Confluence

Online Journal of World Philosophies

Verlag Karl Alber Freiburg/Munich

Vol. 2 · 2015 ISSN 2199-0360 · ISBN 978-3-495-46802-9 Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies Editors

Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies is a bi-annual, Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach (University Konstanz, Germany) peer-reviewed, international journal dedicated to comparative Geeta Ramana (University Mumbai, India) thought. It seeks to explore common spaces and differences between James Maffie (University of Maryland, USA) philosophical traditions in a global context. Without postulating cul- tures as monolithic, homogenous, or segregated wholes, it aspires to address key philosophical issues which bear on specific methodologi- Manuscript Editor cal, epistemological, hermeneutic, ethical, social, and political ques- tions in comparative thought. Confluence aims to develop the con- James Garrison (University of Vienna, Austria) tours of a philosophical understanding not subservient to dominant paradigms and provide a platform for diverse philosophical voices, including those long silenced by dominant academic discourses and Advisory Board institutions. Confluence also endeavors to serve as a juncture where specific philosophical issues of global interest may be explored in an Robert Bernasconi (Pennsylvania State University, USA) imaginative, thought-provoking, and pioneering way. Claudia Bickmann (University of Cologne, Germany) We welcome innovative and persuasive ways of conceptualizing, Anat Biletzki (Quinnipiac University, USA) articulating, and representing intercultural encounters. Contribu- Jonardon Ganeri (New York University, Abu Dhabi, UAE) tions should be able to facilitate the development of new perspectives Raghunath Ghosh (University of North Bengal, India) on current global thought-processes and sketch the outlines of salient Peter S. Groff (Bucknell University, USA) future developments. Paulin Hountondji (Emeritus, National Universities, Benin) Heinz Kimmerle (Emeritus, University of Rotterdam, Netherlands) Michael Krausz (Bryn Mawr College, USA) Ram Adhar Mall (Jena, Germany) Dismas Masolo (University of Louisville, USA) Lorraine Mayer (Brandon University, Canada) Seyyed Hossein Nasr (George Washington University, USA) Frederick Ochieng Odhiambo (University of the West Indies, Barbados) Ryosuke Ohashi (Emeritus, Kyoto University, Japan) Henry Rosemont, Jr. (Brown University, USA) Ofelia Schutte (Emerita, University of South Florida, USA) Lenart Škof (University of Primorska, Slovenia) Georg Stenger (University of Vienna, Austria) Willie L. van der Merwe (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Nether- lands) Franz Martin Wimmer (Emeritus, University of Vienna, Austria) Contents

Articles

World Philosophies in Dialogue: a Shared Wisdom? ...... 11 C. Zene

Approaching Shan Shui Art through Gadamer ...... 33 C. Rentmeester

Conceptualizing Indigeneity and the Implications for Indigenous Research and African Development ...... 52 G. J. Sefa Dei

Indigenous Knowledge: An Engagement with George Sefa Dei . 79 P. Henry

A Romantic Reading of the French ›Burqa Ban‹: Liberty as Self- Expression and the Symbolism of Uncovered Faces in the French Debate on Full Veils ...... 88 G. Gustavsson

Symposium

What (If Any) Limits Ought Democratic Pluralism Impose on Diversity within a Cross-Cultural Context? ...... 107

Democratic Limitations on Diversity and Pluralism? ...... 109 L. T. Outlaw (Jr.)

5 Contents Contents

Responses Institutional Programs on Comparative Philosophy

Negotiating ›Difference‹ in Indic Thought: Reflections on Lucius Chair: ›Philosophy in a Global World /Intercultural Philosophy,‹ Outlaw’s Essay ...... 121 University of Vienna, Austria ...... 273 A. Barua G. Stenger

Not a Flower of Equal Petals, But One of Distorted Growth . . 132 Philosophy and Religious Studies Program, University of Macau, A. Schulherr Waters China (SAR) ...... 275 H.-G. Moeller and W. Franke Whose Equality? Response to Lucius Outlaw ...... 153 M. Wenning New Specialization in Political Thought at Central European University, Budapest, Hungary ...... 277 Reply: Response to Commentators ...... 169 M. Nagy L. T. Outlaw (Jr.) BA World Philosophies, SOAS, University of London, UK . . . 279 C. Zene Philosophical Journeys ›Non-Western/Comparative Philosophy‹ Program at Bucknell My Journey in Philosophy: Highlights ...... 189 University, Pennsylvania, USA ...... 281 O. Schutte P. S. Groff

Living Chinese Philosophy ...... 207 R. T. Ames Notes on Contributors ...... 283

Guidelines for Authors ...... 289 Book Review

Person Properties and Candrakīrti’s Concept of Selflessness . . 223 A. Mattlage

Survey Articles

Comparative Philosophies in Intercultural Information Ethics . . 233 J. Bielby

National Context and Ethnocentrism ...... 254 I. Šimko

6 7 Articles World Philosophies in Dialogue: a Shared Wisdom?

»Indeed, philosophy is not defined directly by wisdom […] but by its strange, complex and unquestioned re- lation to wisdom […] Philosophy does not know wis- dom, does not produce it, but reaches for it, anticipates it like a gift one would offer« (Marion 2003: 183).

»All humans are philosophers« (Gramsci 1975: 1342– 1343).

Abstract Martin Heidegger’s lecture in 1964 ›The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking‹ signalled a crisis and the acknowledgement of sub- stantial changes within Western philosophy. Reflecting upon the con- cept of critical dialogue among World Philosophies (WP) can be seen as a corrective of this crisis and a novel advancement. I aim to sub- stantiate this by referring to the work of three authors: i) Jean-Luc Marion’s reflections on Heidegger will give us the chance to over- come a narrow understanding of ›philosophy‹ and the possibility of discovering »new horizons« for the discipline which are revealed as a »donation« towards »wisdom«; ii) Reyes Mate’s considerations on ›Thinking in Spanish‹ will offer, aided by Walter Benjamin, a concrete example for renegotiating the space and the place for those »excluded from thinking«; and iii) Paul Ricoeur’s meditation On Translation puts forward the ethical element of »linguistic hospitality« and trans- formation of the self when encountering alterity. While it is impossi- ble to do justice to these authors in a short article, I maintain that their work deserves close attention because it depicts the struggle within Western philosophy on its way towards maturity: still en- tangled with so many challenges derived from its troubled history, this maturity appears only faintly, on the horizon, precisely, in the form of ›traces‹. On these grounds, I believe that Anglo-European

11 C. Zene World Philosophies in Dialogue: a Shared Wisdom? philosophy can no longer postpone opening up to an indispensable this tradition. At the same time, I am concerned to avoid yet another dialogue with other systems of thought wherein the presence of WP imposition coming from Anglo-European philosophy. While my and the renewed effort of many philosophers committed to this en- main task remains to prove this »possibility«, I am aware that an deavour is recognised. effort to devise a proper methodology as to how this can be best achieved remains lacking, but this deserves to be treated separately. Keywords The present paper, however, serves the purpose of introducing a vari- World Philosophies, gift/donation, wisdom, »the voice of the slave«, ety of problematic issues and concepts associated with the ongoing »monadological universality«, translation, linguistic hospitality. effort of Anglo-European philosophy to disentangle itself from a Eurocentric – or even egocentric – stance; as such, the essay only foretells both a theoretical and a methodological urgency, but post- I Introduction pones a more thorough analysis to future undertakings. Similarly, I purposely refrain here from taking a line of inquiry which might In April 1964 Martin Heidegger’s lecture The End of Philosophy and insist on the ›wrongs‹ perpetrated by Western philosophy at the ex- the Task of Thinking (Heidegger 1972) was delivered for the first time pense of other systems of thought since I would like to avoid trans- at a colloquium on Søren Kierkegaard.1 Fifty years later, this essay forming this article into an expiatory confession of guilty conscious- still prompts us to rethink the questions raised by Heidegger with ness. Although this too must at some point be tackled, I prefer here to the intent of asking a further question which revolves around the concentrate on the positive elements shown by western philosophy in concept of ›World Philosophies‹ (WP): Could the »end of philosophy« welcoming the encounter with other systems of thought and hence signal the beginning of ›philosophies‹, in the plural, and perhaps of offering a possibility of critical dialogue. what could be defined as ›World Philosophies‹? If this is so, could we also postulate that the »task of thinking« is not the reserve of ›wes- tern philosophy‹2, but concerns other systems of thought, indeed all II Reflecting on J.-L. Marion, R. Mate and P. Ricoeur other possible systems which, by extension and in their totality, could be labelled ›World Philosophies‹? In order to properly engage with the questions raised by Heidegger’s In this article I will concentrate mainly on the task of demon- lecture, I propose a reflection on the works of Jean-Luc Marion on strating, by way of several authors, how western philosophy might donation and a »new horizon«, of Reyes Mate and his interpretation open up and indeed become ready to consider the possibility of the of Walter Benjamin’s »monadological universality«, and of Paul Ri- concept WP, not as an expansion and a continuation of western phi- coeur’s »linguistic hospitality«. The three authors under examination losophy, but as an encounter/dialogue with other systems of thought offer us a distinct approach: while they are in fact ›sympathetic‹ to- which have in fact, at times, developed independently from philoso- wards Heidegger’s philosophy, they are at the same time critical of his phy in the West. I limit myself to consider western philosophers pre- idea of the »closure« of philosophy so as to postulate, in different cisely because I am appealing for a moment of self-reflexivity within ways, an effort of self-reflexivity and a movement towards »new hor- izons« for western philosophy. 1 M. Heidegger, »The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking«, in M. Heidegger, On Time and Being, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1972, pp. 55–73. 2 I take ›western philosophy‹ here in very general terms and as coterminous with Jean-Luc Marion: The Possibility of »Donation« As a »New Horizon« ›western thought‹, in order to locate it not as separate from, but part of a wider classi- fication which would include all possible ›systems of thought‹, all of which belong to In his essay, »The ›End of Metaphysics‹ as a Possibility« (2003), Jean- the ›order of thinking‹ and hence equally committed to delving into »the task of thinking«. At other times, I use the term ›Anglo-European philosophy‹ which has Luc Marion, refusing a polemical interpretation of Heidegger’s lec- lately gained more currency, as perhaps a more inclusive idiom. ture, stresses its positive aspect »as a possibility« and »as a revival of

12 13 C. Zene World Philosophies in Dialogue: a Shared Wisdom? thinking« (Marion 2003: 166), precisely because »with the end of involves« (Marion 2003: 177). However, it is not clear if the »it gives – philosophy, thinking is not also at its end, but in transition to another es gibt« is »tied to the question of being, or goes beyond it« (ibid.). In beginning« (Heidegger 1973: 96).3 Weaving in and out of Heidegger’s short, while the French »il y a« and the English »there is« disregard writings, Marion manages to point towards »what remains un- the ›givenness‹ of ›es gibt‹, Marion’s intent is to »validate the expres- thought in, about and by metaphysics« (ibid.: 171), thus opening up sion ›it gives‹ as a legitimate conceptual formulation« (ibid.: 178). In towards this (new) »possibility«. He sets the pace by clarifying the so doing, he can ascertain that the ›end of metaphysics‹ »leads, in the relevance of the task – »the end of metaphysics« – not as an »end end, all the way to the horizon of donation«, since »the true imple- game« but as a »culmination« and a »completion of possibilities«, ment for overcoming metaphysics is found in the donation […]«, as a thus recovering Heidegger’s understanding of technology as a funda- »new horizon« determined by »the task of thinking« (ibid.: 182). mental part of this culmination (Heidegger 1972: 59). Hence, for Marion, the overcoming of metaphysics, which does not Marion identifies the link between technology and the culmina- require abandoning the name of philosophy, still implies the question tion of metaphysics in the concept of ›destruction‹ (Marion 2003: 171) of »what it overcomes«. Moreover, especially when (re)defining phi- which, in Heidegger, goes hand in hand with the concept of ›nihilism‹ losophy, »we cannot follow any other path than that indicated by the resulting from the »forgetting of Being« (ibid.: 173). However, while question ›What speaks in the It gives?‹« (ibid.: 184). »the nothing makes itself known with beings« (ibid.), this »forgetting I would agree with Marion that »the ›task of thinking‹ will con- of being arises from a similar powerlessness to think nothingness as sist first of all in determining this new horizon« and, despite the fact such« (ibid.), thus falling back into ›the negation of being‹,4 to then that »philosophy is not determined directly by wisdom (or for that conclude: »Would overcoming metaphysics then mean overcoming matter, by knowledge, and even less so by science or representation)«, the mode of thinking that has predominated to the point of imperial- it is indeed determined »by its strange, complex, and unquestioned ism – the imperialism of representation, armed with the power of relation to wisdom«. This does not cease, however, to be a multifa- ordering and mathematical calculation« (ibid.: 173–174)? »No ceted ›relation‹: »A relation of affinity, of inclination, of familiarity, doubt«, replies Marion. He is, however, committed to pursue the re- of desire and of lack as well – a relation to what it lacks and loves to consideration of the question of Being, despite its withdrawal, which possess« (ibid.: 183). would also allow the possibility of positing »the task of thinking« If I am not mistaken, the progression adopted by Marion, mov- differently. ing from technology (and imperialism) to nihilism, brings him to This paradox is expressed also in the almost tautological last sen- postulate, via a novel interpretation of es gibt, that the ›donation‹ tence of Heidegger’s text: »The task of thinking would then be the determined by the »task of thinking« delivers the arrival, as a »new surrender of previous thinking to the determination of the matter of horizon« of the concept of »wisdom«, which seems now to determine thinking« (Heidegger 1972: 73).5 Marion painstakingly retraces the philosophy, be it by a »strange, complex, and unquestioned relation to difference between Sein und Zeit (1927) and other articles written in wisdom« (ibid.). Marion seems inclined to justify that the »self-trans- the 1960s, in which Heidegger operates a shift from »it is« to »there cendence of metaphysics« does not entail the disappearance or aban- is« [il y a], or es gibt (it gives): »In other words, in the final account, in doning of the name of philosophy as such, and the appearance of the final question, in the final ›destruction‹, the overcoming of meta- ›wisdom‹ – re-translating philosophy? – would seem to appeal for an physics depends on the determination of what the ›it gives – es gibt‹ extension of »what [philosophy] lacks and loves to possess« (ibid.). In other words, it is only through the ›yearning of philosophy‹ that the 3 J.-L. Marion, »The ›End of Philosophy‹ as a Possibility«, in M. A. Wrathall (ed.), latter sets itself towards the unfulfilled desire of expanding its pre- Religion After Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 166– sent, limited horizon, towards a new horizon and novel »task of 189; M. Heidegger, The End of Philosophy, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, thinking«, which can only be donated by the renewal and re-transla- 1973. 4 Marion capitalizes ›Being‹ when quoting Heidegger and uses ›being‹ himself. tion of ›philosophy (as) wisdom‹. In this sense, metaphysics as an 5 M. Heidegger, Time and Being (Heidegger 1972: 1–24). overcoming of the being of beings, must be understood »on the basis

14 15 C. Zene World Philosophies in Dialogue: a Shared Wisdom? of donation«, and this donation could find its point of arrival and in Mate’s essay. For instance, when addressing the main question – fulfilment in »wisdom«. Hence, wisdom seems to represent the What does it mean to think/speak in Spanish? – Mate argues that »If »new horizon« towards which the »task of thinking« directs itself, Hegel was right, and with him modernity, one could not be modern almost as a corrective and an overcoming of »the mode of thinking and think in Spanish« (ibid.: 254). Modernity might even allow us to that has predominated to the point of imperialism«. Apparently, there now ›ridicule‹ Hegel’s arrogant assertions, but that arrogance is still seems to be no correlation between wisdom and philosophy, because deeply seated within most prejudgements of philosophy »namely, the if there were, wisdom would fall under the hegemony of philosophy. reduction of thinking to philosophy, the identification of thinking Despite this ambiguous relationship, Marion nevertheless seems to with what is European, or the affirmation that the universal spirit allow for a positive interaction between the two, since »[p]hilosophy [Weltgeist] is European« (ibid.: 253). If technology has become the does not know wisdom, does not produce it, but reaches for it, antici- shortcut to impose a ›bad universality‹ on the rest of the world, then, pates it like a gift one would offer« (ibid.). The question, which I will Mate suggests that one adopt the Heideggerian strategy. This evokes address in the concluding part of this essay, still remains: Is the gift the cabalistic doctrine of the Tsimitsoum: the vacuum that follows (of wisdom?) offered (presumably) by philosophy dispensed to all, or God’s self-withdrawal after creating the world ex nihilo. is it solely the reserve of a few? Or, is it perhaps philosophy itself, Rather than giving in to ›reactionary universality‹ or to ›decon- which – being placed on this »new horizon« – receives the »gift of struction of every universality‹, Mate proposes to follow Walter Ben- wisdom« from a third party? jamin’s »monadological universality« (1968)7: To remake history and hence to construct a universality following those nearly erased footprints is like brushing history against the grain. Monado- Reyes Mate: Universality, Benjamin, and the »Voice of the Slave« logical universality (that universality which consists in valuing as absolute each singularity) constitutes a colossal undertaking that goes against all the Some of the above questions are also addressed in the article by Reyes established and dominant conventions (Mate 2001: 258).8 Mate (2001) ›Thinking in Spanish: Memory of Logos?‹ to which I In order to better clarify the concept of monadological universality, turn now.6 Mate refers to Plato’s dialogue the Meno (Plato 1961: 364 – Meno, In a famous interview published posthumously in Der Spiegel on 81d), concentrating on the question posed by Socrates to Meno re- 31 March 1976, Heidegger seems to imply that »one can think only in garding a slave (»an undocumented and illiterate person«) previously German or Greek« (Mate 2001: 247). Mate, without entering into a summoned by Socrates: »He is a Greek and speaks our language?« »nationalistic dispute«, reminds us that for Heidegger the expression (Meno, 82 b), thus prompting the idea of »knowledge as recollection Western or European philosophy is a tautology and he agrees sub- (anamnesis)«.9 stantially with Heidegger (ibid.: 249). However, »[t]his way of under- standing existence is both a blessing and a curse, a great mission and a terrible fate«, particularly when we take into account the »forgetful- 7 W. Benjamin, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, New York: Harcourt, Brace ness of being« (Seinsvergessenheit) and the »abandonment of being« and World, 1968. 8 (Seinsverlassenheit) (ibid.). This forgetfulness has, according to With an expression taken from theology (restitutio in integrum sive omnium), Benjamin (1978: 313) »points towards a universality that takes into account the right Mate, triggered the technological control of our planet, »which is the to happiness, even for the dead. […] The ›now time‹ is a way of acknowledging the most perverse expression of universality« (ibid.: 250) since »[it] can actuality and validity of the damage that was caused in the past« (Mate 2001: 257). only be a ›bad‹ universality precisely because it is imposed« (ibid.). W. Benjamin, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, H. E. Jeph- The theme of ›bad European universality‹ figures prominently cott (trans.), New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978. 9 Aptly, at this point, Mate refers to Levinas’s reflection: »The ideal of Socratic truth thus rests on the essential self-sufficiency of the same, its identification in ipseity, its 6 R. Mate, ›Thinking in Spanish: Memory of Logos?‹, Nepantla: Views from South, egoism. Philosophy is egology« (Levinas 1969: 44). Plato, The Collected Dialogues of Vol. 2, No. 2, 2001, pp. 247–264. Plato. Including the Letters, E. Hamilton, and H. Cairns (eds.), Princeton, New Jersey:

16 17 C. Zene World Philosophies in Dialogue: a Shared Wisdom?

Socrates, however, knows that the slave speaks another language, of ›globalisation‹ taking place also within philosophy, with English which is not Greek (Mate 2001: 259). Hence, Mate reaches a partial becoming its lingua franca. In order to safeguard the diversity of ton- but vital conclusion regarding his main question, and notices that gues, which is overwhelming in Europe too, Mate suggests that one Maimonides (Mosheh ben Maimon) or Judah Halevi are left out of should not follow the path of ›linguistic uniformity‹. Rather, the an inventory of Spanish philosophers, either because they wrote in strategy of translation, as »the major theme of our time« and the Arabic, the ›other language‹, »or because rationality belongs exclu- »antidote to homogenizing thought« (ibid.) would prove to be more sively to the modernity that was born after 1492« (ibid.). In either fruitful. Here again, one should engage with Benjamin’s intuition case, this reveals an interiorised attitude »that to philosophize is a regarding the theory of translation. While Mate is more prone to thing for Greek or German« (ibid.). accepting a close similarity between the latter and Heidegger’s philo- When returning to the main question, Mate is well aware that sophical recoiling – »namely, that thinking is not exhausted in one even Spanish, which was never awarded the status of ›philosophical‹ thought, even if it has the prestige of philosophy behind it« (ibid.: language, »has shared the theoretical and practical domination of 263) – I am rather more inclined to support Marion’s »new horizon« modernity […] a language that has represented an empire and that as a departure and »new voyage« towards wisdom. As Mate himself has been imposed violently on other people, forcing upon them its comments on José Saramago’s remarks regarding the vocation of vision of the world […] There is a thought in Spanish that far from Spain and Portugal towards the South: »This new voyage can awaken being the memory of logos is the site of forgetfulness« (ibid.: 260). in us new capacities different from those that we presently carry in How can Spanish then recover the »forgetfulness of logos? Only by the name of Western reason« (ibid.: 262). recovering the »language of the slave« which narrates »experiences of I will return to Mate’s thoughts in the final part of my paper. suffering caused by the reign of that dominating logos«. These are Here it suffices to emphasise that Spanish is but one example of the contained in stories, songs, in the memory of the victims’ descen- trajectory followed by one of the many languages which composes dants, or in silence kept from generation to generation« (ibid.). Span- the complex mosaic of WP. While its similarities to other such experi- ish too, like any other language, recalls through these memories. As a ences makes us think in universal terms, its individual characteristics result, it projects two opposite visions of history. In order to attain a point instead towards a distinctiveness of a ›monadological‹ nature. universality which is based on a common history, the memory, and Both, the ›language of the slave‹ and the task of translation indicate the language of the slave are indispensable: »In order to reconstruct one way of re-discovering a novel approach to »the task of thinking«. the whole, in order to advance towards universality, the language of the slave is fundamental and irreplaceable« (ibid.: 261). Although Mate does not elaborate further, he touches upon the overlooked rea- Paul Ricoeur: Language, Translation, Hospitality lity of ›grey zones‹ when analysing the power-structure of language, since also »among the speaker of the language of empire there are Following on from Marion’s concepts on donation and wisdom and experiences of suffering and among the speakers of the language of Mate’s views on the ›language of the slave‹, universality and transla- the slave there are also dominators« (ibid.). Indeed, the violence of the tion, I now propose to bring the two together through the mediation European logos was active for centuries in loco, prior to being ex- of Paul Ricoeur’s On Translation (2006).10 ported elsewhere, and once in ›new‹ territories, found fertile ground In the third and final essay of his book entitled »A ›Passage‹: and valuable allies there. Translating the Untranslatable«, Ricoeur brings to our attention the In his conclusions, Mate warns us about judging his considera- work of François Jullien (2001),11 who, describing the relationship tions as nostalgic and/or romantic, especially in view of a certain kind between ancient China and classical Greece, postulates that »Chinese

Princeton University Press, 1961; E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, Pittsburgh, Penn- 10 P. Ricoeur, On Translation, London, and New York: Routledge, 2006. sylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1969. 11 F. Jullien, Du temps, Paris: Grasset et Fasquelle, 2001.

18 19 C. Zene World Philosophies in Dialogue: a Shared Wisdom? is the absolute other of Greek – that knowledge of the inside of Chi- translator« and his/her »dream of the perfect translation« always in nese amounts to a deconstruction of what is outside, of what is exter- between »faithfulness and betrayal« but still believing in the »dialo- ior, i.e. thinking and speaking Greek« (Ricoeur 2006: 36). While Jul- gicality of the act of translating«, and to »find happiness« in the work lien »maintains that Chinese verbs do not have tenses because of translation through »the work of memory and the work of mourn- Chinese does not have the concept of time« (ibid.), Ricoeur raises the ing« (ibid.: xvii-xix). Ricoeur’s innovative effort is rooted in his criti- question: »how do we speak (in French) about what there is in Chi- cal dialogue with philosophical hermeneutics and the way he proble- nese?« (ibid.: 36–37). matized ›interpretation‹ and easy access to meaning as opposed to a Without disputing Jullien’s main thesis,12 Ricoeur turns it on its plurality of meanings, already present in the polysemy of words and head, proving, as a result – by finding support in Marcel Détienne the secondary meaning of symbols: »For Ricoeur the matter is clear: (2000)13 – that there is a ›construction of comparables‹, found by Ri- there is no self-understanding possible without the labour of media- coeur in the multiple and recurring translations of the Bible. All this tion through signs, symbols, narratives and texts« given that »[e]very induces Ricoeur to say that »there is translation« – both, il y a and es subject […] is a tapestry of stories heard and told« (ibid.: xix). gibt? – and to recognise that, even beyond the translation of sacred In spite of its »fragile condition«, Ricoeur’s »linguistic hospital- texts or masterpieces, »there always were the merchants, the travel- ity« signals a new journey within the task of translation which also lers, the ambassadors, the spies to satisfy the need to extend human implies a deeper, ethical commitment: exchange beyond the linguistic community […]« (Ricoeur 2006: 32). Despite the conflictual character which renders the task of the translator There is, as should be expected, a fundamental continuity be- dramatic, he or she will find satisfaction in what I would like to call linguis- tween the way Ricoeur approaches philosophy in general and his tic hospitality. Its predicament is that of a correspondence without complete style of dealing with the specific problem of translation, making him adhesion. This is a fragile condition, which admits no verification other than »a brilliant mediator between competing schools of thought«, but also a new translation […] a sort of duplication of the work of the translator developing his own brand of »dialogical or diacritical hermeneutics« which is possible in virtue of a minimum of bilingualism: to translate afresh (Kearney 2006: viii–ix).14 This intensive dialogue – favouring »the after the translator.15 long route over the short cut« (ibid.: xi) – assisted him in looking Indeed, as Kearney comments, »Linguistic hospitality calls us to fore- beyond Heideggerian Dasein in the search of meaning of human ex- go the lure of omnipotence: the illusion of total translation which istence, arguing that »the meaning of Being is always mediated would provide a perfect replica of the original. Instead it asks us to through an endless process of interpretations« (ibid.). respect the fact that the semantic and syntactic fields of two languages While engaging with all major theorists, Ricoeur offers his ori- are not the same, or exactly reducible the one to the other« (ibid.: ginal interpretation regarding the ›task‹ of the translator, by retracing xvii). While Ricoeur is telling us that a »perfect language« does not familiar images of the »uncomfortable position of the mediator/ exist and that we must acknowledge our finitude, he allows us to carry on with the task and the commitment to translate:

12 More recently, some of Jullien’s theses have indeed been challenged. Most notably Just as in the narration it is always possible to tell the story in a different by Wang (2008), in an extensive review of Jullien’s The Impossible Nude (2007), and way, likewise in translation it is always possible to translate otherwise, by Franke (2014). S. Wang, Review of F. Jullien, ›The Impossible Nude: Chinese Art without ever hoping to bridge the gap between equivalence and perfect ad- and Western Aesthetics‹, China Review International, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2008, pp. 234– hesion. Linguistic hospitality, therefore, is the act of inhabiting the word of 243; F. Jullien, The Impossible Nude: Chinese Art and Western Aesthetics, Chicago: the Other paralleled by the act of receiving the word of the Other into one’s University of Chicago Press, 2007; W. Franke, ›All or Nothing? Nature in Chinese own home, one’s own dwelling (ibid.). Thought and the Apophatic Occident‹, Comparative Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2014, pp. 4–24. 13 M. Détienne, Comparer l’incomparable, Paris: Seuil, 2000. 14 R. Kearney, »Introduction: Ricoeur’s Philosophy of Translation«, in P. Ricoeur, On 15 I am following the translation provided by Kearney (2006: xvi) here. In the original Translation, London, and New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. vii-xx. text, it is found on pp. 19–20 (P. Ricoeur, Sur la traduction, Paris: Bayard, 2004).

20 21 C. Zene World Philosophies in Dialogue: a Shared Wisdom?

The practice – not just the concept/idea – of linguistic hospitality in- 2004: 9–21)18 which foretell the new horizons announced by Marion, volves a full return journey »by an engaged self which only finds and the new voyage wished for by Mate. It will not be possible to ac- itself after it has traversed the field of foreignness and returned to complish this here at great length but only in a very sketchy way, with itself again, this time altered and enlarged, ›othered‹. The moi gives a promise to return to these initial findings, and investigate them in way to the soi, or more precisely to the soi-même comme un autre« greater depth. (ibid.: xix), thus highlighting this »inner translation« as a continua- Looking into the past of Western philosophy, we should recollect tion of the journey into the »outer translation«, together with the that all works but two of Aristotle would have been lost forever, had discovery of one’s own identity and the ethical demands addressed to these not been translated into Arabic. Aristotelian influence on Isla- the self, emphasized by Ricoeur in Oneself as Another (1992).16 This mic philosophy was already evident during the time of Al-Kindi of is, in other words, the applicability of »a new translation« or the pos- Basra (c. 801–873 CE) and Abu Nasr Al-Farabi (c. 870–950), and be- sibility »to translate otherwise […] to say the same thing in another came even more prominent with Ibn-Sina (980–1037) and Ibn-Rushd way« (Ricoeur 2006: 25). (1126–1198) from Cordova in Al-Andalus (Spain), while later on al- Gazali (1058–1111) showed opposition to this rationalism, in favour of Sufism, representing the ›mystical side‹ of Islam. III Traces of ›New Horizons‹ and the During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the works of Aris- ›Gift of Wisdom‹ for WP totle and his Arab commentators were translated into Latin and they provided the philosophical backbone for the Christian theology of In different ways, the three authors discussed above provide us with Thomas Aquinas. By making extensive use of Aristotle’s philosophy, remarkable entry points in responding to the challenges presented by Aquinas wished to prove the humanistic and rational basis of his the end of philosophy. Rather than giving in to some form of ›philo- theology. Meanwhile the Greek logos, figuring so prominently and sophical atrophy‹, their efforts in self-reflexivity show that western achieving a higher status in St. John’s Gospel, became the Verbum. philosophy can indeed take a different direction and thus postulate a This philosophy/theology dominated the scene for many centuries to repositioning towards »new horizons« motivated by the welcoming come, but not without challenge. While Aquinas and his Dominican presence of other systems of thought. disciples gave prominence to the Verbum Mentis, the Franciscans, Hence, to return to our initial questions: How can present day mainly a mendicant order, placed emphasis on the Augustinian Ver- Anglo-European philosophy accomplish its ongoing commitment to bum Cordis (Capuzzo 2011),19 in a fashion similar to al-Gazali’s op- the task of thinking? Indeed, is Anglo-European philosophy open and position to Aristotelianism. ready to interact with other systems of thought, so that a possibility is Closer to our time, at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of given for us to consider WP as a viable concept and an operative tool? the twentieth century, despite much euphoria resulting from the En- Has the aggressivity of the Greek all-powerful logos nullified this pos- lightenment and modernity, Europe was plummeted into an unprece- sibility for ever, despite the recognition of a ›weak logos‹ running dented crisis which culminated in World War I where, for the first through the western traditions?17 There are some moments of our past time, technology was put to the service of death and destruction. Soon philosophical history which signal the presence – as appearance and after this war, many intellectuals intervened to express their opinion disappearance – of a weaker logos and, following Ricoeur’s lead, we on the crisis, such as the lecture delivered by Edmund Husserl in could discover within this history those »hidden traces« (Ricoeur

18 P. Ricoeur, Ricordare, dimenticare, perdonare. L’enigma del passato, Bologna: il Mulino, 2004. 19 L. Capuzzo, ›Il verbum mentis nella polemica tra francescani e domenicani: Rug- 16 P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. gero Marston critica Tommaso d’Aquino‹, Medioevo: rivista di storia della filosofia 17 This would be the case, for instance, with Vattimo’s concept of pensiero debole. medievale, Vol. 36, 2011, pp. 113–136.

22 23 C. Zene World Philosophies in Dialogue: a Shared Wisdom?

Vienna on 10 May, 1935, bearing the emblematic title: Philosophy their critical-ethical stance when reflecting on the task of thinking and the Crisis of European Man.20 In antecedence, this very proble- and its future development within Anglo-European philosophy, thus matique had been emphasised by Miguel de Unamuno with The Tra- obtaining a renewed task of critical-ethical thinking, which includes gic Sense of Life (1912).21 an essential socio-political dimension of philosophical engagement. In a sense it could also be argued that Heidegger’s Being and This is rather evident in the ›monadological universality‹ proposed Time was a similar response to this crisis, when we take into account by Benjamin and adopted by Mate, but also hinted at by Marion, in particular the emphasis on concepts such as ›concern‹, ›co-being‹ when he refers to »overcoming the mode of thinking that has predo- (Mit-Sein), and authenticity, to counterbalance the ontic, facticity and minated to the point of imperialism« (Marion 2003: 173–174). Criti- anxiety of being-fallen. Post-Heideggerian philosophers have offered cal ethics is equally crucial to both Ricoeur and Kearney. The latter, a variety of responses and interpretations, including Heidegger’s stu- following his mentor, radicalises hospitality even further through dent, Hans-Georg Gadamer (2004 [1960]), who went to great lengths »the discovery of the wisdom of the stranger« and, although Kearney to retrace the past history of hermeneutics so as to make progress is applying »an ethics of radical hospitality« here to discuss transla- towards an ›effective historical consciousness‹ and a more meaningful tion across faith cultures, the same »hermeneutic wager« can be ap- dialogue.22 His work has certainly had a great impact on philosophy as plied to the encounter of WP: »an ethics of radical hospitality presup- well as other fields and disciplines. And yet, the suspicion remains in poses the challenging route of embracing complexity, diversity and many quarters that a sincere, critical, and all-inclusive philosophical ambiguity rather than prematurely endorsing a spiritual Esperanto dialogue is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. of global norms« (Kearney 2014: 153).24 Indeed, the juxtaposition My point, however, is that our Anglo-European philosophy has here of religion and philosophy could provide us with a reason to reached the end of the line of its narcissistic journey precisely because expand our (inadequate) notion of religious pluralism, supposedly it has remained entangled in the struggle for the pursuit of power and dictated by a sort of political correctness, with that of philosophical the acquisition of a knowledge which would guarantee even more pluralism, instead of insisting on playing our (mostly inadequate) power, rather than generating an effort to continuously rediscover card: »They have religions, we have philosophy!«. The point is: there the task of thinking and with it the gift of wisdom. It might be worth, cannot be a real, enduring commitment to the task of (critical-ethical) for argument’s sake, to recall that the Greek word Sophia, from which thinking until all those who are capable of thinking are invited to Marion presumably derives ›wisdom‹, is a feminine noun and, one participate in this undertaking. This can be summarily expressed in would assume, less devoted to the more ›masculine activity‹ of gain- the Gramscian notion: »All humans are philosophers/thinkers«.25 ing power especially through conquest, violence, and war.23 Although an extensive philological discussion should accompany this One trait common to the work of the authors discussed above is quote, my tentative ›re-translation‹ might be: »no human can ever be considered a slave«, with the implication that the slave is defined as 20 E. Husserl, »Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man«, in E. Husserl, Phenom- the one who is prevented from thinking or, at least, whose thought is enology and the Crisis of Philosophy, Q. Lauer (trans.), New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1965, pp. 149–192. for our own pleasure seems to question whether we do indeed possess the ethical 21 M. de Unamuno, Del sentimiento trágico de la vida en los hombres y en los pue- stamina needed to welcome, or heed, the call for WP. blos, Madrid: Editorial Renascimiento, 1912. 24 R. Kearney, ›Translating across Faith Cultures: Radical Hospitality‹, in P. Kemp, 22 H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2004 [1960]. and N. Hashimoto (eds.), ›Nature and Culture in Our Time‹, Eco-Ethica, Vol. 3, 23 This, obviously, raises further questions about male dominance and female subju- 2014, pp. 145–156. gation. Currently, women account for twenty-nine percent of full-time academic staff 25 Prison Notebook 10, »The Philosophy of B. Croce«. »Given the principle that all in philosophy departments in the UK, while in the US they make up only seventeen humans are ›philosophers‹, i.e. that between professional philosophers or ›techni- percent. Apparently, this situation cannot be attributed to a lack of talent in, or inter- cians‹ and other humans there is no ›qualitative‹ but only ›quantitative‹ difference est by, young women. One important reason seems to lie in their being sexually […] it must be, nevertheless, ascertained what this difference is« (Q 10, §52, 1342). harassed, assaulted, or retaliated against (see, The Guardian, 5 January 2015). The A. Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere, A cura di Valentino Gerratana, Torino: Einaudi, treatment by male faculty of our female colleagues and students as objects to be used 1975 [4 Vols].

24 25 C. Zene World Philosophies in Dialogue: a Shared Wisdom? not even taken into consideration. To validate this hypothesis, which heart of Anglo-European philosophy (see Lewis 2011).30 These devel- underpins the concept of WP, we must appeal again to Benjamin’s opments began with the period of time stretching from World War I, »monadological universality« according to which we »value as abso- the inter-war period – continued through the bewildering develop- lute each singularity«. We must also return to Ricoeur’s »linguistic ments of Heideggerian philosophy – to reach his later meditation hospitality« in order to welcome the »word of the Other« into our and down to us, at present. This struggle happening within Western own thinking, and must invoke Kearney’s »radical hospitality« so as philosophy is reflected also in the ambiguity and the difficulty – not to re-discover »the wisdom of the stranger«. solely in Heidegger but the whole of Anglo-European philosophy – to To be fair to Marion’s concept of ›donation‹, we should take into disentangle itself from a domineering logos which prevents us from account his previous, vast output on ›givenness‹ and ›the given‹ (Ma- listening to other, different voices/words, uttered within different rion 1998, 2002) and his most recent work on this topic (2011), which languages, »beyond being and time«, often labelled as lesser lan- is a task beyond the scope of the present essay.26 I must, however, at guages, or the languages of the slaves, perhaps even unwritten and least point out that Marion brings together Heidegger’s and Levinas’ anti-institutional languages. Within this struggle, rather than hold- work.27 Despite strong differences between the two,28 a deep presence ing on to the power of a theoretical apparatus,31 Heidegger himself of ethics cannot be totally dispelled, even when Marion wrestles to do reverts to an ›event‹ (Ereignis), in which even the certainty of dona- so. Moreover, when retracing ›givenness‹ (Gegebenheit) all the way tion as such is lost, so as to give place to a giving which becomes a back to phenomenology and in particular to Heidegger (Marion 2011: ›sending‹ (Schicken).32 But if there is sending – similarly to donation 19–49), Marion has to acknowledge »Heidegger’s entire trajectory«, and gift-giving –, there must be a sender and also a receiver and the starting with the post-war lectures in January-April 1919,29 which two together seem to constitute a plurality within which the ›sending address »the gap between academic theoretical philosophy and life is given‹, the event can happen, it can take place. Furthermore, it itself« (ibid.: 35), and the text Zeit und Sein of 1962: necessarily constitutes a ›we‹ which did not previously exist. Even if one agrees with Marion that the end of metaphysics »leads all the For, in the quasi-conclusive text of 1962, when Heidegger takes for the last time the meditation upon »it gives, es gibt«, deploying there, it is true, a way to the horizon of donation«, the question mentioned above still phenomenological mastery far outstripping the approximations of 1919, the remains: Is this givenness granted to all, or is it the privilege of a task is still to think ›it gives‹ not only independently of thingliness and select group? If so, does this group encompass all those who consti- theoretical objectivity but especially, this time, beyond being and time. tute Anglo-European philosophy, or is to be restricted to further sub- (ibid.: 49) groups within this tradition? Respecting these laws of gift-giving, the If, on the one hand, we might be puzzled by ›Heideggerian jargon‹ sending and receiving happens within a constituted community and perhaps by Marion remaining ›caught‹ within it, on the other, we where individuals and groups recognise each other and self-under- can also appreciate the mighty struggle taking place here, at the very standing is accompanied by mutual understanding and mutual recog-

26 J.-L. Marion, Reduction and Givenness, Investigations of Husserl, Heidegger, and 30 S. E. Lewis, »Introduction: The Phenomenological Concept of Givenness and the Phenomenology, Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1998; Being Myth of the ›Given‹« (Marion 2011: 1–17). Given. Towards a Phenomenology of Givenness, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 31 »And, here again, the same marker, the Ereignis, comes to guarantee the correct 2002; The Reason of the Gift, Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia understanding of the ›it gives‹. At issue is the strongest, and therefore the most deba- Press, 2011. table, thesis: ›Being vanishes in the Ereignis‹ […]« (Marion 2011: 49). 27 See his »Substitution and Solicitude. How Levinas Re-reads Heidegger« (Marion 32 »In the beginning of Western thinking, Being is thought, but not the ›It gives‹ as 2011: 50–68). such. The latter withdraws in favour of the gift which It gives. That gift is thought and 28 »[…] what is at issue is a combat between two types of thought« (ibid.: 68). conceptualised from then on exclusively as Being with regard to beings. A giving 29 M. Heidegger, Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, B. Heimbüchel (ed.), Gesamtaus- which gives only its gift, but in the giving holds itself back and withdraws, such a gabe, Vol. 56/57, Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987; Towards the Definition of giving we call sending. According to meaning of giving which is to be thought in this Philosophy, T. Sadler (trans.), London: Continuum, 2008. way, Being – that which It gives – is what is sent« (Heidegger 1972: 8).

26 27 C. Zene World Philosophies in Dialogue: a Shared Wisdom? nition. Here again, WP must reckon with this mutuality being ex- anthologies, journals, and blogs« (ibid.: 8). However, in the remainder tended to the whole of humanity. of the article, the authors take a realistic approach and illustrate the For WP to succeed, we must be ready and able to listen to the present day scenario in which much resistance towards Comparative language of the other, so as to recognise that the stranger can think Philosophy is still held in many quarters of institutional Anglo-Eur- and hence be able to produce systems of thought and reasoning. This opean philosophy. There are, however, also many hopeful signs and could be, in fact, the new horizon and the gift of wisdom, so that in the launch of Confluence is in itself a proof that new horizons are order to achieve true Mit-Sein (co-being) as a global endeavour for opening up for Anglo-European philosophy and that philosophers, humanity, we must also implement Mit-Denken (co-thinking) on a not only, of the Old Continent are ready for new voyages. universal scale. Heidegger reverted to Husserl in order to prove that Taking into account our discussion thus far, and before drawing ›the end of (European) philosophy‹ could represent an ›opening up‹ of to a conclusion, I would like to clarify some concepts which will help philosophy towards aletheia as ›dis-closure‹: thus, Husserl’s state- us to identify possible theoretical and methodological lines of enquiry ment, »The stimulus for investigation must start not with philoso- concerning the future of WP. While in principle I am not against the phies, but with issues and problems,«33 provided Heidegger with a label ›Comparative Philosophy‹ (and to some extent ›Inter-cultural possible solution: »The phenomenon itself, in the present case the Philosophy‹), it would be relevant to question its validity, or at least opening, sets us the task of learning from it while questioning it, that to ›decontaminate‹ its deeper meaning, in order to achieve a better is, of letting it say something to us« (Heidegger 1972: 66). The pro- result, mainly on two accounts: blem envisaged by Husserl and highlighted by Heidegger seems to be a) the original meaning of ›comparative‹ (Latin com-parare) con- a loss of direction within (Western) philosophical investigation: the tains ›parare‹, the idea of preparing for something, in the sense of failure of philosophy to be truly itself and hence announcing its end, ›getting ready‹, but also the idea of ›defending‹ and ›shielding‹, which but not without proposing phenomenologically a new opening, one obviously implies a sense of confrontation in act, and a struggle of very last task. The issue at stake here is »the task of thinking« and the one against the other; phenomenon is the opening which must take place at »the end of b) the use of ›comparative‹ also in other disciplines, particularly philosophy«, towards a more comprehensive and inclusive approach within the Humanities, has been rather controversial, as for instance to thinking which would recognise – while questioning it – that in ›Comparative Literature‹ and ›Comparative Religions‹, due to the thinking or the gift of wisdom, can no longer be conceived as an ex- fact that an established hierarchy was already built within the com- clusive right of Anglo-European philosophy. parison there, reflecting a knowledge-power component. Relevant moments which have marked the beginning and devel- Should ›Comparative Philosophy‹ remain in use, we must make opment of what has come to be known as ›Comparative Philosophy‹ every effort to dissociate ourselves from the confrontational character and/or ›Intercultural Philosophy‹ would be most pertinent at this linked with it, which reflects the spirit of the laws of the market. I am point. This task, luckily, has been brilliantly covered by the article not talking here, obviously, about healthy competition and construc- written by the editorial team for the first issue of this very journal tive debates, but about a style of organizational approach, apparently as ›Confluence: A Thematic Introduction‹ (Kirloskar-Steinbach, Ra- based on efficiency, which is putting our departments under consider- mana and Maffie 2014).34 Indeed, as we read there: »Comparative able stress and preventing us from focusing on our main duty: the philosophy is a vibrant field today, with a steady stream of new books, task of thinking. We have also better qualified this task as »critical- ethical thinking«, while striving to conceive it as a common effort, as co-thinking (Mit-Denken), derived from our pursuit of co-being 33 E. Husserl, ›Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft‹, Logos, Vol. 1, Tübingen, 1910– (Mit-Sein). This brings us to an alternative paradigm to ›marketplace 1911, pp. 289–341. exchange‹ suggested here: donation and gift-giving. 34 M. Kirloskar-Steinbach, G. Ramana and J. Maffie, ›Confluence: A Thematic Intro- duction‹, Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2014, Donation, even when applied to »the givenness of being that pp. 7–63. gives itself«, must respect the laws of gift-giving, as seen above. Not-

28 29 C. Zene World Philosophies in Dialogue: a Shared Wisdom? withstanding the complexity of this discourse and the negativity rounding this concept, which still contains the idea of ›logos‹, WP which can be ascribed to ›the gift‹, I am inclined to support Marion’s would be assisted enormously by the support of critical-ethical dialo- claim, but with some explanations. Firstly, the being that gives, does gue in which the presence of the ›dia‹ announces the event of a weak- not give itself exclusively to professional philosophers, or indeed to er logos, ›pulled apart‹ in different directions, but respecting the good- some of them, even if these, through their expertise, might claim will of both sender and receiver. Following the logic of the gift, no more sophisticated access to it. As a consequence, Anglo-European individual group can appropriate the word to make it its own, since philosophy cannot boast sole access to the gift of wisdom coming this must continue to circulate, so as to involve as many as possible, in from this donation. Secondly, the gift received through donation, to particular those who have been silenced for too long a time. remain a proper gift, must circulate and cannot become the possession The desire for connectivity also activates the indispensable con- of a select few. This would atrophise the gift itself. An even worse nection between philosophy, thinking, and wisdom. Although this is scenario appears when the gift is transformed into an item of transac- deserving of a full article in itself, let it suffice, for the purpose of the tion, thus falling into the sphere of a market-dominated economy (see present essay, to confirm that thinking, understood as a task carried Hénaff 2002), which now seems a prevailing line of action in acade- out by the philosopher, finds itself between philosophy and wisdom. mia.35 Thirdly, the flow of gift-giving, once passed from being to It originates from the first, but moves towards the second. This seems beings, cannot be conceived as unidirectional, since all have the right to be already present in Heidegger’s »task of thinking« understood as to receive, as much as the right to give, so as to be recognised as part »the surrender of previous thinking to the determination of the mat- of the one, human community. Given the imbalance that so far has ter of thinking« (Heidegger 1972: 73). The idea of ›surrender‹ implies characterised our philosophical exchange, »the voice of the slave« a willingness to accept that »previous thinking« – identified by Hei- must find a privileged place in our dialogues. Fourthly, professional degger as philosophy, which for him is only Western philosophy – is philosophers, as much as other intellectuals and scientists, are mo- superseded by the eagerness to reach for the core, or the matter of rally obliged to treat with respect the ›data‹ – as datum, that is, a given thinking, thus exposing the deficiency of previous thinking. While – which they have received, and of which they cannot claim posses- Heidegger, despite the movement of donation proposed by Marion, sion. While they may occupy a position of power in terms of ›knowl- seems to remain trapped within a restricted – albeit new – way of edge‹, they are called to exercise their profession with utmost humi- thinking and doing philosophy, Ricoeur, as paraphrased by Kearney, lity, so as to be able to communicate unadulterated knowledge. This offers a challenging alternative with his view of a departure and re- implies, contrary to current trends in education, that learning and turn journey »by an engaged self which only finds itself after it has teaching cannot be governed solely by market laws, but by a desire traversed the field of foreignness and returned to itself again«. This is to share and an ability to learn, even by educators. Finally, if we were also confirmed by the ›radical hospitality‹ proposed by Kearney. to accept the perspective that the end of philosophy marks new hor- Could then the »surrender of previous thinking« mean exactly that: izons characterised by the gift of wisdom, we would be already en a full return journey and a readiness to listen to the language of the route – by recognising their presence – to dismantling the many pre- other, without giving in to monolingualism but »embracing transla- judices accumulated within the history of Anglo-European philoso- tion as a vehicle for creating a network of interlinguistic migra- phy. tions«?36 Within the perspective of this new horizon, wisdom would Gift-giving, particularly in line with the idea of ›sending‹ not feature any longer as »the exotic outsider«, but as a common goal (Schicken) – being en route and reaching out – motivates the recipro- for the »task of thinking« for every philosophy as an integral part of cal recognition which occurs in dialogue. Despite the controversy sur- every philosophical endeavour, as inspired by Benjamin’s monadolo-

35 M. Hénaff, The Price of Truth: Gift, Money and Philosophy, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002. 36 Jonardon Ganeri, personal communication.

30 31 C. Zene gical universality. Indeed, even for Heidegger »the attitude of think- Approaching Shan Shui Art through Gadamer ing which is able to listen is paramount« (Tercic 2006: 110).37 Let me sum up: despite a long history of self-absorbed thinking, Anglo-European philosophy shows signs of receptivity towards other philosophies, thus allowing us to reconsider the »task of (critical-ethi- cal) thinking« as a collective endeavour. If a new horizon discloses itself for Anglo-European philosophy, this must include openness to- wards other philosophies, in line with »monadological universality« and »linguistic (radical) hospitality«, so as to acknowledge the pre- sence of WP and to share with these the gift of wisdom, through a Abstract sustained critical-ethical dialogue. Still further, a true radical hospi- Shan shui art is a traditional style of Chinese landscape painting that tality is happening – as an event (Ereignis) – when Anglo-European has had a lasting impact on Chinese culture. This paper attempts to philosophy remains attentive and welcoming to ›the sending of the view a masterpiece of this genre of art – the artwork entitled ›Hermit gift of wisdom‹ which comes to it from other close or distant philoso- Dwelling in the Qingbian Mountains‹ by Wang Meng – from the phies. In practical terms, there is a need, in line with Husserl, to ad- perspective of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophy of art in order to dress »issues and problems« – the many questions raised in this essay show how such an artwork can convey an ontological insight for those at both theoretical and methodological levels – so as to further stimu- who experience it. Instead of viewing the artwork as simply an late our investigation. For, WP is not a given, but a gift always in the aesthetically pleasing landscape and thereby relegating the experience sending. to the realm of feeling as is common in modern Western approaches to art, I argue that the artwork is best understood as imparting mean- –Cosimo Zene, SOAS, University of London, UK ing into our lives by opening up a new perspective on reality. Specifi- cally, I show the Daoist principles and concepts that underlie shan shui art at work in Wang Meng’s (c. 1308–1385) masterpiece. The Gadamerian approach adopted provides an appropriate avenue to re- spect Wang Meng’s artwork and other paintings in the shan shui genre on their own terms for those embracing a contemporary Wes- tern aesthetic sensibility.

Keywords Philosophy of art, Chinese landscape painting, Comparative Philoso- phy, Wang Meng, the Four Yüan Masters, Truth and Method.

The Chinese painting style of shan shui (山水) gained prominence in the fifth century and has had a lasting impact on Chinese culture ever since (Zhen 2013: 8).1 In his commentary on shan shui art from the eighth to the fourteenth centuries, Wen Fong argues that such paint- ing was »infused with life not so much by the representation of rea- lity as by evocation and reflection and the elicitation of associations 37 V. Tercic, La dimensione dell’ es gibt nell’ontologia di Martin Heidegger, Roma: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 2006. 1 L. Q. Zhen, Chinese Landscape Painting, New York: North Light Books, 2013.

32 33 C. Rentmeester Approaching Shan Shui Art through Gadamer that lie within the realm of feeling« (Fong 1992: 60).2 While Fong is losophers performing experiments in the field of experimental philo- correct in pointing out that the primary function of shan shui was not sophy as if they were scientists, art critics viewing works of art solely the representation of reality, his way of relegating the function of this on the basis of their form and ignoring any content of the work in art style to the realm of feeling is misleading. I argue that the proper order to be ›objective,‹ and historians thinking that they can get at function of shan shui lies beyond representation and aesthetics and is ›the truth‹ about a certain historical event just as a scientist can get rather to be found in realm of ontology. Using Hans-Georg Gada- at the truth about the boiling point of water. In Truth and Method, mer’s philosophy of art, I will show that shan shui painting is better Gadamer tries to argue that certain elements of human phenomena understood as an event of truth by looking at a masterpiece of the (such as, what people do and what they create) need to be understood genre of shan shui, a 1366 artwork by Wang Meng (王蒙), a Chinese in a way that is wholly different than the methods of the natural or painter from the fourteenth century, entitled ›Hermit Dwelling in the ›hard‹ sciences. He states: Qingbian Mountains‹ (青卞隱居圖). The human sciences are connected to modes of experience that lie outside Gadamer’s philosophy of art as espoused in Truth and Method science: with the experiences of philosophy, of art, and of history itself. (Wahrheit und Methode) opens up new ways of thinking about works These are all modes of experience in which a truth is communicated that of art that resonate well with the role that shan shui art played in its cannot be verified by the methodological means proper to science. (Gadamer original context. My goal in this paper is to use the ontological frame- 2006: xxi)3 work that Gadamer espouses in Truth and Method and apply it to It is important to point out that Gadamer is not arguing against Wang Meng’s artwork. In doing so, I hope to open new ways of think- science. Scientific experimentation and observation are wholly appro- ing about this style of Daoist art that are divorced from the modern priate when applied to certain aspects of the human world. For in- emphasis on ›aesthetic consciousness‹ (ästhetisches Bewußtsein) that stance, if we want to understand our neurophysiological processes or treats a work of art as an object that is merely ›there‹ for the apprecia- the best way to maximize our nutritional intake, science undoubtedly tion of a subject. Gadamer’s thesis that a work of art is an event of provides the best means of going about attaining such information. In truth provides a much more appropriate way to think about shan shui admitting this, however, we must realize that there are also elements art than the objectifying tendencies that one finds in the modern con- of human life that go beyond the realm of science and need to be ception of art. understood on their own terms. For Gadamer, »the central question of the modern age […] is the question of how our natural view of the world – the experience of the world that we have as we simply live out I Gadamer’s Project our lives – is related to the unassailable and anonymous authority that confronts us in the pronouncements of science« (Gadamer 1996: Although one can point out many elements that characterize the 111).4 In other words, the main question that comes along with the modern era, one of the most salient is the dominance of science and dominance of science in the modern era is how aspects of our lives like the scientific method. The methodology of the ›hard sciences‹ has art, philosophy, and history can be understood authentically, that is, won out to such an extent that the human sciences have been forced in a manner appropriate to their specific contexts. His thesis is that a to adopt their methodology of procedure. This is precisely why one genuine understanding of such phenomena requires us to go outside finds statistical analysis and talk of science-based methodology in the methods of the sciences and view them in more fitting frame- such disciplines as human psychology, sociology, and even communi- cation. In fact, even philosophy, art, and history have fallen prey to certain molds set by the natural sciences. For example, one finds phi- 3 H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, J. Weinsheimer, and D. G. Marshall (trans.), second, revised edition, London and New York: Continuum Publishing Group, 2006. 4 H.-G. Gadamer, »The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem,« in The Conti- 2 W. C. Fong, Beyond Representation: Chinese Painting and Calligraphy: 8th–14th nental Philosophy Reader, R. Kearney, and M. Rainwater (eds.), London and New Century, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992. York: Routledge, 1996.

34 35 C. Rentmeester Approaching Shan Shui Art through Gadamer works. The goal is not to undermine science, but simply to realize that that has been influenced by the methodologies and frameworks of certain aspects of our human world are not amenable to the scientific science is what Gadamer calls the »aesthetic consciousness.« worldview. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on his treatment As Charles Guignon notes, Gadamer’s notion of aesthetic con- of art. In a certain sense, this is where the heart of Gadamer’s interest sciousness is »the orientation to works of art that regards them as lies since in a late essay entitled ›The Artwork in Word and Image,‹ objects for aesthetic appreciation« (Guignon 2003: 38).6 On this mod- Gadamer states that his real interest in Truth and Method was the el, an artwork is an object opposed to a subject, and the function of the experience of art (Gadamer 2007: 195).5 work of art is to bring about sensations or feelings on the part of the subject. Here, it is assumed that there is a single work of art that is the product of a creator and that spectators appreciate the artwork by II Gadamer’s Philosophy of Art getting into the mind of the creator in order to understand his or her intentions. Whether the creator’s intention is to express a feeling that Gadamer argues that art is a special aspect of the human world that he or she experienced or criticize an aspect of culture, the point is that cannot be appropriately understood if we try to view it from the the spectator’s job is to hone in on the creator’s intentions and there- scientific perspective that dominates the modern worldview. He states by have an experience for oneself. The experience that comes about that he is attempting »to defend the experience of truth that comes to from experiencing a work of art is one that a person would not nor- us through the work of art against the aesthetic theory that lets itself mally come across in everyday life. The work of art transports the be restricted to a scientific conception of truth« (Gadamer 2006: xxii). spectator to a place of sensation that is cut off from what happens in According to him, there is a sort of truth that inheres in great art- one’s normal life. While Fong does not use Gadamer’s language of works that cannot be captured by the methodology and worldview of »aesthetic consciousness,« his understanding of the spectator’s ex- science. The problem is that the scientific worldview has infiltrated perience of shan shui fits the mold of aesthetic consciousness since our modern period to such an extent that we no longer recognize any he considers the experience of an artwork from the lens of subjective non-scientific types of truth as legitimate. Because of this, even the aesthetic appreciation. Fong stresses that shan shui art goes beyond art world is forced to implement aspects of the scientific worldview in representation in that it does not merely aim to portray a beautiful order to be taken seriously. landscape. Rather, such artworks »project the very essence of reality The basic structure of modern science is to objectify things and because of their intense psychological absorption« (Fong 1992: 61). attempt to explain them through causal analyses. This is set up on the From Fong’s interpretation, the artists’ »awe and […] empathy with assumption that we, as human beings, are subjects that are attempt- nature« are portrayed in the artworks, and a subject who experiences ing to explain the world around us, which is taken to be a totality of such artworks should come to have similar subjective feelings if he or objects. In this framework, something is true if the propositions that a she is to properly appreciate the work (ibid.). From this perspective, subject ascribes to an object are actual attributes of the object itself. the major function of art is to elicit feelings on the part of the specta- For example, if I say ›The book is on the table,‹ this statement is true if tors that are similar to the ones felt by the artists themselves. Gada- there is, in fact, a book lying on the table. Although people will read- mer would consider such an interpretation to be caught up in what he ily admit that art is distinct from science, Gadamer points out that the calls aesthetic consciousness. realm of art in the modern period has succumbed to some of the as- When aesthetic consciousness comes to take over, the word ›aes- sumptions of the scientific worldview and has thereby lost the force it thetics‹ is introduced and art is merely relegated to the realm of feel- had at earlier points in world history. The modern worldview of art ing. Although we tend to simply identify aesthetics with theories of art, we should note that the word ›aesthetics‹ comes from the Greek

5 H.-G. Gadamer, »The Artwork in Word and Image: ›So True, So Full of Being,‹« in The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the Later Writings, R. E. Palmer (ed. and trans.), 6 C. Guignon, ›Meaning in the Work of Art: A Hermeneutic Perspective,‹ Midwest Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007, pp. 192–224. Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 27, 2003, pp. 25–44.

36 37 C. Rentmeester Approaching Shan Shui Art through Gadamer word αἴσθησιϚ (aesthesis), which means ›perception‹ or ›feeling.‹7 In sure the importance of an artwork in accordance with how true it is, making artworks simply a matter of feeling on the part of spectators, that is, in how much it resonates with the world as it is experienced works of art no longer have any cognitive content. Works of art are and, most importantly, opens up new ways of being in the world for merely there to provide us with sensations and not there to tell us those who experience it. Gadamer argues that we call an artwork anything meaningful about the way the world is or how we should »true« when »we recognize [that] a work of art is ›right,‹ [and thereby live our lives. In other words, by relegating works of art to the realm say], ›So ist es!‹« (Gadamer 2007: 197). In other words, a work of art of feeling, aesthetic consciousness cuts off the essential link that ex- is true when we say »That’s it!« or »That’s the way things are!« as we ists between a work of art and reality. Instead of viewing a work of art come to a new realization about reality. Put simply, we can say that as something that has a claim of truth for the people who experience Gadamer hopes to cease viewing artworks merely from the realm of it, the artwork is seen as there for only aesthetic reasons. aesthetics and begin to incorporate them into the realm of ontology. Along with aesthetic consciousness comes »aesthetic differentia- Gadamer argues that works of art used to play pivotal roles in tion« (ästhetische Unterscheidung), which Gadamer defines as »a the lives of people and his aim is to retrieve this idea that art has an process of abstraction [that disregards] everything in which a work important function in our lives that cannot be reduced to the role of is rooted (its original context of life, and the religious or secular func- merely supplying us with sensations or feelings. In order to do this, tion that gave it significance) [and thereby] becomes visible as the he has to get away from the idea that art is a static object that we, as ›pure work of art‹« (Gadamer 2006: 74). When spectators engage in independent subjects, merely look at and appreciate. In other words, aesthetic differentiation, they abstract out everything ›unimportant‹ he has to divorce the realm of art from the subject/object ontology in the work of art to discover the heart of the meaning of the artwork. that is implicit in modern science. He states, »The work of art is not an One can find this tendency in the art world today in the movement of object that stands over against a subject for itself. Instead the work of formalism in which the artistic value of a work of art lies entirely in art has its true being in the fact that it becomes an experience that its formal characteristics such as the colors, lines, and shapes of the changes the person who experiences it« (ibid.: 103). For Gadamer, artwork. When examining an artwork from the formalist perspective, works of art must be seen within their historical and cultural context the aim is to focus solely on the formal features of the work and as events that have a claim to truth on people. In earlier periods in completely disregard any sort of content that may inhere in the work. human history, artworks were vital components of the life-worlds of Implicit in this process of abstraction is the idea that the ›true mean- people. For instance, an ancient Greek temple was a work of art that ing‹ of the work of art is its form and that the content is merely did not function as an architectural construct that was simply aesthe- peripheral. Gadamer would argue that such an art movement could tically pleasing. Rather, the temple united the Greek people and only come about in the modern period where aesthetic consciousness formed the people’s identity.9 Gadamer asserts, »No one can ignore reigns supreme over all other possible models.8 Instead of looking at the fact that in the work of art, in which a world arises, not only is art in terms of form or content, he wants to view art as an important something meaningful given to experience that was not known be- aspect of our human existence that has an element of truth that can- fore, but also something new comes into existence with the work of not be captured in any ›scientific‹ or ›objective‹ terms. In other words, art itself« (Gadamer 1976: 224).10 Gadamer attempts to retrieve this instead of assessing an artwork on how well it accurately represents reality in terms of its content or on how well the work’s formal fea- tures of color, line, or shape balance together, Gadamer hopes to mea- 9 The example of the Greek temple informing the lives of the Greek people comes from Martin Heidegger. See his »The Origin of the Work of Art,« in Basic Writings, D. F. Krell (ed.), revised and expanded edition, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 7 There are still remnants of this original meaning in, for instance, the English word Inc., 1993, pp. 139–212. Gadamer was extremely influenced by Heidegger’s philoso- ›anesthetic,‹ which means to dull one’s feelings. phy of art. 8 As Gadamer notes, »Aesthetic consciousness has unlimited sovereignty over every- 10 H.-G. Gadamer, ›Heidegger’s Later Philosophy,‹ in Philosophical Hermeneutics, thing« (2006: 77). D. E. Linge (trans. and ed.), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.

38 39 C. Rentmeester Approaching Shan Shui Art through Gadamer idea that artworks inform the lives of people and transform their Expanding our vision beyond Greek worlds. He urges, »art is knowledge and experiencing an artwork tragedy into art in general, we can say that means sharing in that knowledge« (Gadamer 2006: 84). By saying Gadamer’s way of situating art in ontology, that experiencing an artwork allows a person to attain knowledge, as opposed to aesthetics, provides an alter- Gadamer is recovering the idea that artworks have cognitive content native avenue for persons (especially con- and are not merely there for our viewing pleasure or to merely invoke temporary Westerners) to understand art subjective feelings. in the modern period. This is especially ap- In order to achieve this task, he replaces the subject/object ontol- propriate for the genre of shan shui art that ogy that one finds in aesthetic consciousness with an event ontology. has come to play such a significant role in Rather than merely seeing the artwork as aesthetically pleasing, the Chinese culture. As Francois Jullian notes, being of a work of art lies in its ability to transform a person and »The Chinese painter, or at least the literati impart a new sort of knowledge that cannot be arrived at through painter […] is not inclined to depict« (Jul- scientific reasoning. He declares, »the experience of art contain[s] a lian 2009: 189).11 Rather, Chinese literati claim to truth which is certainly different from that of science but just painters aimed to convey meanings in their as certainly […] not inferior to it« (ibid.). The ability of a work of art artworks to open up new perspectives for to transform a person means that the work of art is an event of truth. spectators. Of the Chinese literati painters, Of course, this sort of truth is not of the correspondence variety that perhaps the most famous historical group we find in science (e.g., the earlier example of the book on the table), are the Four Yüan Masters and one of the but rather of the existential variety. The artwork opens up a new most famous artworks in the shan shui tra- perspective on reality and changes the way in which the person views dition comes from Yüan Master Wang the world and – possibly – lives in the world. Gadamer argues, »what Meng. Viewing one of Wang Meng’s mas- we experience in a work of art and what invites our attention is how terpieces from the Gadamerian perspective true it is – i.e., to what extent one knows and recognizes something provides those embracing a contemporary and oneself« (ibid.: 113). The work of art says something true about Western aesthetic sensibility with an appro- the world and one’s place in it. priate sense of the role in which art can play In fact, experiencing a great work of art can transform a person in our contemporary lives by providing an to such an extent that the person is no longer able to view reality the ontological, rather than aesthetic, under- same way that he or she did before experiencing the artwork. This can standing of the artwork. occur in any genre of the art world. Gadamer uses Greek tragedy as an example of a sort of artwork that is able to transform one’s world. He states that the person who experiences a great tragedy »recognizes III The Artwork as an Event of Truth himself in his own finiteness in the face of the power of fate« (ibid.: 128). He continues, »To see that ›this is how it is‹ is a kind of self- The painting attached12 is titled ›Hermit knowledge for the spectator, who emerges with the new insight from Dwelling in the Qingbian Mountains‹ (青 the illusions in which he, like everyone else, lives« (ibid.). In other 卞隱居圖) by Wang Meng (王蒙), a Chi- words, a tragic play has the ability to impart knowledge onto the nese painter from the fourteenth century. If spectators in such a way that their worldviews are changed by the knowledge that they gain from the experience of the artwork. The 11 F. Jullian, The Great Image Has No Form, or On the Nonobject Through Painting, truth of the work of art speaks to the spectators, and this results in a J. M. Todd (trans.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009. more expansive view of life and of the world at large. 12 This painting can be found in Fong (1992: 462).

40 41 C. Rentmeester Approaching Shan Shui Art through Gadamer one, especially as a contemporary Westerner, were to come across this Mongol rule. Wang Meng was part of the literati who famously re- painting today in the Shanghai Museum among other paintings and fused to serve the Mongolian rulers, a group we now refer to as the sculptures, one would probably simply regard it as an aesthetically Four Yüan Masters. These literati withdrew from political life to live pleasing landscape. However, this is not the way in which shan shui their lives as hermits. Wang Meng would often sign his name as the art functioned in the Chinese world for most of its history. In speak- hermit or the woodcutter of the Qingbian Mountains, the place he ing of Daoist art (of which shan shui is representative), Wu Hung fled in order to escape Mongolian rule. In this particular painting, notes that what we group together as ›art‹ was actually seen as inter- which is widely regarded as his masterpiece and a fitting representa- connected integral elements of the lives of the people in Ancient Chi- tive of the shan shui genre, he recalls a past of living in harmony with na. He states: nature that is no longer afforded to people living in his age due to the military unrest. Vinograd states, »The Pien Mountains scroll would The term »art« […] means »visual culture«: the different kinds of visual forms produced by a group of people who were linked together by a shared […] have been a depiction of a retreat no longer secure against the language, shared ideas and behavior, and a common sense of identity. (Wu confusion of the age« (ibid.: 6). Max Loehr notes that »the overwhel- 2000: 77)13 mingly grand and complicated mountain landscapes […] had their origins in actual impressions or studies of the woods and gorges In other words, works of art were seen as the various aspects of cul- where [he] loved to dwell« (Loehr 1959: 150).15 The Four Yüan Mas- ture that united a community. When this particular painting was cre- ters fastidiously studied the landscapes in which they dwelt in order ated hundreds of years ago, there was not a separate realm of exis- to represent them in a realistic manner. Wang Meng’s energetic brush tence that people referred to as ›art‹ like we have now. Rather, strokes beautifully portray the landscape of his place of dwelling. paintings like this along with other works of art were seen as human However, it would be shortsighted to view this painting by Wang phenomena that informed people’s worlds and played pivotal roles in Meng as simply a representation of a beautiful landscape. Rather, this uniting people into a common community. Just as Greek tragedy landscape painting is embedded in the time it was painted and ex- helped to form the patterns of human experience for the ancient presses a truth about the world in which it was created. Greek people, Chinese art functioned as an ontological linchpin for Chinese landscape painting dates back to the Six Dynasties peri- Chinese people in that it imparted meaning into peoples’ lives. od (220–618), and shan shui painting first arises during the fifth cen- This particular artwork was painted in 1366 by Wang Meng, the tury.16 As Ouyang Xiao notes, »Chinese Shanshui painting, viewed as youngest of the Four Yüan Masters from fourteenth Century China. the highest form of visual art in its culture, has flourished for over As Richard Vinograd notes, »The year 1366, when the Pien Moun- 1500 years as an established genre. It has been influenced by human tains scroll was painted, was dominated in southeastern China by the presence in nature ever since, and in return it has nurtured the Chi- ongoing struggle for military and political ascendancy over the region nese understanding of nature« (Xiao 2014: 91).17 Since shan shui lit- and, ultimately, all of China« (Vinograd 1982: 4).14 The Yüan Dy- erally means ›mountain water,‹ the landscapes of mountains and nasty was a time in which the Mongols ruled the Chinese people, and many Chinese persons struggled granting their allegiance to 15 M. Loehr, ›A Landscape Attributed to Wen Cheng-ming,‹ Artibus Asiae, Vol. 22, 1959, pp. 143–152. 13 H. Wu, »Mapping Early Taoist Art: The Visual Culture of Wodoumi Dao,« in Tao- 16 For a history of the beginnings of shan shui art, see A. C. Soper, ›Early Chinese ism and the Arts of China, S. Little, and S. Eichman (eds.), Chicago and Berkeley: The Landscape Painting,‹ The Art Bulletin, Vol. 23, 1941, pp. 141–164. Art Institute of Chicago with the University of California Press, 2000, pp. 77–94. 17 O. Xiao, »Detachment and Reunion: Travel and Human Presence in Landscape,« in 14 R. Vinograd, ›Family Properties: Personal Context and Cultural Pattern in Wang Landscape and Travelling East and West: A Philosophical Journey, H-G. Moeller and Meng’s Pien Mountains of 1366,‹ Ars Orientalis, Vol. 13, 1982, pp. 1–29. Note that A. Whitehead (eds.), London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2014. Those interested in Vinograd calls the painting Pien Mountains and not Qingbian mountains. This is an the history of Chinese landscape painting should consult Michael Sullivan, Symbols older way in which to refer to the painting utilizing the Wade-Giles system, as op- of Eternity: The Art of Landscape Painting in China, Stanford: Stanford University posed to the Pinyin system I am utilizing. Press, 1979.

42 43 C. Rentmeester Approaching Shan Shui Art through Gadamer streams are essential features of this particular style of art. Histori- for Chinese persons for centuries. Amidst political and military un- cally speaking, we can account for the fact that mountains play such a rest, Wang Meng suggests that we embrace the mountains to get in large role in Chinese landscape art due to the Daoist influence of this touch with our vital energies and embrace spontaneity. The brush genre. As Miranda Shaw notes, Chinese landscape artworks typically strokes themselves evoke the energy of the mountains. As Joan Stan- embody Daoist ideals and concepts. She states, »the theme of nature ley-Baker notes, »in […] Qingbian the central feature is the moun- in [D]aoism [includes] a quest for naturalness, spontaneity, and pri- tain in its twisting, surging energy […] The brushwork in Qingbian mordial harmony with nature [as well as] physical isolation in the […] reveals a bouncy, relaxed hand with energetic yet supple wrist mountains« (Shaw 1988: 190).18 Mountains are prominent in Daoist movement« (Stanley-Baker 1990: 169, 172).22 art because they were said to have special qualities that other land- Water is even more revered in Daoism than the mountains since scapes lacked. Stephen Little notes, »Mountains were venerated in it is regarded as the source of all life and seen as an appropriate model China as numinous pivots connecting the human mind and celestial for one to base one’s life. As Hans-Georg Moeller states in speaking of realms. Mountains were also seen as places in the terrestrial landscape Daoism, »The ›river‹ of the world is the source of its fertility – all life where the primordial energy (qi) that created the world was particu- emerges from water« (Moeller 2006: 21).23 This is based on the great larly strong and refined« (Little 2000: 17).19 Daoist sage Laozi’s own words: In order to understand this, we have to take a brief look at what Under heaven nothing is more soft and yielding than water. 氣 qi ( ) means in the Daoist context. Roger Ames and David Hall state Yet for attacking the solid and the strong, nothing is better. that »qi is both the animating energy and that which is animated. It has no equal. There are no ›things‹ to be animated; there is only the vital energizing The weak overcome the strong; field and its focal manifestations« (Ames, and Hall 2003: 63).20 The The supple can overcome the stiff. Daoists believe that all of nature is a complex array of flows of energy. Under heaven everyone knows this, Human beings, as fundamentally natural creatures, are seen as en- Yet no one puts it into practice. (Lao Tsu 1972, Chap. 78)24 ergy circuits that can increase their flows of energy by putting them- When water flows over a rock, the rock seems to dominate the water selves in situations in which the qi levels are particularly high.21 The since the water forms to the rock and does not seem to affect it in any mountains were seen as places in which the energy levels are higher obvious way. However, through time, the water erodes the rock and than other places, so people were urged to wander in the mountains. thereby overcomes it. For Daoists, water teaches us to live our own This is precisely why many mountains came to be seen as sacred lives in that we are supposed to embrace the natural flow of things, when Daoism turned into a religion. The particular scroll that we are rather than fighting against them. By molding ourselves to our sur- considering probably had religious connotations for its original audi- roundings as the water molds itself to the rock, we adopt a fitting ence. The solitary wanderer in the bottom, right-hand corner of the stance towards them. As is typical of the shan shui genre, the multi- painting most likely acts as a model for people who want to get in ple streams that we find in Wang Meng’s painting show an apprecia- touch with the vital energy fields of the mountains. This was not only tion for the flow of water amidst the mountains and an ability to an activity cherished by Wang Meng himself, but also a way of being bring forth the flow of the water into the painting. Stanley-Baker, speaking specifically of the water in the painting, provides the follow- 18 M. Shaw, ›Buddhist and Taoist Influences On Chinese Landscape Painting,‹ Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 49, 1988, pp. 183–206. 19 S. Little, Taoism and the Arts of China, S. Little and S. Eichman (eds.), Chicago and 22 J. Stanley-Baker, ›Repainting Wang Meng: Problems in Accretion,‹ Artibus Asiae, Berkeley: The Art Institute of Chicago with the University of California Press, 2000. Vol. 50, 1990, pp. 161–231). 20 R. T. Ames, and D. L. Hall, Daodejing: Making this Life Significant: A Philosophi- 23 H.-G. Moeller, The Philosophy of the Daodejing, New York: Columbia University cal Translation, New York: Ballantine Books, 2003. Press, 2006. 21 One can still find this belief in the modern practice of feng shui, which evolved out 24 Lao Tsu, Tao Te Ching, G. F. Feng, and J. English (trans.), New York: Vintage Books, of Daoism. 1972.

44 45 C. Rentmeester Approaching Shan Shui Art through Gadamer ing analogy: »Like a dancer who has conquered gravity and for whom tween a person reading a text from another historical period or an- no twist or turn can cause imbalance, the brush of Wang Meng dis- other cultural context. In speaking of textual interpretation, Gadamer plays a particular bio-rhythm« (Stanley-Baker 1990: 221). states that a person trying to understand a text of another historical Just by this brief analysis of the significance of mountains and period or cultural context is able to fuse his or her worldview, which water, we can already see that the painting did not simply serve as a consists of all of the beliefs and values that a person holds, with that of picturesque representation of a landscape in its original context. In- the text. The reason that ancient Chinese texts like the Daodejing, stead, it clearly had a claim to truth for Chinese people that came which is not only a guiding work for those inspired by Daoism like across a painting such as this in a temple or other place of gathering. Wang Meng but is also the single most translated work in the history The painting told people how to live their lives. Viewing this scroll in of the world next to the Bible, can have such a powerful effect on some contemporary art gallery among other framed pictures and humans living in the contemporary Western world is precisely be- sculptures does not do justice to this integral function that the paint- cause our worldviews are expanded by being open to the text. The ing used to play. Instead, as Gadamer urges, a true appreciation of the horizon of the text, which includes all of the wisdom and knowledge artwork is one in which these ontological aspects come forth. It is that lies within it, is able to fuse with a person’s horizon if the person important especially for those with a contemporary Western aesthetic is able to allow the text to speak to him or her. Just as a person can sensibility viewing an artwork of the shan shui tradition to keep in fuse one’s horizon with that of a text, a person can fuse one’s horizon mind this ontological significance. In speaking of the transportation with a work of art and thereby expand one’s worldview to include a of artworks from sacred places to museums, Gadamer avers, »By de- new perspective. Guignon explains this process as follows: »the taching all art from its connections with life and the particular condi- meaning of a work of art is determined by the way the work brings tions of our approach to it, we frame it like a picture and hang it up« to light and makes manifest a dimension of life that is already mean- (Gadamer 2006: 131). ingful, a significance that first becomes formulated and fully illumi- nated through its presentation in the work of art« (Guignon 2003: 44). While a text does this from the concepts that are relayed in read- IV Meaning in the Artwork ing it, an artwork does this by the underlying themes that provide meaning to the spectator. The question I would now like to pose is whether or not this landscape The particular artwork we are considering is infused with many painting has any claim to truth for Westerners living in a contempor- values that are foundational in Daoism. First, we see that the human ary context. While Gadamer (1996: 112) claims that a work of art is beings in the painting take up hardly any space at all. The hiker in the always bound to the community that it is connected with, he also bottom-right hand corner and the man engaged in meditation in the argues that artistic creations, understood as events of truth, can in- hut are found only with careful searching. The towering landscape of form people from other cultures with different worldviews. He states: the mountain makes the human beings in the painting seem extre- mely small and insignificant. This is a common feature of Daoist art The artistic creations of other ages or distant cultures many times cannot reach us very easily. But in the long run, art in all its innumerable forms of the shan shui variety. The idea that comes through in making hu- gains our acceptance, even the most strange. This demonstrates, I think, the mans only a small aspect of the picture is the fact that human beings absolute presentness of art to all times and places. An artwork is able to are not at all special in relation to nature. In most Western cultures, build bridges that reach beyond the enclosure and space in which it origi- the tendency has been to regard human beings as somehow superior nated. (Gadamer 2007: 199) to nature. In Christianity, for example, the belief is that human beings In Truth and Method, the idea of building bridges between works of are created in the image and likeness of God, which gives them prior- art and their interpreters comes out most clearly when he speaks of ity over all other things. This has led to the tendency to treat human the »fusion of horizons« (Horizontverschmelzung) that occurs be- beings at the center of the universe and treat nature as something to be conquered. Animals, plants, and the land as a whole come to be

46 47 C. Rentmeester Approaching Shan Shui Art through Gadamer viewed as resources that exist as material on hand for human beings Just as animals have a right to existence, the Daoists believe that to appropriate for their own use. Gadamer’s teacher, Martin Heideg- landscapes deserve to remain intact. Humans are not supposed to ger, has perhaps the best summary of this tendency in the modern change the world to fit their interests but are rather supposed to live Western world when he states that »nature becomes a gigantic gaso- in a way that respects the integrity of the environments that they line station, an energy source for modern technology and industry« inhabit. This lesson comes through in the painting under considera- (Heidegger 1977: 50).25 As humans have become more and more ad- tion when we notice the way in which the buildings are integrated vanced in their ability to control their natural surroundings, their into the mountain landscape. The group of buildings on the left-hand sense of self-importance has increased and their respect for nature portion of the painting blends in with the environment and acts as a has diminished. fitting complement to the overarching landscape. This idea of setting The Daoist outlook is fundamentally opposed to such anthropo- up architecture in such a way that it complements nature, rather than centric tendencies. From the Daoist standpoint, human beings are compromises its stability, is based on two Daoist principles.27 The first seen simply as another aspect of nature rather than a conqueror over has to do with the earlier point that Daoists view the earth as some- it. One can find this tendency throughout the two classical books of thing that is sacred and that therefore needs to be treaded upon Daoism, the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi. For instance, the Daodejing lightly. Daoists recognize that all creatures depend on the stability advises us to »love the world as your own self« (Lao Tsu 1972, and integrity of ecosystems, which means that any activity that Chap. 13) since »the universe is sacred« (ibid., Chap. 29). Instead of threatens their integrity and stability is harmful for both the land- viewing human beings as special creatures that reign over nature, scape and all the various creatures that depend on it as well. Daoism urges humans to love nature as oneself and take care of the The second principle that grounds this aspect of the painting has world as one takes care of oneself. These anti-anthropocentric tenden- to do with the way in which Daoists view human practices in relation cies are even more prevalent in the book of Zhuangzi. The emphasis to nature. In speaking of the Daoist outlook, Hans-Georg Moeller here is on unifying oneself with nature rather than viewing oneself as explains, »The world of culture or of civilization was an intimate part opposed to it. Zhuangzi states that the Daoist sage is the person who of the natural world, or rather, there was no border drawn between »mingles with the myriad things and becomes one with them [be- nature and culture. Instead of such a distinction, one common order cause] worldly strife leads to chaos« (Chuang Tzu 1994: 7).26 The goal was believed to unite social and celestial space« (Moeller 2004: 24).28 is to view oneself as a natural creature coexisting with other creatures Just as birds build their nests in the appropriate places in a tree, hu- in a state of harmony. Any attempts to pit human beings up against man beings are supposed to build their dwellings in places that fit in nature will only lead to disorder. In another passage, Zhuangzi states, with their environment. This is why one finds temples built into the »In a world of ultimate integrity, men would dwell together with the natural framework of the mountains in many Daoist paintings and birds and the beasts. They would come together in tribes with the why one can go to China today and still find sculptures and architec- myriad things« (ibid.: 81). Instead of viewing animals as merely ture that blend into their natural surroundings.29 sources of meat or fur, the Daoist views them as coexisting inhabi- tants of the land with just as much of a right to existence as other 27 humans. Since human beings and non-human animals are both sim- Interestingly, the concept of integrating artistic creations with nature is currently a project that some contemporary artists like Leslie Fry are working on. Cf. J. Wadler, ply natural creatures living out their existence in the world, there is ›Sowing Enchantment,‹ New York Times, June 15, 2011. no reason to believe that humans have any priority over animals. 28 H.-G. Moeller, Daoism Explained: From the Dream of the Butterfly to the Fishnet Allegory, Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 2004. 29 A good example of this occurs at Mount Tai, which is considered to be the holiest 25 M. Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, J. M. Anderson, and H. Freud (trans.), New mountain in China. As one climbs the mountain, one finds sculptures placed in the York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977. trees and temples atop the peaks of the mountain as if they were meant to be there. 26 Chuang Tzu, Wandering on the Way: Early Taoist Tales and Parables of Chuang Such artworks are not so much ›ornaments‹ of the sacred mountains, but essential Tzu, V. H. Mair (trans.), Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994. aspects that contribute to its nature.

48 49 C. Rentmeester Approaching Shan Shui Art through Gadamer

The idea that the human elements of the world are supposed to conceptions of art, inspired by modern science’s subject/object ontol- blend with their natural surroundings is anchored in Daoist litera- ogy, emphasize accuracy in representation and the ability for an art- ture. Zhuangzi says that the ultimate way in which the world would work to incite certain feelings on the part of the spectator. Gadamer’s be set up would be a world in which »there would be no paths and philosophy of art, on the other hand, views artworks as events of tunnels through the mountains, no boats or bridges to cross the truth that highlight aspects of the world for those who experience swamps« (Chuang Tzu 1994: 81). The idea here is that humans them. Wang Meng’s art brings forth essential truths about human should live in such a way that does not change the landscapes of their existence according to Daoism that provide us insight about the prop- surrounding environment. Laozi also warns against trying to shape er place of human beings in the natural world. An appropriate appre- the world toward human interests. He states, »The world is ruled by ciation of works such as this includes an openness on the part of the letting things take their course. It cannot be ruled by interfering« spectator to the truths that inhere in the artwork. If one is able to be (Lao Tsu 1972: 48). Instead of interfering with the world and with open to such truths, one can fuse one’s horizon with the themes of the nature, Daoists »act on behalf of things but do not lay any claim to artwork and thereby gain ontological insight. This fusion of horizons them« (Ames and Hall 2003: 2) because »those who would control provides a proper appreciation based on the truths that come forth things lose them« (ibid.: 64). What this means is that instead of ma- from the painting, rather than the aesthetic feelings that the painting nipulating the world to force it to meet human interests, the Daoists elicits. view themselves as integrating their living practices into their natural surroundings. In doing so, they are able to live in harmony with nat- –Casey Rentmeester, Finlandia University, Michigan, USA ure. This is probably one of the reasons that Wang Meng resists poli- tical and military conflict with the Mongols and chooses instead to live in seclusion in the mountains where he can live in harmony with nature. These lessons that come forth in the painting were experienced as true to its original audience, and if this application of Gadamer’s philosophy of art is correct, this artwork can provide a similar experi- ence to us Westerners living in the modern period and, hopefully, transform those who experience it in a positive manner. In such a way, the experience of the artwork can come to gain a similar force as it did in its original context: one of ontological, and not merely aesthetic, significance.

V Conclusion

Gadamer’s philosophy of art provides Westerners with a fitting con- ceptual framework from which to approach shan shui art in a manner similar to the way in which it functioned in its original context. I have argued that his framing of art as ontologically significant is a more appropriate way to understand shan shui art than the modern aes- thetic conceptions of art by looking at Wang Meng’s masterpiece, ›Hermit Dwelling in the Qingbian Mountains.‹ Modern aesthetic

50 51 Conceptualizing Indigeneity Conceptualizing Indigeneity and edge the sacred teachings of this Land as informing the conduct of research, research relations and the general pursuit of knowledge. It the Implications for Indigenous Research and is also asserted that Indigenous research must proceed with a degree African Development* 1 of humility and sanctity by affirming holistic relations involving the self as researcher, research subjects, the local community, and Nature. The imperative of centering Indigenous knowledges in nation-build- ing efforts of Africans as nation builders is examined, while also pay- ing close attention to the knowledge embodiment. In the conclusion, the paper examines the implications of Indigenous research for edu- Abstract cation as broadly defined. This paper examines Indigenous knowledges in the context of con- ceptualizing Indigeneity to lay the grounds for Indigenous research Keywords as a counterpoint to conventional ways of knowledge production. It is Indigenous knowledges, Indigeneity, research, spirituality, nation- noted that the urgency of articulating multiple ways of knowing and/ building. or counter visions of knowledge emerges in the contexts of the limits, limitations, or shortcomings of dominant knowledge production. The Indigenous prism brings a critical perspective to Indigenous practices, I Introduction epistemologies, roles, and spaces for sharing and producing local cul- tural knowledges, including understanding social relations of com- How do we rekindle the spirit of place, Land and develop a heightened munal knowledge production. It is argued that central to Indigenous sense of worth for knowledge and human life? There is an emerging research are concepts of spirituality, spiritual knowing, the interface generation of scholars voicing dissatisfaction with dominant, Western of body, mind, soul, and spirit, and the nexus of society, culture, and hegemonic ways of knowledge production. So we need to ask: why? I Nature. Indigenous research must begin with due recognition of the do not think it is because these scholars want to be anti-intellectual or Land and Mother Earth and the acknowledgement of location and have no desire for scholarship and excellence. I see it as a quest for space as sources and sites of knowing. The researcher must acknowl- broadening existing debates about scholarship and excellence to be inclusive of multiple knowledges. The mimicking of dominant Euro- American knowledge of those in power has been nauseating. Such * Paget Henry served as one of the blind referees for George Sefa Dei’s article ›Con- mimicry has not helped to provide adequate answers to the many zeptualizing Indigeneity.‹ Since Henry’s report in our view highlighted issues which challenges confronting humankind. The complexity of problems af- we believe are germane to the broader debate on Indigeneity, but which, however, exceeded the scope of Dei’s article, we, the editors, decided to reveal Dei’s and Henry’s flicting our world today requires multi-centric perspectives and not identities to one another and to request from Henry a brief discussion of his own universal solutions. We can only cultivate multi-centric perspectives views on Indigeneity. We are pleased that both George Sefa Dei and Paget Henry by beginning to work with multiple knowledge systems in education agreed to this intellectual exchange seeing as we believe that it advances the current and research practice. debate. We are particularly grateful to Dei in this regard since this format did not allow him the opportunity to respond to Henry’s statement. Hence, allow me to begin this discussion by asking some simple 1 This paper was written under difficult conditions during the course of a sabbatical questions: How do we begin to think more creatively to offer counter- leave in Ghana in the summer and fall of 2014. Special thanks go to the editors of the stances that challenge dominant and conventional knowledge? How journal for their assistance in getting this manuscript in good shape for publication. I do we create spaces for counter-knowledges to co-exist in our institu- also want to thank Chizoba Imoka, PhD student in the Educational Leadership & tions of learning? How do we produce counter and oppositional International Development Education Program at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto for her intellectual contributions to this knowledges to subvert the status quo ensuing from hegemonic paper that helped me respond to reviewers’ comments. knowledge? What is the place of Indigenous perspectives in critical

52 53 G. J. S. Dei Conceptualizing Indigeneity research? What is the place of Indigenous knowledges in contempor- another. It must be an interrogative process. All knowledge systems ary nation-building in Africa? I pose these questions not as mere in- must be assessed in their own right. tellectual musings. I raise theses questions in order to begin »to ima- The second section of this paper begins by clarifying some im- gine a world that is not yet imagined« (Fine 1994: 30) ans also to help portant philosophical and conceptual standpoints so that this piece is us organize disruptively for what could be (ibid.: 26).2 These are also not misread. In the third section, I will deal with questions of method relevant questions for anyone advancing Indigenous knowledges in and methodology in Indigenous research. In this section, I will high- our institutions of learning. Increasingly, the relevance of Indigenous light the process of coming to know the locality of a given context. research has been raised as way to challenge the conventional ap- The fourth section will sketch the role of Indigenous knowledges in proach to social research and knowledge production (Wilson 2001, the nation-building processes of contemporary Africa. Multi-centric 2008; Kovach 2009; Battise, and Henderson 2000; Smith 1999; Dei knowing and the epistemological pluralism it entails will be addressed 2013a, 2013b, to mention a few).3 in the fifth section. I conclude the paper by looking at Indigenous To this end, I take on two tasks: first, I interrogate the conven- research in the African context and the implications for education as tional concept of Indigeneity. Second, I draw some critical reflections broadly defined in the sixth section. on the implications and absences of Indigenous knowledge in the My article is not a response to dominant scholars or even minor- African schooling and the broader social context. Indigeneity and aca- ity scholars operating with dominant lenses, who are prone to asses- demic research are both implicated in the colonial project. I concur sing the merits and worth of Indigenous knowledges on the terms of that as learners we are all implicated in the conventional ways of dominant ways of thinking and knowledge production. Indigenous knowledge production and, particularly, the coloniality of the acad- knowledges need not be forced into a conceptual framework which emy. Broadly put, the academy continues to sustain colonial struc- makes it primarily understandable and acceptable to dominant scho- tures that establish hierarchies and colonial relations of knowledge larship and thinking. I agree that Indigenous sciences and Western production. In order to subvert these prevailing structures, an anti- science cannot be presented as binaries. But rejecting the binary does colonial and decolonial lens is needed. Only then can counter and not mean we forgo or downplay the deep philosophical differences oppositional stances be articulated that really make a difference to and intersections between knowledge systems. Similarly, when we science and scholarship in general. In this regard, I have always called object to the use of the ›Indigenous,‹ as applied to everything ›Afri- for multi-centric analyses and approaches to knowledge production. can,‹ such a critique is a misleading misrepresentation of Indigenous Standards used in knowledge comparison must be fair and just at all knowledges. There is a body of local, cultural resource knowledge that times. We cannot uphold one standard of knowledge as better than comes with understanding and experiencing the African social, phy- sical, and metaphysical worlds. We cannot claim that this is not Afri- can knowledge. Even if such knowledge is not shared by all African 2 M. Fire, »Dis-stance and other Stance: Negotiations of Power Inside Feminist Re- search,« in A. Gillin (ed.), Power and Method: Political Activism and Educational communities, it is still part of an African knowledge system. It relates Research, New York: Routledge, 1994, pp. 13–35. to the land, cultures, identities, spirituality, histories, and local com- 3 S. Wilson, ›What is Indigenous Research Methodology?‹ Canadian Journal of Na- munities of Africans. There is a more questionable claim that a por- tive Education, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2001, pp. 175–179; S. Wilson, Research Is Ceremony: tion of Western science knowledge is based on the Land and spiritual- Indigenous Research Methods, Halifax: Fernwood, 2008; M. Kovach, Indigenous Methodologies: Characteristics, Conversations, and Contexts, Toronto: University of ity. Even if one accepts this claim on face value, it does not dismiss the Toronto Press, 2009; M. A. Battiste, and J. Y. Henderson (eds.), Protecting Indigenous authenticity and validity of African Indigenous knowledges. Knowledge and Heritage: A Global Challenge, Saskatoon: Purich, 2000; G. Dei (with Indigenous knowledges have been primitivized, romanticized, E. Coburn, M. Stewart-Harawira, and A. Moreton-Robinson), ›Unspeakable Things: negated, or ostracized outright from the corridors of Euro-American, Indigenous Research and Social Sciences,‹ Socio, Vol. 2, 2013a, pp. 331–347; G. Dei, conventional knowledge production. Proponents of such knowledges ›Critical Perspectives on Indigenous Research,‹ Socialist Studies/Etudes Socialistes, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2013b, pp. 27–38 (URL: www.socialiststudies.com), [Special Issue on are associated with skepticism and are met with raised eyebrows. We Transgressive Pedagogies and Research]. are all affected by the limitations of conventional, dominant knowl-

54 55 G. J. S. Dei Conceptualizing Indigeneity edge production. We are not allowed to fully comprehend the history allow knowledges to contest each other in the search for answers and of ideas, events, and social happenings that have shaped human solutions to global challenges. Indigenous knowledges must be re- growth, challenges, and development. Many of us (even as African garded as an appropriate topic in academic discussions. Such knowl- scholars) have been schooled to be dismissive of Indigenous knowl- edges cannot be dismissed or pushed to the background. They deserve edges. This is the problem with Eurocentrism. As learners, we are all to be heard just like Western science knowledge, particularly, if we are shortchanged by working with limited intellectual prisms which con- intellectually honest to admit that what actually constitutes the so- tains a disturbing lack of depth in social meanings. We need to under- called ›science knowledge‹ is itself an appropriation of other bodies of stand what Indigeneity means and the connections of Indigenous knowledge. knowledges and other knowledge forms. We also need to think For these reasons, we must also understand and begin to inter- through the particular prisms and methodologies we employ in aca- rogate the negative reactions to Indigenous knowledges in the acad- demic research and to see the contributions that Indigenous research emy. As others have pointed out, resistance to Indigenous ways of can bring to knowledge production. We must explore Indigenous re- knowing is not simply because such knowledge lacks scientific rigor search, its parameters, and underlying principles more fully. or sophistication (see Battiste, and Hendersen 2000). Indigenous As indicated earlier, Indigeneity is implicated in the colonial pro- knowledges threaten colonial projects. Such knowledges help us raise ject given that colonialism proceeded through the devaluation of the some discomforting/uncomfortable questions. However, Indigenous knowledge systems, cultures, histories, and identities of Indigenous knowledges are crucial for decolonization purposes. Clearly, decoloni- peoples. By distorting histories and cultures, the Euro-colonizers suc- zation cannot proceed solely on the basis of Western science knowl- ceeded in sowing an inferiority complex in the African mind such that edge since it has been a tool of colonization and domination of Indi- as Africans, we shunned our cultures, histories, heritages, and knowl- genous peoples. Therefore, Indigenous knowledges when asserted are edge systems in favor of the colonizers’. By not defending their cul- very threatening to the Euro-colonial domination, which continues to tural values and knowledge systems, colonized bodies have since been cast its shadow on academia. It is the fear of what Indigenous knowl- implicated in the colonizer’s oppressions. How then does an Indigen- edges affirm and bring up for discussion that makes it a ›risky and ous body in the Western academy, begin to push for a more nuanced threatening‹ conversation for those who want to maintain, or stabi- understanding of Indigenous knowledges to highlight its contribu- lize the privileged status of Western knowledge in the academy. These tions to global knowledge and science? How do we bring about a pro- knowledges also bring to the fore issues of the appropriation of other cess of a more critical understanding of Indigeneity which can better bodies of knowledge by dominant ways of thinking, questions of co- relate to identity and practice? lonialism and colonialization, land dispossession, violence on Indi- There are many ways we can begin to respond to such questions. genous persons, etc. For example, there are prevailing imperial and colonial structures that The foregoing also raises the question of assessing the contradic- continue to dominate academic research. It is important for us to tions which arise when Indigenous knowledges are seen through Wes- highlight the contributions that Indigenous approaches bring to re- tern science prisms. The practice has been part of Eurocentric privile- search, debate upon what constitute ›good‹ research, and refashion ging. When Indigenous knowledges are assessed in terms of their the particular epistemic paradigms worth engaging in our on-going conformity to principles and measurements set by Western standards relations with local communities. In this endeavor, our academic task of excellence, it is Eurocentricity par excellence. We need to think should not be about comparing Indigenous knowledges with other through more inclusive measurements of academic excellence. forms of knowledge (e.g., Western science) but to insist on the vali- Throughout human history, ideas have been propelled by social dation, legitimation, and acceptance of such knowledges on their own change. While not all ideas are fully supported, some have the power merits and rights. This does not imply that we should not allow to compel change. Ideas emerge from knowledge systems. Ideas are knowledges to interrogate each other. The starting point is to respect constitutive part of peoples’ cultural knowledges. All it requires is for all knowledges worthy of academic inquiry and to raise questions that a group of staunch believers to hold steadfastly to their ideas and prin-

56 57 G. J. S. Dei Conceptualizing Indigeneity ciples and to question conventional knowledges. Not everyone is going in dynamic co-existence with each other, that is, living in interdepen- to understand the particular stances we, Indigenous researchers, take dent relations and hopefully co-resisting and building relations with as knowledge producers. Some of us may be viewed as lunatics, trou- our landscapes. They share an interdependent relation that allows for ble-makers, or anti-intellectuals when our ideas do not sit well with an interrogation of what each knowledge system brings to critical dominant viewpoints. But all knowledge is produced for a purpose. dialogues about society. A culture or a community is in trouble when Reframing colonial discourses and practices is a difficult task to it no longer remembers what has been lost and, furthermore, it no accomplish as has long been noted. Knowledge production is about longer holds on to the idea that something different is possible. The power. Knowledge systems are heavily embedded in power relations most difficult thing is to lose something and not know what one has and all knowledges are political and contestable. However, there is the lost. Despite substantial losses in the past, fortunately, most Indigen- tendency of the dominant knowledge to masquerade as universal ous peoples know what has been lost and are involved in a project of knowledge and to appropriate other bodies of knowledge as its own. reclamation of knowledge, Lands, cultures, languages, identities, and True, Western science knowledge is now being contested.4 There is histories. not a uniform body of knowledge called Western science. But beyond There is now an on-going struggle of Indigenous resurgence and the contestations and irrespective of the plurality, there is an unmis- revitalization of cultures, languages, and histories. There is a growing taken assumption of the superiority of Western science knowledge. sense that all cultures need to be heard and the revitalization of In- This false superiority can be seen in the devaluation, negation, and digenous histories carry an expectation of local peoples determining subjugation of other ways of knowing in the academy. In fact, the their own destinies. The struggle is perhaps more fierce in the Wes- apprehension to Indigenous knowledges in the academy has more to tern academy located on settled Indigenous lands. European and set- do with the politics of knowledge production rather than a supposed tler colonialism has been disrespectful of Indigenous knowledges. lack of scientific and scholarly rigor of this body of knowledge. Be- European colonialism sought, and continues to seek, unearned privi- cause Indigeneity and Indigenousness threaten colonial hierarchies of leges. The claim for a peaceful co-existence with Indigenous peoples is knowledge production, not surprisingly, Indigenous knowledges and false because colonialism like settler-hood is about power and control. questions of Indigeneity do not sit well with dominant bodies and Consequently, all forms of colonialism including settler colonialism Western science. How else can we explain the arrogance of science must evoke resistance. and dominant scientific thinking which classify other bodies of The pursuit of a comparative analysis of ›Indigenous knowl- knowledge as primitive, irrational, unscientific and unscholarly edges‹ and Western science is a political and an intellectual project. It myths and superstitions? Is Western science the only form of logical, is political because it serves to justify why one posits Indigenous rational, and scientific thinking? Is Western science not simply one knowledges in the first place. The critique against Western science as way of producing knowledge within the plurality of sciences? a ›rational and scientific discourse‹ is from an understanding that the While I critique Western science knowledge, I do not posit a bin- way we have come to know the ›rational and scientific‹ has been ary with Indigenous knowledges. All knowledges are mutually inter- skewed, narrow, and reserved for the dominant Eurocentric thinking. dependent and should be able to co-exist. One would expect the sub- Also, any idea that Indigenous knowledges are stuck in the past or in version of colonial and dominant knowledges to be carried out among the colonial period is a preconceived notion of the critics of such groups that co-exist and are co-resisting together. Cultures are always knowledge. Indigenous knowledges are living and breathing in the present; they change and adapt to emerging situations. However, the basic principles of such knowledges (e.g., the interface of culture, 4 See Battiste, and Henderson (2000); G. Emeagwali, and G. Dei, African Indigenous Nature and society, the connections of the physical and metaphysical Knowledge and the Disciplines, Rotterdam and New York: Sense Publishers, 2015; worlds, and spirituality as the bedrock of such knowledge systems) L. Semali, and J. Kincheloe (eds.), What is Indigenous Knowledge? Voices From the Academy, New York: Falmer Press, 1999; L. Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies, remain intact. This is everyday knowledge of local peoples speaking London: Zed Books, 1999. to reality, to African reality in our particular case.

58 59 G. J. S. Dei Conceptualizing Indigeneity

II Conceptualizing ›Indigenous‹ Discursive Framework denial of a peoples’ history, identity, culture, and language. As a pro- cess of identity formation, Indigeneity is also about politics and resis- Let me now begin conceptualizing the ›Indigenous‹ discursive frame- tance. Indigeneity is developing an Indigenousness or an Indigenous work. As argued elsewhere (Dei 2015a) the term ›Indigenous‹ is about consciousness of who one is and the importance of using such Indi- relations to Land and place.5 One is Indigenous to a place and Land genous identity to resist colonial, and on-going, colonial impositions. that he/she deems to be a place of ›long term occupancy.‹ Being In- Like the term ›Indigenous,‹ Indigeneity has a close relationship to digenous is also about ›unbroken residence‹ in the sense that local Land. It is about the politics of the Land that gives a people their peoples still claim territorial space and belonging to the Land. We identities. There are contestations and contentions of the ›Indigen- define ›Indigenous knowledges‹ as knowledges developed on the basis ous,‹ and ›Indigeneity.‹ There is neither a singular category which of ›long-term occupancy‹ (unbroken residence) of a place, that is, encompasses ›Indigenous,‹ nor ›Indigeneity.‹ ›Indigenous‹ is used Land (see also Fals Borda 1980); and accumulated on the basis of ex- broadly to encompass Aboriginal, African, Hawaiian, Australian, periencing the social and natural (physical and metaphysical) worlds South American, Caribbean, etc., knowledge systems (Dei 2015a). (Dei 1993).6 The fact that colonization may have interrupted this Usually when Indigenous knowledges are broached, there is the ›long-term residence‹ does not deny local peoples the legitimacy of erroneous impression that the dichotomy of such knowledge and their claim of being Indigenous to the Land. However, when local Western (science) knowledge is created. Clearly, any such dichotomy peoples do not adhere to their Indigenous social values, cultural prac- is problematic given that no knowledges exist in isolation. Knowl- tices and abandon their histories, cultures and identities, because of a edges borrow from each other and so-called Western science knowl- colonial imposition, the claim of Indigenous and Indigeneity is lost. edge historically has appropriated other bodies of knowledge. How- For local peoples, who are Indigenous to the Lands and still lay terri- ever, a discussion of Indigenous knowledges is relevant on its own for torial claim to their lands, histories, identities, heritage, and the cul- two reasons. First, such knowledges have been devaluated and ne- tural practices associated with the Land, the claim of being Indigenous gated and even when they have constituted part of Western science to the place is never in doubt, except perhaps to the outsider, who is knowledge, no credit is given.8 Second, we need to highlight such usually the colonial dominant. knowledges for their unique contributions to global knowledge. They Indigeneity, on the other hand, is about process, identity and offer different prisms for reading our world and often highlight cer- resistance, as well as an insistence on the absence of colonial imposi- tain core values (e.g., community, responsibility, relationality, reci- tion. Arango (2014: 8) argues »Indigenous identity or Indigeneity is procity) which may philosophically be different from the core values far from being a monolithic category […] and that despite their cul- emphasized within dominant bodies of knowledge (e.g., rights, indi- tural differences, Indigenous groups share the experience of exclusion vidual, competition, and control). What this implies then is: Any and subordination.«7 The shared histories and experience depend on claim that there is one universal knowledge system is equally proble- the subjects experiencing them. Indigeneity is asserted to resist the matic and false. Often what has masqueraded as universal knowledge tends to be the knowledge of particular groups and bodies, who, more often than not, are the dominant segments of society. In other words, 5 G. Dei, »Indigenous Philosophies, Counter Epistemologies and Anti-Colonial Edu- while all knowledge systems share a lot in common, it is also true that cation,« in W. Lehman (ed.), Reader in Sociology of Education, London: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 2015a. 6 O. Fals Borda, Science and the Common People, Yugoslavia 1980; G. Dei, ›Indigen- 8 For related readings, see: S. Harding, »Gendered Ways of Knowing and the Episte- ous African Knowledge Systems,‹ Tropical Geography, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1993, pp. 28– mological Crisis of the West,« in N. Goldenberger, J. Tarule, B. Clinchy, and M. Be- 41. lenky (eds.), Knowledge, Difference and Power, New York: Basic Books, 1996, 7 A. D. Arango Herrera, ›Indigenous Knowledges and Power in Friction with Human pp. 431–454; »Is Modern Science an Ethnoscience? Rethinking Epistemological As- Rights and Development Discourses: The Case of the Witoto Ethnic Safeguarding sumptions,« in E. C. Eze (ed.), Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader, Plan in the Colombian Amazon,‹ PhD dissertation, University of Montreal, Quebec, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1997, pp. 47–70; Emeagwali and 2014 [unpublished]. Dei (2015).

60 61 G. J. S. Dei Conceptualizing Indigeneity at times, there are unbridgeable differences or knowledge systems are of modernity have sought to spread their social values and ideas glob- incommensurable. Consequently, as noted elsewhere (Dei 2015a), the ally. They have transformed this modernity into an European phase. distinction between Western science knowledge and Indigenous It is a phase camouflaged by European economic, political, technolo- science knowledge is more of a discursive stance to lodge a critique gical, and material power and is leading to an inevitable destruction of of dominant and conventional knowledges. The latter tends to be im- the global space. positional and bequeaths unto itself what is deemed knowledge and Indigenous knowledges are about representation of traditional knowable. and Indigenous cultures, histories, identities, local experiences, and Local cultural knowledges herald the spiritual and cultural the teachings of Land/Mother Earth in the processes of educational foundations upon which the survival of local communities rest. Ara- delivery. When we speak of Mother Earth, we are not speaking of real ngo (2014: 9) has insisted that »Indigenous knowledges are not only estate. We are speaking of something bigger than the material. Indi- esoteric or spiritual, but also materially connected to the daily strug- genous communities have cultural custodians who are knowledge gles for collective survival«. Indigenous knowledges call for placing holders. Indigenous knowledges are affirmed in order to assert the emphasis on qualitative approaches (life histories, genealogies, per- intellectual agency of the colonized and marginalized. Such bodies of sonal narratives) as methods of social inquiry. Such knowledges also knowledge are not homogeneous. They are even contested from with- acknowledge the relevance of emotions and intuition, dreams, vi- in. Nevertheless, they are best conceptualized and operationalized as sions, storytelling, fables, proverbs, folksongs, folklore, folkloric pro- more than simply ›non-Western forms of knowing.‹ Indigenous duction, museum artifacts, archives, and cultural memories as legit- knowledges are about the everyday cultural knowings and form the imate sources of knowing. Such narrative accounts need not be cultural resource base of local peoples. These include, among other experiential; however, each subject is considered to be an ›authority‹ things, local traditions, customs, arts, music, aesthetics, folklore, other to interpret reality. The study of such knowledges also calls for in- expressive and philosophical forms of knowing, communications and teractive approaches. This means that key, subject informants, cul- cultural production forms. Such knowledges are steeped in estab- tural custodians and other knowledge holders become central to the lished traditions and morals. knowledge production project. Oral and cultural reporting are highly A critical discussion of Indigenous knowledges must also focus valued to textual documentation. The use of time and space do not on the construction of knowledge, access to knowledge, the transfer of follow a linear sequence but has a circular feel to it (see also Fixico knowledge and the application of such knowledges as part of multi- 2003).9 centric ways of knowing. In fact, one of the major contemporary In examining oral accounts and cultural narratives, there is a challenges in the academy is the trivialization and devaluation of local search for cultural logic around cognitive categories and themes that knowledges. For example, one must appropriately deal with the im- make meaning within particular social contexts. Knowledge is per- punity of local (Indigenous) scholars who are so steeped in Euro- ceived as accumulative. It builds up through time negating the false centric ideas and thoughts that they devalue such knowledge systems. claims of a static, pristine, and frozen nature of Indigenous knowl- There is also the alienation, tragedy, and irony of local, Indigenous edges. The inseparability of social and natural worlds in which hu- Western-educated scholars who are not schooled in the socio-cultural mans are perceived as part of Nature brings a holistic meaning and and philosophical paradigms of their own communities. Indigenous interpretation to Indigenous knowledges. I prefer ›Indigenous‹ to consciousness must cultivate local, cultural knowledges, and lan- ›traditional‹ because the latter evokes the ridiculous imagery as being guages that contribute to the search for home-grown solutions to the opposite of modern and modernity. The cult of modernity is a local problems and challenges. This is because no Indigenous knowl- fabrication of Europe. Anglo-European societies through false claims edge is alien to its particular socio-cultural and political milieu. The promotion of African Indigenous knowledges can only be 9 D. L. Fixico, The American Indian Mind in a Linear World, American Indian Stu- successful if attention is paid to Indigenous languages. Language and dies and Traditional Knowledge, New York: Routledge, 2003. culture are intertwined. When communities lose their local lan-

62 63 G. J. S. Dei Conceptualizing Indigeneity guages, they also lose significant aspects of their culture. Indigenous knowing and spiritual identity (like other identities of race, class, gen- knowledges can only flourish when local peoples are able to retain der, sexuality, and [dis]ability amongst others) is part of a way of their languages. In Africa, like elsewhere, local languages have been knowing and being. In fact with the Indigenous prism, Land as well a powerful medium for a transmission of culture and cultural expres- as spiritual identity become salient and fundamental analytical con- sions. This has significant implications for questions of development cepts offering significant entry points in understanding the lived ex- too (see Brock-Utne, and Skattum 2009).10 We also need to ask periences of the Indigenous peoples. The spiritual is embodied and whether we do justice to African oral culture when presented and constitutes the axis on which Indigenous knowledges rest, that is, expressed in the dominant colonizer’s language (English or French) the substructure for understanding the social, cultural, economic, ma- rather than in the Indigenous languages of local peoples. Young lear- terial, political, physical, and metaphysical realms. Given that spiri- ners are exposed to the culture, traditions, and community histories tual subjectivity is inseparable from social existence, one must insist by elders as cultural custodians only through the latter. that Indigenous knowledges reside in body and in cultural memory. The Indigenous prism brings a critical perspective to Indigenous The Indigenous prism is also about a wholeness of existence, a practices, epistemologies, roles, and spaces for sharing and producing nexus of body, mind and soul, and the interrelations of society-cul- local cultural knowledge, including understanding social relations of ture, and Nature. To understand a social phenomenon is to have a communal knowledge production. The Indigenous prism posits a complete, holistic way of knowing how to connect the physical, me- counter-hegemonic perspective to challenge any claims to a universal taphysical, social, material, cultural, and spiritual realms of existence. discourses. It is argued that »the articulation between Eurocentric Society, culture and Nature are in intricate relations and no social colonial discourses and powerful (mainly Western and masculine) occurrence is outside of the realms of culture and Nature. Everything positions has contributed to naturalize certain knowledges as univer- that exists in society and culture is related with Nature and the meta- sal [and that such] Eurocentric knowledges […] as civilization, pro- physical world. The world of the metaphysical has real social exis- gress, and literacy have become universal through scientific and tech- tence and this explains why in the African world, for example, local nological arguments« that espouse the ability of the Anglo-Europe peoples humanize Nature and endow the forces that threaten them in (Arango 2014: 2). The so-called universal discourses merely consti- the natural world with human qualities in order to relate to these. tute forms of abstract knowledge which must be complemented with A critical Indigenous discursive framework also brings three local cultural knowledges and practices. On the other hand, Indigen- conceptual understandings to Indigeneity: First, is the dialectic of In- ous knowledges reflect »culturally situated logical systems« acknowl- digeneity and colonialism. Colonialism, with its deep-reaching denial edging »their intrinsic connection to local cultures« (ibid.: 10). of history and local identity, has created unequal outcomes for groups Elsewhere (Dei 2009) I have articulated that as among the basic in terms of their histories, engagement of culture and traditions, and philosophical tenets of an Indigenous prism Indigenous ways of know- spiritual identities. Indigenous peoples seek to upend such unequal ing are epistemologies that seek to connect Land and place, spirit, relations through claims of Indigeneity as identity and process. Sec- body, mind and soul in the process of knowledge production (see also ond, humans have myriad identities and there are situational varia- Meyer 2008).11 For example, Land/Mother Earth is seen as a site of tions in intensities of different identities given the effects and after- effects of colonization. In a universe that is so spiritualized as in the 10 B. Brock-Utne and I. Skattum (eds.), Language and Education in Africa: a Com- Indigenous context, only some forms of identities can be colonized, parative and Transdisciplinary Analysis, Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 2009. but the spirit can never be. Indeed it is argued that African peoples 11 G. Dei, ›Indigenous Knowledge Studies and the Next Generation: Pedagogical Pos- mainly survived colonialism through the powerful connections to sibilities for Anti-Colonial Education,‹ Australian Journal of Indigenous Education, their spiritual identities. Third, central to decolonization of Indigen- Vol. 37, 2008, pp. 5–13; M. A. Meyer, »Indigenous and Authentic: Hawaiaan Episte- ized and colonized communities is resistance. Through resistance, In- mology and the Triangulation of Meaning,« in N. Denzin, Y. Lincoln, and L. T. Smith (eds.), Handbook of Critical and Indigenous Methodologies, Los Angeles: Sage Pub- digenous bodies sow the seeds of our own decolonization. Indigenous lications, 2008, pp. 211–216. peoples articulate and insist on their Indigeneity in order to overcome

64 65 G. J. S. Dei Conceptualizing Indigeneity their historical positions of marginalization. Through the process of the relevance of local peoples cultural knowings.14 A critical Indigen- Indigenous knowledge reclamation, Indigenous peoples become ac- ous research methodology must therefore explore how local peoples tive subjects. Lastly, the Indigenous prism critiques the independence resist continuous colonizing relations and practices by taking into of scholarship from politics and activism. Indigeneity is about politi- account their interpretations of everyday practice and experiences. cal resistance and we seek knowledge to bring about change and social Indigenous research is about the authenticity of local voice and ex- transformation. Indigenous knowledges are about everyday living perience, not in the sense of purity or non-contamination, but rather, and human survival. The pursuit of such knowledge is to employ the as local peoples remaining true to themselves, their histories, cul- knowledge received to serve humankind. The pursuit of knowledge tures, and experiences without filtering these through Eurocentric cannot simply be for the sake of knowledge itself. Consequently, the interpretations and understandings. Indigenous research is about re- worth of Indigenous prism as a social theory is measured by its phi- presenting the Indigenous experience outside of a Euro-American losophical principles and the ability of the theory to offer a social and hegemonic lens. political corrective. Because of the politics of decolonization, Indigen- In Indigenous research there must be a relationship between the ous knowledges are not just a search for knowledge or knowing how. ›concepts‹ used and the ›data.‹ The ›data‹ must move beyond what we It is knowledge to act and do. It is knowledge pursuit intended to help know as researchers. Indigenous research upholds the view that re- local communities deal with social problems in a global interdepen- searching for ›data‹ cannot be pursued as mere descriptive appendages dent world still reeling from the on-going effects of colonization. of theoretical formulations (see also Dei, and Johal 2005).15 This re- search argues that ›data‹ should be a theorization of the Indigenous experience located within the prism of local peoples’ cultures, his- III Indigenous Research: Confronting Some Epistemological tories, identities, and the interpretations with their environments Issues and Questions of Method and Methodology (physical and metaphysical). There is a need for dealing with the em- bodiment of research as more than understanding knowledge as so- As noted elsewhere (Dei 2013a, 2013b) there is a need for a reconcep- cially and discursively constructed. Knowledge is also politically, tualization of Indigenous research situating Indigeneity as a process emotionally, and spiritually constructed. Indigenous research seeks a of coming to know. Indigenous research is researching with an Indi- co-relational status, a humanistic conversation with our communities genous consciousness. It is research that affirms local voice(s), in the search for knowledge (e.g., research is not a one-way conversa- authenticity of selves, and ›epistemic saliency‹ (Dei 1999) of the In- tion). But above all else, Indigenous research must sustain local peo- digenous experience.12 Indigenous research is a complex decolonized ples’ capacity to undertake their own research. approach of producing, interrogating, validating and disseminating Research that is informed by Indigenous prisms or perspectives knowledge based on Indigenous peoples’ cosmology and worldview as outlined in the Indigenous discursive framework in the earlier sec- or ›worldsense‹ (Oyewumi 1997), as well as values system with its tion operates with some critical understandings (e.g., holism; inter- own unique methodological and theoretical framework accepted by connections; spiritual relations; respect for Land and Mother Earth; the epistemic community in question.13 the sacredness and sanctity of human activity; community inter- Indigenous research has a particular research agenda – to subvert dependence; responsibility; transparency and accountability; recipro- the dominant ideology that seeks to dismiss, downplay and decenter city and reciprocal relations; the nexus of society, culture and Nature;

14 Denzin, Lincoln, and Smith (2008); Kovach (2009); Wilson (2001, 2008); M. Stew- 12 G. Dei, ›Knowledge and Politics of Social Change: The Implication of Anti-Racism,‹ art-Harawira, ›Challenging, Knowledge Capitalism: Indigenous Research in the 21st British Journal of Sociology of Education, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1999, pp. 395–409. Century,‹ Socialist Studies/Etudes Socialistes, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2013, pp. 39–51. 13 O. Oyewumi, The Invention of Women: The Making an African Sense of Western 15 G. Dei and G. S. Johal (eds.), Critical Issues in Anti-Racist Research Methodolo- Gender Discourses, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997. gies, New York: Peter Lang, 2005.

66 67 G. J. S. Dei Conceptualizing Indigeneity and the interface of body, mind, soul and spirit; see also Wilson 2001, knowledge. Research must proceed in a very transparent way such 2008). Research is perceived as a sacred activity involving human that the local community knows what is going on in terms of process, beings in the search for knowledge (see also Batacharya 2012; Shah- expectations, and responsibilities. Local community knowledge jahan 2007).16 This search begins with due recognition of the Land holders are also responsible to their own communities to ensure that and Mother Earth and the acknowledgement of location and space as the imparted knowledge truly reflects the aspirations of their com- sources and sites of knowing. The researcher must be diligent in their munity. Cultural custodians are accountable to the Land, Elders, and dealings with the Land on which a study is conducted, acknowledge the ancestors. Their dealings with researchers must always be trans- the sacred teachings of this Land as informing the conduct of re- parent and they must seek to uphold the good name of the local com- search, research relations, and the general pursuit of knowledge. Re- munity. search must proceed with a degree of humility and sanctity by affirm- Indigenous research is purposeful in terms of changing the direc- ing the Land as sacred (see also Wilson 2008). Indigenous research is tion of conventional research agenda. For example, as noted else- about holistic relations involving the self as researcher, research sub- where (Dei 2010), in working on ›educational success‹ using student jects, the local community, and Nature. narratives through an Indigenous research paradigm, the research Indigenous research also involves community and communal re- approach is not to follow a more conventional research agenda, to lations. Research must seek to build communities and community of simply ›generate knowledge about a group of students‹ (that is, un- learners. In Indigenous research, there is no ownership of knowledge derstanding the academic experiences of successful students) or see- but an expectation that those who give their knowledge must be ap- ing these students as ›objects of knowledge.‹17 In an Indigenous acti- preciated and that those who receive such knowledge must also bring vist research agenda, the focus is on students’ discourses of resistance responsibility to such knowledge. The custodianship of knowledge and alternative visions of educational success as critical to transform requires that knowledge holders use their knowledge responsibly to the current school system. Hence, Indigenous research paradigm will build communities and not to enrich themselves. Indigenous research work with ›successful students‹ to offer their own perspectives about is built upon reciprocity and reciprocal relations between the re- ›success‹ (e.g., how they define and achieve academic success) and the searcher and the local community. Research is about reciprocal ex- alternatives to dominant conceptions of success in ways that help us change of knowledge and works with an understanding that both the to rethink conventional schooling. Indigenous research on schooling research and local custodians of knowledge have mutual obligations then becomes forging a productive research and activist agenda be- to each other. This must be respected and appreciated to ensure the tween academic goals of searching for alternatives to conventional success of the research process. schooling as a way to strengthen the current school system (see Bhav- Responsibility, accountability, and transparency are three impor- nani and Davis 2000; Fine and Vanderslice 2005 in other contexts).18 tant pillars of Indigenous research. There is responsibility on the part On the interface of body, mind, soul, and spirit the research sub- of the researcher to pursue knowledge in ways respectful of the peo- ject and the researcher must utilize all aspects of themselves in the ples’ histories, cultures, and knowledges. This responsibility also ex- tends to the researcher using the knowledge responsibly to bring about change in the lives of the local communities. The researcher’s 17 G. Dei (with A. Butler, G. Charamia, A. Kola-Olusanya, B. Opini, R. Thomas, and foremost accountability is to the local community who imparts its A. Wagner), Learning to Succeed: The Challenges and Possibilities of Educational Development for All, New York: Teneo Press, 2010. 16 S. Batacharya, ›Life in a Body: Counter-Hegemonic Understanding of Violence, 18 K. Bhavnani and A. Y. Davis, »Women in Prison: Researching Race in Three Na- Oppression, Healing and Embodiment Among Young South Asian Women,‹ PhD tional Contexts,« in F. W. Twine and J. Warren (eds.), Racing Research, Researching dissertation, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, 2012 Race: Methodological Dilemmas in Critical Race Studies, New York: New York Uni- [unpublished]; R. A. Shahjahan, ›The Everyday as Sacred: Trailing Back by the Spiri- versity Press, 2000, pp. 227–246; M. Fine and V. Vanderslice, »Qualitative Activist tual Proof Fence in the Academy,‹ PhD dissertation, Ontario Institute for Studies in Research: Reflections on Politics and Methods,« in F. B. Bryant et al. (eds.), Methodo- Education, University of Toronto, Toronto, 2007 [unpublished]. logical Issues in Applied Social Psychology, New York: Plenum, 1991, pp. 119–218.

68 69 G. J. S. Dei Conceptualizing Indigeneity pursuit of knowledge through research. The body, mind, soul, and critical, transformative praxis.19 Indigenous research does not make spirit are legitimate sources of knowledge production. Just as race, any distinctions between the ›knower‹/›known,‹ and ›researcher‹/ class, gender, sexual and (dis)abled identities are linked with knowl- ›subject.‹ Research gives agency and voice to all parties. Local com- edge production, so is the interface of body, mind, soul and spirit. The munities are not excluded as non-researchers but are active subjects nexus of society, culture, and Nature when evoked in knowledge pro- playing significant decision-making roles in research projects invol- duction through research requires that an understanding of local ving their own communities. communities engages with the connections of culture, society, and The Indigenous prism raises questions about the relevance and Nature. the application of research. It asks: In whose interests has research In going beyond the episteme to method, Indigenous research is sought knowledge? What are the implications of research for local political. Working with the ›political‹ dimension of research is key to subjects in terms of the pain, emotions, suffering, and other social sustaining Indigenous research and scholarship. A truly Indigenous and psychological costs of conventional research mired in colonial research must seek to capture the ›real‹ and everyday politics, socio- paradigms of control and power of knowledge? Indigenous research material realities, as well as the institutional practices and the resis- takes questions relating to pain and suffering seriously and seeks for tances engaged in by subjects with or without explicit or conscious ways to protect research from inducing pain. Pain and suffering that ›paradigms‹ to articulate them. The particular methodological ap- might emerge through the research praxis must always be known to proaches of Indigenous research must also look simultaneously at the researcher, and made known to the researched. There is an obliga- forms of external and internal colonial and oppressive relations and tion on the part of the researcher to create, and sustain a safe space for practices. A critical Indigenous research methodology must explore researching. Indigenous research must also provide a ›language of how the subjects of study resist continuous external and internal co- possibility for naming‹ for both the researcher and subjects of re- lonizing tendencies. What popular forms of consciousness inform search, problematizing and potentially transforming the subjects’ these resistances and the subjects’ interpretations of everyday prac- personal/lived experiences. tice? Conventional research often proceeds on the assumption that There are obvious limitations in the ability of traditional, Euro- our research subjects have acquired the complete truth or the ›true American social research paradigms, and methods to capture and ex- facts‹ about the researcher, her/his intent, suggested procedures, plain the experiences of colonized, and oppressed peoples. To counter guiding assumptions, motivations, and research questions. Unfortu- and redress these limitations the primary focus in Indigenous re- nately this is not always the case. The idea that somehow imposed search methodology ought to be on the experiences of Indigenous research conditions preconceived by the researcher without partici- subjects as key to understanding oppressions and the pursuit of trans- pants’ input, and the assumption that participants are ›informed‹ once formative praxis. The ›epistemic saliency,‹ referring to the authenti- they ›become part of,‹ or ›participate with(in)‹, is false and deeply city of local subject’s voice, is critical in Indigenous research. Colonial problematic. The researcher has an on-going obligation and responsi- relations cannot be understood fully by focusing solely on the colo- bility to communicate openly with the participants about the research nized. We need the colonizer’s input as well, and vice versa. Thus, interactivities and emergent design. there is a need to work with an overarching concern for domination Local peoples must be part of the process of meaning-making. studies and the transformative potential of Indigenous research. To Research as an emerging process must be informed by multiple this end, Indigenous research must enhance the agency and the ›agen- sources, including empirically situated socio-cultural phenomenon. tial power‹ (Daniel and Yearwood 2002) of the Indigene as part of a The everyday-lived experience as a legitimate direction of social and educational research implies an on-going dialectic (non-mechanical, not mechanistic relations) between researcher and subjects. Clearly, 0 B. Daniel, and M. Yearwood, »African-Canadian Women’s Bodies as Sites of Know- ing and No-ing,« in S. Abbey (ed.), Ways of Knowing In and Through the Body, research methodological approaches must have a dialogic interaction Welland, Ontario: Editions Soleil, 2002. and conscientization. Indigenous research must seek to subvert pro-

70 71 G. J. S. Dei Conceptualizing Indigeneity cesses of domination, manipulation, and colonization of minds (see of governance. In order to build communities that African states and Rahnema and Bawtree 1997 in another context).20 citizens desire, we need to tap into our rich, local, cultural resource Indigenous research ruptures the ›cult of expertise‹ of the re- knowledge base for their contributions to development. searcher and the ›rape model‹ of research that leads solely to the ca- Quintessential to African societies fully taking off on this trajec- reer advancement of the researcher (see Reinhartz 1979: 95, cited in tory, is the need for Africans to possess a decolonized and uplifting Lather 1986: 75).21 As creators of knowledge and understanding, sub- knowledge of self and their society. Many Africans have been socia- jects are co-researchers who are able to change their own social situa- lized and taught to implicitly believe that they are inferior to the White tions and contexts. With this approach, research is no longer an man and woman. This ongoing tragedy is especially prevalent in the authoritarian, parasitic encounter. Rather, it becomes a dialogic, reci- education system and the everyday social experience of Africans. procal, and dynamic meeting. Let me use Nigeria as a good case in point. (What follows here is not only happening in Nigeria by the way.) In Chizoba Imoka’s unpub- lished paper: ›Educating for Global Citizenship But Local Irrelevance,‹ IV Indigenous Knowledges and the Challenge for Nation- she notes that many of the private schools in Nigeria train their stu- Building in Africa dents exclusively in the Cambridge and SAT curriculum for easier transition to schooling abroad.23 The consequence of this is an unforgi- When Indigenous knowledges are gained through the methodology vable and inexcusable silence about the immediate socio-cultural con- described above, they can contribute in responding to some of the text of children in the schooling curriculum. Many students do not challenges faced by postcolonial African nation-states. They can build come to learn and appreciate the value of their cultures, and histories. up knowledge systems that resonate with the past, present, and fu- A number of African learners in the diaspora would concede that we ture. In particular, they are adequate enough to face the challenges learn more about our continent and cultural roots when we leave our posed by globalization. The long experience in nation-building in home countries. For example, it is not farfetched to meet an African Africa reveal moments in which such knowledges have contributed who has visited London, France, and the USA but has not visited other to social development. In many African rural contexts, for example, states within her own country or other African countries. Imoka raises traditional pharmacology is still practiced alongside Western medi- some critical questions that are worthy of reflection: cine. Indigenous farming systems and methods continue to provide What does the silence about the immediate social environment of the stu- daily sustenance to a number of African households. Folkloric pro- dents in school curriculum mean? For example, a Nigerian student who at- ductions of local communities attest to the vibrancy of African tradi- tends secondary school and lives in Lagos State graduates without knowing tional cultures. In effect, contemporary African nation-states cannot the basic history of Lagos but is taught about Buckingham palace and has categorically dismiss our Indigenous knowledge systems in the search visited the palace. Through such teaching, what values, history, and culture for ›genuine development.‹ Such development must proceed through do students come to internalize as important? What does it mean for Ibo paradigms that are »steeped in our home-grown, cultural perspec- students in Nigeria to learn about their society in a way that tells them that tives« (see Yankah 2004: 26).22 Current struggles of African govern- a river their great grandparents swam in was discovered by the Scottish Ex- plorer Mungo Park? What does it mean for Indigenous outfits in Nigeria to ance and democracy have much to learn from our traditional systems be called ›traditional‹ and the European outfits like suits to be called ›English‹ and these English outfits are what you wear for professional and economic- 20 M. Rahnema, and V. Bawtree, The Post-Development Reader, London: Zed Books, ally relevant occasions? More so, ›traditional‹ outfits are worn to work on 1997. Fridays while ›English‹ is the norm for other days. (Imoka 2014: 1) 21 S. Reinhartz, On Becoming a Social Scientist, San Francisco: Jossey-Boss, 1979; P. Lather, ›Research as Praxis,‹ Harvard Education Review, Vol. 56, No. 3, 1986, pp. 257–277. 23 C. Imoka, ›Educating for Global Citizenship But Local Irrelevance: The Case of the 22 K. Yankah, Globalization and the African Scholar, Faculty of Arts, University of Nigerian Teenage School Girl,‹ University of Toronto, 2014 [unpublished course pa- Ghana, 2004. per].

72 73 G. J. S. Dei Conceptualizing Indigeneity

Indeed, as she observes, the consequence of this tragedy is that many V Multi-Centric Knowledging and the Challenge of African learners become schooled to think less of themselves and Decolonization their societies. Through our colonized social priorities and actions, we ascertain that everything worthy and worthwhile of being studied Promoting Indigenous research is an approach to decolonizing knowl- is outside the continent. Our Indigenous cultures are something we edge, and the recognition of the importance of a multi-centric knowl- only experience during the holidays when we go to our ›villages.‹ In a edge base. As an entry point into multi-centric knowledging, we must sense, Indigenous culture is stored in a museum (ibid.). Instead of it seek to ›Indigenize the school curriculum‹ (see Dei 2015b).26 The cur- being lived and used to inform social policies of economic inclusion riculum must broadly include local resources in the search for knowl- amongst other things, it is conceived as useless for contemporary ur- edge. Viewed in such light, researching becomes a project of decolo- ban living. This fallacy must be undone. Africans need to unlearn this nization. Decolonizing and Indigenizing the modern university »is self-deprecating knowledge about ourselves and our communities. not just de-Westernizing but a total re-assertion of [Indigenous peo- History needs to be taught in an African-centered way and from ples and their knowledges] at the center of the process of knowledge pre-colonial era (wa Muiu and Martin 2009) where great Kingdoms discovery and dissemination« (Asante 2013: 3).27 In the African con- like the Benin Kingdom existed and continue to exist.24 This way text, this means that Indigenous voice(s) and the authenticity of African learners will start to rightfully see ourselves as people with selves must be affirmed; the epistemic saliency of the African experi- agency who have contributed to the advancement of our societies and ence underscored. the world from time immemorial (wa Muiu and Martin 2009; Ayitteh Multi-centric knowing is also about ›epistemological pluralism‹ 2010).25 In teaching from this lens, the richness and wisdom in Afri- and a challenge to epistemological polarity where rather than view can traditions, history comes to bear. This will also enable Africans knowledges as complementary they are pitted against each other as who are eager to promote a nation-building project to engage with if always in perpetual conflict. Knowledges are in synthesis with each Western knowledge in ways that ensure a centering of African cul- other. Epistemological pluralism must proceed through knowledge ture, our desires and aspirations however competing and contending synthesis. However, before such a synthesis is possible in the Western with each other. More importantly, the minds and souls of Africans academy, certain challenges must be addressed. For example, as some become the vehicle to drive nation-building (Imoka 2014). have noted there are fundamental tensions, difficulties, contradic- This does not mean that development must only tap into African tions, and paradoxes of translating Indigenous knowledges and epis- Indigenous knowledges. However, it is being insisted that genuine temologies into Western, non-Indigenous languages, categories, and development must not dismiss African Indigenous knowledges as technologies (see Andreotti, Ahenakew and Cooper 2011: 42; Santos pre-modern and therefore of less use to contemporary societies. The 2002).28 This difficulty arises because of the question of language. To failure of African development can in part be blamed on the troubling have a more meaningful conversation about multiple knowledges in refusal to connect questions of culture and local knowledge with the the dominant academy we are forced to use the language of the for- science of development. 26 G. Dei, ›Decolonizing the University Curriculum,‹ Socialist Studies/Etudes Socia- listes, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2015b [forthcoming]. 27 M. K. Asante, ›Decolonizing the Universities in Africa: An Approach to Transfor- mation,‹ Keynote Address, Conference of African Scholars, Promoting Critical Con- sciousness: Deconstructing Colonial Knowledge Legacies in the Academy, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Port Elizabeth, South Africa, 7 August 2013. 24 M. wa Muiu and G. Martin, A New Paradigm of the African State: fundi wa Afri- 28 V. Andreotti, C. Ahenakew, and G. Cooper, ›Epistemological Pluralism: Ethical and ka, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Pedagogical Challenges in Higher Education,‹ 2011 [unpublished paper, forthcoming]; 25 G. Ayitteh, 2010 – Africa’s Development – Making the State Accountable, The B. Santos, »Toward a Multicultural Conception of Human Rights,« in B. Hernandez- New School, YouTube, http://youtu.be/voZBwS3rHUQ (last retrieved on 17 January Truyol (ed.), Moral Imperialism: A Critical Anthology, New York: New York Univer- 2015). sity Press, 2002, pp. 39–60.

74 75 G. J. S. Dei Conceptualizing Indigeneity mer colonizers (like English or French). The problem is that often the myriad identities of the researcher and local, Indigenous peoples with parameters for the conversation are set by the dominant language. whom knowledge is being produced. This means engaging with the Indigenous knowledges are expected to fit into these parameters in myriad identities of gender, race, class, ethnicity, disability, etc. The order to make themselves intelligible to language-speakers of the trialectic space of body, mind, soul, and spirit implicate the dynamics dominant language. This set-up presents the difficulty of working of social difference (race, gender, class, sexuality, disability) in Indigen- with Indigenous ways of knowing that do not fit the »parameters of ous research. Concretely and pragmatically, the trialectic space and the acceptability established by so-called [modernity and] modern knowl- insistence on spirituality as a site of knowing bring concerns of gender, edge« (see also Andreotti, Ahenakew, and Cooper 2011: 42; Santos class, race, ethnicity, sexuality, and the ways people with non-norma- 2002). So the questions these authors have asked are: how do we as tive bodies are disabled onto the table. What might the trialectic ap- Indigenous scholars use the colonial language (in this case English), proach mean then for Indigenous research and education taking into Western terminologies and logics (e.g., epistemology, ontology, ax- account gender, class, race, ethnic, disability oppressions, etc.? iology) and technologies (alphabetical writing, digital scripts) to ad- Similarly, notwithstanding the virtues of community we know dress issues relating to Indigenous ways of knowing? Are there some that local communities can also be oppressive. Indigenous under- ethical concerns and social responsibility issues when we force some standings of the values of community are not always tenable in con- of these oral knowledges into ›corrupted written forms‹ in the domi- temporary contexts. So how do we ensure that Indigenous research nant language? Ethically, what are we doing when we seek to present by engaging the body, mind, soul, spirit in knowledge production as these bodies of knowledges in terms simply comprehensible to the sites of identity and power is not also reproducing oppressions in the dominant and its ways of knowing? These are challenges that we can name of ›community?‹ How does Indigenous African spirituality help only think about and be creative in our pursuit of multi-centric ways offer deeper insights into power, knowledge, and social action in cri- of knowing and doing Indigenous research. Andreotti, Ahenakew, tical research practice, and how are these tensions to be resolved? The and Cooper (2011). need for decolonizing spaces that are without power hierarchies is noble. But there must be a more pragmatic recognition that power is included in all social relations including the power of the community. VI Conclusion Similarly, sexuality complicates dominant readings of commu- nity. For example, how are a gay or a lesbian supposed to hide their I conclude this discussion by looking at Indigenous research and the relations in the name of community? Or is the individual supposed to implications for education as broadly defined. To reiterate: central to put community above self only in the socially-just community, that Indigenous research are concepts of spirituality, spiritual knowing, the is, only in one that recognize the possibilities of all kinds of loving interface of body, mind, soul and spirit, and the nexus of society, cul- relationships including same-sex ones? My point is that communities ture and Nature. The African spirituality is not the consumer spiritual- are not always liberatory. Clearly, a trialectic approach to Indigenous ity we often witness in the European context, but a spirituality that research emphasizing the inevitable interrelations between body, recognizes contradictions, complications, and contentions. In a sense mind, soul, and spirit, might create a new liberatory space for anti- we must speak of African spiritualities. Elsewhere (Dei 2012) this con- colonial and Indigenous research. An Indigenous-centered research nection of body, mind, soul, and spirit has been identified as the ›tria- approach must affirm the Indigenous and subaltern learner as a social lectic space.‹29 The body, social context, location, culture, and history being who has resources for resistance. The research context is about are crucially important in processes of knowledge production. All re- learning from diverse socio-cultural environments. However, this im- search is about knowledge creation. Research is about working with plicitly is also about power and the power of dominant groups to define cultural norms. Indigenous research in local communities of- 29 G. Dei, ›Suahunu: The Trialectic Space,‹ Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 43, No. 8, fers opportunities to critically understand the socio-cultural as a place 2012, pp. 823–846. where dominant colonial cultures can also seek to silence subaltern

76 77 G. J. S. Dei cultural expressions. This is the challenge of Indigenous research as it Indigenous Knowledge: An Engagement with seeks to break away from colonial hierarchies and relations of knowl- edge production. George Sefa Dei From a nation-building standpoint, it is just as important to ac- knowledge interconnections among knowledge systems as it is to dis- cursively separate the categories of ›Indigenous‹ and ›the West‹ in order to offer a sustained critique of the historic negation of Indigen- ous knowledge systems. We also have to be able to address the appro- priation of Indigenous knowledges into Western science sometimes without due credit given for the source of such knowledge. Europe is The primary aim of Professor Dei’s paper is a defense of what he calls not the advent of human history; Westerners need to understand this »Indigenous knowledge« against its devaluation and rejection by the and African children need to be immersed in a decolonized knowledge Western academy. As such a defense it is a very spirited and polemical of self and society. In turn, they will have to affirm their decolonized essay that takes direct aim at the relations of dominance between outlook in their civic practices, social choices, and their interaction Western and non-Western knowledge systems. These relations of with political leaders and fellow citizens. dominance were produced by the long history of European colonial Obviously, Africa had an Indigenous knowledge base before the practices. The impact of this period of colonization has indeed been arrival of Western science. The epistemological polarity that con- quite deleterious for the epistemic orders of colonized societies. The tinues to exist in our institutions of higher learning point to on-going process of colonization incorporated local cultural systems into a hier- relations of dominance between Western and non-Western knowl- archical order that was established between imperial and colonial cul- edge systems produced by a long, colonial history and colonizing tural systems. Within this new hierarchical order, imperial cultural practices of hierarchizing knowledges. This hierarchy was achieved systems had to accumulate authority, information, legitimacy, nor- through the active denial, negation, devaluation, erasure, and open mativity and other form of cultural capital at the expense of colonial dismissal of Indigenous cultural knowledges. As a consequence, an cultural systems. The imperatives of these processes of cultural accu- epistemic polarity has continued to exist that manifests itself in a mulation and dis-accumulation were such that local cultures rapidly ranking of knowledge systems. This is harmful to the ways we come lost normativity, legitimacy, epistemic authority and experienced ma- to know about our world, the social choices we make, the knowledge jor changes in basic sectors such as language, philosophy, religion and we embody and how we act within such a world for change. The education. Thus Professor Dei is very much on point in coming to the urgency of decentering and re-arranging the existing hierarchies both defense of these Indigenous cultures. in the academy and contemporary African societies is real. Further indicating the importance of this defense is the fact that he is not alone. As is well established in the philosophical literature, –George J. Sefa Dei, scholars from these colonized areas have been highly critical of this Department of Social Justice Education, OISE, imperial epistemic hierarchy and have sought to decenter and re-ar- University of Toronto, Canada range it. In relation to Africa, one thinks immediately of Frantz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral, Henry Odera Oruka, Kwame Gyekye, Wole Soyinka, Kwasi Wiredu, Ngugi Wa Thiongo, and V. Y. Mudimbe. Professor Dei’s defense of Indigenous knowledge is very much in the critical spirit of the tradition established by the above authors. In the course of his defense, Prof. Dei defines Indigenous knowl- edge as engagements with the land, identity, spirituality, community, local histories, local cultures, and resistance to the dominance and to

78 79 P. Henry Indigenous Knowledge: An Engagement with George Sefa Dei the universal claims of Western knowledge production. Indigenous addressed this problem. Thus my critical remarks will focus on the knowledge, Professor Dei, tells us has been »primitivized, romanti- areas in which I think that Professor Dei could have advanced further cized, negated or ostracized outright from the corridors of Euro- this project of postcolonial cultural reconstruction. In particular I will American conventional knowledge production«. (Dei 2015: 55)1 This do two things. First, I will examine closely some of the restrictive exclusion, he argues, has very little to do with the methods and rigor consequences of his construction of the Indigenous/Western opposi- of modes of Indigenous knowledge production. Rather, he suggests tion. Second, I will suggest the need for an additional layer of cate- that it has to do with the challenges that Indigenous knowledge poses gories that will enable a more rigorous theorizing of the negating and to Western knowledge; in particular, its challenges to the universal de-legitimizing effects of cultural colonization. These added cate- claims of Western knowledge. gories should also be able to address with equal rigor and precision In support of his claims and arguments, Professor Dei outlines the challenges of postcolonial cultural reconstruction. for us the methodology of Indigenous knowledge production. First and foremost, Indigenous knowledge production must be informed by »local voice(s), authenticity of selves and ›epistemic saliency‹ of I Indigenous Knowledge the Indigenous experience« (ibid.: 66) . In short, the first principle of Indigenous research is that it must be done with an Indigenous con- As presently constructed the category of Indigenous knowledge is sciousness. The second principle of Indigenous knowledge production caught in a polarization that clearly contradicts its stated definition. is its spirituality. This is the domain of subjectivity that cannot be If defined as engagements with the land, identity, spirituality, local colonized and hence is vital for anti-colonial resistance. Third, Indi- histories, etc., then Western knowledge is clearly a case of Indigenous genous research must be responsive to the land and responsible to the knowledge. Western knowledge has all of the local features that are community in which it is being produced. In other words, the re- used by Professor Dei to characterize Indigenous knowledge. Indeed searcher must be respectful of the ways, histories and cultures of the very significant portions of the knowledge produced in the West re- community being studied. Fourth, Indigenous knowledge production late to the land, spirituality and all of the other elements in the must transparent and accountable to the community in which it is author’s definition. Consequently, if our author is to advance the pro- located. Fifth Indigenous knowledge must be »multi-centric« and ject of postcolonial cultural reconstruction, he will have to rethink his not Euro-centric and uni-centric (ibid.: 74) By multi-centric, Profes- construction of the category, »Indigenous knowledge«, and also his sor Dei means that in the case of Africa Indigenous knowledge pro- related rejection of the traditional/modern binary. The substitution duction must be Afro-centric and undertaken from a number of dis- here of Indigenous/Western is definitely not an improvement. cursive perspectives. Sixth and finally, Indigenous research must be Professor Dei places special emphasis on spirituality as a defining activist and politically involved in the sense of being anti-colonial and mark of Indigenous knowledge that separates it from Western knowl- concerned with restoring the legitimacy and cultural capital of the edge. In my view, this emphasis overlooks the spiritual heritage of the formerly colonized cultural system. West – a feature that would definitely confirm its Indigenous status. Professor Dei’s account of the challenges confronting the recon- In spite of being one of the most absolute rejecters of African Indi- struction of postcolonial cultural systems is I think a good general genous knowledge, we can see this tradition of Western spirituality in portrait. It certainly provides us with an excellent overview of the the philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and the responses kind of reconstructive work that needs to be done. At the same time to it by philosophers such as Søren Kierkegaard and Karl Jaspers. If that it provides this overview, his work also confirms very well the there is anything that Hegel’s philosophy attempted to teach the suggestions of the group of thinkers mentioned earlier, who have also West, it was how to continue to be spiritual in the rising period of rational and scientific modernity. Between his Early Theological 1 G. J. S. Dei, ›Conceptualizing Indigeneity and the Implications for Indigenous Re- Writings and The Phenomenology of Mind, we can observe Hegel search and African Development‹, Confluence, Vol. 2, 2015, pp. 52–78. wrestling with his Lutheran heritage and finally arriving at a dialec-

80 81 P. Henry Indigenous Knowledge: An Engagement with George Sefa Dei tical method of thinking that enabled him to surpass many of the the macro-level of societal systems of knowledge production. In other religious practices of his day, but also to preserve their spiritual core.2 words, these macro-level constructions are never opened up so that Further, there is a very interesting convergence here between Profes- we can see their various sectors and subsectors and thus observe any sor Dei’s claim that Western colonization could not conquer African significant differences in impact between them from the imperially spirituality and Hegel’s belief that modernity could conquer Western imposed processes of cultural accumulation and dis-accumulation. religion but not its spirituality. Indeed Hegel’s spirituality, his Euro- The unfortunate result of this polarization between Indigenous centrism, and the »multi-centric« nature of his philosophy – which knowledge and Western science is that it often forces Professor Dei to incorporated multiple discursive perspectives – make his work an ex- compare or oppose Indigenous spirituality and religion to Western cellent example of what Professor Dei has called Indigenous knowl- science. These make for very inappropriate and unproductive compar- edge. isons and oppositions. In my view, more appropriate and much more If I am right in this insistence that we recognize the distinct productive comparisons can be realized from comparing Western spiritual heritage of the West, then this recognition helps to establish science with Indigenous science and Western religion and spirituality the local or Indigenous status of Western systems of knowledge. If with Indigenous religion and spirituality. The practice of the above indeed we recognize Western cultural systems as local or Indigenous, inappropriate comparisons is well established in the Western litera- then it changes significantly how we can or should conceive relations ture on African thought. Thus, in a classic essay by Robin Horton, and exchanges between these systems and the cultures of colonized »African Traditional Thought and Western Science,« we can see societies. This indigenizing of Western cultural systems suggests that clearly the results of such comparisons.3 Another significant example intrinsically they are quite similar to non-Western ones, and that the can be found in the work of Jurgen Habermas, particularly the first differences and claims that have elicited Professor Dei’s defense have volume of The Theory of Communicative Action.4 In both Horton much more to do with the hierarchical system that was established and Habermas the pro-reason and pro-Western biases are so strong between imperial and colonized cultural systems for strategic and ac- that African religious and spiritual thought don’t stand even a ghost cumulative purposes. of a chance. They are condemned before they even speak a word. This is the position of negation and erasure from which Professor Dei and others have been trying to liberate a spiritually inflected construction II Indigenous Knowledge and Western Science of African Indigenous knowledge. In my view, this liberation cannot be achieved within the above Closely related to Professor Dei’s category of Indigenous knowledge categoric framework of a polarized relation between African spiritual- is the rather rigid polarity that he establishes between it and Western ity/religion and Western science. To increase the possibilities for lib- scientific knowledge. Although he asserts that »while I critique Wes- eration, this binary will have to be opened and reset. This resetting tern science knowledge, I do not posit a binary with Indigenous must get us beyond the illusion of the West as an exclusive, uni-cen- knowledge«, Professor Dei’s paper does in fact rest on such a binary tric tower of rational and scientific discourses as presented in the (ibid.: 58). Throughout the course of the paper, Indigenous knowledge works of Horton and Habermas, and also here in the case of Professor is repeatedly set against Western scientific knowledge. Both are con- Dei. This view overlooks the on-going production religious and spiri- structed rather monolithically, which heightens the differences be- tual discourses taking place in Western departments of religion, divi- tween them and obscures the similarities and connections to which nity schools, and in newly opened departments of contemplative stu- Professor Dei gestures quite often. Further, the monolithic construc- tions of these opposed systems of knowledge are firmly maintained at 3 R. Horton, »African Traditional Thought and Western Science,« in Patterns of Thought in Africa and the West, Cambridge University Press, 1993. 2 G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of the Mind, New York: Harper&Row, 1967; 4 J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, Boston: Beacon Press, Early Theological Writings, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971. 1984.

82 83 P. Henry Indigenous Knowledge: An Engagement with George Sefa Dei dies. Further, let us not forget here the millions of popular books on mulative dynamics of colonization, both of these cultural systems religion and spirituality sold in West, and the rise of Christian funda- have been characterized by basic subsectors such as language, reli- mentalism, particularly in the U.S. In short, this binary between gion, poetry, philosophy, music, and empirical knowledge production. Western science and African spirituality reinforces the erasure of the Further, the ongoing productions of images, rituals, arguments, plays, continuing impact of the Christian heritage on Western everyday and poems, and empirical knowledge in the various subsectors of both academic life, and puts African religion and spirituality in unequal systems have been driven by real needs such as the growth and legit- exchanges that they cannot win. imating of human subject formation, the legitimating of political rule, and the technical informing of economic production. Further, the clearer visibility of these fundamental similarities opens up for us III Historicizing Indigenous Knowledge possibilities of non-imperial exchanges, new models of communica- tive equality, and of more objective comparisons. Rather than aiding Finally in this rethinking of the category of Indigenous knowledge, the building of hegemony, these non-imperial types of exchanges and we need to note here another problem that arises from Professor Dei’s comparisons would be motivated by advancing the growth of both rather rigid use of the binary between it and Western knowledge. societies and their peoples. This fixed relation prevents him from adequately historicizing either Second, this more objective acknowledging of similarities and of these two systems of knowledge. In spite of his claims to the con- differences between Western and non-Western cultural systems trary, Indigenous knowledge is for the most part stuck in the colonial would enable us to see and analyze more carefully the mechanisms period and is highly correlated with change in rural communities. and processes of accumulation and dis-accumulation by which the What of change in urban areas like Accra, Nairobi, Kingston or Port exaggerating of differences and the erasure of similarities were pro- of Spain? With more than sixty years of political independence and duced during the colonial period. In Caliban’s Reason, I tried to show rapid urbanization behind us, we are now well into the post- or neo- that colonization brought with it the displacing of local cultural, poli- colonial period. However they are theorized, these years of historical tical, and economic elites, and their replacement by foreign ones.5 experience at nation-building and urban living must be reflected in This was a shift that generated major legitimacy problems and deficits Professor Dei’s epistemic analyses. What kinds of knowledge do Afri- for the colonial state and its new governing elites. Both the colonial can states need in order to build the nation’s they desire? Can this be state and its supporting sets of elites were experienced as illegitimate done using just »Indigenous knowledge«? What has been the place of in the hearts and minds of the colonized population. The solution to modern science in these projects of nation-building? Implications this shortage of legitimacy was of course a combination of force and such as these for the post- or neo-colonial period should be much the re-organization of specific subsectors of the dominated cultural clearer given the time in which the author is writing. system to make them into producers and suppliers of needed legiti- mating symbols, arguments, reserves of normativity, and other forms of cultural capital. IV Advancing Postcolonial Cultural Reconstruction It is around the imposing of such a system of simultaneous accu- mulation and dis-accumulation, of extracting surplus cultural capital Given the above critical points, how does de-polarizing and opening from specific subsectors that were taken over, that we can grasp the up the concept of Indigenous knowledge advance the cause of postco- decline in authority, influence and normative power, as well as other lonial cultural reconstruction? It advances this project of transforma- structural changes experienced by colonized cultural systems. This is tion in at least three basic ways. First, it establishes the reality of the institutional nexus within which we can begin to account for the certain fundamental similarities between Western and non-Western cultural systems – before, during and after colonization. Thus, in spite 5 P. Henry, Caliban’s Reason: Introducing Afro-Caribbean Philosophy, NewYork: of the exaggeration of differences created by the strategic and accu- Routledge, 2000.

84 85 P. Henry Indigenous Knowledge: An Engagement with George Sefa Dei massive exaggerating and inflating of the differences between Wes- open up this category to include the Western system of knowledge, it tern and non-Western cultural systems during the colonial period. It enables us to talk much more objectively, globally and comparatively was also in this context that Western knowledge became a good ex- about the modernizing of different systems of Indigenous knowledge. ample of what Professor Dei has called the knowledge of a particular I have already noted Professor Dei’s rejection of the category of »the group masquerading as universal knowledge. Crucial to the produc- modern«, but it is unavoidable. The category finds its way back in his tion of these exaggerations and inflations were the elevating of the analysis, particularly during Professor Dei’s discussion of rural trans- discourses of reason, science and white supremacy. The latter had as formation in Africa. Further, whether it is in the urban or rural areas, its counterpart, the doctrine of Black inferiority, which was system- knowledge production in Africa, the Caribbean, and other ex-colonial atically integrated within the larger discourse of ›the negro.‹ The lat- societies is undergoing a process that can be called modernization – a ter contributed greatly to the project building hegemony as it pro- process that has a lot in common with the experience of the West. vided the measures of dehumanization that were used to justify the From my point of view, to be able to talk more objectively, globally enslaving of Africans, the political disenfranchisement of people of and comparatively about similarities and differences in these ongoing African descent, and the imposing of Western cultural discourses processes of modernizing epistemic orders and practices would signif- and practices on them in order address the major shortages of legiti- icantly advance the project of postcolonial cultural reconstruction. macy. Before departing, let me thank Professor Dei for writing such an From this perspective of these strategically exaggerated differ- engaging paper that has elicited these thoughts from me. It is my ences, postcolonial cultural reconstruction must be founded on pro- sincere hope that they will be of use. jects of reversing inherited patterns of accumulation and dis-accumu- lation, and of reorganizing severely distorted and malfunctioning –Paget Henry, Brown University, Providence, USA subsectors that had been producing cultural capital for the colonial project. These strategies and policies of reversal and sub-sectoral re- organization have involved dismantling as much as possible of the imperial mechanisms that facilitated the extraction of surplus cultural capital. This has been easier in some subsectors than others. The re- gaining of hegemonic control over the linguistic and religious subsec- tors has been much more difficult than in the cases of music, dance or spirituality. Consequently, such projects of reversal and reorganiza- tion must be seen as ongoing efforts that are subject to major set- backs. Further comprehensive projects of postcolonial cultural recon- struction must include well coordinated efforts at the re-establishing of real linkages between the cultural demands of subject formation, economic development, and political governance on the one hand, and the technical information, ideals, values, ideas, arguments, structures of normativity, and other forms of cultural capital that are being pro- duced within the subsectors of postcolonial cultural systems. The re- storation of the above supply and demand linkages is vital to the pro- ject of cultural reconstruction. The third and final consequence of rethinking the category of Indigenous knowledge that I will address is the following. When we

86 87 A Romantic Reading of the French ›Burqa Ban‹ A Romantic Reading of the French ›Burqa Ban‹: I Liberty in the Debate on Full Veils Liberty as Self-Expression and the Symbolism In 2010, France passed a law that bans the full Muslim veil from any of Uncovered Faces in the French Debate on public space, thereby starting what is currently an on-going trend in Western Europe (cf. Gustavsson 2014a).1 This garment, currently Full Veils worn by somewhere between 400 and 2000 women in France (Galaud 2009)2, is popularly often referred to as the burqa; although in fact, the ban covers not only the literal burqa, which covers the eyes with a semi-transparent mesh, but also the so-called niqab, which covers the Abstract full body and face except for a narrow slit for the eyes. The motiva- This paper suggests that in order to understand the recent ban in tions behind the full veil remain a point of controversy. Anthropolo- France against covering one’s face in public, we need to move beyond gists have argued that this practice is not a symbol of any specific the theoretical frameworks typically applied to the more researched belief or value that can be separated from the act of veiling itself (Alvi ›headscarf ban‹ of 2004. Previous research tends to interpret the ›bur- 2013; Mahmood 2012).3 Others have shown that in a Western con- qa ban‹ as yet another attempt to impose republican unity and order text, the full veil is worn as a sign of a refusal to give in to an aug- over what was taken to be the excessive and divisive self-expression menting Islamophobia, and indeed as a way of deliberately defying manifested by the Muslim veil. It has recently been suggested, how- veil bans of different kinds (Shirazi, and Mishra 2010)4; while yet ever, that it might be more fruitful to approach the debate through a others have objected that the full veil is mostly worn as a marker of rather different theoretical lens: the Romantic ideal of liberty as self- social distinction and extreme piety, or indeed, of Salafi radicalism expression, the original target of Isaiah Berlin’s warnings that posi- (for an overview, see Laborde 2012: 405)5. Most scholars nevertheless tive liberty invites tyranny under the very banner of liberation. The agree on one crucial point: that the full veil in countries such as paper follows up on this suggestion by revisiting the report that re- France is typically not the result of coercion. This voluntary nature commended the 2010 ban on full veils to the National Assembly. of the full veil, we shall soon see, is indeed even acknowledged by its More specifically, it analyzes the section of the report in which it is most staunch opponents. argued that there is something special about faces, which requires us This paper provides a closer look at one of the most central to keep them uncovered. This reasoning, it is argued, does indeed seem to be rooted in a Romantic understanding of liberty and human dignity, and in the fear that full veils suppress rather than express 1 G. Gustavsson, »Contemporary European Liberalism – Exclusionary, Enlightened each individual’s unique self. The ban on full veils must thus also be or Romantic?« in J. M. Magone (ed.), Handbook of European Politics, London and New York: Routledge, 2014a, pp. 75–96. understood as an attempt, whether misguided or not, to promote the 2 F. Galaud, ›La burqa, un phénomène marginal en France,‹ Le Figaro, 30 July 2009, self-expression of veiled women – not curb it, as previous research (URL: http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2009/07/30/01016-20090730ARTFIG has nevertheless often assumed. 00202-la-burqa-un-phenomene-marginal-en-france-.php; last accessed January 27 2015). 3 A. Alvi, ›Concealment and Revealment: The Muslim Veil in Context,‹ Current Keywords Anthropology, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2013, pp. 177–199; S. Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The veil, Romanticism, Isaiah Berlin, republicanism, liberty, self-expres- Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University sion. Press, 2012. 4 F. Shirazi and S. Mishra, ›Young Muslim Women on the Face Veil (Niqab): A Tool of Resistance in Europe but Rejected in the United States,‹ International Journal of Cul- tural Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2010, pp. 43–62. 5 C. Laborde, ›State Paternalism and Religious Dress Code,‹ International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2012, pp. 398–410.

88 89 G. Gustavsson A Romantic Reading of the French ›Burqa Ban‹ claims that was brought up in favor of the ›burqa ban‹ in the French were furthermore known to be converts, and thus rarely assumed to debate: that there is something special about the human face which have been brainwashed into the choice of veiling. Nor was the context makes it essential for us to show our own face and to see the faces of for the latter ban limited to education and schooling; instead, the others uncovered in public. While the inconsistency of this (and in- ›burqa ban‹ made veiling illegal in the entire public space. Thus, while deed other popular arguments for the ban) has already been discussed many commentators in France argued for a ban in both cases, many from a philosophical point of view by for example Martha Nussbaum others did not (Baehr, and Gordon 2013: 253–254)9. Even those who (2012: 105–138) and Elisabetta Galeotti (2014), this paper, by con- defended both bans nevertheless claimed that different normative is- trast, is not concerned with testing the plausibility of such an argu- sues were at stake in the two cases. The proponents of the ›burqa ban‹ ment, but with understanding it.6 In which sense, it asks, was the in 2010 often explicitly argued that the values they tried to defend in nakedness of faces in public argued to be so important that it was fact differed from those involved in the ›headscarf ban‹ of 2004. The believed to warrant a ban on face-covering? Gerin Commission declared that while headscarves in schools were In the report presented on January 26 2010 by the popularly mainly an »attack on laicité,« the full veil was instead »a negation of called Gerin Commission, the Information Commission specifically the principle of liberty, because it is a manifestation of oppression« appointed to investigate the full veil and headed by the deputy of the (Gerin, and Raoult 2010: 87). This, moreover, was believed to be the French Communist Party André Gerin, we find an entire section de- case despite the fact that most women who wear the full veil, the same voted to this symbolism of the face: ›Le »visage miroir de l’âme« report acknowledged, »affirm that they want to do so« (ibid.: 93). (Emmanuel Levinas)‹ (Gerin, and Raoult 2010, part 2, IV. A. 1, 116– In other words, in comparison to headscarves, the very propo- 118).7 Yet this section, or indeed the report itself, has, as of yet, not nents of the ban on full veils did not only invoke secularism or the received a great deal of empirical scrutiny. To the extent that previous values of the Republic, but also relied heavily on the ideal of personal research has considered the report, the prevailing assumption has liberty – while acknowledging that the full veil was something many been that the values to which it appealed were very similar to the women had chosen to wear out of their own free will. This is perhaps secularist and republican values that had earlier been invoked in favor most strikingly summarized in the different reactions of then-Presi- of the ›headscarf ban,‹ the law from 2004 that bans the wearing of dent Nicolas Sarkozy to the two types of veil bans. In regard to head- conspicuous religious symbols in French schools (cf. Daly 2014; La- scarves, Sarkozy famously stated: »If I enter a mosque I take off my borde 2012).8 This perspective, however, risks obscuring the fact that shoes. If a young Muslim enters school, she has to take off her veil.« while there are of course many affinities between these two debates, The headscarf ban in schools, this suggests, was a way to safeguard there are also major differences between them. While the headscarf the sanctity of the republican school as a temple or place of worship in ban was directed at female minors in the context of public schooling, itself, albeit of a non-religious creed: the Republic (Joppke: 2010: the ban on full veils targeted mainly female adults, many of whom 36)10. »The problem of the burka«, by contrast, »is not a religious problem, it’s a problem of liberty and women’s dignity,« Sarkozy de- 6 M. Nussbaum, The New Religious Intolerance: Overcoming the Politics of Fear in clared in 2009 (Chrisafis 2009)11. The very reason to ban the full veil an Anxious Age, Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University for Sarkozy was that »it is not a religious symbol, but a sign of sub- Press, 2012; A. E. Galeotti, ›Autonomy And Cultural Practices: The Risk of Double servience and debasement.« In France, he continued, »we can’t accept Standards,‹ European Journal of Political Theory, 2014 (published online 7 September 2014; last accessed on 26 January 2015). 7 A. Gerin and E. Raoult, Document no. 2262: Rapport d’information au nom de la 9 P. Baehr and D. Gordon, ›From the Headscarf to the Burqa: the Role of Social The- mission d’information sur la pratique du port du voile integral sur le territoire natio- orists In Shaping Laws Against the Veil,‹ Economy and Society, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2013, nale (2262), Paris, Assemblée Nationale, 2010 (URL: http://www.assemblee-natio pp. 249–280. nale.fr/13/rap-info/i2262.asp; last accessed 3 October 2014). 10 C. Joppke, Veil: Mirror of Identity, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010. 8 E. Daly, ›Ostentation and Republican Civility: Notes from the French Face-Veiling 11 A. Chrisafis, ›Nicolas Sarkozy Says Islamic Veils Are Not Welcome in France,‹ The Debates‹, European Journal of Political Theory, 2014 (published online 5 September Guardian, 22 June, 2009, (URL: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/22/ 2014; last accessed on 26 January 2015). islamic-veils-sarkozy-speech-france; last accessed 3 October 2014).

90 91 G. Gustavsson A Romantic Reading of the French ›Burqa Ban‹ women prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived ments as a specifically European identity that has recently come un- of all identity«. That, Sarkozy concluded, is »not our idea of freedom« der threat from Islam, because of Islam’s purported inability to limit (ibid.; emphasis added). religion to the private sphere (Adamson, Triadafilopoulos, and Zol- What idea of freedom, then, was the full veil, even one worn berg 2011; Triadafilopoulos 2011)12. The full veil is interpreted as the voluntarily, believed to negate? By looking for the answer to this ultimate symbol of this threat, and the legislation against it as an question in the recurrent claim that there is something special about attempt to impose modernity and Enlightenment among Muslim im- the face, this paper seeks to contribute to our understanding of how migrants (cf. Fekete 2006; Mavelli 2013; Mookherje 2005).13 the French ban on full veils in public – which intuitively seems to On the other hand, several scholars argue that the ban on full limit both the liberty to practice one’s religion and the liberty to dress veils in France is rooted not so much in a specific understanding of as one wishes – could nevertheless come to be seen as justified in the liberalism, but in the particularly French focus on republicanism (cf. very name of liberty itself. Baehr, and Gordon 2013; Daly 2012, 2014; Laborde 2012)14. On the My argument unfolds as follows. In the next section, I suggest republican view, liberty is not equated with the ›negative liberty‹ of we need to go beyond the predominant perspective in previous re- being explicitly uncoerced in the private sphere that liberals tend to search on French veil bans, which tends to interpret the opponents of seek. Rather than a room in which one is left alone to maneuver, the veil as trying to promote a republican ethos of national unity. The liberty is conceived as a status, the status of the full citizen who gov- subsequent section presents an alternative theoretical framework: erns herself by actively participating in political decisions for the sake Romantic liberty of self-expression, one of the main suspects behind of the common good (Laborde 2008)15. The goal, as Jean-Jacques repression in the name of liberty already according to Isaiah Berlin. Rousseau held, is to be governed not by our private concerns, but by The fourth section goes on to apply this new theoretical lens to the the common will, which is the same for us all independently of our discussion of the uncovered human face in the Gerin Report. This cultural or ethnic background (Rousseau 1983)16. section’s main conclusion is elaborated in the last section. Contrary On this second reading of the ban on full veils, the French pro- to what previous research assumes, I propose there that the commis- sioners insisted on the uncovered face not for the sake of our citizenly 12 duties to one another – but rather because they invoked a Romantic F. B. Adamson, T. Triadafilopoulos, and A. R. Zolberg ›The Limits of the Liberal State: Migration, Identity and Belonging in Europe,‹ Journal of Ethnic and Migration understanding of human dignity, which links our very personhood to Studies, Vol. 37, No. 6, 2011, pp. 843–859; T. Triadafilopoulos, ›Illiberal Means to Lib- the authentic expression of our unique inner self. eral Ends? Understanding Recent Immigrant Integration Policies in Europe,‹ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 37, No. 6, 2011, pp. 861–880. 13 For an overview, see Gustavsson (2014a). Martha Nussbaum sees anti-veiling de- bates as a signal of an augmenting fear-based religious intolerance not only in Europe, II Banning the Veil for the Sake of a Republican Ethos? but increasingly also in the United States (Nussbaum 2012, Ch. 1). L. Fekete, ›Enligh- tened Fundamentalism? Immigration, Feminism and the Right,‹ Race & Class, The main theoretical framework through which the debate on the Vol. 48, No. 2, 2006, pp. 1–22; L. Mavelli, ›Between Normalisation and Exception: ›burqa ban‹ has until now been interpreted has not revolved so much The Securitisation of Islam and the Construction of the Secular Subject,‹ Millennium around liberty, but rather around the conflict between national cohe- – Journal of International Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2013, pp. 159–181; M. Mookherje, ›Affective Citizenship: Feminism, Postcolonialism and the Politics of Recognition,‹ sion on the one hand, and the purportedly divisive forces of religious Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2005, self-expression on the other. This interpretation takes two major pp. 31–50. forms. 14 E. Daly, ›Laïcité, Gender Equality And the Politics of Non-Domination,‹ European On the one hand, there is a growing literature that sees the Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2012, pp. 292–323. 15 French burqa ban as an extreme example of a broader trend that is C. Laborde, Critical Republicanism. The Hijab Controversy and Political Philoso- phy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. spreading across Europe: the rise of a harsh ›identity liberalism,‹ 16 J.-J. Rousseau, On the Social Contract, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, which sees the ability to separate between public and private commit- 1983.

92 93 G. Gustavsson A Romantic Reading of the French ›Burqa Ban‹ ponents are believed to have condemned the veil as a sign of domina- turns out, was not sameness of any kind. Rather, he portrays himself tion and servility to masters other than reason; and, paradoxical as keen to fight any tendency to grind down »individual personality, though it may sound, at the same time also as a symbol of an aggres- imprisoning the individual in a homogenous, collective behavior.« For sive incivility incompatible with republican norms of sociability. The him, the veil is a symbol of this very »suffocating« sacrifice of the veil, we are told, came to be perceived as a symbol of immodesty and individual’s internal life on the altar of external conformity (Gerin, divisiveness; its opponents saw it as a way of flaunting one’s particu- and Raoult 2010: 287). While Bidar also claimed that the veil negated laristic and non-political allegiances instead of restraining oneself in the republican idea of the »shareability of the public space,« it thus public, a refusal, in short, to identify oneself as a French citizen above seems misleading to portray him as a champion of republican same- all (Daly 2014: 6–7, 10–11). The French animosity towards full veils, ness and reciprocity in the public sphere, as previous research has it is argued, should be understood as an attempt to defend Rousseau’s tended to do (cf. Baehr and Gordon 2013: 260–261). ideal of a difference-blind society in which everyone makes an effort In fact, in a recent paper (Gustavsson 2014b) I have tentatively to shed their particular allegiances, in order to identify first and fore- suggested that Bidar’s claim that veils must be banned because they most with the common good of the Republic (Baehr, and Gordon impose uniformity on unique individuals could be understood as 2013: 265). rooted in a Romantic notion of liberty as self-expression. This, I have Although these two lines of interpretation of the ban on full veils argued, is a neglected type of positive liberty, which nevertheless war- in France of course contain several internal differences, both never- rants more attention. Indeed, Isaiah Berlin initially expected this Ro- theless interpret the opponents of veiling as siding with national co- mantic version of positive liberty, rather than its now more infamous hesion and unity, and against what they took to be the divisive forces Enlightenment counterpart, to invite tyranny in the name of liberty – of individual uniqueness, and immodest self-expression. The defen- not always by logical steps, but through certain empirically deep- ders of the veil ban, we are told, were trying to promote universalism rooted tendencies of the human psyche. Future research, I have thus and conformity over what they took to be the uncompromisingly in- recommended, may gain useful insights by revisiting the debate on dividualistic, or even narcissistic, practice of parading one’s difference veils through this novel lens of Romantic liberty as self-expression. by wearing a full Muslim veil. The conflict hence is perceived as The present paper will follow up on this suggestion by applying this standing between the commitment to unity, universalism, and even novel framework of Romantic liberty beyond the single case of Bidar conformism among those who defended veil bans, and the individu- and instead looking at the entire section of the Gerin Report, in which alism, particularism and difference that they took the veil to repre- it is argued that it is essential that we show ourselves, especially our sent. faces, in public. First, however, let us establish what is meant more The point of departure for this paper, however, is that while these precisely by the Romantic ideal of liberty as self-expression. interpretations certainly bring out valuable aspects of the debate, they nevertheless blind us to the fact that, far from siding with unity and conformism over difference, some of the most vehement proponents III An Alternative Theoretical Lens of the veil ban argued that the veil must be banned because it symbo- lized the repression, rather than the excessive expression, of indivi- Romanticism is today perhaps most typically brought up in relation duality. This, I have recently shown, was for example the case for to communitarian ideas (cf. Taylor 1991)18. Some readers might philosopher and Islamicist Abdennour Bidar, whose hearing was un- therefore find it puzzling that the Romantic ideals of liberty and doubtedly one of the most influential ones for the Gerin Commission self-expression would apply to individuals, and not only to commu- (Gustavsson 2014b: 287–290, 2015)17. Bidar’s self-professed goal, it

Politics, Vol. 76, No. 2, 2014b, pp. 267–291; ›Reply to Crowder,‹ The Review of Poli- 17 G. Gustavsson, ›The Psychological Dangers of Positive Liberty: Reconstructing a tics, Vol. 77, No. 2, 2015 (forthcoming; accepted in December 2014). Neglected Undercurrent in Isaiah Berlin’s »Two Concepts of Liberty«,‹ The Review of 18 C. Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991.

94 95 G. Gustavsson A Romantic Reading of the French ›Burqa Ban‹ nities or nations. However, as Isaiah Berlin and several others after tian contemplative philosopher, and that of the rational consumer in him have shown, there was in fact an intensely individualistic strain the market place (two Enlightenment ideals which are of course in in early Romantic thought, especially among the Jena Romantics at deep tension with one another) with a quite different role model: the the cusp of the nineteenth century (Beiser 2003; Berlin 2001; Lar- creative artist, who transgresses all conventions in order to show that more 1996)19. It was indeed in this milieu, among thinkers such as it is an illusion to believe that there is any given state of affairs to Friedrich Schleiermacher, Friedrich Schlegel, and Wilhelm von Hum- which our will must succumb (cf. Humboldt 2009; Schlegel 1991; boldt, that the ideal of self-expressive individuality was born, a notion Schleiermacher 1996)22. As Saba Mahmood in fact notes in passing that was later to become a fundamental building block in the liberal- when discussing veiling in the Egyptian context, it is also this Ro- ism of John Stuart Mill and Ralph W. Emerson (Zakaras 2009)20. mantic understanding of the self that ultimately undergirds the pop- Inspired by Immanuel Kant, the early Romantics celebrated the ular understanding of all ritual and convention as empty and in- idea that we are free agents who can raise ourselves above the causal authentic as such (Mahmood 2012: 129)23. While Mahmood goes on laws of nature. Critical of Kant’s, of what they saw as, austere, rather to argue that agency and self-realization need not after all be opposed bloodless identification of freedom with one’s willingly imposing to culture or even docility, I shall leave this discussion aside here, upon oneself the laws of impersonal reason, these thinkers placed however. My goal in this paper is not to analyze the Romantic ideal their emphasis on the expression and power of the untrammeled will, itself, but rather to see whether it can help us understand the French rather than on reason and self-restraint. As Berlin puts it, they in- debate on veiling. sisted that »the self knows itself not by tranquil contemplation,« but Now, on the face of it, the Romantic ideal of self-expression that »only when it comes into collision with something not himself« (Ber- I have outlined here might perhaps appear to be a negative ideal of lin 2008: 179)21. In this view, the source of our dignity as human liberty, concerned mainly with the area in which I am unrestrained by beings lies not so much in our potential to rise above ourselves and others in asserting my own will. Berlin makes very clear, however, follow the universal laws of reason; rather, it stems from our potential that this ideal belongs to the camp of positive liberty no less than the to be creators, to rise above nature and convention and to impose our rationalistic version of freedom as rational self-rule, for both define own specific will on reality. On this Romantic understanding, to be liberty not as the mere absence of impediments but an end state, the free is to engage in self-expression: to assert one’s true inner self by achievement of a certain status (Berlin 2008: 193). Both ideas also rely setting one’s own unique mark on the world. The main enemies of on a division of the self: the person is assumed to consist of one, true, this freedom are not our passions or instincts, which Kant believed and authentic self that needs to be freed from the other parts of the pull us away from reason. For this Romantic notion of freedom, the self, which are seen as false and corrupted. The Romantic ideal, Berlin main obstacles to be overcome are instead the socialized norms and noted, thereby invites us to think of liberation as an internal struggle: internalized conventions of society, which are believed to hold back an »unceasing civil war« between »the natural man, struggling to get our true selves (ibid.: 194–195). out of the outer man, the product of civilization and convention« In sum, the early Romantics replaced both the ideal of the Kan- (Berlin 1990: 229)24.

19 F. C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative: The Concept of Early German Romanti- cism, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003; I. Berlin, The Roots 22 W. v. Humboldt, The Limits of State Action, New York: Cambridge University of Romanticism, H. Hardy (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001; C. Lar- Press, 2009; F. Schlegel, Philosophical Fragments, P. Firchow (trans.), Minneapolis: more, The Romantic Legacy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. University of Minnesota Press, 1991; F. D. Schleiermacher, »Monologues II and III,« 20 A. Zakaras, Individuality and Mass Democracy: Mill, Emerson, and the Burdens of in F. C. Beiser (ed.), The Early Political Writings of The German Romantics, Cam- Citizenship, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 169–197. 21 I. Berlin, »Two Concepts of Freedom: Romantic and Liberal,« in H. Hardy (ed.), 23 S. Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, Prin- Political Ideas in the Romantic Age, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, ceton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012. pp. 155–207. 24 I. Berlin, »The Apotheosis of the Romantic Will,« in H. Hardy (ed.), The Crooked

96 97 G. Gustavsson A Romantic Reading of the French ›Burqa Ban‹

A person who strives for this Romantic liberty of self-expres- ever, is why the sub-heading of the first part of this section of the sion, and who is convinced that others fail to achieve this status be- Report was »A.1. The ›face as the mirror of the soul‹ (Emmanuel cause they are held back by »the bonds of dreary everyday concerns,« Levinas).« As this allusion to the soul suggests, we shall see in the as Berlin puts it, might thus easily, he feared, take it upon himself to following that while communication and reciprocity were indeed im- liberate them from their explicit wishes for the sake of their own good portant factors in the condemnation of face-covering throughout this – meaning, to coerce them under the very name of liberation (Berlin section of the Report, this was because showing one’s face was taken 2008: 201–202).25 It has often been suggested that Berlin exaggerated to be a crucial sign not primarily of our identity as citizens, but of this concern, because not all ideals of positive liberty philosophically something more profound: our status as persons, as human beings allow for such a conclusion. In my own previous work (Gustavsson with dignity.27 2014b, 2015), however, I have shown that Berlin’s concern was to a The section that explains the importance of the uncovered face great extent with the conclusions that he believed a champion of this begins with reminding us that the aforementioned Bidar saw the full ideal is psychologically likely to embrace – quite independently of veil as standing in the way of both »all social life« and »all interper- whether or not these conclusions are also logically justified. Could it sonal empathy.« The reason for this is that as Emmanuel Levinas put be, then, as I suggest in the aforementioned articles but have not yet it, ›the face of the other speaks to me.‹ »In our cultural tradition,« pursued further, that the ideal of Romantic liberty as self-expression namely, »this part of the body has always been the mirror of the played a key role in the reasoning of those who recommended the soul.« By not showing their faces in public, Bidar thus found veiled French ban on full veils in the very name of liberty? women guilty, we are told here, of denying the communication »in- herent in the public space,« and therefore of perpetrating a »symbolic violence« of sorts (ibid.). IV The Symbolism of the Uncovered Face The commissioners then go on to quote the Sufi-inspired poet and public intellectual Abdelwahab Meddeb, who suggested that the Since the nudity of the face did not of course take such a central role problem of the full veil is the disappearance of »the criterion of a in the more researched debate on headscarves as in the debate on full frank identity.« Meddeb, the Report tells us, declared that »the eclipse veils, this idea has as of yet received only scant attention in previous of the face blacks out the light that emanates from the face.« We are research.26 To the extent it has been analyzed, however, the insistence also given a long recapitulation of how Meddeb, from a Sufi perspec- on uncovered faces has been understood as rooted in the Rousseauan tive, suggested that the face is fashioned in the image of God, and ethos of republicanism, concerned with civility and reciprocity among testifies to the divine presence in humanity. Meddeb’s conclusion, the citizens (Baehr and Gordon 2013: 261–262; Daly 2014: 7–9). In- the commissioners repeat, was that the full veil »is a crime that assas- deed, the discussion on the symbolic meaning of uncovered faces in sinates the face, depriving it of its infinite openness towards the the Gerin Report takes place in the second part, under the heading other.« For Meddeb, the covering of one’s face transforms women »IV. Le refus de la fraternité« (›the refusal of fraternity‹), thereby into »prisons,« »mobile coffins,« or even »ghosts« (ibid.). suggesting that showing one’s face was indeed seen as part of an ideal Finally, after discussing Meddeb, the commissioners state that of the social contract for republican citizens (Gerin, and Raoult 2010: »numerous persons in the hearings underlined the symbolic impor- 116). What previous research has not considered thoroughly, how- tance of the face, often referring to the philosophy of Emmanuel Le- vinas.« They thus finish this section by analyzing Levinas directly, Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas, Princeton, New Jersey: Prin- and quoting his claim that there is something special about the face ceton University Press, 1990, pp. 207–237. because it is »expressive.« The face cannot be captured in a single 25 This is not to deny that Berlin himself was at the same time also inspired by other aspects of Romantic thought, such as value pluralism. 26 This is not to deny that already the headscarf was occasionally referred to as if it did 27 The following analysis is based on the author’s translation of pages 116–118 of the in fact cover the face, for example by Bernard Henri Lévy (Wallach-Scott 2007: 159). report of the Gerin Commission (Gerin and Raoult 2010).

98 99 G. Gustavsson A Romantic Reading of the French ›Burqa Ban‹ form; it constantly »overflows with its expressions.« Seeing the face vinas and veil bans. We shall now instead turn to consider what pro- of the other is thus the only thing which makes us open to his needs blem the commissioners saw with the covered face. as a human being: we feel responsible for him only when we see »the The full veil clearly came to be seen as a problem of communica- essential nudity of his or her face exposed to the world’s violences,« tion. Having no »way of feeling the emotion of the other,« the com- the commissioners declare. Merely seeing a person’s eyes is not en- missioners assume, »considerably weakens the human wish to engage ough, in fact, for the face is a »whole which cannot be reduced to one in dialogue« (Gerin and Raoult 2010: 118). The type of communica- of its elements.« From this, the Commission reaches the conclusion tion they have in mind, however, seems not so much to be about that »to not see more than the eyes of a woman, the rest of her face reasoned citizen deliberation in the public space, as previous research being masked – and sometimes even the eyes being veiled – is to be has suggested (Baehr and Gordon 2013; Daly 2014). Rather, they condemned to address oneself to this human person as an object« seem to be talking about the more fundamental act of recognizing (ibid.). each other as human beings with emotions and personalities. The last First of all, it must be noted that the Commission presents us sentence of the entire section on the symbolism of faces in fact con- with a gravely distorted version of Levinas’ face-to-face ethics. It is cludes that »the person constrained to hiding his face thus loses all his true that for Levinas, our ethical responsibility is grounded in the act specificity and in a certain manner part of his humanity« (Gerin and of seeing the face of the Other, as he puts it. However, neither the face Raoult 2010: 118). nor our vision of it should be taken here as literally as the Commis- In this conclusion, and indeed in the entire section that we have sion does. The face, Levinas explicitly tells us, must be understood »in analyzed here, it seems to me that there is in fact very little reference a wider sense,« as that which shows us a person’s »complete weak- to the republican ethos that would require us to refrain from ostenta- ness, his entire mortality,« and thus places on us a moral responsibil- tious self-expression in the public space, which previous research has ity for him, not as an instance of ourselves but as someone who is attributed to the defenders of the veil ban, as we saw in section II. The different from ourselves. Indeed, says Levinas, »the face can express message is rather the opposite: we must not hide our true personality itself in that which is the opposite of the face! The face is thus not the from one another, but show ourselves in full sincerity to one another color of the eyes, nor the shape of the nose, or the blooming of the in the public space. The full veil is here presented as a threat to this cheeks etc.« (Levinas 1988)28. Nor is the act of seeing the face really very activity of frank self-disclosure. The problem of the veil in these about vision, Levinas explicitly notes, but rather about encountering passages thus seems to be about more than making us neglect our and responding to the Other (Levinas 1985: 88; 1998: 197–201)29. societal duties; the full veil is instead portrayed as threatening to un- Contrary to what the commissioners assumed, then, it is far from dermine our very humanity. As is suggested by Meddeb’s associa- clear that Levinas’ ethics furnishes us with a strong argument for tions with coffins and ghosts contrasted with divine light and open- the veil ban. In fact, it may very well lead to its very rejection, if the ness, by covering our faces we turn into dead objects more than live veil ban is understood as an unethical attempt to transform the Other human beings. In this section of the report, then, showing one’s iden- into a version of ourselves. However, since our purpose here is not to tity is not portrayed as wrong in and of itself; if anything, expressing test the justifiability of the burqa ban, we must leave it to future one’s unique identity is encouraged rather than suppressed. It is just research to disentangle the exact normative relationship between Le- that the full veil, it is assumed, does not allow anyone to express her true identity as an individual. This seems important for understanding why the commission was so unwilling to accept that the veil itself might in some cases be 28 E. Levinas, ›L’autre, utopie et justice, entretien avec Emmanuel Levinas,‹ Autre- a way of showing oneself to others; for example, showing one’s iden- ment – collection Mutations, Vol. 102, 1988, pp. 53–60. tity as a devout Muslim, or, alternatively, as a proud and perhaps 29 E. Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985; Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, rebellious representative of a colonial heritage. The full veil, as one Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998. of the commissioners put it, was simply seen as »very different from

100 101 G. Gustavsson A Romantic Reading of the French ›Burqa Ban‹ manifesting one’s identity through other signs,« because by wearing personality, in short, the ultimate sign of which is our face. This un- it »one inscribes one’s person into a single identity, one erases one’s derstanding, we have seen, was initially espoused by the early Ro- other personal characteristics, one effaces one’s individuality« (ibid.: mantics, who insisted that our first goal as free agents is not contem- 424). The full veil, it was also claimed elsewhere in the report, con- plation or governing ourselves by imposing on ourselves the stitutes »a veritable denial of the person with regards to that which universal laws of reason, but instead to break free from social conven- makes her the most unique.« This statement was backed up by a tions and assert our own unique self in society.30 quote from Marie Perret, a member of a secularist organization, who claimed that the full veil »does not only have the effect of robbing its wearer of her individual identity, but also of rendering her indistin- V Marianne and Romantic Liberty on the Barricades? guishable.« The person who wears such a veil, she concluded, in fact says »I am no-body« (ibid.: 98). Nicolas Sarkozy, I suggested at the start of this paper, summarized a These statements suggest that the opponents of the veil resisted central idea in the debate on full veils in France by saying that the full the veil not because they were against the expression of identity, but veil is intolerable because it is not part of the French »idea of free- partly at least for the very reason that they encouraged self-expres- dom« for women to be »cut off from all social life, deprived of all sion, and did not consider veiling to count as such because what it identity« (cited in Joppke 2010: 36). Since previous research tends expressed was not seen as specific or unique enough to count as the not to differentiate between the debate on the headscarf and the de- true self. The full veil was thus understood as a specific sort of expres- bate on full veils, it has been assumed that such an insistence on sion – that of saying »I am no-body« – but not as a case of self-ex- showing one’s face in public must have been rooted in the republican pression. Yet in order to count as a free person, the commissioners concern with the public space as one in which we meet each other as seem to have thought that one must express one’s unique inner self to citizens, and hold back from expressing our personal identity and will others in society. The reason they could not allow a person to with- – one of the main concerns, indeed, in the debate on headscarves in draw from or remain mute within society by wearing a full veil, we school. The freedom which the proponents of the ban on full veils can now see, was thus not only that they believed we have a duty to wanted to safeguard is assumed to be something along similar lines: others to engage in deliberation in the public space. In this section of the republican notion of freedom as a status, which requires us to the Report, the more important reason seems to be that the commis- liberate ourselves from our particular point of view, and instead iden- sioners assumed we have a duty to ourselves and to our own dignity tify with universal reason, or, in Rousseau’s words, la volonté géné- of not allowing our wills to be dictated by social conventions, but to rale (Baehr and Gordon 2013; Daly 2014). assert our specific will, to set our own stamp on the world. We must, This paper, by contrast, has uncovered a conflicting discourse at they seemed to assume, engage in active self-expression; if we only the heart of the debate on full veils, an argument anchored in the remain observers of the world, we cannot be said to live full lives. Romantic notion of liberty as self-expression, the type of positive This focus on self-expression is very similar, I would argue, to liberty against which Isaiah Berlin originally directed his famous the Romantic view of the human self as a creator above all, and ex- warnings against the inversion of liberty into its very opposite. We pression of one’s will as the mark of freedom. We could contrast this have seen that, at least in their explanation for why it is so important to the Kantian view, on which our human dignity derives from our to show one’s face in public, the Gerin commissioners did not portray capacity for autonomous choice, a universal characteristic that applies equally to us all. The commissioners who recommended the veil ban, by contrast, seemed to rely on the conflicting assumption that our 30 For a brief but elucidating account of the differences between for example Friedrich humanity and dignity are not rooted in any transcendental character- Schlegel’s Romantic view of human dignity and that of Kant’s, cf. K. Gorodeisky 2011, ›(Re)encountering Individuality: Schlegel’s Romantic Imperative as a Response to istics that we all share, as with Kant, but in that which sets us apart Nihilism,‹ Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 54, No. 6, 2011, from everyone else as the actual person we are here and now: our pp. 567–590).

102 103 G. Gustavsson A Romantic Reading of the French ›Burqa Ban‹ the full veil as a case of divisive self-expression harmful for the re- 418). Why, we might ask, would liberty require self-revelation in this publican ethos; on the contrary, their very target seems to have been very literal sense of the word? The only answer that to my knowledge the self-suppression and conformity supposedly inherent in full veils, has hitherto been given to this question relies on the premise that the and the reason they insisted on the nudity of faces in public that they nudity of Marianne must be understood as a mark of female sexual- believed the source of human dignity is to express our unique person- ity. This can be found in the feminist literature, which has suggested ality in public. In contrast to the critique against the headscarf, the that we must understand the provocative aspect of covering the body condemnation of the full veil in France thus seems to rely not only on and face with a veil against the French ideal of a public space that has ideals connected to reason, universalism, republicanism, and the En- historically been connected with the visibility of a sexualized, female lightenment, as previous research tends to assume, but also on ideals body. Female emancipation in France, this literature reminds us, has that starkly conflict with the latter, such as uniqueness, passionate for a long time taken place on the terrain of sexual liberalization, and self-expression, personality, and the untrammeled will. These latter, the concomitant right to wear revealing clothing in public without I have argued, are highly reminiscent of the ideals of the early Ro- losing one’s honor or dignity (cf. Guenif Souilamas 2000; Kemp mantics. 2009; Wallach-Scott 2007: 168–170)32. The insight that Romantic ideals are important for understand- While this literal reading of the role of nudity certainly brings ing the Gerin Commission’s insistence on the need to show our faces out a relevant dimension in the debate on veils, it nevertheless misses in public might also shed new light on other aspects of the French the Romantic meaning of self-revelation that I have argued is at play resistance to full veils. Take for example the role of Marianne, the in the French debate. As Berlin (2001: 113) notes, one of the stormiest icon of the French republic, who in the French debate has been repeat- early Romantics, Friedrich Schlegel, described the ultimate symbol of edly brought up as the very opposite of the veiled woman (cf. Gerin, freedom in his shockingly unconventional novel Lucinde as that of a and Raoult 2010: 345). Previous research tends to assume that Mar- small baby, who is »naked and unrestrained by convention.« In chil- ianne in these instances was invoked as a symbol of the free and equal dren, or for Adam and Eve, nudity is indeed the ultimate sign of the citoyenne, who refuses to be governed by any other laws than those very opposite of sexualization; on the contrary, it represents the nat- of her own making, and who identifies first and foremost with the ural state of humanity, uncorrupted by civilization. The naked body Republic, as symbolized by the anti-monarchic symbols of the French thus also represents a radical break with society and with people’s revolution that Marianne is typically represented as wearing: the expectations, and often symbolizes the freedom of standing up for Phrygian cap and the tricolor flag (Kemp 2009: 25; Laborde 2008: oneself. This was for example why, in the post-revolutionary Paris 112)31. While I do not wish to deny that this understanding of Mar- of the 1790’s – an era which, of course, coincided with early Romanti- ianne and free citizenship was certainly one of the major reasons for cism – wearing thin or even wet white garments that would give the the French resistance to headscarves in public schools, I shall now illusion of nudity became a crucial fashion, representing the unique briefly suggest that in the later debate on the full veil, Marianne’s individual stripped free of all pretence and hypocrisy, expressing role might also go beyond that of symbolizing the values of repub- nothing but her true convictions, and thus in a manner desexualized licanism. (Sennett 2002: 184–185)33. Perhaps, then, the unabashed self-revela- Consider one of the most striking quotes on Marianne in the tion in which Marianne engages could also be interpreted as the epi- report of the Gerin Commission: »Marianne, the symbol of the Re- tome of authentic self-expression and sincerity, as the triumph of the public, most often does not cover her chest with anything. The oppo- natural woman, struggling to get out of the outer woman, the product site would mean a deprivation of liberty« (Gerin, and Raoult 2010:

32 N. Guenif Souilamas, Des beurettes aux descendantes d’immigrants nord-afri- 31 A. Kemp, ›Marianne d’aujourd’hui?: The Figure of the Beurette in Contemporary cains, Paris: Grasset/Le Monde, 2000; J. Wallach-Scott, The Politics of the Veil, Prin- French Feminist Discourse,‹ Modern & Contemporary France, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2009, ceton: Princeton University Press, 2007. pp. 19–33. 33 R. Sennett, The Fall of Public Man, London: Penguin Books, 2002.

104 105 G. Gustavsson of civilization and convention, to paraphrase Berlin’s description of the Romantic idea of natural man (Berlin 1990: 229)? While I leave this question open for future research to explore, I believe we can conclude that the lens of Romantic liberty as self-ex- pression through which I have here looked closer at one aspect of the French debate on full veils has uncovered a neglected yet important fact: that the defenders of the ban attributed considerable importance to freedom as self-disclosure, especially the expression of one’s full personality supposedly revealed in the face. This in turn helps us understand why the veil came to be portrayed as the very suppression Symposium: What (If Any) Limits Ought of freedom even when it was acknowledged that it is most often vo- Democratic Pluralism Impose on Diversity luntarily chosen. If what I have argued in this paper is correct, then part of the reason for this was namely that, in the French debate, the within a Cross-Cultural Context? person who hides herself from others, whether by her own choosing or not, was portrayed as negating her freedom in the Romantic sense of the word, according to which a person is truly free only if she engages in sincere and unconventional self-expression.

–Gina Gustavsson, Uppsala University, Sweden

106 Democratic Limitations on Diversity and Pluralism?

I The Challenging Question

I have been asked to offer a response to a most challenging question: ›What (if any) limits ought democratic pluralism impose on diversity within a cross-cultural context?‹ In responding to the question by taking up the issues it raises, I will not engage in philosophical theorizing in search of answers in the form of universally and necessarily true principles by which to deter- mine the need for, and how to impose, limitations on democratic plur- alism. Rather, I regard the question as an opportunity to join others in giving thought to how best to resolve vexing conditions affecting as- sociated living – political life – within, between, and among persons and groupings of persons comprising socio-political formations of various forms and scales – including organizations, institutions, and polities (the latter ranging in size from villages to nation-states) – that are conditioned, internally and/or through external relations, by significant diversities (cultural and otherwise). Considerations of how best to respond to the question should, in my judgment, be disciplined by an understanding that whether, how, to what extent, and by whom limitations might need to be, should be, imposed on diversity, and imposed democratically, must, as well, be determined and imposed, if at all, democratically. That is to say, not determined solely by an appeal to, and on the basis of, the results of engaging in philosophical theorizing in a quest for guiding principles thought (mistakenly) to be invariant, true, and appropriate univer- sally, theorizing that purportedly also secures the authority of the successful theorizer(s) to impose the principles. Endeavors of philoso- phical theorizing on such an authoritative and authoritarian quest and endeavors of democratic praxis in political life are two entirely different enterprises, and are governed by entirely different criteria, modes of praxis, and possibilities of success with quite different con-

109 L. T. Outlaw (Jr.) Democratic Limitations on Diversity and Pluralism? sequences for affected polities and persons. Such theorizing is not a question. As a contribution to this fleshing out, I offer the following democratic venture. initial considerations. There are many, much-too-long and continuing, traditions (mis- First, regarding ›diversity.‹ This is a fundamental characteristic guided in my judgment, though not in mine alone) of aspiring and of what we have come to ›know,‹ provisionally, about the wee bit of endeavoring to have philosophical theorizing about matters political the vast and at present, practically speaking, mostly unknowable uni- determine and impose ›universal‹ and invariant ›right‹ principles on verse within which our species is but one among many that currently the ordering of political life. And quite often, central to this theoriz- persist on planet earth. (Achieving knowledge by our own means of ing quest has been the determination, the requirement, that the prin- the existence of other forms of ›life‹ elsewhere throughout the uni- ciples of ordering displace factors of unessential or ›morally irrele- verse is presently beyond our capabilities.) Our species-existence is vant‹ diversity in favor of some factor of ›essential‹ sameness in all radically contingent; our possible, probable, likely, and preferred fu- relevant persons that is to serve as the foundational anchorage to tures are more or less open and uncertain. We persist on a constantly which the universal principles are to be connected. changing planet that is situated in, is part of, a dynamic universe the In what follows, then, in the way of an initial response to the time-and-space dimensions of which far exceed our efforts of know- challenging question directed to my attention, I will offer considera- ing and our practical and other efforts to fully control our lives and tions that are not at all intended to specify limitations, general or destinies (to say nothing at all about our inability to control any as- specific, but, rather, considerations of several of the issues most pects of the universe beyond planet earth), and within which there are poignant in the question that, I propose, might be among those taken processes of coming-to-be and passing-away – we might say process up by persons interested in the question and involved in thinking and of ›emergence,‹ ›development,‹ and ›entropy,‹ decline leading to death working through challenges to life in political formations in which – that are beyond our complete control. the issues carried by the focal question command their attention. Further, our precarious, always contingent species-persistence is What I offer, then, are considerations for democratic discussion and situated in various earth-bound environmental locales that condition, debate. First, though, more about the challenging question. in very substantial ways and to varying extents, our evolving embo- diment and how the necessities for continued living are satisfied (temporarily), both in contending with the natural world to secure II Parsing the Question: ›Diversity‹ and ›Pluralism‹ food, clothing, and shelter, and in forging and sustaining social order in and through which to sustain life as shared ventures. (And persis- The question put to me is pregnant with several notions that have tence is a shared venture, beyond the capabilities of any lone human reference to complicated conditions of particular forms and instances being.) Having dispersed throughout planet earth and, so far, conti- of political life: ›democratic pluralism,‹ thus ›democracy‹ and plural- nuing to persist (as a species, particular groupings having come and ity; ›pluralism‹; ›diversity‹ (same as or different from ›plurality?‹); gone) in and through multiple self-reproducing populations, bio-cul- cross-›cultural contexts‹; ›imposed limits‹ on diversity by ›democratic tural group-distinguishing differences have emerged and continue to pluralism.‹ Important work is required to flesh out each of these no- be perpetuated as changing related sets of distinguishing biological tions, and to understand them in their relatedness within the config- and cultural (bio-cultural) characteristics (evolution). uration of a single question emergent from concerns with particular Within these diverse groupings, all involved in cross-genera- historical conditions. And, to my mind, it is important, in taking up tional reproduction and conservation, biologically and culturally, our the question, to test, and verify the adequacy of its formulation as a species-persistence in different and changing environs is enabled, means by which to refer to historical conditions of political life by more or less, by developed repertories of learning-enabled capabil- specifying, as fully as possible, the relevant constitutive particulars ities, more or less refined through further learning, and propagated of those conditions that give rise to the issues encompassed by the across generations. These repertories are conducive, more or less, to the forging of forms of ordered living-together while satisfying the

110 111 L. T. Outlaw (Jr.) Democratic Limitations on Diversity and Pluralism? necessities of living and reproduction within a variety of forms of life (i.e., promoting the evolutionary successes of), the longevity and in occupied socialized and politicized environs. In other words, by well-being of the group and (at least some of) its members, of those means of learned bio-culturally reproductive living-together, sub- assisted by (at least some of) its members.1 Through institutionalized stantial numbers of our species survive to reproduce and to secure constructions of politicized identities and agendas for the making of well-being in various forms of associated living, in polities, on various socialized and politicized histories, agendas, and identities that are terms of association, aided by the formulation, institutionalization, incorporated into narrations of histories made and/or fabricated, and and propagation of schemes of meaning (ideologies; narrations of ori- incorporated into projections of possible and desired futures, all con- gins and missions; religions and theologies; philosophical systems) tingently secured by rationalizations and justifications of prevailing that are devised to define and guide the construction and maintenance and/or desired forms of individual and shared life along with specifi- of the forms of life-stabilizing orderliness, synchronically and dia- cations of which persons and sub-groupings will fulfill roles of super- chronically, socially and politically. Thus, the group continues cross- ordination and subordination, become characteristically definitive of generationally while individuals constituting each generation subse- persistent, politicized forms of life in equally politicized locales. Con- quently pass away. sequently, the processes, natural and human-made, that condition the The agendas guiding such constructed meaning-schemes are de- forging of the contingent orderliness of existence – of the attempts to veloped within the various forms of life and prove their veracity by impose order and regularity upon cross-generational coming-to-be the extent to which, beyond sheer chance, individual and shared life is and passing-away – thus give rise to the myriad forms of diversity sustained. Accordingly, the meaning-ordering agendas structuring and similarity of forms of associated life in and through which evolu- and ordering lives and forms of life are conditioned and conditional, tionary bio-cultural processes provide the means by which always are experimental, though, as is often the case, the agendas tend to be precarious survival is achieved and sustained in the circumstances. buttressed by ›canopies‹ of meta-meanings, sometimes made sacred, Hence, our species’ anthropological diversity, micro and macro – constructed and invoked to provide protection from competitive chal- that is, regarding each individual relative to other individuals (un- lenges of other agendas and from various forms of entropy (Berger iquely different while sharing species-determining characteristics); 1990). These buttressing efforts become even more demanding (and regarding each bio-cultural self-reproducing group relative to other are generally thought to be necessary by those taking responsibility such groups. (And of particular importance, this same diversity is an for protecting the form of life) when individuals, and groupings of important factor that enhances the species’ prospects for evolutionary individuals, who are patriotic to key aspects of an ordered form of life success and persistence.) Thus, the plurality of politicized forms of enter into competitive relations with other patriots regarding the life, of shared agendas for living in diverse polities, though the shar- terms of order or the guiding agenda of a cultural group or patriotic ing tends always to be skewed by unbalanced distributions of power guardians of a form of life, or when the commanding patriots (lea- among subgroups within the politicized forms of life, within polities. ders) of polities enjoin competitive relations with patriots of other Sustaining polities as ongoing ordered and stable forms of associated polities. Competition developed into strife, warfare, genocide – such life thus requires strenuous cross-generational efforts. Among other continues to constitute too much of the history of our species-being. important reasons, because individuals, too, differ. And these differ- Institutions – institutionalizations of ordering schemes of mean- ences are marshaled into competing subgroups that become socio-po- ing and life-sustaining modes of praxis, fortified by schemes of con- litically ordered by various forms of superordination and subordina- ceptualizations and justifying, legitimating, rationalizations that spe- tion that facilitate oppression and exploitation. The hierarchical cify the roles, the distribution and filling of roles, thus the orderings, and the oppression and exploitation, are always rationa- distribution of power, in and through which socio-political life is or- lized by naturalizing appeals to distinguishing characteristics of both dered – have emerged from human efforts across centuries as the principal resource by which to stave off entropy that would lead to 1 For a generalized account of the formation of institutions, of the fortification of the death of all while sustaining, and even, sometimes, advancing institutions conceptually and socially, see Berger, and Luckmann (1967).

112 113 L. T. Outlaw (Jr.) Democratic Limitations on Diversity and Pluralism? oppressors and those oppressed, characteristics that are conscripted the ineradicable radical contingency and uncertainty that define our into religious, theological, philosophical, socio-anthropological, and existence. political justifications and legitimations of the politicized ordering. Moreover, we have also been left with, and continue to perpetu- Diversity becomes a conscript of injustice. ate, learnings mal-distributed: that is, favoring the existence-enhan- Still, diversity is definitive of our species-being, and of the parti- cing learning of some at the expense of others thereby curtailing, if cular portion of the known universe that our species inhabits. ›Plur- not endangering, the prospects for success and well-being for vir- alism,‹ in one sense, is a term we use, when referring to salient differ- tually all in a polity, more broadly endangering the prospects for ences of various kinds among human individuals and human well-being for our species as a whole. The mal-distributions of learn- groupings, to acknowledge and affirm the anthropological facticity ings and the failures to uptake learnings; that neglect or reject the of our species-diversities. Among the significant challenges to forging cultivation of the fullest possible learning by each and all able and and sustaining forms of associated life inclusive of acknowledged di- willing to learn; that neglect or reject the cultivation of maximum versities, social and individual, forms that have been ordered on terms openness of virtually all to the possibility of learning from each and that maximize the possibilities for justice in associated living for vir- all, individuals and polities, seriously devalue the potential for life- tually all without invidious discrimination against particular differ- enhancing contributions to prevailing and future forms of life, to our ences, have been the predominance of persistent failures to learn, or polities, even to the evolutionary successes of our species, that can be our failure to maximize what has been learned about, how to resolve had through ever widening distributions and sharings in the riches of competitive conflicts that block intra-and inter-group learning that the bio-cultural evolutionary successes of our species-diversities al- enhance survival and well-being for more than a few who favor them- ready produced, that provide important lessons for how to work at selves and those they regard as ›their own.‹ Of course, there are the resolving challenges, how to create and enjoy beauty, how to live well challenges imposed by the studied, sometimes murderous determina- so as to enhance the prospects for prolonging our species-being. tions of the few within polities in which they exert dominance to preserve their positions of superordination, in some cases through socially organized (and in some instances violence-backed) propaga- III ›Diversity,‹ ›Democracy,‹ ›Limitations‹ tion of ideological predominance, in others through biological succes- sion wedded to political predominance (hereditary regimes). In these Cultivation of openness to and respect for our species-diversities; of instances, the persistence of injustice is not a consequence of ignor- openness to entertaining, possibly learning from, ideas regarding, and ance. accomplished living in, various forms of associated life and through Where ignorance is a significant factor, the challenges are gener- diverse individual lives; of openness to the diverse forms of wonder ated not only by our not knowing due to having failed to learn, but and beauty consequent of unpredictable human creativity giving rise, are compounded by the limits to our knowing, thus our limited when socialized, to diverse cultures – these are among the many great knowledges, structured by the limits to our natural and culturally- possibilities (and many more actualities across the history of our spe- enhanced capabilities and strategies for coming to know: by the limits cies) of benefits of being oriented by notions of, being committed to to the span of individual lives, and by the natural as well as socio- valorizations of, and being studiously engaged in practices to effect cultural forms of entropy that have not been (perhaps cannot be) cooperative democratic life, locally, between, and among various per- completely eradicated from efforts to preserve through institutiona- sons, groups, and forms of encultured life, various polities. It is to- lizations what has been learned (by some) and to mediate the learn- ward these benefits that notions of democracy continue to be worked ings to (some) others of successive generations. Among other things, at directing us: toward developing and putting into practical effect these limitations leave us without, leave us unable to produce, endur- revised and refined conceptualizations, valorizations, and practices ing certainties about our existence beyond the seeming certainty of tending toward equalization of respect and regard for persons, group- ings of persons, polities of persons, and groupings of polities engaged

114 115 L. T. Outlaw (Jr.) Democratic Limitations on Diversity and Pluralism? in various relations having to do with sharing life within and across practitioners for cultivated openness to the creative adaptations won polities and locales on our shared and increasingly precarious planet. in the experiments of living of virtually all surviving persons, groups, Or so this is now what pursuits of democracy have come to in- and polities and institutionalized in their cultures; opens adherents volve. It was not always so. The range of the denotation of ›democ- and practitioners to enhanced prospects of making new, beneficial racy‹ from many of its earliest connotations and implementations was creative contributions to storehouses of human civilizations while far from as extensive as is the case at present. Refining conceptions, they benefit from withdrawals from the same. broadening the ranges of connotation and denotation, have been hard If this be the case: if the core notions, core commitments, of won efforts across centuries and could only have been conceived and democratic associated life include continual refinement of our con- put into play, in political life and in other dimensions, in keeping with ceptualizations of the connotations and denotations of this family of successes in battles to gain freedom and justice for those kept beyond concepts as involving equality of regard and respect for persons, for the valorized and valorizing range of inclusion in the concept’s pre- culture-making groups, for polities, all of which are both carriers and vailing meanings and practical effects. Conceptions, valorizations, and contributors to the evolutionary successes of our species; if deter- endeavors conditioned by notions of democracy have been forged, mined, persistent, and just practicing of this equality of regard and continue to be refined and set to practice, in efforts to resolve some respect conditions, substantively, our species-efforts to secure, as best of the most vexing challenges to associated life that have to do with we can, enhanced chances for our continued survival and enhanced injustices. Pertinent in this regard is the difficult work of managing well-being by giving rise to more and more shared progressive free- inter-group relations democratically, among polities especially, in or- dom and justice for more and more persons, groupings, and polities der to reduce the prospects of competition and conflict devolving to from whom both have long been denied; if, in short, democratically life-distorting, even life-destroying, conflict. In short, the range of structured relations are the means by which to best take advantage of those served well by democratizing conceptions and practices con- our species-diversity, which is the case I offer for consideration, what tinues to be expanded, with more success in some instances than in might occasion the need to impose limits on diversity in cross-cultur- others. Diversities condition our species in virtually all respects, mi- al contexts? Only in those instances, I offer, in which some idea, crea- cro (individuals) to macro (polities), neither singularity nor unani- tion, prospective intervention into human affairs would, if put into mity. effect, threaten survival and continuing evolution in violation of the Notions of democracy, then, continue to be complicated by di- core value of equality of regard and respect for others. verse conceptualizations and reconceptualizations, evaluations and Who would determine the threat? How? How should such revaluations, implementations and refinements of implementations. threats be managed? These are critical questions that require answers Consequently, the term continues to be conditioned by many of the both appropriate for and adequate to meeting situations that appear to evolutionary developments affecting our species, in political life espe- be, are potentially or in reality, threatening. Taking up the questions cially (though the consequences of associated life increasingly or- would propel the discussion into efforts to conceive, identify, study dered democratically go far beyond the realm of politics narrowly organized practices by which threat-determinations and management conceived). It could not be otherwise, for it is a notion – a diverse might and/or have been, are being, pursued. Such work is beyond the family of notions, if you will – born of human fabrication and thus present scope of this exercise. Still, in keeping with the considerations subject to continuing renovations as the notions are taken up in di- I’ve offered already, I insist on the consideration that in these in- verse historically conditioned contexts, and as we learn and evolve – stances, as well, the work of threat-determination and management and fail to learn or to live the full benefits of learning. Still, demo- should be conducted democratically, and, as fully as possible, in keep- cratic orientations and practices, I offer, are most fitting for an evol- ing with the core commitment of equality of regard and respect for ving species conditioned by diversities. The practiced commitment to others. Accordingly, if limits need to be imposed, the assessment of equality of regard and respect at the core of conceptions of democracy the need; the specification of the nature of the limitations; of the confers the evolutionary advantage of positioning adherents and forms, modes, and terms of imposition – all of these determination

116 117 L. T. Outlaw (Jr.) should be made democratically and, with the imposition of limits, strenuous efforts should be undertaken to avoid diminishing the di- versities that are so vital to the continued survival of our species, thus are so vital to our prospects for well-being.

–Lucius T. Outlaw (Jr.), Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, USA

Responses

118 Negotiating ›Difference‹ in Indic Thought: Reflections on Lucius Outlaw’s Essay

I Introduction

Lucius Outlaw seeks to avoid »universally and necessary true princi- ples« (Outlaw 2015a: 109) that would dictate what limitations, if any, should be imposed on democratic pluralism, proposing that the vital questions are instead how, to what extent, and by whom such limita- tions may have to be imposed democratically. He emphasises the need to develop forms of associated living within and across various types of political formations that would foster our species-diversity, more specifically by fostering the repertoires that cultures have developed for social existence. As he notes, these repertoires, which provide schemes of meaning to cultural formations, have often been ›sacra- lised‹ (ibid.: 112), through canopies of meanings which seek to pro- vide stability against the possibilities of cosmic and social chaos. These canopies have played an extremely crucial role throughout hu- man history both in institutionalizing the distribution of power with- in social groups, and in buttressing the competitive relations across these groups. Thus, the institutionalization of politicised identities in this manner both locates individuals in a historical narrative that is projected into the future in order to impose order across generational changes, and regiments power asymmetries by offering rationaliza- tions of relations of superordination and subordination. In the following, we will respond to Outlaw’s reflections on ›the challenging question‹ from a few specifically Indic perspectives with the following points in mind: (a) the interrogation of Eurocentric norms, (b) the necessity, possibility, or redundancy of developing me- taphysical groundings for forms of social existence, and (c) the value of diversity.

121 A. Barua Negotiating ›Difference‹ in Indic Thought

II Debating Eurocentricism appropriated in the second, now exist in an uneasy tension with va- lues, institutions, and norms more readily identifiable as belonging to The debate over Eurocentricism has by now taken several dialectical a European provenance. Thus we arrive at some of the perplexing turns. In the first stage, Eurocentricism was denounced as a form of dilemmas that confront contemporary India: what should be a femin- false ethnocentrism imported, often through colonial violence, by ist response if a political party on the right end of the spectrum intro- Europe onto its ›Others‹ who were constructed as ›depraved‹, ›barba- duces legislation ensuring a fixed number of seats for women in the ric‹, and in need of immediate succour by their imperial conquerors. houses of parliament, or a secular response if a political party com- Outlaw refers to this debate when he notes that abstract philosophical mitted to a multicultural ethos introduces a uniform civil code across theorizing has often sought to impose universal principles in favour religious boundaries, or a socialist response to the perpetuation of of an essential sameness that would displace »morally irrelevant« di- caste-based competitive acquisition of votes in national elections? versity (ibid.: 110). Indian scholars from various disciplines have The distribution of power and management of social resources both pointed out that the so-called neutral, objective, and universal values, within and across boundaries, which Outlaw notes at several places in beliefs and norms paraded by Europe as the only ›civilized‹ template his essay (ibid.: 112), are therefore complicated by the fact that indi- for the political was in fact a distinctively European version of order- viduals often dwell on several boundaries simultaneously: for in- ing political space. Further, on closer inspection, this version, namely, stance, a lower caste Indian woman employed in an industrial outlet early twentieth century liberal democracy, turned out to be based on suffers multiple violence from the axes of globalization, caste, and massive exclusions: women, people of colour, the colonial natives, and gender. others were systematically excluded from its vision. In the second If we view the debate over ›democratic pluralism‹ in contempor- stage, however, some scholars pointed out that the view that British ary India through the perspective of this discussion, we can therefore administrators had imposed Eurocentric norms onto colonial India see that the jury is still out on the question of whether beliefs, insti- ironically perpetuates the Orientalist stereotype of the ›passive na- tutions, and values of European origin should be dismantled entirely tive‹ and instead argued that we should see Indo-British colonial con- or whether their ambit needs to be progressively increased in the tacts as a series of protracted transactions in the course of which both direction of freedom and justice. The first response risks committing India and Britain underwent significant political, social, and cultural the genetic fallacy of believing that an argument is fallacious entirely shifts (Bayly 1996: 371–372). In particular, it has been pointed out because of its disreputable origins, and producing the nativist retreat that several figures from the lower castes in colonial India appro- to a pre-colonial Arcadia supposedly untouched by power asymme- priated certain key ›Eurocentric‹ elements and creatively adapted tries (Appiah 1991: 146). The second response would seek an alterna- them in their struggles against upper-caste oppression (Sarkar 2005: tive ›Europeanization‹ which is based not on the logic of assimilation, 292–293). That is, instead of a bi-polar contest between the monoliths which undergirds technocratic modernization, but on the values of of ›India‹ and ›Britain‹ over the distribution of resources and the man- freedom, justice, and well-being, which may resonate with indigen- agement of social diversity, we should speak of multi-layered contests ous dimensions of non-European cultures. While the second response that were triggered both within India and Britain, and across their provides more of promissory notes than realized facts, it is arguable boundaries of race, gender, and caste. Therefore, the current third that the modern interventionist Indian nation-state has, for complex stage of the dialectic is characterized in academic discourse not by historical reasons, adopted the wider European project, but now thor- explicit rejections of ›Eurocentric‹ values, but by fine-grained micro- oughly Indianized in some respects. That is, while caste and gender studies of everyday postcolonial life that interweaves elements of continue to mark, and in some ways fundamentally structure, the ›tradition‹ and ›modernity‹ in a work-in-progress that almost defies bases of Indian social existence, these categories now co-inhabit poli- neat characterizations or polarizations. That is, ›caste‹, ›religion‹, tical spaces that employ the vocabulary of human rights, civil liber- ›community‹, and other such social categories which were denounced ties, and social justice. Therefore, Indian political structures are char- as signifiers of Oriental depravity in the first turn, and selectively acterised by the as yet unrealised promises of an ›alternative

122 123 A. Barua Negotiating ›Difference‹ in Indic Thought modernity‹ directed at the progressive extension of the ambit of free- poses of this essay, we may characterise classical Indic thought as dom and justice and the wider maximization of well-being through shaped by a fundamental tension, polarity or even contradiction be- the erosion of institutions that legitimize discrimination. tween two dimensions: one rigidly hierarchical and the other impli- citly egalitarian. Both these dimensions are underpinned by specific metaphysical visions of the nature of the individual and the organiza- III The Politics of Difference tion of the social whole. The first can be found in the so-called legal treatises (Dharma-sastras), the most well-known of which is the On the basis of the historical discussion in the previous section we can Manu–Smriti (c. 200 CE), which lay down the hierarchical structures move to a relatively more abstract question that lies at the basis of of classical Hindu social existence. The groups at the apex of the social ›democratic pluralism‹. As Outlaw notes, the key challenge for demo- pyramid, the Brahmanas, are to be served by those at the bottom, the cratic patterns of existence is to affirm the »anthropological facticity« Shudras, and this is the social template, implemented across large (ibid: 114) of our species-diversity by forging inclusive patterns of parts of the subcontinent and legitimized through both textual sup- social living without invidious discrimination directed at particular port and notions of kingship, that Bhim Rao Ambedkar (1891–1956), differences. The fundamental question, of course, is whether diversity the Chairman of the Indian Constitution Drafting Committee, de- is intrinsically valuable, and if so, what kinds of diversity should be scribed as a system of graded inequality. The differentially-structured valued. In keeping with his intention to avoid invariant principles sets of duties and obligations, refracted through the prisms of gender with universal applicability, Outlaw does not recommend our current and caste, are claimed to lead to the functional stability of the ›organ- forms of ›democracy‹ as a timeless solution to the challenge of max- ic‹ social body. The second is present in the ever-recurring refrain of imizing well-being, noting that democratic forms of existence have the Upanishads and Advaita Vedantic thought that all empirical dis- been shaped by numerous historical contexts. Nevertheless, he con- tinctions which are not grounded in the ultimate reality of Brahman cludes that cooperative democratic life that is based on »equality of are ultimately illusory. Consequently, this metaphysics of identity regard and respect for persons« is the most fitting form of existence in has the sociological implication that all hierarchical categories are the current state of our evolutionary development (ibid.: 116). The merely conventional designations lacking any substantial reality. crucial argument is that such openness confers an evolutionary ad- The intriguing question, of course, is why Vedantically inflected vantage of enabling us to appropriating the various creative adapta- Hindu thought did not traditionally draw upon this implication to tions that human beings have gained in numerous cultural contexts, develop ›democratically‹ organised social worlds free from the discri- thereby enriching our stock of resources through which we can crea- minations of caste, ethnicity, and gender which it declares not to have tively contribute to the advance of human evolution in the direction any deep ontological reality. That is, while mainstream Advaita in of greater freedom and justice. Thus Outlaw’s conclusion: only such classical and medieval India viewed caste and gendered categories as ideas or practices which threaten the survival and evolution of the merely useful fictions to be discarded on the path towards liberation, core value of equality of regard and respect should be curbed in they did not develop programmatic structures of dismantling such cross-cultural contexts. categories in the here and now (Ram-Prasad 2000). To use Outlaw’s The key question is whether the value of ›respect for persons‹, terminology, much of classical Vedantic thought provided a sacred which is arguably of Graeco-Christian origins with subsequent liberal canopy over these social exclusions by consigning them to the ›con- Kantian developments, can be translated into Indic vocabulary, and ventional‹ level which had to be transcended through a liberative in- whether such respect requires robustly metaphysical foundations. sight into the ›ultimate‹ level, but had to be maintained for the sake of Some of the most intensely debated topics in cross-cultural political social cohesion until that insight was attained. theory revolve precisely around the question of whether it is possible Nevertheless, the presence of the second strain with the first to identify non-western precursors or intimations of the values asso- constituted an uneasy tension at the heart of Indic life-worlds: the ciated with western liberal democracy. To oversimplify for the pur- second which pointed to the ultimate reality as beyond empirical dis-

124 125 A. Barua Negotiating ›Difference‹ in Indic Thought tinctions and social exclusivities lingered on as an irritant in a body human beings. That is, the reason why I should develop other-regard- politic structured by the first. The tension was seized upon in at least ing behaviour is because the other is, in a deep metaphysical sense, two ways in ancient and pre-colonial India. The first was the emer- akin to my-self (Beckerlegge 2006). In particular, Radhakrishnan gence of movements such as Buddhism and Jainism (c. 500 BCE) sought to develop the nation-state’s foundational commitments to which rejected the incipient caste structures of early Vedic India, liberal democracy, social justice, universal education, secularism, and though the extent to which they succeeded in eradicating caste-based scientific modernization through the lens of this Vedantic metaphysic distinctions remains a matter of scholarly dispute. In the case of Bud- of the basic ontological affinity of all beings. Radhakrishnan’s neo- dhism particularly, the doctrine of not-self (anatman) was employed Advaita Vedanta was a highly creative formulation in which he inter- in the developments of the tradition such as the Mahayana to empha- wove the classical Upanishadic material with contemporary European sise the radical insubstantiality of all caste and gendered exclusivities, theories of creative evolution, axiology, and spiritual progress. These though again scholars disagree to what extent such categorisations metaphysical foundations provided the basis for Radhakrishnan’s un- were systematically undermined in pre-modern Buddhist cultures. derstanding of ›toleration‹: the religious traditions of the world are to The second set of movements that sought to destabilise, if not actually be ›tolerated‹ because they are, according to Radhakrishnan, diverse eliminate caste hierarchies, were the devotional bhakti movements, historically-shaped intimations of the truth of Advaita. In other centred around the personal Lord, which spoke of the equality of all words, underlying the cultic-ritual differences that characterise reli- individuals. However, the equality in question was predicated on the gions such as Judaism, Hinduism, and Christianity lies an ›essential transcendental relations of the spiritual community of devotees; these unity‹, for they are all, Radhakrishnan claimed, phenomenal expres- movements, with some major exceptions, usually lacked a program- sions of the transcendental ›experience‹ of Advaitic realization. While matic framework for systematically eradicating worldly discrimina- Ambedkar rejected the foundational presuppositions of Vedantic tion (Lorenzen 2004). Therefore the question whether contemporary thought during his conversion to Buddhism, his own appropriation liberal democratic notions of equality and social justice were present of classical Buddhism sought to provide distinctively Buddhist foun- in classical and medieval Indic thought can only receive a qualified dations for the Indian nation’s commitment to social democracy (Fitz- affirmative – the traditions contain themes which often were em- gerald 1999). The Buddhism that Ambedkar put forward to his fol- ployed in the direction of ›respect for persons‹, though these socially lowers was not any of the familiar historical varieties such as egalitarian strands were usually rewoven back into the tapestry of Theravada, Mahayana or Vajrayana, but was a new path, a Navayana caste hierarchy. (›Neo-Buddhism‹) whose goals are more specifically material than As this survey of some of the classical and medieval Indian at- ›spiritual‹ and emphasises the establishment of social equality rather tempts to subvert caste-based forms of oppression indicates, the tra- than the attainment of individual liberation. Ambedkar re-contextua- ditional Indian responses to the question ›which kinds of diversity lized certain key Buddhist notions: ›wisdom‹ is the ability to think should be accepted or valorized‹? have been articulated from within rationally without any demystification, ›compassion‹ becomes the a metaphysical framework that is distinct from Outlaw’s broadly evo- love of fellow-beings expressed through activities directed towards lutionary metaphysic. These attempts to locate social ethics on meta- social justice, and the monk is simultaneously the social worker and physical horizons have been carried out also by key figures of modern the seeker after personal freedom. Hinduism such as Swami Vivekananda (the founder of the Ramak- Our discussion highlights a crucial distinction between, on the rishna Mission; 1863–1902), S. Radhakrishnan (the second President one hand, some strands of classical and contemporary Indic engage- of independent India; 1888–1975) and others have sought to develop ment with social difference, and, on the other, western academic va- an ethical core out of the metaphysics of the Upanishads in the fol- lorisations of plurality. The former are underpinned by specific meta- lowing manner. Taking as their point of departure the Upanishadic physical bases, whether the atman-doctrine in Sanskrit-based dictum ›thou art that‹, they have argued that the justification for Hinduism or the anatman-doctrine in Buddhist thought, whereas ethical concern for the neighbour is the transcendental unity of all the latter either eschew any metaphysical claims or keep the meta-

126 127 A. Barua Negotiating ›Difference‹ in Indic Thought physical bases implicit in the background. The question whether the stant awareness of unchanging, featureless Brahman which is the su- theorization of themes such as the limits of the political, the patterns preme universal perceived everywhere, and specific particulars are in of distributive justice, and regard for the human person, needs to be fact abstracted out of this universal (Thrasher 1993). Difference (bhe- guided by metaphysical commitments has usually been answered in da), for the Advaitin, then, is a construct, unlike for the Buddhists the negative in western academic circles. As a broad generalization, who argue that it is a fundamental aspect of the universe. While thin- we may note that the term ›metaphysics‹ continues to be associated in kers such as Dharmakirti and Mandana did not directly apply these some academic sectors with the search for abstract essences that are metaphysical questions to political theory, we can see that they bear associated with the Eurocentric imperatives of imperial conquest. on contemporary debates over whether difference, and of which Without entering into this vexed question of whether political theory kinds, should be sustained within the horizons of liberal democracy. can proceed without metaphysical foundations, we note that it is pre- The Advaitin claim that ›difference‹ is ultimately an insubstantial cisely these ›abstract‹ notions of universal humanity that have been illusion would move political theory towards underlying commonal- appropriated by some leaders of the lower castes in colonial India for ities across cultural boundaries, while the postmodern-style Buddhist their liberative potential against the hegemonic structures of caste. affirmation of metaphysical ›difference‹ would be more hospitable to a ›multiculturalist‹ ethos of deep diversity. To restate the contrast in another way: the Advaitin view has a greater degree of elective affi- IV Is ›Difference‹ Dignified? nity with the standpoint of classical liberalism that citizens should be treated equally regardless of their differences, and the Buddhist view The question of universals raises a host of intensely debated issues in with that of multiculturalism that citizens should receive differential contemporary western political theory as well as in classical India. To treatment in virtue of their differences. begin with the former, modernity is often charged with being differ- Contemporary political theory, as these contrasts indicate, is ence-blind, and the emphasis falls squarely on difference, locality, structured by a fundamental tension over the status of ›difference‹: heterogeneity, multiplicity, fragmentation, deconstruction, and de- on the one hand, ›difference‹ is to be negated when it appears in forms centering. Several influential political theorists have criticised the of racial, ethnic, and gendered based forms of discrimination, but, on ›abstract neutrality‹ of the liberal nation-state and proposed group- the other hand, ›difference‹ is to be affirmed in contexts of identity- differentiated rights as the solution for overcoming historical forms based politics. Our discussion has shown that this tension appears in of oppression. However, it is precisely over the question of which the Indic traditions too, for the classical Advaitin view that ›differ- differences are to be sustained by the state that various perplexities ence‹ is only conventionally valid and transcendentally illusory has begin to emerge: a classic point of dispute is how the ›difference-sen- been appropriated by some Hindu thinkers in modern India to ground sitive‹ state should respond to groups which maintain, as part of their egalitarian social structures in a spiritual egalitarianism. We can distinctive ways of life, ethnic forms of discrimination. To move on to therefore see that the precise nature of the change instigated in Hindu the classical Indic perspectives, such debates over the significance of life-worlds by the British colonial intrusions needs to be carefully ›difference‹ often receive an explicit metaphysical grounding, as we qualified. On the one hand, one should not overemphasise the dis- should expect by now. We may summarise a complex conversation continuities between pre-colonial and postcolonial Hindu worlds to that spanned several centuries of classical Indic debate by pointing to suggest that ›European‹ notions of liberty, respect for persons, equal- the views of two opponents on the question of the metaphysical status ity and so on are alien grafts onto Hindu soil, for, as we have noted, of difference. Dharmakirti (c. 700 CE) represents the Buddhist per- the Kantian notion of regard for persons has indigenous analogues in spective when he claims that universals, while pragmatically conve- the forms of spiritual equality articulated in Hindu thought. On the nient, are not brute features of the universe but ultimately mental other hand, pre-colonial India, and for that matter early modern Eur- fictions (Dunne 2011: 105). Mandana Misra (c. 800 CE) represents ope, did not possess the modernist apparatus of addressing social in- the diametrically opposed Advaita Vedanta view that we have a con- justices at a systemic nation-wide level through forms of representa-

128 129 A. Barua Negotiating ›Difference‹ in Indic Thought tive democracy, a free press, distributive justice, and so on. The devel- V Conclusion opment of institutions grounded in liberal values was therefore in- deed a decisive transformation, altering the shape of Hindu social Outlaw provides an implicit evolutionary metaphysic for justifying spaces and forms of subjectivity inflected by caste, region, and gender. and promoting difference: those differences are to be valued which do The vital question, of course, again is whether all difference is not negate our evolutionarily acquired capabilities of cooperative ex- intrinsically dignified, or whether there are any moral limits to what istence, and which rather sustain the value of equality and regard for sorts of difference can be accepted. The predominant response to this persons across cross-cultural boundaries. The implicit argument runs question in western political theory suggests that any form of modus as follows: Because we are parts of a common evolutionary matrix, vivendi is acceptable, provided it allows for spaces where differences therefore we should contribute to its further development through can be celebrated. However, the momentous question returns: ›which cooperative democratic life that will further confer upon us evolu- differences?‹ tionary advantages. The classical Indic arguments for negotiating dif- Paradoxically, while lived Hinduism would seem to be encum- ference operate within distinctively Vedantic or Buddhist metaphysi- bered by a panoply of minutely detailed duties that are differentially cal frameworks, even if these horizons have in recent decades articulated across genders and castes, the theological foundations of incorporated evolutionary metaphors. However, both western politi- Advaita Vedantic Hinduism point to the trans-categorical ultimate cal affirmations of diversity, as in the case of Outlaw, and Indic en- reality beyond distinctions. A reformulation of Advaitic Hinduism, gagements with social inequality have to deal with certain ›dilemmas to be consistent with its textual sources, would have to argue that of difference‹ that we have outlined. We may need more refined the- social differences are dignified only insofar as one is able to use the oretical tools to explain why, say, cultural difference is valorised on differences to transcend them to the ineffable ultimate. While classi- the horizons of social democracy but not, say, racial, ethnic or caste cal Advaita and its modern articulations are only one strand of Ve- difference, and how, if the latter are indeed accepted within the con- dantic thought, and do not exhaust the whole of multi-layered Hindu text of affirmative action, such a politics of recognition furthers the spirituality, they have, for complex historical reasons we cannot re- liberal values of equality, freedom, and justice. We may then end our count in this essay, exerted a profound influence on the self-under- reflections on Outlaw’s essay with the observation that political en- standing of many Hindus themselves and the reception of ›Hinduism‹ gagement with ›deep diversity‹ may have to directly confront the in the west. We can now locate the difference between classical and metaphysical question of precisely what ›difference‹ is and why such modern forms of Advaitic Hinduism vis-à-vis the possibility of a ›de- ›difference‹ should be valued. mocratic pluralism‹ in this manner: while for the former the spiritual egalitarianism of all beings was to be realised through a contempla- –Ankur Barua, University of Cambridge, UK tive process that was usually kept distinct from direct engagement with social inequalities, the latter places the emphasis more on an active confrontation with these inequalities as a mediate process through which to attain spiritual perfection. In the end, then, this strand of an Advaitic Vedantic Hindu articulation of ›democratic plur- alism‹ is based on a ›transcendental‹ metaphysic shaped from Upa- nishadic sources while Outlaw’s respect for the other is grounded in an implicit ›naturalist‹ metaphysic of our common participation in an evolutionary narrative.

130 131 Not a Flower of Equal Petals, But One of Distorted Growth Not a Flower of Equal Petals, But One of ates Physical/Psychic Invasion)‹; and (3) ›Schemes of Meaning Cre- ate/Maintain Cross Generational Orderliness (Orderings) For Us.‹ Distorted Growth In other words, to understand the context of ›diversity‹ (and later ›pluralism‹) one must examine concrete instantiations of diversity. First, to experience ›diversity‹ of life means to be engaged in a life where one lacks any control over the processes of that life. The uni- verse, as seemingly immeasurably diverse to us, appears dynamic, and far exceeds our efforts to control any aspect of ›it‹ – including that which we perceive to be a universe »beyond planet earth« (ibid.: 111). I The Challenge We see things coming-to-be and passing-away, processes of emer- gence and decay, in our embodiment and in our environment, but Dr. Lucius Outlaw’s original question, »What (if any) limits ought they are beyond our control. We stand in awe and fear of these democratic pluralism impose on diversity within a cross-cultural con- things.1 text?« (Outlaw 2015a: 109) is translated into the question: How can Second, to experience ›diversity‹ of life means to recognize our- we best resolve vexing conditions that affect associated living (politi- selves as contingent being(s) with survival needs. Our embodiment is cal life) within, between, and among groupings of persons, who al- environmentally bounded by scarce resources and requires ventures ready operate within a variety of socio-political formations (organiza- of persistence. We must share competitive ventures to acquire food, tions, institutions, polities, from villages to nation-states), that are clothing, and shelter. In these shared competitive ventures, as contin- conditioned (internally and/or through external relations) by signifi- gent human beings, we reproduce, and thereby create, and perpetuate cant cultural (and other) diversities? (cf. ibid.) The answer supports a bio-cultural group-distinguishing differences that emerge (evolution) ›Principles of Ordering Theory‹ (rather than a ›universal‹ (logical) or (ibid.).2 ›right‹ (value) principle), that is to explain the ontology of interstices Third, to experience ›diversity‹ of life means we humans develop of social interaction. Outlaw proposes that a principle of diversity ›schemes of meaning‹ that devise life-stabilizing orderliness. These (rather than of sameness) operates to sustain the evolution of our include ideologies, narrations of origin and purpose, religion, theol- human species, and suggests that this principle enables an undermin- ogy, and philosophical systems. These ideologies define, guide, con- ing of any pluralist democracy that purports to be true universally, struct, and maintain a social-political organization (ordering) be- and thus sanctioned by authority, because grounded in an essential queathed to each new generation for survival.3 »Thus, the group sameness of persons. continues cross-generationally while individuals constituting each generation subsequently pass away« (ibid.: 112; my emphasis) as life ›goes on‹ reconstituting itself (ibid.).4 II Parsing Diversity and Pluralism 1 These experiences of living in a universe without control, mirrors articulations of Parsing ›Diversity‹ experiences when cultural upheaval, is caused, for example, by colonization. The sense of having no control over earthly or galactic movement, can be analogized to a sense of having no control over ideological beliefs of conquerors. In the first section of this paper Outlaw parses the question by chal- 2 I would add that in the same way as there are food competitions, for example, there lenging the meaning of »diversity« (ibid.: 111), and subsequently are job-role contingencies. »pluralism« (ibid.: 113). He offers three contextual analyses to under- 3 I would analogize that just as origin stories define boundaries, for example, to create stand diversity terms as used in this paper: (1) ›Humans Lack Control order schemes, the process of networking (akin to giving of military orders), that organizes opportunity by defining, guiding, and constructing orderliness (as a sys- Over Dynamism (Astronomical and Ideological Shifts)‹; (2) ›Compe- tem) of group interaction operates as an institutional scheme. titive Ventures Surround Embodiment Contingency (Scarcity Cre- 4 »Accordingly, the meaning-ordering agendas structuring and ordering lives and

132 133 A. Schulherr Waters Not a Flower of Equal Petals, But One of Distorted Growth

When the guiding ordering principles of one group come into and self-sustain via memberships of, and within, these politicized competition with others, such as in colonization (or when ordering identities. These identities (as protected by individuals following the principles of gatekeepers are challenged), strife, warfare, and genocide demanded ordering rules) sustain life among subgroups hierarchi- can follow. By example, consider the Seminole during and after the cally and futuristically. These schemes of ordering permit value judg- three major ›Seminole Wars‹ of the nineteenth century in Florida, ments consonant with those identities that arise from particular cir- USA (1816, 1835, and 1855).5 Political and economic social ordering cumstances, such as unequal power distribution (in accord with a removed us from homelands, stretched our people from Florida to schematic ordered identity), and roles of subordination. Such ›natur- Georgia, Oklahoma, Texas, and eventually Mexico. In Oklahoma, al‹ and ›man-made‹ institutional processes condition something, after the ›Trail of Tears‹ removals devastated our elders, who held namely the imposition of schematic order. They protect diverse and ›sacred survival knowledge,‹ the imposition of ›farming plots‹ yet similar forms of life, whereby survival is achieved in particular cir- further separated and divided our communities, forcing climate adap- cumstance (ibid.: 113). Thus diversity enhances evolutionary success tations such that the old ways of farming and community were no and persistence of politicized forms and subgroups with an unba- longer applicable. Origin stories became separated from their original lanced distribution of power (ibid.). geographical meanings, and forced ideologies of religion drove our These sites of opportunity create circumstances that exploit any own ›religious practices‹ underground. Such is human history (ibid.). particular group, when one group acts in accord with historical-iden- Thus the development of socially ordering principles leads to the de- tity agendas that assume a right to self-preservation, and in so doing, velopment of protective measures to maintain the status quo, that, act so as to subordinate ›other‹ subgroups. Thus bicultural (dual without institutional control mechanisms, leads to competition of re- meaning) diversity (dynamism, embodiment, and cross-generational sources, institutions, and ideologies. schemes of meaning) sustains evolutionary success and persistence, Institutions, fortified by conceptual schemes, justify, legitimate, and rewards subordination of others. Rewards are fruits of competi- and rationalize role playing of (ordered) power distributions. Insti- tion, ever encouraging the passing on of schemes to the next genera- tutions emerge within a group and function as principal resources. tion. Participation in the life-world of these institutions demands that in- These (competitively acquired) hierarchical orderings facilitate dividuals buttress and protect these life-ordering schemes. These in- exploitation and oppression, and are rationalized (and in tandem le- stitutions, as principal resources, distribute the social power of politi- gitimized) by those in power through philosophies that ›naturalize‹ cal life (of bio-cultural self-reproducing groups), stave off stagnation, religious and political divisions. Moreover, these politics require and demand cross-generational effort and cooperation to continue be- cause individuals become socio-politically ordered by super-ordina- forms of life are conditioned and conditional, are experimental, though, as is often the tion (giving orders to) and sub-ordination (execution of orders) that case, the agendas tend to be buttressed by ›canopies‹ of meta-meanings, sometimes made sacred, constructed and invoked to provide protection from competitive chal- facilitates oppression and exploitation (ibid.). lenges of other agendas and from various forms of entropy.« (ibid.) Does a unilateral institutional inter-generational distribution of 5 The Seminole were not unique in experiencing the imposition of ›meaning stories‹ power tend to exclude marginalized minorities regardless of where it by settler colonial people. The political ramifications of settler strategies to maintain is found? Outlaw seems to suggest as much. And I would agree. Such the status quo of the settler regime is articulated by Kyle Powys Whyte: »Or take groups like the Three Fires peoples, so Ojibwe, Odawa, and Potawatomi in Michigan developments should be relevant to readers situated everywhere, be- and Ontario – we are now divided up into hundreds of groups that the US and Cana- cause they articulate a common template that can be reproduced in- dian federal governments see as separate« (personal correspondence with Waters, July ternationally. One example of such an institution is the American 2014). Kyle’s comment shows the imposition of meaning making by the superordinate Philosophical Association (APA) in the United States of America group; in this case the ›fractionation‹ operating against unity, and imposing limits (USA).6 This association carries on generational political activities, upon what had been a successfully organized political group, thereby creating further strife and suffering toward purpose of colonial land acquisition, resource, and ideolo- gical control. 6 The following quotation can be found online. It articulates the origin, purpose, and

134 135 A. Schulherr Waters Not a Flower of Equal Petals, But One of Distorted Growth where the generations are sometimes blood-related, but more com- If this be so, we must ask, as philosophical truth-seekers, ›What monly ideologically group-related (frequently by colleges/universi- would the discipline of philosophy in America look like from a per- ties who declare themselves superior by use of a ›fixed‹ assessment spective of a non-power-conscripted diverse creativity?‹ of merit). Social order and control are maintained by superordinates over such things as religion or cultural politics of economy, and by practices of different superordinate and subordinate groups within Parsing ›Pluralism‹ the USA. These groups are already crystallized contextually in the embedding culture, as particular groups, usually identifying them- Outlaw claims »[…] diversity is definitive of our species-being, and selves as superior and ›others‹ inferior by nature. If this were not so, of the particular portion of the known universe that our species in- there would not have been a proliferation in the 1980’s of so many habits« (ibid.). Humans simply are ›diverse.‹ Astronomy and micro- ›minority committees‹ put together within the APA, so that minority biology tell us diversity is definitive of the changing nature of our groups might have voice within the organization. The ›carrots‹ of universe itself, and this is how humans experience our universe. behavior control, of course, are career-oriented privileges that can ›Pluralism‹ for Outlaw, refers to human difference among hu- make, or break, a minority career. mans and human groups that affirms the anthropological facticity of These hierarchical orderings, and their concomitant oppression our species diversity (ibid.). But what happens when diversity, rather and exploitation of ›not our own‹ are rationalized by ›naturalizing‹ than operating as a principle of equality favoring pluralism, operates, appeals that distinguish bio-social characteristics of oppressors and as Outlaw notes, as a conscript of injustice? We are told that oppressed. These characteristics are conscripted into institutions of »[…]. challenges to forging and sustaining forms of associated life religion, theology, philosophy, socio-anthropology and politics, inclusive of acknowledged diversities […] forms that are ordered to thereby legitimizing the politicized ordering (and creating a ›glass maximize the possibilities of justice […] for all without invidious ceiling‹ within the organization). Thus »[d]iversity becomes a con- discrimination against particular differences […]« (ibid.; my empha- script [and handmaiden] of injustice […]« (ibid.: 114; my emphasis).7 sis), persistently fail. Outlaw holds that this system of pluralism fails to learn how to resolve competitive conflicts that block intra- and inter-group survival. As such, this system fails to enhance survival institutional structure of the APA (but not its funding): »The American Philosophical Association was founded in 1900 to promote the exchange of ideas among philoso- and well-being for more than a few who favor themselves. Such a phers, to encourage creative and scholarly activity in philosophy, to facilitate the pro- pluralism enhances only for those it regards as ›its own.‹ This occurs fessional work and teaching of philosophers, and to represent philosophy as a disci- throughout successive generations. But does Outlaw hold that this is pline. Having grown from a few hundred members to over 10,000, the American a necessary condition inherent to pluralism itself? It is not clear.8 Philosophical Association is one of the largest philosophical societies in the world These (pluralist) forms have fallen upon a human failure (by and the only philosophical society in the United States not devoted to a particular field, school, or philosophical approach. The APA’s three divisions, the Central, East- individuals and groups) to learn conflict resolution that favors any ern, and Pacific, founded in 1900, 1901, and 1924, respectively, conduct annual meet- but the perpetrators of injustice – again, they operate only on behalf ings at which philosophers present research and exchange ideas. Since 1927, the American Philosophical Association has functioned under a constitution providing for a national board of officers. The APA’s partner organizations include the American 8 What role individuals play in institutional actions of discrimination is not clear Association of University Professors, the American Council of Learned Societies, the here. But it is noted that as of this date only three American Indians have positions International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP), the American Association within a tenure track system in philosophy: Shay Welch, Cherokee, Spelman College, for the Advancement of Science, and the National Humanities Alliance. Since 1975, Georgia; Thomas Norton Smith, Shawnee, Kent State, Stark Campus; and Kyle Powys the national office of the American Philosophical Association has been located at the Whyte, Potawatomie, Michigan State, East Lansing. Unlike Kyle, neither Shay nor University of Delaware – an arrangement made possible through the generosity of the Thomas are at institutions granting a Ph.D. degree in philosophy. Of the remaining University of Delaware« (http://www.apaonline.org/?page=history; last accessed on number of American Indians with a Ph.D. in philosophy (nineteen), none have been 25 August 2014). hired in philosophy departments. Because this committee has been in existence since 7 And I would add, for example knowingly, by some, within our own APA. 2000, that is little progress in fourteen years.

136 137 A. Schulherr Waters Not a Flower of Equal Petals, But One of Distorted Growth of »their own« (ibid.). Thus when challenged, the superordinates Waters (J. D. [Law], and Ph. D.[Philosophy], May 1992), Seminole, of cause »[…] murderous determinations of the few within polities in Florida and Oklahoma, and Viola Cordova (Ph. D. [Philosophy], May which they exert dominance […]« (ibid.; my emphasis). In short, 1992), Apache, of New Mexico (deceased), both entered the academic they function to preserve their position of dominance over others. job market in 1992; and several American Indian professional philo- This is done through a socially organized (sometimes violently sophers came upon the scene shortly thereafter. Although some of us backed by militarization, at other times backed by economic depriva- are known outside our profession for numerous ›classic‹ philosophical tion) propaganda of ideological predominance, and heredity regimes. publications, we hold only one position in a philosophy department For Outlaw this naturalized ideology of bio-social Darwinian super- where a terminal degree (doctorate) is granted: (Kyle Powys Whyte, iority is neither value nor knowledge neutral. Rather, it is a competi- citizen, Potawatomie Nation, Shawnee, Oklahoma, Assistant Profes- tive persistence of injustice over the subordinated. One smells the sor, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan).10 articulation of philosophical roots of totalitarianism and authoritar- ianism in Outlaw’s painted scenario. Does Outlaw mean to say this persistent failure and conscription of injustice is a necessary condition No American Indians are on any decision-making bodies of the APA, of pluralism? other than our own American Indian (now ›Indigenous‹) subordinate Outlaw holds that because power in such a system is distributed committee (glass ceiling).11 via generation and heredity, there is not an ignorance of the injustice (ibid.: 114). Because knowledge of the ›passing of the power and posi- To continue then, Outlaw holds strong to his position, that when the tion‹ is recognized and demanded by those in power, no innocent ›not- dominated challenge the (status quo) order, conflicts are resolved by knowing‹ occurs. Indeed motive continues to be present. And if the dominators who press to protect »their own« (ibid.). This is accom- American institutions have an air of totalitarianism and authoritar- plished with propaganda of ideological predominance of biological suc- ianism, this might explain some contemporary exclusionism against cession. »In these instances, the persistence of injustice is not a conse- US-born American Indians in our own philosophical profession. The quence of ignorance […]« (ibid.). Indeed the opposite: existence- philosophical profession announces, and practices, in much of its enhancing learning institutions favor the dominators (ibid.). In the work, an hegemony of racism, sexism, classism, and unreasoned se- USA dominators create biological family succession, because one is lective privileging of some (›their own‹), that militates against the ›born into‹ class privilege enabling the having of funds or influence, presence of American Indian philosophers (and others) in terms of requisite to receive an education (just as other class privileges). key academic positions of power and authority9. This favoring of ›their own‹ fails to engender the prospects of American Indians have received Ph.D.’s in philosophy. Anne well-being for all. The super-ordinates’ desire to continue privilege for ›their own‹ under the guise of democracy can press down upon 9 Although Blacks have fared much better than American Indians in professional any meaningful diversity. Thus Outlaw claims institutional policies philosophy (and I stand as a prime example, as told to me by Vine Deloria many years devalue and deny diversity of contribution, to both prevailing and ago), racism against Blacks in philosophy, given the constituency of the African Amer- future forms of life and polities, including forms of evolutionary suc- ican population, continues as a stronghold. As recently as 2011, in the American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and the Black Experience Leo- nard Harris points out that »There are two African American distinguished philoso- 10 Given this example of historical discrimination against American Indians in philo- phy professors (named, endowed) in Pennsylvania (Lewis Gordon, Anita Allen) and sophy, perhaps it is time for an apology, and for the APA to embrace, rectify, and New Jersey (Howard McGary, Anthony Appiah); one in New York (Michele Moody- repatriate our name as it was originally known, the Committee on American Indians Adams) and Illinois (Charles Mills); two in southern states (Bernard Boxill, North in Philosophy accompanied by its original mandate, and, to make space for our senior Carolina; Bill Lawson, Tennessee); and none west of the Mississippi. The most well- distinguished philosophers, in decision-making bodies of the ›association,‹ such places known and influential African American philosophers, Angela Davis and Cornel having been historically denied when the chair of the committee requested them over West, do not hold positions housed in a department of philosophy. All appointments ten years ago. except for Boxill’s were made in the last twenty years (Harris 2011: 3).« 11 Formally, this is called the Committee on the Status of Indigenous Philosophers.

138 139 A. Schulherr Waters Not a Flower of Equal Petals, But One of Distorted Growth cess of survival of our species (ibid.: 115). They deny creative resolu- ing in the context of a purported American, pluralist, and democratic tion, the creative beauty of living well, and thereby deny the creative institution, that exclusion of human creativity has been denied to prolonging of our species (ibid.). In this way the knowledge and life American Indians, at least, and others as well. And with that denial, spans of individuals are »as limited,« just as, the »[…] ineradicable according to Outlaw, a denial of survival education, and advancement radical contingency and uncertainty that define our existence« (ibid.; of our human species (in the instant case study, of American Indians) my emphasis). is pursued. Thus, enhancing the learning of ›how to survive/exist well‹ for In the case of the APA, American Indians are denied the oppor- some can endanger the prospects of the well-being of the entire hu- tunity of educational survival and advancement in the philosophical man species as a whole, and thereby devalue potential contributions profession, and of making contributions toward advancement of spe- to human polities and species evolutionary survival. In consonance cies survival. In essence, what appears to be a pluralist democracy, with our APA example, benefitting the status quo, to the exclusion operates as an oligarchy, where people are privilege-distinguished ac- of a subordinated distinct and different minority, threatens the entire cording to race, sex, wealth, family ties, corporate, religious, or mili- human species as a whole, devaluing potential contributions to hu- tary status. And each privileged group supports the others in order to man polities and species evolutionary survival. sanction and continue the domination. Recall that pluralism refers to human difference, and affirms the This organization thus knowingly operates as a death knell to facticity of species diversities (ibid.: 114). Pluralism can thus fail to the flourishing of democratic diversity, to creativity, and to American use the bouquet of species-diversity talents of humans to resolve Indian, at least, if not human species, survival. Operating as a plural- challenges of living well and prolonging our species survival (ibid.: ist democracy the APA can disrespect significant differences of mino- 117). And when it fails under a democracy intended for equality of rities, and those born into less privilege. Most important, it is antag- respect for all, it cuts off survival-knowledge held by differing groups. onistic and repugnant to our calling as philosophers, as seekers of Enhancing the learning of some over others simply fails our creative truth. survival potential. And yet refer back to footnote 6 herein, to recall the purpose of the APA, namely to facilitate (control?) teaching and represent (define?) the discipline, to promote the exchange of ideas III Diversity, Democracy, Limitations, and Their Own: (their own) and encourage creative activity. or Threat Determination and Management Again, as a particular example of instantiation of these principles one need look no further than home, the APA, as discussed herein. As Equality of Respect and Regard a philosophical institution in America, it operates as a tool of social engineering to maintain the status quo. But does it hold back the We saw earlier that Outlaw raised the question: Under what circum- creative potential of individuals not maintaining the status quo dog- stances might limiting the survival education of one or more groups ma? In essence this appears to be what happens. Whereas committees be justified and imposed democratically? Recall that democracy in make decisions (operating as a quasi-senate), and a Board of Officers Outlaw’s theory means an open exchange of human ideas that creates interprets and approves those decisions (operating as a quasi-judi- a democratic life of equality of respect for persons and groups of per- ciary), standards of ›their own‹ (forefathers) are perpetuated (e.g. sons, polities, and groups of polities, across localities, on our shared Harvard and others). Thus dominating institutional schemes are put and precarious planet. And that such ideas are positively and nega- in place and maintained. They are then acted upon by the Executive tively affected by shared conditions that encompass our planet (ibid.: Director, who carries out policies and executes decisions of the Offi- 117). Further, Outlaw holds that practiced commitment to an equal- cers. If Outlaw is right, such duties conveniently and knowingly ex- ity of regard and respect, at the core of conceptions of democracy, clude some members from full participation in the philosophical com- opens the possibility for societal contribution (after individuals with- munity. Thus although lip service is usually paid to the APA operat- draw its education). The sine qua non of democratic purpose is for

140 141 A. Schulherr Waters Not a Flower of Equal Petals, But One of Distorted Growth persons to make beneficial societal contributions (ibid.: 117), just as similar reasons: moral decisions, even when decisions of a govern- the core of species survival is diversity. Democracy is most fitting for ment, ought not to be made according to numbers, or power, but diversity when it permits renovation of itself, when societal contribu- according to value, according to principles held. For it is principles tions to its renovations create struggles toward freedom and justice held, or moral character, that makes good democratic decisions. There (ibid.). may be other good reasons to limit diversity, to eliminate polio, for If Outlaw is right, democratically structured relations may be instance, or miseducation, but these are value decisions, not decisions the best way for our species to take advantage of species-diversity to made merely by numbers or power. enhance species survival, because democracies can be reconstructed according to social need in pursuit of freedom and justice (ibid.). And yet, this is only possible if democracies limit institutional practices to Historical Democracy those that enact ›equal respect and regard.‹ And in this context, if the goal is equal respect and regard for freedom, diversities should be The only historical democracies of which I am aware that incorporate limited only for species survival reasons (benefit of all). moral value into organizational schemes of government are the Even with equal participation, democracy itself seems to require American Indian Confederacies, and the government similarly mod- rights of minorities be protected, from inequalities that arise, as it is eled after them, American democracy12. The problem with American being renovated. Human limitations on genetics, for example, could democracy is that the things valued, called ›rights‹ were applicable to be imposed, only if they enhance our species survival and portray only a few, namely male property owners of age. Hence although equality of regard and respect for persons. For example in genetic values of the Declaration of Independence were, by lip service, incor- engineering, what ought to matter in limiting any genetics is that porated into the US Constitution, persons were not ›equally regarded we have values of health and survival, similar moral values. Behind decisions related to diversity should be common value of equal re- 12 Some American Indian confederacies lay out a constitutional framework of purpose spect and regard. And behind equal respect and regard ought to be (leadership from the ground up closely tied to values) and responsibilities (method of character value. This was the point of Martin Luther King’s request in impeachment if duties not performed) of the united confederacy members. Some say the Civil Rights Movement in the USA, that our children be valued these types of confederate-governing relations may be the longest operating democ- racies in the world. These systems are believed to be a model for the American Con- ›not by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character‹ stitution. (See Pratt 2002.) What makes these confederacies stand out as unique (King’s speech given at the Lincoln Memorial during the US Civil among other legal systems around the world is the blending of law alongside values. Rights ›Poor People’s‹ March, Washington, DC, May, 1967). For lim- Core values are said to be peace, power, and righteousness; law, society, and nature are iting diversity decisions are value laden. We would not want a major- equal partners. Each nation maintained its own council, with chiefs chosen by clan ity in a democracy of equality to give reason to eliminate genetics of mothers, whose responsibility was to see that moral obligations are lived. It is said that around 1730 certain confederacies refused to cement a union with colonists be- some undesirable minority group, simply because that group was an cause they had no centralized government. Benjamin Franklin, in Europe, owned a inconvenient minority voice in decision making, while the democracy printing company, and he is said to have received treaty council proceedings, and the was undergoing renovation. Equally we would not want reason given idea of a society free of oppression and definition of class so intrigued him he took the simply because that group was a minority group. Indeed Outlaw tells position of Indian Commissioner for Pennsylvania. In 1754 the Albany Congress, with members from each colony, discussed a plan of union, to handle logistics of trade, us, these decisions ought to be limited. alliances, etc. with, e.g., the Haudenosaunee, and to ally against the French. Franklin What Outlaw seems to be saying here is that we ought to use drew up a plan, with a president-general to be appointed by the Crown. Colonies were health, or diversity for survival, as a moral compass, that is, the value not ready for unification, however, and the Crown disapproved of such freedom. By of equality of respect and regard must be implemented in renovating 1776 it was inevitable that the colonies would be united, and Franklin chose Thomas a democracy. Equality of regard and respect is about having an equal, Jefferson to draft the Declaration of Independence, with himself editing it. Thus America claimed its independence at least partly through the admiration and respect moral weight in decision making, not merely numbers, or power. A of the American Indian confederacies’ forms of government, way of life, ways of decision of a few, or of those in power, may be equally undesirable for horticulture, striving for freedom, and peace.

142 143 A. Schulherr Waters Not a Flower of Equal Petals, But One of Distorted Growth with respect.‹ Hence, renovations continue endlessly to gain freedoms subordinates, decisions being made by only a few. Some believe this that should have been granted initially. description includes the USA. I think Outlaw is correct to say that these diversities condition Diversities are the voice of human success and survival. »They our species, merely as individuals and polities, neither in singularity condition our species« (ibid.: 116; my emphasis). Because required for nor unanimity. We are not conditioned as individuals, but as groups human species survival, they should not be limited. Diversities en- of individuals; and history shows there is always some preclusion of hance our freedom to survive, and demand, for Outlaw, a justice of unanimity of conditioning: thus the opening for diversity required in equality and respect for diversities of all persons. creativity. One thing I do not understand is Outlaw’s claim that the sine qua non of ›historical democracy‹ holds an equality of regard and Outlaw’s Notions About ›Democracy‹ respect for persons. This is simply wrong. Although not clear ›whose history‹ Outlaw refers to, if he means to be talking about what is Return to the central question Outlaw raises, »What (if any) limits commonly taught to be ›Western Thought,‹ then from the perspec- ought democratic pluralism impose on diversity within a cross-cul- tive of the Western canon of political theory, I don’t see much equal- tural context?« (ibid.: 109) Or again, »[…] if, in short, democratically ity in Western Thought, at least if we are talking about a lived fair- structured relations are the means by which to best take advantage of ness respecting different abilities and talents of the populace. Reality our species-diversity, which is the case I offer for consideration, what seems very different from what Outlaw suggests. There are many might occasion the need to impose limits on diversity in cross-cultur- types of democracies, holding different ideas about what ›equality‹ al contexts?« (ibid.: 117). Outlaw concludes that it is only in those means. Equality in democracy might mean each person counts for instances when »[…] some idea, creation, prospective intervention one (or in some cases, each group counts for one), toward effect of fair into human affairs would, if put into effect, threaten survival and representation or equal influence. In the USA where elections can be continuing evolution in violation of the core value of equality of re- ›bought,‹ this is a different type democracy. So lofty goals not always gard and respect for others« (ibid.). Thus we have a principle of jus- achieved, hence renovations. tice articulated. But what role would ›democratically structured rela- Historically, most people across the globe did not have voting tions‹ play in this principle of justice? What Outlaw means by rights. Decisions were made by those having social and economic pri- ›democratically structured relations‹ remains unclear. More impor- vilege. In Athens, for instance, only about twenty per cent, the sons of tantly, is it fair to be equally regarded when species survival is at Athenian fathers, could vote. They spent days discussing politics, issue, and the superordinated are free to act as an oligarchy in all being educated how to vote for the status quo, for their own. The other ways? other eighty per cent of the populace had to keep busy working to Are »democratically structured relations […] the means by support the polis. Merchants and slaves (and their progeny) were which to best take advantage of our species diversity […]« (ibid.) as fodder for the military, and were conscripted to do the physical work Outlaw urges? And if so, is it a good idea to not limit decisions about of the polis. One was born into position. Those privileged by class anything, unless species survival is at issue? An important question voted by that position of birthright. The majority had no say in the Outlaw does not answer is what decisions should be limited decisions. goings on of the polis. In Athens, anyone who challenged the status Decisions affecting minority groups’ daily living, perhaps, might be quo, or spoke against the state could minimally be ostracized by those an answer. But Outlaw does not go there. in power for ten years.13 History tells us that most ›democracies‹ were As well, what type of relations does Outlaw mean to say are and are still forms of oligarchies, superordinates pressing down upon democratically structured relations? American Indians, as far as I know, are the originators of ›democratically structured institutions‹ in the Americas: democratically structured because they join together 13 See Cartledge (2006). law and values of individuals in nations, as well as law and the value

144 145 A. Schulherr Waters Not a Flower of Equal Petals, But One of Distorted Growth of individuals as nations. This is true in the formation and institution isdiction (an Eastern, Midwest, and Pacific Division). American In- of the American Indian confederacies, upon which some say the US dians south of the USA border at that time identified with the Hispa- system of government was grounded, through the work of Thomas nic/Latino Committee. Those north of the USA border were consid- Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin.14 Materials describing this demo- ered First Nations (with a few exceptions). The latter could either cratic confederacy were circulated in Europe, and recirculated in the have had their own committee within the APA, or have had a com- forming states on this continent, long prior to the construction of the mittee within the Canadian Philosophical Association. At any rate, federal government here in the USA (see footnote 12 herein). Canadian First Nations were not present for the origination of the What type of situation would threaten the survival of evolution American Indian committee. Members of these groups were also in violation of these principles of equality of regard and respect for members of nations extending boundaries beyond the USA, but the others, or, in violation of justice? One answer might be when orga- APA itself was concerned with American-born philosophers discrimi- nized practices have been or are being pursued by management in a nated against, and philosophies affecting the USA, and such was its non-democratic way, thus limiting diversity vital to the survival of jurisdiction with the three named Divisions. our species, and hence our species prospects for well-being. Two pro- The Committee on American Indians in Philosophy originated blems here: Outlaw does not speak to the benefits of limiting diver- because there existed extreme discrimination within the profession sity for good reasons, like, genetic engineering, where we can limit that denied equality of regard and respect for American Indians in debilitating disease. And, he still circles around the question of ›de- philosophy. This denial of equality denied freedom of thought and mocracy.‹ practice in our profession. The committee, with the assistance of the In a democratic process, which Outlaw seems to want to assume APA, was charged to identify and bring to the attention of the APA in his theory, justice of an equality of regard and respect for others institution, discrimination against American Indians in the USA. Pi- requires that actions of management be made with clarity of trans- votal to this task was to identify why American Indians had no parti- parency. Is this possible with our own example organization, the cipation in the discipline. If any individual American Indians had at- APA? Can we use this organization as an example to examine ›diver- tempted to participate, but were denied full participation, including sity,‹ ›pluralism,‹ ›democracy,‹ and ›limitations‹? Thus far it seems to participation on decision-making bodies (by whatever means, have worked. But what can it tell us about democracy and transpar- whether by current members, students or faculty), and were being ency, if anything? Let’s go back to our example, or case study. confronted with discrimination, in access and success of education, research, jobs, publications, or participation in the APA itself, it was to be brought to the attention of the APA decision-making bodies for Committee on the Status of American Indians in Philosophy rectification. (This was frequently done, but there was no rectifica- tion.) In 2009 the Committee on the Status of American Indians in Philo- Drafting work creating this committee actually began around sophy, via a name change approved by the Executive Board, became 1996 by myself, and finalized in committee recognition and mandate the Committee on the Status of Indigenous Philosophers. I originated by the APA sometime around 2000. This committee addressed issues the Committee on American Indians in Philosophy toward the pur- and philosophical work of professional American Indians in philoso- pose of acting upon and preventing discrimination against American phy. Another institution was created that sponsored this committee, Indians holding professional degrees in the field of philosophy. The named the American Indian Philosophy Association. Together these naming of the committee, in the context of the APA, originally de- two groups initiated, as sanctioned by the APA, a Newsletter on noted American Indians in the USA, as this association had US jur- American Indians in Philosophy, with the inaugural edition in the fall of 2001. (I also made reports to the Executive Committee.) From Fall 2001 through Spring 2005, all articles and book reviews published 14 See Holmes Pearson (n. d.).

146 147 A. Schulherr Waters Not a Flower of Equal Petals, But One of Distorted Growth were the work of, or about the work of, American Indians in profes- and return to the APA example. Some people desire ›inclusion‹ of sional philosophy, and were refereed.15 everyone for ›equal opportunity.‹ Yet sometimes, opening up a min- Both, the chair of the committee (myself) and the name of the ority group for greater inclusion, systematically marginalizes and committee’s newsletter, changed in 2005. Subsequently, the commit- thus penalizes a group already undergoing discrimination within a tee’s name and that of the newsletter changed to the Committee on larger association (which is why a ›minority‹ committee may have the Status of Indigenous Philosophers and to the Newsletter on In- been created in the first place). For example, when the APA renamed digenous Philosophy respectively. This formal name change was an- the Committee on the Status of American Indians in Philosophy, (of nounced in the spring of 2011, and affected the lives and dynamics of the Americas, and indigenous to the Americas) to Committee on the American Indians working in the discipline of philosophy. No longer Status of Indigenous Philosophers, and thus expanded the commit- about American Indians in the USA, the newly published editions of tee’s mission (apparently to cover a global population of ›indigenous the newsletter (under a new indigenous Canadian editor) and a new philosophers‹), it was no longer protecting the individuals and groups chair of the committee (having a degree from a Canadian educational it was created to protect. Thus (liberal pluralist) action intended for institution) opened dialogue to Native Canadian issues. Some of these good ends, inclusion for protection, operated to create more harm to issues were also relevant to American Indians (as our lands and gov- individuals and groups of American Indians, who were supposed to be ernments stretched across US borders), but they were contextualized protected from this very discrimination. American Indians were the and problematized in the context of a Canadian parliamentary gov- individuals (and groups) originally intended to be protected against ernment. This created problematics. One of our authors of Canadian discrimination by the APA (and in the profession). Yet the end result philosophical thought at the time (Dale Turner, Anishnabai), who had of the ›name change‹ is that nobody knows who or what these ›indi- been hired in 1997 to teach Native American Studies at Dartmouth, genous‹ persons are, either in social construct or reality, either indivi- was deeply committed to sovereign nations’ relations. Serious ques- dually, or as a group. Thus under the guise of ›their own ignorance‹ tions were raised about his Canadian politics, and the hiring of a Ca- the APA stretched out the original group, thus failing to protect us, nadian philosopher at a US academic institution (as if we did not have American Indians (including Alaskan Natives and Native Hawaiians), US-born Ph.D. American Indian philosophers available to be hired.) and made it unwieldy and confused toward purpose. How can an in- Coming from a parliamentary Canadian government (and degreed at dividual or group prevent discrimination against individuals or a McGill University in Canada), he had prescriptive conservative ideas group, if one does not know who or what they are, or to whom the about how indigenous people ought to best operate within represen- name refers? Gathering such unarticulated ideas together, and forcing tative ideologies of liberalism, pluralism, and democracy.16 (More- a small committee to articulate these ideas of identity, was wrong. over, further philosophical dissonance ensued behind the ›veiled cur- Further, it discriminated against American Indians, froze action, and tain‹ due to an already existing cognitive dissonance between created inability to perform regular committee functions to protect Canadian and US indigenous persons, as well as to conflicting proble- American Indian philosophers. matics of conservatism and liberalism.) This burden, then, of placing the obligation to articulate this in- Pluralism seems to require a principle of inclusion, or ›democ- dividual and group identity should not been placed upon the racy of participation.‹ Put questions of democracy aside for a moment, shoulders of this original committee. In doing so, the APA violated its own mandate, to not discriminate against a small minority group, 15 There was an exception to this policy. Editors were »struck by the similarity of who, although small, can do outstanding philosophy (as evidenced Chinese thought with what American Indian philosophers were talking about regard- herein and elsewhere). Hence pluralism can be plagued by its own ing native languages embracing an animism and a crossing-over of conceptual cate- inability to place limits upon inclusion. And while ›competitive con- gories […], transformation from matriarchal (lineal) to patriarchal (lineal) so- flicts‹ ensued within the Indigenous Committee and the APA, other ciety […],« a non-hierarchic, dynamic, interchanging, and non-teleological ontology (Waters 2003: 1). See Yunxiang Liang (2003). committees and individuals of the APA’s ›their own‹ advanced, with 16 Turner (2007). careers, positions, funding, and respect. These are facts of the past ten

148 149 A. Schulherr Waters Not a Flower of Equal Petals, But One of Distorted Growth years, as can be well documented in the APA records of comparative alleging liberalism and opportunity? How could the APA have al- progress of each of these committees and individuals. Things of ›per- lowed such an institutional structure to appear on the scene, particu- sonhood‹ and ›collegial respect‹ were denied American Indian philo- larly an ›indigenous‹ committee to usurp the American Indian com- sophers through this discriminatory action, with the Committee on mittee? Inclusiveness in the Profession involved, and as permitted by the APA These questions raise an important consideration. Are liberal- Executive Board of Officers. And the APA Legal Committee set up to ism, pluralism, and democracy enough to protect minority interests? attend to discrimination against philosophers, stood by, doing noth- Are there not some limits to pluralism? Outlaw provides the answer ing, as though we did not exist. »If limits need to be imposed, the assessment of the need; the specifi- But what can be made of this? Does Outlaw’s principled under- cation of the nature of the limitations; of the forms, modes, and terms standing of limitations upon diversity enable us to make sense of of imposition – all of these determinations should be made democra- what happened? Would it have changed the situation if his principle tically and, with the imposition of limits, strenuous efforts should be had been employed? Would it have maintained more freedom for undertaken to avoid diminishing the diversities that are so vital to American Indians to practice our professional trade, as the original the continued survival of our species, thus are so vital to our pro- committee was set up to ensure? Or that made a difference that mat- spects for well-being.« (ibid.: 117–118; my emphasis) tered vis-à-vis Outlaw’s principle of justice: equal regard and respect And I would add here, to avoid a Hobbesian approach to philoso- for all? phical terrain within institutions such as the APA, protecting of min- ority diversity must be built into institutions, and cannot be left to ›interpretations‹ of a quasi-judicial branch, in this instance, the APA Limitations and Values Executive Board (or its Committee on Inclusiveness in the Profes- sion). Elsewise, limitations may be a facade or portend to diversity. If we take Outlaw’s thesis seriously, at least some folks would agree Yet the harm has been done. We know that protecting the rights of that diversities are the voice of human success and survival. »They American Indians does contribute to our species survival. A core va- condition our species« (ibid.: 116; my emphasis). Because diversity is lue of equality of regard and respect for others can be crystallized if required for human species survival, we should be careful that it not participation is full. This can still be done by the Executive Board. It be limited. A strong preference for the values of liberalism is en- might have been done if there had been proper American Indian in- graved in our US Constitution and in the Lockean American mind. stitutional representation. Yet there was not, over the objections, in From this vantage point we entertain our notions of individual free- 2005, of the chair of the Committee on American Indians in Philoso- doms within a democracy, and in the USA we do not have a parlia- phy, and the President of the American Indian Philosophy Associa- mentary type of government. It is one at least partly grounded in, and tion. A glass wall was presented to us, that at that time could not be situated in, the context of the American Indian Confederacies. As broken by us. such it is one that employs both value (individual rights) and struc- I finish this response by noting that as of the writing of this ture (organizational form) as one unity (the Declaration of Indepen- paper, since the change of the Committee on American Indians in dence, and Bill of Rights, alongside the US Constitution.) But some- Philosophy to the Committee on Indigenous Philosophy, as approved times, diversity, when accompanied with ignorance of the concrete by the Executive Board, we have been able to achieve placing only one differences between American Indians and other indigenous peoples, American Indian in an academic institution that grants a Ph.D. in or activity behind the ›curtain‹ can substantially and radically change, philosophy,17 and leaving many other US-born American Indians and up-end the world as we know it. along the roadside. Inclusion, for us, has meant exclusion. We are still What happened in the APA with regard to American Indians is still having reverberations among our nations and among our scho- 17 As of the writing of this paper, Kyle Whyte, Citizen Potawatomie Nation, Shawnee, lars. How could such a thing happen, people ask, in an association Oklahoma, Assistant Professor, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, is

150 151 A. Schulherr Waters looking at a glass ceiling. Diversity has conscripted injustice. I hold Whose Equality? Response to Lucius Outlaw the APA accountable for this disaster. There is no innocent not-know- ing. I thank Lou Outlaw for leading the way to opening our under- standing of the dynamics of how these things happen in America, in a land of diversity, liberalism, and democracy. For although we know that these types of limitations on diversity are not justified, and should not happen, they do occur ›behind the curtain,‹ as well as in open view, as proceedings are public. I and others live within the confines of the APA exclusion by the Executive Board for ten years. Under the guise of inclusion, we were Lucius T. Outlaw (Jr.) takes up the challenging task of reflecting on excluded. Kyle Powys Whyte now asks me if we can break the glass potential impositions on diversity in democratic societies. The ques- ceiling. I ponder, quietly at first, and then I answer yes, but I do not tion of whether or not to impose democratically sanctioned limita- know when. In the context of threat management, I ask: Is it time to tions on diversity in cross-cultural contexts is both ambiguous and repatriate our name to our committee? Or to clarify our mission? complex. As the author points out, it is ambiguous because notions And remove the glass ceiling to permit entry to management posi- of democracy, pluralism, and cross-cultural diversity are rather pro- tions? Is it time to grant reparations for discriminatory harm done? It blematic umbrella concepts. These concepts refer to a wide range of is past time for the APA to realize we are part of their own, in the empirical phenomena such as the cohabitation of members of differ- spirit of equal respect and regard for all. When management is threa- ent linguistic, ethnic, or religious backgrounds within the same poli- tened, it is best to look to association values. Developments in the tical community. To add to this empirical complexity, an appeal to USA are relevant to those situated elsewhere; intergenerational in- democracy and pluralism invokes a variety of competing conceptions heritance of power tends to lead to an exclusion of vulnerable mino- of democracy and plurality. Most problematically, perhaps, the ques- rities in other contexts too. In contexts of liberalism, pluralism, and tion provokes a commitment to the implicit assumption that diversity democracy, individual and institutional values and practices brought poses a real or potential threat to a well-ordered society, which should this threat to the fore. I have spent many years in the APA. I have be confronted, for either normative or pragmatic reasons, by specify- hope for this organization. And that hope is that We, American In- ing democratic limitations. In short, the question is a charged ques- dians, will be brought back to the APA, and receive full participation tion in that it commits the person who takes it up to assumptions that as our own. We await, and we, the American Indian indigenous phi- he or she might not have subscribed to independently. To suggest the losophers, look to the horizon for change.18 Thank you Lou! (potential) need for democratic limitations on diversity presumes a skepticism. The call for limitations to diversity further suggests that –Anne Schulherr Waters, a community that cherishes pluralism has to protect from violation Independent Scholar and Editor, and corruption those principles of equality and mutual respect that California, USA allow its style of cohabitation. The assumption underlying the ques- tion is that it would be possible to distinguish the procedurally higher value of democracy and its jurisdiction over, we may infer, potentially the only American Indian with a Ph.D. in philosophy currently teaching in a Ph.D. threatening dimensions connected to an increasingly diverse popula- granting institution. tion. In short, the concepts employed in the question as well as the 18 I thank the following individuals for assistance with this manuscript: Monika Kir- implicit assumptions invoked are far from self-evident and would re- loskar Steinbach, University Konstanz, James Maffie, University of Maryland, Wil- quire further clarification. liam McBride, Purdue University, Agnes Beatriz Curry, University of St. Joseph, Kyle Powys Whyte, Michigan State, Shawn Burns, Stanford, Rebekah Tanner, State Uni- I thus share Outlaw’s unease concerning the question posed and versity of New York, Oswego, and Thomas Norton Smith, Kent State. follow him in taking democratic and pluralistically ordered societies

152 153 M. Wenning Whose Equality? Response to Lucius Outlaw to be those committed to the largest possible level of equality and bit within the cosmos (Outlaw 2015a: 111). Recognition of human mutual respect. Emancipatory movements in the past decades (espe- finitude does not, of course, mean that humans do not have any reli- cially feminism and postcolonialism) have challenged conceptions of able knowledge, nor does it preclude the possibility of consciously established homogeneity and expanded the scope of an appreciation of bringing about some meaningful change. In terms of epistemic capa- diversity with a simultaneous emphasis on equality. The advances cities and the range of practical powers, human finitude is impor- reached constitute a significant achievement. Through practices of tantly a matter of degree: humans can devise better or worse theories resistance the scope of which forms of life are valuable was signifi- and practices with which to situate themselves in a cosmos in which cantly broadened. Democratic pluralism embraces diversity as the they are just small parts. What is meant by ›better or worse‹ depends precondition of and driving force in a flourishing democratic society. on highly contextual goals and aspirations. The inherent intranspar- The author’s insistence on the primacy of plurality over homogeneity ency and exposure at the root of the human condition has been far too as well as the priority of democracy over philosophy (understood as little acknowledged in political philosophy and ethics.1 Acknowled- ideal theory) operates as a crucial preventative against those who ging human finitude contradicts the pervasive attempt Outlaw men- might imagine that they have discovered the one true conception of tions at the end of his paper: the attempt to perceive of society as an life or one true set of guiding principles from imposing them on entity in which threats could be determined and controlled indepen- others without going through democratic decision-making processes. dent of democratic deliberation (ibid.: 117). As a democrat, a radical democrat perhaps, Outlaw naturally ex- Before returning to the implications of gradual finitude of hu- presses a certain uneasiness about formulating any form of imposi- man forms of life, let me turn to the construction and propagation of tion that would not need to be first legitimated through democratic what the author refers to as »schemes of meaning« (ibid.: 112) which deliberation and decision-making processes. As stated, I share Out- serve to foster, as he puts it, »life-stabilizing orderliness« (ibid.) over law’s reservation in taking up the given question directly by spelling various generations. According to this evolutionary conception of the out limits to diversity. The following comments are thus written in a emergence of »developed repertories of learning-enabled capabilities« spirit of general agreement and are meant to evoke further delibera- (ibid.: 111), theory is an attempt by which the species Homo sapiens tion on what a commitment to democratic values in cross-cultural organizes its modes of social cohabitation through individual, intra- contexts entails. In what follows I shall consider two issues raised by and inter-group competition. My worry here, however, is that the the metatheoretical observations developed by Outlaw. The points in adoption of an evolutionary framework threatens to commit Outlaw these reflections that seem particularly salient for further discussion to a detached third-person perspective when it comes to engaging are 1) the coupling of an evolutionary and a democratic perspective, with what he refers to as the mechanisms of social reproduction (ibid.: and 2) the value and scope of equality in relationship to human fini- 112) through individual and group competition (ibid.: 116). Such a tude. At the end of this response, I shall draw on recent interventions stance would be at odds with the democratic spirit evoked by Outlaw. by two political philosophers working in a Chinese context to suggest And yet, Outlaw sees strategies of survival from the third-person a direction in which the issue of diversity could be explored further perspective of an evolutionary theorist or social anthropologist rather beyond the confines of Western democratic theory. than as a member of a society engaged in the democratic exchange about ideas based on more or less convincing reasons within demo- cratic public spheres. I Evolution and Democratic Legitimacy This adoption of an evolutionary outlook raises a number of in- terrelated questions: How does the evolutionary perspective relate to The first part of Outlaw’s article emphasizes human finitude within the practices of citizens within democratic orders who have to, again the larger context of cosmic processes of generation and decline. Hu- man beings are finite in terms of their capacity to know as well as to 1 Important exceptions to this general omission are Butler (2005) as well as Nuss- master the cosmos or even the, by comparison, tiny niche they inha- baum (2001).

154 155 M. Wenning Whose Equality? Response to Lucius Outlaw and again, renegotiate their communal lives? What is the relationship evolutionary spectator of the social. Democratic processes draw on between democratic decision-making processes conducted by free and reasons that go well beyond imperatives related to finding the best, equal individuals and the distant observation of the evolution of social in the sense of the most useful strategy to survive in that they replace arrangements? What is at stake in coordinating social arrangements instrumental calculation and contestation with deliberation. They go so that it is possible »to live well so as to enhance the prospects for beyond detached spectatorship in that they involve the giving and prolonging our species-being« (ibid.: 115)? Is the prolonging of the taking of reasons among equals. Thus they are expressed in terms of species taken to be a precondition that needs to be safeguarded in an an I and Thou encounter rather than from a third-person perspective. evolutionary struggle between individuals, groups and species, or is it There can be little doubt that deliberation retains moments of an end in itself? It will be impossible to address these major questions contestation. And yet, democratic contestation among free and equal in a short space. Nevertheless, an engagement with them would be individuals and group members can hardly be reduced to questions of helpful to better understand the relationship between the democratic species preservation as much as this preservation is a necessary pre- and the evolutionary perspective. condition for asking the more complex normative questions. Once An evolutionary conception of the social, in which self-preserva- evolutionary competition is replaced by practices of what the author tion of individuals, groups, and species is the main motivation for refers to as »cooperative democratic life« (ibid.), it becomes possible interaction, does not, it seems to me, provide the resources necessary to increasingly broaden the scope of forms of life included in the de- for a model capable of confronting the challenge of diversity from the liberation and decision-making processes. What is the role of the in- perspective of participants in a democratic society. It is granted that dividual and his or her capacity to reason reflectively and, to some an evolutionary account might shed light on the development of re- degree, disinterestedly in this evolutionary picture? Outlaw conceives pertories of learning-enabled capabilities. It might also explain the of humans as being »both carriers and contributors to the evolution- emergence of basic institutions of conflict resolution necessary to ary successes of our species« (ibid.: 117) but does not indicate how create some level of stability in a world of competing claims to survi- these dimensions, or the tension between them, are to be reconciled val. It cannot, however, account for the dimension of legitimacy (ibid.: 114).2 By subsuming reflective and creative acts of deliberation claims that is being raised within democratic institutions and pro- to strategies of evolutionary success, he fails to acknowledge the nor- cesses of deliberation among equals. The normative dimension goes mative achievement of practices of intersubjective legitimation. beyond contexts of securing self-preservation and orderliness. If one Whereas the evolutionary picture explains the emergence of an order- is willing to adopt an evolutionary outlook, as Outlaw does, it would ing mechanism in terms of the struggle for mere survival and the be helpful to complement this perspective with an account detailing passing on of genes, the democratic perspective conceives of indivi- the civilizational breakthrough that occurs once the question of how duals as making decisions based on reflective choices within processes to survive is superseded by the question of how to live well. In democ- of reasoned contestation and deliberation. racies, the latter question is raised in a community of free and equal Another dimension where the evolutionary perspective and the human beings who are significantly different from each other, but democratic perspective part ways is that of time-consciousness. While are, at least in principle, equal in terms of their capacity to partake in evolution is premised on the assumption of development through and contribute to decision-making processes. Through acts of collec- learning processes, this is not self-evidently true for processes of his- tive deliberation, they structure their relationships to themselves, each other, and the cosmos. The manifold ways in which these sub- 2 A related tension emerges in the discussion of the concept of diversity. On the one jective, intersubjective and world relationships are debated and trans- hand, diversity is introduced by Outlaw as an anthropological constant, one that is formed again and again in the private as well as public realms of part of the species being of humans. Humans have in common that they are all unique modern democracies seems to be different in kind from the unreflec- (different from one another). On the other hand, diversity is considered as a political category, one that can be defended or misused as a tool for exploitation and oppression tive process of securing species survival as seen either from the agent when »diversity becomes a conscript of injustice« in the process of naturalizing dis- fighting for his or her survival or from the distant perspective of an tinction in order to legitimate forms of inequality.

156 157 M. Wenning Whose Equality? Response to Lucius Outlaw torical development. While it would be dogmatic to deny the possibi- contents of the democratic inquiry is never complete. It is fallible and lity of historical learning processes in general, we should be careful subject to revisions and might suffer significant setbacks. Especially not to take an evolutionary perspective on the emergence of demo- during times of a pervasive crisis of political representation – as it is cratic structures for granted. Learning to unlearn the desire for devel- currently faced in the European Union – democracy requires to re- opment is also a lesson learned from the insight into human finitude. think the nature of political representation beyond traditional con- A linear conception of time according to which later generations are ceptions of homogeneous peoples and nation-states. considered to be more advanced and enlightened in their self-, other- A critical self-reflection of the tradition of democratic liberalism and world relationships has been disproven again and again in his- shows that, while liberalism does not explicitly privilege certain tory. This is not only an empirical observation necessitated by a cen- forms of life and the values affirmed by them, it nevertheless is far tury of humanitarian and environmental catastrophes, but points to a from value neutral. Liberal democratic discourse implicitly en- normative ambivalence at the heart of the concept of progress. We courages certain modes of conducting one’s affairs and promotes cer- might not even consider progress to be a desirable goal, unless we tain models of identity formation. For example, liberal democratic specify what kind of progress we are talking about, who is steering regimes implicitly privilege modes of life that agree to the division it, and whose interests it benefits (cf. Adorno 1998: 143–160). Outlaw, of church and state as well as a corresponding conception of religious to be sure, has a nuanced view about which forms of democratic de- commitments as belonging to the private rather than public realm.3 velopment are desirable and which ones are objectionable. Here, too, While the early proponents of liberalism, such as John Stuart Mill, it would be interesting to hear whether his conception of learning is emphasized liberalism’s negative protective dimension, the toleration based on the prospects of species survival or a reflective conception of of diversity increasingly transformed into a doctrine involving a po- the good life in a well-ordered society. Furthermore, there might be sitive commitment to heterogeneity in which the plurality of forms room to include relationships to the cosmos, including nonhuman of life was considered to be an intrinsic good. The optimal society thus forms of life, as potential dimensions where learning can take place. becomes one with the maximum level of individual and group diver- This leads me to the second issue. sity in line with the maximum toleration of such diversity by equal individuals (Geuss 2001: 80). The inherent paradox of liberalism, thus conceived, is that it claims to be value neutral while in fact maintain- II Human Finitude and the Equality of All Things ing a positive conception of certain forms of institutional arrange- ments and forms of life. At the very least, it fosters conceptions of life The second point in Outlaw’s article I would like to focus on concerns and acknowledges societies in which human diversity is taken to be a the scope and interpretation of equality of regard and respect, which core value. By extension, liberal democratic discourse and the political the author picks out as being the core of democratic order (ibid.: 117). formation in which it flourishes subvert conceptions of life according Negatively stated, the emphasis on equality of regard and respect to which substantive conceptions of the good are not open to constant protects individuals from disadvantagement and discrimination on deliberation. religious, cultural, or racial grounds. It is intended to curtail the arbi- The emphasis on democratic values, especially that of equality, is trary imposition of power by the state, individuals, or groups of in- in danger of losing its emancipatory force, as well as its capacity to dividuals. Positively stated, equally recognized and recognizing indi- sustain, integrate, and foster significantly different life forms, just at viduals as well as groups can make their diverse voices heard within the moment when the politics of appealing to these values are being the limits of democratic deliberation. Democratic deliberation takes reduced to a mechanism of self-preservation (at the species, the place not only at the level of policy decisions and policy implementa- group, or the individual level). If these values are interpreted as an tion, but also at that of determining how policies are to be decided upon and who will have a say in the decision-making process. This 3 Outlaw does not explicitly mention whether the version of democracy he has in process of deliberatively contesting the rules, the actors as well as the mind is in fact liberal democracy.

158 159 M. Wenning Whose Equality? Response to Lucius Outlaw extension of the evolutionary drive to gain competitive advantage been transformed into a democratic melting pot that would open up over other individuals, groups or species, it would simply ignore the realistic prospects for migrants becoming equal members of society. universalistic dimension of equality. Appealing to the value of the Consequently, the majority of its citizens are not willing to give up most extensive level of equality of respect means to transcend local their prevalent essentialist narratives of identity centered around ex- cultural boundaries. clusive conceptions of language use, ethnicity, and cultural heritage. Under conditions of a global neoliberal economy, which expands Under conditions that present migrants as potential threats to the free trade and open markets, we do not only witness an increasing order of society, exclusivist narratives of linguistic, ethnic, ritual and flow of goods and information, but also an exponential increase of cultural identity gain importance. These narratives and the prejudices human migration across borders as well as within borders. As a con- they foster prevent migrants from gaining equal access to participat- sequence of these migration movements, human identities become ing in a society’s spheres of economic and symbolic reproduction. As a increasingly fluid and fail to form narratively coherent identities consequence, migrants enter into a state of permanent diaspora while (Baumann 2006; Sennett 1998). The new economy supports certain trying to retain and strengthen their own cultural identity by con- modes of life that center around mobility and flexibility. It supports structing competing narratives. These lead to further impediments to the increase of fractured, patchwork identities in a world which is integration and further contribute to their marginalization as cultural becoming increasingly less equal between forms of life, and more and economic members of the host society. An equal right to respect homogeneous within forms of life. In spite of the liberal democratic and access to economic opportunity thus remains a distant dream. praise of plurality, one can observe an increasing homogenization of Seen from the perspective of the migrant, the persistently foreign elements within and across cultures in terms of ritual practices, poli- host society at best pays lip service to the ideal of true equality. We tical institutions, and forms of life. The seemingly contradictory trend witness the global emergence of what Doug Saunder has called »arri- of homogenization and a return to traditional cultural values and val cities« (Saunders 2011). In the largest global migration wave in religions needs to be interpreted as two sides of the same neoliberal history, immigrant neighborhoods grow around major cities in the coin. As Benjamin Barber observed already two and a half decades form of, to name just a few, banlieues, Plattenbau developments, Chi- ago, neoliberal globalization threatens democratic values by imposing natowns, Little Indias, and Hispanic barrios. Rather than providing itself and uprooting populations through a homogeneous McDonald’s their inhabitants with the possibility of truly arriving in the sense of culture. These uprooted populations then draw on radicalized concep- becoming equally respected members of the host countries, the new tions of traditional values as defense mechanisms (Barber 1995). In- global class of migrant workers remains in the limbo of being in the tegration of such groups within democratic orders of equality be- diaspora of eternal arrivers who are prevented from realizing the pro- comes increasingly difficult. mise of fully arriving. The potential integration of diverse popula- Let us look at one instance of an increasing failure of integrating tions within democratic institutions is thereby kept at the level of a diverse forms of life into structures of equal recognition. The emer- mere formal promise. The apparently increased social diversity pre- gence of unprecedented levels of cohabitation of people with diverse sents a contradiction that actually proves, as it were, a shift towards cultural backgrounds and the discourse surrounding multiculturalism an increased pressure towards a homogeneity the nation-state is seems to increase diversity of life forms. On the other hand, new nevertheless no longer capable of or willing to provide. forms of global migration movements also document the failure of Insofar as this diagnosis of a growing pressure for homogeneity integrating diversity. In the case of migrant workers, for example, and reactive cultural differentiation is correct, the question of a demo- narratives of distinct cultural identities are reinvented by migrant cratic commitment to diversity needs to be rephrased: how is it possi- communities as a reactive mechanism against dislocation and the im- ble to reconstitute spaces for generating and sustaining true diversity possibility of integration. The nation-state, that traditional motor and plurality alongside the most extensive degree of equality and which had increased internal equality, attracts foreign workers now respect? There is a danger that democratic values – especially that of to boost its labor force. At the same time, the nation-state has not equality, but also that of freedom – remain empty if they are being

160 161 M. Wenning Whose Equality? Response to Lucius Outlaw invoked without being contextualized. They need to be filled by con- of democracy employing species-being would prevent this value from crete associations, either positive or negative, within specific cultural becoming empty. In combination with an updated version of ideology narratives to retain any emancipatory force. The very concern for critique, genealogical critique of normatively charged concepts would democratic values needs to be contextualized in order to prevent it help to prevent the justification of political systems where some are from becoming shallow. Such a contextualization would, for example, more equal than others. Promoting awareness of the contingent so- reveal that concepts of equality and respect belongs to a certain Judeo- cio-historical conditions under which these liberal-democratic cate- Christian tradition and its continuation in secular humanism and, gories and adjacent commitments to individual property rights, for eventually, liberal democratic traditions. This lineage established the example, emerged presents an effective model of preventing norma- standard of equal individual subjects and their capacity to choose be- tive concepts from carrying along an ambivalent history in which tween competing conceptions of how to live well. they played both emancipatory as well as regressive roles. In the cur- Such an attempt at a self-contextualization of core democratic rent increasingly globalized world, there is also a growing need to commitments could take a variety of forms and looks back on a long contrast the value framework undergirding liberal democratic tradi- tradition. A critical self-reflection of the values of democracy, and tions in Europe and America and their specific institutional realiza- especially that of equality, has accompanied the Western tradition tions with the alternatives that have emerged in other socio-historical from Plato through Benjamin Constant, Alexis de Tocqueville, and contexts and reflect different historical experiences and practical con- Max Weber. In the current context, one can draw on these attempts cerns from those which have shaped the Western imaginary. not so much to think of an alternative to democratic rule as to expose Returning to the example of the ever-widening inflow and out- the danger of democratic discourse of succumbing to the rule of the flow of migrant populations in the global labor market (and the grow- masses, partisan politics, and increasing bureaucratization (cf. Geuss ing diaspora of asylum seekers), there is a need to rethink what a 2001: 110–128). Self-reflection on the core values employed in orga- pluralistically structured democracy could mean for members of tra- nizing human cohabitation could be conducted in terms of a genealo- ditions where equality and respect have not been the most prevalent gical critique. By tracing the emergence of the core value of democ- concepts employed in deliberating on how to best organize individual racy, namely, equality of respect for the freedom of others, it is and communal self-, other- and world-relationships. In other words, possible to become aware of their contingency and historical associa- if one’s normative commitments are not to be parochial, it is helpful tion not only with struggles for emancipation, but also with forms of to decenter and, as it were, ›decolonize‹ conceptions of equality and suppression and exclusion. Such a genealogical critique would have to respect that have emerged in a specific history in Europe and Amer- address the concepts employed as well as the vocabulary used to ex- ica. These conceptions cannot be limited to, but continue to reflect press these concepts. To take one of the concepts employed by Outlaw concerns that are specific to these parts of the world but might not as an example, the term »species-being« (Outlaw 2015a: 114) would be expressions of our universal species-being. Any theory of equality, need to be critically reconstructed by way of tracing its origin in Dar- if it is to be a reflective conception, should ask itself not only the win as a biological unit of self-preservation. The genealogist would question ›Equality of what?‹ but also, and more importantly, ›Whose then have to critically reconstruct Marx’s employment of the concept equality?‹ of species-being, Gattungswesen (literally, species essence), as a court Certainly, a liberal democratic regime, which imposes limits on of ethical appeal to expose forms of alienation. The critical self-exam- the scope of who counts as worthy of which form of respect, can be ination of this concept would then also trace how Marx used the con- challenged both from within Western cultures as well as by alterna- cept to establish a conception of humans as being radically and essen- tive conceptions from non-Western cultures. A transnationalization tially distinct from other animals. Moreover, it could then show how and cross-culturalization of the democratic imaginary would be help- Marx thought that humans could not realize the potential of their ful to expand the range of democratic contestation beyond the realm species distinction under conditions of capitalism and so on. of the nation-state as well as beyond the realm of specific cultures and A critical genealogical account of the emergence of the core value their always one-sided narratives of identity. In a transnational and

162 163 M. Wenning Whose Equality? Response to Lucius Outlaw cross-cultural context it is increasingly important to understand how equality (Wang 2012). Recently he has suggested rethinking the con- diversity is addressed in non-Euroamerican traditions of thought, vo- cept of equality beyond the scope of Western political thought by cabularies, and political arrangements. This step beyond the limits of drawing on the Daoist discussion on ›equality of all things.‹ This con- Western theorizing is not only based on an extension of the concept cept, Wang Hui maintains, presents an antidote to a conception of of equality of respect to different and, at times, radically different equal autonomous subjects, which reduces equality to a sameness, others (others that have not only dissimilar linguistic, cultural, and »beneath which a hierarchically structured differentiation lurks« ethnic backgrounds but also experiences of individually unique his- (ibid.: 56). Whereas the anthropocentric standpoint common to poli- tories of degradation as well as flourishing). It may also throw a cri- tical philosophy in the West reduces nonhuman animals, organic life tical light on the normative ambivalence and blind-spots of those con- and nonorganic objects to their serviceability in an evolutionary his- ceptions of equality and plurality that have historically emerged in tory of human self-preservation, the equality of all things situates Europe and further developed in North America. humans within natural history. In such a history they are not mas- A certain understanding of democracy and basic democratic va- ters, but simply finite members of the order of things. It thereby lues is contested not only within modern Western societies but in- acknowledges the concrete singularity in which each thing, including creasingly at a global level. The political philosopher Zhao Tingyang humans and other animals, ought to be respected. The equality is (趙汀陽), to take one influential example, has drawn on Chinese tra- then no longer an equality of subjects of the same kind, which has dition in general and the concept of »all-under-heaven« (天下 tian- been the common denominator of the politics of identity and recogni- xia) in particular to juxtapose what he identifies as specifically Eur- tion in Western academia. Wang Hui summarizes the uniqueness of opean conceptions of universal and equal human rights (Zhao 2009).4 this radical proposal to rethink the universality of Western concepts In contrast to the exclusionary tendency of specific categorizations of of political theorizing centered around the concept of equality as fol- who counts as valuable, usually in the context of nation-states, Zhao lows: calls for a conception of global governance, which transcends the In contrast to a homogeneity within species, the ›equality of all boundary of nation-states. The concept of tianxia undermines the things‹ presupposes their difference. But difference as the bearer of dogmatic assumption that the individual is the primary unit of poli- infinite diversity and uniqueness is not characterized by self-identity, tical legitimacy and the nation-state is the category of international which would be synonymous with one-dimensionality. Identity al- political philosophy. By extension, rather than focusing on equality ways connotes some kind of exclusion, and what is excluded in iden- and freedom among citizens within nation-states, Zhao proposes to tity-formation is not just the other, but also one’s own internal diver- ask which kind of arrangement of our cohabitation in a shared cosmos sity. Recognition, which rests on identity, belongs to the world of would be harmonious (和 he) at a global level. While such concep- naming and appearances (ibid.: 51). tions as all-under-heaven are of course also subject to criticism For Wang Hui, as well as for the ancient Chinese thinkers he through democratic contestation within and between cultures,5 they draws on, the politics of equal recognition is proclaiming to be uni- present a contrast to Western appeals to the universality of equal hu- versal, while in fact being based on arbitrary distinctions by humans man rights. These contrasting concepts could, when related in an in- who take themselves too important. Human categories of their var- tercultural dialogue, have the function of providing a corrective to ious others are taken as fixed identities within a hierarchical struc- certain pathological dimensions of the respective other concept. tured order of assigned names and corresponding hierarchies (citizen- Wang Hui (王翬) is a second example of a scholar who is contest- migrant, human-animal, etc.). The tendency of human beings to take ing the claims to hegemony and the anthropocentric bias implicit in themselves too important ignores the contingency at the basis of their Western conceptions of democratic rule and its focus on human specific life form and fails to acknowledge other things but them- selves as real equals who make a claim to be respected. 4 See also the Confucian reformulation of his position by Angle (2012: 74–90). Like Wang Hui, Outlaw also stresses that »our species is but one 5 Kerr (2011). among many that currently persists on planet earth« (ibid.: 111). Our

164 165 M. Wenning species-being is contingent and our knowledge and capacity for tech- nical mastery irreducibly finite in a cosmos that, in varying degrees, exceeds our conceptual grasp and practical attempts at mastery. Incor- porating this insight concerning the limits of human forms of life and action into democratic theory is an important task that far exceeds the context of this discussion. If one were to engage it further, the con- ception of ›the equality of all things‹ could provide a promising start- ing point in opening up new perspectives on how to rethink the claims of humans in a cosmos in which any entity is equal in terms of being unique and thereby also different from each other. It could contribute Reply to an expansion of the capacity of the imagination to better allow hu- mans to not stop at the level of protecting existing regimes of equality and combatting known forms of inequality. This would mean an ima- gination of other forms of being as both equal and different.

–Mario Wenning, University of Macau, China (SAR) and Goethe University, Frankfurt, Germany

166 Response to Commentators

Those who invested in conceiving, developing, and launching Conflu- ence are to be commended, highly. It is a historic and promising ven- ture. Accordingly, it is an honor to have been asked to contribute to an international dialogue focused on the question »What (if any) limits ought democratic pluralism impose on diversity within a cross-cul- tural context?« Developing a response to the query was quite challen- ging. So, too, considering and responding to the very thoughtful and thought-provoking commentaries on my response. Each of these has helped to heighten my appreciation of the mission of Confluence and of how this instance of response-and-commentaries is fulfilling that mission to my benefit, especially. For I have had to reconsider my response in light of considerations offered by persons who have forged their commentaries by drawing, in part, on the resources of traditions and praxes of thought from historical and cultural contexts different from those on which I have drawn, in which I have lived. Dialogue is now under way. Following are my contributions to its continuation …

I Response to Ankur Barua

Much more than a direct response to my considerations, Ankur Barua offers considerations of philosophical efforts by Indic thinkers who, both drawing on and renovating Indic traditions of thought-praxis made sacred, wrestled with vexing issues of ordering and ordered In- dic social life that were fraught with philosophical-anthropological, ontological, political (ethical) significance: the terms, logics, and char- acteristics of differentiation by which persons, by nature or by con- vention, could or should be proscribed into social orderings of hier- archical or egalitarian arrangements.

169 L. T. Outlaw (Jr.) Response to Commentators

I find especially helpful Barua’s abbreviated and cogent account from sacred traditions. A crucial difference, apparently, is that the of the evolving ›stages‹ of strategies of critique and correction, and valorizations of the essential equality of individuals in tradition-in- the understandings produced, by which Indic thinkers continue to fluenced Indic thought draw explicitly on foundationally sacred me- wrestle with how to think the consequences of Indic encounters with taphysical principles while the political philosophy of liberalism, in the various aspects of European colonialism or Eurocentrism. I am many contemporary articulations especially, abjure metaphysical persuaded by Barua to endorse the »third stage« of the dialectical groundings. The challenging question that Barua raises for my offer- evolution of strategies of engaging Eurocentric elements in Indic life: ing is whether I am relying on an implicit evolutionary metaphysic. recognition, through »fine-grained micro-studies of everyday post- Mine is an explicit evolutionary perspective on philosophical colonial life,« that ongoing life is »a work-in-progress« in which are anthropology, an empiricist evolutionary human social ontology. interwoven old and new traditions, »tradition« (forged and institutio- However, I insist that the political philosophy of liberalism was, from nalized, I take it, before European colonization) and »modernity« (In- the outset, likewise grounded on particular social ontologies that em- dic life during European colonization and now during postcolonial braced both inclusive egalitarian and exclusive hierarchic commit- life-world rescue, rehabilitation, and reconstruction efforts) (Barua ments ordered by gender, raciality, ethnicity, religion, socio-economic 2015: 122). ›Eurocentrism,‹ then, is hardly a simple unity, however class. Hierarchies and inequalities, firmly embedded in very elaborate imposing and destructive overall, that can be accounted for and re- and articulate metaphysical and ontological constructions concerning jected wholesale because of the impositions and destructions since race and gender, especially, fundamentally and thoroughly structured aspects of European thought have been taken up by some Indic thin- European modernities. kers as resources for critical rethinkings of invidious social orderings One of the foundational metaphysical and ontological ›unit via castes and gender. ideas‹ structuring distinctively ›modern‹ European philosophical and I am inclined to regard Barua’s very thoughtful disclosure of theological thought, but out of intellectual legacies stretching back how social categorizations of caste and gender still in play in Indic for several thousand years, was that of »the Great Chain of Being« circumstances also »co-inhabit political spaces that employ the voca- (Lovejoy 1936). This metaphysical unit idea provided resources by bulary of human rights, civil liberties and social justice« (ibid.: 123) which to develop strategies for forging and imposing explanations of presumably carryovers from encounters with Eurocentrism, as a re- the relative and linked characterizations and positionings of all types vealing instance of evolutionary adaptation. What I am arguing for, or categories of living beings. During the formations of the distinc- and aspire to contribute to, is the normalization of situations of en- tive European modernities, the ›chain of beings‹ idea was conjoined to counter and engagement that are democratically structured so as to that of distinctive ›races‹ to provide a rational and rationalizing ac- maximize the possibilities for the mutuality of adaptations that en- count of racial hierarchies in the ordering of socio-political life in hance human flourishing without the impositions, destructions, ex- terms of civilizations as well as in particular polities. Only as the ploitations, and distortions of life generally that were characteristic of result of centuries of partially successful, still ongoing struggles colonialisms. against those metaphysically-grounded socio-political constructions Barua points out how such efforts have been under way in India: and the practical implementations of them have the political philoso- Indic thinkers have drawn on traditions of Indic thought to forge phies of Modernity, philosophies of liberal-democratic individualism critiques of invidious gender and caste orderings, critiques that valor- in particular, been largely rescued from racialized imperialist projects ize the essential equality of individuals on much the same terms as, of White Racial Supremacy and rehabilitated to make possible the for example, conceptions of liberal-democratic individualism long recognition of and respect for the ontological equality of differing thought to be definitive of European modernities. Still, Barua notes, non-white races, disparaged ethnicities within white races, women some of these Indic thought-projects are stressed by efforts to affirm of all races and ethnicities, persons who orient key aspects of their both egalitarian notions of persons and hierarchic social orderings by identities and lives by understandings and norms different from gender and caste as the key to social stability in keeping with insights those that structure heterosexuality, and social classes that are not

170 171 L. T. Outlaw (Jr.) Response to Commentators in control of the economic and political means by which shared life is for and by whom, etc. – all of the questions emergent in the experi- organized and sustained.1 ment of political life. Put differently, I am convinced that the better Still, as Barua makes clear, here, in colloquial terms, is where the resources for attending to the questions and issues of political life, rubber meets the road: »The vital question […] is whether all differ- including, especially, those emergent in conditions of diversity and ence is intrinsically dignified, or whether there are any moral limits plurality, are not those of political theory in search of invariant and to what sorts of difference can be accepted« (ibid.: 130) The signifi- ›universal‹ truths, nor a similar theology as a foundation for political cance of this question is such that it has priority over that which theory. Rather, persuaded by Aristotle, I am convinced that a better motivates and frames this Confluence discussion: »What (if any) lim- resource is to be had in the knowledge-production efforts he charac- its ought democratic pluralism impose on diversity within a cross- terized as phronesis, that is, wisdom about matters in the realm of cultural context?« With laser-like intensity of focus, Barua poses changing political life regarding which studied lived experience is the what might seem to be the question: »which differences […] (ibid.: key, not theoria. 128)« should be valorized as dignified, which should not; which sub- jected to limitations, which ones not? Are answers to be provided by philosophizing about the political II Response to Anne Schulherr Waters while drawing on the resources of whatever traditions of thought- praxis and their enabling metaphysics and ontologies, philosophies Through her response, Anne Schulherr Waters, of the Seminole peo- of history, social and political aspirations? Or, due to seemingly iner- ple of Florida and Oklahoma, raises a number of important issues and adicable conflicts that come with the de facto plurality of such con- questions that test my considerations. In doing so, she brings to the structed resources and the seeming epistemological impossibility of discussion one of the most profound challenges to forging just politi- forging a non-self-serving metaphysical foundation for a political cal life in the United States of America: how best to conceptualize, philosophy that trumps all others in affirming which differences for realize, and sustain democratic recognition, respect, and justice, retri- affirmation and limitation, are we compelled to settle for forms of butive and distributive, for peoples who are the descendents and car- modus vivendi only? riers of the life-worlds of the peoples who settled the landmasses tens As I hope I made clear in my initial offering to this discussion, of thousands of years before the coming of imperialist, exploitative my intellectual ›inhabitation‹ of an evolutionary perspective on (and European explorers and settler-colonists who unjustly appropriated self-understanding of) our species being, as it were, compels me to and renamed the lands ›the Americas‹ while subjecting many, many conclude that evolutionary constraints on our knowledge-produc- thousands of the peoples to genocide and various modes of oppres- tions prevent our developing either retrospective or prospective in- sion. (A personal note: I refuse to participate in referring to these stances of ›knowledge‹ regarding matters historico-empirical, thus peoples as ›Indians,‹ which derives from a misnaming by the lost matters socio-political, that have the security of invariant certainty Christopher Columbus; likewise in referring to them as ›Native unaffected by history or evolution. Consequently, I favor, advocate, Americans,‹ since they had their own names for themselves as well can endorse a form of modus vivendi as acceptable, in Barua’s words, as for the landmasses across those tens of thousands of years before »[…] provided it allows for spaces where differences can be cele- the renaming of the lands to honor latecomer Amerigo Vespucci.) brated« (ibid.: 130). Such a form I would regard as a favorable set of Indeed, how descendents of these Indigenous peoples share in politi- conditions in which democratic equality of regard and respect can be cal life at all levels in the USA, whether they can do so to the satisfac- in play such that the experiment in living can proceed through which tion of their critically vetted notions of justice required, are major democratic pragmatic decisions can be reached regarding which differ- tests of the viability and suitability of my considerations of how best ences should be valorized positively, which limited, to what extent, we might wrestle with matters of democratic limitations on diversity and pluralism. However, it is my very firm conviction that I have 1 See, for example, Sandel (1998); Young (2011); Pateman (1988); Mills (1999). neither an obligation nor a responsibility – definitely neither the cap-

172 173 L. T. Outlaw (Jr.) Response to Commentators ability nor the legitimacy – to lead the way in taking up these pro- losophers in the USA, within the APA in particular, reflects, in just found challenges to philosophizing and to actual political praxis. and appropriate ways, the demography of the historically diverse peo- Rather, I believe, I am to be led by those from among and on behalf ple-cultures and civilizations still being carried and reproduced by of Indigenous peoples who take up the challenges with democratic relatively distinct people-groups in the USA, including descendents openness and equality or regard and respect. of Indigenous peoples. Third, the extend to which most of shared Anne Schulherr Waters is just such a person, and a philosopher. daily life, short-term and long-term, is much affected, if at all, by A key aspect of her response is her challenging proposal that my what professional philosophers do as professional philosophers. offering of a way of conceiving of human bio-cultural life-world di- Though the first and second issues are related, progress addres- versities negotiated by way of democratically informed principles and sing the first could possibly proceed, to some extent, without conco- practices – fundamental equal respect and regard for all – be tested, in mitant progress addressing the second. In truth, though, progress in part, by examining and adjudicating a particular case-study of a re- increasing the number of professional philosophers who are descen- cent history of decisions regarding one of the ›diversity committees‹ dants of peoples native for many thousands of years to the land- (Waters 2015: 136) of the US American Philosophical Association masses renamed ›the Americas,‹ and who philosophize out of and on (APA): a change-of-name from the ›Committee on the Status of behalf of modes of knowledge long vetted and confirmed by the sur- American Indians in Philosophy,‹ of which Waters was the founding vival-successes and flourishing lives of the various peoples before dis- chairperson (but who, apparently, was neither involved in nor con- placements and genocide were imposed by settler-colonials from Eur- sulted about the consequential changing of the name of, thereby the ope, will, in all likelihood, be key to motivating increasingly wider, demographic scope of those to be served by, the committee) to the more respectful and informed considerations of the ways of knowing ›Committee on the Status of Indigenous Philosophers.‹ Water’s fram- forged by Indigenous peoples. ing question is »What would the discipline of philosophy in America I think it important to distinguish these two complex issues in look like from a perspective of a non-power-conscripted diverse crea- order to better assess how best to work for progress, even how best to tivity« (ibid.: 137)? Very much at issue for Waters is what she use either or both as a case-study for wresting with matters of diver- (though she is hardly alone …) takes to be the prevalence of consid- sity and democratic justice, and to be as clear as possible about where erations and practices by which persons among US-born »American best to focus efforts on conditions affecting the production and the Indians« (ibid.: 138; passim) are excluded from professional Philoso- philosophizing of persons who are descendants of Indigenous peoples. phy – first and foremost from tenure-track and tenured positions in Meanwhile, I do not believe that daily shared life in the life-worlds of departments of Philosophy in institutions of higher education – most of the world’s people-cultures are much affected directly by the thereby from the oldest and largest US-based organization of profes- work of professional philosophers since, beyond the teaching of un- sional philosophers, the APA. I will focus my response on this chal- dergraduates, most of what we do as professionals is directed primar- lenging case study while acknowledging that there are other issues of ily at other professional philosophers. Consequently, I am not yet importance that Waters has raised. persuaded by Waters that failures within the APA to proceed demo- In addressing Waters’ concerns regarding the APA, I prefer to cratically and justly in renaming and staffing a committee charged distinguish three issues, two closely related, one less so: First, the with attending to the status of ›American Indian‹ philosophers is of extent to which what serve as canonical paradigms of quests for, and great and direct consequence for the life-worlds, thus for the lives, of instances of, philosophically vetted ›knowledge‹ in professionalized, descendents of Indigenous peoples except for those who are, or might academic Philosophy are representative of the full range of the modes become, professional philosophers who seek involvement in the orga- of ›knowledge‹ produced and philosophically vetted within the histor- nization. ical life-world contexts of the world’s people-cultures and civiliza- The consequences, then, of institutionalized injustices within the tions, those of Indigenous peoples of the Americas in particular. APA as a profession is of some significant consequence for the social Second, the extent to which, demographically, the profession of phi- and intellectual productions of philosophers, thereby for the produc-

174 175 L. T. Outlaw (Jr.) Response to Commentators tion, legitimation, and mediation of what passes for ›knowledge‹ in I remain convinced that a great deal more transformative pro- academic Philosophy and, further still, for the education of successive gressive work within and on the APA has to be accomplished, and generations of college and university students who take courses in the sustained, to have the profession and its practices manifest much discipline and draw on their learning experiences, to whatever extent, more fully and appropriately commitments to democratic equality to orient themselves and to act in the world. For far too long these and respect, epistemologically as well as socio-politically. Epistemolo- production activities have proceeded in bad faith, sanctioned by ratio- gically, we stand to gain substantially by expanding the range of cri- nalizations that have served efforts to secure knowledge-production tical examples of knowledge-production through human evolution- and validation from contamination by sociological and historical fac- ary adaptations and flourishings that the world’s people-cultures tors while pursued in the contexts of institutions and organizations offer us through, in part, the stocks of knowledge they have devel- distorted by investments in White Racial Supremacy and by other oped. Waters provides a poignant example: that of stable, long-run- invidious considerations. ning democratic confederacies that were forged by Indigenous peo- The sanctioning of a Committee on the Status of American In- ples many years before peoples from Europe and elsewhere dians in Philosophy was an effort by officers and members of the APA emigrated to and settled on lands renamed ›the Americas‹ and devel- to provide a formal organizational context in which to articulate and oped, in the case of the USA, a democratic republic. pursue agendas by which to safeguard and improve the professional However, I am convinced that even more such work must be status of those Waters refers to as »American Indians,« and to con- accomplished in individual programs and departments that teach Phi- sider ways by which to increase their numbers among professional losophy in institutions of higher education, high schools, middle philosophers. This effort was in keeping with a broader, hard-won schools, elementary schools. These are the contexts in which demo- agenda of the APA to recognize and support diversity/pluralism in cratic recognition and respect, invested in teaching the thinkers and philosophizing that was a consequence of the diversity/pluralism of texts that become legitimated when included in curricula as exem- peoples’ life-worlds in which the diverse population of professional plars of accomplished philosophizing, can be particularly impactful philosophers were nurtured. Subsequently, a Committee on Inclu- in addressing many of Waters’ concerns regarding longstanding fail- siveness in the Profession was chartered, with the chairperson also ures to cultivate such regard for Indigenous peoples. These are the having membership on the APA’s Board of Officers, to serve as the contexts in which to engage in the cultivating work that will be most board-level committee for attending to organizational and profes- likely to produce more academic philosophers from among Indigen- sional issues that transcend the charters of the ›diversity committees‹ ous peoples. This work should be endorsed and supported, not im- serving particular constituencies (committees on Black; women; paired, by the APA. Asian and Asian-American; Hispanic; lesbian, gay, bi-sexual, and Would such efforts result in a substantial increase in the num- transgender; and Indigenous philosophers). ber of philosophers who are descendants of the continents’ Indigen- It is to the Committee on Inclusiveness in the Profession, then, ous peoples? Perhaps. But only if more such persons become con- that I believe Waters’ account of the change-of-name, demographic vinced that a career as a teacher-scholar of academic Philosophy is a scope, and agenda of the committee charged with attending to profes- viable and worthwhile choice. The convincing case is not to be made sional matters concerning ›American Indian‹/Indigenous philoso- by the APA as an organization, which exists, first and foremost, to phers must be directed for initial adjudication, first and foremost by serve persons who have already made a decision to become a profes- philosophers, and by assisting activist thinker-scholars from other sional philosopher. Rather, the persuasive case tends to be experi- disciplines and contexts of service, who are themselves descendants enced during the years of undergraduate education, especially, lar- of Indigenous peoples. I have already taken a critical position in this gely through the influence of particularly impactful teachers (who response on failures of recognition and respect involved in imposi- need not all be descendants of Indigenous peoples; I never had a tea- tions of renamings on Indigenous peoples who had already forged cher of academic Philosophy who was a person of African descent), identities and registered those in names of their choosing. and through the experiences of impactful intellectual stimulation and

176 177 L. T. Outlaw (Jr.) Response to Commentators growth through formal and informal learning-situations fostered by tices and/or judgments that call for assessments regarding propriety such teachers. and justice are matters of institutionally-local jurisdiction, though The APA continues to support efforts to foster renovations of these can sometimes be influenced through mobilized letter-writing course syllabi to include more materials of philosophical significance and publicity campaigns that can include the participation of APA- produced by thoughtful persons whose life-worlds, identities, and affiliated persons, officers, and committees. Even so, success in influ- life-agendas have not been forged in, nor are in service to, life-worlds encing such situations requires that work building principled demo- and agendas of peoples of Europe or Euro-America. In addition, sum- cratic solidarity must have been accomplished and nurtured, or be mer programs targeting young women and men of people-groups forged, through a campaign organized to influence a particular situa- with low numbers in the profession can help to increase the numbers, tion (or pattern of similar situations), particularly among the officers as has been the case through summer programs offered by Philoso- and members of the diversity committees, and among members of phy departments at Rutgers University and the Pennsylvania State other organizations affiliated with the APA. University. One or more of the APA Divisions has supported these Finally, we should take particular care in determining just how programs. Why not a program targeting young Indigenous under- valuable a critique of national or international organizations such as graduates? the APA can be in terms of providing critical understandings by The use of the APA as a case-study of to what extent, and how which to attend to, and struggle to correct, historic injustices consti- well, democratic equality of regard and respect has been institutiona- tutive of the very formation and continuing structuring of life within lized by and among professionals who philosophize about such im- nation-states. In my judgment, Waters’ case-study, while instructive, portant matters is appropriate and, in exploring the questions, can be does not suffice to provide corrective leverage on injustices perpetu- very instructive. However, it is crucial that we be clear about the ex- ated well beyond organizations of persons whose professional lives tent to which the organization can have direct impact on the numbers are played out in the contexts of institutions of higher education. of persons who decide to become professional academic philosophers, Still, within such institutions and organizations much important and have direct impact on the hiring, promotion, and tenuring of progressive, transformative work can be accomplished with varying professional philosophers. To the best of my knowledge, the APA mediated impacts on the social orders within which the organizations has no direct leverage on these important matters; rather, these are and institutions are situated. Institutions of higher education, because adjudicated within the context of individual institutions and their de- they are chartered to sustain socio-political life through the reproduc- partments and programs, though individual professional philoso- tive socialization of, and mediation of knowledges to, successive gen- phers, many of whom may well be members of the APA, do influence erations being prepared to become heirs of the social order, are espe- decision-making through formal and informal communications and cially pertinent sites for cultivating and practicing principles of recommendations. democratic equality of regard and respect without distortion by sec- It is the deliberate disconnect between the APA and departments ondary commitments to principles of recognition and reward in keep- and programs of Philosophy in individual institutions that accounts ing with meritocratic considerations regarding capabilities and ac- for the absence of direct leverage on departmental and program prac- complishment. Here, then, is the key point of leverage for the force tices: the APA is organized not to serve as anything approaching an of Water’s challenge: that we endeavor to determine, and correct accrediting agency, even regarding standardized curricula for under- where needed, that our academic institutions, and the professional graduate majors or minors, or for graduate degrees. This deliberate organizations of academics, are structured foundationally by demo- structuring of the independence of individual institutions’ depart- cratic equality of regard and respect and, consequently, are inclusive ments and programs of Philosophy from APA influence and author- through deliberate efforts devoted to nurturing diversity and plural- ity guarantees the organization’s impotence regarding, and freedom ism of capable persons of life-worlds and cultures from the full range from culpability and responsibility for, improprieties and injustices in of evolutionary successes at adaptation and flourishing. institutional situations. Consequently, attending to instances of prac-

178 179 L. T. Outlaw (Jr.) Response to Commentators

III Response to Mario Wenning historicist understanding of our species that conditions, substantively, how I approach the work of forging understandings of democracy and Mario Wenning’s response is so very rich with considerations that a of instantiating instances of ›democratic‹ social practices and arrange- proper response would require a full essay from me, which would be ments. When such understandings are sanctioned epistemologically more than is expected or acceptable on this occasion. I will focus my and thereby valorized as instances of ›knowledge,‹ they then provide response, then, for the most part, on the first of what Wenning iden- rational (and rationalized) grounds for legitimations of normativity. tified as two issues raised by my »metatheoretical observations« Such efforts have histories, as Wenning notes. This very Confluence- (Wenning 2015: 154): namely, »the coupling of an evolutionary and initiated exchange is a shared international effort to revise considera- a democratic perspective« (ibid.). tions of democracy with mindfulness of global socio-cultural diversi- Wenning’s worry: ties – that is, to contribute to directed efforts to ›evolve‹ notions of democracy. A structuring anticipation of this Confluence-initiated […] that the adoption of an evolutionary framework threatens to commit Outlaw to a detached third-person perspective when it comes to engaging discussion, I believe, is that instantiations of praxes guided by revised with what he refers to as the mechanisms of social reproduction through considerations of democracy made more fit for global diversities individual and group competition […] Such a stance would be at odds with would contribute, substantively, to human well-being. the democratic spirit evoked by Outlaw. And yet, Outlaw sees strategies of Thus, I disagree with Wenning that »[t]he normative dimension survival from the third-person perspective of an evolutionary theorist or goes beyond contexts of securing self-preservation and orderliness« social anthropologist rather than as a member of a society engaged in the (ibid.: 156). Further on Wenning argues that »[b]y subsuming re- democratic exchange about ideas based on more or less convincing reasons flective and creative acts of deliberation to strategies of evolution- within democratic public spheres. (ibid.: 155) ary success […]« (ibid.: 157) I fail »to acknowledge the normative First, I believe, Wenning is wrong about my offering being from »a achievement of practices of intersubjective legitimation« (ibid.). detached third-person perspective« rather than being offered »as a How are terms of ›normative achievement‹ set? What are the mea- member of a society engaged in the democratic exchange about ideas sures of ›achievement‹ if not by way of some terms of survival-suc- based on more or less convincing reasons within democratic public cess and enhanced well-being? I remain convinced that the primary spheres« (ibid.). My offering is written in first-person voice, as an work of praxes constituting the ›normative dimension‹ is, precisely, invited contributor to an explicitly democratic context of public dis- to secure preservation and orderliness, to secure ›the good life,‹ how- cursive exchange – Confluence – within which the reasonings consti- ever and by whomever conceived on behalf of some polity, current or tuting my offering were to be, have been, and will be subjected to desired. Such efforts, I believe, are hardly ever ›unreflective‹ because testing, by Wenning and by others. Furthermore, the ›evolutionary concerned with securing preservation while, Wenning claims, demo- perspective‹ articulated in my offering is drawn from public, socially cratic processes »replace instrumental calculation and contestation constructed reservoirs of theorizings about processes of evolution, with deliberation« (ibid.). Really? This claim is totally unpersuasive. which theorizings are subjected continuously to discussion, critique, Clear and compelling historical examples might persuade me other- and revision. And there is the crucial matter of my own self-under- wise … standing regarding my evolutionary perspective: that I, too, am both Finally, Wenning wonders whether my conception of learning is a product of and contributor to processes of evolution, socio-cultural »based on the prospects of species survival or a reflective conception (as a teacher-scholar, for example) and biological (as a father of three of the good life in a well-ordered society« (ibid.: 158). I should be sons). I am in no way ›detached‹ from such processes. clearer than was the case in my essay: the evolutionary perspective I It is with this self-understanding that I must respond to the sev- invoked was not restricted to concern for »mere survival.« Rather, it eral questions raised by Wenning regarding »the relationship be- was intended as a conceptualization of the situating context for all tween the democratic and the evolutionary perspective« (ibid.: 156). that humans do, including engaging in reflective conceptualizations The evolutionary perspective provides me with a particular mode of and discussions, democratic or otherwise, of »good life« for whom-

180 181 L. T. Outlaw (Jr.) Response to Commentators ever in a society however »well-ordered« (ibid.). Because of the them to do so. Rather, I argue for democratic ›integration‹ of diverse anthropological diversity and diverse historicities characterizing our populations – unity in diversity, many and one. species, I endeavored to argue, such conceptualizations have been, will Otherwise, there is much with which I agree with Wenning’s be, diverse. My emphasis on equality of regard and respect was of- critique of the history of conceptualizations and instantiations of lib- fered as an initial normative grounding for democratic praxis through eral democracy, of the ideological masqueradings of the political phi- which to work through differing conceptualizations and instantia- losophy of liberal democracy as »value neutral« (ibid.: 159). No need, tions of, or quests for, shared life well-ordered, always weighing these I think, to belabor those partaking of Confluence with recapitulations against the questions whether, in what ways, to what extent, if at all, of the critiques of the lies of the masquerades. Particularly inspiring any particular instance, current or proposed, preserves and enhances were Wenning’s sharing of the notion of »all-under-heaven« (ibid.: the survival and well-being of humans, other species, our planet 164) by Chinese political philosopher Zhao Tingyang and that of (which Marx, in speaking about ›nature,‹ characterized as ›man’s ex- »equality of all things« by Chinese scholar Wang Hui (ibid.: 165). tended body‹). Hence, for me it is not appropriate to position an evo- Both notions, Wenning makes clear, enrich considerations of equality lutionary perspective as an alternative to a democratic perspective. in ways that challenge the »anthropocentric bias« that deeply affects, There are more challenges in Wenning’s response worthy of at- even afflicts, conceptualizations of democracy with long heritages in tention, particularly the discussion of »the scope and interpretation of Western polities. I am very much open to having my own taken-up equality of regard and respect« that I made foundational to my evolu- notion of equal regard and respect for diverse peoples be refined tionary perspective (ibid.). Wenning worries that: through engagement with the considerations Wenning has brought to the fore. The emphasis on democratic values, especially that of equality, is in danger of losing its emancipatory force, as well as its capacity to sustain, integrate and foster significantly different life forms, just at the moment when the –Lucius T. Outlaw (Jr.), Vanderbilt University, politics of appealing to these values are being reduced to a mechanism of Nashville, Tennessee, USA self-preservation […] If these values are interpreted as an extension of the evolutionary drive to gain competitive advantage over other individuals, groups or species, it would simply ignore the universalistic dimension of equality. (ibid.: 159–160)

I agree. However, an ›evolutionary perspective‹ need not interpret efforts by social groups seeking to preserve themselves as requiring destructive competition. Rather, an enlarged sense of human diversi- ties, and of the significance of particular diversities (cultural, geno- mic, for example) for enhanced prospects for the survival and well- being of groups that partake of them in fruitful ways, could, should, hopefully will lead to reduced destructive competition and enhanced cooperation that help to preserve life-enhancing diversities as a coun- ter to diversity-eliminating processes of homogenizations. In explor- ing tendencies toward homogenization, I would urge Wenning to take more care with key concepts: in advocating the ›integration‹ of diverse migrant populations into receiving polities, it seems that Wenning is advocating the assimilation of the migrants into a ›melting pot.‹ Mi- grating persons might well wish to assimilate; I would not require

182 183 References References T. Fitzgerald, »Ambedkar, Buddhism, and the Concept of Religion,« S. M. Michael (ed.), Untouchable: Dalits in Modern India, Boulder, Colorado; London: Lynne Rienner, 1999, pp. 57–71. R. Geuss, History and Illusion in Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. L. Harris, ›Philosophy and Flagships,‹ Philosophy and the Black Experience, APA Newsletter, Vol. 10, No. 2, Spring 2011, pp. 2–3. E. Holmes Pearson, ›Iroquois and the Founding Fathers,‹ teachinghistory.org, (URL: http://teachinghistory.org/history-content/ask-a-historian/24099; last accessed on 25 August 2014). D. Kerr, »Paradoxes of Tradition and Modernity at the New Frontier: China, T. W. Adorno, »Progress,« in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, Islam, and the Problem of ›Different Heavens‹,« in: W. A. Callahan and H. W. Pickford (trans.), New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, E. Barabantseva (eds.), China Orders the World: Normative Soft Power pp. 143–160. and Foreign Policy, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 2011, S. Angle, Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy, Cambridge: Polity, pp. 143–179. 2012. D. N. Lorenzen, »Bhakti,« in S. Mittal and G. Thursby (eds.), The Hindu K. A. Appiah, »Out of Africa: Topologies of Nativism,« in D. LaCapra (ed.), World, London: Routledge, 2004, pp. 185–209. The Bounds of Race: Perspectives on Hegemony and Resistance, Ithaca: A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea, Cornell University Press, 1991, pp. 134–163. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1936. B. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism’s Challenge to Democracy, New C. W. Mills, The Racial Contract, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, York: Times Books, 1995. 1999. A. Barua, ›Negotiating »Difference« in Indic Thought: Reflections on Lucius M. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Outlaw’s Essay,‹ Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies, 2015, Press, 2001. Vol. 2, pp. 121–131. L. T. Outlaw (Jr.), ›Democratic Limitations on Diversity and Pluralism?‹ Con- Z. Baumann, Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty, Cambridge: Po- fluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies, 2015a, Vol. 2, pp. 109–118. lity, 2006. L. T. Outlaw (Jr.), ›Response to Commentators,‹ Confluence: Online Journal of C. A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Com- World Philosophies, 2015b, Vol. 2, pp. 169–186. munication in India, 1780–1870, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, Stanford, California: Stanford University 1996. Press, 1988. G. Beckerlegge, Swami Vivekananda’s Legacy of Service: A Study of the Ra- S. L. Pratt, Native Pragmatism: Rethinking the Roots of American Democ- makrishna Math and Mission, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006. racy, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002. P. L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Reli- C. Ram-Prasad, ›Knowledge and Action I: Means to the Human End in Bhatta gion, New York: Anchor Books, 1990. Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta,‹ Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 28, P. L. Berger, and T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise 2000, pp. 1–24. in the Sociology of Knowledge, New York: Anchor Books, 1967. M. J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, New York: Cambridge Uni- J. Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, New York: Forham University Press, versity Press, 1998. 2005. S. Sarkar, »Indian Nationalism and the Politics of Hindutva,« in D. Ludden P. Cartledge, ›Ostracism: Selection and De-Selection in Ancient Greece,‹ His- (ed.) Making India Hindu: Religion, Community, and the Politics of De- tory and Policy, 20 July 2006, (URL: http://www.historyandpolicy.org/pol- mocracy in India, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 270–293. icy-papers/papers/ostracism-selection-and-de-selection-in-ancient-greece; D. Saunders, Arrival City: How the Largest Migration in History is Reshap- last accessed on 25 August 2014). ing Our World, Munich: Blessing, 2011. J. D. Dunne, »Key Features of Dharmakīrti’s Apoha Theory,« in M. Siderits, R. Sennett, The Corrosion of Character, The Personal Consequences Of Work T. Tillemans, and A. Chakrabarti, Apoha, New York: Columbia University In the New Capitalism, London and New York: Norton, 1998. Press, 2011, pp. 84–108. A. W. Thrasher, The Advaita Vedānta of the Brahma-Siddhi, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993.

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186 My Journey in Philosophy: Highlights

Abstract This autobiographical essay addresses the author’s evolution as a La- tin American/Latina philosopher in the United States, focusing on a shift of perspectives she undertook through the 1970s and ’80s as she gradually became more engaged with her own Latin American cultur- al roots. She traces the complex conditions that allowed her to pursue a systematic interest in Latin American philosophy and to defend the philosophical methodologies needed to sustain it (considered margin- al to mainstream philosophy). Showing how philosophical dialogue across cultures can break down at times but also how it can overcome its ruptures, she argues that thinking critically at the limits means enacting the possibility of listening to underrepresented or ›new‹ speakers. She claims that this involves the ability to cross the gap between the conventional and the new and that a far richer philoso- phical life is possible when full attention is given to the voices of women, underrepresented others, and philosophers from the global South.

Keywords Latin American philosophy, Latin American feminist philosophy, comparative philosophy, Eurocentrism, philosophy of culture.

It is unusual for me to write an autobiographical essay. In my teach- ing practice I have often mentioned personal experiences in a variety of pedagogical contexts. In research and publications, however, I shy away from this, perhaps influenced by the still traditional notion that the attention needs to be on the questions addressed, at some distance from the subject who raises them. There’s also the concern that being too personal detracts with the process of philosophizing, in the sense that it would be egocentric to focus on oneself. I do claim, unapologe- tically, that the philosophy I write is a product of my life experience;

189 O. Schutte My Journey in Philosophy: Highlights nonetheless it is a transformed product. Unless I remark on some book was largely impenetrable, yet I was fascinated by it. I couldn’t experience explicitly, one cannot often tell from the thoughts on the put it down. From my recollection of more than fifty years later, page what the actual experiences were that led to those thoughts. As a among other things this book discussed the tension between faith writer I do not feel like a detached intellect producing a conceptual and reason; it covered medieval debates between nominalists and rea- result, but rather as a living, embodied human pursuing a question lists regarding the nature of the real, and questions regarding essence or issue that means a lot to me at the point in time when I write about and existence. These discussions captivated me. I had never before it. The outcome of this process is to contribute to the larger on-going encountered anything like it. I would have probably majored in phi- philosophical discussion of the issue at hand through the lens of what losophy but only a minor was available. my own life-experience can lend to the topic. With Spanish as my native language, I took the unlikely course In any case, I call this contribution ›My Journey in Philosophy‹ of majoring in English literature. My minors were philosophy and because ›journey‹ is an open-ended term, unlike the Western sense of history. I recall avoiding courses in Spanish thinking (perhaps too ›development,‹ which is conceptualized in terms of stages (whether rashly) that, as a native speaker, I could read any work of future inter- linear or dialectical). A journey does not necessarily need to be linear est on my own. In what might seem hard to believe today (given my in the sense of a straight line (and, certainly, mine hasn’t been). It can later trajectory) my cultural interests as a teenager were Anglo- be curved, wavy, or circular; it can have detours, ups and downs, rest centric. I was still trying hard to adapt to our new life in the United areas, dead ends, rifts and abysses to cross, and the like. One might be States. It even became a matter of survival after my father died at the able to trace a line through all that but in that case I would look at the beginning of my senior year of college. Cuba represented a forbidden line aesthetically, as in a painting. Here some partial highlights. land for me, with the US blockade, the missile crisis, and the Cold War raging on. Latin America was not even a concept for me at the time. Of course, I knew of individual countries, but I lacked a concept of the I First Encounters With Formal Philosophy region as a historical or cultural construct. My geographical world south of the US ended at the Caribbean Sea. It wouldn’t be until the My first encounter with a philosophy book took place in Miami in the 1980s that I began to pursue systematically an interest in Latin Amer- summer of 1962. I was preparing to enter a local liberal arts Catholic ican philosophy and thought. How did this ›turn‹ in my awareness women’s college run by Dominican nuns. I was sixteen years old and happen? had only arrived as an immigrant from Cuba with my mother and As I write this, I am trying to explore this question not just for father two years earlier, in 1960. Later in the essay I touch on ways the reader, but for myself. The first thing that comes to mind is the in which the experience of the Cuban revolution of 1959 and the socio-cultural environment in which one is placed, or the opportu- move to the United States at the age of fourteen may have influenced nities that arise in the context of such environments. This basic layer my philosophical outlook, but for now, let’s place me back then as a of the preconditions for enabling or disabling certain experiences is freshman-to-be, fully concentrated on entering college. That summer necessary. For example, what if my parents had been experts in Latin the College sent all incoming students a short reading list on a wide American literature, or even fans of Spanish-language theater, films, variety of topics. They instructed us to read these books as we con- or culture, all of which were available in Cuba? Yet none of this was sidered our choices of major fields. the case. One of the books on this list was A Gilson Reader, an edited Rather, for entertainment I saw mostly Hollywood films or collection of essays by the French Catholic philosopher-historian Éti- (once TV was introduced) shows like Highway Patrol, or Roy Rogers enne Gilson (1884–1978).1 Given my background at the time, the with Dale Evans and his horse Trigger, dubbed in Spanish. In general, as a child I was taught to think that all (high) culture came from 1 E. Gilson, A Gilson Reader: Selected Writings, edited with an introduction, A. C. France and all science and technological innovations came from the Pegis (ed.), Garden City, New York: Hanover House, 1957. United States. A good education meant studying English and French

190 191 O. Schutte My Journey in Philosophy: Highlights so as to combine science and culture, as it were. Fortunately, these (and, in some views, the predictable) outcome that, if a person is re- languages, which I began to study in Cuba as a child, would prove to peatedly interpellated in a particular way, s/he will become the sub- be very helpful for scholarly purposes later in my life. But what was ject (or assume the subject position) corresponding to the particular missing? And how would I know what I missed? structure (which is also a power-structure) of the processes/practices Fast forward to 1973, the year I entered the Ph.D. program in of interpellation by which s/he is ›hailed.‹ philosophy at Yale. By that time I had obtained a Master’s degree in At International House, where I lived for about a year, there philosophy at Miami University in Ohio. There I had my first en- were residents from a wide variety of places, including Japan, Yugo- counter with analytic philosophy. For its proponents it was ›philoso- slavia, Australia, Belgium, Italy, Germany, Spain, and Venezuela. phy‹ as such (without adjectives). My main interests were in aes- Pedro (from Spain) interpellated Carmen (from Venezuela) and me thetics and political philosophy and, to some degree, the history of (from Cuba/US) as Latin American. Carmen interpellated me as a philosophy, areas that I liked quite well. At Yale, though, the study Latin American like herself. Pedro also interpellated me as Cuban, of philosophy was qualitatively different. It was primarily a continen- and started inviting me to see some of the Cuban-made films that tal philosophy program (although the adjective was also not used were being shown on campus. He would say, »this might interest much). I liked post-Kantian continental philosophy far better than you since it’s a film from Cuba.« My introduction to Cuban culture, any type of philosophy I had studied before, and in 1978 graduated post-revolution, took place in New Haven through film and music happily with a dissertation on Nietzsche. I should also give much thanks in large part to my year at International House. With the credit to my dissertation advisor, George Schrader (1917–1998), who process of interpellation and the creation of this new subject position always encouraged me to write in my own voice. that arose for me as a Latin American and a Cuban abroad who could Apart from the strictly academic philosophy program, in my relate in a constructive sense to the film and music of Cuba in its first year at Yale I had the opportunity to live at a residence called revolutionary context (which up to that point, after landing in Miami, ›International House.‹ The residence included mostly Yale graduate as you recall, I had experienced as totally prohibited from my life), students and post-docs although a few residents attended other New the first seeds of my eventual Latin American identity were planted. Haven schools. In terms of my earlier question, how did (or could) my A similar experience took place in the summer of 1974 which I spent ›turn‹ in awareness happen (away from Anglocentrism or, later, Euro- in Munich taking a German course for foreign students. Among my centrism), let’s consider as one of the components of a socio-cultural classmates there were students from many parts of the world, but in environment necessary for such a turn the socio-linguistic practice of particular there were two students from Spain and one from Chile ›interpellation.‹ Interpellation is a concept usually associated with the with whom I socialized. The Spaniards interpellated the Chilean and theoretical work of Louis Althusser (1918–1990) (on ideologies), but me as Latin American. I confirmed then from daily experience in New it may be used more widely. Basically, it refers to the process by which Haven and Munich that Cuba, Chile, and Venezuela, to name a few, a person is addressed (or discursively engaged with) by an interlocu- formed part of a larger cultural network of peoples who could act and tor, a process that carries with it the ideological component of an as- interact among ourselves and with others not just as nationals of iso- signed social (subject) position. I believe that in Althusser’s example a lated countries but just as easily, as Latin Americans. It was therefore policeman hails someone nearby with the words: hey, you! (Althus- away from Cuba and away from Latin America that I discovered the ser 1971: 174)2 The person who is addressed this way becomes the basic elements of what it felt to be Latin American. I also learned part subject (or target) of interpellation and is likely to respond in the of its painful history, as it had been plagued by dictatorships and co- context in which s/he was interpellated. This leads to the possible lonialism.

2 L. Althusser, »Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Inves- tigation),« in Lenin and Philosophy, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971, pp. 127–186; see especially pp. 170–183.

192 193 O. Schutte My Journey in Philosophy: Highlights

II The 1980s in Retrospect in my life and thinking (on one side) and the social and/or normative expectations pressuring me to think in conformity with dominant In the 1980s, my search went much further and I crossed a number of trends (on the other). This is not to say that I wanted to be eccentric, significant cultural barriers. It was a monumental decade for me in a rebel, or a radical. I only wanted to seek a way to knowledge that as terms of experiences (good and bad) that shaped the rest of my life far as I could tell was not there (yet) to be studied, analyzed, or dis- and the expansion of my areas of research. Whereas in my graduate cussed. That project itself turned my quest into something radical, student years I could begin comparing, for example, the differences insofar as there were no existing normative constructs to control and between different Cubans in regard to how they felt about the Cuban manipulate a field that as yet lacked a canon and a recognizable aca- revolution or some of the similarities that Latin Americans from var- demic name (at least, in most US philosophy departments). ious countries shared despite originating in different lands, it wasn’t I should also add that my major project during this period was until the 1980s that I began to draw larger cross-cultural compari- completing my manuscript on Nietzsche, Beyond Nihilism (1984).3 sons. A sample of my activities and, in particular, the professional My book on Nietzsche also meant a kind of breakthrough in terms travel undertaken in the first five years of that decade will make this of providing a different (especially feminist) approach to Nietzsche’s clear. works. A few years later it may not have been so different since US In 1979–1980 (my second year as a tenure-track assistant pro- scholarship on Nietzsche became more diversified, but at the time I fessor at the University of Florida, Gainesville) I planned and taught was a very solitary writer when my first book came out. my first undergraduate course in Latin American philosophy. It was In October, 1981, Florida State University in Tallahassee hosted offered in the spring of 1980 and subsequently for the next two dec- the Tenth Interamerican Congress of Philosophy. By this time I had ades, at which point I moved to the University of South Florida in already taught my undergraduate course in Latin American philoso- Tampa. As a young assistant professor I had the opportunity to intro- phy twice. At this congress, for the first time I met living Latin Amer- duce new courses in the curriculum. My first syllabus described the ican philosophers, including Leopoldo Zea (1912–2004) and Enrique course’s main themes as: Dussel. In the next few years I would encounter them at other meet- ings and would become more familiar with their works. What struck The need for an authentic and original Latin American philosophy; the con- struction of a Latin American philosophy of history and culture; the role of me about Zea was his ability to expose the marginal status given to education in the struggle for freedom; the question of racial identity, racial Mexican philosophers such as himself vis-à-vis Anglophone and Eur- theory, and racial discrimination; and, finally, the experience of solitude, the opean philosophers. What he claimed was the need to be accepted need for solidarity, and the question of revolution. (PHI 3930 Syllabus, concretely in terms of a person’s cultural, historical, or linguistic spe- Spring 1980, mimeo) cificity, while also being treated equally as any other person coming from a more dominant zone of the world. Zea was a major promoter The issue of authenticity was important for me when I started reflect- of Latin American thought and its history. Dussel adopted the posi- ing on what it meant to do Latin American philosophy (in an aca- tion of an outsider to systems of oppression, both political (influenced demic universe dominated by the Anglo-American and European by development theory) and metaphysical (highly influenced by Em- schools of philosophical thought). I was also carrying on a parallel line manuel Levinas [1906–1995] and the theology of liberation). He ar- of thought arguing that feminism (in particular, the disengagement of gued from the position of a subject of liberation as such although his women’s lives from patriarchal frameworks and structures) lay the preference (and explicit political orientation) was for Third World grounds for the possibility of women’s authenticity. Later in time I liberation. He also conceptualized philosophers of liberation as advo- became critical of the concept of authenticity insofar as it carries cates for the victims of oppression. At this congress I decided that strongly essentialist claims and is often associated with purist (unten- able) subject positions. But initially the concept served me well in that 3 O. Schutte, Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche without Masks, Chicago: University of it put a question mark between a way of being that I wanted to follow Chicago Press, 1984.

194 195 O. Schutte My Journey in Philosophy: Highlights upon completion of my Nietzsche book and attaining tenure, my next Cuba, something that eventually happened in subsequent years.)4 A major project would be on Latin American philosophy. Chilean musical group played one night. There was an exhibition of The following June (1982) I was visiting Munich when I read in works by Frida Kahlo (1907–1954) and Tina Modotti (1896–1942) the morning paper that a Latin American Cultural Festival – Hori- nearby. The audience was full of Latin Americans, including Central zonte ’82 – was being held in West Berlin that week. Without further and South Americans. It was a wonderful experience for me to find delay, I packed my bags and took the train to West Berlin. The West that island of Latin American culture in the heart of Berlin, a city that Germans cautioned me that this train passed through the DDR (East had suffered as much pain and division as some in our continent. Germany) on its path to West Berlin and that the East Germans After this trip, one world congress or international conference would be running the train during that part of the journey. I did go followed another. In August of that same year (1982) I travelled to through the overwhelming experience of crossing that Cold War bor- Mexico (and Latin America) for the first time to attend the Tenth der especially as the train changed hands between the DDR border World Congress of Sociology in Mexico City. A year later, in August and West Berlin. And once in West Berlin, after the festival ended, I 1983, I travelled to Montréal to attend the Seventeenth World Con- took a guided tour of East Berlin, with the tour bus crossing the fa- gress of Philosophy. At the end of September, 1983, I travelled to mous ›Checkpoint Charlie‹ point at Friedrichstrasse. For me, this was Mexico City again to attend the Eleventh International Congress of an unforgettable experience, to see the two Berlins and the two Ger- the Latin American Studies Association. A year later in July 1984 I manys so divided. I thought back about Cuba and how I was on one travelled to Bogotá to attend the Third International Congress of La- side (in the US) of a similar wall. Also, while the train rode through tin American Philosophy. I was awarded a Fulbright Senior Research the DDR, slowing down at times, I noticed some familiar human ges- Fellowship at UNAM, Mexico City, beginning August, 1985, and in tures: a couple holding hands, a man helping an elderly lady cross the November of that year attended the Eleventh Interamerican Congress street. I was seeing through the train’s window that there were hu- of Philosophy in Guadalajara. And then the most existential of all mans showing affection and kindness to each other there, as they breakthroughs took place in December, 1986, when I was able to tra- might anywhere else in the world. It saddened me that there were so vel back to Cuba to attend a Latin American film festival in Havana, many walls and divisions around the world, when you could find acts the city where I was born and raised. This took place in the second of kindness on both sides of those rigid boundaries. half of the eighties, about which I will speak shortly. The real joy of that trip was the Latin American cultural festival. The events of those years – the people I met, the papers I heard, It was my first exposure to a vibrant Latin American cultural com- the bookstores I visited while abroad, the books and artesanías I munity. Ironically (but how else might it have happened to someone brought home with me, the collaborative communications that with a Eurocentric education), my first intensive experience of Latin emerged, the engaging head to toe with a field of research that most American culture took place in West Berlin. Horizonte ’82 had been US philosophers did not even know exist – this was the living materi- programmed primarily as a writers’ festival. I did not get to see Octa- al out of which my second book was born (to be published a decade vio Paz (1914–1998), who apparently left after giving the opening later in 1993).5 speech the first day. But there were many other wonderful writers So, again, looking at the question: how could my perspective there, including the Brazilian anthropologist Darcy Ribeiro (1922– have shifted from the predominantly Anglo-Eurocentric one in which 1997), and writers Manuel Puig (1932–1990), Juan Rulfo (1917– I was educated (even as far back as my early life in Cuba) to one 1986), and Luis Rafael Sánchez. They either read from their works seeking to find, through an exploration of my Latin American cultur- or addressed particular themes related to their writing, for example, what it was like to write from a place of exile. I think it was Puig who 4 said that he defined an exiled writer as someone who could not be I have had papers published in three Cuban journals: Casa de las Américas (1998), Temas (2008), and Revolución y Cultura (2013). published in his own country. (That led me to think about how nice 5 O. Schutte, Cultural Identity and Social Liberation in Latin American Thought, it would be if some day I would have a philosophy paper published in Albany: SUNY Press, 1993.

196 197 O. Schutte My Journey in Philosophy: Highlights al roots, what the former perspective was missing (especially in phi- after twenty-six years of absence. This meant that I could connect losophy)? The answer shows that when social conditions arose where with the memories and experiences of the first fourteen years of my I began to be interpellated as a Latin American, I responded favorably life and start healing the split that had divided my life into two sepa- and found a type of cultural resonance that both excited and chal- rate tracks that needed to be reconnected. lenged me to seek out more knowledge as well as more contact with The main problem affecting my professional life was that in the source. It nourished me spiritually and aesthetically, intensifying 1986 my home department of philosophy at the University of Florida my appreciation of life. From the solitary position in which I found was subjected to an administrative disciplinary action which placed it myself as a graduate student, I eventually found links with other in receivership (with the added threat of abolition). This situation was philosophers who, like myself, were Latin American, even though not fully resolved until 1989, at which time a thorough curriculum they did not live in the United States. Some of them did not live in ›reform‹ was implemented (away from the history of philosophy, po- their original countries either due to our shared turbulent history of litical philosophy, and European continental philosophy). The depart- Latin American politics. As the decade moved on, I would also find ment changed its mission to what I have often called ›hard-line‹ An- very supportive colleagues in philosophy who specialized in this area glo-American analytic philosophy. Not all analytic philosophy is of in the United States – among them, Jorge Gracia, Oscar Martí, and this sort, but the type that was imposed on my department was highly Amy Oliver. We were active in the Society for Iberian and Latin intolerant of any methodology or concept of philosophy that was American Thought which usually met alongside the APA Eastern Di- rooted in, or that acknowledged as a base, a socio-cultural concept of vision meetings. existence. This meant that while my philosophical work was gaining recognition nationally and internationally, back home in my own de- partment it was placed at best at the margins of philosophy. During III Advances, Setbacks, and Possibilities this period and subsequent decades, I learned to defend my conception of philosophy as a socio-historical construct before a vast range of The second half of the 1980s was quite difficult for me because these philosophical audiences, whether supportive or hostile. years reversed the relative freedom of inquiry that I had benefitted Earlier I discussed how a shift away from Anglo-Eurocentrism from in my earlier academic employment. Fortunately, there was can take place through a process of interpellation that creates affinity plenty to keep me busy through my continued involvement in con- groups around theoretical or philosophical subjects that excite us in ferences and projects related to Latin America, and the opportunity to cultural (or cross-cultural) fields other than the mainstream. This engage more closely with Latin American women philosophers and process works when there are opportunities and rewards for the new feminists across the disciplines. An important highlight was the First types of knowledge to develop and to be embraced by the academy. International Meeting of Feminism and Philosophy held at UNAM in But what about resistance to such knowledge from defenders of the Mexico City in 1988, co-organized by Graciela Hierro (1931–2003) in status quo, as it happened by the stroke of an administrative pen in Mexico and the Midwest chapter of the Society for Women in Philo- my department? Or what about times when resources are limited and sophy in the US, where María Lugones was active. The Second Inter- we are told we must stick to ›the (traditional) core‹? national Meeting of Philosophical Feminism (1989) took place in Bue- Besides the process of interpellation mentioned above, there is a nos Aires, Argentina. These meetings brought together feminist second, more difficult step one may take to reverse the focus of phi- philosophers and theorists from the United States and Latin Ameri- losophy away from Anglo-Eurocentrism. This step is more difficult ca.6 Most importantly, in 1986 I was finally able to travel to Cuba – because it involves detaching oneself from past privilege (the greater the privilege, the harder it is to shed it). Ultimately, this is what com- parative philosophy may demand of mainstream philosophy: a recon- 6 Papers by G. Hierro, M. L. Femenías, and G. Gutiérrez Castañeda were published under the title ›Special Cluster on Spanish and Latin American Feminist Philosophy‹ figuration of its identity and world-view. The pleasures, let’s say, of in Hypatia, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1994, pp. 164–192. becoming acquainted with another cultural tradition are not necessa-

198 199 O. Schutte My Journey in Philosophy: Highlights rily sufficient to unseat the hegemony of a dominant outlook as long out of, and responding to, the specific socio-cultural conditions found as that cultural difference is subsumed hierarchically as inferior in in Latin America? Those who favor the first view tend to see Latin method or value. As I reflect on my lived experience, I think that American philosophy as an extension of Western philosophy (what- one way to visualize what’s at stake when a philosopher begins to ever this means to them) or else as a type of ›applied philosophy‹ notice that something is missing in mainstream philosophy (some- where the philosophical aspect refers to something Anglophone phi- thing that cannot be resolved by continuing to read ever more articles losophers recognize as legitimate and the ›applied‹ aspect refers to a and books of the same type) is to imagine a coin, with one living focus on Latin America. The main problem with seeing Latin Amer- entirely on one side of it. Doesn’t the question ultimately arise: ican philosophy as an extension of Western philosophy is that it often what’s on the other side? And, further, how can I get to the other side rests on a binary construction where the terms original/copy and without falling off an abyss? Who has the intellectual courage to seek authentic/inauthentic relegate whatever is produced in Latin Ameri- out what is missing? ca to a deficiently rational or idiosyncratic status. Moreover, the two One may compare two actual things, whether they are of similar other main streams of thought that characterize the region – its in- status or asymmetrically positioned in power vis-à-vis one another; digenous and Afro-descendant world-views – are unlikely to be given whether they are internally homogeneous (as hardly anything is) or full and equal consideration. Assigning the status of applied philoso- internally diversified. But perhaps riskier yet not altogether unrea- phy to Latin American philosophy avoids the problem of inferiority. sonable is to stretch out a comparison between the actual and the It tends, however, to ›normalize‹ Latin American philosophy along possible, between the spoken and the (yet) unspoken, the visible and mainstream understandings of philosophy outside of Latin America, the (still) invisible. I am not speaking about mysticism. I speak about a strategy that eliminates or could fail to account for (and therefore representation and its limits: discursive representation, conceptual give credit to) its distinctly differential aspects. On the other side of representation. In philosophy, this includes its methods and systems. the spectrum, categorizing Latin American philosophy solely as a dis- What are the limits of legitimation for philosophical speech or dis- tinctive school of philosophy runs the risk of essentializing its con- course? Thinking critically and radically at the limits means enacting tents and rigidifying its boundaries, thereby isolating it from the the possibility of listening to underrepresented or ›new‹ speakers. It’s complex set of interactions characterizing the multi-faceted intellec- the ability to cross that gap between the conventional and the new, tual trends found in today’s world. Clearly, there has been a shift in bearing in mind that some privileges are no longer acceptable, and global politics after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the subse- that it is worth seeking the multi-dimensionality of a deeper and ri- quent disintegration of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European cher form of philosophical life. allies. While up to that time one could situate a distinctive type of Latin American philosophy in the context of the Third World, once the Second World collapsed, conceptually, so did the Third. IV Latin American Philosophy in the Context The categories global North and global South currently help to of Global Changes situate Latin America in light of the reconfiguration of global politics in the 1990s. To seek distinctive traits in Latin American philosophy To this day, there is no consensus on what is meant by ›Latin Amer- today, comparable to what was going on from the sixties to the eigh- ican philosophy.‹7 For example, is it primarily philosophy produced in ties, is to place it in the global South, in dynamic interaction with Latin America but judged by standards favored in the United States or other global South regions as well as regions in the global North. This Europe, or is it primarily a distinctive school of philosophizing arising accounts for the rise of postcolonial and decolonial approaches to knowledge and cultural politics. In other words, the radical questions that philosophers like Zea, Dussel, and Augusto Salazar Bondy 7 For example, in the volume I co-edited with Susana Nuccetelli and Otávio Bueno we decided to keep the definition open to more than one view. See A Companion to Latin (1927–1974) were raising in the 1960s – how can Latin American American Philosophy, Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. philosophy address the needs of the people of this region and others

200 201 O. Schutte My Journey in Philosophy: Highlights in the Third World? – has shifted to the post-Soviet era question: how containing Rorty’s presentation and the critical notes on the problem can Latin American (and Latino/a) philosophies best address the of US philosophical hegemony by my University of Florida colleague needs of the more disenfranchised people suffering the effects of co- Tom Auxter (who had attended both this Interamerican congress and lonialism, racism, sexism and their sequels in the global South and in the earlier one in Tallahassee [1981]) and myself. Auxter noted the its immigrant communities in the North? Whether in the 1960s or discrepancies in attitudes by the Canadian plenary speakers Venant today these questions address major intra-cultural and cross-cultural Cauchy (1924–2008) and Kenneth Schmitz, both of whom made issues, the fabric of which keeps alive innovative epistemologies and overt initiatives in favor of transcontinental diversity and the An- methodologies rooted in the socio-cultural conditions of philosophiz- glo-Eurocentric narrowness particularly evident in Rorty’s presenta- ing. tion.10 Needless to say, the Latin Americans who spoke and whose turn it was to host the meetings were explicit in supporting cultural diversity. Auxter observed: V From Cultural Imperialism to Cultural Alterity Several of the plenary speakers referred to Hegel as an example of the arro- gance with which European thinkers have placed themselves at the center of Evidence of the shift in the cultural location of Latin American philo- the world’s philosophical stage. Those outside ›the center‹ tire of reading sophy vis-à-vis global cultural politics can be found in the way I ad- histories of European thought presented as histories of the world’s thought. dressed these matters in the mid-1980s compared to the late 1990s. They know from their own experience that there is another face to the logos For this comparison I take two slightly different texts in which I ad- – with other senses of place, other versions of history, and other construc- dressed the asymmetrical relations between North American and La- tions of human reality. The European face of the logos has cast a very long tin American philosophers. The first is a short critical commentary on shadow, obscuring the face expressing cultural diversity. (Auxter 1986: 756) the absence of a philosophical dialogue between US philosophers (on Rorty had presented a highly erudite analysis of the evolution of the one side) and Canadian and Latin American philosophers (on the European continental and Anglo-American analytic schools of philo- other) at the Eleventh Interamerican Congress of Philosophy held in sophy throughout the twentieth century. Although he was expressing 1985 in Guadalajara. The second is a paper I presented initially as part only his own opinion and doing so from a non-foundationalist per- of a panel on Cultural Relativism and Global Feminism at the APA spective, these qualifiers did not come clearly across. His manner of Pacific Division meetings in 1997, later published in Hypatia under presentation and general lack of acknowledgment to other philoso- the title ›Cultural Alterity.‹8 By the late 1990s the mapping of Latin phical sources appeared insensitive to the audience. In the discussion America in a global context was quite different from its place in 1985, period he stated that philosophy could only be exercised in ›enclaves yet the concerns expressed in the critical report and the paper speak to of freedom.‹ similar issues and problems. In my Notes on this event, I commented that I had heard some The congress in Guadalajara elicited a debate over cultural im- prominent Latin Americans refer to this session as ›un gran desen- perialism because there was a kind of mismatch between the dis- cuentro‹ (a great dis-encounter).11 One attends these international courses of cultural diversity and inclusion used by the plenary speak- meetings in large part to dialogue with one’s counterparts in other ers from Latin America and Canada, and the absence of these con- cerns in the plenary speakers from the United States (Richard Rorty 9 [1931–2007] and Hilary Putnam). A special report on this matter 10 See R. Rorty, ›From Logic to Language to Play: A Plenary Address to the Intera- was published in the APA Proceedings and Addresses (June 1986) merican Congress,‹ Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Asso- ciation, Vol. 59, No. 5, 1986, pp. 747–53; T. Auxter, ›The Debate over Cultural Im- perialism,‹ Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 8 O. Schutte, ›Cultural Alterity: Cross-Cultural Communication and Feminist Theo- Vol. 59, No. 5, 1986, pp. 753–757. ry In North-South Contexts,‹ Hypatia, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1998, pp. 53–72. 11 O. Schutte, ›Notes on the Issue of Cultural Imperialism,‹ Proceedings and Ad- 9 Donald Davidson (1917–2003) was also invited but he could not attend. dresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 59, No. 5, 1986, pp. 757–759.

202 203 O. Schutte My Journey in Philosophy: Highlights parts of the world, but here we ended in an impasse rather than a my limited horizons in the light of asymmetrically given relations dialogue. As I wrote: marked by sexual, social, cultural, or other differences« (Schutte 1998: 54). Building on the work of Julia Kristeva and other feminist At the plenary sessions, the U.S. philosophers, whether deliberately or not, spoke from a position that intellectuals around the world have come to theorists, I claimed, further, that this concept of the other as stranger, associate with the hegemony of the United States over its Latin American as the foreign other, as something that disrupts my perceived position and Caribbean neighbors. This type of discourse may be characterized as of control, also points to »those elements or dimensions of the self Anglo-Eurocentric, though it is not hegemonic by virtue of this feature that unsettle or decenter the ego’s dominant, self-enclosed, territoria- alone. What irritates Latin Americans is the additional premise – an atti- lized identity« (ibid.). I appealed to feminist postcolonial theoretical tude, a conscious or unconscious assumption, implicit in this type of dis- perspectives to show the complexities of developing »a model for the course – that the Anglo-Eurocentric conscience is the measure of all things. understanding of subaltern cultural differences« (ibid.: 55). The cri- (Schutte 1986: 757) tiques of cultural imperialism and colonialism offered by male theor- I also raised the question as to why fields such as existentialism, phe- ists all-too-often have contained models of liberation premised on nomenology, feminism, and Marxism were ignored as material for masculine-dominant constructs of gender and sexual difference. At plenary sessions, suggesting that perhaps »these fields would have the same time, however, I argued that global North/South asymme- been better equipped theoretically to breach the wall separating U.S. tries of power also affected cross-cultural communication among wo- philosophers from their southern neighbors« (ibid.: 758). men (including feminist women). With respect to an audience of An- The 1997 feminist panel that gave birth to ›Cultural Alterity‹ glo-American feminists, my point was and continues to be that the consisted of presentations by Susan Okin (1946–2004), Alison Jaggar, decentering made possible by the awareness of cultural alterity, com- Lorraine Code, and myself.12 I focused on the concept of cross-cultur- bined with the awareness of a postcolonial feminist perspective, is al communication between culturally differentiated participants situ- likely to yield favorable conditions for cross-cultural communications ated in asymmetrical positions of power, referring specifically to the and dialogue. position of Latina and other subaltern speakers in North-South con- Nonetheless, I cautioned about what I labeled the principle of texts. How could we even begin a dialogue about a global feminist cross-cultural incommensurability (ibid.: 56–58). In a nutshell, this ethics (in the North), I asked, if we did not shed light on the condi- refers to a residue of meaning that may be expected to remain un- tions that make it possible to frame such a dialogue from the stand- translated and thereby not fully communicated in cross-cultural en- point of a discursive model sensitive to cross-cultural communica- counters. It is true, as I think about this now, that human gestures, the tion? intonation of voice, and possibly other nonverbal corporeal behaviors I expanded on the concept of alterity (otherness, the other) in or aesthetic endeavors like dance or painting (if understood appropri- continental philosophy by extending its range from a simple encoun- ately) may make up for the lack of translatability in verbal encoun- ter (let’s say, of exchange) between self and other under the presumed ters. And yet, given the power of words over the ways in which we conditions of relative equality and reciprocity to a deeper experience understand ›the other‹ (including each other), the notion that a resi- where the self is able to decenter itself in relation to the other as a due of untranslatable meaning persists is salutary, in my view, in result of attending to the other’s differences. I noted that a key to this order to prevent us from the arrogance of believing that we have disposition involves allowing the other’s otherness to become mani- captured the meaning of the other completely and, likewise, to facil- fest without thinking that such decentering constitutes a flaw in the itate future conditions for disclosure and further cross-cultural un- self’s control over its environment. Rather, the other (from this derstanding, if such conditions were to become available. standpoint of cultural alterity) makes it possible for me »to recognize The current Latin American, Caribbean, and Latina/o philoso- phers who have taken up the project of decolonizing Western epis- 12 The papers by Jaggar, Okin and Code also appeared in Hypatia, Vol. 13, No. 2, temologies are, in my view, working in this direction. It’s the direc- 1998. tion in which one calls for the de-centering of Western Reason in its

204 205 O. Schutte ethnocentric, monological manifestations, or of that mighty one- Living Chinese Philosophy sided Logos that showed off its discourse as well as its discourse’s limits in Guadalajara. There is no final outcome in this endeavor be- cause as each discourse assumes mastery over a cognitive field, it dis- places others: some, indeed, for the better, but also others, at times, for the worse. Some decolonialists may be extremist or totalitarian despite their best intentions; others, less rigid and more attentive to warding off against stereotyping the Eurocentric values that they ex- pose. My own position (given that this has also been one of my areas of specialization) is that one need not read or teach European conti- Abstract nental philosophy in a Eurocentric way.13 I believe I have endeavored The title of this essay, ›Living Chinese Philosophy‹ is a double en- to do this in my own philosophical practice. Similarly, just because tendre that captures the transformative nature of Chinese philosophy one studies US culture or Anglo-American philosophy, one need not for those who study it, and the fact that it is a philosophical tradition do this in a racist, sexist, Anglocentric way. In fact, creating the spaces taking the ordinary affairs of the day as both source of philosophical for cultural alterity in a postcolonial/decolonial key within Anglo- reflection and warrant for the conclusions reached. The goal of the European philosophy is a much needed project and one that will serve canonical texts is not only to provide a vocabulary for thinking co- to create bridges with the still underrepresented sectors of philosophy gently about philosophical issues, but more importantly to encourage we find in the United States and similarly constituted academic con- a personal cultivation directed at making one’s life significant and stituencies of today’s world. transforming the ordinary into the extraordinary.

–Ofelia Schutte, Emerita, University of South Florida, USA Keywords Confucianism, comparative philosophy, role ethics, Henry Rose- mont Jr., David L. Hall, D.C. Lau, non-Western philosophy, process philosophy.

My narrative as a student of Chinese philosophy and culture began many years ago. My late father wrote mystery stories; my older brother for his career taught English literature. Writing was always a part of our life at home. As a young man, I wrote a lot of poetry, and in order to find and to study with the best of my generation, I left the comfortable nest of our Vancouver home and enrolled at a liberal arts college in southern California, the University of Redlands. My pas- sion for creative writing was well served. Redlands was a wonderful experience for a serious student, and I am grateful to that school for sending me to Hong Kong on their student exchange program. I arrived in Hong Kong one sultry evening in the summer of 1966. I was eighteen years old and alone in a world of strange sights, colors, and smells. Indeed, I remember looking out from the window 13 O. Schutte, ›Continental Philosophy and Postcolonial Subjects,‹ Philosophy Today, of the small Nathan Road hotel on that first evening in China, fully Vol. 44, 2000, pp. 8–17 [SPEP Supplement]. aware that my short life had taken an irreversible turn.

206 207 R. T. Ames Living Chinese Philosophy

I was a young man in search of the intensity and high adventure back on the receding lights of Hong Kong from the deck of the Pre- necessary to write poetry filled with life. At Redlands I had been sident Cleveland as we sailed out of the harbor on a homeward jour- studying Western philosophy, and like innumerable students over ney to first San Francisco and then on to Canada. I was now a student the centuries, I was immediately inspired by the honesty of Socrates of Chinese philosophy. and his philosophical quest to ›know thyself.‹ In Hong Kong, I was From those beginnings at Redlands, it took me fully thirteen introduced to Confucian philosophy, and in contrast to but perhaps years at university to complete my PhD. Why? Because Chinese phi- complementary with Socrates’s journey of self-discovery, I became losophy was not taught then in Western philosophy departments, and fascinated by its aesthetic project of ›cultivating oneself‹ (xiushen), for the most part, is not taught now. Western philosophy as a profes- ›broadening the way‹ (hongdao), and ultimately, ›transforming the sional discipline has to this day invoked geographical rather than phi- cosmos‹ (ping tianxia). During the summer studying the Chinese losophical criteria to persuade itself and the world that philosophy is language at New Asia College in Kowloon I had the opportunity to an Anglo-European enterprise. The counterintuitive implication of meet and listen to several prominent philosophers – in particular, this tacit assumption is that cultures beyond this Anglo-European Tang Junyi (1909–1978) and Mou Zongsan (1909–1995) – who were sphere are not interested in the pursuit of wisdom. Having lived and asserting the enduring strength of a Chinese tradition after a long studied in Hong Kong, I found this premise parochial and unworthy, night in which a hemorrhaging China had suffered humiliation at and with the passage of the years, I became increasingly committed to the hands of Western imperialism. When, at the end of the summer, challenging a Western philosophical tradition burdened with this pro- I moved out to Chung Chi College in Shatin for the academic year, I found ethnocentrism. had the chance to study Mencius with Professor Lao Siguang (1927– In order to study Chinese philosophy at the University of British 2012), a thoroughly engaged intellectual who impressed many Columbia, I had to do two bachelors’ degrees in five years, one in young minds including my own with his own deep philosophical Chinese and one in philosophy. In pursuing a masters degree, it was passion. the same. I went to National Taiwan University for two years, doing Hong Kong at this time was poor – very poor. For us students, my course work in the philosophy department and having the oppor- there were stones in the rice and not much at all in the soup. But there tunity to study with Fang Dongmei (1899–1977). In 1972 I returned was an exciting curriculum taught by young professors, and I devel- to the University of British Columbia from Taiwan to finish my oped important friendships with my classmates and teachers that three-year masters degree in the Asian Studies department, not phi- have lasted these many decades. As the year in Hong Kong pro- losophy. gressed, there were anti-foreign riots, and on more than one occasion, While at National Taiwan University I came to a realization my young friends and I were stranded overnight at someone’s home, about the status of philosophy in the world that astounded me. For a afraid to go out on the streets. But these classmates took good care of long time now, in the world’s seats of higher learning, Western phi- me, and if I learned something of Chinese philosophy from classroom losophy – that is, almost exclusively European philosophy – has con- lectures and books, I certainly learned much more from a community stituted the mainstream curriculum worldwide. And this situation is of people who were remarkably different from the world I had known not simply a matter of Western arrogance; there is a good deal of self- until then – a community of people who in the process of deepening colonization as well. This self-understanding of professional philoso- their caring relationships brought to life the wisdom of the Chinese phy is a fact as true in Taipei, Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing, and Delhi as it is tradition. in Boston, Oxford, Frankfurt, and Paris. If indigenous Asian philoso- The following summer, with a copy of D. C. Lau’s (1921–2010) phies have been ignored abroad, they have also been significantly Daodejing1 in my hand, and as a much older ›young‹ man, I looked marginalized within their home cultures. William James (1842– 1910) had it almost right when he prefaced his Gifford lectures at 1 R. T. Ames and D. L. Hall (trans.), Daodejing: Making This Life Significant, New Edinburgh by allowing that »it seems the natural thing for us [Amer- York: Ballantine, 2003.

208 209 R. T. Ames Living Chinese Philosophy icans] to listen whilst the Europeans talk« (James 2008: 11),2 except Marcel Granet (1884–1940) and Joseph Needham (1900–1995) on that he might have included the Asian philosophers along with the ›correlative thinking‹ as a signature of Chinese philosophy. Americans as the natural audience for Anglo-European philosophy. Having finished at the University of London in 1978, I was most And little has changed in the century and more since 1901. fortunate on the recommendation of D. C. Lau to receive an appoint- After studying Chinese philosophy again in an Asian Studies ment in the philosophy department at the University of Hawai’i, the department in Japan for two years, I was finally able to enter a pro- only philosophy program in the Western world that at that time of- gram at the University of London in which I could study Chinese fered the PhD in Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Buddhist, and Islamic philosophy with philosophers. It was at the University of London that philosophies. The philosophy department at the University of Ha- I had the opportunity to study with D. C. Lau, in his time perhaps the wai’i was and remains today a unique program. The first chair of the most distinguished translator of Chinese philosophical classics. And it department in the 1930’s was Wing-tsit Chan (1901–1994), and he is Professor Lau, in his unrelenting insistence that we must go back together with Charles Moore (1901–1967) in South Asian philosophy and think through the original texts, who has had the greatest influ- established an integrated program in world philosophy. The premise ence on my approach to Chinese philosophy. From the beginning, of the program is that students who study non-Western philosophy Professor Lau had little patience with reliance upon secondary aca- are much stronger if they do so within the context of a Western phi- demic discussion that floated high above the philosophical literature. losophy department rather than a religion or Asian Studies program. His first question on my first day as his student was: »How many And that students who have Western philosophical training are often times have you read the Huainanzi?«3 And he was chagrined at my able to bring fresh perspectives to an understanding of the Chinese most inadequate answer, »All of it?« He pointed to the library with a tradition. wry smile. And for years after finishing my PhD with Professor Lau, Such comparative training is an advantage for students not be- I would spend months during the summer with him in his Hong cause Western philosophy has a ›rigor‹ lacking in the Chinese tradi- Kong study piled high with books reading the Huainanzi together. I tion that is ›necessary‹ or ›essential‹ to good philosophizing. Rather it learned from Professor Lau what it means to be a student’s teacher, is useful because comparative philosophy is hybridic and expansive in and over the years we collaborated on the first and one of the most providing an alternative vantage point, and Chinese philosophy in important fascicles of the Huainanzi, ›Tracing Down to Its Source‹ particular has a capaciousness that enables the student to see beyond (yuandao), along with a translation of the recently recovered ›second technical Western arguments. There is a Chinese expression: ›I can- Sunzi‹4 – the Sun Bin Art of Warfare.5 not see the true face of Mount Lu because I am standing on top of it‹ At London in the SOAS library and in subsequent years when that captures the same idea expressed by Rudyard Kipling (1865– Angus Graham (1919–1991) was a visiting professor with us at the 1936) when he observed: »What knows he of England whom only University of Hawai’i, I had the opportunity to study with him, and England knows.« became particularly intrigued by his efforts to continue the work of That the benefits of comparative philosophy move in both direc- tions is a fact still lost on many Western philosophers. That is, our study of Western philosophy can be much enhanced by reflecting on perennial problems with different languages and with alternative sets 2 W. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature, Rock- ville, Maryland: Manor, 2008. of categories found in the non-Western traditions. As a specific ex- 3 Liu An, The Huainanzi, J. S. Major et al. (trans.), New York: Columbia University ample, while process thinking is relatively new within the context of Press, 2010; D. C. Lau, and R. T. Ames (trans.), Yuan Dao: Tracing Dao to its Source, Western philosophy in figures such as A. N. Whitehead (1861–1947), New York: Ballantine, 1998; R. T. Ames, The Art of Rulership: A Study of Ancient Henri Bergson (1859–1941), William James, and John Dewey (1859– Chinese Political Thought, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. 1952), the qi-cosmology of the long Chinese tradition entails a pro- 4 R. T. Ames (trans.), Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare, New York: Ballantine, 1993. 5 D. C. Lau, and R. T. Ames (trans.), Sun Bin: The Art of Warfare, Albany: State cess worldview that begins historically as early as the compilation of University of New York Press, 2003.

210 211 R. T. Ames Living Chinese Philosophy the first of its philosophical classics, the Book of Changes.6 An inter- Lau an enormous source of personal and professional growth, I also est in process philosophy has emerged over the past century in the sought out my present collaborator, Henry Rosemont, Jr. (1934–). Western narrative as a strong current in the internal critique of sub- Rosemont is an analytic philosopher by training and, as a student of stance ontology, and might be much enhanced by a closer look at the Noam Chomsky (1928–), a rigorous linguist of the first order. Like developed Chinese process sensibilities. Indeed, I met my first colla- my introduction to David Hall, I had come to know Rosemont by borator David Hall (1937–2001) at the gates of China because he was using his publications on the Chinese language in my own work. trying to go beyond Whitehead’s appeal to eternal objects and the As a graduate student, I first met Henry Rosemont (as I did Hall) primordial nature of God in looking for greater coherence in process in the pages of the comparative philosophy journal, Philosophy East thinking. What are often construed as ›alternative‹ traditions might and West. Fresh from his post-doctoral work with Chomsky at MIT, be better seen as ›complementary‹ and mutually enriching resources. Henry wrote an article ›On Representing Abstractions in Archaic Indeed, our philosophical worlds remain less to the extent that they Chinese‹7 that in its arguments was so original and has been so en- remain exclusive. during as to have served a generation later as the foundation for the Shortly after arriving at the University of Hawai’i, I began a ›Introduction‹ and ›Appendix‹ to our collaborative translation of the professional relationship with David Hall that would produce six Analects of Confucius.8 Perhaps the most radical argument in this books: a combination of first interpretive studies followed by philo- article is Rosemont’s ›uniqueness thesis,‹ a considered challenge to sophical translations of several of the classics. Indeed, this happy Hall the commonplace that most linguists in the study of language focus and Ames collaboration over nearly a quarter of a century was a sus- on speech almost to the exclusion of its written forms. Far from the tained attempt, however imperfect, to bring together both philologi- written form being derivative of and accidental to the spoken lan- cal and philosophical skills in our interpretive studies of classical Chi- guage, the written and spoken forms of the Chinese language (until nese philosophy, and then to apply this interpretive context in our this last century) are importantly different in their semantic, syntac- new philosophical translations of seminal texts. tic, and phonological constraints, and both must be taken into account This happy collaboration of Hall and Ames changed over the in philosophical speculations about the nature of Chinese thinking. years. Tragically, the David Hall side of the project that burned most And Rosemont argues for the priority of context and semantic brightly, also burned most quickly, and in the company of his family information over syntax and phonetics in the decoding of classical and his friends, he died in his desert one spring day in 2001. Hall was Chinese texts. In Chinese education, the more formal features of the a Chicago Divinity School and Yale University trained Western phi- language have traditionally been learned from the rote memorization losopher, and as such, he brought much imagination and ›views‹ to of specific canonical texts that provide intellectuals a shared reservoir our work. What I brought to the collaboration was philological train- of contextualized usages from which they can draw analogies in their ing in ancient Chinese philosophical texts that hopefully made our own creative expression. Rosemont’s insight here is that the Chinese scholarship more responsible, coupled with an important anthropolo- worldview, whether words or persons, begins from ontological parity gical sense of what seems right within a Chinese context from having and the uniqueness of the particular and its context. spent many years living in Chinese academic communities. For me, In all of these insights into the nature of the early Chinese lan- the study of Chinese philosophy is much more than merely academic; guage and philosophy, the thread of Rosemont’s arguments is that it is a profoundly personal and transformative quest that has been broadly speaking the Chinese concern was not so much with ontology inspired by the close personal relationships I have enjoyed over the or epistemology as it was with the primacy of the dynamic relations years with teachers and colleagues at Chinese universities. Having found the collaborations with David Hall and Professor 7 H. Rosemont, Jr., ›On Representing Abstractions in Archaic Chinese,‹ Philosophy East and West, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1974, pp. 71–88. 6 R. Lynn (trans.), The Classic of Changes, New York: Columbia University Press, 8 R. T. Ames and H. Rosemont, Jr. The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Trans- 2004. lation, New York: Ballantine, 1998, pp. 1–70, and pp. 271–317.

212 213 R. T. Ames Living Chinese Philosophy that not only obtains among and between things, but indeed consti- emy. An essential occupation of philosophers is to identify and de- tutes them as transitory events. Said another way, the emergent cos- scribe the generic traits of the human experience in order to locate mic order in a Chinese world is best understood as the art of correlat- problems within the broadest possible context. And these defining ing and contextualizing within the eventfulness of the human generic characteristics are importantly different as we move from experience. Culture is the production of meaning through the effica- one cultural and epochal site to another. Philosophers have the re- cious coordination of the phonetic and the semantic, the semantic and sponsibility to seek out and to understand the uncommon assump- the syntactic, the visual and the oral, the metaphorical and the more tions that distinguish cultures both as a resource for addressing phi- literal, the particular and the contextual, and most importantly, the losophical problems, and as a preventative against cultural reduction- formal and the informal (or the determinate and the indeterminate). ism and the misconceptions such ethnocentrism produces. Thus, the At the heart of Rosemont’s philosophical life is a rejection of top- absence of philosophers in the interpretation of Chinese philosophy down wholesale, centralized strategies for achieving order – ethical, to a Western audience has come at a cost. social, political, religious – whether such strategies be Stalinist, Papal, It has become a commonplace to acknowledge that, in the process or Maoist, the hegemony of large capitalist corporations, or the arro- of Western humanists attempting to make sense of the classical Chi- gant unilateralism of our own federal government in the States. nese philosophical literature, many Western assumptions have inad- Instead, Rosemont advocates a decentralized, participatory, and inclu- vertently been insinuated into the understanding of these texts, and sive conception of order always made local by appeal to the indigen- have colored the vocabulary through which this understanding has ous impulse. been articulated. Chinese philosophy has been made familiar to Wes- My now several collaborations have been motivated by what we tern readers by first ›Christianizing‹ it, and then more recently, by have all regarded as a profound weakness in the way in which Chinese ›orientalizing‹ it as a poetical-mystical-occult worldview that is the philosophy has been introduced into the Western academy. The Chi- converse of our own commitment to the enlightenment of reason. nese corpus is constituted by profoundly ›philosophical‹ texts – the To the extent that Chinese philosophy has become the subject of Wes- Book of Changes, the Analects, the Zhongyong,9 the Daodejing, Sun- tern philosophical interest at all, it has usually been analyzed within zi: The Art of Warfare, and so on – and yet this body of literature has the framework of categories and philosophical problems not its own. not been treated as philosophy. These texts have been translated and The recent recovery in archaeological finds of new versions of interpreted initially by missionaries, and more recently by sinolo- existing texts and the further discovery of many documents that have gists. That is to say that, to date the Chinese philosophical corpus been long lost, has in the English-speaking world occasioned the re- has only incidentally and tangentially been engaged by philosophers. translation of many of the Chinese philosophical classics, and has This assertion is meant neither to impugn the usually good intentions provided both a pretext and an opportunity for philosophers to step of the missionaries nor to pretend that there is any substitute for the up and rethink our standard readings. Most importantly, it has pre- sophisticated philological, historical, literary, and cultural sensibilities sented us with the challenge of trying, with imagination, to take these that we associate with good sinology. Indeed, it has been a vicious texts on their own terms by locating and interpreting them within circle in which a non-philosophical reading of the Chinese corpus fails their own worldview. to attract the attention of a philosophical audience who thus do not In developing a strategy for our new philosophical translations, engage the Chinese tradition philosophically, and so it turns. we collaborators have worked out a structure that includes an intro- Given this marginalization of other philosophical traditions, phi- duction that provides an interpretive context, an evolving glossary of losophy as a discipline has an unfulfilled responsibility to our acad- key philosophical terms, a self-consciously interpretive translation, and the inclusion of the definitive critical Chinese text. In describing our translations as ›self-consciously interpretive,‹ we are not allowing 9 R. T. Ames and D. L. Hall (trans.), Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philo- sophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, that due to our own license we are less ›literal‹ than other transla- 2001. tions. On the contrary, we would insist that any pretense to offer a

214 215 R. T. Ames Living Chinese Philosophy literal translation is not only naïve, but is itself a cultural prejudice of is in fact radical in the interpretation it promotes. To our mind, to the first order. consciously or unconsciously transplant a text from its own historical To begin with, we would assert that English as the target lan- and intellectual soil and replant it in one that has an importantly guage carries with it such an overlay of philosophical assumptions different philosophical landscape is taking liberties with the text and that, in the absence of reference to an extensive introduction and is radical in the sense of tampering with its roots. And it is our con- glossary, the philosophical import of the Chinese text is seriously certed effort, however imperfectly accomplished, to locate the text compromised. Further, a failure of translators to be self-conscious within its own conditions that is properly conservative. and to take fair account of their own Gadamarian ›prejudices‹ with But our goal has not been to replace one inadequate formula for the excuse that they are relying on some ›objective‹ lexicon – a lex- translating Chinese philosophical terms with yet another inadequate icon that, were the truth be known, is itself heavily colored with cul- set of equivalencies. Our translations of key terms have always been tural biases – is to betray their readers not once, but twice. intended as no more than suggestive ›placeholders‹ that refer readers Just as each generation selects and carries over earlier thinkers to back to the glossary to negotiate their own meaning, and to hopefully reshape them in their own image, each generation reconfigures the appropriate the Chinese terms for themselves. Along with Wittgen- classical canons of world philosophy to its own needs. We too are stein who understands that the limits of our language are the limits of inescapably people of a time and place. And a most cursory under- our world, we would argue that in order to understand the Chinese standing of the classical Chinese philosophical literature itself – al- philosophical tradition, the student is going to need more language. It ways genealogical and historicist – would require that we acknowl- will only be when students of Chinese philosophy are able to bring a edge ourselves as such. The self-consciousness of our interpretation, sophisticated understanding of dao and tian and li to a reading of a then, is not to play fast and loose with the literary corpus, but rather Chinese text in the way in which we have developed a nuanced sense to endorse its premises. of kosmos, logos, and nous in our reading of the classical Greek corpus In seeking to challenge the existing interpretations, we try to be that we will begin to take the Chinese world on its own terms. at once deconstructive and programmatic. That is, we have begun Let me say something about these collaborations as a signature from the concern that the popular translations of these philosophical of my career. First, I have always seen this way of working as an terms often do not adequately respect the degree of difference be- object lesson in what we have to learn from Confucian philosophy. tween a persistent Western commonsense and the ways of living and Association is a fact; nothing does anything by itself. And nowhere is thinking in which these early Chinese texts were located and pro- this truer than in personal growth and the production of knowledge. duced. What seems to be the most comfortable choice of language, In authoring monographs with Lau, David, and Henry, I had the ben- and what at first blush makes the best sense to the translator within efit of not only finding such intellectual intimacy with very different the target language might well be a signal that what is originally not but equally wonderful scholars, but I also had to become them in the familiar is, at a stroke, being made so. The conventional translation of sense of two becoming one. I had to take ownership of the whole dao as ›the Way‹ or tian as ›Heaven‹ or li as ›ritual‹ are rather obvious product. I could not appear at a professional meeting, and when asked examples of overwriting the Chinese language with assumptions that about a certain philosophical claim, demure by saying that it was in- are alien to it. Indeed, it is just such a formula of translations that has troduced by my collaborator and I did not understand it either. Colla- been authorized and has been insinuated into our standard Chinese- boration requires not only that you understand everything, but also English dictionaries and glosses. that you endorse it all. My most recent monograph, Confucian Role Hence, to encourage those who would consult these reference Ethics: A Vocabulary (2011)10 was an elaboration of the 2008 Ch’ien works to do so with the uncritical assumption that this set of transla- Mu lectures that I gave at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and tions will provide them with a ›literal‹ and thus ›conservative‹ render- ing of the texts is to become complicit in an entrenched cultural equi- 10 R. T. Ames, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary, Hong Kong, and Honolulu: Chi- vocation. Our argument is that this persistent formula of translations nese University Press and University of Hawai’i Press, 2011.

216 217 R. T. Ames Living Chinese Philosophy hence it was published under my name as the single author. But in this possibility of becoming Confucians, we must allow that Confu- fact it is a confluence of a fully shared life, and should properly have cius himself would answer this question in the affirmative. In the all of our names on the cover. opening passage of the Analects, Confucius is reported to have said, In the many years that have ensued since my first adventure in »To have students coming from distant quarters – is this not a source Hong Kong, I have continued my interest in Confucianism, and my of enjoyment.« In his time during the Spring and Autumn period, for personal narrative has continued too.11 I have now been a student of him as a resident of the state of Lu a ›foreigner‹ from distant quarters Confucian philosophy for more than half a century, and two ques- would be someone from the state of Chu or Jin. And again, Confucius tions arise: How has the study of this tradition affected me personally, told his students that he himself wanted to go and live among the and more importantly, how will the rise of an increasingly Confucian nine tribes of the Eastern Yi barbarians. When asked if exemplary China during these few decades affect the world broadly? persons could live among such crudeness, he answered that were ex- In response to the first question as to how the study of Confu- emplary persons to live among them, they would cease to be barbar- cianism has changed me personally, one might well ask, if our Chi- ians. Indeed, when an aging Confucius continued to be frustrated in nese philosopher friends can call themselves Kantians and Heidegger- his native state of Lu, he chose to take his most promising students to ians, can a foreigner like me become a Confucian? The resistance of go and live for more than a decade among the ›foreigners‹ to see if other, more exclusive cultures to embrace Confucianism might arise with these foreigners he could effect the cultural transformation that from the reluctance of one culture to model and redefine itself on the had eluded him at home. And then consider also how Korea, Japan, values of another. But then ›Confucianism‹ is only a Western transla- and Vietnam – ›Eastern‹ barbarians all – are continuing examples of tion of the more inclusive idea of ruxue that references a social class how Confucianism can transform and be transformed by foreign cul- and the intergenerational transmission of a culture, rather than the tures in a profound and lasting way. life and legacy of one person named Confucius. Although the nom- In answer to the second question of how will a Confucian China inal ›goal‹ of Confucian practice was identified by the canonical texts change the world broadly, we must allow that in a single generation, as cultivating ›the way (dao),‹ in fact, dao seems to have designated the rise of Asia, and in particularly the rise of China, has precipitated something more like a journey with a distinctive direction of interge- a sea change in the prevailing economic and political order of the nerational transformation than any specific destination. Emphasizing world. In the quarter century since 1989, the Asia Pacific Economic landscape and traveling rather than any predetermined end, the road Cooperation (APEC) has grown to include twenty-one Asia-Pacific for Confucianism seems clearly better than the inn, and human en- nations with forty percent of the world’s population, the GDP in the joyment of our sojourn together more important that any quest for Asia-Pacific region has more than tripled, and trade in and with the certainty. region has increased by over four hundred percent. The Chinese Ruism is the elegant life of the gentle people made possible by economy has grown at annual double-digit rates to overtake Japan as having committed themselves to the transformative power of perso- the second largest economy in the world, and is predicted to become nal growth and practical wisdom. It is the continuing story of a fel- the world’s largest economy sometime in the 2020’s. lowship among literati whose cultural literacy serves their succeeding Asian development generally and the global impact of China’s generations as a model for a philosophy of life that elevates and growth more specifically are producing seismic changes in the world’s brings joy to the daily lives and activities of the people. Who would economic order and international relations. To date, these changes not want to be included in thus aspiring to live inspired lives as hu- have remained largely entrained and thus easily traced within the man beings? boundaries of the emerging economic and political conditions. But Even if we ourselves for whatever reason might want to resist this reconfiguration of economic and political dominance neverthe- less opens possibilities for cultural changes of the sort required to 11 See, for example: R. T. Ames, Living Chinese Philosophy, Insight Media, 2007 challenge an elite world cultural order that has long been dominated [two-hour documentary]. by a powerful liberalism, especially since this liberalism has proven

218 219 R. T. Ames impotent with respect to the global predicaments and equity issues that promise to shape the course of the twenty-first century. Chal- lenges might be posed from, for example, the perspectives of indigen- ous peoples, or from religious traditions like Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism. But there is much to recommend considering the cultural resources offered by what Robert Bellah (1927–2013) referred to as ›secular religions‹ like Confucianism. When we look for the cultural resources necessary to respond to the current global predicament, primary among them are resources suited to replacing the familiar competitive pattern of single actors Book Review pursing their own self-interest with a collaborative pattern of players strengthening possibilities for coordination across national, ethnic, and religious boundaries. Evidence is that many in Asia today feel that Confucian culture can make valuable contributions to the articu- lation of a new world cultural order. And enormous resources are being invested in China and other Asian cultural spheres to renew traditional Confucian learning as a repository of values and concep- tual resources that can be drawn upon to shape their own responses to contemporary dynamics. As is now widely appreciated, Confucian culture celebrates the relational values of deference and interdepen- dence. That is, relationally-constituted persons are to be understood as embedded in and nurtured by unique, transactional patterns of relations – a conception of person that contrasts rather starkly with the more familiar model of discrete, self-determining individuals as- sociated with liberal democracy. Might a contemporary Confucian ethic that locates moral conduct within a thick and richly textured pattern of family, community, and natural relations not indeed be a force for challenging and changing the international culture order?

–Roger T. Ames, University of Hawai’i, USA

220 Person Properties and Candrakīrti’s Concept of Selflessness James Duerlinger, The Refutation of the Self in Indian Buddhism: Candrakīrti on the Selflessness of Persons, London: Routledge, 2013, 255 p.

During the lifetime of the Buddha and in subsequent centuries, the philosophical traditions of India commonly accepted the existence of an eternal, substantive self (ātman). Among Buddhism’s most novel and noteworthy tenets was the rejection of this view and the accep- tance of the doctrine of selflessness or the non-existence of the self (anātman). The non-existence of the self was, however, controversial even among Buddhists, due in part to the Buddha’s conflicting com- ments on the question and to the Buddha’s use of personal pronouns. This led some to believe that he endorsed the existence of the self. As a consequence, various schools interpreted the doctrine in various ways. Several schools, particularly the Vātsīputrīyas and the Saṃm- mitīyas, maintained that some sort of ›inexpressible person‹ (pudga- la) must exist in order to make sense of personal continuity and re- birth and that this inexpressible person did not contradict the non- existence of the self. These schools became collectively known as Pud- galavādins. Other schools, particularly the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas, maintained that the self was a conceptual fiction, con- structed out of more fundamental elements called ›dharmas.‹ Still another school, the Madhyamakas, considered the self, along with all objects, to be without independent existence. The Madhyamaka view was developed first by the second century philosopher Nāgārjuna and subsequently by other philosophers, including the seventh century philosopher Candrakīrti. Works written by Buddhist philosophers on the self are well- worth reading for any philosopher outside of the Buddhist tradition as they offer theses that are at times analogous to ones found in the European tradition as well as theses that have no clear analogy. Among the most important works is the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya by Vasubandhu, particularly its ninth chapter, Refutation of the Theory of the Self (Ātmavādapratiṣedha or Pudgalapratiṣedhaprakaraņa). This work presents several important theories of the self. It outlines

223 A. Mattlage James Duerlinger, The Refutation of the Self in Indian Buddhism: Candrakīrti on the the view held by the Sarvāstivādins, the Pudgalavādins, and the Sau- traditions and explains the ten stages of the Bodhisattva path of med- trāntikas. For the Madhyamaka tradition, one would do well to read itation and its fruit as Candrakīrti understands it from the Sūtra on Verses on the Fundamentals of the Middle Way (Mūlamadhyama- the Ten Stages (Daśabhūmika Sūtra). The third presents valuable kakārikā) by Nāgāruna and several works by Candrakīrti: Clear explanations of several critical terms used by Candrakīrti, and the Words (Prasannapadā), Introduction to the Middle Way (Madhya- fourth section relates Candrakīrti’s theory of persons to other Indian makāvatāra), and his Autocommentary on the Introduction to the Buddhist theories. Middle Way (Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya). None of these are easy The second part of the work, the translation of the root text, is reading for anyone not steeped in the concepts and terminology of informed by what is perhaps the most important contribution that the Buddhist tradition. Happily, James Duerlinger has provided us Duerlinger makes toward understanding Candrakīrti’s arguments: with two mostly clear and insightful guides to much of this literature. the distinction between a self ›with person-properties‹ and a self The first work is his 2003 book, Indian Buddhist Theories of ›without person-properties.‹ By selves ›with person-properties,‹ Persons: Vasubandhu’s ›Refutation of the Theory of the Self‹ which Duerlinger means beings that possess minds and bodies, perceive, provides us with a translation of Vasubandhu’s Refutation of the The- think, feel, act, etc. When English speakers use the term ›self‹ (and ory of the Self.1 The second is his 2013 book, The Refutation of the personal pronouns), we commonly refer to beings with such proper- Self in Indian Buddhism: Candrakīrti on the Selflessness of Persons ties. This is most evident in our use of the reflexive pronouns ›my- which provides us with a translation of verses 120–165 of Candrakīr- self,‹ ›yourself,‹ ›himself,‹ ›herself,‹ ›ourselves,‹ ›yourselves,‹ and ti’s Autocommentary on the Introduction to the Middle Way. A full ›themselves.‹ In each case, we refer to beings that have person-proper- review of Duerlinger’s 2003 work is beyond the scope of this review, ties. Even in the case of ›itself,‹ we commonly use the term to refer to but readers would be well served to read at least the introduction to beings with person-properties, e.g., ›the mouse trapped itself in the the 2003 work. This will give the reader a background that will make box.‹ The neuter pronoun merely elides our ignorance of the mouse’s reading Duerlinger’s 2013 work more meaningful. sex. There are, however, some instances when we use ›itself‹ (and The Refutation of the Self in Indian Buddhism is composed of even ›themselves‹) to refer to objects without person-properties, three parts. The first part is a general introduction to the root text and e.g., ›the building collapsed on itself‹ or ›the bean stalks entwined an overview of the issues that it addresses (pp. 1–54). The second is themselves around the poles.‹ In these instances, we appear to suggest the translation of the root text (pp. 55–89). The third is Duerlinger’s a degree of agency (a feature of personhood) that on more careful own verse-by-verse commentary on the root text (pp. 90–194). In the analysis we would reject. So while it is not always true, on the whole introduction, Duerlinger describes and explains the views that Can- our use of ›self‹ refers to beings with person-properties. drakīrti attributes to a several Buddhist schools: the Sāṃmitīyas, the The use of the term ›ātman‹ to refer to persons is less consistent Āryasāṃmitīyas, the Sarvāstivādins, and the Sautrāntikas, as well as in Buddhist texts. The word ›ātman‹ is normally translated as ›self,‹ the non-Buddhist Tīrthikas. Duerlinger also provides a relatively but it ambiguously refers to beings with person-properties and ob- clear expression of Candrakīrti’s criticisms of these views as found in jects without person-properties. According to Duerlinger, by care- Candrakīrti’s Clear Words, Introduction to the Middle Way, and his fully attending to the ambiguities in the Buddhist texts and marking Autocommentary on the Introduction to the Middle Way. The intro- them with his person-property terminology, we can better under- duction is composed of four sections. The first section distinguishes stand the arguments made by Candrakīrti. Duerlinger writes, »The Duerlinger’s translation and commentary from the existing English distinction [between selves with and without person-properties] is translations and commentaries. The second places Candrakīrti’s not to my knowledge explicitly drawn by Candrakīrti and his Mad- Autocommentary in the context of the Mahāyāna and Madhyamaka hyamaka (Middle Way) followers,« but he goes on to write, »The distinction is needed to explain why he [Candrakīrti] represents his 1 J. Duerlinger, Indian Buddhist Theories of Persons: Vasubandhu’s ›Refutation of the fellow Buddhists as asserting the thesis that a self exists by itself Theory of the Self,‹ London: Routledge, 2003. when they deny that a self exists by itself« (p. 4). Perhaps it is because

224 225 A. Mattlage James Duerlinger, The Refutation of the Self in Indian Buddhism: Candrakīrti on the

Duerlinger does not find explicit evidence for his person-property self), but the important point is that the self is a composition of ele- terminology that he does not use the terminology in his translation mentary parts and does not have an independent existence. The Sar- of the root text, but it helpfully appears in both his introduction to the vāstivādins differed from the Sautrāntikas on a number of points, but root text and in his commentary on the root text. most importantly the former maintained the existence of the past, The third part of the work is Duerlinger’s verse-by-verse com- present, and future, while the latter only accepted that the present mentary on Candrakīrti’s Autocommentary. It is based on seven Ti- exists. In other words, the Sarvāstivādins accepted a kind of duration betan commentaries written in the Madhyamaka tradition, six of of the dharmas that the Sautrāntikas rejected. At the same time, the which are from English translations. Among the value-added features Sautrāntikas accepted the spatial extension of the bodily dharmas of Duerlinger’s commentary are quotations from Candrakīrti’s Clear while the Sarvāstivādins held that they were infinitely divisible. Im- Words, his commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Verses on the Fundamentals portantly, they agreed that the self was identical to the aggregates and of the Middle Way. These quotations provide additional helpful per- that a self with person-properties did not exist independently of those spective on Candrakīrti’s views. aggregates. To delineate the various Buddhist views of the self as Duerlinger In contrast, the Pudgalavādins held a view that lay precariously believes Candrakīrti understands them, we should start by describing between the Tīrthika view and the Sarvāstivādin-Sautrāntikan view. a view of the self held by the non-Buddhist Tīrthika school. This is For the Pudgalavādins the self was dependent upon the aggregates. In the most robust view of the self considered by Candrakīrti. We can this respect it was like the Sarvāstivādin-Sautrāntikan self; however, compare it to something like (but only something like) a Cartesian the Pudgalavādin self did possess person-properties. This latter fea- substantive self. It is an eternally existing mind that is temporarily ture made the Pudgalavādin self similar to the Tīrthika self, but as associated with a particular body. This is in contrast to the Buddhist distinct from the Tīrthikas, Pudgalavādins did not maintain that the view that sees the self as identical with or dependent upon sets of self was eternal. It could, though, transmigrate from body to body in psycho-physical elements. Perhaps the simplest version of this con- rebirth. That the Pudgalavādin self was dependent upon the aggre- trasting view is held by the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas. They gates, but at the same time possessed person-properties while the maintained that the self is identical to the aggregates (skandhas), aggregates did not, meant that the self and the aggregates were meaning, collections of elementary ›dharmas‹ which we might recog- neither the same nor different from each other. The Pudgalavādin self nize as (i) physical atoms, (ii) sensations, (iii) perceptions, (iv) voli- was, in this way, ›inexpressible.‹ Perhaps the closest Western notion tional actions and external forces that condition our circumstances, to the Pudgalavādin view is that of a form of supervenience. The self and (v) consciousness. The classic explanation of this view appears in is dependent upon the aggregates, but does have the same ontological the Questions of Milinda (Milindapañha), written in the first cen- status as the aggregates. It is not substantive as is a Cartesian or tury. In this text, Nāgasena explains to King Milinda that the self is Tīrthikan self; yet, it does possess a mind and body and has the capa- like a chariot, composed of parts, and while one might say that each city to perceive, think, feel, act, etc. It is no wonder that orthodox part exists, the chariot only exists dependently upon the parts; hence, Buddhists greeted this view with extreme skepticism. its ontological status is different than the ontological status of the Candrakīrti rejected all of these views and carried to completion parts. The chariot does not exist in the strictest sense. The word ›char- the refutation of the self begun by the Buddhist tradition. His refuta- iot‹ is only a convenient way to refer to the collection of parts that tion relied on a distinction that all of the previous schools of Bud- alone exist. Similarly, the word ›I‹ is merely a convenient way to refer dhism accepted but did not make the most of. Each school recognized to the collection of parts or ›aggregates‹ which make up the self. two forms of truth: conventional (saṃvṛtisatya) and ultimate (para- David Hume comes closest to holding this particular view of the mārthasatya). By asserting that the self is a collection of aggregates self. For Hume, personal identity is a bundle of overlapping impres- and that reference to the self was a short hand for referring to the sions and ideas. Hume would not agree with the Buddhist enumera- aggregates, Buddhists were able to maintain that the existence of the tion of the aggregates (the strands that make up the bundle that is the self was of a different order than the existence of the aggregates. That

226 227 A. Mattlage James Duerlinger, The Refutation of the Self in Indian Buddhism: Candrakīrti on the is, the self existed conventionally, while what ultimately existed were most helpful aids to understanding the critical and intriguing Bud- the aggregates or the elementary dharmas that composed the aggre- dhist doctrines of the self. gates. This allowed Buddhists to maintain that it was conventionally true that the self ›existed,‹ while at the same time maintaining that it –Alan Mattlage, University of Maryland, USA was not ultimately true. When the Buddha spoke of the self or made use of personal pronouns, he was asserting facts that were merely conventionally true. Both the Pudgalavādins and the Sarvāstivādin- Sautrāntikan made use of this distinction and both accepted that the aggregates – or more precisely, the dharmas – had an ultimate exis- tence. It is this last claim that Candrakīrti and the Madhyamikas re- jected. Their critical premise was that all things with which we are normally acquainted arise dependently. That is, their existence relies on the existence of other things. This includes even the dharmas, the elemental building blocks of the aggregates. In light of this, the self had no ultimate basis at all. All things, including the self, neither existed (independently) nor did not exist. Instead, they maintained what provisionally might be thought of as a third ontological status between existence and non-existence known as ›emptiness‹ (śūnyatā). One might see this as similar to the Pudgalavādin claim that the self was neither the same as nor different from the aggregates, but the similarity is only superficial. The Pudgalavādins located the ›inex- pressible self‹ within the conventional realm, while accepting the ul- timate reality of the aggregates. Consequently, the self had a basis in the ultimate realm. Against this, the Madhyamikas drew the conven- tional-ultimate distinction not between the self and its component parts, but between all experience and a transcendent realm accessible only to the enlightened. The illusion of the self as ultimate or as being composed of ultimate elements was what anchored us in samsāra – this delusional world of suffering. Candrakīrti and the Madhyamikas were thus able to acknowledge the purely conventional existence of the self while completely purging it of any ultimate reality. This, more than any other Buddhist theory of the self, was able to interpret the doctrine of anātman in its most rigorous form, while making sense of our (and the Buddha’s) use of personal pronouns. Relying solely on Buddhism’s root texts upon which these dis- tinctions are based makes for difficult study. Consequently, commen- taries and other secondary literature are of great value. James Duer- linger’s The Refutation of the Self in Indian Buddhism along with his early work Indian Buddhist Theories of Persons stand among the

228 229 Survey Articles Comparative Philosophies in Intercultural Information Ethics

Abstract The following review explores Intercultural Information Ethics (IIE) in terms of comparative philosophy, supporting IIE as the most rele- vant and significant development of the field of Information Ethics (IE). The focus of the review is threefold. First, it will review the core presumption of the field of IIE, that being the demand for an inter- mission in the pursuit of a founding philosophy for IE in order to first address the philosophical biases of IE by western philosophy. Second, a history of the various philosophical streams of IIE will be outlined, including its literature and pioneering contributors. Lastly, a new synthesis of comparative philosophies in IIE will be offered, looking towards a future evolution of the field. Examining the interchange between contemporary information ethicists regarding the discipline of IIE, the review first outlines the previously established presump- tions of the field of IIE that posit the need for an IE as grounded in western sensibilities. The author then addresses the implications of the foregoing presumption from several non-western viewpoints, ar- guing that IIE does in fact find roots in non-western philosophies as established in the concluding synthesis of western and eastern philo- sophical traditions.

Keywords Information Ethics, Intercultural Information Ethics, Information and Communication Technologies, pluralism, hermeneutics, meta- physics, comparative philosophies.

»The problem is not a technical one, but one of social exclusion, manipulation, exploitation and annihilation of human beings« (Capurro 2007: 8)1.

1 R. Capurro, ›Information Ethics for and from Africa,‹ International Review of In- formation Ethics, Vol. 7, 2007, pp. 1–13.

233 J. Bielby Comparative Philosophies in Intercultural Information Ethics

I Introduction tional professional expertise from numerous fields, from law to librar- ianship to IT to journalism. The gathering prompted an awareness of Intercultural Information Ethics (IIE) is the most significant develop- the need for the establishment of an organized global initiative to ment of the discipline of Information Ethics (IE). IIE is also arguably regularly address the current state of the digital society, where UN- an untapped resource for one of the most relevant contributions to ESCO was encouraged to pursue the task through its INFOethics in- comparative philosophies facing an information society and an infor- itiative. Since that time, the UN has followed the commission mation culture. The following review is multitiered. Its concluding through the establishment of the World Summit on the Information task looks to contribute to a foundation for a comparative philoso- Society (WSIS), held consecutively in 2003 (Geneva) and 2005 (Tu- phies discourse around the subject of IE by exploring the significance nis), where an international and intercultural effort to address and of an intercultural understanding of the place of Information and overcome the digital divide supports the goal of an Information So- Communication Technologies (ICTs). Towards that end, a review of ciety for All. the literatures and philosophies of the field will be outlined, conceived On the academic end, IIE is traced back to the inception of the as such by information ethicists from around the globe, explicated Cultural Attitudes towards Technology and Communication confer- below in sections four through six. It will look at intercultural per- ence, established in 1998 by Charles Ess and Fay Sudweeks, held bi- spectives on ICTs from both the point of view of globalization and ennially; and the establishment of the International Center for Infor- localization, outlined in section three ›Philosophy and Information & mation Ethics (ICIE), an international academic community formed Communication Technologies.‹ Preceding and concluding the review in 1999 by Rafael Capurro around the exploration of the field of in- of the field, an account of ICT culture as originating from and being formation ethics. While Cultural Attitudes towards Technology and presumed through western and otherwise developed cultures will be Communication (CATaC) explores »how diverse culture attitudes and critiqued, and it will be posited that IIE is equally pertinent to, and as communication preferences shape the implementation and use of in- will be argued, rooted in, all cultures. The above argument will be formation and communication technologies« (CATaC 2014),3 ICIE is crafted and envisaged through a concluding synthesis of comparative a center for publication and discussion that focuses on connecting the philosophies from Buddhist and western-influenced IIE traditions global information ethics movement around philosophical founda- that endeavors to bridge a notable chasm in the field of IIE, namely tions for the field (ICIE 2014).4 The founding goal of ICIE is the at- the foundational divide between information ecology and hermeneu- tempt to bring together the disparate reaches of the field’s intercul- tics, as outlined towards the latter part of section three and section six. tural infancy into a collaborative community (Froehlich 2004).5 The history of Intercultural Information Ethics (IIE) as a sepa- rate discipline of its own, apart from even the wider scope of IE, and II The Roots of Intercultural Information Ethics the inter-discovery of fragmented pockets of localized explorations in ICT based IE, is only about a decade old. The burgeoning discipline IIE finds its origins in UNESCO, 1997, with the »First International represented by both academic and practical elements of IIE was, in Congress on Ethical, Legal and Societal Aspects of Digital Informa- 2007, united in partnership between UNESCO and the International tion« (Carbo 1997), organized by the Government of Monaco.2 The Center for Information Ethics, and in a series of conversations regard- congress hosted over two hundred participants from fifty-four coun- tries who came together to discuss concerns of digital information 3 CATaC Conferences, ›Culture, Communication, Technology‹ (URL: http://www. access and preservation, and consisted of a wide spectrum of interna- catacconference.org, last accessed on 15 December 2014). 4 International Center for Information Ethics (ICIE) (URL: http://icie.zkm.de/ research, site last updated February 2, 2013; last accessed on February 21, 2014). 2 T. Carbo, ›Info-Ethics: First International Congress on Ethical, Legal, and Societal 5 T. Froehlich, ›A Brief History of Information Ethics,‹ BiD: textos universitaris de Aspects of Digital Information, March 1997, Monaco,‹ International Information & biblioteconomia i documentació, Vol. 13, 2004 (URL: http://bid.ub.edu/13froel2. Library Review, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1997, pp. 111–260. htm; last accessed on 13 January 2015).

234 235 J. Bielby Comparative Philosophies in Intercultural Information Ethics ing the nature of an Information Ethics for and from Africa, the union tions of information technology, no less than the pretensions of moral codes saw the establishment of a new field coalesce from merely an aca- and ethical thinking, and open at the same time different kinds of strategies demic venture into a globally recognized new discipline. However, when dealing with the digital divide. This debate presupposes a patient and the above association is only one of a number of initiatives that shape respectful philosophic dialogue that should not take place under a consensus compulsion of reaching universality also because universality remains, to the foundations of IIE. Along with UNESCO, ICIE and CATaC, IIE put it in Kantian terms, a »regulative idea« that cannot be reached by any finds its early and ongoing home in ETHICOMP, a conference estab- kind of moral codes. The role of ethics is to enlighten or weaken not only lished by Simon Rogerson, Terry Bynum and the Centre for Comput- local moralities but also the pretension of universal principles with regard ing and Social Responsibility (CCSR) in 1995, as well as the CEPE both to their unquestioned presuppositions and especially as far as they are Conference – Computer Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry (1997), and practically misused for local interests. This is not a plea for moral relativism lastly the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, established in but an incentive to enlighten our minds and lives with regard to the open 2003 under the support of the Uehiro Foundation on Ethics and Edu- space of thought and the groundless world we share, which allow us to re- cation in Japan. main in an endless process of intertwining society, nature and technology, looking for flexible norms that regulate rather than block such a process. A growing intercultural awareness of the need for a foundational (Capurro 2008: 172)7 and unified intercultural philosophy begs consideration. Any attempt at developing an IE without first recognizing and then reconciling westernized philosophical monopolies to the exclusion of, for exam- III Philosophy and Information Communication Technologies ple, Buddhist philosophical world views proves futile. Pak-Hang Wong, who has written extensively in the field of IIE, and whose ICTs have the potential to both support and undermine efforts to- interest in Chinese philosophy and ethics gives him a valuable insight wards developing an equitable global citizenship. In part, such a di- into the non-western applications of IIE, contends that the existing chotomy arises from the decentered nature of what will be defined discussions and dialogues in IE are dominated by ethical contexts un- further below as ›digital citizenship,‹ a type of cosmopolitan citizen- ique to western cultures whose ethical structures are not necessarily ship that not only differs from, but is opposite to the traditional poli- compatible with the numerous differing cultural frameworks around tical philosophy of cosmopolitan citizenship that looks to a single the world. Wong states, for example, that in western ethics, »the ar- world state. Citizens of a digital cosmopolitanism, referred to here as guments for the protection of privacy are often based on the indivi- the ›netizen,‹ rather than the citizen, understands their global iden- dual’s autonomy; these arguments may sound peculiar for Confucian tity in terms of both localization, and cosmopolitanism. In other cultures, which generally weigh the collective, common good over words, they are a netizen among ›information societies‹ (plural), 6 and above the benefit of individuals« (Wong 2009: 1). The argument rather than a citizen in an information society (singular). They are will be made herein that such differences are not necessarily divisive. not held to terms of nationalism nor state, but instead to their loca- Worth quoting at length in its entirety is Rafael Capurro’s con- lized place within a global digital community, and while they hold no cise summary of the field of IIE: particular allegiance to state or nation, they all the same identify fully We need an intercultural debate on information ethics in order to critically with their cultural heritage. They are existentially grounded rather discuss the limits and richness of human morality and moral thinking in than geographically or politically grounded, and thus the options for different societies, epochs and philosophic traditions as well as on their im- identity offered them in ›cyberspace‹ surpass, what in their view, are pact on today’s social appropriation of information technology. This would the ever-increasing, non-tangible, and unattainable identities offered open different paths of theory and practice that would weaken the ambi- them through traditional terms of nationalism and global citizenship.

6 P. H. Wong, ›What Should We Share?: Understanding the Aim of Intercultural In- formation Ethics,‹ ACM SIGCAS Computers and Society, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2009, 7 R. Capurro, ›On Floridi’s Metaphysical Foundation of Information Ecology,‹ Ethics pp. 50–58. and Information Technology, Vol. 10, Nos. 2–3, 2008, pp. 167–173.

236 237 J. Bielby Comparative Philosophies in Intercultural Information Ethics

They are both citizen and stranger at all times, especially in their own ments to protect their citizens from ›terrorism‹ through high-tech ›land.‹ monitoring security surveillance systems (the term ›terrorism‹ often However, while ICTs enable global dialogue, awareness, educa- a convenient demonization of dissidents and oppositions), the means tion, and new forms of being-in-the-world, they also enable the to doing so can become a vice at a moment’s notice where the mass widespread abuse of privacy, autonomy, anonymity, and security (Ca- ›monitoring‹ of individuals for national security purposes becomes a purro 2013: 3).8 The greatest and most relevant example of such gross erosion of anonymity, as outlined by Ess, Johnson, and the in- abuse centers around issues of surveillance, now the complex contem- formation philosopher Luciano Floridi. To lose control of our infor- porary concern of IE in general and IIE globally. Such concerns are mation is to lose control of who we are, a premise first offered by demonstrated best in the contemporary phenomena of WikiLeaks and Johnson, and recently taken up by Floridi who also contends that the NSA surveillance revelations, the fallout of which is just begin- our being consists of our information. Robert Herritt sums up Flori- ning to be addressed (Bielby 2014).9 While democracy ideally realized di’s premise, »you are your information, which includes everything should enable trust, the mere presence of ICTs, never mind the abuse from data about the relations between particles in your body to your of them, potentially undermines the foundational cultural and psy- life stories« (Herritt 2014).12 Thus the relationship between anonym- chological stalwarts behind democracy itself where the dynamics of ity, autonomy and privacy, at least from an IE perspective, is as fol- the distribution of political power and the ›rule of the people‹ become lows – our autonomy is synonymous with our information, and any muddied in an ICT-saturated world of open access to mass informa- breach of privacy is both a breach of autonomy and anonymity when tion, resulting in a distrust of power structures in general. Charles Ess that which we choose to conceal or to reveal is removed from our own and others demonstrate the preceding claim in a discourse that de- control (Capurro 2014).13 From both psychological and philosophical fends privacy as being foundational to democracy. perspectives, such an erosion undermines more than simple privacy, it Ess writes, »privacy is important as a means to develop a sense of also undermines the prerequisite of autonomy at the core of our hu- self and personal autonomy first of all – along with the intimate re- manness, and thus threatens the very dignity of our being« (Ess 2006: lationships, and other capacities and abilities important to this singu- 223). Chikako Endo, a scholar who has written and taught at both lar autonomy. Thereby, privacy funds the basic elements required for Oxford and Kwansei Gakuin Universities, addresses at length the re- participating in a democratic society – i.e., personal autonomy/free- lationship between autonomy, government, and democracy. The cor- dom and then the capacity for dialogue, debate, etc.« (Ess 2006: 223).10 relation is developed in a number of her published and unpublished Deborah Johnson states in her Computer Ethics, »one of the critical materials, first tackled in her doctoral dissertation for Oxford Univer- ways that an individual controls his life is by choosing with whom he sity, Autonomy and Citizenship: Implications for Citizenship Educa- will have relationships and what kind of relationships these will tion (Chicago: 2008a).14 In an unpublished paper presented at the be […] Information mediates relationships. Thus when one cannot 2008 Political Studies Association Conference, »The Idea of Autono- control who has information about one, one loses considerable auton- my in Liberal Democratic Citizenship: Autonomy and Citizenship in omy« (Johnson 1985: 65).11 While ICTs supposedly allow govern- Plural Societies,« Endo informs us that we must be able to first gov- ern our own selves freely without coercion in order to externally reflect and thus participate in a democracy as an autonomous indivi- 8 R. Capurro, ›Information Ethics in the African Context,‹ Information Ethics in Afri- ca: Cross-cutting Themes, Vol. 7, 2013, pp. 7–20. 9 J. Bielby, ›WikiLeaks and the Dissolution of Information: Accountability to Infor- 12 R. Herritt, ›Google’s Philosopher,‹ Pacific Standard, Dec 30, 2014. (URL: http:// mation Entropy,‹ accessible at: https://www.academia.edu/8635117/WikiLeaks_and_ www.psmag.com/navigation/nature-and-technology/googles-philosopher-technol the_Dissolution_of_Information_Accountability_to_Information_Entropy (last ac- ogy-nature-identity-court-legal-policy-95456/; last accessed on 5 January 2015). cessed on 23 October 2014). 13 R. Capurro, ›Shapes of Freedom in the Digital Age,‹ Sept. 3, 2014 (URL: http:// 10 C. Ess, ›Ethical Pluralism and Global Information Ethics,‹ Ethics and Information www.capurro.de/kastamonu.html; last accessed on 4 January 2015). Technology, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2006, pp. 215–226. 14 C. Endo, Autonomy and Citizenship: Implications for Citizenship Education, Chi- 11 D. Johnson, Computer Ethics, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1985. cago 2008a [doctoral dissertation, Oxford University].

238 239 J. Bielby Comparative Philosophies in Intercultural Information Ethics dual. As she qualifies, »we can come to reflect on our commitments (what people ought to do), but recognizing even therein the biased and potentially revise them through such encounters. Without this nature of the task, thus delving into applied ethics (how does one capacity to evaluate and potentially revoke our second-order desires, put a critical morality into practice?). Finally it has considered the our beliefs according to which we direct our first-order desires could realm of meta-ethics (an exploration of the biases behind the termi- simply become an expression of habit and complacent belief rather nology itself – commonly typified as ›what does »right« even than one of conscious self-government and self-direction.«15 It is only mean?‹).17 However exhaustive, the entire process speaks yet to a as an autonomous being that one is capable of reflecting on otherness, specific cultural horizon, namely ethics as per Greco-Roman, Chris- the prerequisite to any informed citizenship, and thus the prerequi- tian, and otherwise western traditions. site to democracy. Regarding the futility of uncritically applying the western ethi- However, it is within the above presumed concerns that IIE is cal tradition to a global scale, Soraj Hongladarom and Johannes Britz brought to a halt, not in the absence of answers to the above noted note in their introduction to Volume 13 of the International Review quandaries, but rather in the uncritical assumption that said issues are of Information Ethics, Intercultural Information Ethics, that: in fact the globally agreed upon concerns of IE. Ethics, as a discipline, The main area of discussion and debate within intercultural information is deeply entrenched in western history, tradition and culture, and the ethics centers around the age-old philosophical problem of universalism uncritical application of day-to-day presuppositions about the nature and particularism. The sets of ideas promoting Western style of individual- of reality, being, and ›right‹ and ›wrong,‹ appear so automatically and ism are predicated upon the more foundational belief that these ideas are are so subconsciously engrained. And thus, as abstracted by Johannes universal in nature. It does not make much sense to promote autonomy and Britz, while the field of IE as historically developed under a western liberty of individuals if these individuals are restricted only to a few groups worldview can be exemplified in three main notions, those being the (such as the European whites), because that would totally defeat what these freedom of speech, freedom of access to information and freedom of ideas stand for. On the other hand, those arguing for the traditional hier- archical society ideas presumably also believe that their ideas are universal. the press (Britz 2013: 3),16 a direct overlay of such foundations at a (Hongladarom, and Britz 2009: 3)18 global level is a gross misrepresentation of the subtleties of other cultural and historical worldviews and ethical systems. The World Summit on the Information Society envisions IE through The above recognition is one of the founding concerns of IIE. a truly global-centered approach that addresses what it sees as the While traditional ethical philosophies (whether we are referring to most critical elements of a fair and equitable globally informed com- the western tradition – ancient Greece onward, or an eastern tradition munity. Its eleven key principles, as listed in its Declaration of Prin- – Confucianism, for example), are forced to self-reflect on their own ciples, explore: »the role of governments and all stakeholders in the tradition when faced with another, they can only do so within the promotion of ICTs for development, information and communication parameters of their own tradition. The western tradition, for example, infrastructure; access to information and knowledge; capacity build- has attempted to assess the nature of morality from its own localized ing; building confidence and security in the use of ICTs; enabling perspective. It has critiqued its biases in detail, establishing what is environment; ICT applications; cultural diversity and identity; lin- referred to as descriptive ethics (asking the question – what it is that guistic diversity and local content; media; ethical dimensions; and ex- people think is ›right‹). From descriptive ethics it has established what plorations of international and regional cooperation (WSIS 2003, is referred to as normative ethics, a critical exploration of morality 2005)«.19

15 C. Endo, ›The Idea of Autonomy in Liberal Democratic Citizenship: Autonomy and 17 As explored by the National Open University of Nigeria course syllabus for Com- Citizenship in Plural Societies,‹ University of Oxford, Presented at the Political Stu- parative Ethics in a Pluralistic Society (URL: http://www.nou.edu.ng/NOUN_OCL/ dies Association Conference, 2008b (URL: http://www.pol.ed.ac.uk/psa_postgrad pdf/SASS/CTH%20423%20.pdf; last accessed 17 April 2014). uate/abstracts; last accessed on 6 January 2015). 18 S. Hongladarom, and J. Britz, ›Intercultural Information Ethics,‹ International Re- 16 J. Britz, ›Understanding Information Ethics,‹ Information Ethics in Africa: Cross- view of Information Ethics, Vol. 11, 2009, pp. 2–5. cutting Themes, Vol. 7, 2013, pp. 1–6. 19 ›Declaration of Principles: Building the Information Society: A Global Challenge in

240 241 J. Bielby Comparative Philosophies in Intercultural Information Ethics

However, as noble as the above agenda is, encompassing the vast The difficulty of an IIE surpasses even the disparity among govern- array of potential dynamics involved in the development of an equi- ments representing their localized geographical regions. While gov- table global citizenship, it is ultimately still theoretically biased. As ernments traditionally represent particular cultural traditions, a digi- per the First Regional Conference for the Asia and Pacific Region on tally globalized society complicates those traditional structures. As the Ethical Dimensions of the Information Society (12–14 March Hongladarom and Britz note, »when we really look deeper into the 2008, Hanoi, Vietnam), Peter Malcouronne comments on the princi- matter, we find that there can be as much difference within these ples highlighted above, specifically regarding the Asia-Pacific region: geographical regions themselves as there is among the separate re- gions« (Hongladarom, and Britz 2009: 2). These differences are reli- Ethnic diversity in the Asia Pacific region is unequalled. We have hundreds of millions of Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Shinto, Sikh and Buddhists; we gious, cultural, and philosophical, and they are as many as they are live under feudal kings, socialist prophets and capitalist roaders. Our differ- varied. As Wong states in regards to Confucianism, »it is often for- ences pose unique regional challenges to reaching a consensus on Informa- gotten that Confucianism is not simply fixed rules derived from the tion Society Ethics. Would we be able to reach a consensus amongst our- canons; but, it is itself a school of thought that contains various sub- selves? And if we did so, the concerns of our region are likely to be very traditions, e.g., Neo-Confucianism, New Confucianism, etc.; and, the different to those, say, of Europe. Indeed is a meaningful International Code problem of complexity multiplies once we consider Chinese culture as 20 of Ethics possible, even desirable? (Malcouronne 2008: 2) a whole, which is constituted by Confucian, Daoist and Zen, and each Predictably so, the above concern was realized in full when in a press has their own moral systems« (Wong 2009: 4). When the above is release of the Civil Society for WSIS during the 2003 Geneva Summit also considered in terms of geographical multiculturalism and the it was revealed that there was significant discord among governments interplay of equally dispersed subcultures as expanding uniformly around even the first article of the common foundation of the Sum- around the globe, the vast complexity of the matter begins to mani- mit declaration regarding the Universal Declaration of Human fest. Rights. As stated in the release regarding the struggle over human The initial consideration of an IIE, much like any ›international‹ rights: study, attempted to focus on various cultural differences from the perspective of geographical locality. However, insight into the nature Not even the basis of human life in dignity and equality, the Universal of globalization, especially as precipitated by an ICT-saturated, global Declaration of Human Rights, finds support as the basis for the Information Society. Governments are not able to agree on a commitment to basic hu- culture, quickly revealed a lack of such convenient borders. It in fact man right standards as the basis for the Information Society, most promi- revealed the birth pangs of the dissolution of said borders with the nent in this case being the freedom of expression. (Civil Society 2003)21 delivery of a new and hitherto unknown spectacle in governance, namely that of digital Global Citizenship and the concept of the neti- zen. This wider concept of a ›digital citizen‹ seeks to surmount an the New Millennium,‹ World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), Geneva arcane understanding of political citizenship. Here, traditional ideas 2003/Tunis 2005, Document WSIS-03/GENEVA?DOC/4-E, 12 December 2003 of cosmopolitanism are revisited through questions of digital identity (URL: http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official/dop.html; last accessed on 3 May and online being-in-the-world, demanding a readdress of everything 2014). from patriotism to ideas of the face-to-face. The very nature of glo- 20 P. Malcouronne, First Regional Conference for the Asia and Pacific Region on the Ethical Dimensions of the Information Society, 12–14 March 2008, Hanoi, Vietnam balization entails a new clash of cultures not from a butting up of (URL: https://www.google.ca/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad= previously separated nation states of cultural, religious and geogra- rja&uact=8&ved=0CB8QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fportal.unesco.org%2Fci% phical origin, but rather a clash of these same cultures in terms of new 2Fen%2Ffiles%2F27201%2F12142152553Final_Report_Hanoi_Conference.doc% forms of localization and inter-geographical cosmopolitanism in the 2FFinal_Report_Hanoi_Conference.doc&ei=3FuzVKmPM4XVoASv-ICIBQ&usg= AFQjCNE0EWV1j83k9L7giuUBvmw2RF8YVg&bvm=bv.83339334,d.cGU; last ac- cessed on 13 January 2015). November 2003 (URL: http://www.worldsummit2003.de/download_en/CS-press- 21 Civil Society Statement at the End of the Preparatory Process for the WSIS 14 statement-14-11-03-final.rtf; last accessed on 3 November 2014).

242 243 J. Bielby Comparative Philosophies in Intercultural Information Ethics world, of multiculturalism, of subcultures within culture, all propa- with the capacity to resist and reshape-to hack, if you will-the pre- gated by ICTs. vailing terms and conditions of cybercitizenship if they no longer In Teaching about (and with) Digital Global Citizenship C. F. serve our needs« (ibid.). Risinger notes that, »While national identity is certainly not going In Capurro’s work on communication theory (specifically his away, there is a growing support for a form of global citizenship, and monumental Messages and Messengers: Angeletics as an Approach technology has become a major and even transforming force within to the Phenomenology of Communication [2007]), the hermeneutical this movement« (Risinger 2014: 1).22 While the definition of global dichotomy between message and communication (as established in citizenship may seem somewhat ambiguous to begin with, especially the western continental tradition of philosophy) is opened up to es- in terms of how its existence could ever legally trump the rights and tablishing cross-cultural and intercultural communication as couched duties of national citizenship, the digital manifestation of global citi- specifically in terms of ICTs.24 Hermeneutics, originally worked out zenship has prompted a reevaluation of what citizenship entails in the ontologically by Martin Heidegger and perhaps subsequently illumi- digital age. Graham Longford proposes a radical digital global citizen- nated by Hans-Georg Gadamer, and demonstrated through the fields ship philosophy. Longford believes that the very nature of cyberspace of cybernetics and communication theory by theorists Claude E. is both self-governing and structured towards enabling global citizen- Shannon, Warren Weaver, Norbert Wiener, and Marshal McLuhan, ship in what he terms the politics of code (Longford 2005: 1).23 His in many ways represents the foundations of both IE and IIE. The new concept of digital global citizenship is reminiscent of a kind of Hei- field of angeletics looks to »what extent the internet creates a new deggerian ontology, offering both cyberspace and digital citizenship angeletic space, giving rise to new synergies of messages and messen- as present-at-hand, where the code of cyberspace is pre-existent in its gers beyond the hierarchical structure of mass media« (Capurro very design. As Longford states, a digital global citizenship must look 2011: 1). Tadashi Takenouchi approaches the task through what he towards »the ways in which citizenship norms, rights, obligations and terms hermeneutic information studies or hermeneutic informatics practices are encoded in the design and structure of our increasingly (Takenouchi 2004: 2, 6),25 an approach that captures the study of in- digital surroundings« (ibid.). formation in terms of communication and dialogue, based on Heideg- Because of the prevalence of ICTs and their tendency towards ger’s original re-envisioning of being-in-the-world. Thus through bridging cultures (whether for good or bad), and their overarching Capurro and Takenouchi, one encounters the crossroads between influence in both localized and globalized settings, the above supposi- ICTs and the hermeneutical circle, a basic hermeneutical premise po- tion of a present-at-hand digital citizenship ought to be considered siting that any understanding as a whole is established by reference to carefully. If ICTs are the predominant catalyst to a contemporary the individual parts, but in turn, any understanding of each individual cultural zeitgeist, and if they presuppose a ready-at-hand digital citi- part must be referenced back to the whole, and that this iterative zenship, then it could be argued that the predominance of a digital process becomes the ongoing dialogue that allows the truth of a mat- global citizenship must inevitably trump, if not at least work in tan- ter to emerge. Angeletics, as a basic theoretical foundation to IIE, dem with, any previous form of national citizenship. Longford con- posits the possibility of navigating the cyberspace of digital citizen- cludes, »Genuine technological citizenship in the digital era entails a ship as well as bridging intercultural differences in global political critical awareness of how code constitutes the conditions of possibility bodies such as UNESCO and WSIS. for different norms, models, and practices of on-line citizenship, along

22 F. C. Risinger, ›Teaching About (and With) Digital Global Citizenship,‹ Social Edu- 24 R. Capurro, and J. Holgate (eds.), Messages and Messengers: Angeletics as an Ap- cation, Vol. 78, No. 5, 2014, pp. 241–242. proach to the Phenomenology of Communication, Paderborn: Fink, 2011. 23 G. Longford, ›Pedagogies of Digital Citizenship and the Politics of Code,‹ Techné: 25 T. Takenouchi, ›Capurro’s Hermeneutic Approach to Information Ethics: Ethos in Research in Philosophy and Technology, Vol. 9, 2005 (URL: http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ the Information Society and the Development of »Angeletics«,‹ International Journal ejournals/SPT/v9n1/longford.html, last accessed on 13 January 2015). of Information Ethics, Vol. 1, 2004 pp. 1–8.

244 245 J. Bielby Comparative Philosophies in Intercultural Information Ethics

IV Privacy and Intercultural Information Ethics dividual and the community are entities that exist in convention only; a concept explained in part six below, where the only ethical exchange From discord in terms of freedom of expression to mutually incom- that can exist does so according to affording the best solutions to a patible concepts of privacy, a global philosophical foundation for IIE is mutual common good. yet wanting. The complexity of a unified definition of the merits of To obfuscate the matter, Andrew A. Adams, Kiyoshi Murata, and privacy alone from an IIE perspective is lacking. The foundations of Yohko Orito, contend that the idea of privacy has always existed in the very concept of privacy cannot be substantiated in commonplace Japan, but that the cultural fluctuations of technology and law have evaluations. What do, for instance, North American and African cul- distorted the traditional cultural Japanese norms of privacy. As stated: tures have in common regarding ideas of privacy? What about Afri- In keeping with this recent trend to demonstrate that the Japanese do have can and Thai cultures? Ess underlines philosophical notions of privacy concerns about privacy, we claim that there is a strong sense of information in Japan where the Buddhist worldview encourages the rejection of privacy in Japan which has long been a part of the culture […] it is our one’s connection to self through the practice of denying one’s self its contention that this legal development is not indicative of a new emergence privacy, all toward the goal of purification from self (Ess 2006: 9). of privacy concerns within Japanese society, but a response to the failures of Such acts encourage a disclosure of shame and secrecy, a necessary social norms that previously guaranteed such privacy. These failures have act that frees the self. By such cultural terms, there is neither the been brought about by economic and technological shifts. (Adams, Murata, 27 desire for nor the expectation of privacy. Alongside other historical and Orito 2009: 328) causes of cultural transformation due to intercultural exchange, the Soraj Hongladarom explores the concept of privacy specific to infor- gradual global-wide proliferation of ICTs is contributing to a slow mation ethics through the Buddhist thinkers Nagasena and Nagarju- transformation of traditional values in Asian countries under western na whose writings represent Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism re- influences, adding a complexity to an already exponential escalation spectively. Hongladarom complicates the debate by arguing against of the intercultural face-to-face (ibid.). the very western assumption of a private self and hence privacy as a Toru Nishigaki weighs in on the nature of IE in Japan. Nishigaki reflection of that self. The concept of privacy, according to Hongladar- highlights that IE in Japan, to date, is concerned mainly with main- om, exists only conventionally, but not ontologically, an assertion taining the status quo of society, and stresses that there is no drive in influenced by the above two schools of Buddhism. He points out that Japanese IE as there is in its western counterparts towards an ontol- since the self does not exist in an ultimate sense, then neither can the ogy of being-in-the-world (outlined below in section V), instead rights belonging to the self exist (Hongladarom 2007: 112).28 Hongla- looking simply towards how ICTs should be incorporated into already darom understands the Buddhist conception of ›no self‹ as advanta- established cultural norms and expectations. He differentiates how- geously offering pragmatic solutions to the IE privacy debate in that ever, this general application of IE in Japan from his own understand- an exploration of privacy can take place without its presumed attach- ing of the consequences of ICTs on Japanese society (Nishigaki 2006). ment to self, offering an idea of privacy, even from a Buddhist per- Nishigaki takes a critical look at the western ontological presupposi- spective, that accommodates convention, and thus ultimately allows tions of a coherent self and contrasts it to the Japanese idea of no self, protections against the same abuses outlined in the western ethical juxtaposing the two perspectives towards the possibility of a ›middle way.‹ Where many western ontologies consider the wellbeing of self cisco Varela’s The Embodied Mind From the Perspective of Fundamental Informatics,‹ as primary, in contrast, Buddhist philosophy does not adhere to any Ethics and Information Technology, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2006, pp. 237–242. confirmation of a coherent self, looking instead to an ethics where, as 27 A. A. Adams, I. Murata, and Y. Orito, ›The Japanese Sense of Information Privacy,‹ in China and Thailand, the relationship between the individual and AI and Society, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2009, pp. 327–341 (URL: http://opendepot.org/209/1/ the community takes precedence (Nishigaki 2006: 2).26 Here, the in- Adams_Murata_Orito_v4.pdf; last accessed 13 January 2015). 28 S. Hongladarom, »Analysis and Justification of Privacy from a Buddhist Perspec- tive,« S. Hongladarom, and C. Ess (eds.), Information Technology Ethics: Cultural 26 T. Nishigaki, ›The Ethics in Japanese Information Society: Consideration on Fran- Perspectives, Hershey, Pennsylvania: Idea Group, 2007, pp. 108–122.

246 247 J. Bielby Comparative Philosophies in Intercultural Information Ethics perspective. While the above notion excludes self in the ontological wrong because they disagree with the one set of putatively universal truths western sense of beingness, it recognizes the physical entity that con- and values. The resulting intolerance of all such different norms and claims stitutes a self. As Hongladarom puts it, »According to Nagarjuna, the inspires precisely the relativist effort to establish and justify tolerance to- self as an inherently existing entity does not exist, strictly speaking, wards a wide diversity of views, beliefs, practices, and cultures. The relati- vist can do so, however, only at the cost of actively denying the possibility of but as an empirical entity, it certainly does« (ibid.: 109). Privacy too ethical standards and norms that may be compelling and legitimate for exists as a »right« for this empirical entity, but only in a conventional, more than the individual and/or specific ethnos. (Ess 2006: 1) not ontological, sense. As far as an exploration of IIE goes, the critical difference between western and Daoist, Confucius, and Buddhist no- How then does one come to terms with intercultural ethical truth? tions of self and the potential of privacy being accorded them resides How does one maintain information societies rather than submitting in the presumed beingness or lack of self apart from its value, where to an idea of an information society? How do cultures exist both lo- the value of a being exists only in its reflection as an entity co-existing cally and globally, globally in terms of the digital cosmopolitanism and interacting among other living entities. While Nagarjuna would outlined above? Ess argues that succumbing to relativism is as good recognize the entity that is a self as being a part of and interacting with as abandoning any hope of arriving at an IIE. Instead he advocates for other entities, such a self is only of value in reflection to its presence a pluralism that looks to a multiethnic, global city where the avoid- among other entities and its political value. Hongladarom clarifies: ance of compromises is critical, specifically, the move beyond mere tolerance or token inclusion, the consequence of which is nothing Privacy is justified in Buddhism through its being a necessary element in the realization of democratic ideals that require individuals to be respected and more than a state of ignorance. In his estimation, a non-engagement accorded a certain number of rights that would allow them to function effec- with ›otherness‹ does nothing towards enhancing the knowledge of tively in the task assigned to citizens in a democratic polity, such as delibera- one’s world, mutual or otherwise. Ess explores, instead of tolerance, tion and participation in public policy process. In such a scenario, violation of the move to a place of authentic sharing, a type of pluralism he de- individual privacy would mean that the violator gains an unfair power over fines by a state of shared multiplicities. Ess notes that if mere toler- the individual; thus, the basic underlying principle of democracy would be ance of differing values inevitably leads to ›ghetto‹-like divisions undermined, the principle that individuals are equal in power in need of some within a global city, resulting in a form of cultural alienation which space within which they can live, think, and communicate freely. (ibid.: 112) inevitably leads to conflict through force in the end despite such tol- erance, then pluralism must look towards a value structure built V Pluralism in Intercultural Information Ethics around not just agreements of difference, but also on a sharing of differences that avoids the fragmentation that so often accompanies Charles Ess speaks to the above noted foundational tenets of IIE in ›tolerance‹ (ibid.: 2). This is not to deny that some level of compro- terms of ethical pluralism. The aforementioned arguments regarding mise must inevitably take shape in the interaction, but that the com- the ungrounded nature of global ethics lead to the conclusion that any promise not be forced begrudgingly, and in fact be a type of mutually stand on the truth of ethical claims whatsoever becomes culturally edifying compromise. Thus, Ess looks towards models of connection subjective, since it appears now that truth only exists in the eye of and ›complementarity‹ in what he deems an active engagement that the beholder. Ess notes, regarding truth and cultural differences: results in both sides connecting through self and identity but doing so without the negation of irreducible differences. The goal is irreduci- A first response, in the face of these irreducible differences, is that of ethical bility not irreconcilability. Ess states, »complementarity relationships relativism. Such relativism, of course, pits itself especially against an ethical preserve and enhance the irreducible differences that define distinc- dogmatism – the usually ethnocentric belief that universal ethical standards indeed exist, that these are known to a particular person and/or ethnos, and tive individuals, cultures, and civilizations« (ibid.: 3). that these standards must indeed be acknowledged as universally legitimate, Ess further develops his thought in terms of pluralism in IIE, i.e., as normative for all people in all times and all places. This dogmatism looking to the origins of western tradition and Greek philosophy it- simply condemns all different views, claims, approaches, norms, etc., as self in order to escape the numerous strains of western tradition that

248 249 J. Bielby Comparative Philosophies in Intercultural Information Ethics might otherwise cloud any shared origins between western and east- emplified in the above noted case of WSIS’ failure to develop even a ern philosophy. He engages Plato and Aristotle as forbearers of the foundation for universal human rights, remains thus far non-exis- above pluralism whereby Plato’s cybernetes (the origin of Weiner’s tent. Wong attempts to overcome the above deadlock by replacing Cybernetics, and thus of IE) and Aristotle’s phronēsis (practical wis- ethical norms with common cultural values, but admits that a detailed dom) offer more than just a methodology to IIE, but also a common explication of what those values should be is yet needed (ibid.: 7.). starting place for IIE through parallels to eastern, specifically Confu- cian, thought. Ess quotes Joseph Chan as making the crucial point regarding the similarity between what Plato and Aristotle understood VI Information Ecology and Intercultural Information Ethics as practical wisdom and what the Confucians deemed rén, the Con- fucian virtue of shared humanness that focuses on the connection As global consciousness (or at least awareness) increases through the between two subjects of an action. As Chan summarizes rén, »If after exposure of previously closed ethical systems to intercultural other- careful and conscientious deliberation, two persons equipped with rén ness, an inevitable evolution of IIE will begin to look at cultural and come up with two different or contradictory judgments and courses of intercultural perspectives of the interface between not only ICTs and action, Confucians would tell us to respect both of the judgments« human agency but between ICTs and other agents as well, including (Chan 2003: 137).29 This deliberation is the very act of Greek phron- artificial agents (robots, cyborgs), environment, and the ethical and ēsis, where rather than employing an uncritical tolerance, and thus moral agency of non-human beings (like animals), and indeed such avoidance of differences that create a cultural ›peace,‹ an accountable perspectives have already found their roots in the IE and IIE tradition. engagement is instead pursued and a pointed and deliberate encoun- Where western interpretations of being have thus far limited moral ter results in a mutual edification of Self and Other based on irredu- agency to human beings, perpetuated by western notions of dualism cible differences, not irreconcilable differences. and human superiority as ›divinely designated,‹ the interface with Yet even here, the practical application of IIE is still in need of eastern philosophies demands now an accountability of western work. In addressing the aim of IIE, Wong critiques Ess’ pluralism. ethics to life removed from religious and metaphysical moralities Regarding Ess’ conclusions he writes, »it is unclear exactly what and notions of human superiority. counts as maintaining cultural diversity and respecting different mor- Leading IIE in environmentally inclusive moral agency are the al systems […] and when the norms are considered to be shared« notions of Luciano Floridi’s infosphere and Terrell Ward Bynum’s (Wong 2009: 2). Wong sums up the IIE debate thus far, especially as notion of ›Flourishing Ethics‹ (FE). Where Bynum advocates for two culminating in Ess’ pluralism, as offering two possibilities, one unat- modes of flourishing ethics based on the ethics of Aristotle, those two tainable, the other attainable only under certain conditions. He expli- modes being ›human-centered FE‹ and ›general FE,‹ Floridi looks to a citly outlines the debate concerning establishing an IIE in terms of post-analytical flourishing of being through a metaphysics of inclu- either »shared norms, different interpretations« or »shared norms, sive moral entities that make up the entirety of what he calls the info- different justifications,« where cultural norms are established differ- sphere, an interactive continuum of reality consisting of the positive ing only in interpretation of said norms or justifications of such, re- and negative outcomes of information entropy. While Bynum advo- spectively (ibid.: 5). His critique is that any such shared point of ori- cates for understanding flourishing ethics in the traditional Aristote- gin of reference succumbs to metaethical moral relativism unless this lian sense (human-centered FE) he also insists on differentiating that point of origin is first clearly identified and agreed upon. Doing this, traditional sense from a Flourishing Ethics that applies to »every phy- however, would require a detailed and successful outline that, as ex- sical entity in the universe, including humans,« otherwise labeled as General FE (Bynum 2006: 158).30 Floridi understands his ethics in 29 J. Chan, »Confucian Attitudes towards Ethical Pluralism,« in R. Madsen, and T. B. Strong, (eds.), The Many and the One: Religious and Secular Perspectives on Ethical Pluralism in the Modern World, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003, 30 T. W. Bynum, ›Flourishing Ethics,‹ Ethics and Information Technology, Vol. 8, pp. 129–153. No. 4, 2006, pp. 157–173.

250 251 J. Bielby Comparative Philosophies in Intercultural Information Ethics terms of information entropy where all things consist of and are taphysics to Hongladarom’s Buddhist-influenced foundation of non- formed of information, assigning them moral agency and attributing being. Perhaps it is in such dialectics that a possibility for a cohesive all entities, living or otherwise, a more-or-less equal standing as being IIE exists, bridging two traditions that, on one hand, recognize the deserving of ethical consideration and capable of moral agency, and it complexities of the pluralism debate, outlined above in Ess and is the moral action of each entity that either detracts from or adds to Wong’s critique and valuation of such, and on the other hand a hope the entropy of the infosphere (Floridi 2002a, 2000b, 2007).31 Though for mutual perceptions of information ecology between western and coming from western ethical traditions, both Floridi and Bynum’s eastern traditions as per Brey’s bridging of Floridi’s infosphere to the ecological ethics are possibly conducive to, for instance, certain Bud- pragmatic grounding of convention. It is also conceivable that dhist or Hindu worldviews. through the establishment of such a platform, IIE can then begin to Philip Brey, however, takes issue with Floridi’s all encompassing explore, through convention via information ecology, the possibility IIE, arguing that while grand in theory, Floridi’s IE, specifically his of intercultural communication per hermeneutical horizons along a concept of information object as morally entitled, cannot be grounded common trajectory of the Heideggerian-based work of Capurro and or supported, at least in terms of information objects possessing a the traditional information ethicists of the hermeneutical tradition. metaphysical intrinsic value in of themselves. Instead, Brey allows a possible reconciliation of Floridi’s value-based information entity by replacing his value-based metaphysics with a respect-based alterna- VII Conclusion tive. Rather than each information entity being entitled to moral re- spect because of an ontological entitlement, the support for which While traditional IE assumes a western founded philosophy and an Brey contends is missing in Floridi’s work, Floridi’s infosphere of ob- intrinsic positive value to ideas such as privacy, complimented by de- jects can rather be afforded equal moral respect as being equally va- mocratic and capitalist concerns of ownership and rights, and assumes lued by other information entities. As Brey contends, »inanimate a fundamental and existential self, IIE is confronted by a global mor- things in the world deserve moral respect, not because of intrinsic ass of supposedly unremitting differences between eastern and wes- value, but because of their (potential) extrinsic, instrumental or emo- tern thought that threatens the very undoing of everything that IE tional value for persons« (Brey 2008: 10).32 has thus far established under its western tutelage, including the va- Perhaps it could be surmised that Brey’s reevaluation of Floridi’s lue and nature of self! Fortunately, IIE finds roots in non-western information entity actually brings Floridi closer to bridging eastern philosophies as well as western, as outlined above, allowing room for and western IIE within common roots in that a respect-based info- the exploration of a common intercultural ground for IE. While the sphere reflects Hongladarom’s Buddhist idea of reality convention larger scope of IE readily looks to wider implications of the address of rather than reality actualization, specifically his necessity of no self the en-masse arrival of ICTs, pause must first be afforded to working and also the negation of concepts attached to the supposed self, in the out an IIE whereby the sudden sharing of a cultural-techno world case of Hongladarom’s work, the attachment being the false pretense awaits a fair advocacy. Such questions are yet to be addressed, or are of the concept of privacy as intrinsically existent. Here one can afford currently being surveyed in the field and will formulate the evolving Floridi a platform bridging his own western-based post-analytic me- directions of IIE within the wider playing field of comparative philo- sophies. It may yet prove that IIE ultimately and eventually provides 31 L. Floridi, ›Information Ethics,‹ Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Vol. 9, the resolve that bridges the long-suffering chasm between the vary- No. 1, 2002a, pp. 39–45; ›On the Intrinsic Value of Information Objects and the Info- ing philosophical approaches to IE. sphere,‹ Ethics and Information Technology, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2002b, pp. 287–304; ›Glo- bal Information Ethics: The Importance of Being Environmentally Earnest,‹ Interna- –Jared Bielby, University of Alberta, Canada tional Journal of Technology and Human Interaction, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2007, pp. 1–11. 32 P. Brey, ›Do We Have Moral Duties Towards Information Objects?‹ Ethics and In- formation Technology, Vol. 10, Nos. 2–3, 2008, pp. 109–114.

252 253 National Context and Ethnocentrism National Context and Ethnocentrism boastful pride (Vico 1948: 125).3 Notwithstanding the rising interest in non-European traditions of thought, as well as the gradual globali- zation of the academic sphere, these matters have also become more urgent. Starting with the second half of the twentieth century, scholars of philosophy and other human sciences have adopted the term ›eth- nocentrism‹ for these limitations. The term itself comes from the field of American social psychology. It was coined in 1908 by the social Darwinist thinker William G. Sumner (1906: 15)4 and later used by Abstract David Levinson (1949),5 working with Theodor Adorno’s research In this survey article, the author reviews three recent works concern- team on the problem of ›authoritarian personality.‹ Both theories di- ing Slovak history. They criticize the idea of a ›national revival‹ and verged in their definitions of ›ingroup,‹ meaning, the ideal group present the history of the national movement as a later construct which reveres the values of the ethnocentrist person. For Sumner, omitting the variety of contradicting ideologies which propelled it. ethnocentrism is a phenomenon observable in the cultural output of By introducing a broader perspective, they show how an isolated tra- major cultural groups like nations; for Levinson, it is a property of an dition of thought can become comprehensible or relevant outside of individual, while the reference group of one’s ethnocentrism does not its self-imposed cultural borders. have to reflect his actual ethnic identity. Other human sciences focused on two main effects of ethno- Keywords centrism. For anthropologists the problem was more epistemological nationalism, national revival, Slovakia, Hungary, ethnocentrism. in nature: it described the tendency to make analogies between the researcher’s society and that of the object of study. In this way the criticism of Clifford Geertz (1989)6 or Ernest Gellner (1996)7 contin- I Introducing Ethnocentrism as a Problem of Philosophy ued the idea of cultural relativism, proposed variously by Franz Boas, Ruth Benedict, and Edmund Leach (1964).8 For others, the use of local Since the earliest times, European philosophy was faced with its lo- categories from the thinker’s cultural background for societies outside cality. The tradition called ›philosophy‹ by its admirers and propo- of it was not only a methodological weakness, but it was also seen as a nents did not hold the sole claim for truth and wisdom against the forceful imposition of a foreign order. In the terminology of Edward ›barbarian‹ traditions (Diogenes Laërtius 1915: 3),1 yet it could not Said, human sciences – anthropology, history, sociology, and also phi- escape its identification with the Hellenic world for long. The ancient Sceptics already saw the cultural background as an obstacle: the deter- Nature, J. Spedding, R. L. Ellis, and D. D. Heath (trans.), Boston: Taggard and Thomp- mination of one’s thoughts by the social environment narrows the son 1863 (Online edition at: http://www.constitution.org/bacon/nov_org.htm, last perspective from which a problem can be examined (ibid.: 410). Later accessed on 25 May 2014). 3 thinkers from the early modern era criticized this aspect of things as G. Vico, The New Science, T. G. Bergin and M. H. Fisch (transl), New York: Ithaca, 1948. well. We are limited both from an objective point of view, from the 4 W. G. Sumner, Folkways, Boston: Athenaeum Press, 1906. aspect of language and traditional methods of inquiry (Bacon 1863, 5 D. J. Levinson, ›An Approach to the Theory and Measurement of Ethnocentric Book 1, Aphorism 43),2 as well as from a subjective view, because of Ideology,‹ Journal of Psychology, Vol. 28, 1949, pp. 19–39. 6 C. Geertz, Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as an Author, Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1989. 1 Diogenes Laërtius, The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, C. D. Yonge 7 E. Gellner, Anthropology and Politics, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. (trans.), London: Bell and Sons, 1915. 8 E. R. Leach, Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Struc- 2 F. Bacon, The New Organon, or: True Directions Concerning the Interpretation of ture, London: G. Bell and Sons, 1964.

254 255 I. Šimko National Context and Ethnocentrism losophy – thus continued the European (or, more generally, Western) ethnocentrism. The work that coined the term has already used na- colonization of the ›third world‹ in the intellectual sphere (Said tions as main examples of institutionalizing and promoting this syn- 1978).9 This line of thought, especially as articulated in debate be- drome. Sumner uses the term while retaining all of its ambiguity – tween Geertz and Richard Rorty (cf. Geertz 1985; Rorty 1991),10 but namely the blurry borders between the definition of the anthropolo- as already similarly initiated by Jacques Derrida (1997),11 entered the gist’s ethnic group and the historian’s country or faction, but also philosophical discourse as well. Recent discussion on political terms between the institutionalized, sovereign nation and an externally de- proposed by non-Western thinkers found these terms often marked fined ethnic category. These ambiguities persisted until today, as nationalist or otherwise locally biased by their Western critics although many studies have managed to make the definition of a (Dallmayr 2004).12 The term gained an ethical (or political) meaning, ›nation‹ and ›nationalism‹ clearer (e.g., Hutchinson, and Smith 1994; reflecting phenomena like disrespect of ›lesser‹ cultures, marginaliza- Eriksen 2010).14 tion of their philosophical traditions or history, attempts for assimila- In keeping with the impetus of cross-cultural philosophy, my tion, and such. In this way, the borders between epistemological, ethi- focus will be on the high variety of specific national ideologies, effec- cal, and political questions were quite blurred. tive either within a single country or in a trans-national region. These Recent discussions within the field of cross-cultural philosophy particular ideologies are usually reflected in the literature of the na- adopt the term ›ethnocentrism‹ as well. It is remarkable that the iden- tional ›canon,‹ embedded in national educational systems, in the scope tification of the ingroup of a biased philosopher with anthropological of the local academic community of historians, and also in political ethnic groups is generally avoided. Confessional groups, ideological rhetoric. I will thus present three works of historians which critically affiliations, or adherence to particular schools of thought can function review the construction of the specific national ideology of Slovakia. in the same way: cross-cultural philosophy can be considered cross- These are: Alexander Maxwell’s book Choosing Slovakia (2009), Tet- religious, cross-ideological, and cross-disciplinary as well. Following suya Nakazawa’s article ›Slovak Nation as a Corporate Body‹ (2007) Jürgen Habermas and Franz Wimmer (Habermas 1996; Wimmer and Miroslav Hroch’s book Národy nejsou dílem náhody (›Nations 2004),13 we can terminologically speak of a ›centrism‹ without the Aren’t the Work of Chance‹) (2009).15 All of them are ›foreign‹ to ›ethno-‹ prefix. The variety of ingroup categories doesn’t, however, ›Slovak academia‹: one piece comes from New Zealand, the second make them irrelevant for study. Identification of one’s own centrism, from Japan, and the third is from a Czech writer. They all show ambi- of overestimated values or unavoidable premises, remains very im- tions to formulate methods for researching the concept of nation, its portant for the thinker. It is actually one of the first steps with which a emergence, and its propagation universally. They propose the idea person attempting cross-cultural philosophy has to contend. that the specific historical traditions tend to focus on the existing (or In this article, I will divert a bit from the usual cross-cultural realized) nations instead of the causes behind the development. This discourse, and take a very traditional definition of an ingroup: na- bias towards the present is a kind of ›centrism‹ too. Maxwell, Naka- tions. Nations have always had a specific role in discussions about zawa and Hroch consider these national historical narratives to be the source of bias, not the cultural centres of nations. 9 E. Said, Orientalism, London: Penguin, 1978. 10 C. Geertz, ›The Uses of Diversity,‹ Lecture at the University of Michigan, 8.11.1985, (transcript available at: http://tannerlectures.utah.edu, last retrieved on 14 J. Hutchinson, and A. D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 25.5.2014); R. Rorty, »On Ethnocentrism,« in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and 1994; T. H. Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives, Lon- Truth, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991, pp. 203–2010. don: Pluto Press, 2010 [third edition]. 11 J. Derrida, Of Grammatology, G. Chakravorty Spivak (trans.), Baltimore: John 15 A. Maxwell, Choosing Slovakia: Slavic Hungary, the Czechoslovak Language and Hopkins University Press, 1997 [corrected edition]. Accidental Nationalism, New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2009; T. Nakazawa, 12 F. Dallmayr, ›Beyond Monologue: For a Comparative Political Theory,‹ Perspectives »Slovak Nation as a Corporate Body,« in: T. Hayashi (ed.), Regions in Central and on Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2004, pp. 249–257. Eastern Europe: Past and Present, Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007; M. Hroch, 13 J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Band 1, Frankfurt: Suhr- Národy nejsou dílem náhody: Příčiny a předpoklady utváření moderních evropských kamp, 1982; F. M. Wimmer, Interkulturelle Philosophie, Wien: Facultas, 2004. národů, Prague: Slon, 2009.

256 257 I. Šimko National Context and Ethnocentrism

Similar to cross-cultural philosophers, these works attempt to on the prevalent ideology, these movements can be seen also as peri- ›decenter‹ the approach to the historical phenomenon of nationality. odization, culminating in ›Slovak particularist nationalism‹ in Cze- Where the philosophers propose cross-cultural or comparative para- choslovakia. In the first period, described in the first four chapters, digms instead of universalist claims of European or Socratic tradition, the Slovak movement is seen as attempts of a certain group of thin- we can propose a similar variety of theories of social order apart from kers, writers and political activists in 1840s, mostly Lutheran Protes- the ›theory of nations.‹ The works described here show and compare tants, to emancipate the Slavs of northern Hungary from the Ma- alternative political concepts and social mechanisms at work during gyar-speaking population. A critical turning point in this conflict various revolutionary periods in a nation’s history before they were was the revolution of March 1848. Here, the main Slovak politician suppressed and replaced by a local application of the general ideology L’udovít (in contemporary writing used by Maxwell: L’udevít Štúr) of nationalism. All of them focus on Slovakia as one such case in withdrew his support for the revolutionary movement after the Hun- point. garian Diet refused to acknowledge Slavic as one of the languages of administration and education. Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the second political model, namely II Decentering the Historical Phenomenon of Nationality that of solidarity between Slavs (All-Slavism, in Maxwell’s terminol- ogy), or more particularly between Czechs and Slovaks. This model Alexander Maxwell – Choosing Slovakia was popular among intellectuals of both emerging nations, because of the mutual intelligibility of their dialects, historical parallels regard- Maxwell is a senior lecturer of history at the University of Welling- ing their unity (ninth century principality of Great Moravia), and ton, New Zealand. He has gained his Master’s degree at the CEU in even a common literary language (bibličtina, from seventeenth cen- Budapest and the PhD at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. His tury translation of Bible based on the Moravian dialect of Kralice). main research interest is the culture and politics of the late Habsburg Unlike Štúr’s pre-revolutionary movement, this movement de- Empire and its successor states, primarily the phenomenon of ›na- manded much broader political emancipation, based either in the Bo- tional revivals‹ of this period. He directs an ›Antipodean East Europe hemian kingdom or a separate Slavic republic. It started somewhat Study Group,‹ which focuses on these themes as well. Choosing Slo- earlier with Ján Kollár, who had published his major work on All- vakia is his second book publication: the first was a translation of Ján Slavic reciprocity in 1836. His thoughts gained prominence especially Kollár’s work Reciprocity Between the Tribes and Dialects of the Sla- in Prague, endured the opposition of Štúr, and finally managed to vic Languages (2008).16 He has also edited two volumes of studies, the reach their goals with the founding Czechoslovakia after World first one concerning symbolic geography (2010), and another one War I. looking at the influence of Miroslav Hroch on studies of nationalism The Czechoslovak movement is central to the third part of his (2011).17 book. The last three chapters deal with the reasons why the solidarity The full title of the book in question is Choosing Slovakia: The did not ultimately survive: both in 1939, when Slovak politicians de- Slavic Hungary, the Czechoslovak Language and Accidental Nation- clared independence under the threat of Nazi occupation, as well as in alism. This title reflects the author’s attempt to divide the early Slo- 1993, when the federation was dissolved in the wake of nationalism vak national movement into three historical movements. Depending throughout post-Communist Europe. Maxwell’s explanation is a cul- tural one. Because of different education systems in both parts of the Czechoslovak Republic, the generation born in 1910s and 1920s had 16 J. Kollár, Reciprocity between the Tribes and Dialects of the Slavic Language, already acquired distinct identities. Solidarity between Czechs and A. Maxwell (trans.), Bloomington: Slavica Press, 2008. Slovaks was undermined by the very attempt to preserve the cultural 17 A. Maxwell (ed.), The East-West Discourse: Symbolic Geography and its Conse- quences, Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010; The Comparative Approach to National Move- distinction; it was reduced to a mere political alliance. The cultural ments: Miroslav Hroch and Nationalism Studies, London: Routledge, 2011. base for this distinction, however, could be found already earlier: in

258 259 I. Šimko National Context and Ethnocentrism

Štúr’s theory of a specific Slovak ›tribe‹ and ›dialect,‹ in the successful fact, that by mastering one or the other orthography, one could be spread of the modern standard Slovak created by Martin Hattala, and thus qualified for jobs only in one half of the country. He illustrates also in the Catholic populist movement of Andrej Hlinka. However, it with a case from 1937 where some students in Bratislava protested the education system of the First Republic, ironically despite its at- against the use of the Czech language at their school. This is, in my tempts, primarily helped the ›Slovak particularist nationalism‹ to be- opinion, an unnecessary tangent, as the anti-Czech propaganda was come a political power. already strong enough in the 1920s. Hlinka’s Populist Party was with- Maxwell tries to answer the primary question ›how and why the out doubt the most influental political power in Slovakia: it gained Slovak nation came to be‹ (Maxwell 2009: 1) by using a method simi- more than half a million votes in 192520 and entered the government lar to the one used by Eugen Weber in his book Peasants into French- in 1927. Imprisonment of Hlinka’s right-hand Vojtech Tuka for espio- men (Weber 1976)18 and Miroslav Hroch’s Social Preconditions of nage in 1929 also helped to radicalize the particularist movement National Revivals in Europe (Hroch 1985),19 namely by showing the somewhat. cultural centers and channels of influence of national ideology on the One could argue about the conclusions Maxwell draws from his broader masses of population. His view, on the other hand, also points analysis, but the idea of a national history as a string of group-defin- out that there were multiple models of Slovak nationality at work, ing contingencies is quite interesting in the face of the narrative of while only one of them succeeded in the long run. As these models ›national revival.‹ This narrative replaces the cause behind a develop- contrasted each other, Maxwell considers the failure of different revi- ment with its result – the ›choice‹ of national loyalty is predetermined vals to be a crucial factor for the explanation of his primary question, by the needs of the community. Maxwell presents himself in fact as a a factor avoided in studies of Weber and Hroch. The development was radical constructivist with his Bourdieuan ›dialect argument‹: it was discontinuous: its »historical actors selectively appropriated, reinter- the convergent identification of a dialect group, a region, a political preted, or discarded preexisting heritages in light of political goals« force, and carefully chosen (and in the course of action appropriated, (Maxwell 2009: 3). These reinterpretations are presented most vi- reinterpreted or discarded) historical symbols, which led to the crea- vidly in the case of Hlinka and his party, through their newspaper tion of the Slovak nation. To understand these choices, however, one Slovák. This newspaper, for example, had an important rule in deny- has to avoid the bias of the present situation and dominant narratives ing the relevance of Protestant literature to Slovak literary history of national history, and speculate on possible scenarios as to what (ibid.: 178). could have been, were the choices different. The ironical conclusion (ibid.: 7) that the attempts of Czechoslo- vakia to promote the idea of a bilingual nation actually led to the destruction of the »possibility of a single Czechoslovak nation« (ibid.: Tatsuya Nakazawa – Slovak Nation as a Corporate Body 181) is not thoroughly argued. In the last chapter, Maxwell describes the convergence of both orthographies, culminating in the unsuccess- Nakazawa’s article forms the ninth chapter of the volume Regions in ful reform of 1931, which was bashed as propaganda by circles within Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Present, edited by Tadayuki Hlinka’s party and also multiple different political and non-govern- Hayashi and published in 2007 by the Slavic-Eurasian Research Cen- mental activists (ibid.: 179). During this time, loyalty to language ter at Hokkaido University in Sapporo. As the title shows, the volume seemed to be at work across society: socialist writers united with itself has a very broad scope: the geopolitical meaning of the Central- Catholic populists against the reform. European region, contrasts between the West and the East, and finally However, Maxwell argues that the opposition grew from the regional concepts and identities have all their respective parts. The

18 E. Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976. 20 The second strongest Agrarian Party gained merely 248 thousand votes in the 19 M. Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe, B. Fowkes (trans.), Slovak regions (http://csugeo.i-server.cz/csu/2006edicniplan.nsf/t/220060E38B/$File New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1985. /4219rr11.pdf, last accessed on 20 November 2014).

260 261 I. Šimko National Context and Ethnocentrism historical and regional definition of the volume’s scope is also some- The Diet thus became the main bearer of state sovereignty, with no- what unclear: the first article by Hayashi broadly identifies it with the bility as its ›limbs‹ and the king as its ›head.‹ The natio Hungarica was »zone of small nations,« defined by Masaryk21 and others (Hayashi a term for the class of population (one of its gentes, ›communities‹) 2007: 5).22 with political privileges to be represented in the Diet. As the nobility Tatsuya Nakazawa obtained his PhD in European History from was seen as an ›organic‹ part of the realm, these privileges are inter- Waseda University. Since 2005 he has worked as an associate profes- preted here as ›corporate rights.‹ It is a pity that the author fails to sor at the University of Fukui. He also lectured at Comenius Univer- demonstrate how these privileges were extended to free royal cities sity in Bratislava. His focus is on studies of the Habsburg monarchy, and other communities, like the specific gentes included, for example especially its legal traditions. Nakazawa has also published articles on those in the aforementioned Treaty of Szatmar (1711). coronation rituals in Hungary (2012) and on early Hungarian Jaco- In the next sections, Nakazawa examines the activities of L’udovít binism (2013). His Slovak Nation as a Corporate Body: The Process Štúr during his time as a member of the Diet and afterwards, describ- of the Conceptual Transformation of a ›Nation without History‹ into ing these activities in three periods. The first phase stretches from his a Constitutional Subject during the Revolutions of 1848/49 resulted election as a representative of the royal city of Zvolen in October from a paper presented at two conferences in Fukui. 1847 to March 1848, when he abdicated his mandate. During his It might be asked why a review of a whole book is followed by a mandate he proposed an extension of privileges held by the natio to review of a single article. On the one hand, Nakazawa’s article can be a broader mass – first to smaller, non-royal towns (were the Slovak said to supplement Maxwell’s book. The article presents a phenomen- language was more common), and from December 1847 to the pea- on which shows the contingent character of nation-building, the dy- sants even. Thus he tried, Nakazawa concludes, to redefine the natio namical development of an ideology controlled by only a limited from a class concept into a nation-state composed of multiple, ethni- group of ›representatives‹ of the nation. On the other hand, the article cally defined gentes. Štúr believed that a privilege should have been also provides an alternative explanation to the problem, without the transformed into a civil right. This was in an opposition to the view of danger of copying the ›revival‹ narrative. While Maxwell’s book sees the majority backing Lajos Kossuth. This majority would have liked the nation as a new creation, this article traces the tools, rhetorical to see their privileges transformed into civil rights too, but also con- tropes, and legal practices used not only by the national activists, but sidered their ideal natio Hungarica to be an ethnically homogenous also by their opponents. In this case ›national revival‹ is presented as a (Magyar) group. In Kossuth’s view, the extension of rights should part of the local legal, and political scene. follow a ›magyarisation‹ of the population. Thus Štúr’s proposals Nakazawa begins the article with a description of the key con- were rejected. cepts and documents of the constitutional system of the Kingdom of In the second period, Štúr acted mostly through his own assem- Hungary, focusing on the idea of ›corporate rights.‹ To describe the bly of Slovak intellectuals. In their petition from May 1848 he identi- etymology of this term, he enumerates the legal documents from the fied the ethnic groups as ›limbs‹ of the nation, the same formulation Golden Bull of 1222 onward (Law of Seignioral Rights of 1351, Law of we have seen in the description of the ›body of the realm.‹ He declared 1435, Tripartitum Law of 1514). These documents show a general patriotic loyalty to Hungary as a political nation, while demanding tendency to empower the nobility, conceived as a ›body of the realm‹ natural rights for Slovaks as one of its traditional gentes. The revolu- (corpus regni). Nobility was represented with its Diet, which since the tionary government reacted with a warrant for his arrest, so he left fifteenth century included the king, who was elected by the assembly. for Prague, where a Pan-Slavic congress was held in June of that year. There he proposed the idea of ›United Independent Slavic Commu- nities‹ as a direct subject of the Austrian Empire. In this way, the Slavs 21 T. G. Masaryk, Světová Revoluce, Prague: Čin a Orbis, 1924. (with Slovaks forming one community under the UISC), being ethni- 22 T. Hayashi, »Masarykí’s ›Zone of Small Nations‹ in His Discourse during World War I,« in T. Hayashi (ed.), Regions in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Present, cally defined, should have received a similar position to that of pre- Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007, pp. 3–20. viously feudally defined Crown realms of the Empire. This position,

262 263 I. Šimko National Context and Ethnocentrism however, put him into a conflict with the parties representing those Miroslav Hroch – Národy nejsou dílem náhody peoples, which claimed certain privileges in the realm: primarily the Czechs and Croats. The Czech representative Šmíd, for example, pre- The last text of this review is a work from one of the most influental ferred an approach to national revolution similar to that of the Kos- Czech historians of the last century, Miroslav Hroch. A professor at suth’s party in Hungary, by identifying a traditional Crown (Bohe- Charles University of Prague, Hroch is known for his extensive work mia) with the ethnic (Czech) majority. comparing national movements, especially in ›smaller nations‹ Thus in the third period, beginning after the June Congress of (Hroch 1971).23 Already known at that time in Germany, these stu- 1848, Štúr began to call for an independent Slovakia as a specific com- dies became available to English-speaking academia in 1985, when he munity: first as a county (e.g., as a Pannonia Superior), later as a published Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe. As a grand principality with the name Slovakia (Slovensko). His loyalty professor with international renown, he held lectures at many uni- was totally in support of Vienna then. Štúr even organized a volun- versities around the world. Besides his most influental works, he also tary armed force of students in support of the imperial counter-revo- wrote several studies on historical subjects ranging from the High lutionary forces. In March 1849 he submitted a plan to establish the Middle Ages to the present. He is also the author of many didactic principality to the Emperor, who, after some glimpses of hope, re- texts and popular works on history. jected it after the Hungarian revolution was defeated. These attempts The Czech version of Národy nejsou dílem náhody was pub- show, however, a reluctance still to define the nation within new, eth- lished in 2009 by Slon, a sociological publishing house in Prague. nic-territorial borders. Nakazawa concludes that in all of these con- The book is an answer to a request from the Center for Comparative cepts Štúr used traditional legal categories as a base. Instead of pre- History at the Free University of Berlin. This institute requested a senting Slovaks as a revolutionary, new nation ›without history,‹ he major work that could offer a good analysis on the matter. On the always returned to natural rights granted by the Crown and similar one hand, this book can be seen as an update of the theme presented precedents. in Social Preconditions, considering that the work became a standard While it has to be admitted that Štúr was not the only leader of for discourse on nationalism, or rather national movements in gener- the Slovak movement, he was surely the most influental – and the al. On the other hand, this work was a conclusion of the author’s own most respected – during the Hungarian revolution. An interesting long-running studies and an opportunity to declare some of his own fact is that Štúr never invoked Great Moravia as a predecessor of the opinions on the controversial themes pertaining to the study of na- Slovak nation during his political career, although he often did so in tions. Unlike Social Preconditions, which mostly analyzed ›smaller his earlier works. The reason for this was his adherence to the Hun- nations,‹ Národy gives a considerable attention to larger ›state na- garian, and, according to Nakazawa, to the general East-Central Eur- tions‹ as well. opean political tradition as well. This tradition is based on continuity: The work is divided into three parts. The first portion (pages 13– in case of Hungary, this could be traced to the establishment of elec- 60) provides an extensive outline of the study of nations and nation- tive monarchy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. This work alism from the nineteenth century until today. Two aspects merit the shows an interesting reinrepretation of the national movements. The special attention of the author. One is the typology of nations: a mod- call for national emancipation is presented not as a redefinition of ern European nation, as the author rightly stresses (Hroch 2009: 48). citizenship and equality, but rather as an extension of the noble pri- Here, he adopts a three-fold definition from Theodor Schieder, recog- vileges to state-constituting nations – one nation in case of Kos- nizing ›state nations‹ (státní národy) as emerging within already ex- suthian Hungary, two in Czechoslovakia. Although the state-consti- isting countries by means of internal revolution (e.g., France); unify- tuting nation is a quite broad mass of population, it should be noted it still can (and historically does) behave as a dominant class. 23 M. Hroch, Obrození malých evropských národů, Prague: Univerzita Karlova, 1971.

264 265 I. Šimko National Context and Ethnocentrism ing nations formed by an integration of states with a population with Hroch’s study is one of the most complex works in the field of similar cultures and languages (e. g., Germany); and separatist na- national studies. It provides an overview (or at least a glimpse) of tions, which emerge within multiethnic empires. The second aspect many national movements in Europe, and one which found success is connected with the book’s title: Hroch rejects the radical construc- or at least wide recognition from the scholar community. The author tivist position, considering national movements, especially in Eastern openly confesses that he omitted the details of the Russian and Jewish Europe, to be a deviation from the course of inter-class emancipation national movements due to their complexity, although at least the and the effects of destructive nationalism. Russian case is described in many instances, e.g., when comparing In the next part (pages 61–130), the author follows out his point its relations to Finnish, Latvian, and other movements. that reducing a national movement to a mere effect of nationalism is The text is relevant for us as an example of an attempt at a ›de- an oversimplification. No study of nationhood can omit the specific centered‹ view. One important aspect is his own terminology: e.g., workings of historical consciousness, language, modernization, ›modernization‹ has a broad meaning, but it is in no case a non-criti- clashes of social interests, and emotional aspects of identity (ibid.: cally accepted positive ideal of development. Its role as the motive 44). Three of these aspects – history, ethnic (linguistic) heterogeneity, force of nationalism is also questioned. We can see that the Czech and modernization – form the second part of the book, presenting the movement worked as a model for Hroch: industrial capital in German objective ›preconditions‹ for the national revival. Under the broad hands came into economic conflict with Czech workshops in Bohemia term ›modernization,‹ Hroch understands processes of administrative (ibid.: 165); but still it is instantly contrasted with the cases where centralization, industrial development, intensification of social com- socio-economic tensions were not relevant for national agitation at munication, spread of mass education, and even democratization of all, as in the Polish and Hungarian cases. Another aspect of overcom- politics. While linguistic differences act as a precondition for the ing bias is his reflection of it. Hroch constantly turns to the Czech emergence of new national movements well into the twentieth cen- example, but he does not take it as a model: he is aware that the na- tury, the other aspects combined themselves in various forms. For tional movement of his own nation is not unique and wishes to pre- example, industrialization preceded the mass movement which led sent relevant differences and analogies in the movement of other na- the Czech national revival. This is taken to be an example of an ›in- tions. tegrative movement.‹ However, in the Irish case, we have a ›rebel The main argument of the work is the refusal of the Hans Kohn’s movement,‹ where industrial revolution only followed the declara- typology of Eastern (›ethnic‹) and Western (›civic‹) nationalism, as tion of independence (ibid.: 124). well as the whole ›tradition‹ of similar generalizing classifications, The longest and final part focuses on historical instances of na- like Friedrich Engels’ criticism of smaller Slavic nations or the newer tional movements, seen as agents of revival. Hroch analyzes their typology of Liah Greenfeld. These critics of national movements con- social background, the existing clashes of social interest, the use of sider them to be negative outcomes of history, because of their reac- historical narrative, and the tensions caused by modernization. The tionary views (Engels) or xenophobic nature (Greenfeld). Greenfeld, preconditions from the second part sometimes seem to affect the de- as Hroch mentions, does not refer to Kohn at all; it is clear this ›tradi- velopment of national movements as ›needs,‹ for example in case of tion‹ is his construct. In fact, one can find many convincing argu- administration, where a language had to be chosen for schools. The ments against such classifications in his earlier 1985 book; Národy classifications from the previous part, however, still shows that a sin- serves rather as an update and extension. gle, reductive model for a national movement cannot be formulated. But why did he actually need to refer to them at all? The reason This holds true even for ›nationalism,‹ as far as it doesn’t mean the is in the text: justification of the nation’s existence proceeds through ethnocentrism in the specific psychological sense (ibid.: 133). As the construction of its history, thus providing arguments against its Hroch concludes, the preconditions for a national movement include critics, both real, and fictive (ibid.: 179). By explaining the whole in psychological, social, and historical aspects as well, and neither of rational terms, he attacks the notion that even the Czech national them suffices to produce a successful national movement on its own. movement could be an irrational enterprise. Hroch provides an exten-

266 267 I. Šimko National Context and Ethnocentrism sive, cross-national analysis of the phenomenon usually confined to national context does not have to contrast with transnational integra- national historical discourses, and yet he remains a ›loyal‹ member of tion, cross-cultural philosophy, or individual cosmopolitanism. the tradition. If Maxwell’s irony was hard to grasp, Hroch’s autoirony is remarkable. –Ivan Šimko, University of Vienna, Austria

III Conclusion

As we can see in the works reviewed here, the concept of a ›national revival‹ has already surpassed the context of historical narratives of particularly ›revived‹ nations. Thanks to his extensive knowledge and systematic comparison of historical cases, Hroch’s influence was cru- cial in this regard. The concept has its explicative power, and despite its roots in a rather limited socio-cultural context, it was successfully adopted in various historical analyses throughout the world. The concept has, of course, its shortcomings. It is still focused on the ›victors,‹ the present order of nations seen primarily as product of multiple national revolutions – no matter whether they broke down multiethnic countries or were built by integration and conquest. Hroch (a thinker ›within‹ the revivalist tradition) admits it, but he does not step over it. Thus it is hard to see the workings of the legal systems of their precedent countries, which Nakazawa (with his leg- alist perspective) shows, or the inner oppositions and dynamics of self-identification markers in national movements, as described by Maxwell (focusing on choice). The goals of the Slovak movement, if they can so be called, were changing not only according to the oppor- tunity, but also according to the subjective ideals of society. These ideals were often determined by the existing legal order, even if the present historical narrative interprets the revival movement as a counter-culture. The national context is thus a very productive phenomenon. Its needs for education, nation-branding, and a dominant historical nar- rative have to be fulfilled through the constant production of texts and followers of the tradition. The only danger for these followers remains in their own head: whether they will choose to ignore the writings of non-natives on their narrative as attacks on their own justifications of the nation’s existence, or whether they will begin to see the work of these outsiders as contributing to a better understand- ing between various traditions of thought. Consciousness of one’s

268 269 Institutional Programs on Comparative Philosophy Chair: ›Philosophy in a Global World/Intercultural Philosophy,‹ University of Vienna, Austria

The Department of Philosophy at the University of Vienna, Austria launched a new chair in 2011 called ›Philosophy in a Global World/ Intercultural Philosophy.‹ This chair seeks to contribute to a philosophical understanding of global stature by building up on previous research in the fields of intercultural philosophy and philosophies originally located outside the Anglo-European tradition (especially East Asian, Latin-Ameri- can, Arabic, and African philosophies). Phenomenological, herme- neutic, ontological, and epistemological approaches are implemented to tackle methodological, systematic, and historical questions pertain- ing to comparative thought. In close cooperation with various departments and faculties from all across the University of Vienna, the chair concentrates on unpack- ing the global dimension of the following research fields: human rights and democracy; diversity; concepts of experiencing the other, of difference and plurality, of ›aisthesis‹ and ethics. All students specializing in philosophy can further hone their skills in intercultural philosophy and global thought by choosing courses especially designed for this purpose. Till date, the chair has conducted a wide range of lectures, seminars, and reading courses. Some of them in the BA program were: Intercultural Philosophy – Methods and Conceptions; Philosophical Hermeneutics – Intercultur- al Hermeneutics; History of Philosophy – Perceiving Aristotle in Baghdad; History of Philosophy – Metaphysics and Ontology in Avi- cenna and Thomas Aquinas; History of Philosophy – Epistemological Problems in the Philosophy of the Middle Ages: Ibn Rushd and the Latin Averroism; Origins of Thought – Pre-Socraticism and Philoso- phical Daoism; Philosophy in Africa – An Overview from Ancient Egypt to the Present; Classical Chinese Philosophy – Confucianism and Daoism; Ways of Thought in Indian Philosophy – The Path of Samadhi; Ibn Sina’s Paradigm Change in the Analysis of Existence; ›Selbstaffektion‹ – From Kant to Sankara; Heidegger and East Asian Thought; Nietzsche’s ›Der gute Europäer‹ and the Plurality of Cultur- al Forms of Thinking; African ›Womanism‹ – Feministic Concepts in Dialogue; Kwasi Wiredu’s Conceptual Decolonization; Poverty and Philosophy – Is Poverty a Philosophical Problem?; The Forgotten Phi-

273 Chair: ›Philosophy in a Global World/Intercultural Philosophy‹ Vienna, Austria losophical Body – Philosophy on Stage; An Intercultural Philosophi- Philosophy and Religious Studies Program, University of Macau, cal Anthropology. China (SAR) The MA program included courses on: ›Europe‹ and Philosophy – Openings and Limits; Philosophy in a Global World; Experience and Transcendence; Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity and Culture; The Philosophy and Religious Studies Program at the University of The Intercultural Discourse on Human Rights and ›Menschenrechte Macau is a newly emerging center for research and teaching in Com- des anderen Menschen‹ (Levinas); Theory of Art and Its Practice in an parative Philosophy and Religion. The English-speaking University Intercultural Context; Texts on Postcolonial Theory; Indian Paths – of Macau has just been relocated to a newly built expanded campus The Path of Yoga: Patañjali, Aurobindo, Rig-Veda; Time and Infinity and is aspiring to develop into a leading academic institution in the in Indian Thought; Do We Know What the Body Can Do? Religion of South-East Asian region. The University is expanding ambitiously in the Body. all areas including the humanities, and is particularly interested in Moreover, the chair regularly hosts courses for its doctoral stu- promoting intercultural studies in the fields of religion and philoso- dents hailing from Europe, Asia, and the Americas. phy. Created in 2012–2013 by internal transfer of faculty and by hir- –Georg Stenger, University of Vienna, Austria ing of renowned senior scholars from outside the University, the Phi- losophy and Religious Studies Program is home to a mid-size faculty specializing in Chinese, Western, and Comparative Studies. Staff ex- pertise ranges from Medieval and Classical European traditions to socio-political and historical studies of religion, with a focus on the Daoist and Buddhist traditions, to contemporary Western Philosophy (including Critical and Social Theory, Phenomenology, Analytic Phi- losophy, Philosophy of Religion, and Philosophy and Literature). The Program is keen to promote comparative studies and to at- tract an increasing number of undergraduate and postgraduate stu- dents and researchers from both East and West in order to sustain its continuing growth into a dynamic and vibrant intellectual and cultur- al forum. In recent years, the Program has been host to a number of international conferences including ›Rethinking Resistance,‹ ›Critical Theory and the Way: A Symposium on Kantian Paradigms and Pro- spects in East Asia,‹ ›Force of the Imagination,‹ ›Natural Cognition,‹ ›Religion, Cognition, and Science,‹ ›Women and Gender in Chinese Religions,‹ ›Nature, Time, Responsibility,‹ ›Buddhist Studies.‹ Infor- mation on these and on upcoming events can be obtained at: http:// www.umac.mo/fah/philosophy_and_religious/event.html The Program continues to hire faculty with expertise in meth- odologies of comparative philosophy and inter- and transcultural phi- losophy to direct research and offer courses fostering a new genera- tion of Ph.D.s with sensitivity to the cultural underpinnings of contemporary philosophical thinking and the geopolitical stakes of

274 275 Philosophy and Religious Studies Program, University of Macau, China (SAR) speculative ideas in today’s world and in our institutions, both educa- New Specialization in Political Thought at Central European tional and governmental. University, Budapest, Hungary

–Hans-Georg Moeller and William Franke, Philosophy and Religious Studies Program, Beginning with the academic year of 2015/2016, Central European University of Macau, China (SAR) University (CEU) in Budapest will launch an interdisciplinary, grad- uate program entitled ›Specialization in Political Thought.‹ The background: In recent years, academic programs in politi- cal thought suffered many cutbacks. In many cases faculty positions have been cut entirely or rededicated to positions in democratic theo- ry or empirical theory. Additionally, the Bologna process, which seeks to ensure comparability and transparency between higher education systems across forty-six countries, and the uniformization of degree programs led to a reduction and limitation of the field. These devel- opments imply the danger that the social sciences generally, and the study of political thought specifically, are increasingly losing their foundations in history and philosophy. The initiators of the Speciali- zation in Political Thought at CEU wish to reverse this trend by creat- ing a program committed to the comparative study of political thought. The initiative was also based on the consideration that poli- tical thinkers played an active role in establishing CEU in 1991, after the fall of communism. Ever since then, political thought has played a central role in many of CEU’s educational programs. In order to sup- port the new specialization, the university has made additional fund- ing available, which allows for creating a new post-doc position in classical political thought and various schemes for visiting scholars from all areas of political thought. The program: The Specialization in Political Thought engages in the comparative study of political thought from a variety of per- spectives, both within and outside the Western canon. Special atten- tion will be given to the historicity of diverse political traditions and also to recurring themes and questions. Learning to recognize politi- cal thought, both past and present, as being time- and place-specific will equip students, regardless of their major field of study, with addi- tional analytical and methodological skills grounded in the apprecia- tion of the contextual and intertextual aspects of diverse intellectual traditions. Beyond contextualization the students will learn to apply comparative methods to address topics of political thought from inter- cultural and diachronic perspectives. Further, the program aims to provide a specific professional fra-

276 277 New Specialization in Political Thought, Budapest, Hungary mework for the participating students and faculty, by linking up with BA World Philosophies, SOAS, University of London, UK transnational networks, generating faculty interaction, research, and co-teaching. The program will offer a core course ›Introduction to Political Thought‹ every fall, in which members of different CEU de- The School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS, University of partments will introduce their various perspectives on political London) has taken the courageous decision to launch in 2016–2017 a thought. BA World Philosophies, exactly one hundred years after it was Students participating in this specialization will receive a Certi- founded – in 1916, in the midst of World War 1 – as the School of ficate in Political Thought, in addition to their MA degrees in one of Oriental Studies. the participating disciplines: Gender Studies, History, International Recent centenary commemorations of the First World War have Relations and European Studies, Medieval Studies, Philosophy, Poli- sparked many critical reflections within philosophical circles. We tical Science. might assume that, in line with efforts made by other countries in According to their specific interests and career plans, interested Europe to secure a stronghold over colonised territories, Great Britain students apply to one of the participating departments listed above. was also intent on providing an extra tool – knowledge – with which The departments normally offer a choice between a one-year and a to increase its chance of gaining supremacy. The ›territorial war‹ in two-year MA program. In their applications prospective students Europe had extended to new regions, which required the use of dif- should indicate their interest in the specialization. All applications ferent tactics in order to assure successful management. The ›British are accepted through the online system (http://www.ceu.hu/admis- Empire‹ needed efficient administrators and colonial officials able to sions/apply/) organize its growing infrastructure. SOAS’s original mission was The university: Central European University is a graduate-le- very clear on this, while also providing the University of London with vel ›crossroads‹ university where faculty and students come from a rival to the renowned Oriental schools of Berlin, Petrograd, and more about hundred countries. All instruction is in English; however Paris. Following the logics of European territorial expansion, in CEU’s Source Language Teaching Group facilitates students’ research 1938, ›Africa‹ was added to the School’s name, thus becoming the and educational experience. Also, it prepares them for working and School of Oriental and African Studies. During the Second World living in an increasingly globalized academic and professional world. War, the role of SOAS as a part of the state apparatus to provide In order to attract outstanding individuals irrespective of their specialised personnel was further reinforced. financial situation, CEU offers a range of financial aid packages sup- One hundred years later, with continued exposure to other lan- porting the majority of students during their studies. guages and cultures, SOAS has achieved a transformation in its pre- sent thinking and future commitments. It now welcomes the clearer –Mónika Nagy, Coordinator, CEU, Budapest, Hungary presence of other systems of thought and philosophies as a decisive contribution to the School’s endeavours. The teaching of world lan- guages at SOAS will undoubtedly provide an extra incentive to the »learning to philosophize in local languages« (Kirloskar-Steinbach et al. 2014: 26)1 for prospective students of the new BA World Philoso- phies. This commitment to cultivate in young enthusiastic minds the ›seed‹ of Comparative Philosophy is certainly a hopeful sign for all those philosophers who have made this a priority in their academic

1 M. Kirloskar-Steinbach/Geeta Ramana/J. Maffie, ›Introducing Confluence: A The- matic Essay‹, Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies, Vol. 1, 2014, pp. 7– 63.

278 279 BA World Philosophies, SOAS, University of London, UK activities. Although we sustain Comparative Philosophy as a perti- ›Non-Western/Comparative Philosophy‹ Program at Bucknell nent concept, the use of this label could prove problematic in our University, Pennsylvania, USA context owing to the fact that in 1992 a clear choice was made to designate the host Department for this programme as the ›Study of Religions‹, as opposed to ›Religious Studies‹ or ›Comparative Reli- The Philosophy department at Bucknell University has seven full- gions‹. The then Head of Department, John Hinnells, was all too time faculty, one of whom is responsible for covering the designated aware of the implications of adopting a meaning-laden term such as ›Non-Western/Comparative Philosophy‹ line (initially created 1993). ›comparative‹ when applied to Religions. We would have stumbled on Since that time, courses in a variety of world philosophies have the same dilemma had we adopted ›Comparative Philosophy‹. Un- been taught on a regular basis. In recent years we have offered Life, doubtedly, this as well as other theoretical and methodological issues, Death, Freedom (PHIL 100: a comparative introduction to classical will be taken into consideration by those involved in teaching this BA Greek, Indian, and Chinese philosophy), Medieval Philosophy (PHIL Programme and motivate them to research its conceptual foundations 206: a comparative study of Christian, Islamic, and Jewish philosophi- in collaboration with philosophers elsewhere. Indeed, it is our firm cal traditions), Chinese Philosophy (PHIL 266), Islamic Philosophy intention to rely on the expertise of those colleagues who are, like (PHIL 267), Indian Philosophy (PHIL 269), and Jewish Philosophy us, determined to make a significant contribution to the discipline by (PHIL 270). Until recently, however, these courses (excepting PHIL enhancing the study of World Philosophies. The BA programme it- 100) have counted towards the fulfillment of our major only as elec- self, in addition to courses covering general training in standard phi- tives. losophical themes (logic, epistemology, ontology, ethics, aesthetics, This changed in 2012, when the department voted to revise its political philosophy etc.) approached within a World Philosophies curriculum extensively. One of the numerous changes we implemen- perspective, will offer courses on specific philosophical traditions ted was to introduce a new ›Movements and Traditions‹ area require- (African, Islamic, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, Chinese, Japanese, South ment into the curriculum (every major will now have to take at least Asian, etc.). A language unit will be highly recommended in each one class from this category). The rationale for this was a conviction year of the programme in order to ensure that our students are able that the usual dual categorization of philosophy in terms of historical to engage meaningfully with the philosophical traditions in which periods (ancient, medieval, modern, nineteenth century, and twenti- they wish to specialise. eth century or contemporary philosophy) and topical fields/subjects (ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, epistemology, etc., as well as more –Cosimo Zene, SOAS, University of London, UK specific topics such as philosophy of religion, science, mind, art, law, etc.) is no longer adequate. This is due to various factors. One is the emergence and tenacity of the split between ›analytic‹ and ›continental‹ philosophy. This bi- furcation in contemporary Western philosophy has made it increas- ingly clear that there is no one neutral, monolithic or homogeneous activity that can legitimately claim to represent the discipline of phi- losophy wholly and exclusively (we accordingly conceive of the ›ana- lytic‹ and ›continental‹ approaches as constituting different traditions or lineages, i.e., established and widespread – albeit historically situ- ated and evolving – ways of doing philosophy). Another factor is the emergence of particular movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (e.g., feminism, German idealism, Marxism, existentialism, phenomenology, logical positivism, ordinary language philosophy,

280 281 ›Non-Western/Comparative Philosophy‹ Program, Pennsylvania, USA the Frankfurt school, poststructuralism, etc.), which have given rise Notes on Contributors to a variety of important figures and topics. It is difficult to study and do justice to these figures/topics without examining them within the context of the larger movements they identified with. Such figures and their concerns often get disfigured, diminished or passed over altogether because they don’t easily fit into either the standard histor- ical or topical categories. Finally, and most importantly, the last few decades have seen a growing awareness of the existence and signifi- cance of a number of broader and more long-standing traditions of philosophy, variously conceived in geographical, cultural, linguistic Roger T. Ames is Professor of Philosophy and editor of Philosophy or religious terms. East & West. His recent publications include translations of Chinese The most striking aspect of this has been the emergence of ser- classics: Sun-tzu: The Art of Warfare (1993); Sun Pin: The Art of ious attention to ›non-Western‹ philosophical traditions (e.g., Chi- Warfare (1996) and Tracing Dao to its Source (1997) (both with nese, Indian, Buddhist, Islamic/Arabic/Persian, African, etc.).1 Their D. C. Lau); the Confucian Analects (1998) and the Classic of Family long-standing exclusion from the standard philosophical curriculum Reverence: A Philosophical Translation of the Xiaojing (2009) (both in Western universities betrays an increasingly obvious and indefen- with H. Rosemont), Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philo- sible provincialism. It is becoming clearer that the study of philoso- sophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong, and A Philosophical phical traditions other than the standard Eurocentric trajectory (from Translation of the Daodejing: Making This Life Significant (with ancient Greece to medieval Christendom to modern Europe and its D. L. Hall; 2001). He has also authored many interpretative studies intellectual progeny) is an important aspect of a serious contempor- of Chinese philosophy and culture: Thinking Through Confucius ary philosophical education. In addition to studying these diverse, (1987), Anticipating China: Thinking Through the Narratives of Chi- resourceful, and sophisticated traditions in their own right, compara- nese and Western Culture (1995), and Thinking From the Han: Self, tive examination (establishing cross-cultural dialogues between Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture (1997) (all them) is a crucial step in doing philosophy in a global context, and with D. L. Hall). Recently Ames has undertaken several projects that arguably a necessity in this new century. entail the intersection of contemporary issues and cultural under- standing. His Democracy of the Dead: Dewey, Confucius, and the –Peter S. Groff, Bucknell University, Pennsylvania, USA Hope for Democracy in China (with D. L. Hall; 1999) is a product of this effort. Almost all of his publications are now available in Chinese translation, including his philosophical translations of Chinese cano- nical texts. Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary (2011), his most recent monograph that evolved from the endowed Ch’ien Mu lectures at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, is an argument that this tradition has a sui generis vision of the moral life. He has most re- cently been engaged in compiling the new Blackwell Sourcebook of Chinese Philosophy, and in writing articles promoting a conversation 1 Here it should be noted as well that there are enormously important and influential between American pragmatism and Confucianism. philosophical traditions that have been hastily or uncritically categorized as nomin- ally ›Western,‹ but which consistently fall through the cracks of curricula centered After a B.Sc. in Physics from the University of Delhi (India), Ankur exclusively on the standard historical-topical template: e.g., the tradition of Jewish philosophy, ranging from Philo of Alexandria to contemporary figures like Emmanuel Barua read Theology and Religious Studies at the Faculty of Divinity, Levinas. Cambridge (UK), completing a Ph.D. on a study of the symbolism of

282 283 Notes on Contributors Notes on Contributors time and embodiment in St Augustine and Ramanuja. His primary Traditional Area of Ghana. His stool name is Nana Adusei Sefa At- research interests are Hindu Studies and the comparative philosophy weneboah I. of religion. Under the former, he teaches and researches various his- torical, philosophical and conceptual aspects of the Hindu traditions Gina Gustavsson is a Marie Curie post-doc fellow in the Depart- as they have developed in the Indian subcontinent. Second, an inte- ment of Government at Uppsala University (Sweden), and an associ- gral part of his academic research is the comparative study of reli- ate member of Nuffield College, Oxford (UK). Her work has been gions: in particular, the question of whether Christian terms such as published in Political Studies, The Review of Politics and the Eur- ›grace‹, ›creation‹ and ›God‹ have any Hindu analogues, and Hindu opean Political Science Review. She is currently finishing a book that terms such as dharma, karma, and samsara have any Christian offers the first systematic study of ›enlightenment liberalism‹ and its equivalents. neglected baby brother ›romantic liberalism.‹ The main argument of her book is that, with its focus on sincerely expressing rather than Jared Bielby is Co-Chair of the International Center for Informa- transcending one’s unique self, it is in fact this romantic liberalism, tion Ethics and Co-Editor of the International Review of Informa- rather than its enlightened counterpart, that ends up supporting the tion Ethics. A recent graduate of the dual MA/MLIS masters pro- new intolerance of religious minorities – both philosophically and grams in Digital Humanities & Library and Information Studies at empirically, in debates over the Muslim veil and Muhammad car- the University of Alberta, Jared studied under the tutelage of Dr. toons. Toni Samek, writing his thesis on the history of Information Ethics where he explored the current and future directions of the field of Alan Mattlage holds an M.L.S. from the University of Maryland, Information Ethics and its crossroads with WikiLeaks. His research USA and a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Illinois, USA. investigates the interdisciplinary connections between ICTs and the He taught philosophy at St. Cloud State University, Iowa State Uni- history of information culture, civil rights and social action. He is versity USA, and the Richard Stockton College of New Jersey, USA. also currently researching, alongside Dr. Rafael Capurro and mem- He has published articles and reviews in The Journal of Academic bers of the International Centre for Information Ethics, applications Librarianship, portal: Libraries and the Academy, The Library Quar- of global citizenship in a digital era with a specific address of digital terly, and The Journal of Information Ethics. He is currently on sab- citizenship and the netizen, as well as connections between the batical from his position as a public services librarian at the Univer- Greek, Latin, Arabic, and Persian Roots of the Concept of Informa- sity of Maryland and is working on a book on Indian Buddhism. tion. He is the current guest editor of the International Review of Information Ethics for Vol. 23 on Global Citizenship, and a peer Lucius Turner Outlaw (Jr.), the author of On Race and Philosophy reviewer of articles for Springer’s Journal of Ethics and Information (Routledge: 1996) and Critical Social Theory in the Interests of Black Technology (ETIN). Folks (Roman and Littlefield: 2005), is Professor of Philosophy and of African American and Diaspora Studies at Vanderbilt University George J. Sefa Dei is Professor of Social Justice Education at the (Tennessee, USA), having joined the faculty in July of 2000. (Outlaw Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Tor- was formerly the T. Wistar Brown Professor of Philosophy at Haver- onto, Canada. His teaching and research interests are in the areas of ford College Haverford, Pennsylvania.) Outlaw teaches, researches, Anti-Racism, Minority Schooling, International Development, Anti- and writes about race and ethnicity, American Philosophy, African Colonial Thought, and Indigenous Knowledges Systems. He has pub- American Philosophy, Critical Social Theory, Social and Political Phi- lished extensively on African youth education, anti-racism, Indigen- losophy, and the History of Philosophy in the »West.« Born in Stark- ous knowledges and anti-colonial thought. In June of 2007, Professor ville, Mississippi, he is a graduate of Fisk University (BA, 1967) and of Dei was installed as a traditional chief in Ghana, specifically, the the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Boston College (Ph.D., Gyaasehene of the town of Asokore, Koforidua, in the New Juaben Philosophy, 1972).

284 285 Notes on Contributors Notes on Contributors

Paget Henry is Professor of Sociology and Africana Studies at Brown conference in Karlovo in 2013. His publications can be accessed online University, Providence USA. His specializations are Dependency at: http://univie.academia.edu/Ivan%C5%A0imko. Theory, Caribbean Political Economy, Sociology of Religion, Sociol- ogy of Art and Literature, Africana Philosophy and Religion, Race Ofelia Schutte is Professor Emerita of Philosophy at the University and Ethnic Relations, Poststructuralism, and Critical Theory. He has of South Florida, USA. Her research interests include Nietzsche, re- served on the faculties of S.U.N.Y. Stony Brook, University of the cent continental philosophy (particularly as it intersects with feminist West Indies (Antigua) and the University of Virginia. Paget is the theory and the philosophy of culture), Latin American philosophy author of Caliban’s Reason: Introducing Afro-Caribbean Philosophy and postcolonial thought, and feminism (particularly feminist ethics (Routledge: 2000), Peripheral Capitalism and Underdevelopment in and Latin American feminisms). Professor Schutte’s principal publi- Antigua (Transaction Books: 1985), co-editor of C. L. R. James’s Car- cations are Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche without Masks (1984), Cul- ibbean (Duke UP: 1992) and New Caribbean: Decolonization, De- tural Identity and Social Liberation in Latin American Thought mocracy, and Development (Institute for the Study of Human Issues: (1993), and numerous articles on feminism, Latin American philoso- 1983). His more than fifty articles, essays, and reviews have appeared phy, and continental philosophy, among which ›Cultural Alterity‹ in such journals, newspapers, and magazines as Caribbean Quarterly, (1998), ›Continental Philosophy and Post-Colonial Subjects‹ (2000), Social and Economic Studies, The Cornell Journal of Social Relations, and ›Negotiating Latina Identities‹ (2000) are some of the best known. The Encyclopedia of the Left, Sociological Forum, Studies in Com- She is co-editor of A Companion to Latin American Philosophy (Wi- parative International Development, The American Journal of So- ley-Blackwell: 2010) with Susana Nuccetelli and Otávio Bueno. A ciology, the Antigua and Barbuda Forum, Third World Affairs, The former Fulbright Research Fellow in Mexico, her work has appeared Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs, and Blackworld. in Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, Philosophy Today, Journal of Social Philosophy, Cuadernos Americanos (Mexico), Mora Casey Rentmeester is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Finlandia (Argentina), and the Cuban journals Casa de las Américas, Temas, University in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula. He specializes in Conti- and Revolución y Cultura, among other journals and edited collec- nental philosophy, Chinese philosophy, and environmental philoso- tions. phy. Rentmeester has published various articles on comparative phi- losophy, including comparisons of Leibniz and Huayan Buddhism as Anne (Schulherr) Waters, J.D., Ph.D., an American Indian intellec- well as Nietzsche and Daoism as also on the philosophy of climate tual, writer, editor, educator, philosopher, poet, and lawyer, edited the change, social and political philosophy, and the work of Martin Hei- first and only collection of articles by American Indians holding a Ph. degger. His first book, Heidegger and the Environment, will be pub- D. in philosophy, American Indian Thought: Philosophical Essays lished by Rowman and Littlefield Publishers in 2016 as an imprint of (Blackwell: 2003), co-edited the first anthology of diverse and minor- the New Heidegger Research Series. ity voices in American philosophy, American Philosophies: An An- thology (Blackwell: 2003), co-guest edited a special issue of a research Ivan Šimko was born in Bratislava (Slovakia) in 1985. He studied journal intersecting philosophy and women studies, Hypatia – A Philosophy at Comenius University in Bratislava and at the Univer- Journal of Feminist Philosophy: Indigenous Women in the Americas sity of Vienna (Austria), where he graduated in 2008. He successfully (Indiana Univ.: 2003), co-edits the only U.S. academic series devoted defended his Ph.D. thesis titled ›Ethnocentrism‹ in 2014. During his to Indigenous Philosophy not also listed as Native Studies, Anthro- studies, he presented papers at multiple conferences on ethnocentrism pology, or Religion, The Living Indigenous Philosophies Series (State in philosophy (Vienna, Salzburg, Poznan, Bratislava) and stoicism in University of New York Press), is editor of Indigenous Philosophies an Islamic context (Bratislava). Furthermore, he studies Slavic Lan- of the Americas Special Series (Value Inquiry Book Series, Rodopi guages at the University of Vienna. He specializes in Bulgarian lan- Press), and past editor of American Philosophical Association News- guage and history, and presented a paper on national mythology at a letter of American Indian Philosophy. Anne now lives in a log home

286 287 Notes on Contributors in the swamps of Florida at the Tamiami Trail near the Withlacoochee Guidelines for Authors River.

Mario Wenning is a faculty member of the University of Macau, China (SAR) and research fellow at Sun Yat-sen University, Guangz- hou, China. His work focuses primarily on social and political philo- sophy from an intercultural perspective. Apart from his scholarship, Mario has been translating recent German philosophers (Karl Jaspers, Carlo Schmitt, Peter Sloterdijk, and Ernst Tugendhat) and has orga- nized a number of international conferences. He was awarded fellow- We welcome contributions, critiques, survey articles, and book re- ships from the Humboldt Foundation (Germany), the Liberty Fund views on any philosophical topic pertaining to comparative thought. (USA), the Mercator Foundation (Germany), and the Cusanuswerk Unless solicited, only original articles will be considered for publica- (Germany). tion. All articles should be submitted electronically under: conflu- ence-submission[at]web.de Cosimo Zene is currently Reader in the Department of the Study of We will adopt a double blind reviewing policy, thus ensuring that Religions, at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), Uni- the identities of both the author and the referees are not revealed versity of London, UK. He has published on ex-Untouchables (The during the process. When submitting your article, please ensure that Rishi of Bangladesh, Routledge, Curzon: 2002), on Gramsci (ed., your full name and address (including e-mail address), your institu- The Political Philosophies of A. Gramsci and B. R. Ambedkar, Rou- tional affiliation, five to ten keywords, and an abstract appear on a tledge: 2013), on anthropology in Sardinia (Dialoghi Nulesi, Edizioni separate page. Your name should not appear on any page; references ISRE: 2009), and various articles on gift-giving. Having recently fi- to your own work should not reveal your identity. nalised an ethnographic film on this topic (S’Impinnu – The Vow, 2014), Zene is currently preparing an extended monograph (Itiner- Please ensure that your article follows all the conventions aries of the Gift). He is also working towards the introduction of a listed in these guidelines new BA World Philosophies programme at SOAS and coordinating an 1. Articles: The text should be double-spaced throughout (this in- international Editorial Board for a World Philosophies Series (Mim- cludes displayed quotations, notes, references and any other esis International). matter) using 12 point font. Please leave ample margins on the left, right, top and bottom of the text, and keep to a regular number of lines per page. Texts (including notes) should not ex- ceed 25 manuscript pages (or 6250 words). 2. Headings: Limit the levels of heading within an article to at most five. Avoid lengthy headings and do not number them. Ensure that the different levels of headings are clearly distin- guishable in the typescript. 3. Endnotes: These should be consecutively numbered and pre- sented at the end of the paper, not at the foot of each page. To keep endnotes to a minimum, please note that systems of refer- encing within the text (e.g., ›Hutt 1993: 99‹) can be used. An acknowledgement or statement about the background of the ar-

288 289 Guidelines for Authors Guidelines for Authors

ticle can be set as an unnumbered footnote, before any other notes. Please avoid ›i.e.‹ and ›e.g.‹ in the text but use them in endnotes. notes if you wish. 4. Spelling and Punctuation: Please consistently follow British 10. Numbers: Write numbers in figures (rather than words) for or American styles for spelling and punctuation (e.g. the use of exact measurements and series of quantities, including percen- single or double quotes, the placement of punctuation with re- tages. In more general descriptions, numbers below 10 should be gard to quotation marks). spelled out in words. In the text use ›per cent‹ (or ›percent‹ if you 5. Quotations: Use double quotation marks, reserving single are otherwise following the American style); in tables use the marks for quoted words within a quotation. The spellings of symbol ›%‹. Use standard forms for dates and page numbers, words within quotations should not be changed. No quotation e.g., 1780–88, 1650–1730, pp. 200–2, pp. 168–74. marks are required around longer passages (of 45 words or more) 11. Dates: Give dates in the form ›12 December 1962‹. Decades may broken off from the main text. be referred to either as ›the eighties‹ or ›the 1880s‹. Spell out ›the 6. Italics: Italicize non-English words, as well as book and journal nineteenth century‹ (not ›the 19th century‹), etc. titles. Italics may be used sparingly to emphasize English words. 12. Images: If your article makes use of images, please submit them (Do not use underlining.) Do not italicize non-English words as a separate document. unnecessarily. Consider first whether the average reader is likely 13. Unicode: Please ensure that your browser uses Unicode (UTF- to be familiar with the word or expression: words such as ›dhar- 8) so that special characters are rendered properly. ma‹ or ›status quo‹ need not be italicized. Use italics for all non- 14. Referencing Style: English terms with which the average reader is likely to be un- For published sources the following examples illustrate the familiar, unless particular terms occur so frequently that they style to be followed: are better in Roman (upright) type. Proper names in any lan- (a) Books guage should always be in Roman type. W. Halbfass, India and Europe. An Essay in Understanding, 7. Romanization: Please follow established conventions in the New York: Continuum Press, 1988. source languages when using less-familiar terms from foreign If a book is published simultaneously at different places, one or languages, presenting non-Latin characters, and when writing at most two of them may be cited, followed by ›etc.‹ proper names (Confucius instead of Kong Zi). (b) Edited Volumes 8. Hyphenation: Please use hyphenation consistently. For exam- B. K. Matilal, and J. L. Shaw (eds.), Analytical Philosophy in ple, do not alternate between ›macro-economic‹ and ›macroeco- Comparative Perspective. Exploratory Essays in Current nomic‹, ›decision making‹ and ›decision-making‹. However, a Theories and Classical Indian Theories of Meaning and Re- distinction should usually be made between noun and attributive ference, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985. adjective: ›the seventeenth century‹ but ›seventeenth-century (c) Articles in Journals India‹; ›the middle class‹ but ›middle-class ethics‹. A. Sen, ›Democracy as a Universal Value,‹ Journal of Democracy, 9. Abbreviations: Include a final stop in abbreviations (words Vol. 10, No. 3, 1999, pp. 3–17. shortened by omitting the end) such as ›p.‹, ›vol.‹, and ›ed.‹, but (d) Articles in Edited Volumes not in contractions (words shortened by omitting the middle) H. Rosemont Jr., »Against Relativism,« in G. J. Larson, and such as ›Dr‹, ›Mr‹, ›edn‹, ›eds‹, and so on. No stops are necessary E. Deutsch (eds.), Interpreting across Boundaries: New Es- between capitals: e.g., ›GDP‹, but they are necessary after initi- says in Comparative Philosophy, Princeton, New Jersey: als: e.g., ›B. K. Matilal‹. Short forms likely to be unfamiliar to Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 36–63. some readers should be spelled out in full the first time they Ibid. will be used immediately following the first reference. occur. If few in number, abbreviations can be listed early in the The use of op.cit. and loc. cit. is to be avoided completely.

290 291 Originalausgabe

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