This article was downloaded by: 10.3.98.104 On: 25 Sep 2021 Access details: subscription number Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK

The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics

Ricki Bliss, J.T.M. Miller

Rudolf Carnap

Publication details https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315112596-3 Robert Kraut Published online on: 14 Jul 2020

How to cite :- Robert Kraut. 14 Jul 2020, from: The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics Routledge Accessed on: 25 Sep 2021 https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315112596-3

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT

Full terms and conditions of use: https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 16:02 25 Sep 2021; For: 9781315112596, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315112596-3 entities as “merely verbal,” or to endorse the eliminativist view that ontological arguments ontological that view eliminativist the endorse to or verbal,” “merely as entities of sorts of various the about arguments to dismiss seek not He does inconsequential. the practice ontological and/or vacuous are disputes ontological of that – him to attributed often conception – view “deflationist” his is Nor resources. linguistic/conceptual about logy leavesintactthenotionof amind-­ how itisconvenienttotalkmustbepreserved. mind-­ a that to “pushes back” on our empirical . The contrast between how things are and commitment profound Carnap’s with and dichotomy lan- a guage/world with inconsistent appears conflation such any But 208).) 1950, (Carnap …” of form certain a accept to than more nothing means world thing the accept (“To conflation of advisability the about questions deploying one or another practical “linguistic form” in describing with the world. His is smacks of such world the way the about questions flate linguistic (concerning questions mode” “formal frameworks) misleadingly formulated in the “material are mode of speech,” Carnap appears to questions con- ontological that claiming In ities. Atmosttheydeterminethewaywedescribesuchrealities. non-­ a Pluto render cannot practices arguments aboutculture,ethnicity,and/orgeography. are They language. of bit a of use appropriate the negotiating of instances they are nor cates; are Nordic, Slavic, or Scandinavian are not arguments about the suitability of descriptive predi- Finns whether about arguments Analogously: numbers. natural contains that place a world the – the pragmatic utility of calling the world a place that contains natural numbers does not make numbers does not make it a place that contains natural numbers. And – to push the point further make it a leg. Likewise – by parity of reasoning – calling the world a place that contains natural not does leg a tail a Calling . of matters from distinct are language of matters that is – aside marks quotation missing and conflations use/mention – conundrum familiar this of moral The Answer: Four:becausecallingataillegdoesnotmakeit one. Question: Ifahorse’stailwerecalledleg,howmanylegswouldhorse have? Carnap’s views – properly understood – do not threaten the contrast. His theory of onto- Carnap’s views on – as customarily construed – appear to contradict such wisdom. So goes the folk wisdom on such matters. If Pluto is a planet, then trendy shifts in taxonomic Pragmatist andexpressivistaboutontology Rudolf Carnap planet: semantic do not determine astrophysical real- astrophysical determine not do facts semantic planet: Robert Kraut independent realitythatconstrains practicaldecisions 3 32 independent Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 16:02 25 Sep 2021; For: 9781315112596, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315112596-3 ontology. toward togesture intend deflationary theories perhaps, of , but not, rather intend do to portray Carnap’s “deflationary” theory as as serving to “deflate” ontology to approach Carnap’s Carnap’s strategies, somenot,andareirrelevant. illuminate some others; than toward friendlier are Some considerably. vary Details etc. disquotational, robust, minimalist, ascent, semantic prosentential, formative, but to do something else. There are many varieties of such theories: redundancy, per- a to a attribute to not serves true’ is ‘S that assumption basic the share theories These true.’ is ‘… of the about theory) specific any (not theories of family a denotes – art philosophical of term a as – ‘Deflationary’ misleading. but prevalent are characterizations Such of ontological deflationism”(Thomasson2016,122).RasmusJaksland notes form original “Carnap’s of speaks e.g., Thomasson, Amie “deflationary.” as characterized the intellectualenvironment. given Carnap, to evident been have not might “”) and (e.g., “eliminativism” between contrasts methodological certain required: is caution Interpretive practice. for ontological accounting in strategy other some and/or explication, reduction, analytical theory, error revision, expressivism, elimination, deflation, advocates Carnap whether unclear is it sionally and Ontology,” though supporting text is often drawn from works of different periods. (3) current discussion seeks to develop the position articulated primarily in “, Semantics The . over views Carnap’s of account unified a forward put to discussion this of goal no is on a par. (2) It is likely that Carnap’s views on these matters shifted and evolved. It is meta- all Not dismissal. of worthy deemed are scientific empirical to unrelated and/or idle appear that speculations metaphysical whereas legitimization, of worthy as Carnap strike xmls n case-­ and of examples (1) caveats: Several misunderstandings. common some correct and consequences, the effortsrequired”(Carnap1950,221).Thushispragmatism. of complexity and amount the to achieved results the of ratio … the instruments as efficiency their by decided be “will frameworks linguistic of rejection or acceptance the Moreover, ism. expressiv- his Thus frameworks”). (“linguistic resources linguistic/conceptual certain adopting fact-­ descriptive, a not is discourse ontological that suggesting by does he This scruples. empiricist with sistent slated fordisappearance. nor patronized neither are questions Ontological repertoire. our from expunged be should n mnmz i, u rte t prry t s eiiae n h fc o eprcs misgivings. empiricist of face the in legitimate as He wishes toearnontology therighttogo on. it portray to rather but it, minimize and then serious interpretive ontology, errors have occurred: Carnap’s of goal is not theory to let the Carnap’s air out of to ontology applied when signals ‘deflationary’ what is this otherwise If or downplay. loss, substantial without eliminable as portray shallow, as depict in, confidence Perhaps these terminological caveats (or reprimands) are beside the point. Those who describe One terminological caveat is especially urgent. It is not uncommon to hear Carnap’s approach The goal in what follows is to clarify Carnap’s account of ontological discourse, articulate its Carnap’s goal is rather to show that continued participation in ontological theorizing is con- tionists regardmetaphysicaldebatestobemisguided. metaphysics in general, often claimed and to follow particular a tradition in after Rudolf ontology Carnap. Defla- to approaches deflationary in interest of surge recent the 1 To deflate is to devalue, deprecate, minimize, depict as vacuous or misguided, weaken stating mechanism, but rather a device that serves to express commitments to commitments express to serves that device a rather but mechanism, stating tde i ciia: rget o mtpyis id o eatc hoy e.g., theory, semantic to tied metaphysics of fragments critical: is studies Rudolf Carnap 33 (Jaksland 2017, 1196) Occa- Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 16:02 25 Sep 2021; For: 9781315112596, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315112596-3 eain aog hm Uiesl are Universals them. among and properties) (or universals of terms in truth and , of laws classification, resemblance, case-­ a as latter study. the upon focus we Here entities. abstract of existence the concerns another mind-­ of reality the concerns dispute such One practice. ontological of Carnap invokes several traditional metaphysical disputes as a motivating backdrop for his theory lating Carnap’sviews. is puzzling it is not because not is it puzzling is guistic activity. -­ reach theirmeaningfulness. out- that ways in applied illegitimately–i.e., deployed are that is claim the Here no possibleevidenceisrelevanttoresolvingacontroversy,then thecontroversyisillusory. if confirmation: and verification of matters in grounded obviously is Carnap’s Here He says, e.g., without the characterize to how begging questions. unclear Carnap does not is formulate his it skeptical misgivings with but precision and not: clarity. does that one from other, or way some in differs, universals contains that world a Presumably context. metaphysical this of very the questions He exist). not to (or exist to universals for BE would it what e.g., wonders, he intelligible; and clear equally no are exception. universals of existence the about questions problems; conceptual special no offer and not numbers greater than ten, or golden mountains are meaningful, intelligible, sufficiently precise, do they or exist universals either (however difficult it might be straightforward: to determine). Questions about the existence of neutrinos, prime and familiar is existence of concept A venerable tradition in metaphysics – Platonism or Platonism – metaphysics in tradition venerable A In light of such considerations, it is best to leave the word ‘deflationist’ behind when articu- The question is whether such entities exist. It seems an intelligible question. If the question the If question. intelligible an seems It exist. entities such whether is question The Here, however,Carnapdisplaysaslightlydifferent(though related) perspective: are questions existence all that doubts Carnap view. Carnap’s not is It view. one That’s concept cannotbemeaningfully appliedtothesystemitself. way. To be real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the system; hence this ries without ever being solved. And it cannot be solved because it is framed in a wrong tive answer, subjective idealists a negative one, and the controversy goes on for centu- affirma - an give Realists world] external the of reality the about disputes [concerning the oppositethesesmoreprobablethanother. and therefore,ifactuallyfound,woulddecidethecontroversy oratleastmakeoneof philosophers [viz. the realist and the nominalist both concerning the existence of by numbers], relevant as regarded be would that evidence possible any of think cannot I time, multiply instantiable, and not dependent for their existence upon mental or lin- or mental upon existence their for dependent not and instantiable, multiply time, is puzzling, but because but puzzling, is existence eenl imtbe non- ­ immutable, eternal, entities: abstract Robert Kraut The data (“the concept of reality”) as deployed in deployed as reality”) of concept (“the existence 34 realism – explains facts about facts explains – realism rem ante are puzzling. Surely the Surely puzzling. are universals (Carnap 1950, 219) independent objects; independent (ibid., 207) oaial in localizable Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 16:02 25 Sep 2021; For: 9781315112596, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315112596-3 Admittedly, much of this looks like heavy-­ Rosen’s classicpaper: Einstein-­ in occurs notions ontological basic about concern of instance another Yet mechanics: Mann reflecting in conversationGell-­ uponMurray Hughis Everett’s “manye.g., worlds”Here, interpretationepistemology. ofpositivist quantum in grounded be not need and Carnap, to from anundulyrestrictiveempiricistepistemology–perhapsobsessiveverificationism. flow to appear misgivings Carnap’s obvious. and clear surely is – the whatever tute acompellingargumentforonesideortheother. consti- would what or about, disagreeing are they what know not does He directives). further disagreement about the existence of universals. He thinks the disagreement is vacuous (pending to knowwhatisgoing on. as Carnap regard simply us wants he disputes; ontological let insoluble seemingly ongoing, with frustrated now, and dumbfounded For problem. (alleged) the of view clear a get to need quasi-­ already deploy his formidable theoretical apparatus – linguistic frameworks, internal vs. external, clarification. Our interpretive task is complicated by the fact that Carnap’s remarks on this front conceptual seeks He question. in disputes philosophical the understand not does Carnap that is Speaking ofphilosophicaldisputesabouttheexistencenumbers,Carnap says Not clear. Puzzlement about certain occurrences of ‘reality’ and ‘existence’ talk is not unique – disputes existence of content the skepticism: Carnap’s with sympathize to easy not is It More specifically: Carnap challenges the metaphysical disputants to specify the ‘equally real,’OK–butthat’sallitmeans. all on an equal footing, except for their . Now if ative course-­ people mean is that there are many alternative histories of the universe – many altern- linguistic formswhichconstitutetheframeworkofnumbers. the language the into incorporate to not or whether problem practical the is it case non-­ is it fact in while question theoretical a of form the in justified in our suspicion that their question is a pseudo-­ cognitive content. Unless and until they supply a clear cognitive , we are any answers possible the to and question external the to giving in succeeded not have in terms of the common scientific language. Therefore our judgment must be that they Unfortunately, these philosophers have so far not given a formulation of their question f hscl elt crepnig o hs hscl uniy I ses o s ht this that us to seems It quantity. physical this to corresponding reality physical of equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element If, ourpurposes. for unnecessary We is, however, reality of definition comprehensive A it does What … people of lot a confused has which real,” “equally being worlds many about talk this is One features. peculiar two has work Everett’s people, some by interpreted As syntactic, etc. – which presumably were introduced by Carnap without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with (i.e. with (i.e. certainty with predict can we system, a disturbing way any in without shall be satisfied with the following criterion, which we regard asreasonable. regard we which criterion, following the with satisfied be shall grained, decoherent histories of the universe – and the theory treats them , ‘equally real’? It doesn’t really have any useful . But what But meaning. useful any have really doesn’t It real’? ‘equally mean, Rudolf Carnap handed radical empiricism. Nevertheless, the upshot 35 2 question, that is, one disguised theoretical; in the present the in theoretical; that’s what you mean by to solve a problem; here we (ibid., 209) content of their Podolsky- Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 16:02 25 Sep 2021; For: 9781315112596, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315112596-3 2 promising: level of sentential truth. It is not likely to be found there. Other possibilities, however, the are more on contrast the for content seeks It conclusive. not is universals of nonexistence and ence reference touniversalsisinvolved. that sense the dispel might paraphrases nominalistic (e), and (d) in phrases noun abstract the for versals: such quantification might be understood in substitutional rather than objectual terms. As higher-­ sense tothedisputedcontrastbetweenexistenceandnonexistence ofuniversals. clear gives That sentences. such of falsity the entails universals of universals. nonexistence of the Therefore existence the upon truth their for depend argued, be might it sentences, Such 1 of ontologicalclaims: several such strategies, lest it be assumed that we endorse Carnap’s misgivings about the content rehearse briefly we record, the For difference. a makes that difference genuine a fact, in is, sals egies for showing that the touted difference between the existence and nonexistence of univer- strat- i.e., skepticism: such addressing for strategies Carnap, contra are, there But empiricism). radical of sting the is (such sleeves their on sensory of fund no carry universals that real/non- always clear. (or: contrast existence/nonexistence the of content . that Carnap is not alone in wondering suggest remarks above the Nevertheless, metaphysics. and between contrast the blurring background, the in lurk might operationalism and/or empiricism of forms Certain viz., – metaphysical or – reality physical a recognize to how viz., – epistemic is concern their whether text EPR’s from tell to hard is It So this effort to address Carnap’s bewilderment about the alleged contrast between the exist- This is not a compelling argument. Even allowing that the of (a)–(c) involves (a)–(c) of form logical the that allowing Even argument. compelling a not is This Return to the ontology of universals. Carnap’s puzzlement is perhaps prompted by the fact the by prompted perhaps is puzzlement Carnap’s universals. of ontology the to Return powers andresemblances they do. the have they that others, than rather universals, certain instantiate question in objects the because is It universals. to appeal an on turn might resemblance such of explanation The powers. causal similar have they ways; significant in another one resemble objects Various e d c b a to considersuchsentences as us invites argument The sentences. of variety a for truthmakers the among are Universals Perhaps the content of the disputed ontological contrast can be found on the level of terion isinagreementwithclassicalaswellquantum-­ cri- this reality, of condition sufficient, a as merely but necessary, a as not Regarded at least provides us with one such way, whenever the conditions down in it occur. reality, physical a recognizing of ways possible all exhausting from far while criterion, order quantification, higher- ­ quantification, order Patience isavirtue. Redness isasignofripeness. Similar objectsshareproperties. There arepropertiesofmicroparticlesthathavenotyetbeendiscovered. Some humanpropertiesareinherited,whereasothersacquired. 3 order variables need not be construed as ranging over uni- over ranging as construed be not need variables order what it is for an entity or magnitude to exist and/or be Robert Kraut for something to be a physical reality. physical a be to something for is it what 36 mechanical ideasofreality. (Einstein etal.1935,777–8) real contrast) is not not is contrast) ­real . Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 16:02 25 Sep 2021; For: 9781315112596, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315112596-3 disputes about the existence of universals are substantive. are universals of existence the about disputes behavior thatlackssuchconstraints.SurelythiswouldaddressCarnap’sskepticism. non- and existence the between existence of universals contrast is manifest in the the contrast between that normatively constrained behavior insist and can partisan the then right, is this If 4 of natureholdandoneinwhichtheydonot.SurelythiswouldaddressCarnap’sskepticism. laws which in world a between contrast the in manifest is universals of nonexistence and ence If this is right, then the partisan can insist against the skeptic that the contrast between the exist- 3 Carnap’s skepticism. address would this Surely not. does that one and resemblances contains that world a between If this is right, then the problematized existence/nonexistence contrast is manifest in the contrast ontology – the study of What There Is – is an essential part of semantic theory and thus worthy devoid of meaning, and thus worthy of elimination. But not all metaphysics is thus condemned: pseudo-­ of consisting as metaphysics of bulk the regards Carnap that undeniable is It His theoryisanelaborateresponsetothisquestion. people are “What – resolve pragmatist able admir- with – asks Carnap Thus do. they what do to right the ontologists earn to rather is task is hand at task His significant. deems he enterprise an theory, semantic of aspect essential an is ontology halt: screeching a to grind to metaphysics of practice is ofontology analogous. However persuasive (or not) his motives might be, Carnap does not wish the entire theory Carnap’s significance. philosophical considerable of is theory Hume’s nevertheless plausible; be not might or might that acquisition concept and justification, stemic epi- impressions, , of theories in rooted is concepts causal and causation of theory of universals,itisnotclearthatsuchademandreasonable. cepts. On the other hand, if he seeks empirical, sensory-­ con- such among be might ‘reality’ and ‘Existence’ concepts. other of terms in analysis to tible not clear that any such definition is forthcoming: some concepts are so basic as not to be suscep- are ontology of able standardsofintelligibility–remainsskeptical. unreason- and/or operationalism, empiricist to commitment a epistemology, restrictive overly Each such strategy purports to locate an area in which Carnap’s skeptic can be reassured that o te rsn w pt sd te esaiees f anps oie. nlge Hume’s Analogue: motives. Carnap’s of persuasiveness the aside put we present the For theory his toward Carnap driving forces the that emphasize to is exercise this of point The expressed bythosepredicatesareexemplifiedindividuals. universals the that fact the in lie might normativity such of explanation The constrained. normatively is usage Linguistic individuals. certain to apply correctly predicates Certain certain that universals, those among lawlike statementsare true. hold connections certain because and universals, denote statements lawlike in embedded predicates because is It magnitudes. or universals between relationships describing fact of statements singular are laws that is contrast the of unlike generalizations, figure in the explanation of their instances.nature, Oneof possiblelaws explanation and counterfactuals; support generalizations, mere unlike nature, of Laws irresistible. If he seeks a definition of ‘exists’ and cognate expressions, it is it expressions, cognate and ‘exists’ of definition a seeks he If irresistible. not Rudolf Carnap The theory when they engage in ontological disputes?” ontological in engage they when doing 37 perceptual confirmation for the existence 4 But Carnap’s skeptic – driven by an by driven – skeptic Carnap’s But the rejection of ontology; his ontology; of rejection the not statements Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 16:02 25 Sep 2021; For: 9781315112596, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315112596-3 metaphysics isdeemeddefective.Itdeludedandself-­ most mechanism, expressive an as even But explicit. made expressivism Carnap’s find we Here by Carnapasexpressive. says the metaphysical discourse that constitutes the bulk of Heidegger’s And 24). 1935, (Carnap form” grammatical misleading in command a than else nothing is value “a that notes he 1935 in climate: intellectual Carnap’s of part were discourse representational discourseonthescaleofdiscursivesignificance.Itdoes not. play”: but this assessment would illegitimately assume that expressive discourse fares lower than “down- of variety a deemed be might shift a such Granted, another. to meaning of kind one neither patronizes nor downplays ontological ; he rather shifts attention away from (loc. something” express certainly they therefore and effect, strong very a sometimes and reader, the on effect an have obviously books metaphysical the in sitions it. Thus equipped, Carnap stresses the expressive function of metaphysics: “[ontological] propo- upon heavily draw noncognitivism of strains other and wherein metaethics, in sial) controver- (though familiar especially is contrast The purpose. other some serves which course fact-­ descriptive, between bifurcation a countenances thus Carnap is – overlooked often and publicized expressivist. less – another Yet reductive. is another revisionist; is physics, it is unwise to seek a unifying insight. One strain is dismissive and eliminativist; another meta- about thinking Carnap’s in strains distinguishable several are there Because retention. of inferior topoetry,music,andotherexpressiveartforms: is metaphysics But world. the about truths of articulation toward aimed mechanism a – Thus metaphysics is more like art – a mechanism aimed toward expression – and less like science As a matter of historical precedent, it is relevant that noncognitivist explanations of moral of explanations noncognitivist that relevant is it precedent, historical of matter a As In PhilosophyofLogicalSyntax,Carnapdrawsanexplicitdistinction: … Theyservefortheexpressionofgeneralattitudeapersontoward life. The (pseudo)statements of metaphysics do not serve for the of states of affairs. sive functionandtherepresentativefunction. We have here to distinguish two functions of language, which we may call the expres- are musicianswithoutmusical ability. Metaphysicians … Mozart. of music the in expressed clearly more is system, monistic lyrical poetsdothesamewithout succumbingtoself-­ r a sae I raiy hwvr h hs o asre ayhn, u ol expressed only but anything, asserted something, likeanartist. not has he however, reality, In stake. at are … throughtheformofitsworksitpretendstobesomething thatitis not. The harmonious feeling or attitude, which the metaphysician tries to express in a in express to tries metaphysician the which attitude, or feeling harmonious The The metaphysician believes that he travels in territory in which truth and falsehood Robert Kraut 38 deceived: delusion … Was ist Metaphysik ? is construed .). Note that here Carnap here that Note cit.). ttn dsore n dis- and discourse stating (Carnap 1959, 78) (Carnap 1935, 27) (ibid., 80) (ibid., 79) art: bad Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 16:02 25 Sep 2021; For: 9781315112596, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315112596-3 system ofnaturalnumbersishelpful: the of specification his point, in case a As rules”). deductive “customary and rules formation recursive with combined items vocabulary of sets (i.e., systems syntactic merely or structures interpreted semantically be to frameworks intends Carnap whether unclear is it Often content. are speaking” of “ways But …” rules new to subject speaking, of ways new “introduce to is framework” a “introduce to systems: formal basically are works guistic form. There is room for disagreement as to how these notions are best understood. Frame- according toCarnap’saccount,shouldweunderstandwhatishappening here? thus establishing that the dispute is non-­ is dispute the that establishing thus exist, to they were have, sufficient would universals properties the about agreement ensure in to discussion engage disputants The existence. their denies nominalist of strain one exist; ties such prejudiceismisguided. But earlier). adumbrated sense the (in deflation constitute descriptivism from departures that does constitute strategy a “deflation” of ontology. Anythis appearance to the contrary derivesthat from the prejudice Note ends. nondescriptive certain achieve to functions that anism mech- a as commitment, human of context larger the within – integrity their preserving while – them explain to wishes rather he claims: ontological of analysis nor elimination neither seeks advocated by emotivists. Insofar as this interpretation captures Carnap’s theory, it is clear that he discourse moral of accounts noncognitivist to analogous discourse, ontological of account ist” central thesis of this discussion is that Carnap recommends a “non- ­ conception ofthepracticeontologyiseasiertofathom. basic Carnap’s acknowledged, is discourse expressive and descriptive between bifurcation the once But stultifying. some and enriching, some solidarity, communal to conducive some ficial, bene- adaptively are some vary: commitment such any of consequences Pragmatic whatever. religious perspectives, artistic genres, styles of human companionship, philosophical methods, or deploying specificlinguistic/conceptualframeworks. of advisability pragmatic and/or value the to but life, of way a to commitment of expressions as not terms: expressivist in understood be to is claims ontological of meaning The inquiries. semantic by required ontology of portions those least, at – ontology legitimize to aims matism prag- “metalinguistic” Carnap’s enterprise. vital a – theory semantic to essential are entities of effectively. tute for art: it achieves – in misleading “theoretical” form – what art achieves more honestly and substi- expressive inadequate an tool, defective a as metaphysics of bulk the treats Carnap Here The central ingredient in Carnap’s explanation is the of a of notion the is explanation Carnap’s in ingredient central The Return to the traditional dispute about universals. One strain of realist insists that such enti- Expressivism is a prominent theme in Carnap’s thinking, and ought not to be neglected. The resources, linguistic life, of forms to commitments: myriad tolerates condition human The Not all metaphysics is regarded with dismissiveness: statements about the existence of systems that …’)withthecustomarydeductive rules. for sentences (‘for every (‘for sentences universal for forms like ‘two plus three is five’; (4) numerical variables (‘m’, n’, ‘ etc.) and quantifiers sentence and ‘plus’), (e.g. functions and than’) ‘greater (e.g. relations ‘prime’), ‘odd’, (e.g. numbers of properties for expressions (3) number’; a is ‘five like forms sentence and entities, new the for ‘number’ term general the (2) table’; the on books five are ‘There like forms sentence and ‘five’ like numerals (1) rules: suitable with expressions new language the into introducing by constructed is system this for framework The …) and existential sentences (‘there is an is (‘there sentences existential and …) n Rudolf Carnap illusory and concerns the same subject matter. How, matter. subject same the concerns and illusory 39 they have semantic have they meaningful: descriptivist” or “antifactual- or framework linguistic (Carnap 1950, 208) such n lin- not Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 16:02 25 Sep 2021; For: 9781315112596, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315112596-3 sophical complexities.HereishowStewartShapirodescribes thesituation: second-­ a of deployment require connections tial offers tremendous advantage in expressive power; but specifications of logical form and inferen - Lp rewards. as well as risks involves Lp of adoption case, present the In difficult. and complex be can adoption their of advisability pragmatic the about disputes liabilities; and benefits with work. Buttheconflictisreal,drawinguponbeliefs,commitments,agendas,goals,andinterests. frame- discursive given a adopting of advisability pragmatic the to commitment viz., beliefs: of appeasement is the optimal strategy. The conflict involves a clash of commitments rather than one betweenstrategista who decides togo to battle and one who reaches the opposing decision that thing properties); the nominalist embraces an opposing decision. The conflictThe isrealist realhas made – “the as practical real decision as thatto accept certain frameworks” (viz., the framework of issue manifestsaquestionabouttheadvisabilityofadoptingLp;thatquestion,in turn, realism/­ the it, sees Carnap As universals. about controversy the of foundation the at Call the system of thing properties ‘Lp’: this is the linguistic framework the adoption of which lies articulated –aspecificlinguisticframework:viz.,thesystemofthingproperties: capture Carnap’sstrategy. of notion a robust how of question the open leave we present the For Not only is the conflict real, but its resolution has ramifications. Every framework comes framework Every ramifications. has resolution its but real, conflict the is only Not Thus equipped, the dispute about the existence of universals involves – in a sense yet to be to yet sense a in – involves universals of existence the about dispute the equipped, Thus room forsecond-­ is there perhaps then practice, mathematical informal of abilities communicative and a standard to which correct reasoning must adhere, and to characterize the descriptive second-­ then purposes of logical theory. If a is to be a calculus, an effective canon of inference, for second-­ system deductive complete and sound enumerable, recursively no is there – effective own. second-­ its disqualify of writers ontology Other an have not should logic logic; not mathematics, of purview the in are functions and sets while study, foundational rigorous for obscure too are second-­ that argue philosophers Some or assertion. justification theoretical a of need (expect with respect to expediency and fruitfulness), because it in does not imply a belief not is acceptance This forms. linguistic those is not a theoretical question but rather the practical question whether or not to accept ‘There isanfsuchthatacolorand …’). (i.e., common’ in color one least at have paper of pieces two ‘These color,’ a is ‘Red property,’ a is ‘Red like sentences admit which down laid term are rules general New ‘property.’ the furthermore and substitutable are words those which for etc., ‘g,’ used for describing what things are like. Now we may introduce new variables, say ‘f,’ we which etc., ‘house,’ ‘stone,’ ‘hard,’ ‘red,’ like words contains language thing The order logic. The deeper issues underlying the dispute concern the goals and order logic is beyond the pale. If, on the other hand, one aims to codify to aims one hand, other the on If, pale. the beyond is logic order order logic. order logic because its consequence relation is not is relation consequence its because logic order Robert Kraut order logic is not logic. Properties and relations and Properties logic. not is logic order 40 order logic, which presents formal and philo- and formal presents which logic, order is required to required is framework (ibid., 211–12) (Shapiro 1998) (ibid., 218) nominalism Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 16:02 25 Sep 2021; For: 9781315112596, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315112596-3 every openhigher-­ whether i.e., scheme: comprehension a of form the about made be must decisions Moreover Lowenheim-­ containing all subsets of the first-­ models full deploys semantics the if i.e., – so if domain: specified the of set power full the over second-­ monadic the If immense increase in expressive power, but that additional, perhaps unwanted complexities arise. second-­ over quantification that only not acknowledge must properties” For present purposes, the point is that any pragmatic cost-­ Simon Blackburn’s projectivism,andothersuch “irrealist”theories. expressivism, norm Gibbard’s Allan by provided are approach an such of variants sophisticated or might not be satisfactory: it might not accommodate various aspects of moral discourse. More non-­ to moral-­ case, according this (in theory, commitment of region nondescriptivist some which or irrealist an of case a is Emotivism ments. commit- articulate or attitudes, manifest sentiments, express to serve judgments moral that is theories such do not purport to discourse: translate moral claims moral into claims about of sentiments; the claim, theories rather, emotivist Consider ways. certain in talk or think we when an have to suffices it cases some In paraphrase. translational or expressivist aspectmustnowbediscussed. be friendliertoempiricistconstraints. to likely one endeavor, human of map the on it relocate to simply is it it: deflate or minimize, patronize, to not is beliefs of clash a than rather commitments of clash a as conflict ontological does ontology of conception Carnap’s that clear is it But it. evaluate to not view, Carnap’s articulate to is task current the here; adjudicated be to not is reality of description accurate and facts of representation than rather utility pragmatic of terms in practice ontological explaining by achieved is understanding in gain any Whether new light–onewhichinvolves a in exist?” universals “Do question ontological the of role the illuminate to seeks He is. there statement to be devoid of meaning of the thesis of the reality of universals – is devoid of cognitive content.” He does adoption oflinguisticframeworksisseriousbusiness. decision to adopt a linguistic framework which requires a higher-­ but choiceofaxiomsisnotoriouslycomplexanddelicate(seeWoodin2001). of sets all with integers; questions then arise which are not solvable from ZFC. One solution is to add ; together integers the of theory the is, that – Theory Number Order Second Not all philosophical illumination takes the form of reductive analysis, meaning equivalence, The dispute. ontological of conception Carnap’s of aspect pragmatist the highlights This case special a – properties of reality the of statement philosophical “the that us tells Carnap the clearly but goals); one’s upon (depending prohibitive not are complexities such Perhaps explore to wish might we ambitious sufficiently If here. end not do complexities the And dient, fruitful,conducivetotheaimforwhichlanguageisintended. or false because it is not an assertion. It can only be judged as being more or less expe- accept the new linguistic forms. The acceptance cannot be judged as being either true to not or whether of question the is it question; theoretical a than rather practical, a fact-stating mechanism that serves some vital, nondescriptive purpose. Such a theory might Skolem fails. There is no sound and complete proof system for second-­ order sentencespecifiesapropertyorwhethertyperestrictionsapply. order variables range over sets, questions arise as to whether they range they whether to as arise questions sets, over range variables order order domain – then completeness fails, compactness fails, and simpliciter: cognitive content is not the only kind of meaning Rudolf Carnap 41 portray it as shallow or easy: to portray to easy: or shallow as it portray not benefit analysis of “the system of thing evaluative discourse) is portrayed as a as portrayed is discourse) evaluative of “what’s going on” going “what’s of explanation order logic has strings attached; 5 (Carnap 1950, 214) order variables brings variables order not claim the order logic. Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 16:02 25 Sep 2021; For: 9781315112596, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315112596-3 closure requiresnotingadditionalchallengesitconfronts. Evaluation of Carnap’s theory of ontology lies beyond the scope of this discussion; but full dis- costs the theories, expressivist of incurred byCarnap’stheoryofontologyaremoreapparentto usthantheywereto him. dynamics and details the into inquiry systematic intensive fact-­ descriptive, as viewed be to ontology allowed and requirements empiricist his softened have might he expressivism, logical claimsconformtostandardTarskianconstraintsonquotationanddisquotation. onto- other and exist’ ‘Properties that show must he conditionals; of antecedents as occurring Frege-­ with deal must He evaluated. semantically how Boolean combinations of truth conditional and non-­ must Carnap more: there’s explain how And ontological discourse interacts with shortly). descriptive discourse: how the discussed logic works and be (to loom to appear circularities sible: discourse and the “thinner,” non-­ ontological in manifest attitudes the between connections the is explain work must Carnap additional required: But forms. linguistic of adoption motivated pragmatically of the ing done to specify precisely what role logical discourse is nondescriptive – that is, plays a non-­ andsome generally, onto- that us told Having strategies discourse. ontological to strategies such of application the tonondescriptivist to unique someendemic – arise challenges difficult guistic frameworks–e.g.,onethatpermitsquantificationoverpredicatevariables. lin- specific adopting of advisability pragmatic the to commitment of expressions are – exist” “universals e.g., – claims ontological that is idea key The discourse. of region puzzling a of – (with which he was familiar), insofar as it provides a nonreductive explanation – irrealist in form emotivism to analogous precisely another is theory Carnap’s or interpretation, this one On form.” “linguistic adopting of advisability the about questions” “external are questions logical ments toadoptingcertainlinguisticforms. results. Talk about what exists, according to Carnap, is best understood as manifesting commit- certain achieving for mechanism a as explicable but irreducible, as treated be can existence of meaning-­ or tions non-­ providing of burden the removes it that is virtue one prospects: ultimate stances, or some other such nondescriptive enterprise. This is a fascinating strategy, whatever its manifesting commitments, articulating for mechanisms as portrayed are – etc. objects, physical existence or nonexistence of various kinds of entities – propositions, numbers, mind-­ h pamtc diaiiy f dpig lnusi faeok hc pris higher- ­ the permits about deliberations manifest which propositions of framework existence the about linguistic questions quantification; a adopting of advisability pragmatic the is at issue. Questions about the existence of properties, for example, manifest deliberations about ontological which which about of adoption the framework linguistic corresponding a exists there entity arise, might questions of kind each for that requires strategy explanatory Carnap’s These are formidable challenges; had Carnap been aware of the costs incurred by any sort of profoundly explanation, irrealist any with As theory. Carnap’s of rudiments the are These This conception of ontological discourse captures the core of Carnap’s suggestion that onto- Carnap applies this explanatory strategy to ontological discourse. Thought and talk about the preserving translations of “existence” talk into some other kind of talk. Talk talk. of kind other some into talk “existence” of translations preserving stating discourse. But hindsight is 20/20: after several decades of decades several after 20/20: is hindsight But discourse. stating Problems andcomplexities ontological reality that prompts them. This might not be pos- is played by such discourse. This Carnap has done, by invok- Ontological relativity Robert Kraut 42 Geach problems involving ontological claims ontological involving problems Geach fact-stating role – careful work must be truth-conditional indicatives are to be circular explica- circular independent 6 order Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 16:02 25 Sep 2021; For: 9781315112596, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315112596-3 such a framework is consistent with the with consistent is framework a such of adoption if But quantification. propositional and variables sentential contains which work frame- linguistic a adopting of advisability pragmatic the to commitment a of expression the is is nouniquesuchinterpretation:ifthereonewaytoconstructit,thenaremany ways. And theory. background some into Quine’s theory doctrines of Indeterminacy accepted of Translation an and Ontological interpret Relativity counsel that to there how is said be can that most The commitment. such unique no is there for form, linguistic given a accepting in taken that frameworkisnot,initself,acceptanceofanontologynonphysicalstatesandevents. of acceptance then events, and states neurochemical and/or uniformities behavioral of domain a in satisfiable sentences of formulation permits – X’ desires ‘____ and P’ that believes ‘_____ if the “linguistic framework” of Folk Psychology – a framework that contains such predicates as Analogously: numbers. natural above and over entities of existence the to commitment stitutes con- – formulated are they which in language the use to decision the and – sentences those of can be satisfied in a domain of natural numbers, then there is no basis for alleging that acceptance to choice of ontology. If, for example, sentences formulated in the language of material objects sistent with a variety of . Choice of linguistic framework is not, therefore, equivalent con- is theory the of adoption as insofar theory, any of commitments ontological “real” no are so as to simultaneously satisfy a given set of sentences (Quine 1969). Given such relativity, there there is no fact of the matter about the objects that must be reckoned among values of variables over quantification and sentential positions.Andso on. variables sentential allows that framework a adopting of advisability physical objects and mental events.” feet and indignantly asserting “I am might seek to block non-­ theses about what does and does not exist, itself carries hypo- no formulate unique cavalierly ontological we commitments. which We in discourse, “background” own our even ontology: of relativity the does as home, at begins translation of indeterminacy insists, Quine as For, theory. of instances truth of(p).Carnaphasnot,afterall,capturedtherealitiesontologicalpractice. the for condition sufficient no is quantification propositional of language the then to commitment – propositions exclude that domains in interpretations of admit framework that within conventions, or decisions regarding explanatory ineliminability of linguistic forms; but that critic commitments, linguistic by determined uniquely not is example) (for numbers of existence the non-­ linguistic framework, there is equal slack between ontology and existence claims construed in a given a adopting of advisability the to commitment and ontology between slack is there if for challenge: own their to vulnerable are critics his that noting requires fairness Relativity, logical – assumingcertainconstraintsnowayto run. neo-­ of repudiations explicit our even arithmetic, in model a has All ofthispurportstoworkagainstCarnap.Forhesuggests that The upshot is that it is misguided to inquire into the specific ontological commitment under- that claim notorious Quine’s of light in emerges theory Carnap’s to challenge formidable A Carnap should not be singled out for bad publicity here. Even if Quine is right about (some Here is why: Carnap’s “realist” critic invokes the idea of ontological relativity to establish that Onto- of thesis Quine’s withstands theory Carnap’s whether is here concern the as Insofar (p) Therearepropositions. Carnapian way. ) ontological relativity, no fatal blow is thereby struck against Carnap’s expressivist Carnap’s against struck thereby is blow fatal no relativity, ontological ) intended interpretations of our background language by stomping our 7 not talking about natural numbers or sets; I am talking about But if Quine’s strategy is viable and our indignant assertion non-­ Rudolf Carnap existence of propositions – if sentences formulable sentences if – propositions of existence 43 Pythagorianism fail. There is There fail. Pythagorianism Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 16:02 25 Sep 2021; For: 9781315112596, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315112596-3 imsie uzeet bu otlgcl icus, un’ iqiy tm fo n such no from stems inquiry from Quine’s stems discourse, which ontological inquiry, Carnap’s about unlike puzzlement for dismissive analogy: helpful no provides science into inquiry scientific Quine’s But 5). 1960, (Quine imagine” we that world the within activities as ponder our talk of physical phenomena as a physical phenomenon, and our scientific imaginings “to efforts fruitful) (and laudable Quine’s about reminders and ship Neurath’s invoking glibly by defused be might discomfort Such concept. very that deploys that theory a by illuminated to theorize about talk of existence. But it is not clear that – or how – a puzzling concept can be effort any upon itself force likely will existence of talk enterprise: theoretical the permeate thus and undertaken, been already have commitments such that surprise no is it – discourse logical goal is to theorize about certain commitments – those, for example, allegedly manifest in onto- theorizing aboutthediscourseofrealityandexistence. theorizing in deployed about talk of is existence; there is No Exit from the discourse of reality and existence existence, even when of talk Thus exist. not does and does what about course dis - in engagement requires expressions cognate and ‘exists’ of explanation irrealist an starkly: tion of pragmatic decision and commitment requires deployment of ontological discourse. More objects prompt speakers to undertake commitments? Thus the circularity: an adequate explana- must events and objects Such commitments. undertakes and/or attitudes, projects stances, manifests who agent the to the discourseunderanalysis. story rich a about such stances, commitments, and attitudes, a story needs which does not backhandedly advert to attitudes, noncognitive evince or commitments, express stances, manifest to serve discourse of fragment given a with formulated indicatives that suggesting in irrealist, The etc. confidence, of feelings Wittgensteinian’s the sentiments, moral emotivist’s the posed: presup- is base phenomenological certain a cases, these of each In 1982). (Kripke way. certain a in series mathematical a continue will agent an that confidence of feelings exploits butions, rule-­ by played role the explaining in Wittgenstein, Kripke’s attitudes; hooray” their origin – are real enough to get smeared onto the world. Emotivism exploits a set of “boo/ the assumes – whatever he which “colors” and job, the do to rich sufficiently states sentiment,” psychological of existence internal from borrowed colors the with objects natural staining and “gilding of speaks Hume When indicatives. moral in expressed theory) the to (according the it call – stances and/or sentiments noncognitive well-­ a requires example, for discourse, moral about expressivism thoroughgoing A implementation. their for ingredients require – explanations any like – explanations Irrealist stages? rabbit than rather rabbits to refers ‘rabbit’ fact, of matter a as unless, stages, rabbit or rabbits to refers ‘gavagai’ whether to as matter the of fact no is there that claimed be coherently it can How falsity. own their assume to appears formulation very their incoherent: expressivist theoryofontologicaldiscourseencountersnoadditionalproblems here. remarks about the existence of certain kinds of objects fail to fix a unique ontology; thus Carnap’s exists.Quine’s argument applies to (p) above. If ontological relativity is correct, this critic’s own as insofar relativity (alleged) same the precisely confront must lenge toCarnap’sstrategyisforthcomingonthebasisofsuchconcerns. Intelligibility of ontological relativity notwithstanding, the present point is that no special chal- It is unclear whether this predicament vitiates Carnap’s enterprise. On the one hand, if the if hand, one the On enterprise. Carnap’s vitiates predicament this whether unclear is It But the irrealist also needs a story about the objects and events that serve as prompting stimuli be ultimately might relativity ontological and indeterminacy translational of doctrines The if they are to fulfill their explanatory role: how can nonexistent can how role: explanatory their fulfill to are they if exist Robert Kraut No exit 44 eeet o wih are which of elements – base projective it infects her own discourse about what what about discourse own her infects it following attri- following defined set of set defined 8 No matter. No Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 16:02 25 Sep 2021; For: 9781315112596, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315112596-3 And itisnotclear howthisbearsupontheplausibility ofexpressivismasasemantic theory. before. as participate to continue example), (for terms expressivist in activities his explain rists question whether a reflective participant in a given practice can or will, upon learning that theo- before;it’s for agood cause.” Responses –including disruptions might– vary. It is an empirical as practice the continue shall I sentiments. internal my from borrowed colors with staining and track, accepting the noncognitivist explanation and saying “Very well; in moralizing I am gilding this as no refutation of their theory. On the otherregard noncognitivists hand, Some the that.” informed doing moralizerlike don’t might I remain because on stop, better had I then moralize, I when doing I’m what THAT’S if “Well, say Hare, or Stevenson, Ayer, reading upon who, moralizers reflective of know all We sustained. be can conservativism such that obvious not is it so, if But ontology. of practice the in participation continued with consistent is, that conservative: by practitioners.Butthismightnotbeahelpfulanalogytoall cases. quate theory of a practice should pack the resources ade- to An explain why explanation. the Freudian theory his might to be rejected resistance patient’s the of explanation Freudian robust a happening, stands prepared for militant resistance to his explanations, and stands equipped with even ifitpredictsandexplainsitsownrejection. – retained be should explanation irrealist the whether clear not it’s then it,” doing continue to her practice, says “Well, if of explanation pragmatist/expressivist Carnap’s of learned having ontologist, the If instability. essential an from suffers explanation irrealist extent, this To undermined. is it doing on go to ability) (or willingness their that disruptive so doing are they what of explanations certain find might practice a in participants explanation: irrealist any to applicable is concern Korsgaard’s fatal flaw.(SeeHumberstone1997;Keefe2002). a constitute not might or might it about theorizing while discourse ontological exit to unable is Carnap that fact the pernicious; equally not circularity, of forms many are there But larity. cient comfortwithsuchdiscoursetodeployitinone’stheorizing,whytheinitial fuss? suffi- is there if suspicious: methodologically is legitimacy its questioning simultaneously while discourse a in Acquiescing imaginings. scientific and phenomena physical about puzzlement an inventionofpoliticians,usedtokeeptheirhumancattleinline,”notes that once tions destabilizethatwhichtheypurporttoexplain.Thus:NoReturn. thus, and to up are they what informed, be unable of to return to their practice explanation in good faith, going on irrealist as before. Some explana- the by undermined feel might expressivism, whateverthetargetdiscourse.Itturnsuponfactthatparticipantsinapractice of implementation any with connection in arises that one – puzzle another yet faces Carnap The sting of this concern depends upon whether Carnap intends his theory of ontology to be Cases differ. Perhaps a zealous Freudian therapist, having informed his patient of what’s really circu- from suffer to appears theory pragmatist/expressivist Carnap’s that is point basic The , reflecting upon Bernard Mandeville’s ironic assertion “that virtue is just because somepoliticianwantstokeepyouin line? just desire, heart’s your up give Why true. was it that belief our survive not would of how moral practices came about, but rather that our commitment to these practices The trouble with a view like Mandeville’s is not that it is not a reasonable explanation that’s what I’m doing when I engage in ontology, I’m not sure I want Rudolf Carnap No return 45 (Korsgaard 1996, 9) Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 16:02 25 Sep 2021; For: 9781315112596, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315112596-3 that adopting the framework of thing properties does not imply embracing a Platonic ontology, This is not the best description of his enterprise. Carnap is better regarded not as having shown within ontological discourse.Thustheconnectionbetweenpragmatism andexpressivism. well formulated assertions be is which not of one might ways, of or variety a might in itself commitment shows it The but advised; back. pushes world the way the given and agendas, and goals, interests, one’s given resources, those adopting of advisability the cerning con- considerations practical in grounded is turn, in commitment, This resources. conceptual or (“reality” property a of “existence”) but rather as the expression ascription of a commitment to the adoption of the certain linguistic/ as not understood best is exist” numbers “Natural “What isthisdiscourseABOUT,andwhatareitscharacteristics?” question representationalist customary the replaces discourse?” this in engaged when DOING we are “What question pragmatist familiar the Thus practice. social constrained normatively the upon instead focusing explicated, eschews that one : of kind one of symptomatic are discourse of region a of explanations Expressivist destabilizing explanationsshouldbedeemedincorrect. why and Credo, a such for provided be might justification principled what clear not is it But Carnap’s assessing In show. might contribution, wemightendorsethisgeneralconstraint: impact such what and practitioners, upon strategy such atory on constraints methodological the about questions confront explanations. later or sooner must that involves theorizing about a fragment of discourse from an external explanatory perspective and explanationofinstitutionalpracticeneednotbeconservative. description philosophical correct Perhaps practice. the continued in with unchanged) consistent (relatively is engagement theory the believe to coming that such be practice a of theory philosophical a that requirement no is it Perhaps clear. Not theory? Carnap’s disconfirm tion reac- such of prevalence the Does metaphysicians. among uniform fairly be to theory Carnap’s mind-­ or that is what I am doing when I make claims about the existence of propositions, numbers, and/ Here isCarnap’sdescriptionofhisagendaconcerningontology: form the of assertion indicative an strategy, Carnap’s of understanding current the On explan- irrealist his of impact destabilizing possibly the to attention insufficient paid Carnap project philosophical Any areas. philosophical of range wide a across apply questions These “If saying: by responds account, Carnap’s of learned having ontologist, working a Suppose scientific thinking. embracing a Platonic ontology but is imply perfectly compatible not with empiricism does and strictly entities] abstract to referring language [a using that shown be will it engaged, thenthoseaccountsshouldberejectedasincorrect. logical practice upon learning of certain accounts of “what they are doing” when thus Methodological Credo: if metaphysicians would have difficulty continuing their onto- independent physical objects, I shall do so no more.” Indeed, suppose this reaction to reaction this suppose Indeed, more.” no so do shall I objects, physical independent as the basic notion in terms of which semantic content is to be to is content semantic which of terms in notion basic the as representation occupied by locutions within a broader, a within locutions by occupied roles functional Conclusion Robert Kraut 46 (Carnap 1950, 206) 9 Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 16:02 25 Sep 2021; For: 9781315112596, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315112596-3 10 thinking” thanonemightinitiallyhaveassumed. ing that linguistic framework, and is thus less offensive to the tenets of “empiricism and scientific but rather that embracing such an ontology simply Carnap, R. 1950. “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.” In Ontology.” and Semantics, “Empiricism, 1950. R. Carnap, Carnap, R.1935.PhilosophyandLogicalSyntax.Bristol:ThoemmesPress. Blackburn, Simon.1993.EssaysinQuasi-­ Blackburn, Simon.1984.SpreadingtheWord.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Bealer, George.1993.“Universals,”JournalofPhilosophy60: 5–32. isen A, oosy B, n Rsn N 13. Cn Quantum-­ “Can 1935. N. Rosen, and B., Podolsky, A., Einstein, Carnap, R. 1959. “The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language,” in A. J. Ayer ubrtn, . . 97 “w Tps f Circularity,” of Types “Two 1997. L. I. Humberstone, Translation,” of Indeterminacy and Theories Scientific of Bifurcation “The 1975. J. Donald. Hockney, Gibbard, Allan.1990.WiseChoices,AptFeelings.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. Gell-­ Friedman, Michael.1991.“TheRe-­ (eds.), Wasserman and Manley, Chalmers, in ,” Ontological and “Carnap 2009. Matti. Eklund, Kraut, Robert. 2010. “Universals, Metaphysical Explanations, and Pragmatism,” Kraut, Robert.1990.“Varietiesof Pragmatism,”Mind99:157–83. Korsgaard, ChristineM.1996.TheSourcesofNormativity . Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Matter?,” Circularity Does “When 2002. Rosanna. Keefe, ,” or Realism Metaphysical Realism: Empirical for Dilemma “A 2017. Rasmus. Jaksland, 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 (ed.), LogicalPositivism.Glencoe,IL:TheFreePress. of ChicagoPress:205–21. Philosophy ofScience42:411–27. quantum mechanics,theworkofEverett,”availableatwww.youtube.com/watch?v=bx2cUfPrbGU. Metametaphysics: NewEssaysontheFoundationsofOntology.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress:130–56. Reality BeConsideredComplete?,”PhysicalReview47:777–80. 253–70. Philosophia 45:1195–1205. 249–80. 590–609. suggestions and/orcriticaldiscussion. Michael Lynch, Tristram McPherson, Dorit Bar-­ Kennedy, Juliette Blackburn, Simon Belleri, Delia Price, Huw Shaw, Jamie Brauer, Ethan Jaksland, Rasmus Shapiro, Stewart to grateful am I Helsinki). of (University Conference Pragmatism European Portions of earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the University of Connecticut and the 3rd The connectionsarefurtherexploredinKraut1990.SeealsoWilliams 2013. The objectionisfamiliar.See,forexample,Hockney1975;Searle 1987. model-­ Putnam’s of against Realism;seeLewis 1984. discussion Lewis’ in emerge occasionally sentiments Such Kraut 2016;seealsoandScharp 2015. in detail greater in explored are ontology of theory expressivist Carnap’s for prospects and Problems expressivist by faced Challenges 2010. semantic strategiesareforcefullyarticulatedinSchroeder2008.SeealsoRosen 1998. Schroeder 1990; Gibbard 1993; 1984, Blackburn e.g., See, Explanatory andjustificatorystrategiesdeployinguniversalsarefurtherexploredinKraut 2010. is therebyrevealed.SeeBealer 1993. Assuming such paraphrases to be available; if not, a compelling argument for the existence of universals of Everett,”availableatwww.youtube.com/watch?v=bx2cUfPrbGU. Transcribed from an interview with Murray Gell-­ Similar perspectivesareconveyedinFriedman1991;O’Grady1999;Eklund2009;andelsewhere. Mann, Murray. No Date. Transcribed from an interview with Murray Gell- ­ Murray with interview an from Transcribed Date. No Murray. Mann, evaluation ofLogicalPositivism,”JournalPhilosophy88:505–19. Realism. Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Rudolf Carnap References Notes 47 On, Bill Lycan, and an anonymous reader for helpful Mann, “Working on quantum mechanics, the work 10 is the expression of a commitment to adopt- 57: Research Phenomenological and Philosophy . Chicago: University Chicago: Necessity. and Meaning 102: Society Aristotelian the of Proceedings ehncl ecito o Physical of Description Mechanical Journal of Philosophy CVII: Mann, “Working on “Working Mann, hoei arguments theoretic Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 16:02 25 Sep 2021; For: 9781315112596, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315112596-3 Kraut, Robert. 2016. “Three Carnaps on Ontology,” in S. Blatti and S. Lapointe (eds.), Lapointe S. and Blatti S. in Ontology,” on Carnaps “Three 2016. Robert. Kraut, Kraut, Robert and Scharp, Kevin. 2015. “Pragmatism Without ,” in Christopher Daly (ed.), Daly Christopher in Idealism,” Without “Pragmatism 2015. Kevin. Scharp, and Robert Kraut, Kripke, Saul A. 1982. A. , O’Grady, Paul. 1999. “Carnap and ,” Lewis, David.1984.“Putnam’sParadox,”AustralasianJournalofPhilosophy62:221–36. Quine, W. V. O. 1969. “Ontological Relativity,” in Relativity,” “Ontological 1969. O. V. W. Quine, Quine, W.V.O.1960.WordandObject.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Schroeder, Mark. 2008. Rosen, Gideon.1998.ReviewofSimonBlackburn’sEssaysinQuasi-­ Shapiro, Stewart. 1998. “Philosophical Issues in Second-­ Person,” First the and Empiricism, “Indeterminacy, 1987. John. Searle, Schroeder, Mark.2010.NoncognitivisminEthics.LondonandNewYork:Routledge. Williams, Michael. 2013. “How Pragmatists Can Be Local Expressivists,” in Huw Price (ed.), Lapointe S. and Blatti S. in Ontology,” Easy for Prospects the and “Carnap 2016. Amie. Thomasson, Woodin, W.Hugh.2001.“TheContinuumHypothesis,PartI,”NoticesoftheAMS:567–76. Carnap. Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress:31–58. Palgrave HandbookofPhilosophicalMethods.LondonandNewYork:Macmillan:331–60. Press. 59: 1015–27. Columbia UniversityPress:26–68. 123–46. sity Press. (eds.), OntologyAfterCarnap.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress:122–44. Taylor &Francis.Availableonlineatwww.rep.routledge.com. Pragmatism andRepresentationalism.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress:128–44. . Cambridge, MA: Harvard MA: Cambridge, Language. Private and Rules on Wittgenstein Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism. Oxford: Oxford Univer- Robert Kraut 48 . New York: New Essays. Other and Relativity Ontological order Logic,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Realism. Noûs32:386–405. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. LXXXIV: Philosophy of Journal Ontology After Ontology Expressivism, The