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A Bibliography of Papers in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (1994) A Bibliography of Papers in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (1994) Nelson H. F. Beebe University of Utah Department of Mathematics, 110 LCB 155 S 1400 E RM 233 Salt Lake City, UT 84112-0090 USA Tel: +1 801 581 5254 FAX: +1 801 581 4148 E-mail: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] (Internet) WWW URL: http://www.math.utah.edu/~beebe/ 11 March 2017 Version 1.27 Title word cross-reference p [2640]. π [2136, 2294, 2138, 1568, 2137, 1585]. pi=4 [554]. q [346]. r [2631]. t [1507]. v [2070]. w (1+,λ) [3101]. (s; t) [2700]. 0 [2716]. 1 [1175]. Z [1227]. [2716]. 16 [2245]. 2 [3492, 874, 633, 1887, 1891, 1116, 1872, 872]. - [1202, 2070, 2716, 2162]. -adic [2640]. -ary 2k − 1 [1202]. 3 [2593, 2207]. -Best [2077]. -Body [1074, 3282, 1048, 2075, 2480, 1883, 1097, [3482, 898]. -Calculus 3284, 1887, 1891, 2760, 1116, 1059, 1885, [2294, 3317, 1568, 2136, 2138, 2137, 754, 1585]. 1870, 1088, 1203, 1872, 1119, 1082, 3377, -categorical [633]. -Clustering [354]. 1037, 1091, 1108, 1121, 876]. 8 [539]. k [339]. -Coloring [2037]. -Cube [2586]. -cubes 2 [2217]. D [1202, 2162]. f [2291, 2037]. h [2593]. -D [2070]. k [1202, 1733, 354, 2593, 1974, 2053, [3492, 1048, 2480, 1887, 1116, 1059, 1091, 62]. 1848, 306, 2312, 2039, 2077, 2162, 1865]. k=n -Dimensional [539, 1203, 3377, 1097]. [573]. L [3560]. Lp [374]. λ∆ [754]. m [106]. -DQPSK [554]. -Edge-Connect [2039]. NCk(NP)=ACk−1(NP) [341]. µ [3317]. N -Grammars [346]. -Interpretation [2168]. [3482, 2207, 821, 1720, 898, 2593, 2586, 62]. o -invariants [1507]. -Label [306]. [167]. O(log log N) [1201, 1861]. O(n) [3543]. -Languages [1175]. -Matching [2291]. 1 2 -Metric [374]. -MKRP [1476]. -Nodes 1741, 1742, 3360, 654, 1162, 2016, 3065, 988, [167]. -Overlap [2312]. -Pairwise [2053]. 1407, 503, 743, 3337, 3430, 758, 1233, 739, -Paths [2700]. -Reductions [3560]. 2010, 627, 1453, 1458, 722, 638, 724, 2148]. -Round [2245]. -Sequences [106]. -sets Abstracted [1156]. Abstracting [1974]. -Strategies [3101]. -Structures [780, 2353, 1831, 2351, 1745, 2329]. [1733]. -Style [1227]. -Trees [1848, 1865]. Abstraction [728, 3169, 1164, 1330, 1304, 1653, 2104, 486, / [185]. 483, 3551, 3326, 503, 2890, 2320]. Abstractions 0/1 [3225]. 011 [1773]. 011-AC [1773]. [2795, 1633, 516, 1342, 1623, 2143]. 011-DC [1773]. abstractor [701]. AC [2374, 1455, 2372, 499, 1773]. 1 [182, 879, 982, 3504, 2822]. 1-k [335]. AC-superposition [1455]. AC-Unification 1-Reader [2822]. 1-Writer [2822]. 1.2 [2374, 2372]. AC-unifiers [1455]. [2031]. 120 [231]. 15 [1009]. Academic [32, 23]. Accelerated [2652]. Accelerating [838]. Acceleration [164]. 2 [950, 2656, 1356, 2406, 1360, 3027, 1294, Acceptance [359, 360, 3430]. Accepted 2355, 3253, 3517, 1606, 2398, 2713, 2617]. [2284]. Access 2-Adic [1294]. 2-class [3446]. 2-d [2739]. [568, 2926, 2525, 564, 3418, 1678, 2652, 490, 2-Optimal [2713]. 2-Structures 3415, 532, 2940, 549, 2905, 2649, 542, 1903]. [1356, 1360]. 200 [3518, 893]. 2DT [650]. Accesses [149]. Accessibility [2917]. Accessible [2924, 2917]. Accessing [2936]. 3 [485]. Accommodation [2933]. Accounting [2842]. Accumulators [116]. Accuracy 5 [3489, 118, 148, 2602, 965, 3518, 893, 910]. [846, 3528]. Accurate [1307, 1879, 3139]. 5/4 [2694]. 5/4-Approximation [2694]. 5/ Achieved [1000]. Achievement [1791]. CM [3484, 3521]. 5E [3484, 3521]. Achieving [2091, 2572]. Acquisition [3163, 597, 2986, 3159, 3158, 3165]. Across 6 [205]. 64 [1274]. 64-bit [1297]. 65 [572]. [670, 2348]. Act [1333, 1331]. Action [3330, 65-MHz [572]. 1959, 3087, 1910, 747, 178, 2956, 1994, 3357, 644, 643, 2359, 2010, 3257, 2140, 3263, 3242]. 802.12 [2397]. Action-Based [643]. Actions [2938, 1402, 2886, 3233]. Activation 90 [998, 1004]. 90D [152]. 90D/HPF [152]. [3018, 1580]. Activation-Oriented [3018]. 93 [1485]. Active [1680, 2768, 1035, 2298, 2852, 2769, 2851, 2770, 2771, 1577, 1054, 1037, 1057, = [1379]. 1144, 1108]. Activities [1663]. Activity [202]. Actor [1597, 394]. Actor-Based A-Codes [92]. Abduction [1597]. ACTRESS [644]. Acyclic [2190, 3299, 1928]. Abductive [2221, 651]. AD [3273]. Ada [9]. [1304, 1782, 2498, 1925]. abelian [3449]. Adaptable [2165]. Adaptation [3188, 2166, Ability [1592]. AbleProfessionals [2933]. 3080, 84, 3187, 3114, 3115, 2165, 3193]. Abnormality [2959]. Abstract [1182, 3046, Adaptations [2511]. Adapted [3429, 1116]. 655, 385, 387, 1780, 729, 3043, 2297, 3053, Adapting [978, 2969, 2897, 815, 548]. 3 Adaptive [340, 1573, 148, 2594, 1653, 2611, 1528, 3551, 2736, 3521, 1192, 698, 2146, 2142, 2593, 2006, 2554, 2178, 2392, 2609, 2592, 1458, 624]. Algebra-Based [845]. 1563, 3085, 3142, 532, 3176, 546, 3118, 1127]. Algebraic Adaptively [3141, 254, 253]. Add [1006]. [3059, 1941, 1898, 3486, 2490, 1725, 519, 632, Add-On [1006]. Added [2531]. Adder 315, 1526, 1891, 686, 2002, 2275, 2861, 1191, [2571]. Adding 1590, 3549, 1872, 72, 58, 403, 2761, 2762, [2202, 3366, 1767, 1552, 525, 660, 3379]. 1199, 727, 1442, 3038, 1170, 3531, 626, 3241, Additional [3294, 348, 3296]. Additive 622, 634, 3455, 639, 801, 640, 641, 3469]. [2269]. Address [1, 2600]. Adequacy Algebras [1829, 1151, 628]. adic [2640, 1294]. [2313, 793, 1378, 2130, 633, 638, 2132]. adjunctions [635]. Adjusting [2064]. ALGOL [2320]. ALGOL-like [2320]. Adjustment [74]. Admissible [1409]. Algorithm Admission [2398]. Admits [2017]. [229, 951, 3306, 2385, 2092, 3186, 1837, 1234, Admitting [2639]. ADMS [460]. Advance 1839, 1947, 3308, 3079, 2463, 504, 2990, 2714, [3179]. Advanced 2703, 2702, 3150, 676, 960, 1842, 3129, 2717, [779, 2515, 993, 2526, 2513, 564, 3102, 2811, 2087, 2063, 2644, 2654, 2973, 1728, 3075, 3501, 28, 2423, 57, 1374, 872, 803]. Advances 2689, 2439, 2031, 3147, 298, 1609, 3317, 606, [416, 2901, 1043]. Advantages [512, 1057]. 919, 587, 1649, 3151, 2042, 1644, 920, 355, Advection [3481]. Advection-Chemistry 1274, 687, 2050, 893, 790, 1538, 1582, 3543, [3481]. Adventure [17]. Adverbials [1922]. 1281, 3109, 2713, 1861, 2854, 309, 2701, 2633, Advice [2766, 1479]. ADVISE [2629]. AE 2831, 3328, 217, 3107, 2835, 2377, 1208, 839, [1424]. AEA [907]. Aeronautical [860]. 2716, 596, 1289, 3124, 2062, 3099, 458, 2699, Aerospace [937, 935, 936]. AF2 [1996]. 1865, 3448, 3451, 3461, 3248, 1139, 2117, 824, Affine 3462, 1070, 1110, 3456, 3464, 802, 2214]. [1126, 1715, 1867, 1881, 1872, 1049, 1117, Algorithmic 1080, 1116, 1067, 1084, 1069, 1047, 1037]. [1710, 78, 2885, 1374, 2687, 2040]. Affinity [157, 1587]. AFORIZM [3168]. Algorithms Aft [6]. After [1968]. Against [2601, 1835, 3558, 3104, 3136, 1237, 3548, 581, [1869, 253, 805, 254]. Agent 3106, 1573, 2698, 3092, 3137, 2064, 2875, 3080, [2791, 3159, 1956, 3439, 1957, 2100, 1593, 354, 2593, 3103, 1845, 2662, 1591, 2626, 1847, 1271, 1268, 1965, 3232, 3240]. Agent-Based 3500, 3542, 2690, 2688, 2689, 1198, 2712, 1848, [3159]. Agents 3078, 1704, 3508, 3133, 1852, 3083, 1257, 2634, [2522, 1964, 191, 3145, 1960, 2976, 2954, 1927]. 2027, 3082, 161, 2045, 892, 2033, 1200, 1615, AGG [403]. Aggregate [1662]. 353, 1242, 3146, 446, 2026, 1855, 2312, 2603, Aggregating [283]. Aggregation 2643, 2676, 3091, 250, 3450, 3521, 1858, 2888, [1330, 3423, 3387]. Aggregations [1958]. 3072, 3557, 3081, 331, 2995, 417, 3564, 2978, Agley [6]. Agreement [2832, 257]. 2727, 1592, 2683, 3144, 3073, 2721, 1377, 1969, Agricultural [2629]. AI [2415, 2896, 1315]. 2067, 3524, 882, 2169, 1219, 567, 3093, 2999, aid [3229]. Aided [57, 66, 58, 87, 90, 3234]. 2086, 2084, 3289, 1078, 1093, 825, 3225, 1509]. Aids [2902]. Air algorithms [3477, 1077]. Aliasing [3481, 3491, 2225, 454, 1660]. Aircraft [2569, 2506]. Align [159]. Alignment [855, 2804, 936]. Airline [2716]. AKL [1237, 1888, 1234, 1235, 154, 1241, 1240, 1135]. [1012]. Al [2937, 703]. ALF [1226]. Algebra Alignment-Distribution [154]. [1181, 1982, 1944, 1873, 3369, 845, 479, 498, Alignments [1236]. all-digital [803]. All/ 4 Nothing [113]. Allcache [1575]. Allegories Annealing [1387]. Allocation [513, 1759, 2828, 529, [1608, 3137, 2682, 2428, 3135, 3134, 898]. 2544, 986, 1607, 1963, 1588]. Allows [1243]. Annotated [2340]. Annotation [1933]. Almost [98]. ALOHA [822, 566]. Annotation-Based [1933]. Anomalies ALOHA-based [822]. Alpha [497, 1230]. [1762, 2825]. Anomalous [2959]. Alpha-Conversion [497, 1230]. Alphabet Anonymous [113]. Answer [305, 1026]. [1244]. Alphabet-Independent [1244]. Answering [1805, 3230, 1438]. Ant [1956]. Alphabetic [1708]. Alphabets [1250]. Antenna [534]. Anti [1788]. Anti-Links Altera [2437, 2468]. Altera-PLDs [2468]. [1788]. Anticipatory [3087]. Alternate [133, 134]. Alternating Antiprenexing [1775]. APIs [2525]. [136, 1712]. Alternation [2309, 1404, 323]. apparent [1039]. Appendix [2264]. Alternative [116, 1240, 41, 482, 2561, 21]. Applicability [2512, 581, 1430]. Alternatives [447]. Always [327]. Application Amalgamated [403]. ambiguities [1072]. [2993, 280, 368, 1669, 2378, 2653, 957, 2177, Ambiguity [371, 2854, 3223]. Ambiguous 2537, 2988, 1671, 3205, 1673, 2529, 1956, [3321]. America [2921]. among 2001, 1867, 2352, 269, 1687, 1807, 1393, 3095, [3546, 2709]. Amorphous [894]. Amount 2804, 2054, 1663, 2735, 3512, 3187, 975, 3146, [2091]. AMPHION [3244]. Amplifiers 1620, 1795, 1269, 1995, 1768, 990, 2983, 2716, [555, 546]. Amplitude [544]. analog [1070]. 933, 2194, 3001, 2028, 1428, 1489, 3216, 1040]. Analogical [2417, 603, 2151, 1312, 2152]. Applications Analogies [3300]. Analogue [95]. [3181, 3396, 3586, 3195, 570, 2668, 2759, Analogues [3513, 3076]. Analogy 1911, 994, 1658, 3196, 1670, 993, 2669, 958, [2167, 3300]. Analyser [2098]. Analyses 889, 2395, 921, 3559, 2630, 2235, 2555, 1689, [2869]. Analysing [2064, 1613]. Analysis 1935, 2588, 3272, 2797, 3334, 2516, 3585, [380, 2280, 2494, 2574, 2696, 1326, 3059, 2283, 2018, 965, 832, 576, 86, 394, 3398, 572, 265, 843, 421, 2759, 2847, 1761, 840, 655, 3335, 1745, 1322, 2394, 1880, 987, 3380, 2254, 2267, 912, 1790, 3069, 1985, 514, 296, 149, 562, 666, 3179, 969, 3590, 1347, 2743, 1009, 1119, 2375, 3102, 2501, 1211, 3054, 174, 173, 171, 3066, 532, 973, 902, 2787, 757, 1917, 2009, 3281, 3044, 36, 3393, 3067, 1732, 1596, 1721, 2178, 2014, 3172, 1659, 816, 1046, 3475]. Applied 3064, 3063, 2674, 2582, 1695, 84, 586, 1334, [2425, 2340, 3504, 892, 3519, 1407, 987, 936, 3055, 1242, 833, 88, 2675, 2568, 2850, 2764, 62, 3229, 1077]. Applying [206, 3145, 1596, 687, 2616, 3383, 1760, 2844, 501, 3048, 2592, 3348, 208, 1090, 3173, 3088, 1672, 2794].
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