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The Why and How of the Anbar Awakening: Its Rise and Fall

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The Why and How of the Anbar Awakening: Its Rise and Fall By Mark Chamoun 38 NMC JOURNAL | JOURNAL NMC At the height of the American oc- The Anbar Awakening remains an import- cupation of Iraq in the Sunni dominated ant chapter in recent Iraqi history and an province of al-Anbar, a coalition of tribes interesting example of how groups can allied with American forces mobilized to- mobilize towards collective action, and gether and gained control of the al-Qaeda disintegrate according to the environment dominated cities of Ramadi and Fallujah. they are in, both by actors associated with With a group of Sunni Arab fighters, many the state and those not associated with it. of them former insurgents, numbering The Awakening gives an opportunity to 80,0001, the movement quickly gained better understand how Sunni Iraqi tribes prominence in the region and assisted mobilized against an insurgency in the in the stabilization of the province. Soon al-Anbar province and what exactly drew spreading outside of al-Anbar, what came them to do so in the first place. Effectively, to be known as the Anbar Awakening and two major questions arise when analyzing the Sons Of Iraq (SOI) was hailed as a mil- the mobilization of the Anbar Awakening: itary achievement by the United States. In why Sunni tribes began to mobilize against a 2007 speech on the War in Iraq, Presi- al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and how did they dent George W. Bush said plainly: “An- go about doing so. More specifically, what bar province is a good example of how motivated Sunni tribal leaders to mobilize our strategy is working… Together, local against AQI, considering many were pre- sheiks, Iraqi forces, and coalition troops viously aligned with the group, and how drove the terrorists from the capital of Ra- did they do so effectively within the politi- madi and other population centres. Today, cal circumstances and resources they were a city where al-Qaeda once planted its flag given. I argue that the answer to these is beginning to return to normal”.2 Yet, questions lies in a political environment what quickly followed after the withdrawal where Sunni tribal leaders recognized a of American troops in 2009, was a large re- political opportunity within contentious versal of whatever control tribal coalitions actions efforts against AQI, one fueled by had in al-Anbar and the return of many both previous grievances that motivated Anbar Awakening members to al-Qaeda. mobilization against the insurgency and The Anbar Awakening, or “Sahwa” in Ar- the recognition of a new political opening. abic, was largely disbanded and the al-An- Further, I provide three specified factors bar province thrown back into turmoil as to how the Anbar Awakening chose amidst the rise of the Islamic State. to mobilize and what exactly contribut- ed to its effective organization: the (1) tribal structure of the Anbar Awakening, (II) the Sunni element of the Awakening, 1 Myriam Benraad, “Iraq's Tribal 39 “Sahwa”: Its Rise and Fall,” Middle East Poli- and (III) insurgent weaknesses. These el- cy 18, no. 1 (2011): 122. ements provided a fertile environment 2 “Full Text of President George for collective action in which Sunni tribal W. Bush’s Speech on Iraq,” The Telegraph, members, catalyzed by grievances and the September 14, 2007, , accessed November recognition of political opportunity, were 20, 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/1563127/Full-text-of-President- able to mobilize against al-Qaeda in Iraq George-W.-Bushs-speech-on-Iraq.html. and form the Anbar Awakening and Sons of Iraq. XII | ISSUE Copyright © 2020 Mark Chamoun Anbar Awakening Rising, AQI Falling came before him, including the Albu Ma- hal tribe that worked with U.S troops since On September 26th, 2006 Sheikh 2005 against AQI encroachment in their Abd al-Sattar al-Rishawi announced the territory.9 formation of the “al-Anbar Salvation Council”, formalizing what was to become Only three tribes stood with the Anbar Awakening.3 However, by that al-Rishawi initially: the Albu Risha, Albu time Sunni tribes were already directly Ali Jassim, and Albu Thiyab; this out of contesting AQI in the province and had a total of twenty-five that he reached out 10 been doing so since 2003.4 Al-Rishawi, like to in Ramadi. This number soon grew many other tribal leaders at the time, par- as more tribal leaders found themselves ticipated in a variety of illegal activities as a disenchanted with AQI and saw an oppor- primary means of gaining revenue— most tunity within the Awakening. Tribesmen notably participating in highway robberies from the Albu Alwan and Albu Faraj soon and oil smuggling5, even participating in a began working with the Awakening and 11 short-term partnership with AQI itself.6 A joining the police force and other tribes, former AQI insurgent articulated with re- such as the Albu Ghanem, grieved by at- gards to the tribal leader “He wants mon- tacks by AQI quickly joined the Awaken- 12 ey and power and will shake the hand of ing. By March 2007, the Anbar Awak- anybody who he thinks can get him mon- ening gained support from nearly every 13 th st ey and power. But tomorrow, he can turn tribe and between the 29 and the 31 of and cut off the same hand if somebody the month, AQI pulled out of the city of 14 else offers him more”.7 Three of al-Risha- Ramadi. Fallujah soon after saw a quick wi’s brothers and his father were killed by decline of AQI power and tribal leaders AQI, sparking what some would call his from the Awakening aligned Albu Issa 15 turning away from the group.8 The sheikh took hold of the city. was compelled to form a council to mobi- Al-Rishawi, through all of this, lize against AQI in the province, and thus was the figurehead of the Awakening. Of began the formation of a formalized An- course, his intentions to stir up collective bar Awakening. However, al-Rishawi was action against AQI may have come as a not the first tribal leader to rebel against result of his own personal grievances and AQI power in al-Anbar, several others inability to work with the insurgency than 3 Myriam Benraad, “Iraq's Tribal with any real want for AQI influence to 'Sahwa': Its Rise and Fall," 122. leave the region. Yet, the Sheikh knew how 4 Ibid., 122. 5 Ibid., 142. 9 Benraad, “Iraq's Tribal 'Sahwa': Its 40 6 Mark Kukis, “Turning Iraq’s Rise and Fall," 122. Tribes Against Al-Qaeda,” Time, Decem- 10 Carter Malkasian, Illusions of Vic- ber 26, 2006, accessed November 26, 2018, tory: The Anbar Awakening and the Rise of the http://content.time.com/time/world/arti- Islamic State (New York, NY, United States of cle/0,8599,1572796,00.html. America: Oxford University Press, 2017), 117. 7 Ibid. 11 Ibid.,135. 8 Diane L. Maye, “Understanding the 12 Ibid., 152. Sunni Realignment in Iraq with Complexity 13 Ibid., 153. Th e or y,” Digest of Middle East Studies 25, no. 14 Ibid., 156. NMC JOURNAL | JOURNAL NMC 1 (2016): 142. 15 Ibid., 160. to gain the support of the Sunni tribes as lead the people”.19 Clearly, the benefits of well as complicated and internally divided such an alliance were recognized by the entities. He showed a skill for garnering United States and Colonel MacFarland awareness of the Awakening; “he under- after speaking to Brigadier General Reist stood how to use rumor and the press to was authorized to support the movement, spread his propaganda far better than the with US backing forthcoming.20 What US American officers ever had…statement -af support meant for the Anbar Awakening ter statement on the internet, al-Iraqiyaa was military training, protection, advis- television, and publicly in Ramada broad- ing, and money.21 The money came from cast the killing of AQI leaders and their both payments to the families of dead po- defeats in battle.”16Al-Rishawi used rheto- licemen and the commander’s emergency ric like “sahwa” (awakening) and “inqadh” response program (CERP); $10 million is (salvation) purposefully, knowing its ap- allotted to Ramadi between August 2006 peal to the tribal populace and to the goal and March 2017 by the latter.22 This mon- of unifying the tribes.17 He was an effec- ey allowed tribal leaders to gain authority tive leader and gained both the support of once again within their tribes and garner those Sunni tribes that proved invaluable economic power within the province.23 to the liberation of Ramadi and Fallujah The protection afforded to tribal leaders and the United States military who came and training of police recruits bolstered to be a beneficial source of resources and the Awakening’s mobilization efforts and alliance. attracted more tribes to align themselves with the movement. Soon enough the An- Al-Rishawi looked for Ameri- bar Awakening grew and spread outside of can support for the Awakening early on the Anbar province, quickly leading to the in the al-Anbar Salvation Council’s for- Sons of Iraq. mation and approached US marine forc- es for support at the exact time Colonel The Sons of Iraq (SOI), repre- Sean MacFarland was facing difficulty in sented the mobilization of Sunni Arab tackling the security situation in the re- fighters outside of al-Anbar and across the gion.18 In a 2007 interview, the Colonel country.24 Many of the leaders of the SOI posited that “When you’ve secured the were former insurgents themselves and people, you have won the war.
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