Dr. Alistair Clark – Written Evidence (ERA0002)
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Dr. Alistair Clark – Written evidence (ERA0002) Reader in Politics, Newcastle University My expertise is in electoral integrity and administration in Britain, with several published research articles and reports on these themes, including an evaluation of electoral administration in the 2016 EU Referendum (http://www.ncl.ac.uk/gps/staff/profile/alistairclark.html#background). I write in a personal capacity. 1. Has the introduction of individual electoral registration been a positive development overall? Has it achieved its objectives, and how does it compare with the previous household registration system? 1. The broad policy aim of having individual electoral registration is a reasonable and positive development. This would have been sufficient in and of itself as an aim for the act. This equally applies for the various electoral administration measures it provides for. The subsidiary aim of reducing voter fraud however was ill-conceived given the generally low levels of such fraud. Tying the shift to IER in with electoral fraud was unfortunate as it allowed the Act to be seen as partisan, a purging of voter rolls by one party, when the introduction and implementation of IER itself was something that cross-party agreement might have been found for given its origins with the Labour Party. 2. How well was the transition to individual electoral registration managed? How might it have been done differently? 2. One key issue in managing the transition was the resourcing of electoral registration officers (EROs) and their departments. Research based on data prior to the introduction of IER showed that increased levels of investment on electoral registration had a positive effect on the delivery of elections in local authorities.1 In short, funding electoral registration properly mattered. 3. Any grants provided to support IER’s introduction were insufficient. Research I conducted (with Toby James, UEA) into electoral administration in the 2016 EU referendum found 43% of counting officers (COs) reporting that they did not have enough funds to support the work required to maintain the electoral register.2 One reason for this was cited as being the introduction of IER. This was commonly described as more expensive to implement. One CO described 1Clark, A. (2014) ‘Investing in Electoral Management’ in P. Norris, R. Frank & F. Martinez I Coma (eds.) Advancing Electoral Integrity, New York: Oxford University Press, pp165-188. 2 Clark, A. and James. T. (2016) An Evaluation of Electoral Administration at the EU Referendum, London: Electoral Commission, pp13-14. This was conducted as part of the Electoral Commission’s evaluation of the referendum. 1 how the ‘funding massively underestimates the scale of the task at in hand in IER.’ Cuts in Cabinet Office funding were also cited. Recommendation 1: An urgent review of the current funding of electoral registration processes. For any future developments to electoral registration processes, these be realistically consulted upon and costed with sufficient provision to cover the tasks required to maintain the register. 4. Bringing forward the end of the transition period for IER from 2016 to December 2015, against the advice of the Electoral Commission, was an unwise move. This also allowed the transition to IER to be portrayed as being manipulated for partisan purposes. The perception of partisan advantage in any electoral administrative process is unwelcome. Bringing the transition forward is likely to have contributed to incompleteness of the registers at that point, with some pointing to there being up to 8 million missing from the electoral register.3 3. What other steps are necessary to improve the electoral registration process, and to increase the accuracy and completeness of registers in particular? Has there been sufficient Government focus on completeness of registers? 5. I note some suggestions in this regard, related to research I have carried out, in the question on personation fraud below. I would note here that, while government has undertaken various attempts to improve completeness, particularly among hard to reach groups, more could be done.4 4. What other non-legislative measures might be necessary to encourage registration among groups that may be harder to reach? What are the main obstacles in this respect? 6. Research into what might work with such ‘hard to reach’ groups is clearly necessary and urgent. I am currently working with colleagues from Exeter (Moseley, Katz), Liverpool (Wilks-Heeg) and Newcastle (Rainsford) to develop an experimental research project examining registration of young voters and students. 7. There is an urgency around clarifying the voting rights of EU citizens in the UK given Brexit, and being clear about how they may be identified and registered electorally. This also applies to overseas voters who are British citizens. Registration drives by various third sector organisations – e.g. Operation Black Vote; Bite The Ballot – should continue to be supported by EROs, the Electoral Commission and the Cabinet Office. Recommendations 2: Research into ‘what works’ in registering hard to reach groups; support for third sector registration campaigns. 3 James, T. S., Bite the Ballot & Clark, A. (August 2019) Missing Millions Still Missing: A Vision for Electoral Modernisation in the UK. London: All Party Parliamentary Group on Democratic Participation. 4 Snelling, C. (2014) Maximising Electoral Registration: An Evaluation of Local Activities, London: Cabinet Office. 2 Electoral fraud 5. Has the Act been an effective measure in its stated intention of tackling electoral fraud? How has the implementation of the Act addressed offences such as personation and duplicate voting, and do further steps need to be taken to tackle these? 6. The act has not been effective in achieving its stated intention of tackling electoral fraud. It has most likely had little effect. Personation fraud is vanishingly small in the UK and internationally recognised as being one of the hardest and potentially most costly forms of committing such fraud. 7. Research I have carried out with Toby James (UEA) into polling station workers in the 2015 general election, and 2018 and 2019 local elections in England has found that no more than 1% of polling station workers had concerns about electoral fraud in their polling station.5 8. Completeness and accuracy of the register is a bigger problem in polling stations. In 2015, 69% of polling station respondents had experience of at least one incidence of staff, correctly, turning away voters because they were not properly registered. In the 2018 local elections, this was 52%. As an example of the reasons for this, we had a range of qualitative comments. Various reasons were given, but the following is representative: Someone had moved recently from one area of [location given] to another, he assumed because he pays his council tax on new house his election rights automatically moved over at the same time, which stopped him from voting. Recommendation 3: To minimise difficulties in polling stations, steps to further modernise electoral registration, making it more convenient to register should be examined. These may include: automatic voter registration; voter registration ‘nudges’ when voters engage with public services such as council tax; and examining developing on the day registration and online poll books. International best practice should be examined in order to develop clear proposals around these areas. 9. What has been the impact of introducing online registration? What challenges has this created for electoral administration? 9. The impact of introducing online registration has been added convenience for voters. This is to be welcomed as a step in removing barriers to participation. 5 Clark, A. and James, T. S. (2017) ‘Poll Workers’, in P. Norris & A. Nai (eds.) Election Watchdogs: Transparency, Accountability and Integrity, New York: Oxford University Press, pp144-164. James, T. S. and Clark, A. (2018) Voter ID: our first results suggest local election pilot was unnecessary and ineffective, The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/voter-id-our-first-results-suggest-local-election-pilot-was-unnecessary-and-ineffective- 100859 3 10. Major electoral events – particularly, but not exclusively the EU referendum – have seen major registration drives. Since there is no easy way to check whether one is registered, this has led to many applying to register when they are already registered. Estimates of such duplicate applications during the EU Referendum could be as high as around 50% of total applications in some local authorities.6 This creates major difficulties for electoral registration officers as they then have to divert resources to checking what are often duplicate applications. At the time of writing, this difficulty is potentially repeating itself as applications surge in relation to speculation over a ‘snap’ general election in 2019.7 11. The Electoral Commission have examined various ‘look-up’ tools to test a system where voters can check their registration, including at a local, national and UK-wide level. Other means are also being worked on, such as unique identifiers.8 Given the speed of electoral events, the development of this has been slow however, and needs to be prioritised. The UK government nonetheless rejected the idea of a national portal to check electoral registration on cost grounds in 2017.9 Recommendations 4: That a system be prioritised which will allow voters to easily check if they are registered. 5. Wording be found to include in registration drives, broadcast and press advertising and announcements, and on the government portal to make it clear that if someone is already registered, they do not need to do so again. Electoral administration 10. Do you think that elections in the United Kingdom are currently well managed and regulated overall? If not, why not? 12. Electoral law in the UK is currently widely recognised to be a mess. It requires considerable work to bring it up to date. Its origins are Victorian. A key piece of legislation, although regularly amended, is close to four decades old (Representation of the People Act 1983) and fails to address current difficulties in running elections.