78 – 15 July 2008

THE NEW LEBANESE EQUATION: THE CHRISTIANS’ CENTRAL ROLE Middle East Report N°78 – 15 July 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. DOHA: VICTORY FOR THE CHRISTIANS AND THEIR MOMENT OF TRUTH............................................................................. 1 II. DIFFICULT TIMES FOLLOWING THE CIVIL WAR.............................................. 2 A. DECAPITATION AND STAGNATION OF THE MAIN CHRISTIAN MOVEMENTS....................................2 B. THE LEADERS RETURN WITHOUT REFORM OF PARTISAN INSTITUTIONS .........................................4 III. CHRISTIAN STRATEGIES FOLLOWING SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL .................. 6 A. THE CHALLENGES AND AMBIGUITIES OF THE FREE PATRIOTIC MOVEMENT...................................6 1. Aoun’s isolation upon his return to Lebanon .......................................................................6 2. The paradoxical alliance with Hizbollah ..............................................................................7 3. From an entente on general principals to a real alliance ....................................................10 4. Falling back on the community or the trivialisation of the Aounist movement .................11 5. Aoun’s failed presidential ambitions..................................................................................13 B. THE PRECARIOUS GAME OF ALLIANCES PLAYED BY THE MARCH 14 ALLIANCE CHRISTIANS......15 C. THE CHURCH IN POLITICS: A PRESIDENTIAL STRATEGY .............................................................18 IV. THE PRESIDENT: THIRD WAY, COUNTER-WEIGHT OR FIGUREHEAD?... 20 V. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................ 24 APPENDICES A. MAP OF LEBANON ...........................................................................................................................25 B. TEXT OF THE DOHA AGREEMENT.....................................................................................................26 C. TEXT OF THE TAEF AGREEMENT ......................................................................................................27 D. TEXT OF THE ENTENTE BETWEEN THE FPM AND HIZBOLLAH...........................................................31 Middle East Report N°78 15 July 2008 THE NEW LEBANESE EQUATION: THE CHRISTIANS’ CENTRAL ROLE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY After decades during which they saw their influence course, violence or massive irregularities prevent the consistently decline, Lebanon’s Christians are in a holding of elections or undermine their credibility. position to once again play a decisive political role. The May 2008 Doha agreement, coming in the wake Thirdly and lastly, Christians will be in a position to of Hizbollah’s takeover of West Beirut, provides the revitalise old demands which the rest of the political Christian community with the opportunity to regain class generally has disregarded. President Suleiman an important place on the political map and to mentioned these in his inaugural address and Michel advance demands that have long been ignored. Aoun, the community’s self-proclaimed leader, also Already, Christians have obtained key positions in the made them the focus of his effort to build a large new government, which was formed on 12 July. But Christian coalition. Among these demands are long the Doha agreement goes well beyond. overdue and ever deferred administrative reforms (eg, decentralisation), empowering the presidency, ensuring The Doha accords have ushered in three significant better Christian representation in senior civil service changes. First, they led to the election as president of positions, rejecting the naturalisation of Palestinian Michel Suleiman, the former army commander. As a refugees and facilitating the return of displaced and result, the Christians recovered the institution to exiled co-religionists. Never before have these claims which they are constitutionally entitled but whose – which have long obsessed members of the Christian effective powers had considerably diminished since community – been as central a part of the political the crisis began in 2004. The new president is likely debate as they are today. Because powerful Muslim to be courted by political actors of all stripes, each actors will need to ensure the loyalty of Christian poli- seeking to shape decisions he will face at his term’s ticians, and because such politicians’ leverage thereby outset. These include initiation of a dialogue on a will be strengthened, some of these longstanding de- national defence strategy (which, ultimately, will have mands could well be realised in the end. to include the question of Hizbollah’s weapons), preparation of the 2009 parliamentary elections and For Lebanon’s Christians, these represent potentially the definition of new relations between Syria and momentous changes. The formula devised in 1989 to Lebanon founded on mutual respect for sovereignty. end the fifteen-year civil war shifted the balance of power in a way that clearly disfavoured them: the Secondly, the Doha agreement paves the way for a president was stripped of several prerogatives while more Christian-friendly electoral law. Up until now, the number of parliamentary seats allocated to Chris- the electoral map was such that the vast majority of tians was brought down from 60 to 50 per cent. The Christian candidates had to enter into alliances with ensuing period was characterised by Syria’s military the main Muslim parties. Most Christian politicians, it occupation and the systematic repression of pro- follows, were elected thanks to Muslim votes. Not independence Christian movements. Already weak- any more. Post-Doha, Christian parliamentarians for ened by a substantial wartime exodus, the Christian the most part will be elected in predominantly Chris- community was both leaderless and adrift, contributing tian disticts. That means they will have real leverage to a sense of dispossession that, to this day, shapes its and be able to adjudicate between the two principal outlook in profound ways. Muslim poles, the one dominated by the Sunni Future Movement, the other by the Shiite Hizbollah. Because Syria’s 2005 withdrawal enabled the return and release Lebanon’s political system broadly allocates ministerial of key Christian leaders together with the reassertion seats in accordance with various parties’ parliamen- of core demands. But the Christian political scene split tary weight, the Christian vote will be decisive in the into two camps. On one side, Samir Geagea’s Leba- establishment of a novel balance of power – unless, of nese Forces and Amine Gemayel’s Phalanges banked The New Lebanese Equation: The Christians’ Central Role Crisis Group Middle East Report N°78, 15 July 2008 Page ii on the end of all residual Syrian influence, joined emergence of an unchallenged Christian leader (read: forces with former pro-Syrian actors (a majority of Aoun as president) would allow a complete overhaul Sunnis and Druze) and called upon the international of the political system. community to help restore a sovereign Lebanese state. This latter goal would be achieved, in particular, The tug of war between the two principal Christian by setting up an international tribunal charged with camps is hardly over. Much will depend on the 2009 investigating former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri’s parliamentary elections which will be a test of their murder, imputed to Damascus, and by pressing for respective power and determine the country’s next Hizbollah’s disarmament. On the other side, General government. In that sense, the Christian electorate – Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement challenged the whose political preferences are by far the least pre- political system as a whole, breaking its isolation by dictable of all – will play a decisive role. Assuming forging a controversial understanding with Hizbollah, it can play its role deftly, it will be in a position to Syria’s main Lebanese ally. promote policies it has long advocated. More impor- tantly, it will be in a position to ensure that the coun- The first camp defined the priority as genuine sover- try’s political conflicts are resolved within and not in eignty through which would emerge a strong state spite of its institutions – through ballots rather than capable of carrying out Christian demands. Aoun’s bullets. After one full-blown civil war and another camp, by contrast, argued that its ties to a powerful near-miss, that would be no small achievement. actor, flexible on all issues other than its armed status, was the optimal way to address the community’s im- Beirut/Brussels, 15 July 2008 mediate and vital concerns. It also claimed that the Middle East Report N°78 15 July 2008 THE NEW LEBANESE EQUATION: THE CHRISTIANS’ CENTRAL ROLE I. DOHA: VICTORY FOR THE ance of these parties gives the Christian vote unaccus- CHRISTIANS AND THEIR tomed weight, tipping the balance of power in favour MOMENT OF TRUTH of one or other of the groupings which dominate the coalitions in Lebanese politics. The game of forming alliances played by Christian politicians, a new un- clear factor on the political chessboard, will, in prin- The Doha Agreement1, signed on 21 May 2008 by all ciple, allow them to be more than simple auxiliaries to Lebanese parties, was, broadly speaking, a triumph for the large Muslim parties. Doha also represents the re- the Christian community. It re-established the presi- turn of some arbitration

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