Imagination, Maternal Desire and Embryology in Thomas Fienus
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Chapter 9 Imagination, Maternal Desire and Embryology in Thomas Fienus Hiro Hirai 9.1 Introduction A pregnant woman encounters a wolf in the woods. She is so scared that her strong emotion of fear imprints the wolf’s morphological traces on the fetus in her womb. Another pregnant woman craves strawberries or cherries so intensely that she leaves certain marks or impressions of these fruits on the fetus. The belief that the power of maternal emotions such as desire and fear can imprint certain marks, signs or signatures on the fetus was widespread in the early modern period. This belief was adopted by Renaissance philosophers such as Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499) and Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525), who intimately connected it to the traditional theory of imagination or phantasia.1 Moreover, folkloric tales about the mysterious and extraordinary psychic powers exerted by special groups of women, who were often labeled as witches and healers, might have reinforced this belief, contributing to the propagation of the idea that their forces could exceed the order of nature. Recent studies have shed new light on the historical and intellectual background of the issue, although its complete history has yet to be written.2 In this article I will focus on the intervention of early modern learned medicine in the theorization of The first version of this article was presented in the seminar organized by Concetta Pennuto at the Centre d’e´tudes supe´rieures de la Renaissance (Tours). My warmest thanks go to Clare Hirai for her assistance in its preparation. 1See the excellent article by O’Brien 1993, 3–19. On the notion of imagination, see also Bundy 1927; Fattori and Bianchi 1988; and Cocking 1991. 2On this belief, see Angelini 1994, 53–69; Pancino 1996; eadem. 1997, 154–162; and Pennuto 2008, 368–379. H. Hirai (*) Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] © Springer International Publishing AG 2017 211 G. Manning, C. Klestinec (eds.), Professors, Physicians and Practices in the History of Medicine, Archimedes 50, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56514-9_9 [email protected] 212 H. Hirai this belief. To this end I will address the case of Thomas Feyens or Fienus (1567–1631) of Antwerp, who wrote a monograph devoted to the power of imag- ination in the embryological framework.3 Fienus was a professor of medicine at the University of Louvain from the end of the sixteenth century until his death and published a series of embryological works. Among these works there is a treatise, entitled On the Forces of the Imagination (Louvain, 1608).4 This was dedicated to Ernest of Bavaria (1554–1612), Count Palatine, Archbishop of Cologne and Prince-Bishop of Liege, now known as an active prince-practitioner and fervent patron of new sciences and arts, including Paracelsian medicine and alchemy.5 Fienus’s work on the powers of imagination consists of one book divided into twenty-four questions. Fifty-six conclusions, or theses, are disseminated among these twenty-four questions. His main authorities are Aristotle, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. He also uses a wide range of ancient, medieval and early modern philoso- phers and physicians, including Galen, Avicenna, Ficino and Pomponazzi. As a preliminary study of this treatise, I will respect the sequence of its discussion around three major themes: (1) the relationship between soul and body; (2) the notion of imagination; and (3) the working of the mother’s imagination in fetal formation. 9.2 The Soul and the Body Fienus begins his discussion with the question as to whether the soul acts on the body (Q1).6 According to him, the soul separated from the body is an agent quod,thatis, the true and whole agent of its action (C1). However, this type of soul is not a subject of his inquiry. Then Fienus defines the soul united with the body as an agent quo,a “principle” (principium) or “reason-principle of acting” (ratio agendi) (C2). It is thanks to the soul that the animated body exerts forces on corporeal substances (C3). Next Fienus asks which kind of bodies the soul can act on and in what way (Q2).7 To answer these questions, he divides bodies into two groups: “proper” (proprium) and “foreign” (alienum). The proper body is a subject of the soul and is informed by the soul. This category includes all essential parts of the body, such as the heart, the brain and the hand, which are animated by the soul and in which the soul extends “formally” ( formaliter) or in the way of a form. By contrast foreign bodies are not 3On Fienus, see Sondervorst 1958, 1–7; Rather 1967, 340–367; Papy 1999, 317–337; and Hirai 2011, 160–161. 4I have used the following edition: Fienus, Thomas 1608. De viribus imaginationis tractatus. Louvain: Gerardus Rivius. Its quaestiones and conclusiones are hereafter indicated respectively as Q and C with numbering. 5On Ernest of Bavaria, see Halleux and Berne`s 1995, 3–29; and Xhayet and Halleux 2011. 6Fienus, Q1, 1–4. 7Ibid., Q2, 4–31. [email protected] 9 Imagination, Maternal Desire and Embryology in Thomas Fienus 213 animated nor informed by the same soul of the proper body. The fetus and the body of another person placed near the proper body fall into this category. Fienus further distinguishes foreign bodies into two kinds: “internal” (internum) and “external” (externum). Internal foreign bodies are the things residing inside the animated body such as blood, humors, spirits, seeds and the fetus, while external foreign bodies are all corporeal entities placed near the proper body. On the basis of this classification, Fienus argues that the soul has the power of locomotion in the proper body (C4). The animated body is thus directly moved by the soul as its principle of motion. Fienus then addresses the power of change by stating that the soul cannot directly alter the proper body (C5). For him it is only “accidentally” (per accidens) that the soul can produce changes in the proper body. As for internal foreign bodies, Fienus argues that the soul cannot directly change their form (C6). But he accepts the idea that the soul can change them by producing some effects inside them “vitally” (vitaliter) and “efficiently” (effective) through the temperament of bodily parts and native heat (C7). To explain the issue further, Fienus adds that the soul can change internal foreign bodies such as humors and spirits by the power of concoction (C8). For him the soul can also move these bodies without “informing” them (C9). Indeed he thinks that the soul can directly move humors and spirits as its corporeal instruments or assistants (C10). To elucidate the relation between the soul and these corporeal instruments, Fienus affirms under the authority of Thomas Aquinas, the Coimbra Jesuits and Francisco Valle´s (1524–1592) that the soul can “spiritually” (spiritaliter) move humors and spirits in the animated body (C11).8 Turning to external foreign bodies, Fienus wonders if the soul can also move them. He finds an impressive series of authors, mostly of a Platonic tendency, such as Avicenna, Algazali, Albertus Magnus, Ficino, Pomponazzi and Paracelsus (1493/ 94–1541), who all ascribed an extraordinary power to the soul and especially to its faculty called “imagination” (imaginatio), able to act even at a long distance. However, relying on Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Francisco Sua´rez (1548–1617), the Coimbra Jesuits and Valle´s, Fienus clearly rejects this position. For him the soul cannot directly move external foreign bodies or bodies placed at a distance (C12).9 Like locomotion he also denies that the soul can alter or produce these bodies at a distance (C13). Note that here the notions of sympathy and occult properties, celebrated by Renaissance natural philosophers and physicians such as Girolamo Fracastoro (1478–1553) and Jean Fernel (1497–1558), are totally out of consideration.10 Next Fienus asks through which type of powers the soul causes movements and actions in both the proper body and internal foreign bodies (Q3).11 He first argues that the soul cannot directly act upon these bodies but only through “superimposed” 8On Valle´s, see Solana 1941, 297–347; Zanier 1983, 20–38; Pinero~ et al. 1988; and Martin 2002, 1–30. 9On Sua´rez, see especially Hill and Lagerlund 2012. 10On these notions, see Hirai 2011, 50–51, 73–75 and 104. 11Fienus, Q3, 32–39. [email protected] 214 H. Hirai (super-additae) powers as its instruments (C14). Among these instrumental powers (C15) Fienus enumerates two: (1) a power called “animal” (animalis) by physicians and “motive” (motiva), “voluntary” (voluntaria) or “progressive” (progressiva)by philosophers; and (2) a power called “natural” (naturalia) or “involuntary” (involuntaria). According to Fienus, animal power resides in the brain and is com- municated to the whole body through nerves. This power follows sense and desire and obeys the will. By contrast natural power, residing everywhere in the body, cannot follow sense and desire like animal power, but only assumes a certain natural inclination. On the basis of this classification, Fienus explains that the soul moves the proper body, firstly on its own, secondly through animal power and lastly through natural power (C16). He adds that the soul can also move internal foreign bodies such as humors and spirits though natural power, while the soul’s animal power is responsible for their movements only accidentally (C17). As for external foreign bodies, Fienus clearly rejects, once again, the idea that the soul can locally move them or alter them (C18). There is no room for action at a distance for the soul’sanimaland natural powers. 9.3 Imagination or Phantasia After animal and natural powers, Fienus turns to the soul’s higher cognitive and intellectual powers.