38 By Mark Chamoun NMC JOURNAL | Its and Rise Fall Anbarthe Awakening: The Why and How of

province of al-Anbar, acoalition of tribes cupation of Sunni inthe dominated Copyright ©2020Mark Chamoun George-W.-Bushs-speech-on-Iraq.html. worldnews/1563127/Full-text-of-President- 20, 2018,https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ NovemberSeptember 14,2007,,accessed W. Bush’s Speech on Iraq,” 2 cy “Sahwa”: Its and Rise Fall,” 1 amidst of Islamic rise the the State. bar province thrown back into turmoil abic, was largely disbanded and al-An the The Anbar Awakening, or “Sahwa” in Ar Anbar Awakening members to al-Qaeda. had inal-Anbar and return the of many versal of whatever control coalitions tribal of American troops in2009, was alarge re what quickly followed afterthewithdrawal tois beginning return to normal”. a city once where planted al-Qaeda its flag madi and other population centres. Today, drove terrorists the from capital the of Ra sheiks, Iraqi forces, and coalition troops our strategy is working… Together, local bar province example is agood of how dent George W. Bush “An said plainly: ona 2007speech War the inIraq, Presi achievementitary by United the States. In Sonsthe OfIraq (SOI) was hailed as amil knownto be as Anbar the Awakening and spreading outside of al-Anbar, what came stabilizationin the of province. the Soon prominence region in the and assisted 80,000 of former them insurgents, numbering With a group of Sunni Arab fighters, many dominated cities of and Ramadi Fallujah. gether and gained control of al-Qaeda the with American forcesallied mobilized to 18, no. 1(2011):122. 1 , the movement, the quickly gained At height the of American the oc “Full Text of President George Myriam “Iraq's Benraad, Tribal The Telegraph,The Middle East PoliMiddle East 2 Yet, ------actions efforts against AQI, fueled one by opportunitypolitical within contentious where a leaders recognized Sunni tribal questions environment liesinapolitical given. Iargue that answer the to these circumstancescal and resources were they effectively doso politiwithinthedid they viously with group, the aligned and how against AQI, considering many were pre motivated leaders to Sunni mobilize tribal go about doing so. More specifically,what inIraq (AQI),al-Qaeda and how didthey why began to Sunni mobilize tribes against mobilizationthe of Anbar the Awakening: two major questions analyzing when arise first inthe tothem doso place. Effectively, al-Anbar province and what drew exactly mobilized against an insurgency inthe better understand how Sunni Iraqi tribes The Awakeninggives an opportunity to statethe and not those associated with it. arethey by in, both actors associated with disintegrate according to environment the mobilize towards collective action, and interesting example of how groups can ant chapter inrecent Iraqi and history an The Anbar Awakening remains an import of Iraq. and form Anbar the Awakening and Sons able to mobilize against inIraq al-Qaeda recognition of opportunity, political were members, catalyzed by and grievances the for Sunni collective actionin which tribal ements provided environment afertile and (III)insurgent These el weaknesses. Sunni(II) the element of Awakening, the structure of Anbartribal the Awakening, toed its effective organization:the (1) to mobilize and what contribut exactly as to how Anbar the Awakening chose Further, Iprovide factors three specified recognitionthe of opening. political anew mobilization against insurgency the and previousboth that grievances motivated - - - - - 39 ISSUE XII | 40 NMC JOURNAL | Anbar Awakening Rising, AQI Falling AQI Rising, Awakening Anbar 1 (2016):142. y,” or e Th Sunni Realignment inIraq with Complexity 8 7 cle/0,8599,1572796,00.html. http://content.time.com/time/world/arti November 26,2006,accessed ber 26,2018, Tribes Against Al-Qaeda,” 6 5 4 'Sahwa': Its and Rise Fall," 122. 3 AQI power inal-Anbar, others several not leader to first the tribal rebel against bar Awakening. However, al-Rishawi was formationbegan the of aformalized An lize against AQI province, inthe and thus was compelled to form acouncil to mobi turning away from group. the AQI, sparking what some would his call wi’s brothers and his father were by killed offerselse him more”. and cut offsamethe handsomebody if andey power. But tomorrow, he can turn anybody can he get who thinks him mon andey power andshake hand the will of gards “He leader to tribal the wants mon former AQI insurgent with articulated re short-term partnership with AQI itself. and oil smuggling notably participating inhighway robberies meansprimary of gaining revenue— most ticipated asactivities in a variety of a illegal many leaders at other tribal time, the par doing sincebeen 2003. so contesting AQI province inthe and had were Sunnitime tribes already directly Anbarthe Awakening. Council”, formalizing what was to become formation of “al-Anbar the Salvation Abd al-Sattar al-Rishawi announced the

Digest of Middle East Studies ofMiddleDigest East Diane L.Maye, “Understanding the Ibid. Mark Kukis, “Turning Iraq’s Ibid., 142. Ibid., 122. Myriam “Iraq's Benraad, Tribal On September 26 5 , evenparticipating ina 7 Three al-Rishaof 3 However, by that Time, 4 Al-Rishawi, like th , 2006 Sheikh , 2006Sheikh Decem 8 The sheikh sheikh The 25, no. - - 6 A ------took hold of city. the from Awakening the Albu aligned Issa decline of AQI power leaders and tribal Ramadi. month,the AQI out pulled of city the of tribe ening gained support from nearly every ing. tacks by AQI quickly joined Awaken the such as Albu the Ghanem, by grieved at joining force police the began working with Awakening the and from Albu the Alwan and Albu Faraj soon tunity within Awakening. the Tribesmen disenchanted with AQI and saw an oppor as more leaders found tribal themselves to inRamadi. a total of twenty-fivethat he reached out Jassim,Ali and Albu Thiyab;this out of Albu the Risha,al-Rishawi Albu initially: territory. 2005 against AQI encroachment intheir that tribe workedhal with U.S troops since came before him,including Albu the Ma 15 14 13 12 11 OxfordAmerica: University Press, 2017),117. Islamic State ofthe Awakening andthe Anbar Rise The tory: 10 andRise Fall," 122. 9 leave region. the Yet, how knew Sheikh the with any real want for AQI influence to inability to work with insurgency the than result of his own and grievances personal action against AQI may have come as a course, his intentions to stirup collective was figurehead the the of Awakening. Of

12 13 By March Anbar 2007,the Awak and 29 the between 14 9 Ibid., 160. Ibid., 156. Ibid., 153. Ibid., 152. Ibid.,135. Malkasian, Carter Al-Rishawi, through of all this, with stood Only three tribes Benraad, “Iraq's Benraad, Tribal 'Sahwa': Its Fallujah after soon saw a quick (New York, NY, of 10 This grewsoon number 15

11 and other tribes, th Illusions ofVic and 31 the st of of ------entities. He showed for askill garnering well as complicated and internally divided to gain support the of as Sunni the tribes ry,” ,142. Realignment inIraq with Complexity Theo 18 (2017): 273. lization,” Movement: ANarrative-level Study of Mobi 17 State ofthe Awakening Islamic andtheAnbar Rise 16 people, you have won war. the The sheiks posited that “When you’ve the secured gion. situation security the tackling re inthe MacFarlandSean was facing in difficulty es for support at Colonel time exact the mation and approached USmarine forc al-Anbarin the Salvation Council’s for can support for Awakening the early on alliance. source abeneficial to be of resources and and United the States came who military to liberation the of and Ramadi Fallujah that Sunnithose tribes proved invaluable tive and leader gained support the both of tribes. of the unifying populace and to tribal to the goal the peal (salvation) purposefully, knowing its ap like “sahwa”ric (awakening) and “inqadh” defeats inbattle.” ofcast killing the AQI leaders and their television, and publicly broad inRamada ter statement on internet, the al-Iraqiyaa American officers ever had…statement af spread his propaganda far better than the howstood to rumor use and press the to awareness of Awakening; the “he under

, 128. 18 In a2007interview, Colonel the Small WarsSmall &Insurgencies Maye, “Understanding Sunni the Newton, Allen “The Awakening Malkasian, Al-Rishawi looked for Ameri 16 Al-Rishawi rheto used Illusions of Victory: The The Illusions ofVictory: 17 He was an effec 28 , no. 2 ------. Anbarthe province, quickly leading to the bar Awakening grew and spread outside of with movement. the enough An the Soon attracted more themselves to align tribes Awakening’sthe mobilization efforts and and training of recruits police bolstered The protection affordedleaders tribal to 19 cluded former officers soldiers and from came backgrounds from military that in were former insurgents themselves and country. fighters outside al-Anbarof and acrossthe sented mobilization the of Sunni Arab economic power within province. the once and again garner within tribes their leaders to gain allowed authorityey tribal and March 2017by latter. the allotted August tobetween Ramadi 2006 response program (CERP); $10million is licemen and commander’s the emergency paymentsboth to families the of po dead and money.ing, training, protection,was military advis support meant for Anbar the Awakening with US backing forthcoming. was authorized to support movement, the afterReist General to Brigadier speaking United States and Colonel MacFarland such an alliancewere by recognized the people”. the lead Rise andRise Fall," 122. 24 23 22 21 State , ofthe Awakening Islamic andtheAnbar Rise 20 htm. world/iraq/2007-04-30-ramadi-colonel_n. 2007, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/

120. 24 Benraad, “Iraqs Benraad, Tribal 'Sahwa:' Its Ibid., 125. Ibid., 122. Ibid., 121. Malkasian, Jim Michaels, SonsThe of Iraq (SOI), repre Many of leaders of the SOI the 21 19 The money came fromcame money The Clearly, benefits the of llusions of Victory: The The llusions ofVictory: USA Today,USA 22 20 This mon What US May 01, 23 ------

41 ISSUE XII | 42 NMC JOURNAL | Rising State Islamic Falling, Awakening Anbar its momentum. bar Awakening movement beganto lose inIraq slowlytary withdrawing, An the that joined it. and with former officers and insurgents leaders thating, with tribal facilitated it, politicians encouraged who awaken the groups inIraq: within Sunni with society Awakening developed along with three standing by movement the as well. and SunniBaghdad soon politicians began Ghafoori helped spread Awakening the to Shiite militias as aresult of latter. the brought about having lost his brothers to of violence and group the lack of security cisms of AQI, mostly aimed at amount the Abu Abed). ofleader SOI the was Sa‘ad Ghaffoori (aka Saddam Hussein’s regime. AR2007091300490.html. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/13/ 14, 2007,http://www.washingtonpost. of U.S.,” 30 29 28 27 26 ry,” 144. Realignment inIraq with Complexity Theo 25 to AQI and with U.S the military’s retreat after, many Awakening members returned triumphs would felt never be again. Soon regionthe Ramadi after the and Fallujah dominance movement the had garnered in ofas leader Awakening the but level the of madi. inan explosionkilled inhis house inRa assassination attempts by AQI, was finally Abd al-Sattar al-Rishawi, after numerous

30 His brother took over soon Ahmed The WashingtonThe Post, “Bomb Kills aKey Sunni Ally Ibid., 141. Ibid., 145. Ibid., 148. Ibid., 143. Maye, “Understanding Sunni the On September 13 26 Ghaffoori had his criti own 29 But with America’s mili September th 25 , 2007 Sheikh , 2007Sheikh One major 28 The The - 27 - - - - -

to co-opt Awakening leaders inan effort structures designed upset tribal parallel disbanding councils,and and tried tribal and public jobs),repressed its members (includingto survive providing security Awakening of financial the means it needs government’s control: he deprived the ing was brought into of scope the Iraqi the complished three things afterthe Awaken of movement’s the influence, quickly ac Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, worried sustainability of Anbar the Awakening. quickly came to threaten strength the and was felt as by abetrayal United the States supportive of Awakening, the and what al. during years the of U.S support withdraw materialthe privileges accumulated they Iraqi forces leadersbegan feeling and tribal The Awakeningtransferredthen was to 34 andRise Fall," 123. 33 State ofthe Awakening Islamic andtheAnbar Rise 32 andRise Fall," 122. 31 joining insurgency, the perhaps acknowl and many Sunnis begansupporting and am” begangaining influenceal-Anbar in turned “the and al-Sh al-Anbar. inIraq enough al-Qaeda Soon stop second the coming of insurgency in influence,the Awakening was unable to to government this, efforts to subdue its ening was severely weakened. Added to divide and conquer. infrastructure toinfrastructure operate on own. their sufficient enough business enterprises and ince, citing leaders had that fact the tribal bar and reducing funding their of prov the marines beganwithdrawing from al-An massive retaliatory attacks. out of Iraq, movement the began facing

33 The Iraqi government wasthan less , 164. Ibid., 125. “Iraqs Benraad, Tribal 'Sahwa': Its Malkasian, “Iraqs Benraad, Tribal 'Sahwa': Its Illusions of Victory: The The Illusions ofVictory: 34 The Anbar Awak 31 By 2008,US 32 ------

Why Did the Anbar Awakening Arise? Awakening Anbar the Did Why AQI interfering leaders means with tribal ers. Grievances came form in the of either foremost by felt grievances lead by tribal Anbar Awakening was ignited first and inIraqda has to The dowith grievances. leaders to collective action against al-Qae first place whatand triggered tribal Sunni why Anbar the Awakening arose inthe Grievances nance region. inthe ening and directly contesting AQI’s domi themselvesfind joining the Anbar Awak leaderswouldously quickly tribal aligned effort againstgroupthe meantthat previ mobilization within a ties opportuni of political recognition es and the of grievanc ing amount AQI, agrow y l s with aligned u o i v e r p against group. the Although many were that found themselves inclined to mobilize of rational actors, leaders primarily, tribal orcal religious obligation, than with aset has less to dowith any of sense ideologi emergencethe of Anbar the Awakening relationshiptheir with AQI. The reason for were less it when than idealistic came to al-Anbar that Awakening inthe took part of matter the is leadersof that tribal the against aSunni insurgency. But truth the ince of al-Anbar would find battling itself granted that Sunni the dominated prov against Sunnis? Indeed, it for taken can be

The answer the to question of Why would Sunnis mobilize - - - once-prosperous movement has ic State and what remained of the in Iraq by killed Islam the been Anbar Awakening members have 2009and 2013,1,345 Between largely disbanded. ------Ahmed AbuAhmed has Reesha, since his brother’s ening and leader al-Rishawi’s brother, Washington Post, Awakening inIraq before It CanStart,” 38 37 36 State ofthe Awakening Islamic andtheAnbar Rise perous movement has largely disbanded. State and what remained of once-pros the inIraq havebers by killed Islamic the been and 2013,1,345Anbar Awakening mem an ever-dwindling 2009 impact. Between and discredited resurrected”. to be awakeninges in2015the “was broken too turned to Iraq as acommander of USforc dissipated MacFarland and Sean when re What remained of Awakening the quickly Abu was established. al-Baghdadi Bakr Sunni Iraq and caliphate anew by headed bar and as well Ramadi as majority the of Islamicthe State captured much of al-An government and against Islam?”. sibility ifdoing is insupport so of aShi’a fighting “is the leader: Islamic Statepos a The questionposed by a was tribal Sunni regionthe against other perceived threats. benefitsgroupthe the edging may have in 35 and what sparked it to doso. to how movement the exactly mobilized Anbar Awakening inmind, we now turn With and of of history the rise the fall the

, 178. David Ignatius, “Stopping an Ibid., 191. Ibid., 184. Malkasian, November 20,2014. Illusions of Victory: The The Illusions ofVictory: - results and unremarkable met with been one that has region,in the ing’s influence Awakenthe routeical to a more polit death pursued 35 By 2014 37 Awak The The 38 36 ------

43 ISSUE XII | 44 NMC JOURNAL | tribe members. AQItribe openly challenged own their mined influence amongsttheir waysthe insurgency the inwhich under itwhen came to power contestation; and threat political the recognized AQI had againstalso leaders tribal These them. leaders, includingtribal himself, to revolt role incentivized them incurtailing many participated insuch and activities AQI’s of income. Indeed, al-Rishawi himself leaders lost whattribal was a main source fering process inthe of activities these for leaders, and with AQI’s tribal inter were nevertheless key sources of revenue money gaining were activities but illegal and reconstruction efforts. from smuggling, robbery, black markets, ers lost key resources including revenues encroachment into al-Anbar, lead tribal discriminate of use violence. With AQI’s powerthe leaders, or of in their tribal of garnering revenue, challenge their to Washington Quarterly Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives,” 41 ry,” 141. Realignment inIraq with Complexity Theo 40 andRise Fall, 123. 39 families.their to wellbeing their also and wellbeing the of a threat to power the leaders but of tribal public dismemberment” not only posed ily members, including beheadings and murders leaders and of fam their tribal assassinations, torture, and grotesque demonstrative intimidation: kidnappings, through “a violent campaign of gruesome, ceding of resources to insurgency. the AQI tivities meant to intimidate and force the power leadersthrough of violent tribal ac leadership.their of religion or society, directly threatening leaders on of matter rulings the the tribe

John A.Mccary, Anbar “The Maye, “Understanding Sunni the “Iraq's Benraad, Tribal 'Sahwa': Its 41 40 It challenged the further

32, no. 1(2009):48. 39 Many of these The The ------Sunni populace into Awakening; the and andcil SOI, and recruitment the of the creationthe of al-Anbar Salvation Coun Awakening. gion, pushing into them hands the of the restthe of Sunni the population re in the not leadersbut only alienated tribal also of by violence perpetrated AQI angered Awakening. with counterinsurgency the efforts the of caused realignment grievances their these andhad same as the leader the grievances In Sa’ad Ghaffori’scase, many other Sunnis ances were not only felt leaders. by tribal AQI’s presence. insufficiency insecurity broughtabout by death of his brothers, he which blamed on AQI and adverse their influence after the foori was driven to mobilization against hands of AQI. der of his three brothers and father at the al-Anbar Salvation was mur the Council what motivated al-Rishawi to establish the lize against AQI. U.S forces discovered that SOI counterpart Sa’ad Ghaffoori to mobi that grievance drovery al-Rishawi and his no. 11(2014):930. of Iraq,” Forces inIrregular War:Sons Case the The of Friend Thomson,“The Enemy of My Enemy Is My 45 ry,” 148. Realignment inIraq with Complexity Theo 44 43 ry,” 142. Realignment inIraq with Complexity Theo 42 action against AQI. However, are they not tors, notably leaders, into tribal collective arose and what drove exactly ac certain indicatora good of why such amovement Anbarthe Awakening came are to they be, although donot grievances explain how

… Studies inConflictStudies & Terrorism Govinda Clayton and Andrew Maye, “Understanding Sunni the Ibid., 148. Maye, “Understanding Sunni the Indeed, violence was prima the The DynamicsSelf-Defense The of 45 44 Grievances facilitated both Indeed, gratuitous these acts 42 43 In asimilar way, Ghaf However, griev these 37, ------the Anbarthe Awakening and mobilizing leaders foundtribal themselves creating onlythe factor that explains why Sunni cle/0,8599,1572796,00.html. http://content.time.com/time/world/arti Against Al-Qaeda,” 47 Movements: onSocial parative Perspectives Meyer, “Framing Political Opportunity,” 46 an opportunityognized for self-advance by himself and leadersbut other tribal rec ing, he not only felt addressed grievances formalized Sheikh the Anbar the Awaken can get himmoney and power”. “shake hand the of anybody he who thinks former AQI insurgent, al-Rishawi would vancement. If we words the recall of one opportunity arose for own their self-ad U.S forces and mobilizing against AQI, an Sa’adpart Ghaffooribegan workingwith When al-Rishawi and his SOI counter portunities played can not understated. be role that recognition the of op political Anbarthe Awakening’s emergence, the a large role inanswering question the of Indeed,tribes. although played grievances territories and regain power within their toty once again over take respective their Awakening would result inan opportuni that followed that himrealized joining the in al-Anbar. He leaders and tribal the all opening political the recognized he had ated al-Anbar the Salvation he Council collective action.When al-Rishawi cre motivationthe of agroup to mobilize into tion of opening apolitical plays arole in and substantive location” ing of space and political its institutional broadlythe defined as “opening and clos Opening Political a of Recognition against inIraq. al-Qaeda

Mark Kukis, “Turning Iraq’s Tribes William A.Gamson and David S. If opportunity political can be Time, Time, December 26,2006, December 46 ; the recogni; the 47 When - Com 14. ------region leverage to garner he needed power inthe ly excluded leader, minor tribal to gain the tunity for al-Rishawi, was who aprevious Awakening and U.S the was akey oppor members. tribal ating arenewed of sense loyalty amongst had overthey cre respective their tribes, of that legitimacy power increased the again relevant became and gained asense money at own their prerogative, once they paid directly and were able to distribute subordinates. leaders were tribal Because leaders to gain influence amongsttheir provideditary an opportunity for tribal reaped leaders from by U.S the tribal mil Awakening. inthe part leadersthatinactive didnot tribal take influencethe in province overthe more leaders, like al-Rihawial himself, to gain anvided opportunity for more junior trib for of Sunni the al-Anbar tribes and pro initiated identity arenewed of sense tribal AQI insurgency. The Anbar Awakening ment through mobilization against the 50 An Alliance of Incentives,” 50. 49 tion,”, 273. ment: ANarrative-level Study of Mobiliza 48 tributed of to Anbar rise the the Awaken tion of opening apolitical that con truly AQI, it and was grievances their recogni leadersthatal to mobilize decided against prominent leaders at tribal time. the to gainalso power over other the more to counter of rise AQI the inal-Anbar but U.S forces created an opportunity not only leaders of Anbar the tribal Awakening and

50 Therefore, cooperationbetween Ibid., 48. Mccary, Anbar “The Awakening: Newton, “The Awakening Move Moreover, material the resources Because it Sunni wasBecause those trib 49 The alliance between the between alliance The 48

------45 ISSUE XII | 46 NMC JOURNAL | Alliance of Incentives,” 46. 51 openingspolitical were reasons why the mobilized movement. the Grievances and to movement the cannot said to be have assembled itself. Essentially, what lead Awakening the in which organized and Awakening to them ways and the ascribe that to emergence lead the of Anbar the enough characteristics to those identify movement mobilizes. Indeed, it is not action do notlective answer how such a Yet motivations the for organizing col and recognition the of openings. political tinguished role the played by grievances Anbarthe Awakening came we to dis be lize? Mobi Awakening Anbar the Did How with left understandingstill how. why Anbar the Awakening arose, we are to But be. after answeringthe question of Awakening and why movement this came leaders inal-Anbar to create Anbar the derstanding of what inspired Sunni tribal Throughtwo these factors, we gain an un province inthe al-Qaeda of al-Anbar. create an Awakening movement against opportunity, the indeed to mobilize and ers inal-Anbar need, and the recognized tunity structure at lead time, the tribal openinga political oppor political inthe factors: and grievances recognition the of ing and Sons of Iraq. Throughtwo these what was to becomeAnbar the Awaken mobilize into collective action and form like al-Rishawi and later Sa’ad Ghafoori to ence inal-Anbar motivated leaders tribal AQI the both insurgency and U.S pres structure and environment created by gain influence powerand politicalthe in ing.

51 The recognition of an opportunity to Mccary, Anbar “The Awakening: An In answering question the of why ------alty leaders through from asystem tribal tribal loyalty. that relied heavily on concepts such as policies weaken yet them tribal enacted expropriated large areas land of to tribal fluence but aware theirhe of usefulness, with leaders;fearing Sunni in their tribal Saddam sought to weaken both and work Iraq with Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath regime. lation structures of have tribal in ahistory garner resources. Tribes and manipu the movement was able to organize itself and to explaining mostthe crucial how the mobilization of Anbar the Awakening is The rolethat structure tribal played the in what made Anbar the Awakening happen. Tribes of Role The organization and sustained mobilization. factors those thattify contributed to its Awakening arose it is important to iden Indeed, understanding how Anbar the answer only one of questions the posed. uted to growth the of awakening, the they lyzing what sustained truly and contrib movement came to but be, without ana 21-22. Saddam Husseins Tribal Policies 1991–96,” 54 Saddam Husseins Tribal Policies 1991–96,” 19. 53 Studies 1991–96,” in Iraq: Saddam Husseins Tribal Policies 52 into them byticular socializing Ba’ath the Saddam manipulated inpar Sunni tribes state even inthe tribes justice system. creating norms tribal and new aplace for changed what it meant of part to atribe, be identityof tribal innovated he also and to extent the that Saddam renewed a sense intotribes to president. allegiance the of rewards and recruitment that coaxed

29, no. 01(1997):4-5. Baram, “Neo-Tribalism inIraq: Baram, “Neo-Tribalism inIraq: Amatzia Baram, “Neo-Tribalism The al-Anbartribes of Sunni are International Journal of Middle East 52 Saddam brought about loy 53 Yet 54 ------

Rise andRise Fall," 126. 58 Journal East Political inSaddam’s Survival Iraq.” M 57 ry,” ,144. Realignment inIraq with Complexity Theo 56 andRise Fall," 127. 55 have of was asense cohesion and loyalty movementsthat tribal before it didnot gain. manipulate system for tribal the his own loyaltythat tribal had and found away to Saddam Hussein, importance the knew form for mobilization. Al-Rishawi, like as present aconvenient and effective plat force identities tribal region, inthe as well opportunitya new to revitalize and rein ening and its leaders, however, presented divisions and infighting. AQI region, in the apart falling all due to attempts tribal several had been to combat beforedeed, Anbar the Awakening, there inabilitythe to mobilize effectively. complicated and resulting fractioned, in during Saddam’s regime. Tribes remained to play ceased same the tribes role did they of Anbarrise the Awakening against AQI, ance on loyalty. their played intensified as did Saddam’s reli from office the that identitiesrole tribal U.Sthe drew to closer removing Saddam anbecame important affiliation and as am’s Iraq. SOI were themselves soldiers under Sadd many of leaders of the Awakening the and system. This is epitomized that the fact by State ofthe Awakening Islamic andtheAnbar Rise 59

,118-119. Malkasian, “Iraqs Benraad, Tribal 'Sahwa': Its Adeed, Dawisha. “”Identity” and Maye, “Understanding Sunni the “Iraq's Benraad, Tribal 'Sahwa': Its What Anbar the Awakening had identitiesBy 1990stribal the 55

53, no. 4(Fall, 1999): 56

Illusions of Victory: The The Illusions ofVictory: 57 Yet by 2006and the 59 The new Awak 567. iddle 58 In ------number of participants Awakening. inthe tures furthermore to led an increase inthe for mobilization. available and organic structure ideal social available. Thus, tribes presented a readily nism for mobilization was quickly made recruited)labour amecha (tribesmen chains of command) and access easy to tional resources and milieus tribal (tribal through facilitation the both of organiza source mobilization Awakening in the and for method structure was primary the re action against insurgency. the tribal The subsequent mobilization and collective leaders and subordinates their tribal for structure and its architecture, organizing like al-Rishawi were able to utilize tribal ment of Awakening tribesmen. leaders structuresources and intribal recruit the against AQI. its co-opting could result inmobilization system and tribal their way the inwhich opportunity the nized structure present in number of them). amongst followers their (no matter the Forces inIrregular War,” 932. Friend Thomson,“The Enemy of My Enemy Is My 62 tion,” 270. ment: ANarrative-level Study of Mobiliza 61 State ofthe Awakening Islamic andtheAnbar Rise 60 al-Anbar and as one scholar puts it “re wereallegiances fatal to AQI’s success in directly combatting against AQI. loyalty and found allegiance themselves mer insurgents through who tribal their neutralcruited both actors and evenfor of use structures,the existing re tribal Indeed, Anbar the Awakening, through Malkasian, , 102. … Govinda Clayton and Andrew Newton, “The Awakening Move The utilization struc tribal of The DynamicsSelf-Defense The of 61 Tribal leaders found re 60 Illusions of Victory: The The Illusions ofVictory: Tribal leadersrecog 62 Tribal ------47 ISSUE XII | 48 NMC JOURNAL | tion efforts against AQI. the Indeed, role Awakening to move towards collective ac mobilization by used leaders of Anbar the was an important resource and tool for populace. The role consequently tribes of ofsense belonging and duty tribal in the through of use the rhetoric that invoked a identity,to tribal reinforcing loyalty tribal sentimentsal and of asense membership (salvation).dh These terms provokedtrib of terms like sahwa (awakening) and inqa bly as mentioned before, through use the through framing processes— most nota participants for Anbar the Awakening also leaderslikeIndeed, al-Rishawi tribal drew by mere the existence structure. of atribal was notallegiance solely brought about haven inal-Anbar”. ational, recruiting, and evenideological restricted, and destroyed Qaeda’s al oper dients that have undermined, thwarted, are allegiances key ingre tribal the newed An Alliance of Incentives,” 53. 63 and sometimes explicitly, a Shia identi 2003 Iraq would bring with it “implicitly apost- and Because own their societies. selves within Iraqi the both government have to findways new them of asserting andence country inthe that would they Sunnis were no longer dominant the pres environment political A new meant that ening Sunni identity was inastate of flux. Element Sunni The nation of movement’s the mobilization. and organize, but it is not only the expla to explainused how Awakening the arose isof a significant tribes factorthat canbe

Mccary, Anbar “The Awakening: At of time the Anbar the Awak 63 However, tribal this ------toward Shias”. insurgencythe with a“genocidal stance AQI saw which members Sunni join tribal thoughts were cemented of with rise the ry,” 151. Realignment inIraq with Complexity Theo 68 67 66 65 19. and more the Salafists radical of AQI. ages more the between moderate Sunnis ening was aresult of cleav political the it argued can be that of Awak rise the the a monolith inpost-Saddam Iraq. Indeed, leaders showstribal that Sunnis were not Anbar Awakening was sparked by Sunni AQI. Just by gleaming at that fact the the Sunnis were sympathetic to Salafism and of Salafistbeliefs amongst Sunnis. enemy and worked intandem with rise the of Shiites, one that group the deemed an identity took with it a more view critical 65 create own their “group-specific symbols”. was a richarray of Shiite identity markers, and inan effort to compensate forwhat Haddad posits, reinventing identity, their This meantthat began,Sunnis as Fanar toneed find a post-Saddamrole in Iraq. ty” 2003,” ening: TheReinvention of Sunni Identity After 64 more those between Salafist whoSunnis overtake region; the adding to divide the AQI was made up of foreigners looking to leaders ofal Awakening the argued that Sunnis into counterinsurgency. the Trib cleavages up to drum support and recruit of Awakening the took advantage of these isthis so, it follows leaders that tribal the This process the of reinvention of Sunni

64 , Sunnis now had an overwhelming Singapore Papers Middle East ( Maye, “Understanding Sunni the Ibid., 22. Ibid., 22. Ibid., 16-18. Fanar Haddad, “A Awak Sectarian Yet not does this mean that all 67

2014): 66 These These 68 - If If - - - - brand of Sunnism. did not with groups identify the particular followed AQI and moderate Sunnis who ry,” 137. Realignment inIraq with Complexity Theo 71 State ofthe Awakening Islamic andtheAnbar Rise 70 An Alliance of Incentives,”, 49. 69 The moderate Sunni identity provided a damage to AQI’s integrity region. inthe Iraqi government yet ablesevere to inflict Awakening independent could be of the This, coupledwith U.S aid, meantthat the ineffectivethe government time.the at against AQI without having to resort to of set actorsto mobilize particular these leaders like al-Rishawitribal were able against AQI and Iraq’s Shiite government, moderate Sunnis. nity structure within mobilization the of vironment and found opportu apolitical ening took advantage of en political this country.their Tribal leaders of Awak the force, and foreign aradical insurgency in was an illegitimate government and police Sunnis were stuck what felt between they imate regime. situation and what felt they was an illegit jority voicing disdain for their political the government at for time the its Shiite ma Shiite identity. assumptionsthe made due to forces’ the selves athreat.beliefstemmedfrom This thatlieved Iraqi forces police were them Awakening.the Sunnis inal-Anbar be to play role inthe of Sunni the element in were dominant the power has a part also environmenta political Shiites inwhich

, 101. Maye, “Understanding Sunni the Malkasian, Mccary, Anbar “The Awakening: Because these Sunnis these wereBecause both The within Awakeningoccurring 71 70 Consequently, moderate Sunnis Iraqi the rejected 69 Illusions of Victory: The The Illusions ofVictory: ------Weaknesses Insurgency not given to insurgency the itself. possible ifadequatebeen attention was out of al-Anbar and would this not have ening was to drive AQI and its influence that of goal Anbar the primary the Awak effectively. This said one must not forget large role inhow movement the mobilized identity of Anbar the Awakening played a opportunitypolitical structure, Sunni the processes and manipulation of current the ly by intermingling the of framing these effective, Shiite led government. Effective insurgencycal without resorting to in the as moderate Sunnis fighting against aradi bilize against AQI by framing themselves within religious their community and mo leadersinal-Anbaral to exploit cleavages element provided an opportunity for trib government instance). inthis The Sunni not dependent on an actor external (the its ability to ensure that mobilization was for mobilizationnecessary and through initsboth ability to appeal actors to those opportunitypolitical for Awakening the Insurgent Mistakes,”, 53. 73 (2009): 59-60. Breaks:the Insurgent Mistakes,” 72 Moving forward, terrors exporting and and within its fracturing leadership. was ultimately met with aloss of control to defend (i.e., aterritory Fallujah)trying waysthe insurgency the inwhich through to defeat and of case in the AQI it means way defending inwhich can territory lead zealotry. terrors,porting dysfunctional terror, and Anbar Awakening: holding territory, ex were later exploited by U.S forces and the mistakes made inIraq by that al-Qaeda

72 Krause, “Playing for Breaks: the Lincoln B, Krause, “Playing for Lincoln B. Krause identifies four Holding refers territory to the Parameters 73 ------

49 ISSUE XII | 50 NMC JOURNAL | from two mistakes insurgency the made, Anbarleaders inthe Awakening realized against AQI with efficiency. For instance, were able to exploit and them mobilize shortcomings the tifying of insurgency the forties Awakening the through who iden opened uptakes opportuni political new native population of area. the mis These and inability their to combat against the nis, or mistakes their on battlefield the ages moderate between and Sun radical force customs of social that to led cleav amongstgrievances population, the their it overuse their of be violence that to led mistakes on numerous occasions; whether citizenry. customsimposes social on an unwilling refers to way the an inwhich insurgency ulation respectively. to an insurgency and can alienate apop terrorwhich attacks can boomerang back dysfunctional terror refer to ways the in ry,” 143. Realignment inIraq with Complexity Theo 76 75 74 able to move, organize, or conduct our op “we found ourselves in a circle not being shortly afterthe defeat of RamadiAQI in combat against AQI Awakeningthe was able to effectively andulace access to reliable intelligence, through knowledge their pop of local the of movement the against group. the And gion that could facilitate they success the werewho enough re inthe experienced enlisting help the population of local the that mobilizing against AQI would entail holding and territory dysfunctional terror

Maye, “Understanding Sunni the Ibid., 51. Ibid., 52-53. An Emir of al-Qaeda inIraqAn Emirof said al-Qaeda 75 AQI inal-Anbar made these 76 74 . Zealotry, inturn, ------ening is unique insome regards to most Indeed,weaknesses. Anbar the Awak garneredbe from exploitation the of these openingscal and resources the that could ening was able to advantage take of politi madetakes by insurgency, the Awak the were contesting. Thus,through the mis direct combatting against entity the they region,in their mobilization their meant of AQI inal-Anbar and renew stability Awakening aimed to counter influence the es for mobilization. Anbar the Because fectively leading to an increase of resourc membership towards Awakening;ef the counterinsurgency,the provided aflow of population local the ed in turn who joined mistakes thatthose AQI made that alienat withthem evenmore resources. Indeed, ening’s mobilization efforts and provided made, strengthenedthey Anbar the Awak in al-Anbar, that stemmed from mistakes on battlefield. the Theweakness of AQI mobilize against and them combat them ofweaknesses AQI were able to effectively tunity advantage had intaking they of the correctly oppor identifyingpolitical the erations”. State , ofthe Awakening Islamic andtheAnbar Rise 77 Conclusion gagainst. shortcomings of entity the are they actin how can advantage take they of tactical the through deliberate the contemplation of mechanisms moments, of social but also mobilize through of use the traditional movement such as Anbar the Awakening combatting means that not only a does belligerence against agroup. This direct meansthe of mobilization both and direct is an example of collective action through movementsother social that sense inthe it

155. Malkasian, 77 The Anbar Awakeningthrough Illusions of Victory: The The Illusions ofVictory: ------ter inIraq’s history. Through answering Awakening remain an important chap these three factorsthese were by used tribal the Throughthe analysis the waysof which in insurgency were they combatting against. Awakening,the and of weaknesses the the structures,by Sunni the tribal element of tively mobilize thanks to role the played The Anbar Awakening was able to effec effectively in effortsits initial against AQI. answering how movement the mobilized Awakening and Sons of Iraq are to linked contributed to emergence the of Anbar the openings played.two These factorsthat andgrievances recognition the of political ing arose we of learn important the role questionthe of why Anbar the Awaken The rise rise Theandthe fall of Anbar - - - such moments of collective action. in Iraq, atestament to significance the of continue to have ramifications political events the deed, of Anbar the Awakening prongs movement of social theory. In counterinsurgencies using framed can be can avarietyof take forms and how even ple of way the of acts inwhich contention Awakening as an interesting serves exam derstand its Nevertheless, fall. Anbar the collective actionthat we may to un begin instancelyzing of particular rise the this of mobilized effectively. Indeed, it is by ana derstand better how movement the exactly mobilizationthe of Awakening, the we un nities and resources, as well as inframing and advantage taking of opportu political leaders of Anbar the Awakening in finding ------51 ISSUE XII | 52 NMC JOURNAL | Malkasian, Carter. Maye, Diane L.“Understanding Sunni the Realignment inIraq with Complexity Theo Kukis, Mark. “Turning Iraq’s Tribes Against Al-Qaeda.” Krause, Lincoln B. “Playing for Breaks: the Insurgent Mistakes.” Jordan River. Ignatius, David. “Stopping an Awakening inIraq before It CanStart.” Haddad, Fanar. “A Awakening: Sectarian TheReinvention of Sunni Identity After Gamson, William A.,and David S.Meyer. “Framing Political Opportunity.” “Full Text of President George W. Bush’s Speech on Iraq.” Dawisha, Adeed. “”Identity” and Political inSaddam’s Survival Iraq.” M Clayton, Govinda, and Andrew Thomson.“The Enemy of My Enemy Is MyFriend “Bomb Kills aKey Sunni of Ally U.S.” Myriam.Benraad, “Iraqs Tribal“Sahwa”: Its and Rise Fall.” Baram, Amatzia. “Neo-Tribalism inIraq: Saddam Husseins Tribal Policies 1991–96.” Bibliography State. y.” r content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1572796,00.html. 2009, 49-64. JordanRiver_en.svg. 70fc-11e4-8808-afaa1e3a33ef_story.html?utm_term=.95da9e87549c. ignatius-stopping-an-awakening-before-it-can-start/2014/11/20/5939c22a- Post. 2003.” Movements: onSocial Perspectives President-George-W.-Bushs-speech-on-Iraq.html. 14, 2007. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1563127/Full-text-of- nal of Iraq.” … AR2007091300490.html. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/09/13/ (2011): 121-31. Studies ofMiddle Journal ternational East The DynamicsSelf-Defense The of Forces in Irregular CaseSons the of The War: 53, no. 4(Fall, 1999):553 Digest of Middle East Studies Studies ofMiddleDigest East November 20,2014.https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david- Wikimedia Commons New York, NY, United States of Oxford America: University Press, 2017. Singapore Papers, Middle East Studies inConflictStudies & Terrorism Illusions of Victory: IllusionsThe Anbar Awakening of and Victory: the Rise of the Islamic , 2016.https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File: -567. 25, no. 1(2016):132-54. . Post. Washington The 275-90. 2014. 37,no. 11(2014):920- 29, no. 01(1997):1-31. Time Middle East Policy Policy East Middle h Telegraph. The . December 26,2006.http://. December September 14,2007. Parameters, Parameters, The Washington The iddle East Jour East iddle Comparative September 18, no. 1 January January In - - - - Mccary, John Anbar A.“The Awakening: AllianceAn of Incentives.” Newton, Awakening “The Allen. Movement: ANarrative-level Study of Michaels, Jim. tion.” iraq/2007-04-30-ramadi-colonel_n.htm Quarterly USA Today. USA Small WarsSmall &Insurgecies 32,no. 1(2009):43-59. May 01,2007.http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/ 28,no. 2(2017):267-90. The Washington The a z i l i b o M - 53 ISSUE XII |