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Morocco's Religious Diplomacy in Africa

Morocco's Religious Diplomacy in Africa

>> POLICY BRIEF ISSN: 1989-2667

Nº 196 - FEBRUARY 2015

Morocco’s religious diplomacy in Africa

Ghita Tadlaoui

Over the past decade, has tried to diversify its >> traditionally northern-oriented foreign relations southwards. HIGHLIGHTS Developing closer economic and political relations with Sub-Saharan African countries, Rabat hoped, would help raise Morocco’s regional • After years of isolation from the profile and boost the Kingdom’s exports. Hassan II, the father of the rest of the African continent, current King Mohammed VI, started opening up to the continent Morocco has been trying to raise its during the last years of his reign in the late 1990s by signing numerous profile in and the Sahel cooperation agreements and deploying the diplomatic corps of the through the use of religious Kingdom all over the continent. This represented a radical shift in diplomacy. Morocco’s foreign relations with Africa. • The Kingdom has also greatly The current global financial and economic crisis has aggravated boosted its economic ties with Sub- Morocco’s considerable domestic economic and social challenges, Saharan Africa and is now trying to especially since European demand for Moroccan export products has position itself as an entry point to slowed down. In need to diversify its export markets, Morocco has started the African continent for Western to reach out to southern countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, , and investors. . Moreover, in August 2013 Mohammed VI formally announced that Morocco’s foreign policy priority would henceforth be strengthening • However, there remain many the economy, inter alia through closer ties with Africa. While Morocco’s obstacles to Morocco’s African main diplomatic and economic partners remain the countries of the ambitions, such as the unresolved European Union (EU) and the (US), from 2008-2013 the conflict, rivalry with Kingdom doubled its exports to Sub-Saharan Africa. , and question marks over the sustainability of the Kingdom's Morocco’s efforts to step up its southern engagement, however, transcend model of democratisation. merely economic interests. With the spread of arms across MOROCCO’S RELIGIOUS DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA

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>>>>>> and the growth of jihadist groups in the Sahel fol - Moroccan-West African relationship. Today, there lowing the ouster of Colonel Gaddafi in Libya in are millions of Tijane Muslims spread around 2011, Morocco faces a new intensification of secu - Western African countries such as , rity threats at its doorstep, which can only be fully Guinea, , Gambia, and Côte d’Ivoire. tackled by stronger regional cooperation. As a The followers of this religious group still regard the result, Morocco wants to end its relative diplomat - Moroccan king as a religious leader, and Fez as a ic isolation in Africa – Rabat vacated its seat at the pilgrimage centre, thereby conferring legitimacy to Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the prede - Mohammed VI as a moderate Sunni leader. cessor of the African Union (AU), in 1984, as the Kingdom was opposed to the OAU recognition of Regional cooperation on religious matters is the the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR – most evident expression of the Moroccan king’s also known as Western Sahara). Morocco’s static religious diplomacy. In September 2013, posture on the unresolved Western Sahara issue Morocco signed an agreement with Mali’s new remains an impediment to a more comprehensive government to train 500 Malian in an political rapprochement with its immediate south - effort to promote a more tolerant version of ern neighbours. in Mali. Following this initiative, the Moroccan Ministry of Islamic Affairs has received further However, Rabat has recently added a new requests for educating Imams from countries such element to its regional approach: the strategic use as Guinea and . In addition, Morocco is of ‘religious diplomacy’. Presenting himself as a also planning on building in different religious authority, Mohamed VI has sought to Sub-Saharan countries such as Senegal, , use a moderate discourse of Islam to help build Benin, and Guinea. On recent visits to African new economic and political ties. neighbouring countries, Mohammed VI has symbolically offered copies of the Koran to be distributed amongst the country’s mosques. PROMOTING RELIGIOUS ‘MODERATION’ In addition, Morocco has managed to peacefully include an Islamist party – the Party of Justice Moroccan religious ‘moderation’ is meant to both and Development (PJD) – in government (they contrast with and limit the propagation of the ultra - are currently holding office). This peaceful conservative brand of Wahhabi Islam sponsored by accommodation with political Islam ostensibly , which has inspired numerous extrem - recommends Morocco to Sahel and West African ist groups spawning instability in the region. countries as a potential model to emulate, alongside the fact that it is one of the few West Africa is home to 190 million Muslims, and countries that has managed to remain stable in a for historical reasons many of them recognise the region of turmoil. legitimacy of the Moroccan king’s religious leader - ship. Mohammed VI uses the status of ‘Comman - der of the Faithful’, bestowed upon him by the ASPIRING TO REGIONAL LEADERSHIP, Moroccan constitution, to assert his position of RIVALRY WITH ALGERIA regional religious leader. His legitimacy derives from Morocco’s relations with West Africa during the Morocco’s religious diplomacy has not been pre-colonial period, around the 11 th century, when limited to promoting religious cooperation. It has most of the region adopted Islam due to the jihad of also been put to use to try to deepen security the Almoravids, a berber dynasty of Morocco. cooperation between the countries of the region and to raise Morocco’s regional profile. In its The Brotherhood , a Sufi group within efforts to thwart terrorism and ensure broader , is a legacy of this long-held regional stability, however, Morocco also aspires POLICY BRIEF - Nº 196 - FEBRUARY 2015

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to supplant its long-term rival Algeria as a leader nity initiated by former Libyan leader Gaddafi in in the region. Rabat’s geopolitical soft power 1998), and which does not include Algeria. efforts have been complemented by an intensification of diplomatic relations with Sub- Unofficially assuming the leadership of the CEN- Saharan Africa at a time of growing insecurity in SAD, over the past few years Morocco has the Sahel (as reflected, for example, in the rekindled the organisation to expand security accumulation of visits the Moroccan king paid to cooperation between its 28 member states, Sahel countries over the past year). including creating a Permanent Council for Peace and Security. It is worth noting that the countries Algeria, historically the informal leader on security that form part of the CEN-SAD are mainly challenges such as countering terrorism in the Muslim Sahel-African countries which respect the wider region, but lacking Rabat’s religious soft spiritual authority of the Moroccan monarch. power, has recently appeared to lose some credibil - The king’s religious diplomacy hence indirectly ity and regional political standing. This is in part helps him to consolidate Morocco’s regional because of Algiers’ failure to prevent a major terror - leadership on security matters, to the (potential) ist attack on its own soil in 2013 – the hostage cri - detriment of Algiers, Rabat’s rival. sis at a gas facility at In Amenas. King Mohammed VI has also made use of his close ties and privileged status as a religious COUNTERING EXTREMISM IN NORTH Rabat’s geopolitical authority to mediate AND WEST AFRICA in Mali – traditional - soft power ly an Algerian client The insurgency of radical Islamist militias in efforts have been – between Bamako’s Northern Mali in January 2012 was a wakeup call central government for Morocco. Rabat supported the -led complemented and the rebel and Operation Serval in Mali in early 2013 by sending Tuareg groups of humanitarian aid to Mali and establishing a by an intensification Northern Mali. A military hospital in Bamako. Morocco also gave of diplomatic newly self-confident $5million to the African-led International Morocco may be Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). The relations with able to take advan - Moroccan Royal Military Academy of Meknes tage of Algiers’ weak - also hosts military officers from West Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa ened position also on has recently created an exchange programme for other dossiers, such Malian officers to be trained in Morocco. at a time of growing as the future of insecurity in the Western Sahara. More generally, since the Malian insurgency, Rabat has put fighting violent jihadism – which may be Sahel Algeria has been at detrimental to its own stability – at the centre of its the forefront of secu - regional efforts. Morocco’s ambassador to the Unit - rity cooperation initiatives involving Sub-Saharan ed Nations (UN), Mohamed Loulichki, called in countries, most notably the Process 2012 for the ‘development of a united and inclusive (an African Union initiative to improve security global cooperation between states of North and cooperation across the Sahel-Saharan region). Due West Africa and the UN’ to deal with security chal - to their difficult bilateral relations, Algiers has lenges in the Sahel. Morocco has also tried to revive always excluded Morocco from such regional the ‘Tripoli Process’ (a regional border security frameworks. Over the past few years, however, cooperation initiative originally created by Libya’s Morocco has been pushing the alternative frame - Gadafi), including organising a conference in Rabat work of the Community of the Sahel-Saharan in 2013 calling for stronger implementation of that States (CEN-SAD – a regional economic commu - grouping’s agreements. In addition, Morocco has >>>>>> MOROCCO’S RELIGIOUS DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA

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>>>>>> proposed creating a ‘Ministerial Conference of economy. Having consolidated his standing in African States Bordering the Atlantic’ to strengthen the Economic Community of West African security cooperation between 22 countries. States (ECOWAS) region, inter alia thanks to his religious credentials and Morocco’s historic and For Western governments, counter-balancing cultural ties with West Africa, King Mohammed extremist Islamist ideologies across the region – VI has taken advantage of these good relations to such as the Islamic State (IS), Al-Qaeda in the conclude various economic cooperation agree - Islamic (AQIM) or Boko Haram – is a ments. Morocco’s choice to invest in its links with priority since they also pose a direct threat to West Africa seems to be a sound strategic move, Western countries and their interests. As a result, since that region is currently home to most of the Europeans and Americans perceive Morocco as a fastest growing economies on the continent, with a key ally in a region plagued by extremism. In projected economic growth in the region of 7.4 per addition, the EU, preoccupied with increased cent in 2014 (see also FRIDE policy brief number irregular immigration from North Africa and the 176 – West Africa: continental engine or brake? ). Sahel, has pushed Rabat to strengthen its migration policies. For example, Morocco has During his recent visits to Mali, Gabon, Guinea adopted new legislation to regularise the influx of and Côte d’Ivoire, accompanied by hundreds of Sub-Saharan immigrants while collaborating with Moroccan businessmen, Mohammed VI and his the EU to contain irregular migration towards the ministerial delegation signed some 118 business Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. agreements over 20 days. Morocco’s state airline, Royal Air Maroc, and the spiritual guides of the Morocco’s opening to Africa is also partly driven by Tijanya Brotherhood in Bamako signed a business a desire to promote Rabat’s plan to confer Western agreement in February 2014, giving preferential Sahara with the status of an ‘autonomous rates to the members of the Brotherhood for trips community’ within the Kingdom. Some African linking Abidjan to Fez. Since 2008, Morocco has countries have become more sympathetic to also been negotiating a preferential Trade and Rabat’s proposal. In the last few years, countries Investment Agreement with the West African Eco - such as , Benin, Togo, and lately nomic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and Mali, have started to back the idea of autonomy strategic partnership accords with ECOWAS and instead of an independence referendum for the the Economic and Monetary Community of Cen - Western Sahara territories. However, given the tral African States (CEMAC), with the aspiration growing security threats in the region, Western of eventually establishing free trade zones. powers are pushing for a prompt resolution of the Western Sahara conflict, which Morocco has so far Morocco’s trade volume with Sub-Saharan Africa resisted. In 2013, for example, Rabat reacted has more than tripled during 2003-2013, forcefully against an American proposal to expand increasing from 4.7 Moroccan Dirhams (MAD; UN monitoring of human rights in the Western €434.1 million) in 2003 to 14.4 billion MAD Sahara, which led to the abandonment of the (€1.3 billion) by late 2013. In spite of this proposal. Similarly, in 2014 Morocco rejected the impressive relative increase, Africa still only idea of an AU envoy to the Western Sahara. represents between 5-7 per cent of Moroccan exports. Nevertheless, it is Rabat’s declared objective to quickly increase this percentage by MOROCCO’S NEW BUSINESS GATEWAY gaining shares in African markets. Morocco’s IN WEST AFRICA investments in the African continent have been on the rise, accounting for 44 per cent of total On top of improving regional security cooperation, Moroccan foreign direct investment (FDI) in Morocco’s African diplomatic charm offensive is 2013 (worth €127.2 million) according to the also geared towards strengthening the Moroccan Moroccan Office des Changes , making Morocco POLICY BRIEF - Nº 196 - FEBRUARY 2015

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the second-largest African investor on the not the model of peaceful moderation and continent after South Africa. Amidst unrest and democratic inclusion of Islamists that its insecurity across North Africa, Morocco’s relative leadership likes to portray. Morocco’s religious stability might work to its commercial gain. moderation and stability mainly function thanks Rabat seeks to position itself as an entry point to to a heavy political monitoring of domestic Africa, especially as a bridge between the West Islamists. While the Islamist PJD forms part of ( and America) and Africa. To this end, the current governing coalition and provides the Morocco has been developing a ‘ incumbent prime minister, the party’s political Finance City’, which aims to position Casablanca margin of manoeuvre is quite limited (see also as a regional financial hub in Africa and a gateway FRIDE policy brief number 182 – Morocco’s for Western investments. Islamists: bucking the trend? ). In contrast, Al Adl wal Ihsane (Justice and Spirituality), the second- largest Islamist formation, which is more radical CONCLUSION ideologically and very popular among the broader population, has been marginalised from the Morocco’s African vision is helping the Kingdom political game (it is currently not recognised as a to make a stronger contribution to dealing political party). with trans-national security challenges, to revamp its domestic economy, reposition itself Furthermore, Morocco’s approach to counter-ter - geopolitically, and raise its profile in relations rorism has hardly been so much more successful with key Western allies on which Morocco’s than those of its regional peers, at least not as much economy and security still largely depends. as Rabat presents. For example, Moroccan secret Morocco’s religious diplomacy, including the services dismantled more than 18 jihadist cells king’s legitimacy as a religious leader in West between 2011 and 2013, while around 1,500 Africa, has been a critical element for the success Moroccans are estimated to be fighting with IS in of this regional strategy. However, two major Syria and Iraq. True, Morocco currently appears challenges remain: resolving the Western Sahara more stable than most other countries in the question; and avoiding increased tensions with region, and Rabat understandably would like to regional rival Algeria. take advantage of this positive image to develop a stronger African role. But there remain large ques - Morocco’s regional strategy could prove tion marks over just how transferrable the Moroc - beneficial to US and EU interests in several ways. can approach to political Islam is in practice. For example, if Morocco became a financial hub and gateway to African growth, it could serve as a Ghita Tadlaoui is junior researcher at FRIDE business and trade facilitator for US and European investors (who already have a privileged relationship with the Kingdom). From a security e-mail: [email protected] standpoint, Morocco, Europe and the US could www.fride.org try to reduce insecurity in the Sahel region through deepening their joint cooperation. In addition, Morocco’s ‘religious diplomacy’ should help promote religious moderation and greater security cooperation across North and West Africa, including in the Sahel.

At the same time, some factors may limit the extent to which the Kingdom’s goals can be effectively achieved. In some respects, Morocco is

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