canada to limit the progression of the Arctic Council towards becoming a full-fledged IGO (Smieszek & Kankaanpää 2015), both before and after the signing of the Ottawa Decla- ration. Basically, interest in the Arctic in general was muted among Washing- ton officials and politicians; moreover, specifically, there was resistance to the participation of indigenous peoples and the use of the concept of ‘sustainable development’. Also, the US blocked a security dimension in the Ottawa declaration; thus, for instance, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum with a military component became an informal organisation outside the Arctic Council, but with the same members and the same rotating chairman. In terms of procedure, the US fought hard against allowing the Arctic Council chair discretion- ary power. Later, the US resisted the establishment of a permanent secretariat (nonetheless decided in 2011 and located in Tromsø (Norway), although with

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 a technical function only). a technical function from theglobalArctic hypeina‘controlled’ way. benefit to able been has council the circumscribed, heavily status observer probably usefulinthe long run.Finally, byhard making membership to get and large, tendto generate towardsmedia attention theArcticwhich is Council, to haveAlso, the cleavages,in thecouncil. permanent opponents small or temporarynecessitating from assistance canaffordnobody othermembers; are hardlyhavenot do that members any each other,‘beefs’ with two or one of blocsmemberscemented by oneoverarching cleavage. while thereThus, appropriateof criss-crossingnumber cleavages, preventingthe establishment an been have paradoxically, perhaps healthy, Equally 2013. in response and searchon binding decisions its andrescuepreparedness spill and oil 2011, in been ahealthy development,not leastasevidenced by positive resultslike no disengaged members like in the Barents Council. This has by and large to hand, therethe other progression,its spoil trying state no is and there are naturally). state. On The Arcticis hardlyCouncil particular any thedarlingof (though withsomewhatdifferentamong alleightstatemembers agendas, engagement of level equal roughlytoday, a of be toas picture,seems big The than multilateralist lines. the Harperadministrationduring ratherwas channelled alongnationalist it – had been. Canada it hadan engaged initiallystill Arcticagenda,– atleast but fact thatthe Arcticwas nolongerthe Canadian darling organisation Council cf. Nord and observers; towitness bears 112-113) 2016: the ing to participants At the same time,Canada’s(accordof 2013-2015 chairmanship unsuccessful - their mind. Kerry2015, threatened to stay awaymade the Canadianschange and,thus, in chairmanship its of meeting final the fromLavrov) Sergey minister (foreign Russia inArcticAnecdotally,matters. whenCanada planned to exclude Russia fromCouncil paralysis’ ‘high politics by takinga approachconciliatory towards safeguarded Arctic the John Kerry State of Secretary Ukrainethe conflict, and tomember.an engaged becoming council converted the US Crimea of spite In In preparing fortheObama administration’sfrom chairmanship though, 2015, as apparent, eventually unsuccessful. 16 However, and, the US resistance washalf-hearted Arctic-5: Denmark’s darling ARCTIC ORGANISATIONS ARE NATIONS’ SPECIAL DARLINGS. BUT WHO’S WHOSE?

Arctic-5 is not an IGO, but a set of intermittent top-level meetings for the Arc- tic Ocean coastal states (Russia, Norway, the Danish Kingdom,17 Canada and the US). In the wake of the Russian semi-official flag planting on the North Pole seabed, Danish foreign minister Per Stig Møller, together with Greenlandic leader Hans Enoksen, invited the coastal state foreign ministers to Ilulissat in Greenland. The purpose was twofold: to signal to the world that the Polar Sea would be divided territorially among the five coastal states (unlike the Antarc- tic UN regime), and secondly to confirm that this could be done peacefully in accordance with UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas). This second part was meant to pre-empt a competitive flag planting as seen in the North Pole case, or by the Canadians on Hans’ Island (disputed between Canada and the Danish Kingdom). These two purposes are manifest in the Ilulissat Declaration signed by the five foreign ministers (Illulissat Declaration 2008).18

The initiative was controversial. Finland, Sweden, and Norway (chairing the Arctic Council at the time) found that creating a new forum, or perhaps even an organisation, might undermine the Arctic Council through its precedence effect. Iceland argued that it should have been classified as a coastal state and thus have been invited. The US Bush administration was reasonably positive, though, and was represented in Ilulissat by Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte. However, with the shift of administration in 2009, and later as part of its newly-won engagement in the Arctic Council, the US became sceptical towards the A-5 forum.19

According to Per Stig Møller, the seriousness of the matter necessitated that as few states as possible be present – only those with a stake in the upcoming territorial partition. This view is supported by Kuersten (Kuersten 2016: 392), who emphasises the efficiency of the forum, avoiding that ‘the involvement of other actors would have needlessly bogged down discussion and delayed action’.

It is still in the balance whether the A-5 will survive as a forum. Canada’s A-5 meeting in 2010 in Chelsea (Quebec) ‘seemed to mark the death knell of the Arctic Five format’ (Exner-Pirot 2015). Secretary Clinton was present, but left early. According to her written statement, significant discussions on Arctic

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 strengthened the ArcticCouncil In spiteofthe apparentof A-5,the whole persistence process seemsto have icantly. has forthe oscillated signif A-5 forum US and Canadian support Norwegian, mate process intheArctic Council. Declarationwill have– toby befollowedup abroadermore andthus legiti- anyA-5 decisions –ad-hoc and outside the constraintsmentary; ofthe Ottawa Again, in theview of Kuersten(Kuersten the two fora2016), may becomple- again creating muchdissatisfactioninIceland. sign an agreement on a fishing moratorium for the Arctic Ocean (ADN 2018) – (Zou 2016). In July 2015 the five met in Oslo at the level of top civil servants to management fisheries Ocean Arctic Central the of stewardship the over take Denmark’sto save theArcticeffort 2008. peace in The A-5hasattemptedto to stress the forum’sopportunity existenceand thereby alsoremind othersof issues should includeabroaderissues group. they are lessinvolved today, asGrimssonisnolongerinpresidential office. that seems it but Circle, Arctic the of partners’ ‘strategic so-called are Office the Icelandic governmentis concretely involved. The MFA andPrimeMinister’s gapore andinQuebec City, Canada). It ishard to evaluate theextentto which development forthepeoplesofArctichave(forums alsobeenheld Sin in US) onsearoutesNuuk (Greenland)in 2016 and in and shipping economic on Anchoragein 2015 in instance Iceland, for outside cialised forums (Alaska, gathering of allcategories. Reykjavikwith ‘Arcticcompetition in is, Frontier’ in Tromsø,the largest Arctic itself asa ‘network’. Its assembly, which takes place every year in October in organisation’, characterising nonpartisan ‘non-profit also and a is It Grimsson. at theinitiative2013 in cle wasestablished ofthenIcelandicPresident Olafur Cir Arctic the 2015), (Exner-Pirot Arctic-5 of defiance conscious in Possibly Arctic Circle: Iceland’s darling has been consistently sympathetic towardssympathetic has been consistently exclusive its ‘membership’, appear,As should Arctic-5 obviouslyis Denmark’s darling. Whereas Russia and forums and being responsible for communications with partners all over and beingresponsibleand forums partners with communications for The Circle has a permanent secretariat inReykjavik, organising assemblies 24 Inaddition,ArcticCircle hasarranged more spe- 23 –maybereaction asaconscious to A-5. 20 Denmark uses, nonetheless, everynonetheless, Denmarkuses, 21

22 the 25

- - - the world. This, obviously, implies a considerable influence not only on the ARCTIC ORGANISATIONS ARE NATIONS’ SPECIAL DARLINGS. BUT WHO’S WHOSE? workings of the Circle, but also on the emerging Arctic ‘public’.26 Also, this pres- idential initiative is effective in branding Iceland as an Arctic nation,27 not least among Asian nations who participate eagerly and see the Circle as a shortcut into the Arctic.

In fact, one of Grimsson’s motivations behind the initiative was to include Asian countries, notably China, in the Arctic sphere.28 At the time China had been denied observer status in the Arctic Council (granted shortly thereafter, though). This outreach to Asia fits neatly with Iceland’s ambition to become the shipping gateway to Asia the moment the north-eastern sea route becomes prof- itable (Ingimundarson 2015). So as judged from declared Icelandic interests, the Arctic Circle must surely be seen as an Icelandic darling.

Nordic Council of Ministers and Nordefco

The Nordic Council of Ministers, the intergovernmental body for Nordic cooperation, with a secretariat in Copenhagen, is relevant to the Arctic chiefly through its financial means.29 The Nordic Arctic Cooperation Programme 2015-2017 financially supports ‘processes, projects and initiatives that will help promote sustainable development and benefit the people of the Arctic under the conditions generated by globalisation and climate change’ (NACP 2015). Some projects may be under the umbrella of, for instance, BEAC or the Northern Dimension. Of course, the priorities set for the selection of projects are compromises compromise formulations between the relevant Nordic ministers. Judging from the national budget contributions, the Nordic Council of Ministers is hardly the darling of any Nordic country in particular, but a fairly balanced and stable funding mechanism. The secretariat, obviously, has the ‘power of the purse’ vis-à-vis grant recipients in the Arctic (or elsewhere).

Turning to security and defence policy, the main Nordic multilateral contribution to the Arctic is NORDEFCO, the Nordic Defence Cooperation. It developed on the basis of the Stoltenberg Report of 2009, aiming ultimately towards a Nordic foreign and security political union. More modestly, NORDEFCO also built on some pre-existing elements of defence cooperation between Sweden, Finland and Norway in the High North. Iceland and Denmark joined, the latter with some hesitation though, initially fearing NORDEFCO as a competitor to NATO (Bailes 2016).

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 Danish Kingdom). The Councilhasasecretariat inReykjavik. Greenland and the Faroe Islands (the two latter enjoying self-rulewithinthe operation. The West Nordic fromof parliamentarians consists Council Iceland, assembly(the Westinter-parliamentary Nordicand governmental Council) co- WestNordic cooperation,toanalogous Nordic cooperation,an both includes Cooperation West Nordic Council and Nordic Atlantic NORDEFCO to allitsparticipants. tocommitment oscillating its NATO of may strengthen thefuture importance and presidency US Trump Finally, the bilaterally). NATO through or fulfilled be vital linkbetween Greenland and Denmark (although maythese purposes also a airbase, Keflavik the of use shared and surveillance as such Atlantic, North Nordefco es 2016). Still, may be helpful regarding cooperation military inthe regards.both acceptable in (Bail enthusiastic less Denmark is Asmentioned, both domesticallyand in relation to Russia(mildlyspeaking), NORDEFCO is policies. Whereascurity NATOis sensitive,for these countries membership However,NORDEFCO may beeven moreto essential se- SwedishandFinnish DEFCO couldbeseenasitspotentialstick(deterrence). as Barentscooperation Norway’sis NOR carrot to the High North, in Russia no. 1. NORDEFCOpolicy priority in thisregard. couldbe a substitute So where- being thatNATO Norway’s had shown littleinterest inthe High North, foreign tookwar). Norway Of course, the initiative onereason (the Stoltenberg Report), from (e.g. the Georgia2008 about assertion power the Russian undoubtedly defence (saving resources and money), the incentive behind NORDEFCO was NORDEFCO is hardly thedarlingofanystateinparticular. from smart Apart vian Arcticthere are regular ‘CrossBorder Training’ (CBT) aerialexercises. all practicalthe Scandinavian purposes: Arctic and Iceland. In the Scandina- NORDEFCO’sArctic to relevance geographical two pertains far so arenas for training event inorder to circumvent problems withNATO secrecy). a as classified was space air Icelandic of surveillance (the ministers defence accompanied er planes(Dahlby 2014), thepresence ofNordic foreign and Nordicof fight- 2014 Meet’ Air ‘Iceland so-called the hosted far so has Iceland 31 30 - -

Nordic Atlantic Cooperation (NORA) covers the same three countries as the ARCTIC ORGANISATIONS ARE NATIONS’ SPECIAL DARLINGS. BUT WHO’S WHOSE? West Nordic Council plus the coastal areas of Norway. This is an intergovernmental organisation under the Nordic Council of Ministers, governments being represented by civil servants. NORA’s secretariat is located in Torshavn (Faroe Islands), financing transnational projects (business, research, development) in the sub-region, mainly through means provided by the Nordic Council of Min- isters.

The common denominator for these small nations is their heavy reliance on fishing and apprehension towards the EU Common Fisheries Policy (Bailes 2014). Their cooperation involves much of the Arctic Council agenda, and common positions are prepared for other fora such as Nordic, Arctic or Euro- pean ones. For Greenland and the Faroe Islands a significant vested interest in West Nordic cooperation is ‘practicing’ for independence from the Danish Kingdom (Nielsson 2016). Iceland, for once, can play the role of ‘great power’ and mentor, given its routine from international organisations as well as its greater resource base (much like Sweden’s traditional role in Nordic cooperation). This might tempt one to pronounce this cooperation to be Iceland’s darling; on the other hand, the other members are the ones most dependent on its proper functioning. Taken together, it seems that this sub-regional cooperation is highly useful to all members, but in very different ways: for Iceland by its being the ‘big brother’, for the others by their acquiring useful knowledge and experience.

Arctic organisations: limited autonomy, but a playground for national interests

Whereas international NGO secretariats may sometimes enjoy considerable autonomy vis-à-vis their members, this is seldom if ever the case for international governmental organisations. Their members – national governments – keep them in a tight grip, depending, though, on the importance of the issue area (the more important (high politics), the tighter the grip; cf. Mouritzen 1990 part III).

The Arctic governmental organisations analysed above do not hold much lev- erage in relation to their member governments. The weakest, of course, are

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 certain independentethos certain together withitscriss-crossingcleavages, provide the Arcticwith a Council have oscillated over time). Member states’ roughly equal level of engagement, reasonsgeneralits for and Canada of theUS (although theenthusiasm status Today, the Arcticis nobody’s Council darling,whichisparadoxically oneofthe NGO). This is,inotherwords, aquitewidespread tendency. Denmark’sdarling (andArctic Circle asIceland’san is although this darling, as Finland’s Dimension the EU Northern darlingand the Arctic-5meetings as the ‘darling’government. We certain a of have seen BEACas Norway’s darling, their nationalinterests. Inmanycases,the organisationsare or an instrument the arenais thateach of themprovidesthe interplay for ofgovernmentsand being said, however,This what makesof study theArcticorganisations worthy member governments. transcend apurelyand isbeingzealously technicalfunction surveyed by the tonomousorganisation relative tothe secretariatStill, members. its hardlycan au- most the is contrast, supremacy. by Norwegian A-8, camouflaging façade retariat secretariat. BEACand theArctic (A-8) have Council sec- an international both NORDEFCO, onthe other hand,hasa rotating presidency,no international but has a secretariat, technicalfunctions. Council albeitsmalland only serving –makesof course also – felt.priorities policy national its The West Nordic givesthe organisation a homeandreasonable but term, its during stability secretariatinternational (2) arotating or presidency which (chairmanship), moreslightly autonomous(or both):(1)apermanent can beone oftwothings organisations meeting. What makes certain governmenthosting theparticular representatives,national where providedis theadministrative by the support ‘organisation’:between meetings intermittent of a series is instance, for A-5, label the deserve hardly which chairman, official or secretariat no with those form ‘we are‘we form of your amember if youdarling, are darling’). of our amember SergeyLavrov). a geopolitical of are Others presentpart as greatmous’ powerrepresentatives Clinton,a or instance, for a Hillary (be it areStates toinstance, for members, toor information collect meetwith‘fa We have alsoseenvariousvested interests bybeing served thesearenas. here. above. In otherwords,organisationinternationalised itisthemost analysed and a rotating presidency. In the case ofBEAC, a though,thisismostly , further adding to itsrelative, further autonomymentioned quid prothe (of quo - Moreover, in an age of Arctic hype, it is a national asset in terms of status ARCTIC ORGANISATIONS ARE NATIONS’ SPECIAL DARLINGS. BUT WHO’S WHOSE? simply to be a member of the Arctic Council. Also, smaller states may practice dependency spreading; instead of negotiating bilaterally with Russia or the US from an inferior position they can multilateralise issues in an Arctic organisation.

All these vested interests are the likely reason, why international organisations are seldom dissolved (Mouritzen 2013) – even though some of them may lie ‘dormant’ (like the CBSS or the BEAC). As new organisations are established to serve current pressing needs, the net result is a steadily growing wilderness of international organisations and NGOs – especially in the Arctic. With the Arctic hype after the Cold War and in particular in recent years, Arctic organisations have been mushrooming.

It should be emphasised that the persistence of international organisations should not be ascribed to any influential bureaucracies of their own, as insti- tutionalists would argue (Hellmann & Wolf 1993; Keohane & Hoffmann 1993). Instead, the reason is that their national sponsors (governments) with strong vested interests are powerful and can mobilise inertia.32

Denmark: some policy recommendations

In order, finally, to suggest how Denmark should navigate among Arctic organisations, we shall stipulate Denmark’s two basic interests in the Arctic. Firstly, it is essential to preserve the Danish Kingdom,33 since it provides Denmark with considerable status broadly in international politics, not least during the current Arctic hype. Without the Kingdom Denmark would no longer be an Arctic player. Preserving the Kingdom requires, both in relation to the Greenlanders and the general international ‘public’, a greater Arctic commitment from the Danish part of the Kingdom. An Arctic identity is, evidently, unattainable, but more Arctic capabilities and intellectual instruments would bolster Denmark’s Arctic credibility, so the Kingdom is not just seen as a formality and an empty shell. Even if this should be attained, however, the Kingdom is far from om- nipotent in the Arctic. The second basic interest is therefore a continuation or improvement of existing cooperation with other Arctic actors. Many essential tasks in the Arctic, such as search and rescue or the detection of oil spills, require bilateral or multilateral cooperation.

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 Arcticand beyond. China, geographically a non-Arctic country,to iscrucial Danishinterests inthe continental shelfinthePolar Sea(possiblyalsoinvolving Canada). in particular,with Russiawillbecrucial, forfutureregarding negotiations the can beshielded fromnon-Arctic the serious A decentrelationship tensions. should therefore be anessentialcooperation partner, provided the relationship the Arcticis of territory,terms in superpower and infrastructure. population It the Kingdom).Bycontrast, for could erode– Russia turn in which – support should safeguard thattheUSpresence does notalienate the Greenlanders, the caseof asin tegic game, such Thule radarGreenland in Denmark (but oftheglobalstra actor there,military crucial - that shouldbeseenaspart but a is it course, Of Arctic. the in significance modest more of is fields, other in guard these basic interests? The United States, which is Denmark’s closest ally whichareactorsessential themost orderthe Kingdomin for toshort, In safe The Kingdom,thus,isto someextentdependentonIcelandicgoodwill. tourism. or fisheries Greenlandic of development the for helpful be also could searchcommon andrescue exercises and Iceland are growing inimportance, Danish-Icelandic facilities). harbour (Keflavik, instance for transport, military ‘steppinga crucial stone’ between Denmark and Greenland, when itcomesto overlooked.located literally Icelandis Since is it the middleofKingdom, in to the cohesion ofthe Danish Kingdomtendsto be geopolitical importance (Canada and the US arery also interesting inthisregard). Finally, Iceland’s being essential tosurveillance theKingdom’sGreenlandic enormous territo- of polarresearchestablishment hubs(like in Tromsø orSvalbard) or satellite Norway’s and its surrounding waters,be it the experiencesinthe High North agenda tois similar one.Ingeneral, theNorwegian Denmarkcanlearnfrom the Kingdom’s respect, Inthis etc.) sealing, (fishing, inhabitants Arctic local and more oriented towards accommodatingthe economic development ofthe different agenda. It isslightlylessglobalistinoutlook(environment,climate) that compared to Sweden and Finland the Danish Kingdomhas a somewhat bureaucraticbe neglected It cannot however,instance. for thanwithRussia, al Nordic cooperation easierandless makehabits undertakings common Turningto theotherNordicsayingit goeswithout countries, thattradition- a challengeto thecoherence oftheKingdom. Greenlandicviability, economic maybut alsopresent challenge and asecurity ture in mostofthe Arctic,including Greenland. This willundoubtedlyimprove 34 Chinainvestsin research and infrastrucmining facilities, - - What organisational recommendations can be deduced from this basis? The ARCTIC ORGANISATIONS ARE NATIONS’ SPECIAL DARLINGS. BUT WHO’S WHOSE? following seem essential:

1 The Arctic Council being the main arena for multilateral Arctic cooperation should be further strengthened, if possible, in spite of tensions with Rus- sia in other regions. The Council is an indispensable instrument to further engage, but also contain, Chinese involvement in the Arctic. The Council should therefore continue to be the Kingdom’s top priority for Arctic multilateralism. A smooth functioning of the Arctic Council requires, however, that NATO involvement in the Arctic is limited due to Russian sensitivities.

2 In view of Denmark’s need to learn from Norwegian experiences in the High North (Arctic credibility), Denmark should upgrade its (formal) membership of the Barents Council to a more substantial participation.

3 Danish official and non-official representatives should participate more frequently in Arctic Circle arrangements, not only to gain Icelandic goodwill. It would also be essential to Denmark’s reputation among the Circle’s emerging Arctic public, so that the Kingdom is seen as more than a facade (Arctic credibility).

4 The future of Arctic-5 is a delicate issue. On the one hand, its existence serves to underline Denmark’s status as belonging to the Arctic ‘Premier League’, a Danish vested interest. On the other hand, it is a red rag to the Icelanders in particular. In the future A-5 meetings should be convened only if absolutely necessary – i.e. if something should go wrong in the UN- CLOS process. A wise compromise was made in the context of the 10-year anniversary of the Ilulissat Agreement in Greenland (May 2018), by also inviting the remaining members of the Arctic Council.35

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 – not that bad after all – notthatbad after all The organisational wilderness However, this argument is too superficial. tooHowever, is argument this ference dinners’. differentwith time-spans toon hats short havewithin yet more‘con delicious - Some may find it extravagant that almost the same state representatives meet to memberstate taxpayers andattentivethan thecurrent publics profusion. as regional bodiesundertheArcticCouncil. would beeasiertoThis explain step further, several Arctic IGOscouldbe terminated or, atbest,subordinated to ‘…avoid repeating41). orduplicatingthings’(Heininen2004: To proceed a aneworganestablish done or with thesamedesign…’forum or important is it ‘Although istrendy, theNorth there isnoneed to eitherrepeat whathasbeen and get ‘clarity’. AsexpressedArctic about organisations several years ago: 1989) wouldsuggestthatitshouldbeprunedbackinorder to save resources management (organisation)(e.g. ganisational wilderness, Mintzberg theory or- this of out come that ills or goods collective of level the to briefly Turning growing wilderness. That, however, isnotasbaditmay sound. (3) they areto impossible of(Mouritzen getrid 2013). theyThus, a constitute decorativerhetoricin political (useful and good purposes), by allegedly serving (2) they are(1) theyplants: aresupport), without upright stand weak (cannot nor do they allowthem toorganisations perish. International are like climbing As hereconceived, neither allowIGOsto states become too autonomous, bad, afterall. state interestscynical in the landscapeofArctic organisations. that It isnot of interplay the from consequences beneficial unintended get sometimes We (A-8). legitimacy for stand may another (A-5), efficiency safeguard may one by being useful atdifferentcomplementary and whereas phasesofanissue, the unpredictable natureOrganisationspolitics. ofinternational may alsobe given essential, is flexibility whateverSuch reason.blockedfor is organisation ‘sleeping’pectedly –befoundbyone, hitherto using organisation,if another unex- – ‘solution’may Arctic However, an speaking. roughly engaged, equally nature.the healthiestorganisations Of course, are are thosewhosemembers organisationsare evenor political (international) a genuinely of geopolitical these because context, present the in naïve is it firms, privateto applicable be 36 Whereas may organisation theory

Notes ARCTIC ORGANISATIONS ARE NATIONS’ SPECIAL DARLINGS. BUT WHO’S WHOSE?

1 I am grateful for inspiring comments to a previous draft from Martin Breum and from the participants in an ‘Arctic Politics Seminar’ at the University of Aalborg (in Copenhagen), arranged by Ulrik Pram Gad.

2 The author is dr.scient.pol. and a senior researcher at DIIS.

3 I am not aware of any scholarly classification of member state profiles in international organisations. However, ‘darling organisation’ or ‘spoiler’ are terms occasionally used by journalists. Examples could be NATO as the UK darling organisation or the UK being mentioned as an EU spoiler. On different types of stakeholders in Arctic Council Working Groups, cf. Knecht, ‘Exploring different levels of stakeholder activity in international institutions.’

4 Cf., for instance, Allison 1971 ch. 3. Organisations, including governments, strive to avoid uncertainty, even if considerable benefits have to be sacrificed in the process.

5 However, international institutions have indeed been studied by a subset of scholars within the realist tradition dealing with international regimes and hegemonic stability theory (e.g. Krasner, ‘International Regimes’). Cf. also Grieco, ‘Cooperation among Na- tions.’

6 On the assessment of effectiveness of Arctic organisations, cf. Stokke & Hønneland, International Cooperation and Arctic Governance, ch. 2.

7 ‘Arctic organisations’ are here understood as organisations being important to the areas north of the Arctic Circle.

8 Cf. https://www.barentscooperation.org/en/Working-Groups/Project-Funding

9 Author interview on 21 September 2016 in the Kirkenes secretariat.

10 For a corresponding initiative, cf. Denmark propagating itself as a ‘bridge-builder’ between Norden and the EC, as it had gained EC membership in 1973 as the only Nordic country.

11 Arter, ‘Small state influence within the EU’; Gebhard, ‘Soft Competition.’ Perhaps Finland felt that it was ‘payback time’ for Sweden’s not informing Finland about its intention to apply for EU membership in October 1993?

12 Sweden presumably wished to present a 100% European image in Brussels and avoid a mainly Northern image.

13 By contrast, Finland had been rather unenthusiastic about both the CBSS and the BEAC.

14 See Ingimundarson, ‘Managing a contested region.’ On the Arctic Council as a (mini- malist) society of Arctic states and their invited guests, cf. Wilson, ‘Society, steward or security actor?’

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 With over 2000 participants in2016. With over 2000participants return oftheArctic Five’. Arctic-5Exner-Pirot,see also forums, multiple of challenge. the usefulness On ‘Blog: The Arctic sayingCouncil’, the Arcticthat ‘revivedcame out Council andeven strengthened’the bythe of Role the over ‘Debates Pedersen, to refers p. 11 Chairmanship’, Council Arctic the of Kankaanpää’s‘Role & Smieszek System’; Concert Arctic ‘The Ohnishi, See Arcticstrategies cf. Konyshev dispute, after theCrimea etal.,‘Russia’s Arctic Strategies’. researchersfrom Russia’sKingdom. On and theDanish Canada, Norway the US, Russia, Arctic’, anNGO with itshome base inMoscow,members are followsthe A-5 format:its on Cooperation Council For inthe the Expert membership ofthe instance, ‘International land, JapanandSouthKorea to theagreement. Ice- EU, the China, adding made, was agreement A5+5 an 2017 In fishing-agreement/. rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2015/07/30/iceland-blasts-arctic-five-for-exclusion-from- Ministry,where Iceland’sdispleasure withtheagreement wasvoiced. Cf.http://www. The Reykjavikwerethe A5states of ambassadors to summoned the IcelandicForeign ries/article/98678_inuit_group_wants_in_on_five-nation_arctic_meeting/ http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/sto- See disappointed. was expectation the However, states’). Arcticfive Ocean the of meetings excludedin but ArcticCouncil the in included is aboutthe Arcticsummit Ocean coast’; and because ‘it makes no senseforusto be clear thattheyare(‘because expected Inuit an invitation a coastal people,becausethis Danish sacrificing of her national interests.to Prior themeeting,representatives ofaboriginalgroupsmade it accusing domestically, storm media a caused that choice The newDanishforeign minister,chose toLene Espersen, holidayEaster goon a – fields couldbetranslated to theArctic arena have proven naïve. battle- Afghan or Iraqi on won goodwill that expectations Danish Any views. different regardthis Both in Arcticsubstantial andconcerning haveand theUS agendas, Denmark Cf., forinstance,Rahbek-Clemmensen& Thomasen (2018). Consisting ofDenmark,theFaroe IslandsandGreenland. eight membercountries. Tromsø).the secretariat By2016 drawnmembers staff had13 fromamong seven the of entation by Icelandicsecretariat directorin on 19September2016 MagnusJohanneson and Progresslishment Arcticof theStanding Secretariat’,Council also pres p.117-119; - Estab- ‘The (Johanneson, outreach’ and communication enhanced [and] efficiency, al The secretariattoinstructed is providememory,‘institutional with theCouncil operation - (see Brighametal.‘TheArctic Council’,p.10. tookCouncil over the working groupsof the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy cooperationother things, onenvironmentalamong Arctic issues states). The Arctic Mikhail Gorbachev’sleast, 1 October speechon Murmansk among (suggesting, 1987 NGOs and,not initiative,was aFinnish This on aprocess building initiated by northern 25 Author interview with ambassador at Arctic Assembly on 14 October 2017. ARCTIC ORGANISATIONS ARE NATIONS’ SPECIAL DARLINGS. BUT WHO’S WHOSE?

26 Generally, NGO secretariats are relatively stronger than IGO secretariats, because they are not in the grip of governments to the same extent. See Mouritzen 2013.

27 Its name derives from the fact that mainland Iceland is just south of the Arctic Circle.

28 Author interview with ambassador at Arctic Assembly on 14 October 2017.

29 Author interview with civil servant in the secretariat of the Nordic Council of Ministers on 31 May 2017.

30 In the air exercise ‘Arctic Challenge’ in the autumn of 2013, the CBT was extended to include considerable air forces from the US and the UK (Dahl, ‘NODEFCO and NATO’.)

31 Not to be confused with the rotating NATO air surveillance over Iceland.

32 Thus, the Warsaw Pact and the ‘Council for Mutual Economic Assistance’ (the socialist trade organisation) were dissolved after the Cold War, simply because their true members – the socialist regimes – disappeared.

33 ‘Rigsfællesskabet’ in Danish.

34 Cf. Sørensen (2018).

35 Cf. http://www.highnorthnews.com/ilulissat-declarations-10-year-anniversary/

36 For instance, Michelmann, ‘Organizational Effectiveness in a Multinational Bureaucracy’ p. 232 warns against it in his study of the EC Commission. Galtung, ‘On the Anthropology of the United Nations System’, p. 6 argues that ‘duplication’ of work by partly overlapping organisations may actually be fruitful, because it allows for different perspectives on a given topic.

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 References Non-tariff Barriersto Trade. Grieco, Joseph(1990). pp. 365-390. ern DimensionoftheEuropean Union’. Scandinavian Political Studies, - Gebhard, Carmen(2013).‘SoftCompetition:Finland, SwedenandtheNorth cies, pp.1-23.London:Croom Helm. In: David Pitt& Thomas Weiss (eds.),TheNature ofUnited NationsBureaucra- Galtung, Johan(1986).‘OntheAnthropology oftheUnitedNationsSystem’. (accessed December2016). rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2015/07/23/blog-the-return-of-the-arctic-five/, Exner-Pirot, Heather(2015).‘Blog: The return oftheArctic Five’. http://www. Research Paper no.101,Rome:NATO Defense College. NATO:Dahl, Ann-Sofie(2014).‘NODEFCOand Defence’ ‘Smart in theNorth?’. Forum. (eds.), ‘The Arctic Council:twentyyears ofpolicyshaping’.In:LassiHeininenetal. Brigham, Lawson,HeatherExner-Pirot, LassiHeininen&JöelPlouffe (2016). 2016 tic?’. In:NannaHvidt&HansMouritzen (eds.), Bailes, Alyson(2016).‘DenmarkinNordic cooperation: leader, player, scep ation inFashion?’ Reykjavik: (brief). Centre forSmallStateStudies,IIA. Bailes, Alyson(2014).‘Nordic andArctic Affairs:Whyis‘West Nordic’ Cooper Dimension’’.‘Northern JournalofCommonMarket Studies,38,pp.677-97. Arter, David (2000).‘Smallstateinfluence withintheEU:caseofFinland’s Crisis. Boston: LittleBrown. Allison, Graham (1971).EssenceofDecision.ExplainingtheCubanMissile unregulated-fishing/2015/07/16/ com/arctic/article/five-nations-sign-declaration-protect-arctic-donut-hole- unregulated fishing’. ADN (2015).‘Five nationssigndeclaration to protect arctic ‘donut hole’ from , pp.31-51.Copenhagen:DanishInstituteforInternationalStudies. Arctic Yearbook 2016 Anchorage DailyNews, Cooperation AmongNations: Europe, America,and Ithaca:CornellUP. , pp. 9-15. Akureyri, Iceland: Northern Research , pp.9-15.Akureyri, Iceland:Northern 16 July2015. Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook https://www.adn. (36)4, - - Heininen, Lassi (2004). ‘New external political structures in Northern cooper- ARCTIC ORGANISATIONS ARE NATIONS’ SPECIAL DARLINGS. BUT WHO’S WHOSE? ation and Northern governance: from quantity to quality’. In: Timo Koivurova, Tanja Joona & Reija Shnoro (eds.), Arctic Governance, Juridica Lapponica 29. Rovaniemi: University of the Arctic.

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 oeg aid foreign The transformation ofDanish their fifteen-year life span, the Millennium Development Goals introduced in introduced Goals Development Millennium the span, life fifteen-year their normative agenda has grown tremendously in influence and prominence. Over power oftheParisagenda seems to have waned. Meanwhile, anotherglobal tempt to strengthenand resultsthe implementation of aid activities. Today, the Declarationthat emphasisedcoordination, an at- in and ownership alignment the culmination of the aid effectiveness efforts with the ratification of the Paris saw 2000s mid The decade. past the over fluctuating been has development viduals orprivate Moreover, foundations. theglobalnormative landscape of living abroad, and even charitable transfers indi- from singlehigh-net-worth migrants from remittances investments, direct foreign as such flows private loss of relative power for official development assistance in the light of growing an agenda of ‘beyondengagement and furthered aid’ that stresses a perceived reduction. haveDonors poverty sional re-centredon private their focus sector and the development ofcommercial relations aboveof multidimen the pursuit growth economic enhanced value that relations benefit’ ‘equal or win-win of Cooperation.South Traditionalhave donors responded by returningto notions often through foreign South- and development policy through assertive efforts, influence political and economic their extend to them for way the paved tries improvednium, macroeconomicin several conditions middle-income coun ofthe millen- the turn With and a changingglobalcontext. priorities political dalities anddriversof change are pressureunder challenged put or by shifting mo- approaches, conventional the as flux, of state a in is development Global Introduction Lars Engberg-Pedersen 1 &AdamMoeFejerskov 2 - - 2001 moved from a life in the shadows to become a set of central guiding THE TRANSFORMATION OF DANISH FOREIGN AID principles for development. This culminated in 2015 with the Agenda 2030 and the new Sustainable Development Goals that have hit the ground running and amassed attention from across all the world’s countries and from both sides of the political divide.

It is easy to comprehend, from these important changes, why notions of disruption, radical change or disorder have come to dominate contemporary development cooperation discourse. Some have suggested that traditional donors such as Denmark are experiencing a threefold set of interconnected crises (Mawdsley 2015): an ontological crisis driven by the challenges both emerging states and non-state actors currently pose to the former monopoly over donor identity occupied by traditional donors; an ideational crisis stem- ming from the erosion of their normative and agenda-setting dominance (as seen, for example, in the strong influence of states from the Global South in formulating and securing the ratification of the SDGs); and finally a material crisis springing both from the relative and the absolute rise of the South and from the relative marginalisation of international public finance by different private flows. Consequently, the question of how development agencies face this increasingly complex operating environment and must adapt to maintain their relevance and effectiveness presently receives a great deal of attention within the development community and in the academic and policy literature surrounding it (Gavas et al. 2015; Gulrajani 2015; Kharas & Rogerson 2012). For example, some countries have seen the reabsorption of bilateral development agencies into Ministries of Foreign Affairs (e.g. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands), in attempts to bring aid and foreign policy closer together.

In this contribution, we step into the debate on how development agencies respond, adapt to, or disregard these changes by exploring one long-term significant donor: Denmark. We explore the question of what have been the major shifts, if any, in Danish development cooperation over the past decade, and if these changes are incited by a changing global context, as the literature on future-fit development agencies would see it, or other stronger factors? The contribution concludes that significant policy shifts have taken place, but that they reflect short-term domestic political concerns rather than constituting a strategic response to global change. Important changes have occurred financially, and development cooperation with several countries has been phased

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 nate Danishdevelopment cooperation. role of the private sector, and other non-development interests tendto domi- out. Moreover, issueslike refugeedomestic reliefcosts, and development,the evaluationas tools to generate evidence-basedimprovethat can decisions Finally, dimension, the fourth totion multilaterals, useofprogrammatic aid and coordinated analytical work. as fragmentationsuch acrossagencies, medianprojectdonor size, contribu measurescoordinationThe dimension efforts. indicatorsand harmonisation and fragmentationand rewardsaid implementation, in engaging in for donors to avoidtoas thenameindicates, problemsefforts donor of overlap, waste ability. The third dimension, technical cooperation and scope offorward spending planstopredict foster - recipients’ top developmentuse ofrecipient priorities, coordination systems, of strategies.plement indicatorsincludes The dimension as sharesuch ofaidto toability countries’ developinvestmentscan strengthenthat andim- partner developmentand buildingonnational systems It rewards priorities. long-term strengthsside by onthe institutional country usingavailable country partner untied aid. The second dimension, administrative programmableshare costs, ofcountry aid as wellshare of measuresmension indicatorsas sharesuch to ofallocation countries, poor countries. and sectorscountries availabilityas wellits The di- partner in efficiency,strategicconcerns made over choices acrossdistributed how aidis dimension, first mid-2000s. The the in adopted Effectivenesswas of ODAideal forms were conceptualized when theParisDeclaration Aid on how of question fundamental the well illustrate These aid. quality’ ‘high ing reflect- dimensions core of set a into ODA about discussions policy different framework developed by Birdsall and Kharas (2014)isanattemptto collapse Developmentvelopment (QuODA)agencies. Official Assistance of Quality The of ODAmensions and introduce the literature on the future readiness of de di- core highlight briefly we context, global changing a to adaptation potential elements ofcontemporary change in Danishdevelopment cooperation and trace to possible is it degree what to and where of discussion the qualify To agencies development Quality of ODA and the future-fit of reducing the burden on partner countries, alludes, countries, reducing the burden on partner transparency and learning, fostering institutions, is aboutbuildingup promotes data and Maximising - - aid effectiveness. The dimension includes indicators such as implementation THE TRANSFORMATION OF DANISH FOREIGN AID of International Aid Transparency Initiative data reporting standards, detail of project descriptions, reporting of aid delivery channels, quality of main agency evaluation policy.

The QuODA thus highlights several traditional core criteria of development cooperation such as ownership, effective and lean implementation, coordination and harmonisation, as they are strongly promoted in the Paris Declara- tion. Ownership is crucial to helping build local institutions and strengthens effective implementation but requires multi-year planning and less focus on donor interests, something not always feasible in changing domestic political environments. Likewise, harmonisation and coordination ease the burden on the partner country and help eliminate duplication of programmes, but also require donors to sometimes sideline their own interests. The framework’s focus on rewarding donors for programmable aid puts the highest value on funds made available in recipient countries for projects and programmes, stripping away humanitarian aid, debt relief and several non-recipient-country-related expenses such as donor refugee costs, administrative costs of donor aid programmes, student scholarships etc.

Building on the QuODA idea of aiming to ensure as effective and impactful development cooperation as possible, a body of literature spanning academic and policy circles has emerged over the past few years that engages in the future for development agencies (Gavas et al. 2015; Gulrajani 2015; Kharas & Rogerson 2012), targeting the core question of how these can and should adapt to a changing global context. It seeks to identify future policy priorities, financing decisions, delivery approaches and options for organisational reform. Reflecting the QuODA in some issues and diverging in others, this literature predominantly focuses on exogenous and endogenous challenges arising from a set of global challenges.

As in the QuODA, geographic scope is important to this work, with an emphasis on how agencies need to adapt to a world of engagement with fragile states and situations on the one hand, and countries with a wide poverty gap on the other, i.e. often middle-income countries with a substantial poor segment of population (in themselves two radically different political and operational challenges). The growing focus on fragile states in particular is seen to necessitate a revamp of concepts of aid effectiveness, as these situations require less

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 but it is a whole other business toit isa but whole other business navigate that maysuch changing conditions cies find themselves caught up in. It is one thing to identify and spell out risks, tothat developmentpriorities power and shifting of politics, awhirlwind agen contribute these of All engagements. and efforts international questioning by either indirectly subordinate ordirectlydevelopment undermine cooperation that priorities political craticfromcontest and thedomestic states, short-term challenges tocountries, theliberalpartner worldordermany frommore auto- among assertiveness growing a of or etc. conflicts disasters, technology, of form the take These disruptors. of influence exponential the and change of new world order. Strategic isincreasinglyplanning challenged by thefast pace Finally,and a thisliterature ofnavigatinguncertainty highlightstheimportance other politicalaimsorto otherpoliticalinstitutions. as theylabour arethat development inensuring subordinatedis not policy to bureaucraticdomestic in clear lines out setting in areof divisions asimportant mandates Such 2009). (OECD period’ sufficient a for relevantremain can and cooperation,that haswide whether ownership in legislationoranotherform, strong need ‘afor clear top-level of developmentstatement ofthe purpose the effectivenessing of development the the OECDunderlining agencies, with determin- in important equally as highlighted often are commitments political coherenceof aid of implementation provision. Relatedly, mandates and robust reasoningrationales asanyunderlying asmuch ofincreasing effectiveness or New Zealandhavepriorities political shifting andtheNetherlands, shapedthe side. Inrecentthe other casesofreorganisationCanada, Australia,as in such the traditional integrated approach of Danida in Denmarkisa prototype for DevelopmentInternational asanexampleofthelatter, oftenserves whereas plete independence (Faure etal.2015). The UnitedKingdom’sfor Department integrationfull ofdevelopment agencies into foreignor com- affairsministries a returningof emphasisinthisliterature,point withresearcheither underlining Donor governance structuresof bureaucraticthe division or responsibilitiesis into longer-termfoodassistanceandsocialprotection programmes. protracted naturetoday,crises most of aid maywhich humanitarian in extend aid and demands agrowing coherence withaid programmesthe lightof the in positive experiences. also entailsagrowingThis shift on humanitarian focus edge and newapproacheswhich therewithin forcontexts are limited very a strong including cial instruments, on the process focus ofbuildingknowl- non-finan and financial between flexibility more and aid disburse to pressure - - easily undermine years of work, the legitimacy of an agency, or even the very THE TRANSFORMATION OF DANISH FOREIGN AID concept of development.

The QuODA sees quality of aid as a reflection of many concerns, including the degree of ownership and support to local institutions (including the use of country systems), donors’ efforts to coordinate and harmonise their work to reduce the burden on recipient countries, and the share of real programmable aid that strips away any attempts to inflate aid budgets. The ‘future-fit’ literature, on the other hand, is less concerned with classic issues of bilateral/ multilateral aid, concessionality (grant, lending or blended finance), ownership or coordination, and applies a more pragmatic understanding that blends all of these according to the context and situation at hand, driven mainly by a strategic approach from the donor. When analysing processes of change and stasis in Danish development cooperation, these different criteria for quality of aid and future-fitness of development agencies will serve as the analytical background. The question we want to explore in the following then, is to what extend we have seen marked changes to Danish development cooperation over the past decade, and if these can be seen as responding to a global context, as the literature assumes it, or rather stem from other sources of change?

Moments of change in Danish foreign aid

Establishing a baseline, this section outlines the major characteristics and trends of Danish foreign aid up to 2010. Since the beginning of Danish development cooperation it has been a significant priority to avoid interfering in political processes in decolonised societies (Bach et al. 2008). The notion of partnership has a long history, and even though political priorities (environment, gender and human rights) began to be established in the second half of the 1980s, the subsequent years continued to be characterised by a substantial respect for the independence of developing countries. Partnership was, albeit with different interpretations, a well-established notion all the way up to the adoption of the Paris Declaration and its focus on ownership and alignment. In the early days Danish foreign aid focussed on project assistance and technology transfer with a large involvement in integrated rural development in Bangladesh in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1978, some years later than Sweden and Norway, Danish aid reached the quantitative target of constituting 0.7% of GNI established by the UN and during the 1980s a majority in

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 tably Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia (the three countries receiving Danish ODA foreign aid, and funds were increasingly channelled towards fragile states, no- and Zimbabwe. and The developmentlinking ofsecurity came to dominate Malawi Eritrea, to support bilateral of out phasing quick a initiated and NGOs over, thegovernment adopted a tougher stancetowards Danishdevelopment More- support. parliamentary narrow very with 2003 in Iraqwar the in engage ‘hard’oritise instead of‘soft’to solutions challenges security and went onto toand thenewgovernmentthe late1990s the Balkansduring began to pri Danish troops intervention. had beendeployed and military concerns security of favour in policy, foreign Danish within position significant earlier its from downgradedclearly also all aidbudget,but aid anddevelopmentcooperation The change of governmentbroughtonly not 2001 in the overin a cut about - years laterinthesecondwhitepaper, of national legislationand policies. mentation These ideas were repeated six erationto countries to determinehowDanishaid might contribute theimple- created by Denmarkshouldnow engage with co-op outsiders. in negotiations corresponded developmentnicely withtheview that sustainable be cannot torare institutions development.for conditions crucial Moreover, the change lands’ with few sustainable long-term effects and,secondly, thateffective sec- is- ‘development become to tended projects that firstly, rationales: two were from project aid to sector-wide approaches.new orientation this Underlying de Lima &Moore 2006). Moreover, the 1994 white paper announceda change proliferationacross recipient comparedcountries to Fuzzo Denmark(Acharya, more significantly exhibits countries ‘like-minded’ and Western other most of was toobecause it spread.thinly effects,has hadsome This as foreign aid called ‘co-operationcountries’. impact The idea was thatDanishaidhadlittle bilateraldecided wasthat Danish it be concentrated aidshould so- twenty on changes tookof A number (Danida 1994). years.these placeduring 1989 In concerns cross-cutting three democratisation and environment equality, der velopment, paper, white government first the 1994, In goals. qualitative six draftedpolicy (Danida waspublishedin1988 1988) identifying by theministry al aid policy was outlined in various commission reports while the first general ofDanishdevelopmentFrom cooperation thebirth the gener- intheearly1960s to 1.0%ofGNIby 1992where itstayed throughout the1990s. decided parliament that Denmark’s developmentshould increaseassistance came out making poverty reduction the overall making poverty cameout objective, withgen- Partnership 2000 Partnership (Danida2000). A World in De- - - amounting to DKK 27 million in 2001, 307 million in 2005 and 636 million in THE TRANSFORMATION OF DANISH FOREIGN AID 2009).

Around the turn of the millennium the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the development cooperation section of which is called ‘Danida’) was characterised by two developments: one was an attempt to significantly strengthen and streamline aid management, primarily by developing a set of aid management guidelines, setting up a unit for quality assurance in the ministry, and undertaking regular performance reviews of embassies. The other was the decentralisation of substantial aid management powers to the embassies which were henceforth responsible for developing new support programmes (Engberg-Pedersen, 2014). Both processes were, however, strongly influenced by cuts in administrative resources in the early 2000s. The liberal-conservative government that came to power in 2001 wanted to make the public sector more effective and ‘more bang for the buck’ was also a central message in development cooperation. Between 2001 and 2004 the administrative resources of Danida were reduced by 25%, which prompted a DAC peer review to note: ‘This decreasing trend in administrative resources raises the question of how far Danida can reduce its resources without negatively affecting quality and its ability to adapt to new aid modalities’ (OECD/DAC 2007: 16).

In retrospect, the 1990s constituted the heyday of Danish foreign aid. It was backed by the government, the budget was large and constant, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs developed an ‘active multilateralism’, and a professional and long-term commitment to programme support increasingly characterised bilateral cooperation. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Danida formed Danish development cooperation largely in agreement with international norms as they emerged in OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, and it was not far from satisfying the four dimensions of QuODA outlined above. With the change of government in 2001 the political support for development cooperation decreased significantly, the budget was cut, and the military became a major instrument in Denmark’s foreign policy. Politically, development cooperation was less and less seen as an important element in Denmark’s international engagement and more and more as a playground for domestic politics.

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 in the 2010s Significant issuesin Danish foreign aid principles were supposed to be equally ranked, the policy introduced the pos the introduced policy the ranked, equally be to supposed were principles three the As 11). 2010: (Danida mentioned specifically were interests’ ‘Danish into three(development principles need, relevance, and results) impact where cooperationhad been countries their level of poverty,this waschanged but opment cooperation. the Hitherto, issue primary influencing the choice of new devel- to approach new a reflect however, did, paper the point one On ology. the paperwasnotmuchmoreupdating couchedinaliberal than apolicy ide growththem witheconomic fragilein andstability situations. To someextent supplementing while climate/environment) and democratisationequality, der (gen concerns cross-cutting earlier three the included priorities five the and approach wasreiterated,tocontinued a statedobjective,be the partnership 2000 compared manysurprises not contain to Partnership from introducing astrongnida 2010).Apart on freedom, focus thepaperdid ten years,white paperin called new first the presented and Copenhagen toSotos, de Hernando proponent, ty ofFreedom,the Ministry invitedtheprivate properHe baptised hisdepartment - Sørencian, was appointeddevelopment Pind, February2010. 23 on minister politi high-profile ideologically an government, then the of reshuffling a After The whitepapersandthelaw catastrophes callingforaredirection offundstowards humanitarianrelief). natural instance, (for events contingent by influenced are latter the because do accounts than intentions reflect policy better budgets that argumentbeing is based on aid budgets ratherfollowing discussion the thanaid accounts, instead drivenor global context the bybe notedthat should It concerns. other extend thesourceexogenousfound ofchange is of achanging the form in gree of change in these different areas, and and then toelucidate to try what refugees,tions, relief and development.here Ourambition isto explore thede private sectordevelopmentfor on fragileand (v)thefocus purposes; situa seekersassistance forasylum inDenmark; (iv) tothe attempts the mobilise with respect to aid;(ii)thereductionof foreign aid; (iii) theuseofdevelopment areasof aid as foreign inDanish out change: (i) the proliferation ofwhite papers and high-levelchanges political stand issues five 2010s the During Freedom from Poverty, Freedom to Change(Da . Poverty reduction. Poverty

------sibility of selecting countries other than low income countries as partners. The THE TRANSFORMATION OF DANISH FOREIGN AID paper was met with a lot of opposition in parliament, but not for its content (Folketingstidende 2010: 15-39). The government announced a nominal freez- ing of foreign aid together with the draft white paper, provoking the opposition to vote against the policy. Such a narrow adoption of a white paper on development cooperation was unusual and it reduced the legitimacy of the paper.

After the elections in September 2011 a new government led by the social democrats came to power. The new development minister, Christian Friis Bach, came with a background in civil society and research. Given that the new government had voted against Søren Pind’s development policy, a new white paper had to be prepared. As the law framing Danish development cooperation dated back to 1971, Christian Friis Bach decided to change both in one go, and as he was a committed human rights activist, both the law and the policy came to reflect a human rights-based approach. The law establishes a broad set of objectives for Danish foreign aid, including poverty reduction, human rights, democracy, sustainable development, peace and stability. In addition, it refers to the importance of policy coherence for development which was a relatively new phenomenon in a Danish context.

The white paper, The Right to a Better Life (Danida 2012), stands out in four different ways. First and foremost, it introduced a human rights-based approach which created some unease in Danida as although the ministry was used to handling policy dialogues with public authorities in developing countries, advocating the roles of duty bearers and rights holders seemed rather intrusive. The approach was translated into four principles (non-discrimination, participation and inclusion, transparency, and accountability) which could more easily be integrated into aid activities. Secondly, green growth was promoted vigorously. In Danish foreign aid, economic growth has always constituted a condition for poverty reduction, but the white paper elevated it to one of four priorities and the minister begins his introduction by noting that “[p]overty must be fought with human rights and economic growth” (Danida 2012). The government had established the position of Minister of Trade and Investments in an attempt to strengthen commercial relations abroad, and the white paper refers to the use of ‘public-private partnerships and innovative financing modalities as cat- alysts for green growth through enhanced cooperation on technological development and energy and emission-reduction interventions in developing countries’ (Danida 2012: 22). This was the first visible step towards later efforts

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 ed observation that displaced people often cannot returncannot that displacedpeople often ed observation to homes in their well-document- the on based is and areas conflict neighbouring communities here presented refugees in close relation and host toof supporting the priority relieftarian anddevelopmentcooperation. new,not is Whilethis is the issue humani- integrate to need the emphasises paper the First, points. significant additiontoIn on refugees thefocus andmigrants,featuresthe newpolicy three a parwithotherbasicvalues. in The Right totion aBetterLife, gender equality is again an issue important on equality. From a relatively apolitical and devalued position under social protec- growthsustainable andfreedom,and (ii) democracy, and gender rights human tosomething prevent. areThe twootherpriorities (i) inclusive, nowoldfriends: rootof migration’causes migration5). Assuch, (Danida 2017: perceived is as the … address […] and migration economic ‘irregular counter to seeks cifically spe- and development and migration with deals other The conflict. and crisis refugees areasin communities andhost neighbouring supporting on focusses eigners comingto Denmark. One addressesand development security and policy,reducingdeal with priorities main four of for as two of thenumber the in reflected clearly is This Sweden. reach to roads Danish along marched The paperwasdrafted in thewake oftherefugeerefugeeswhen Syrian crisis ed agreements thatcanconstrain Danishdevelopment cooperation. arewhite papers more thannegotiat- priorities policy signalling for aplatform been developedby democraticsocial the earlier government, the that seems it governmentlivedthe 2000s of with happily terms and does not exclude specific activities. Just as the liberal-conservative ingly, moreit isphrasedthan earlierpapers.Still, binding politically in broad accordbar one. Itis, - parties, ofallpolitical in parliamentwiththesupport developmentall earlier bypolicies beingtheproductagreementof apolitical World 2030 A newchange of government preceded recentthe most whitepaper, The ment asoutlinedintheintroduction to thisarticle. inresponse to the increasingunderlined, partly of globaldevelop complexity - integrated into otherissues.Fourthly, policycoherence for development was and priorities independent as downplayed were environment the and equality energyfor investments.to private mobilise particularly capital, Thirdly,gender , published in January 2017 (Danida 2017). 2017 January in published , paper differsThis from Partnership 2000 Partnership although it had althoughit - the short or medium-term. In a world where climate change is likely to induce THE TRANSFORMATION OF DANISH FOREIGN AID substantial numbers of people to move, the policy change is, however, fundamental as climate change risks jeopardising long-term efforts to bring about significant progress. With an increasing allocation of resources to ever-changing locations of natural disasters and social conflicts, the accumulation of experience and trust gained through long-term partnerships with authorities and organisations in particular areas become difficult. This undermines the effectiveness of development cooperation though it may increase the sustainability of humanitarian relief.

Secondly, the policy wants to move ‘from charity to investment’. The priority on inclusive, sustainable growth does not primarily concern support to better economic policies or strengthened institutions creating an enabling economic environment in poor countries which, internationally, has constituted the main approach to growth since the late 1980s. Instead, it is argued:

‘Denmark will invest in inclusive, sustainable growth and development in the developing countries, focusing on energy, water, agriculture, food and other areas where Denmark has special knowledge, resources and interests. This will contribute to creating sustainable societies with economic freedom, opportunities and jobs – especially for young people. It will also benefit the Danish economy, trade and investments’ (Danida 2017: 5).

Despite later discussions of the importance of an enabling business climate (Danida 2017: 28), there is a strong focus on mobilising private capital and on creating opportunities for Danish companies.

Thirdly, the policy sets out three categories of cooperation countries: poor, fragile countries and regions; poor, stable countries; and transition and growth economies. It states that these categories have been elaborated ‘to create convergence between the need for support in the developing countries and the representation of Danish interests’ (Danida 2017: 8). Moreover, cooperation with transition and growth economies is intended to stimulate sustainable development with poverty reduction only as a derived effect. This categorisation seems to use the SDGs and the notion of sustainable development to move Danish aid away from a strict focus on low-income countries.

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 development cooperation shapethewhitepapers. the movenon-development towardsinterests through short-term, satisfying refugees on stimulating focus andirregular migrantstonot cometo Denmark, law,2012 white paper.appear inthe2017 doesnot Together with thestrong with policycoherenceconcern fordevelopment,intowhich waswritten the able from therecipients’of view.point thatthe noteworthy furthermore, Itis, towards addressingtragedies,humanitarian predict less making assistance - operation indicatingthata larger share of Danishforeign aid will be channelled towardstion theintegrationand developmentassistance of humanitarian co- aid. withrespectAlso, to aidpredictability,the latestwhitepaperdirects atten- sharelower aid goingto of shareand alower countries low-income untied of of Danishaid. tion increasinglyThe white papers provide the argumentsa for and sectoralof thethematic thebasis form will capacities and Danish orienta- towardsonly growthcountries, poor to is through be stimulated investment, intereststhrough developmentcooperation. Foreignlonger directedno aidis clear thatthere is a movesteady policy towardsDanish commercial satisfying is it quality, aid of elements the to papers white of progression this Relating took initiative to doso. 15) their intention had officially been to raise aid to 1.0% of GNI, but they never eign aid againiftheya government form the future.in power (2012– Whilein Social Democrats announcedthattheyraisingsee any scope for donot for tohas continued assistance to amount Februarythe 0.7%ofGNI,andin 2018 Vietnam, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Since then Danish official development of aidtoout a phasing Central Bolivia, Pakistan, America,Indonesia, Nepal, This meantareductionfromcountries of priority in thenumber 21to 14and came to they2015 June poweragain in made the cuts. done; whentheparty and becausethisisthelevel recommended by theUN.Scarcely saidthan that Danishaid toshould becut 2013 0.7%ofGNIbecause money isscarce, the liberalGNI. While inopposition, party, Venstre, announcedinSeptember werethe allocations 2011 September in increased toaid at0.83%of maintain government of change the With 2000s. late the of crisis financial the after up decreasinga slowly implying billion, percentage ofGNI,whichbeganto speed eral governmentof thetimedecided toat DKK 15.2 amount lockthenominal Danish foreignthe 2010s Entering to aidamounted and thelib- GNI of 0.83% fordevelopment cooperationChanging economicsupport - In terms of the distribution of the aid budget for different purposes, changes THE TRANSFORMATION OF DANISH FOREIGN AID have also taken place. Figure 1 gives an indication of the distribution of aid between bilateral assistance, environmental and climate support, humanitarian relief, multilateral assistance through the UN system, and assistance through multilateral development banks and funds.

Figure 1: Percentage distribution of the Danish aid budget 2011–2018

0 2011 2012 201 201 201 201 201 2018

E H N

Source: Regeringens udviklingspolitiske prioriteringer 2010–2017. Note: The different categories are based on the organisation of the financial bill. As there are other budget items (e.g. costs of receiving asylum seekers), these five items do not add up to 100%.

Four points can be highlighted based on the figure. First, the role of bilateral assistance has declined significantly. This is partly because this budget item can be cut relatively easily, and partly because Danida looks for others to

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 national activities onwards2001 andagenerallyinterest decliningpolitical inDenmark’s inter bly related both to the increased focus on‘hard’ means inforeign policy from share largerof a much economyondevelopment assistance. This isproba- 2016. holds thatDenmarkcanonlyuseasmaller consensus the political Thus, per capitahasrisenfrom approximately toin 1993 PPP $20,000 in $51,000 environmentalprojects abroad. givenis evenThis thatGNI more noteworthy wastoat thetime the ambition 1990s, spendanadditional0.5%ofGNIon sistance has clearly waned. In additionto allocating1.0% ofGNIforaid in the developmentfor as- tothe 2010s Comparing support the political the1990s, tions are usedunder otherbudgetitems,notablyhumanitarianrelief. arrangements may have increased theirsharethese institu ofDanishaidas and tosystem thedevelopment banks.Actually, multilateraland institutions relatively stable, albeit with a fluctuating balance of resources going to the UN declined, andfourthly,the share allocatedto multilateralhas been institutions ly, the share of resources forclimatechange adaptation and mitigation has priorities. Third - political changed the also but needs, increasing the reflecting capacity. Secondly, thesharerelief ofhumanitarian has grown substantially, tothe assistance implement due toextent some limited administrative its was obligedtogiven meet commitments to developmentbanks andthe EU eral aid channelled throughwere the UN system all halved. Given thatDenmark Bilateral 1). to and multilat and adaptation, change mitigation climate support assistance, figure and 1 table (see budget aid the of parts other on impact the total(30.0% of Obviously,2016. budgeted aid) for had atremendousthis By Novemberin 2015. had amount grownthis 2015 tomillion DKK 4,436.9 relatedtal budgeted costs aid) was setasidefor to receivingseekers asylum in November5,094 2015.InAugustDKK (5.8%ofthe to980.1 million 2014, - rivalseekers,asylum of fromprimarily peakedwhom of the number Syria, at developmentfor changed dramatically.assistance was relatedThis tothe ar- Overfrommonths aperiodof15 Augustto2014 Novemberthe budget 2015, Development aidused for asylumseekers its budgetshare withoutstrong politicalreactions. which wasstrongly defended of years10–20 a considerable ago,haslost part bilateral where assistance, budget aid the of composition the in reflected also tonow subscribe an aid percentage of 0.7. is The lukewarmsupport political 3 where the largest political parties onbothsideoftheaisle where the largestparties political - - - and given that there was a political interest in maintaining the amount allocat- THE TRANSFORMATION OF DANISH FOREIGN AID ed to humanitarian relief, the cuts elsewhere in the budget had to be propor- tionally even deeper. The political willingness to use as much as possible from development assistance to cover the costs of asylum seekers without jeopardising the OECD/DAC definition of ODA was very clear. In the 19 November 2015 agreement between the then government and its three political parties it is written:

‘The parties to the agreement concur that the possibilities for this [using official development assistance to cover the costs of asylum seekers] should be exploited fully – including if it becomes evident that asylum costs go up further during 2016 than has been budgeted for in the Finance Act for 2016’ (Regeringen 2015: 19, authors’ translation).

Although other countries were discussing whether a cap should be put on the share of ODA to be spent on receiving asylum seekers, this was not considered by the political majority.

Table 1: Shifts in the Danish development aid budget 2015–2016

Danish development policy

Main budget items 2015 2016 Change (million DKK)* (million DKK)** (%)

Bilateral assistance 6354.3 2893.9 -54.5

Assistance through NGOs 1103.0 744.0 -32.5

Climate change 652.0 301.0 -53.8

Multilateral assistance through the UN 1629.1 824.6 -49.4

Development banks and EU funds 1941.6 1968.5 1.4

Humanitarian relief 1775.0 1825.0 2.8

EU assistance 1044.1 1352.6 29.5

Asylum seekers in Denmark 980.1 4436.9 352.7

Total Danish aid 16893.0 14777.7 -12.5

* The budget for 2015 published in August 2014 ** The budget for 2016 published in November 2015

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 up again. seekersasylum reachingyearsof couple Denmarkthelast sharethis hasgone However,importance. toseems secondary beof the reducedwith of number considerableDenmark is andthe share ofaid reaching developing countries rapidties takingplaceatavery pace. towillingness The political useaid within up, Summing Tabledemonstrates 1 priori aid policy change of asubstantial ‘growth advisors’based atDanishembassies. areasin ties whereexcel.bycompanies Danish 25 at least supported is This sectorcooperation and cooperationbetween Danish authori public country the SDGsindevelopingExplorer),(Danida Business countries andstrategic related [P4G]), the GlobalGoals2030 explorationto opportunities ofbusiness forGreen Growth thatcanbe scaled-up (Partnering and private partnerships development and commercialinternational of public– Partnerships), opment non-commerciallike entities organisations civilsociety (Danida Market Devel- oping countries. They seek tocooperation stimulate and between companies develin to- they to try getDanishcompanies opportunities business exploit Some ofthese are variations onthe earlier programmes inthe sense that of private capital,avarietyhave ofinstruments beenproposed ordeveloped. mobilisation immense an require also and alone aid foreign throughachieved cooperationbyand sustained theobviousbe that theSDGscannot point Given the interestpolitical inintegrating private companies into development to rethink itscooperation withtheprivate sector. AB 2014). Facility promptedThis Danida toand Partnership close theBusiness with respectto thebroader developmentobjectives (NCGandDevFin Advisors transfer, failed technology of but field the in succeeded had Programme ness and project phases.A recent evaluation concludedthattheBusiness-to-Busi through havepilot contact, to sought thepartnerships stimulate of support Facilitywhere2011–2014), Partnership the DanidaBusiness differentdegrees grammethe Business-to-Business 1993–2006, Programme and 2006–2011, recentsucceeded one another(in years, the Private SectorDevelopment Pro - reduction. Differentand poverty ment programmesobjective withthis have to contributing growth, economic developsocial viable partnerships - cially developingin with companies tion to countries commer long-term, establish Danida has, fora tolong time,sought engage incooperaDanish companies - Mobilising theprivate sector - - - - In addition, three other major instruments have been strengthened or devel- THE TRANSFORMATION OF DANISH FOREIGN AID oped in the field of development finance. First, the contributions to the Invest- ment Fund for Developing Countries (IFU) have grown in recent years and IFU has established a number of special purpose funds (the Danish Climate Invest- ment Fund in 2014, the Danish Agri-Business Fund in 2016 and the SDG Invest- ment Fund in 2018) partly based on capital from Danish pension funds. The SDG Investment Fund is planned to consist of DKK 3 billion from IFU and the state plus another DKK 3 billion from pension funds. This amount is expected to generate investments of around DKK 30 billion in SDG-related projects in developing countries in the period 2018–2021. Although IFU has been formally untied from cooperating with Danish companies, it is still the expectation that most projects will have strong Danish components. Secondly, Danida Busi- ness Finance which aims at helping finance large public infrastructure projects that would not otherwise obtain financing, is planned to grow in the coming years to DKK 400 million in 2019 (from DKK 350 million in 2010 and DKK 200 million in 2016). It provides soft, but tied, loans and Danish companies are thus expected to be involved in the two most recently approved projects, a water treatment plant in Bangladesh (total grant commitment: DKK 976.6 million) and a wind farm in Ethiopia (total grant commitment: DKK 727.3 million). Thirdly, Denmark is a co-founder of and investor in the African Guarantee Fund which has provided guarantees for loans to small and medium-sized enterprises in Africa since 2012. The fund is viewed as a success as it has facilitated USD 800 million in loan disbursements to almost 8,000 enterprises in 38 Afri- can countries.

Although there is still no clear picture, these developments raise three questions in relation to the quality of Danish foreign aid. First, it is not clear how the new as well as existing business-related instruments will respond to the concern expressed in the evaluation of the Business-to-Business Programme, namely that partnerships and development finance may succeed in commercial terms but fail with respect to poverty reduction. Actually, the SDGs seem to be used to justify the activities financed through these various instruments. At the goal level the SDGs can be cited to justify anything, and they risk, thereby, weakening the development requirements put on aid-supported private companies and investments. Secondly, the formal (Danida Business Finance) and informal (IFU) tying of aid to Danish suppliers has not been challenged. On the contrary, it appears that tying of aid is not perceived to be a problem given that more money is expected to be channelled through these instruments. Thirdly,

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 come andleastdeveloped countries. seems likely that anincreasingly smallershare of Danishaid will go to low-in growthof and transition a category of white paper,the latest in economies it in 2016). being GNIpercapitaofUSD12,235 limit Together with thecreation the DACon all countries mented in of ODA-eligiblelist (the upper countries to up including and some, 50%oftheSDGInvestmentFund, can beimple- severalin lowermiddle-incomecountries activities allow for oftheinstruments of theshareterms in ofaidallocatedto lowversusmiddle-income countries, and the Minister for Developmentand the Minister Cooperationfor Immigra and the Minister - responsiblean ambassador the repatriationfor rejectedof seekers, asylum foreignabove. aidasdiscussed ofForeignThe Ministry Affairshasappointed recentIn years,migrants and refugees have becomeacentrein ofattention million) atthedisposaloffundin2017(Statsministeriet etal2017). 368 (DKK resources the of quarters three for accounted aid Foreign justice. and defence affairs, foreign of ministries the and Office Minister’s Prime the Fundand Stabilisation administeredand is 2010 was establishedin by jointly cooperation between diplomacy, Moreover, aid and the military/police. a Peace emphasising 2013) Justice Defence,of of and Ministry Ministry eign Affairs, mark’s ofFor(Ministry - waspublishedin2013 integratedefforts stabilisation better coordinatedauthorities in relation to fragileon Den- A policy situations. of thecountry. parts However,on gettingDanish muchemphasishasbeenput ily through organisationsinternational and NGOs with a foothold in different to Somaliahasbeenchannelledprimar Afghanistan,education in the support the interestexplains Somalia. WhileDanida inadopted a sectorapproach to ventionwhereas theburden piracycompanies wasplacingonDanishshipping was conditionedbyistan theperceivedthreat inter security and the military to fragile Afghanistan and Somalia. particularly states, The choice ofAfghan changed, however, and Denmark began to provide developmentto assistance territory.its of control in This state strongreasonably required a aid Danish of becausethesector-wide approach whichwasacornerstonepartly countries, onwards,Danish cooperation werecountries stable but selectedamongpoor and 2003 from Afghanistan and Iraq in troops of deployment the Until 1990s. security, migration andrefugees have beengrowingsince thelate concerns Alongside the interest intheprivate sector and commercial opportunities, Fragile situations, migration, relief anddevelopment - - - - tion, Integration and Housing have visited Nigeria together to pave the way for THE TRANSFORMATION OF DANISH FOREIGN AID the repatriation of Nigerians. Moreover, funds (DKK125 million in 2018) have been set aside for facilitating measures in this context, sometimes described by the ministers as quid pro quo. In February 2018 the Social Democrats, then in opposition, published a proposal for a new immigration policy, Fair and Realistic, in which they propose a ‘comprehensive reform of Danish development assistance’ (Socialdemokratiet 2018: 24). They suggest spending DKK 3.5 billion more in areas neighbouring conflicts and natural disasters which roughly means a doubling of the funds currently allocated to these areas. It is proposed to take the money from long-term development assistance. While there are good reasons to consider how relief and development can be better integrated and how to support areas with a sudden huge influx of refugees, the suggestion of a comprehensive reform of development assistance in an immigration policy partly funded by reallocating DKK 3.5 billion presently used for purposes of long-term development evidences how little importance the major opposition party attaches to this issue.

There is no doubt that the current enormous numbers of refugees are unsus- tainable and that this requires attention. Likewise, it is obvious that security and development need to go hand in hand as has been often repeated the last 15 years. However, these observations seem to work as window-dressing for an underlying indifferenzce to long-term development and an increasing use of foreign aid for non-development purposes. Aid is expected to support military intervention, to limit migration, to settle refugees, to facilitate commercial relations and to combat radicalisation. One thing is that it is highly questiona- ble whether aid can serve all these purposes; another is that whenever one of these purposes and development may complement each other, development appears to be the secondary concern.

Conclusion

This article set out to explore contemporary changes in Danish development priorities, budgets and allocations vis-à-vis academic discussions on both the ideal quality of aid and the issue of how development agencies adapt to a changing global context. The question was to what extent marked changes in Danish development cooperation could be identified, and secondly to what extent these changes should be seen as responses to a changing global context

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 overseas aidensure thatdevelopmentand aidarepolicy subordinated not to made and and clear divisions between domestic concerns litical commitment po- Strong future. the to adapt to agencies development for vital as identified elements core contradict likewise they aid, of quality of characteristics key analysed here leave Denmark inaproblematicwhen heldagainst up situation of ‘future-fit’ development agencies? Just as we have shown that the changes straints. Where do these changes position Denmark in relation to the question con - financial domestic of auspices the under expenses cover to used been have Denmark, of benefit the for also importantly issues, international solving tainable development. Fundsthat couldhave made adifference otherwise in aid resourcesrelated distantly only purposes for reduction toand sus poverty and aid topolicy promote Danishideas about development,that allocate but regime interests has given use waythatdodevelopmentnot just to short-term subordinatedsome cases, development aims.Astrategicaid and persistent in and, influenced, greatly have that priorities political domestic shifting the Rather,context. theoverarching ‘disruptor’ ofDanishaid seems to have been responsesappear as do not changes that of to anexogenouschanging global Overall, Danishdevelopmentand aidseemstopolicy have been through aset tries unableto trustinthepersistenceanddependabilityofDanishaid. coun been weakened greatlyleavingpriorities, shifting of atthehands partner when and they2016 were almost halved. Unsurprisingly, aid predictability has 2015 between blow great a suffered budgets bilateral as fluctuating, highly is (often commercial) capacities. The share of aid reaching developing countries the basis ofinvestmentmigrationrisk, security potential, and Danish concerns areactivities nolongerstrongly related to perceived ratherneed but made on sectors countries, and multilateral and choices ofpartner tion, development seek toDanish commercial satisfy intereststhrough developmentcoopera - Danish non-development interests. on short-term The policies increasingly towardsaccountability) and mutual harmonisation alignment, a strong focus the Pariswith the ideas in cern Declaration Aid Effectivenesson (ownership, con- a equality,and gender etc.) environments, sustainable governance, good has moved fromof asetvalues a combination democracy, (humanrights, es have occurredBasically, the2010s. during nevertheless foreign Danish aid aged, reframed,remarkable chang- relativetheir in andprioritised importance, which arepriorities similar of betweensets repack continuously and forth While over timeshiftingdevelopmentperhaps predictably, policies, move back (as theacademicliterature proposesratheror it) wasdriven byconcerns. other - - - other political aims. These are universally seen as two important conditions THE TRANSFORMATION OF DANISH FOREIGN AID for the relevance and effectiveness of development agencies and it is possible to conclude that Danida increasingly does not benefit from either. On the other hand, the increased Danish concern with integrating development and humanitarian relief corresponds well with the ‘future-fit’ argument that aid should focus on fragile situations, the twist being that the former is conceived partly to induce refugees to stay in their near neighbourhood while the latter is more concerned about stabilisation and development. The last important ‘future-fit’ argument relates to the capacity to navigate uncertainty and the future through strategic planning. On this point, Danish development cooperation has manifestly not been able to resist the whirlwind of shifting politics, power and priorities, and has been dragged from one short-term political priority to another, at the risk of having its legitimacy and effectiveness undermined.

Notes

1 PhD Lars Engberg-Pedersen is a senior researcher at DIIS.

2 PhD Adam Moe Fejerskov is a researcher at DIIS.

3 Thanks to a reviewer for pointing this out.

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 Chapter 4 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Selected bibliography

This is a selection of scholarly books, articles and chapters about Danish foreign policy published in English in 2017.

Agius, Christine (2017). ‘Drawing the discourses of ontological security: Im- migration and identity in the Danish and Swedish cartoon crises’. Cooperation and Conflict, 52(1), pp. 109-125.

Bergman Rosamond, Annika & Annica Kronsell (2017). ‘Cosmopolitan militar- ies and dialogic peacekeeping: Danish and Swedish soldiers in Afghanistan’. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 20(3), pp. 1-16.

Bjørst, Lill Rastad (2017). ‘Uranium: The Road to “Economic Self-Sustainability for Greenland”? Changing Uranium-Positions in Greenlandic Politics’. In: Gail Fondahl & Gary N. Wilson (eds.), Northern Sustainabilities: Understanding and Addressing Change in the Circumpolar World, pp. 25-34. Cham: Springer.

Borring Olesen, Thorsten (2017). ‘Scandinavian Development Policies’. In: Peter Nedergaard & Anders Wivel (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Scandi- navian Politics, Routledge International Handbooks. London: Routledge.

Broad, Matthew (2017). Harold Wilson, Denmark and the making of Labour European policy, 1958-72, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

Daugbjerg, Mads (2017). ‘Heroes Once Again. Varieties of Danish ‘Activism’ in Conflated Commemorations of the War in Afghanistan and the Prusso-Dan- ish War of 1864’. Ethnos, Journal of Anthropology, pp. 1-18.

Daugbjerg, Mads & Birgitte Refslund Sørensen (2017). ’Becoming a warring nation; the Danish “military moment” and its repercussions’. Critical Military Studies, 3(1), pp. 1-6.

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 Mouritzen (eds.), branding’: thecaseofDenmarkandNordics’. In:KristianFischer&Hans Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas (2017).‘Refugeepolicyas‘negative nation China andNordic Diplomacy, pp.27-44.Milton: Taylor andFrancis. ple’s questforbilateral In:BjørnarSverdrup-Thygeson harmony’. etal.(eds.), Forsby, Andreas Bøje(2017).‘Denmark’s RelationshipwithChina:Anoddcou Yearbook Fischer, Kristian&HansMouritzen (eds.)(2017). gional andFederal Studies,27(3),pp.239-259. peace-building andreconciliation? Re The caseofDenmarkandGermany’. (2017).‘Minoritiesasseconday foreign policy agents in Klatt, Martin Law. Leiden:Brill. Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, Astrid(ed.)(2017).Nordic Approaches to International Politics, Nedergaard &AndersWivel (eds.), Cautious Sceptics,CommittedBelievers, Cost-benefitCalculators’. In: Peter Jakobsen, Peter Viggo(2017).‘TheUnitedNationsand theNordic Four: and Historiography. London:UCLPress. Holbraad, Carsten(2017). Studies. Yearbook 2017 ronment’. In:KristianFischer&HansMouritzen (eds.), Frederiksen, Claus(2017).‘DenmarkinarapidlyHjort changingsecurityenvi 2017 Kristian Fischer&HansMouritzen (eds.), Prospects forandBarriersto DanishArctic DiplomacyinWashington’. In: Henriksen, Anders&JonRahbek-Clemmensen(2017).‘TheGreenland Card: 254-268. London:Routledge. Handbook ofScandinavian Politics, ferent Together’. In:Peter Nedergaard &AndersWivel (eds.), Gebhard, Carmen(2017).‘Scandinavian Defence andAlliancePolicies: Dif gen: DanishInstituteforInternationalStudies. , pp.75-98.Copenhagen:DanishInstituteforInternationalStudies. RoutledgeInternationalHandbooks,pp.281-293.London: Routledge. 2017. , pp.23-30.Copenhagen:DanishInstituteforInternational Copenhagen: DanishInstituteforInternationalStudies. Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017 Danish Reactionsto GermanOccupation:History The RoutledgeHandbookofScandinavian RoutledgeInternationalHandbooks,pp. Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook Danish Foreign Policy , pp.99-125.Copenha Danish Foreign Policy The Routledge - - - - - Kluth, Michael Friederich & Kenneth Lynggaard (2017). ‘Small State Strategies SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY in emerging Regional Governance Structures: Explaining the Danish advoca- cy for China’s inclusion in the Arctic Council’. European Politics and Society, 19(1), pp. 103-119.

Kosiara-Pedersen, Karina (2017). ‘Denmark’. European Journal of Political Research, Political Data Yearbook 2017, 56(1), pp. 79-84.

Larsen, Jessica & Christine Nissen (2017). ‘Learning from Danish counter-pi- racy off the coast of Somalia’. DIIS report, 10. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Marcussen, Martin (2017). ‘Scandinavian Models of Diplomacy’. In: Peter Nedergaard & Anders Wivel (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Scandinavian Politics, Routledge International Handbooks, pp. 240-253. London: Routledge.

McNeil-Willson, Richard (2017). ‘Between Trust and Oppression: Contempo- rary Counter-Terror Policies in Denmark’. In: Scott Nicholas Romaniuk et al. (eds.), The Palgrave handbook of global counterterrorism policy, pp. 419-435. New York: Springer.

Møller, Per Stig (2017). ‘Europe through a crystal ball’. In: Kristian Fischer & Hans Mouritzen (eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017, pp. 31-50. Co- penhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Nedergaard, Peter & Mads Dagnis Jensen (2017a). ‘You’re gonna have to serve somebody: A comparative analysis of the Polish, Danish and Cypriot EU Presidency discourses’. Comparative European Politics, 15(2), pp. 268-309.

Nedergaard, Peter & Mads Dagnis Jensen (2017b). EU Presidencies between Politics and Administration: The governmentality of the Polish, Danish and Cypriot Trio Presidency, Milton Park, Abingdon: Routledge.

Nissen, Christine (2017). ‘Country Study of Denmark’. In: Hans-Peter Bartels et al. (eds.), Strategic Autonomy and the Defence of Europe, pp. 139-151. Dietz Verlag J.H.W. Nachf.

Olesen, Thorsten Borring (2017). ‘Scandinavian Development Policies’. In: Peter Nedergaard & Anders Wivel (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Scan- dinavian Politics, Routledge International Handbooks, pp. 294-305. London: Routledge.

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DANISH FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 2018 between highandlowpolitics, the internationalpoliticsofachangingArctic: postcolonialparadiplomacy Rahbek-Clemmensen, Jon&KristianSøby Kristensen(2017). Cooperation andConflict, mark? Three narratives oftheactive internationalisminDanishforeign policy’. Pedersen, RasmusBrun(2017b). ‘Was somethingrotten intheStateofDen pp. 1-25. in theNordic States’Status-seekingStrategies’. Pedersen, RasmusBrun(2017a). ‘BandwagonforStatus:ChangingPatterns death inDenmarkandSweden’. Cooperation andConflict Åse, Cecilia&MariaWendt (2017).‘Gendering thenew hero narratives: Military Peace andSecurity?’.Peace Review, 29(4),pp.489-496. Wivel, Anders (2017).‘WhatHappenedto theNordic Model forInternational an University Press. Cooperation inEurope, 1950s-1980s, Bange &Poul Villaume, of NATO andtheLongDétente: The CaseofDenmark,1969-1989’.In:Oliver Villaume, Poul (2017).‘Pathfinders and Perpetuators ofDétente:SmallStates 51-74. Copenhagen:DanishInstituteforInternationalStudies. Fischer &HansMouritzen (eds.), politans: DanishForeign Policy Debates afterBrexit and Trump’. In:Kristian Vedby Rasmussen,Mikkel (2017).‘Nationalists,NationalLiberals andCosmo of AppliedSecurityResearch, Emerging Forms ofStatelessnessinDenmark,Norway, andSweden’. Journal Stokes-Dupass, Nicole(2017).‘MassMigration, Tightening Borders, and Studies. Policy Yearbook Policy in2016’.In:KristianFischer&HansMouritzen (eds.), Samuelsen, Anders(2017).‘TheInternationalSituationandDanishForeign in theAfghan ‘sandbox’’. Studies,3(1),pp.7-26. CriticalMilitary Randrup Pedersen, Thomas (2017).‘Getreal: ChasingDanishwarriordreams al Spectator, 52(1),pp.100-115. tions onForeign Policy: Think Tanks inFrance andDenmark’. Rahbek-Clemmensen, Jon&OlivierSchmitt(2017).‘TheImpactofInstitu

2017 , p. 11-22. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International , p.11-22.Copenhagen: Danish Institute The LongDétente:ChangingConceptsofSecurityand pp. 1-18. 12(1), pp.40-60. Oxford: Routledge. Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017 pp. 205-234.Budapest:Central Europe- International Peacekeeping, , 53(1),pp.23-41. Danish Foreign The Internation- Greenland and , pp. - - -

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