THE LAWS of WAR and the FIGHT AGAINST SOMALI PIRACY: COMBATANTS OR CRIMINALS? the Laws of War and the Fight Against Somali Piracy DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE *
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THE LAWS OF WAR AND THE FIGHT AGAINST SOMALI PIRACY: COMBATANTS OR CRIMINALS? The Laws of War and the Fight against Somali Piracy DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE * Despite its codification in treaty law, the law applicable to the repression of high seas piracy remains a subject of unnecessary confusion and speculation. It is sometimes suggested that because pirates were described by classical authors as hostes humani generis (‘enemies of humankind’), or because the United Nations Security Council has authorised the use of ‘necessary means’ in repressing Somali piracy, that we are at war with pirates. Alternatively, it might be thought that because the current counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden are being conducted by naval forces, the appropriate law governing their actions should be the laws of armed conflict. On the contrary, this commentary confirms the view accepted by all governments involved in counter-piracy operations: that this is a law-enforcement operation to which the laws of armed conflict have no application. This follows from the fact that pirates are not in any relevant legal sense engaged in an armed conflict. Further, it is far from obvious that deeming the laws of armed conflict to be applicable would make the task of navies any easier on the one hand, or provide any greater human rights protection to suspect pirates on the other. There is already a clearly established framework for law-enforcement operations at sea; not only is this the correct law to apply as a matter of doctrine, it is hard to see what advantages would follow from applying the laws of war as a matter of policy. CONTENTS I Introduction............................................................................................................... 1 II Are the Laws of Armed Conflict Prima Facie Applicable?...................................... 3 III The Consequences of Applying the Laws of Armed Conflict to Counter-Piracy Operations ....................................................................................... 7 IV The Applicable Law of Law Enforcement Operations ............................................. 8 V Do the Laws of Piracy Apply to Civil War Insurgents? ......................................... 11 VI Conclusions............................................................................................................. 12 I INTRODUCTION Poverty, lack of employment, environmental hardship, pitifully low incomes, reduction of pastoralist and maritime resources due to drought and illegal fishing and a volatile security and political situation all contribute to the rise and continuance of piracy in Somalia.1 Pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia are now endemic. In the early 1990s such attacks were limited, conducted relatively close to shore and were allegedly * BA (Hons), LLB (Hons) (ANU); LLM, PhD (Cantab); Lecturer in Law, Faculty of Laws, University College London. The present commentary is a revised and expanded version of a presentation given at the International Committee of the Red Cross 10th Bruges Colloquium on International Humanitarian Law in October 2009. I am grateful to the anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Any errors remain my own. Email: [email protected]. 1 International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast, Piracy off the Somali Coast — Final Report: Assessments and Recommendations (Workshop Commissioned by the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations to Somalia Ambassador Ahmadeou Ould-Abdallah, 21 November 2008 15 <http://www.imcsnet.org/> (‘UN Expert Report’). 1 2 Melbourne Journal of International Law [Vol 11 the work of groups trying to protect Somalia’s waters from unregulated foreign fishing.2 Indeed, it is often suggested that these early pirates were trained by internationally financed coastguard development programs discontinued during the civil war.3 Claims that piracy is also a response to the illegal dumping of toxic waste off Somalia’s coast are often repeated but have not been substantiated by United Nations Environment Programme investigations.4 Irrespective of their origins, pirate attacks have now escalated to hostage-taking for ransom, with vessels being indiscriminately seized far outside Somali waters. The terror of piracy now jeopardises trade and fishing as far from the Somali shore as the Seychelles.5 There is no doubt that piracy has outgrown any alleged displaced-fishermen origins and is now a serious, organised criminal activity. While it principally targets foreign ships, it also affects regional trade and shipping. Various national and multinational counter-piracy missions now patrol the Gulf of Aden6 and this military presence — along with the wording of relevant Security Council resolutions endorsing the use of ‘all necessary means’ or ‘all necessary measures’ at sea and on land to suppress piracy7 — has raised the question of whether the laws of war have any role to play in combating piracy. The simple answer is ‘no’. The purpose of this commentary is to set out briefly the reasoning that supports the conclusion that the laws of armed conflict have no application to the case of Somali piracy. The generally accepted starting proposition is that the fight against piracy is a law enforcement operation and that the applicable rules are those of police powers. Pirates are not combatants, they are ordinary 2 On the history of Somali piracy, see generally ibid 14–22. 3 On the role of the United Kingdom firm Hart Security in training ‘coastguard’ units in the Puntland region of Somalia, see Firms Reap Somali Piracy Profits (9 September 2009) Al Jazeera <http://english.aljazeera.net/>. 4 UN investigations in 1992, 1997 and 2005 have failed to find any traces of toxicity on Somali beaches reported to be so heavily contaminated that locals had died. See United Nations Environment Programme, ‘The State of the Environment in Somalia: A Desk Study’ (December 2005), 33 <http://www.unep.org/depi/programmes/Somalia_Final.pdf> at 21 March 2010. Claims that Somali warlords have allowed European companies access to land sites for unsafe waste disposal are better documented. See, eg, Jonathan Clayton, Somalia’s Secret Dumps of Toxic Waste Washed Ashore by Tsunami (4 March 2005) Times Online <http://www.timesonline.co.uk>. 5 Seychelles Coastguard Vessel Rescues Fishermen from Somali Pirates (29 March 2010) France24 Online <http://www.france24.com/>. 6 States and organisations involved include Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, India, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States, NATO Operation Ocean Shield, the Coalition of the Willing’s Combined Taskforce 151 and EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta. See SC Res 1846, UN SCOR, 63rd sess, 6026th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1846 (2 December 2008) [6] (‘Resolution 1846’); SC Res 1897, UN SCOR, 64th sess, 6226th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1897 (20 November 2009) Preamble (‘Resolution 1897’); Max Blenkin, HMAS Toowoomba Turns Heat on Pirates, (9 November 2009) The Age Online <http://www.theage.com.au>. See also Douglas Guilfoyle, ‘Counter-Piracy Law Enforcement and Human Rights’ (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 141. 7 SC Res 1816, UN SCOR, 63rd sess, 5902nd mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1816 (2 June 2008) [7(b)] (‘Resolution 1816’); Resolution 1846, UN Doc S/RES/1846, [10(b)] (both concerning action in Somalia’s territorial waters); SC Res 1851, UN SCOR, 63rd sess, 6046th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1851 (16 December 2008) [6] (‘Resolution 1851’) (concerning action in Somalia’s land territory); Resolution 1897, UN Doc S/RES/1897, [7] (renewing the authorisation given in earlier resolutions). 2010] The Laws of War and the Fight against Somali Piracy 3 criminals. This is the view taken by all governments engaged in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, a view demonstrated by the conclusion of agreements allowing for the transfer of captured pirates to Kenya and the Seychelles for criminal investigation and prosecution.8 The Security Council has endorsed this approach and has stressed that the governing law is that of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.9 The laws of armed conflict could potentially apply to Somali piracy only under the most limited conditions, none of which presently appear to be met. The analysis here proceeds in several steps: • First, why the laws of armed conflict are not prima facie applicable; • Second, why the laws of armed conflict — if they did govern piracy operations — would simply be counterproductive or question-begging; • Third, I will suggest that there is an applicable lex specialis of law enforcement operations at sea that already covers the field — there is no need to have recourse to the laws of armed conflict to fill any legal ‘black hole’; and • Fourth, I will briefly discuss the historical debate as to the status of civil war insurgents who ‘take to the seas’ in their fight to overthrow a government. II ARE THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT PRIMA FACIE APPLICABLE? Despite the rhetoric of classical writers on this subject, denouncing the pirate as hostis humani generis (‘an enemy of humankind’),10 we cannot start from the presumption that we are at war with pirates. The laws of war only apply during an armed conflict. The existence of an international or non-international armed conflict is a question of fact: [A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.11 On