Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security – Questions on Notice
Can each university provide material evidence of:
1. What Foreign Interference tools do they have in place and when were they developed?
A detailed outline of UTS’s approach to foreign interference, including a timeline of when these tools were developed and our approach for the future, can be found in our opening statement tabled with the Committee on 19 March 2021.
In summary for the Committee’s benefit, UTS, working closely with University Foreign Interference Taskforce (UFIT) and other universities, has developed a number of tools designed to mitigate foreign interference risks including:
• A mature policy framework covering risk and due diligence • A risk-based delegation framework which ensures independent oversight and approval, including the use of an external due diligence partner • Clear rules around managing conflicts of interests in the Code of Conduct • External risk condition indicators used for risk assessments • Best practice cyber security program, including online awareness training • A principles-based approach to international engagements which ensures UTS makes an informed decision on a potential partner based on the opportunity and risk profile • A deliberative cultural change program including staff training activities that are tiered based on the risk profile of the area. High-risk areas have received training designed and delivered in collaboration with the National Counter Foreign Interference Coordination Centre in the Department of Home Affairs, and • Various staff resources including an online information portal supported by multi- channel awareness campaigns.
As the Government’s risk appetite for international engagement has evolved, so too has ours and while many of these tools existed for some time they have evolved over the years. There is still more work to do to implement our current suite of responses, particularly around training and a cultural change program to embed our new approaches. We are also conscious that the international context will continue to change so we need to be prepared to adapt our tools into the future.
2. What business processes do they use in the implementation of those tools?
A detailed outline of UTS’s business approaches in relation to our foreign interference tools can be found in our opening statement tabled with the Committee on 19 March 2021.
In summary for the Committee’s benefit, we have a variety of business processes that are used to review and assess the risks of foreign interference in our operations. For example, we have:
• Developed a mature risk management process and culture, including using an external due diligence partner for various international engagements • Updated policies outside of their normal review cycle to incorporate foreign interference considerations and strengthen due diligence requirements • Deployed an online outside work register and information collection process • Established a UTS-wide International Business Assurance function to take carriage of our response to the Foreign Arrangements Scheme, facilitate process improvement to continually strengthen business processes in light of the changing foreign interference landscape, and support a capacity uplift across these domains • Independent delegates reviewing and approving all international engagements • Updated the mandatory Protocol for the Execution of Documents (PED) to include references to foreign interference. The PED is completed by staff for the delegated authority to support their review • Aligned our processes to engage international collaborators to our UTS 2027 strategy through implementing a principles-based international engagement framework • Implemented a best-practice cyber security program, deployed two-factor authentication and jointly appointed a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) with the University of Newcastle to support information sharing • Dedicated risk resourcing to manage higher-risk areas, including research, and • Utilised the appropriate existing governance functions, including Council, to monitor performance and regularly assess risk appetite.
We are constantly evolving our systems, processes and cultural programs to maintain our operational integrity and protect national security in our work.
3. What criteria do they use to assess an engagement with a foreign entity and identify the risks?
We use a range of internally and externally informed criteria to assess a potential international engagement based on the nature of the work and the partner entity. For research partnerships for example, we consider the following risk conditions (criteria):
• Country: we look at where the partner university/academic/entity is from and consider factors such as the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).
• Partner: we examine who the partner is including: o The activities of the proposed partner, including the industries they are engaged in and whether there are any political sensitivities associated with them or key individuals in the entity o The compatibility of the partner and activity with UTS’s values, including our longstanding commitment to social justice
• Activity: we consider the area of activity or research and interrogate aspects such as: o Whether the activity is on the Defence Strategic Goods List, is a sanctioned export or there is a potential dual use o Compatibility between any contractual conditions and UTS policies, and o Work, health and safety and reputational risks.
• Dissemination: we take into account how research outcomes will be disseminated such as open publication or protection of university IP.
These risk conditions inform a risk assessment which in turn informs:
• The level of due diligence required, including obtaining external independent due diligence for collaborations assessed as having a medium or higher risk, and • The seniority of delegate required to approve the research project. For our highest risk engagements, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Research) in consultation with the Senior Executive, review arrangements.
Similar frameworks are used with tailored, activity-specific risk conditions for various key processes.
4. What is their definition of non-mitigatable risk?
The Senior Executive define UTS’s risk appetite on an annual basis informed by UTS Council. In accordance with UTS’s Risk Management Policy, the UTS risk appetite is reported to the Audit and Risk Committee of UTS Council each year.
5. How many engagements have they reviewed and when did they start with the review?
UTS has an established program of reviewing international engagement activities. Over the last ten years we have reviewed hundreds, if not thousands, of engagements.
6. Were any cases reviewed prior to the tools mentioned above being developed/implemented? If so, how?
Yes, various reviews were undertaken before our current suite of tools were implemented. As far back as 2013 and in response to the Defence Trade Controls and Autonomous Sanctions Acts, UTS reviewed our current (at that time) processes, capabilities, capacity and resources to respond; assessed the risks and mitigation options for UTS activities impacted by the Acts; recruited staff to help UTS comply with and respond to the Acts; developed training resources and a screening tool to automatically risk assess proposals against the Defence and Strategic Goods List; established best- practice processes to identify, assess and manage activities impacted by the Acts and provided training to those staff and students most impacted by the Act.
7. How many new engagements have been rejected, when and on what basis?
We review hundreds of arrangements each year. A small number of these have been rejected for a range of reasons including non-alignment with UTS strategy, lack of commercial viability and risk profile.
A key element of our response when it comes to foreign interference has been a deliberative program of cultural change which has helped reduce the instances of engagements being nominated that would be rejected on the basis that they would not meet our risk appetite for an activity.
8. What risks or irregularities with previous/ongoing engagements have been identified?
As part of reviews of previous international engagements, we identified the following considerations which required a higher-level of scrutiny and sophisticated due diligence:
• Projects where there are opaque corporate governance arrangements, particularly involving subsidiary entities, and • Projects where concerns exist around the potential application or dual use.
9. How did the institution address the risks?
UTS has continued to strengthen our systems and processes to address the evolving threat of foreign interference and address the considerations outlined above. This work has included:
• Regularly auditing key processes, practices and documentation to identify opportunities to improve our practices • Undertaking more detailed analysis and documentation of subsidiaries of organisations involved in collaborative arrangements • Moving to more active partnership management by regularly re-evaluating risks associated with agreements and partners in light of changing geopolitical situations, and • Adopting a strategic focus on the responsible use of technology.
10. Have they found any irregularities in previous/ongoing engagements that may create a conflict with federal funding provisions?
We are not aware of any instances where a review has identified contractual positions that conflict with federal funding positions.
11. Did the development of an internal FI framework also prompt a review of existing internal conflict of interest policies?
UTS’s conflicts of interest policy is embedded within our Code of Conduct. The Code of Conduct was reviewed in 2020 and updated to clarify disclosure requirements for external conflicts and to reference foreign interference. A project is planned for 2021/22 to further refine and strengthen how me manage conflicts of interest.
12. What steps have they taken to prevent IP theft?
UTS’s approach to active IP management is defined in our Intellectual Property Policy and characterised by two distinct aspects – access and control. The following table provides an overview of key steps which we have taken to protect UTS IP:
Response Examples Access • We operate on the basis of open access and support the broad dissemination of the outcomes of our research and scholarship.
Control • We clearly articulate the ownership of IP and prescribe conditions associated with its use in contracts, agreements, arrangements and policy documentation. • We regularly review the level of access staff and students have to UTS owned IP. • We restrict the places where UTS IP can be stored and, where data or IP is not stored on UTS owned infrastructure, require appropriate encryption to protect it from unauthorised access or use.
• We consider IP theft as a risk to be managed at a project level and may stipulate specific actions which must be taken to protect IP as part of our risk assessment and mitigation review. • We require staff to select a security classification for all digital material (including non-IP documentation) which ensures appropriate cyber protection.
13. Is there a central repository/register of institutional IP?
UTS maintains central repositories institutional IP: • For teaching and learning, these include our Curriculum and Student System and Course Information Systems. • For research related IP, staff are required to disclose this to the Research Office who maintain a register. This must be done prior to a UTS staff member disclosing the IP to a third party.
14. Do they have a mandatory storage/access/sharing of research materials that belong to sensitive subject matters in a system-based repository server that creates an audit trail?
Over the past 24 months, UTS has moved towards adopting a single data management platform, Stash, which includes advanced reporting for research activities. In the same period, we have updated our Research Policy and its associated Research Data Management Procedure to strengthen the protection for research materials. All research projects are required to have a data management plan which outline the data storage location, security classification, sensitivities, retention period, and the steps that are taken to protect the data from unauthorised use.
Questions asked of the University of Technology Sydney
1. Question: Is it true that UTS Global Vice President, Partnerships, Leo Liu, served as a PRC diplomat in Sydney and a consultant to the United Front body Australian Council for Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China prior to joining UTS? Mr Liu is a long serving and distinguished leader in the UTS community. He is an Australian citizen. Mr Liu came to UTS from the University of Newcastle more than 12 years ago.
2. Question: Huang Xiangmo was chairman of ACPPRC when he funded the establishment of ACRI at UTS. Does UTS have any concerns about how this influences the trajectory of UTS research and linkages? No. University research centres worldwide rely on a mix of funding sources, including private philanthropic gifts and corporate contributions. At the same time, these centres have fully independent, academically rigorous and transparent research agendas. This is fundamental to university research and the Australia China Relations Institute is no different.
ACRI’s research outputs and expert views are openly published in keeping with normal academic practice. Like all other research centres of the university, it must comply with all university policies and procedures – including UTS’ commitment to academic freedom - and all legislation that governs Australian higher education institutions.
3. Question: How much money from China or Chinese institutions- either directly or indirectly -- is used to fund the Australia-China Relations Institute? ACRI’s annual reports are all publicly available. In 2020, UTS contributed 86% of ACRI’s funding. External contributions from industry supporters John Holland, King & Wood Mallesons, Moelis Australia, PwC, China Construction Bank and Yancoal made up the remaining 14% (or $185,000). Industry partners do not provide ACRI with strategic direction.
4. Question: The Australian Technology Network of universities (RMIT, UTS etc) has formed an alliance with China's Excellence League of 9 universities 卓越大学联盟 which ties together PLA-linked technological universities in China. Does UTS have any concerns about this collaboration? If so, what is it doing about this collaboration? Not at this time. In early 2020, ATN and E9 agreed to develop collaboration areas focussed on the UN’s sustainable development goals. Given the difficulties of COVID and border restrictions, the development of the partnership remains in the planning phase. No actual activities have taken place. Any future activities will be assessed against UTS’s latest risk management processes.
5. Question: What links, agreements and collaborations does UTS have with Southern University of Science and Technology (SUSTECH)?
SUSTECH has been a Key Technology Partner (KTP) of UTS since 2017. UTS launched its KTP strategy in 2010 with the aim of building enduring, broad-based international engagement and strategic, high-quality research links with overseas partner universities. UTS has partnerships with leading universities in India, Europe, China and the Americas. Such partnerships are a critical function of a university, designed to generate benefit for Australians, as recently endorsed by ASIO director general, Mike Burgess, during his testimony before the Committee.
Apart from the overarching KTP agreement, UTS has two joint research centres and a collaborative PhD program with SUSTECH.
6. Question: Is Professor Jin Dayong employed by UTS or SUSTECH? By which institution should his patents be registered? By which institution were his patents registered?
Professor Jin has appointments with both UTS and SUSTECH. Contracts have been established to manage patents and intellectual property such that IP related to his work with UTS belongs to UTS, that related to his work with SUSTECH is owned by SUSTECH, and that which relates to his work for both institutions is owned by them jointly. It is worth noting that one of Professor Jin’s most recent registered patents relates to a rapid test for COVID-19 which has been licensed to a West Australian company.
7. Question: The Chau Chak Wing scholarships are only for PRC students from the following universities to study at UTS in Sydney: Beijing Institute of Technology, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Shanghai University and South University of Science and Technology of China. These are all defence-tied universities. Why does UTS allow such restrictions to be placed on Chau Chak Wing’s scholarships?
The Dr Chau Chak Wing Scholarships aim to build relationships between China and Australia by providing support to Chinese students enrolled at UTS in study abroad or full award coursework programs, and support to Australian students enrolled at UTS to undertake short term or study abroad programs in China. The Gift Agreement in no way limits the scholarships to particular
universities. The universities currently included in the scholarship program are chosen because they are Key Technology Partners of UTS and UTS can thus be confident of the pastoral care and safety of our students while offshore.
8. Question: UTS Professor Jay Guo is also a professor at Hangzhou Dianzi University's Electronics and Information College. Dianzi University is a PLA-tied university. Xidian University in Xi'an has also established a Jay Guo Electromagnetic Space Perception Technology Lab, named after Jay Guo. Xidian University is also a key PLA-tied university. Professor Guo also co-authors papers with PLA University scholars. Does UTS have any concerns about such intimate links between its researchers and the Chinese military? If so, what is it doing about this collaboration? Distinguished Professor Jay Guo is a UK and Australian citizen. He has no Chinese passport or citizenship. He is not a member of the Thousand Talent Plan or other like program. He is not a professor at Hangzhou Dianzi University.
Professor Guo is an internationally recognised scholar of high standing in the area of antennas and electromagnetics. In 2019, he visited his alma mater so they could name a laboratory after him in recognition of his career achievements in the UK and Australia where he is a citizen.
This was purely an honorary initiative. It is not his lab. He has no office there, or staff. He does not travel to Xidian to work or research. They do not pay him a salary or any other entitlement. He does not receive any research funding from Xidian University. He does not hold an academic title at Xidian University.
Professor Guo conducts his academic activities with full transparency, and UTS has no concerns whatsoever about his international connections.
9. Question: The UTS Australian Artificial Intelligence Institute headed by Lu Jie is almost entirely staffed by PRC scholars. Does UTS have any concerns that it is being used by the PRC as an offshore institution involved in research for the benefit of the PRC? If so, what is it doing about this collaboration? No. The AAII’s research outputs and expert views are openly published in keeping with normal academic practice. Like all other research centres of the university, it must comply with all university policies and procedures – including UTS’ commitment to academic freedom - and all legislation that governs Australian higher education institutions.
The AAII was launched in March 2017. It is wholly funded by UTS, though it attracts many competitive research grants from the Australian government and external organisations, given the importance of this area of research to our economy. It partners with dozens of leading universities, corporations and not-for-profits around the world - these include MIT, Stanford, University of California, Harvard, and Toyota. All international collaborations and partnerships will of course be subject to UTS risk assessments and processes.
10. Question: UTS and Providence Asset Group have signed a 5-year agreement to collaborate on joint research projects and initiatives within Faculty of Engineering and IT under the name of The Smart Future Research Centre (SFRC). Who owns and runs the Providence Asset Group? Are there any concerns about its PRC links? If so, what is it doing about this collaboration?
UTS has completed appropriate due diligence on its collaboration with Providence Asset Group. The nature of the collaboration is around renewable energy in the cities of the future. Providence Asset Group is an Australian company whose major shareholder is IProsperityGroup (IPG).
11. Question: The UTS Smart Futures project is headed by Xu Guandong, who is a Thousand Talents program scholar for Tianjin City in China, tied to its statistical research Institute. Is it appropriate that Australia’s future smart cities are being planned by a scholar who is tied to Tianjin and a company with PRC backing? If not, what is it doing about it? Professor Guandong Xu is not a Thousand Talents Program scholar. As described above, the UTS Smart Futures project is around renewable energy in the cities of the future. Professor Xu’s leadership of the Centre is entirely appropriate given his area of academic expertise. Projects will of course be assessed with appropriate due diligence and according to rigorous risk management processes.
12. Question: The Australian Research Council provided $300,000 to University of Technology Sydney to develop a cloud platform for China-tied Australia Education Management Group AEMG) in a project headed by UTS's Zhou Wanlei & Zhu Tianqing. Who approved this engagement? AEMG is an agent of the Hanban which is China-based and it runs a cloud platform in an effort to influence education in Australian universities. It has now taken on former ANU Vice Chancellor to promote its activities. Why should UTS and Australian taxpayers funding be used to fund PRC influence operations? The then-Education Minister approved the project upon recommendation from the Australian Research Council, as is usual practice. The collaboration went through UTS’s usual, rigorous due diligence processes and provides clear economic and public-safety benefits for Australia.
13. Question: The UTS Centre for Clean Energy Technology is headed by Thousand Talents scholar Guoxiu Wang. Professor Wang is an energy storage and batteries specialist, joined UTS after several years at the University of Wollongong. He is currently the director of the Centre for Clean Energy Technology and an ARC Professorial Future Fellow. He has received more than $5m in Australian Research Council grants.
14. Question: China's Yangzhou University website states Prof Wang was a Thousand Talents recipient and so does the Dongguan University of Technology, where Wang Guoxiu is a professor at its Department of Materials Science and Engineering. But UTS denies Professor Wang is part of the program. "It is quite common for universities in China to loosely refer to esteemed academics as “Thousand Talents Scholars” as a sign of respect akin to the term “Distinguished Professor”. They are not meant to literally signify that the academic is a part of a formal Chinese Government sponsored program," the UTS spokesman said. "He has, however, long collaborated with universities in China on academic research, and has co-published papers with Chinese academics, to the benefit of Australia, China and the global community. His research has brought international funding to Australia that has supported our local economy and jobs, and brought knowledge to our country for the benefit of local industries." Unbeknownst to UTS, The Australian has also discovered that Professor Wang has been involved in 11 international patent applications, the rights to which have been assigned to the Dongguan University of Technology and other Dongguan agencies.
UTS said Professor Wang had "no knowledge" of 10 of 11 patent applications and said he had "contacted the relevant parties to ask that his name be taken off these applications."
Professor Wang is also a key figure in the new ARC Research Hub for Integrated Energy Storage Solutions at UNSW. He is also a key researcher in Dongguan Shenbo Electronics (Sunbet) Ltd in the PRC. http://archive.is/5hOh9 All the patents assigned to Dongguan University of Technology and etc are listed here 2016-19 https://patents.google.com/?inventor=汪国秀&oq=汪国秀 PIC LINK: https://web.uts.edu.au/staff-photos/Guoxiu-Wang.jpg More than half the staff members are from PRC and most of the PhD students which are taken on are from PRC: https://www.uts.edu.au/research-and-teaching/our-research/centre-clean-energy- technology/our-people/core-members https://www.uts.edu.au/research-and-teaching/our-research/centre-clean-energy- technology/our-people/alumni
Alumni | University of Technology Sydney
PhD Graduates from UTS Dr. Xin Guo - Nano-structured functional materials for Li-O2 batteries. 2018. Research Associate, School of Mathematical and Physical Sciences, University of Technology Sydney, Australia. Dr. Weizhai Bao - Lithium-Sulphur battery. 2018. Winner of 2018 Chinese Government Award for Outstanding Self-Financed Students Abroad with US$6000. www.uts.edu.au
Is it appropriate that a scholar so compromised should be heading and deciding the direction of key projects in Australia? Does this potentially prejudice the security of Australia's energy networks? We reiterate that Distinguished Professor Guoxiu Wang is not now, nor has he ever been, a participant in China’s Thousand Talents Plan. He has no affiliation, past or present, with Dongguan Shenbo Electronics (Sunbet) Ltd. The professor’s leadership in various centres and on key projects is entirely appropriate given his expert knowledge and skills, and the rigorous due diligence that is applied to all partnerships.