'UNVEILING' CANADIAN AID AND MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN: POLITICIZED REPRESENTATIONS OF AFGHAN WOMEN

by

Alison Kekewich

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\ Table Of Contents

Abstract vi

List Of Abbreviations Used vii

Acknowledgements viii

Chapter 1: Introduction 1

1.1 Rationale & Research Statement 1

1.2 Research Questions & Structure Of Thesis 5

Chapter 2: Literature Review 8

2.1 Overview Of The Literature: An Absence Of Canadian Critique 8

2.2 Voiceless Victims: Deconstructing Politicized Representations Of Afghan Women 10

2.3 Women's Rights: Propaganda For The 'War On Terror' 15

2.4 The Rhetoric Of Liberation Vs. The Reality Of War 17

2.5 Conclusion: Challenging Gendered Oppression 20

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework And Research Methodology 22

3.1 Introduction: Negotiating Discourses Of Difference 22

3.2 Postmodernism 23

3.3 Postcolonialism 27

3.4 Tensions Between The 'Posts' 29

3.5 Feminism: Bridging The Divide 36

3.6 Research Methodology 48

3.7 Conclusion: An Integrated Approach 52

iv Chapter 4: 'Unveiling' Representations Of Afghan Women In Canadian Newspapers 54

4.1 Introduction: The Media - An Instrument Of War 54

4.2 Gender And The News 57

4.3 The Problem Of Progress 60

4.4 Victimized Afghan Women: Agency Denied 63

4.5 Veiled Afghan Women 66

4.6 Outliers 68

4.7 Conclusion: (Re)producing The 'Other' In Canadian newspapers 71

Chapter 5: Interrogating (Re)Productions Of The 'Other' In Canadian

Non Governmental Aid Discourses 74

5.1 Introduction: Parallel Discourses 74

5.2 Contextualizing RAWA 76

5.3 Contextualizing CW4WAfghan, CASC, And The FMF 80

5.4 Oppositional Discourses Of'Liberation' And 'Oppression' 88

5.5 Cultural Relativism 92 5.6 (Re)producing The 'Other' In The Discourse Of CW4WAfghan And CASC 96

5.7 Conclusion: Orientalist Feminism 101

Chapter 6: Conclusion 105

6.1 Next Steps 108

References 109

v Abstract

Since the events of September 11th 2001 and the resulting US led 'War on Terror,' the position of women in nations associated with 'Islamic fundamentalism' has attracted sustained attention in the global North. In fact, women have become central to debates in 'Western' popular culture and policy circles over the nature of Islam and the 'War on Terror.' This research demonstrates that the Canadian government, mainstream media and Non-Governmental Organizations, in particular Canadian Women For Women In Afghanistan and Canada-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee, have strategically utilized women's rights rhetoric post 9/11. Furthermore, it argues that this gendered discourse along with politicized representations of Afghan women influenced, and potentially justified, CIDA policy shifts and massive injections of aid into Afghanistan and worked to garner support in Canada for the military intervention. It also explores how the Canadian 'war story' supports the image of Canada as 'rescuer,' sustaining national mythologies of peacekeeping or peace-creating, tolerance, and multiculturalism through an Orientalist discourse that often frames women in Afghanistan as 'traditional' and 'oppressed' victims and Afghan men as uncivilized aggressors. Ultimately, this thesis aims to highlight the utility of feminist, postmodern, and postcolonial approaches to a critical analysis of national foreign, aid, and defence policies.

vi List Of Abbreviations Used

CASC Canada-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee CIDA Canadian International Development Agency CW4WAfghan Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan FMF Feminist Majority Foundation NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-Governmental Organization RAWA Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan UN United Nations US United States (of America) 9/11 September 11, 2001 (the events of)

vii Acknowledgements

I am deeply grateful for the unwavering support of my family and friends, notably Greg Nasmith, Beth Hayward, Sam Wang, and Jane Kirby for talking me through the most difficult of questions and doubts while providing invaluable support and editorial insights. I am further indebted to my committee - David Black, Theresa Ulicki and Jane Parpart, for guiding this research and encouraging me to produce my best work. I would also like to thank the dedicated faculty and staff of the International Development Studies Department. Lastly, I am greatly appreciative of the Social Sciences and Humanities Council of Canada for funding this research.

viii Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Rationale & Research Statement

Sedef Arat-Koc argues that Canadian identity has been reshaped after the events of

September 11, 2001 (9/11). She suggests that this reconfiguration has led to "a re- whitening of Canadian identity" in order to situate Canada squarely within 'Western

Civilization' and therefore on the 'right' side of the 'clash of civilizations' (2005, 32).

Arat-Koc postulates that the 'clash of civilizations' rhetoric permeating government, media, and aid discourses is central because several governments in the global North

"quickly interpreted the object of the [9/11] attack as 'Western civilization' and its values of freedom and democracy" (2005, 34). A number of scholars suggest that Canada's ties with America was one of the most influential factors determining Canada's preliminary military decisions in 2001, and again when Stephen Harper took office in 2006 (see

Laxer 2008; Stein and Lang 2007). Indeed, in his first speech to the House of Commons as Leader of the Opposition in May 2002, Prime Minister Harper, then Leader of the

Canadian Alliance, argued:

...Mature and intelligent Canadian leaders must share the following perspective: the United States is our closest neighbour, our best ally, our biggest customer and our consistent friend...Not only does the United States have this special relationship to us, it is the world leader when it comes to freedom and democracy... If the United States prospers, we prosper. If the United States hurts or is angry, we will be hurt. If it is ever broadly attacked, we will surely be destroyed (In Laxer 2008, 137).

Whatever the actual motivations for war - Canada-US relations, control over energy (oil) resources (Foster 2009), a struggle to stem poppy cultivation, and therefore heroin and opium production (Laxer 2008) - the Canadian government has focused on the 'clash of civilizations' rhetoric identified by Arat-Koc and others, an emotional

1 discourse of extremes, as well as themes of rescue and benevolence that complement widely held understandings of national identity. For example, John Manley, acting as

Foreign Affairs Minister, stated the day after 9/11, "Canada has soldiers that are buried all over Europe because we fought in the defence of liberty and we're not about to back away from a challenge now because we think somebody might get hurt" (In Stein and

Lang 2007, 1). More recently, Canadian Immigration Minister Jason Kenney articulated

Canadian policy using the 'clash of civilizations' framework. In discussing Canada's support of Israel, Kenny explained, "the existential threat faced by Israel on a daily basis is ultimately a threat to the broader Western civilization" (Kenny in Salutin 2010). The binaries (re)constituted in Canada, between 'Western' and 'Eastern' civilizations post

9/11, between 'liberty' and 'oppression,' are not only Orientalist in nature. They support other, equally problematic and simplistic dualisms designed to justify Canada's foreign and aid policies. The binaries that dominate Canadian discourses of the 'War on Terror' - civility/barbarity, freedom/oppression, progress/tradition, democracy/tyranny, Judeo-

Christianity/Islam, and so forth - are not novel. They are rooted in Colonial, Imperialist, and Orientalist legacies. As Edward Said explicates, Orientalism is a "Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient" (1978, 3). According to

Said, this is accomplished in large part through cementing understandings of the 'East' as being "lamentably under-humanized, antidemocratic, backward, barbaric, and so forth"

(1978, 150).

Canadians have been divided regarding their nation's military presence in

Afghanistan, especially in recent years. Polls demonstrate a considerable decline in public support for the intervention, from 75% in favour in 2002 to 41% in September of

2 2008 (CBC 2006; CBC 2008a). This thesis argues that in response to flagging enthusiasm, and in attempt to gain purchase in Canada on the 'War on Terror' in

Afghanistan, the government, media, and aid organizations have often relied on telling age-old stories about 'good' and 'evil,' about a 'clash of civilizations.' These narratives often focus on the victimization of Afghan women at the hands of the Taliban, Afghan society, Afghan men, or fundamentalist Islam. As Stephen Spencer contends:

It is important to see that the power of colonial discourse may be derived from how it positions women... Into the twenty-first century, the veiled Muslim woman has come to represent the ultimate symbol of backwardness and oppression and acts as a visual cue to bolster claims of the 'alarming' rise in Islamic militancy (2006, 125-126).

The government has been explicit in its attention to the plight of Afghan women and children, identifying (often gendered) humanitarian aid a priority of the intervention

(Government of Canada 2010b). The government of Canada's website devoted to the nation's engagement in Afghanistan explains:

Building on progress and addressing the remaining challenges is a long-term process that will not happen overnight. But with Canada's support, positive changes have already taken place in Afghanistan. Moving forward, Canada's commitment will remain steadfast in helping improve the lives of Afghan women and girls (Government of Canada 2010b).

Prime Minister Harper has gone on the record, stating that improving human rights for the women of Afghanistan is not only an important goal of the mission, but that it is

"very, very central" to the motivation for the intervention itself:

Making progress on human rights for women is a significant component of the international engagement in Afghanistan. It's a significant change we want to see from the bad old days of the Taliban...The concept that women are full human beings with human rights is very, very central to the reason the international community is engaged in this country (CBC 2009).

The way in which old Orientalist representations of Afghan women are made new again, post 9/11, is interrogated in this thesis.

3 Yasmin Jiwani suggests that in Canada, "under the guise of a 'rescue' mission, the intervention has been aimed explicitly, and especially rhetorically, at establishing

democracy and equality in Afghanistan, and liberating Afghans from the yoke of Taliban tyranny" (Jiwani 2009, 732). Indeed, in discussing the then potential Afghan mission in

November 2001, former Prime Minister Jean Chretien expressed that, "the principal role that we hope they [the Canadian Forces] will have...will be to make sure aid get to the people who need it. Of course, we don't want to have a big fight there. We want to bring peace and happiness as much as possible" (In Stein and Lang 2007, 1). Of course, Canada has had a "big fight" in Afghanistan but when the highest-ranking Canadian government officials framed the war to the Canadian public in 2001, they stressed the duty and desire to deliver "liberty," "peace," and "happiness" to the people of Afghanistan. As early as

September 12, 2001, government discourse began constructing the 'Other' in

Afghanistan, and, concomitantly, reaffirming the Canadian self though constructions of

Canada as 'benevolent rescuer.' Arat-Koc maintains that there were benefits to feminists who fell in line with the discourse of the government by emphasizing the plight of

Afghan women and the ability and/or duty of the government to 'save' them via an

intervention:

After September 11, feminism as critical thought, like all other forms of dissent, was suppressed while feminism was deployed as a potential ally in the new imperialism. The only respectable belonging for feminists in a nation reconfigured along civilizational lines is one that confirms women's superior position in 'the West' and expresses gratitude for this (2005, 45).

As argued in Chapter 5, Orientalist feminism, as identified in the foundational discourses of Canadian Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), Canadian Women for Women in

Afghanistan (CW4WAfghan) and Canada-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee (CASC), not only buttresses the national justification for war of establishing women's rights in

4 Afghanistan, but receives financial support from government granting bodies, shapes the

Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA) policies and programming, and is reinforced by the mainstream Canadian media. Considering Canada's engagement in the

'War on Terror,' there is an urgent need to interrogate how discourse is utilized and representations of Afghan women are politicized and underwritten by imperial and

Orientalist frames. Ultimately, this thesis argues that there has been a strategic discursive deployment of gender in Canadian government, media and international development realms in an attempt to both garner popular support for, and justify, the aid and military interventions in Afghanistan.

1.2 Research Questions & Structure of Thesis

I came to the above conclusion by asking one main research question and a series of secondary questions. The main research question is: have the Canadian government, media, and NGOs strategically utilized women's rights rhetoric post 9/11? If so, has this gendered discourse, along with politicized representations of Afghan women, influenced and potentially justified CIDA policy shifts and massive injections of aid into

Afghanistan, and worked to garner support in Canada for the military intervention? In addition to the main research question, my thesis sets out to address the following secondary questions, which overlap with and complement my main research question:

1) How have the Canadian government, media, and aid institutions represented Afghan women, and what discourses underpin these representations? 2) How are characterizations of Islam being used in constructing representations of Afghan femininity? 3) How can these representations be interpreted using feminist, postmodern, and postcolonial lenses? 4) Is the employment of women's rights discourse and politicized representations of Afghan women a means to achieve self-interested goals, i.e. security through development?

5 5) How should we challenge and rethink our conception of development when it

becomes inextricably connected with military engagement?

My main and secondary research questions have been explored through a series of chapters. Chapter 2 surveys the literature on the subject of the gendered discourse of the

'War on Terror,' paying special attention to Canadian sources and key themes. Chapter 3 explores theoretical literature relevant to my thesis, observes tensions within and between my chosen approaches, and ultimately makes an argument for the application of a feminist framework incorporating aspects of postmodernism and postcolonialism to this topic. Documenting and deconstructing the government narrative alone is not a primary focus of this thesis. Rather, this thesis attempts to demonstrate how the 'official' government discourse is reflected in media and NGO realms. Chapters 4 and 5, the case studies, explore the ways in which the discourses of the government, media, and NGOs often echo and interact with each other. For example, the members of CW4WAfghan, an organization lauded, consulted, and funded by the government, are often featured as

'experts' in the media. Furthermore, media and NGO discourses are widely considered legitimate in Canadian society, and are primary conduits through which the public gains information about Afghanistan. Lastly, in both case studies, I attempt to demonstrate that media and NGO realms have the possibility to be inclusive of alternative discourses or marginalized understandings of social justice, respectively. More specifically, chapter 4 examines representations of Afghan women in Canadian newspapers from April 2009 to

February 2010 and questions the extent to which they are underwritten by Orientalist notions that may also be bound up in a particular expression of 'national interest' - bolstering support for the intervention. Chapter 5 interrogates the foundational discourses of CW4WAfghan and CASC and uses the Revolutionary Association of the Women of

6 Afghanistan's (RAWA) discourse as a counterpoint. The chapter demonstrates that

CW4WAfghan and CASC run parallel to rather than intersect with one of the most prominent women's rights organizations in Afghanistan. In so doing, CW4WAfghan and

CASC (re)produce difference in Canadian debates by invoking Orientalist logic which ultimately buttresses the national justification for Canada's involvement in the 'War on

Terror' - 'saving' women and children, and 'civilizing' the Afghan nation (Butler 2009;

Jiwani 2005). Lastly, chapter 6 argues that feminist, postmodern, and postcolonial interrogations should not be dismissed as mere intellectual exercises. As demonstrated by this thesis, discourse profoundly alters reality and understandings of 'Others' and ourselves. When these notions are unpacked, real changes can be imagined and initiated.

I also describe the next steps I intend to take with this research. Taken together, these chapters should convince the reader of the problematic implications of the Orientalist and gendered discourses being deployed to justify the Canadian military and aid interventions in Afghanistan. It is my hope that this thesis will inspire further critical engagement with the implications of Canada's mainstream media and foreign, aid, and defence policies.

7 Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Overview Of The Literature: An Absence Of Canadian Critique

This Chapter focuses on the works most influential to this thesis that investigate how

Afghan women are being represented in relation to the 'War on Terror' post 9/11. The majority of the relevant theoretical literature is explored in Chapter 3, and some works that speak directly to the questions of Chapters 4 or 5 are also not included. A review of the literature on this topic reveals that scholars are largely preoccupied with politicized representations of Afghan women from an American perspective. There is a paucity of authors who tackle strictly Canadian content. However, Yasmin Jiwani, Melanie Butler, and Sedef Arat-Koc's essays have been invaluable.

Jiwani undertakes discourse analysis of Canadian English-language mainstream media - The Globe and Mail and The Gazette of Quebec - immediately after September

11 and suggests that the media sustains national mythologies founded on ideals of peace, tolerance, and multiculturalism through an Orientalist discourse that frames Muslim women in Afghanistan as 'backward,' 'traditional,' and 'oppressed' victims (Jiwani

2009; 2004; 2005). Ultimately, Jiwani argues that "the role of the nation as an icon of tolerance and as a 'rescuer' of those who are victims of barbaric cultures and practices" is buttressed by problematic gendered binaries between the 'East' and 'West' that are reproduced in Canadian newspapers (2005, 53). Butler asserts that CW4WAfghan's discourse is predicated on Orientalist logic, which is particularly problematic as it is disseminated in Canadian school curriculums. She suggests, "CW4WAfghan's portrayal of Canadian values and responsibilities is at odds with feminist efforts to reconceptualize the gendered nature of war and national identity" (2009, 217). Lastly, Arat-Koc explores

8 the ways in which Canadian identity has been reconfigured post 9/11 to better reflect the

'clash of civilizations' framework. As mentioned above, she reasons that this shift has led to a "re-whitening of Canadian identity" and a backlash against political, anti-imperial feminisms that do not reflect national agendas (2005, 32).

Jiwani, Butler, and Arat-Koc's studies are relevant to my own, and have been exceptionally valuable in conceptualizing and organizing my own questions and findings.

However, Jiwani does not look beyond the medium of newspapers, Butler draws only on

CW4WAfghan's discourse and Arat-Koc responds to the intense reactions to Dr. Sunera

Thobani's October 2001 speech. These pieces are, understandably, limited in scope.

There is little space to ask larger questions regarding how the discourse of gender and

Afghan femininity is deployed in Canadian foreign policy, in either the military or aid interventions in Afghanistan. Nor do they explore, at any length, possible outcomes of this discourse, or articulate ways to move beyond it. I want to make clear that this does not indicate a weakness in their work, but a gap in the literature, which is, in small part, addressed by this thesis.

Due to the lack of academic commentary on the deployment of gendered discourse in Canada, I rely on accounts of American government, media, and aid agencies to create comparative context. While there are important differences between

The United States and Canada's use of this discursive approach, the United States is also engaged in the 'War on Terror' in Afghanistan and their aid policy is strikingly similar to

Canada's (USAID 2008, "About USAID/Afghanistan"). Furthermore, it is important to interrogate the politicized nature of this aid - a minor theme in the literature that will be

9 explored in greater depth in this thesis. As Yves Engler writes regarding Canadian aid to

Afghanistan:

Is it realistic to think that Ottawa would provide nearly $300 million a year in aid to Afghanistan if there were no Canadian troops in that country? This much is clear: Canadian aid was designed to consolidate the military occupation in Afghanistan (2009, 155).

As a result of the current nature of this topic, there is not an abundance of literature, but it is still possible to identify central themes that I can apply to my own research on Canadian discourses. It is important to note that the majority of academics writing on this subject do so from a feminist perspective that often includes insights from postmodernism or postcolonialism - that is, the theoretical approach of this thesis. There are three distinct clusters of critique. The first represents scholars who deconstruct homogenized representations of Afghan women as victims; the second cluster is concerned with demonstrating how these representations serve to justify the 'War on

Terror' in Afghanistan; and the third endeavors to reveal the difference between women's rights rhetoric and the reality on the ground in Afghanistan. Many of these themes overlap in the literature, and individual academics may be engaged in more than one cluster.

2.2 Voiceless Victims: Deconstructing Politicized Representations Of Afghan Women

Academics in the first cluster include Ann Russo (2006), Carol Stabile and Deepa Kumar

(2005), Kevin Ayotte and Mary Husain (2005), Roksana Bahramitash (2005), Jiwani

(2005), Dana Cloud (2004), Zillah Eisenstein (2004), Charles Hirschkind and Saba

Mahmood (2002), Krista Hunt (2002), Miriam Cooke (2002), Emily Rosenberg (2002), and Lila Abu-Lughod (2002). These scholars have taken issue with homogenized

10 representations of Afghan women as victimized, oppressed, voiceless, imprisoned, helpless, and violated.

While the obvious comparison in the global North is between the 'oppressed'

Afghan woman and the 'liberated' 'Western' woman, an equally important distinction is being made between 'civilized' 'Western' men and 'barbaric' Afghan men, as evidenced by how they allegedly treat women in their society (Hunt 2002, 119). In order to sustain the representation of Afghan women as a victimized group, Afghan men must be depicted in such a way as to support that image. As Dana Cloud explicates, in times of war, "an enemy nation's men often represent 'the enemy,' [while] the women (and children) of that same nation often are represented as victims needing rescue from the men of their society" (2004, 289). While both Afghan men and women are cast as the 'Other,' Islamic women are 'civilizable,' and therefore must be 'rescued' by 'Western' men, or 'Western' nations. One potential consequence of this ideology is articulated by Zillah Eisenstein, who asserts that the vilification of Afghan men "leads us too quickly away from Islam to the West, where it is too easy to think all women should be free like me - whoever the

'me' is" (2004, 153).1

Furthermore, many of these interpretations of Afghan femininity have been linked to a singular, reductionist notion of Islam. As Bahramitash explains:

1 The term villify is used to indicate that Afghan men are often homogenized and demononized in relation to other, usually 'Western,' men in the gendered discourse of the 'War on Terror.' While this thesis does not attemp to speak to the specifficities of Afghan culture or engage directly in the gender order in Afghanistan, it acknowledges the forces that work in Afghanistan, as they do in many other parts of the world, to enforce hierarchies of masculine priviledge. The empahsis on how that priviledge is challeged, or exercised differently, in the case of male supporters of RAWA, or the focus on deconstructing Orientalist representations of Afghan men in Canadian discourses evident in this thesis, does not discount systems of male privilege in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

11 While it is true that some conservative interpretations of Islamic religious texts are misogynist, many Muslims are strong advocates of women's rights, both inside and outside the Muslim world. Naturally, the latter are concerned about the simplistic and generalized ways in which these issues are raised. For example, in the aftermath of 11 September, US President George W. Bush has frequently campaigned to save the 'civilized' world from 'evil' (2005, 221).

A homogenized Islam is central to constructions of 'enlightened' 'Western' women in opposition to 'backwards' Afghan women. Ayotte and Husain argue that the important differences among Muslim countries are erased in 'Western' discourses of the 'War on

Terror' as the focus is put on women's apparently singular position in a separate, Islamic

'world' (2005, 120).

Academics, who deconstruct representations of Afghan women as oppressed victims, often do so by exposing their Orientalist, imperial, or sexist underpinnings. As

Carol Stabile and Deepa Kumar elucidate:

The central framework employed to justify the US war was thoroughly Orientalist; it constructed the West as the beacon of civilization with an obligation to tame the Islamic world and liberate its women. This served to erase...the political struggles of women in Afghanistan against both the Northern Alliance and the Taliban...(2005, 766).

The 'civilizing' mission that Stabile and Kumar describe is bound up in Enlightenment notions of progress that have arguably justified many incarnations of domination, from colonialism to modern forms of development. Jiwani illustrates how the Canadian rescue myth operates and reinforces conceptions of national identity when she writes, "as victims, they [Afghan women] become recipients of Canadian benevolence signified through the various rescue attempts of the state and its agencies, and as survivors, they signify the success of multicultural tolerance and liberal values" (2005, 53). The very notion that women need to be 'saved' and are not capable of protecting, fighting, or advocating for themselves is deeply problematic. As Stabile and Kumar note:

12 By rendering women the passive grounds for an argument aimed at imperialist domination, the discourse of protection used by politicians and media alike - like the very fundamentalism it purported to attack - denied women any agency in the decision-making processes that affected their everyday lives and futures (2005, 770).

Many writers in this cluster concur with Stabile and Kumar and are concerned that

Afghan women's agency2 is denied through their politicized representations in government, media, and aid discourses.

For example, the burqa has been particularly powerful in conjuring images of subjugation and supporting paternalistic and/or imperialistic impulses. As Ayotte and

Husain note:

In claiming to secure Afghan women from the oppression of the Taliban, the United States has reinscribed an ostensibly benevolent paternalism of which we should remain wary. In particular, the image of the Afghan woman shrouded in

2 This thesis draws on a fluid understanding of agency, which reflects the fact that the concept remains unsettled. Definitions of agency include "the operationalization of choice" (Kabeer, forthcoming), and "arising as intelligent being" (Rostami-Povey 2007, 297). Sherry Ortner (2001) suggests that agency is often linked to power, peoples' "ability to act on their own behalf, influence other people and events, and maintain some kind of control in their own lives," which is relevant to notions of both domination and resistance (2001, 78). The term applied to Afghan women in this thesis can indicate expressions of autonomy, resistance through diverse means - for example, through voice or through silence (in order to avoid suggesting a false dichotomy between agency and victimhood), varied "negotiations between social, political, economic, ethnic, cultural and gender spheres" and the exercise of old and new coping mechanisms, sometimes "under the most extreme forms of coercion, fear and high levels of uncertainties" (Rostami-Povey 2007, 294). However, as Dianne Baxter points out, agency must also be considered outside resistance, within and reflecting "structural, ideological, and experiential configurations" (2007, 737). A further tension is evident when agency is equated with the operationalization of empowered choice. Kabeer's articulation of agency, which she identifies as existing in both passive and active forms, demonstrates this view (see Kabeer, forthcoming). Alternatively, Jane Parpart suggests that so closely relating agency with empowered or strategic choice may be limiting and "tends to create a binary that privileges the 'empowered' over the 'disempowered'" (Parpart, forthcoming). Rather, she argues, "agency could (and should) also be understood as a process, as the partial, tentative moves that people often take...towards understanding and subverting injustices, recognizing that 'injustice' is affected by local contexts, particularly in dangerous and highly constrained circumstances" (Parpart, forthcoming). It is with these disparate and evolving understandings of agency that I approach the ways in which Afghan women's agency may be erased from or discordant with Canadian discourses. Also considered is how agency is restrained, but also how it is being, and may be exercised by Afghan women in their daily lives and in local or transnational coalitions.

13 the burqa has played a leading role in various public arguments seeking to justify U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks (2005, 113).

Cloud concurs, and suggests that paternalism is inextricably linked with colonialism.

Representations of veiled Afghan women post 9/11 construct the 'Western' viewer "as a

paternalistic saviour of women and posit images of modern civilization against depictions

of Afghanistan as backward and pre-modern" (2004, 286). Furthermore, many 'Western'

characterizations of the burqa equate the garment itself, not its imposition, with

imprisonment and oppression: "representations of the burqa have come to stand in for all

of the other violence done to Afghan women" (Ayotte and Husain 2005, 115). This

serves to deny the agency of Afghan women who may choose to wear a burqa, or an

alternative form of covering. As Ayotte and Husain elucidate: "it is the burqa itself that is

to be considered sub-human" (2005, 119). Jiwani agrees, and suggests that in the

Canadian media:

The construction of the veil as a sign of duplicity, concealment, and oppression occludes any consideration of the act of veiling as grounded in resistance... many Muslim women in the West wear the veil as a sign of resistance against the oppressive forces of the dominant society...yet, these views are often absent in the popular imagination" (2005, 54).

In other words, "a Muslim woman can only be one of two things, either uncovered, and therefore liberated, or veiled, and thus still, to some degree, subordinate" (Hirschkind and

Mahmood 2002, 353).

Just as singular representations of Islam and Afghan women are limiting, so too

are claims that all images of Afghan women in American and Canadian government,

media, and aid discourse are identical. However, the authors of this cluster demonstrate

the dominance and currency of homogenized representations of Afghan women as

victims in need of rescue. They also establish that Colonialism/Imperialism, Orientalism,

14 and paternalism often underwrite these images, which is why they are politicized and have the ability to shape the discourse of the 'War on Terror.' Emily Rosenberg reminds us however, that, "images involving gender and rescue represent no single, settled meaning in policy discussions but, rather, present a continually contested process of meaning formation" (2002, 458). If Rosenberg is correct, and representations of Afghan women offer an "unstable set of signifiers" onto which diverse parties attempt to legitimate their particular interpretations and assumptions, debates will continue to be generated that can potentially unsettle the problematic representations of Afghan women that the authors of this cluster attempt to debunk.

2.3 Women's Rights: Propaganda For The 'War On Terror'

The second cluster is smaller than the first, but includes many of the same authors: Hunt,

Russo, Bahramitash, Stabile and Kumar, Ayotte and Husain, Eisenstein, Hirschkind and

Mahmood, Engler, and Rosenberg. Saba Gul Khattak (2004), and Gillian Wylie (2003) are also included in this group. These authors suggest that the position of women in

Afghanistan and their representation as a homogenized, victimized group is used as propaganda for the 'War on Terror.' They argue that women's rights language has been co-opted as a means to 'sell' the war to the North American public, which draws attention to the power of discourse. Hunt contends, "the co-optation of women's rights discourse and the indignation expressed about the treatment of women by the Taliban serve to justify a US response to the 'war on terrorism' and moralize the plan to force the Taliban from power" (2002, 117). In 1996, well before the attacks of September 11, Eisenstein warned that "western feminism is used by the global telecommunications networks - TV, e-mail, CNN news - as well as the film industry to define a colonialist/imperialist

15 narrative that reconfigures barriers across the globe" (quoted in Hunt 2002, 119). Indeed, if post 9/11 representations of Afghan women as oppressed and voiceless victims go unchallenged, opportunities for solidarity founded on equity between 'Western' and

Afghan women will be limited. For, as Eisenstein contends, when 'Western' feminism is seen to justify imperialism, women can be effectively divided across cultures.

However, the invocation of women's rights language has proven to unify disparate political and civil society groups in the global North:

Rallying against the Taliban to protest their policies against Afghan women provided a point of unity for groups from a range of political perspectives: from conservatives to liberals and radicals, from Republicans to Democrats, and from Hollywood glitterati to grass roots activists (Hirschkind and Mahmood 2002, 340).

Hirschkind and Mahmood demonstrate that even those who would generally be skeptical of any 'Western' desire to 'save Third World women' are sympathetic to persuasive government, media, and aid campaigns highlighting women's plight under the Taliban that was reignited after 9/11. Rosenberg also questions new post 9/11 alliances asking,

"who, before September 11, could have imagined a...common endeavour between the

Bush administration and feminist leaders?" (Rosenberg 2002, 456).

This collective cooperation has proven to be a point of contention within

'Western' feminism; however, as some influential feminist organizations, most notably the American Feminist Majority Foundation (FMF) and CW4WAfghan, support the 'War on Terror' in Afghanistan, a move which other feminists have deemed an imperialistic and cynical appropriation of feminist ideals. For example, Ann Russo contends:

While the FMF's Campaign draws public attention to the discrimination and violence facing Afghan women under the Taliban, its discourse is embedded in an ahistorical and Orientalist framework that assumes the benevolence and superiority of the US in establishing gender equality. Thus, the FMF reproduces an imperial feminism tied to the US state interests in empire building - a

16 feminism that evades accountability for the consequences of US militarism while it establishes its own power and authority in determining the future of Afghanistan (2006, 557)

Furthermore, Russo argues that the US buttressed their justification for war by "flooding the news with images and stories about the plight of women in the Taliban's

Afghanistan" (2006, 558). Indeed, reports about Afghan women flourished in America the year after 9/11; from September 12, 2001 to January 1, 2002 there were 628 broadcast programs and 93 newspaper articles, a marked increase from the previous year (Stabile and Kumar 2005, 772). Ayotte and Husain agree "burqa-clad figures, potent political symbols of the 'evil' of the Taliban, were suddenly everywhere" (2005, 117). The authors in this group maintain that representations of Afghan women designed to invoke moral outrage are being cultivated in the public consciousness of the global North above others in order to sustain the premise that the 'War on Terror' in Afghanistan is necessary to

'save' Afghan women.

2.4 The Rhetoric Of Liberation Vs. The Reality Of War

Academics in this cluster include Stabile and Kumar, Abu-Lughod, Wylie, Khattak,

Hunt, Russo, Engler, and Eisenstein. These authors are interested in revealing the difference between women's rights rhetoric and reality 'on the ground' in Afghanistan.

Their approach is threefold. First, while they demonstrate the 'West's' commitment to the discourse of women's rights, they question the invading nations' dedication to actualizing gender equality in Afghanistan. Second, these scholars interrogate how women's human rights can be achieved in a war zone, and question if the intervention has not, in fact, made daily life more difficult for Afghan women. Third, the writers in this cluster reveal that what little is being done will likely be ineffective as the discourse on gender and femininity which informs military and aid programs, and much public knowledge in the

17 global North, is ahistorical in nature, ignoring important dimensions of the political context.

Hunt believes that the American government's focus on Afghan women's lived realities following September 11 is disingenuous:

I have concluded that these reports are part of the political campaign circulated through the media in order to rally support for Bush's 'war on terrorism'. It is not the result of a genuine commitment to eradicating the oppression faced by women in Afghanistan (2002, 116).

If Hunt is correct in her assessment, then so is Eisenstein in her judgment that, "it is unforgivable to have used women's rights as a pawn in the Afghan war while increasing human suffering, and then forget to remember women's rights once again" (2004, 158).

Wylie claims that this is exactly what has happened in 'liberated' Afghanistan under the

Northern Alliance, and that reports to the contrary are misleading. She contends, "instead of being empowered by recent political developments, many women, knowing the past of the actors who now govern Afghanistan, are experiencing continued insecurity" (2003,

119).

Furthermore, Hunt suggests that the focus on women and their rights serves another purpose - to obscure the effects of the 'War on Terror' on women (2002, 118).

Khattak suggests that, in fact, NATO's intervention has only worsened Afghan women's suffering: "their oppression intensified with the US-led bombing of Afghanistan as the constant threat of death and the destruction of their neighbourhoods and communities eliminated a sense of security" (2004, 214). Stabile and Kumar agree, and argue that the fact that Afghan women still endure terrible conditions demonstrates that "the issue of women's liberation was used as a cover for US intervention - when we strip off this rhetorical veil, we find the ugly face of imperialism" (2005, 766). Arguably, the 'moral

18 mission' of delivering women's rights to Afghanistan can easily distract 'Western' political commentators from the very real and violent gendered consequences of war.

Lastly, a focus on gender inequality as Afghanistan's defining characteristic by

'Western' governments and media detracts from the importance of the country's ethnicity, class, plurality in religious interpretation, pertinent history, and other important factors. Russo argues that the constructions of Afghan women as victims and Afghan men as 'violent terrorists' that encourage 'Western' 'rescue fantasies' "erase the history and politics of Afghanistan, including Afghan women's resistance against the Taliban and other fundamentalist and imperialist forces, including the USA and the USSR"

(2006, 562). Lila Abu-Lughod notes the obsession with the cultural and the gendered in

'Western' media after the attacks of September 11:

What is striking...is that there was a consistent resort to the cultural, as if knowing something about women and Islam or the meaning of a religious ritual would help one understand the tragic attack on New York's World Trade Centre and the US Pentagon...the question is why knowing about the 'culture' of the region, and particularly its religious beliefs and treatment of women, was more urgent than exploring the history of the development of repressive regimes in the region and the US role in this history... Instead of questions that might lead to the question of global interconnections, we were offered ones that worked to artificially divide the world into separate spheres - recreating an imaginative geography of West versus East, us versus Muslims, cultures in which First Ladies give speeches versus others where women shuffle around silently in burqa. (2002, 784)

The approach described by Abu-Lughod is Orientalist in nature, reliant on binaries that are maintained through superficial and ahistorical constructions of Afghan gender and culture. As Russo notes, "rather than addressing the roots of terrorism in global geopolitical power politics, the US public interest is drawn to the treatment of women through an Orientalist lens that equates Islam with fundamentalism with the oppression of women with terrorism" (2006, 563).

19 Wylie argues that the gravest consequence of this ahistorical approach is that the intervention of the global North and the resulting programs targeting women's rights will prove to be ineffective as they are not culturally, historically, and politically sensitive and exclude the priorities of Afghan women:

Western presumptions that women's lives would be transformed simply by removing the Taliban and exerting pressure to ensure their inclusion in politics, employment and education have proved to be a delusion. This gap between expectation and reality is explicable if one takes into account the long-contended history of Afghan gender politics and the current political and economic situation. Acknowledging such factors reveals that Western intervention will not easily subvert the existing gender order. Rather, any real change will result, not from prescribing Western models, but by enabling Afghan women to be autonomous agents with the right to determine their own life plans. (2003, 217)

Viewing Afghan femininity and culture through an Orientalist framework excludes relevant historical, political, socio-economic, and spiritual context, ultimately rendering

Afghan women passive bodies, without history or agency, on which to impose 'Western' ideals of liberation and equality.

2.5 Conclusion: Challenging Gendered Oppression

The literature reviewed in this chapter is not a comprehensive treatment of the work written on the topic of Afghan women and gendered discourses of the 'War on Terror,' nor does it address the full range of the literature drawn on throughout this thesis.

However, it includes the work that has influenced the questions posed in this thesis, and the conclusions it draws. Furthermore, the three themes discussed are central to the literature on this topic. Lastly, the authors discussed in all three clusters agree that it is vital to illuminate and challenge the injustice and gendered oppression Afghan women face in a way that avoids Orientalist and binary-laden thinking. Hunt is optimistic that feminists can expose the "motivation behind the use of women's rights discourse in the

American campaign against Afghanistan... to oppose the use of women's rights to justify

20 violence" and "challenge the divisiveness created by setting up western women's liberation in opposition to Muslim women's oppression" (2002, 119). While feminists remain divided on the fundamental question of whether violence "can be a recommended instrument for ensuring women's rights" (Khattak 2004, 214), the resulting dialogue speaks to the plurality, dynamism, and transformational potential of feminism which will be further explored in the following chapter.

21 Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework And Research Methodology

...This enigmatic thing which we call power, which is at once visible and

invisible, present and hidden, ubiquitous. - Michel Foucault (1977, 13)

3.1 Introduction: Negotiating Discourses Of Difference

Representations of Afghan women in Canadian discourses on the 'War on Terror' are often intensely politicized. The gendered subjugation enacted through victimizing depictions that deny Afghan women agency and justify warfare cannot be separated from other intersecting oppressions based on race, class, sexuality, religion, and geographical location (Hunt and Rygiel 2006, 2). Therefore, the study of gendered discourse

surrounding the 'War on Terror' demands a nuanced and layered theoretical approach.

Feminist theory that incorporates aspects of both postmodernism and postcolonialism is an ideal framework with which to examine the politicized representations of 'Others' in the global North. This approach encourages the questioning of knowledge production, binary thinking, and the role of power relations in constructing politicized representations through the use of such analytical tools as discourse analysis, deconstruction, and an emphasis on difference, which extends to an allowance of disparate interpretations of

'truth.' A feminist framework that includes insights from postmodernism and postcolonialism encourages "reading critically or against the grain, 'writing back' and making political interventions" without advancing alternative 'truth' claims (Gill 2007,

65). While asserting a different or 'better' truth over a dominant discourse is problematic because, as postmodernists might argue, insisting on any one truth often marginalizes

difference and indicates power, a 'hybrid' framework of feminism, postmodernism, and postcolonialism allows for critique of dominant discourses and the articulation of

divergent political positions. Therefore, despite clear tensions within and between the

22 theories, this chapter argues that aspects of feminism, postmodernism, and postcolonialism can productively interact with each other.

3.2 Postmodernism

Postmodern thought evolved from a movement in art and architecture, and the poststructuralist writings of French theorists and philosophers, including Michel

Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Giles Deleuze (Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002, 84). In addition to the poststructuralists mentioned above, postmodern thinkers include Jean-

Francis Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, and Kenneth Gergen as well as many other less prominent social scientists (Benton and Craib 2001, 162). Postmodernism is often considered to subsume poststructuralism, or is "taken to encompass the key figures and debates within poststructuralism," so for ease, the term postmodernism will be used in this thesis to refer to postmodern and poststructuralist thought (Sim 2001a, ix). The approach has a long and complex history, which defies conclusive definition, some would argue deliberately (Spencer 2001, 160). Lloyd Spencer suggests that, "although it has become established in cultural and intellectual discussion over recent decades, the term

'postmodernity' never gained any precise or clear definition" (2001, 161). Caroline

Ramazanoglu and Janet Holland describe the term in the following manner: "postmodern thought itself can be seen as a specific form of knowledge, emerging at a particular time, telling particular truths, and constituting a particular version of modernity to which it is opposed" (2002, 96). Stuart Sim offers a less ambiguous explanation:

In a general sense, postmodernism is to be regarded as a rejection of many, if not most, of the cultural certainties on which life in the West has been structured over the last couple of centuries. It has called into question our commitment to cultural 'progress' (that economies must continue to grow, the quality of life to keep improving indefinitely, etc.), as well as the political systems that have underpinned this belief. Postmodernists often refer to the 'Enlightenment project', meaning the liberal humanist ideology that has come to dominate

23 Western culture since the eighteenth century; an ideology that has striven to bring about the emancipation of mankind from economic want and political oppression. In the view of postmodernists this project, laudable though it may have been at one time, has in its turn come to oppress humankind, and to force it into certain set ways of thought and action. It is therefore to be resisted, and postmodernists are invariably critical of universalizing theories... as well as being anti-authoritarian in their outlook. To move from the modern to the postmodern is to embrace scepticism about what our culture stands for and strives for... (2001a, vii).

Sim's definition of postmodernism makes apparent the theory's utility to this thesis. The rhetoric of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan is based on ideals of 'progress' - cultural, governmental, and societal. Enlightenment thinking is deployed in the rationale for war, as the 'West' must deliver 'civility' and 'liberation' to the 'East,' 'saving' its women and children from 'oppression.' Lastly, in embracing skepticism of what "our

culture stands for," this thesis explores how the discursive deployment of gender in the

Afghan operation is bound up with notions of Canadian national identity.

Key aspects of postmodern thought that are valuable to this analysis include dubiety of 'metanarratives,' a focus on language, and a celebration of difference. Lyotard argues, "the grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative narrative or a narrative of emancipation"

(1979, 38). In fact, he defines postmodernism simply as "incredulity towards metanarratives" (1979, xxiv). As Jane Parpart and Marianne Marchand assert, postmodernists "doubt the ability of thinkers from the West either to understand the world or to prescribe solutions for it" (1995, 2). Because postmodernists understand reality as "largely linguistic or symbolic" (Benton and Craib 2001, 170), Lyotard contends that discourse is a vehicle for grand narratives: "it is being dispersed in clouds of narrative language elements - narrative, but also denotative, prescriptive, and so on... each of us lives at the intersection of many of these" (1979, xxiv). Furthermore, he

24 argues that language is intimately connected to structures of power rooted within the

'West' and demonstrates the link between language, power, and knowledge:

The point is that there is a strict interlinkage between the kind of language called science and the kind called ethics and politics: they both stem from the same perspective, the same 'choice' if you will - the choice called the Occident... knowledge and power are simply two sides of the same question: who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be decided?" (1979, 8- 9).

As Ramazanoglu and Holland argue, "postmodern thought is attractive in enabling feminists to look imaginatively at power, selves and knowledge production and, in particular, at how the power of language and representation operates" (2002, 85). Lastly, the celebration of difference, which works simultaneously with the rejection of essentialism, is a further key feature of postmodern thinking. In a discussion between

Michel Foucault and Giles Deleuze, the latter contends, "a theory does not totalize: it is an instrument for multiplication and it also multiplies itself. It is in the nature of power to totalize and...theory is by nature opposed to power" (1977, 208). As Sim explicates, postmodernism can be considered a form of skepticism:

Scepticism about authority, received wisdom, cultural and political norms, etc...that puts it into a long-running tradition in Western thought that...sets out to undermine other philosophical theories claiming to be in possession of ultimate truth, or of criteria for determining what counts as ultimate truth (2001b, 3).

Postmodernism positions itself in opposition to totalization and essentialism and therefore, it celebrates or privileges the notion of difference (Stabile 1995, 89).

Michel Foucault's thoughts on the role of the intellectual, the nexus of theory and practice, and entry points into revolutionary action have influenced the theoretical and methodological approach to this thesis:

...The intellectual discovered that the masses no longer need him to gain knowledge: they know perfectly well, without illusion; they know far better than he and they are certainly capable of expressing themselves. But there exists a system of power which blocks, prohibits, and invalidates this discourse and this

25 knowledge...The intellectual's role is no longer to...express the stifled truth of the collectivity; rather, it is to struggle against the forms of power that transform him into its object and instrument in the sphere of 'knowledge,' 'truth,' 'consciousness,' and 'discourse.' In this sense theory does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice. But it is local and regional...and not totalizing. This is a struggle against power, a struggle aimed at revealing and undermining power where it is most invisible and insidious (Foucault and Deleuze 1977, 207-208.

Foucault proposes that the desire among theorists to speak for others or to 'awaken the consciousness' of the 'masses' is misplaced as the 'masses' are aware that consciousness is a "form of knowledge" and are better able than the intellectuals to speak for themselves

(Foucault and Deleuze 1977, 208). Rather, he contends that scholars should question the structures of power that privilege some voices over others and practice reflexivity regarding their own advantaged position. Lastly, he suggests that theory and practice coincide when a scholar struggles against systems of power that perpetuate inequality. He posits that individuals can "struggle on their own terrain" in a fight "directed against power" (Foucault and Deleuze 1977, 216). He concludes his conversation with Deleuze, arguing that, "in engaging in a struggle that concerns their own interests, whose objectives they clearly understand and whose methods only they can determine, they enter a revolutionary process" (1977, 216). These final thoughts suggest to me an important way of thinking about solidarity. In this thesis, I attempt to confront systems of power operating in Canadian society which exclude marginalized voices and privilege those of the elite and the 'West' while avoiding speaking for those marginalized others/'Others.' It is my hope that by 'struggling on my own terrain,' this work will become a small part of a larger international dialogue and will support transnational movements against power that oppresses.

26 Lastly, discussing how power is manifested in the prison system, Foucault

suggests that "tyranny...is cynical and at the same time pure and entirely 'justified,' because its practice can be totally formulated within the framework of morality. Its brutal tyranny consequently appears as the serene domination of Good over Evil, of order over disorder" (1977, 210). The notion of oppression, or tyranny being exercised and justified within a "framework of morality" has been applied in my analysis of the discourse of

Canadian non-governmental organizations and the mainstream media. As Spencer remarks, "few isms have provoked as much perplexity and suspicion as postmodernism"

(2001, 158) but despite this, the utility of the theory to this thesis is evident.

3.3 Postcolonialism

Postcolonialism is associated most clearly with the work of Frantz Fanon, Homi K.

Bhabha, Edward Said, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Chandra Talpade Mohanty in

addition to many other lesser-known scholars (Syrotinski 2007, 1; Spencer 2006 123).

Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin posit that postcolonial theory:

...Involves discussion about experience of various kinds: migration, slavery, suppression, resistance, representation, difference, race, gender, place, and responses to the influential master discourses of imperial Europe such as history, philosophy and linguistics, and the fundamental experiences of speaking and writing by which all these come into being...we would argue that post-colonial studies are based in the 'historical fact' of European colonialism, and the diverse material effects to which this phenomenon gave rise (1995a, 2).

While postcolonialism is arguably grounded in the cultural and historical experience of

once colonized people, Bill Ashcroft, writing six years later, suggests that the term has

wider relevance:

The term 'postcolonial' has come to represent an increasingly indiscriminate attention to cultural difference and marginality of all kinds, whether a consequence of the historical experience of colonialism or not...the term has expanded to engage issues of cultural diversity, ethnic, racial and cultural difference and the power relations within them, as a consequence of an expanded

27 and more subtle understanding of the dimensions of neo-colonial dominance. (2001, 10-11).

Arguably, Afghanistan has a neo-colonial or imperialist history and is currently negotiating a foreign intervention. Therefore, accepting Ashcroft's most recent definition, it is possible to employ aspects of postcolonialism in this thesis while respecting the theory's foundations. Postcolonialism and postmodernism are often confused, but both have distinct theoretical contributions to offer this thesis. As will be expanded upon below, apparent weaknesses of postmodernism, including apathy towards resistance and a lack of historical context, are strengths of postcolonialism.

The postcolonial works of Mohanty and Said are essential to my interrogation of representations of Afghan women. The concept of the 'Other' for example, explored by both Said and Mohanty, has been particularly valuable. The term has proven to be useful in revealing the legacy of colonial assumptions and representations of non-'Western' people, articulating the process of systematic marginalization based on being defined as

'Other,' and demonstrating the centrality of 'Othering' to identity construction and the maintenance of national and international power relations. The 'Other' is a term that crosses disciplinary boundaries, and therefore, there are multiple ways in which it is conceptualized and employed. However, the 'Other,' defined broadly, is a person or a group of people who are constructed and represented as being different, exotic, and inferior by the persons or groups who are representing them. This process maintains the identity, assumed superiority, and/or control of those who represent the 'Other.' Mohanty describes the process thusly: "it is not the center that determines the periphery, but the periphery that, in its boundedness, determines the center" (1991, 73-74).

28 The concept of the 'Other' has been employed to characterize citizens from underdeveloped nations in the global South, whose cultures and religions do not mirror those that typify the West. In understanding this sense of the 'Other,' Edward Said's

Orientalism is particularly useful. He argues that the West's tradition of negatively and inaccurately essentializing the 'Orient' as inferior is bound up in imperialist discourses which have maintained 'Western' hegemony (1978, 7). In a new 2003 preface Said writes:

There has been such a massive and calculatedly aggressive attack on the contemporary societies of the Arab and Muslim for their backwardness, lack of democracy, and abrogation of women's rights that we simply forget that such notions as modernity, enlightenment, and democracy are by no means simple and agreed-upon concepts that one either does or does not find, like Easter eggs in the living room (1991, xix, emphasis added).

Here, Said recognizes that women's position in society is often used as a justification in the 'West' to 'Other' societies like Afghanistan. However, I recognize that the ways in which the concept of the 'Other' are employed, including by feminists, must be considered critically. I argue that the feminist tendency towards essentialism to which I am referring can be addressed through a postmodern or postcolonial focus on difference.

3.4 Tensions Between The 'Posts'

There are tensions within and between postmodernism and postcolonialism: neither is a uniform theory. There is substantial overlap between the two theories, and while some scholars recognize this, others insist the two theories remain at odds (Radhakrishnan

2000, 38; Hutcheon 1995). Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin concede that the central projects of the two theories are closely related: "...the major project of postmodernism - the deconstruction of the centralised, logocentric master discourses of European culture, is very similar to the post-colonial project of dismantling the Centre/Margin binarism of

29 imperial discourse" (1995b, 117). They go on to note further similarities: "the decentring of discourse, the focus on the significance of language and writing in the construction of experience, the use of the subversive strategies of mimicry, parody and irony - all these concerns overlap those of postmodernism" (1995b, 117). Linda Hutcheon concurs that there are considerable "formal, thematic, [and] strategic" links between postmodernism and postcolonialism (1995, 131). She goes on to argue that at a "thematic and structural level, it is not just the relation to history that brings the two posts together; there is also a strong shared concern with the notion of marginalization, with the state of what we could call ex-centricity" (1995, 132).

Despite significant overlap, the relationship between postmodernism and postcolonialism remains uneasy. For example, there are several common postcolonial critiques of postmodernism, including that postmodernism's focus on difference can tend toward extreme cultural relativism or become an instrument of power or imperialism itself, that the theory can be Eurocentric, apolitical, and ahistorical, and that it is not securely rooted in material reality. Spencer further identifies some of the "core vocabulary" used to critique postmodernism: "nihilistic, subjectivist, amoral, fragmentary, arbitrary, defeatist, willful" (2001, 162). While not the case in the reverse, a focus of postcolonial literature is critiquing postmodernism and distinguishing between the two schools of thought, likely because postcolonialism continues to be characterized as merely "an important aspect of postmodern theory and practice" (Spencer 2006, 134) rather than a distinct entity unto itself. Therefore, this section highlights several of postcolonialism's criticisms of postmodernism, which not only demonstrates the tensions between the two theories, but also provide insights into them. While the differences

30 between postmodernism and postcolonialism cannot be discounted, this chapter concludes that there is too much to gain from both theories - when they overlap, interact, or stand alone - to limit this thesis to one body of 'post' literature.

Postcolonial scholars often charge postmodernism with a "disinterested objectivity" (Brydon 1995, 136) that manifests as political vacillation. Hutcheon argues that "links between the post-colonial and the post-modern are strong and clear ones," but identifies one major difference. She contends that both feminism and postcolonialism have "distinct political agendas and often a theory of agency that allow them to go beyond the post-modern limits of deconstructing existing orthodoxies into the realms of social and political action...post-modernism is politically ambivalent" (1995, 130).

However, as Alcoff, Griffiths, and Tiffin argue:

Postcolonialism is not simply a kind of 'postmodernism with politics' - it is a sustained attention to the imperial process in colonial and neo-colonial societies, and an examination of the strategies to subvert the actual material and discursive effects of the process (1995b, 117).

The politics of postcolonialism engage and embrace resistance in a way that postmodernism often does not. As David Jefferess notes:

Resistance is a continual referent and at least implicit locus of much postcolonial criticism and theory...the concept of resistance functions as an amorphous concept in postcolonial studies, identifying a diverse range of modes, practices, and experiences of struggle, subversion, or power (2008, 3).

This flexible understanding of resistance is appealing and distinct from postmodernism.

Furthermore, discussing modes of resistance and transnational solidarity is central to the analysis of this thesis.

Ted Benton and Ian Craib suggest that due to postmodernism's focus on fluidity and difference, a range of political positions take up the theory (2001, 170). This position suggests to me that while postmodernism may not be specific to a particular politics, it is

31 not necessarily apathetic either. The question remains, what politics influence postmodernism itself? Sim posits that, "postmodern philosophy...can be seen as a deployment of philosophy to undermine the authoritarian imperatives in our culture, both at the theoretical and the political level" (2001b, 13). Sim's argument is in line with the conclusion that postmodernism's political project is one of "constant deconstruction of claims to knowledge and truth...the critique of the positive, the critique of domination, and the rejection of meta-narratives" (Benton and Craib 2001, 170). Iain Hamilton Grant takes a different view of postmodern politics, inspired by Lyotard's invocation of experimentation. He writes:

What form, then, should a postmodern politics take? Lyotard's advocacy of experimentation...must be applied to the context of the material organization of postmodern societies. Such a situation requires experimentation not only at the aesthetic level...nor solely at the level of narrative: it requires that the media of techno-capital in which knowledge, power and information are stored, be the object themselves of radical experimentation (Grant 2001, 39-40).

Grant suggests that because postmodernism finds "the tools of the past - Marxism, the

Enlightenment project, market liberalism, and so on - have been tried and found wanting, then experiment is demanded" (2001, 40). Arguably, while postmodernism does not integrate resistance into its theory in the same way as postcolonialism and it is easily applied to various political platforms, it is not "politically ambivalent" as Hutcheon suggests (1995, 130). A politics of skepticism, deconstruction, and, as Grant proposes, experimentation, motivate postmodernism.

Postmodernism is also often critiqued for being ahistorical in its approach. For example, Carol Stabile argues that a feature of postmodernism is "historical amnesia"

(1995, 89). However, this particular criticism is contested. Hutcheon suggests that,

"despite the...view of the post-modern as ahistorical - because it questions, rather than

32 confirms, the process of History - from its roots in architecture on post-modernism has been embroiled in debates and dialogues with the past" (Hutcheon 1995, 132). In fact,

Hutcheon insists that postmodernism's connection to history is one important reason why it overlaps with postcolonialism (1995, 132). More specifically, Grant traces the history of what he terms the 'postmodern condition,' contending that it involves:

...On the one hand, a history of the evolution of capitalism into techno-capital, on the other, a history of the demise of the Marxist grand narrative and a response to the void left by this most accomplished of critical repertoires (Grant 1995,40).

While some postcolonial and Marxist scholars deem postmodernism ahistorical, this is too general a critique. Not only does postmodernism have clear historical foundations, as

Hutcheon articulates, postmodern applications can engage directly with historical discourses.

A further point of contention revolves around postmodernism's ability to account for material realities. Kevin Ayotte and Mary Husain argue that postmodern feminist approaches often lack an appreciation for the "material conditions of discrete historical- cultural contexts," identifying postcolonial feminism as the superior framework to deconstruct representations of Afghan women and begin to understand their lived realities and histories (2005, 114). Furthermore, Chandra Talpade Mohanty emphasizes the importance of the local and the material in discerning the universal. She describes herself as holding a "firm belief in the importance of the particular in relation to the universal - a belief in the local as specifying and illuminating the universal" (2002, 503).

She goes on to explain that by focusing only on difference and grand or totalizing narratives (an approach she associates with postmodernism), scholars have misunderstood her work:

33 I am misread when I am interpreted as being against all forms of generalization and as arguing for differences over commonalities. This misreading occurs in the context of a hegemonic postmodernist discourse that labels as 'totalizing' all systemic conditions and emphasizes only the mutability and constructedness of identities and social structures (2002, 504).

Postmodern frameworks could work to incorporate a further appreciation of material, as well as discursive, realities. This is perhaps an area in which postmodernism could gain from both feminist and postcolonial collaboration. However, postmodernism works against the notion of 'metatheories,' which are to be everything to everyone, so if in fact postmodernism is not a 'grand theory' itself, that should not undermine its usefulness.

Another criticism faced by postmodernism is that it accounts for cultural relativism or absolutism that inadvertently justifies a whole host of unjust or oppressive practices (Ayotte and Husain 2005, 114). Postmodernism's celebration of difference and aversion to universalisms and 'metanarratives' often leads to this conclusion. As Benton and Craib explicate:

If there is no presence, no truth, no morality which can be argued about, it is difficult to know how we can condemn the Holocaust, or the oppression of women or ethnic minorities. If we adopt post-modernist or post-structuralist conceptions of truth and morality, the paradoxical result seems to be that we cannot argue that the hierarchies we condemn are worse or more oppressive than the absence of hierarchies we propose: they are just different (2001, 170).

Indeed, postmodern texts can be interpreted in this way. Deleuze, in a discussion with

Foucault, articulated postmodernism's resistance to grand narratives:

...Power emphatically develops a total or global vision...all the current forms of repression...are easily totalized from the point of view of power... We have no need to totalize that which is invariably totalized on the side of power; if we were to move in this direction, it would mean restoring...a hierarchical structure (1977,211-212).

Deleuze argues that it is in the interest of power to totalize, and complicating grand narratives, including human rights arguments, may expose the global powers that authorize what is and is not 'universal.' A central postmodern method used to achieve

34 this is emphasizing difference. As Lila Abu-Lughod elucidates, however, the appreciation of difference should not immediately be conflated with an extreme cultural relativism that forgives human rights violations:

When I talk about accepting difference, I am not implying that we should resign ourselves to being cultural relativists who respect whatever goes on elsewhere as 'just their culture...' 'their' cultures are just as much part of history and an interconnected world as ours are. What I am advocating is the hard work involved in recognizing and respecting differences - precisely as products of different histories, as expressions of different circumstances, and as manifestations of differently structured desires. We may want justice for women, but can we accept that there might be different ideas about justice and that different women might want, or choose, different futures from what we envision as best? (2002, 786-787)

Here, Abu-Lughod demonstrates that postmodern approaches, or frameworks employing postmodern analytical tools, cannot be automatically associated with extreme cultural relativism. Adopting a "postmodern scepticism" towards universal truths does not preclude the possibility that scholars "can make claims about and act upon injustice"

(Parpart and Marchand 1995, 9). Even Ayotte and Husain, who critique elements of postmodernism, concede that "the attribution of relativism to all theories carrying the whiff of postmodernism needs to be greeted with skepticism" (2005, 115). Furthermore, as Abu-Lughod suggests above, a postmodern appreciation of difference is essential to creating the political and/or intellectual environment in which justice can be understood from many perspectives, and not just the dominant one.

Hutcheon observes that while it is important to take note of the key differences between postmodernism and postcolonialism and avoid subsuming one into the other, the convergence of concerns between the two can create both powerful and widely-read work

(1995, 132). I agree that when the two theories work in concert, with the focus on their shared priorities rather than their differences, the outcome can prove fruitful.

35 Furthermore, using feminism as a bridge between postmodernism and postcolonialism accounts for weaknesses in all three theories by drawing on the strengths of the others.

3.5 Feminism: Bridging The Divide

In recent decades, feminism has splintered so that it is not only difficult, but likely imprudent to make claims as to the 'nature,' or the 'core' of the theory today. Sue

Thornham comments on the current state of feminism:

The women's movement has fragmented, so that it can no longer be written of as a political movement with a mass following. The assumption that the politicised intellectual can speak on behalf of all women can no longer be made. The category 'all women' has itself become suspect, as 'sisterhood' reveals itself to be fractured by power differences along lines of class, race, age and sexual orientation; and women as a group can no longer line up so easily with 'other oppressed people' (2007, 2).

Liesbet van Zoonen argues that despite its fragmentation and heterogeneous nature, feminism's "unconditional focus on analyzing gender as a mechanism that structures material and symbolic worlds and our experience of them" is unique across the social sciences, despite the fact that the focus on gender will not always result in the

"conclusion that gender is the defining factor in human relations and society" (1994, 3).

Most feminist theories now recognize that gender intersects with race, class, sexuality, and other dimensions of identity in important and "sometimes contradictory" ways (van

Zoonen 1994, 3). Furthermore, while feminism may provide language, theory and politics for negotiating gendered lives, it does not offer an "orderly position on pinning down the contradictions of 'gender'" (Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002, 4). van Zoonen's understanding of gender as "a particular discourse...a set of overlapping and often contradictory cultural descriptions and prescriptions referring to sexual difference which arises from and regulates particular economic, social, political, technological, and other non-discursive contexts" is only one interpretation among many, but she suggests that

36 gender is constructed, regulated, and performed which most feminists agree upon (1994,

33).

A second key aspect of feminist thought is power. While there remains a multitude of feminisms, including Marxist feminism, ecofeminism, standpoint feminism, anti-imperial feminism, postmodern feminism, postcolonial feminism, etc. most entail a theory of power relations. Caroline Ramazanoglu and Janet Holland suggest, "feminist investigations of the social world are concerned not just with truth, but how knowledge is produced and authorized" (2002, 14). A feminist approach recognizes that power is central to knowledge production, questions dominant discourses and 'norms' and also helps to answer my question of who has the power to represent 'Others' in specific ways.

However, as van Zoonen notes, a feminist approach to power, especially a postmodern one, does not simply identify who wields power in society and who does not, as "society is not constituted by orderly and dichotomous divisions of oppressors and oppressed"

(1994, 4). Rather, as Chantal Mouffe contends, the challenge is to "theorize the multiplicity of relations of subordination" (1992, 372) and to "analyze how in these relations of subordination individual and collective identities, such as gender and ethnicity, are being constituted" (van Zoonen 1994, 4). Therefore, gender and power, while hotly and continuously debated, form the basis of feminist theories and methodologies. Arguably, however, feminism is amorphous, and conceptions of gender and power diverge and are treated differently within various feminist traditions. How then, can feminism be applicable to both postmodernism and postcolonialism?

37 The alliance between feminism and postmodernism is best described as uneasy.

Indeed, Judith Butler termed postmodern feminism an unruly field (1992, 6). Thornham, however, identifies compatibilities between feminism and postmodernism:

Both feminism and postmodernism argue that the 'grand' or 'master' narratives of the Enlightenment have lost their legitimating power. Not only, they would both suggest, have claims put forward as universally applicable in fact proved to be valid only for men of a particular culture, class and race, the ideals that have underpinned these claims—of 'objectivity', 'reason', and the autonomous self— have been equally partial and contingent. Both also argue that Western representations—whether in art or in theory—are the product of access not to truth but to power...Both present a critique of binarism, that is, thinking by means of oppositions, in which one term of the opposition must always be devalued...Both, instead, insist on 'difference and incommensurability'. Finally, both seek to heal the breach between theory and practice, between the subject of theory/knowledge and its object (2001, 44).

Regardless of the numerous shared priorities between feminism and postmodernism, there are also feminist concerns over the political and theoretical implications of postmodernism (Parpart and Marchand 1995, 4). Some central critiques include the belief that postmodernism lacks a way to theorize resistance and agency, that it is not only

Eurocentric but male-centric, and that the emphasis on difference will lead towards further fragmentation and away from feminist consciousness and activism (Parpart and

Marchand 1995, 6). In other words, "in throwing in its lot with postmodernism...might not feminism be colluding in its own eradication, accepting the demise of'metanarratives of emancipation' at a point when women's own emancipation is far from complete?"

(Thornham 2001, 45). However, feminists in favour of adopting postmodern approaches argue that postmodernism can be a "sort of therapeutic corrective to feminism's universalizing tendency" and are more comfortable with a feminist approach that

"eschewfs] the analysis of grand causes of women's oppression, focusing instead on its historically and culturally specific manifestations" (Thornham 2001, 45). Furthermore, postmodern feminist frameworks avoid singular conceptions of feminine identity,

38 embracing instead complex and multiple understandings of social identity of which gender is but one significant part (Thornham 2001, 45).

Judith Butler takes this concept farther still, arguing that the category of gender is merely "regulatory fiction" that is "falsely naturalized" through imitation, or performance

(Butler 2004, 112). In Thornham's words, Butler understands gender as a

"...performance which constructs that which it claims to explain" (2001, 46). While

Butler's gender theories have been both formative and popular, there are some important critiques of her work. For example, some feminists argue that "disembodied, 'anti- essentialist' feminism" is "a luxury open only to the most privileged of women. Only those who have a sense of identity can play with not having it" (Thornham 2001, 48).

Other feminists argue simply "for the maintenance of the essentialist category 'woman,' since without it, what purpose could feminism conceivably serve?" (Grant 2001, 32).

Fundamentally, these critics argue that the project of deconstruction is too extreme. For example, Benton and Craib suggest that it is "hard to make any sense of what it might be to remain a feminist having deconstructed the category of 'woman'" (2001, 159).

However, the authors fail to recognize that such a project does not eliminate the possibility of collective action based on resistance to gendered oppression. Furthermore, these critiques do not acknowledge the possibility of feminist solidarity grounded in opposition to an essentialized, homogenized category of 'woman.' Arguably, a strength of postmodern thought is its ability to embrace multiplicity and fluidity. As Ramazanoglu and Holland illuminate:

A postmodern approach need not demand that identities such as woman/man, Hindu/Muslim, black/white, gay/straight, have to be abandoned, but does insist that...they should be interrogated. Interrogation means that their histories should be questioned, the constitution and crossings of their boundaries examined, and

39 their multiplicities enabled, in order to show what makes some identities powerful in relation to others, and how this power is exercised (2002, 92).

A postmodern feminist approach does not accept monolithic representations based on stereotypes, and my thesis works to complicate images of Afghan women in particular through the methods described by Ramazanoglu and Holland above.

Despite the concerns of feminists across various traditions, none of which are groundless, Parpart and Marchand note that "a growing number of feminists believe postmodern thinking has much to offer feminist theorizing and action" as some feminists identify little conflict between postmodernism and feminism while others call for a more

"strategic engagement" (1995, 6). Feminists who identify minimal discord between postmodernism and feminism often "do not advocate a simple marriage between feminism and postmodernism but they believe feminism's attempts to challenge male hegemony from within male centric Enlightenment thoughts are doomed to failure"

(Parpart and Marchand 1995, 9) - hence the appeal of postmodernism's rejection of the grand narratives of Enlightenment philosophy. Others who call for "strategic engagement" imagine the interaction between feminism and postmodernism transforming both theories (Parpart and Marchand 1995, 9). They emphasize the shared priorities of feminist and postmodern approaches, namely the development of "new paradigms of social criticism which do not rely on traditional philosophical underpinnings" (Parpart and Marchand 1995, 9-10).

Lastly, the concept of difference is central to the union between postmodernism and feminism. Thornham asserts that feminism "must embrace differences between women and accept a position of partial knowledge(s). And once it occupies this position, feminist thought would seem to move away from its Enlightenment beginnings, and to

40 have much in common with postmodernist theory" (2001, 43-44). 'Western' liberal feminist movements, however, continue to have a tendency to homogenize women, their interests and goals, or ascribe 'Western' values and prerogatives to women of the global

South. As Parpart and Marchand argue, "feminist concern with female 'otherness' ignored the possibility of differences among women themselves" (Parpart and Marchand

1995, 7). While Said identifies the object of the 'Other' as a person of the 'Orient' and the subject as a person of the West, Simone de Beauvoir posits in The Second Sex that man has defined the 'Other' as woman. De Beauvoir argues that 'she' (read: woman) is constructed "with reference to man and not he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute - she is the Other" (Beauvoir 1989, xxii). Implicit in Beauvoir's work is an important critique of binary thinking based on gender, but when she contended that women were 'Other' to men, her words laid the groundwork for notions of 'sisterhood,' the idea of a commonality between all women, an 'Otherness' built on the assumption of shared oppression.

'Western' feminists have also been charged with portraying 'Third World' women as traditional, voiceless, and victimized, as well as interchangeable (Chowdhry

1995, 33). Mohanty describes the depiction thusly, laying bare its implicit assumptions:

"this average third world woman leads an essentially truncated life based on her feminine gender (read: sexually constrained) and her being 'third world' (read: ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, family-oriented, victimized, etc.)" (1991, 56). As

Mohanty argues, such representations of Southern women serve to privilege 'Western'

female identity as superior (1991, 56).

41 In fact, the postmodern focus on difference has allowed feminists to address and interact with postcolonial critiques of 'Western' feminist work that constructed a uniform

Southern 'Other' and privileged 'Western' feminine identity (i.e. Mohanty 1991). Here is an area of feminist scholarship which synthesizes all three theories and can not only produce critically engaged work but can potentially open up opportunities for transnational coalitions. Critiques like Mohanty's demonstrate that postcolonialism, as well as postmodernism, can counteract the essentializing tendency of 'Western' feminisms. As Parpart and Marchand assert, critiques have "inspired considerable soul- searching among feminists in the North, and have encouraged an openness to difference and a reluctance to essentialize 'woman' that bodes well for global feminist understanding" (1995, 8). These feminists owe much to both postmodern and postcolonial interventions. There has been a backlash in feminism to the postmodern celebration of difference, however:

While reminding us of the need to guard against glib assumptions about global feminist solidarity, this focus on difference can exacerbate differences among women and undermine possibilities for collective action by women, thus reinforcing the power of patriarchy and reducing the chance that women can challenge the gender hierarchies and ideologies that construct and maintain their subordination (Parpart and Marchand 1995, 19).

In a similar vein, Thornham argues:

With no arguments for change, power is ceded to the powerful. This last point takes us on to a further argument: that postmodernism may itself be a new 'master discourse', one which deals with the challenges posed by feminism by an attempted incorporation—as when feminism is offered inclusion in the postmodern debate as 'an instance' of postmodern thought (2001, 47).

Thornham observes that many feminists are skeptical of any postmodern approach that attempts to "deal with...feminist critique by offering itself as a 'framing discourse'"

(2001, 47). Certainly, an engagement on those grounds does not reflect a critical dialogue that shapes, challenges, and benefits both theories. The task for feminists who share this

42 concern, then, is to employ feminism to frame investigations of the postmodern

(Thornham 2001, 52). As Parpart and Marchand note, "the encounter between feminism and postmodernism is clearly ongoing, indeterminate and fluid. It is contested terrain, which will no doubt continue to foster debate and dialogue" (1995, 10-11).

In addition to the focus on difference mentioned above, how does postcolonialism overlap with feminist approaches? Stephen Spencer describes why he believes feminism and postcolonialism are aligned:

In many different societies, women, like colonised subjects, have been relegated to the position of'Other', 'colonised' by various forms of patriarchal domination. They thus share with colonised races and cultures an intimate experience of the politics of oppression and repression, albeit from a very different perspective. This is clearly a reason why post-colonial theories have shared concerns with developments in feminist theory. Both discourses endeavour to examine and reassert marginalised voices (2006, 125).

He also suggests that feminists have developed some important critiques of foundational postcolonial texts, and vice versa. Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin agree, asserting that,

"feminism has highlighted a number of the unexamined assumptions within post-colonial discourse, just as post-colonialism's interrogations of western feminist scholarship have provided timely warnings and led to new directions" (1995c, 249). Mohanty's 'Under

Western Eyes' is a key example of such an exchange. Feminist critiques of Said's

Orientalism provide another. Feminists have pointed out that Said frames Orientalism as a unified discourse, failing to question women's apparent absence as producers of

Orientalist discourse and agents of colonial power, and that he does not fully explore the portrayal of 'Other' women as powerless, which is central to the "discursive subordination of the East" (Spencer 2006, 125). Orientalist discourse maintains its power in part through depicting the 'East' as lacking women's rights, and as this thesis will demonstrate:

43 The veil, the hijab, has come to be seen as a symbol of this oppression as well as the signifier of romantic mystique of the Orient contrasted to the supposed freedoms of western sexuality... Into the twenty-first century, the veiled Muslim woman has come to represent the ultimate symbol of backwardness and oppression...(Spencer 2006, 126).

Rajeswari Sunder Raj an and You-me Park also describe the intersection between feminism and postcolonialism:

Postcolonial feminism cannot be regarded as a subset of postcolonial studies, or alternatively, as another variety of feminism. Rather, it is an intervention that is changing the configurations of both postcolonial and feminist studies. Postcolonial feminism is an exploration of and at the intersections of colonialism and neocolonialism with gender, nation, class, race, and sexualities in the difference contexts of women's lives, their subjectivities, work, sexuality, and rights (2000, 53).

They discuss the centrality of representation to this field, which is particularly relevant to this thesis:

In their engagement with the issue of representation, postcolonial feminist critics...have attacked both the idea of universal 'woman,' as well as the reification of the Third World 'difference' that produces the 'monolithic' Third World woman. They have insisted instead upon the specificities of race, class, nationality, religion, and sexualities that intersect with gender, and the hierarchies, epistemic as well as political, social, and economic that exist among women. First World feminists are called upon to recognize differences, acknowledge the historical specificity of women in other places and times, and abandon their unexamined ethnocentrism and the reproduction of orientalist categories of thought; nor can these earlier positions be replaced simply by an attitude of easy benevolence towards Third World women-as-victims, 'information retrieval' as a way of knowing them, or the celebration of pluralism. Instead First World feminists must enter the hard work of uncovering and contesting global power relations, economic, political, military, and cultural- hegemonic (2000, 54).

Postcolonial feminist approaches that emphasize cultural difference and refuse to homogenize experiences of women's oppression are central to the interrogation of politicized representations.

Furthermore, Sue Thornham argues that in addition to gender and power, politics is also central to feminism. In fact, "for feminism...politics and theory are interdependent" (Thornham 2001, 41). In this way, feminism and postcolonialism

44 resonate because, as Hutcheon argues, both theories "have distinct political agendas and often a theory of agency that allow them to go beyond the post-modern limits of deconstructing existing orthodoxies into the realms of social and political action" (1995,

130). As mentioned above, a recurring critique of postmodernism is that it lacks a theory of politics or resistance. Indeed, as Stephen Morton points out, a central postcolonial critique of work informed by postmodernism is that it "denies the agency and voice of the colonized" by "framing political resistance in the abstract terms of signs, codes and discursive strategies" (2007, 161). As argued above, I would not go so far as to depict postmodernism as "politically ambivalent" as Hutcheon does (1995, 130). However, it is clear that postcolonialism and feminism theorize resistance and agency in a way that postmodernism does not, and from which the latter could benefit.

Feminist debates are ongoing concerning the most effective framework to tackle issues of representation. While many feminist scholars have expressed unwavering opposition to postmodern theories, "feminists of various persuasions are increasingly convinced that at least some aspects of postmodernist thinking are relevant to feminist theor(ies) and praxis" (Parpart and Marchand 1995, 8). A number of feminist interrogations of the 'War on Terror' in Afghanistan draw on both postcolonialism and postmodernism, demonstrating that this 'hybrid' framework is not only functional, but also effective. Speaking generally, many postcolonial feminist frameworks do intersect with Foucauldian or Derridean positions, suggesting that while postcolonialism should not be subsumed into postmodernism, the two approaches are perhaps not as incompatible as some scholars suggest (Rajan and Park 2000, 55). Take, for example,

Mohanty's 'Under Western Eyes.' While she explicitly distances herself from

45 postmodernism, which she criticizes for its inability to account for material realities, her essay combines feminism, postcolonial politics, and Foucault's analysis of power/knowledge in an incredibly effective and enduring way (2002, 504). Similarly,

Derrida influences Spivak's 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' and furthermore, Said's

Orientalism, while not an explicitly feminist text, draws heavily on Foucauldian notions of discourse (Said 1978; Spivak 2006; Spencer 2006, 125; 133). As Said explains in his introduction to Orientalism:

I have found it useful here to employ Michel Foucault's notion of a discourse, as described by him in The Archaeology of Knowledge and in Discipline and Punish, to identify Orientalism. My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage - and even produce - the Orient politically, sociologically, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period (1978, 3).

Written from a postcolonial perspective, however, Said's work does depart from

Foucault. A more recent example of the interplay between these theories is the work of

Krista Hunt and Kim Rygiel, who discuss how "feminist analyses of this (en)gendered war disrupt and make visible the masculinized, militarized, racialized, sexualized, and classed dynamics through which the war operates and which often go unnoticed, ignored, or hidden by official representations of war" (2006, 3). Hunt and Rygiel's position is overtly feminist, their insistence upon the intersecting specificities of race, sex, class, and so forth is akin to postcolonialism (Rajan and Park 2000, 54), and their emphasis on

'making visible' is achieved through discourse analysis and echoes commentary of

Foucault, who is said to "[render] visible certain aspects of our experience in profoundly new ways" (Raibow and Rose 2003, viii). These perspectives demonstrate the expediency of a multi-pronged approach that includes feminist, postmodern, and postcolonial analysis.

46 In discussing the project of recovering women's knowledge/voices (especially those of marginalized or poor women), Parpart and Marchand point to the utility of a

feminism which incorporates both postmodernism and postcolonialism:

The post-colonial literature, with its focus on the discourse of the powerful, offers important insights into the forces silencing women, but it has less to say about the way women actively construct their own identities within the material and discursive constraints of their lives. The postcolonial analysis of resistance, hybridity and mimicry, with its attention to the multiple forms of resistance against Western hegemony (Bhabha 1994; Spivak 1990), along with postmodern feminists' attention to difference, language and power, have much to offer discussion on this issue (1995, 18).

As Parpart and Marchand propose, feminism, postmodernism and postcolonialism are especially relevant to one another within the frame of development. They argue that "the issue of colonial/neo-colonial discourse has thus far been the most immediate 'link' between postmodern feminism and gender and development" (1995, 15):

The critique of modernity and Western hegemony, the focus on difference and identity, the emphasis on the relationship between language and power, the attention to subjugated knowledge(s) and the deconstruction of colonial and postcolonial representations of the South as the dependent 'other' have much to say to those involved in the development business. After all, the development enterprise, whether drawing on liberal or Marxist perspectives, has been largely rooted in Enlightenment thought (1995, 11).

As this section has demonstrated, feminism, postmodernism and postcolonialism have much to offer each other, especially when applied to the discourse and practice of development, embedded as it is in Enlightenment philosophy. When discourses of resistance and material realities are accounted for, which feminism and postcolonialism reminds theorists to do, the three theories can work in concert. For this topic, which

questions development rhetoric and practice, media and government discourses, and politicized representations of a 'Third World' and gendered 'Other,' there is no more

suitable theoretical framework than one that combines feminism, postmodernism, and postcolonialism.

47 3.6 Research Methodology

In a discussion with Foucault, Deleuze argues that, "a theory is exactly like a box of tools...it must be useful. It must function. If no one uses it, beginning with the theoretician him self... then the theory is worthless" (1977, 208). This section will be brief, because my methods are derived from and contained within the theories I have described at length above. My methodological approach combines relevant aspects of feminism, postmodernism, and postcolonialism to focus on gender, power, representation, Orientalism, resistance, material reality, difference, binary thinking, and discourse. I will quickly expand on three methods central to my approach - discourse analysis, difference, and deconstruction.

Discourse analysis can refer to a huge variety of methods, but here the term is used to indicate poststructuralist, postmodern, or postcolonial approaches to texts, images, and history - many of which owe much to the philosophies of Michel Foucault.

Foucault encourages thinking of power as being "exercised within discourses," which then constitute and control individuals, societies, and institutions (Weedon 1997, 110).

He also argues that it is not possible to discern which representations or ways of knowing are true and which are false; the more pertinent question is which discourses are linked to power (Gill 2007, 61). Foucault's work is central to past and current projects of discourse analysis. Parpart and Marchand elucidate his work:

He argues that discourse - a historically, socially and institutionally specific structure of statements, terms, categories and beliefs - is the site where meanings are contested and power relations determined. The ability to control knowledge and meaning, not only through writing but also through disciplinary and professional institutions, and in social relations, is the key to understanding and exercising power relations in society. According to Foucault, the false power of hegemonic knowledge can be challenged by counter-hegemonic discourses which offer alternative explanations of'reality' (1995, 2-3).

48 Through discourse analysis, scholars can uncover much about how power operates and affects lived realities. Hunt and Rygiel speak to the importance of destabilizing meta- narratives through discourse analysis:

Discourse analysis...provides the ground upon which to challenge and destabilize dominant discourses. By revealing how dominant discourses pose as regimes of truth, we aim to open up space in which alternative discourses can be produced along with the alternative politics that they enable. As such, this approach should not be regarded as simply a theoretical exercise, since discourses produce and legitimize the political realities that materialize 'on the ground' (2006, 5).

Hunt and Rygiel's justification for discourse analysis and deconstruction is very persuasive - particularly their insistence that their methodology is not merely theoretical, but has the potential to change material realities.

Difference has been discussed extensively throughout this chapter. In this last section, rather than revisit these debates, I would like to focus on Mohanty's 2002 reflections on differences and solidarity. Mohanty argues that a focus on difference does not necessarily need to be fragmentary, or preclude possibilities for transnational solidarity. She writes of her seminal essay 'Under Western Eyes,' "my insistence on the specificity of difference is based on a vision of equality attentive to power differences within and among the various communities of women" (2002, 502). Mohanty's thinking provides an illustrative example of how postmodern, postcolonial, and feminist approaches can be melded together. She begins with a rejection of Eurocentric universalizing discourses in 'Under Western Eyes.' In revisiting that essay, she goes further to account for commonality as well as difference within a paradigm of decolonization (2002, 503; 504). She explicates:

In knowing differences and particularities, we can better see the connections and commonalities because no border or boundary is ever complete or rigidly determining. The challenge is to see how differences allow us to explain the

49 connections and border crossings between and more accurately, how specifying difference allows us to theorize universal concerns more fully. It is this intellectual move that allows...concern for women of different communities and identities to build coalitions and solidarities across borders" (2002, 505).

While in this thesis, the site of my resistance remains in the academy and my primary focus is my own nation - I "struggle on my own terrain," as Foucault suggested -

Mohanty's characterization of difference here is valuable to feminists inside and outside of the university. It is vital to recognize and respect difference, and if a real appreciation of difference rather than a sense of pity, guilt, or superiority motivates action in the global North, transnational solidarity movements have real potential, as they will be propelled by a common purpose and rooted in material realities.

Lastly, deconstruction allows for the examination of the power of representations.

Influenced by Derrida, Ramazanoglu and Holland "take deconstruction.. .as reflecting on, questioning and unsettling existing assumptions, meanings and methods. Deconstruction in this sense exposes binary thinking and questions how ways of thinking, telling truths, reading texts, and so on, have been socially constituted in particular contexts" (2002, 88).

Parpart and Marchand assert that the project of deconstructing binaries is important because the first term in a pair is always assumed superior to the second, and also, "these pairs are as embedded in the definition of their opposite as they are in the nature of the object being defined, and they shape our understanding in complex and often unrecognized ways" (Parpart and Marchand 1995, 3). The process of postmodern deconstruction helps us understand and articulate the process of binary thinking, which is often naturalized and justified in media, aid, and government discourses. Deconstruction of oppositional binaries allows for more fluid thinking about social realities, and helps scholars explore the power relations informing binary oppositions, which can be

50 considered socially constructed rather than natural when using a feminist, postmodern, postcolonial lens. Paradoxically, the project of deconstruction illuminates the search for how social identities, meanings, and differences are constructed (Parpart and Marchand

1995, 3). Not surprisingly, discourse from the global North has dominated the construction of differences, of 'Others' (Parpart and Marchand 1995, 4). The critical engagement between postmodern (de)construction and postcolonial understandings of

Orientalism can offer new avenues for thinking about difference, and who 'controls' as well as 'resists' discourse (Parpart and Marchand 1995, 4).

Clearly, my research methods are inextricably bound to my theoretical framework. I employ an extensive discourse analysis of Canadian primary source material resulting in my investigation of Canadian representations of Afghan women in media and aid discourses, which are often reflective of government rhetoric. The

Canadian primary sources I consult include local and national newspapers, reports and press releases from various branches of the government, including the Department of

National Defence's website on Canada's engagement in Afghanistan, the Prime

Minister's Office, and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the websites and promotional material of Canadian Women for the Women of Afghanistan

(CW4WAfghan) and Canada-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee (CASC). In identifying key themes and media templates (Kitzinger 2000), I evaluate the employment of women's rights discourse in media, aid and government realms and question the notions that underpin the most popular representations. Thematic analysis like that conducted in this thesis refers to the exploration of the "connection between cultural representations - meanings - and power relations, affirming the importance of images, values and

51 discourses in constructing and reproducing the social order" (Gill 2007, 54). This approach enables researchers to destabilize the dominance of images and social relations that have become naturalized (Gill 2007, 54). The research methods employed in this thesis, namely discourse analysis with the aim of exposing power relations, a focus on difference as opposed to homogenization, and the deconstruction of the 'Other' as well as problematic binaries, are all tools that are derived from my theoretical framework. These methods will prove to be the most effective in answering my main research question which examines whether politicized representations of Afghan women and the co-option of women's rights discourse has influenced, and potentially justified, massive injections of aid into Afghanistan and garnered support in Canada for the military intervention. My research questions follow from my theoretical approach because they seek to uncover the power dynamics that inform representations of Afghan women and the political uses of these constructions. Moreover, they challenge homogenized interpretations of Afghan femininity and static 'Enlightenment' conceptions of development.

3.7 Conclusion: An Integrated Approach

Working with a feminist framework that incorporates aspects of both postmodernism and postcolonialism is in many ways a fraught exercise, as each theory has an uneasy relationship with the other. However, in order to think about and access interlocking oppressions in analyzing politicized and gendered representations and discourse, a layered theoretical approach is essential. Each theory offers invaluable arguments and tools that are applied to my central research questions, and while the interactions between feminism, postmodernism, and postcolonialism can be strained, they can also open up important ways to research the rhetoric of development, security, and the discourse of

52 'Other' women in a Canadian context. Feminism can bridge the gap between postmodernism and postcolonialism, and due to the overlap and potential for constructive interaction between the 'posts,' it is both feasible and fruitful to include them both in a

'hybrid' theoretical approach. Furthermore, when the theories productively connect with one another, the potential for new and effective ways to analyze data and approach transnational solidarity is actualized. As Parpart and Marchand articulate, "dialogue across differences is not simply a matter of good will. It requires a recognition of the power of language, a conscious effort to situate one's own knowledge and a willingness to open oneself to different world views" (1995, 18-19). This is arguably achievable through a critical engagement in feminist, postmodern, and postcolonial discourses.

53 Chapter 4: 'Unveiling' Representations Of Afghan Women In Canadian Newspapers

4.1 Introduction: The Media - An Instrument Of War

News of the mission in Afghanistan often dominates the Canadian mainstream media; in

2006, the intervention was, by far, the top Canadian news story (Hayes 2008, 281). More specifically, since the events of September 11, 2001 and the resulting US led 'War on

Terror,' the position of women in nations associated with 'Islamic fundamentalism' has attracted sustained attention from media outlets in the global North. In fact, women have become central to debates in North American popular culture over the nature of Islam and the 'War on Terror.' As Roksana Bahramitash argues, a major theme in media coverage seems to be Muslim women as victims of religious doctrine (2005, 221). Similarly,

Sultan Barakat and Gareth Wardell suggest that after 9/11 the global North

'(re)discovered' oppression faced by Afghan women, and most of the attention the issue received has been well intentioned, but ill informed (2002, 909). In an increasingly globalized and media saturated world, representations in media matter. Furthermore, as

Kenneth Payne argues, modern media is "indisputably an instrument of war" (2005, 81).

Canadians' understandings of Afghan women's realties are shaped by the way in which they are portrayed. Simultaneously, politicized depictions of Afghan women influence the views Canadians hold regarding their nation's role in the Afghan intervention.

Cynically interpreted, the sudden and renewed interest in the wellbeing of Afghan women post 9/11 is disingenuous and self-serving, as representations of victimized

Afghan women are central to national justifications for Canada's presence in

Afghanistan. As Yasmin Jiwani suggests, in 'civilized' nations such as Canada, "the

54 violence of the state through its brutal invasion and occupation... needs to be rationalized in discourses of care, compassion, and rescue" (2009, 729). Speaking critically of

Canadian media post 9/11, Erin Steuter and Deborah Wills argue:

In the climate of anxiety following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, government and military filters became less tacit and more overt, flourishing in an atmosphere in which the twin modalities of fear and patriotism not only permitted, but encouraged journalists to set aside their traditional appearance of objectivity (2009, 10).

Similarly, James Laxer, academic and former Toronto Star columnist, argues that

Canadians have been ill served by the mainstream media:

There has been shockingly little analytical journalism on this war, its origins and course, and the role Canada is playing in it. Too much of the reportage has come from journalist embedded with the Canadian forces; their stories are like those of sports writers working for the home team (2008, 11).

Building on such skepticism, this chapter will question the extent to which representations of Afghan women in Canadian media from April 2009 - February 2010 are underwritten by Orientalist notions that may also be bound up in efforts to garner support for the military intervention. Articles including editorials, news reports, columns, special features, and dispatches from the field have been selected from national and local newspapers with various political leanings. These include The Globe and Mail, The

National Post, The Edmonton Journal, The Regina Leader Post, The Vancouver

Province, The Toronto Star, The Calgary Herald, The Waterloo Regional Record, The

Ottawa Citizen, The Montreal Gazette, The Edmonton Sun, and The Hamilton Spectator.

Searching for articles on the online database Factiva over a ten-month period, a relatively small pool of twenty-five to thirty-five articles emerged that referenced both the war in

Afghanistan and Afghan women. Of that sample, I selected articles of substantial length published in a variety of newspapers across Canada. On this basis, a discourse analysis of

55 sixteen disparate articles is undertaken, and main themes emerging from the collection are analyzed in an attempt to "understand how images and cultural constructions are connected to patterns of inequality, domination and oppression" (Gill 2007, 7). Although this corpus does not exhaust the multiplicity of Canadian newspaper coverage of Afghan women and the 'War on Terror,' while avoiding repetition, it does account for the most relevant reports to this topic over April 2009 - February 2010 and therefore, it provides a representative sample that is part of a larger Canadian discourse in need of critical analysis.

While there is no uniform 'regime of truth' (Dakroury and Jiwani 2009, 2) proffered by the Canadian media, the prevalence of representations which render Muslim women, men, and society 'Other' and the resurgence of Orientalist logic and blatant stereotypes evident in Canadian news must continue to be interrogated. The three dominant themes of the corpus - 'Western' 'progress,' 'victimized' Afghan women, and veiled Afghan women - intersect with one another, ultimately working to justify a

Canadian presence in Afghanistan that will result in 'liberating' women permanently from 'uncivilized' Afghan men and society. Sherene Razack contends,

Three allegorical figures have come to dominate the social landscape of the 'war on terror' and its ideological underpinning of a clash of civilizations: the dangerous Muslim man, the imperilled Muslim woman, and the civilized European, the latter a figure who is seldom explicitly named but who nevertheless anchors the first two figures (2008, 5).

When applied to Canadian news, Razack's observation is significant, but important outliers exist which can work to destabilize simplistic categories of 'victim,' 'threat,' and

'hero.' However, this analysis suggests that while outliers persist, the Canadian news media's (re)construction of Afghan women as veiled 'victims' and its emphasis on maintaining Orientalist distinctions through discourses of progress overwhelms them.

56 Ultimately, Canadian newspapers are instruments that most often work to bolster the justification of the national state for war and garner support for the Afghan intervention.

4.2 Gender And The News

The news often speaks for others and 'Other' women; an action that some feminist theories contend is "arrogant, vain, unethical, and politically illegitimate" (Alcoff 1991,

6). In a discussion between poststructuralists Giles Deleuze and Michel Foucault,

Deleuze suggests that Foucault teaches us "something absolutely fundamental: the indignity of speaking for others...only those directly concerned can speak in a practical way on their own behalf' (Deleuze and Foucault 1977, 209). The practice of speaking for others is inextricably bound to the 'crisis of representation' discussed briefly in Chapter 3 and remains contested within academia (Alcoff 1991, 9). In the news, however, the practice of speaking for others is often uncritically accepted. This is especially true of reporters who represent Afghan women as being unable to speak for themselves, and who benefit by sensationalizing their plight. The ability to mold images, and therefore understandings, in public discourse is one reason the media proves to be so powerful:

In an era in which image is truth and truth is image, the power of the media is pervasive. Doing much more that merely holding up a mirror to society...the media also contribute to the construction of social reality by selectively 're- presenting' identities and issues and by serving as gatekeepers to public space and moderators of social dialogue. While the advent of the Internet has provided alternative means of entry to public conversation and has created fora for unconventional voices and opinions, the media of television, radio, magazines and mass-circulation newspapers remain influential (Sharify-Funk 2009, 74).

As Sharify-Funk points out, although technology has made possible alternative spaces for self-representation, media discourses continue to be legitimized by larger structures of power. While the rise of 'social media' should not be discounted, 9/11 and the events that followed only reinforced and underscored the continuing power of the mainstream media

57 to "shape and define dominant social narratives, ...be captured by influential political and economic actors...[and] remain captive to deeply engrained stereotypes" (Sharify-Funk

2009, 74-75). The positionality of Canadian journalists and the currency of Orientalist narratives post 9/11 are proving very influential, impacting what is and what is not reported in the news, the discursive framings used, and the types of images that are most popular. Furthermore, the repetition of specific images and phrases in discourse can work to build consensus around questionable rhetoric (Brock and Cornwall 2005). Media templates that link the Taliban, Islam, the burqa, and oppression, for example, will be explored below (Jiwani 2009, 735).

Rosalind Gill notes that when women are considered 'newsworthy,' "one consistent finding is that most news about women focuses on their physical appearance"

(2007, 115). For example, 62% of the articles analyzed in this paper draw attention to the appearance of Afghan women, specifically the veil. This finding highlights the important question of which women are 'worthy' of being saved. Afghan women are deemed

'worthy' of rescue through what Susan Jeffords (1991) and others identify as a

'protection scenario.' The logic of a 'protection scenario' creates three categories: the protected/victim, the threat/villain and the protector/hero (Jeffords 1991, 204). Edward

Said contends that Orientalism underlies the 'protection scenario,' which gives "the more powerful, more developed, more civilized the right.. .to colonize others.. .in the name of a noble ideal" (2000, 574). As observed by Carol Stabile and Deepa Kumar, the 'noble ideal' in the case of the Afghan intervention is the rescue of Afghan women (2005, 771).

Stabile and Kumar also note that the "protection scenario is closely linked to the

58 justificatory narratives of colonialist projects, in which exotic brown women...must be saved by the civilized (white) hero from some barbaric villain" (2005, 770).

Yasmin Jiwani articulates how the Orientalist 'protection scenario' works in

Canadian news to build consent around the intervention:

To be 'saved,' Afghan women have to be considered worthy of rescue. Afghan women are rendered worthy of this rescue (even though their situation has not changed for the better since then) by the virtue of the construction of the Taliban as an ultra-patriarchal force representative of Islam. This reinforces stereotypical constructions about the barbaric nature of Islam and its subhuman treatment of women, a theme that resonates with orientalist literature and popular images of oppressed Muslim women (2009, 735).

The 'protection scenario' works to deny Afghan women agency, to boost support for

Afghan intervention, and to cement Orientalist notions about how the

'Enlightened"West' differs fundamentally from the 'barbaric' 'Orient.' Criticizing feminists who align themselves with a 'protection scenario,' Iris Marion Young notes:

Even before the war it seems to me, however, and still seems to me, that feminist focus on women under the Taliban constructed these women as exoticized others and paradigmatic victims in need of salvation by Western feminists and it conveniently deflected attention from perhaps more intractable and mundane problems of gender-based violence, domination, and poverty in many other parts of the world, including the enlightened West (2003, 19)

While the Taliban should certainly be condemned for its discriminatory and oppressive policies against women, the 'protection scenario' problematically assumes that all women in the global North experience gender equality and women's human rights. As Stabile and Kumar assert, 'the 'protection scenario' "has never been an innocent or progressive discourse" (2005, 770). Rather, they argue:

...militarism by the world's imperialist powers never improves the lives of women and children. Instead, by rendering women the passive grounds for an argument aimed at imperial domination, the discourse of protection used by politicians and media alike - like the very fundamentalism it purported to attack - denied women any agency in the decision-making processes that affected their everyday lives and futures (2005, 770).

59 The three main themes that emerge from the sources examined here - 'progress,'

'victimized' Afghan women, and veiled Afghan women - indicate that the 'protection scenario' has infiltrated Canadian news.

4.3 The Problem Of Progress

Having come of age in a time of great transition and new hope in her country, Sitara is keenly aware of how she was felled by its old traditions. Over the past eight years, Canada alone has spent $10-billion in its effort to rebuild Afghanistan; improving the situation of women in Kandahar - the most fundamentalist of Afghanistan's 34 provinces - was originally an intended byproduct of the mission...While no two stories are the same, the women all share a suffocating sense that the boundaries of their lives are predetermined and impenetrable. - Jessica Leeder, 'My Dreams Are Gone,' The Globe and Mail, September 19 2009

In the article quoted above, Jessica Leeder emphasizes Canada's effort to lessen the oppression of Afghan women, originating as it does from Afghanistan's 'old traditions.'

She confuses readers by insisting "no two stories are the same" while simultaneously homogenizing Afghan women by claiming that they all share "a suffocating sense that the boundaries of their lives are predetermined and impenetrable" (Leeder 2009). Leeder invokes the 'protection scenario' which Iris Marion Young calls 'paternalist militarism.'

Young articulates the centrality of notions of 'progress' to 'paternalist militarism' and the

Afghan intervention:

The knights of civilization aim to bring enlightened understanding to the further regions of the world still living in cruel and irrational traditions that keep them from developing the economic and political structures that will bring them a good life. The suppression of women in these societies is a symptom of such backwardness (2003, 19).

Similarly, Said argues that Orientalist logic emphasizes the 'progress' and diversity of the

'West,' while reducing the 'East' to a singular entity ruled by Islamic barbarism:

...the world of Islam - its varied societies, histories and languages notwithstanding - is still mired in religion, primitivism and backwardness. Orientalism posits the West as modern, greater than the sum of its parts, full of enriching contradictions, and yet always 'Western' in its cultural identity. The

60 world of Islam, in stark contrast, is no more than 'Islam,' reducible to a small number of unchanging characteristics, despite the existence of contradictions and experiences of variety that seem on the surface to be as plentiful as those of the West (1981, 10).

The discourse of 'progress' pervades news about the Afghan mission, and Afghan

women. This theme closely echoes government discourse. For example, John Manley,

quoted above, discussed Canadian soldiers fighting in the "defence of liberty" and Jean

Chretien invoked Canadian morality and an inscrutable enemy 'Other' when framing the

struggle against terrorism in October 2001:

I have made clear in the days since September 11 that the struggle to defeat the forces of terrorism will be a long one. We must remain strong and vigilant. We must insist on living on our terms according to our values, not on terms dictated from the shadows. I cannot promise that the campaign against terrorism will be painless, but I can promise that it will be won (In Stein and Lang 2007, 1).

Of the selected articles, 81% suggest that 'progress' is central to NATO's Afghan

mission and/or that Canadian soldiers will deliver 'liberation,' 'civility,' and 'order' and

install systems of human rights and government akin to those in the West. The notion of

'progress' prominent in this collection of articles is often Eurocentric, ahistorical, and

deeply Orientalist. The corpus reinforces the 'superiority' of 'Western' civilization, promotes the highly contested 'ideal' of linear, 'Western' modernization and often does not consider history prior to the Taliban regime. In contrast, Afghan society has a

complex history, recent and long-term, defined by power struggles in which gender roles

have often been redefined (Khattak 2004). Afghan women's realities across time and

space have certainly not been static since time immemorial.

For example, Joel Brinkley suggests in an op-ed published in The Vancouver

Province that in Afghanistan prior to 2001, "women lived in medieval Taliban theocracy"

(Brinkley 2009). Therefore, he argues, after the invasion, foreign governments "needed to

61 do very little to give women a sense of liberation" (Brinkley 2009). It is clear from

Brinkley's comments that freedom would be delivered to oppressed Afghan women from benevolent NATO governments. Brinkley concludes his argument by musing, "women have fought in the U.S. for 200 years to win equal rights. In Iraq and Afghanistan, women must climb a far steeper hill. Let's hope the accomplishments of western women can serve as inspiration to shorten the journey" (Brinkley 2009). Brinkley's summary statements are problematic on a number of levels. He victimizes Afghan women, who in his view have to climb a ''much steeper hill,' presumably due to their 'barbaric' culture or religion, so that they can mirror women in the global North who are portrayed as having achieved full equal rights. Brinkley's depiction is not only Orientalist, it assumes that an

Afghan model should reflect an American one and that women in the global North do not continue to struggle against discrimination based on gender.

Antonia Zerbisias' Toronto Star article, 'Afghanistan Worse Than Ever,' is an outlier in that she does not support Canada's military engagement and is critical of the deployment of women's rights discourse to garner support for the intervention. Despite this critical stance, she contends that Canada should follow through on its commitments to women through a focus on development:

The only way to bring security is to protect women and children, not with bombs and bullets, armour and airplanes, but with secure schools, clean wells, steady supplies of food and legislation that punishes men, not women. That's how you change a country. Canada can do much better (Zerbisias 2009).

Zerbisias' article, while an outlier in this corpus, ultimately accepts that Canada should play a role in delivering 'progress' to Afghanistan's women. Canada has the power, and, it is insinuated, the responsibility, to "change" the nation. In the Canadian news, "efforts to define a collective 'we' through contrasts to a Muslim 'they' have become

62 commonplace" (Sharify-Funk 2009, 75). Clearly, one way this is achieved is through an emphasis on 'Western' cultural superiority, or 'progress.' Another avenue Canadian journalists have pursued in demonstrating the 'West's' superiority is a focus on women's advancement. As Sharify-Funk notes, "women's rights have also become a new orthodoxy of implied Western identity, at least insofar as it provides a basis for favourable contrasts with a less-progressive Muslim 'other'" (2009, 75). The image of the

'victimized' Afghan woman not only works to sustain Orientalist notions of 'Western' ascendancy. It simultaneously supports national justifications for war.

4.4 Victimized Afghan Women: Agency Denied

What an oddity a female reporter must seem in her flak jacket and combat helmet walking with a group of men, her face in full view. Are they scandalized? Or do they envy me? I have no idea. On the occasions that I have actually interviewed Afghan women, I have been struck by their constricted existence - lives that to a western woman seem to have much in common with prized livestock. But they have largely been reluctant to be critical of their society, perhaps fearing repercussions from their men. - Gloria Galloway, 'A Women's World Only Most Can Imagine,' The Globe and Mail, September 20 2009

In the above quotation, Gloria Galloway sets herself apart from Afghan women who she imagines must either envy her or be scandalized by her when they see her in the field with men, her face uncovered. She problematically cannot envision that they would feel something other than desire of her 'liberation' or shock due to their own "constricted existence" which, in her view, they are reluctant to fight against. Galloway effectively vilifies Afghan men, suggests that Afghan women's agency is minimal if it exists at all, and victimizes Afghan women while asserting the superiority of 'Western' femininity, claiming that, to her, Afghan women's lives resemble that of "prized livestock" in comparison to the lives of 'Western' women. In 1991, Chandra Talpade Mohanty described how the 'average third world woman' was often portrayed by feminists in the

63 global North, laying bare the representation's implicit assumptions: "this average third world woman leads an essentially truncated life based on her feminine gender (read: sexually constrained) and her being 'third world' (read: ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, family-oriented, victimized, etc.)" (56). Mohanty's decades old depiction can be applied to Galloway's observations, as well as many other contemporary representations of Afghan women in Canadian newspapers today. An overwhelming 94% of the articles examined here depict Afghan women as victimized - as oppressed, helpless, hopeless, and needing assistance. Furthermore, the binary between victimized Southern women and liberated Northern women continues to hold political currency as it serves to reinforce Canada's 'civility' by privileging 'Western' female identity, thereby authorizing its intervention in an 'uncivilized' Afghanistan. As mentioned above, this framing, which suggests that Afghan women are waiting to be

'rescued,' problematically eliminates the possibility of individual or collective Afghan agency or activism. As Susan Jeffords articulates, "...if victims achieve their own levels of power...the protector's role is necessarily lessened" (1991, 205). It also homogenizes

Afghan women, expunging significant differences around class, race, location, education, etc. Linda Alcoff posits that the "effect of the practice of speaking for others is often...erasure and a reinscription of sexual, national, and other kinds of hierarchies"

(Alcoff 1991, 29). While all the articles in this corpus talk about Afghan women, only

44% of them quote Afghan women directly. It is important to recognize that it can be difficult to interview Afghan women, especially in rural areas. Nevertheless, as Barakat and Wardell note, "since the advent of the Taliban, much ink has flowed on the subject of

64 Afghan women. Many have claimed to speak for Afghan women, sometimes at the expense of listening to them" (2002, 910).

Furthermore, as Jiwani explicates, Canadian journalists work to create a 'media template,' or association between the Taliban, Islam, the burqa, and the oppression of women that further reinforces their victimized status (2009, 735). Jenny Kitzinger explains that media templates are "routinely used to highlight one perspective with great clarity, templates serve as rhetorical shorthand, helping journalists and audiences make sense of fresh news stories" (2000, 61). It is not the only media template associated with

Muslim and Afghan women - others highlight the potential for women to be threats in times of war, their exoticism or their resiliency (Jiwani 2009; Bhattacharyya 2008; Oliver

2007) - all of which deserve further scholarly attention. However, if the template is widened to include notions of the Taliban, Islam/traditionalism/fundamentalism, the burqa, and the oppression of women, 81% of the stories assessed made connections between three or all four of the components, making this particular template quite pervasive in Canadian news media. This chapter questions the ramifications of cementing those particular associations, as media templates shape both understandings and narratives around a particular issue (Kitzinger 2000, 61), and it is therefore crucial to identify, and if necessary, deconstruct problematic templates. The template linking the

Taliban, Islam/traditionalism/fundamentalism, the burqa, and Afghan women's oppression in Canadian newspapers reinforces the victimization and homogenization of

Afghan women in the press and ultimately, buttresses the national justification for intervention: 'saving' Afghan women from oppression and the burqa being thrust upon them by Islamic fundamentalism and/or the Taliban.

65 4.5 Veiled Afghan Women

My first impression of Kandahar City, apart from the heat and dust, was that half the population was missing, or else all the women had gone inside. There were no female faces anywhere. Occasionally, a ghostlike figure would appear on the sidewalk, covered from head to toe in a billowing burka. I thought they looked like Halloween trick-or-treaters in ghost costumes...The covered women in Kandahar have a distinctive gait. They scurried along the narrow sidewalks in a half-trot, shoulders bent. And they traveled in packs, either with a group of children or other women. If they were with men, they shuffled a couple of feet behind. I watched all this from the backseat of a moving car, my vision obscured by my own burka I, too, was required to wear while traveling in the city. The outfit is hot and stuffy. Being draped in rolls of fabric with no ventilation is akin to sitting in an airless sauna. - Jane Armstrong, 'Telling Women's Stories in Afghanistan,' The Globe and Mail, September 18 2009

The language Jane Armstong uses to describe women in burqas in the above quotation is deliberately alienating. To her 'Western' eyes, the women look as though they are wearing "ghost costumes." Furthermore, she describes their movements in animalistic terms - the women 'scurry' in a 'half-trot.' 'They' are different from 'us,' and to further emphasize this, she details her own discomfort in wearing the burqa - she is overheated, her "vision obscured" in the "airless sauna." Problematically, a depiction like

Armstrong's situates Afghan women as foreign, singular 'Others' and supports the notion that the burqa itself, and not the imposition of it, should be equated with oppression

(Ayotte and Husain 2005, 127). As mentioned above, 62% of the articles make specific mention simply of Afghan women wearing burqas. The image of the "burqa-bound" woman has become part of the discourse of the 'War on Terror,' "part of the propaganda, a sign of progress, a reason to keep on fighting" (Zerbisias 2009). Myra Macdonald also speaks to the ability of the "veiled Muslim female body to provoke intense reactions....and to eclipse Muslim women's own diversity of voice and self-definition"

(2006, 8). Macdonald goes on to note that the global North's obsession with veiling/unveiling eliminates space to discuss the diversity of perspectives Muslim women

66 hold (2006, 8). Instead, as with the stereotype that portrays Muslim women as mere victims of men, their cultures, society, or religion, the fixation on the burqa in Canadian newspapers homogenizes Afghan women and erases their differences.

Articles in the stories analyzed often simplistically link Afghan women shedding their burqas with liberation and women wearing burqas with oppression. For example,

Nigel Hannaford, an editor of The Calgary Herald, remarks on the positive impact he believes Canadian forces are making in Afghanistan: "oppressed women? Burkas are seen, but not that often: more common is a shawl over the head" (2009). Jessica Leeder, a

Globe and Mail reporter, argues in the opposite vein, but reinforces the connection between the burqa and oppression. She contends that Afghan women are "forfeiting gains they only recently won" by "slipping on burkas instead of shedding them" (2009).

Hannaford and Leeder's conflation of oppression with the burqa and liberation with unveiling is problematic, and frequent. This notion is not often unsettled by Canadian newspaper outlets, and arguably contributes to increasing discrimination against Muslim women in the global North who choose to practice veiling in multiple forms (Russo 2005,

572). As Macdonald asserts:

...media discourse and debates are fixated on 'veiling' and 'unveiling' and rarely differentiate between styles of Muslim clothing...The singularity of the veil also elides a crucial distinction between coercion and freedom of choice in women's adoption of the variety of head- and/or face-coverings so defined. The 'veil' becomes an all-encompassing symbol of repression, and in its dominant association with Islam (with equivalent Jewish, Christian, or Hindu practices written out of the script) reinforces the monocular representation of that religion (2006, 8).

The focus on veiling and unveiling in Canadian newspapers, removed from discussions of the personal, political, and/or religious reasons that women choose to veil, supports

Orientalist binaries set up between 'us' and 'them' and 'here' and 'there.' Jiwani notes

67 that veiling is central to the 'rescue motif or 'protection scenario' so present in Canadian newspapers post 9/11. She argues, "the burqua in Afghanistan, the chador in Iran, and the abaya in Saudi Arabia...have become iconic symbols of women's oppression under

Islam. The mobilization of the US-Intervention into Afghanistan after 11

September...has utilized this image to secure consent for war" (Jiwani 2009, 731-732).

4.6 Outliers

I spoke to several soldiers about Canada's mission in Afghanistan, and most told me that their job was to protect the populace from the Taliban so that the country's infrastructure can be rebuilt, and democracy can take root. They also spoke about how they wanted Afghan women to be granted their rights, and for children - girls and boys - to go back to school. That's a noble goal, but lousy foreign policy. The West will never change how women are treated in Afghanistan, in my opinion. Only Afghans can do that. - Bruce Ward, 'Missing In Action,' The Ottawa Citizen, January 9 2010

Bruce Ward breaks from the dominant thrust of the stories assessed to suggest that the rhetoric of the mission, which revolves around protecting Afghan women and delivering democracy to Afghanistan, is problematic. He also suggests that Afghans have the ability to create change, which is atypical. He goes on to cite Malalai Joya, a former Afghan MP, who is publically critical of the media representation of Afghan issues in the West, the

Karzai administration, and, perhaps most notably, the existence of foreign troops in

Afghanistan. Ward's article is an outlier - it stands apart from the majority. In fact, 37% of articles in the corpus could be considered outliers in one way or another; however, of that 37%, 67% ultimately demonstrate support for Canada's 'civilizing' presence in

Afghanistan.

As mentioned above, Zerbisias' article is unique because she identifies Canada's focus on Afghan women's plight as propaganda - a view associated with scholarly work but not widely expressed by popular media outlets. Zerbisias is critical of the government

68 for deploying the discourse of women's rights, yet not doing enough on the ground in

Afghanistan to realize them:

If you recall, among the other slogans used to sell us on Afghanistan was 'women's rights...' Western leaders did not care, not until it came in handy as a casus belli. Then those burqa-bound women became part of the propaganda, a sign of progress, a reason to keep fighting...Yes, there has been lots of good news about girls going to school and women in Parliament although the latter are mostly pro-warlord and keep silent. But really, these things mean nothing if they are immolating themselves rather than being married off to old men, if they are attacked with acid on their way to class, if they are imprisoned for being raped only to be raped by their jailers, if they are killed for being outspoken... (2009)

While Zerbisias is opposed to military intervention as a means to achieve gender equality, she does not advocate for Afghan women's autonomy or recognize Afghan women's voice and agency. Rather, she contends that Canada can, and should "change"

Afghanistan through targeted development. Despite the strengths of her article, it is ultimately limited by her focus on Canada's failure to actualize women's rights while uncritically accepting that Canada should do so. Zerbisias identifies Afghan women as

'victims' and Canadian development initiatives and "legislation that punishes men" as the potential fix (2009). However, this rigid construction of the 'Other' and, simultaneously, the Canadian self, precludes understanding, even in small ways, Afghan women's autonomy and agency.

Nigel Hannaford's article provides another example of an outlier that ultimately supports Canada's intervention in Afghanistan. It relates closely with Zerbisias' in that it takes note of how Canada has been 'selling' its presence in Afghanistan to the nation.

Hannaford also recognizes how taking up the cause of women's rights works to sustain national myths, a rather rare perspective in mainstream Canadian media. He writes:

The narrative from both government and opposition is that we are there doing good works. Canadians like that, as it fits our dominant self-image...There's something deeply rewarding in the knowledge that what you're doing makes a difference: It also helps when you're grieving a lost comrade, that it is not all for

69 nothing. However, it could turn out that way if Canada doesn't stay the course. Development is part of the strategy, the hearts-and minds part of the war, not an end in itself (2009).

Unlike Zerbisias, however, Hannaford supports the continuation of the intervention beyond 2011 and believes the focus of the media should be on the 'real issues,' which he identifies as al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Furthermore, he focuses on the gains that have been made in Afghanistan due to the NATO intervention: "in a third-world kind of way, driving around Kabul is encouraging...Oppressed women? Burkas are seen, but not that often: More common is a shawl over the head. Girls go to school, some to higher education" (Hannaford 2009). While he does not create space to recognize women's agency, he does not victimize Afghan women, choosing rather to represent them as

'liberated' due to 'Western' intervention. This representation comes with its own limitations, not the least of which is that it is very much anchored to Orientalist notions, as it is the West that is transforming and 'civilizing' the East. Furthermore, Hannaford seems to conceptualize development as a linear process along 'Western' lines; why else would Kabul be measured by "third-world" standards? Hannaford contends that "things are moving in the right direction in Afghanistan," and that if Canada pulls out in 2011 then the 'progress' he sees blooming will be lost: "Canada has a job to do in Afghanistan that can only be done by its army. Canadians must understand that, or everything we have done will ultimately be for naught" (2009). Divergent perspectives are vital as they can potentially upset Orientalist notions sustained by representations of victimized, veiled

Afghan women and media templates that associate Islam, the Taliban, the burqa, and the oppression of women. However, the stories analyzed suggest that the majority of outliers ultimately support the official justification for war of 'saving' Afghan women by

'civilizing' the Afghan nation.

70 4.7 Conclusion: (Re)producing The 'Other' In Canadian Newspapers

Three main themes emerge from this collection of sixteen articles, which are suggestive of the wider, dominant Canadian discourse on the nation's involvement in the 'War on

Terror' in Afghanistan. To reiterate, 94% of the corpus depicts Afghan women as victimized, and the articles analyzed often tie the representation of Afghan women as oppressed to an image of Afghan society as 'uncivilized,' or Afghan men as dangerous.

As Krista Hunt explicates, constructing Afghan women as victims reinforces the

'uncivilized' nature of Afghan men and society in contrast to the 'civilized' West; the two representations work in tandem (Hunt 2002, 116). The second theme evident throughout the articles was the notion of linear progress, tied up with women's rights, modernity, and Westernization. Many reporters contend that 'progress' can only be delivered through a continued and committed Canadian presence, because 'Western' women have achieved 'liberation' and Canada, therefore, has the ability and/or duty to act as a 'civilizing' savior. Clearly, this framing complements national myths that depict

Canada as a liberal, peace-creating nation (Jiwani 2005). Lastly, the image of the "burqa bound" Afghan woman permeates this collection (Zerbisias 2009). The burqa, rather than its imposition, is equated with oppression and unveiling is simplistically conflated with

'liberation' (Ayotte and Husain 2005, 127). These reductions do not allow for the possibility that women could choose to wear the burqa, and there is no space to discuss

Afghan women's different interpretations of the practice. Outliers exist, which have the potential to destabilize the representations of Afghan woman as victim and Canadian nation as savior, both of which are integral to these articles. They demonstrate that it is possible to challenge dominant discourses within the mainstream media, a forum that is

71 easily understood and accessed. However, the majority of articles ultimately contend that

Canada can and should be a 'civilizing' presence in Afghanistan - a notion in need of critical analysis. This suggests that increasing the inclusion of alternative discourses would benefit the Canadian news.

James Winter indicts the Canadian media for their role in garnering support for the Afghan intervention:

...like their American counterparts, the mainstream Canadian media have adopted the role of stenographers to power, and cheerleaders for the war team. Although this performance has served the establishment well, it is a disservice to the public, the troops, and to the victims in Afghanistan (2006).

While Winter's critique is noteworthy, Aliaa Dakroury and Yasmin Jiwani remind us that the Canadian mainstream media is not a "one way conduit" (2009, 2). It is, however, a realm that forms and informs public discourse and when critically studied, can reveal how power is exercised in society (Dakroury and Jiwani 2009, 1-2). Dakroury and Jiwani suggest that the emphasis of critical analysis should fall on the "preferred meanings, the dominant messages that are repeatedly communicated through legitimized channels of discourse" (2009, 2). This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that while there is no one uniform 'regime of truth' forwarded by the Canadian media, there is a prevalence of representations - most notably surrounding 'progress,' the oppression of Afghan women, and the veil - that speak to "historically archived and inscribed stereotypes" (Dakroury and Jiwani 2009, 2) about Muslim women that not only entrench (mis)understandings of the 'Other' in Canadian society, but directly buttress the official justification for the military intervention.

The majority of reports regarding Afghan women in Canadian media from April

2009-February 2010 lack specificity and complexity, an appreciation of difference, and

72 dissenting viewpoints, especially from the women of Afghanistan themselves, many of whom call for a total troop withdrawal (RAWA 2008). The Canadian media appears to be biased towards supporting the Canadian intervention, even when outliers recognize that the discourse of women's rights may have only been deployed to garner public support.

Arguably, critical voices in mainstream media, as well as alternative media spaces, academia and activism are much needed to temper Canadian media reports regarding

Afghan women. Edward Said's warning at the conclusion of Orientalism is relevant here.

Naturalizing powerful political and ideological distinctions will only intensify and

solidify divisions and misunderstandings among people. He asserts: "no one can escape

dealing with, if not the East/West division, then the North/South one, the have/have-not one, the imperialist/anti-imperialist one, the white/colored one. We cannot get around them all by pretending they do not exist..." (1978, 327). Canadians need to confront their own investment in Orientalist representations of Afghan women, men, and society in the news that secure notions of 'Western' superiority and benevolence. As Sue Thornham notes, "the public narratives of history and culture - endlessly circulated in media forms

- offer frameworks for our self-understanding, frameworks which are externally generated but in which we may have powerful internal investments" (2007, 19).

73 Chapter 5: Interrogating (Re)Productions Of The 'Other' In Canadian Non- Governmental Aid Discourses

5.1 Introduction: Parallel Discourses

Globalization is associated with rapid technological advances, which have made possible greater connectivity between vastly different groups of people. In one respect, these ever- increasing links create the potential for mutually respectful and effective transnational solidarity networks. In another, they have produced new arenas to study 'Other' cultures, and to observe or (re)produce a 'clash of civilizations' (Cloud 2004). As Dorothea

Hilhorst and Mathijs van Leeuwen contend, in a globalized world it often becomes too easy to feel a false "sense of identification and proximity with 'other' women" and to

"project one's images onto those 'others' and to mistake them for real" (2005, 106). It appears this may be the case with the Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations

(NGOs), Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan (CW4WAfghan) and Canada-

Afghanistan Solidarity Committee (CASC). Despite the intentions of CW4WAfghan and

CASC to consider Afghan voices, these organizations' respective discourses neglect dissenting Afghan opinion and reports of local realities that unsettle their positions in favour of projecting their own views onto Afghan people.

This chapter employs the Revolutionary Association of the Women of

Afghanistan's (RAWA) discourse as a counterpoint to explore the differences in how these Canadian NGOs and RAWA define and understand 'liberation' and 'oppression' and demonstrates how, most often, the foundational discourses of CW4WAfghan and

CASC run parallel to rather than intersect with one of the most prominent women's rights organizations in Afghanistan. This disjuncture is problematic because, as Iris Marion

74 Young notes, "the protector-protected relation is no more egalitarian...when between women than between men and women" (2003, 20). I do not doubt the sincerity of

CW4WAfghan and CASC or aim to cast aspersions on the value of their work in Canada or Afghanistan. I do not claim to know how the diverse citizenry of Afghanistan interpret the current foreign military and aid interventions in their country, nor do I believe

RAWA is representative of more individuals than its membership. Lastly, I do not profess to know what course of action Canadian foreign policy should take. Instead, as a

Canadian feminist and academic, I am concerned with how the discourses of

CW4WAfghan and CASC (re)produce difference in Canadian debates by invoking

Orientalist logic which ultimately buttresses the dominant national justification for

Canada's involvement in the 'War on Terror' - 'saving' women and children, and

'civilizing' the Afghan nation (Butler 2009; Jiwani 2005). I focus on CW4WAfghan,

CASC, and RAWA, NGOs that directly express their political position on the 'War on

Terror' in Afghanistan in publicly-accessible forums, like a website or a newsletter, analyzing political principles and organizational goals as well as noteworthy silences.

The organizations included have discourses that speak directly to, or around, each other's. RAWA is the only Afghan organization that I identified with a public interface and overtly political message regarding the military intervention in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, as Sonali Kolhatkar contends:

RAWA is the oldest political women's organization in Afghanistan to link fundamentalism and women's oppression, and has consistently called for secular democratic government. RAWA's work and message of peace and democracy must be an integral part of any discussion concerning Afghanistan (2002, 29).

75 RAWA member Weeda Mansoor describes the organization as the only independent political feminist organization in Afghanistan (2002, 80). This is largely due to the dangerous nature of their work, expanded upon below.

5.2 Contextualizing RAWA

RAWA, the oldest and most renowned humanitarian and political women's organization in Afghanistan, was established in 1977 by Meena Keshwar Kamal (Meena) and a number of female intellectuals in Kabul, Afghanistan (RAWA, "About RAWA"). The organization's early membership suggests RAWA was comprised mostly of women from higher socioeconomic classes (Mansoor 2002, 76-77). Meena was indeed from an upper class family, part of the largest and most politically powerful ethnic group in the 1970s

(the Pashtuns), and was educated at Kabul University (Fluri 2008, 38). Despite her personal status, Jennifer Fluri asserts that "Meena's plans for social reform were not limited to her class, ethnicity, or education level...from the beginning, RAWA actively recruited women from lower socioeconomic classes and ethnic minority groups" (2008,

38). RAWA is currently focused on securing secular democracy in Afghanistan and encouraging women's full and equal participation in all social and political realms

(Mansoor 2002, 76-77). RAWA articulates women's abilities as activists and leaders rather than relying on their roles as wives and mothers to strengthen their political position (Fluri 2008, 50). Their activities encompass health, education, income generation, cultural projects, as well as political agitation and securing women's human rights (Mansoor 2002, 76-77).

In 1987, Meena was assassinated in Pakistan; several of RAWA's key activists have also been imprisoned, tortured, killed or exiled (Mansoor 2002, 76-77; Fluri 2008,

76 39; Cornell 2001, 434). In order to protect existing membership, RAWA has operated underground since the death of Meena (Fluri 2008, 39). To avoid persecution, the organization has no formal office, members change residences frequently to safeguard against bodily harm, they are veiled to conceal identities, and no images of living RAWA members are used in publications (Fluri 2008, 39; Mansoor 2002, 78). Death threats are exceedingly common, yet RAWA has remained unremittingly non-violent (Mansoor

2002, 78; Cornell 2001, 434). As Fluri notes, "RAWA members are willing to dedicate their lives (with a potential threat of death) for the political vision of the organization and nation. However, they are not willing to kill" (2008, 49). Considered an illegal organization in Afghanistan (Mansoor 2002, 80), RAWA has been a vocal and persistent force in Afghanistan since the Russian invasion of 1978. They have spoken out against the Soviet occupation, the mujahideen (also identified as Jehadies in RAWA literature), the Taliban, and most recently, the Karzai administration, the Northern Alliance, and the

US-led NATO intervention.

RAWA works to earn the trust of men by providing opportunities to families and male children through their education, health, and income generation programming (Fluri

2008, 40). While the organization deliberately maintains an all-female leadership structure, Dunia, a RAWA member explains, "We are not anti-male. We...can't work without men" (Dunia in Brodsky 2003, 193). RAWA estimated in 2003 that they had approximately as many male supporters as they did active female members - two thousand in each category (Brodsky 2003, 193). Men are central to the success of the organization, both practically and ideologically. Men often act as family escorts for

77 women, recruit women from within their kinship networks, or serve as guards (Fluri

2008, 41; Benard 2002, 152). Shahla, a member of RAWA explains:

It's true that our tradition contains some very negative values...but in practice, if an Afghan man is open-minded, then he will support women and believe in human rights. I would estimate that the majority of Afghan men are by now against fundamentalism, because everyone suffered under the jihadis and the Taliban, and we've all learned a lot from that experience (Shahla in Benard 2002, 151).

Shahla's insight reminds us that under the Taliban, gendered behavior was strictly enforced for men as well. Furthermore, male RAWA supporters can destabilize the prevalent stereotypes of Afghan men as dangerous and domineering. As Shahla observes,

"people in the West have gotten the impression that every Afghan man is a fundamentalist" (Shahla in Benard 2002, 150). Many male supporters of RAWA dedicate their lives to the organization, though they are denied full membership. Atal explains his motivation: "...this cannot be only women's struggle. This can't be obtained by women alone. We should be shoulder to shoulder" (Atal in Brodsky 2003, 193). In many ways

RAWA "measures the organization's gender dynamics as a marker for successful feminist politics" and provides an oppositional model of gender relations that appears to be operational (Fluri 2008, 41). As male supporters of RAWA do not obtain positions of power often associated with their sex, gender roles, relations, and expectations are reconfigured within the organization.

RAWA has won several international awards for advancing women's human rights in Afghanistan (RAWA, "RAWA Awards"). Despite this record, their networks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and their thirty-three years of experience working to secure the rights and safety of women and children in Afghanistan, RAWA does not currently receive funding from the UN, international NGOs, or foreign and Afghan

78 governments (RAWA, "About RAWA;" RAWA, "RAWA's Social Activities"). This is quite possibly due to their unswerving anti-fundamentalist, pro-secular, pro-democratic position and critical stance concerning the 'War on Terror.' The organization, and their numerous humanitarian projects, including running a hospital, over fifteen schools for boys and girls, and nine orphanages relies on individual donations, membership fees, and revenues from publications and handicrafts (RAWA, "RAWA's Social Activities").

RAWA notes on their website that, "the intensity and the impact of Afghan women's activism for the cause of democracy, and against fundamentalism, would have been much wider and more tangible if we were not in such financial dire straights" (RAWA,

"RAWA's Social Activities").

Ultimately, RAWA hopes to represent women in future democratic governments

(Mansoor 2002, 80). Certainly RAWA is a controversial organization in Afghanistan,

Pakistan, and to a lesser extent, the NATO nations that are intervening in Afghanistan. In addition to their political positions and principles, RAWA challenges the masculinist order by asserting women's leadership potential and demanding women's full and equal participation in social and political public spaces. As Benard asserts, "for many Afghan women, RAWA is the first hint that the things they have thus far been told about women and their limits and frailties and incapacities are, simply, not true" (2002, 43).

Furthermore, RAWA members "refuse to compromise politically with any group or

individual with ties to extremist/fundamentalist groups, which in one respect reinforces their political commitment to women's rights, secularism and democracy, and in another respect marginalizes them from contemporary mainstream politics" (Fluri 2008, 40).

Therefore, it seems unlikely that RAWA will achieve their goal of government

79 participation in the current political environment. Despite this, the members of RAWA continue to demonstrate commitment to their development and awareness initiatives at great personal risk. As Mansoor explains, "we need to be uncompromising in our work and undaunted by misunderstandings or threats against us" (2002, 79).

There has been much scholarly interest in the organization, the majority of it overwhelmingly positive (Fluri 2008; Brodsky 2003; Benard 2003), making its erasure from Canadian discourses all the more significant. RAWA's unique position in Afghan society merits attention to their remarkably unified and consistent voice. Whether one agrees with RAWA's observations and prescriptions or not, ignoring the organization's principles while claiming to speak for Afghan women is remiss.

5.3 Contextualizing CW4WAfghan, CASC, And The FMF

There has been less scholarly interest in CW4WAfghan and CASC than RAWA, in part because both organizations are relatively new. However, since its conception in 1996,

CW4W Afghan has quickly positioned itself as the Canadian authority on Afghan women.

CW4WAfghan boasts internationally acclaimed members, including journalist Sally

Armstrong and popular novelist Deborah Ellis and an annual budget of two million dollars (CW4WAfghan, "History"). Currently, there are twelve CW4WAfghan chapters across Canada comprising approximately 2000 members (O'Conner 2009), and prominent members are regularly featured in Canadian media. Furthermore,

CW4WAfghan consults with the Canadian government. For example, on February 9,

2009, Lauryn Oates represented CW4WAfghan at a roundtable meeting hosted by CIDA and attended by the Minister for International Cooperation, Bev Oda and CIDA's

Afghanistan Task Force and Vice President, Stephen Wallace to give input on CIDA's

80 programming to Afghanistan (CW4WAfghan 2009, 3). If the leadership of the organization is deliberately gendered, CW4WAfghan does not state this specifically; however, all members mentioned by name on the website are female. Most of

CW4WAfghan's funding originates from individual donors, but the organization and its members have received a number of grants from the Canadian International Development

Agency (CIDA) as well (Engler 2009, 154), the implications of which will be discussed below. The organization supports many projects in Afghanistan that focus on education, health care, skills training, and human rights awareness for women and girls

(CW4WAfghan, "History"). CW4WAfghan also works to gain support for their initiatives as well as their political position through education and advocacy initiatives in

Canada (CW4WAfghan, "History;" Butler 2009). CW4WAfghan and individual members of the organization have won a number of awards, raising the profile of

CW4WAfghan further (CW4WAfghan, "Awards and Recognition").

CW4WAfghan and CASC work in cooperation. Nine founding members of

CASC are associated with CW4WAfghan, including Lauryn Oates, a founding member and current project director of CW4WAfghan; Janice Eisenhauer, the Executive Director; and Colette Belanger, who sits on the board of directors (CASC, "Founding Members";

CW4WAfghan "Governance and Finance"). Furthermore, CW4WAfghan devoted a page of their July/August 2008 newsletter to promoting CASC (CW4WAfghan 2008, 6).

CASC's leadership structure is comprised of both men and women, and the organization currently receives no government funding, relying on private donations (CASC, "Get

Involved"). Their focus is on raising scholarship funds for orphaned girls in Kabul and

"helping Canadians understand the importance of Canada's continuing involvement" in

81 Afghanistan (CASC, "Get Involved"). CASC argues that Canada should remain in

Afghanistan post 2011 and that a military component is vital and necessary to secure development and security goals (CASC, "Our Priorities"). CASC is a young organization, introducing itself with a submission to the Independent Panel on Afghanistan in

November of 2007 (CASC 2007). Due to its public profile, CW4WAfghan has the ability to shape Canadians' understanding of Afghan women's realities and the intervention in a way that CASC cannot. However, CASC is increasingly active in the media (CASC,

'Media') and echoes the gendered discourses of CW4WAfghan and the US-based

Feminist Majority Foundation (FMF), which is interesting given that the organization's focus is not explicitly on Afghan women. CASC's discourses also demonstrate that

CW4WAfghan is not alone in its political positions or its strategies for disseminating and defending their views. Therefore, CASC is included in this discussion, though

CW4WAfghan is the primary focus.

While there is a lack of scholarly literature pertaining to CW4WAfghan and

CASC's work, ideology, discourse, and relationship with the Canadian government, the

Feminist Majority Foundation's staunch support of the American intervention in

Afghanistan and its use of Orientalist images and discourse have generated vigorous academic and feminist debate that is applicable to CW4WAfghan and CASC. The FMF has a similar social profile to CW4WAfghan, and therefore comparisons between these two organizations come most easily; however, critiques of the FMF's operational discourse are relevant to both CW4WAfghan and CASC. It should be noted that the FMF and CW4WAfghan campaigned against the Taliban's treatment of women prior to 9/11, and both organizations chose to strategically aligned themselves with their governments

82 and support the 'War on Terror' because 'liberating' Afghan women and children was touted as a justification for war. However, despite feminist advocacy, before the

September 11th attacks, the Taliban was tolerated, and even supported by the global

North, receiving aid from the US as late as four months prior 9/11 (Laxer 2008, 95).

Founded in 1987, the FMF is a highly influential American women's organization. The

'Campaign for Afghan Women and Girls' replaced the FMF's 'Campaign to Stop Gender

Apartheid in Afghanistan,' which had been operating effectively since 1997. In part, its success is due to its high profile chair, Mavis Leno, wife of late night TV personality, Jay

Leno. The FMF's original focus on the plight of women under the Taliban had the ability to bring together vastly disparate individuals. As Charles Hirschkind and Saba Mahmood explain:

Even skeptics who are normally leery of Western feminists' paternalistic desire to 'save Third World women' were sympathetic to the Feminist Majority's campaign...rallying against the Taliban to protest their policies against Afghan women provided a point of unity for groups from a range of political perspectives: from conservatives to liberals and radicals, from Republicans to Democrats, and from Hollywood glitterati to grass roots activists (2002, 340).

The FMF credits itself with raising public awareness of the realities faced by women in

Afghanistan under the Taliban, preventing the Taliban from being recognized as the legitimate government of Afghanistan by the US and UN, and pressuring UNOCAL to forgo its multi million dollar oil and gas investment in a Taliban-run Afghanistan (FMF

2009; Hirschkind and Mahmood 2002, 340).

The FMF became more controversial, however, when American feminists found themselves at odds with the organization regarding the 'War on Terror' in Afghanistan.

Unlike feminists who criticized what they interpreted as the imperialist appropriation of feminism to justify the 'War on Terror,' the FMF supported their government's attention

83 to gendered oppression in Afghanistan and saw the military intervention as a means to

(re)establish women's human rights in the country (Rosenberg 2002, 456; Russo 2005

558). Again, this chapter leaves the merits of the FMF's initiatives and the current state of the Afghan mission to a longer debate to focus on the discourses employed by the

FMF and how they coincide with their Canadian counterparts, CW4WAfghan and CASC.

The FMF casts Afghan women as helpless victims and 'Western' actors as saviors, likely because it has proven to be an effective means to win support for its causes.

CW4WAfghan and CASC employ the same Orientalist discourse in their attempts to convince the Canadian public that Afghan women and children need military intervention to live a democratic and 'free' life. For example, Mavis Leno, speaking on her role as chair of FMF's campaign(s) explains, '"Jay's celebrity is something I can bring to the table to save these women...I firmly believe we are their last hope'" (Leno in Fields-

Meyer and Benet 1998, 234). As Shahnaz Khan suggests, Leno's framing encourages the imagination of "burqa-clad bodies whose images leap at the reader from the pages of the article...burqa-clad women as disembodied spectacle..." (2001, 39). Eleanor Smeal, president of the FMF, testified before Congress in 2001, stating:

In removing the Taliban, the US and its allies must rescue and liberate women and children, who have suffered so terribly ... the link between the liberation of Afghan women and girls from the terrorist Taliban militia and the preservation of democracy and freedom worldwide has never been clearer (Smeal in Russo 2005, 573).

Leno and Smeal's belief that nations of the global North, and specifically the US, are truly the "last hope" of Afghan women and children who are merely waiting to be

'rescued' eliminates the possibility of individual or collective Afghan agency or activism.

This framing renders Afghan women impotent, needing the help, guidance, and ultimately the intervention of the 'civilized' West. Additionally, the assumption that

84 'Western' women are to "save" or 'rescue' Afghan women rather than work with them shifts focus from ongoing issues in the 'West,' which are much deserving of feminist attention. It incorrectly assumes that all women in the global North experience gender equality and women's human rights, and are therefore able to turn their attention to the

'less developed' 'Third World' where an organic feminism could not possibly exist.

Furthermore, Kevin Ayotte and Mary Husain argue that the reliance of the FMF's website on images of burqa-clad women cements the misunderstanding that the burqa itself, and not its imposition, should be equated with oppression (2005, 127). This reduction, which is not often complicated or addressed by North American media, governments, or organizations like the FMF, CW4WAfghan, or CASC, contributes to increasing discrimination against Muslim women in the 'developed' world who choose to practice veiling in various forms (Russo 2005, 572). Dialogue is limited regarding their motivations for veiling, whether they are personal, political and/or religious and, problematically, "the right to practice veiling is not visible as an issue" (Russo 2005,

572). These discussions are vital, however, because they have the potential to upset the

Orientalist binaries set up between East and West, Islam and Judeo-Christianity, uncivilized and civilized, fundamentalism and democracy, and terrorism and freedom.

Ann Russo suggests that the FMF's focus on the burqa, outside of any meaningful context, is evidence of Orientalist framing: "in the FMF campaign, and in the media's response to 9/11, the veiled woman became a spectacle of 'otherness' as well as

'backwardness', and the image stood in contrast to the so-called 'freedom' of fashion here" (2005, 571). Conversely, RAWA's website approaches the issue of veiling by offering political, historical, and cultural contextualization of the practice which "opens

85 up possibilities for transnational solidarity with women subjugated by diverse forms of

'fundamentalism' independent of covering practices" (Ayotte and Husain 2005, 128).

The FMF's support of the military intervention in Afghanistan has obscured the effects of the war on the same women and children the organization purports to help.

RAWA makes the same argument, and it can be extended to CW4WAfghan and CASC.

The focus of NGOs who advocate for the 'War on Terror' often remains on the victimization of women and children and the need for the global North to 'save' them.

They are stubbornly silent when it comes to reporting civilian casualties, mass relocations, or famines caused or aggravated by bombing campaigns and militarism, or the emotional trauma caused by trying to survive in a warzone (Hirschkind and

Mahmood 2005, 341; Russo 2005, 568). Furthermore, the FMF is often charged with being ahistorical - cleverly avoiding the role of the US in creating the objectionable conditions for women under the Taliban by supporting, based on its Cold War strategy, extremist religious groups in Afghanistan (Hirschkind and Mahmood 2005, 341; Russo

2006, 559).

Like CW4WAfghan and CASC, RAWA's opposition to the intervention is not detailed on the FMF's website. As Russo notes, "it seems that since the women of

RAWA reject the 'rescue mission' of the USA given the history of prior militaristic and imperialist interventions, they are no longer included in the FMF's project nor its

'success' story" (2005, 574). Despite this omission, the FMF claim to build their campaigns on knowledge obtained 'in the field,' asserting their own expertise over that of

RAWA members:

From its inception, our Campaign...has been based on primary research. Throughout the campaign, we have interviewed Afghan women leaders about the plight of Afghan women and girls and our staff has traveled into the region and

86 to Afghanistan. Our ability to report first-hand on conditions in the region has significantly increased our credibility with policy makers, enhanced our ability to propose concrete policy changes, and strengthened our advocacy campaign (FMF 2009).

CW4WAfghan and CASC employ this strategy of justification by exclusion as well. For example, RAWA only garners one mention on CASC's website, where founding member

Terry Glavin dismisses RAWA as an "irrelevant neo-Maoist sect" that "enjoys far more support among the rich white liberals of San Francisco and Toronto than it ever did in

Afghanistan" and attempts to separate the group from what he considers 'authentic'

"Afghan feminists" (Glavin 2010).

The Orientalist logic underpinning the Feminist Majority Foundation's 'Campaign to

Stop Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan' and 'Campaign for Afghan Women and Girls' and their continuing support for the 'War on Terror' in Afghanistan has elicited passionate debate in intellectual and feminist communities that adds much needed context to the cases of CW4WAfghan and CASC. As demonstrated in this brief exploration of the FMF, the similarities between the two organizations are many, and as such, several of the feminist critiques of the FMF can be levelled against CW4WAfghan and CASC as well. Furthermore, the case of the FMF demonstrates that discourses of Canadian organizations like CW4WAfghan and CASC can be placed in a larger North American, or 'Western' context. But despite the fact that a number of activists and academics have demonstrated the limitations of the FMF's position, it is vital to critically engage in the

Canadian discourses that often go unexamined next to their more prominent American counterparts. Along with the similarities, moreover, important differences exist between the FMF and CW4WAfghan and CASC, including the centrality of cultural relativism to

87 CASC and CW4WAfghan's defense of its discourse and CW4WAfghan's symbiotic relationship with the Canadian government.

5.4 Oppositional Discourses Of 'Liberation' And 'Oppression'

The discourses of CW4WAfghan and CASC are markedly similar, which is unsurprising considering their overlapping founding and base memberships. CW4WAfghan and

CASC situate oppression as originating solely within Afghan society. For example, Terry

Glavin of CASC argues, "Afghan women continue to be singled out for oppression by a violent corruption of Islam" (2007). Elsewhere, he asserts that in Afghanistan, "it is a

struggle against poverty, illiteracy, and slavery. It's a struggle against an Islamic variation of all the totalitarian, xenophobic, obscurantist and misogynist currents that it has been the historic mission of the left to fight and to defeat" (Glavin 2008, 15). CW4WAfghan identifies the Taliban as the main source of Afghan women's oppression. Sally

Armstrong suggests that under the Taliban, "Afghanistan had become the equivalent of a medieval insane asylum" for women (Armstrong in Williamson 2003, 17). Oates

graphically reminds Canadian readers that Taliban "edicts meant torture, rape, the amputation of nail-polished fingers, women whipped in the streets for an exposed ankle, and girls killed for studying secretly...Today, the Taliban are busy torching schools, decapitating teachers and threatening civilians" (Oates 2006).

RAWA members argue that apart from a minority of women in Kabul, life for

Afghan women has remained the same or worsened since the fall of the Taliban and the

NATO intervention (Kolhatkar and Rawi 2008). In contrast to CW4WAfghan and CASC,

RAWA associates much of the continuing oppression faced by Afghan women with

88 external intervention. RAWA recently responded to US President Obama's plans for a troop surge in Afghanistan:

The so-called 'new' strategy of Obama's administration and the surge of troops in Afghanistan have already dragged our ill-fated people in the danger zone and his 100-day old government proved itself as much more war-mongering than Bush and his only gifts to our people is hiking killings and ever-horrifying oppression. This administration is bombarding our country and tearing our women and children into pieces... (RAWA 2009).

RAWA agrees with CW4WAfghan and CASC that life under the Taliban was one filled with gendered injustice; RAWA maintains, however, that the military presence in

Afghanistan has only compounded the numerous difficulties that are being faced by

Afghan women. Over four thousand, four hundred civilians were killed in the last two years, many of them women and children (Wingrove 2010; Kolhatkar and Rawi 2008).

Refugee camps are struggling to accommodate new arrivals; one in three Afghans who remain in the country suffer extreme poverty and infant and maternal mortality rates are exceedingly high (Kolhatkar and Rawi 2008). In addition to the physical vulnerability of women in times of conflict, Mariam Rawi and Sonali Kolhatkar suggest that though the

Taliban has been removed, Afghan women are just as oppressed by the Northern

Alliance, composed of misogynistic former warlords, and installed through the support of foreign nations (2008). RAWA observes and articulates a direct correlation between foreign intervention and civilian insecurity, continuing 'underdevelopment,' and government corruption and misogynist policies.

Similarly, CW4WAfghan and CASC do not agree with RAWA regarding the meaning of liberation. For CW4WAfghan, liberation is equated with security:

For women, security means more than just the presence of soldiers, barbed wire and barracks. Security is about whether girls are safe walking to school, whether women can venture to the fields...and whether women have appropriate representation in the judicial system. It is about an end to grinding poverty,

89 sexual abuse and the stifling of women's voices. It is about the difference between just surviving, and living with respect and dignity (Reicher and Oates 2006).

For the members of RAWA, liberation must be attained on their own terms:

RAWA strongly believes that there should be no expectation of either the US or any other country to present us with democracy, peace and prosperity. Our freedom is only achievable at the hands of our people. It is the duty of all the intellectuals, all the democratic forces and progressive and independence-seeking people to rise in a constant and decisive struggle for independence and democracy by taking the support of our wounded people as the independent force, against the presence of the US and its allies and the domination of Jehadi and Taliban criminals (RAWA 2008).

RAWA envisions creating a democracy that is entirely Afghan, free from the influence of both the totalitarian Taliban and NATO forces. Yet CW4WAfghan associates freedom with military presence, insisting that NATO is more than just weapons technology and soldiers on the ground, but also the bearers of respect and dignity.

A further tension exists surrounding the question of how best to secure liberation.

Again, CW4WAfghan and CASC disagree with RAWA on whether violence is a legitimate means to attain liberation in Afghanistan and if NATO forces have been successful in protecting women's rights. CASC states that, "we support international and

Canadian intervention in Afghanistan...and call for the continuation of a robust military engagement in which Canada participates..." (CASC, "Our Principles"). Similarly,

Oates, of CW4WAfghan, stresses that withdrawal should not be considered a viable option and that a Canadian military presence enables Canada to influence the Afghan government, sending clear signals "that laws which discriminate against women have no place in our shared goals of justice, human rights and peace" (2009a). However, RAWA members insist, "...coalition troops are combat forces and are there to fight a war, not to preserve peace" and that "the first step toward improving people's lives is a negotiated

90 settlement to end the war" (Kolhatkar and Rawi 2008). They contend that war and women's liberation are antithetical:

The tired claim that one of the chief objectives of the military occupation of Afghanistan is to liberate Afghan women is not only absurd, it is offensive. Waging war does not lead to the liberation of women anywhere. Women always disproportionately suffer the effects of war, and to think that women's rights can be won with bullets and bloodshed is a position dangerous in its naivete (Kolhatkar and Rawi 2008).

Discourses also clash when CW4WAfghan, CASC, and RAWA describe the results of the military intervention in Afghanistan. CASC founding member Glavin paints a rosy picture: "now, millions of girls are attending school, three out of every four children have been immunised against childhood diseases, eight in ten Afghans now have access to basic medical services, and there are ten universities, dozens of newspapers, and seven national television stations" (Glavin 2008, 16). He goes on to posit that a removal of foreign troops would "plunge" the nation back into "bloodshed" and provide a catalyst for an indeterminate number of new wars (Glavin 2008, 13). Similarly, Oates emphasizes the progress Canadian troops have made in her writing, drawing on personal narratives of girls returning to school, for example, to engender support for the mission (2009a). Rawi and Kolhatkar disagree and argue against the notion that troops cannot leave because

Afghan women would be worse off. They depict a contrasting image:

Let us be clear: Women are being gang raped, brutalized and killed in Afghanistan. Forced marriages continue, and more women than ever are being forced into prostitution - often to meet the demand of foreign troops. The U.S. presence in Afghanistan is doing nothing to protect Afghan women. The level of self-immolation among women was never as high as it is now. When there is no justice for women, they find no other way out but suicide. Feminists and other humanitarians should learn from history. This isn't the first time the welfare of women has been trotted out as a pretext for imperialist military aggression (Kolhatkar and Rawi 2008).

Clearly, CW4WAfghan and CASC maintain discourses of 'liberation' and

'oppression' that run parallel to, but do not intersect with, those of RAWA. While all

91 three organizations agree that Afghan women have experienced gendered injustice,

RAWA contends that Afghan women are being further oppressed by foreign troops and that liberation is necessarily associated with troop removal and Afghan women's activism. Alternatively, CW4WAfghan and CASC emphasize that oppression of Afghan women originates inside Afghanistan and that foreign troops will deliver liberation. Their argument suggests that Afghan women are unable to exercise agency within their current circumstances. CW4WAfghan and CASC focus on 'success stories' and operate with little or no acknowledgement of the physical and emotional costs of Canadian militarism.

This exclusion raises the question posed by Hirschkind and Mahmood: "why [are] conditions of war, militarization, and starvation considered to be less injurious to women than the lack of education, employment, and most notable...Western dress styles?"

(2002, 345).

5.5 Cultural Relativism

Cultural relativism is so central to the construction of 'liberation' and 'oppression' in the discourses of CW4WAfghan and CASC and to the defense of their ideological positioning that it is necessary to explore how the term is deployed discursively. As

Ayotte and Husain note, "the insecurity of Afghan women, discursive and material...reflects some rather long-running theoretical debates within feminism" (2005,

113). The theory and practice of cultural relativism as it applies to Afghan women represents one such site and, interestingly, culture has become a battlefield for those who do and do not support the 'War on Terror.' Postcolonial and postmodern approaches often advance deconstruction, plurality, and the challenging of meta-narratives and strict binaries (Parpart and Marchand 1995). These theories tend to be anti-universalist, and

92 therefore complicate human rights and women's rights arguments if only to expose which global powers authorize what is and is not 'universal.' Postcolonialism and postmodernism challenge neo-imperial, Orientalist arguments for universality that act to politically repress difference in order to create "discursive and practical space for autonomous action by marginalized groups and peoples across the globe" (Donnelly

2007, 297). Human rights have the ability to operate in 'Western' society as a dominant discourse that legitimizes itself on the basis of furthering 'progress,' and 'bettering' or

'aiding' societies.

Arguably, one way of maintaining this position of superiority is to systematically suppress or exclude alternative ways of knowing, which is why cultural relativism is a useful tool to the social sciences, though it is not the only approach to negotiating difference (see Haraway 1988; Butler 2001). The valuation of other ways of knowing and living is essential to challenge or, at the very least, to temper the prizing of one system of knowledge over many other available, and potentially valid, models. Cultural relativism advocates a non-judgmental analysis of cultures in order to alert the observer to biases

"rooted in describing and judging other societies according to modern Western categories and values" (Donnelly 2007, 294). Cultural relativism encourages respect for difference and an awareness of the euro-centric gaze of the 'Western' observer, but does not exclude the possibility of critique.

Cultural absolutism, a radical interpretation of cultural relativism, is often conflated with cultural relativism, to its detriment. Jack Donnelly details many valid criticisms of this position, which often reduces what is 'right' to what is 'traditional,' romanticizes indigenous cultures, confuses "what a people has been forced to tolerate

93 with what it values," views culture as homogenous, ignores the fact that culture is constantly contested and changing, and even condones intolerant or genocidal relativism

(2007, 295-296). Few activists and authors who encourage a degree of cultural relativity are this extreme, although feminists who support the 'War on Terror' often misrepresent their views in order to 'expose' anti-war and anti-imperialist feminists as morally bankrupt - a strategy that lacks sophistication.

For example, Oates contends that cultural relativism is only "disgraceful excuse- making" which "reaches its most toxic levels in 'antiwar' debates" and in Canadian universities, and "has come to infect national debates about the Afghan mission, clouding our judgment and entirely obscuring the very meaning of universal human rights"

(2009b). Oates and Carolyn Reicher, CW4WAfghan President, write, "violations against women's rights continue. The new central government has little reach beyond Kabul, where women are subject to 'traditional' and often harmful practices" (2006). As previously mentioned, automatically associating what is 'right' with what is 'traditional' is problematic, but so is unquestioningly conflating convention with harm, as Oates and

Reicher do above. Oates asks if Canada will be able to look back on our involvement in

Afghanistan and "recognize death-cult misogyny for what it really is? Did we have the courage to call fascism by its proper name, or did we excuse ourselves and retreat into the comfortable, false virtues of pacifist isolationism and cultural relativism?" (2009b). Sally

Armstrong, in line with Oates, argues that cultural relativism works to shut down debate:

"people play it like a cultural trump card to silence women like me" (quoted in Glavin

2007). Both CW4WAfghan and CASC focus on 'educating' Canadians by discrediting cultural relativism. CW4WAfghan states that one of their goals is to "increase the

94 understanding of Canadians about human rights in Afghanistan" (CW4WAfghan, "Who

We Are") and one of CASC's principles states, "human rights are universal, and not culture specific" (CASC, "Our Principles"). However, misrepresenting cultural absolutism as cultural relativism, linking 'liberation' with the actualization of one specific notion of human rights and 'progress,' and suggesting that those who exercise a degree of cultural relativism or oppose the war are morally questionable or unmoved by the gendered injustice faced by Afghan women eliminates the possibility for productive dialogue across different perspectives. Oates considers the varied Canadian antiwar positions "deplorable" (2009a). This intense disdain for feminists and citizens who do not share in her views and her unbalanced representation of cultural relativism is as problematic as cultural absolutism, as it obscures the Oriental, politicized, and gendered nature of the 'War on Terror' in Afghanistan. Relying on broad generalizations of cultural relativism does not do justice to the complexity of the debate.

Postmodernism's emphasis on difference often leads to the conclusion that the approach will necessarily account for unjust, oppressive practices against women.

However, as Lila Abu-Lughod elucidates, the appreciation of difference should not immediately be related to an extreme cultural relativism, or cultural absolutism that forgives human and women's rights violations:

When I talk about accepting difference, I am not implying that we should resign ourselves to being cultural relativists who respect whatever goes on elsewhere as 'just their culture...' 'their' cultures are just as much part of history and an interconnected world as ours are. What I am advocating is the hard work involved in recognizing and respecting differences - precisely as products of different histories, as expressions of different circumstances, and as manifestations of differently structured desires. We may want justice for women, but can we accept that there might be different ideas about justice and that different women might want, or choose, different futures from what we envision as best? (2002, 786-787)

95 Abu-Lughod demonstrates that approaches including postmodernism and postcolonialism cannot be automatically associated with a cultural relativism that passively accepts abuses of women's human rights. Even Ayotte and Husain, who critique elements of postmodernism, concede that "the attribution of relativism to all theories carrying the whiff of postmodernism needs to be greeted with skepticism" (2005, 115). Regardless, it is unlikely that there will be room in the discourses of CW4WAfghan and CASC for the dissenting viewpoints of an organization like RAWA if they do not develop a way to embrace difference among women in the world. It is impossible and undesirable to deny the gendered injustice and oppression faced by many Afghan women, but it is vital to discuss and challenge it in ways that do not fall into imperialist, Orientalist, and binary- laden thinking. It is clear from the discourses of 'liberation' and 'oppression' articulated by CW4WAfghan, CASC, and RAWA, that feminists remain divided on fundamental questions like whether violence is a justifiable means of securing women's rights, and if cultural relativism - and the appreciation of difference - is a valid tool to help feminists in the global North build solidarity and understanding with those in the global South. Not only is the content of CW4WAfghan and CASC's discourses problematic, so too is the way in which they are framed and defended. CW4WAfghan and CASC's misuse of cultural relativism, for example, precludes the possibility of constructive engagement with alternative viewpoints.

5.6 (Re)producing The 'Other' In The Discourse Of CW4WAfghan And CASC

CW4WAfghan and CASC clearly operate using parallel discourses of 'liberation' and

'oppression' to RAWA. These oppositional discourses themselves are noteworthy, but what is most interesting is the power differential between these two sets of discourses and

96 the consequences of that imbalance. Like RAWA, CW4WAfghan should not claim to represent more individuals than their membership, but its prominent position in Canadian

society has allowed the organization and its members to act as 'truth' tellers. The overlap between CW4WAfghan members and CASC founding members indirectly legitimizes the positions of that organization as well, though the organization has a lower profile.

Due to the fact that CW4WAfghan and, less so, CASC, are in the position to shape the

Canadian public perception of Afghan women and the 'War on Terror,' their interaction with alternative discourses or 'voices,' like that of RAWA's, becomes critical.

Furthermore, the ways in which the organizations' discourses (re)produce difference is

salient, as is the politicization of CW4WAfghan's funding.

CW4WAfghan claims to be "non-political" (CW4WAfghan, "Who We Are"), yet the organization supports the Canadian intervention in Afghanistan, the continuation of the mission post 2011, and is critical of anti-war groups. Its members have expressed these views in numerous published articles in the Canadian press and have participated at

speaking engagements across the country in order to maintain their influence. Prime

Minister Harper has met personally with Oates in order to congratulate her on her efforts

(Office of the Prime Minister 2008). Alternatively, RAWA has received little or no press

in North America (Stabile and Kumar 2005, 778), and based on the previous chapter's

media analysis, there is a paucity of critical, alternative discourses in the Canadian news

that work to widen the debate about Canada's intervention in Afghanistan. CASC and

CW4WAfghan's endorsement of the war has aided politicians who tell an Orientalist war

story - one that portrays Canada as 'rescuer' of 'victimized' Afghan women. As Melanie

Butler asserts:

97 As the authoritative voice of Afghan women, CW4WAfghan helps insulate its government from the criticisms of feminists who see Canada as engaging in a war on - not for - women's rights, and the observations of human rights organizations who testify that women's situation has not improved since the Taliban lost power, but has in many ways grown worse (2009, 220).

Furthermore, CW4WAfghan's prominence works to validate an Orientalist logic which informs its discourse - one that renders Afghan women victims and Canada a "custodian of human rights" (Butler 2009, 218). CW4WAfghan and CASC's position is undeniably political, especially when members of both organizations dismiss Canadian anti-war movements (Oates 2009a; Glavin 2007), and have "failed to distance themselves from the discursive mechanisms that manufacture consent for women's oppression" (Butler 2009,

218).

While CASC does not receive government funding, CW4WAfghan benefits from a close relationship with government granting bodies. CIDA recently provided five hundred thousand dollars to CW4WAfghan's Excel-erate Education initiative and committed to match, dollar for dollar, funds raised by CW4WAfghan and their affiliated youth organization, Little Women for Little Women in Afghanistan (Government of

Canada 2008). CIDA also sponsors CW4WAfghan's advocacy and educational programming within Canada, and Rights and Democracy, a CIDA-funded organization, provides additional monetary support (Butler 2009, 221). CW4WAfghan appears to have strategically aligned itself with the government's rhetoric on the 'War on Terror' in

Afghanistan (Butler 2009, 221). While I cannot speak to the effectiveness of

CW4WAfghan's programming, CIDA's generosity towards them raises concerns that

Canadian aid is being dispersed along political lines, as the discourse of CW4WAfghan is, in essence, synchronized with the discourse of the government. It should be noted that this is symptomatic of CIDA's shifting position towards Afghanistan in general. Before

98 the fall of the Taliban in 2001, CIDA's annual funding to Afghanistan ranged between

$10 and $20 million (CIDA 2008b). For the fiscal year 2007-2008, CIDA's funding to

Afghanistan totaled approximately $280 million dollars, making it Canada's largest-ever bilateral aid recipient (CIDA 2008a; CIDA 2008b). Moreover, in February of this year,

CIDA reduced its aid partners from 25 to 20 but added Afghanistan as a new country of concentration (CIDA 2009). Canada's aid to Afghanistan will total almost $2 billion dollars over 2001-2011, making Canada one of the nation's largest international donors, and Bev Oda, current Minister of International Cooperation and Vice-Chair of the

Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan, has pledged that Canada will continue to fund development and humanitarian aid post 2011 (Government of Canada 2010a). In two years, from 2003-2005, CIDA spent $150 million dollars, some on microfinance, but also on the disarmament of Afghan militias and rebuilding Afghan national institutions (Stein and Lang 2007, 269). In 2005, a Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) policy statement read, "Canadians cannot be safe in an unstable world...progress in the developing world will have an impact on Canada in terms of both our long-term security and our prosperity. Security and development are inextricably linked" (CIDA quoted in

Beall et al 2006, 52). Considering the priorities of CIDA's programming in Afghanistan,

and that these unprecedented aid engagements in Afghanistan coincide with an armed

intervention, it is clear that Canada's aid is becoming increasingly militarized post 9/11

(Brown 2008; Simpson 2007).

Furthermore, CW4WAfghan and CASC sustain their position in Canadian society by marginalizing oppositional voices, like that of RAWA, despite emphasizing the

99 importance of listening to Afghans and learning from their lived experiences. For example, CW4WAfghan explains:

One of our most important grounding principles [is to] listen to the voices of Afghan women. We realized very early on that Afghan women are the best possible sources of knowledge, experience and expertise on the issues that affect them and it is their stories and voices that must guide our actions (CW4WAfghan, "History").

Similarly, CASC states, "we are listening to the demands of Afghans for human rights, the protection of women's fledging rights, and the desire for a democratic system of governance...we call for ...all Canadians to pay attention to Afghan public opinion, and to make room for Afghans to participate in our discussions (CASC, "Our Principles," emphasis added). The directionality of this potential conversation is troubling as it reveals the unequal power relations that underwrite the discourses of CW4WAfghan and

CASC. One would think that to learn about Afghan public opinion, one would ask to join in their discussions. Also, both CW4WAfghan and CASC do not recognize the limitations of equating voice with agency. As demonstrated by RAWA's need for extreme secrecy and the violence their members have faced, it is clear that in a society like Afghanistan, currently dominated by a masculinist order, privilege cannot always be publically challenged (Parpart 2009, 1).

However, RAWA does manage to speak for itself against extreme odds. Despite this, and their pledges to include Afghan voices and learn from Afghan realities,

CW4WAfghan and CASC ignore RAWA's dissenting views. RAWA shares many of the same goals as CW4WAfghan in particular and the former has been working in

Afghanistan and Pakistan for over thirty years at great personal cost. Yet RAWA is effectively erased from the discourses of CW4WAfghan and CASC. It seems as though

CW4WAfghan and CASC's stated principles and goals of incorporating and respecting

100 the voices of Afghan women only apply if those voices reflect the discourses of

'liberation' and 'oppression' to which CW4WAfghan and CASC are committed. Butler concurs:

While RAWA and Malalai Joya's more radical policies are not representative of the majority of Afghan women, they are evidence of a diversity of views for which CW4WAfghan does not allow. Refusing to take such views seriously, CW4WAfghan wield their stamped passports like wild cards, suggesting that those who dare challenge them 'go see for themselves what life is really like in Afghanistan'" (2009, 222)

RAWA does not claim to represent a majority of Afghan citizens, but arguably, they do know what Afghanistan is "really" like, and they signify a disparate position that, when excluded, limits the debate on Canada's involvement in the 'War on Terror' in

Afghanistan. Furthermore, if RAWA represents one alternative discourse, there are likely more. Therefore, the way CW4WAfghan and CASC's discourses dominate Canadian society, and the way their members' are positioned as experts by the media who then offer these organizations a privileged platform, is problematic. As such, the decision to reject the views of a group that is comprised of the very people CW4WAfghan and

CASC purport to learn from and speak for is both hypocritical and negligent.

5.7 Conclusion: Orientalist Feminism

In many ways, globalization has allowed CW4WAfghan, CASC, and RAWA to exist in their current incarnations. Sahar Saba remarked in 2002, "the internet was crucial in our survival. Five years ago no one knew of us...the website was very important in making an impact and connecting RAWA" (Saba in Farkas 2003, 15). RAWA's utilization of internet and email technologies resulted in the development of transnational solidarity networks that have provided much needed financial and moral support to the organization over the last decade (Fluri 2008, 40). New technologies also gave Canadian women

101 access to information about Afghanistan, which encouraged them to mobilize, and gave

them the opportunity to travel abroad. Oates, for example, recently returned from her

seventh trip to Afghanistan (Oates 2008). However, does a genuine concern for the

wellbeing of Afghan women and a sense of proximity to them afforded by globalization justify speaking for them and, despite dissent, projecting one's own views onto their

bodies and realities?

CW4WAfghan and CASC prioritize their own research, politics, and personal

experiences in Afghanistan in order to authorize their perspectives on Afghan women and

the 'War on Terror.' As Butler explicates:

In situations where their authority to speak on behalf of Afghan women is contested, such as in debates about the War on Terror, CW4WAfghan members position themselves as native informants of Afghanistan, citing their 'first-hand experience' working with Afghan women as evidence of their authenticity (Butler 2008, 222).

RAWA members have risked a tremendous amount to speak for themselves, so for

CW4WAfghan and CASC to attempt to erase their views from Canadian discourses on

the 'War on Terror' demonstrates disrespect for the struggles of Afghan people - the

same struggles CW4WAfghan and CASC strive to alleviate. Organizations like

CW4WAfghan have the authority to shape Canadian discourses on the 'War on Terror'

and discourse helps form our understandings of the world. Access to information,

especially in a world as rife with power imbalances as our own, is necessary to keep the

level of debate high surrounding such issues as Canada's involvement in the 'War on

Terror.' While globalization can grant access, the case of CW4WAfghan and CASC

demonstrates that it can also be used as a justification to deny it.

Ultimately, through their exclusion of RAWA in their projects and press releases,

their use of Orientalist images and logic, and their misrepresentation of cultural

102 relativism, CW4WAfghan and CASC, like the FMF, ally themselves with their government, rather than with feminists in Afghanistan and in the global North who oppose the NATO intervention which, according to RAWA, is contributing to the oppression of Afghan women and girls. Furthermore, by excluding dissenting voices from Afghanistan and vilifying Canadians who hold opposing positions, CW4WAfghan and CASC stifle important dialogue and become complicit in obscuring and maintaining the Orientalist, politicized, and gendered aspects of Canada's participation in the 'War on

Terror' in Afghanistan. Lastly, Canadian feminists and citizens interested in transnational solidarity need to question how the Orientalist feminism practiced by CW4WAfghan and

CASC contributes to systems of intersecting oppressions faced by Afghan women and recognize that CIDA-funded NGOs are offering discourses of protection and paternalism rather than respect and solidarity (Russo 2005, 573; Young 3003, 3). Until we can move past the Orientalist logic that sets up 'victimized' and 'voiceless' Afghan women against

'Western' women, who are portrayed "as educated, as modern, as having control over their own bodies and sexualities, and the freedom to make their own decisions" (Mohanty

1991, 56) and stop simplifying the intervention in Afghanistan as "white men...saving brown women from brown men" (Spivak 2006, 33), opportunities for effective transnational solidarity will be limited. As Russo contends, "the basis of transnational feminist solidarity must be a spirit and practice of equality rather than 'saving', respect rather than pity, accountability rather than superiority" (2005, 577). Orientalist, politicized, and gendered American discourses surrounding the 'War on Terror' in

Afghanistan have captured academic and activist attention. However, continued interrogation of the ways in which Canadian discourses both resonate with, and are

103 dissonant from, their American counterparts is necessary to critically analyze Canada's unique framing of the mission and their role in NATO's military intervention in

Afghanistan.

104 Chapter 6: Conclusion

Feminist, postmodern, and postcolonial interventions are often dismissed as being intellectually provocative, but lacking relevancy to more concrete realms including foreign and aid policies and, most importantly, peoples' lived realities. However, the kind of theoretical investigation my thesis offers is worthwhile because the politicized representations and discourses contended with are profoundly impacting Canadians' conceptions of 'Other' places, like Afghanistan, as well as their own national identity.

Furthermore, feminism has been cynically employed to help justify CIDA policy shifts and unprecedented aid engagements in Afghanistan that are arguably influenced more by security priorities than women's rights. Arat-Koc summarizes how Orientalist feminism gained currency in Canadian military and aid discourses post 9/11:

...Given strong ideological attempts to define the civilizational distinctness of 'the West' in terms of freedom and democracy, claims to gender equality are treated as a significant marker of 'the West's' civilizational difference; thus, feminism has become a strategic tool deployed by non-feminist and anti-feminist politicians to support the thesis of the clash of civilizations. While more critical versions of feminism are under attack, a deliberate attempt is underway to deploy feminism in the service of a new imperialism (2005, 45).

When gender is so central to the narrative of war, critical feminist, postmodern, and postcolonial approaches cannot be ignored. Canadian resources are being deployed and lives risked and lost on the basis of an Orientalist gendered rationale that demands complication. This thesis has attempted to unpack simplistic assumptions using a feminist framework informed by the 'posts' and has established that Canadian government, media, and Non-Governmental Organizations strategically employ women's rights rhetoric and politicized representations of Afghan women, men, and society not only to justify aid spending and policy change but to garner public support for the military intervention.

105 This thesis has also demonstrated that Orientalist feminism, practiced by feminists and NGOs such as CW4WAfghan, echoes government and mainstream media discourse and is rewarded by the government in the form of CIDA grants and public honours.

Where does Orientalist feminism leave Afghan women, however? Barakat and Wardell argue that, "in recent years... [Afghan women's] exploitation has taken on new forms, as various international actors, driven by their own political agendas, have sought to make capital out of championing their rights" (2002, 928). All the while Afghan women and children continue to suffer the real costs of war and instability in their nation. While

Chretien insisted he wished to bring "peace and happiness" to Afghanistan, and Stephen

Harper stated that Afghan women's rights were "very, very central" to the reason Canada and its allies are fighting in Afghanistan, Art Eggleton, acting as Minister of National

Defence stated on September 18, 2001 "I think we will play a major role, a front-line role. We will make sure the Canadian forces get what they need to do the job. We'll stand with our allies in weeding out the perpetrators, in destroying the organizations" (In Stein and Lang 2007, 1). Indeed, Harper has promised further spending, when already as of

2007 Canada had only spent more during the Second World War (Pugliese 2007). The

CBC estimated in March of 2008 that $24 billion had been spend on domestic and military security, based on NATO figures; other reports estimate that Canada's defence budget tops $18 billion per year (CBC 2008b; Pugliese 2007).

While the women of Afghanistan face gendered oppression and injustice, which

should be condemned, they should not be portrayed as a homogenous imperiled entity to justify the military and aid interventions in Afghanistan. These victimizing portrayals have tremendous currency, which accounts for their popularity. However, these

106 depictions deny the possibility of Afghan women's agency and individual or collective resistance, which this thesis has challenged through its exploration of RAWA as one example. Even if the oppression of Afghan women is accepted as a given - and my thesis does not deny that gendered injustice exists in Afghanistan as it does elsewhere - as

RAWA demonstrates, the 'right' response to that oppression is not a given. RAWA acknowledges oppression, and effectively mobilizes against it, without victimizing

Afghan women, vilifying Afghan men, or condoning the foreign intervention. This indicates that the Canadian discourse and response is particular, located, and politicized.

However, the Orientalist and gendered discourse on the 'War on Terror' deployed in government, media, and NGO realms suggests to Canadians that the Canadian actions and interpretations are the only conscionable actions and interpretations, thereby limiting

Canadians ability to debate the Canadian intervention in Afghanistan, access alternative discourses, understand Afghan women's agency, and appreciate the reality of Afghan women's hardship free from Orientalist or paternalist frames. Central questions that emerge from this thesis are: how is the oppression of Afghan women used to understand

'Others' and ourselves? Is it possible that additional oppression of Afghan women is being perpetrated by furthering rigid forms of political, military, and humanitarian intervention and discourse? A feminist 'post' approach to the question of women's rights in Afghanistan does not excuse oppression but seeks to engage with it in ways that allow for difference and create space for effective transnational solidarity.

The Canadian war story supports the image of Canada as 'rescuer,' sustaining national mythologies of peacekeeping or peace-creating, tolerance, and multiculturalism through an Orientalist discourse that often frames women in Afghanistan as 'traditional'

107 and 'oppressed' victims and Afghan men as uncivilized aggressors (Butler 2009; Jiwani

2005). Perhaps if feminist, postmodern, and postcolonial interrogations were given greater attention, works similar to this thesis would improve the prospects for stimulating critical changes to Canadian aid, defence, and foreign policy.

6.1 Next Steps

Further research is required to move beyond the deconstruction that I have conducted in this thesis, to question whether the dominant Canadian discourse is merely an opportunistic political tool, as some analysts argue, or if it has transformational potential.

In other words, has the discourse surrounding gender in Afghanistan changed the military, political and ideological landscape in Canada? If so, how, and with what implications? Like James Ferguson, it is necessary to ask: "what do...ideas do, what real social effects do they have?" (1994, xv). In order to answer this question, I plan to explore the insights of returning soldiers, aid workers, media employees, political representatives, and Afghan refugees and immigrants. This research will therefore build on and extend my Master's work, and my theoretical approach will be sustained and further refined. Both my Master's thesis and my proposed doctoral research are timely as they coincide with the buildup to the date of Canada's proposed 2011 military withdrawal from Afghanistan, thus confronting a critical social and political juncture that has the potential to profoundly shape Canadian policy and public opinion in the coming years. It is my hope that this thesis and my future research contribute original, practical, and theoretical insights on the effects of the gendered discourse surrounding the Canadian intervention in Afghanistan, and provide work that will be relevant in both academic and foreign policy realms.

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