Incident Command 3Rd Edition 2008

3rd Edition 2008 Edition 3rd Volume 2 Volume IncidentCommand Fire Service Operations Fire and Manual Rescue

Fire Service Manual Volume 2 Fire Service Operations Incident Command 3rd Edition 2008

www.tso.co.uk £00 Fire Service Manual Volume 2 Fire Service Operations

Incident Command

3rd Edition

2008

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N5653433 5/08 Contents

Chapter 1 – Fire and Rescue Service Incident Command Doctrine 7 1.1 The Incident Command System 7 1.2 Leadership 7 1.3 The Operational Environment 9 1.4 The Incident Command Environment 9 1.5 Leadership in Operation 10 1.6 The Incident Commander’s Leadership Role 12 1.7 Operating within the Multi-Agency Bronze, Silver and Gold Structure 14 1.8 The Operational Commander’s Competence 17 1.9 Incident Management and Decision Making 17

Chapter 2 – Organisation on the Incident Ground 19 2.1 General 19 2.2 The Role of the Incident Commander 19 2.3 Levels of Command 20 2.4 Duties of the Incident Commander at Operational (Bronze) Level 21 2.5 Duties of the IC at Tactical (Silver) Level 22 2.6 Duties of a Strategic (Gold) Level Commander 24 2.7 Structuring an Incident 24 2.8 Managing Crews on the Incident Ground 29 2.9 Line of Command 30 2.10 Span of Control 30 2.11 Roles and Responsibilities within Incident Command 31 2.12 Identification of Command Roles 35 2.13 Briefing & Information 44 2.14 Communications 44 2.15 Inter-Agency Liaison 44 2.16 Cordon Control 45 2.17 The Closing Stage of the Incident 46 2.18 Maintaining Control 46 2.19 Welfare 46 2.20 Debriefing 47 2.21 Post-Incident Considerations 47

Chapter 3 – Command within the UK Resilience Framework 51 3.1 Introduction 51 3.2 Local and Regional Structures 52 3.3 Central Government’s Role 54 3.4 Roles of the Emergency Services and Military 55 3.5 Structured Response to a Major Incident 57 3.6 FRS Resilience 57 Chapter 4 – Incident Risk Management 63 4.1 Introduction 63 4.2 FRS Operational Risk Philosophy 64 4.3 Risk Assessment in the Fire Service 65 4.4 Managing the Risk 68 4.5 The Tactical Mode 71 4.6 Announcement and Recording of Tactical Mode 73 4.7 Using Tactical Mode when Sectors are in Use 73 4.8 Responsibilities within Tactical Mode 77 4.9 Examples of Application of Tactical Mode 78 4.10 Analytical Risk Assessment 79 4.11 Risk Control Measures 80 4.12 The Role of a Safety Officer 81 4.13 Closing Stages of the Incident 83 4.14 Summary 84

Chapter 5 – Command Competence 85 5.1 Introduction 85 5.2 Definition of Competence 85 5.3 National Occupational Standards 86 5.4 Unit 86 5.5 Element 86 5.6 Performance Criteria 87 5.7 Knowledge and Understanding 87 5.8 Workplace Assessment 87 5.9 Knowledge and Understanding in Incident Command 88 5.10 Evidence 89 5.11 Personal Development Records 90 5.12 Continuing Personal Development 90 5.13 Guidance for assessors 92

Appendices

Appendix 1 – Analytical Risk Assessment Process 96

Appendix 2 – Incident Command System 100

Appendix 3 – The Psychology of Command 107

Appendix 4 – Decision Making Model 119

Appendix 5 – Response Arrangements in Wales 132 Appendix 6 – Response Arrangements in Scotland 135

Appendix 7 – Response Arrangements in Northern Ireland 138

Glossary of Terms 141

References and Bibliography 144

Further Reading 146

Acknowledgements 147

Incident Command Chapter 1 Chapter 1 – Fire and Rescue Service Incident Command Doctrine

1.1 The Incident Command System framework. Building upon changes to legislation and supporting guidance2 the broader role of Fire The Incident Command System (ICS) constitutes and Rescue Services in incidents other than fire is the doctrine of the Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) considered in relation to the capacities, objectives, in the context of operational incident management, and constraints of other responding agencies. leadership, and the functional command and control processes that flow from it. The Incident Command System and supporting processes described in the following chapters The Incident Command System is the recognised constitutes a template against which incident “nationwide safe and effective system for managing command policies and procedures can be written in operations”.1 It presents the key elements of FRSs, and the training and assessment of individuals effective incident command in three functional and teams to operate those systems safely and areas; these are: effectively can be conducted. Any amendment to this template should be proposed to the Chief Fire ●● Organisation on the Incident Ground – this and Rescue Adviser’s Unit (CFRAU). gives the Incident Commander a recognised system from which to work when organising The Incident Command System itself operates and using resources at an Incident. within a wider framework of policies, values and an ●● Incident Risk Management – the principal in depth understanding of operational issues which consideration of Incident Commanders is must be taken into account by staff in all roles in the safety of their personnel. Therefore, the FRS. Some of these are considered below. prior to deciding upon the tactics an assessment of risk must be performed. The Incident Commander must identify the 1.2 Leadership hazards, assess the risks, and implement The Fire and Rescue Service in England and all reasonable control measures before Wales has chosen to express its values and vision committing crews into a risk area. of leadership in the form of a simple model. The ●● Command Competence – considers the skills model has been named “Aspire”. It has at its heart, knowledge and understanding required by an the core values of the service; which are: Incident Commander and the importance of maintaining such competencies. ●● Diversity ●● Our People Additionally, this edition of the manual reflects the ●● Improvement need for FRSs to be able to work effectively within ●● Service to the Community a broader multi-agency incident management

1 Framework Document 2006-08 2 Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, Civil Contingencies Act 2004, HM Government Emergency Response and Recovery (Non-statutory guidance document) and Emergency Preparedness (Statutory guidance do cument)

Incident Command 7 Although not usually discussed in the context of Leadership Capacities: incident command, it can be seen that the values are intrinsic to everything we strive to achieve at ●● Organising and Changing an operational incident, where we routinely serve ●● Partnership Working all of our communities equally and professionally, ●● Delivering Services with the safety and well being of our own crews ●● Community Leadership at the forefront of our mind and reflecting on how ●● Setting Direction well we have done in order to be better next time. ●● Priorities and Resources ●● Personal and Team Skills The core values inform and underpin the personal qualities and attributes (PQAs) at each role level. These are practiced in the three Leadership Thereafter the model describes the “Leadership Domains: Capacities” and “Leadership Domains”, which take the model a stage closer to the actual behaviours ●● Operational and outcomes: ●● Political ●● Personal-team approach

Core Values PQAs Leadership Qualities Leadership Domains

8 Fire Service Manual Command and Control of operational incidents ●● Time sensitivity/ tempo of activity. Time is inextricably linked with the Aspire model and pressure on the requirement to make the values of the Service. Operational incident decisions and act upon them is arguably command represents an area where leadership the major contributory factor in the takes on a risk critical and central role. In recent determination of incident criticality. Further years the Fire and Rescue Services has advanced to that, time pressure on decision-making the notion of leadership in many ways that appear will, by definition, drive the tempo of to be allied to, but distinct from, the operational activity in any incident response. context. The identification of core values and the ●● Complexity. Critical incidents may be expression of key domains provide an excellent accompanied by a degree of complexity that platform upon which to build a robust command will result in uncertainty about outcomes. and control doctrine. It is sometimes thought ●● Moral Pressure. Critical incidents involving that such work is left behind when the “bells go people and property at risk will generate down”, and the service is called into action in its moral pressure on those responding who may key operational intervention role. This is not the feel under pressure to quickly take action. case. Perhaps the clearest example of the area ●● Duty of Care. Closely related to the above where strong leadership and the ethic of the FRS characteristic will be the duty of care by comes into play is in the area of Dynamic Risk those in command at critical incidents to Assessment (DRA). The concept that “firefighters avoid exposing their people to unnecessary will take some risk to save saveable lives”3 has to be exposure to risk. professionally, ethically and effectively managed. ●● Retrospective Scrutiny. Those in positions of authority at critical incidents must expect to Leadership in the domain of critical incident have their decisions and subsequent actions command is often characterised by the need to publicly scrutinised. deal with uncertainty in demanding timeframes. The role of the leader in such circumstances 1.4 The Incident Command was described by Henry Kissinger, who stated Environment that: “The most important role of a leader is to take on his shoulder the burden of ambiguity In general, incidents will generate an increasingly inherent in difficult choices. That accomplished, intense command environment as the complexity his subordinates have criteria and can turn to and scale increases. However, the commander must implementation”. (Kissinger, 1982). realise that intensity is also relative to the position and circumstances perceived by any individual 1.3 The Operational Environment involved in such an incident. The Nature of Critical Incidents For example, a firefighter in breathing apparatus, The requirement to develop and apply an incident operating in offensive mode at a dwelling fire in command system is driven by the critical nature of which persons are reported, will be subject to a many of the incidents which the FRS responds to. more intense and narrowly focused experience of These incidents often share common characteristics, the incident than the officer outside the building in including: a position of command. Such an example can be developed through increasing layers of command present at complex larger scale incidents, further removing the overall incident commander from a

3 See 4.2 in this manual.

Incident Command 9 multitude of high-pressure situations. Therefore, by the Health & Safety Executive in HSG654 a critical success factor in responding to any provides an essential framework for designing incident will be the commander’s understanding of and implementing organisational structures and the whole context and the complete environment processes for managing successfully and safely. within which command is to be exercised. HSG65 has five key elements which make up the framework. Of the three Leadership Domains identified within the “Aspire” Leadership Model, incident command 1.5.1 Policy resides largely within the operational context. This There should be effective policies which set a clear assumption is more valid at operational levels of direction for the organisation to follow, contributing response. However, the reference above to the to all aspects of business performance. Fire requirement for commanders to fully understand and Rescue Service’s policies should set out the the incident command environment is of increasing approach to delivering effective incident command. relevance here. As the complexity/scale/intensity of The model described in this manual provides a incidents escalates, so too does the requirement for a consistent approach that can ensure interoperability broader understanding across the three Leadership throughout the UK. Interoperability is critical both Contexts. At the lower end, incident commanders for routine cross border mutual aid operations and will address, in the main, internal factors i.e. for larger scale incidents involving deployment of those confined largely to the incident ground. As national assets, for example major emergencies the complexity, scale and intensity increases, the requiring urban search and rescue or mass incident commander will be faced with a greater decontamination. Apparently minor modifications, degree and frequency of issues regarding external for example a change in terminology, can cause FRS support, multi-agency considerations, as confusion when fire and rescue services have to well as media, legal and political considerations. work together. Therefore, the demands of the FRS Leadership Model directly reflect the demands of competent 1.5.2 Organising incident command throughout a successful FRS There needs to be an effective management career at all levels. structure and arrangements in place to deliver the policies. The arrangements should be underpinned 1.5 Leadership in Operation by effective staff involvement and participation and be sustained by effective communication and The Incident Command promotion of competence. All involved should Policy Framework understand the Fire and Rescue Service’s approach The procedures that form the Incident Command and objectives in relation to the command function, System should be an integral part of a Fire in particular the procedures associated with their and Rescue Service’s organisational systems area of responsibility. for managing risk. The approach published

4 HSG65 Successful health and safety management 2nd Edition ISBN 0 7176 1276 7

10 Fire Service Manual Incident Command 11 1.5.3 Planning Incident Command System, involving the constant There should be a planned and systematic approach development of policies, systems and techniques to implementing the policies through an effective for delivering an effective and safe response. management system. The aim is to deliver an effective response which minimises risks. Risk assessment techniques should be used to decide on priorities and set clear objectives for the incident response. Generally there is a hierarchy of control measures with preference being given to eliminating or controlling hazards rather than relying on systems of work or personal protective equipment. In the context of the Fire and Rescue Service operational incidents it is not always possible to eliminate hazards although this should be done by the selection and design of equipment and processes wherever possible. Risks should be minimised through appropriate physical controls 1.6 The Incident Commander’s or, where these are not possible, through systems Leadership Role of work and personal protective equipment. It is the duty of the Fire and Rescue Service Incident Commander at an operational incident to 1.5.4 Measuring performance exercise authority over fire service resources on Performance should be measured against agreed the incident ground. standards to reveal when and where improvement is needed. Active self-monitoring reveals how The Incident Commander has much to consider effectively the management system is functioning, when dealing with an emergency and the task looking at equipment, processes and individual will become more complex with increased scale behaviour/performance. If the incident response is and duration. Clearly, no officer can be expected i nef fect ive or health a nd safet y cont rols fail, react ive to remember everything, so the system of incident monitoring discovers why, by both determining the command described in this manual will provide immediate causes of the sub-standard performance operational and managerial prompts to reinforce and identifying the underlying causes, with the those given by the incident itself and the personnel implications for the design and operation of the in support roles. management system. The Incident Commander must ensure that adequate 1.5.5 Auditing and reviewing resources are available and that arrangements have performance been made to control them. At larger incidents these Fire and Rescue Services should learn from all will normally be delegated as the responsibility of relevant experience and apply these lessons. supporting officers in the command structure. There needs to be a systematic review of incident command performance by Fire and Rescue Services Good communication between personnel, on based on monitoring data and independent audits and off scene, is essential throughout the incident of the management system. There should be both but especially at the time of the handing over of internal reference to key performance indicators command, which can result in confusion if it is not and an external comparison with relevant best done properly. The accumulated knowledge of the practice. There should be a strong commitment to continuous improvement in the delivery of the

12 Fire Service Manual site, the incident, the risks and the actions taken so The following paragraphs illustrate the model far need to be communicated, in an easily assimilated of command and control used by the emergency form, to the officer taking over. responders in the UK. There are many cases where the roles may appear to overlap. This is An Incident Commander should be prepared to brief to be expected, as the strength in a system lies a more senior officer at any time so that a decision in its flexibility and adaptability. Adapting the can be made whether or not to assume command. model to fit particular circumstances, based on If the senior officer decides to take command then a deep understanding of how the model would this intention must be made clear to the existing normally be applied is entirely different to failing IC, by using some form of words such as “I am to adhere to the model because of poor procedures, taking over”. The change of command must also be understanding or weak command. For example, relayed to Fire Control. Having assumed command whereas decision making levels are clearly defined, the senior officer will in all likelihood want to common sense dictates that where a tactical retain the previous commander in the command decision has to be taken by an officer of relatively structure to provide advice and continuity. junior rank in the absence of a senior officer, it will be taken. Equally, someone operating at tactical It is the duty of officers being relieved to give the level will not overlook an urgent operational issue officer who is assuming command all the relevant that arises that can easily be dealt with, merely on information they possess concerning the incident. the grounds that it is not an appropriate task for Handover of command to more junior officers their command level. as the incident is being reduced in size must be equally thorough. The FRS Incident Commander must focus on the safe and effective resolution of the incident, When taking over a command role on the incident working at a tactical level, in conjunction with ground, it is necessary to bear in mind the key other services and agencies as necessary, to return elements of the role. It is essential to assume circumstances to normality as soon as possible. In command at the appropriate time, according to the UK emergency services context, tactics can either standard operating procedures or to the be summarised as the deployment of personnel senior officer’s judgement of how the incident and equipment on the incident ground within set is developing. Every effort should be made to objectives and priorities to achieve the overall aims. avoid a ‘time lag’ during handover, where no one The IC is therefore principally concerned with the is focussed on making vital decisions due to the tactical co-ordination of tasks in progress, which exchange of information at the handover. The new will be based on approved operational procedures. IC must make it clear that a single team is now operating under their leadership. Key elements of Operations can best be described as tasks that the leadership role are: are carried out on the incident ground to achieve desired objectives, using prescribed techniques and ●● the maintenance of shared situational procedures in accordance with the tactical plan to awareness by effective communications; achieve the strategic aims of Gold where that level ●● clear planning and setting of operational of Command is in operation. priorities; ●● direction and focusing of activity in pursuit At the smaller incidents all decision making will of objectives; be the responsibility of one individual (the IC), ●● ensuring subordinates have freedom and in conjunction with the Service’s policies and resources to carry out their role safely within procedures. This is likely to be the first arriving the plan. Crew Commander, who will be very much concerned with the tactics and operational tasks

Incident Command 13 in the initial stages, delegating responsibility for the first two being located on the incident ground. the operational level if sufficient resources are These terms need to be understood in the context available. At larger incidents the team of officers of the incident command structure. This section responsible for the various command functions of the manual describes the broad command and will be organised by the Incident Commander to leadership remit of each level, with more detail discharge the operational tasks, while the Incident about the functions and lines of communication Commander retains overall tactical command. being found in subsequent chapters. Whereas it is highly unlikely that strategic decisions will have to be made at this level, if the need were In the following paragraphs, it must be borne in to arise, the responsibility to deal with the issues at mind that most incidents are managed without the hand resides with the most senior officer available. need for an elaborate structure. The vast majority of fires and Road Traffic Collisions (RTCs) are likely Therefore, at any incident, the Incident and/or to be dealt with by crews being managed by their Sector Commanders have a set of tactical priorities line supervisors. Even if an FRS incident escalates to follow. These can be found in Chapter 2. and more senior fire officers assume command, it shou ld not b e a s s u m e d t h a t t h e mu lt i- a ge nc y Br o n z e, 1.7 Operating within the Multi- Silver, Gold system will be applied. However, it is Agency Bronze, Silver important to understand what the levels mean, and and Gold Structure what functions they have responsibility for if the structure is implemented. Bronze, Silver and Gold, reflecting operations, tactics and strategy, are the descriptions given to the managerial levels of fire service involvement,

14 Fire Service Manual 1.7.1 Operational (Bronze) Level Command may also need to consider whether there is the need At the start of every incident for which there has for a Gold or Strategic level of command if one is been no warning, the ‘operational level’ will be not already in place, and if so communicate this activated first. The IC will attend the scene, (or upwards. as close as is deemed safe to do so depending upon the nature of the incident and resulting risk A key task of the Silver Command function is assessment). The role of the IC is to: to give early consideration to the ‘consequence management’ and recovery phases of the incident. ●● Assess the extent of the incident, the number This consideration may also suggest that a Gold of resources, hazards and risks. Command would help to address such issues, ●● Consider the appropriate level of command. leaving the tactical command to be undertaken ●● Prioritise objectives. from the scene. ●● Develop and implement plan taking into account SOP and DRA. Where there is an identifiable geographical ●● Communicate and control the plan. focus of an incident, tactical management or ●● Evaluate the effectiveness of plan. Silver Command is usually undertaken from an Incident Control Point normally adjacent to the The findings of the above assessment will prompt scene of operations. Other agencies however, may the IC to consider whether to request additional choose to discharge their functions from a remote resources should they be required, either in the form location, i.e. the Police may adopt a Police Station of specialist equipment or purely for additional for example or the Local Authority may chose to personnel. Any such request at an incident may operate from their administrative offices. In such trigger the attendance of a more Senior Officer(s) cases it is vitally important to co-operate through and a dedicated Command Support Officer liaison officers who would provide a vital transfer (Team). of information. If the incident is geographically dispersed, such as wide area flooding, riot situations If the incident becomes multi-agency and other or perhaps the consequences of an air crash, the services are operating their command structures at senior fire commander will make a decision about similar levels, then the FRS ‘Incident Commander’ where the optimum location should be. would assume the role of ‘Fire Silver’. Likewise, Sector Commanders would become ‘Fire Bronzes’. In a developing situation and where the use of either Bronze Commanders must motivate and control a significant additional resources or specialist crews doing difficult, dangerous, and sometimes equipment is required, the Silver Commander may distressing work. They frequently have to lead be assisted by an FRS specialist advisor. These from the front. Consequently, their timeframes are advisors are specialists in their particular fields typically short, with quick decisions and ongoing and may be mobilised by the FRS National Co- appraisals of the developing risks (Dynamic Risk ordination Centre (FRSNCC) to attend an incident Assessment) being necessary a lot of the time. to offer tactical advice to the IC. It is not intended that they take charge of any incident. 1.7.2 Tactical (Silver) Level Command The Silver Commander’s role is to manage the The value of an FRS advisor at a tactical level overall incident, determining priorities, allocating has been recognised because FRS officers cannot resources and obtaining additional resources be expected to have a complete and detailed as required. It will be necessary to plan and co- knowledge and understanding of every policy ordinate tasks to be undertaken and liaise with other and procedure surrounding the diverse roles agencies wherever necessary to co-ordinate efforts of Urban Search and Rescue (USAR), Mass to achieve this. The Silver on-scene commander Decontamination (MD), High Volume Pumping

Incident Command 15 (HVP) etc. When utilising resources provided by need to be addressed strategically through Gold or the New Dimension Programme (often referred to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) as it may as “national assets”) special provisions have become be referred to, or possibly even the Regional Civil necessary. This includes a ‘Convoy Procedure’ for Contingencies Committee (RCCC), see Chapter 3. moving a number of vehicles, potentially over large distances throughout the country, a ‘Strategic SCG members are representatives drawn from Holding Area’ for holding the vehicles close to all relevant agencies with the authority to the scene of operations prior to deployment, and make executive decisions appropriate to the Enhanced Command Support (ECS) which will be circumstances. adopted to support the existing command structure and assist in the control and co-ordination of these The Gold Commander will typically: additional assets. ●● Be located away from the scene. Most 1.7.3 Strategic (Gold) Level Command agencies have dedicated facilities for such Most incidents, and the early stages of more occurrences. serious incidents, may only require operational, or ●● Establish a framework for the overall operational and tactical, levels of command. If it management of the incident(s). becomes apparent that the scale of resources or level ●● Establish a policy within which Silver of decision making required are beyond the tactical Commanders will work, also known as commander’s capacity or authority, or if there is setting ‘tactical parameters’ an example of the need to co-ordinate more than one incident/ which may be ‘allowing a fire to burn itself scene, then a Strategic or ‘Gold’ Command will be out’ where ‘run off water’ could cause an necessary. Gold will be a major support to Silver, environmental catastrophe as oppose to often discussing tactics and their implications and airborne pollution. acting as an advisor. ●● Determine strategic objectives that should be recorded and periodically reviewed. The strategic or “Gold” level is the most senior in an ●● Provide resources, or determine limitations organisation and rarely comes into play in pure Fire upon levels of resourcing. Service operations. However, it can often feature in ●● Prioritise the demands from a number multi-service operations such as major incidents, of Silver Commanders and allocation of large-scale civil disorder, wide area flooding or resources. other protracted and serious incidents. Whereas ●● Ensure that there are clear lines of “Gold” does not directly deal with operations on communication. the ground, at tactical or “Silver” level, it can often ●● Ensure that there is long term resourcing and involve political considerations and policy level expertise for command resilience. decisions that extend beyond a single organisation. ●● Undertake appropriate liaison with strategic ‘Gold’ or strategic command is invariably exercised managers in other agencies. at a distance from the scene of the incident. It is ●● Plan beyond the immediate response phase intended to take the longer view of the situation; for recovering from the emergency and the time frame of Gold, or strategic command, is returning to a state of ‘new normality’. in days rather than hours or minutes. The requirement for strategic management may not Major incidents may place considerable demands apply to all responding agencies owing to different on the resources of the responding organisations, levels of engagement; however emergencies are with consequent disruption of day to day activities, invariably multi-agency and rarely remain with a and they may have long-term implications for a single agency. It may therefore be appropriate for community or the environment. Such matters will an agency not involved at strategic level to send

16 Fire Service Manual a liaison officer to the meeting of the SCG. SCG supporting and leading incident management from m e m b e r s a r e r e p r e s e nt a t ive s d r aw n f r o m a l l r eleva nt a strategic perspective. Roles within the ICS will agencies with the authority to make executive draw on those standards as appropriate, and some decisions appropriate to the circumstances. variations in application will necessarily be found, reflecting particular circumstances of the incident, The SCG should be based at a pre-planned the organisations involved, the capabilities of the location, away from the noise and confusion of command team, etc. any disaster scene, normally in the first instance police headquarters. On most occasions it will be 1.9 Incident Management the responsibility of the police to establish and and Decision Making chair the group. However this may change to the ‘lead’ organisation, for example the local authority The processes associated with the management during the recovery phase when the emergency and command of serious or large scale operational services have little or no involvement. incidents are complex and detailed. Much work has been done to assist Incident Commanders and In the event of a wide scale emergency the SCG others charged with operational responsibilities to will need to liaise with neighbouring SCGs and in understand the cognitive and emotional processes the recovery phase, the appropriate Government that occur at such times. Appendix 3 to this manual Office of the region or devolved administration. gives an insight into the psychological processes involved. Understanding these will help in dealing A member of one of the Fire and Rescue Service’s with ones own reactions to challenging situations specialist advisory teams may be mobilised to as they arise. advise the Fire Gold Commander at an incident which may be unusually large, protracted or However, such a description of the cognitive “catastrophic”. processes is not a tool. In the search for a device to practically assist commanders in the discharge 1.8 The Operational of their responsibilities, experienced officers have reported the value they have derived from the Commander’s Competence Decision Making Model developed by the London Because of the widely differing demands of the Fire Brigade. See Figure 1 overleaf. va r iou s com ma nd a nd oper at ional roles w it h i n major incident management, the competences associated This is a cyclical process control model, not unlike a with each level are necessarily different. Chapter 5 Deming “Plan, Do, Check, Action” cycle (Deming outlines this in more detail, and gives guidance to W E, “Out of the Crisis”, Cambridge, Press those responsible for development and assessment Syndicate, 1982), which may assist commanders in of commanders at key levels. The key levels are achieving their operational objectives. An obvious reflected in the National Occupational Standards application is in the analytical phase of the risk (NOS), WM.7 for those working at the operational assessment. The full explanatory note is appended level of command and EFSM.2 for those responsible at Appendix 4, courtesy of London Fire Brigade. for tactical or incident ground levels of command. EFSM.1 describes the role of those tasked with

Incident Command 17 Figure 1

18 Fire Service Manual Incident Command Chapter 2 Chapter 2 – Organisation on the Incident Ground

2.1 General in readiness for not only localised incidents, but for cross border and national incidents of varying This chapter focuses on organising and controlling complexity. operations on the incident ground, including the specialist support to operational sectors from support sectors and advisors. 2.2 The Role of the Incident Commander The Incident Command System (ICS) provides a The FRS Incident Commander at an operational clear framework to assist the Incident Commander incident is the ‘nominated competent person’, to organise and deploy available resources in a usually identified by wearing the IC’s surcoat. This safe and efficient manner. It provides the IC with role need not invariably be fulfilled by the most a ready to use organisational structure that can senior officer present, but the senior officer present be adapted to fit every incident, from a one pump does have a moral and organisational responsibility attendance to the largest most complex incident. within the overall command structure that cannot It is therefore essential that the ICS is adopted in be divested. This arrangement allows an officer full and becomes familiar to all personnel so that more senior to the IC to adopt a mentoring or the ‘language’ and concepts are fully understood monitoring role.

Incident Command 19 As each operational incident is different, IC’s will 2.3 Levels of Command need to adapt the strategic plans and systems of There are three levels of command and control that work, which are based on generic risk assessments, may be brought into play at a multi-agency incident, in the light of the specific circumstances of the known as Bronze, Silver and Gold. The terms incident, and the resources actually available to are used to describe tiers of joint, multi-agency deal with those risks. emergency management and will normally only be utilised where a combined multi-agency response At any incident, the Incident and/or Sector is necessary. The adoption of this nationally agreed Commanders (SCs) have to set tactical priorities. The management framework will assist to integrate following is an example of a typical list of objectives plans and procedures between agencies ensuring that have to be prioritised at a structure fire. that roles and responsibilities are understood. 1. Perform rescues and ensure medical support is The UK’s emergency responders model (Strategic called for casualties without delay. – Gold, Tactical – Silver and Operational – Bronze), 2. If the building is already fully involved in fire, which is described in more detail in Chapter one, take steps to prevent spread to exposure risks. can be summarised as follows. 3. Contain the spread of fire within the building or affected portions of it as soon as possible. ●● Operational – which is the level at which 4. Extinguish the fire. command of immediate “hands-on” or task 5. Commence damage control operations as soon level work is undertaken at the scene of as conditions and resources allow. an incident. If the incident develops with 6. Commence ventilation as soon as conditions several agencies needing to work effectively and resources allow. together, each sector would become a Bronze 7. Commence cutting away and investigations Command in line with other agencies. It to ensure all cavities and voids have been must be emphasised that even if the incident covered. is “multi-agency”, the operational level role 8. Consider the welfare of victims or those who would not be formally labelled “Bronze” have suffered loss at the earliest possible time, unless a tactical or silver level was in place, calling in external support as necessary. and usually when a multi-agency “Silver” group had been formed. This assumes an appropriate risk assessment has ●● Tactical – which is the level of overall been completed, has been properly announced and command on the incident ground and which is under continual review (see Chapter 4). These ensures that the Operational levels are tactical priorities will also be helpful at debriefs supported, and if there are several sectors and when ICs or Sector Commanders are self operating to ensure their operations are co- assessing their own, and their teams’, performance ordinated to achieve maximum effectiveness. at an incident: Again, if the incident develops along multi- agency lines this role would become Silver The IC has much to consider when dealing with an Command. An incident may be formally incident and this will become even more complex structured with multi-agency Bronze and with increased scale and duration. Clearly, no Silver Commands functioning without a officer can be expected to handle every aspect of ‘Gold’ being in place. the operations in progress personally, so the system ●● Strategic – may be invoked where an event of incident command described in this manual or situation may have significant impact will provide operational and managerial tools and on resources, probably involving a large support. number of agencies or has impact for an

20 Fire Service Manual extended duration. This will be referred for purposes of effective inter-service liaison that to as Gold Command and will normally the levels of command and the labelling associated be implemented as a multi-agency group with them are understood but not interpreted too (SCG, see Chapter 3) bringing together Gold rigidly. Also, it needs to be understood that because Commanders from relevant organisations. It an incident might be serious for one service, e.g., is possible, but not usual, to designate a Gold large fire for the fire service or a murder for the Commander solely within an FRS operation police, it does not necessarily involve other services, of very large scale which is not impacting either at all, or at the same command level. upon other organisations to any great extent. Whereas an incident may be structured up to 2.4 Duties of the Incident Silver level without Gold necessarily being Commander at Operational brought into play, if a Gold is formed, the (Bronze) Level levels below will invariably be structured as Silver(s) and Bronze(s).5 Upon arrival at an incident the IC has a wide base of information to consider and this will become It should be borne in mind that different services, even more complex and onerous as the incident depending on the circumstances of the specific escalates. It is therefore essential that consideration incident, may choose to exercise command at is given as soon as possible to start laying the similar levels from different locations. The most foundations of the Incident Command System. common example of this is where the police Silver This will include the following: Commander chooses to locate in a police HQ or communications facility, whereas the FRS IC ●● Consider all of the relevant information, (or Fire Silver), chooses to co-ordinate the Fire whether from the pre-planning stage or that Bronzes, or Sector Commanders, from the incident available on the scene prior to forming a plan. ground communications facility, most frequently ●● Identify the hazards and risks to crews a command unit. When the Fire Silver needs to and third parties, and select a safe system attend a multi-agency liaison meeting at the police of work ensuring that a ‘Tactical Mode’ is commander’s HQ, or elsewhere, the incident declared and communicated to all those on ground will be left under the supervision of another the incident ground and to central mobilising senior member of the Silver Command team for the where it will be documented on your behalf. duration of the absence. In these circumstances, ●● Assess the available resources against the designation of “IC” will rest with the officer the objectives of the incident and request on-scene. additional support where required. ●● Form a robust plan to meet the objectives of If a fire incident, or multi-agency incident with the incident, prioritising where necessary a FRS controlled “hot zone”, e.g. a USAR or if the resources are not adequate to achieve mass decontamination event, escalates to Gold them simultaneously. The failure to prioritise level, it is entirely possible that the Fire IC, who may compromise a plan and put personnel at may be a Principal Officer, will assume incident risk (see Decision Making Model in Chapter 1) command, sending a lower ranking officer, with the ●● Consider environmental issues such as run appropriate experience and authority to act, as the off water or airborne pollution as soon as FRS representative at Gold. It is the responsibility practicable and where appropriate inform the of the Principal Officer to assume the Gold role relevant authorities, working within recognised as soon as circumstances permit. This reflects the protocols agreed with other agencies. positions are role related. It is, therefore, important

5 It should be borne in mind that the NATO hierarchy of Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels doesn’t align directly to the structure of the UK Emergency Services, therefore allowances will have to be made where the military are deployed.

Incident Command 21 ●● Establish effective arrangements for ●● Confirm the existing plan according to the communications, both on the incident ground agreed tactical priorities. itself and to provide regular updates to central ●● Confirm the risk assessment and Tactical control and oncoming supporting officers. Mode, ensuring that safe systems of work are ●● Establish and maintain effective liaison with being utilised. other agencies, whose knowledge may be ●● Ensure that the requested resources are critical in helping to achieve the objectives. adequate and effectively deployed to reflect ●● Give early consideration to welfare, both of the tactical priorities. If the incident is under fire crews and any other party affected by resourced a request for further assistance the incident. should be made. ●● Prepare to brief a more senior officer using ●● Ensure that communications are effective all available relevant information so that and well structured informative messages a decision can be made as to whether that have been passed on and documented. officer should assume command. ●● Review the command structure of the ●● Establish support in order to provide a incident and ensure that no one is fulfilling a reporting and holding area for oncoming role beyond their experience and capability resources, to assist with communications and that the spans of control of individuals from the incident ground and to document remain manageable. necessary information, this will be formally ●● Evaluate the tactical plan against all referred to as Command Support. available information, ensuring that a risk v ●● Constantly update the risk assessment and benefit analysis is performed (see Chapter 4). subsequent plan based on the availability of ●● Confirm that adequate measures have been additional information. taken to address any welfare issues that may ●● Communicate plan to Sector Commanders arise from the incident. and ensure regular updates are given and ●● Maintain effective liaison with other received on progress. agencies ensuring that each are working towards a common set of objectives. 2.5 Duties of the IC at ●● Initiate any necessary investigations as Tactical (Silver) Level soon as practicable, ensuring that possible evidence is recovered or preserved and On arrival at an incident the Tactical officer witness statements are taken. Where legal must report to Command Support and book in proceedings may follow the police should be attendance, ensuring that mobilising control is involved in the operational decision making made aware. Contact must be made with the IC as process at the earliest possible time and full soon as practicable and the exchange of relevant co-operation afforded to them. information regarding the incident undertaken. A ●● Consider any relevant points that would decision whether to take over the incident, remain be of benefit during the debrief, including at the incident in a mentoring or monitoring role, or good and bad practices, success or failure of allow the existing IC to remain in charge, must be equipment or policies and the performance taken and effectively communicated to all relevant of crews. parties. To ensure that there is no doubt about the ‘handover’, the process would be confirmed by the The IC is responsible for securing and controlling exchange of the IC’s tabard. resources on the incident ground. The assessment of resources will include consideration of the need Where the decision to take over the incident for additional: is undertaken, the following points must be considered:

22 Fire Service Manual ON-SCENE E Operational Sectors SCEN F- OF

Sector 1

Multi-Agency Fire Silver Incident Silver Commander Command Sector 2 Location determined by the nature of the incident

Command Support

Support Sectors

USAR Water Sector 3 ON-SCENE E

Safety Mass Decon SCEN Support Sectors F- Operational Sectors OF

●● Appliances ●● Decontamination ●● Personnel ●● Water ●● Equipment ●● Foam ●● Firefighting media ●● Relief Management ●● Consumables (e.g. fuel, BA cylinders) ●● Crew Rehabilitation and Welfare ●● Safety The degree of control an IC will need to maintain ●● Communications will depend, in part, on the size and demands of ●● Press Liaison the incident. At larger incidents specific areas of resource control may be delegated to appointed Each of these functions may be assigned by the officers. Such areas may include: IC to support sectors if the scale of the operation demands it. If this occurs, the support Sector ●● Operational Sectors Commander will report in the line of command to ●● Command support the Command Support Officer, who has a similar ●● Marshalling command responsibility level to an Operations ●● BA Main Control Commander (see Chapter 2.11.2). ●● Logistics

Incident Command 23 Where complex or technical operations such as Gold Commander will direct or take charge of High Volume Pumping, Mass Decontamination operations on the actual incident ground. The Fire or Urban Search and Rescue are being carried Gold Commander will participate in the multi- out in operational sectors, they can be assisted by agency Gold group where one has been deemed support sectors in the same way as BA operations appropriate, and from that position: are supported by a BA Main Control. The IC must ensure that there is never any misunderstanding ●● Determine and promulgate a set of strategic or confusion about the Incident or Sector aims and objectives and review them Commander’s direct line of operational command regularly. as opposed to the support and advice provided by ●● Set tactical parameters for Silver to operate support sectors and their staff, some of which may within. hold rank higher than those in the sectors being ●● Prioritise the demands of the Silver supported. It is important that mutual assistance Commander(s) and allocate personnel and arrangements and standard operating procedures resources to meet requirements. fully address these issues. ●● Formulate and implement media handling and communication with the public. 2.6 Duties of a Strategic (Gold) ●● Direct planning and operations beyond the Level Commander immediate response in order to facilitate recovery. This paragraph refers to the role of the senior FRS ●● Support and advise Silver. officer who will discharge the responsibilities ●● Work with partner agencies. of a strategic commander when a multi-agency Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) is brought 2.7 Structuring an Incident into play during an operational incident. The task is to take overall organisational responsibility for The ICS is based on a framework that assists with the the management of that incident and to establish management of resources at an incident. It enables the policy and strategic framework within which the IC to delegate responsibility for a range of tasks Silver(s) will work. It is not intended that the Fire and functions during what may be a stressful,

24 Fire Service Manual rapidly developing situation whilst remaining very Sectorisation should be introduced when the much in control. The main elements of the standard demands placed upon an IC make it imperative that ICS framework are: responsibility and authority are delegated to ensure appropriate command and safety monitoring of all ●● A clear, defined and visible line of command; activities, and to reduce officers’ spans of control. ●● Management of the span of control of key Even if it is possible for the IC to oversee all commanders; operations, the need to sectorise will arise if there is ●● Appropriately shared responsibility and so much going on that the IC risks being distracted authority, with a clear definition and and unable to give sufficient attention to each task. understanding of roles and responsibilities. This would indicate that the IC’s span of control is ●● A consistent and predictable pattern of in danger of becoming too great. Where spans of sectorisation e.g. at a four sided building the control begin to reach or exceed 5 lines of direct front or main scene of operations becomes communication at a working incident, it is possible Sector 1, and Sectors 2, 3 and 4 are allocated that performance will be adversely affected. in a clockwise rotation, Sector 3 being the rear. In unusual buildings or sites the IC The creation of sectors will only be done on should sectorise in a way as consistent with the instructions of the IC who will sectorise the model as possible appropriately to meet the demands of the incident following the standard model. Other than in Understanding the concept of ‘Span of Control’ exceptional circumstances, sectorisation must is key to managing large volumes of activity and follow this standard model. Using this approach, information and is discussed more fully in 2.10, Sector 1 is invariably located at the front (or main however, sectorisation is key to managing these scene of operations) progressing thereafter in a volumes of activity and providing a clear line of clockwise direction, with Sector 3 normally at the reporting for everyone on the incident ground. rear. (see examples in the following diagrams). Research has shown that at large incidents, ICs This will ensure continuity at major or cross border were not only making decisions about tactics, incidents where crews from two or more Fire and resources, logistics etc, but also mentally building Rescue Services would likely attend. an organisational chart at the same time. The use of a standard and predictable model of incident In buildings or environments that don’t lend organisation, to be applied during the early stages themselves to the ‘preferred model’, then it is vitally of escalation, eases this task considerably. However important when delegating the responsibility of it must be done correctly and consistently. sectors that a thorough understanding of both the physical boundary and parameters in which Adherence to common terminology is also very to operate are communicated to all who need to important as an aid to developing a common understand the layout to avoid confusion. understanding of the situation which is being dealt with. The ICS uses ‘roles’ to describe Frequently, operations take place in more than one responsibilities thus allowing individual FRSs location during an incident, for example at the front to assign each function according to their own and rear of a building. In such cases the IC’s span particular circumstances. The standard model of control may only be small. At a typical semi- allows the structure of the incident to develop in a detached house fire the IC has the ability to monitor predictable and manageable way. tasks at front and back simply by moving to and fro, and therefore it is unlikely that there will be a need 2.7.1 Sectorisation of Incidents to sectorise. However, if the house is mid terrace Incidents are best managed if they are kept as simple with no quick access from front to rear, then despite as possible, if it is not necessary to sectorise, then the small span of control it is unlikely that the IC to reduce the possibility of barriers to information will be able to adequately manage operations and flow between crews and the IC, it is best not to.

Incident Command 25 Typical Example of Sectorisation Structure Fire

Sector 3 Sector 2

Main Entrance

Sector 1 Sector 4

Primary Source of Operations

supervise safety at both locations simultaneously. The principle to be borne in mind is that sectorisation In this case the most appropriate response would is driven by the need to delegate responsibility and be for the IC to retain command of the front of the authority in order to ensure appropriate command building, and to assign all operations at the rear of and safety monitoring of all activities. the building to another officer of appropriate level and experience. 2.7.2 Vertical Sectorisation In buildings or structures with multi-floors where It is important to note that where this happens at operations may be spread over several levels, i.e. small scale incidents only, it is not mandatory that high rise buildings or ships, the suggested model this officer is nominated as a Sector Commander above would not prove to be effective or easy to and equally does not necessarily mean that a execute. The vertical sectorisation model is based separate Sector Commander has also to be created on maintaining effective spans of control when for the front of the building. Sector Commanders cannot follow the normal practice of being physically present in the sector, Similarly, at an RTC there may be no need to due to smoke, heat etc. formally sectorise, however if crews are assigned to a vehicle, which has come to rest 30 metres At an incident in a multi-storey building external down an embankment remote from the main sectorisation may be necessary as well as internal, scene of operations on the roadway, it may be for example if aerial appliances are being used necessary to assign that vehicle as a separate area of responsibility, which might be a Sector.

26 Fire Service Manual for access or rescue. External sectorisation would ●● Fire Sector – this is an operational sector follow the normal model, identifying the sectors and would be the main area of firefighting by number. and rescue operations, consisting of the floor/s directly involved in fire, plus one level Internal sectorisation has to recognise the particular above and one level below. If crews involved constraints of operating in an environment where in this exceed acceptable spans of control, the “fire floor” constitutes a barrier to the areas consideration should be given to activating a above, and to some extent the entire area from Search Sector.. above the bridgehead, which is conventionally ●● Search Sector – this is an operational sector located two floors beneath the fire floor, must be and would be the area of operations in a high considered a hazard zone. It may only be necessary rise, above the ‘fire sector’ where search to operate a single operational sector internally, and rescue, venting and other operations with external and support sectors operating outside are taking place. In a basement scenario the as described above. However, at an incident where Search Sector could extend from fresh air a large number of personnel are firefighting, to the lowest level. If the distance from the searching, or ventilating etc. more than one internal ground floor lobby to the bridgehead is more sector may be required to ensure that the Sector than two or three floors and spans of control Commander’s span of control is not exceeded. The require it, consideration should be given to zones of activity within the structure (e.g. internal activating a Lobby Sector. firefighting operations) could then be identified as in the following examples:

Search Sector

Fire Fire Sector Sector

Lobby Sector

Figure 2.1 High-rise fire

Incident Command 27 ●● Lobby Sector – this is a support sector and All support sectors must report to the IC via the would cover the area of operations from the command support function. This is important to ground floor lobby to the bridgehead, which preserve spans of control. At more serious incidents, is normally two floors below the fire floor. it is likely that the command support function will The Lobby Sector Commander will act as be headed by an officer of some seniority and the co-ordinator of all the logistics needs of experience. the fire and search Sector Commanders, who will, on most occasions, need to be located at Although the diagrams give examples of five, the bridgehead directing operations via radio eight, fifteen etc, pump incidents, this is illustrative and liaising with the BAECO’s. The Lobby only and the range is, of course, variable and Sector Commander would also co-ordinate dependent on the requirements of the incident and all operations beneath the bridgehead level, the resources of the individual FRS. including salvage and ventilation, liaising with fellow Sector Commanders in the usual way. Services and organisations listed to the right of the command support function, police and press, etc., It is not intended that the system be over-prescriptive (40 pump incident, p43) are examples only, and and situations may arise where other approaches the list is far from exhaustive. It may include any may need to be taken, for example in a large or or all of the agencies that are stakeholders in the complex building it may be necessary to introduce incident. more than one sector on a floor. This system was necessary at an actual incident, where two sectors The larger number of crew members in the vicinity were required each with its own bridgehead, of Command Support that appear in the diagrams operating in different stairwells and an Operations after a command unit is in place, represent those Commander co-ordinating the sectors from the allocated as command support and radio operators lobby area. etc. Individual FRSs will have different ways of managing this requirement. All other aspects of the structure, e.g. lines of responsibility, lines of communication and reporting 2.7.3 Location of Sector Commanders for the Sector Commander would function in the It must be emphasised that Sector Commanders normal manner. See figure 2.1 for an example of should be in direct communication with personnel vertical sectorisation. in their sector. Sector Commanders provide direct and visible leadership at each sector and need to These principles can be readily applied to other remain directly accessible to the Crew Commanders situations where vertical, internal sectorisation for whom they are responsible. In cases where it is may be necessary. essential that an IC requires a Sector Commander to leave their post, for a briefing or another purpose, The diagrams on p37–p43 are examples of the they must be replaced by someone with appropriate Incident Command structure applied to incidents, competence and authority to maintain continuity and how the command structure expands to match of supervision. Any such replacement must be the demands of an escalating incident. communicated to all those operating in the sector.

The layout is not intended to be prescriptive, but 2.7.4 Support or Functional Sectors certain features are considered “standard”. For Not only may incidents be sectorised geographically example, external operational sectors are generally as described above, but they may be sectorised numbered not named. All operational sectors report by ‘function’ or support sectors, e.g. water, direct to the IC or to the Operations Commander if decontamination etc, such sectors are designated one is in place. as the IC sees fit and may be grouped according to availability of officers and resources to suit the need.

28 Fire Service Manual It is important that established lines of command 2.7.5 Assuming and Handing- are observed, Commanders of support sectors over Command of Sectors should report directly to Command Support. When command of an incident changes for what ever reason it must be done in a disciplined and Examples of support sectors include: formal manner. This includes the appointment of, or change of a Sector Commander. In every case a ●● Command Support clear and precise exchange of information must be ●● Marshalling undertaken to confirm the status of the incident or ●● Logistics sector prior to assuming command or delegating ●● Safety responsibility. ●● Communication ●● Water 2.8 Managing Crews on the ●● Foam Incident Ground ●● Decontamination ●● BA Main Control Where possible, crews should be kept intact and ●● Welfare work as a team on the incident ground. An IC should remember that, for a variety of reasons, crews can

Incident Command 29 be tempted to self-deploy. This must be avoided The potential for post-incident stress must be as it is essential to account for all of the available recognised and officers should be trained to identify resources. A thorough briefing of crews must take signs of this. At protracted and complex incidents place prior to deployment so that safety critical support and counselling may need to begin on the information can be shared. The main priority of incident ground and must in any case be addressed any Incident Commander is the safety of personnel as a post-incident consideration. under their control. This must be established by identifying the risks that are present, adopting 2.9 Line of Command appropriate control measures and ensuring that safe systems of work are used. Using this approach For the ICS to work effectively it is essential that firefighters can carry out their duties and remain all of those involved at each incident: safe whilst doing so. ●● are adequately trained, At large and sectorised incidents in particular, ●● are competent, it is important for crews to be aware of the IC’s ●● are confident in their ability, intentions and the overall objectives which have ●● know who they are responsible for, been set for the incident. This will form the ●● know who they need to report to, parameters within which they are deployed in their ●● know what their operational brief is. sectors and crews. The system provides for a line (or chain) of Once crews have been briefed they must follow command to form to ensure that every activity on those requirements and work safely. This will the incident ground, be it within a crew or a sector, include wearing the appropriate personal protective is working under the responsibility of a competent equipment (PPE) and ensuring that access and person. The system must be flexible enough to egress is properly secured at all times. The IC and meet the demands of every incident regardless of Sector Commanders where appropriate will need size or complexity, however, these principles are to maintain a position where, as far as practicable, central to the system. progress can be monitored. Where the level of risk requires it, the appointment of one or more safety 2.10 Span of Control officers must be considered to act as advisors at One facet of the span of control is the pivotal need key levels. to maintain lines of communications, which at times may be numerous, in order to achieve the Once crews are at work they will require a level of objectives of the incident. This may consist of supervision and support, this may mean having the direct or indirect reports from individuals, crews necessary resources available (e.g. BA cylinders or sectors. and servicing facilities etc) and to ensure that their welfare needs are addressed. Care must be taken to Communications will also be received from give crews sufficient rest, relief and refreshment. other emergency services, assisting agencies The frequency of relief’s will depend upon the and control centres. When analysing the span of demands of the incident and the individual policies control, careful consideration should be given as of each FRS. A recognised problem exists at to how communications will be managed, and the protracted rescues where personal commitment pressures that may be placed upon the Incident to the victims is high. Under these circumstances Commander. the level of fatigue must be measured against the continued desire to work. A balance must be found The system requires that direct lines of between safe operations and crew morale. communication and areas of involvement need to be limited to manageable levels to enable the

30 Fire Service Manual commander to cope with the flow of information. to supervise the sectors. Likewise, if the number Failure to do so could, and indeed often does, result of sectors continues to grow, the IC may need to in essential, risk critical information being badly group the sectors under more than one Operations communicated or overlooked, the result of which Commander. Naturally, incidents on such a scale could be catastrophic. are rare, nevertheless the system must be able to cope with them, and commanders must understand The span of control for tactical roles should clearly how such a scale is dealt with by proper ideally be as narrow as possible. No individual application of the standard ICS model. should be responsible for so many aspects of the incident that it is difficult or impossible to give In the diagram on page 34, an IC is responsible for sufficient attention to each. In most cases the 3 working crews at an incident and has detailed span of control should be limited to five lines of a firefighter to carry out a specific task, possibly direct communications, however this may in some Command Support, which involves regular contact. cases be excessive depending upon the intensity of The span of control for this IC is 4. activity of those lines. Where this is apparent, for example during the fast moving early stages of an 2.11 Roles and Responsibilities incident, the direct lines may need to be reduced or within Incident Command limited further to ensure that commanders do not become overburdened. In a rapidly developing or In order to manage a large incident effectively complex incident where the intensity is great, the the IC may decide to delegate responsibility and span of control may need to be as small as 2 to 3, devolve authority for some of the operations. This whereas later on, in more a stable situation, up to 6 can be achieved by sectorising the incident, either or 7 may be acceptable. geographically or by functions as described in Paragraph 2.7.4. The span of control for support roles, e.g. the Command Support Officer, may in some The Incident Commander remains at all times circumstances be wider, however this depends responsible for the overall management of the very much on the circumstances of the case and incident and will focus on the command and the stage of the incident. control, deployment of resources, tactical planning and co-ordination of the sector operations and Therefore the ICS offers a structure within which running the incident itself. an appropriate span of control can be maintained at all times by providing for additional roles to be 2.11.1 Sector Commander introduced into the incident command structure The Sector Commander will report to the IC or when the demands on any individual’s attention to the Operations Commander if one is in place, become excessive. taking responsibility for the resources and the achievement of operational objectives within that At small incidents where the area of operations sector. The Sector Commander will principally is easily manageable and the use of sectors not focus on command and control, deployment required, the IC may oversee all aspects of the of resources, tactical planning, BA search co- incident directly. As the number of crews increases ordination and most importantly health and safety beyond 4 or 5, and the burden of supervision of personnel. The progress of operations in each becomes more challenging, the IC should consider sector must be communicated fully to the Incident or stepping back and appointing two or more Sector Operations Commander to enable them to monitor Commanders to supervise the crews. If the number the overall progress towards resolution of the of sectors has to increase beyond 4 or 5, the IC incident. A Sector Commander has a high degree of may choose to appoint an Operations Commander operational independence in determining how the

Incident Command 31 objectives agreed with the IC are to be delivered, the press, police, public and other agencies, the but must at all times ensure that the IC is aware of number of lines of communication will potentially the tactical mode being employed. Any change in become unmanageable. tactics must have the IC’s explicit approval, (or the approval of the operations commander where one The function of the Operations Commander is to is appointed), other than to withdraw personnel supervise and co-ordinate the operations within immediately from a potentially hazardous area. In sectors. The Operations Commander will also such a case the IC must be informed as soon as is assume the responsibility on behalf of the IC of practicable and the tactical mode should be updated approving changes of tactical mode. The Operations accordingly. The officer assigned to command of a Commander is a member of the command team and sector must assume the incident ground radio call operates on behalf of the IC at Tactical/Silver level. sign for that sector e.g. Sector Two Commander, sometimes just shortened to “Sector Two”. The Operations Commander should avoid becoming involved in support activities or 2.11.2 Operations Commander dealing with the press etc, these functions being The purpose of the Operations Commander is to addressed by Command Support. This allows allow the IC to maintain a workable span of control the Operations Commander to co-ordinate the when an incident develops in size or complexity. Sector Commanders, offering support, addressing If, for example, an incident has more than four resourcing issues, and ensuring that risk operational sectors and some support or functional assessments have been performed at the proper sectors such as water, decontamination, and damage times, are of the expected quality, and have been control for example, then taking into consideration appropriately recorded. the likelihood that the IC would need to liaise with

32 Fire Service Manual It is important to note that if an incident does not Other responsibilities of Command Support include: demand the use of an Operations Commander due to the number of sectors, or the activity within the ●● To act as first contact point for all attending sectors, then this extra tier is best omitted from the appliances and officers and to maintain a command structure. There is no advantage in over physical record of resources in attendance at structuring an incident with additional tiers if they the incident. are not needed. ●● To operate the main-scheme radio link to the mobilising control, to allocate fire ground In the event that an incident requires more than radio channels and to log all relevant data. one Operations Commander to maintain the span ●● To assist the IC in liaison with other of control then it is essential to ensure that their agencies, where appropriate a dedicated call signs are suitably distinguishable, either by Liaison Officer may be appointed. descriptive terms i.e. High Street Operations, ●● To direct all resources to the required Quayside Operations etc. or by alphanumeric terms operational location or marshalling area i.e. Alpha Operations, Bravo Operations etc., and as instructed by the IC and to record their that sectors understand exactly which operations operational status. command they fall within and are reporting to. If ●● To maintain a record of the findings of the the facility exists, consideration should be given risk assessment and operational decisions to allocating different fireground or tactical radio made or actions taken as a result of it. chan nels to each operations com mand, e.g. sectors 1 ●● To allocate and record specific roles and to 4 on one channel reporting to Alpha Operations, assignments of supporting officers. sectors 5 to 8 reporting to Bravo Operations on a ●● To record information about sectors, such separate radio channel. as the name of the Sector Commander, the identification of each sector, the physical 2.11.3 Command Support boundaries where appropriate, the resources Command Support should be introduced at all deployed and requested and the Tactical incidents to assist the IC in the management of Mode in operation. the scene. It should be initiated as soon as is practically possible as the importance of laying To assist with the function of the ‘initial’ command the foundations of command support in the early support duties, a support pack should be provided stages of an incident cannot be over emphasised. A on all vehicles that may warrant its use. suitably experienced member of personnel should be nominated to operate Command Support. At larger incidents where a dedicated Command This may be a firefighter during the early stages Support vehicle is mobilised an officer should be operating in, or adjacent to an appliance at a smaller delegated the task of heading the Command Support incident. The task being delegated to a suitably team (or Sector), with the task of supporting the IC. trained and experienced officer as an incident develops and more resources become available. Also at larger or escalating incidents, command The function may be managed from an appliance support, which at this time may have become the not directly involved in operations, an officer’s car Command Support Sector, may also be responsible or a dedicated command vehicle of some kind. for the following duties: Command Support should be clearly identified at every incident. ●● To arrange the positioning of appliances and to some extent marshalling. This may need to become a specific function assigned to a dedicated support sector. Close liaison

Incident Command 33 with the police or Highways Agency Traffic ●● Mapping the progress of the incident. Officers may be required to keep congestion ●● Logging decisions made and the rationale to a minimum. behind them. ●● Liaising with crews of specialist units such ●● Constructing time lines and utilising them to as BA Main Control, Urban Search and prompt the IC regarding progress. Rescue and High Volume Pumping etc. to ensure that they are utilised fully in support The amount of activity and span of control within the of the incident. Command Support Sector must itself be continually ●● Arranging for additional resources or monitored and where required additional staff specialist equipment as requested by the IC, should be requested to support the function. in support of Sector Commanders. ●● Liaising with other agencies as necessary, 2.11.4 The Command Team when such agencies attend an incident a The command team comprises of the IC and any system of ‘logging’ personnel must be other staff that are operating in a supporting role implemented, especially if they are to i.e. Command Support, Operations Commander enter the inner cordon. Supervision for and despite the likelihood of working from a remote such personnel may need to be arranged location, Sector Commanders. and a safety brief delivered prior to their deployment. At incidents requiring specialist equipment i.e. ●● Briefing designated personnel of their tasks USAR, HVP or Mass Decontamination etc, a and safety critical information. specialist advisor may be deployed to assist the IC, ●● Arranging for relief crews and equipment to in an advisory capacity only. ensure sustainability of deployment.

34 Fire Service Manual FRS’s will almost certainly adopt different Efforts have been made to avoid patterns and approaches to which roles and functions form part of colours used by other agencies wherever possible, the command team, however the aim is to integrate but in the absence of a national multi-agency policy and record decision making and communication of identification it may be necessary to clarify between the IC and those performing operational roles at the time. It should be noted that the above tasks. Some of the command support functions patterns are for use at conventional incidents and may take place from a location remote from the the patterns described do not conflict with other incident, particularly at major or multi-agency task specific requirements for use on motorways, incidents. railways, airports etc. Common sense indicates, however, that a full command structure is unlikely 2.12 Identification of to be established on a motorway carriageway or a Command Roles railway embankment with live traffic.

The command team comprises officers holding a In addition to the above the following are patterns variety of roles and it is essential for each to be of uniform that appear in the forthcoming diagrams easily identified. At any incident, but in particular at and are for illustration purposes only. cross border and other large incidents where officers who may not know each other personally have to work together, it is important that a commonly understood means of identification of roles is used. The following means of identification are not part of any standard but are in common usage:

Incident Commander – White surcoat (or in Scotland, red and white quadrants)

Sector Commander – Yellow surcoat with red shoulders

Operations Commander – Red surcoat

Command support – Red and white chequered surcoat

Incident Command 35 Incident Operations Sector Commander Commander Commander

Safety Gas Tight Mass Decontamination Officer Suit Wearer Director/Assistant

Crew USAR USAR Commander Team Leader Team Member

Crew BA Entry Command Support Member Control Officer Officer

Sector Boundary Support Area

Key for the following diagrams

36 Fire Service Manual Sector 1 Command Suppor t Sector 1 Commande r Inciden t Commande r Sector 2 Commander Sector 2 l 4 Pump Incident Brigade Cont ro 2 Pump Incident Incident Commander Command Support

Incident Command 37 5 Pump Incident fice r Safety Of Sector 1 Incident Commander Sector 1 Commande r Command Support Sector 2 Commande r Sector 2

38 Fire Service Manual s t Secto rs ational Sector Oper Suppor Sector 3 Commande r 8 Pump Incident Sector 3 am Inciden t Commande r Sector 1 Sector 1 Command Te Commande r Command Support Sector 2 Commander Sector 2 ater Sector W Commander ter Secto r Wa

Incident Command 39 s t Secto rs Sector 4 Commander ational Sector Sector 4 Oper Suppor 8 Pump Incident Sector 3 Commander Sector 3 am Inciden t Commande r Command Te Command Support Sector 1 Sector 1 Commander ector Decontamination Dir Secto r ter Sector Wa Commander Decontamination Sector 2 Commander ter Sector Sector 2 Wa

40 Fire Service Manual

s t Secto rs Sector 4 Commander ational Sector Sector 4 Oper Suppor 15 Pump Incident with15 Ops Commander Sector 3 Commander Sector 3 am Inciden t Commande r Operations Commande r Command Te Command Support ficer SafetyOf Sector 1 Sector 1 Commander ector Decontamination Dir Secto r ter Sector Wa Commander Decontamination Sector 2 Commander ter Sector Sector 2 Wa

Incident Command 41

s t Secto rs Sector 4 Commander ational Sector Sector 4 Oper Suppor 25 Pump Incident with Ops Commander Sector 3 am Sector 3 Inciden t Commande r Commander Operations Commande r Command Te Command Support fice r Safety Of Sector 1 Sector 1 Safety Sector Commander Foam Sector Commander ector ficer Decontamination Dir Secto r SafetyOf Sector 2 Commander Foam Sector ater Sector W Commander Decontamination ter Sector Sector 2 Wa

42 Fire Service Manual r Sector 8 Sector 8 Commande Sector 7 t Secto rs Sector 7 Commander s Suppor Sector 6 Sector 6 Commander ol onment Agency ational Sector ess Ambulance Liaison Envir FRS Contr Police Liaison Pr Council Emergency Planning Oper 40 Pump Incident Multi Ops Commanders ficer Safety Of Operations Sector 5 Commander 2 Sector 5 Commande r am Command Suppor t Command Te Incident Commander Operations Commander 1 Sector 4 Commander Sector 4 Safety Sector ter Sector Wa Commander ater Secto r W Sector 3 Commander Sector 3 ector Decontamination Dir fice r Sector Foam Sector Commander Safety Of Decontaminatio n Foam Sector Sector 2 Commander Sector 2 USAR Sector Commander Sector 1 USAR Secto r Sector 1 Commander

Incident Command 43 2.13 Briefing & Information 3. Establish communications with other agencies. (This may employ communications equipment Effective communication is of critical importance on agreed channels or simple direct verbal at all incidents. Information has to be relayed communication.) accurately from the IC to the crews carrying out 4. Establish communications with Sector the work and vice-versa so that the crews are aware Commanders for regular reporting between of the tactics being employed and the IC is aware of sectors and the IC and between Sector developments on the incident ground. The IC also Commanders themselves. has a duty to relay messages and information back 5. Utilise local systems. Some new and complex to mobilising control to ensure an accurate picture buildings and structures, particularly those of the incident is maintained and recorded. extending underground, have communication systems installed for emergency services’ use. The effective briefing of crews is essential. This may commence en route to an incident and will The above duties will invariably be the role of be supplemented on arrival once a risk assessment Command Support under the guidance of the IC. has been performed. Following the initial assessment, crews will be briefed as to the tasks to be undertaken and the hazards and risks they will 2.15 Inter-Agency Liaison face. The extent of the briefing will depend largely The IC must establish and maintain effective on the nature and extent of the incident; the pre- liaison with all other agencies, as appropriate. briefing for small fires that crews regularly deal This will include tactical liaison with other with is likely to be relatively straightforward. On emergency services to co-ordinate operational the other hand, at incidents where crews have little activities effectively, and liaison with technical experience and where there is a high risk factor, specialists whose specific knowledge may be the briefing will need to be comprehensive. The critical in helping to resolve the incident. There is need to debrief crews that have withdrawn from also a need to maintain effective liaison with the a working area during the incident should not be media, if in attendance, in order that appropriate overlooked as valuable safety critical information and accurate information is made available. This may be sourced at this time. is best done in conjunction with other emergency services and other agencies that are present to 2.14 Communications avoid conflicting reports. The IC must establish effective arrangements for Where there has been a work-related death the communications. Information is one of the most terms of the Work Related Death Protocol6 will important assets on the incident ground; information apply. The police will initially be responsible for must be gathered, orders issued and situation investigating the death and may require assistance reports received. The needs of other agencies must in securing evidence. The Protocol is between be assessed and provided for. Regular situation the police, Health and Safety Executive, Crown reports should be passed to the IC from all sectors Prosecution Service and the Local Government via the established communication links. Association. The Office of the Rail Regulator, Rail Accident Investigation Branch, Civil Aviation The IC will need to: Authority, Maritime and Coastguard Agency and the Fire and Rescue Service have agreed to abide 1. Establish communication links with FRS by the principles of the Protocol. control. 2. Ensure that incident ground radio channels and call signs have been correctly allocated.

6 Work-related deaths: a protocol for liaison available on HSE’s website

44 Fire Service Manual The command structures and responsibilities of After the initial cordon has been established to the other emergency services are summarised in secure the scene, usually by the police, the incident Chapter 3. The methods in which services relate is usually divided into two types of cordon: to each other is described in the publication ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’ HM 2.16.1 Inner Cordon Government November 2005, non statutory An inner cordon is used to control access to the guidance to the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 Ch 3 immediate scene of operations. Access to the area Responding Agencies, 2005. controlled by an inner cordon, which by definition is a high hazard zone, should be restricted to 2.16 Cordon Control the minimum numbers required for work to be undertaken safely and effectively. However, if Cordons are employed as an effective method of the incident is the consequence of a suspected controlling resources and maintaining safety on criminal act, the police will assume overall control the incident ground. The IC must consider the of the area and liaison between the two services safety of fire-fighters, the public, members of will determine entry and exit protocol. Personnel other emergency services and voluntary agencies should only enter when they have received a full attending. However, it must be noted that overall briefing and been allocated specific tasks. responsibility for the health and safety of personnel working within the inner cordon remains with The Civil Contingencies Act guidance document the individual agencies. Such agencies should entitled ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’ ensure that personnel arriving at the scene have states in Section 3.7 that “Fire and Rescue Services appropriate PPE and are adequately trained and are trained and equipped to manage ‘gateways’ briefed for the work they are to undertake within into the inner cordon, if requested to do so by the the cordon. Where this is not the case, the matter police”. Capacity to discharge this responsibility must be referred to the command level.

Incident Command 45 varies considerably across the UK, therefore it ●● Post-incident considerations is important that local planning and exercising is conducted to ensure misunderstandings about 2.18 Maintaining Control roles and responsibilities do not occur during an incident. The process of task and hazard identification, assessment of risk, planning, organisation, control, In terms of accounting for the safety and whereabouts monitoring and review of the control measures of personnel, it is already a responsibility of must continue until the last appliance leaves the ICs, delegated to Sector Commanders when the incident ground. incident has been sectorised, to be aware of which personnel and crews are active in their sector. As the urgency of the situation diminishes, the This responsibility may be more effectively IC may wish to nominate an officer to gather discharged if the Sector Commander has a sector information for the post-incident review. In some command folder or board, as used by some FRS’s cases this officer should start to take brief statements already. The addition of space for other agencies’ from crews before they leave the incident, whilst personnel, together with checklists for PPE, escorts events are still fresh in their minds, these records if necessary, and details of working location, is a may form part of the contemporaneous notes should minor but necessary addition. It would also be they be required. necessary to consider a safety briefing, a record of their presence and agreed evacuation signals. Details of all near misses i.e. occurrences that could have caused injury must be recorded because 2.16.2 Outer Cordon experience has shown that there are many near misses for every accident that causes harm. There This is used to prevent access by the public into is usually no reason for having to accept significant an area used by the emergency services while they operational risks at this stage. At the closing stages are attending an incident. The police will usually of the incident, the responsibility for health and control outer cordons. A traffic cordon may then safety must be handed over to the appropriate further supplement the outer cordon and the person. police, in liaison with the FRS and the ambulance service, will identify safe routes into and out of the At the closing stages of the incident the cordon for further emergency vehicles and other responsibility for health and safety must be handed attending agencies. over to the appropriate person.

Marshalling areas will usually be located within the outer cordon area if one or more are established. 2.19 Welfare The welfare of personnel is an important 2.17 The Closing Stage consideration. It must be given particular attention of the Incident by the command team at arduous or protracted incidents where the normal replacement of So far only the initial and developing stages of an personnel is delayed or prevented. Supervisors incident have been addressed, however the closing will continually monitor the physical condition of stages must also be considered and complacency crews, and where necessary relief crews must be must be avoided. The key activities involved in the anticipated and managed in an appropriate way. closing stages of an incident are: Welfare considerations such as the provision of ●● Maintaining control and transfer of health food and drink, toilet facilities and possibly shelter and safety from the elements should, where possible, be ●● Welfare

46 Fire Service Manual provided outside the immediate incident area and Where a formal post-incident review is required always away from any risk of direct or indirect it should be held at a venue that is suitable and contamination. convenient for those to be invited to attend. Copies of relevant documentation should be available and 2.20 Debriefing provision made for recording proceedings, outcomes and learning points. Notes of the outcomes and The IC and anyone nominated to gather information details of action taken, or planned, to address the at the incident should supervise completion of any learning points raised should be made available to necessary documentation and ensure that this is the relevant people as soon as practicable. complete, accurate and able to be made available promptly. 2.21 Post-Incident Considerations Debriefing plays an important part in promoting The majority of the activities and processes centre improvements in personal and organisational around the emergency phase of an incident. performance and should take place whenever However, there are issues which involve the FRS there is an opportunity to improve standards for well beyond the emergency phase. Examples of service delivery. Such post-incident reviews include the following: may be informal or formal; they can range from something as simple as brief discussions on return ●● Post-mortem enquiries and Coroner's to station from a minor incident, to a large multi- hearings agency debrief or a Public Enquiry following a ●● Fire investigation major incident. The format chosen for the review ●● Accident investigation (where a death has should be appropriate to the nature of the incident or may result then the ‘Work Related Death attended and should be conducted in a manner Protocol’ must be adhered ) that promotes open, supportive and constructive ●● Public or judicial enquiries discussion of all aspects of the incident. If the ●● Litigation performance of individuals is considered in the ●● Financial costs to the brigade i.e. damaged review, then this should be measured against the equipment standards relevant to the role of each individual. ●● Criminal Investigation Effective performance and meritorious conduct ●● Incident debriefing and evaluation should be acknowledged where appropriate. ●● Fire safety issues ●● Learning and recommendations, both local Following an incident, any significant information and national gained or lessons learned relating to existing ●● Critical incident – ongoing emotional and operational intelligence information must be fed back welfare support into the policy and procedures of the organisation. This includes personal protective equipment (PPE), The IC must, at the earliest convenient time, attempt the provision and use of communications, other to assess what the post-incident considerations systems of work, instruction, training, and levels might be. On the basis of this assessment, the of safety supervision etc. following tasks might need to be undertaken:

It is equally important to highlight any 1. Scene Preservation: As soon as it is identified unconventional methods or procedures which that detailed examination of the scene might were used successfully or made the working be required as part of a criminal investigation, environment safer. efforts must be made to preserve the scene from any further interference and to secure

Incident Command 47 evidence. Where there is a work-related fatality 6. Before finally closing an incident and the procedures in the Work Related Death withdrawing all FRS resources, the IC Protocol should be followed. should inform the person having ongoing 2. Recording and Logging: This might include a responsibility for health and safety on the written log available from FRS control room, incident ground, or their agents, that FRS in the Command Unit during the incident or operations have closed down and indicate all voice recording of critical messages. The early hazards still present. In the absence of advice attendance and planned deployment of service from other appropriate agencies, the IC may photographic/video personnel can prove to be wish to give advice on how the hazards may of great benefit in this area. The obtaining of ultimately be dealt with and advice about security videos from on-site equipment can appropriate interim control measures. The often be of value in subsequent investigations. IC must ensure that the responsible person Action on this matter needs to be taken without fully understands the hazards and accepts delay, as some systems will re-use the tapes. responsibility for ensuring health and safety 3. Impounding Equipment: Where accidents or on the site; this may include the control of faults have occurred, any associated equipment potential environmental hazards caused by should be preserved for later investigation. FRS operations. Should major malfunction of FRS equipment 7. In a similar way, security issues, particularly occur, in addition to the normal required where premises are left vulnerable, must be notification being carried out, any associated properly communicated to those accepting guidance involving any external agency or responsibility from the FRS commander. department (i.e. Health and Safety Executive) FRS’s may wish to consider some form which it is a requirement to inform, should be of documentary evidence of this kind of observed. handover. 4. Identification of Key Personnel: The names and location of witnesses to important events should be obtained and recorded for later interviews. It may be necessary or appropriate to commence interviewing during the incident. 5. Managing the closure of the incident: This includes considerations such as proper handovers as the incident reduces in size, continued vigilance regarding the hazards that continue to exist or newly emerge, making appliances and crews available again at the earliest possible time, and ensuring that site occupiers, neighbours and others who have been affected by the incident are kept appropriately informed.

Detail of Mass Decontamination Team structure – see diagram page 49

48 Fire Service Manual ch and Rescue eam 1 eam 1 Sector 2 Sector 2 Commander Urban Sear Mass Decon T Mass Decon T e on on ch and Rescue rd Sector 1 rd Sector 1 Commander Urban Sear Co r Co te ch and Rescue Sector 3 Inner Inner Ou Sector 3 Commander Urban Sear ophic incident in one jurisdiction) ea 3 Operations Commander Ar eam 1 Mass Decon T Multiple Operations Command (Single catastr CBRN Incident Command Structur ea 2 Operations Commander Ar ch and Rescue Sector 2 Sector 2 Commander Urban Sear Incident Commander eam e Fir Command T ch and Rescue Gold Sector 1 Silver Command Command Support Sector 1 Command Commander Urban Sear ea 1 Operations Commander Ar ch and Rescue Sector 3 Sector 3 Commander Urban Sear ch and Rescue Sector 2 Sector 2 Finance/ Administration Logistics Planning Commander Urban Sear ater Secto r W Commander ater Sector eam 3 W Mass Decon T 48

eam 1 eam 2 page

on n ow sh s tail De Mass Decon T Mass Decon T

Incident Command 49 ch and Rescue Sector 2 e Sector 2 Finance/ Administration Logistics Planning Commander Urban Sear ch and Rescue Sector 1 Sector 1 Commander Urban Sear Incident Commander eam ch and Rescue e Fir Operations Commander Sear Command T Silver Command Command Support Gold Command eam 2 Operations Commander Mass Decontamination Mass Decon T ater Secto r W Commander CBRN Incident Command Structur with Silver Command (Separate incidents in same jurisdiction) ater Sector W eam 1 Mass Decon T Incident Commander eam e Fir Command T Silver Command Command Support ch and Rescue Sector 3 Sector 3 Commander Urban Sear Incident Commander eam e Fir Command T ch and Rescue Sector 2 Silver Command Command Support ch and Rescu e Sector 2 Operations Commander Sear Commander Urban Sear ater Secto r W Commander ch and Rescue Sector 1 ater Sector W Sector 1 ch and Rescu e Commander Urban Sear Operations Commander Sear Operations Commander Mass Decontamination eam 2 Mass Decon T ch and Rescue Sector 2 ater Secto r W Commander Sector 2 eam 1 Commander eam 1 Urban Sear ater Sector W ch and Rescue Sector 1 Mass Decon T Mass Decon T Sector 1 Commander Urban Sear

50 Fire Service Manual Incident Command Chapter 3 Chapter 3 – Command within the UK Resilience Framework

3.1 Introduction mid 1990’s it was clear that the civil defence and emergency planning framework was no longer fit Management and command of the most serious for purpose. A review was commenced involving all incidents is rarely a single agency task. The Incident the major stakeholders, including local authorities, Command system was developed to ensure that FRS emergency services, and other government structures and protocols would fit seamlessly with departments. Issues such as the “Y2K Millennium those of partner organisations and the UK’s overall Bug”, or millennium date change problem, became approach to integrated emergency management. typical of the type of issue attracting attention from That approach has been significantly revised and the planning and response communities, as did the updated to reflect the new nature of the risks and fuel crisis, foot and mouth disease and other non- threats that the country faces on a daily basis, and hostile action types of risk. is formalised in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, including associated guidance and regulations. This perspective changed on 11th September FRS commanders need to understand clearly the 2001, or “9/11”. The subsequent consultation and various entities, and players, at various levels preparations, and resulting legislation, primarily within the UK’s resilience framework, including the CCA 2004, and for FRSs the Fire and Rescue knowledge of the powers and duties of officials at Services Act of 2004, has provided an expanded key levels. This chapter examines that framework. range of duties. This has been accompanied by detailed guidance for authorities to ensure that they The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA 2004) will be able to deliver what is expected of them at brought together elements of a number of older the required times, be able to work effectively with statutory provisions, including the Defence of other partners, and have means in place to continue the Realm Act of 1914, the Emergency Powers their operations at times of challenge to their own Acts of 1920 and 1964 and the Civil Defence Act infrastructures. 1948, which have all now been repealed (with the exception of S.2 of the Emergency Powers Act of For FRSs, the post 9/11 environment demanded 196 4, wh ich allows t he Defence Cou ncil to aut hor ise that their own capabilities be developed to cope “the temporary deployment of Service personnel with a wider range of disruptive challenges to on urgent work of national importance”). the community. This programme, which became known as the “New Dimension” programme, The UK’s emergency preparedness was previously delivered the capability to deal with mass closely linked with the civil defence framework decontamination incidents; to detect, identify and that developed post World War Two, during the monitor chemical substances; pump high volumes period of the cold war. Even before that, the focus of water over large distances; search for, and rescue was clearly changing, with the Civil Protection in persons from, urban collapses, landslides etc; and Peacetime Act 1986 making provision for resources effectively command and control the large scale of previously allocated to civil defence to be used in operations that may be necessary when bringing preparation for peacetime emergencies. By the these capabilities into play.

Incident Command 51 The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 Part 1 covers likely to have a role in most emergencies that could ‘arrangements for civil protection’. The Act generate ministerial interest or national/regional applies to England, Scotland and Wales with press coverage. Government departments may also some differences in application. In Scotland, civil use GOs to cascade information and guidance to protection is a devolved matter and therefore the local responders. Regional Resilience Teams (RRT) responsibility of the Scottish Executive, whereas have been set up in each of the GOs to co-ordinate the Welsh Assembly Government in Wales the response of the whole GO area, and to act as exercises authority. In Northern Ireland the ‘Civil the first point of contact for any resilience issues Contingencies framework’ discharges the principles in normal working hours. RRTs act as support contained within the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. for lead government departments’ representatives (The Fire & Rescue Service is not a Category One when they need to operate in the regions or support Responder in Northern Ireland). In general Category Gold level or other operational decision making One and Two Responders are obliged to co-operate groups during emergencies. with each other and other organisations engaged in response in the same local resilience area. Each local 3.2.2 Government Liaison Team residence area is based on a police area. Government Office provides the focus for communication to and from the Strategic Co- A more detailed explanation of the slight differences ordinating Group (SCG), the Lead Government of the arrangements within the devolved Department and the Government Liaison Team administrations will be found in the Appendices (GLT). This would be headed by a senior Home 5 to 7. Office official in the event of the incident being a result of terrorist action. Otherwise the team Category One and Two Responders have a duty would normally be headed by the Regional to share information with each other. Information Resilience Director of the GO. The team consists sharing is considered both good practice, and of representatives from central government who also essential to underpin co-operation. Although assist the Gold Commander by: there is an initial presumption that all information can be shared, there are in fact certain limits on ●● Keeping the Cabinet Office Briefing Room disclosure. It is important when working in this field (COBR) fully informed of the involvement of to understand the categorisation of information, the incident. and the constraints on how it may be used. This ●● Accelerating liaison between the Gold is described in Chapter 3 of the document entitled Commander and COBR when Central Emergency Preparedness (HM Government, Government involvement is required in November 2005); statutory guidance that supports decision making. the Civil Contingency Act 2004. ●● Ensuring that the local interest is taken fully into account at COBR, and conversely to 3.2 Local and Regional Structures ensure that the Government’s views are kept in mind at the scene. Before considering the FRS roles and ●● Ensuring smooth communication flow responsibilities, the local and regional structures between COBR and the incident. and machinery that come into play during times of crisis or major emergency should be examined. 3.2.3 The Local Resilience Forum 3.2.1 Government Offices of the Regions The Local Resilience Forum (LRF), comprising Category 1 Responders as defined by the Civil The nine Regional Government Offices (GOs) offer Contingencies Act 2004, is the basic mechanism a single point of access to central government for through which local government, emergency local responders in English regions. The GOs are

52 Fire Service Manual services and utility services co-operate under the An LRF may be chaired by a representative of Act. The Act requires that Category 1 Responders any Category One Responder organisation, but attend the LRF, and the guidance offers model in most cases this function is undertaken by the terms of reference for it, which includes ensuring police. Equally, the secretariat for the group will joint policy positions, risk assessments, planning, be provided by one of the leading Category 1 exercising etc. Responder organisations, often a local authority.

Category One Responders under the CC Act The provisions of the Regulations in Scotland are include: largely the same as in England and Wales, however Local authorities the LRF is called the Strategic Co-ordinating Police (local and British Transport Police) Group, which if not properly understood gives Fire and Rescue Authorities potential for misunderstanding with the English Ambulance Services model. Additional Regulations made by Scottish National Health Service (including Primary Care Ministers determine how Category One and Two Trusts, Strategic Health Authorities and Local Responders within devolved administrations Health Boards) should co-operate with each other. Health Protection Agency (the HPA will represent port health authorities if applicable) 3.2.4 The Regional Resilience Forum Environment Agency Unlike LRFs, Regional Resilience Forums (RRF’s) Maritime and Coastguard Agency are not statutory bodies. They are not hierarchically superior to LRFs or inferior to other national level Category Two Responders under the CC committees. This status is defined as “subsidiary”. Act include: An RRF’s main function is to provide regional Electricity distributors and transmitters co-ordination of multi-agency resilience activities Gas distributors and delivery. A RRF will undertake a range of Water and sewerage undertakers functions, including compiling a regional risk Telephone service providers map; considering policy initiatives in the area of Railway operators civil protection that emanate from government; Airport operators facilitating information sharing, including lessons Ports from exercises and incidents at home and abroad, Highways Agency and co-ordinating multi-agency exercises and HSE training. RRFs are usually chaired by the Regional Other Co-operating Bodies under the CCA Resilience Director of the Government Office of include: the Region. The main exception is that in London Regional Resilience Teams this function is performed by the Minister of Military the Crown with the London portfolio. London is Voluntary Sector unusual in the fact that the LRF and the RRF are effectively the same body, given the boundaries It is often the individual officials who represent of the Metropolitan Police Service, which is co- their organisations as LRF members who find terminous with the area of the London Fire Brigade themselves with operational responsibilities during and the London Ambulance Service. the emergency response phase. Therefore, in effect, the LRF constitutes the group of responders 3.2.5 The Regional Civil engaged in planning and preparation, which Contingencies Committee becomes the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) In a similar way to an LRF which will, at times or multi-agency Gold group, in times of emergency of emergency, convene operationally in the guise response. of a Strategic Co-ordinating Group, the RRF

Incident Command 53 member organisations may convene as a Regional appointed by central government, to deliver the Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC) On strategic objectives set by government to resolve occasions the same individual may represent their the emergency. organisation in both LRF and RRF arenas. This is usually a consequence of a particular organisation’s 3.3 Central Government’s Role geographical and operational boundaries. Although the vast majority of crises, however The RCCC can come into play to co-ordinate the significant, are handled effectively at local level, response to, and recovery from, an emergency at from time to time, in the most complex and large regional level in England. The RCCC is likely to scale incidents, central government support and co- be convened only rarely and only when it can add ordination is necessary to control the emergency. value to a response. Government will consider the overall strategic position and provide direction where necessary. There are three levels of RCCC meetings; Information will be provided from a range of sources, including the local SCGs, the Joint Terrorism Level 1 – Preparedness in the phase prior to an Analysis Centre (JTAC), scientific advisory groups Emergency via the Lead Government Department (LGD) and other key stakeholders. Consideration may be Level 2 – Co-ordination of Response in the given to such issues as the mobilisation of national Region. assets and military resources, managing the public information and international or diplomatic aspects Level 3 – Declaration of Special Legislative of the emergency, ensuring a common picture of Measures. the situation is developed, and assessing the likely development of the situation to enable the recovery The role at Level One, where the committee will be phase to commence as early as possible. Central chaired by the GO Director, is one of monitoring and government will also make decisions involving assessing the situation which may be developing, the prioritisation of use of scarce resources during and establishing a state of preparedness. multi-site incidents, consulting the devolved administrations where appropriate, and give Level Two meetings are intended to co-ordinate consideration to whether existing legislation is a response to an emergency across a region. It is adequate to cope with the challenge, and if not, possible that a request to perform this role would implement emergency powers. come from a Strategic Co-ordinating Group at a local level. Level Two meetings are also co- 3.3.1 Cabinet Office Briefing Room ordinated by the GO Director, or in the case of The Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR, an event where a clear lead from a government sometimes referred to as “Cobra”) can be activated department could be identified, e.g. a health or to support the co-ordination and decision making veterinary crisis, then the chair would be provided that may be required. Officials and key stakeholders by that department. will meet and prepare advice for ministers on the most pressing issues. Level Three meetings are only called when Emergency Powers under Part Two of the Civil There are three levels of emergency described in Contingencies Act 2004 have been invoked and the central government’s concept of operations: have to be managed. A Level Three meeting would be chaired by a Regional Nominated Co-ordinator,

54 Fire Service Manual Level 1 3.4 Roles of the Emergency “Significant”: In this case the Lead Government Services and Military Department (LGD) leads. The COBR facility is not fully activated but provides cross-government co- Chapter 3 of the document entitled ‘Emergency ordination. Examples of this level would be prison Response and Recovery’ HM Government 2005 riots or severe weather. outlines the roles and responsibilities of each of the main agencies and sectors that are likely to become Level 2 engaged in the response to, and the recovery from “Serious”: At this level where the situation threatens an incident. a wide or prolonged impact COBR is activated, Cabinet Office or the LGD would chair meetings 3.4.1 Role of the Fire and Rescue Service of officials. The primary role of the FRS in an emergency is to rescue people trapped by fire, wreckage or Level 3 debris, and to prevent further escalation of an “Catastrophic”: Where the situation threatens the incident by controlling or extinguishing fires highest and most serious level of impact COBR and taking other preventative measures. Other would be fully activated and lead the response. It responsibilities include: is likely that the Prime Minister or a senior cabinet level minister would chair the meetings. ●● Dealing with released chemicals or other contaminants in order to render the incident site safe or recommend exclusion zones.

Incident Command 55 ●● Assist other agencies with the removal of ●● Co-ordinating search activities on land large quantities of flood water. following an event where it is possible that ●● Assist the Ambulance Service with casualty persons may not be located in the immediate handling and the police with body recovery. vicinity of a disaster scene. ●● Manage gateways into the inner cordon if requested to do so by the police, recording 3.4.3 Role of the Health Service the entry and exit of personnel. Note: the The role of the Ambulance Service is to co- health and safety of personnel working in ordinate the on-site National Health Service (NHS) the inner cordon remains with the individual response, and to determine to which hospital agencies, however in the absence of casualties are transported, depending on the types appropriate personal protective equipment of injuries sustained. (PPE), refusal into the risk area should be considered. The Ambulance Service will also (in conjunction ●● Assist the National Health Service (NHS) with a Medical Incident Officer): with the decontamination of casualties by undertaking where required the mass ●● Endeavour to sustain life through effective decontamination of the general public where emergency treatment at the scene. large numbers of people have been exposed ●● Determine the priority for release of to chemical, biological, radiological or trapped casualties and decontamination nuclear substances (CBRN). in conjunction with the Fire and Rescue Service. 3.4.2 Role of the Police ●● Transport the injured in order of priority to The police will co-ordinate the activities of those receiving hospitals. responding at and around the scene of a land based sudden impact emergency. The saving 3.4.4 Role of the Military and protection of life is the priority, but as far as The national structure, organisation, skills, possible the scene is to be preserved to safeguard equipment and training of the Armed Forces may evidence for subsequent investigations. Other be of benefit to the civil authorities in managing responsibilities include: the response to and recovery from emergencies. This support is governed by the Military Aid to Establishing and maintaining cordons around the Civil Authorities (MACA) arrangements. However incident, in particular an outer cordon to facilitate the Armed Forces maintain no standing forces for the work of other agencies. MACA tasks, and assistance will be provided on an availability basis only. Therefore it is essential ●● Where terrorist action is suspected the police that responding agencies do not base plans upon will assume overall control of an incident. the assumption of military assistance. The Armed ●● Carrying out a search for secondary devices Forces should only be called upon as a last resort and performing an assessment of associated and approval is required by the Defence Minister. risks involving terrorist incidents. ●● Oversee any criminal investigation including In normal circumstances, the ‘concept’ of the Lead the preservation and retrieval of evidence. Government Department taking charge of an event ●● Process information surrounding casualties is applied, however in the event of a terrorist attack, and the identification and removal of or when the local responses are overwhelmed fatalities on behalf of the HM Coroner. Central Government would take charge.

56 Fire Service Manual Military Aid to Civil Authorities supports the civil 3.6 FRS Resilience authorities in the fulfilment of civil objectives, The Government’s national capabilities programme principally in peace. MACA is subdivided into 3 refers to “resilience” as the ability to manage categories: disruptive challenges, for example, responding to terrorist attacks or other events such as widespread ●● Military Aid to other Government flooding within the UK. Part of this resilience Departments (MAGD) – is the aid provided programme is to build capacity in the UK’s Fire by the Armed forces on urgent work of and Rescue Authorities to be able to deal safely and national importance or in maintaining effectively with major incidents on a local, regional supplies and services essential to life, health or national level. and safety of the community. ●● Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) The UK FRS’s structure for responding to major – the provision of military assistance (armed emergencies has been developed, and updated, if appropriate) to the Civil Power in the to complement, and benefit from, the structures maintenance of law, order or public safety. described above. The Civil Power is normally construed as the Chief Constable in the relevant area. The New Dimension programme, in conjunction ●● Military Aid to the Civil Community with the Fire and Resilience Directorate of (MACC) – is the provision of unarmed the Department for Communities and Local military assistance: Government ensured that Fire and Rescue –– To the civil authorities when they have Authorities were suitably equipped and trained an urgent need for help to prevent or deal to deal safely and effectively with major CBRN with the aftermath of a natural disaster or and conventional terrorist incidents on a national a major incident. scale. The “enhanced capability” programme –– To civil sponsors, either by carrying saw the allocation of resources to strategically out special projects of significant social positioned Fire and Rescue Services of Incident value to the community or by attaching Response Units (IRU), Detection, Identification individual volunteers full-time for and Monitoring (DIM) teams, Urban Search and specific projects. Rescue (USAR) teams, Enhanced Command Support (ECS) and High Volume Pumps (HVPs). 3.5 Structured Response to a Major Incident These were part of a range of measures taken to In order to achieve a combined and co-ordinated improve resilience in the UK which include the response to a major incident the capabilities of the following. FRS must be closely linked with other agencies. A generic command structure has been agreed 3.6.1 FRS National Co‑ordination Centre nationally which can be employed for all significant The New Dimension programme resulted in many incidents. Gold, Silver and Bronze are in common specialist units being located in FRSs across use in most responding organisations, referring the UK. To ensure that all of this equipment and to levels of command at Strategic, Tactical and specialised crews can form a coherent and effective Operational respectively For a detailed examination response to catastrophic incidents, the Fire and of the roles at each level please see Chapter 1, and Rescue Service National Co-ordination Centre for the operational duties at each level, Chapter 2 (FRSNCC) was established to co-ordinate the of this manual. mobilisation and deployment of New Dimension in collaboration with local or regional control centres. In the longer term the continued delivery

Incident Command 57 Sector1 Sector2 Sector3 Tactical Advice Tactical Operational Sectors Operational Sectors Operational Water Mass Decon Mass Command Support Command Incident Command SupportSectors SupportSectors USAR Safety

ON-SCENE ON-SCENE

OFF-SCENE OFF-SCENE the incident the FireSilver bythe nature of Commander Location determined Location Silver Multi-Agency Affected FRSNCC ControlCentre FireRescue & Service National Coordination Centre Coordination National SCC Gold Strategic Multi-Agency RCCC Communications Centre Communications Regional Civil Regional (Fireand Rescue) Emergency Room Emergency Local Government Local Commmunities and Commmunities Contingencies Committee Contingencies Strategic Advice IMRG Recovery Group Recovery COBR Incident Management Incident Briefing Room Briefing

58 Fire Service Manual of a robust national co-ordinating capability will 3.6.3 Convoy Procedure be closely linked with the development of Regional In planning for large scale incidents, and following Control Centres. the formalisation of national mutual assistance arrangements, it can be seen that from time to time The FRSNCC’s principal role is to co-ordinate there may be the need to move large numbers of the national and cross regional mobilisation and vehicles and personnel around the UK. A guidance deployment of all New Dimension resources in note has been issued by the Fire and Resilience response to a major incident. It will do so in close Directorate which supports this. All guidance will co-operation with the Communities and Local of course be kept current. Government Emergency Room (Fire and Rescue) where these arrangements have been activated, For example, all FRSs have been equipped by and control room staff in both the affected FRS Communities and Local Government with the and those FRSs being asked to assist. To enable capability to deal with mass decontamination of it to undertake this role and maintain a database the public, in the form of Incident Response Units of resource availability, FRSNCC continuously (IRU’s). In the event of a Chemical, Biological, monitors and tracks New Dimension resources, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) attack anywhere using information provided by Fire and Rescue in the UK, the mobilisation of the IRU’s and Services. supporting appliances will take place. FRSs are expected to pre-plan for this in conjunction with 3.6.2 FRS Mutual Assistance the guidance document and their respective police The existence of a national mutual aid agreement force, where Convoy Assembly Points (CAP) will allows individual Fire and Rescue Authorities be identified as a starting point. to secure assistance from other authorities in the event of a major incident. Authorities have 3.6.4 Strategic Holding Area for many years provided mutual support across Convoys of vehicles converging on a city or other borders for responses to emergencies through the geographical point which has been affected by a shared availability of fire crews and appliances. It serious incident need to be managed and marshalled is important that this good practice is universally effectively. Accordingly, Strategic Holding Areas applied at local, regional and national level to ensure (SHA) have been identified at key locations on the an effective and efficient response to incidents. motorway and trunk road network. A SHA is an area which will be used to ‘hold’ FRS resources Every FRA in England has agreed to participate and national assets of all kinds in response to an under the terms of the National Mutual Aid incident. It will be an area with suitable space and Programme.7 Each FRA has confidence in being facilities to accommodate large numbers of crews, able to request or provide assistance from each appliances and equipment where these resources other should a serious incident occur. Full FRA can standby, or rest whilst awaiting deployment participation in the protocol also means that the to marshalling areas and from there to the scenes task of the FRSNCC co-ordinating New Dimension of operations. The SHAs are part of an overall resources during serious incidents, is greatly deployment plan to support the operations on the assisted. The protocol has enabled FRAs to agree in ground, and of the FRSNCC. advance the terms under which they can support each other during an incident such as a terrorist attack.

7 DCLG 20th July 2006; Fire and Rescue Service Circular 42/2006 invited FRSs to participate in the National Mutual aid Protocol for Serious Incidents; FRSC 75/2006 of 12 Dec 2006 indicated that all FRSs agreed to participate.

Incident Command 59 The responsibility for co-ordination and ●● Under the direction of the IC, to facilitate communication within the SHA will initially rest crew reliefs and rotation, and a structured with the commander of the Enhanced Command rehabilitation of personnel and equipment to Support facility. their point of origin in conjunction with the FRSNCC (the FRSNCC will co-ordinate the 3.6.5 Enhanced Command Support recovery of ND resources). Enhanced Command Support (ECS) will facilitate ●● Co-ordinate or conduct additional activities the management of national assets following as requested by the FRSNCC or the IC. mobilisation to a large incident. It will be adaptable, flexible and complement the ICS. 3.6.6 FRS National Support Arrangements ●● It will be located at the SHA and provide At times of the most serious challenge to the Fire and a communications link to the IC through Rescue Services of the UK, and to assist in ensuring Command Support. that operations are at all times co-ordinated and ●● ECS will co-ordinate resources into, effective, various teams of advisors have been within and out of the SHA, facilitating the established to advise government ministers and provision of logistics support to USAR, MD senior civil servants who may have to make critical and HVP teams. decisions that will impact on operations. There ●● Provide communication links between the will in addition be specialists available to advise IC, FRSNCC, the National Advisory Team Incident Commanders, Sector Commanders and members and groups advising senior civil other relevant officials at a tactical and operational servants and ministers. level in specialist areas including USAR, MD, HVP, DIM etc.

60 Fire Service Manual 3.6.7 Communities and Local Government The Communities and Local Government Emergency Room (Fire and Rescue) Emergency Room (Fire and Rescue) has seven During incidents where a FRS has made the principal roles: request for National support or proactively on receipt of such information which identifies a 1. Providing structured, trusted advice and possible threat to the critical national infrastructure secretarial support to Director FRD and or major emergency , the Communities and Local the CFRA and event information to other Government Emergency Room (Fire and Rescue), Government departments and Ministers as together with the FRSNCC, will be actively directed by CFRA or Director of FRD involved in the co-ordination of resources. Certain 2. Acting as a FRS central Government hub for circumstances could also identify the need for the collection, distribution and provision of pre-deployment of resources in a preparedness operational, logistical and policy information phase to ensure that they are closer to the possible relating to FRS activity at events of National threatened area prior to any occurrence. significance 3. Linking to the Regional Resilience Teams (the During activation the Emergency Room (Fire and RRT cell offers links through to Government Rescue), should be considered as the hub of the Offices) to provide accurate information on advisory and co-ordination framework and will the whole incident to the Director FRD and be the key point for providing national advice others as appropriate. and co-ordination relating to the use of FRS/ 4. Co-ordinating cross Government and Government assets during any major emergency. international support to assist the Incident In close liaison with FRSNCC, personnel will plan Command System and advise on national co-ordination and will be 5. Providing cross-government and FRD responsible for ensuring that the most effective developed strategic advice to the FRSNCC, distribution of FRS/Government assets during any Gold Command tier and NSAT major emergency is achieved with the maintenance 6. Maintaining liaison with FRSNCC and of national resilience. Operational Commanders on the progress of the event(s) The Emergency Room (Fire and Rescue) will 7. To assist with the co-ordination of overseas provide comprehensive advice and support deployments and reception of teams from capability to the affected FRS, the Fire and outside of the UK (working closely with DFID, Resilience Directorate (FRD) and Ministers, EU etc) the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR), the Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser (CFRA), the Activities in support of these roles could include National Strategic Advisor Team (NSAT), and but not be limited to: the FRSNCC. Their responsibilities will also include the preparation of timely information in ●● The proactive cross government/international the form of briefings and support to any other planning during a major emergency key stakeholder as required (e.g. Environmental ●● Liaison with intelligence services and other Agency, PNIC, DEFRA). relevant bodies ●● Assisting with the logistic function responsibility for obtaining additional resources from outside the FRS (e.g. foam from the Ministry of Defence/Civil Aviation Authority/industry or Urban Search and Rescue from the French Government)

Incident Command 61 ●● Recognising obstacles that may impact on ●● When a decision has been made to seek the affected authority’s ability to provide international support, CLG Emergency adequate support to the emergency and Room may have a specific role with supporting/prioritising in the areas of arranging this. The UK aims to be self concern as quickly as possible to ensure that sufficient in dealing with events, and any the response is not adversely affected decision to seek overseas aid would require ●● Preparing briefs, guides, submissions to policy approval, and likely to be brokered ministers as directed by Director of FRD or through Cabinet office the CFRA ●● Liaison with Devolved Administrations ●● Ensuring that sufficient national cover Emergency Rooms. is being maintained whilst an incident is being managed and prioritising resource The Communities and Local Government deployment in the event that there is more Emergency Room (Fire and Rescue) main location than one incident occurring is London Victoria with a number of contingency ●● Providing support to the affected FRS fallback locations (Fire Service College and as necessary. Guildford).

62 Fire Service Manual Incident Command Chapter 4 Chapter 4 – Incident Risk Management

4.1 Introduction outweighed by the savings in legal costs, compensation, and the need to replace The overriding priority of any incident Commander equipment. is the safety of all that may be affected by the ●● Legal – Fire Authorities, in common with incident. This must be established by identifying other employees have many legal duties in the hazards and risks that are present, identifying respect of safety. These require employees and adopting appropriate control measures and to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, ensuring that safe systems of work are implemented the health, safety and welfare of employees and maintained. This will ensure that personnel can and others affected by their work activities. carry out their duties and remain safe whilst doing In order to achieve this they must carry so. Pre-planning is pivotal, where foreseeable events out and record suitable and sufficient risk exist generic risk assessments must be carried out. assessments, then implement the control Only after this process can FRS’s consider that measures necessary to ensure an acceptable they have taken all appropriate action to ensure level of safety. Both the risk assessments the safety of their personnel and members of the and the control measures must be regularly public etc. monitored and reviewed to confirm their continuing validity. The ‘Dynamic Management of Risk ‘ has been defined as: “the continuous process of identifying Employees have a legal duty to take care of their hazards, assessing risk, taking action to eliminate own safety and that of others who may be affected or reduce risk, monitoring and reviewing, in the by their acts or omissions. They must also co- rapidly changing circumstances of an operational operate with their employer in health and safety incident”. matters.

There are moral, economic and legal reasons for To enable an effective risk assessment to be the FRS to take the ‘management of health and performed it is necessary to understand the safety’ seriously. following concepts:

●● Moral – As caring employers, organisations ●● Hazard: which is something with the want to ensure the safety of their employees potential to cause harm, e.g. falling roof tiles at all times. ●● Risk: which is a measure of the likelihood ●● As professional bodies, the aim is to of harm from a particular hazard occurring discharge their duties to the community to and the severity of the consequences, e.g. a the highest possible standards at all times. fire at derelict property involving the roof ●● Economic – Good health and safety may result in an increased risk of injury management is always cost effective. from falling roof tiles. The severity of this The money invested in safety is always occurrence could be significant if a crew member were hit by the tile.

Incident Command 63 ●● Control measure: this is any measure taken An important part of risk management at this to reduce risk, e.g. remove the hazard level is the post incident review. This allows i.e. roof tiles, or prevent access into the relevant information to be recorded and fed back immediate area where harm could be caused. in to the Strategic decision making process via the Section 4.11 ‘Hierarchy of Risk Control’ Systematic level, in order that safety standards can gives further examples of how control be constantly improved. measures can be applied at an incident. Upon arrival at an incident the first task of the IC In order to provide an acceptable level of protection must be to gather all available information relating at operational incidents, the organisations health and to the incident. This is likely to include information safety management must operate at three different obtained at the pre-planning stage and available on levels – Strategic, Systematic and Dynamic. risk cards or electronic storage media. This is in addition to information from the caller, received en- ●● Strategic – Strategic health and safety route or passed on by persons already in attendance management is carried out by FRS i.e. occupiers or other agencies. Management Teams and the Fire Authority. They demonstrate management’s The IC must then apply professional judgement commitment to safety by setting the in conjunction with the Standard Operating organisation’s health and safety policy, deciding Procedures to decide the most appropriate course priorities, providing resources and promoting of action, weighing the benefits of proceeding with a positive health and safety culture. a task against the benefits likely to be gained. It is ●● Systematic – Systematic health and safety important to ‘think before you act rather than act management is carried out by recognised before you think’. The consequences of a wrong departments within the organisation. decision at this stage may be irreversible. Initially, risk assessors identify the hazards likely to be encountered at the various There will be occasions when rapid intervention types of operational incident and assess the may be necessary to effect immediate rescues, or to level of risk presented by these hazards. prevent escalation of the incident. When faced with Management Teams act upon the results these situations, personnel are likely to be eager of the risk assessments and commissions to commence operations immediately on arrival. departments to develop and implement The highest level of Incident Command will be additional control measures. These could, for required to ensure personnel undertaking any role example, be information, personal protective do not act outside agreed safety procedures. In such equipment (PPE), and equipment, systems circumstances, the IC must ensure that personnel of work, instruction, training and safety are not subjected to unacceptable risks which will supervision. outweigh the benefits. It is the responsibility of the ●● Dynamic – Dynamic risk management is IC to carry out a DRA and decide whether operations carried out by all personnel at an operational should continue or adopt a defensive approach until incident. The main responsibility lies with further information has been gathered. the Incident Commander who must identify the hazards, assess the risks, and then make 4.2 FRS Operational professional judgements in order to use Risk Philosophy the available resources in such a way as to achieve an acceptable level of safety during The benefits of proceeding with a task must be work activities. weighed carefully against the risks, it is important to “think before you act rather than act before you think”.

64 Fire Service Manual The following statements embrace the philosophy planning should therefore include detailed risk of the service’s approach to managing risk at an and task analysis and consideration must always incident: be given to ensure that the attendance of critical resources are mobilised as soon as possible. In a highly calculated way, firefighters: 4.3 Risk Assessment in ●● will take some risk to save saveable lives. the Fire Service ●● may take some risk to save saveable property. Operational procedures and practices are designed ●● will not take any risk at all to try to save to promote safe systems of work. To minimise the lives or properties that are already lost. risk of injury Incident/Sector Commanders must ensure that recognised safe systems of work are Therefore, if after implementing all available being used so far as is reasonable and practicable. control measures, the cost (in terms of risk to Where possible, operational crews should work life) of proceeding with a task still outweighs together in teams, and whenever practicable the the benefit, the IC must not permit operations to teams should be made up of people who are familiar proceed but consider viable alternative courses with each other and have trained together. of action. This is a critical and defining aspect of operational command responsibility. To discharge When necessary, safety briefings must be carried this competently requires a detailed knowledge out and, as the incident develops, or where the risks of the principles and regulations surrounding of injury increases, those briefings must be more risk assessment and a sound understanding of precise, and appropriate precautions taken. the factors influencing safety within the ‘fire’ and rescue domain of the present situation. Pre-

Incident Command 65 4.3.1 Statutory Requirements employees. It also requires employers to have Fire and Rescue Authorities, as the employers, a general policy with respect to the health have statutory duties towards their employees and and safety at work of their employees and the others who may be affected by the way in which organisation and arrangements for the time they carry out their undertaking. Employees also being in place for carrying out that policy. have statutory responsibilities for themselves and ●● Section 3 requires employers to conduct their anyone who may be affected by their actions or undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so inactions. In practice, high standards of health far as is reasonably practicable, that people and safety management can only be achieved if all they do not employ who may be affected are concerned co-operate in delivering effective and not exposed to risks to their health and safety; safe systems of work. ●● Section 7 requires employees to take reasonable care of their own health and safety Incident Commanders are responsible for and of the health and safety of others who implementing safe systems of work at incidents. may be affected by their acts or omissions at In deciding whether the health and safety of work and to co-operate with their employer employees is, so far as is reasonably practicable as far as is necessary to enable the employer being ensured, a number of factors have to be taken to comply with their duties. into account. These include considering the benefit, in terms of saving life, versus risk. Whilst it may Management of Health and Safety at Work be suitable to commit appropriately equipped and Regulations 1999 trained personnel into a hazardous environment for ●● Regulation 3 requires employers to make a the purpose of saving life, it may be unsuitable in suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks a similar situation where it is known there are no to the health and safety of their employees to lives to be saved. which they are exposed at work and the risks to the health and safety of persons they do Fire and Rescue Services should carry out suitable not employ arising out of the conduct of their and sufficient assessments of the risks involved undertaking, to identify the measures that in responding to incidents. Following paragraphs are needed to comply with their statutory explain how this requirement is implemented in the duties; FRS, with its wide range of unpredictable and fast- ●● Regulation 5 requires employers to put changing incidents. The key elements of the risk in place arrangements for the effective assessment process8 are: planning, organising, control, monitoring and review of the control measures; ●● Regulation 10 requires employers to provide ●● identification of the hazards; employees with comprehensible and relevant ●● decide who might be harmed and how; information on the health and safety ●● evaluate the risks and decide on precautions; risks identified by the assessment and the ●● record the findings and implement them; preventive and protective measures; ●● review the assessment and update if necessary. ●● Regulation 11 requires employers, where The key legal requirements include: they share a workplace (for example, an incident ground), to co-operate with the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 other employers and take all reasonable steps ●● Section 2 requires employers to ensure, to co-ordinate the control measures. so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work of their

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66 Fire Service Manual 4.3.2 Generic Risk Assessment Generic Risk Assessments provide information on Due to the scope and nature of FRS operations there are a wide range of activities to cover. This ●● The scope of the activity can potentially make risk assessment a time ●● Significant hazards and risks consuming activity. To minimise this and avoid ●● Key control measures duplication and inconsistent approach, Generic ●● Technical references Risk Assessments (GRAs)have been produced to ●● List of considerations assist FRS with their regulatory requirements. Fire ●● Summary (in the form of a table) Service Guide, Volume 3 – ‘A Guide to Operational Risk Assessment’ contains a wide range of risk 4.3.3 Dynamic Risk Assessment assessments that all commanders should be aware The term Dynamic Risk Assessment (DRA) is used of when formulating operational plans. to describe the continuing assessment of risk that is carried out in a rapidly changing environment GRAs form the foundation for Dynamic Risk at incidents (see DRA model in Figure 4.1, p.70). Assessments (DRAs), FRS Standard Operating The outcome of a Dynamic Risk Assessment is the Procedures (SOPS) and training schemes. They declaration of a Tactical Mode (See section 4.5). also assist in the completion of Analytical Risk Assessments (ARA’s) at incidents (see Dynamic Risk Assessment takes into account the Appendix 1). continually and sometimes rapidly evolving nature of an incident and is a continuous process. This is further complicated for the FRS commander in that often rescues have to be performed, exposures protected and stop jets placed before a complete

Incident Command 67 appreciation of all material facts has been obtained. As the incident develops, changing circumstances It is nevertheless essential that an effective risk may make the original course of action assessment is carried out at all operational incidents. inappropriate, for example: In a high risk, low time environment the Incident Commander must implement greater levels of ●● Fire fighting tactics may change from control and apply appropriate control measures, in defensive to offensive or vice versa. order to reduce risk to an acceptable level. Only ●● New hazards and their associated risks then can crews be committed into the hazard area. may arise e.g. the effects of fire on building stability. A DRA must be reviewed continuously and updated ●● Existing hazards may present different risks. as required, and as a result of which it is important ●● Personnel may become fatigued. to declare a ‘Tactical Mode’. The mode must be communicated to everyone on the incident ground Incident and Sector Commanders, therefore, and transmitted over the main scheme radio where need to manage safety by constantly monitoring it will be recorded and time stamped. For example, the situation and reviewing the effectiveness of during Offensive operations, new information is existing control measures. received concerning fire spread to a previously unaffected out-building containing cylinders. During the development stage of the incident, the A new Defensive Tactical Mode should now be DRA will form the basis of the analytical risk declared (See section 4.5.4 Defensive Mode). assessment (see section 4.10).

Although the dynamic management of risk is 4.4.1 Risk Control Process: continuous throughout the incident, the focus of Initial Stage of Incident operational activity will change as the incident There are 6 steps in the initial assessment of risk: evolves. It is useful to consider the process during the three separate stages of an incident 1. Evaluate the situation 2. Introduce and declare Tactical Mode ●● The Initial Stage 3. Select safe systems of work ●● The Development Stage 4. Assess the chosen systems of work ●● The Closing Stage 5. Introduce additional control measures 6. Re-assess systems of work and additional 4.4 Managing the Risk control measures If an incident develops to the extent that sectors are Step 1 Evaluate the situation designated, Sector Commanders will be responsible The Incident Commander will need to evaluate for the health and safety of all personnel within the situation at the earliest opportunity. This will their sector. Sector Commanders may feel that commence immediately following receipt of the they can supervise safety within their own sectors. call by reference to information provided during Alternatively the Sector Commander may feel it pre-planning arrangements. These take many forms necessary to nominate a Safety Officer (see section and include 7(2)(d) information, SOP’s, fire plans, 4.12). This officer will be responsible to the Sector GRA’s etc. On arrival the Incident Commander will Commander. need to identify hazards, assess the risk to crews, the public, the environment and analyse resource (NB: although the Safety Officer must report to the requirements to decide on the most appropriate Incident Commander or Sector Commander, the course of action. organisation of the Safety Officers will be managed by the Safety Sector if one has been established.)

68 Fire Service Manual I n o r d e r t o id e nt i f y h a z a r d s t h e I n c id e nt C o m m a n d e r Step 4 Assess the chosen systems of work will initially need to consider: Once a course of action, be it offensive or defensive, has been identified Incident Commanders need to ●● Operational intelligence information make a judgement as to whether or not the risks available from risk cards, fire safety plans, involved are proportional to the potential benefits SOPs, GRAs and crews etc. of the outcome. If YES proceed with the tasks after ●● Incident information available from the ensuring that: owner or responsible person at the scene. ●● The nature of the tasks to be carried out. ●● The objectives, both individual and team are ●● The significant hazards presented by the understood. incident. ●● Responsibilities have been clearly allocated. ●● The risks presented to: ●● Safety measures and procedures are understood. –– firefighters, –– other emergency service personnel, If NO then go back to step 3. –– the public and –– the environment Step 5 Introduce additional control measures –– The resources that are available e.g. Incident Commanders will need to eliminate, experienced personnel, appliances and or reduce, any remaining risks to an acceptable equipment, specialist advice. level, if possible, by introducing additional control measures, such as use of: Step 2 Introduce and declare Tactical Mode The declaration of a Tactical Mode, which is the ●● Personal Protective Equipment e.g. safety simple expression of whether it is appropriate to glasses, safety harnesses proceed to work in a hazard area or not, is a device ●● Breathing Apparatus to enable commanders of dynamic emergency ●● Specialist personnel or equipment e.g. HP, incidents to demonstrate their compliance with the TL/ALP, USAR principles of risk assessment and be seen to have ●● Safety Officer(s) done so. The detail of the process can be found in section 4.5. However, in simple terms, after a rapid Step 6 Re-assess systems of work and appraisal of the situation the Incident Commander additional control measures will either be comfortable in announcing ‘offensive The DRA model requires the IC to review the plan mode’, which is the most usual mode of operation, based upon changes to existing information and or if not must announce ‘defensive mode’ until the risks presented to the crews. Once the Tactical sufficient additional information has been gathered, Mode has been declared the review process starts. control measures taken, etc. to allow ‘offensive’ to By continually returning to step 1 ‘evaluate the be declared. situation’ the cycle continues.

Step 3 Select safe systems of work Even when a safe system of work is in place the The Incident Commander will then need to IC must take into account changing priorities as review the options available in terms of standard this may alter the perception of risk. Where risks procedures. Incident Commanders will need to are present, an assessment of the benefits gained consider the possible systems of work and choose by performing the tasks must be made taking into the most appropriate for the situation. account the possible consequences. Thus:

The starting point for consideration must be ●● If the benefits outweigh the risks, proceed procedures that have been agreed in pre-planning with the tasks. and training and those personnel available at the ●● If the risks outweigh the benefit do NOT incident have sufficient competence to carry out proceed with the tasks, but consider viable the tasks safely. alternatives.

Incident Command 69 Figure 4.1

70 Fire Service Manual 4.5 The Tactical Mode If the Incident Commander is unsure whether it is safe to announce “Offensive”, or confirm offensive 4.5.1 General operations, then ‘Defensive Mode’ must be Tactical Mode is the term used to describe the announced. As soon as the Incident Commander is outcome of the strategic decision which has able, a review of the DR A should be conducted. This been taken by the IC which in turn provides the approach is referred to as ‘Default to Defensive’. operating framework within which all tactical operations will be conducted. It is often the only The key to effective use of Tactical Mode procedure strategic decision taken at an incident. A Tactical is speed of application. The process is founded on Mode is required for all incidents and must be kept the psychology of naturalistic decision making current at all times. and specifically ‘recognition primed decision making’. The ability of the Incident Commander In any sector or incident which has not been to accept risk exposure will be dependent upon the sectorised, there are two possible modes of recognition of the adverse impact from an event operation; these are “Offensive” and “Defensive”. e.g. the decision versus the risk, this is termed as Where safe systems of work are deployed and ‘risk appetite’. More details about these theories adequate control measures implemented the mode can be found in Appendix 3 but in application the of operation is likely to be ‘Offensive’. However principles are the same. where the risk to crews is excessive ‘Defensive’ mode will be declared. Where an incident is Tactical Modes that can be declared at an sector ised and the mode of operation var ies bet ween incident are: sectors, i.e. both Offensive and Defensive modes are in operation at the same time at an incident, the 4.5.3 Offensive Mode incident is deemed to be in “Transitional Mode”. This mode may apply to a sector, and/or the entire incident. On arrival at an incident the Incident Commander must establish what and where are the most This is where the operation is being tackled from significant hazards to crews. The Incident within the perceived hazard area. The Incident Commander must be aware that the hazard area Commander will have established that potential may well extend beyond the boundaries of the benefits outweigh the identified risks, so the building. The hazard area is defined as ‘an area Incident Commander will be committing crews in which significant hazards have been identified’. into a relatively hazardous area, supported by The Incident Commander must decide if the level appropriate equipment, procedures and training. of risk to crews is justifiable within this area’. Greater levels of control and additional control measures may be required. 4.5.2 Default to Defensive At a critical incident where immediate action is Offensive Mode is the normal mode of operation required, the Incident Commander will make used at, for example, house fires, road traffic judgement based on the information available, collisions and industrial premises to fight the fire, about whether it is safe to proceed with offensive effect rescues or close down plant, etc. operations. If the Incident Commander determines that the available control measures are insufficient For example, a fire in a derelict property may well to effectively manage health and safety, a defensive be fought from the outside using a jet through a approach must be adopted until a safer alternative window. This may be a defensive tactic; however approach to dealing with the incident can be operations are carried out within the hazard area implemented. (due to the significant hazard of unsecured roof tiles

Incident Command 71 being identified). Offensive Mode would be declared and suitable and sufficient control measures put in place to deal with the risk of falling roof tiles i.e. PPE, crew briefing and safety officers.

Further examples:

●● Committing BA crews to a smoke filled or toxic atmosphere (hazard area) to rescue persons or undertake firefighting action is an offensive action. ●● Committing crews to a structural collapse (hazard area) to undertake rescues is an offensive action. ●● Committing crews into a hazard area at an RTC to perform a rescue is an offensive action. ●● Committing a crew to fight a fire in a field is an offensive action.

4.5.4 Defensive Mode This mode may apply to a sector and/or the entire incident.

This is where the operation is being fought with ●● Road Traffic Collision involving a chemical a defensive position. In Defensive Mode, the tanker leaking a hazardous substance, no identified risks outweighs the potential benefits, so persons reported. Crews are standing by no matter how many additional control measures awaiting attendance of a specialist advisor are put into place the risks are too great. and second tanker for decanting.

In these circumstances the Incident Commander 4.5.5 Transitional Mode would announce Defensive Mode. For example, Transitional is declared when both Offensive fight the fire with ground monitor jets and aerial jets and Defensive tactics are being carried out at an and protect exposure risks and adjoining property incident at the same time but in different sectors. without committing crews into the hazard area. It never applies to an individual sector or scene of operation but always to the whole incident. Examples of Defensive: ‘Transitional’ Mode is not in itself strictly a tactical ●● Withdrawing a crew from a hazardous area mode of operation but is a codified description of because the risk has increased. the incident status signifying that Offensive and ●● Using jets from outside a hazard area. Defensive operations are in use in one or more ●● Standing by awaiting expert advice, before sectors. It is intended to warn personnel that their committing crews. actions may affect the safety of teams working ●● Standing by awaiting specialist equipment. in a different Tactical Mode in other sectors. For example, crews may be working in ‘defensive mode’ and using a water tower to fight a fire in a warehouse, however crews from a different sector

72 Fire Service Manual may have been committed into the building to 4.7 Using Tactical Mode when perform a specific task. By communicating to all Sectors are in Use personnel throughout the incident ground that the incident is Transitional, this will prompt the Sector When the incident has been sectorised, the Incident Commander responsible for the water tower to Commander will remain accountable for the consider whether this action may compromise the Tactical Mode at all times and Sector Commanders safety of those inside the building. are obliged to seek approval for any change of Tactical Mode in their sector. For example, should a Sector Commander wish to deploy personnel 4.6 Announcement and into the hazard area, moving from a defensive to Recording of Tactical Mode an offensive mode, then permission must be sought A Tactical Mode should be decided upon and from the IC. This process is essential for the IC’s announced at all incidents. As the incident grows overall situational awareness of the incident. and the Incident Commander’s span of control increases, it is essential that all personnel are However, in an emergency situation the Sector aware of the tactics on the incident ground and the Commander will need to quickly respond to prevailing Tactical Mode. changing conditions e.g. signs of collapse, discovery of cylinders etc. and move from offensive to The first first and subsequent informative messages defensive mode. In such circumstances, the Sector to FRS control should include a confirmation of the Commander will carry out a DRA, initiate the Tactical Mode for the information of oncoming relevant actions, remove personnel from the hazard appliances and officers. For better clarity over area and then inform the IC. Only in exceptional the radio, some FRSs have found it helpful to use circumstances, such as persons reported, crews in the phonetic alphabet to prefix or suffix defensive distress etc. may a Sector Commander move from with ‘Delta’, offensive with ‘Oscar’ or transitional defensive to offensive mode and subsequently with ‘Tango’. advise the IC. The IC will amend the Tactical Mode accordingly in that sector. A typical Informative Message might be ‘Informative message from SM Black at Green Sector Commanders must be involved in any Street, Anytown: factory premises, used for textile intervention by the IC to amend the Tactical Mode. manufacturing, three floors, 20m x 20m. All floors The change can be implemented effectively and well alight, three ground monitors in use, “WE personnel made aware of the current mode in ARE IN DEFENSIVE ‘DELTA’ MODE”. use. However, the proposal to change mode will normally be initiated by the Sector Commander. This should then be updated by informing FRS control of which mode the incident is in at frequent intervals or as and when the risk to crews changes (see section 4.10 – Analytical Risk Assessment).

Informing FRS control ensures the recording and time stamping of the decision. When an Analytical Risk Assessment is conducted the outcome is recorded on the appropriate forms.

Incident Command 73 74 Fire Service Manual Incident Command 75 76 Fire Service Manual 4.8 Responsibilities within Any message sent should include the current Tactical Mode Tactical Mode which is in operation at the incident. This should be repeated at regular intervals or as Everyone on the incident ground has a responsibility the risk to crews change, until all FRS operations for their safety and the safety of others. Although have finished. specific responsibilities are outlined below, if anyone sees anything developing which may The Incident Commander should review and compromise the safety of others, they have a clear confirm the Tactical Mode on initial and duty to intervene to prevent harm. This duty is all subsequent briefings to Crew and Sector absolute. Commanders. If appropriate a Safety Officer(s) should be appointed. 4.8.1 Incident Commander The Incident Commander is at all times accountable Where an Operational Commander has been for approving and declaring the Tactical Mode. An appointed, they will be responsible for approving assessment of the incident should be made and changes of the Tactical Mode for the sectors under an appropriate plan implemented. The prevailing their control and ensuring that the IC is aware of Tactical Mode should reflect the Incident the prevailing modes at all times. Commanders plan and associated risks at the incident. 4.8.2 Sector Commanders Sector Commanders should continually monitor conditions and operational priorities in the sector and ensure that the prevailing Tactical Mode

Incident Command 77 remains valid. The Sector Commander must liaise Although a hazard area has been identified by the with the Incident Commander to ensure the current IC, a decision has been made that crews should Tactical Mode is appropriate. operate within that hazard area, so the incident is in Offensive Mode. Sector Commanders must immediately react to adverse changes, withdrawing personnel from risk Later, the fire on the ground floor has been knocked areas without delay if necessary and advise the down. The BA team with a hose reel enters ground Incident Commander of the change in conditions floor to continue fire fighting. The incident is still as soon as possible thereafter. in Offensive Mode.

If appropriate, Sector Commanders should Example 2 consider appointing Safety Officers, either for The incident is a 2-pump RTC with persons trapped. specific areas of concern (e.g. structure stability, Crews are working on the vehicles to carry out dangerous terrain, etc) or for general support. Such rescues. The incident is not sectorised. Safety Officers should report directly to the Sector Commander but must liaise with other Safety Because the vehicle being worked on and the Officers at every opportunity. surrounding environment of the roadway etc constitute a hazard area in the opinion of the IC, It is essential to update the Tactical Mode to the and a decision has been made that crews should crews working in the sector at a suitably frequent operate within that hazard area, the incident is in interval. Offensive Mode.

4.8.3 Crew Commanders Example 3 A 2-pump grass fire occurs on a railway All Crew Commanders should continually monitor embankment. All firefighting operations are being conditions in the risk area and draw the attention of conducted at a safe distance from either the track the Sector Commander to significant developments, or associated overhead line equipment. Crews are also react immediately to adverse changes and standing by awaiting a confirmation that the status withdraw crew members from the risk area without of caution has been passed to the rail operator. No delay where necessary. personnel have been committed to the embankment and no other operations are under way. The incident Note: firefighters should also continually monitor is not sectorised. conditions in the risk area as part of the Safe Person Concept. The IC has identified the main hazard area as the rail track, any overhead line equipment and determined 4.9 Examples of Application that crews should not venture anywhere near this of Tactical Mode hazard, therefore the IC declares that the incident Example 1 is in Defensive Mode. The incident is a 3-pump house fire. The ground floor is well alight and there are persons reported, Later, caution has been confirmed and safe believed to be in a first floor bedroom. A large jet systems of work are being observed. Crews are has been got to work through a front window to now working on the embankment but the hazard knock down the fire on the ground floor. is much reduced by the control measures which have been taken, so the IC now declares that the Two BA teams have been committed from the incident is in Offensive Mode. rear door up the stairs to search the first floor. The incident is not sectorised.

78 Fire Service Manual Example 4 As a general guide in these circumstances, if A 2-pump RTC with a chemical tanker involved. conditions within a large building allow a Sector The tanker is leaking an unidentified substance. or Incident Commander and associated staff to No persons are reported trapped. The road is work within the building, then the risk assessments closed and crews are standing by upwind and should be made on the basis of specific areas or uphill awaiting attendance of a specialist advisor compartments within the building rather than the and second tanker for decanting. whole building. Commanders and support staff should always work from an area of relative safety, The IC has identified a hazard zone and decided so only crews committed beyond that area into a that because neither persons nor the environment is more hazardous environment could be considered at risk crews will not be committed until the nature as being committed offensively of the chemical is established, and specialist advice on tactics obtained. Therefore the IC declares that Therefore, although crews are inside the mall, the incident is in Defensive Mode. the IC has determined that the hazard zone is the affected unit. Because crews are operating outside Later, when full hazard information has been of the main hazard zone, the IC has declared that received and advice from the Environment the incident is in Defensive Mode. agency about potential harm to the environment considered, the IC commits a crew in chemical Example 6 protection suits to prevent the substance entering A fire is being dealt with in a multi-occupancy, a drain. No operations are yet being conducted at single story range of premises. Crews in sector 1 are the crash scene. fighting a severe fire in a storage unit with two large jets and an aerial monitor. They are outside the risk Because crews are now, with suitable protection and area identified by the Sector Commander, therefore using safe systems of work, operating within the they are in defensive mode. Crews in sector 2 and hazard zone, the incident is in Offensive Mode. 4 (sector 3 is not in use) are conducting damage control operations in adjoining retail units using Example 5 BA. They are within an identified risk area, albeit a The incident involves a 5-pump retail unit fire in low risk and are therefore in offensive mode. a covered shopping mall. The retail unit is heavily involved in fire, all persons are accounted for. Because the incident has been sectorised and Smoke is issuing from the front of the unit into the ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ modes are in use, the shopping mall but is being contained and vented overall incident is declared as being ‘transitional’. from a large atrium roof space. The smoke level is several metres above the mall floor and is stable. 4.10 Analytical Risk Assessment

Operations in the mall are taking place in fresh Having carried out the DRA and established a air and crews are within easy reach of final exits. Tactical Mode, the Incident Commander will be The back of the unit is outside the mall. Smoke aware of the immediate hazards, the people at risk is issuing from the unit’s roof and from an open and the control measures necessary to protect loading bay. those people. This initial assessment now forms the basis of a more detailed risk assessment, which Crews are at work inside the mall with jets into the in the FRS is termed “Analytical Risk Assessment” front of the retail unit. Crews are at work at the rear (ARA). of the unit with jets through the loading bay. No crews have made an entry to the retail unit.

Incident Command 79 Due to the continually changing nature of identified risks. Where this is the case, the Incident the environment at an incident, the Incident Commander is likely to declare the incident Commander must ensure that as soon as resources ‘Offensive’ and commit crews into a ‘Hazard Area’ permit, an ARA is carried out and, when necessary, to perform an identified role. Where this approach new control measures implemented whenever the is appropriate the Incident Commander must hazard or degree of risk demands it. The ARA endeavour to reduce the risks to an acceptable level must be recorded. The outcome of the review of the to complement the training, safe systems of work risk assessment will either confirm that the DRA and specialist equipment the UKFRS has adopted. and chosen Tactical Mode was correct, or will result in a change of mode with the appropriate The expression ‘Hierarchy of Control Measures’ is announcements and action occurring without used to detail, in preferential order, measures that delay. It will also form the basis of a future or may be implemented to eliminate or reduce risk. ongoing DRA. The mnemonic ‘ERIC PD’ can be used as a prompt to assist in the process. At smaller incidents that do not require sectorisation, responsibility for the completion of ●● Eliminate the risk or substitute it for the analytical review of the risk assessment lies with something less dangerous, e.g. declare the Incident Commander or nominated suitable defensive mode at an incident thus preventing person. At incidents that have been sectorised, the personnel access into the hazard area, or responsibility for the analytical risk assessment substitute a hand operated branch for a may be delegated to the Sector Commanders. The ground monitor, again removing personnel Incident Commander remains accountable for from the hazard area. approving the Tactical Mode on all occasions. ●● Reduce the risk by preventing or reducing the number of personnel that come into The ARA should be kept constantly under review. contact with it or reducing the time of the Whenever the risk to crews changes (or at 20 exposure to the risk. minute intervals, whichever is the sooner) the ●● Isolate the risk by separating persons from Tactical Mode should be reviewed and the risk the risk, e.g. the use of a physical barrier to assessment confirmed or changed as required. protect a casualty from cutting operations Any documentation used should be updated if the during extrication from a vehicle following a information or overall assessment has changed collision. after such a review. ●● Control the risk, e.g. the IC would adopt safe systems of work e.g. tactical ventilation For incidents where a formal debrief may take could be used to improve conditions within place, the ARA documentation should be submitted the building, in conjunction with the to the Incident Commander for use at the debrief. appropriate standard operating procedures. Analytical Risk Assessments should be kept for ●● Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), is audit and periodic review purposes. An example always the last line of defence because it of a procedure to conduct a review and record doesn’t contribute to a safer environment, the outcome of the risk assessment is shown in in the FRS it must be assumed that all Appendix 1. personnel are provided with suitable and well maintained PPE and that this is utilised 4.11 Risk Control Measures at every incident. The use of additional PPE can be requested where circumstance It has already been discussed that the IC has a dictates e.g. the use of eye protection at a decision to make at every incident to determine Road Traffic Collision (RTC) or chemical whether the potential benefits outweighs the protection suits at a chemical spill.

80 Fire Service Manual ●● Discipline – ensure that discipline is 4.12 The Role of a Safety Officer maintained throughout the exposure to the A Safety Officer may be designated at any risk; it may be tempting for example to time during an incident by either the Incident remove PPE while communicating with a Commander or Sector Commander as appropriate. casualty at an RTC, where this is in the hazard This person should be suitably qualified and of area personal safety will be compromised. appropriate experience. Where appropriate (for Training plays a key part in maintaining example at larger incidents requiring sectorisation) discipline on the incident ground. a Safety Officer for the incident may be appointed by the Incident Commander to co-ordinate the role It is not possible to implement suitable control of other Safety Officers and take responsibility for measures for an incident prior to arrival and before any Health & Safety reporting issues (e.g. accident the subsequent risk assessment is performed. investigations). In addition, the Safety Officer Generic Risk Assessments identify possible for the incident, who is referred to as the “Safety hazards, risks and control measures at a range Sector Commander” may be responsible for the of incidents, thus ensuring personnel adopt a following: consistent approach to managing risk.

●● To survey operational sectors, identifying Incident Commanders ideally have access to the hazards, and advise the Sector Commander appropriate Generic Risk Assessment information as appropriate whilst en-route or in attendance at an incident, to ●● To liaise with Sector Safety Officers, to assist with the identification of suitable control support and exchange information measures. This, in conjunction with other ●● To confirm the validity of the initial risk specific facts regarding the premises, for example assessment and record as appropriate information gained on risk visits, will assist the IC ●● To collate and record Analytical Risk to formulate an effective plan. Assessment

Incident Command 81 ●● To act as an extra set of eyes and ears to the ●● evaluate the situation gathering all available Sector Commanders in monitoring the safety information of personnel ●● declare a Tactical Mode. (As an outcome ●● Liaise with IC or Operations Commander of the DRA. ‘Defensive Mode’ would ensure that crews are operating in a safe Safety Officers will be responsible for following list, environment thus reducing risk of injury. which is not exhaustive and updating the Incident Operating in an ‘Offensive Mode’ would Commander of any changing circumstances. require additional control measures.) ●● brief the crews ensuring that all relevant ●● Identify safety issues information is passed regarding the hazards, ●● Initiate corrective action incident objectives and the plan ●● Maintain safe systems of work; ●● committing BA crews in accordance with ●● Ensure all personnel are wearing appropriate approved guidance personal protection equipment ●● ensure a safety jet is provided for the ●● Observe the environment protection of crews ●● Monitor physical condition of personnel ●● options for tactical ventilation to reduce or ●● Regularly review remove smoke and hot gases ●● Record an Analytical Risk Assessment ●● alternative safe means of access and egress ●● thermal image cameras for BA crews The following two examples identify some safety ●● appointing a Safety Officer where considerations for a safety officer at operational resources allow incidents. Example 2 RTC Example 1 Derelict property fire At a Road Traffic Collision some of the potential At a fire in a derelict property some of the hazards hazards may include: present may include: ●● moving traffic ●● structural collapse ●● vehicles involved and their loads ●● difficult access /egress ●● airbags, pre-tensioners or hazardous ●● unsafe floors and staircases materials ●● the presence of asbestos ●● the occupants of the vehicles or others ●● discarded or deliberately placed hypodermic involved needles or other booby traps ●● broken glass or sharp metal and plastics ●● the unstable state of utilities and services due ●● hypodermic needles to vandalism ●● soft and uneven ground where a vehicle has ●● poor state of repair of the structure, e.g. roof left the carriageway tiles ●● contamination by body fluids ●● contents and fire loading of building ●● manual handling ●● specialist rescue equipment i.e. those The likelihood of injury to crews is increased due operated by hydraulic fluid etc. to state of the building and subsequent hazards. ●● alternative powered vehicles e.g. dual fuel Therefore, it will be necessary to assess the risk to ●● fluoroelastomers, fuel/brake fluid lines crews against the benefits of saving the building or ●● composite materials e.g. carbon fibres life should ‘persons’ be involved.

Possible control measures may include: (this list is not exhaustive)

82 Fire Service Manual The likelihood of injury to crews is increased 4.13 Closing Stages of the Incident due to working in close proximity to the vehicle During the closing stage of an incident, personnel and subsequent hazards. Therefore, it will be must not become complacent. The process of necessary to assess the risk to crews and implement task and hazard identification, assessment of risk, appropriate control measures. planning, organisation, control, monitoring and review of the preventive and protective measures Possible control measures may include: (this list is must continue until the last appliance leaves the not exhaustive) incident ground.

●● evaluate the situation gathering all available There are usually fewer reasons for accepting risks information at this stage because there are fewer benefits to be ●● declare a Tactical Mode as an outcome of gained from the tasks being carried out. Officers the DRA. should, therefore, have no hesitation in halting ●● brief the crews ensuring that all relevant work in order to maintain safety. information is passed on ●● request assistance from the Police for traffic Debriefing forms an essential part of the management management of health and safety on the incident ●● cone area off in the absence of the Police ground. Debriefs may vary in style and content ●● wear high visibility clothing depending upon the scale of the incident. To ●● additional PPE i.e. surgical gloves, eye and assist the Incident Commander, an officer can ear protection, dust masks etc. be nominated to help gather information for the ●● cover exposed sharp material debrief. Debriefing will identify any significant ●● ensure close supervision to ensure correct information or lessons learnt. Whenever possible, techniques are adopted the Incident Commander should debrief crews ●● appointment of a Safety Officer(s) prior to leaving the incident.

Incident Command 83 Details of all ‘near misses’, i.e. events that could 4.14 Summary have, but did not on this occasion ●● Evaluate situation ●● Carry out DRA and announce Tactical Mode result in personal injury or equipment damage, ●● Communicate Tactical Mode must be recorded. Experience has shown that there ●● Commence operations are a number of near misses prior to an accident ●● Review Tactical Mode occurring. If we fail to eradicate the causes of a ●● A risk assessment must be performed at all near miss, we will probably fail to prevent injury incidents or damage in the future. Appropriate information ●● The Incident Commander remains must then be fed back into the strategic decision accountable for declaring the Tactical Mode making process via the Systematic Level (see on all occasions reference to HSG 65 below) in order to: ●● The Incident Commander may delegate the completion of the Analytical Risk ●● Review performance of the organisation, Assessment to other suitable personnel when team and individuals appropriate ●● Improve procedures and equipment ●● There are two operational Tactical Modes ●● Develop staff and training strategies – Offensive and Defensive ●● For audit purposes ●● Sectors can only be in Offensive Mode or Defensive Mode Equipment, PPE, systems of work and training etc ●● If combinations of Offensive Mode and can all be improved as part of this performance Defensive Mode are in use, the whole management system. HSG 65 – Successful Health incident (which must have been sectorised) and Safety Management gives further guidance will be deemed to be in Transitional Mode. on the principles of effective health and safety This is an operational code which signals to management in the workplace. any individual with a responsibility for their own, or others’ safety that both offensive and It is important to highlight any unconventional defensive operations are being carried out at system or procedure used which was successful or the same time. made the working environment safe. It is equally important to highlight all equipment, systems or The Tactical Mode must be current and recorded as procedures which did not work satisfactorily or made appropriate, throughout the incident. the working environment unsafe. More information on closing down incidents and debriefing can be When a Tactical Mode has been decided, the found in Chapter 2 (2.17 and 2.20) Incident Commander must ensure that everyone on the incident ground is aware of it.

Confirmation of the prevailing Tactical Mode must be maintained between Incident, Sector and Crew Commanders throughout the incident. Incident Command Chapter 5 Chapter 5 – Command Competence

5.1 Introduction to be able to apply ICS to different situations. The ability to do this consistently is the key This chapter explains the term competence and and the introduction of the Integrated Personal the assessment of competence of the Incident Development System (IPDS) was brought in to Commander (IC) against National Occupational achieve this. Standards (NOS). At the very heart of IPDS is the term competence. Incident Command is a safety critical function for IPDS supports competence by describing the all managers who have a responsibility to respond systems that are necessary to ensure that UKFRS to incidents. It is essential that organisations are able can be sure that its people are safe. to provide evidence that their ICs at all levels are competent and that the ICs themselves understand and maintain competence. 5.2 Definition of Competence Competence is concerned with: The key elements of the process are: ●● outcomes, and the impact made upon 1. The definition of competence performance, 2. National Occupational Standards ●● measurement against standards 3. Workplace Assessment ●● reviewing progress towards achieving the 4. Personal Development Records outcome; i.e. competent performance 5. Continuing Personal Development (CPD) Competence is the ability to consistently use It is important that the organisation and the knowledge, skills and understanding to the individual are able to learn continuously from standards expected in employment, to meet the successes and challenges experienced during changing demands and solve problems. Incident Command. Competence and the assessment of competence are fundamental to performance The features of occupational competence should management, which states that if performance isn’t encompass: being measured, it isn’t being managed. ●● Personal effectiveness – being able to get The process of the assessment of competence things done appropriately. It embraces the in terms of knowledge, skills, experience and ability to successfully deal with situations understanding is explained below. and to interact with people employed in the workplace and being able to deal with Throughout this manual, guidance is provided contingencies as they arise, getting organised on good practice regarding Incident Command, and getting results of the right quality in a however, it does not describe the significant reasonable time. professional knowledge and understanding needed

Incident Command 85 ●● A range of occupational skills – the skills, the means for assessing performance in a job. In standards and practices associated with an the early 1980s, the Government were determined occupation. to improve the effectiveness of British Industry ●● The ability to transfer knowledge, skills and by introducing national standards of occupational experience to situations e.g. experiences competence. These standards were to be ‘explicit, gained and utilised within other contexts. agreed, widely accessible, flexible, progressive ●● Personal qualities and attributes i.e. problem and testable’ (Manpower Services Commission solving, planning and implementing (as per 1981). National Occupational Standards are FSC 51/2004) concerned with what an individual can do, not just what they know. The Incident Commander will be operating within a risk environment that is possibly wide and complex, The Qualifications and Curriculum Authority with many variables added by the actual situation provides guidance that NOS should focus upon the being dealt with. The IC will have to satisfy four critical aspects of competence at work. NOS can inter-related components; these are: also be used for training, appraisals, recruitment, retention planning and Continuous Professional ●● Task skills, which are routine and largely Development (CPD) needs. technical components. ●● Task management skills to manage a group The concept of assessing competence against of tasks and prioritise between them. (NOS) units, elements and the performance criteria ●● Contingency management, which means the can be a complex process. skills to recognise and deal with things that go wrong and with the unexpected. Regarding Incident Command there are 3 separate ●● Role/job environmental skills, which are standards that provide learning outcomes for the about ensuring safety, interacting with National Occupational Standards, listed opposite. people and the ability to deal with the environmental factors required in fulfilling 5.4 Unit the wider role. A unit of competence defines the broad functions It is important that the individual is not only able carried out in a particular job role. It is the smallest to demonstrate adequately those physical skills sub-division of a key area of work. involved in carrying out a range of tasks, but can manage a range of tasks at the same time. This must As an example: be done while planning contingency arrangements to cope if something goes wrong or there is an Lead, Monitor and Support people to resolve unexpected problem to solve. This must be achieved operational incidents (unit EFSM2). A unit whilst considering the wider environmental issues describes a workplace activity that can be performed and personal/interpersonal skills that are most by a single person. appropriate to the situation. 5.5 Element 5.3 National Occupational Each unit is made up of at least two elements Standards that provide a description of the main activities NOS are statements of the skills, knowledge and necessary for the completion of the unit. understanding needed in employment and clearly Therefore for Unit EFSM2, this unit comprises define the outcomes of competent performance. of 3 elements, i.e. They are benchmarks of performance, providing

86 Fire Service Manual WM 7 Lead & Support people to For those who respond to incidents in charge of fire appliances resolve operational incidents and crews (Crew Manager and Watch Manager) EFSM module database 008 describes the learning outcomes for those developing in this role

EFSM 2 For those who respond to incidents of a more complex nature to support initial crews (Station, Group and Area Managers and Lead Support & Monitor people to also Brigade Managers who are required to assume tactical resolve operational incidents command at incidents) EFSM module database 027 describes the learning outcomes for those developing in this role

ESFM 1 For those who respond to incidents to provide strategic advice and support (Area and Brigade Managers) Provide Strategic Advice and support to resolve operational EFSM module database 045 describes the learning outcomes incident for those developing in this role

2.1 Review and determine incident status. ●● Role, responsibilities and level of authority at 2.2 Assume responsibility and implement action operational incidents to support those involved in the incident. ●● Lines of communication at incidents and the 2.3 Debrief following resolution of incident incident command system

The element is the sub-division of a unit of 5.8 Workplace Assessment competence; it is a description of what a person should be able to do. It encompasses some action or Workplace assessment is a process for assessing outcome, having real meaning in the occupational people against NOS in the course of normal day to sector to which it relates. day activity. It helps to maintain skills, knowledge and understanding and provides evidence that people are competent. If there are shortfalls in 5.6 Performance Criteria performance these become part of the development Each element of competence will have performance required for the people concerned. To ensure that criteria, each of which consist of a short statement the assessment process is effective it is important that has two components, a critical outcome and to ensure that: an evaluative statement. Successful achievement of an element will be recognised when the individual ●● Line managers/ assessors understand the being assessed meets the stated performance requirements of the NOS criteria. As an example, see Section 5.13 Guidance ●● A person’s performance is judged against the for Assessors. NOS ●● The nature and formats of assessment 5.7 Knowledge and Understanding processes are known by those participating ●● Opportunities that occur naturally in day to This describes what must be known and understood day work should be identified. Where this is and how this knowledge applies to the job. As an not possible then appropriate Development example, part of the knowledge for unit EFSM2 is: Activities need to be constructed. For example, at the higher levels of Incident

Incident Command 87 Command, where naturally occurring and the effects of a fire upon the structure. The opportunities are not available on a regular IC must also be aware of the capabilities of the basis, then simulation could be used. available resources in order to make an effective ●● People and assessors generate, collect and deployment. record relevant evidence to demonstrate competence An IC must consider many other factors, to varying ●● Assessors make decisions and provide degrees. A Crew Manager (CM) at a relatively feedback small incident who is working at the operational ●● Decisions and feedback are recorded level must have a highly detailed knowledge and understanding of the professional fire domain. The assessor judges this evidence against all of Wider political or social implications factor less the performance criteria and makes a decision that in the resolution of smaller scale incidents so the standards have been met or that a development while the CM must have an appreciation that these need has been identified. considerations exist, they need not concentrate too much on them. 5.9 Knowledge and Understanding in Incident Command In contrast, a Brigade Manager (BM), working at major incidents, possibly involving the strategic or In order to function effectively, ICs must possess ‘Gold’ level, must have a detailed understanding of knowledge and understanding of the domain in the political, social and environmental implications which they are operating (and of the domains that the incident may generate. The BM’s specific operating above and below). For example, to make domain knowledge and understanding does not an appropriate assessment of risk in a building, there need to be as technically detailed as that of the CM. must be an appreciation of building construction For example, the BM in charge of a 25 pump fire

88 Fire Service Manual does not need to know how to operate the pumps Any overall judgement of competence should not which are delivering the water to the incident, be based upon one assessment only; it must be part but does need to know the issues associated with of a process conducted over time. It is necessary reinstating normality for FRS and the business to practice and be re-assessed, maintaining community. competence by Continuous Professional Development. More frequent assessment is needed Commanders at any level must also understand for higher risk tasks and tasks where associated that all incidents have a wide impact. A car fire skills may decay more quickly. may have impacted upon the car’s owner, who now has no car and cannot get to work. At the other end 5.10 Evidence of the spectrum, a large fire at a factory making components for cars may result in the laying off It is a basic principle of vocational competence of hundreds of workers. Incidents impact upon that competence can only be demonstrated against the natural environment; water run off can cause the NOS, on several occasions and in various pollution that may persist for many years. Closure conditions and contexts. It therefore follows that of a major transportation link as a result of an evidence gathered to support the demonstration of incident can have national economic implications. competence during incident command must also be gathered according to: A tactical or Silver Command Officer can be seen to need a different balance of all these skills. ●● Observation of workplace activity Although it can be argued that domain knowledge ●● Observation of simulated activity and understanding is of equal importance here, the (Development Activities) officer working at this level has a significant level of support via the command team and Command This may be supported by: Support and needs to begin to look outwards from the incident. ●● Products of a person’s work ●● Witness testimony The comparison of the knowledge and understanding ●● Personal statements of the domain against the wider organisational ●● Outcomes from questioning considerations can be viewed as a sliding scale and ●● Debriefing is represented in the graph below.

Domain Knowledge and Understanding

Wider Organisational Operational Tactical Strategic Level Level Level

Incident Command 89 In all cases regarding Incident Command, direct ●● A recording methodology is required to observation is crucial but can be supported by support the demonstration of competence questioning or other means to explore the skills, and further development needs of people knowledge, understanding and how, why and when ●● This methodology must complement the the evidence was produced. IPDS and withstand the scrutiny of audit (this is necessary to confer consistency and The Assessment Process transferability across organisations) In most instances it will be line managers who will ●● Systems should be non-bureaucratic and carry out workplace assessments, although they encourage people to feel that they ‘own’ their may also be completed by: development ●● The systems should inform the development ●● Trainers at a training/development centre planning process on a needs basis, for ●● Other service assessors (e.g. observers at individual, teams or the organisation exercises/simulations) ●● Other independent assessor’s e.g. external 5.12 Continuing Personal organisations during Gold Command Development simulation exercises at the Fire Service College ●● People with specialist skills who are qualified Personal Development to meet the NOS and IPDS is a phased approach, incorporating: Regardless of who carries out the assessment, all assessors must be familiar with the relevant NOS ●● Acquisition of knowledge skills and and suitably trained and competent to do so. understanding ●● Application of knowledge skills and If the assessment is to gather evidence for a relevant understanding in the workplace qualification (S/NVQ) then the assessor must be ●● Maintenance of knowledge skills and qualified to do so. understanding and CPD

Quality Assurance It is important to note that in the wider personal FRSs should have in place a system that will context personnel may be in one or more phases ensure that the assessment process is fair and in any point in their career. An individual may consistently applied. Question and answer sessions progress through the phases above as they change underpin workplace assessments and is one of role and develop upwards adopting a different IC eight components of IPDS. More information can role on behalf of their organisations. be sourced in FSC 11/2003. As the world around us changes and the core 5.11 Personal Development Records functions of FRSs widen, it is important that learning for ICs is designed to ensure that they FRSs require a means by which they can: can continue to operate competently within their current role. ●● Record achievements ●● Record competence CPD is an intrinsic part of Personal and ●● Record development needs Organisational Development (POD). Implementing effective CPD will give rise to both direct Whichever system is adopted the following and indirect costs. FRSs should view this as principles apply: an investment that may be expected to accrue savings over time. In particular the maintenance

90 Fire Service Manual and further development of knowledge, skills and ●● Mitigate risk to the organisation from the understanding through equitable development potential occurrence of negligent acts programmes will help organisations to: ●● Support fairness and equality policies ●● Support national and European initiatives for ●● Support the safe person concept life long learning ●● Meet duties under relevant law and ●● Meet the requirements of quality assurance/ regulations development initiatives, e.g. Investors in ●● Meet the staff development implications of people (IIP), ISO 9000 etc. business risk management and organisational development policies

Incident Command 91 5.13 Guidance for assessors of the garage. Upon attendance, the crew were met by the occupier of the garage who stated that there The following are provided as examples only. was a car on fire inside the garage. Demonstration of competence against WM7.1 Example scenario:

A crew has been mobilised to a report of a fire at a vehicle repair workshop. Whilst mobile the crew could see a plume of smoke rising from the vicinity

Performance Criteria Example characteristics of an Incident Commander’s performance which would meet the required standard Collect and confirm information The Incident Commander discussed generic risks present in relevant to the known and garage fires with the crew whilst mobile and asked the occupier anticipated risks to people, whether all persons had been accounted for and about the property and the environment presence of specific hazards such as acetylene cylinders, services, inspection pits, containers of fuel, materials which could be harmful to the environment, construction of the building, duration of the fire etc. Details of the hazards, such as location, quantity etc were confirmed with the occupier and the details were communicated to the crew members. The Incident Commander also considered wider implications such as previous incidents involving the same premises or other factors such as racial or other criminally motivated factors which may have led to the premises falling victim to arson. Plan action to lead and support The Incident Commander devised and communicated a safe the crew’s response to the and effective plan of action, considering the requirement for incident any additional resources and taking into account the resources available and their skills. Clear briefings were given to crew members to enable them to understand exactly what they were required to do and that they were fully aware of the risks present in the premises. Develop objectives through risk A DRA was conducted and objectives were planned in accordance assessment with the DRA. The details of the DRA were communicated to all and a suitable Tactical Mode was declared and communicated to Control. Significant safety findings were recorded effectively.

92 Fire Service Manual Demonstration of competence against EFSM 2.1 garage. The workshop contains an acetylene cylin Example scenario: der and there is an environmental hazard posed by the workshop asbestos roof. The Tactical Level IC Four pumping appliances are in attendance at a has been mobilised to the incident. fire in a vehicle repair workshop. The initial IC has implemented a tactical plan taking into account the information obtained from the occupier of the

Performance Criteria Example characteristics of an Incident Commander’s performance which would meet the required standard Obtain sufficient information from The Tactical Level Incident Commander ensured that comprehensive all available sources on incident additional information was obtained from Fire Control and through progress, risks, deployment, observation and consultation with the initial Incident resource availability and existing Commander. This includes: incident management Who are the Incident Commander and crew? Are they familiar with the locality and aware of any risks present? How experienced are the Incident Commander & crew? Have there been any previous incidents at this location? What possible causes are there for this incident – accidental through generic risks such as welding etc or deliberate through business competitors, disgruntled customer/employee? Could this be a crime scene? Are there any concerns over contamination from fire water run off? Will the incident cause severe traffic congestion? What time of day is it? Will customers be arriving to collect their cars? A comprehensive review of the tactical plan was undertaken taking into account all likely influencing factors. These include: Are safe systems of work employed? Are there sufficient numbers of suitable people available to perform the work? Are relief arrangements adequate? Are suitable rehydration and hygiene arrangements available? Has the use of specialist resources been considered fully? Resources in attendance and the effectiveness of their deployment were evaluated. This includes the number and skills of people already at the incident and who may be required. The existing Incident Command structure was thoroughly reviewed to ensure its effectiveness. The spans of control were evaluated to ensure the Incident Commander was not being overloaded with channels of direct communication. The use of sectorisation and functional roles was evaluated and implemented to delegate tasks efficiently. Confirm that current action The Tactical Level Incident Commander carried out a complies with relevant legislation comprehensive review of the tactics and ensured that the actions and protocols took into account the requirements of the FRSA 2004, Health & Safety at Work Act, environmental, Civil Contingencies Act and other relevant legislation. The Incident Commander demonstrated a thorough awareness and practical application of existing relevant risk information, procedures, 7.2 (d) information and GRAs and ensured these were implemented within the tactical plan.

Incident Command 93 Performance Criteria Example characteristics of an Incident Commander’s performance which would meet the required standard Determine the current The current and potential involvement of other Category 1 & 2 involvement of other agencies, responders as defined in Parts 1 & 3 of Schedule 1 to the Civil their current activities and key Contingencies Act 2004. These include Police, Ambulance contacts Service, Local Authority, Health Services, Utilities, Environment Agency, Environmental Health, Health Protection Agency, Highways Agency, etc. and any other relevant persons such as the premises occupier or owner was evaluated in full, taking into account wider implications of the incident such as: interruption to utility services, environmental pollution resulting from the incident, potential effect upon health in the area, preservation of evidence, disruption to transport infrastructure.

Demonstration of competence against EFSM 1 Example scenario: the collapse of a large public building in a city centre following an explosion.

Performance Criteria Example characteristics of an Incident Commander’s performance which would meet the required standard 1.1g anticipate the likely demand The strategic commander would arrange for ridership and on resources and the implication appliance availability data for the next 48 hours to be made overall service delivery available immediately. Forecast rolling 20 pump, 10 officer peak requirement during the next 24 hours. Gather heads of department to analyse other known priority events in the next 2 working days and report back on their findings. 1.2f provide accurate and timely The strategic commander had a press conference arranged information to the media and in liaison with other agencies involved and the known media utilise media resources to inform contacts. Had a statement prepared in agreement with other and protect the community agencies to inform and advise the community of the nature of the incident and possible short medium and long term effects. 1.2k conduct comprehensive The strategic commander initiated a conference briefing with the and timely briefings with relevant Chief Constable, Authority CEO, Authority party leaders and the people Environment Agency Officer to outline the projected timeline of the incident to enable them to interface their interests, priorities and resources.

94 Fire Service Manual Incident Command Appendices

Appendices

Appendix 1 – Analytical Risk Assessment Process 96

Appendix 2 – Incident Command System 100

Appendix 3 – The Psychology of Command 107

Appendix 4 – Decision Making Model 119

Appendix 5 – Response Arrangements in Wales 132

Appendix 6 – Response Arrangements in Scotland 135

Appendix 7 – Response Arrangements in Northern Ireland 138

Glossary of Terms 141

References and Bibliography 144

Further Reading 146

Acknowledgements 147

Incident Command 95 APPENDIX 1 Analytical Risk Assessment Process

A1.1 Introduction ●● An assessment of existing control measures with additional control measures introduced Having carried out a Dynamic Risk Assessment as appropriate and established a Tactical Mode, the Incident ●● Confirmation that the dynamic risk Commander must consider a more detailed assessment and tactical mode was/is correct approach, this process is known in the FRS as the ●● Informs ongoing DRA process “Analytical Risk Assessment”. The Risk Management Model in figure A1 below Due to the continually changing environment is a tool that can be used on the incident ground to at an incident, for ‘best practice’ the IC should assist with the ARA process. It can also be used ensure that as soon as resources permit an ARA to feed relevant information from the incident is performed and documented. This must be kept ground, via the incident debrief, back into the risk constantly under review and updated at 20 minute assessment process at the systematic level, thereby intervals or when ever the risk to crews changes. confirming or amending the organisations ‘Generic Risk Assessment’ or the ‘Standard Operational Procedures’. A1.2 Analytical Risk Assessment Process Figure A2 is an example of an ARA form used at The Analytical Risk Assessment’ includes the the Fire Service College. It is used in conjunction following elements: with the Generic Risk Assessments (GRA) found in “A Guide to Operational Risk Assessment” ●● A formalised assessment of the hazards, who folder (Fire Service Guide Volume 3) or what is at risk from those hazards, the likelihood and severity of risk

Organisation Strategic Systematic

Generic Risk Assessment Incident Debrief Standard Operating Procedures

Dynamic Risk Assessment

Tactical Mode

Analytical Risk Assessment Figure A1: Risk Management Model

96 Fire Service Manual APPENDIX 1

Incident Command 97 APPENDIX 1 Analytical Risk Assessment Process

98 Fire Service Manual APPENDIX 1

A1.2.1 The Analytical Process Any relevant notes or plans should be included on 1. Complete the information surrounding the the rear of the form prior to it being signed by the incident or sector and identify the appropriate Incident or Sector Commander taking responsibility GRA number if applicable (see reverse of form for operations in the relevant area of operations. for index). Identify the significant hazards, those that may be at risk and the existing Additional consideration should be given to control measures. environmental issues as soon as reasonably 2. Using the five-point grid to decide the practicable,(the requirement to address this on the SEVERITY and the LIKELIHOOD associated rear of the form should act as a prompt to IC or to each hazard. Multiply the severity and Sector Commander). likelihood scores together and enter the total to calculate the risk rating: e.g. tolerable, The completed forms should be collated by moderate, high, very high. Command Support for debriefing and audit 3. Enter the total and the risk rating in the purposes. appropriate columns and decide if the existing control measures are adequate. 4. Where this is not the case, list additional controls measures that are necessary to make the management of the risk tolerable.

Incident Command 99 APPENDIX 2 Incident Command System

Further Examples of Figure A2.4 Application of Sectorisation Example of Tactical Mode, Hazardous substance release, Offensive Mode Figure A2.1 Examples of Sector Development Figure A2.5 Example of Tactical Mode, Hazardous substance Figure A2.2 release, Transitional Example of Sector Designation at a multiple RTC Figure A2.6 Figure A2.3 Example of Sectorisation for Ships. Example of Tactical Mode, Hazardous substance release, Defensive Mode

100 Fire Service Manual APPENDIX 2 Figure A2.1 Sector 3 Sector 4 Sector 5 Sector 3 Sector 4 Sector 1 Sector 2 Main Entrance Sector 1 Sector 2 Main Entrance Sector 3 Sector 4 Sector 3 Sector 1 Main Entrance Sector 1 Examples of Sector Development Main Entrance

Incident Command 101 APPENDIX 2 Incident Command System Figure A2.2 Sector 1 Lorry Sector 2 Coach Sector 3 Embankment Example of Sector Designation at a multiple RTA

102 Fire Service Manual APPENDIX 2 Figure A2.3

Incident Command 103 APPENDIX 2 Incident Command System Figure A2.5

104 Fire Service Manual APPENDIX 2 Figure A2.6

Incident Command 105 APPENDIX 2 Incident Command System Figure A2.6 For’d Sector For’d Defensive Mode Midship Sector Offensive Mode Defensive Mode Machinery Sector Aft Sector Offensive Mode Example of Sectorisation for Ships

106 Fire Service Manual APPENDIX 3 The Psychology of Command (courtesy of Professor Rhona Flin)

The psychology of command is beginning to 1. Identify the problem. emerge as a distinct research topic for psychologists 2. Generate a set of options for solving the interested in selection, training, competence problem/choice alternatives. assessment, decision making, stress management, 3. Evaluate these options concurrently using one leadership and team working. The following of a number of strategies, such as weighting overview of recent research into decision making, and comparing the relevant features of the stress and leadership is based on Flin (1996) which options. gives a more detailed examination of these issues. 4. Choose and implement the preferred option.

A3.1 Decision Making In theory, this type of approach should allow you to The decision making skill of the Incident make the ‘best’ decision, provided that you have the Commander is one of the essential components mental energy, unlimited time and all the relevant of effective command and control in emergency information to carry out the decision analysis. response. Despite the importance of high speed This is typically the method of decision-making decision making in the fire service and a number in which managers are trained. But we know from of other occupations, it has only been very our everyday experience that when we are in a recently that research psychologists have begun to familiar situation, we take many decisions almost investigate leaders’ decision making in demanding, automatically on the basis of our experience. We time-pressured situations. do not consciously generate and evaluate options; we simply know the right thing to do. This may be The traditional decision-making literature from called intuition or ‘gut feel’ but, in fact, to achieve management, statistics and economics is very these judgements some very sophisticated mental extensive but it offers little of relevance to the activity is taking place. So we can compare these Incident Commander, as it tends to be derived two basic types of decision-making, the slower but from studies of specified problems (often artificial more analytic comparison and the faster, intuitive in nature), inexperienced decision makers and low judgement. Which style do commanders use when stake payoffs. Moreover, it is rarely concerned with deciding what to do at the scene of an incident? ambiguous, dynamic situations, life threatening odds or high time pressure, all important features A3.2 Naturalistic Decision of a fire or rescue environment. Making (NDM) In the last ten years there has been a growing If we turn to the standard psychological literature interest by applied psychologists into naturalistic on decision-making it tells us almost nothing of decision making (NDM) which takes place in emergency decision making, as so much of it is complex real world settings (Klein et al, 1993; based on undergraduates performing trivial tasks Zsambok & Klein, 1997; Flin et al, 1997). These in laboratories. Similarly, the management research researchers typically study experts’ decision is concerned with individuals making strategic making in dynamic environments such as flight decisions when they have several hours or days decks, military operations, fire-grounds, hospital to think about the options, carefully evaluating trauma centres/intensive care units and high hazard each one in turn against their business objectives industries, for example nuclear plant control rooms. using decision analysis methods. These provide a This NDM research has enormous significance for range of explanatory frameworks, which may have the understanding of how commanders and their value for managers’ decision making where they teams make decisions at the scene of an incident as are encouraged to emulate an analytical style of it offers descriptions of what expert commanders decision making. At its simplest form this usually actually do when taking operational decisions in incorporates the following stages: emergencies.

Incident Command 107 APPENDIX 3 The Psychology of Command

Ten factors characterise decision making in be lifesaving. He was interested in operational naturalistic settings: environments where experienced decision makers had to determine a course of action under conditions 1. Ill defined goals and ill structured tasks. of high stakes, time pressures, dynamic settings, 2. Uncertainty, ambiguity and missing data. uncertainty, ambiguous information and multiple 3. Shifting and competing goals. players. 4. Dynamic and continually changing conditions. Klein’s research began with a study of urban fire- 5. Action feedback loops (real-time reactions to ground commanders who had to make decisions changed conditions). such as whether to initiate search and rescue, 6. Time stress. whether to begin an offensive attack or concentrate 7. High Stakes. on defensive precautions and how to deploy their 8. Multiple players (team factors). resources (Klein et al, 1986) They found that the 9. Organisational goals and norms. fireground commanders’ accounts of their decision 10. Experienced decision makers making did not fit in to any conventional decision- tree framework. In typical NDM environments information comes from many sources, is often incomplete, can be “The fire ground commanders argued that they were ambiguous, and is prone to rapid change. In an not ‘making choices’, ‘considering alternatives’ or emergency, the Incident Commander and her or his ‘assessing probabilities’. They saw themselves as team are working in a high stress, high risk, time acting and reacting on the basis of prior experience; pressured setting and the lives of those affected they were generating, monitoring and modifying by the emergency, (including their own fire rescue plans to meet the needs of the situations. Rarely personnel) may be dependent on their decisions. did the fire ground commanders contrast even two options. We could see no way in which the concept How then do they decide the correct courses of of optimal choice might be applied. Moreover it action? In the view of the NDM researchers, appeared that a search for an optimal choice could traditional, normative models of decision making stall the fire ground commanders long enough which focus on the process of option generation to lose control of the operation altogether. The and simultaneous evaluation to choose a course of fire ground commanders were more interested in action do not frequently apply in NDM settings. finding actions that were workable, timely and There are a number of slightly different theoretical cost-effective.” (Klein et al, 1993, p139). approaches within the NDM fraternity to studying decision making but they all share an interest in During post-incident interviews, they found that dynamic high pressure domains where experts the commanders could describe other possible are aiming for satisfactory rather than optimal courses of action but they maintained that during decisions due to time and risk constraints. the incident they had not spent any time deliberating about the advantages or disadvantages of these A3.3 Recognition-Primed different options. Decision Making (RPD) Dr Gary Klein of Klein Associates, Ohio, conducts It appeared that these Incident Commanders had research into decision making by attempting to ‘get concentrated on assessing and classifying the inside the head’ of decision makers operating in situation in front of them. Once they recognised many different domains. Klein’s approach stemmed that they were dealing with a particular type of from his dissatisfaction with the applicability of event, they usually also knew the typical response traditional models of decision making to real life to tackle it. They would then quickly evaluate the situations, particularly when the decisions could feasibility of that course of action, imagining how

108 Fire Service Manual APPENDIX 3

they would implement it, to check whether anything (an ‘action replay’ in reverse) and if it is deemed important might go wrong. If they envisaged any problematical then an attempt will be made to problems, then the plan might be modified but only modify or adapt it before it is rejected. At that point if they rejected it, would they consider another the commander would re-examine the situation to strategy. generate a second course of action.

Klein Associates have also studied other decision Key features of the RPD model are as follows: makers faced with similar demand characteristics (e.g. tank platoon captains, naval warfare ●● Focus on situation assessment commanders, intensive care nurses) and found ●● Aim is to satisfy not optimise the same pattern of results. On the basis of these ●● For experienced decision makers, first option findings they developed a template of this strategy is usually workable called the Recognition-Primed Decision Model. ●● Serial generation and evaluation of options This describes how experienced decision makers (action plans) can rapidly decide on the appropriate course of ●● Check action plan will work using mental action in a high-pressure situation. simulation ●● Focus on elaborating and improving The model has evolved into three basic formats action plan (see Figure A 3/1). ●● Decision maker is primed to act

In the simplest version, shown as Level 1, the To the decision maker, the NDM type strategies decision maker recognises the type of situation, (such as RPD) feel like an intuitive response rather knows the appropriate response and implements it. than an analytic comparison or rational choice of alternative options. As ‘intuition’ is defined as, If the situation is more complex and/or the decision “the power of the mind by which it immediately maker cannot so easily classify the type of problem perceives the truth of things without reasoning faced, then as in Level 2, there may be a more or analysis” then this may be an acceptable label pronounced diagnosis (situation assessment) phase. for RPD which is rapid situation assessment to This can involve a simple feature match where the achieve pattern recognition and associated recall decision maker thinks of several interpretations of of a matched action plan from memory. the situation and uses key features to determine which interpretation provides the best match with At present this appears to be one of the best models the available cues. Alternatively, the decision maker available to apply to the emergency situation whether may have to combine these features to construct a the environment is civilian or military; onshore or plausible explanation for the situation; this is called offshore; aviation, industrial, or medical. In the story building, an idea that was derived from legal USA, the RPD model is being widely adopted, research into juror decision-making. Where the it is being used at the National Fire Academy as appropriate response is unambiguously associated well as in a number of military, medical, aviation with the situation assessment it is implemented as and industrial settings (see Klein, 1998). The RPD indicated in the Level 1 model. model and associated research techniques have begun to generate a degree of interest in the UK, In cases where the decision maker is less sure of most notably by the Defence Research Agency and the option, then the RPD model, Level 3 version the Fire Service. indicates that before an action is implemented there is a brief mental evaluation to check whether there are likely to be any problems. This is called mental simulation or pre-playing the course of action

Incident Command 109 APPENDIX 3 The Psychology of Command yes Action 1 ...n Relevant Cues Will it work? Evaluate Action (n) [Mental Stimulation] Implement Course of Action Changing Context Perceived as typical [Prototype or Analog] yes, but Experience the Situation in a Expectancies Recognition has four byproducts Plausible Goals modify Level 3 – Evaluate CourseLevel of Action Figure A 3/1: TheFigure A 3/1: Recognition Primed Decision Model Klein, 1996

yes typical Analog] Typical Action Relevant Cues Perceived as [Prototype or no Implement Course of Action Changing Context Expectancies Recognition has four byproducts Plausible Goals Experience the Situation in a Diagnose Interference [Story Matching] [Feature Matching] Level 2 – DiagnoseLevel the Situation Clarify Anomaly Typical Action Relevant Cues Changing Context Perceived as typical [Prototype or Analog] Implement Course of Action Experience the Situation in a Expectancies Recognition has four byproducts Plausible Goals Level 1– Simple 1– Level Match

110 Fire Service Manual APPENDIX 3

A3.4 Command roles and If we consider the Orasanu model, the key decision style skill is matching the correct decision style to the demands or allowances of the situation. For Obviously the RPD approach is not appropriate for example, not using the fast intuitive RPD style all types of operational decisions and other NDM when there is time to evaluate options. Furthermore researchers have been developing taxonomies of senior fire officers in strategic command roles the different types of decisions other emergency may require special training to discourage them commanders, such as pilots, make in different from using the fast RPD approach when a slower, situations (see Figure A3/2). The NASA Crew analytical method would be more appropriate Factors researchers (Orasanu, 1995) have found that (Fredholm, 1997). two key factors of the initial situation assessment are judgements of time and risk and that these There are significant differences in the balance may determine the appropriate decision strategy of cognitive skills required of commanders, to use. The issue of dynamic risk analysis is a depending on their role (rather than rank) in a significant component of situation assessment on given operation, ascending from operational or the fireground as discussed in Chapter 3 (see also task level, to tactical command, and to strategic Fire Engineers Journal, May, 1998). command (Home Office, 1997). From studies of

CUES

What’s the problem? How much time is available? How risky (present and future)?

TIME LIMIT Time Available RISK HIGH Risk Variable

Problem Understood Problem Problem NOT OR NOT Understood Understood Understood

Multiple Rule Multiple No Options Options Available Tasks To Do Available Available

Choose Schedule Create Gather more Apply Rule Option Tasks Solution Information

Incident Command 111 APPENDIX 3 The Psychology of Command commanders’ decision strategies (see Flin, 1996; and structured by ‘feed-forward control’ through a Flin et al, 1997; Zsambok & Klein, 1997) these stored rule. Stored rules are of the type if (state) then roles are briefly outlined below in terms of the (diagnosis) or if (state) then (remedial action). decision skills required. The tactical decision maker is likely to be on scene, The figure below shows the decision process with a remit to maintain a good mental model of model for fixed wing pilots. (Orasanu 1995B) the evolving plan and unfolding events. Situation Reprinted with permission of the Human Factors assessment is expected to be a more significant and Ergonomics Society component of tactical decision-making than spending time choosing appropriate responses. Strategic Command However the tactical commander may have to This involves the overall policy of command ‘create’ time to engage in reflective thinking and and control, deciding the longer term priorities when necessary to use more analytic decision for tactical commanders and planning for strategies to evaluate alternative courses of action. contingencies depending on the enemy’s response. The task also contains a strong analytical element, Kerstholt (1997, p189) found from an interview as co-ordination of multiple sources of information study with battalion commanders of peace-keeping and resources demands an awareness that cannot operations, that, “decisions were mostly made be based on procedures alone. analytically in the planning phase and intuitively during the execution of the mission. By analytic The decision making style assumed to be adopted procedure we meant that several options were for strategic decision making is creative or explicitly weighed against each other, whereas analytical, since the situations encountered will an intuitive decision meant that the commander feature a number of novel elements or developments immediately ‘knew’ which decision to take.” the strategic commander has not previously encountered. Operational Command This involves front line or sector commanders who Neither time pressure nor high immediate risk have to implement orders from the tactical level. should be influencing command at this level, where They are operating in real time and have to react the aim, if possible, is to devise an optimal solution rapidly to situational demands. Decision making for the situation, taking into account the wider and at this level is assumed to contain rule-based longer term implications. The strategic commander and intuitive elements. It is assumed that under is usually remote from the incident and will be time pressure and at high risk, they primarily supported throughout by a team of lower ranking make decisions based on pattern recognition (e.g. officers. RPD) of the situations encountered. Ongoing situation awareness must remain very high as their Tactical Command performance depends on rapid identification of the This refers to the planning and co-ordination of the situation and fast access to stored patterns of pre- actions determined at the strategic level. programmed responses.

Due to the higher time pressure at this level, Only when time permits will they be able to engage decision-making is based to a much greater extent in analytic decision making and option comparison. on condition action matching, or rule-based Striving to find optimal solutions runs the risk of reasoning. This style is characterised by controlled ‘stalling’ their decision making, therefore their actions derived from procedures stored in memory. main objective is to find a satisfactory, workable Control of behaviour at this level is goal oriented course of action.

112 Fire Service Manual APPENDIX 3

A3.5 Styles of Command far greater cognitive processing. Thus, they take a Decision Making longer time to accomplish, and for most individuals can only be used in situations of relative calm and From the above description of decision making minimal distraction. techniques associated with particular command roles, there appear to be four main styles of decision In fast moving, high-risk situations these styles are making used by commanders: creative, analytical, difficult if not impossible to use, and in order to procedural and intuitive. maintain command and control, officers have to rely on procedural or intuitive styles which will The most sophisticated (and resource intensive) is produce a satisfactory, if not an optimal decision. creative problem solving which requires a diagnosis of an unfamiliar situation and the creation of a novel Procedural methods involve the identification of course of action. This is the most demanding of the the problem faced and the retrieval from memory four techniques, requires significant expertise and of the rule or taught method for dealing with as Kerstholt (1997) found, is more likely to be used this particular situation. Such decision methods in a planning phase rather than during an actual (e.g. drills, routines and standard procedures) are operation. frequently practised in training.

Analytical decision making also requires a full With experience, officers may also use the fastest situation assessment, rigorous information search style of decision making, intuitive or recognition- and then recall, critical comparison and assessment primed decision making described above. In this of alternative courses of action. Again with proper case there may not be a written rule or procedure preparation, some of these option choices may but the commander rapidly recognises the type of already have been evaluated during exercises situation and immediately recalls an appropriate or planning meetings. These are the two most course of action, on the basis of prior experience. powerful decision techniques as they operate on large information sets but consequently they require

Decision Style Cognitive Processes

Creative Problem Solving Diagnosis of unfamiliar situation requiring extensive information search and analysis. Development/synthesis of new courses of action. Knowledge-based reasoning. Analytical Option Comparison Retrieval and comparison of several courses of action. High working memory load. Knowledge-based reasoning. Procedural/ Situation identification. Standard Operating Procedures Retrieval (and rehearsal) of rules for course of action Explicit rule-based reasoning. If x then y. Intuitive/ Rapid situation recognition based on Recognition-primed decisions (RPD) pattern matching from long-term memory. Implicit rule based or skill-based. ‘Gut feel’ Table 1: Command decision styles

Incident Command 113 APPENDIX 3 The Psychology of Command

The evidence suggests that commanders use all be discussed with the team and/or the trainer. This four decision styles to a greater or lesser degree assists officers to learn the critical cues for given depending on the event characteristics and resulting types of situations and to store methods of dealing task demands. For more senior commanders, with new situations. distanced from the front line, the task characteristics change in terms of time frame, scale, scope and In essence the basis of good command training must complexity, necessitating greater use of analytical be a proper understanding of the decision making and creative skills (Fredholm, 1997). processes utilised by effective commanders.

Studies of military and aviation commanders have Psychologists can offer a range of research shown that the following factors are of particular techniques to begin to explore in a more scientific significance in determining decision style: fashion the skills of incident command (e.g. Burke, 1997; Flin et al, 1997). For instance, one of the ●● available time most salient features of a fireground commander's ●● level of risk decision task is the speed of fire development. ●● situation complexity/familiarity,(or none at all) Brehmer (1993) is particularly interested in this ●● availability of information type of dynamic decision task, which he believes has four important characteristics: a series of The training implications of applying this new decisions which are interdependent, a problem decision research to fire and rescue operations is which changes autonomously, and as a result of the first to determine the types of situations where decision maker's actions, and a real time scenario. experienced fire commanders use the intuitive RPD type of decision making. In these situations He gives the following example, “Consider the the critical focus will be on situation assessment. decision problems facing a fire chief faced with So the next stage is to discover the cues these the task of extinguishing forest fires. He receives experts use when quickly sizing up an incident and information about fires from a spotter plane and the responses they would choose to apply once they on the basis of this information, he then sends out have assessed the situation. commands to his firefighting units. These units then report back to him about their activities and Less experienced commanders need to be trained locations as well as about the fire and the fire to recognise the key features or cues of different chief uses this information (and whatever other scenarios using simulated incidents with detailed information he may be able to get, e.g., from a feedback on their decision making. They need to personal visit to the fire and the fire fighting units) develop a store of incident memories (from real to issue new commands until the fire has been events, simulator training, case studies, expert extinguished.” (p1). accounts) which they can use to drive their search for the critical classifying information at a new Brehmer and his colleagues have developed a incident. computer programme (FIRE) based on a forest fire scenario which incorporates the four elements The US Marines who favour the RPD model have of dynamic decision making described above. developed a very useful volume of 15 decision The decision maker takes the role of the fire chief exercises in Mastering Tactics: A Tactical Decision and using the grid map of the area shown on the Games Workbook (Schmitt, 1994, see Klein, 1998). computer screen, she or he has to make a series These are a series of tactical decision scenarios of decisions about the deployment of fire fighting where a description of a problem is presented resources with the goal of extinguishing the fire and officers are required to quickly work out and and protecting a control base. explain a solution to the problem which can then

114 Fire Service Manual APPENDIX 3

The commander's actions are subject to feedback Weiseath (1987) discussing the enhanced cognitive delays, that is time delay in actions being demands for leaders under stress describes reduced implemented or in the commander receiving status concentration, narrowing of perception, fixation, update information. Brehmer's studies have shown inability to perceive simultaneous problems, that decision makers frequently do not take such distraction, difficulty in prioritising and distorted feedback delays into account, for example sending time perception. out too few firefighting units because they do not anticipate that the fire will have spread by the time Brehmer (1993) argues that three ‘pathologies of they receive the status report. decision making’ can occur, he calls these

He argues that the decision maker needs to have a I. thematic vagabonding when the decision good 'mental model' of the task in order to control a maker shifts from goal to goal dynamic event, such as a forest fire, and his research II. encystment the decision maker focuses on has enabled him to identify several problems only one goal that appears feasible, and as in of model formation: dealing with complexity, (i) fails to consider all relevant goals; and balancing competing goals, feedback delays and III. a refusal to make any decisions. taking into account possible side effects of actions. Brehmer (1993) uses control theory to encapsulate Not all researchers agree that the decision making the dynamic decision process, “the decision maker of experienced Incident Commanders will be must have clear goals, he must be able to ascertain degraded by exposure to acute stressors. Klein the state of the system that he seeks to control, he (1998) points out that these effects are most typical must be able to change the system, and he must when analytical decision strategies are used,. In have a model of the system.,” (p 10). contrast, the recognition-primed type of decision strategy employed by experts under pressure may A3.6 Causes of Stress for actually be reasonably stress-proof. Commanders A3.7 Leadership In fireground operations, stress may also have an impact on commanders’ decision making and Leadership ability is generally deemed to be a key techniques for managing this need to be considered attribute of an Incident Commander and to some (see Flin 1996 for further details). extent may be regarded as an umbrella term for the required competencies which have to be trained. The effects of stress on commanders’ thinking and However, finding a precise specification of the decision making ability are of particular interest. required behaviours or the style of leadership is Charlton (1992) who was responsible for the rather less frequently articulated. selection of future submarine commanders referred to the ‘flight, fight or freeze’ response manifested Leadership within a military context embodies the as problems in decision making, ‘tunnel vision’, concepts of command, control, organisation and misdirected aggression, withdrawal, and the duty. There has been extensive military research ‘butterfly syndrome’ “where the individual flits into leadership much of which unfortunately never from one aspect of the problem to another, without sees the light of day outside the defence research method solution or priority” (p54). He also mentions community. self delusion where the student commander denies the existence or magnitude of a problem, regression to more basic skills, and inability to prioritise.

Incident Command 115 APPENDIX 3 The Psychology of Command

The dominant model of leadership for training in are unlikely to work. The contingency theories the British armed services, the emergency services emphasised that leadership style cannot be and in lower level management is Adair’s (1988) considered in isolation. Thus, what is effective Action Centred Leadership with its simple three leadership behaviour is likely to be dependent on circles model. the leader’s personality and skills, the situation and the competence and motivation of the group being Adair developed his ideas from his experiences led. Thus the most effective leader needs to: with the British Army, and he maintained that the effective leader must focus on the needs of the I. be able to diagnose the situation (the task/ individual, the task and the team. This functional problem, the mood, competence, motivation model has not changed significantly since its initial of the team), exposition thirty years ago and continues to be II. have a range of styles available (e.g. delegative, taught in a wide range of management courses. consultative, coaching, facilitating, directive), While the three circles diagram and the associated III. match her or his style to the situation (for advice to leaders is intuitively appealing, there example Hersey and Blanchard’s (1988) model has been little empirical work to test whether it of situational leadership). can actually function as an explanatory theory of leadership in routine managerial duties or In an emergency which has high time pressure emergency command situations. and risk, then it is unlikely that a consultative leadership style would be totally appropriate and The managerial research literature on leadership while the Incident Commander needs to solicit is a progression from a long standing focus on advice from available experts and to listen to the leadership characteristics, to research in the 1960s sector commanders, the appropriate style is likely on leader behaviours (e.g. autocratic vs democratic; to be closer to directive than democratic. team vs task), to an awareness that “one size fits all” recommendations of the best leadership style

Adair’s Leadership Model Task Needs

Group Needs

Individual Needs

116 Fire Service Manual APPENDIX 3

The need for a perceptible change in leadership studied this particular type of human factors style is very obvious when observing simulated training have argued that it has clear applications emergency exercises when the time pressure and for the fire service (Bonney, 1995, Wynne, 1994). task demands are increased. Moreover, this sends a very important message to the rest of the team that References to Appendix Three the situation is serious and that they will also have Brunacini, A. (1991) Command safety: A wake-up to ‘change gear’ and sharpen their performance. call. National Fire Protection Association Journal, January, 74-76. Within the business world, the current fashions in leadership style are the delegative, consultative Burke, E. (1997) Competence in command: styles, couched in the language of empowerment Research and development in the London Fire and transformational leadership. These approaches Brigade. In R. Flin, E. Salas, M. Strub & L. Martin have not been developed with the Incident (Eds) Decision Making under Stress. Aldershot: Commander in mind and while it was argued above Ashgate. that a consultative style may be inappropriate, particularly in the opening stages of an incident, this Driskell, J. & Salas, E. (1996) (Eds) Stress and does not mean that there should be no delegation to Human Performance. Mahwah, NJ: LEA. more junior commanders. Flin, R. (1995a) Incident command: Decision In a larger incident considerable authority has to making and team work. Journal of the Fire Service be devolved to sector commanders who will be College, 1, 7-15. required to take critical decisions and who will not always have time or opportunity to seek the opinion Flin, R. (1995b) Crew Resource Management of the Incident Commander. These individuals for teams in the offshore oil industry. Journal of need to have the expertise and the confidence to European Industrial Training, 19,9, 23-27. make decisions as the need arises. Flin, R. (1996) Sitting in the Hot Seat. Leaders The essential point is that the commander should and Teams for Critical Incident Management. be comfortable with the style required and that Chichester: Wiley. the front-line commanders should have a clear understanding of their delegated authority and the Flin, R., Salas, E., Strub, M. & Martin, L. (1997) Incident Commander’s plan of action. (Eds) Decision Making under Stress: Emerging Themes and Applications. Aldershot: Ashgate. Finally, the Incident Commander does not, and should not work alone. The need for effective Fredholm, L. (1997) Decision making patterns in team performance on the incident ground remains major fire-fighting and rescue operations. In R. paramount. Recent advances in team training, Flin, E. Salas, M. Strub & L. Martin (Eds) Decision known as Crew Resource Management (CRM) Making under Stress. Aldershot: Ashgate. have been developed by the aviation industry and are now used in medicine and the energy industry. Home Office (1997) Dealing with Disaster. Third The focus is on non-technical skills relevant to edition. London: TSO incident command, such as leadership, situation awareness, decision making, team climate and Klein, G. (1998) Sources of Power How People communication (see Flin, 1995b; Salas et al, in Make Decisions. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. press for further details). Fire officers who have

Incident Command 117 APPENDIX 3 The Psychology of Command

Klein, G. (1997) The Recognition-Primed Decision Orasanu, J. & Fischer, U. (1997) Finding decisions (RPD) model: Looking back, looking forward. In in naturalistic environments: The view from C. Zsambok & G. Klein (Eds) Naturalistic Decision the cockpit. In C. Zsambok & G. Klein (Eds) Making. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Naturalistic Decision Making. Mahwah, NJ: LEA.

Klein, G., Calderwood, R., & Clinton-Cirocco, A. Salas, B., Bowers, C. & Edens, B. (in press) (eds.) (1986) Rapid decision making on the fireground. Applying Resource Management in Organisations. In Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 30th New Jersey. LEA. Annual Meeting. San Diego: HFS. Schmitt, J. (1994) Mastering Tactics. Tactical Klein, G., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R. & Zsambok, Decision Game Workbook. Quantico, Virginia. US C. (1993). (Eds.) Decision Making in Action. New Marine Corps Association. York: Ablex. Zsambok, C. & Klein, G. (1997) (Eds) Naturalistic Murray, B. (1994) More guidance needed for senior Decision Making. Mahwah, NJ: LEA. commanders on the fireground. Fire, 87, June, 21‑22.

118 Fire Service Manual APPENDIX 4 Decision Making Model (courtesy of London Fire Brigade)

1. Introduction Application of the Decision Making Model for Personal Development 1.1 This note introduces the Decision Making 1.4 This system clearly identifies best practice Model as a tool for Dynamic Risk Assessment in decision making for all personnel developing (DRA). The model provides a framework for these skills. Formalising a best practice approach decision making for any task or event, every to Decision Making facilitates consistent feedback individual requires the skills to apply its principles to individuals on their performance and identifies in order to control the risks associated with an both positive and negative aspects of their actions. activity. The Decision Making Model is therefore Some of the benefits of this are listed below: applicable to all Personnel at all levels. To the individual: 1.2 This guidance discusses the various stages ●● Encourages individuals to use their initiative of the Decision Making Model and explains how and take personal responsibility. the process achieves DRA. ●● Facilitates consistent assessment of management skills. 1.3 The cyclical nature of the model means that ●● Brings together and reinforces training and it is particularly suitable for changing and dynamic actual experience. environments. The model is a simple flow diagram ●● Provides a structure for developing and which guides users through the decision making controlling safe systems of work. process in an organised way. This process reduces the potential for information to be missed and requires To the Service: objectives to be set and implemented. A key element ●● Identifies areas for further in-depth analysis in this process is the consideration of safety and and review. the development of safe systems of work. ●● Supports the training of officers in the management process.

DECIDING ACTING

EVALUATING

Information Information on about the Task Progress or Event

COMMUNICATING Information GATHERING about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME Resources THINKING CONTROLLING

Information about Risk and Benefit The Decision Making Model

Incident Command 119 APPENDIX 4 Decision Making Model

●● Improves the knowledge and skills of any 2. The Decision Making Model personnel who may undertake the role of 2.1 The Decision Making Model is formed manager at any level. around two main activities, Deciding and Acting. Each stage identified in the model falls into one of 1.5 Use of the Decision Making Model will these activities. confirm best practice and identify training needs when applied to a dynamic situation. The feedback Deciding process will also identify when policy, procedures ●● Gathering and thinking about all available or equipment need to be introduced or improved. information. ●● Identifying appropriate objectives. 1.6 The following are examples of when the ●● Defining a plan. decision making model could benefit personnel ●● Considering the results of evaluations. other than those attending operational incidents. The list is not exhaustive: Acting ●● Communicating the objectives and plan to all ●● Accidents, accident investigation and post those at the incident. accident action. ●● Controlling the activity. ●● Performance or conduct issues. ●● Evaluating the outcome of the plan. ●● Compliments or complaints procedures. ●● Welfare issues. 2.2 The functions within the two main activities of the Decision Making Model are explained as follows.

DECIDING ACTING

EVALUATING

Information Information on about the Task Progress or Event

COMMUNICATING Information GATHERING about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME Resources THINKING CONTROLLING

Information about Risk and Benefit Gathering and Thinking APPENDIX 4

Gathering and Thinking Evaluation of the situation, task and persons 2.3 It is often not possible to gather all of at risk. the information about a task or event before it is necessary to take action. 4. Information about the task or event 2.4 In seeking to achieve safe systems of work it is vital that sufficient information is gathered 4.1 The first stage in the process involves upon which a reasoned decision can be made. gathering relevant information, whilst making the best use of the time available. It must be recognised 2.5 In order to achieve safe systems, a key that information gathering is the key to effective factor will be the nature of the task or event and decision making. the time pressures that are associated with it. 4.2 The following are some examples of information about the Task/Event that the person 3. Information Gathering or persons following the process should be 3.1 During the initial stages of any decision considering. making process it is necessary to gather relevant information. There are four sources of information ●● What is the environment? that should be considered: ●● What is happening? ●● Is the situation static of developing. ●● Information of the Task/Event. ●● What was it that led up to the event? ●● Information on Resources. ●● Who is involved? ●● Information on Risks and Benefits. ●● Are there any immediate risks to anyone? ●● Information on Progress. This list is not exhaustive and other information 3.2 This links with Step 1 of the Dynamic Risk available may prove vital to the decision making Assessment: process.

DECIDING ACTING

EVALUATING

Information Information on about the Task Progress or Event

COMMUNICATING Information GATHERING about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME Resources THINKING CONTROLLING

Information about Risk and Benefit Information about the Task or Event

Incident Command 121 APPENDIX 4 Decision Making Model

DECIDING ACTING

EVALUATING

Information Information on about the Task Progress or Event

COMMUNICATING Information GATHERING about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME Resources THINKING CONTROLLING

Information about Risk and Benefit Information about Resources

5. Information about available resources 5.1 What is available to assist in the resolution of the task or event? This may include:

●● People ●● Equipment. ●● Agreed policies and procedures. ●● Information sources. ●● Other agencies and knowledge or training.

The list may be extensive depending on the complexity of the situation.

122 Fire Service Manual APPENDIX 4

DECIDING ACTING

EVALUATING

Information Information on about the Task Progress or Event

COMMUNICATING Information GATHERING about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME Resources THINKING CONTROLLING

Information about Risk and Benefit Information about the Risks and Benefits

6. Information about 6.3 The Decision Maker should consider: risk and benefit ●● Who and/or what is the event likely to 6.1 In order to make a balanced decision it present a risk to. is essential that the potential risks are considered ●● What are the potential benefits from a against perceived benefits. particular course of action?

6.2 In considering risk and benefit the broadest 6.4 This will only become apparent when the approach should be taken since they may apply to process is applied to a specific task/event. people, property, the environment or a combination of all of these and/or many others.

Incident Command 123 APPENDIX 4 Decision Making Model

DECIDING ACTING

EVALUATING

Information Information on about the Task Progress or Event

COMMUNICATING Information GATHERING about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME Resources THINKING CONTROLLING

Information about Risk and Benefit Information on Progress

7. Information on Progress 7.3 As part of the cyclical nature of the Decision Making model, Gathering Information 7.1 As part of the process the Decision Maker on Progress is considered in more detail later in will be presented with additional information as this note. the situation develops. This information should be kept current from the very earliest stages.

7.2 At an early stage this information may be minimal, but as the event progresses the information will develop into a valuable source, shaping or changing the objectives and the overall plan.

124 Fire Service Manual APPENDIX 4

DECIDING ACTING

EVALUATING

Information Information on about the Task Progress or Event

COMMUNICATING Information GATHERING about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME Resources THINKING CONTROLLING

Information about Risk and Benefit Objectives

8. Objectives 8.4 The objectives and the plan subsequently developed to implement them should provide 8.1 Once all the available information has been outcomes that are achievable with an acceptable gathered and considered the Decision Maker will level of risk for the situation. be able to identify and set a number of objectives that need to be achieved. 8.5 It is therefore when setting the objectives that the link is made with Step 2 of the Dynamic 8.2 Clear and defined objectives give direction Risk Assessment: to resolve the task/event in a satisfactory manner thereby achieving the principle aim of the Authority: Select safe systems of work ‘Making London a Safer City’

8.3 In setting detailed objectives the primary concern is the reduction of risk to people. Objectives that provide resolution to a static situation but expose members of the public or brigade to unnecessary risk would not therefore be acceptable.

Incident Command 125 APPENDIX 4 Decision Making Model

DECIDING ACTING

EVALUATING

Information Information on about the Task Progress or Event

COMMUNICATING Information GATHERING about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME Resources THINKING CONTROLLING

Information about Risk and Benefit Planning

9. The Plan 9.4 The planning stage should result in the development of actions designed to deliver the 9.1 This stage in the process requires that required outcomes with an acceptable level of prioritised objectives be developed into plans that risk to those involved. These are defined as Safe are achievable and take into account the need to Systems of Work. reduce any risks to acceptable levels. 9.5 Once the plan is developed the Decision 9.2 When developing effective plans, the Maker will need to make sure that sufficient achieving of set objectives is unlikely to be resources are put into place to deliver it. This may considered in isolation. There may be a number of relate to an individual obtaining a particular piece conflicting priorities such as: of equipment or the request by a Decision Maker for additional resources to deal with a developing ●● Safety issues. situation. ●● Availability of resources ●● Involvement of other agencies and their 9.6 Once the Plan has been formulated, the objectives. Decision Maker can move on to Step 3 of the Dynamic Risk Assessment: 9.3 All of these conflicting priorities need to be considered and accounted for in the plan. It is Assess chosen systems of work likely that the plan will set a number of primary 9.7 In a dynamic situation it is likely that plans objectives that, once achieved, can be built upon to will have to be modified as the situation develops. achieve the final objectives.

126 Fire Service Manual APPENDIX 4

DECIDING ACTING

EVALUATING

Information Information on about the Task Progress or Event

COMMUNICATING Information GATHERING about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME Resources THINKING CONTROLLING

Information about Risk and Benefit Communicating

10. Communicating the recipient, so keeping the information clear and concise. However, care should be taken not 10.1 An essential element in the implementation to exclude information that may indirectly affect of the plan is the need to ensure effective individual efforts or safety, such as the work of communication from and to the Decision Maker. others around them.

10.2 This is particularly relevant in dynamic 10.5 Accuracy: The information should be situations where changes that are occurring may accurate to avoid confusion and misinterpretation not be readily apparent to all those involved. Within when it is passed to the recipient. Good this section of the model, key aspects exist that are communication will leave the recipient in no doubt essential to effective communication. These are: of what is expected.

●● The Relevance of the information. 10.6 Timely information: The information ●● The Accuracy of the information. passed should be current. Information that is out ●● The Timeliness of the information. dated or whose validity has expired should not be ●● Selection of the Medium to be used. passed on.

10.3 Effective communication will enable those 10.7 Choice of Medium: When passing involved to carry out their role in the plan and make information it is important that a medium is used sure that they are kept up to date with developments which is suitable to the situation. Examples of and progress. Communication must be two way to possible media include: keep all parties updated on progress. Verbal Communication, whether it be face to face 10.4 Maintaining Relevance: The information or by radio. should be relevant to the recipient, as there may be little or no benefit from passing on all details of ●● Visual Communications, such as Hand Signals. the event. Effectiveness of communication is often ●● Written communication. improved by only including details that affect

Incident Command 127 APPENDIX 4 Decision Making Model

10.8 The most appropriate medium will depend comply with the plan and safe systems of work are on the individual situation and the nature of the put into place. Responsibility for certain areas may information to be passed. It would be inappropriate, be delegated to make sure control is maintained for example, to rely on verbal communication in a over the whole event and to enable individuals to noisy environment to pass a complex chemical name carry out tasks effectively. when a written note would avoid misinterpretation. The use of established communication routes and 11.2 The degree to which the responsibility is methods will assist in ensuring the effective flow delegated will depend on the complexity of the of information to all those involved. event and vary as it progresses. Delegation should aim at increasing rather than reducing the level of 10.9 Confirmation: It is important to confirm control the Decision Maker has over the event. that the communication has been received and understood. Often the easiest way to make sure 11.3 If the risks are not proportionate to the that the recipient has accurately understood what is benefits of taking the action, additional control expected of them is to have them repeat it back. measures should be introduced. Here the link is made to Step 4 of the Dynamic Risk Assessment: 11. Controlling Introduce additional control measures 11.1 Having communicated the plan to those involved it is necessary to make sure that resources are allocated appropriately, that the actions taken

DECIDING ACTING

EVALUATING

Information Information on about the Task Progress or Event

COMMUNICATING Information GATHERING about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME Resources THINKING CONTROLLING

Information about Risk and Benefit Controlling

128 Fire Service Manual APPENDIX 4

DECIDING ACTING

EVALUATING

Information Information on about the Task Progress or Event

COMMUNICATING Information GATHERING about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME Resources THINKING CONTROLLING

Information about Risk and Benefit Evaluating

12. Evaluating may relate to individuals carrying out tasks and providing feedback, or team leaders ensuring that Seek/give progress and situation reports – team members are properly briefed. 12.1 During the task/event the Decision Maker will receive information from a variety of sources. 12.4 At this stage it is also necessary to This will range from progress and situation reports evaluate the systems of work and the effectiveness to information gathered from the Decision Maker’s of any control measures. If the risk is still not own observations. All of this information can be proportionate to the benefits, then work should not used to assist the Decision Maker in evaluating the proceed. This links with Step 5 of the Dynamic plan. Risk Assessment: 12.2 These reports should be provided regularly Reassess systems of work and additional and it is the responsibility of all persons to pass control measures. these reports to the next level in the decision making chain.

12.3 It is the responsibility of the Decision Maker to make sure that all persons in the decision making chain are kept regularly informed of subsequent changes to the plan, the developing situation and progress being made. This process

Incident Command 129 APPENDIX 4 Decision Making Model

DECIDING ACTING

EVALUATING

Information Information on about the Task Progress or Event

COMMUNICATING Information GATHERING about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME Resources THINKING CONTROLLING

Information about Risk and Benefit Information on Progress

13. Information on progress achieved. This will allow the Decision Maker to determine whether the plan is effective or requires 13.1 As discussed earlier, Information on amendment. Progress will become of greater importance as the Acting elements of the Model are put in place. 13.6 The results of the comparison between expectation and reality can then be used to 13.2 It is at this stage that the Decision Making supplement other information about the task/ Model completes the loop and the first three event in the ‘Gathering and Thinking’ part of the elements along with the Information on Progress model. This additional information should then be should be revisited. considered and used by the Decision Maker to re- evaluate their objectives and plan. Comparing progress made to that expected 13.3 Expected progress – Having formulated 13.7 The evaluation phase completes the the plan and allocated the required resources with information-gathering loop and ensures that the the relevant levels of control, the Decision Maker control of the task/event remains dynamic. will have decided the timeframe within which objectives and events should be achieved. This is 13.8 Whenever new information becomes the expected progress to be made. available it is fed into the process and enables decision makers to make sure that the act of 13.4 Actual progress – By receiving regular directing and controlling personnel and resources updates in the form of progress or situation reports within an effective plan is based on all the available the Decision Maker will be able to determine the information. actual progress being made.

13.5 Comparison – The Decision Maker will need to make a comparison between the progress expected against information on progress actually

130 Fire Service Manual APPENDIX 4

DECIDING ACTING

EVALUATING

Information Information on about the Task Progress or Event

COMMUNICATING Information GATHERING about AND OBJECTIVES PLAN OUTCOME Resources THINKING CONTROLLING

Information about Risk and Benefit Outcome

14. Outcome 14.3 Finally, it must be stressed that the use of the Decision Making Model should be 14.1 The outcome will be achieved successfully continuous throughout an event. In the early when the Objectives are met with minimal exposure dynamic stages it may be used many times and to Risk. as the event becomes more controlled and less dynamic the model may be used less frequently. 14.2 On each occasion that new information, from any source, is introduced into the event the Decision Maker will evaluate the objectives, plan and control structure in light of this information, through use of the Decision Making Model, to ensure safe systems of work are maintained and resources are being used to best effect.

Incident Command 131 APPENDIX 5 Response Arrangements in Wales

Local response is the building block of resilience The Wales Resilience Forum across the UK with operational response to The principal mechanism for multi-agency co- emergencies being managed locally by the Strategic operation and co-ordination is the Wales Resilience Co-ordination Groups (SCGs). The UK government Forum (WRF), which senior representation from and the Welsh Assembly Government work together the Welsh Assembly Government, Cabinet Office, on the development of civil protection policy. The local authorities, emergency services, armed concordat between UK Government and the Welsh forces, Environment Agency Wales, NHS Wales, Assembly Government on the Civil Contingencies Maritime and Coastguard Agency and the Health Act 2004 provides clarity on the anticipated role(s) and Safety Executive. of the Welsh Assembly Government under this Act and, in particular relation to Emergency Powers The WRF is a planning body that considers under Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. resilience planning and preparation in a similar The Welsh Assembly Government plays a vital manner to the Regional Resilience Forums in role in the co-ordination of emergencies in or England, but with a higher level of political affecting Wales. Co-ordination arrangements in involvement. The WRF works alongside other Wales are established to provide links and joint elements of the multi-agency protection framework working protocols between multi-agency groups at local and UK Government level. The framework and organisations. is not a hierarchy; LRFs are not subordinate to the WRF, this allows for the free flow of information Welsh Assembly Government across the multi-agency structure. The Assembly Government has devolved powers in agriculture; housing; education and training; The Wales Civil Contingencies the environment; health and health services; Committee local government; and social services. It has responsibility for the front line public services of T h e Wa l e s C i v i l C o n t i n g e n c i e s C o m m i t t e e ( WC C C ) the Ambulance Service, NHS, Fire and Rescue is constituted and functions in a similar way to Services. The Welsh Assembly Government, with the Regional Civil Contingencies Committees in its devolved powers, has an important role to play in England. The WCCC will be established for wide terms political, social and economic aspects of the spread disruptive incidents requiring a pan Wales critical national infrastructure in Wales. In relation response and recovery effort. The membership of to this plan the Assembly Government will: the WCCC will be determined by the nature of the incident and will be lead by a pre-determined lead official from a list of strategic officers and officials. ●● Inform stakeholders of the activation of the pan-Wales Response Plan The WCCC will not interfere with local command and control arrangements, but will ensure local ●● Set up an run the ECC(W) responders are fully informed. The WCCC will ●● Act as Secretariat to the WCCC meet at three levels: ●● Establish links with COBR and the UK Government through the ECC(W) Level 1 – prior to an emergency where warning Deploy Assembly Government Liaison Officers, is available. The meeting would be held to review where appropriate, to Strategic Co-ordination the situation and update local stakeholders, with Groups. a view to escalating to Level Two if the situation warranted.

Level 2 – in the event of a wide area disruptive challenge in Wales. The meetings would be convened by the Welsh Assembly Government, in

132 Fire Service Manual APPENDIX 5

consultation with relevant members of the WRF. inform local SCGs of the pan UK picture ensuring They might also be convened if a national response good communication is maintained in order that or national co-ordination of an event was required. local decisions reflect the needs of the UK. The WCCC may also be convened for an emergency which occurs in Wales where the Strategic Co- The ECCW will assist in co-ordination of mutual ordinating Group or the WRF feels it will be able aid/assistance and cross border issues during to add value to the response. a major emergency, and where there are no established protocols in place the ECCW will Level 3 – could only be called once an assist in facilitation of a central link between emergency arises which requires the making of UK Government departments and the devolved emergency regulations under Part 2 of the Civil administrations. The decision to implement the Contingencies Act. ECC(W) will depend very much on the nature of the emergency in or affecting Wales. The WCCC will request situation reports from local responders to ensure Welsh Ministers are Agencies that are not transferred functions will fully briefed. Welsh Ministers will inevitably use report directly to their respective UK department, this same information to brief UK Government although copy reports will be forwarded to the Ministers, thus reducing the need for duplication. ECC(W) where appropriate.

The Emergency Co-ordination In addition to their normal roles the Fire and Rescue Centre Wales Service will provide a representative as a liaison officer at the ECC(W) to act as a communication When there is a requirement or expected escalation link between the ECC(W) and those Welsh Fire and of an incident, the Welsh Assembly Government Rescue Services involved. They will also provide will activate the Emergency Co-ordination Centre situation and exceptional reports to the ECC(W) Wales (ECC(W)). The ECC(W) provides an and link with the Welsh Assembly Government’s important role in the consequence management Department for Social Justice and Regeneration on issues that arise from emergencies, particularly policy issues. where the impact of those emergencies that affect devolved functions. The ECC(W) is a facility Under the provisions of the Civil Contingencies that supports the WCCC and Welsh Ministers in Act 2004 if emergency regulations are introduced providing briefings and advice. Additionally, the that impact upon Wales the UK government will EEC(W) provides a link between the SCGs, the appoint a Wales Emergency Co-ordinator. office of the Secretary of State for Wales and Civil Contingencies Secretariat.

The primary role of the ECC(W) is to gather and disseminate information to Welsh Ministers and the UK government. Additionally, the ECC(W) will

Incident Command 133 APPENDIX 5 Response Arrangements in Wales

Welsh Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC) Assembly PNICC COBR Government ACPO UK Goverment Minister Ministers

Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS)

Lead Official/Chair Wales Civil Contingencies Committee (WCCC)

Lead UK Government Department

Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales)

Other Devolved Administrations Strategic Co-ordinating Group Gwent, North Wales, South Wales, and Dyfed Powys Gold Command Rooms

Co-ordination Arrangements and Communication Links in Wales

134 Fire Service Manual APPENDIX 6 Response Arrangements in Scotland

Local response is the building block of resilience ●● brief Ministers; across the UK with operational response to ●● produce a handling plan, as soon as possible, emergencies being managed locally by Strategic which offers a clear assessment of whether Co-ordinating Groups (SCGs). The UK the emergency is within its scope or whether government and the Scottish Executive work central co-ordination arrangements need together on the development of civil protection to be invoked in consultation with Scottish policy. The Scottish Executive plays a vital role Executive Justice Department; in the co-ordination of major emergencies in or ●● take whatever executive decisions and affecting Scotland. Co-ordination arrangements in actions are needed from the centre to handle Scotland are established to provide links and joint the emergency or to help local responders to working protocols between multi-agency groups deal with it; and organisations. ●● draw upon and apply resources to support the local response to the emergency; Strategic Co-ordinating Groups ●● ensure effective liaison with UK Lead Government Departments regarding Scottish The principal mechanism for multi-agency co- interests; operation and co-ordination across Scotland ●● co-ordinate and disseminate information for are the eight SCGs. SCGs are established in the public and the media at the national level; each police force area in Scotland and typically ●● engage with stakeholder representatives contain representation from the constituent local at national level on matters of interest for authorities, emergency services, armed forces, Scotland; Scottish Environmental Protection Agency ●● account to the Scottish Parliament and (SEPA), NHS, and the Maritime and Coastguard lead in the submission of evidence to any Agency (MCA). The SCGs consider resilience subsequent Government appointed inquiry; planning and preparation in a similar manner to ●● identify and share the lessons from the the Regional Resilience Forums in England. They emergency; also participate in a Scotland – wide Strategic Co- ●● at all times assess whether the emergency ordinating Group Forum to facilitate information remains within its scope or whether to sharing, the development of good practice and activate the corporate Scottish Executive or promote consistency in preparation for response UK central government arrangements. to emergencies in Scotland. The SCG (s) will be activated in the event of incidents requiring a If a single Department is nominated to lead it is strategic level of management. likely that it will operate from its normal offices and, if necessary, provide direct input for SCGs. The Lead Scottish Once the Department recognises that the emergency Executive Department has consequences for other Scottish Executive Departments it will activate SEER. Where the nature of the emergency is such that some degree of central government co-ordination or support becomes necessary, the Scottish Executive The Scottish Executive will consider designating a single Department to be Emergency Room (SEER) responsible for its overall response to a significant The precise role of SEER is likely to vary depending emergency. The Scottish Executive will activate its on the nature of the emergency at hand. SEER corporate response arrangements to: will not duplicate the role of local responders. It encompasses all Scottish Executive Departments ●● act as the focal point for communication and performs its role through a number of integrated between the Scottish Executive, its groups, such as the Ministerial Group on Civil sponsored bodies and the SCG(s); Contingencies (MGCC).

Incident Command 135 APPENDIX 6 Response Arrangements in Scotland

It will: ●● ensure that UK strategies and input to response and recovery is co-ordinated with ●● provide strategic direction for Scotland; the Scottish and local efforts. ●● co-ordinate and support the activity of SE Departments; The Scottish Emergencies ●● collate and maintain a strategic picture of the Co-ordinating Committee emergency response with a particular focus on consequence management and recovery The Scottish Emergencies Co-ordinating issues; Committee (SECC) will provide support and ●● brief Ministers; advice to SEER in the event of a major emergency. ●● identify if it is appropriate for a particular The representation of agencies at SECC would be SE department to lead in a relevant area of determined by the particular circumstances of the response; emergency. The role of the SECC is to provide ●● ensure effective communication between specialist information and advice to support the local, Scottish and UK levels, including the development of Scotland’s strategies. co-ordination of reports on the response and recovery effort; UK Arrangements ●● mobilise Scottish assets and release them When the particular circumstances of an to support response and recovery efforts as emergency require co-ordination and support from appropriate; U.K. Government, the Cabinet Office will consider ●● determine public information strategy and instigating UK Government plans. When the co-ordinate public advice in consultation decision to mobilise plans is made, links will be with SCGs and other key stakeholders; established with the Scottish Executive’s corporate ●● advise on the relative priority to be attached arrangements. The national structure for Managing to multi-site or multiple incidents and the Response is appended in Figure 1 overleaf. allocation of scarce Scottish resources; ●● co-ordinate and disseminate information for N.B. (A full version of these arrangements can be the public and the media at the national level; found in “Preparing Scotland”, available on the ●● raise at UK level any issues that cannot be Scottish Executive website). resolved in Scotland;

136 Fire Service Manual APPENDIX 6

SCOTTISH UK ARRANGEMENTS ARRANGEMENTS Scotland EST Office EAT SECC MGCC CCC

S-PICC SEER COBR

Strategic

Tactical

LOCAL Operational ARRANGEMENTS

Figure 1

Key to Figure 1 MGCC – Ministerial Group on Civil Contingencies

SECC – Scottish Emergency Co-ordinating Committee

SCG – Strategic Co-ordinating Group

S-PICC – Scottish Police Information and Co-ordination Centre

SEER – Scottish Executive Emergency Room

EAT – Scottish Executive Emergency Action Team

EST – Scottish Executive Emergency Support Team

COBR – Cabinet Office Briefing Room

CCC – Civil Contingencies Committee

Incident Command 137 APPENDIX 7 Response Arrangements in Northern Ireland

The UK Government and the Northern Ireland The Lead Department Principle Assembly work together on the development of Where the nature of the emergency is such that Civil Protection Policy and ensure resilience at a some degree of central government co-ordination local and National level. or support becomes necessary, the Northern Ireland Executive, in keeping with best practice, operate The primary legislation in Northern Ireland the lead Department principle. This in practice relating to Fire and Rescue Services is ‘The Fire means that the nominated department who has and Rescue Services (Northern Ireland) Order overall responsibility for the type of emergency in 2006’ with the ‘Civil Contingencies Framework’, progress will: the mechanism for discharging the principles of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. ●● act as the focal point for communication between the Northern Ireland Assembly, While Strategic Co-ordinating Groups (SCG’s) Northern Ireland Office (NIO) and the provide a local response to UK resilience in CMG/ESSCG; England, Scotland and Wales, in Northern Ireland ●● brief devolved administration Ministers and this role is carried out by the Crisis Management where necessary Northern Ireland Office Group (CMG). (NIO) Ministers; ●● take whatever executive decisions and Crisis Management Group actions are needed from the centre to handle The principal mechanism for multi-agency co- the emergency or to help local responders to operation and co-ordination in Northern Ireland deal with it; is the Crisis Management Group (CMG). This is ●● draw upon and apply resources to support chaired by the Head of the Northern Ireland Civil the local response to the emergency; S e r v ic e o r t h e h e a d of t h e L e a d d evolve d gove r n m e nt ●● ensure effective liaison with UK Lead department as appropriate. Membership is made up Government Departments on all devolved of representatives of the nine devolved government matters; departments. This group is supported at the ●● co-ordinate and disseminate information planning and co-ordination of policy levels by the for the public and the media on devolved Emergency Services Senior Co-ordinating Group matters; (ESSCG), comprising Fire, Police, Ambulance, ●● engage with stakeholder representatives Maritime and Coastguard Agency and Military at national level on matters of interest for and the Integrated Emergency Planning Forum Northern Ireland on devolved matters; (IEPF), made up of private and public sector ●● account to the Northern Ireland Assembly major utility and transport organisations, who and lead in the submission of evidence to any help co-ordinate and brief Category 2 responders subsequent Government appointed inquiry in the event of a Regional/National emergency. on all devolved matters; Both of these forums participate in the sharing of ●● identify and share the lessons from the information, the development of good practice and emergency; promote consistency in preparation and training in ●● at all times assess whether the emergency line with the principles of integrated emergency remains within its scope or whether management. CMG will, in most instances, be to activate UK central government activated in the event of incidents requiring a arrangements. strategic level of management.

138 Fire Service Manual APPENDIX 7

The Northern Ireland Office ●● determine public information strategy and Briefing Room (NIOBR) co-ordinate public advice in consultation with the ESSCG and other key stakeholders NIOBR is the main communication link to Central on non devolved matters; Government and the other devolved regions. ●● advise on the relative priority to be attached However, current governance arrangements mean to multi-site or multiple incidents and the that the Northern Ireland Office will act as the allocation of resources on non devolved Lead Department for all terrorist related incidents. matters; In effect this could mean that NIOBR will operate ●● co-ordinate and disseminate information for either in partnership or separate of the linkage the public and the media at the national level with CMG (see Figure 1 Emergency Response on non devolved matters; Arrangements in Northern Ireland). Where ●● raise at UK level any issues that cannot be NIOBR is established alongside CMG, it will not resolved in Northern Ireland on non devolved duplicate the role of local responders but support it matters; at a strategic level and ensure links are established ●● ensure that UK strategies and input to at National level with the Cabinet Office Briefing response and recovery is co-ordinated with Room (COBR) or those of the other devolved the Northern Ireland Assembly efforts. regions. It encompasses all involved or effected ●● determine public information strategy and government departments and is chaired by a NIO co-ordinate public advice in consultation Minister. with the ESSCG and other key stakeholders on non devolved matters; It will: ●● advise on the relative priority to be attached to multi-site or multiple incidents and the ●● provide strategic direction on non devolved allocation of resources on non devolved issues for Northern Ireland; matters; ●● support the activity of devolved ●● co-ordinate and disseminate information for Departments; the public and the media at the national level ●● collate and maintain a strategic picture of the on non devolved matters; emergency response with a particular focus ●● raise at UK level any issues that cannot be on consequence management and recovery resolved in Northern Ireland on non devolved issues; matters; ●● brief Central Government Ministers on non ●● ensure that UK strategies and input to devolved issues; response and recovery is co-ordinated with ●● ensure effective communication between the the Northern Ireland Assembly efforts. Northern Ireland Assembly and UK levels, including the co-ordination of reports on the response and recovery effort;

Incident Command 139 APPENDIX 7 Response Arrangements in Northern Ireland

Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC) COBR

Nortjhern Ireland Northern Ireland Other Devolved Assembly Lead Office Briefing Administrations Department Room (NIOBR)

Crisis Management Group (CMG)

Emergency Service Senior Co-ordinating Group (ESSCG)

Planning and Co-ordination

Integrated Emergency Planning Forum }

Communication Link Key Planning and/or co-ordination In emergency situation

Emergency Response Arrangements in Northern Ireland

140 Fire Service Manual Glossary of Terms

ANALYTICAL RISK ASSESSMENT (ARA)– COMMAND TEAM – the ICS relies on shared having carried out a DRA and established a Tactical responsibility and authority. While the Incident Mode, the IC will be aware of the hazards, the Commander retains overall responsibility for the people at risk and the necessary control measures incident, and dictates the overall tactical plan, the to protect those at risk. This initial assessment decision making for, and control of, local operations forms the basis of a more detailed risk assessment is kept as close as possible to those operations. This which in the FRS is termed the Analytical Risk is achieved by the creation of a single command Assessment. line from the crew commander to the Incident Commander. This command line, together BRIDGEHEAD – a central and advanced control with staff tasked with supporting commanders, point for occasions where it is necessary for BA to is the Command Team. For ICS purposes the be started up at a distance from the original point Command Team is usually taken to be the Incident of entry to a risk area, whilst remaining in a safe air Commander, Operations Commander(s) and environment (TB 1/97). Sector Commanders, together with Command Support staff. COMMAND – the authority for an agency to direct the actions of its own resources (both personnel CONTACT POINT – a designated point (usually and equipment). an appliance not involved in operations or an officer’s car) from which a nominated member of COMMAND LINE – the line or chain of command personnel will carry out the Command Support at an incident. The ICS relies upon a single unified function at a small to medium size incident. command line. With the exception of urgent safety related issues officers should not take control of CONTROL – the authority to direct strategic and operations outside their assigned responsibility tactical operations in order to complete an assigned and should ensure all information and instruction function and includes, where agreed, the ability to is passed via the relevant command line officers. direct the activities of other agencies engaged in the completion of that function. The control of an COMMAND POINT – point from which assigned function also carries with it a responsibility Incident Commander operates, this may be a car, for the health and safety of those involved. appliance, specialist unit or part of a building. CREW MANAGER – an officer tasked with COMMAND SUPPORT – Command Support supervising specific tasks or meeting specific is a role undertaken by one or more staff at an objectives utilising one or more fire-fighters. incident. The role typically provides recording, liaison, detailed resource management and information gathering for the Incident Commander. At large incidents Command Support may comprise a dedicated team working from a mobile command unit and may include individuals tasked with supporting Sector Commanders. However, Command Support is not directly in the command line.

Incident Command 141 Glossary of Terms

DYNAMIC RISK ASSESSMENT (DRA) – this INTER AGENCY LIAISON OFFICER (ILO) – is the continuous assessment of risk in the rapidly a trained and qualified officer who can advise and changing circumstances of an operational incident, support Incident Commanders, Police, Medical, which is done in order to implement the control Military and other Government Agencies on the measures necessary to ensure an acceptable level organisations operational capacity and capability of safety. Dynamic Risk Assessment (DRA) is to reduce risk and safely resolve incidents at where particularly appropriate during the time critical an attendance may be required. This will include phase of an incident, which is usually typical of major incidents, public order, domestic or any other the arrival and escalation phase of an incident, situation that would benefit from the attendance of but at the earliest opportunity the Dynamic Risk the ILO. Assessment should be supported by analytical risk assessment. MARSHALLING AREA – area to which resources not immediately required at the scene COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOVERN- or being held for future use can be directed MENT EMERGENCY ROOM (FIRE AND to standby. May be a sector function under a RESCUE) – an advisory group established by Marshalling Sector Commander, reporting to the Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor to support the Incident Commander via Command Support. Director of Fire and Resilience and the fire minister during serious incidents. NATIONAL CO-ORDINATION CENTRE (FRS NCC) – a facility established to co-ordinate ENHANCED COMMAND SUPPORT (ECS) the mobilisation of national resources such as – a communications and co-ordination facility USAR teams, mass decontamination units, DIM to support operations during incidents requiring vehicles etc when needed. national mobilisation and use of strategic holding areas. OPERATIONS COMMANDER – an officer tasked with co-ordinating and directing the FORWARD COMMAND POST – point, near operations of several sectors. Responsible the scene of operations, where the officer delegated directly to the Incident Commander. When an responsibility for command in that area is sited. Operations Commander is assigned, operational This may be at a bridgehead. Sector Commanders will report to the Operations Commander rather than the Incident Commander. GENERIC RISK ASSESSMENT – risk Assigning an Operations Commander at an incident assessments that have been produced to assist which has several operational sectors keeps the the FRS with their regulatory requirements and span of control of the Incident Commander to be published in “Volume 3 – A Guide to Operational maintained at a satisfactory level. Risk Assessment”. OUTER CORDON – an area which surrounds INCIDENT COMMANDER – the nominated the inner cordon and seals off a wider area of competent officer having overall responsibility for the incident from the public. This designates the dictating tactics and resource management. controlled area into which unauthorised persons are not permitted access. It encompasses the inner INNER CORDON – a secured area which cordon, and the area between into which command surrounds the immediate site of the incident and positions and other essential activities (such as provides security for it. Such an area will typically post-decontamination casualty management) are have some formal means of access control. This set up. surrounds the immediate scene and provides security for it.

142 Fire Service Manual Glossary of Terms

RENDEZVOUS POINT (RVP)- point to which SECTOR COMMANDER – an officer all resources at the scene are initially directed for commanding a sector, who is tasked with logging, briefing and deployment. responsibility for tactical and safety management of a clearly identified part of an incident. Subject RISK ASSESSMENT – a risk assessment involves to objectives set by the Incident Commander the an identification of hazards, and an estimation of the Sector Commander has control of all operations risks, taking into account the existing precautions within the sector and must remain within it. available and used, and a consideration of what else needs to be done. SPAN OF CONTROL – the number of lines of communication that a single individual has to SAFETY – a state where exposure to hazards has maintain. This is usually defined by the number of been controlled to an acceptable level. people who potentially require an officer’s attention for briefing, reporting, passing instructions or other SAFETY OFFICER – officer delegated specific incident management concerns, in order to carry responsibility for monitoring operations and out their role at the incident. As a guide five such ensuring safety of personnel working on the reporting lines are considered the usual optimum incident ground or a designated section of it. for an Incident Commander to maintain during an incident. This may be increased at an incident, SA F E S YST E M S OF WOR K – a formal procedure which is well in hand or have to be reduced to two or which results from systematic examination of a task three during the early stages of a rapidly escalating in order to identify all the hazards and risks posed. or highly complex incident. Management of the It defines safe methods to ensure that hazards are Span of Control must be effective throughout the eliminated or risks controlled as far as possible. command line.

SECTOR – a sector is the area of responsibility STRATEGIC HOLDING AREA (SHA)– a key of a Sector Commander (i.e. a sector should not be location that has been identified on a motorway created unless someone is given the responsibility or trunk road as a suitable space to accommodate for running it.) Sectors should be created to manage FRS resources and national assets in response to a spans of control and provide tighter supervision major incident. of operations. Boundaries between geographic sectors may be geographic features, walls, roads STRATEGY – in the context of incident command, differences in elevation or separate areas of plant. this is the highest level of planning for dealing with Operational sectors are those dealing directly with situations either in advance of an incident or while the incident, typically operational sectors will incidents are underway (sometimes called “Gold undertake fire fighting, rescue, cooling and so on. Command”). Support sectors are those not dealing directly with the incident. Support sectors are usually defined TACTICS – the deployment of personnel and by the function they undertake, for instance equipment on the incident ground to achieve the decontamination, foam supply, marshalling or aims of the strategic plan. water supply. References and Bibliography

Adamson. A. (1970) The Effective Leader. Flin, R. (1996) Sitting in the Hot Seat. Leaders Pitman. and Teams for Critical Incident Management. Chichester: Wiley. Bonney, J. (1995) Fire command teams: what makes for effective performance? Fire Service College, Flin R, Arbuthnot K (Eds) (2002) Incident Brigade Command Course Project 2/95. Command: Tales from the Hotseat, Aldershot, Ashgate. Brunacini, A. (2002) Fire Command (2nd Ed) Quincy, Mass. National Fire Protection Association. Flin, R., Salas, E., Strub, M. & Martin, L. (1997) ISBN 0-87765-500-6 (Eds) Decision Making under Stress: Emerging Themes and Applications. Aldershot: Ashgate. Burke, E. (1997) Competence in command: Research and development in the London Fire Fredholm, L. (1997) Decision making patterns in Brigade. In R. Flin, E. Salas, M. Strub & L. Martin major fire-fighting and rescue operations. In R. (Eds) Decision Making under Stress. Aldershot: Flin, E. Salas, M. Strub & L. Martin (Eds) Decision Ashgate. Making under Stress. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Cannon-Bowers, J., Tannenbaum, S., Salas, E. HM Govt, (2005), Emergency Preparedness, Cabinet & Volpe, C. (1995) Defining Competencies and Office. www.ukresilience.info/preparedness.aspx establishing team training requirements. In R. Guzzo & E. Salas (Eds.) Team Effectiveness and HM Govt, (2005), Emergency Response and Decision Making in Organisations. San Francisco: Recovery. www.ukresilience.info/response.aspx Jossey Bass. Keampf, G. & Militello, L. (1992) The Problem of Charlton, D. (1992, April) Training and assessing Decision Making in Emergencies. Fire International submarine commanders on the Perishers’ course. No 135, p 38-39. In collected papers of the First Offshore Installation Management Conference: Emergency Command Kerstholt, J.H. (1997) Dynamic decision making Responsibilities. Robert Gordon University, in non-routine situations, in R.Flin, E Salas, M. Aberdeen. Strub, & L. Martin, Decision making under stress. Ashgate, Aldershot, UK. Driskell, J. & Salas, E. (1996) (Eds) Stress and Human Performance. Mahwah, NJ: LEA. Kissinger, H; 1982, “Years of Upheaval”, Boston, Little Brown Flin, R. (1995) Incident command: Decision making and team work. Journal of the Fire Service Klein, G. (1998) Sources of Power How People College, 1, 7-15. Make Decisions. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

Flin, R. (1995) Crew Resource Management Klein, G. (1997) The Recognition-Primed Decision for teams in the offshore oil industry. Journal of (RPD) model: Looking back, looking forward. In European Industrial Training, 19.9, 23-27. C. Zsambok & G. Klein (Eds) Naturalistic Decision Making. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

144 Fire Service Manual References and Bibliography

Klein, G., Calderwood, R., & Clinton-Cirocco, A. Orasanu, J. & Fischer, U. (1997) Finding decisions (1986) Rapid decision making on the fireground. in naturalistic environments: The view from In Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 30th the cockpit. In C. Zsambok & G. Klein (Eds) Annual Meeting. San Diego: HFS. Naturalistic Decision Making. Mahwah, NJ: LEA.

Klein, G., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R. & Zsambok, Salas, B., Bowers, C. & Edens, B. (in press) (eds.) C. (1993). (Eds.) Decision Making in Action. New Applying Resource Management in Organisations. York: Ablex. New Jersey. LEA.

Murray, B. (1994) More guidance needed for senior Schmitt, J. (1994) Mastering Tactics. Tactical commanders on the fireground. Fire, 87, June, Decision Game Workbook. Quantico, Virginia. US 21‑22. Marine Corps Association.

Orasanu, J. (1995) Training for aviation decision Wynne, D. (1995) Expert teams performing in making: the naturalistic decision making natural environments. Fire Service College, perspective. Proceedings of the Human Factors Brigade Command Course Project 1/95. and Ergonomics Society 39th annual Meeting. San Diego, Santa Monica CA: The Human Factors and Zsambok, C. & Klein, G. (1997) (Eds) Naturalistic Ergonomics Society. Decision Making. Mahwah, NJ: LEA.

Incident Command 145 Further Reading