The Paradoxes of Environmental Policy and Resource Management in Reform-Era China*

Joshua Muldavin Department of Geography, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095–1524 [email protected]

Abstract: Over the last 5,000 years serious environmental problems—deforesta- tion, desertification, erosion, and widespread pollution of air, land, and water— have prevailed throughout most of China, brought about by a diverse set of social and political contexts. In this paper I focus on an enduring contradiction associated with the post-1978 reforms, namely accelerated environmental resource degrada- tion in rural areas amid unprecedented national economic growth. Declining enti- tlements to assets and social capital in China’s rural village populations are a cru- cial aspect of altered state-peasant relations, as these are increasingly mediated by the market during China’s transition to a hybrid economy. This has resulted in changing patterns of resource use, impacting both the environment and peasant livelihoods. A brief assessment of China’s postrevolutionary environmental policy and management practices provides the context for detailed case studies in Henan Province. These examples highlight the relationship between political-economic changes and environmental policy and management. Contrary to reform rhetoric, rural peasants’ embracing of reform policies does not necessarily optimize their welfare or promote sustainable use of resources. The case studies reveal alternative pathways for villages, ones that ought to be brought into the policy debate spotlight. Key words: China, environmental resource management, policy, political ecology, entitlements, social capital, property relations, vulnerability, reforms, villages, rural development, peasants.

Within the context of contemporary owed some of the nation’s more intractable China’s much-heralded economic success problems, particularly those of environ- in socialist transition, extraordinary eco- mental management. Decollectivization nomic growth has until recently overshad- and privatization in the reform era have led to intensification of the environmental degradation found in prerevolutionary and * Thanks to Piers Blaikie for his constructive Maoist China. The combination of massive critiques of a number of drafts of this manu- sustained growth with simultaneous envi- script. I would also like to thank Joseph Nevins, ronmental degradation and social stratifica- Alex Clapp, and Patrick Burns for their insight- tion—unintended consequences of the ful comments and research assistants Manija Said and Bahram Fazeli for adding depth and transition from a state-planned socialist detail. Two anonymous referees and the editors economy to a state-interventionist capital- of Economic Geography also provided helpful ist economy—points to the need to assess comments. I would also like to thank Jeri Stolk subsequent changes in environmental for her superb copy editing, which significantly management. clarified my prose. Funding for this research Environmental policy anywhere can only was provided by grants from the MacArthur seek to change environmental manage- Foundation, the UCLA Academic Senate, and UCLA’s International Studies and Overseas ment indirectly through encouraging, pro- Programs. Of course, all shortcomings of the hibiting, or introducing new ways of using final manuscript are solely the responsibility of or conserving resources. Such policy sets the author. up levers, but these have to be pulled by

244 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 245 local actors themselves: peasant farmers, in fact exist on the ground, and that they forest officials, entrepreneurs, local offi- appear to offer prospects for the improve- cials, and so forth. These actors all have ment of rural livelihoods.1 Through these their own agendas—economic, social, and examples, I aim to highlight how broad cultural. They also compete with each structures of the Chinese political economy other, ideationally and materially, and are intertwine or articulate with localities to shaped by social relations in which they are create particular social entitlements, vul- enmeshed (Sargeson and Zhang 1999, 98). nerabilities, and environmental ramifica- Environmental policy, of course, has lit- tions. Understanding this complex process tle control over these social relations and allows us to perhaps envision an environ- the conflicts associated with them. Indeed, mental policy where the divide between the social transformations which China is policy rhetoric and reality in practice is experiencing are so profound, so rapid and bridged rather than serving to maintain the contradictory, that the state, through its status quo. Such an environmental policy environmental policy, has had difficulty in would better advance the interests of those identifying the root structural causes of its living the reality of China’s environment. environmental problems, let alone mitigat- I carried out long-term research in the ing them. The processes of collectivization three Henan Province villages from 1989 (1949–78), followed by decollectivization to 1997. My methods varied by village con- and market reforms (1978–present), have a ditions and relative access. In both Nanjie political dynamic of their own. Myriad and Beixu villages I interviewed the village environmental outcomes, often unfore- leaders, as well as ten random households, seen, have resulted. Environmental policy during multiple-day visits. I physically sur- has therefore tended to be reactive and veyed the villages, their industries, and detached from the social causes of environ- agricultural areas, while simultaneously mental problems. It has not addressed— interviewing people as they worked. In and perhaps, within the limitations of envi- Beixu village, I interviewed workers in the ronmental policy as presently articulated brickworks, most of whom were not from and enacted, cannot address—those the village. In Nanjie village, I interviewed aspects of the ongoing social transforma- workers in the instant noodle factory, flour- tion which are driving environmental mill, and bakery. In contrast, in Village 3, I change in China. did participatory ethnographic research In this article, I begin by theorizing the and observation. During four extended changing social relations of production and visits I lived with one family of seven in a subsistence within China, contrasting the typical walled compound. I participated in collective and reform eras. This exposé on fieldwork, harvesting, transport, and pro- Chinese peasants’ changing entitlements cessing, primarily of corn. I completed a and access to assets leads to a historical detailed physical survey and mapping of overview of China’s environmental policy the village and its infrastructure and had and management. I argue that rather than repeated interviews with approximately 70 using the standard communist-collective percent of the villagers. I also interviewed versus market-private dichotomy to struc- the county leadership that represents ture policy thinking about China, we ought Village 3 and surveyed the market town, also to recognize a range of other alterna- grain-buying station, and other commodity tives, in particular those where, within a market economy, there continues to be a significant level of collective organization 1 This reverberates with work on other coun- of production and exchange. I then present tries and socioeconomic formations that talk of a structural analysis of environmental renegotiating market relationships from below resource use in three villages in Henan (Bebbington 1996; Szelènyi 1998). This might Province to suggest that these alternatives be described as a social economy or “third way.” 246 ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY outlets. In addition, I did brief surveys of resources can be understood as an entitle- nearby hamlets to study kinship networks ment process, albeit one that is socially and labor reciprocity. mediated and conditioned. Income oppor- tunities are another kind of asset (intangi- ble) that help define livelihood strategies, Changing Entitlements and but they are not entitlements since they are Environmental Policy mediated through the market and social I analyze China’s transformation in connections. The confusion of terminology terms of four concepts: entitlements, com- results from the evolving but eclectic and munal capital, property relations, and vul- personalized use of the major concepts in the literature. Membership in a group, for nerability. By analyzing the transition with example, gives an individual entitlement to these concepts, I attempt to provide a new assets. This is either formalized or under- window into China’s evolving environmen- stood through community regulation and tal policy—revealing both its limitations social norms, as asserted by Leach, and the prospect of creating policy that Mearns, and Scoones (1999). Incor- reduces the vulnerability of those most at porating the moral economy into entitle- risk. China’s social transformation has ment analysis is further advocated by Gore unfolded largely outside of the central in his argument that competing notions of state’s environmental policy purview. The legitimacy and “unruly” practices challenge state has sought to issue environmental legally established rules, determining peo- edicts in a manner totally detached from ple’s command over commodities. In his this process. Each of these four concepts is study, power relations and discursive prac- contentiously debated in the literature, and tices are instrumental to entitlement analy- I therefore outline and interconnect them sis, and entitlements are seen as a result of briefly before returning to a more detailed an active process of negotiation in which discussion of China’s environmental policy. unruly practices are central to transforming The concept of entitlements is used cre- formalized access (Gore 1993). Nonethe- atively by theorists to help explain the rela- less, the notion remains of a set of claims, tive vulnerability of people under stress rules, and expectations underpinned by from “natural disasters.” These theorists formal custom or legal instruments. focus upon famine and hunger in sub- Blaikie (1985) and Watts (1991) discuss Saharan Africa and South Asia (Drèze and access to resources in a broad way that Sen 1990; Blaikie et al. 1994; Bohle et al. incorporates the role of the state and glob- 1991; Watts and Bohle 1993; Swift 1989). alization trends, avoiding an excessive and This concept has yet to be applied to China narrow focus on proximate causation. under socialism or in its more recent tran- Using a dynamic approach in which social sition to a market-oriented economy. aspects of political economy may precipi- Entitlements can be defined as the right to tate entitlement crisis, Blaikie et al. (1994, make a claim on a person or an entity. In 86), in their access model, extend Sen’s other words, entitlement describes the (1981) rather economistic entitlement con- relationship between a claimant on an asset cept to encompass socially derived (rural peasants, urban laborers), an institu- resources which can be called upon by tion that grants access to the asset (the individuals according to the current alloca- state, social norm, community institution), tive rules of the society. Extending Sen’s and the asset (tangible or intangible) itself. “relations and flows of surplus,” they link Thus, entitlement is a three-way relation- local actors—such as moneylenders and ship. landlords—to international changes in cur- Theoretically, the distinction between rency valuation, food grain prices, and productive resources (understood as tangi- imports. Watts, too, moves away from a sta- ble assets) and access to those productive tic notion of entitlements by revealing enti- ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 247 tlements as a terrain of struggle within soci- lective organization of production. For eties in which group interests (defined by example, previously privately held capital class, caste, gender, age, and ethnicity) are assets were redistributed among groups of in contradiction (Watts 1991). In the later poor peasants, who were then encouraged work of Watts and Bohle (1993), they con- to use them collectively. Redistribution tend that entitlement analysis should also allowed peasants to operate in a less include long-term political, economic, and vulnerable situation and coordinate their social processes along with the structural efforts toward the creation of, for example, notions of “capability” and “totality of windbreaks, terraces, and other anti-ero- rights.” They argue for inclusion in entitle- sion methods. The benefits of these ment analysis of a process by which a improvements would be captured collec- broader range of rights are contested and tively, hence their classification as commu- defined (“empowerment” and “enfran- nal capital (Muldavin 1997). chisement”). Furthermore, they point out Given the growing role of the market the benefits of examining the distribution and private property over the last two of entitlements and the ways they are decades in China, it is important to address reproduced under specific circumstances. the concept of shifting property relations I incorporate social capital into this in order to help analyze the changing social analysis because of its importance in relations of production and subsistence and China’s postrevolutionary history. Access their effects on the environment. to basic needs and the specific natural Redefined property relations were central resources involved in their fulfillment is to the creation of peasants’ entitlements to dependent, among other factors, upon the basic needs on the commune and to ensur- creation and deployment of social capital. ing social capital. Chinese collective agri- This second major concept is defined here culture had many similarities to traditional as forms of nonstate, nonprivate assets cre- common property regimes, in that land ated through collective action, socially con- control was divorced from both individual trolled and accessed through cultural and and market yet was overlaid with an eco- juridical measures (Muldavin 1997; nomic and political centralism that Dickenson et al. 1996, 260). A particular directed production and planned distribu- kind of social capital produced under the tion (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). commune system of postrevolutionary In the subsequent reform period, there China is communal capital (Muldavin was a fundamental change in property rela- 1997).2 Examples of communal capital tions and entitlements to assets, and there- range from agricultural implements for fore a deterioration of the conditions under large-scale production, agro-processing which communal capital was previously facilities, education and health facilities, to reproduced and called upon by all mem- soil erosion control measures—all con- bers of the population. This led to an structed through collective labor, by defin- increase in vulnerability, the final concept, ition. During the collectivist period, the defined as “a combination of factors that state provided the conditions for the cre- determine the degree to which someone’s ation of communal capital through material life and livelihood is put at risk by a dis- redistribution and successful ideological crete and identifiable event in nature or in conversion from household-based to col- society” (Blaikie et al. 1994, 9–10). Underpinning this loss of entitlements for many was a restructuring of property rela- 2 Similarly, Swift (1989) breaks down the enti- tions that defined sets of rights and obliga- tlement bundle into assets, tangible and intangi- tions which form part of these entitle- ble. Through this he also introduces the idea of ments. For example, communal land collective assets, so important in the China case tenure and the labor point system ensured both before and after market reforms. distribution of the products of land and 248 ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY labor to all. When land became de facto individual. In this respect, the new expo- privatized in different ways, these rights sure that peasants continue to experience is were no longer assured, entitlements fell similar to, though much more severe than, away, and vulnerability increased for many. the dynamic of market penetration undo- Building on Blaikie and Brookfield ing traditional common property regimes (1987), Swift resolves the problem of dif- elsewhere in India, Africa, and Latin ferentiating poverty from vulnerability by America (Peet and Watts 1996; Schlager introducing the notion that many tangible and Ostrom 1992). In the prereform and intangible assets are directly related to period, the market did not operate in the community expectations of reciprocity allocation of entitlements, the state being which can be drawn upon in a crisis (Swift the primary actor. But entitlements in 1989, 11). Thus, households with equiva- China’s recent history of transition are lent levels of poverty can have different increasingly determined through the mar- levels of vulnerability, because intangible ket, though an imperfect one. Despite the household assets (such as assistance from state’s retreat from a commandist economy neighbors and kin networks) are not typi- (Kelliher 1997; Zweig 1997; Hussain and cally included in poverty statistics but Stern 1994), a contradiction emerges nonetheless offset some vulnerability. between its desire to maintain control Whereas poverty statistics often represent while allowing the market to take over the a snapshot of current household condi- allocation of resources. The impact of tions, relative vulnerability is based upon decollectivization upon resource use is the complete set of variable assets, both mediated through altered livelihood strate- physical and social, available to the house- gies. At the macro level, the changing rela- hold and its individual members over time. tions between state, peasants, and markets China’s period of socialist agriculture both constrain and enable alternative (1952–78) is completely different from any strategies (Muldavin 1998). With decollec- other case study used to inform the work of tivization in China, certain state-guaran- the above authors. Still, when entitlement teed entitlements for individuals declined. analysis is applied to the socialist context, For example, the state once provided for the focus is constructively redirected from those who could not work “five guarantees” the strictly economic and material to intan- of food, clothing, shelter, education, and gible and social aspects. Examples range decent burial, as well as access to health from identifying noncommodified forms of services (Aziz 1978, 66). Furthermore, the exchange (reciprocity claims, assets); to crucial entitlement of land access was rede- state political commitment to the well- fined along contractual lines originating being of peasants (intangible assets); to with male heads of households (Selden individual claims to goods and services by 1998; Kung and Liu 1997). This had virtue of membership in socialist institu- adverse implications for the entitlements of tions such as commune, brigade, and team women as well as households, who lost out (collective entitlements); as well as the dis- in the competition for securing official land tinctly social yet materially based commu- rights, receiving either less land or land of nal accumulation process and resulting lesser quality (Judd 1994; Griffin and Zhao communal capital (Muldavin 1986), such as 1993; Khan et al. 1993; Riskin 1993). soil conservation, irrigation systems, and Sustainable livelihoods are those which productive infrastructure—Swift’s (1989) allow individuals to recover from stress and “collective assets” and Blaikie’s (1985) shocks, maintain their capabilities and “access to collective resources.” assets, and provide long-term opportunities In the transitional reform period and benefits for the next generation (1978–84) Chinese policy instigated a (Chambers and Conway 1992). Batterbury devolution of risk and responsibility away and Forsyth (1999) see sustainable liveli- from the collective to the household and hoods as an extension of Sen’s entitlements ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 249 concept, which focuses on individual ated through the opening up of other enti- access to resources rather than that of the tlements. This is because the poor have community. They argue that a strengthen- neither the political networks in local offi- ing of institutional capacity alleviates vul- cialdom nor the social capital deriving from nerability and pressure on natural expectations of collective responsibility for resources, thus maintaining sustainable food security. Nor can they successfully livelihoods. In China, market devolution, pursue claims upon shrinking common by decreasing institutional capacity, has property resources. Furthermore, they are severely impaired the prospect of sustain- much more vulnerable to the encroach- able livelihoods for many peasants ment of more well-off peasants and entre- (Muldavin 1998). preneurs upon common property, from As entitlements for women, children, which the poor have drawn important elders, and some households are under- resources with which to augment their mined and disappear, it is up to the indi- livelihoods. This is because they are politi- vidual in an uneven and imperfect market cally weak, geographically dispersed, and to find a viable livelihood strategy. Access usually function within informal cultural to resources and assets, the basis of liveli- organizations (e.g., kinship groups). As in hoods, are now primarily achieved through many other parts of the developing world, the market under competitive circum- a major risk aversion strategy of the poor is stances, and therefore are uncertain. to rely on common property (Shanin 1987). Secondarily, livelihoods are guaranteed Privatization, both de facto and de jure, through the building up and expenditure of then, has immensely unequal social social capital—directly connected to con- impacts. With marketization, familial rights trol over various assets and access to an of access are lost or codified, ending previ- array of resources (Bebbington 1999; ous access through common property Kelliher 1997). Market primacy, particu- regimes (Bromley 1987; Ostrom 1990; larly for households with less-powerful Schlager and Ostrom 1992). Privatization social networks, profoundly changes peo- also has a serious gender component in ple’s livelihood strategies, encouraging rural China, since land is passed to the short-term opportunism as people seek to male head of household, thus squeezing lay claim to and consume public goods women out of previous entitlements that (e.g., timber, grazing lands, potable and were accessible through familial and col- irrigation waters). For those households lective rights (Judd 1994). In China’s case, with particularly valuable forms of social the abrupt transition from state property, capital—for example, networks into local previously underpinned by collective social officialdom—accessing this social capital capital, to quasi-private property has led to becomes an individualistic accumulation a huge “free-rider” problem, degenerating strategy. In either case, as the future to a virtual “open access” situation without becomes more highly discounted, in an regulation. Because the policy climate is so uncertain and conflictual social environ- volatile, peasants simply do not know what ment, sustainable forms of development the state will do next, whether it will abro- are severely undermined (Redclift 1987, gate or return their rights to assets 36; Muldavin 1998). This supports Leach, (Muldavin 1993). Thus their livelihood Mearn, and Scoone’s (1999) contention strategies shift accordingly. Uncertainty in that dynamic and changing institutional peasants’ entitlements, and risk to the contexts determine people’s access to and resources which form part of them, leads control over resources, which, in turn, them to overconsume and despoil local influences resource use and the course of resources in an attempt to exploit them environmental change. before someone else does. For example, if The loss of access to collective entitle- a powerful peasant cuts and sells trees from ments and resources cannot often be palli- a hillside that was previously managed col- 250 ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY lectively by a village, others in the village changes in resource use and environmental are encouraged to follow suit for fear of management. Increased vulnerability has being left with nothing. The result is rapid led in some instances to a desperate eco- mining of hitherto communal assets, cide, with encroachment into forests, destroying the productive base upon which movement of cultivation up steep slopes, future development might occur overgrazing, and the despoliation and (Muldavin 1986, 1992). destruction of fragile environments In assessing changing vulnerability in (Blaikie 1985; Muldavin 1996a). The fulfill- reform-era China, the reasons why vulner- ment or denial of entitlements can lead to ability has increased for some and such environmental degradation. Thus, decreased for others within China’s new environmental policy must incorporate hybrid economy is central.3 One explana- environmental justice, since it may other- tion may be found in seeing the asset status wise criminalize the already vulnerable by of rural communities not as static but as an denying entitlements derived from natural evolving “prime determinant of vulnerabil- resources (Blaikie and Sadeque 1999). An ity” (Swift 1989, 13). For some, state enti- understanding of these issues can provide tlements (e.g., minimum provision of food, important insights for the formation and clothing, health services, and housing) have implementation of environmental policy. decreased, while for others, exchange enti- tlements (e.g., the ability to produce agri- cultural or manufactured goods for the China’s Social Transformation market) have increased. Those who bear and Environmental Policy the burden of decreased state entitlements Serious environmental problems— are often not those who get the benefit of deforestation, desertification, erosion, increased exchange entitlements, as the habitat loss, and widespread pollution of case studies will illustrate. This applies in air, land, and water are the most obvious particular to elders, pensioners, and those manifestations—have prevailed through- with little to exchange, since household out most of China for over five millennia, wealth is increasingly connected to the brought about by a diverse set of social and characteristics of the household and its political contexts (Elvin and Liu 1998; Smil comparative advantages over others (i.e., 1984). Here I address a number of endur- its internal makeup and the dynamics of ing contradictions in the more recent his- age, gender, and skills of available labor tory of Chinese environmental policy. power). Freedom of market participation During the last 50 years, the state has belongs to those who have something to become increasingly aware of environmen- sell. Yet the shift to market mechanisms for tal problems; it has recorded them, studied allocation and signals in decision making them, and enacted an almost endless concerning all resources is occurring within stream of environmental edicts at the cen- what is still state-directed development. tral, provincial, and local levels. But the Thus, changing entitlements, property edicts are almost universally ignored in relations, and the nature and deployment practice. Why? Through an analysis of enti- of social capital have brought important tlements I outline here one possible answer to this difficult question. Environmental policy, if it is to reach its 3 In Russia, the nominal creation of a market social and biophysicial objectives, must economy has not brought an actual increase in address the underlying structural aspects of many exchange entitlements to the vast major- ity, and yet it has brought a breakdown in state resource use and degradation (Blaikie entitlements. This helps explain problems cen- 1989). This requires an understanding of tral to Russia’s contemporary quandary (Selden the linkages between socioeconomic condi- 1998). tions and resource use—why and how peo- ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 251 ple use resources the way they do, and and the state has since maintained a certain what the implications of that use are amount of continuity in environmental pol- (Kasperson and Dow 1991; Rieger 1978). icy. But two critical junctures brought sub- Without such an understanding, environ- stantial changes in environmental policy: mental policy is reduced to a series of tech- the creation of modern China in 1949 and nocratically determined and politically vac- the economic reforms of 1978. uous edicts, usually of a punitive yet myopic nature, running counter to existing China under Maoism: State social relations. The Chinese state has had, Environmental and Natural Resource at various times, an ability unparalleled by any other state in Asia to control the social Use Policies, 1949–1978 relations shaping its environment, often Historically, the majority of Chinese with catastrophic outcomes (e.g., the Great peasants have had a weak claim even on Famine of 1961–63 (Becker 1996)). But subsistence—the end goal of their entitle- since 1978, ironically, it has lost that con- ments—let alone surpluses generated trol amid an often chaotic scramble for through their labor. Following the revolu- economic growth, with serious implications tion in 1949, the state took control of major for sustainable management as well as the industrial and commercial assets, as well as provision of a minimum level of basic responsibility for providing certain entitle- material needs for the most vulnerable. For ments. The role of the state in terms of nat- example, rapid deforestation in the Yangtze ural resources shifted to an implied respon- and Songhua river watersheds since the sibility for environmental management, late 1970s has resulted in catastrophic including the creation of numerous regula- flooding in the 1990s, with immense eco- tions concerning soil and water conserva- nomic destruction and loss of life (Zhang tion, potable drinking water guarantees, and 1985). In this section, I examine changing the protection of forests (Ross and Silk entitlement provision and access to assets 1987, 65–66).5 Peasants gained collective within the context of the state’s environ- entitlements to land, social welfare, educa- mental policy, gauging the often conflicting tion, health care, and improved means of demands of China’s evolving socioeco- livelihood. From the late 1940s through the nomic transformation and sustainable first years after the founding of the People’s resource management. Republic of China, land reform (the redis- In China, an “environmental policy” tribution of land held by landlords and existed under the Xia (2100–1600 B.C.), wealthy peasants to landless and land-poor Shang (1600–1066 B.C.), and Zhou peasant households) was the principal enti- (1066–256 B.C.) dynasties (Dunstan 1996; tlement that brought the new controllers of Vermeer 1998; Elvin and Liu 1998).4 The the state immense legitimacy. State respon- state has long played a role in trying to adjudicate the conflict between pressures for economic intensification and necessary 5 Forestry policy provides an interesting exam- ecological and social stability (Osborne ple of the changes in environmental policy fol- 1998, 203). But what might be termed con- lowing the founding of modern China. The temporary environmental policy was only forestry ownership system was reformed along initiated in 1932 under the Guomindang with land reform after 1949. The general policy administration (Elvin and Liu 1998; was as follows: large forested areas belonged to Vermeer 1998). Thereafter, a number of the nation, and smaller forested areas belonged laws and regulations were promulgated, to towns, villages, or private owners. The wood- lands that originally belonged to small individual landowners or peasants remained in their hands. Active government support reportedly helped 4 See Elvin and Liu (1998) for informative dis- motivate these peasants to manage their forests cussions of China’s environmental history. in a fairly sustainable manner (Zhang 1985). 252 ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY sibility had as its counterpart peasant Protection,” which addressed soil erosion accountability to the state, its representa- problems (Palmer 1998). In the period tives, and plans. Under a policy of “land to 1962–65—following the Great Leap the tiller,” the claim on land became recog- Forward—such regulations were resusci- nized, and in the process land turned into an tated and rationalized with improvements entitlement for peasants. During the subse- based on lessons from earlier agricultural quent process of collectivization in the latter and industrial mistakes. This included an half of the 1950s, this land asset was slowly expansion of individual household produc- enveloped into larger and larger entities. tion and local markets to help overcome Access to land as an entitlement remained, the widespread food shortages and famine though primarily through peasant accep- and a restrengthening of a peasant voice in tance of the collective labor process and policy debates (Hsu 1995). new property relations. The continuous sub- The Cultural Revolution’s first period sistence entitlement of “garden plots,” aver- (1966–72) once again emphasized growth aging 15 percent of arable land, helped at all costs, with unattainable goals for legitimate the shift to large-scale production industrial expansion and increased grain on the remaining 85 percent of collectively production causing serious ecological dam- managed lands. age despite environmental regulations. In the early 1950s state policies were Peasant life was ideologically interpreted as heavily influenced by populist peasant central to political discourse, while the demands. Mao had successfully rearticu- state simultaneously strengthened its top- lated peasant claims from consumption- down control over land use decisions and oriented assets to fulfill immediate needs environmental management. Control was to production-based assets (land, water, reimposed over exchange of household- and machinery) as part of the gradual produced surpluses in small local markets, process of collectivization. Peasants’ legiti- though a significant percentage of land mate claims on consumption were subse- assets, in the form of garden plots, quently channeled through their engage- remained under household control. ment with the state’s productionist goals. Maintaining their average 15 percent of The Great Leap Forward (1958–61) was a arable land even during the Cultural reversal of these peasant-led populist Revolution shows the importance of a pri- agrarian policies and the imposition of a vately held subsistence entitlement for top-down blueprint, with disastrous conse- state legitimacy with peasants. quences for both the peasantry and envi- An important turning point came in ronmental management (Becker 1996; 1972, when three critical events brought an Smil 1984). This period witnessed wide- explicit environmental awareness to major spread pollution, deforestation, the drain- policy circles. First, a red tide in the Bay of ing of lakes, mass extermination of “pests,” Dalian caused substantial shellfish and and the building of large-scale environ- aquatic production losses. Second was the mentally destructive infrastructure projects Beijing fish market pollution incident. Fish to increase grain production (Becker 1996; from Guantian reservoir, sold to the capital Palmer 1998). The resulting natural disas- city of Beijing, were found to have high lev- ters and famines devastated the peasantry els of toxic chemicals in their flesh because and brought an end to many of the most ill- of massive industrial pollution of the reser- conceived policies. An incipient environ- voir. The State Council, under Zhou mental policy had first been initiated in Enlai’s direction, formed an investigation China with the 1956 “Regulations of the and treatment committee. This was the Protection of Mineral Resources” to ensure first top-level state acknowledgment of the maintenance of water quality against widespread pollution problems. Third, the industrial waste and the 1957 “State United Nations Conference on Health and Provisional Program on Water and Soil Environment, held in June of 1972, had an ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 253 important impact on the development of environmental problems (Smil 1984) stim- an environmental protection organization ulated the beginnings of an explicit envi- in China. The Chinese delegation returned ronmental awareness by the state. Despite from the conference with concrete recom- this growing awareness, the following mendations for the leadership, and the period witnessed an intensification of these State Council responded with a series of and other intractable environmental prob- decrees (Qu 1994). The UN conference lems. provided the impetus for China to create environmental policies regardless of the China under Market Reform: fear that First World states would use envi- Decollectivization and Its Impact on ronmental issues to impede its economic potential. China’s environmental bureau- the Environment, 1978–1996 cracies, such as the State Environmental Another turning point in China’s ongo- Protection Administration, have their ori- ing structural transformation occurred in gins in the historic 1972 UN conference. 1978. By emphasizing the problems of the The incorporation of the environment in previous period under Mao, the state and national planning was another important new leadership created the much-needed result (Ross 1998). political support, both nationally and During the last years of the Cultural locally, to implement a range of new poli- Revolution (1973–76) there was a strength- cies. Many of these policies (decollectiviza- ening of environmental awareness and tion, for example) were only begun on a regulatory work, with the first national con- national level in 1982, but were essentially ference on environmental protection held completed by 1984. With the implementa- in Beijing in August of 1973. tion of the Household Responsibility Representatives from all over the country System, which divided all land into house- used this opportunity to bring evidence of hold-controlled plots, there was a dramatic extensive environmental problems to the change in entitlement structures for the attention of the leadership in Beijing, peasantry. The state exposed sectors of the resulting in 11 regulatory decrees. These peasantry to economic forces far beyond covered problems ranging from water and local control. To cope with the subsequent air pollution, to agricultural chemicals and increase in risk and vulnerability, peasants loss of species, to proximity of industrial responded (where possible) by diversifying plants to residential areas. The conference their livelihoods (Ronnås 1993). Uncertain suggestions were approved by the State property relations beset by free-riding also Council in November of 1973, putting in reflected a declining sense of community place “Several Rules on Protecting and and common property management of Improving the Environment,” the first resources. The maintenance of communal purely environmental law since 1949 capital assets (such as irrigation ditches, (Palmer 1998). An environmental protec- terraces, forest and grassland reserves, tion group was formed under the State windbreaks, erosion control infrastructure, Council, and in 1974 the State Council set and so on) is one cornerstone of local state a goal of controlling pollution in five years legitimation. The neglect of common prop- and solving it in ten years. One of the pri- erty goods seriously undermined produc- mary difficulties identified was the “irra- tive capacity, further increasing the vulner- tional” geographic distribution of indus- ability of the peasantry (Smil 1999, 1998; tries. It was officially acknowledged that Muldavin 1992, 1986; Hinton 1990). this placed immense structural obstacles The late 1970s also ushered in a new on any efforts to reverse or control envi- level of central government attention to the ronmental pollution from industrial environment with passage of the sources (Qu 1994). Hence, the combina- Environmental Protection Law in 1979. tion of acute episodic and longer-term This significantly increased regulatory 254 ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY activity, although the power of local envi- good window into the general structural ronmental agencies was very limited (Jahiel environmental problems (Zhao 1993). As 1998). In the early 1980s, the central state in many other forested areas of China, began a slow retreat from command of the Yunnan’s forests are under enormous pres- economy, increasingly relinquishing land sure from peasant demands for land to use use and environmental management deci- in basic food production. That is, many of sions to the market and local governments the poorer peasants have become more (Walder 1992; Huang 1990). Environ- vulnerable to food shortages in recent years mental policy building suffered its greatest and are obliged to put additional forest setback during the 1982–83 Deng adminis- land into cultivation illegally. Officials sim- tration structural reforms that streamlined ply look the other way, as enforcement of the Chinese bureaucracy (NEPA 1988). the regulations would lead to serious hard- The Environment Protection Office was ship for these peasants. Their entitlements, made subservient to the Ministry of hitherto collectively ensured, are now seri- Construction, obstructing environmental ously eroded. In turn, this has led to what protection efforts well into the 1990s Blaikie (1985) calls desperate ecocide—a (Jahiel 1998). dramatic term perhaps, but one that ade- With the process of decollectivization quately describes the environmental impli- begun on a wide scale, there was a corre- cations of increasing socioeconomic differ- sponding deregulation of environmental entiation. Furthermore, the policy of management and a significant loosening of privileging economic growth above sustain- land use decision making as collective ability has led to a reluctance to invest in assets were either formally sold off to indi- environmentally safe road construction, vidual households or informally comman- adequate industrial and domestic waste deered by them (Muldavin 1986). treatment, and longer-term investment in Decommunization, accompanied by a the planting of trees for watershed protec- return to populist appeals for individual tion (Smil 1993; Zhang 1985). The result- and household control over production, struck a responsive chord among peasants, ing high sediment loads in most of the but it was happening within a risky, unsta- larger rivers led to record floods in 1998 ble, and undeveloped market context. and 1999 (“China’s Record Floods” 1998; While peasants’ immediate direct control Laris 1999). over production increased, indirectly their Another important reform-era economic control has been substantially reduced in activity, which has profoundly affected land land and resource management decisions use and environment, is the Township and as the market has replaced collective Village Enterprises (TVE) system. TVEs action. This loss of control is apparent as are an attempt by the state to address the peasants shift to less sustainable produc- problem of conflicts between excess labor tion practices in this highly competitive in the countryside and limited capability of environment, despite their knowledge of urban areas to absorb additional labor resulting long-term problems. Any other (Vermeer 1995–96; Sichuan Jingji Shehui choice is difficult given the increased vul- Wenhua Fazhan Zhongda Wenti Duice nerability they are experiencing. The struc- Yenjiu Zhongxin 1995; Odgaard 1992). The tural factors behind this behavior are dis- TVE policy attempted to fuse and over- cussed and theorized more fully in the next come the predominant binary economic section, together with examples from the structure of countryside and city, agricul- accompanying village case studies of unsus- ture and industry, as exhibited in the case tainable practices on the part of knowl- study for Village 1 below. TVEs, which edgeable peasants. have developed rapidly, have contributed The current problems faced by forest much to the improvement of farmers’ liv- management in Yunnan province are a ing standards since 1979. In 1990, total ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 255 output value from the TVEs accounted for delegate the implementation of policies to 30 percent of national output by value. municipal and county authorities, however, But the TVEs have also led to many and local governments and enterprises are environmental problems. Development of expected to provide the capital for state- the TVEs resulted in extensive transforma- planned projects (Jahiel 1998). As a result, tion of large areas of croplands into indus- many regulations are poorly or unevenly trial facilities. Furthermore, there has been enforced (Vermeer 1998). a shift away from subsistence food crops to Additionally, the implementation of crops providing raw inputs for local indus- environmental policies is largely concen- tries, such as textiles and cigarette produc- trated in urban state-owned industries and tion. Together, this has intensified pressure neglectful of village-owned rural indus- on the remaining fields planted to subsis- tries, reflecting China’s institutional and tence crops. Additionally, it is expected economic division of urban and rural areas. that as of 2000, TVEs are predicted to be This is exemplified by the 1997 Ninth Five- responsible for 50 percent of all pollutants Year Plan for Environmental Protection nationally (Vermeer 1998). Due to lack of and Distant Targets for the Year 2010, necessary technology and skills, the TVEs which is almost exclusively focused on excavate coal, minerals, sand, stones, and urban and state-owned industrial sectors. construction materials in a wasteful man- The rural industrial and agricultural sectors ner which often seriously pollutes air and with serious nitrate surface and groundwa- water and degrades the environment. After ter pollution, for example, as well as unreg- excavation, they fail to restore land, so ero- ulated pesticide use, have largely been sion is usually very heavy. Nonetheless, ignored by this plan. Generally, large sec- these enterprises frequently manage to tions of industry managed by TVEs are out- obtain preferential treatment and relax- side the control of the State Environmental ation of existing regulations by local state Protection Administration, escaping envi- representatives dependent upon TVE tax ronmental monitoring and regulation revenues. enforcement (Vermeer 1998). Thus, com- Paradoxically, while the reforms brought prehensive national legal provisions for deregulation in many spheres of produc- environmental protection are bypassed and tion, environmental laws were strength- have almost no impact in rural areas. ened on paper. The 1979 Environmental While this brief and generalized account Protection Law of the PRC (NPC 1979) of social transformation and national envi- was strengthened from provisional to per- ronmental policy over the past 50 years manent status in 1989 (NPC 1989). On exposes some overall trends, actual mani- paper the 1989 law was a significant festations on the ground cannot be dis- improvement on the earlier version cussed in the same manner. A high degree (Palmer 1998). It expanded the specific of heterogeneity of environmental out- responsibilities for environmental protec- comes is apparent. The interpretation and tion at all levels of government, created the implementation of national and provincial Five New Systems (xin wu zhidu) for pol- environmental regulations and guidelines lution control, and added strong sanctions varied enormously across space and time to help improve enforcement (Ma and and were mediated by state, provincial, and Ortolano 2000). China’s Agenda 21, a local politics. Also, the socioeconomic “white paper” created following the Rio processes outlined above (socioeconomic conference of 1992, provides official posi- stratification, a reduction of communal tions on China’s implementation of envi- capital ensuring the meeting of basic needs ronmental policy changes (State Planning for all, and an altered distribution of enti- Commission and State Science and tlements) developed with varying intensi- Technology Commission 1994). Many ties and speeds in different parts of the environmental laws and national plans country. Likewise, agricultural systems and 256 ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY environmental conditions are highly vari- environmental problems, its edicts and able, adding to this overall unevenness. policies have little impact on the ground in In sum, China’s historic reality has more reducing identified environmental degra- continuity than change in its ultimate dation. Lastly, China contains an immense direction and sets of environmental out- diversity of environments, a broad range in comes (Smil 1984, 1990; Purdue 1987; degrees of regional autonomy and thus dif- Edmonds 1994; Vermeer 1998; Elvin and ferentiated local relationships with the cen- Liu 1998). What have changed are the poli- tral government, and an often underesti- cies, organization of production, and the mated cultural and historical heterogeneity social and political contexts under which that makes generalization difficult (Oakes people have access to their resources 1996; Chai 1996). Beyond the difficulty of (Lamouroux 1998). In the recent past it has generalization of outcomes, there is the been characterized as a commandist para- further real difficulty of formation and dox of man over nature, development at implementation of even the most well- the expense of environment (Smil 1984; meaning environmental policies within this Dunstan 1996). Now it is increasingly char- complex political mosaic. acterized as an unregulated, unruly mar- Given the current evolution of national ket-inspired loss of command that has environmental policy, I now turn to what brought about a continuation of the same has occurred at the local level of rural vil- environmental problems, some at higher lages. Have the reforms, through their rates, others at lower rates—still justified transformation of peasants’ access to by growth and development (Smil 1990; resources and entitlements, produced vul- Muldavin 1997). nerability and environmental degradation Simply stated, while the Chinese central despite claims to the contrary? Have the government has maintained commandism developmentalist goals of the state, and its in the political realm, it has attempted to technical and apolitical definitions of envi- put in place an apolitical commandism in ronmental problems and solutions, truly the environmental realm. This has led to a failed to overcome the significant environ- series of technical decrees that are often mental problems facing China’s rural unrelated and do not take into account the majority? These research questions cannot essentially political nature of environmen- be answered for the whole country, but the tal management. This is ironic given three village case studies below from China’s postrevolutionary highly politicized Henan Province provide examples of the social context (Ma 1994). The political nuanced mosaic of China’s rural reality. nature of environmental management is clearly demonstrated by continuous power struggles over issues directly linked to it, Case Studies from Henan such as land control and ownership, rela- Province tions of production, and mobilization of resources. And so, modern Chinese envi- The three case studies in Henan ronmental policy has a peculiarly dated and Province show the great diversity across statist feel. On the one hand, it is technical even this small geographic region, which is in its rhetoric and fails to engage the fun- steeped in historical importance. Henan damentally political character and diverse Province is at the heart of Chinese civiliza- circumstances of China’s environmental tion, the center of its agricultural heritage, reality. On the other hand, it employs and the founding place of Han culture and policy initiatives, many of which are driven centralized administration. Four thousand by implicit political agendas and faded years of continuous use of these lands bor- exhortations out of touch with China’s dering the Yellow River prevents any quick environmental and social realities. Hence, analysis based on such a short period of while the state is acutely aware of severe study as seven years (Purdue 1987; Elvin ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 257 and Liu 1998). Nevertheless, these case use practices intensify. The resulting dete- studies show three outcomes from among rioration in livelihoods has not been ame- the enormous heterogeneity that is rural liorated through an expansion of income China under reform—three separate and opportunities. This has led to labor out- distinct outcomes under unified national migration as well as state delegitimation, and provincial environmental policies and visible through small but everyday forms of legal decrees. As such, I make no claim that resistance. these case studies are in any way represen- tative of rural China as a whole; they sim- Village 1: Nanjie, A Model New ply suggest the diversity of pathways fol- lowing decollectivization. Collective Village Treated as three points on a continuum, the villages discussed here range from a The challenge then is to build short-term successful transition and relatively benign pragmatic and realistic responses that work environmental outcome, to the breakdown from contemporary contexts, and do so in a of institutions, severe environmental way that is coherent with and builds towards degradation, and organized resistance.6 longer-term utopias that are already imma- nent within the strategies and hopes of popu- Village 1 (Nanjie) is a recently proclaimed lar sectors. (Bebbington 1996, 105) model “reunified” village that has under- gone rapid industrialization, completely Nanjie Village, located near Luohe City transforming the livelihood strategies of all in Henan Province, provides a relatively of the villagers (Kaye 1994; Kou 1998). unusual case study in postreform China. Whereas in the past the village was primar- Unlike most villages, Nanjie chose to ily agricultural, today only 2 percent of its decollectivize on paper and in name, but residents are engaged full time directly in then continued to collectively farm and agricultural production. Village 2 (Beixu) is kept all of its industry within the village col- a model, partly decollectivized “agroeco- lective, refusing to contract out any village logical” village that has purportedly main- assets to individual households. Despite its tained and improved sustainable produc- historically contingent and spatially specific tion practices, while still diversifying outcome, such a refusal to implement peasant income opportunities for its resi- reform policy has many other examples in dents. This has been done through a com- rural China resulting in locally specific bination of indigenous technology, inten- instances similar to Nanjie (Oi 1995; Lin sive tree planting, and new industrial 1995; Yep 1998; Sichuan Jingji Shehui activities such as brick making. Village 3 is Wenhua Fazhan Zhongda Wenti Duice not a model village. On the contrary, with Yenjiu Zhongxin 1992). In a clandestine decollectivization and privatization it has manner, Nanjie became an experiment in experienced rapid resource degradation, as collective production within an increas- infrastructure declines through lack of ingly market-oriented economy. The vil- investment and production and resource lage diversified livelihood strategies through land conversion to value-added uses, such as expansion of village collective 6 Although Villages 1 and 2 are identified by enterprises. The result was immensely suc- name in this discussion, I have not provided cessful, so much so that in the early 1990s names or identifying information (population, Nanjie was finally recognized by the state area, etc.) for Village 3 in an effort to protect and was held up as an important model individuals who took part in the research sur- veys and interviews. Villages 1 and 2 do not (Kaye 1994; Kou 1998; Henan Nanjiecun require the same level of anonymity due to Group Co. 1999). But as a model, it is a their widespread recognition as “model vil- paradox, demonstrating that while the lages,” as well as the numerous interviews and shortcomings of reform policies were coun- surveys conducted there. tered by maintaining collective production 258 ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY and distribution, new environmental prob- embodies contradictions that limit its lems were created through its very success. applicability throughout China. Nanjie’s In terms of agriculture, Nanjie’s success comes through exploitation and increased production has not come without marginalization of people from other environmental problems. Increased pro- places—both neighboring villagers and ductivity has been achieved primarily migrant laborers. But as a step along the through a rapid increase in the use of fer- way, it challenges assumptions about both tilizers. Combined with a corresponding markets and collectives, showing how local dependence on pesticides, this has many control and empowerment can be potentially negative environmental and enhanced within a market context through public health impacts. On the industrial collective production organization.7 The front, the rapid expansion of unregulated collective provides a framework within village enterprises has encroached on the which all of the village’s households are limited arable land, while utilizing occupa- able to prosper through the spreading of tionally hazardous processes. In addition, risk, efficient use of all forms of capital many of these industries contribute to sig- (communal, money, and human), and the nificant air, water, and soil pollution— expansion of livelihood opportunities with- “externalities” that are ignored in the ever- out a massive increase in vulnerability. expanding production statistics—while Nanjie peasants’ access to an expanding giving Nanjie another advantage in the set of assets are guaranteed through mainte- market. Further land conversion has nance of a system of entitlements, despite resulted from new housing constructed for state withdrawal from the broader economy all villagers. This loss of arable land results (Eckholm 1999). The enhancement of the in further intensification of agriculture on strong sense of community is also critical in remaining lands, while the soil and water the preservation of these entitlements, as table of land converted to industrial pur- poses is severely polluted by chemical reciprocal arrangements (intangible assets) effluent. are continued and social ties strengthened Because of its success in achieving pro- through the overall growth in community duction growth, providing social welfare, control and regulation of resources. and guaranteeing the livelihood of its Further, the maintenance of common prop- population, Nanjie’s leaders have not been forced as of yet to attend to the significant environmental impacts of their chosen 7 Bebbington (1996) argues that rather than development path. Recent scrutiny of the just discard “the modern” as fundamentally dis- village by higher authorities may lead to a empowering of local peoples, the adoption of reassessment of this model (and should be certain practices (such as chemical use in agri- culture) can be both empowering and commu- seen in the context of political struggles at nity enhancing. In the case of Nanjie, the main- the highest levels of government), but is tenance of collective institutions and their unlikely to result in strict implementation articulation with an increasingly competitive of existing environmental regulations. Nan- market need not necessarily lead to the kinds of jie’s political importance as a model almost socially and environmentally destructive prac- guarantees its ability to adopt such regula- tices critics of the market, myself included, tions only in the realm of rhetoric, and not often predict. The strengthening of community in reality. In fact, Nanjie has become a pil- provides both a unique buffer and potential grimage site for China’s old and new Left comparative advantage to the community in its competition with other producers. Without (Eckholm 1999). either the market or the collective, Nanjie Thus, Nanjie represents the best that Village would be in a worse situation. Thus can be expected of collective entities appropriate adaptation to rapid economic within an increasingly competitive market- changes becomes a crucial element in rural sus- oriented and risky economy, and yet it tainability. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 259 erty institutions in Nanjie, with agricultural expanded from 17 percent of cultivated production practices socially regulated, for land, to 100 percent in 1992. This was example, provides the potential for rela- achieved through collective investment in tively benign environmental management, wells (a combination of collective capital though perhaps only after other productivist and labor), one for every 1.4 hectares. As a goals are met. result, output increased because of the On the other hand, contrary to village availability of irrigation water despite a leaders’ official pronouncements, Nanjie is serious drought in 1992, unlike Village 3 in not a model of development for the area, this study (Muldavin 1996c). Average out- though it is being repeated throughout put has grown from 4.5 to 12 metric tons China. In any particular region, it repre- per hectare over this same period. Most of sents a system resulting in highly stratified this increase in production is attributed to incomes between the model village and the irrigation, improved seeds, increased fertil- surrounding region of subcontracted-labor izer use (growing from 225 kilograms per villages (Sargeson 1999). It is also a model hectare to 750 kilograms per hectare), in which the foundation for its success more intensified and complex cropping intensifies significant environmental prob- practices, and relatively higher prices for lems. Corporatist/collectivist activity may products. Average income also rose from provide some incentives for environmen- 200 to 850 renminbi yuan (U.S. $25 to tally sound policies. But top-down pop- $104) per person between 1980 and 1992. ulism also leaves environmental regulation In 1980, the collective divided all land in the hands of those with a strong incen- among private households and demecha- tive to maximize surplus extraction for nized production. But with stagnant yields social and political benefit. As such, these in the mid-1980s, the village decided to understandable goals may lead to interpre- tation and implementation of state envi- reunify certain aspects of production while ronmental policies in ways inconsistent keeping individual contracts for the divided with the goals of their creators at the plots. Thus, all plowing and bed prepara- national level. tion is once again mechanized, and the vil- lage collective repurchased two large trac- tors in 1987.9 Although agriculture is the Village 2: Beixu, An Agroecological main focus of the village, animal hus- Model bandry, agro-processing, forestry, and fish- As a model agroecological village begin- eries have been incorporated into a com- ning in the 1950s, Beixu is credited with plex “ecological” system of production. The expanding tree planting to cover 30 per- village’s claim to practice ecological agri- cent of the total village area of 193 culture is somewhat contradicted by prac- hectares. In this Wuyang County village, all tice. Although cropping patterns are more the land is intensively intercropped (aver- agroecological than in comparable villages aging 2.46 crops per year), with wheat the in the area, this same system is dependent most important crop (planted on 79% of more than ever on high levels of chemical the total cultivated area), followed by maize (59%), fruit and grapes (29%), soy- beans (17%), cotton (17%), vegetables 9 The loan for these tractors took five years to (17%), tobacco (14%), rapeseed (7%), and pay off, with an average charge of 28.3 yuan sesame (7%).8 Since 1980, irrigated area RMB per hectare ($3.48 per hectare) each year, for cultivation. The village’s original tractor was sold in 1980 at a heavily discounted price of 500 yuan RMB ($61.35), when it was deemed use- 8 The percentage is greater than 100 because less during the implementation of the of multiple crops being planted each year, as Household Responsibility System (Muldavin well as intercropping. 1996c). 260 ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY inputs, particularly chemical fertilizer. The sense of continuity with the organization, impact of this intensive fertilizer use on technological successes, and knowledge soils is mitigated to some extent by the gained during the commune period; (2) simultaneous use of large amounts of effective and legitimate collective gover- organic fertilizers (methane digester com- nance; (3) strong community participation post, fish pond dredgings, fruit tree clip- in resource regulation (through social pings, more readily available crop residues, norms and policing); and (4) the produc- and so on). tion of marketable commodities that have Methane digesters have been main- expanded income opportunities and the tained and expanded from the commune ability of the village to maintain entitle- period, incorporating local knowledge into ments. This has prevented short-term innovative new technologies. Thus, 50 of exploitation of resources and assets that 352 (14%) households have their own might otherwise have resulted from methane pits producing gas and no longer increased vulnerability and risk with enti- rely on other fuel for cooking, lighting, and tlement declines. heating of water. This has significantly Some of the contradictions of this village reduced village air pollution and potential are seen in development which still rests on health problems common in villages with- exploitative labor practices, similar to out such innovations (Hricko 1994). It has Nanjie Village. For example, the brick- also reduced village reliance on other non- works hires workers, many from outside renewable energy resources. Common the village, on a piecework basis to do the energy sources such as coal briquettes, difficult and dangerous work in the brick stalks, and wood not only rob soils of scarce kilns. In addition, despite providing a sig- organic matter via lost crop residue, trans- nificant amount of income for the village, form land through coal mining, or denude the brick industry is far from ecologically hillsides through woodgathering, but the sound, causing extensive air pollution, soil smoke produced adds significantly to vil- and coal mining for raw materials, and the lagers’ health problems. creation of other toxic waste, which is cur- Despite the shift to market-oriented rently dumped on village commons adja- production, this village has been able to cent to the brickworks. articulate with the regional economy while But Beixu Village illustrates the benefits maintaining a certain amount of local of a successful partial decollectivization. autonomy and control over resource use. Continued strong collective institutions This is possible partially because of strong and efficient use of productive village village leadership in the maintenance and assets have enabled the maintenance of expansion of collective institutions that crucial social welfare entitlements, buffer- support such villagewide activities. ing households from the emerging market Although land was divided to households economy. By only allowing access to many (unlike Nanjie), the new plots have gener- assets by collective entities, these resources ally incorporated many of the best aspects have not been diverted to consumptive of agroecology, predominantly in the form demands of individuals and households. of integrated fish farming with multistoried Labor demand is increasing through col- mixed crop agriculture. Fruit trees, berry lective support for expansion of sidelines bushes, and a large variety of plants are and limited but significant industrializa- interspersed with grain and vegetable tion. Indigenous technological innovations crops. Use of some pesticides continues, and maintenance require primarily labor, but the quantities are generally small and rather than scarce capital, thus structurally only for extreme outbreaks. The ability of limiting the need for labor out-migration. the village to maintain these kinds of envi- Only 100 village residents work outside of ronmentally sound practices has to do with the village on a regular basis, a relatively a number of unique features: (1) a strong small number compared to Village 3 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 261 (Muldavin 1996c). Together these factors closing of the health clinic and the increase and choices enable community stability, of school fees to a loss of guaranteed access enhancing some intangible assets (such as to irrigation water, led to changing produc- reciprocity claims) and thus reducing vul- tion practices quite different from the two nerability. villages already discussed. Individuals Beixu’s adherence to environmental reg- sought to rapidly mine communal capital ulation is limited to its tree planting cam- assets—trees, gravel, grasslands, water, paign over many decades. Other environ- ditches, and so on. As collective buffers mental regulations are not acknowledged, declined, investment decisions in this with the village’s ecological public image increasingly vulnerable context shifted providing a buffer to scrutiny. The implicit toward short-term goals, such as quick assumption is that as an agroecological increases in production and productivity “green” village, the environment is a top through, for example, heavy fertilizer use priority of all villagers. While in relative (for those farmers able to afford it).10 terms this may be so, it still leaves open the In Village 3, agricultural yields have stag- potential for abuse. The village’s brick- nated and declined as a result of changing works are a clear example of this problem. cropping patterns and techniques, with Still, overall, it could be rightfully claimed subsequent soil degradation and growing that the village does better than most (both pest problems. Soil degradation is primar- in its region and throughout China) in ily due to overuse of chemical fertilizers. terms of environmental awareness and Peasant farmers complain about “soil burn- implementation of environmentally benev- ing” from long-term fertilizer use. Because olent production practices and technolo- of the loss of soil structure and decline in gies. The fact that this is not a response to overall quality, the soils become harder, explicit environmental regulation and pol- less friable, and available nutrients dimin- icy speaks to the unintended consequences ish despite large additions of chemical fer- of daily practice by villagers, as well as the tilizer. The ability of widely used hybrid challenges to policymakers to achieve corn varieties to achieve consistent yield intended results. The ability to identify increases is dependent upon optimal field unintended consequences may provide the conditions. The combination of growing key to clarifying alternative environmental pest resistance to pesticides and repetitive policies. monocropping intensifies disease and pest problems. As a result of declining availabil- Village 3: A Hinterland Marginal ity and reliability of irrigation water, due to the lack of investment in crumbling irriga- Village tion works (constructed and previously Village 3 completely decollectivized in maintained collectively), agricultural pro- 1982, dividing and distributing all land duction has become both more intensive assets as well as village sidelines and indus- and unstable, with complete crop failures trial assets to individual households. The two years out of three (Muldavin 1996c). village collective was left with few claims to resources and few responsibilities to vil- lagers. Privatizing access to most natural 10 Collective buffers include, first, entitle- resources, and breaking up and distribut- ments provided by the state to collective entities ing agroindustrial assets to a few house- which limit risk for all households; second, the holds (such as grain mills, tofu workshops, spread of risk among a large number of house- holds as a consequence of collective organiza- and tractor repair stations) led to rapid tion of production and consumption; and third, social stratification. Access to these limited the ability of collectives to spread investment industrial assets placed a few families well and consumption over long terms and thus on their way to becoming the new village enable the maintenance of collective capital for- elite. Peasant loss of entitlements, from the mation. 262 ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY During my investigations between 1989 regulation, whether perceived as necessary and 1996, the irrigation systems were clearly or punitive in nature. in disrepair, not only in the village, but throughout the county. Lack of irrigation Summary of Village Studies drastically reduces the efficient use of avail- able chemical nutrients in most crops, ren- In the three villages studied (see Table dering additional fertilizer applications use- 1), Village 1, Nanjie, paradoxically benefited less. The decline in communally maintained from the reforms by avoiding total decollec- irrigation infrastructure and resulting tivization. But Nanjie features the environ- dependence on seasonal rains dramatically mental externalities from industrial pollu- increases peasants’ risk and susceptibility of tion that accompany rising peasant incomes. the village to natural disasters. It has also attempted to prevent a resource It would also appear that natural disas- free-for-all by maintaining social/collective ters enable peasants to compel the state, control of resources. Village 2, Beixu, is via moral imperative, to relinquish control both a model of the reforms and a favored over the area’s surplus in any given year. context via extra investment from the For example, in 1996 villagers forced the provincial government. Beixu has created state to further subsidize agricultural pro- agroecological conditions that improve the duction through easy credit that, by prece- local environment and uses renewable dent, the state writes off if there is a natural resources (methane) and increased tree disaster. Hence, it appears that peasant planting, but it also has a brick kiln that is families are increasingly using claims of polluting the air and destroying land. Village natural disasters, real and otherwise, to 3 did not benefit from the reforms because reduce their obligations to the state, just as of the high degree of exposure to the new the state has limited their entitlements— political economy of declining entitlements an indirect form of resistance. and degraded collective assets. In essence, The effects of unregulated individual there were few buffers to the riskier aspects livelihood strategies on the environment of the transition process. There is a strong are severe in the village. This can be seen linkage between increased vulnerability due in dilapidated irrigation infrastructure, to reduced entitlements and discounting the overgrazing of hillsides, destruction of for- future, creating Blaikie’s (1985) desperate est resources, an end to investment in ero- sort of ecocide. Subsequently common sion control projects, and expansion of property management institutions and cropping onto the most marginal and easily mutual trust break down, inducing free-rid- destroyed lands. Attention to environmen- ing and declining legitimacy of the local tal regulations is nonexistent. The leader- state. ship of the village is almost universally Villages 1 and 2 were relatively successful ignored, since few entitlements of any kind in avoiding this precipitous decline. In these still emanate from it or the county. As such, two villages, productive assets were pre- attempts by the county to enforce environ- served by disallowing consumptive needs of mental regulations concerning land use, individuals to reappropriate assets. Where such as land conversion fees and fines for allowed (Village 3), the shift of assets from destruction of tree windbreaks, are resisted production to consumption created vulnera- as additional forms of unfair taxation. The bility outcomes similar to the prerevolution- few village enterprises are taxed but not ary period. Ironically, Village 3 has agricul- regulated in terms of polluting effluents. In ture without the environmental impacts of sum, local village leaders have little legiti- chemicals because of its relative poverty and macy or real leverage in their attempts to lack of resources. Few in the village can still implement environmental policy. County afford fertilizers, insecticides, or herbicides. leaders have more power, but they are con- But the declining investment in infrastruc- strained by ongoing, everyday resistance to ture, and subsequent loss of irrigation, has ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 263 Table 1 Environmental Characteristics of Henan Province Case Study Villages ← Recollectivized Decollectivized → Village 1, Nanjie Village 2, Beixu Village 3 Relative vulnerability of • Low (medium for • Low to medium • High majority of villagers surrounding labor-shed villages) Characteristics of • Land conversion from • Explicit agro-ecological • Lack of cash or collec- resource use agricultural to indus- emphasis on agricul- tively supplied inputs ÑAgriculture trial uses. tural and industrial such as pesticides or ÑForestry • Successful industrial development. fertilizers leads to low- ÑLand conversion diversification • Environmentalism, input, low-productivity ÑFisheries increases potential self-reliance, and recy- agriculture for most resource degradation. cling focus, e.g., in households. methane production • Significant environ- and fisheries system. mental benefits of low- • Tree-planting cam- input agriculture offset paign throughout vil- by soil degradation lage lands. through over-taxing regimes. Environmental pollution • Village enterprises • Brickworks destroy • Destruction of com- & resource degradation produce significant lands though mining munal capital via indi- outcomes effluent discharged activities, as well as vidual claims on for- ÑTVEs into local water sup- increase soil, air, and merly collective assets. ÑAgricultural practices plies, air, and onto soil. water pollution. • Intensified use of local ÑHousehold activities • Limited household- resources, with result- level pollution due to ing degradation. continued village-level • Overuse of fertilizer organization of pro- leads to “soil-burning” duction. and loss of soil fertility. Environmental policy • No explicit environ- • Only village that • Lack of implementa- ÑExisting regulations mental policy focus. explicitly used term tion beyond fines and ÑActual implementation • Productive assets con- “environmental policy” levies directed toward served via collective in interviews and in filling county coffers ownership, limiting practice. without parallel provi- infrastructure decline. • Agro-ecology and for- sion of services or est planting program. investment. Policies, regulations, and • Modified decollec- • Partial decollectiviza- • Complete decollec- decrees tivization. tion of village assets. tivization. Degree to which • Constraints on prof- • Stable social welfare • Increase in fees, taxes, decollectivization itability and competi- entitlements. fines imposed by local implemented tiveness cited as result- state constrains house- Constraints and ing from excessive hold income and enablers regulation and tax investment. remittances. • Decline and disappear- • High incomes, but via ance of social welfare mediation of individual entitlements and assets claims to resources increases household through collective units vulnerability. (shareholding) enables • Complete lack of maintenance of social investment in or main- welfare and infrastruc- tenance of rural pro- ture investment. ductive infrastructure constrains production. 264 ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY led to a significant rise in vulnerability. The formation and as they shift the costs of result is intensified use of remaining reforms to others. resources. Declining irrigation may in a In Village 2, at the same time that eco- strict sense bring better environmental nomic growth is now emphasized above all practices—dry farming, decreasing saliniza- else, a contradictory policy of ecological tion, and less “burning” of soils with fertiliz- agriculture is also promoted. The policy ers—but it also increases overutilization of aim of ecological agriculture is to achieve other resources to compensate for lower optimum economic, ecological, and social agricultural incomes. benefits (Ma 1984). Chinese ecological In attempting to explain the geographic agriculture is somewhat different from its variations in levels of collective action Western counterpart, which emphasizes across China as a whole, it is important to increasing land use efficiency, even some- accept that in each individual case they are times using high inputs of material and historically and politically contingent. For energy. The Chinese version, at least in example, we need to examine to what principle, emphasizes increasing use effi- extent these circumstances arise from dif- ciency of inputs, so that costs can be low- ferent conditions in pre- and postrevolu- ered and dependence on inputs lessened tionary China, from varied experiences (in Western parlance, low-input agricul- with collective production, or from uneven ture). It expressly excludes chemical fertil- patterns of party activity across villages. izer, though as can be seen in Beixu These questions are important to under- Village, this is often overlooked for the sake stand if we seek to generalize from the of expanding overall production. cases presented. Answers to these ques- In 1984, the State Council advocated a more ecologically sound agriculture in the tions are beyond the scope of this essay. Second Meeting of National Environ- Still, the analytical framework laid out in mental Protection, drawing up a document this article might help us to understand the advocating that environmental agencies at uneven geographies of collective action different levels should cooperate with presented by the three villages. other governmental agencies to spread In this sense the incorporation of a vil- eco-agriculture technology and prevent lage into modern markets is a means of environmental destruction (Ross 1988). rural survival, though neither without con- The central government’s Document No. 1 tradictions nor a transformation of what is of 1992 indicated clearly that agricultural understood to be rural. This is an option, development should be focused on low- but not the only one, in the diversity of input, high-efficiency methods and be sen- experiences that now make up rural China. sitive to environmental protection. Many But the revalorization of the collective other examples of specific environmental experience within the hegemonic discourse regulations related to different productive that overwhelmingly denies its value is an sectors exist in the contemporary period. important step in itself, particularly for For example, Article 5 of the Agricultural China’s New Left (Eckholm 1999; Law stipulates that “the state forbids any- Bernstein 1998; Sichuan Jingji Shehui one to burn mountain land for cultivation, Wenhua Fazhan Zhongda Wenti Duice reclaim land from lakes, and to cultivate Yenjiu Zhongxin 1995). Our understanding steep slopes.” Article 57 stipulates that “the of alternative strategies cannot be limited state forbids anyone to denude hillsides, to visions that ignore the realities which and requires protection of forests, and people must struggle with today. But increased forest coverage.” Article 55 stip- simultaneously, alternative pathways such ulates “special protection for basic crop- as that taken by Nanjie must still be seen as lands.” Article 10 of the Grassland Law limited, as they are embedded within the stipulates that “grassland plant communi- broader context of China’s structural trans- ties must be protected strictly, and forbids ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 265 anyone from reclaiming or destroying irrational choice at best. Perhaps the even- grassland” (Guowuyuan huanjing baohu tual emergence of a collective political con- weiyuanhui wenjian huibian 1995; Palmer sciousness will enable social regulation of 1998). The question at issue here is the rel- common property resources. It is too soon ative effectiveness of these decrees on the to speculate on this rather hopeful out- ground. While the laws have played a posi- come, as Village 3 has no such seed of opti- tive role in protecting agricultural mism. resources and the environment in princi- ple, pressures to fulfill contracts and poor peoples’ necessity to break many of these Policy: The Contradictions laws in order to survive have forced offi- between Social Process and cials to turn a blind eye toward many Environmental Sustainability infringements. Beixu Village, despite its obvious achievements in agricultural sus- An extensive literature chronicling tainability, is no exception. changes in modern China already exists Environmental policy finds no explicit (Hussain and Stern 1994). Here I have expression or vehicle for implementation, mapped out one set of diverse local in terms of environmental aspects of responses to reform, and in particular, the resource use, in Village 3. Lack of cash or ways in which resource use and environ- collectively supplied inputs, such as fertiliz- mental policies have played out at the local ers and pesticides, has led to low-input level. The impact on villages of interna- agriculture by the majority of households, tional economic liberalization is shaped with unintended environmental benefits. through the shifting evolution of relations These are offset by intensified cropping between the state, market, and the peas- regimes that tax soils and increase erosion. antry. In some cases, local deregulation Furthermore, forest and grassland destruc- and diminishing entitlements, with declin- tion have no external or internal con- ing investment in social capital, are con- straints. In communal production brigades, straining which development pathways before the reforms, the state’s political cap- emerge. In other cases, where entitlements ital was built up through collective use of and investment have been maintained, the and responsibility for resources, a practice articulation of the local with the global continued in Village 1, Nanjie. This politi- through the market is enabling heretofore cal capital, necessary for imposing unpopu- unexpected hybrid strategies for improving lar state policies, was lost in Village 3 dur- livelihoods. In either case, local and ing decollectivization. By transforming the regional-based societal forces, both formal perception of collective labor from an and informal, play a key role in providing archetype to a relic of a failed model, the the foundation for alternative development state forfeited in certain cases its hard-won pathways, as well as opportunities for resis- legitimacy, and thus its means to carry out tance by those who have experienced rising negotiations over crucial resource issues. vulnerability. Accompanying changes included a loss of During China’s transition era, there has economies of scale, a devolution of tech- been a gradual shift from peasant-state to nology, and a lack of institutions concern- peasant-market relations and an increasing ing property regulation and use. emphasis on market regulation of land use Voluntarist stewardship runs headlong into decisions. This is coupled with a decline in the “green apple syndrome”11 and is an the power of participatory collective insti- tutions at a local level and the receding role of the central state, as local state represen- 11 This refers to the situation where individu- tatives garner increased power in both als pick apples green, before they are ripe, out obtaining revenue and distributing assets, of fear of not getting any at all. as well as profits of local government- 266 ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY owned productive enterprises. This shift economic elite. As such, these households increases local particularism in the ways have done best in every case study, with the policies, laws, and guidelines are inter- exception of Nanjie, where a breakup of preted, negotiated, practiced, and evolve.12 collective goods never materialized. Particularism allows for appropriate adap- It is impossible to clearly assess the tation of policies across complex geogra- impacts of the reforms without analyzing phies, and at the same time opens potential the impacts of declining collective institu- new avenues for corruption and abuse of tions on perceived risk and associated deci- power. Furthermore, it limits the state’s sion making on the part of households and ability to enforce unified environmental individuals. In contemporary China, peas- policies on a national basis. ants are engaged in environmentally Declining peasant access to key tangible destructive production practices, some- and intangible assets appears as a funda- times against their better technical judg- mental failure of the state in managing ment. High-input agriculture is accompa- China’s transition to a free market. The nied by soil deterioration and an increase breakdown of collective action to maintain in “natural hazards” as infrastructure infrastructure and communal capital has declines through lack of investment resulted in a rapid degradation in such (Muldavin 1992). Declining forests, important infrastructure as canal networks degraded grasslands, increasing desertifi- for irrigation, tree farms, and windbreaks cation, as well as transformation of coastal (“China Vows to Stop Deforestation .#.#. ” zones and remaining wetlands, continue to 1998; Muldavin 1983, 1986, 1992, 1996b), severely undermine China’s environment as well as social services. It has also led to and therefore threaten long-term produc- tremendous socioeconomic differentiation tivity. as the state has retreated from the coercive From huge controversial projects such as egalitarian principles of the commune the Three Gorges Dam (Holley 1992), to period (Chai 1996). By allowing the poorly the rapid expansion of highly polluting functioning market to allocate resources, Township and Village Enterprises over new kinds of motivation have replaced the arable land (Vermeer 1995–96; Muldavin old, based on corruption, cheating, and 1992), the specter of disaster in the individual desires to maximize incomes in Chinese environment casts a sinister and the rather chaotic new context. Thus the lengthening shadow. Large corporate enti- coercion of the market has replaced that of ties, from newly independent collectives the state, but with quite different results. run on a shareholder basis to transnational Households with labor power have been corporations setting up far-flung produc- able to diversify livelihood strategies and tion facilities in rural and suburban areas, minimize risk in the new context. Access to tie China’s environmental problems into resources has been another important the rapid restructuring of the global econ- means to expand income and diversify omy. livelihood strategies. In the three case The state too is directly responsible for studies presented here, households in vil- ongoing environmental destruction, as lages that have maintained collective insti- large state-run enterprises are slow to tutions and production organization have “green” toxic and outdated processes.13 fared better than most. The exceptions are the limited number of households that gained industrial and sideline assets upon 13 Despite using most of the monies from the decollectivization and became the new Montreal Protocol set aside to decrease Chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) output worldwide, 12 See Peet and Watts (1996) for an explo- China’s actual production of CFCs continues to ration of the changing roles of emergent institu- rise more than 10% annually. This is becoming tions and organizations in the context of shifting a serious liability for China in the donor com- configurations of state and market roles. munity (Muldavin 1995). ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 267 Decentralization of political and economic hybrid corporatism (quasi-private/quasi- authority, accompanying the reforms, has collective) provides yet another potential produced uneven opportunities for entre- alternative to social and environmental preneurialism and development by local decline (Oi 1992; Sichuan Jingji Shehui government entities (Oi 1992; Walder Wenhua Fazhan Zhongda Wenti Duice 1994; Unger and Chan 1999; Sichuan Jingji Yenjiu Zhongxin 1995). Shehui Wenhua Fazhan Zhongda Wenti Although China has increasingly relied Duice Yenjiu Zhongxin 1995). Further- on individual entrepreneurship and private more, it is unclear whether this “localiza- enterprise to solve many problems, it tion” of the state has resulted in an would be a mistake to view these individual increased voice in environmental policy undertakings as somehow beyond the decisions on the part of peasants (Sargeson influence of the strong social context in and Zhang 1999, 99). In some cases, con- which they operate. Despite rising mobil- strained by severely weakened village-level ity, place still greatly defines individuals, collective institutions, peasants have families, and clans in rural China (Potter become primarily a reactive force, and Potter 1990). Individuals’ ties to local- responding to perceived illegitimate acts of ity make comparisons with footloose profit- local state representatives. With little cen- seekers in other countries misleading. A tral government funding, county-level offi- village moral economy still opposes such cials increasingly view the peasantry and entrepreneurial behavior, often dictating local resources as their primary means of levels of redistribution of accumulated cap- creating revenue. In this context, surplus ital and profits, as well as the provision of extraction often translates into exploitative social welfare benefits, either directly or labor and resource use practices, as when through local government entities (Walder county- and township-level industries act 1995; Oi 1995; Bernstein 1998). Further as subcontractors in extensive commodity research is needed on community pressure production chains running from remote toward responsible resource use by entre- Chinese villages to U.S. cities (Vermeer preneurs and small private businesses. 1998; Muldavin 1992, 1996c). In cases Contemporary China’s political econ- where the local state loses legitimacy, peas- omy has led to a spatially diverse range of ants are unwilling to engage in collective environmental outcomes, with divergent activities which support long-term sustain- reasons for serious land degradation and able production for the village as a whole pollution. These difficult problems are (Unger and Chan 1999). more often than not a result of long-term The assumption that the introduction of structural challenges, and because of their private property, individualized household seeming intractability, may not only production, and “free” markets would lead require sustained state intervention but to a better allocation of resources, and bet- also fundamental change in the ways pro- ter decision making regarding long-term duction, distribution, and consumption are productivity, is strongly refuted by the evi- carried out and resources are defined and dence now available from many local areas used. In essence, solutions require a major in China. It assumes a realignment of local shift in the society-nature relationship— political economic power within a regula- which is easier to diagnose than to rectify. tory framework and rule of law that would The implementation of the reforms has promote policies and practices oriented to witnessed a shift in state environmental the long term—a change that is unlikely to mitigation efforts from long-term invest- happen any time soon. In some areas, the ment and allocation of state resources to actual limits on privatization (social and regulatory policies and institutions (from structural) provide the potential avenues to international treaties to the establishment avoid some negative aspects of social and of the National Environmental Protection environmental decline. In other areas, Agency), combined with market signals to 268 ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY provide the proper allocation of invest- Blaikie, P., and Brookfield, H. 1987. Land ment. 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