THE EFFECT OF AFRICA'S EXILES/REFUGEES UPON INTER-AFRICAN STATE RELATIONS: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION - 1958 - 1988
AN ABSTRACT
SUBMITTED ON THE EIGHTEENTH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1988
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF
TULANE UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
BY
Charles Paulinus Gasarasi
APPROVED: ames D. Cochrane (Ph.D) Chairman
William B. Gwyn',, (Ph. D. )
Henry 'L. Mason (Ph.D.
Robert S. Robins (Ph.D.),, ABSTRACT This study argues that trans-border movements and activities of Africa's exiles/refugees have significantly affected inter-African state relations, as evidenced by the preponderance of explicit concern within African states that their national security was threatened by subversion undertaken by their nationals enjoying asylum in other African states.
Chapter 1 explores the theoretical/conceptual aspects of the African exile/refugee phenomenon, delving into issues like: (i) the political situations generating exiles/refugees in Africa; (ii) the conditions which predispose the exile/refugee factor to conflict proneness; (iii) the inherently strain-ladden dynamics of inter-African state relations in exile/refugee situations.
In chapters 2, 3 and 4, case studies of Southern
Africa, Eastern Africa, and a combination of Northern, West and Central Africa are presented. In each case, an attempt is made to document instances of inter-state conflict or cooperation directly or indirectly associated with the exile/refugee factor. The case studies show abundant evidence that the exile/refugee factor has frequently affected inter-African state relations. However, it is acknowledged that sonie of the conflicts ostensibly caused by the exile/refugee issue are symptoms of larger conflicts. The study concludes that the exile/refugee phenomenon is associated with a high incidence of conflict among African states and that the phenomenon has had high political salience, judging by the governmental actions it has precipitated, many of which have diverted scarce resources from the economic development process. The study remarks that erosion of generous asylum policies is on the rise in African states. It questions the current approaches to solving the exile/refugee problem and considers them inadequate. It suggests that a more durable solution would be the creation of a "Federated States of Africa," instantly rendering obsolete the present national boundaries, and with them the exile/refugee status they confer.
Such a controversial political restructuring may help Africa to achieve economic independence and political stability which are indispensable to prevent the prevalence of a repressive political culture. The reasoning is that a united Africa may be the ultimate political-economic structure in which the fundamental root causes of the exile/refugee problem can be effectively tackled. THE EFFECT OF AFRICA'S EXILES/REFUGEES UPON INTER-AFRICAN STATE RELATIONS: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION - 1958 - 1988
A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED ON THE EIGHTEENTH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1988
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
-OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF
TULANE UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
BY
Charl Paulinus Gasarasi
APPROVED: aines D. Cochrane PH.D.) Chairman
i
William B. Gwyn (PH.D.)
Henry L. Mason (PH.D.)
,Robert S. Robins(PHD.)
FOREWORD
When I embarked on this study, I wanted to fulfill my doctoral dissertation requirement in a manner that would make a modest contribution to the study of a neglected probiem area in African politics: the effect of the African exile/refugee phenomenon upon inter-African state relations.
I hope the following report will stimulate more indepth studies of the role played by exiles/refugees in international relations.
Collection of the information used to put this study in
its present foret was based on a systematic examination of
relevant published materials, unpublished reports and proceedings, and above all, interviews with international
organizations personnel, government officials, and
exiles/refugees themseives. This study would not be in its present foret, if it were not for the kind cooperation I
received from those individuals I had the honor and
privilege to dialogue with. Since the list of those persons
is rather long, and since some of them would rather remain
anonymous, I will not mention them by naine here. They are
all aware of my gratitude through the active personal
contact I have maintained with them since. One exception to
this unpersonalized expression of thanks is Dr. Chris
Bakwesegha of the Organization of African Unity's Bureau for
ii Refugees who, in addition to granting me interviews, read the first drafts of chapters 1 and 2 and gave me very constructive comments. Many of the individuals who helped me with information were able to do so thanks to their institutional affiliation. I thus like to thank the following institutions for serving, directly or indirectly, as fountains of sonie of the information I have used in this study: The United Nations (New York), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva), the World Council of Churches (Geneva), the Ail Africa Conference of Churches (Nairobi), and the OAU Bureau for Refugees (Addis Ababa). Throughout the various stages of this study, from design to finish, I enjoyed the dedicated guidance and encouragement of my dissertation committee members. I like to thank Professor James D. Cochrane for accepting the responsibility to direct the dissertation. His interest in my academic endeavors and the study itself, his expediticus reading and thorough scrutiny of the draft chapters and his constructive comments have very positively factored into the good progress and hopefully good quality of the dissertation. I cannot possibly thank him enough. I also like to thank Professor William B. Gwyn for serving on my dissertation committee and for being a wonderful graduate advisor from early on. Professor Robert S. Robins and
Professor Henry L. Mason did not only give me appreciated guidance as members of my dissertation committee, but also ensured smoothness in other aspects of my graduate school
iii life, in their administrative capacities as Chairmen of the department. Most sincere thanks to all of them.
In the wider context of my doctoral program, I like to express my gratitude for the support, financial and otherwise, which I received from the following institutions: the University of Dar es Salaam (my home institution), the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (where I did the first one and half years of the program), Tulane University, and the International Development Research Centre (for funding my field research). This accomplishment would have been impossible without the emotional support from my family and our many friends and well-wishers. I owe an unpayable debt of gratitude to this precious social base. In particular, I thank my wife Dinah for being an unfailing source of support, encouragement and inspiration throughout the program. I hope she can say the saine things about me, because she, too, was concurrently going through the saine agonies in her own doctoral program.
Finally, I like to thank Rosana Seymour for typing this dissertation through its various drafts.
iv TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD ...... ii Chapters
I. A THEORETICAL/CONCEPTUAL EXPOSE ...... 1
The Magnitude of the Problem ...... 6 The Dynamics of the Problem ...... 17
II. THE CHRONIC CASE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA ...... 38
The Intra-Regional Character of the Exile/Refugee Phenomenon in Southern Africa ...... 40 The Inter-Regional Character of the Exile/Refugee Phenomenon in Southern Africa ...... 43 Angolan and Zairean Exiles/Refugees: A Major Source of Strain in Inter-State Relations ...... 48 FRELIMO Exiles, Colonial...... Mozambique, and the Neighboring Host Countries ...... 60 U.D.I. Rhodesia, Its Exiles/Refugees, and the Neighboring Host Countries ...... 65 South Africa, Its Exiles, and the Neighboring Host Countries ...... 73 Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe: Their Exiles/Refugees and the Neighboring Host Countries ...... 96 An Analytical Summary ...... 103
III. EASTERN AFRICA: THE SECOND HARD-HIT REGION ...... 112 Sudan: The Oldest Trouble Spot...... 114 The Troubled Relations Between Ethiopia and Somalia ...... 143 Djibouti's Share of the Problem in the Horn ...... 147 The Problem in East Africa Proper: Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya ...... 148 An Analytical Summary ...... 164
IV. THE RELATIVELY LESS AFFECTED REGIONS: NORTHERN AFRICA, WEST AFRICA AND CENTRAL AFRICA ...... 170 V Northern Africa ...... 171 Saharawi Exiles/Refugees as a Cause of Conflict ...... 171 Libya's Use of Exiled Dissidents as a Tool for Destabilization of Its Neighbors ...... 184 West Africa ...... 191 Portuguese Guinea, Its Exiles/Refugees and the Neighboring Host Countries ...... 191 Ghana at the Center of the Exile/Refugee Controversy in West Africa ...... 194 Occasional Allegations Against Burkina Faso, Togo and Ivory Coast ...... 203 Guinea's Exiles/Refugees: A Source of Conflict with Its Neighbors ...... 205 Chad: Its Relations with Other African States Which Host Its Exiles/Refugees ...... 207 Other Sporadic Exile/Refugee Situations Affecting Relations Between West African States ...... 210 Central Africa ...... 212 Cameroon, Its Exiled opposition and the Neighboring Host Countries ...... 213 The Two Congos ...... 214 Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe: Their Exiles and the Neighboring Host Countries ...... 217 Former Belgian Central Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire ...... 220 An Analytical Summary ...... 227
V. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF THE EXILE/REFUGEE PHENOMENON IN INTER-AFRICAN STATE RELATIONS: AN ANALYTICAL APPRAISAL ...... 232
The Conflict Proneness and Political Salience of the African Exile/Refugee Phenomenon...... 232 The Emerging Erosion of the Generous Asylum Policier ...... 235 The Inadequacy of the Current Approaches to Solving the Serious Exile/Refugee Problem in Africa ...... 247 Conclusion ...... 266
APPENDIX I: POLITICAL MAP OF AFRICA ...... 270
vi APPENDIX II: A SUMMARY OF AFRICAN CONFLICTS AND THE ROLE OF THE OAU IN THEIR RESOLUTION OR MANAGEMENT, 1975-80 ...... 271 APPENDIX III: AGREEMENT ON MILITARY ATTACKS ...... 276 NOTES TO CHAPTER I ...... 278 NOTES TO CHAPTER II ...... 282 NOTES TO CHAPTER III ...... 288 NOTES TO CHAPTER IV ...... 292 NOTES TO CHAPTER V ...... 296 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...... 298 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 300
vii 1
CHAPTER I A THEORETICAL/CONCEPTUAL EXPOSE
Today, just as nearly three decades ago, relations between African states are negatively affected by the trans- border movements and activities of each other's exiles/refugees. Just as in 1963 when President Ahidjo of
Cameroon was accusing Ghana of showing hostility to his country by welcoming political refugees and "directly or indirectly helping terroristsl," in mid-1987 the saine accusations were at the center of deteriorating relations between Kenya and Uganda. Prior to the closure of the border between the two countries on May 20, 1987, the Kenyan government accused Uganda of welcoming Kenyan dissidents and issuing them passports to enable them to proceed to Libyan camps for guerrilla training. On the other hand, Uganda viewed Kenya's hosting, in May, 1987, of a meeting of the
Uganda People's Front, a movement opposed to the Museveni government, as an act of hostility.2
As this study will attempt to show, for the last three decades incidents similar to those referred to above have been so frequent in inter-African state relations as to constitute a very significant input in the overall picture of relations among African states. It is the thesis of this study that the trans-border movements and activities of 2
Africa's exiles/refugees have constituted an issue of very high salience in inter-African state relations as evidenced by the preponderance of explicitly stated concern, on the part of African states, that their national security was threatened by the subversion their nationals were allowed to engage in while enjoying asylum in other African countries, and the foreign policy postures adopted as a result of these concerns.
The study does not attempt to engage in any highly quantitative analysis to put a figure on the degree of salience or significance attributable to the exile/refugee phenomenon in inter-African state relations. This is because I believe the complex nature of international relations is, in some cases, not well served by the often arbitrary choice of a limited number of variables and the further limitation dictated by operational definitions called for in quantitative analysis.
Problems of international relations, either in their conflict or co-operation forms, are not single-issue problems. For example, throughout the last three decades, inter-African state relations have been characterized by mutual recriminations in which exile/refugee-generating countries have accused asylum-giving countries of helping their dissidents to commit acts which were prejudicial to their national security, while asylum-giving countries have accused the former of engaging in various forms of aggression. No matter how real, and therefore how important 3 an empirical datum any such explicitly stated concern might be, its ultimate significance can only be appreciated if it is viewed in the broader, complex context of relations between and among the states concerned.
Tolerance, or even promotion, of the subversive activities of exiles/refugees on the part of an asylum- giving country might be a mere tactic to further a broader, cherished conflict-generating foreign policy. Unleashing the subversive potential of exiles/refugees against their country of origin might, for example, occur in the context of a broader strategy of an on-going struggle for regional dominance on the part of the host country. Alternatively, exiles/refugees might be given a free rein to subvert their home government in a situation whereby their host country is involved in a territorial dispute with the home government. In such cases, the accusation made by refugee-generating countries against asylum-giving countries to the effect that the latter either encourage the exiles/refugees' subversive activities or fail to control them depicts only a moment in a broader context of conflict, and such individual incidents are intricately connected with the other numerous aspects of a broader foreign policy concern. The flare-up triggered at the spur of the moment of exile/refugee-related incidents might be just a symptom of a deeper and bigger conflict.
Thus, my choice of an unconstrained, non-quantitative
approach to the subject is meant to allow me the latitude
necessary to freely introduce and account for the many, 4 albeit often controversial aspects of conflict and
.cooperation specific to each set of countries being examined. However, this latitude will be used judiciously in order to show that while admitting thatthe exile/refugee phenomenon has not been the sole or even most important source of inter-African state conflicts, because it has been intertwined with other important issues, it has nonetheless been of high salience because it has been very frequently and explicitly stated as the immediate cause of damage in relations between African states. In my analysis of the
African exile/refugee phenomenon as it features in conflict and co-operation among African states, I will view the relationship between conflict and co-operation as a dialectical one, in total agreement with Charles Horton
Cooley who wrote that "conflict and co-operation are not separable things but phases of one process which always involves something of both."3
Before proceeding any further, sonie definitions are in
order.
1. Exile/Refugee: The legalistic distinction between the
ternis "exile" and "refugee" is irrelevant to the
political processes being investigated in this study.
Thus, either one is considered as a victim of political
violence or political decision who seeks refuge outside
his/her nation's borders. In this broad sense, I
consider the Organization of African Unity's definition
of the term "refugee" to be adequate in describing who 5
an exile and a refugee are. Disregarding the
legalistic question of formai status, both ternis
basically refer ta:
an individual who owing ta well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing ta such fears, unwilling ta avail himself of the protection of that country or, who, owing ta external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality is compelled ta leave his place of habituai residence in order ta seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.
My definition includes political dissidents, national liberation fighters and guerrillas who have left their own countries ta establish bases for military activities from which they may operate back into their own countries. It excludes economic migrants and victims of natural disasters whom sonie writers include in their rather broad definition of the term "refugee." The only condition that would qualify individuals in these two categories for my definition would be if, while living in their host countries, those individuals became active members of exiled groups of their compatriots opposing regimes in power in their home countries through either political activism or military action. This condition would confer upon them the criterion of a well-founded fear of political retribution by their home countries. Thus, on the permissive side, my definition includes ail those who meet the key criterion of a well-founded fear of political persecution, whether or not 6 the individuals concerned have applied for and obtained legal refugee status. On the restrictive side, it excludes all other categories of migrants and displaced persons. My use of the rather clumsy terra "exile/refugee" throughout the study is necessitated by the fact that the terra "refugee," while falling under the generic.term "exile," carries with it a distinctive legal status tag.
2. Conflict: For the purpose of this study, the terra
"conflict" is used in a generic sense to refer to the
entire spectrum of antagonistic relations between
states, ranging in intensity from the mildest form of
dispute to the active outbreak of armed hostilities.
Thus, the usual distinction drawn between the terras
"conflict" and "crisis" is not deemed relevant to this
study.5
3. Exile/refugee-generating country; country of origin;
home country: These ternis are used interchangeably to
mean the country where exiles/refugees originally came
f rom .
4. Asylum- civing country; host country: These are used
interchangeably to mean the country giving asylum to exiles/refugees.
The Magnitude of the Problem Throughout the period covered by this study, press reports abound showing that relations between various African exile/refugee-generating and asylum-giving countries 7 have been affected by either the movements of these exiles/refugees across international borders or their political and sometimes military activities in the host countries. As I pointed out earlier, the most common accusation made by exile/refugee-generating countries against asylum-giving countries is that the latter allow exiles/refugees to conduct subversive activities on their territories against their countries of origin, or that non- asylum-giving but sympathetic countries allow free passage to exiles/refugees from a third country on their way to attack their home government.
Peter Woodward's description of the various forms of subversive relations between neighboring states in North-
East Africa throws some light on both the overt and covert ways in which triadic relations between the exiles/refugees, their host country, and their country of origin crystallize into conflicts. Premising his analysis on the argument that
"few political refugees in Africa will readily accept their new status as a permanent condition and that many will become involved in supporting resistance movements,"6
Woodward cites examples of the central role played by
Somalis from Eastern Ethiopia in the protracted conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia; that played by exiled
Eritreans in the Sudan in the conflict between the Sudan and
Ethiopia; that played by the Southern Sudanese from bases in
Uganda and Ethiopia in the conflict between the Sudan and these two countries, respectively; and that played by 8
Ugandans in Kenya and Tanzania in the conflict between Amin's Uganda and these two countries, respectively.
Asylum-giving country support ta exiles/refugees in their subversive activities against their home countries has often been covert, including such things as provision of training and logistic support ta overthrow the regimes in power in the exiles/refugees' home countries. There are a variety of reasons why asylum-giving countries may be willing ta support exiles/refugees against their home countries. From a perspective of a hypothetical political altruism, it is possible ta reason that asylum-giving countries may be motivated by a strongly felt sympathy for the cause of the victims in their sanctuary. Saadia Touval has observed that in cases where exiles/refugees seek shelter among their kinsmen who happen ta be citizens of their country of asylum on the other side of the border, it is not inconceivable that this kinship affinity may be translated into sympathy and ultimate political support ta the cause of the uprooted kinsmen.7 Even when initially the government of the asylum-giving country might have intended ta remain neutral, its emotionally involved border population committed ta extending shelter, comfort, and other forets of aid ta their brethren from across the border, makes it difficult for the government ta remain aloof and indifferent. The compassion thus thrust upon the government may see the latter throw its weight behind the cause of the subversive inclinations of the exiles/refugees. 9
Besides the least likely position of political altruism, asylum-giving countries may support exiles/refugees in their sanctuaries out of considerations of "national interest."8 In this regard, there may be a constellation of political issues in the exiles/refugees' country of origin, such as ethnic, religious, or class fâcets of politics, the outcome of which the host country might want to influence by aiding the exiles/refugees engaged in the pursuit of those outcomes.9 When "national interest" politics is the major motive for host country involvement, then the exiles/refugees might be used by the host country as proxies to subvert their home country on its behalf. In such conditions, the host country might go to the extent of covertly committing its regular troops disguised as invading exiles/refugees, in order to deal a military blow to a politically incompatible regime in the exile/refugee-generating country.
Another possible scenario of host government support to exiles/refugees against their home country would be if the former wanted to exert pressure on the latter. In this regard, Touval has observed that in the case of Africa, "the goal of such pressure was often to induce the neighboring government to stop its support to rebels in one's own 10 territory. ,1 It would, however, be wrong to assume the genuineness
of all accusations to the effect that an asylum-giving
country has tolerated or even supported exiles/refugees in 10 their subversive activities against their home countries.
Indeed, as Woodward correctly observes, activities of the agents of neighboring states are often cited, without any justification, as being responsible for political disturbances or potentially unstable conditions. According to him,
...some of these charges may be inventions designed to cover the fragility of the regime making them, or to deflect attention from genuine internai opposition.11
In sonie real or imagined cases of host country support to exiles/refugees against their home country, a process of reciprocal subversion has corne into being, whereby the two
countries involved have given support to each other's dissidents. Sometimes, third countries have been drawn into multi-actor conflict relations involving exiles/refugees,
their host countries, and their home countries. An
illustration of this phenomenon would be Egypt's occasional military assistance to the Sudan when the latter's regime was under attack by exiles/refugees from bases in neighboring countries.12
A useful illustration of the salience of the
exile/refugee phenomenon in inter-African state relations is
the way in which various African states have behaved in
response to exile/refugee activities over the years.
Exile/refugee-generating countries alleging to be victims of
subversion organized by their exiled nationals in asylum-
giving countries have behaved in ways ranging from appeal
for mediation to waging war against the asylum-giving 11 country, with a wide variety of intermediate measures. The following state actions shed some light on what has been happening.
In 1963, when Rwanda believed that the Burundi government was helping Rwandese refugees in Burundi ta organize armed attacks against it, it appealed ta the United
Nations for mediation. While this was happening, mutual, violent and inflammatory radio broadcasts filled the air.
In 1966, Chad staged mass demonstrations directed against
Sudan for the latter's alleged encouragement of subversive activities undertaken by Chadian exiles/refugees in that country. The saure year, Sudan allegedly attacked refugee camps of the Southern Sudanese in Uganda, an act that Uganda formally protested ta the Sudanese ambassador in Uganda. In all the above cases, the exile/refugee-generating countries are the ones expressing concern for unfriendly acts on the part of the asylum-giving ones. In most cases, these asylum-giving countries denied their alleged involvement. However, there have been cases where asylum- giving countries have openly supported exiles/refugees against their countries of origin. For example, in 1966, the Ivory Coast permitted Guinean exiles ta form the Front de liberation nationale du Guine (FLNG), an organization whose primary aim was ta overthrow the government of their country of origin - Guinea. Another illustration of overt support ta exiles/refugees is provision of radio time ta them for propaganda against the regimes in their countries 12 of origin. Tanzania, Zambia and Algeria could be cited for their open support to the victims of the Portuguese colonial regime and the white minority regimes in Southern Africa.
Over the years, the African exile/refugee phenomenon has adversely affected bilateral diplomacy between exile/refugee-generating and asylum-giving states in Africa.
The following are some of the forets which the said deterioration in,bilaterial diplomacy has taken. Suspension of bilaterial co-operation (Senegal against Guinea, 1966); recail of ambassador (Sudanese ambassador recalled from
Ethiopia, 1976); expulsion of ambassador of exile/refugee- generating country (expulsion of Guinean ambassador from
Senegal, 1971); breach of diplomatic relations (Chad and
Libya-1971, Sudan and Libya-1976, Libya and Senegal-1980).
These are not the only unfriendly acts which have transpired between exile/refugee-generating and asylum- giving African countries. Mention could be made of closure of borders and/or transportation and communications cuts: air, surface, telephone, etc. (Uganda and Tanzania-1972,
Sudan and Chad-1966, Uganda and Kenya-1987). In 1973, Tanzania's dockworkers boycotted Burundi's cargo after
Burundi had made incursions into Tanzania in pursuit of
Burundi refugees. In 1966, Chad blocked Sudan's bank accounts as a reprisal for alleged Sudanese government involvement in supporting Chadian dissidents in the Sudan.
In the saine year, Chad gave Sudan an ultimatum to hand over
Chadian exiles. In this category of hostile acts falls the 13 notorious policy of economic destabilization undertaken by
South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portuguese colonial Africa against neighboring African states giving assistance to national liberation fighters opposed to these regimes.
War, declared or undeclared, has been the most severe form of conflict between exile/refugee-generating and asylum-giving countries in Africa. Ône common form of armed conflict has been trans-border military raids by exile/refugee-generating countries against exile/refugee camps in host countries (Portuguese colonial troops against
Zambia-1969, Senegal-1970; the innumerable incursions by
South Africa and Rhodesia into neighboring states.) At least two cases of full scale war could be cited as the ultimate crystallization of conflicts having much to do with the African exile/refugee phenomenon. The Ethiopia-Somalia war of 1977 and the Uganda-Tanzania war of 1979.
Earlier in this chapter, I acknowledged Cooley's assertion that conflict and co-operation are phases of one process. The exile/refugee phenomenon in inter-African state relations seems to bear out this observation. While the phenomenon in question has had its share in generating conflict, it has also necessitated acts of co-operation motivated by various considerations. Thus, for example, in
1965, Uganda pledged to prohibit the subversive activities of Sudanese exiles/refugees living in Uganda against their country of origin. Similarly, in 1972, Sudan pledged to
stop the activities of Ethiopia's Eritrean Liberation Front 14
(ELF) members enjoying asylum in Sudan. Prior to this,
Ethiopia and Sudan had, in 1965, reached a formai agreement not to permit any type of activities harmful to the national interests of each other. At the saine time, the two countries established a joint-ministerial consultative committee to monitor the issue of exile/refugee subversive activities on each other's territory.
Other acts of co-operation on the subject have included the setting up of joint-committees to make administrative arrangements for the repatriation of refugees
(Sudan and Uganda-1966 and 1986/87, Congo-Leopoldville and
Zambia-1966); mounting joint-counter-insurgency operations along the common border (Chad and the Central African
Republic, 1985); agreements for joint-tightening of border control (Sudan and Congo Kinshasa, 1969); appointment of joint-commissions to demarcate the border (Ethiopia and
Sudan, 1972); signing of extradition treaties (Rwanda and Tanzania, 1965); evacuation of refugees from border areas
(Burundi, 1964); disarming exiles (Uganda with regard to
Congolese rebels, 1965); signing of mutual defense agreements (Uganda and Sudan, 1972); signing of non- aggression pacts (South Africa and Mozambique, 1984); expulsion of exiles in response to pressure from exile/refugee-generating country (Uganda's expulsion of
former Rwandese King-1963, United Arab Republic's expulsion
of Congolese rebels in Cario-1965, Swaziland's and
Mozambique's expulsion of ANC exiles-1980s); handing over 15 exiles ta countries of origin (Ghana ta Ivory Coast, 1966); and exchange of dissident exiles (Kenya and Tanzania, 1983).
A considerable amount of co-operation on the exile/refugee issue has also manifested itself in the area of multilateral diplomacy. Within the Organization of
African Unity (OAU), a concerted effort has been made ta address the problem of exiles/refugees using the territory of their host countries ta undertake subversive activities against their countries of origin. In this regard, in 1965, the OAU came up with its Accra Declaration on the Problem of Subversion and Resolution on the Problem of Refugees, followed in 1969, by the OAU Convention Governing Specific
Aspects of the Problem of Refugees in Africa. Article III of the latter document spells out the OAU's position on the matter:
1. Every refugee has duties ta the country in which he finds himself, which require in particular that he conforms with its laws and regulations as well as with measures taken for the maintenance of public order. He shall also abstain from any subversive activities against any member states of the OAU.
2. Signatory States undertake ta prohibit refugaes residing in their respective territories from attacking any member state of the OAU, by any activity likely ta cause tension between member States, and in part] ular by use of arms, through the press, or by radio.
Unfortunately, as of the time of this writing, not all OAU member states had ratified the 1969 Convention.
Furthermore, as the following chapters will indicate, the
above principles spelt out in Article III of the 1969 OAU
Convention were sometimes breached by some member states. 16
Besides these efforts to legislate against exile/refugee subversion, summit meetings were held to discuss the issue of control of refugees' activities within the borders of host countries (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania,
Zambia, Ethiopia, Congo Leopoldville, Somalia, Rwanda; and
Burundi-1966). In 1964 the OAU set up the OAU Commission on
Refugees. It was after the exile/refugee problem had been taken up by the OAU that most of the co-operative state actions outlined above increasingly became a feature of
African interstate relations. Subsequently, other forms or acts of co-operation began to appear. These include withdrawal of previously filed complaints on the subject of
subversion from the UN Security Council (Guinea with regard to its dispute with Senegal and Ivory Coast-1974, Chad with regard to its dispute with Libya-1978).
The African states' behavior of conflict and co-
opération outlined above signifies the presence of a real problem. For example, instances of Libya giving covert
support to Chadian exiles against Chad have been documented. So has the case of Somalia helping exiled guerrillas from
Ethiopia. The long list of cases includes Libyans alleged
provision of training and logistic support to dissident
Sudanese in the latter's attempt to overthrow the Numeiry
regime; Ethiopia's assistance to the opposition movement
from Southern Sudan; and Sudan's support to anti-Qaddafi
Libyans living in exile there. Numerous other cases of this
type could be cited.-4 17
The Dynamics of the Problem The magnitude of the African exile/refugee problem and the extent to which it has affected inter-African state relations can best be appreciated by relating it to the extent of involuntary human migration it entails. In 1985, the Bureau for Refugee Programs of the United States
Department of State put the total African refugee population at 2,834,700. This is about 0.5 percent of the entire
African population. The figure does not include the many undocumented exiles who, for a variety of reasons, are not formally categorized as refugees according to the criteria used by the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Thus, going by my rather more generic, non- legalistic definition of who is a refugee, the Bureau's figure is a conservative one. Nevertheless, even keeping within the confines of the UNHCR's definition, there have been times when the refugee population has shot up considerably. In the early 1980s, for example, there were an estimated 5 million refugees in Africa, meaning that one out of every seventy African persons was a refugee.15
These refugees, generated by about sixteen African countries and given asylum in twenty-three countries have, as pointed out earlier, been a significant source of
conflict between and among African states. Although I have arbitrarily chosen to project the 1985 figure, this phenomenon of an up-rooted, floating exile/refugee population has been an African problem for the last three 18 decades, the period covered by this study. The numbers have
fluctuated from year to year, but the strain on inter- African state relations has been constant. An attempt to theoretically explain why this strain in relations came
about in the first place, and why it has remained
omnipresent, will be made in the next few pages. For now, a
look into the causes of the dislocation of African
exiles/refugees would be in order.
Generally speaking, African exiles/refugees have corne
from two types of political situations - on the one hand,
from independent countries in which there has been severe
political and military strife and, on the other, from
countries still under colonial or white minority regimes.16
At present, only South Africa and Namibia are- in the latter
category. The immediate determinants of exile/refugee
outflows vary from one situation to another. The most
frequent ones are: protracted warfare, international wars,
ethnic tensions, elite rivalry, coups d' état, governmental
suppression of critics, arbitrary governmental decisions,
etc. According to Astri Suhrke,
..some types of conflicts (protracted warfare, international wars, and certain types of ethnic tension) seem to produce major outflows; other conflicts (typically elite rivalry, coups d'etat, governmental suppression of critics) tend to prodï9e a trickle of a few, highly politicized individuals.
In recent years, a few scholars interested in
political conflict studies have sought to explain the
genesis of exile/refugee migrations. Aristide Zolberg has, 19 for example, tried to associate the phenomenon of refugee flows in the Third World with two major factors: the process of state formation and underdevelopment. In a rather convincing argument Zolberg views the process of state formation in the Third World as being often abruptly triggered by a change in internai or external circumstances which produce a political crisis that is very likely to produce victim groups.
In this process of state-formation, old solidarities get destroyed and new oves are forged. In this rather fluid condition, those in power capitalize on the consolidation of state power. To secure the consent of the governed, the rulers have to combine persuasion with the distribution of tangible benefits, but underdevelopment undermines the latter effort because the material and organizational resources at the disposai of the rulers are meager. For lack of a better alternative, these rulers resort to authoritarian means. Thus, according to Zolberg,
...Underdevelopment contributes to the generation of refugee flows in that it fosters the adoption of authoritarian strategies of state and nation formation, whose execution entails political persecution of certain categories of the population.
Depending on the circumstances, some groups become particularly vulnerable. For example, ethnic minorities that straddle more than one state; trading diasporas without homeland; ethnic groups associated with the colonial rule as indigenous governing classes; any victims who seek to defend themselves and hence, by definition, come to be tagged as subversive.19 In his analysis of the general causes of conflict in 20
Africa, Zartman has identified scenarios which also describe, quite well, situations which lead to exile/refugee flows. He, for instance, argues that in "decolonization power struggles,"
it is natural that there should be fierce competition and maneuvering among domestic groups and parties to participa8 in and control the process by which it is achieved.
From this one can infer that in some cases this fierce competition leads to oppression of some groups when independence is won and the process of state and nation building as described by Zolberg, begins. In fact,
Zolberg's and Zartman's perceptions of the process converge at a certain point. In what Zartman ternis "new independent consolidation," he describes the dynamics that lead to the production of exiles/refugees thus:
...The absolute nature of anticolonial struggie, which allows the dominant nationalists to brand their opponents traitors, carries over the independence. Losers in the power struggie often go into exile, either in Europe or in neighboring ASfican countries of a different ideological stripe.
Both Zolberg and Zartman envisage a possible spill- over, with regard to the dynamics of conflict situations producing exiles/refugees, from the affected country into neighboring states. According to Zolberg, the political crisis producing exiles/refugees is rarely limited to one country at a time, but affects neighboring countries also.
...As a consequence of this, the tensions [the crisis] generated within any given country interact with those simultaneously experienced by others. The result is heightened tensions between states, often leading to international conflict, which in turn exacerbates refugee producing conditions in each state in the 21
region.22
In the scenario outlined by Zartman, the events following the spill-over of the crisis into neighboring states are determined by the response of the individual states concerned:
...At times, usually when a previous commonality of experience has existed, leaders agree not to support neighbors' opposition movements, largely because everyone is vuinerable to the saine threat. At other times, ideological differences arise to outweigh the common threat, or leaders perceive the threa3being used against them first, and so they reciprocate.
Another exile/refugee-producing scenario is termed
"leftover liberation movements" by Zartman. This situation, like the others already described, has its roots in pre- independence struggies and it becomes a problem during the state formation and consolidation stages of the political process. Since historically the struggle for national liberation has legitimized antistate politics and guerrilla movements, governments which corne to power at the time of independence have often, in their turn, experienced exiled guerrilla opposition groups calling themselves liberation movements and seeking to topple the new government from day one in office. Because, as Zartman argues, "national liberation movements have a presumption of authenticity,"24 these groups more often than not gain the sympathy of at least one neighboring state and a conflict between these two neighboring states ensues.
There has also been an attempt to explain the root causes of the African exile/refugee problem from a political 22 economy perspective. For example, Gaim Kibraeb has asserted that one of the root causes of Africa's present-day refugee problem results from "a confrontation between imperialism and the neo-colonial state on the one hand and the people on the other."25 In this confrontation, the masses of the people try to realize their rising expectations of a better future, better opportunities, better access to the means of production, democratic rights, respect for human rights, etc. Pulling in the opposite direction is imperialism whose sole interest is to secure its interests at the expense of those of the masses. Vacillating between these two poles of interest is the ruling petty bourgeoisie whose selfish interests sometimes coincide with those of imperialism or depend on imperialism for protection. The net result of these struggies is repression and the victim groups and individuals vote with their feet.
So far, nothing has been said about non-African factors influencing and exacerbating the African exile/refugee phenomenon in inter-African state relations.
.However, forces exogenous to Africa have often played an extremely important, albeit very negative role in inter-
African state relations involving exiles/refugees. Of these exogenous factors, East-West tensions have heightened conflicts which have caused refugee flows. East-West wars by proxy as in the case of Ethiopia and Somalia have exacerbated refugee migrations.
As if this were not bad enough East-West tensions have 23 frustrated bilateral efforts, on the part of some African states, to build friendly and co-operative relations.
Angola and Zaire can serve as a very good example. After several years of supporting each other's exiled dissidents,
Angola and Zaire signed a mutual defense and security agreement in February, 1985, pledging to work together towards a "rapprochement" in the context of which they would stop supporting each other's dissidents. However, the
Reagan administration, which was committed to using UNITA - the Angolan "leftover liberation movement" led by Jonas
Savimbi against the Angolan government, asked the Zairean government to help. The Zairean government, which is well known to have been over-reliant on American patronage, agreed to play the role of providing the Reagan
Administration with transit facilities for arms, including
Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, supplied to UNITA rebels.26
This obviously has served to worsen relations between Angola
and Zaire.
Although the yole played by exogenous factors in making the exile/refugee phenomenon damage inter-African
state relations has been an important one, the modest scope
of this study due to time and resource constraints does not
allow me to delve into that dimension of the problem.
However, even if these constraints were not there, I have a philosophical rationale for not exploring the exogenous
dimension of the exile/refugee phenomenon in inter-African
state relations. For more than a decade, most literature on 24 various aspects of African politics has capitalized, almost ad nauseam, on the quasi-absolute control of Africa's economic, political and social policies by external actors.
Whereas I acknowledge the strength and influence of such actors, I cannot help feeling that too much of that line of analysis is.tantamount to an opologia for inept and corrupt
African governments. Deemphasizing the perceived omnipotence of the exogenous actors would, in my view, serve as an antidote to the current tendency to hastily absolve
African governments from responsibility for the problems they create, with or without an exogenous imput. Admitting that African governments should assume primary responsibility for the bad policies they adopt due to external pressure may serve to shed light on an equally important reality - that for these governments, saying "yes" to any caprice of those mighty exogenous actors is not pre- ordained in some divine plan.
Exile/refugee migrations, regardless of the specifics of the diverse situations in which they arise, inherently put a strain on exile/refugee-generating and asylum-giving states alike. It is a paradox that exile/refugee-generating states create discomfort, fear and insecurity for themselves by their very act of causing forced migrations. Generally speaking, exiles/refugees are losers in power struggles in their countries. When they go into exile, governments of their countries of origin experience problems of controlling their political activities. For these governments, control 25 of national political space may break down, and when it does not, it becomes strained in the sense that it has to reach beyond national borders.
One attribute shared by all states is their determination to maintain a monopoly over "political organization of space," defined by Edward Soja as "the way in which space and human interaction are structured to fulfill political functions."27 Exile/refugee-generating countries have their political ôrganization of space affected because their institutions can no longer control and direct the political processes of competition, conflict and cooperation with regard to the exiled sections of their populations. These exiled populations find themselves outside the "territoriality"28 of their country of origin's state power, often out of reach of the coercive instruments of the latter.
The presence of discontented exiles in foreign countries-neighboring or distant-creates a feeling of insecurity in the exile/refugee-generating country's "sense of spatial identity" and, as a result, such a country's
"sense of exclusiveness," which was normally latent, is activated by a perceived "invasion." This self-inflicted sense of insecurity may lead to a situation of "governmental hypochondria" whereby imagination of subversion may be omnipresent in the minds of the country's leadership. In those cases where subversion is real, the exile/refugee- generating country has to divert a sizable amount of its 26 resources to contain the challenge, a no less burdensome situation. Saadia Touval has observed that "the needs of fighting insurgents can greatly contribute to a government's dependence on external assistance" and that if fighting dissidence "becomes a major preoccupation of the government, it may have political consequences on the domestic scene."29
The outflow of exiles/refugees hurts the country of origin yet in another way. Once freed from their home country's control of political space, exiles/refugees seek to influence international opinion. It has been correctly observed in this connection that:
refugees bear witness to the international community of what is happening within the country and thus may produce negative consequences of international condemnation and loss of political and economic support.30
The other reason why exiles/refugees become a significant concern of the country that generates them is the simple fact that, like any other international migrants, exiles/refugees often become a political force in the country in which they reside. Commenting on international migrants, of whom exiles/refugees are a category, Myron
Weiner has observed that:
...How they relate to the politics of that [host] country, and their political relationship to their country of origin have become relevant factors in the policies influencing the sending and the receiving countries.i
This being the case, the exile/refugee-generating countries naturally fear that the foreign policy processes of the asylum-giving countries will be saturated with, and biased 27 by, negative propaganda furnished by the exiles/refugees.
The exile/refugee-generating countries' fear that their exiled citizens are likely to influence international politics and, therefore, inter-state relations, is not unfounded. Once out of the territorial political space of their countries of origin, the politicized segments of exile/refugee populations develop what Gabriel Sheffer has termed "trans-state networks"32 in an attempt to influence international politics and public opinion.
These networks often put in motion complex multi-actor relations involving the refugees themselves, their country of origin, their host country, and all kinds of international agencies-both governmental and non- governmental. Well organized exile/refugee groups can build sophisticated networks of sympathizers in a way that enables them to mobilize significant amounts of political, economic and even military resources. The effect of this is a rise in conflict among sonie of the actors involved, but also the development of a pattern of consultation and cooperation among them.
In his study of modern diasporas in international politics, Sheffer has identified a similar process whereby modern organized diasporas
...develop and maintain multilateral connections with various political and social groups in their host countries, homelands and third countries. They exchange information and resources with international organizations, governments, and other relevant groups within the states which serve s their base and, of course, with their homelands. 28
This applies to exiles/refugees as well who are a subset of diasporas after ail.
Once such networks are in place, a lot of activities of political consequence take place in the grey areas of the international system, or within certain sub-systems of the host countries and homelands, as well as in third countries.34 In these circumstances of active involvement in the trans-state arena, African exiles/refugees can acquire, and have indeed often acquired a certain influence in inter-African state relations. The multilateral relations forged within the mentioned networks have become an integral part of inter-African state relations and do
influence the behavior of the parties involved.
Even in cases where exiles/refugees are not politically active in the asylum-giving countries, their presence alone is a subject of inter-state relations. As
Ferris eloquently puts it,
...While a government may abuse, repress, and even slaughter its citizens with relative impunity, the flood of refugees-which may result from such aflions quickly beco.nes the "business" of other nations.
The asylum-giving state finds itself obliged to assume
commitments it would otherwise have not got itself into.
For example, that state begins to experience the pressure of
adhering to international criteria of asylum-giving,
ratifying UN and other conventions regarding refugees,
signing agreements and having to welcome and deal with all
kinds of voluntary agencies involved in relief work, etc.
These commitments often conflict with the state's desire to 29 protect its sovereignty, hence the strain on asylum-giving countries. These unwelcome involvements can easily be blamed on the exile/refugee-generating state.
An equally legitimate fear, on the part of an asylum- giving country, is that other governments and the international community might leave it shouldering more of the burden of catering for the exiles/refugees than it can bear. But, even when other governments and the international community intervene generously, the asylum- giving country has to generate a significant portion of the human, financial and material resources to meet the short and long-term needs of the displaced exiles/refugees. In the case of African countries, these resources are so meager that diverting any of them to this unexpected influx of human beings from another country may be a big issue in domestic politics.
In his study of the origin and destination of Africa's
refugees, John R. Rogge has found that in Africa the burden
of giving asylum to exiles/refugees falls inordinately
heavily upon a few countries. According to him,
...West Africa's role in both creating and receiving refugees has been relatively passive compared to most of central, southern, and eastern Africa...To date, the greatest burden of asylum has been borne by as few as twelve states, of which four, Zaire, Tanzania, Sudan and Uganda, have been supporting very large communities for over a decade. For many asylum states, the specter of further refugee influx persists, and even with substantial infusions of international assistance, the needs of refugees place enormous demands upon the already overextended economies of host countries.36
This uneven distribution of the burden of catering to 30 exiles/refugees seems to have been a perennial feature of the African exile/refugee phenomenon because, as long ago as
1974, Gould made the following observation similar to
Rogge's:
...The largest concentration of refugees is in Eastern and South-Central Africa, from Sudan and Ethiopia southward to the borders of Zambia with Portuguese territories and Rhodesia. Though there are many small states in West Africâ and several of them have ha97 recurrent internai strife there are few refugees.
The above described disproportionate distribution of exiles/refugees among only a few African states, for no fault of the latter, has raised questions of fairness and responsibility, directed to the less involved African states. The grudge with which the over-burdened countries make their case is latently of negative consequence to inter-African state relations. As early as 1969, the OAU recognized this problem and enshrined the principle of
"burden-sharing" in its 1969 convention on refugees.
According to Article II, paragraph 4, of the Convention:
...Where a Member State finds difficulty in continuing to grant asylum to refugees, such Member State may appeal directly to other Member States and through the OAU, and such other Member State shall in the spirit of African solidarity and international co-operation take appropriate measures t lighten the burden of the Member State granting asylum. $
In practice, however, this provision in the OAU
Convention has not been adhered to by most member states.
Ten years after the said OAU Convention, the former
President of Tanzania, Julius K. Nyerere, had to lament the failure of the noble "burden-sharing" principle thus:
...The 1967 Conference acknowledged the need for the 31
refugee burden of Africa ta be shared with some concept of equality among all African States. It has not happened yet...This meeting cannot be told anything very much about progress in sharing the burden which refugees cause for sonie nations.39 Nyerere has not been alone in perceiving the sad indifference of many OAU Member States ta the principle of
"burden-sharing." For example, as a way of trying ta arrest the indifference in question, the following concrete recommendations were made at the 1979 Arusha Conference on African refugees: i) the establishment of an agreed quota system whereby African states undertake ta accept a certain number of refugees for permanent settlement and ta provide them with Convention Travel Documents. ii) the establishment of a fund ta defray the various costs involved in the a28eptance of refugees by first asylum countries. Ironically, constructive multilateral commitments of this nature ta deal with the exile/refugee problem seem ta contain an inherent seed of future discord. As the problems of adherence ta the commitments made ta the OAU Liberation
Committee have demonstrated, some African states have a tendency ta renege on "burden-sharing" promises. When the
OAU Liberation Committee was created in the early 1960s ta help the exiled liberation movements struggiing against colonial and white minority regimes, mainly in Southern Africa, but also in other parts of the continent, it was then agreed that each member state would regularly pay its quota ta the OAU liberation fund. However, a good number of African states have not been paying their financial 32 contributions as agreed, and this has caused all sorts of friction, behaviorally manifested in such actions as: names- calling, formation of exclusive "concerned action groups," etc.
The problems discussed above clearly show that, indeed, an exile/refugee-generating country ipso facto creates burdens for itself as well as other states. This reality is at the same time a predisposing factor of the conflict-proneness of both refugee/exile-generating and asylum-giving countries.
As suggested earlier, another burden unnecessarily incurred by asylum-giving countries, which can be blamed on the exile/refugee-generating countries, is in the area of the former countries' sovereignty. Nation-states, especially those newly independent, do not like to have external actors intruding in their policy-making processes.
However, since exile/refugee relief and resettlement often require the intervention of the international community, the asylum-giving state finds itself compelled to welcome external actors who, as a matter of necessity, participate in the policy process on matters involving the exile/refugee problem.
The actors in question here are Intergovernmental
Organizations such as the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees and the OAU Liberation Committee and various Non-Governmental International Organizations, popularly known as Private Voluntary Agencies (PVOs). What 33 makes asylum-giving countries nervous about having to work with PVOs can be summarized as follows:
1. PVOs corne each with their own policies which they
want the asylum-giving country to accommodate in
its refugee policy, and this can put a strain on
national sovereignty.
2. Many of the PVOs, especially but not exclusively
church organizations, are credible opinion-makers
abroad; thus, the asylum-giving states have to
deal with the fear of negative publicity abroad.
3. Very often, the views and policies of PVOs
conflict with each other and impose on the asylum-
giving country the burden of undertaking impartial
co-ordination of their varying tendencies.
There is no doubt that all this leaves the sovereignty of the asylum-giving country somewhat circumscribed, to the latter's chagrin.
In his study of the politics of exile/refugee relief work involving PVOs and asylum-giving states, Robert Gorman has made a revealing description of the stakes involved:
...The political motivations of PVOs include protection of their individual autonomy and in some cases expansion of their control or at least their freedom of action in relation to governments and other agencies. In some cases the politics of PVOs in relief will extend to specific positions of advocacy or to outright challenges to the pollîies and practices of donor and host countries.
In the saure article, Gorman asserts that "PVOs naturally tend to identify with the refugees, and less so with the problems of local governments."42 In the case of 34
Africa, he cites Somalia, where,
...several PVOs have run afoul of the government for various reasons. PVO workers have-been harassed on occasion for blowing the whistle on food diversion, local corruption, and other irregularities. Such incidents create tension between PVOs and host governments, even if they are a result of the behavior of a sing over-zealous PVO staffer or government official.
The relevance of the dynamic underlying the relationship between international organizations and asylum- giving states to the subject of this study is that, ultimately, in indirect and sometimes even circumspect ways, some of the tactical, pragmatic doings of these actors spill-over into the broad picture of inter-African state relations, in the saine way that foreign policy is generally viewed in International Relations as a result of domestic pol'icy inputs.
It seems that some of the classes of activity which, according to Milton Esman, implicate diasporas in international relations, apply to exiles/refugees as well.
Such activity may be initiated by any of the major actors: exiles/refugees -hemselves, home governments, host governments, or international organizations. The following are sonie of the possible scenarios:
1. Exiles/refugees may attempt to influence events in the home country. The methods they employ may be economic, political or military. Direct action by exile/refugee groups may create serious tensions between host and home governments, the latter accusing the former of tolerating and even abetting hostile activities which they are believed 35 to have the power to suppress.
2. The host country government may attempt to use exiles/refugees in pursuit of its external political, economic or military goals. The exiles/refugees may be a convenient and low-cost resource for the host government, while by supporting the host country's government, the exiles/refugees enhance their own security.
3. Exile/refugee communities may attempt to influence international organizations against their country of origin or even in sonie cases against their country of asylum.
4. Exiles/refugees' countries of origin may ask the host government to influence, usually to restrain what they perceive to be hostile or embarrassing activities of the exiles/refugees.44
In any of the above scenarios, the scope and intensity of those activities of exiles/refugees which affect inter-
African state relations are determined by three factors: the material, cultural and organizational resources available to them; the opportunity structures in the host country,, and their inclination or motivation to maintain their solidarity and exert group influence.45
In this regard, peasant refugee communities are less likely to influence inter-African state relations than mobilized exiled elites. The latter bring occupational and communication skills which may give them access to the elites of the host country. As a result, a scenario can be envisaged whereby these exiled elites may secure the 36 patronage and protection of the local elites whom they can possibly influence in the long run. This relationship may evolve into facilitated contacts with sympathetic actors in the international community.
"Opportunity structure" which according ta Esman,
"denotes the degree of freedom available ta
[exiles/refugees] ta organize and ta promote their group interests,"46 is decisive but not always guaranteed. Tom
Lodge has eloquently expressed both the precariousness and the generosity of the exiles' political milieu in the host country. On the positive side, he observes that
...the terrain of exile is not wholly disadvantageous for the development of a political movement. It can provide protection, security, powerful form of external support, factors and conditions which facilitate the development of a form and quality of organization unattainable in the precarious circumstan es of opposition politics within the homeland.4
On the tougher side, he observes that:
...Exile politicians are forced into a dependent relationship with their hosts and patrons, whose hospitality and generosity may be conditional and subject ta capricious change. Survival and success in such an environment may depend on skills and talents quite different from those developed in the history of the"movement before its departure from home. It can require ideological innovations which ïsk distancing it from its original social constituency.
As I get into the empirical specifics of this study, I consider the following ta be sonie of the most interesting issues deserving investigation: the various determinants of exile/refugee migrations in different parts of Africa; the composition of refugee populations with particular reference ta their political mobilization potential; the opportunity 37 structures available to exiles/refugees in host countries; the influence of exiles/refugees on the domestic politics of the host countries; the interaction between exiles/refugees, international organizations and third countries; the inclination of home or host governments to draw on exiles/refugees as political resources to promote their interests in bilateral relations, international politics and organizations; instances of inter-African state conflict and co-operation involving overtly stated allegations of hostile exile/refugee activity; and specific measures adopted by the states concerned in response to such allegations.
The picture emerging from this analysis will hopefully shed sonie light on the relative share attributable to the exile/refugee phenomenon in the totality of salient issue areas which have characterized inter-state conflict and co- operation on the African continent for the last three decades. 38
CHAPTER II
THE CHRONIC CASE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA In this chapter, I will attempt to present, in as comprehensive a manner as possible, the serious and frequent inter-state conflicts in Southern Africa which can either directly or indirectly be associated with the exile/refugee problem. I will attribute the chronic nature of this problem in the region to the complexities of the politics of decolonization, minority rule and apartheid. I will, however, acknowledge the fact that in sonie cases both the intra-regional and the inter-regional manifestations of sonie of those conflicts ostensibly caused by the exile/refugee issue may be mere symptoms of larger conflicts. In order to fulfill the above task without bogging down the inevitably detailed presentation, the complex set of interstate relations associated with the exile/refugee factor in the region has been broken down into the following simpler diadic sets of relations: Colonial Mozambique versus each of its neighbors-Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi; Angola versus Zaire; U.D.I. Rhodesia versus each of its three neighbors - Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana; South Africa versus each of its six neighbors - Zambia, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Swaziland; Malawi versus each of its two neighbors - Tanzania and Zambia; and finally, 39
Zambia versus Zaire. An analytical summary gauging the detailed facts against the adopted theoretical framework concludes the chapter.
For the purpose of this study, Southern Africa is defined as that part of the African continent consisting of
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia,
South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.l This sub- region has been a vortex of political violence for the last thirty years, and victims of this violence have fled their countries to seek asylum in others. Of the ten countries in
Southern Africa, only two have not generated any significant numbers of exiles/refugees. These are Botswana and
Swaziland both of which have hardly experienced any significant internai political opposition since independence. Of the remaining eight, all of which have generated sizeable numbers of exiles/refugees, only Lesotho,
Malawi and Zambia have not experienced massive exile/refugee emigrations. The remaining five--Angola, Mozambique,
Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe have each produced several tens of thousand exiles/refugees as a result of the violent nature of the politics of decolonization in the
Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, minority rule
in Rhodesia under the Unilateral Declaration of Independence
(U.D.I) regime, apartheid in South Africa, and the illegal
occupation of Namibia by South Africa.
In terms of hosting exiles/refugees, practically all ten have at one time or another been host to some group of 40 exiles/refugees, although in the case of South Africa and
Namibia, the apartheid regime has not always been forthcoming in admitting the presence of exiles/refugees in these two countries, because in most cases these individuals or groups were dissidents from neighboring countries who were undergoing training to engage in subversive activities against their home governments. However, both in the mid-
1970s and mid-1980s, South Africa admitted having exiles/refugees from neighboring countries. In the former period, South Africa admitted that it was accommodating "not less than 11,000 refugees in four camps."2 These refugees were mostly from the recently liberated Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique. In the latter period, from 1984 to date, sources such as the UNHCR have revealed that close to 220,000 Mozambicans fled their country due to the terror directed against them by anti-government rebels.
The Intra-Regional Character of the Exile/Refugee Phenomenon in Southern Africa Exile/refugee flowL in Southern Africa have been both an intra-regional and an inter-regional phenomenon. At the intra-regional level, exiles/refugees from South Africa have been given asylum in post-independent Angola since the mid- 1970s; in Botswana since the mid-1960s; in Lesotho since 1960; in Malawi during the first three years or so following its independence in 1964; in post-independence Mozambique since 1975; in Swaziland and Zambia since 1960, before the two countries even became independent; and in Zimbabwe since 41 independence in 1980. Namibian exiles/refugees have been absorbed by fewer countries in the sub-region. Since the mid-1970s, Angola has hosted several tens of thousand of Namibian refugees (about 70,000 in 1985); Botswana has since the mid-1960s hosted small numbers of Namibians; and there have been significant numbers of Namibians in Zambia since 1960, their number coming sometimes close to five thousand, according to UNHCR estimates. Portuguese Angola and Mozambique distinguished themselves in producing huge numbers of exiles/refugees from the early 1960s until 1975, but the majority of these people found asylum outside Southern Africa. The only country in the sub-region which hosted exiles/refugees from the two Portuguese colonies in significant numbers was Zambia which began to receive Mozambicans and Angolans by the thousands in 1965/6. By 1973, for example, two years before the independence of Mozambique and Angola, Zambia was hosting 17,000 Angolan and 6,500 Mozambicans refugees.3 Huge numbers of Angolan refugees poured once again into Zambia in 1982 following the joint South Africa-UNITA offensive against Angola, and they continue to live there. Botswana has hosted moderately large numbers of Angolans since 1966, the highest figure being approximately 4,000 exiles/refugees in 1973. The number decreased sharply when Angola became independent in 1975, but since the joint South Africa-UNITA offensive of the early 1980s a few hundred Angolans have again been documented in the refugee statistics of Botswana. 42
Malawi received about 20,000 Mozambicans in 1967 but this figure decreased dramatically to sonie 3,000 in 1970, a decrease which reflects Malawi's politics of subservience to
South Africa and the latter's former ally in the Southern
African liberation wars--Portugal. Swaziland, for its part, hosted very small numbers of Mozambican exiles (about 40) since 1965. Since 1975, following Mozambique's independence, there were no Mozambican exiles/refugees in
Swaziland until aroùnd 1985 when, following the intensification of terrorist activities by anti-Mozambican government rebels, new refugees fled the country. About
1,240 Mozambican refugees were documented in Swaziland in
1985, as were another 15,000 in Zimbabwe the saine year.4
The exiles/refugees fleeing U.D.I Rhodesia found asylum in Botswana, post-independent Mozambique, and Zambia.
Over the years, since the mid 1960s, each of these countries had only a handful of Rhodesian exiles. However, the escalation of violence inside Rhodesia saw a dramatic increase in Rhodesian exile/refugee numbers in these three countries in 1977 (20,000 in Botswana, 42,000 in Mozambique,
30,000 in Zambia).5
South Africa has hosted numerous dissident groups from countries within the sub-region. It has hosted the Lesotho
Liberation Army (L.L.A.) which struggled since 1974 to remove the government of the late Chief Leaboa Jonathan in
Lesotho. It inherited from the defunct Rhodesia the
Mozambican Movement for National Resistence (M.N.R.) vowed 43 to destroy the Mozambican government. It welcomed dissidents from Zambia and Zimbabwe and offered to provide them with the necessary training to subvert their respective governments. It has also given sanctuary to UNITA rebels who have been trying to overthrow the Angolan government for the last 10 years. These small but specialized exiled groups, added to relatively small numbers of exiles/refugees who fled Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe at the time of their independence, and the more recent refugee influx from
Mozambique, constitute South Africa's share in the
experience of the exile/refugee phenomenon in the sub-region
as an asylum-giver. The picture of the intra-regional
character of the exile/refugee phenomenon in Southern Africa
would not be complete without mentioning Zambia's welcome to
about 17,000 Jehovah's Witness refugees from Malawi in
1972/73.
The Inter-Regional Character of the Exile/Refugee Phenomenon in Southern Africa The exile/refugee flows briefly described above portray an incomplete image of the exile/refugee problem in Southern Africa, because so far the inter-regional aspects of the problem have not been addressed. Two more phenomena need to be added to complete the picture. The first of these is that at least two of the countries in Southern Africa have hosted exiles/refugees from outside the sub- region, and the second is that at least eleven African countries outside Southern Africa have, at one time or 44 another, given asylum and support ta exiles/refugees from various Southern Africa countries.
The two Southern Africà states which have given asylum ta exiles/refugees from outside the sub-region are Angola and Zambia. In both cases, the source of the exiles/refugees has been Zaire--that notorious land of political turbulence in Central Africa since 1960. The presence of a significant number of Zairean exiles/refugees in Zambia appears in refugee statistics of the late 1970s, mainly those published after the Shaba I and II invasions of
Zaire by rebels based in Angola in 1977 and 1978, respectively.
Regarding the presence of Zairean exiles/refugees in
Angola, significant numbers of them had fled Zaire into
Angola even before the independence of Angola. However,
following Shaba I and II invasions, thousands of Zaireans poured into Angola--about 25,000 in 1978. The figure dropped ta 18,000 in 1981/82, and 13,200 in 1985.7 This decline in numbers reflects some response ta voluntary repatriation following President Mobutu's frequent
declarations of amnesty. The extent ta which these
exiles/refugees from Zaire became a salient feature of the
Zairo-Angolan and Zairo-Zambian bilateral relations will be
explored in the following pages. The only observation
appropriate at this point is that the relations between
Zaire and Angola revolving around the Zairean exile/refugee
factor have been more strained than those between Zaire and 45
Zambia, because the latter has historically had no serious reason to wish to engage in subversive activities against Zaire. The eleven or so countries outside Southern Africa which have given asylum to exiles/refugees from Southern African countries include Zaire, Tanzania, Congo- Brazzaville, Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Kenya and Uganda. Of these, Zaire and Tanzania have experienced the heaviest involvement with massive flows of exiles/refugees from Southern Africa because of the contiguity factor. The rest have hosted relatively smaller numbers of exiles/refugees from Southern Africa, and because of their relatively safer geographical location, away from Southern Africa, they have been sheltered from the punitive blows of the exile/refugee-generating regimes in Southern Africa. For more than thirty years, Zaire has, since its Belgian Congo days, hosted Angolan exiles/refugees. In fact, the first exiled groups of Angolans living in Belgian Congo was documented in 1954, but it was not until 1960 that a large exile/refugee population of about 150,000 Angolans was reported to be living in the Congo.8 The figure has fluctuated over the years, but never dropping below two hundred thousand exiles/refugees since 1962. In 1985, there were some 282,000 Angolan exiles/refugees in Zaire.9 One irony is that both Portuguese Angola and independent Angola have generated massive flows of exiles/refugees into Zaire 46 for various reasons which will be discussed later. Besides the Angolans, Zaire has also given asylum to a handful of
South African exiles/refugees (about 20 were reported for the year 1972) and since 1972 Zaire has given asylum to exiles/refugees from neighboring Zambia. From an initial
750 Zambians who fled their country because of alleged religious persecution, the figure rose to about 1,800 in
1981 and subsequently dropped, stabilizing at around 600 by the nid-1980s.
Tanzania has been another major recipient of exiles/refugees from Southern Africa. Mozambicans fleeing the brutalities of the Portuguese colonial regime were offered asylum in Tanzania in 1962 and, by 1964 there were
as many as 10,000 Mozambican refugees in Tanzania. This
figure rose steadily, so that by 1975--the year of
independence for Mozambique--there were about 70,600
Mozambicans in the country. Much smaller but highly active
groups of exiles/refugees from Southern Africa offered
asylum in Tanzania came from Malawi, Rhodesia, South Africa,
and Namibia. Less than 50 Rhodesian exiles/refugees were
documented for the years 1966-67 and by 1968 about 150
exiles/refugees from Malawi were living in Tanzania. In
addition to this already heterogeneous nature of
exile/refugee presence in Tanzania, relatively small groups
of Namibians and South Africans have been living in the
country since the early 1970s.
Of the remaining African countries involved in hosting 47 . exiles/refugees from Southern Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia,
Egypt, Libya, Kenya and Uganda have at one time or another given asylum to at least one small exile/refugee group from
South Africa and Namibia. Algeria, Ghana, Ethiopia and
Egypt hosted exiles/refugees from Rhodesia prior to its independence in 1980. Congo Brazzaville hosted Angolan exiles/refugees belonging to the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) since 1964.
The above-outlined inter-regional character of the exile/refugee phenomenon in Southern Africa reveals a lamentable aspect of the African exile/refugee problem. It shows that the province of exile/refugee generation has not been solely the monopoly of colonial and white minority regimes. The flight of Zambians into Zaire and vice-versa, the flight of Malawians into Tanzania and Zambia, the flight of Angolans into Zaire after 1975--ail this shows that
independent African states, for reasons to be addressed later, have also produced exiles/refugees.
The exile/refugee-generation and asylum-giving involved in the cases outlined above have taken a heavy toll on inter-state relations in Southern Africa. For the most part, these relations have been conflictual in character.
Where there has been a semblance of cooperation, such
cooperation has been thrust upon the states concerned by the mere necessity of self-interest. It is to the dynamics of these inter-state relations in Southern Africa that I now turn. 48
Angolan and Zairean Exiles/Refugees: A Major Source of Strain in Inter-State Relations As pointed out in Chapter one, anti-colonial politics have been an important feature of several scenarios of exile/refugee generation. According to the information I could find while doing research for this study, the earliest exiled group from Southern Africa which engaged in organized anti-colonial politics was that of Angolans working in the
Belgian Congo in the 1950s. On July 10, 1954, Angolan emigrants who were living in the city of Leopoldville in the Belgian Congo founded a movement called the Union of the Populations of Angola (U.P.A.). These Angolans had fled their country because of the deplorable living conditions prevailing in Angola at the time. What was attractive about the Belgian Congo was its relatively better living
conditions. The fact that the Congo was at the time a
colonial territory also made organizational work within the
Union of the Populations of Angola very difficult. Despite
the organizational difficulties, the movement was able to
succezsfully stage a strike inside Angola on March 10, 1956.
Portuguese authorities, having intercepted some of the movement's tracts, intervened with Belgian colonial
authorities in order to bring an end to the movement's activities.10
Naturally, the colonial regime in the Congo
cooperated. On March 23, 1956, the Provincial Director of
the Criminal Investigation Department in Léopoldville
convoked the members of the movement and made them sign a 49 document in which they pledged ta cease all political activities. Some of the members were arrested and deported.
About three years later, when the Belgian colonial administration had ta face its own problem of revolting
Congolese nationalists in 1959, malitants of the Union of the Populations of Angola were among those who were arrested. Ail of them were subsequently extradited ta
Angola where they were sent ta plantations and placed in forced labor camps.11 From this time on, nationalist struggles in Angola grew in intensity as the organizational element became more sophisticated. This made the Portuguese colonial administration intensify its ruthlessness in dealing with nationalist agitation.
By 1960, when Angola's national liberation struggle broke out along its northern border, the former Belgian
Congo had moved ta independent status and a government of
indigenous nationalists was in place. The cooperation the
Portuguese colonial regime in Angola enjoyed from its
Belgian counterpart in the Congo came ta an end. Since
1960, Congo-Leopoldville gave sanctuary and support ta the
National Liberation Front of Angola (FLNA), an organization which grew out of the pioneering efforts of the Union of the
Populations of Angola. The FLNA proceeded ta form the
Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE) under
Holden Roberto in the Congo. The FLNA was given some
freedom of movement and training facilities in the Lower
Congo area. 50
Given the appealing nature of the anti-colonial nationalist struggles on the African continent at that time, it would be reasonable ta cite political altruism as one of the factors which motivated the leaders of the new Congolese government ta give asylum ta the exiled FLNA nationalists.
From this perspective, it might be said that it was only natural for the nationalists in the Belgian Congo, upon attaining their independence, ta wish ta help their Angolan comrades ta win their own independence. After all, the exiled Angolans and the Congolese nationalists had suffered together the previous year, in the 1959 Belgian crackdown on political activists in the Belgian Congo. However, the young Congolese government had other incentives ta support the exiles/refugees of the FLNA. Since the leadership and membership of this movement was dominated by the Bakongo tribe ta which the first president of the Congo, Joseph
Kasavubu, belonged, the movement was seen as "the natural prolongation of Congolese independence and Kasavubu's
Bakongo tribe."12 Even after Mobutu came ta power in a coup d'état, the FLNA "became the Angolan arm of the Zairean army and foreign policy....""13
Little did the infant Congolese government of 1960 know that by giving asylum ta the FLNA exiles and supporting their government in exile, it was ushering in a period of protracted antagonism between the Congo and, ironically, both colonial and independent Angola. Until mid-1966, there were only one-way accusations about harboring and supporting 51 subversive exiles voiced by the Portuguese colonial government against the Congo. These accusations had been more frequent before Tshombe became Prime Minister of the
Congo in 1964. During Tshombe's tenure, the political activities of Angolan exiles in the Congo were drastically curtailed as a result of a tacit guid pro quo for services rendered to Tshombe by the Portuguese colonial authorities.
However, the situation changed with the fall of Tshombe's regime, particularly from 1967 onwards. During this year,
3,000 gendarmes mutinied against the Mobutu government at
Kisangani and 2,000 others joined a mercenary revoit at
Kisangani and Bukavu. Mobutu's heavy-handed response
produced exiles from among the gendarmes who feared his
reprisais and fled to Zambia and Angola.14 Those who fled
to Angola were used by the Portuguese colonial regime
against liberation movements, and they were given freedom to
organize a political movement against the Congolese
government. Thus, the Congolese National Liberation Front
(FLNC) was formed in mid-1968 in the Angolan border town of
Texeira de Sousa, under the leadership of General Nathaniel
Mbumba, a former Katangan Police Commissioner, who joined
hands with other exiled opposition groups. Until the fall
of the Portuguese regime in Angola in 1975, the FLNC
remained basically a body of errant mercenaries.
The Portuguese regime in Angola adopted a policy to
punish the Congolese government for its support for the FLNA
nationalists. However, the extent to which the regime used 52 the FLNC mercenaries in this enterprise is not very clear.
In their endeavor to destabilize the Congo, the Portuguese
"sought to enlist Congolese border officiais to collaborate by either arresting or harassing infiltrators and refugees, and by tipping off the Portuguese officiais about suspected incursions."15 In sonie cases, the Portuguese carried out trans-border raids into the Congo. For example,
...on June 3 and again on June 28, 1968 the government of Congo-Kinshasa protested to the UN Security Council about alleged intrusions into Congolese airspace by Portuguese aircraft based in Angola, the dropping of leaflets from aircraft at Moerbeke southwest of Thysville (about 30 miles from the frontier) on May 21, and bombing of the Congolese village of Yongo on June 23, resulting in 45 deaths and considerable property damage. In a letter dated July 5, the Congo charged that Portuguese troops based in Angola had committed acts of aggression ac-9ss the border on June 26 and 30 and July 2 [1968]....
Such antagonistic relations between the Congo and the
Portuguese colonial regime in Angola do not sound as absurd as those which have existed between Zaire and Angola, after the latter's independence in 1975. To understand the adversarial relations which have persisted between the two countries until now, it is necessary to examine the
evolution of the liberation movements in Angola during the period of struggle for independence. The FLNA, whose
creation and base in the Congo have been briefly described, was not the only important liberation movement formed by
Angolan nationalists. Two other movements, the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 53 were key actors in the independence struggle.
The MPLA was founded in Luanda, Angola, in 1956. When it began its armed struggle in 1961, its cadres went into exile in Conakry, Algiers, Rabat, and Leopoldville. Like the FLNA, the MPLA set up its headquarters in Leopoldville,
Congo, but before long the Congolese government became hostile to this movement and paralysed it logistically. The
reasons for this hostility are complex. Suffice it to say
that both the close relationship between the Congolese
government and the FLNA (MPLA's rival) and cold war politics
in the form of American anti-MPLA pressure were among the
most important factors. The American anti-MPLA policy
stemmed from the fact that the movement was receiving aid
from the Soviet Union, mainly in the form of guerrilla
training and weapons. The Congolese government's hostility
towards the MPLA culminated in Mobutu's explusion of the
movement in 1965. As a result, the MPLA was forced to
operate from Congo-Brazzaville. Two years later, it opened
up training bases in Zambia and Tanzania, making Lusaka,
Zambia, its headquarters.
UNITA was founded in 1966 as a breakaway group from
the FLNA and began its guerrilla operations from Zambia.
However, in 1967, the Zambian government expelled UNITA
because the latter had attacked the Benguela railway that
carried Zambia's copper to the Atlantic. More will be said
about this movement later because it is the notorious left-
over liberation movement which has assumed the task of 54
attempting to bring down the MPLA government in Angola, using covert American aid and South Africa's military
support.
Although each of these threé movements waged anti-
colonial struggles, they at the saine time had bitter power
struggles among themselves. The resulting disunity caused much concern among sympathizers of the national liberation
cause in Angola. Many of these sympathizers worked very
hard to unite the movements. For example, on December 13,
1972, the Foreign Ministers of Zambia, Zaire, the Congo
People's Republic and Tanzania met in Kinshasa in a round of
talks designed to bring the MPLA and the FLNA together. The
talks succeeded and an accord between the two was signed.
However, the unity proved to be very short-lived and discord
continued to the time of independence.
Despite the disunity among the Angolan liberation
movements, the aggregate impact of their uncoordinated armed
struggle was enough to encourage a group of military
officers in Portugal to overthrow the Caetano government in
April, 1974. By this time, the MPLA controlled eleven of
sixteen provincial capitals in Angola. The new military
government in Portugal, which initially conducted secret
negotiations with UNITA and FLNA about the future of Angola,
had to reckon with the superior strength of MPLA and sign a
cease-fire agreement with the latter, formally recognizing
the principle of independence for Angola. In January, 1975,
the Portuguese government and the three liberation movements 55 agreed on a four-party transitional government which would govern Angola until independence scheduled for November 11,
1975, following elections to be held in October.
It was at this particular juncture that the fate of the long-standing conflict between the Zairean government and the MPLA government in independent Angola was decided.
The strength of the MPLA on the eve of independence precipitated foreign intervention in Angola, in which each of the foreign actors who rushed to the scene wanted to influence the independence outcome. Zaire was on the side
of those who wanted to short-circuit the impending MPLA victory. Michael J. Schultheis has summarized the
activities of the major actors at that decisive moment in
Angola's history:
...In January 1975 the USA began to channel arms to the FLNA. In March the FLNA with the assistance of Zairean troops tried to seize Luanda [occupied by MPLA] by military force; in July the MPLA drove them out. Now South Africa and the USA increased their support for the anti-MPLA forces in a coordinated effort to prevent MPLA from proclaiming independence. South Africa began to train UNITA forces and to supply both UNITA and FLNA forces in central and southern Angola. On october 16 the South African army invaded southern Angola and moved an armoured column north in an attempt seize the capital, Luanda, before November 11. 1?
Thus far, Schultheis' description reveals that the efforts
of anti-MPLA forces consisted of the FLNA, UNITA, the
U.S.A., South Africa, and Zaire. To complete the picture, he observes that in the ensuing response from the Communist world,
...Cuba provided 480 military instructors to assist in training MPLA recruits, [and that] on November 5 the 56
Cuban Government agreed to send the first Cuban Combat troops to Angola, in response to MPLA requests for assistance against South African invaders. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavj also responded by shipping arme and equipment to MPLA.
This support from the communist countries to the MPLA was decisive because it enabled the latter movement to be in control of Luanda, the capital of Angola, when independence day was celebrated on November 11, 1975. After the MPLA's victory, most FLNA and Zairean troops fled into Zaire.
Thus, from day one of Angola's independence, hostile Zaire found itself stuck with anti-MPLA exiles. The presence of these anti-MPLA government elements in Zaire, coupled with
Zaire's hostile behavior towards the MPLA at that crucial hour on the eve of Angola's independence, constituted the genesis of the conflict which has existed between the two countries since 1975. Furthermore, the above short description of South Africa's open intervention on the side of UNITA and FLNA gives the background against which hostile relations between South Africa and Angola have unfolded.
Relations between Angola and Zaire since 1976 have been characterized by mutual hostility and some occasional acts of cooperation. Central to every swing of the pendulum in these relations have been each other's exiles. For example, there have been reports that on the Angolan side,
President Agostinho Neto tried from 1976 to 1978 to unite the anti-Mobutu factions in Zaire under the leadership of his old friend and ideological mentor Antoine Gizenga,20 while at the saine time he was encouraging Mobutu's opponents 57 in Angola to invade the Shaba province in Zaire. At the saine time, Zaire was preparing "Operation Cobra" to invade the Cabinda enclave and Northern Angola.21
When the Congolese National Liberation Front (FLNC) based in Angola invaded the mineral-rich Zairean province of
Shaba on March 8, 1977, Mobutu maintained that the invaders,
"were armed by the Soviet Union, supported by Angola's MPLA government and led by Cuban troops."22 In response to this accusation, Angola's Neto declared: "Angola condemns with great vigor foreign meddling, be it African or other, in the domestic affairs of Zaire."23 Following the 1977 FLNC invasion of Zaire from Angola (Shaba I), sonie political observers characterized the invasion as Angola's revenge for
Mobutu's continued support for the FLNA and his support of the Front for the Liberation of Cabinda (FLEC), a movement which intended to tear the oil-rich Cabinda enclave north of the Zaire River off from Angola.24 This saine analysis was maintained in connection with the second invasion of Shaba
(Shaba II) by the FLNC in early 1978. Another line of analysis is that the Angolan government gave the FLNC a go- ahead to attack Zaire, in the hope that if the FLNC won, the weak Angolan state would get rid of the Zairean exiles/refugees who had developed into a threatening military force themselves during their sixteen-year stay in
Angola. An FLNC victory would also have meant a friendly group in power in Zaire, a development that would have been very positive as far as the Angolan Government was 58 concerned.
The turbulent history of relations between Angola and
Zaire since 1975 is also characterized by co-operative attempts to de-esclate the conflict. Central to such attempts have been mutual pledges to refrain from supporting each other's exiles/refugees in the latter's hostile activities towards their respective countries of origin.
Just after the independence of Angola in February, 1976,
Mobutu and Neto attempted to bury old grudges by signing an accord to normalize relations. In this accord, Zaire promised to stop assisting the FLNA and FLEC, while Angola pledged not to interfere in internai affairs of Zaire,
"perhaps hinting to return the Katangans [the gendarmes who joined the FLNC]."25 Mobutu's offer to stop assisting the
FLNA in that accord might sound generous, but in reality it was not, because at that time he had withdrawn the totally impotent FLNA troops from the border and had instead opted to help the more spirited UNITA and FLEC to undermine the
MPLA government.
Another reconciliation attempt took place in June,
1978, just after Shaba II. The major focus of this attempt was on exiled opponents' raids across the border on either
side. Shaba I and II had proved that Zaire's complaint about the activities of the FLNC troops based in Angola were a real menace to Zaire. Similarly, Angola's complaint to the UN about raids on its villages by exiled Angolan guerillas in Zaire was documented beyond dispute. This new 59 reconciliation attempt produced some tangible results. One significant result was the effectively conducted voluntary repatriation of over 200,000 exiles/refugees in each direction which led to the signing of a tripartite agreement between the two states and the office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for refugees (UNHCR) in September, 1980, to organize continued voluntary repatriation. This voluntary repatriation came about because each of the two countries declared an amnesty for exiled dissidents. On the
Angolan side, the Katangan gendarmes who did not repatriate to Zaire voluntarily were forced to moue several hundred kilometres away from the Zaire border. Another tangible result of this reconciliation effort was the expulsion of the leaders of the opposition movements from each other's territory. Mbumba, leader of the Angola-based FLNC was expelled and went to Guinea-Bissau, while FLNA's Holden
Roberto was expelled from Zaire and left for Paris after having refused asylum in Senegal.26
This attempt at co-operation between Angola and Zaire lived on even after Neto's death. In February, 1985, for example, Dos Santos and Mobutu signed bilateral agreements on defense and security and the trans-border movement of people and goods. A joint-commission to oversee border security was established to prevent both countries from allowing their territories to be used to launch attacks against one another.27 This co-operative spirit has however failed on many occasions, particularly because of the 60 resilience of UNITA whose survival and growing strength has been sustained by United States dollars and arms under the
Reagan Administration. Zaire's current involvement in helping exiled elements struggling against the Angolan government is rather indirect. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, Mobutu's over-dependence on the U.S. has put his government in the awkward position of having to help the U.S. in the latter's covert operations against Angola.
Thus, when Mobutu made an official visit to Angola in July,
1986, there were complaints from the Angolan side that UNITA guerrillas regularly carried out raids from Zaire's Shaba and occidental Kasai provinces,28 where they were alleged to have many facilities. In September, 1987, there were reports that U.S.A. stinger missiles sent to Savimbi's rebel forces transited Zaire.29
FRELIMO Exiles, Colonial Mozambique, and the Neighboring Host Countries The viciousness of Portuguese colonialism did not produce exiles/refugees only in Angola. It also created nationalist resistance in Mozambique and an anti-colonial national liberation struggle which required its organizers to flee their country. The independent Southern African countries neighboring on Mozambique became the natural recipients of Mozambique's exiles/refugees. Those asylum countries in the region which allowed Mozambican exiles/refugees to engage in armed liberation struggle found themselves thrust into a position of conflictual 61 relationship with the Portuguese colonial regime in
Mozambique.
Organized armed struggle against the Portuguese colonial regime in Mozambique took concrete shape in 1962 in
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, when three exiled Mozambican movements merged to form the Front for the Liberation of
Mozambique (FRELIMO). FRELIMO's military officers were trained in Algeria and its guerrillas were trained in
Tanzania, a country which shares a border with Mozambique.
When FRELIMO launched its war of liberation in 1964, the
Portuguese colonial regime ear-marked Tanzania as its enemy and undertook to punish this country which had not only given asylum to the national liberation fighters, but had actually given them training bases. Portuguese punitive
action against Tanzania mostly took the form of territorial
incursions and the laying of mines along the Tanzanian side
of the border. One of the earliest incidents took place on
November 29, 1966, when a mine piaced by Portuguese troops
in a road in the Mtwara Region of Tanzania killed four
Tanzanian civilians. This incident prompted the Second
Vice-President of Tanzania to order all military reservists
in the border regions of Mtwara and Ruvuma to report to
their respective Area Commissioners for further
instructions.30 The following year, after the death of two
more Tanzanians killed by mines laid across the Ruvuma River
border on the Tanzanian side, the Second Vice President
announced on April 23, 1967, that all able-bodied residents 62 living along the Ruvuma River would be armed by the Government.31 This period also happened ta be one of massive influx of Mozambican refugees into Tanzania. The number jumped from 10,000 in 1965 ta 12,000 in 1966, ta 19,000 in 1967. However, Tanzania was neither the only host ta exiles/refugees from Mozambique nor the only target of the Portuguese colonial regime. Zambia was another country siphoned into the unfolding conflict. Precisely because Zambia had been hosting about 5,000 Mozambican exiles/refugees since 1965 and because it had allowed FRELIMO ta open up guerrilla bases on its territory,32 it incurred, on June 9, 1968, a loss of its Luangwa River bridge when agents of the Portuguese in Mozambique blew it up. The bridge was strategically located on the road from Lusaka (via Malawi) ta the port of Beira in Mozambique.33 The following year, President Kaunda of Zambia accused the Portuguese of dropping 18 incendiary bombs on a village near Chipata.34 Malawi, which had approximately 20,000 exiles/refugees from Mozambique in 1967 also had its share of conflict with the Portuguese regime in Mozambique when the latter's troops made an incursion into Malawi. In December, 1972, South
Africa put out a report of a communiqué from Mozambique military authorities which claimed that FRELIMO forces were operating from Malawi. Relations between Malawi and the Portuguese regime in Mozambique became strained when the 63
Portuguese envoy in Malawi refused to confirm or deny the report. The Portuguese envoy left on a three months leave, and it was widely believed that he was requested to leave
for failing to give "adequate explanation for the incursion of Portuguese troops from Mozambique into Malawi."35 In this particular case, it seems Malawi had not in any way
allowed its Mozambican exiles/refugees to engage in
subversive activities. Instead, the colonial regime
suspected that Malawi might strike a bargain with the
guerrillas for their freedom to operate within the borders
of Malawi in exchange for an agreement not to attack
strategic rail communications through Mozambique.36 The
incursion had been designed as a preemptive measure.
The Portuguese colonial regime in Mozambique came to
an end in 1975, following the coup in Portugal which had
much to do with the strength and the gains of liberation
movements in Portuguese African colonies. These liberation
movements, one of which was FRELIMO, had considerably
exhausted the Portuguese military, hence the military coup
and the accelerated transition to independence. Until 1975,
Mozambique had been an exile/refugee-generating country, not
an asylum-giving one. Its problem thus far had been one of
coping with nationalist guerrilla operations inside the
country, reinforced from bases in neighboring countries.
These countries had been defined by the colonial regime as
targets of punitive sanctions. After independence, the
exile/refugee problem in Mozambique did not end, as one 64 might have expected. Rather, it took on a different complexion. In the year that followed, Mozambique became both a major asylum-giving country and an exile/refugee- generating one. No sooner did Mozambique celebrate its independence in 1975 than it began ta host exiles/refugees from the neighboring countries of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), South Africa and Namibia. At the time, U.D.I. Rhodesia was an oppressive white minority regime which had generated exiled liberation movements. South Africa, for its part, had activated its notorious apartheid system ta contain the
activities of South Africa's liberation movements in exile and those of Namibia's exiled SWAPO. From its inception, independent Mozambique found itself incompatible with its oppressive white minority regime neighbors, and undertook ta give assistance ta FRELIMO's sister liberation movements. The most undisputable candidate for this assistance was the
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), a movement which had been waging its guerrilla war against U.D.I Rhodesia for several years. The FRELIMO government naturally felt obliged ta assist ZANU, because since 1972 ZANU guerrillas had begun ta operate from FRELIMO's liberated areas in launching attacks into Rhodesia. Troops of both movements often fought side by side against the Portuguese, Rhodesian and South Africa forces.37 FRELIMO's sympathy for other struggling liberation movements in Southern Africa quickly turned independent Mozambique into a land of exile/refugee 65 asylum. Only two years after its independence, Mozambique was hosting about 42,000 from Rhodesia and this number had increased to about 60,000 by 1980. In addition to this,
Mozambique gave asylum to exiles/refugees who fled apartheid
South Africa. The population of these victims of apartheid was relatively smaller, rising gradually from 100 in 1981 to about 700 in 1985.
U.D.I. Rhodesia, its Exiles/Refugees, and the Neighboring Host Countries The Ian Smith government of U.D.I. Rhodesia began to experience the problem of insurgency in earnest in April
1966, when thirty guerrilla troops of the Zimbabwe African
National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of ZANU operating from bases in Zambia, clashed with Rhodesian troops at Sinoia. This marked the beginning of the war for independence in Rhodesia, whose preparation had begun in mid-1962 when a group of Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union
(ZAPU) supporters went into military training in Algeria,
Ghana, China (PRC) and Czechosiovakia. Subsequently, ZAPU organized joint training with the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC-SA) in Zambia and the Soviet Union. On the ZANU side, guerrilla training took place in bases in
Zambia, Tanzania, and China.38
It is in this context of insurgency that Rhodesia's heavy-handed behavior towards its majority rule neighbors, including Mozambique, can be understood. Rhodesia' punitive action against Mozambique was severe and protracted. 66
Rhodesia's justification for its attacks against its neighbors was the presence and support of insurgents in those countries. Rhodesia relentlessly and frequently struck at its neighbors until the very eve of the independence of its people in 1980.
Rhodesia versus Mozambique Rhodesia's punitive sanctions against Mozambique were very eloquently characterized by the late President Samora
Machel as a phenomenon that is not unique to the post- independence period as many observers would characterize them: ...First of all, the Rhodesian attacks on Mozambique did not begin in 1976. They began in 1965. Smith's troops were then fighting alongside the Portuguese against our people in Niassa province...But it's true that there have been changes. In the first stage-beween 1975 and 1977 - the racists launched large-scale operations which lasted several days and during which they massacred hundreds of people. One need only recall the savage slaughter of Nyanzonia in 1976. ...Today, the enemy resorts chiefly to aerial bombarCments and localized acts of banditry on the ground.
Indeed, the above retroactive view of Rhodesia's action against Mozambique is correct. However, it is also correct to view the years 1977-1980 as the most intense period of the punitive sanctions in question. Hardly two years after its independence, Mozambique was charging that
Rhodesian troops had crossed the border on raids more than
150 times, killing 1,400 civilians and destroying $13 million worth of property.40 Rhodesia acknowledged sonie of
the raids, saying that the purpose had been to destroy the
Mozambique-based camps of Zimbabwe liberation forces.41 67
Press reports of that period of intensified punitive action by Rhodesia against Mozambique make abundantly clear
Rhodesia's resolve to stop Mozambique's support to
Rhodesia's exiled guerrillas. For example, in mid-1978,
Mozambique was reported to have accused Rhodesia of ordering its jet fighter bomber--supported troops to attack the
Sussendenga agricultural station in Manica Province, where they killed 17 persons described as refugees and two Belgian technicians working for the Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO).42 Mozambican officiais claimed that
Rhodesia's army raided Mozambique 340 times between March
1977 and March 1978. Perhaps the mort spectacular raid
during this period was that on Chimoio which was both a
ZANLA base and a refugee camp. Hospitals and schools filled with patients and pupils were attacked by helicopter-borne
troops, infantry and mirage fighter-bombers.43
As a result of the intensification of the raids,
Mozambique decided to introduce compulsory military service
for ail its citizens, including those living abroad, from
the age of 18 to 40 for women and 18 to 45 for men.44
Rhodesia's determination continued unabated in 1979. During
the first half of March, 1979, Rhodesian war planes launched
six attacks into Mozambique aimed at Zimbabwean guerrilla
bases.45 At the end of September, 1979, the Rhodesian army
launched a five-day raid against the main ZANU base in
Mozambique.46
The strategic objectives of Rhodesia's punitive 68 actions against Mozambique changed over time. Initially, the main objective was to discourage Mozambique from continued support to the Rhodesian guerrillas and to deter the unarmed exiles from joining organized armed struggle.
Subsequently, the strategy was expanded to include the creation of popular discontent within Mozambique and the
crippling of the country's economy. However, none of the measures taken by the Ian Smith regime against Mozambique has been as destructive and of long-term consequence as the
regime's creation of the Mozambican National Resistance
(MNR)--a dissident guerrila group that vowed to bring the
FRELIMO government in Mozambique to its knees.
The MNR was created in 1974 by the Rhodesian secret
service in collaboration with sonie Portuguese settlers and
agents of the crambling colonial regime. For those
Portuguese losers like former Secretary of State under the
Salazar dictorship, Jorge Jardim, and former PIDE
(Portuguese Secret Police) agent Orlando Christina and their
colleague Evo Fernandes, the purpose in creating the MNR was
to destabilize the FRELIMO government in independent
Mozambique. For the Rhodesian secret service, the MNR was
meant to be a "fifth column" instrument they needed to
inflitrate Mozambique for purposes of spying on the
activities of ZANU based in the Mozambican capital, as well
as destabilizing that liberation movement. The initial MNR
recruitment targeted the former FRELIMO guerrilla
leadership, members of the former Portuguese colonial army, 69 convicts of the re-education camps, and ex-FRELIMO partisans who had either been expelled from the party or become dissidents.
Once the group had taken shape in 1976, the Rhodesian government provided it with arms, a military base at Bindura and extensive training. From there MNR bands crossed into
Mozambique to burn villages, plunder agricultural cooperatives, attack railroad lines and road traffic, disrupt commerce, and raid re-education camps from which they recruited additional members. They also collected
intelligence data on ZANU forces in Mozambique and
intimidated Rhodesian refugees. By 1979, Rhodesia had
established two more training centers and was regularly
resupplying, by air, guerrilla bases along the Mozambican-
Rhodesian border.47 Although the MNR lost its bases and
training facilities in Rhodesia when the latter became
independent under the majority rule government of Robert
Mugabe in 1980, it was aiready a strong dissident structure.
When, subsequently, South Africa decided to inherit the MNR
from Rhodesia, the Mozambican government knew an era of
severe destabilization had dawned on it.
Rhodesia versus Zambia
Mozambique was not the only Southern African country
to experience Rhodesia's reprisais for supporting Rhodesian
exiles/refugees. Although by 1975 Rhodesia had identified
Algeria, Ghana, Egypt and Tanzania as the African countries
offering military training to Rhodesian freedom fighters, 70 these countries were not the hardest hit by Rhodesia's reprisais because of their distant, relatively safer geographical location. The most easily accessible victims comparable ta Mozambique were Zambia and Botswana. Because Zambia provided sanctuaries for the Rhodesian national liberation fighters of ZAPU since the mid-1960's, Rhodesian forces frequently made incursions into Zambian territory until 1979. Rhodesia consistently justified its actions by saying that it sought ta destroy Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (.ZIPRA) based in Zambia. Rhodesia's hostile actions against Zambia took many forms since 1966. For example, in 1972, Rhodesian jets violated Zambian air space while carrying out retaliatory border raids on guerrilla bases in Zambia. Such raids continued sporadically throughout the 1970s, until 1979 when the political climate in Rhodesia changed in favor of a process leading ta majority rule. The frequency of such raids increased between 1977 and 1979 in response ta increased guerrilla activities inside Rhodesia. For example, in September 1978, Rhodesian forces launched an assauit on a ZAPU base near Lusaka, killing 330 refugees including 200 girls.48 Another form of sanction used was the closure of the border. For example, on January 9, 1973, Rhodesia closed its border with Zambia following intensified activity by Zambia-based liberation fighters against Rhodesia. When Rhodesia reopened the border on February 4, 1973, alleging 71 that Zambia had pledged ta stop the guerrilla attacks,
Zambia refuted this alleged deal and kept the border closed.
Rhodesia's hasty decision ta close the border overlooked the fact that this would result in heavy losses of freight earnings which Rhodesia normally obtained from the transport of Zambia's copper through Rhodesia ta South Africa's ports.
This incident gave Zambia the resolve ta look for alternative routes ta export its copper.
Rhodesia versus Botswana Botswana which had about 20,000 exiles/refugees from
Rhodesia in 1977 was another target of Rhodesia's hostile actions. When in 1977, Rhodesia accused Botswana of harboring guerrillas struggling ta overthrow the Ian Smith regime, Botswana insisted that its aid ta refugees was solely humanitarian and blamed Rhodesia for having violated
its borders in search of alleged guerrillas on more than 30 occasions.49 On March 28, 1977, the number of border
incidents since 1966, was estimated at 63. In June of the
saine year it had increased ta over 100.50 Rhodesia's
incursions into Botswana forced the latter ta ask for more than $50 million in foreign aid ta carry out projects directly related ta the war in Rhodesia, including an
estimated $28 million ta expand its police force ta cope with the increased demand for protection of its citizens
along the border with Rhodesia.51 Following Botswana's
complaint of early 1977, a United Nations mission was sent
ta Botswana ta assess aid requirements of the country in 72 view of the deteriorating security situation on the
Botswana-Rhodesia border.
To make things worse, the border insecurity spread into the towns as the Rhodesian paramilitary Selous Scouts began to operate clandestinely inside Botswana. These
Rhodesian agents engaged in such activities as abducting exiles/refugees to Rhodesia, launching grenade attacks on popular night spots in Botswana's capital, and carrying out cross-border mortar sheliings. Observers of the unfolding
Rhodesian offensive viewed Botswana as an innocent victim of circumstances which were beyond its control:
...The war in Zimbabwe [Rhodesia] has in a literai sense "spilled" over the border - not because Sir Seretse [then Botswana's President] allows Zimbabwe nationalists to set up guerrilla bases on his territory (Botswana law expressly prohibits that), but because there was no way he could stop guerrillas criss-crossing the long border almost at will, hait the flood of refugees (entering Botswana at a rate of 800 a week for most of the year), and check the consequent Rhodesian "hot puuit" raids, cross-border shellings, and abductions....
The hostilities continued throughout 1978 and 1979.
For example, in 1978, Botswana closed its Kazungula border post on the Rhodesian border indefinitely following a
February raid by Rhodesian troops who killed 15 Botswana soldiers and two civilians. The Rhodesians claimed they were chasing Rhodesian guerrillas whom they alleged were among the Botswana soldiers. As late as April 1979,
Botswana radio reported that two Rhodesian troop carriers entered Botswana apparently to launch an attack against one of the three refugee camps in the country.53 Troops from the infant Botswana Defense Forces (BDF) intercepted the 73
Rhodesians and the ensuing exchange of fire injured some
Botswanans.
South Africa, its Exiles and the Neighboring Host Countries By far the most important actor in the exile/refugee problem in inter-state relations in Southern Africa has been South Africa. As I pointed out earlier, the twin factors of South Africa's apartheid and its illegal occupation of Namibia have produced exiles/refugees in those two countries. The discriminatory and oppressive nature of apartheid and illegal occupation have produced organized armed resistance by groups which went into exile in countries neighboring on South Africa as well as in more distant lands. The 1960 Sharpeville massacre in South Africa ended the black nationalists' illusion that peaceful means of struggle to end apartheid would bring about the desired reforms. Thus, the two most important black nationalist movements which were active in South Africa-the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)-embarked on armed struggle. In 1963-64 the
PAC formed its military arm known as Pogo and the ANC formed its own-Umkonto we Sizwe. Subsequently these guerrilla groups organized and intensified their activities in exile, from bases offered by sympathizing states. Sonie of these states were in Southern Africa itself. The saure process took place in South Africa-occupied Namibia, where in 1966
the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) turned 74 to guerrilla warfare under its military wing-the People's
Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN).
South Africans general accusation against its neighbors has been that they harbor "terrorists" of the liberation movements mentioned above, and that these countries' territories are used as launching pads for guerrilla attacks on South Africa. This accusation made by
South Africa has not been false in every case. In fact, some African countries such as Tanzania have consistently made knowledge of their support for South Africans liberation movements public. According to John D. Nelson, most of the ANC's military instruction in the first half of the 1970s was conducted in Tanzania.54 South Africa tried to prevent guerrilla activities of South African exiles living in Tanzania by proposing a non-aggression pact to the latter. In response, Tanzania's President Nyerere said:
"There is no basis whereby we can hold dialogue when South
Africa regards Africans there as sub-humans and by inference all other Africans."55
Zambia, where the ANC headquarters is currently situated, is also known for its support to the movement.
According to Tom Lodge, once ANC recruits from South Africa reach Zambia via Botswana or Swaziland, they are placed in a reception camp where
they receive introductory lessons in South African history and politics, lectures on explosives, map reading and military tactics, as well as physical drilling and exercise sessions. Weapon handling begins in a second camp; recruits are taught to handle automatic rifles, RPG7 rocket launchers, hand grenades, 75
as well as the light weapggry employed by the South African Defense Force....
South Africa versus Zambia
Ta punish Zambia, South Africa's commandos conducted raids inside the country, ostensibly aimed at ANC bases. As recently as mid-1987, South Africa carried out a raid in
Zambia on the morning of April 25 by helicopter from the
Caprivi strip in Namibia. The commandos landed near
Livingstone and proceeded by motorcycles ta two target
places believed ta harbor ANC guerrillas. Four Zambians were killed in the raid.57 For its part, the Zambian
government has also voiced a complaint ta the effect that
South Africa has been training Zambian dissidents known as
the Machala gang.58 In October 1980, President Kaunda
announced that Zambian security forces had thwarted an
attempted coup involving Zambian dissidents and Zairean
mercenaries, allegedly trained by South Africa. Kaunda
unveiled the coup plot ta the public one week after an armed
gang, numbering between 50 and 200, was discovered by police
at a farm at Chilanga, south of Lusaka. After a few of the
gang members were caught, the government launched the
largest security crackdown in years, imposing a dusk-to-dawn
curfew and detaining several prominent Zambians, including
three members of the military.59
However, the severity of South Africa's hostile
actions against Zambia pales when one compares them with the
devastating blows South Africa has inflicted on Mozambique 76 and Angola, alleging that these two states permit exiled guerrillas from South Africa and Namibia to organize armed attacks on the apartheid regime. There is no doubt that
following their independence in 1975 these two ex-Portuguese
colonies had a strong resolve to help their comrades in the
South African and Namibian liberation movements to move
Gloser to victory. After all, South Africa had been a close
ally of the Portuguese colonial regime in its war against
the FRELIMO and MPLA national liberation fighters, and
therefore an enemy of these new governments. During the
liberation war in Angola and Mozambique, Sir De Villiers
Graaff, United Party leader in South Africa, had
unequivocally articulated his country's stake in the
liberation war in the Portuguese colonies of Southern Africa
to the effect that if the Portuguese troops failed in their
operations in Angola and Mozambique, South Africa could be
faced with a guerrilla war within weeks. He urged the
Portuguese be given help since "in a sense they are fighting
for us."60
One of the facets of South Africa's strategy to punish
Mozambique, Angola and the other neighbors believed to give
support to exiled anti-apartheid liberation fighters has
been to give military, financial and logistic support to
these countries' dissident movements which have been willing
to be used as proxies in the unfolding conflict. In the
case of Mozambique and Angola, there was no need to create
new dissident structures from scratch, since the MNR and 77
UNITA were already in place against the Mozambican and the
Angolan governments, respectively. In the case of Lesotho,
South Africa helped to nurture the Lesotho Liberation Army
(LLA). It also provided training for Zimbabwean dissidents
in much the saure way as it did for the Zambian Machala gang.
South Africa inherited its patronage to the MNR from
Rhodesia when the latter attained majority rule in 1980 under the government of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe. When the MNR could not maintain its sanctuaries in new Zimbabwe,
it sought protection from South Africa. Ever since, South
Africa has been involved in the training of MNR guerrillas
at military bases in Transvaal and in providing them with supplies and logistical assistance inside Mozambique. These
supplies have included war materiel such as rockets,
mortars, smala arms, as well as instructors.61
South Africa versus Mozambique
Abundant evidence of South Africa's support for the
MNR has been produced by Mozambique. As far back as 1982,
Mozambique presented documention of South Africa's support
for the MNR in the foret of documents recovered from a
captured resistance base at Garagua inside Mozambique.
Among other revelations, the documents showed that
Zoabostad, 75 miles south of the Mozambique border in the
northern Transvaal region of South Africa was an MNR
training base.62 In addition, the Portuguese-language radio
(Radio Free Africa) which frequently beamed MNR propaganda
from South Africa was further evidence of the MNR-South 78
Africa connection. Mozambique's great concern about the destablizing activities of the MNR became very manifest in
1982 when the Machel government embarked on the reorganization of its military forces. Among the reforms
introduced was Machel's appointment of military commanders for each of the country's provinces and the government's offer to arm the citizens of the Inhambane province to counter the activities of the NNR guerrillas. The MNR guerrillas had been targetting and attacking communal villages set up by the FRELIMO government in that area.
The destabilizing activities of the MNR since its
inception have varied. Principal among them have been
attacks on road and rail links between Mozambique and
Zimbabwe. However, the most recent and by far the most
destabilizing MNR actions have centered around terrorizing
civilians and destroying the ability of the government to
demonstrate that its policies can improve the quality of
life. According to Carol Thompson, the MNR's latest tactics
have included:
the killing and kidnapping of anyone with special skills in the rural areas: teachers, mid-wives, extension workers, health assistants, truck drivers... The sabotage also explicitly attacks hospitals and schools. Patients are murdered in hospital beds... to give the message that hospitals and clinics are not to be used...Children are attacked in schools and the buildings burnt, again to destroy any desire to use them...The most vicious terror is the increased use of land mines, placed in foot paths leading to fields.... 63
Besides its support for the MNR, South Africa has
directly carried out raids in Mozambique using its own
defense forces. In January, 1981, South African commandos 79 raided the houses of refugees living in the Maputo suburb of
Motala, murdering 12 of them and wounding another seven. In
1982, a prominent South African exile, Ruth First, was assassinated in Maputo by a mail bomb. In 1983, there were two more South African raids. In May, 1984, South African aircraft bombed Motala again, killing four Mozambicans, and
in October a commando unit was infiltrated into Maputo to
destroy an ANC information office.64 Ail these raids were
declared to be in retaliation for ANC guerrilla activities
against South Africa from bases inside Mozambique.
By 1983, the effect of the joint South Africa-MNR
destabilization programs was beginning to take its toll on
the policy process in Mozambique. On the domestic policy
scene, just a week after the May 1983 raid, the late
President Machel announced a cabinet reshuffle in which he
assumed the Defense Ministry portfolio himself. He pointed
out that the South African raids demanded that the
leadership of defense be centralized at the highest level.
On the foreign policy scene, he adopted an unusually soft policy of talks with the apartheid regime. A series of
sporadic talks between the two countries had begun in 1983
and they continued through 1983-84, culminating in the
signing of the Nkomati Accord on March 16, 1984.
The major demands made in these talks between
Mozambique and South Africa were that, on the one hand,
Mozambique wanted South Africa to withdraw its support from
the MNR, while on the other, South Africa wanted Mozambique 80 to stop the activities of the ANC on its territory. At this point, the escalated activities of the MNR and the South African raids had combined with a cruel drought to strain Mozambique's resources past the breaking point. It was against this background that Mozambique and South Africa embarked on their shaky relations of cooperation, for which the Nkomati Accord is a landmark. Article three of the accord stipulates that neither of the two parties will let its territory be used by foreign military forces, organizations or individuals to undertake actions of violence or aggression against the other party. Thus, Mozambique pledged to stop its support for the ANC in exchange for South Africa's pledge to stop its support for the MNR. A Mozambique-South Africa Joint-Security Commission was created to deal with matters relating to the implementation of the agreement. Just before the signing of the Nkomati Accord, in February, 1984, Mozambique sought to demonstrate its resolve to make peace with South Africa by expelling Joe Slovo, the white South African who is second-in-command of the ANC's military wing. Although Mozambique resisted South African pressure requiring it to expel the entire ANC organization, the explusion of Slovo surprised many political observers- sympathizers and foes alike. when subsequently the Mozambique-South Africa Joint Security Commission met for the first time in Maputo toward mid-1984, Mozambican soldiers and police "raided virtually all the homes of the 81
ANC in the capital, confiscating weapons and money and detaining several ANC members.""65 Unfortunately, Mozambique's message of good will did not pay off very much. Although in the spirit of the
Nkomati Accord, South Africa closed down three MNR bases in northern Transvaal and stopped "Radio Free Africa," formerly
used by the MNR, it did not stop the supply of arms ta the
MNR guerrillas who had infiltrated Mozambique when South
Africa expelled them. In fact, in August 1984, MNR leaders travelled by submarine ta South Africa where they met
Foreign Minister Pik Botha, the Defense Minister, and the Secret Service Chief, General Van der Westhuizen ta plan arms and materiel supplies ta the MNR.66 Mozambique was obviously upset by South Africa's
continued support for the MNR but it did not have evidence
ta support its frequent accusation of South Africa for the latter's non-compliance with the Nkomati Accord. Eventually, the evidence was found in a diary and notebooks
at Casa Banana (MNR headquarters inside Mozambique), captured during a joint Zimbabwean-Mozambique offensive
against the MNR in 1985. At a press conference held on September 30, 1985, Mozambican Security Minister Sergio Vieira revealed that South Africa's violations included regular supplies of arms and ammunition, deliveries of "humanitarian aid," construction of an air-strip for the
MNR, smuggling rebel officers out of Mozambique, several meetings between South African Defense Forces (SADF) Chief 82
General Constand Viljoen and MNR leaders, and visits to guerrilia headquarters by Louis Nel, then Deputy Foreign
Minister.67 Besides, boxes of ammunition.and other supplies dropped by parachute to MNR camps in Mozambique are usually marked in English and Afrikaans, leaving no doubt as to their country of origin.
South Africa also resumed its incursions into Mozambique, despite the latter's tough measures against the
ANC since the Nkomati Accord. South Africa's first raid in
Mozambique after the signing of the Nkomati Accord took place on May 29, 1987, when South African commandos attacked homes in a Maputo residential area, killing Mozambican citizens. South Africa's justification of its renewed raids and its continued support for the MNR has remained the saure:
Mozambique harbors the ANC and allows it to use its territory to attack South Africa. Yet, as far back as 1982,
attempts by members of the international community to find
evidence of the existence of ANC bases in Mozambique led to
the conclusion that there were none. The following dialogue
extracted from a 1982 session of U.S. Congressional hearings
illustrates the verdict of Mozambique's innocence in that
regard:
...Mr. WOLPE. Is there any evidence of Mozambican support for ANC military bases in Mozambique?
Mr. ISAACMAN. I put this to Mozambican officiais and to Western diplomats in Maputo. The Mozambican Government officiais were unequivocal, that there are no ANC bases. Indeed, President Machel and other Mozambican officiais have publicly indicated that the ANC presence in southern Mozambique is to be limited to a small number of offices and houses. Now, it is probably true that 83
ANC guerrillas are passing through Mozambique. Western diplomats with whom I spoke indicated that the long border between South Africa and Mozambique, which is unguarded and unprotected, allows for easy access. They have suggested that, in fact, the Mozambican government is unable to contain small groups of ANC guerrillas who pass through Mozambican territory. But there is no evidence whatsoever of ANC bases in Mozambique as the e were ZANU bases during the struggle over Zimbabwe.... 98
South Africa's twin-strategy of aid to the MNR and direct raids into Mozambique has produced two significant
consequences. The first is that independent Mozambique has generated exiles/refugees, just as its colonial predecessor had. Before the MNR activities intensified, the number of people fleeing Mozambique into neighboring countries was very small. This initial trickle of exiles/refugees
consisted mainly of individuals who were running away from
areas hit or targeted by the MNR. However, among these
early exiles/refugees, there were also a few individuals who
either fled in search of better economic opportunities or
who were running away from the socialist policies of the
FRELIMO government. In many cases, Mozambique's neighbors
did not offer asylum to these exiles/refugees, in accordance
with an existing agreement between Mozambique and its
neighbors to that effect. For example, in 1980, Swaziland
forcibly repatriated 68 exiles to Mozambique. Zimbabwe did
the saure thing to an unknown number in 1983.69 In more
recent years, however, following the MNR's escalation of its
offensive, floods of Mozambican exiles/refugees have poured
into neighboring countries and, ironically, the majority of
them have entered South Africa. Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe 84
and Swaziland have also experienced the recent influx of
Mozambican exiles/refugees. In 1986, there was an estimated
160,000 ta 200,000 Mozambican exiles/refugees in South
Africa, 24,000-40,000 in Zambia, 100,000 in Malawi, 70,000
in Zimbabwe, and 4,000 in Swaziland.70
The second consequence is that Mozambique's friends bath in Southern Africa and sonie other parts of the
continent have felt obliged ta give military support ta the
Mozambican government. For example, Zimbabwe's Prime
Minister once declared that his country was ready ta fight
ta the last man ta prevent the MNR's victory in Mozambique.
Indeed, it was estimated that there were 12,000 Zimbabwean
soldiers in Mozambique in 1986, helping ta contain the MNR's
insurgency.71 Zimbabwe's military assistance ta Mozambique
ta contain the insurgents has been in force since the two
countries signed a security pact in October 1980, whereby
Zimbabwe was ta deploy troops ta seal the 750-mile common
border. Military support has also been provided by
Tanzania, with an estimated 6,000 troops in Mozambique in
1987.72 In earlier years, Tanzania's military support was
only in the form of military advisers, 200 in number
according ta a 1982 estimate.73 Even far-away Ethiopia
offered ta send troops ta Mozambique although by July, 1987,
Mozambique had not yet given its assent ta the arrival of
Ethiopian troops.74
Ironically, even Malawi which was often suspected of
sympathy for the MNR is said ta have sent about 1,000 troops 85 to guard the Nacala rail line corridor in northern
Mozambique although this intervention was not totally voluntary on the part of Malawi, because apparently the
Malawi government was pressured into this decision by both
Mozambique and Zimbabwe.75 The irony of this Malawian intervention is that since 1982, Mozambique had been accusing Malawi of supporting the MNR. Although I am not aware of any incontestable evidence to support Mozambique's accusations against Malawi in this regard, I am inclined to accept the frequently published incidents in generally credible journals to the effect that Malawi has supported the MNR. Africa Report, for example, stated that "airplanes dropping supplies to the rebels in Northern Mozambique and flying back toward Malawi were sighted repeatedly in
January, 1985."76 Jeune Afrique also asserted that "the MNR consolitates its bases in Malawi, where it has for a long time enjoyed solid support from President Bandais good will."77 As for Mozambique's support for the Malawian
opposition, there exists published information to the effect that a Malawian dissident organization-the Socialist
Organization for the Liberation of Malawi-whose cause has been the toppling of President Bandais regime through the use of arms, has had a base in Mozambique.78
South Africa versus Angola
There is much similarity between the South Africa-
Mozambique conflict and that between South Africa and
Angola. When Angola became independent in 1975, the MPLA's 86
reasons for wishing to support the ANC and SWAPO were the
same as those which.made Mozambique extend its aid to the
ANC. Angola's support for the ANC has been fairly well
documented. For example, the training of the ANC's military
recruits is said to have taken place in Angola since 1977,
where much of the ANC army "is accomodated in five training
camps run by the ANC in Angola, two near Luanda, and the
others in the north and north-east."79 Regarding the level
of the ANC guerrilla activities against South Africa, it has
been high in terms of the number of attacks secretly
launched inside the country.
Tom Lodge has identified a total of 88 ANC attacks
during the period July 1-December 31, 1985, and another 118
attacks in the period January 1-June 30, 1986. Most of
these attacks were directed against facilities belonging to
the South African government, economic infrastructure, and homeland politicians.80
SWAPO's presence in Angola is also beyond doubt, and
so are its intensified activities against South Africa from
Angola since 1975. According to Zartman, by 1979, the
frequency of encounters between SWAPO guerrillas and the
South Africa armed forces
...had increased to an average of one a day causing South Africa to extend martial law over the northern half of Namibia in May...By 1982, the war was estimated to cost South Africa half a billion dollars a year but only 77 deaths out of a total outlay for all activities in Namibia of $1.25 billion.. .As host and sanctuary for SWAPO, Angola suffered losses twenty times higher than this figure and spent half a billion dollars for annual rental of the Cuban army alone, not coïting the cost of its own military operation and losses. 87
SWAPO's guerrilla operations against South Africa have mainly consisted of the laying of mines, sabotage of
civilian and military installations, the killing of certain
tribal authorities, and occasional clashes with the South African Defense Forces. South Africa's retaliation against Angola has been both direct and by proxy. South Africa's measures to destabilize Angola have included military support for the
anti-government UNITA rebels. This rebel movement is the
equivalent of the MNR in Mozambique, in ternis of the
former's proxy status in the South Africa-Angola conflict.
However, unlike in Mozambique, South Africa has also
conducted direct military campaigns against Angola, using
its own Defense Forces. South Africa began to train UNITA
rebels in earnest around July 1975, when the MPLA drove
UNITA and FLNA forces out of Luanda just before independence. Immediately after Angola's independence,
South Africa attempted, without success, to set up a joint
FLNA/UNITA "democratic republic in Angola" in the southern
part of the country. The years that followed saw a graduai
escalation of a joint South Africa-UNITA war of
destabilization in Angola fuelled by the support from the
U.S. since the coming to power of Ronald Reagan in 1981, and
especially since the 1985 U.S. Congress' repeal of the Clark Amendment prohibiting assistance for military or
paramilitary operations in Angola. UNITA's gains in this
struggle seem to have increased over the years. According 88 to Schultheis, ..By 1982, UNITA was again active as a fighting force throughout southern and central sections of Angola and had mounted operations in the north. Within two years, UNITA had moved into the northern province of Uije. In 1984 they attacked coffee plantations within 100 miles of the Zaire border and the diamond mines in the northeast of the country. Together South African and UNITA military action had displaced more than haif a million ggople and severely disrupted the Angolan economy.
The tactics of UNITA resemble in many ways those of the MNR in Mozambique: destruction of economic infrastructure, terrorizing people in the villages, extensive use of land mines which has resulted in Angola having "the highest amputee rate in the world.,,83 South Africa's direct incursions in Angola have been adequately documented. In May 1978, 600.Namibian refugees were slaughtered by a raiding party of South African commandos at Kasinga in southern Angola. In 1979, the late President Neto of Angola charged South African troops with almost daily incidents along Angola's southern border with
Namibia. He also accused South Africa of planning to invade his country. In July, 1980, South African armed forces launched an attack on Chitado, a small Angolan town about seven miles from the Namibian border, reportedly killing 27
Angolan soldiers and SWAPO fighters. According to the South
African army, the raid was aimed at the destruction of SWAPO bases located at Chitado, which were being used as a transit point for SWAPO's attacks into Northern Namibia. For the first haif of 1980 alone, South Africa's violations of Angolan territory totalled 529.84 Several other raids 89
followed: in June-August 1981 and in June-August 1982.
In mid-February, 1984, South Africa ànd Angola reached
a disengagement agreement prompted by a political-military
stalemate which had developed since neither party was in a
position to win a total victory, and since the cost of the war was too heavy for both sides. Despite its relative wealth, South Africa was feeling the financial burden of
deploying between 60,000 and 80,000 troops for its counter-
insurgency operations. As for poor Angola, the economic
costs of military engagement with South Africa were immense.
In his 1982 speech commemorating the seventh anniversay of
Angolan independence, President Jose Edwardo dos Santos
stated that South Africa had caused over $10 billion worth
of material damage in Angola since 1975.86 It was against
this background of too heavy costs for each side that South Africa and Angola reached the previously mentioned
disengagement agreement, one aspect of which was to
institute a joint monitoring commission of South African and
Angolan troops in southern Angola. Some short-lived
cooperation ensued, in which the joint commission clashed
with SWAPO insurgents a few times in 1984, as Angolan troops
joined South African forces to seal off a large section of
southern Angola to prevent SWAPO fighters from infiltrating
Namibia.
South Africa versus Zimbabwe The first independent government in Zimbabwe, headed
by a veteran-nationalist politician, Prime Minister Robert 90
Mugabe, came to power with a baggage of sympathy for fellow national liberation fighters. Thus, not long after Zimbabwe's independence, its foreign minister affirmed that his country had pledged "full support as a front-line state" to liberation movements in Southern Africa and would "give every assistance possible within the context of the OAU."87 This policy posture on the part of Zimbabwe and its subsequent diplomatic militancy over the Namibian issue resulted in South Africa's charge that Zimbabwe was supplying arms and foodstuffs to SWAPO guerrillas operating in Southern Africa.88 With regard to the ANC, Mugabe stated that as a matter of principle Zimbabwe stood firmly behind this liberation movement although Zimbabwe was "simply not strong enough to give bases as such since there would be reprisais from South Africa.'189 Not satisfied with Zimbabwe's publicly stated policy of not giving military bases to the ANC, South Africa pressured Zimbabwe even further, saying it would regard the mere opening of an ANC office in that country as a prelude to military support and that some foret of retaliation should be expected. When in 1981, the Zimbabwe cabinet reached an unannounced decision to permit the opening of an ANC office in the country, this was closely followed by the assassination of Joe Gqabi, a prominent ANC official in Zimbabwe. Besides this, South Africa was implicated in other-acts of sabotage in Zimbabwe such as: a major arms theft from Cranborne barracks; the sabotage of an ammunition 91 depot at Inkomo barracks; the escape of a white army officer accused of spying for South Africa; and the explosion which severely damaged the ZANU (Patriotic Front) party headquarters in the capital in December 1981.
The Zimbabwean leadership has also frequently accused
South Africa of training and arming Zimbabwean dissidents.
As early as 1982, it alleged that between 5,000 and 6,000
dissidents, many of them former members of the Rhodesian
security forces such as the Selous Scouts or the former
followers of a defeated politician (Bishop Muzorewa). were
being trained by South Africa at Palaborwa near Kruger
National Park for infiltration into Zimbabwe.90
South Africa versus Lesotho
Three more countries in Southern Africa have been
involved in conflicts with South Africa over the question of
the latter's exiles/refugees. These are Botswana, Lesotho
and Swaziland. Of these three, Lesotho has experienced
South Africa's hostile actions the most. Lesotho has hosted
South Africa's exiles/refugees since 1960, well before its
independence in 1966. Ever since, South Africa has put
heavy of pressure on this tiny country about the presence of
these exiles/refugees. Lesotho has always been intimidated
by the threats of giant South Africa. Thus, as far back as
1968, Lesotho's Deputy Prime Minister warned the South
African exiles/refugees living in Maseru at the time against
the publication of inflammatory material aimed at Lesotho or
"other countries," insisting that his country "should not be 92
used as a platform from which attacks can be made against
outside governments under any guise whatever."91 In August
of the saine year, the late Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan
announced that political refugees resident in Lesotho were
ta leave the country by September 30 of that year. The
extent ta which South Africa's pressure contributed ta this
.harsh decision is not easy ta estimate, because the Johathan
government was itself displeased by the political support
some of the exiles/refugees were giving ta the opposition. By 1980, South Africa was giving support ta Lesotho's
exiled opposition-the Basotho Congress Party-whose
guerrillas began ta cross into Lesotho with South African
collusion. Lesotho's increasing concern about South
Africa's tactics of supporting the opposition became obvious
in late August, 1980, when Prime Minister Jonathan met with
his South African counterpart ta discuss the improvement of
relations between the two countries. However, rapprochement
proved ta be a difficult thing ta achieve and, in the years
that followed, South Africa escalated its conflict with
Lesotho.
South Africa's escalation of the conflict took three
main forets. First, it increased its support for the exiles
opposed ta the Jonathan government. In 1981, Jonathan
claimed that South Africa was providing support for the
Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), allowing it ta operate from
bases in the Orange Free State. During 1981 and 1982, the
LLA blew up electricity pylons and staged a series of other 93 explosions in Lesotho. It also carried out assassinations of top government and ruling party officiais. Furthermore,
Jonathan frequently accused the LLA of working in collusion with South African security police to ovethrow his government. He identified the South African town of
Ficksburg as an LLA base from which its guerrillas attacked Lesotho.
Second, South Africa blockaded Lesotho's borders, constricting the importation of supplies into the country and the passage of Lesotho''s workers to South Africa. As a result of this new South African tactic, Lesotho yielded to
Pretoria by expelling South African exiles/refugees in 1983, following another effort at cooperation, whereby South
Africa agreed to stop supporting the LLA guerrillas in return for Lesotho's agreement to restrict the activities of the ANC on its territory.
Third, the South African Defense Forces began direct raids into Lesotho. For example, on December 9, 1982, the
South African Defense Forces attacked Maseru with guns and mortars, killing 30 ANC refugees and 12 Lesotho nationals in their sleep in what the South African government described as "a preemptive strike against ANC terrorist bases."92
These three forets of South African sanctions against Lesotho complemented each other and they were repeated over and over again. In January 1986, a full economic biockade imposed on
Lesotho was severe enough to precipitate the overthrow of Jonathan. The new government in Lesotho has been much 94 tougher on the South African exiles/refugees in order to win
South Africa's approval. In some cases, it has deported some of the exiles to South Africa.
South Africa versus Botswana Botswana, which has given asylum to South African exiles/refugees since its independence in 1966 has not been spared from South Africa's punitive sanctions. For example, in February and June, 1985, South Africa carried out attacks on homes and an office complex in Botswana's capital, killing at least 16 persons, including members of the ANC and Botswana citizens. South Africa said the raid was to put an end to ANC infiltration into South Africa from
Botswana, a route then considered by the apartheid regime as the only one remaining since Mozambique and Lesotho signed security agreements with it. Although Botswana has resisted
South Africa's pressure to sign a non-aggression treaty with
Pretoria and to expel members of the ANC, in May 1985 it advised ANC exiles to leave Bostwana as the country could no longer guarantee their safety. Furthermore, Botswana assumed a much tougher posture vis-a-vis the ANC, warning them that it would not tolerate the use of its territory as a base from which to attack South Africa. Although Botswana has not stopped giving asylum to South African exiles/refugees, it has been forced to quickly move them from their reception point near its border with South Africa to a distant camp in the north. 95
South Africa versus Swaziland Swaziland's policy towards South Africa's pressure about ANC presence on the former's territory has been more conciliatory. This country in which South African exiles/refugees sought asylum since 1960 has consistently given them tough warnings in its efforts to ingratiate
itself with South Africa. In this regard, as far back as
1979, the exiles/refugees were subjected to very harsh treatment by the Swazi government, such as imprisonment and deportation. To formalize its intent to appease South
Africa, Swaziland secretly signed a non-aggression pact with
the former in 1982, and the impact of this agreement on the
South African exiles/refugees has been a very adverse one.
For example, in 1983, Swaziland served notice on the
ANC to the effect that the Swazi government "cannot afford
to allow its territory to be used as a springboard for
launching armed attacks against other states."93 This
announcement was coupled with Swaziland's re-introduction of
a 60-day detention-without-trial law for anyone who participates in an illegal meeting. At about the saure time,
the Swazi Chief Justice directed that all cases involving
ANC members charged with possessing weapons must be referred
to the High Court, where stiffer penalties would be imposed.
The following year, Swazi police staged raids throughout the
country in search of ANC members alleged to have entered the
country from Mozambique, and bona fide South African
refugees were ordered to leave the country. In July, 1984, 96 the ANC members arrested in the above mentioned search were moved to Tanzania. Despite Swaziland's subservience to South Africa, South African commandos have occasionally conducted cross-border raids into that country whenever they felt the Swazi government was not vigilant enough against
ANC exiles/refugees.
This rather bleak description of Swaziland's treatment of ANC exiles/refugees should, however, not be taken at its face value, because as I will explain at length in Chapter
5, the unbecoming behavior of sonie of the exiles/refugees greatly contributed to alienating the Swazi government's sympathy.
Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe: their Exiles/Refugees and the Neighboring Host Countries
As pointed out earler, Malawi, independent Zimbabwe and Zambia have also generated exiles/refugees, a phenomenon which has taken its toll on relations between these countries and those which offered asylum to their exiles/refugees.
Malawi versus Tanzania
Just after its independence in 1964, Malawi experienced a cabinet crisis which erupted as a result of dissatisfaction within the cabinet concerning President
Banda's rule. Subsequently, Banda dismissed several of his dissenting ministers, sonie of whom fled to neighboring countries. One of the countries which gave asylum to some 97 of these victims of Banda's cabinet shake-up was Tanzania. The civil strife which ensued made some 500 Malawian peasants also flee to Tanzania. About 150 of them were settled at Pangale refugee settiement. Before long, Banda embarked on a campaign protesting against states allegedly involved in training Malawian rebels. On several occasions, Banda charged that his former foreign minister, Kanyama Chiume, exiled in Tanzania, was organizing invasions of Malawi. In one of these accusations, Banda told a meeting of tribal chiefs in Lilongwe that he had concrete evidence of a plot made by Kanyama Chiume to invade Malawi either at Fort Hill on the Tanzania border or at Fort Manning on the Zambian border. Subsequently, at a London press conference, Banda produced documents acquired by his special police branch, allegedly linking Tanzania with a plot by six refugee "rebel ministers," aimed at overthrowing the government of Malawi.
On November 10, 1965, Banda gave the National Assembly the narres of 51 Malawi rebels allegedly undergoing training in Tanzania, 16 in China, 9 in Cuba, and 10 in Algeria.94 The following year, in a radio broadcast, Banda warned that rebels were preparing to invade Malawi at several points during the rainy season, alleging that Malawian guerrillas trained in Algeria had returned to their base in Tanzania and were ready to spearhead an invasion. Tanzania, whose effort to contain the activities of Malawian exiles/refugees was sometimes explicit, 98 consistently denied Malawi's charges. In 1965, Tanzania issued at least two official statements refuting Malawi's charges. One of these statements was issued by the Ministry of Information and Tourism and it read:
...Recent press reports of Dr. Banda's speeches seem ta associate the United Republic of Tanzania with the internai troubles of Malawi. The Government of the United Repubiic of Tanzania is disappointed ta read such reports, and is particularly-concerned ta learn that Dr. Banda suspects that Tanzania has a hand in an "invasion of Malawi," which he alleges is brewing. The government wishes ta make it very clear that Tanzania has not had, and will not have, anything ta do with the internat troubles of Malawi, aug has no cause ta be interested in the alleged invasion.
The second statement made by President Nyerere was characterizing Malawi's ailegations as unjustifiably alarmist:
...Of course we have these ex Ministers from Malawi in Tanzania. Ever since they came, the good doctor [Dr. Banda] has been saying we have been plotting against him. I am waiting ta hear him make the saine accusation against President Johnson because Chipembeg [another exiled former Minister] is now in the U.S.
Over the years, the Malawi leadership and the western press kept alleging that an opposition movement known as the
Malawi Freedom Movement (MAFREMO) was based in Tanzania. Similar accusations have been made against Tanzania,
Mozambique and Zambia in connection with these countries' alleged aid ta another opposition movement in Malawi, the
Socialist League of Malawi (LESOMA). It is against this background that relations between Malawi and these three countries, particularly Tanzania, have been rocky. 99
Malawi versus Zambia The fired Malawi cabinet members and the tiny political elite group which fell with them are not the only
Malawian exiles-in its twenty-three years of independence.
In 1972-73, about 36,000 men, women and children belonging to a Jehovah's Witnesses sect fled to Zambia from Malawi, after they had clashed with the government over the incompatility of their religious practices with the new patriotic political culture the government wanted to inculcate in its citizens. These Malawian exiles/refugees fled their country after they had been allegedly persecuted by the government for their refusai to salute the country's flag and to sing the national anthem. After Zambia had given these exiles/refugees asylum, it was frequently accused by Malawi of harboring criminals and subversives.
There seems to have been a bit of rapprochement between
Malawi and Zambia in the 1980s, which took the form of
Zambia's turn against the exiled Malawian opposition. In
March, 1982, Attati Mpakati, leader of LESOMA, was deported from Zambia. The Zambian government explained this deportation in terms of its commitment to not interfere in the internai affairs of other countries. This action was closely followed by the departure of two other prominent
Malawian opposition leaders from Zambia. Orton Chirwa, alleged to have been abducted from a meeting in the Zambian border town of Chipato was "arrested" inside Malawi in
December 1982. Another exiled opposition leader, Kanyama 100
Chiume, head of the Congress of the Second Republic, left
Zambia apparently as a result of pressure from the Zambian government. Zambia versus Zaire
Although I have sa far depicted Zambia mainly as an asylum-giving country, it is also true that in some small measure, it has generated exiles/refugees. In 1964, armed confrontation broke out between members the Lumpa Church led by Alice Lenshina and the government which had been formed at Zambia's independence. The conflict arase when Lumpa adherents refused ta carry the ruling party's membership cards and ta make financial contributions ta the party.
When party officiais attemped ta coerce the Lumpa Church members into acquiescence, bloody clashes resulted and about
12,000 Lumpa adherents fled ta Congo-Léopoldville. Although this exile/refugee group did not create any significant tension between Zambia and Congo-Léopoldville, it occasionally featured on the two countries' bilaterai relations agenda.
When the Lumpa adherents sought refuge in the Congo in
1964, Moise Tshombe was Prime Minister. He shared one thing with the Lumpa sect in Zambia's internai politics: sympathy for opposition leader Harry Nkumbula. For this reason,
Zambia could not help worrying about what Tshombe and the
Lumpas could do ta help Nkumbula's opposition. This explains why after the fall of Tshombe, Presidents Mobutu and Kaunda were anxious ta repatriate the Lumpas. 101
In April 1966, the foreign ministers of Zambia and
Congo-Leopoldville agreed to set up a joint committee for the "peaceful return" to Zambia of members of the Lumpa sect exiled in the Congo. Mobutu took the repatriation of the
Lumpas so seriously that during his state visit to Zambia in
1970, he declared he would refuse to grant citizenship to
16,000 Lumpas living at Mokambo in Zaire.
Mobutu's policy against the Lumpas backfired in 1971, adversely affecting relations between his country and
Zambia. On September 29, 1971, the Zambian News Agency reported that at least three Zambians had been shot dead and ten others injured when Zairean soldiers opened fire on
Lumpas at Mokambo, just inside Zaire. The agency added that
Zambian immigration and customs offices were hit by bullets and that several government files had been seized by Zairean troops. Zaire's version of the incident was that its troops were taking the Lumpas for relocation at Kamina, away from the border, when the latter began to stone passengers on the train which was to transport them. The Lumpas' next action was allegedly to stampede towards the border, causing
"intervention by the Zambian army." These official versions of the incident contradict each other to say the least.
Whatever the correct version may be, the incident certainly benefitted the Lumpas because Zambia spontaneously welcomed them home.
It is also important to note that influxes of Zairean exiles/refugees into Zambia have from time to time strained 102 relations between the two countries. One of the most recent incidents was an influx of over 1,000 Zaireans from the town of Moba, following its recapture by Zairean government troops from rebels of the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP)
led by Laurent Kabila. Zaire's tendency ta pressure Zambia ta hand over the rebels has been one of the factors causing
strained relations. Zambia has also felt the burden of having ta control the activities of an armed gang of rebels
and has often feared that Zaire might be tempted ta violate
its border in hot pursuit of the rebels.
Zimbabwe versus Botswana
A final case of inter-state friction relating ta
exile/refugee-generation and asylum-giving in Southern
Africa has involved post-independent Zimbabwe and Botswana.
Fortunately, friction has been vary benign. Since 1983,
close ta 5,000 Zimbabweans have sought asylum in Botswana as
a result of their dissatisfaction with the policies pursued
by the government of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe. Although
Botswana has notified Zimbabwe that its acceptance of the
exiles/refugees does not mean that Botswana is interested in
interfering in Zimbabwe's internai matters, Zimbabwe has
warned that those exiles/refugees are fugitives and army
deserters who plan ta use Botswana as a base ta stage raids across the border. Botswana has responded by affirming that
the exiles/refugees in question do not carry arms and it has
pledged ta repatriate any exile/refugee found plotting against Zimbabwe.97 103
An Analytical Summary To make a case for the salience of the exile/refugee phenomenon in inter-state relations in Southern Africa, it is not necessary to recount each and every incident in which real or alleged exile/refugee activities have been invoked to justify conflictual or cooperative behavior on the part of the states in the sub-region. The foregoing account hopefully makes abundantly clear the omnipresent character
of the exile/refugee issue in relations among the states of
Southern Africa for the last thirty years. This is not to
say that there have not been many other, and even more
fundamental motives, at the centre of those relations.
However, the exile/refugee phenomenon has been used as a very handy and sensational tool to sustain states' agressive
intents, legitimize states' fears, and to cover up states'
foreign policy agendas which do not have the approval of
mainstream international relations and law. For example, in
the field of international economic relations in the sub-
region, South Africa has been trying to maintain the
economic dependence of its neighbors, while the latter have,
for the last ten years, been trying to collectively break
away from this dependence. These countries have instituted the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference
(SADCC) precisely for the purpose of bringing about eagerly
awaited economic independence from South Africa. Naturally,
South Africa would like to economically desbilize those
underdogs in order to maintain its regional economic 104 dominance. The most convenient way to do so without appearing to be the aggressor is to portray itself as the victim of subversive "terrorists" supported by hostile neighboring countries, against which retaliation is
justified.
Ideology is another obvious polarizing or unifying
factor in relations among the states of Southern Africa.
Apartheid is understandably repugnant to most, if not all,
independent states in the sub-region. This common feeling
has a.galvanizing dynamic which makes South Africa feel
insecure. However, without sonie concrete pretext, South
Africa would find it extremely difficult to translate its
insecurity into preemptive assault against its enemies,
individually or collectively. The pro-status quo colonial
regimes in the region were naturally in total disagreement
with the nationalist governments of the post-independence
era in the sub-region, but this alone did not constitute an
adequate basis for the trans-border raids which so often
took place. Yet these regimes were able to translate their opposition to the widespread nationalist ideology into punitive action by invoking the generally accepted principle
of "hot pursuit." This rather absolving notion of "hot
pursuit" sounded credible only because there was an object
of "hot pursuit" to point an accusing finger at: the
exiles/refugees. Similary, the independent states in
Southern Africa would have found it difficult to translate
their abhorence of apartheid and colonialism into direct 105 punitive action against the regimes in question. Such direct action might have hurt them politically and militarily. Thus, the existence of exiles/refugees provided those states an alternative means ta accomplish the saine task without compromising themselves tao much.
Sonie of the inter-state conflicts mentioned in this chapter might have been caused by the malaise brought about by ideological differences centered on the classical capialist-socialist divide. South Africa, Malawi, Botswana,
Lesotho, Swaziland and peripheral Zaire advocate a capitalist path ta development. On the other hand,
Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, peripheral Tanzania, and ta a small extent Zambia define themselves as socialist. Thus, assuming that any of these countries might find the existing ideological differences strong enough ta justify sonie punitive action against another, it would need some pretext for such adventure. Here again, what more convenient scapegoat is there than exiles/refugees hosted in the targeted country?
In ideological conflicts with a heavy component of East-West tensions, exiles/refugees have been used as proxies of great power interference. A good example of this kind of scenario in Southern Africa is the conflict between
Zaire and Angola, on the one hand, and South Africa and
Angola, on the other. The Soviet and Cuban assistance ta the MPLA government in Angola has given the American government the excuse ta become heavily involved in Southern 106
Africa, supplying UNITA forces in order ta bring down the
MPLA government in Angola. Without UNITA exiles serving as
America's proxy in the latter's indirect war against Angola,
U.S. direct military action against Angola would be very
difficult ta justify.
The exile/refugee phenomenon in Southern Africa has
its imprint on other forms of inter-state disputes in the
sub-region. The area of territorial disputes might help ta
illustrate this point. There has been, for instance, an
outstanding dispute between Malawi and Tanzania over where
the border should be drawn relative ta the lake which
separates their land masses. The timing of Malawi's initial
claim ta the waters of Lake Nyasa came amidst its
allegations that Tanzania was harboring and training its
dissidents. Although an undisputable correlation between
Malawi's accusation of Tanzania and its claim to the whole
of Lake Nyasa is not easy ta establish, there seems ta be a
lot of sense in suggesting that Malawi was motivated ta
initiate the territorial dispute by its perception that Tanzania was preparing Malawian exiles ta invade their home
country. Zaire's territorial claim ta the Cabinda enclave
could also be said ta have been encouraged by that country's
ability ta utilize Angolan exiled dissidents of the Front
for the Liberation of Cabinda (FLEC). Zaire's decision ta
undertake direct military action ta annex Cabinda might have
been more difficult ta reach.
In sum, the exile/refugee phenomenon has played a very 107 significant role in the poltics of inter-state relations in
Southern Africa. The immediate determinants of the exile/refugee problem have predominantly been decolonization power struggles; struggles for majority rule; problems of state formation in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho,
Malawi and Zambia; and rebellious actions of leftover liberation movements such as the MNR and UNITA. The less direct, albeit significant determinant has been great power involvement in the politics of the countries of Southern
Africa, particularly in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and
South Africa. Those countries in Southern Africa which gave assistance to exiles/refugees involved in decolonization and majority rule struggles seem to have extended their support out of their conviction that colonialism and minority rule were no longer acceptable in the modern world. Those which supported exiles/refugees of the leftover liberation movements such as UNITA and the MNR seem to have done so in order to weaken revolutionary regimes in neighboring countries, thus making those regimes unattractive models for their own revolution-oriented nationals.
The regimes which generated exiles/refugees in
Southern Africa have had to deal with the problem of how to counter the damaging political activities of their exiled nationals abroad. A good example in this regard is South
Africa. This police state is well-known for its ability to control effectively the political and social activities of its inhabitants. Repression of internai opposition has so 108 far been very successful in South Africa. South Africa's frustration at not being able to equally effectively control the exiled opposition has been demonstrated by its numerous raids into neighboring countries to destroy the exiled opposition which can effectively organize once out of South Africa's political space. Other methods of reducing the organizational effectiveness of the exiled opposition besides military raids on the sanctuaries have included the sending of agents to infiltrate liberation movements and corrupting officiais of host countries into spying for South Africa.
The case of the ANC serves as a good example of how, once out the political space of the regime they intend to destroy, exiles/refugees can mobilize international support for their struggle. Thanks to its freedom to organize, the exiled ANC has established a network of diplomatic offices and representatives embracing seine twenty-two countries. In many of these countries, the ANC has led to the creation of local anti-apartheid or anti-racist pressure groups, whose political input in the struggle against apartheid South
Africa is not negligible.
From its external sanctuaries, the ANC has been able to reach various politically significant groups based in
South Africa. Since September 1985, the exiled ANC has had formai contacts with a group of businessmen led by the chairman of Anglo-American (a powerful company), representatives of the Progressive Federal Party, the Soweto 109
Parents' Crisis Committee, the Federated Chamber of
Industries, the National Convention Movement, Roman Catholic and Protestant churches, the Kngwane Inyandya movement, the
Congress of South Africa Trade Unions, the National Union of South African Students, and the National African Federated Chambers of Commerce.98
A more recent event is even more illustrative of how remarkable the political organization of exiled groups can be in ternis of undermining the legitimacy of their home governments. From July 9 to 11, 1987, fifteen members of the exiled ANC met with a delegation of some fifty white
South African intellectuals opposed to apartheid. In this meeting, which was held in Dakar, Senegal, the ANC established an important contact with progressive white
South Africans, an event which may have some political significance. Similar gains in the diplomatic arena and in the influence of domestic politics inside Namibia could be credited to exiled SWAPO.
These organizational achievements by no means suggest that exiled groups in Southern Africa have always enjoyed very favorable opportunity structures in the host countries.
They only mean that the exiled groups were given some latitude to organize within the limits defined by host states and that the groups in question tried to make the best use of the opportunities provided by a circumscribed political environnent. To understand the circumscribed nature of the political environment which the 110 exiles/refugees in Southern Africa have had to put up with, one only needs to remember the warnings, arrests and deportations occasionally made against the exiles/refugees
in Swaziland, Lesotho, Mozambique, etc. Yet, all these
limitations notwithstanding, the political actions of the exiles/refugees in Southern Africa have had a strong
influence in inter-state relations in the sub-region.
This chapter has, in my view, demonstrated the high
incidence of inter-state conflict in Southern Africa due to the exile/refugee factor. This high incidence of conflict
is hardly surprising, if viewed in the context of the
following set of circumstances. All ten countries in this
sub-region have at one time or another hosted
exiles/refugees. Only 20 percent of the southern African
countries have not generated significant numbers of
exiles/refugees. Of the 80 percent which have produced
significant numbers of exiles/refugees, only 24 percent have
not experienced massive waves of exile/refugee influxes. At
least 15 organizations of armed, politically active
exiles/refugees operated, at one time or another, in the
various countries of the sub-region during the period
covered by this study. At least 53 percent of these
organizations emerged from decolonization and minority rule
power struggles; 13 percent could be considered as leftover
liberation movements; and some 33 percent seem to have
emerged in the wake of the problems of state formation and consolidation of independence. 111
The inherently belligerent character of these organizations, which consider themselves as victim groups, has sent waves of fear to their target countries, and the latter have, justifiably or not, blamed the host countries for the sense of fear and insecurity which have resulted from the situation. Whole communities of exiles/refugees have found themselves pawns in the power gaines that have normally crystallized around that sense of insecurity, even though only small numbers of peasant exiles/refugees gravitated towards these organizations which have been almost exclusively led by small cores of mobilized elites.
If it were possible to put a dollar-figure on the costs of raising, maintaining, and countering the various warring exiled movements and their respective activities in the dysfunctinal political environnent of Southern Africa, and if it were possible to put a pint-figure on the blond shed in the process, those colossal figures would serve as an eloquent indictment of the root causes of the exile/refugee phenomenon in the sub-region. Those figures would graphically demonstrate the amount of scarce resources which the exile/refugee phenomenon has diverted from the economic development process. 112
CHAPTER III
EASTERN AFRICA: THE SECOND HARD-HIT REGION The purpose of this chapter is to present the facts which help to make the case that the exile/refugee issue has constituted a very sizable portion of the inter-state relations agenda in Eastern Africa. Particular attention will be directed to the various ways in which exile/refugee generating countries and host countries have reacted to the problem, and the extent to which the exiles/refugees had the opportunity to be influential actors in the arena of inter- state relations in the region. The massive information used to document the extensive impact of the exile/refugee factor on relations among Eastern African countries themselves as well as relations between the latter and some non-Eastern African states has bee.i presented in the following simple diadic sets of relations: Sudan versus each of its five neighbors - Uganda,
Ethiopia, Zaire, Chad and Libya; Ethiopia versus Somalia;
Djibouti with Ethiopia; Uganda versus each of its four neighbors - Rwanda, Zaire, Tanzania and Kenya; Kenya and
Tanzania; Kenya versus Somalia; Tanzania with each of its three neighbors - Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire; and finally
Tanzania with distant Nigeria. An analytical summary 113 inspired by the various theoretical propositions made in chapter one concludes the chapter.
The Eastern African region consists of the countries of East Africa proper, the countries of the Horn of Africa and the Sudan. Thus, the seven states which form Eastern
Africa are: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan,
Tanzania and Uganda.1 Practically all seven have given asylum to exiles/refugees. As a matter of fact, Uganda and
Tanzania received the first exiles/refugees before they became independent and they have uninterruptedly maintained large numbers of them to this day. By 1989, these two countries will have a thirty years experience of hosting exiles/refugees. Kenya has also maintained small numbers of African exiles/refugees since the early 1960s. Both
Ethiopia and the Sudan were also early recipients of exiles/refugees, with initial significant influxes dating back to the early 1960s. Djibouti and Somalia are relatively new corners in the business of giving asylum to large numbers of exiles/refugees.
Regarding exile/refugee generation, there is a very big disparity among the seven. Tanzania, Kenya and Djibouti have hardly produced any significant numbers of exiles/refugees. Just a handful of dissidents in the case of Kenya, an even smaller number from Tanzania, and a tiny number of dissident politicians in the case of Djibouti. In contrast, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda have generated huge numbers of exiles/refugees at various times throughout 114 the last thirty years.
Just as in southern Africa, the effect of the exile/refugee phenomenon upon inter-state relations in
Eastern Africa has been both intra-regional and inter-
regional in character. The flow of exiles/refugees within
the region has caused tensions between and among the seven.
At the saine time, at least six countries which lie outside
Eastern Africa have been drawn into the complex relations of
conflict or cooperation having to do with the presence of
exiles/refugees in the region.2 These non-Eastern African
countries are Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic,
Libya, Rwanda and Zaire.
Sudan: The Oldest Trouble Spot
The flow of exiles/refugees from Southern Sudan, which
took place within the context of the decolonization process
in the country, began in 1955 when an army mutiny broke out
in the south of the country. The black mutineers and their
black supporters were protesting the disadvantaged social,
economic, cultural and political situation in the black
southern part of the country vis-â-vis the relatively more
privileged Arab north. The repression with which the
Khartoum government responded was savage enough to send the
participants in the mutiny and the subsequent armed revoit
into exile in Uganda, the Belgian Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia and
what is today called the Central African Republic. At the
time of independence in 1956, the southerners' wish to have
a federal system of government in Sudan was denied, and this 115 contributed to the traumas of state-formation which further exacerbated the political crisis which produced exiles/refugees. By 1960, the number of southern leaders quietly slipping away into exile had increased considerably.
The political malaise which persisted in Sudan since the time of independence culminated in a civil war which engulfed the country during 1962-72. The southern leaders' exile into neighboring countries gave them the opportunity to try to organize the hitherto disorganized resistance against the government in Khartoum. The government has been
forced, since 1962, to try to cape with the challenges of a newly created political space outside its jurisdiction, within which it could not effectively control the activities
of the exiles/refugees.
Political organization of the southerners' resistance
crystallized in 1962 when the southern leaders in exile formed the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union
(SACDNU) in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) in the Congo (Zaire). This organization was renamed the Sudan African
National Union (SANU). The following year, Kampala, the
capital of Uganda, became SANU's headquarters. Once
established outside the political space controlled by the
Sudanese government, the exiled southern leadership
deliberately adopted a strategy to internationalize the
conflict between the Sudanese government and the
southerners. Sonie southern Sudanese leaders hoped that the
flight of refugees to neighboring countries would help to 116 awaken international concern. William Deng and sonie of the other southern leaders hoped that by launching guerrilla raids into southern Sudan from bases in neighboring countries, they might involve the Sudanese government in a conflict with its neighbors, thus causing the United Nations to intervene. Such UN intervention would, so thought the southern leaders, provide an opportunity for securing a plebiscite.3 This strategy turned out to be a gross miscalculation. Indeed, tensions arose between Sudan and its neighbors as the guerrilla raids were launched from the neighboring host countries, but international intervention tended to favor the Sudanese government. As the conflict escalated around 1965, SANU's appeals to the UN, the
International Red Cross and the OAU for intervention stimulated very little response. This was because of the usual tendency of these institutions to avoid antagonizing governments in favor of less known, less powerful opposition groups. The political organization of the exiled southerners was deemed to be inadequate without a well established military organization. Thus, in 1963, various southern Sudanese guerrilla groups, most of which had emerged in
1955, united to form the Anya-Nya military organization. These exiled guerrilla groups agreed to unite under General
Lagu to wage a war against the Sudanese government.
However, the political leadership of SANU was so weak and
torn by factionalism that it was unable to coordinate the 117 political and military wings of the southern resistance.
Evidence of the organizational fiasco which prevailed was the Anya-Nya's autonomy from the control of the exiled southern politicians. The military wing of the southern resistance operated without a central command as SANU disintegrated around 1965, giving rise to a new political movement - the Azania Liberation Front (ALF). The ALF does not seem to have fared any better in unifying the various political factions and the military.
The presence of the various exiled political and military factions of the southern Sudanese separatists in
countries sharing borders with Sudan claimed a heavy toll on
relations between Sudan and its neighbors. Regular
exile/refugee influxes from Sudan into neighboring countries
characterized the early 1960s. It is estimated that by
1962, Uganda had some 4,000 Sudanese exiles/refugees; Congo-
Leopoldville had about 8,000 in 1964; the Central African
Republic had some 18,200 in 1965; Ethiopia had about 25,000
in 1964; and Kenya had about 100 in 1966. In some cases,
these numbers had increased considerably in some of these
asylum countries by 1972 - the year of the peace agreement
between the Khartoum government and the southern Sudanese separatists.
As the Southern Sudanese poured into the neighboring
countries, their separatist leadership hoped to receive
assistance from the governments of these countries.
According to Touval, they expected two kinds of assistance: 118
the acquiescence of these governments ta the establishment on their territory of bases for the Anya- Nya and some assistance in the equipping of the guerrillas with necessary supplies and weapons and political assistance as well, resulting in international intervention on their behalf.4
Sudan versus Uganda
Ta a certain extent, the exiled Sudanese received some of the help they sought from some of their host countries, and this became the basis for intermittent conflicts between
Sudan and its neighbors. Uganda was one of the countries which upset the Sudanese government by giving direct or indirect assistance ta the Southern Sudanese exiles/refugees in their struggle against the Khartoum government. When, in
1964, Uganda had an estimated Sudanese exile/refugee population of about 15,000, Milton Obote, then head of government in Uganda, opted for a sympathetic policy toward the southern Sudanese exiles/refugees in his country. He, for example, provided facilities for a meeting of the various factions of the southern separatist movement, aimed at unifying them for a more effective political and military action against the Khartoum government. He even allowed the first convention of SANU ta meet in Kampala - Uganda's capital. When SANU failed ta survive as a viable political movement catering ta the aspirations of the exiled southern
Sudanese, Obote gave a chance ta the nascent Azania
Liberation Front (ALF).
According ta Asiwaju, in 1965, the Ugandangovernment gave SANU active assistance in the implementation of its 119 decision to move the party inside the Southern Sudan.
Although he describes Obote as having vacillated between working towards a peaceful settlement and supporting the southern separatists during the period 1965-69, he categorically asserts that Obote "secretly provided military and logistic assistance to the southern Sudanese."5 Kyle has also observed that there was in Uganda of the time, considerable trans-frontier movement, without too much obstruction or difficulty, by the ALF and other top leaders of the southern Sudanese rebellion, most of whom seemed to hover around the Ugandan towns of Arua, Gulu, and Kitgum which controlled the arms trail from Mombasa through the
sparsely inhabited parts of Kenya and Uganda into Equatoria
Province in the Sudan.6
Besides its direct assistance to the Sudanese
exiles/refugees, Uganda also coordinated Israel's military
assistance to the Southern Sudanese, most of which was sent
through Uganda. For instance, Adefuye has revealed that "a
quantity of the equipment which Israel captured from the
Arabs in the six-day war in 1967, was delivered to the Anya- Nya through Uganda."7
Uganda assumed an even more engaged position on the
side of the southern Sudanese separatists under Idi Amin.
When Obote was still President of Uganda before his ouster
by Idi Amin in 1971, he had put the latter in charge of the
coordination of the Israeli military assistance to the
southern Sudanese which transitted Uganda.8 Idi Amin had 120 executed this assignment with enthusiasm because of his ethnic background. Being a Kakwa, he had a feeling of ethnic solidarity toward fellow Kakwas as well as other related tribes of Southern Sudan. As Amin's commitment ta the cause of the Southern Sudanese became deeper, a symbiotic relationship developed between him and the Southern Sudanese exiles. The exiles used him ta facilitate their military action against the Khartoum government and he used them ta organize and carry out his successful coup d'etat against Obote. During the period between Amin's coming ta power in 1971 and the peace agreement between the southern Sudanese separatists and the Khartoum government in 1972, Amin's government was unequivocally on the side of the Southern separatists. The following description may adequately illustrate Amin's strong commitment to the cause of the Southern Sudanese at the time: ...Amin ordered officers in charge of army units near the Sudan border ta allow supplies which included weapons and food ta go from Uganda ta the Anya-Nya and there were cases when medicines bought with Ugandan funds for their own armed forces were diverted on Amin's orders ta the Southern Sudanese. Amin made trips ta the Southern Sudanese secessionist fighters inside the Sudan and occasionally me the Anya-Nya leaders in Uganda's West Nile district. The Sudanese government responded ta Uganda's assistance ta the southern Sudanese separatists in a variety of ways, primary among which was the closure of the border.
For instance, in May 1964, the Uganda-Sudan frontier was reported ta have been closed.10 Sudan also made occasional 121 trans-border raids on refugee camps in Uganda. Evidence of this is to be found in the occasional complaints voiced by Uganda in 1965-66, to that effect. One such complaint was expressed by Uganda's minister of defense in September 1965, alleging that Sudanese aircraft had bombed a refugee camp two miles inside Uganda in West Nile District.11 Sudan, which denied the act, was accused again the following year, this time by the exiled ALF, of having moved its troops across the border into Uganda and killed scores of refugees in a camp at Logoba about six miles inside Uganda. The government of Uganda also lodged a protest with the Sudanese Ambassador in Kampala against alleged violation of the Uganda border, stating that Sudanese army units had crossed at Gombiri and Afogi.12 It would be incorrect to conclude, from Uganda's general tendency in the 1960s to favor the cause of the southern Sudanese, that it unreservedly gave much latitude of action to the Sudanese exiles/refugees then living in Uganda. Particularly under Obote who, despite his general sympathy for the Southern Sudanese, was also sensitive to other forces at work, the exiles/refugees' "opportunity structure" was quite circumscribed.13 It is for this reason that many instances of cooperative behavior revolving around the exile/refugee issue can be cited between Uganda and the Sudan during the saure period. One of the earliest gestures of cooperation between Uganda and the Sudan occurred in 1963, when both countries 122 staged "joint exercises" of their soldiers as a sign of mutual concern for each other's security. However, the exercises did not lead to any lasting results in terms of controlling the long porous border through which the exiled
Southern Sudanese guerrillas entered and exited almost unchecked. Uganda moved a step forward in showing Sudan its spirit of cooperation when, in 1964, it detained SANU's president for trying to recruit southern Sudanese for the
Anya-Nya from refugee camps in Uganda.
In March 1965, Uganda exerted pressure on the ALF to attend a conference which the Sudanese government convened in Khartoum. As an observer at that conference, Uganda tried to induce the southern insurgents to accept the
Khartoum government's proposais for a peace settlement. The saine year, Uganda rewarded the diplomatic efforts of the
Sudan's Premier Mahgoub by restricting the activities of the
ALF in Uganda and subsequently detaining its president when the movement's activities continued illegally underground.
In April, 1966, Uganda's Prime Minister and his Sudanese counterpart met to discuss the problem of the
Southern Sudan. They decided to set up a six-man committee, three each from Sudan and Uganda, to make administrative arrangements to facilitate the return of refugees to Sudan under a general amnesty. It was also in July, 1966, that
Uganda relocated several Sudanese refugees from the border
area to a new site away from the Sudanese border. This saure year, Uganda pledged to Sudan that it would refuse asylum to 123
Sudanese refugees engaged in subversive activities.
This obvious anti-Anya-Nya policy consistently pursued by Uganda since 1963, created sonie tensions between Uganda and the Anya-Nya. For instance, it was reported that in
September 1966, a Uganda army unit clashed with a 250-man unit of the Anya-Nya movement in the Moyo area of Uganda. Apparently, Anya-Nya guerrillas had threatened Ugandan officiais and local chiefs for thwarting their efforts to use refugee settlements for the southern Sudanese in Uganda as staging areas for raids into Sudan.' Shortly after this incident, a Uganda government spokesman announced that guerrillas from southern Sudan had attacked a Uganda army platoon at Koboko in northwestern Uganda, killing three
Ugandan soldiers and wounding five.14
Uganda's conciliatory policy toward the Sudanese government and its apparent loss of interest in continued
support for the southern Sudanese separatists can be best
understood in the broad context of its own security
concerns. By 1966, Uganda had an exile/refugee population
of about 250,000 people from Sudan, Rwanda and Congo-
Kinshasa. Each of these groups had politically active
elements who aspired to go back home through armed struggle.
Controlling the activities of these diverse groups was
placing heavy demands on Uganda's military and other
resources. Under these circumstances, continuing to
antagonize Sudan which had a superior army of about 18,500
men was deemed to be suicidai. Thus, it was only rational 124
for Uganda to act with restraint in its dealings with Sudan.
The graduai rapprochement which ensued led to the official
re-opening of the border between the two countries on May
11, 1972, and to the signing of a mutual defense agreement which officially ended the protracted crisis in relations between the two countries. This crisis had stemmed from the
activities of the southern Sudanese exiles/refugees in Uganda.
By the time the mutual defense agreement between
Uganda and Sudan was signed, Uganda was aiready generating
its own exiles/refugees, following Amin's successful coup
d'état against the Obote government in 1971. Since Amin was
pro-southern Sudanese separatists and since the Anya-Nya had
helped him to carry out the coup d'état, it is not
surprising that the Khartoum government hastened to back up
Obote followers who sought refuge in Sudan in their efforts
to organize a counter-coup against Amin. In the coup
aftermath, President Numeiry of Sudan gave all possible
assistance to Obote aimed at reinstating him. Numeiry
allowed Obote to establish a military training camp in
Sudan, sonie 10 miles from the Ugandan border, and to recruit
his loyal followers into Sudan in preparation for an
eventual counter-coup against Amin. However, this operation
was overtaken by events, as phase one of the Sudanese civil
war quickly came to an end in 1972, as a result of a
successfully negotiated peace settlement between the
Sudanese government and the Anya-Nya. This agreement was 125 reached thanks to the mediation efforts of Emperor Haile
Selassie of Ethiopia and the intervention of the World
Council of Churches and the All Africa Conference of
Churches.
After the peace agreement, continued Sudanese assistance to Obote and his followers against Amin would not have been tolerated by the Anya-Nya, so in order to give the peace settlement a chance, Numeiry asked Obote and his
exiled forces to leave. The subsequent relocation of Obote
and his men in Tanzania prevented a deterioration of
relations between Amin's Uganda and Sudan.
Relations between Uganda and Sudan have not been
seriously affected by the exile/refugee problem after 1972.
This is mainly because many southern Sudanese
exiles/refugees in Uganda voluntarily repatriated to Sudan
after the 1972 peace agreement. For the next ten years or
so, there was no exile/refugee exodus from Sudan into
Uganda. It was not until southern rebel activities against
the Khartoum government resumed and increased around 1983
that the exiles/refugees began to flee the Sudan again into
neighboring countries, including Uganda, which had about
1,000 southern Sudanese exiles/refugees in 1986. However,
despite this new exile/refugee exodus caused by "Anya-Nya
II" and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)15
guerrilla operations, both Uganda and Sudan have avoided
getting embroiled in giving military assistance to each
other's exiles/refugees. 126
Several thousands of Ugandan exiles/refugees sought refuge in Sudan after the latter's peace agreement of 1972: about 4,000 Obote followers in 1972, most of whom moved to
Tanzania as indicated earlier; about 39,000 when the Amin dictatorship fell in 1979; and several thousands generated as the various post-Amin governments fell. By March, 1985, Sudan was hosting 250,000 exiles/refugees from Uganda.16
Yet, despite the presence of such a large Ugandan exile/refugee population in Sudan, relations between the two countries have remained normal after 1972. This assessment remains generally valid, even though once in a while short- lived complaints have been voiced. For instance, in 1980, some leftover members of Idi Amin's army were alleged to have invaded Uganda from Sudan, but no major issue was made out of this incident by either Uganda or Sudan.
Since President Museveni came to power in Uganda in
1986, his government has pursued a vigorous policy of voluntary repatriation of all Ugandan exiles/refugees. In
May 1987, the government adopted an Amnesty Bill to enable even those Ugandan exiles who had been waging war against the new regime to return. For its part, the Sudanese government has, since 1983, cooperated with the various
Ugandan administrations, including the present one, in
facilitating the repatriation of Ugandan exiles/refugees.
For instance, Sudan has cooperated in providing military 127 escort for convoys carrying Ugandan returnees to ensure their safe passage to the border.
Sudan versus Ethiopia Uganda was but one of the many countries to which the southern Sudanese exiles/refugees fled from the early 1960s onwards. Ethiopia was one of the other major recipients of the southern Sudanese. In 1964, Ethiopia was estimated to host some 25,000 southern Sudanese exiles/refugees. The mere presence of those exiles/refugees in Ethiopia was enough to worry the Khartoum government so much that by
1965, Sudanese Premier Mahgoub stated that he had evidence of Anya-Nya recruiting and training camps in Ethiopia near the border.17
It is difficult to establish whether or not Ethiopia was at the time encouraging Anya-Nya subversive activities against Sudan. Most probably, Ethiopia's control over the activities undertaken by the Anya-Nya in the three camps they had established in Ethiopia near the Sudanese border was lax. Because of this laxity in host government control, the Anya-Nya occasionally carried out raids into Sudan "for cattle, grain, arms and recruits",18 not necessary with any collusion on the part of the Ethiopian government.
The increasingly uneasy relations which developed between Ethiopia and Sudan were compounded by Ethiopia's fear of the presence of its own exiles/refugees from Eritrea in Sudan. Fighting in the Eritrean region of Ethiopia had begun in 1962, when Emperor Haile Salassie of Ethiopia 128 formally incorporated Eritrea into his empire. Eritrea had become a colony of Ethiopia by a UN decree in 1952 and when ten years later Ethiopia appropriated it, the Eritrean
Liberation Front (ELF) which had been created in 1961, fought to resist the move and to reverse that political act. The resistance and the fighting in Eritrea generated exiles/refugees from Ethiopia, some of whom were granted asylum in the Sudan.. The number of exiles/refugees from Eritrea streaming into Sudan increased steadily since 1963, so that by 1967 there was an estimated 30,000 Eritrean exiles/refugees in Sudan. The number of Ethiopian exiles/refugees in Sudan had shot up to about 250,000 in 1979. This included, in addition to Eritreans, rebels from the Tigre Province of Ethiopia, and the members of the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) - a group of liberals exiled during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie. Because of the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict at the time, the predominantly Arab government in Khartoum was predisposed to team up with other Arab states to assist the Eritrean exiles beyond giving them simple humanitarian aid. At the time, most Arab states were resentful of Ethiopia's behavior in allowing Isreal to continue using Massawa- Eritrea's main port. Thus, they opted to support the Eritrean rebellion with the ultimate aim of securing from the would-be independent Eritrean government, Israel's explusion from the only port it still had access to along the Red Sea coast. Under these circumstances of pan-Arab 129 solidarity, the Khartoum government gave military and financial support ta the ELF. Two other movements - the
Eritrean Liberation Front - Popular Liberation Forces (ELF-
PLF) and the Eritrean Peopl-e's Liberation Front (EPLF) - which were barn out of the factionalism within the original
ELF, have also had sanctuaries in the Sudan. The relationship between these movements and their host country,
Sudan, made Ethiopia very uncomfortable from early on.
By 1964, the Ethio-Sudanese relations were already bad because of Sudanese support for the Eritrean guerrillas on the one hand, and Ethiopian support for the Anya-Nya on the other. In 1964, the exiled SANU made protests ta the UN, alleging that Sudanese government troops occasionally
followed Sudanese refugees over the Ethiopian,border. It
also alleged that fourteen southern Sudanese refugee
settlements in Ethiopia had been burned down by Sudanese.
soldiers.19 Ethiopia, too, has engaged itself in such
border violations. For instance, around 1975-6, Ethiopian
troops repeatedly carried its war against Eritrean
guerrillas into Sudanese territory. In ternis of letting
exiles/refugees attack their country of origin, Ethiopia has
not been without blame either. For example, in 1968,
Ethiopia let sonie 500 southern Sudanese guerrillas cross
into the Upper Nile province of Sudan where they attacked
government security forces.20
The mutual infliction of injury between Ethiopia and
the Sudan using each other's exiles/refugees as proxies has 130 continued unabated over the years. The ELF became more effective in its guerrilla activities between 1968 and 1969, thanks to Sudanese assistance, so much that it was able to conduct raids against Ethiopia, destroying petrol tankers on the Massawa-Asmara road and attacking Ethiopian planes. For
its part, Ethiopia, both under the late Emperor Haile
Selassie and the new regime, has provided training safehavens and supplies for the southern Sudanese guerrillas. For example, the Sudanese government discovered
that in 1976, Ethiopia was training and arming Sudanese guerrillas in camps along the border. The Sudanese President responded by threatening to use the 120,000
Eritrean and the other 100,000 Ethiopian refugees in Sudan
in retaliatory attacks against Ethiopia. Sudan also
recalled its ambassador in Addis Ababa, alleging that Ethiopia was harassing Sudanese diplomats.21 Along with the conflictual relations between Ethiopia and Sudan due to the exile/refugee problem in the area, there has existed a record of cooperative endeavor between the two in order to minimize the negative effects of that
problem. When large numbers of southern Sudanese
exiles/refugees poured into Ethiopia in 1964, President
Abboud of Sudan concluded an extradition treaty with Emperor
Haile Selassie. Even though this treaty has not meant much,
in that hardly any exile/refugee from either side has been
extradited under the provisions of the treaty, it has
nonetheless some symbolic value, inasmuch as it captures a 131 momentary mood of cooperation briefly shared by the two countries under the conditions prevailing then.
In July 1965, Sudanese Premier Mahgoub visited
Ethiopia, the abject of the visit being ta convince Ethiopia ta stop giving aid ta the southern Sudanese rebels. In
August, the Sudanese foreign minister announced that his government had undertaken ta prohibit Eritrean refugees in
Sudan from engaging in subversive activities against the
Ethiopian government. As a sign of good will, Sudan deported one of the Eritrean rebel leaders ta Ethiopia.
Also at the time, Premier Mahgoub stopped the transit of arms ta Eritrean rebels.
The Ethio-Sudanese rapprochement increased even further through 1966. In July of this year a joint boundary commission ta demarcate the border between the two countries was announced. The following year, Emperor Haile Selassie made a state visit ta Sudan. In the course of this visit, the two countries agreed:
ta conclude a treaty on the question of refugees which will give the refugees the option of repatriation ta their2r ountries of origin, or removal from the frontier ares. In this connection, Agence France-Presse reported from Khartoum on September 8, 1967, that the Sudanese government, in an effort ta reduce incidents on the Ethiopian border, intended ta move sonie 123,000 Eritrean refugees from camps near the border and resettle them on agricultural projects near Khashm al-Girba, sonie fifty miles west of the border. As the peace settlement of 1972 between the Khartoum 132 government and the Southern Sudanese separatists approached,
President Numeiry of Sudan made a six-day state visit to
Ethiopia and promised his hosts that his country would close down ELF's offices in Khartoum. The fact that a few days later the Ethiopian government bitterly complained that the
Syria-based ELF was allowed to hold a secret meeting in the
Kassela area of Sudan bordering Ethiopia confirms the perceived importance of the explusion of the ELF from Sudan in the relations between the two countries.
The year 1972 was special in Ethio-Sudanese relations.
Despite the ups and downs in their rapprochement efforts,
Ethiopia and Sudan were Gloser than ever before on March 27,
1972. On this occasion, thanks to the behind-the-scenes mediation efforts of Emperor Haile Selassie and other actors, the Sudanese government and the southern Sudanese separatists signed a peace agreement officially ending
Sudan's 16-year civil war, in the presence of the Emperor himself. Two months after the peace agreement, a pro- Egyptian Lebanese newspaper accused Sudanese President
Numeiry of moving against Eritrean secessionists operating from Sudanese territory, in exchange for the aid Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie gave the Sudan in bringing about a settlement of Sudan's 16-year war with Southern Sudanese secessionists.23' After the fall of Haile Selassie, the Sudanese government tried to play a mediating role between the new Ethiopian government and the ELF. In mid-February, 1975, the Sudanese foreign minister visited Addis Ababa with proposais for a ceasefire. This intervention does not seem 133 to have impressed Ethiopian authorities, as the latter continued to condemn Sudan along with sonie other Arab countries for backing the Eritrean rebels. Despite Sudan's failure to mediate between the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean rebels, it did not give up its efforts to use the exile/refugee card to improve its relations with Ethiopia.
Thus, just before the OAU summit meeting which was held in Sudan's capital in July 1978, the Sudanese government took the trouble to move about 20,000 refugees out of the capital city, so that the Eritrean and other Ethiopian refugees would not pose a security threat to the visiting Ethiopian delegation. Efforts to normalize relations between Sudan and Ethiopia continued through 1979 and 1980. In February, 1979, President Mengistu Haile Mariam and President Numeiry met in sierra Leone's capital to review their relations and try to normalize them. Sierra Leone's President Siaka Stevens tried to mediate, but the four days of talks ended in a deadlock over the issue of Eritrean exiles/refugees. In March of the following year, Sudan's first vice-president Abdul Khalil visited Addis Ababa as a further gesture towards the much desired normalization of relations. In April, Sudan closed its border to Eritrean guerrillas and hopes were revived. It looked like the long-strained Ethio- Sudanese relations were at last going to improve significantly.
On May 27, 1980, Mengistu and Numeiry held a highly 134 secret meeting assumed to have focused on the difficulties caused by the constant trans-border movement of Eritrean exiles/refugees across the Sudanese border where up to 500,000 Eritreans had sought refuge. At this point, the Sudanese government had reached a critical situation of being unable to bear the huge costs of sustaining the Eritrean exiles/refugees. For its part, the Ethiopian government wanted Sudan to effectively close its border with Eritrea, so as to block all clandestine routes used to supply the Eritreans with arms, food and other supplies. By 1982, internal political developments in Sudan had eroded the fragile political stability ushered in by the negotiated peace settlement ten years before. In his political miscalculations, Numeiry had obstinately moved towards a policy of redividing southern Sudan into three regions and introducing isiamic "sharia" law. These policies produced a new opposition in Sudan. Fighting resumed and new Sudanese exiles/refugees were generated. Once again, Ethiopia became a major host to anti-Numeiry dissidents. One group of such dissidents was the 800-man army of Yagoub Ismail. An even more formidable group was John Garang's Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) whose political agenda is: to work for national unity; to bring about socialism; to respect the autonomy of the south; and to safeguard freedom of religion in Sudan.24 The new wave of Sudanese exiles/refugees streaming into Ethiopia sparked off a reversai in the course of Ethio- 135
Sudanese rapprochement. Sudan began to accuse Ethiopia of providing rear bases to the fleeing dissidents for subversive military activities. This would not have happened at a worse time, since the process of rapprochement seemed to have been progressing very well. In June, 1982, the two countries had signed an agreement in which both parties agreed to: close down all facilities used by secessionists and dissidents or destabilizing elements operating against either state and to expel all groups who p any way work to the detriment of the neighboring country. In a counter-charge, Ethiopia condemned Sudan for allegedly continuing to allow the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF) to maintain headquarters in Khartoum, although in 1980 Sudan was supposed to have closed down the offices of these movements. By 1983, the Ethio-Sudanese relations had reached an all-time low. Radio Sudan announced that conspiracies were being "hatched by Ethiopia and Libya against Sudan." The radio reports alleged that forces of saboteurs were massed on the Ethiopian-Sudanese border with the aim of carrying out attacks on border positions, striking oil fields, and sabotaging the Jonglei canal. In early February, 1984, a
Chevron oil installation in Sudan was attacked by guerrillas of the "Anya-Nya II" movement, whom Sudan claimed to have infiltrated the country from Ethiopia. Less than a week after the Chevron incident, the Sudanese consulate in Gambela, Ethiopia, was stormed by Sudanese refugees living 136 in the area, an act which strained relations between the two countries even further.
Following the coup that ousted Numeiry in Sudan in
1985, the chairman of the Transitional Military Council
(TMC) sought ta improve relations between his country and
Ethiopia. In his pursuit of this objective, he met with
Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile Mariam in July ta discuss the outstanding irritants between the two countries, one of which was mutual subversion using each other's exiled
dissidents. Both leaders agreed ta establish technical
committees ta work on a variety of problems, including the
issue of Sudanese support for Eritrean and other rebel
groups and Ethiopia's assistance ta John Garang's SPLM. Up
ta the time of this writing, there has been no breakthrough
in resolving the conflict between the two countries with
regard ta the thorny issue of support for the subservive
activities of exiles/refugees from either side.
Sudan versus Zaire The inter-regional dimension of Sudan's experience with the exile/refugee phenomenon brings ta the scene a variety of national actors from outside Eastern Africa.
These are the Congo (Zaire), the Central African Republic,
Chad, and Libya. The Congo (Zaire) and Sudan have hosted
each other's exiles/refugees at various times since their
respective independence. Earlier in this chapter, mention
was made regarding the founding, in 1962, of SACDNU (the
organizational protoform of southern Sudanese separatism) in 137
Leopoldville. During the decade that followed, the Congo
(Zaire) became a major host of Sudanese exiles/refugees.
UNHCR statistics put the Sudanese exile/refugee population in Zaire by 1972 at around 50,000. On the other hand, Sudan has maintained relatively large numbers of exiles/refugees from Zaire since the mid-1960s to the present. The figure has fluctuated between 7,000 and 5,000 people.
Zaire and Sudan have experienced strained relations because of the exile/refugee factor. When the Anya-Nya guerrillas launched an abortive assault on a Sudanese military barracks at Wau in January 11, 1964, the Sudanese government alleged that the attack had been planned and mounted from a guerrilla camp just over the border in the
Congo (Zaire), and that the Congolese government was aware of what was happening and had condoned it. In retaliation, the Sudanese government authorized its troops to cross over into the Congo and attack an Anya-Nya camp near the town of
Aba, from where it was thought the Wau attack had been launched. In 1965, the Sudanese Premier complained to the
American government that the Tshombe government in the Congo was using military aid from the U.S.A., in co-operation with southern Sudanese rebels, against his government forces.
Indeed, Tshombe supported the southern Sudanese rebels in order to set them against his own rebels who had sought refuge in Sudan. This strategy worked to a limited extent, because the southern Sudanese rebels frequently intercepted and appropriated arms destined for the Congolese rebels, 138 thus weakening the latter to the advantage of the Tshombe government.
The Congolese exiles/refugees who sought asylum in
Sudan in 1964-65, comprised among them, Simba rebels who had been fighting to bring down the Congolese government. When
Sudan granted them asylum, the Congolese government saw this as a hostile act on the part of Sudan. The Congolese government's fears were confirmed when, in 1965, the official Sudanese News Agency announced that the government had authorized the Congolese refugees from Stanleyville to undergo military training on Sudanese territory. The
Congolese government's anxiety heightened when it was reported that at least 14 Soviet-built military transporters from Ghana, Algeria and the United Arab Republic had landed in Sudan with supplies for the Congolese rebels. About 40
Algerians, presumably military advisors, were said to have accompanied the supplies.26
As relations between Sudan and Zaire were deteriorating fast because of the exile/refugee factor, the two countries sought to cooperate in order to alleviate their mutual fear. By 1966, they reached a preliminary agreement to the effect that: (i) refugees engaged in subversion against their respective governments would not be granted asylum in either country; and, (ii) a joint committee would be formed to work out appropriate refugee
exchange methods. 139
Sudan versus Chad Another country with which Sudan has had problems because of the exile/refugee factor is Chad. In the mid-
1960s, Sudan was blamed by Chad for hosting exiled dissidents who were alleged to be plotting against their home government.27 Relations between the two countries worsened when Sudan allowed the dissidents to form a Chadian
Islamic Government-in-Exile in 1965. This political conflict was translated into political action when, in 1965,
Chad's President Francois Tombalbaye declared that Sudanese residents in Chad would be expelled in three weeks, unless
Sudan ceased granting asylum to opposition elements
operating in Khartoum as the "Government of the Islamic
Republic of Chad-in-Exile." On this occasion, the Chadian
President charged Sudan of arming and training the exiled
rebels.
In 1966, the conflict escalated. Maintaining the saine
charge against the Sudanese government, the Chadian
President gave Sudan a fourteen days altimatum to hand over Chadian rebels allegedly operating from Sudanese territory.
Sudan refuted the charge and rejected the ultimatum, stating
that the exiles in question were political refugees and
therefore exempt from extradition. Following the Sudanese
refusai to yield to the ultimatum, the government of Chad
ordered the army to fire on any Sudanese aircraft overflying
Chadiam military installations. At the saine time, Chad
closed its frontier with Sudan and restricted movement of 140
Sudanese residents in Chad. Sudan responded by suspending the weekly service of Sudan Airways from Khartoum ta Fort Lamy - the capital of Chad. In late 1966, Chad's minister of defense claimed that
40 rebels operating from Sudan had attacked a Chadian village near the border, stealing cattle and grain and burning several houses before withdrawing ta Sudan. Shortly after this incident, the Sudanese government protested an alleged attack by 160 Chadian troops on a village in Sudan, in which three people were-killed and seven wounded. Chad politicized the conflict by having its Union des Travailleurs Tchadiens stage anti-Sudanese demonstrations in the capital. Sudan retaliated by staging anti-Chad
demonstrations in Khartoum. A huge rally was held in support of a break of relations with Chad. It took the mediation efforts of President Hamani Diori of Niger ta de-esclate the conflict. In this mediation exercise, the two countries reached the following three-point agreement: (i) Chad and Sudan are ta strengthen their existing joint-frontier commission sa that it may intervene effectively in local incidents before they balloon into major disputes; (ii) Chad agrees ta implement its economic and commerical agreements with Sudan, unblock Sudanese bank accounts, and restore freedom of movement ta Sudanese nationals residing in Chad; (iii) Sudan agrees ta satisfy requests for extradition of Chadians under th ternis of its extradition agreement with Chad.'8 The internal political conflict in Chad degenerated 141 into a civil war from the late 1960s through the 1970s.
During this time, the rebel Front for National Liberation of
Chad (FROLINAT) fought hard to overthrow the Tombalbaye and
Malloum governments with continued support from Sudan, as well as Libya since the 1969 coup d'état which brought
Qaddafi to power. When, in a more complex turn of events
FROLINAT broke into the Goukouni Woddeye faction and that of
Hissene Habre, Sudan channelled its. support to the Habre faction, leaving the Woddeye faction to Libya. This polarization of support around two different Chadian exiled groups has had the side effect of worsening the conflict between Sudan and Libya.
It was, for example, thanks to Libya's support that the Goukouni Woddeye faction seized power in Chad in 1981, only to lose it to Hissene Habre when his Northern Armed
Forces (FAN) seized N'djamena and overthrew Goukouni's government on June 7, 1982. When Goukouni Woddeye seized power in 1981, Hissene Habre's FAN took refuge along the
Sudan-Chad border. Subsequently, Sudan allowed FAN to organize and launch attacks against the Woddeye government from the former's territory. There is even evidence that sometimes Sudan committed its own armed forces to sonie of the battles. For instance, Sudan claimed that in September
1981, its airforce had shot down a Libyan bomber (backing the other side) with the assistance of FAN.
Sudan versus Libya Another important inter-regional manifestation of the 142 exile/refugee problem as it has impacted on Sudan has to do with the latter's relations with Libya. The coming to power of Numeiry through a military coup in Sudan in 1969 sent some Mahdists of the Umma Party into exile in Libya. The
Libyan government, because of its own motives defined in terms of its perceived national interest in regional politics, supported the exiled Mahdists in their struggle to oust Numeiry. It was in this context that in 1976, the
Libyan government infiltrated some exiled Mahdists into
Khartoum to assassinate President Numeiry and his principal ministers upon his return from his state visits in the
U.S.A. and France. This abortive plan led to Sudan's withdrawal of its diplomatic mission from Libya. Libya, too, subsequently withdrew its own mission from Khartoum.
The conflict between Sudan and Libya was further
exacerbated by their already mentioned diametrically opposed positions in the polarized politics of Chad. What happened
is a typical case of how an exiled community can influence
international relations. The Goukouni Woddeye faction became Libya's protege, while that of Hissene Habre became
Sudan's. The micropolitics of the two contending factions became a decisive factor in relations between their
respective host countries.
There have been many indicators of the strain in
relations between Sudan and Libya due to the Chadian
exile/refugee factor. In its assistance to the Woddeye
faction, Libya occasionally violated Sudanese airspace. As 143 a result, Sudan lodged a complaint with the UN Security
Council in September, 1982, about Libya's continued aggression against Sudanese territory by its planes which were dropping bombs on Sudanese citizens. The Sudanese government also claimed that Libya was setting up an underground army called the Libyan Salvation Army for the
Liberation of Sudan, with revolutionary committees in
Khartoum. Several Sudanese workers were allegedly expelled from Libya for not joining that army. On this question of an underground army, it seems Libya was emulating Sudan which, in October 1980, had formed a suicide army to
infiltrate Libya.
The Troubled Relations Between Ethiopia and Somalia
In the preceding section, I attempted to show that the presence of the exiled Eritrean Liberation Fronts in Sudan was a major cause of strained relations between Ethiopia and
Sudan. In this section, I am making the saure argument with
regard to the effect of the presence of the Western Somali
Liberation Front (WSLF) in Somalia upon relations between
Ethiopia and Somalia. Although ethnic Somali in the
Ethiopian Ogaden region have been encouraged by Somalia to
secede since 1961, the WSLF as we know it today was not set
up until 1975, with heavy support from Somalia. This
movement, together with its ally, the Somali-Abo Liberation
Front (SALF), have been waging a protracted war of secession
against Ethiopia. Their survival over the years has 144 depended on the persistent support of the Somali government. The conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia over the question of Somali support for guerrillas in the Ogaden became acute in 1964 when the two countries engaged in a short conventional war. Until that time, the rather disorganized Western Somalis, then known merely as shiftas (bandits), had been carrying out a series of raids in the Ogaden with the support of the Somali government. Those incidents escalated into fighting between the regular armies of Ethiopia and Somalia. Ethiopia, which viewed Somalia as the aggressor, lodged a complaint against Somalia in the
OAU. In March, 1965, Somalia let the OAU Commission on Refugees visit the country to talk to the Ethiopian refugees of Somali ethnic background, who had been granted asylum in the country. In the couple of years that followed, the two countries tried to normalize their relations through cooperation. In 1968, Somali Prime Minister Egal visited Ethiopia. One outcome of the visit was a mutual pledge not to engage in subversive activities against each other. For the next few years, guerrilla activity against Ethiopia in the Ogaden region decreased, as a result of an effective control exercised by the Somali government. Somalia's irredentism, which has always been the philosophy behind its support for secessionism in the Ogaden, was fuelled by the discovery of natural gas on the
Ethiopian side of the Somali-Ethiopian border in 1972 by
TENNECO, a U.S. company. Somalia's increased irredentist 145 ambitions manifested themselves through increased support for Ethiopian dissidents. In January 1976, the Somali
President met leaders from the Ogaden and reorganized the
WSLF. He tried ta reinforce his control over the movement and ta give it some ideological content. Later in the year, the organization of the secessionist movement in the Ogaden was modified ta provide for two separate but coordinated bodies: the WSLF of Somalis and the SALF of Oromos. Control over much of the Ogaden countryside was established through contacts with the Somalis living there.29 As a result of
increased Somali support, guerrilla attacks against
Ethiopian government installations increased significantly
in 1976.
The complexion of the conflict changed in May 1977, when Somalia sent its regular forces into the Ogaden ta
reinforce the WSLF guerrillas. The involvement of Somalia's
regular forces backed by warplanes and tanks turned the
conflict into a full-scale conventional war between the two
countries. Initially, Somalia and the WSLF seemed to have
the upper hand in this war until January 1978, when Ethiopia
launched a successful counter-offensive with the backing of
Soviet and Cuban forces. Although Ethiopia won the 1977-8 war, conflict over the Ogaden has persisted, albeit at the
relatively lower pre-1977 level of intensity.
In 1979, the WSLF, still backed by Somalia, recaptured much of the Ogaden region, after driving Ethiopian
government troops back into eight large towns and putting 146 all the major roads in the area under their control. Somali support for the WSLF and SALF has continuel after the major war of 1977-8. In 1982, "a high Somali official acknowledged that his government was continuing to provide some material support for WSLF operations in the Ogaden."30
Some foret of low intensity conflict with occasional flare- ups has characterized the Ethio-Somali relations throughout the 1980s. For instance, in retaliation against WSLF attacks on the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway for which the movement in question claimed responsibility, Ethiopia
conducted air raids in Northwest Somalia in 1984, using six
of its MIGs.31
Although it is true to say that in the protracted
conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia the latter has more visibly utilized the proxy weapon of the Western Somali
secessionists, this does not mean that Ethiopia has not done
the saure using dissident Somali nationals, albeit on a much smaller scale. Ethiopia emulated Somalia's strategy by
fostering its own "Eastern Somali Liberation Front." In the
early 1980s, Ethiopia encouraged exiled Somali dissidents to
foret the Somali Democratic Action Front (SoDAF) and the
Somali Salvation Front (SoSaF) in preparation for an
Ethiopian-backed attack against Somalia.32 In 1981-2, SoSaF
united with other exiled groups to foret the Democratic Front
for Somali Salvation (DFSS), thus becoming a broad
opposition coaliation against the Somali government. In
July 1982, Ethiopia used the DFSS caver to invade Somalia in 147 retaliation against the latter's support for WSLF activities. Similar attacks against Somalia have occurred since then.
Djibouti's Share of the Problem in the Horn The tiny Republic of Djibouti has been affected by the exile/refugee phenomenon in a number of ways. As an asylum giver, it was providing sanctuaries for small groups of
Ethiopian exiles/refugees even prior to its independence from the French in 1977. Thereafter, the exile/refugee population in Djibouti increased, especially following the
1977-78 war between Ethiopia and Somalia, and in the wake of the 1984 drought and famine in Ethiopia. By the end of
June, 1987, there was an estimated 13,534 refugees in
Djibouti.33 When, in 1983, Djibouti, Ethiopia and the UNHCR
embarked on a joint program of voluntary repatriation for
Ethiopian exiles/refugees living in Djibouti, the latter was highly criticized by the WSLF based in Somalia for the voluntary repatriation policy in question. The WSLF was
against voluntary repatriation of the refugees in Djibouti because it used those refugees to attract world attention in publicizing its goal to make the Ogaden secede from Ethiopia. In its pressure against Djibouti, the WSLF warned that Djibouti would have itself to blame for any difficulties encountered by the repatriating refugees.
As far as exile/refugee generation is concerned,
independent Djibouti has not forced many of its nationals to 148 flee the country. However, because of the political alignments of Djibouti's pre-independence movements which had placed Issa nationalists under Somali patronage and
Affar nationalists on the Ethiopian side, there has been some benign conflict between the Issa-dominated Djibouti government and former Affar movements whose members were inclined to mount some opposition.34 It was in this context that in 1978, Djibouti's President Hassan Gouled, who belongs to the Issa, banned the Popular Liberation Movement
(MPL) (an Affar group) and accused Ethiopia of trying to destabilize his government. The following year, Djibouti claimed that Ethiopia was planning to topple its government, and Mogadishu Radio in Somalia announced that Djibouti's
Foreign Minister had accused a group organized in Ethiopia of working against the Djibouti government. Apart from occasional complaints of this type, Djibouti's relations with its neighbors have not been severely affected by the
exile/refugee factor.
The Problem in East Africa Proper: Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya, which conventionally constitute East Africa proper, have had their share of the exile/refugee problem. In chapter two, I discussed Tanzania's role in meeting the challenges of the exile/refugee problem in southern Africa, and the extent to which its foreign relations have been affected by its generous asylum policy. I have also presented, early in 149 this chapter, the conflict-ridden relations between Uganda and Sudan, hinging upon the exile/refugee issue. However, these two cases leave the picture of the effect of the
exile/refugee problem in East Africa incomplete. This sub-
section attempts ta complete that picture.
Uganda and Rwanda
Besides giving asylum ta the Southern Sudanese, Uganda
received exiles/refugees from other neighboring countries,
mainly Rwanda and Zaire. Most of the Rwandese
exiles/refugees entered Uganda during the 1959-62 political
upheavals in Rwanda. Despite the presence of a large
Rwandese exile/refugee population in Uganda, the two
countries had not had any major problems arising from this
situation until 1982, when the Obote government in Uganda
expelled several thousands of ethnic Rwandese-refugees and
Ugandan nationals alike. Following this mass expulsion
which forced some 44,000 people ta cross into Rwanda, the
Rwanda government began pressing Uganda ta readmit most of these people, claiming that only about 6,000 of them could be considered Rwandese nationals.35
This set in motion a series of consultations between
the two governments. The outcome of these consultations was
an agreement according ta which Ugandan ministers would
interview the expelled ethnic Rwandese who had crossed into
Rwanda, ta determine which of them were considered to be
truly Ugandan. Those sa classified would be permitted ta
return if they wished, while Rwanda would accept the 150 balance. This agreement prevented a possible deterioration of relations between the two countries.
Prior ta this incident, only on a couple of occasions had relations between Rwanda and Uganda been slightly affected by the exile/refugee factor. The first occasion was when, in 1963, the Rwandese government pressured Uganda ta refuse asylum ta the deposed King of Rwanda who had been living in Uganda as a guest of the Kabaka of Buganda. The
Ugandan government cooperated by ordering the deportation of the ex-King. The second occasion was when, in the 1971-72 conflict between Uganda and Tanzania during which Ugandan
exiles in Tanzania attempted ta overthrow Idi Amin, Uganda
closed its border with Rwanda and threatened ta destroy the
latter's capital, alleging that Rwanda was harboring
Isreali-financed exiled Ugandan guerrillas who planned ta
attack Uganda.
Uganda and Zaire
Relations between Uganda and Zaire, both of which have
hosted each other's exiles/refugees, have also been affected
by the exile/refugee problem, although not very adversely.
When thousands of exiles/refugees from the Congo (Zaire)
poured into Uganda from 1964 onwards, the Congolese
government started accusing Uganda of assisting the Simba
rebels. In 1965, the government of Uganda publicly denied
the charge and sought ta prove its innocence by disarming
the rebels and prohibiting them from operating in Uganda. 151
Some press reports alleged, at the time, that in its efforts to ingratiate itself with the Congolese government, Uganda had agreed to extradite several thousands of Congolese refugees in Uganda. There is neither evidence that Uganda ever entered into such an agreement, nor that it carried out any involuntary repatriations of Congolese at the time.
Zaire's suspicion that Uganda was supporting its exiled opposition persisted and necessitated occasional summit meetings between Mobutu and Amin. One such meeting was held in December 1971 at Kisangani (Zaire). A joint communique issued at the end of this meeting included a pledge to "solve the problem of refugees in the spirit of mutual understanding and African neighborhood by creating the necessary conditions for the persons concerned to return to their countries of origin."36 Despite this, Amin gave temporary support to a Zairean opposition movement, the
Popular Liberation Movement of Congo (PLMC) in 1974. He withdrew this support after he had met with Mobutu again in
April 1975.
Some years later, when the government of Idi Amin fell and many of his supporters fled into Zaire, it was Uganda'a turn to accuse Zaire of aiding the exiled Amin forces to
destabilize the new government. On one occasion in 1980,
Ugandan government troops followed exiled pro-Amin rebels in hot pursuit across the Zairean border. This border violation prompted President Mobutu to deploy Zaire's 31st parachute batallion along the Uganda border.37 152
Uganda versus Tanzania
Perhaps nowhere in East Africa has the exile/refugee issue caused as much damage in inter-state relations as in the case of Uganda and Tanzania. As pointed out earlier in this chapter, when Idi Amin ousted Obote in 1971, the latter was given asylum for a short period in the Sudan, after which he and his supporters moved to Tanzania. Immediately after Tanzania had granted them asylum, the government of
Idi Amin charged that Tanzania was preparing its army to invade Uganda and reinstate Obote. For the next eight years, this and similar charges were made by Uganda over and over, and many unfriendly actions directed against Tanzania were based on this allegation. For instance, in July 1971, Uganda claimed that pro-Obote guerrillas had infiltrated
Uganda from Tanzania and warned that any aircraft approaching Uganda from Tanzania would be shot down.38
The conflict between Uganda and Tanzania escalated rapidly in the last months of 1971 through 1972. In October
1971, Uganda's military aircraft made incursions into Tanzania. The military confrontation which ensued necessitated the intervention of Kenya's President, who offered to mediate. In September, 1972, Obote's men exiled in Tanzania invaded Uganda with the connivance of Tanzania government. This abortive operation brought the two countries on the brink of a full-scale war. Ugandan military aircraft began to strike deep into Tanzanian territory, bombing towns. On the ground, Ugandan and 153
Tanzanian armies stood face ta face on their common border.
Bellicose pronouncements dominated the airwaves in the capitals of both countries. Anxiety ran high in the OAU throughout September of 1972 and the first week of October, at the end of which a peace agreement was reached between the two belligerents, thanks ta Somalia's mediation efforts.
Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey have adequately
documented the extent ta which Tanzania assisted Ugandan
exiles/refugees in their attempt ta bring down the Amin
regime. Among other things, they affirm that:
Nyerere...gave Obote facilities ta establish a training camp at Kingolwira, two hundred kilometers inland from Dar es Salaam. Here Obote's followers began training in late March and by April 1971, 294 men had made final preparation9ta invade Uganda and begun moving toward the border.
Avirgan and Honey have indicated that Tanzania's assistance
ta exiled followers of Obote was sustained through 1972 when
about one thousand pro-Obote guerrillas expelled from Sudan
arrived in Tanzania and
...began military training at an unused National Service camp near Handeni, 160 kilometers inland from the coastal town of Tanga. Another saveral hundred Obote followers were at Kigwa in the Tabora region, where they had been waiting since August 1971 ta move into Uganda.40
For at least one year following the Mogadishu Peace
agreement, Tanzania was more discrete in its assistance ta
Ugandan exiles/refugees in their mission ta overthrow Amin.
Although the President tolerated their subversive
activities, he became decisively concerned with the
principle of plausible deniability. However, in 1974, 154
Tanzania's support became a little more visible when government authorities "arranged for some.of Museveni's followers ta receive guerrilla training with Frelimo at its Nachingwea base in southern Tanzania."41 Avirgan and Honey have also identified an exiled group called the Save Uganda
Movement (SUM) as having carried out small-scale sabotage activities against the Amin government with behind-the- scenes aid from Tanzania. Tanzania's commitment ta assist this group seems ta have been even more resolute in 1977, when the former agreed ta train and arm a small SUM guerrilla force."42 Another Tanzania-based group which occasionally received financial support and arms from Tanzania was called Uganda National Unity and Reconciliation. As the Uganda-Tanzania conflict unfolded over the years due ta the exile/refugee factor, Amin continually harassed Tanzania. For example, in 1974, he threatened ta invade Tanzania, after the latter had given high visibility ta exiled ex-President Obote by sitting him in the front raw of the reviewing stand, on President Nyerere's side, at the celebrations marking the 20th anniversary of the founding of Tanzania's ruling party. Not long after this threat, Amin tried ta help an exiled Tanzanian politician based in London ta "look for financial support for a plot ta topple Nyerere."43 In 1978, Amin warned that the occasional border clashes between his troops and Tanzanian forces would continue until Tanzania expelled Obote and his guerrillas. 155
The escalating conflict between Uganda and Tanzania culminated in a full-fledged conventional war in 1978-9, during which Tanzania's regular forces fought side by side with Ugandan exiles to topple Amin.
The strained relations between Uganda and Tanzania due to the exile/refugee factor occasionally had moments of cooperation. One such moment was the negotiation of the
Mogadishu Peace Agreement, the outcome of which was a mutual agreement for:
(i) cessation of military operations against each other's territory and withdrawal of military forces to a distance of at least ten miles from the common border;
(ii) halting of hostile propaganda;
(iii) refraining from allowing "subversive forc22" to operate in one country against the other.
Needless to say, this spirit of cooperation did not endure,
for each of these points was soon flagrantly violated by
both parties.
An even more surprising act of cooperation took place
in 1973 at the OAU summit in Addis Ababa when Nyerere and
Amin signed an accord that included a pledge by Amin to drop
his demand that Tanzania evict Obote. This pledge did not
endure Amin's erratic political style either.
Uganda and Kenya
Following the fall of Obote's government in Uganda,
Kenya also had its share of Ugandan exiles/refugees who were
also naturally inclined to organize a resistance against Idi
Amin. Kenya, whose policy was to maintain warm relations 156 with Uganda, made it difficult for Ugandan exiles/refugees to use its territory as a base of operations against the Amin government. In fact, there were occasions when Ugandan exiles/refugees had a rough time as a result of sonie warming up of relations between the two countries. For instance, in 1973, Amin made a state visit to Kenya and convinced the Kenyan government to hand over to his government Ugandan exiles/refugees wanted for criminal charges in Uganda. Kenya cooperated by returning three prominent Ugandans who were subsequently killed by the Amin regime. Nevertheless, despite Kenya's tight control over the activities of Ugandan exiles/refugees, the latter managed to discretely set up sonie resistance organizations such as the
Uganda Liberation Movement (ULM) which secretly organized an abortive invasion of Uganda in October 1977; the Nairobi Discussion Group formed in 1978; and the Uganda Nationalist Organization (UNO) which recruited some fighters to send to Tanzania for military training during the 1978-79 Uganda- Tanzania war.
Even though Kenya did its best to avoid any conflict with Uganda arising from the presence of the latter's exiles/refugees on its territory, it was not always successful. For example, in February 1973, Amin claimed that Luo tribesman of western Kenya were involved in supporting pro-Obote guerrillas, and he threatened to expel
some 50,000 Luos living in Uganda. This threat alarmed the
Kenyan government which in turn put pressure on Amin, 157 forcing him to withdraw the threat. Another period of strained relations between the two countries was May 1987, long after Amin had been ousted. This time, the ideological incompatibility of the Museveni government in Uganda and that of President Moi in Kenya caused mutual suspicion to the effect that the two countries were using each other's dissidents for subversion. Kenya accused Uganda of harboring Kenyan dissidents of the Mwakenva movement-a banned leftwing movement, some members of which lived-in Uganda. Kenya charged that Uganda was issuing Mwakenya dissidents with passports to enable them to travel to Libya for guerrilla training. Yet, not very long ago, Kenya had given facilities to Museveni's opponents to hold a meeting and constitute themselves into an organized opposition movement - the Uganda People's Front. The fallout of this conflict took the form of the closure of the border between the two countries on May 20, 1987, and harassment of each other's immigrant nationals. Instances of Kenya's connivance with Ugandan exiles/refugees against their home country have been so rare that they do not negate the validity of Kenya's general policy of a biased cooperation in favor of all incumbent governments in Uganda. This rather consistent bias tends to render credibility to a claim made by some Ugandan exiles/refugees living in Kenya in 1984. They claimed that the Kenyan government either turned a blind eye or even cooperated when Ugandan government agents forcibly abducted 158 and repatriated Ugandan exiles/refugees who had been granted asylum in Kenya.45 One characteristic which distinguishes Kenya from both
Uganda and Tanzania as far as the exile/refugee issue is concerned is that, on the one hand, the number of exiles it has produced is very tiny, while on the other hand it has deliberately kept the number of exiles/refugees granted asylum there very low. This fact, coupled with the government's inclination to please governments of neighboring states, sometimes at the expense of the exiles/refugees, has minimized the incidence of strained relations between Kenya and most of its neighbors.
Kenya and Tanzania Despite their other serious differences, Kenya and
Tanzania were exceptionally cooperative in 1983, over the
issue of a handful of exiled dissidents from either side.
In 1983, Kenya and Tanzania exchanged exiled dissidents sonie
of whom had been previously granted official refugee status.
This exchange, which was effected in violation of the 1951
Geneva Convention on Refugees, affected some Kenyans who had
fled to Tanzania after the 1982 abortive coup attempt in
Kenya, and sonie Tanzanians who fled to Kenya on charges of
plotting to overthrow the Tanzanian government and to
assassinate President Nyerere. This exchange sent a message
of mutual trust and played sonie role in the normalization of
relations between the two countries. The normalization was
marked by the reopening of the border between the two 159 countries in 1983. The border in question had been closed for about five years.
Kenya and Somalia Concerning the perennially strained relations between
Kenya and Somalia, it might be argued that even in this case, the exile/refugee factor is at play, although it is not as obvious as in the other cases described above.
Somalia's ability to pursue its irredentist claims over the
North-Eastern Province of Kenya has been facilitated by the
collusion of Kenya's nationals of Somali ethnic background
living in the area. These Kenyan nationals, turned rebels, have been a hard nut to crack despite Kenya government's
efforts to crush them. Their resilience has been due to
their ability to cross the border into Somalia when they are
in danger and return unconstrained, or even positively
supported by the Somali government.
The easy transborder movement, thanks to which Kenyan
Somalis have been able to carry out their secessionist
activities, constitutes, in my view, a quasi-exile/refugee
situation which has strained relations between the two
countries since 1963. Besides, evidence of the presence of
Kenyan exiles/refugees in Somalia came forth in 1966, when
President Kenyatta of Kenya and Prime Minister Egal of
Somalia met and agreed "to abolish refugee camps and allow
those who fled from Kenya to return."46 Also in February,
1969, Kenya agreed to grant an amnesty to political
offenders who hed fled the country and lifted the state of 160 emergency in the Northeastern Province.
The thorny issue of Kenyan somalis in the North- eastern Province of Kenya has remained embedded in the
Kenya-Somali relations, and it occasionally flares up. For example, in 1977, Kenya accused Somalia of furnishing
Kenyans of Somali origin with travel documents which they used ta go abroad for training in guerrilla warfare. The government of Somalia admitted that it had indeed issued such documents ta individuals without Kenyan papers who wanted ta travel abroad for humanitarian reasons. However, the Somali government pledged ta stop that practice.
The two countries seem ta have made some progress on
this issue in the 1980s. A U.S. congressional delegation which visited Somalia reported in 1982 that it was pleased ta learn of constructive discussions between President Siad and President Moi of Kenya which have resulted in practical steps by Somalia ta control "Shifta" (bandit) activity in th Somali-populated Northeastern Province of Kenya.4'
Tanzania and Rwanda The effect of the exile/refugee phenomenon upon
Tanzania's relations with sonie states in Southern Africa,
and with Uganda and Kenya in East Africa, has already been
discussed. Nevertheless, Tanzania has also hosted
exiles/refugees from Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire, and this has
affected the nature of its relations with at least some of
these countries.
As in the case of Uganda, most exiles/refugees from
Rwanda entered Tanzania between 1959 and 1962. One striking 161 difference between the way Tanzania treated Rwandese exiles/refugees and the bulk of its other refugees-mainly those from Southern Africa and Uganda-is the sternness with which it prevented the Rwandese to engage in subversive activities against their country of origin. As a first sign of its pro-Rwanda government policy in this matter, Tanzania signed an extradition treaty with Rwanda on January 25,
1965. Subsequently, when the government of Tanzania discovered that sonie Rwandese exiles/refugees were
clandestinely organizing a guerrilla movement to help them to return to their country through armed struggle, it
detained the leaders of this organization. Thus, over the years, the Rwandese government has had no reason to complain
against Tanzania over the exile/refugee issue. If anything,
it owes Tanzania a debt of gratitude for, in 1979-80,
Tanzania relieved Rwanda of its responsibility for the
Rwandese refugees in Tanzania by granting them mass naturalization.
Tanzania versus Burundi Relations between Tanzania and Burundi have not been
very cordial in the exile/refugee issue area. Burundi
exiles/refugees crossed into Tanzania in large numbers in
1973, in the wake of a severe ethnic strife which engulfed
the country. The fleeing refugees initially camped just
across the border in Tanzania where sonie exiles/refugees
introduced guerrilla activities initiated by a Rwanda-based
guerrilla movement known as the Front populaire de 162 libération du Burundi (FPLB). For a short period, the guerrillas made some raids of Burundi which responded by letting its troops cross the border in pursuit of the former. In the course of such incursions in March, April and June, 1973, Burundi government troops bombed some villages in Tanzania and killed some Tanzanian nationals. When Tanzania strongly protested these raids, Burundi extended a format apology ta the Tanzanian government on
April 3, 1973. Meanwhile Tanzania moved quickly ta restrict the activities of the FPLB, denying it material support and prohibiting it from holding public meetings. Ta reinforce this prohibition, Tanzania transferred the thousands of
Burundi exiles/refugees from the border area ta far away settiements.
Despite Burundi's formai apology, its aggression became politicized when on July 2, 1973, Tanzanian dock- workers at the Tanzanian ports of Dar es Salaam and Kigoma decided ta boycott the handling of ail cargo ta and from
Burundi, demonstrating their indignation and condemnation
for the raids that Burundi troops had been perpetrating against Tanzania. The boycott ended on July 23, 1973,
following a tripartite accord signed in Dar es Salaam between Presidents Nyerere, Mobutu and Micombero. In this accord, Tanzania undertook ta restore normal relations after
Burundi's President had acknowledged the incursions and promised ta pay compensation for the loss of life and destruction of property. 163
Tanzania and Zaire Tanzania also gave asylum to exiles/refugees from the
Congo (Zaire). Several thousands of these exiles/refugees entered Tanzania in the wake of the war waged by rebel forces in the Congo against the government in power between
1964 and 1966. Despite the continued presence of some of these exiles/refugees in Tanzania, there had not been any major strain in relations between the two countries, arising from the exile/refugee situation until 1984. This is somewhat surprising, because in the early 1960s Tanzania showed sympathy for the exiled Congolese rebels by hosting a
four-day meeting of Congolese rebel leaders in Dar es Salaam between January 26 and 29, 1965. This meeting was meant to unite the différent segments of the rebel movement under one
revolutionary council. However, it would seem that Tanzania withdrew such indiscrete forms of support for this group of
exiles/refugees thereafter. It was not until 1984 that
Zaire openly accused Tanzania of having been involved, in
some unspecified way, in assisting anti-Mobutu guerrillas of
the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) led by Laurent Kabila
to capture and temporarily hold the eastern Zairean town of
Moba. Tanzania and Nigeria
Further afield, Tanzania had problems with Nigeria
during the latter's civil war in the late 1960s. During
Nigeria's civil war, Tanzania supported the attempted
secession of Biafra from the Federal State of Nigeria. It 164 went as far as formally recognizing the state of Biafra.
Tanzania's stand on the matter upset the federalist government of General Gowon. In the ensuing conflict, the
Lagos government alleged that Tanzania had undertaken ta train 150 Biafran refugees in guerrilla warfare.48 Although
Tanzania denied this charge, the damage this caused in relations between the two countries took a long time ta heal.
An Analytical Summary
The incidence of inter-state conflict in Eastern
Africa has been remarkably high. This is not surprising when one considers that practically all of the seven
countries in the region have given asylum ta some group of
exiles/refugees. In some cases, one single countryhas
hosted several different groups of exiles/refugees from
various countries. As in the case of Southern Africa, the
exile/refugee phenomenon assumed both an intra-regional and
an inter-regional character.
Over the last thirty years, Eastern Africa has been
the home of about two dozen organized exiled groups engaged
in armed struggle against the regimes in power in their
respective home countries. About 41 percent of these
groups, mainly from Ethiopia and Sudan, have been pursuing a
secessionist agenda. Where the secessionist philosophy of
such groups has been a derivative of an irredentist policy
of the asylum country, as in the case of the very existence
of the WSLF thanks ta Somalia's irredentism, the conflict 165 between the country of origin and the asylum country has tended to be extremely fierce. This has been so because the
idea of dismembering an existing state always invariably generates strong feelings about the sacrosanctity of the territorial integrity of the state gainst which irredentist claims are directed. This explains, in part, why there was a full scale war between Ethiopia and Somalia in the late
1970s.
The remaining 59 percent of the exiled movements in
Eastern Africa has consisted of groups whose exile has been
the result of political upheavals which befell their
respective countries of origin because of power struggles
whose roots can be traced to the decolonization process, or
the independence consolidation process, or both. In either
case, the exiled movements have sprang from the debris of
defeat in such power struggles.
The opportunity structure afforded the exiled
movements in Eastern Africa in their subversive activites
against their countries of origin has varied considerably. In sonie cases, the support was extremely generous, as in the case of Somalia's support for the WSLF against Ethiopia. In this case, the support was almost total. At the other
extreme, support was not only denied, but the host
government responded heavy-handedly to any signs of
subversion discernible in exile/refugee behavior, as in the
case of Tanzania's swift thwarting of organization among its Rwandese exiles/refugees. 166
Between these two extremes lies a mosaic of various types of host country response. For example, the Uganda of
the 1960s and early 1970s fervently supported southern Sudanese separatists, although for reasons of public relations posturing, the support was as covert as possible. The saine could be said about Tanzania's support for Ugandan exiles in the early 1970s, or Sudan's support for its
Chadian exiles. In most cases,. host country support has been short-lived, non-committal and very covert. Uganda's alleged support for anti-Mobutu exiles, or Tanzania's cautious interest in the activities of the Congolese rebels in the 1960s, might fall in this category of response. Another discernible type of response, for which Kenya
and Tanzania would be a good example, is a deliberate display of imposition of restrait on exile/refugee behavior,
calculated to convey a message of fungible good will. On a continent where exiles/refugees have been used to inflict pain, these two countries have reversed the trend by using
each other's exiles/refugees as a currency to fetch a long- desired rapprochement. Instead of using the exiles/refugees to hurt each other, they exchanged them in order to create the necessary confidence to reopen trade, transport and other forets of communication between them.
A look into the various motives which made the host countries in Eastern Africa support the subversive activities of their exiles/refugees confirms some of the
theoretical propositions discussed in Chapter 1. For 167 example, kinship affinity is clearly discernible as a motive in Uganda's support for the southern Sudanese separatists, particularly under Idi Amin, a Kakwa by tribe, who identified very strongly with the predicament of his fellow
Kakwas of Sudan. The case of Uganda also corroborates the proposition that, in some cases, countries or origin make false allegations of subversion against host countries, in order to deflect attention from domestic problems. Whenever Amin
faced domestic problems, such as army mutinies and defections, or strife among different religions, he used to
fabricate and disseminate information alarming the Ugandan population to some impending invasion by Tanzania and its pro-Obote exiles. Sudan often resorted to the same gimmick with respect to its exiles in Libya.
National interest has been clearly one of the major motives behind Somalia's support for the exiled secessionist
Ethiopian Somalis, in order to promote its irredentist policy enshrined in its constitution. This is true even though at some point the irredentist motive seems to have become overshadowed, but not entirely supplanted, by the motives of superpower rivalry in the region.
As in the case of Southern Africa, small groups of
politicized elites have been the life blood of subversion-
oriented exile/refugee organizations in Eastern Africa.
This has been so despite the fact that numerically the
exile/refugee population of peasant stock has been far 168 greater in Eastern Africa than in Southern Africa.- As in
Southern Africa, the peasant refugee communities have only served as a reservoir from which mobilized elites have recruited combatants.
The massive nature of population dislocations in
Eastern Africa, involving exiles/refugees, particularly in
Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, has ironically made the region better known abroad. The necessary relief work has made at least thirty voluntary agencies rush ta the scene ta work with the governments concerned ta alleviate the human misery brought about by the exile/refugee phenomemon. In this regard, the presence of these agencies has not only been welcome, but highly desirable. But in some cases, agencies like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have clashed with the host governments over policy and matters of national security. However, as I will explain in
Chapter 5, the states affected have tended ta see this side effect of relief work by voluntary agencies as a minor nuissance and a manageable liability.
Compared ta the other regions of Africa discussed in this study, Eastern Africa could be considered ta have experienced the greatest intensity of conflict due ta the exile/refugee problem. This proposition is justified by the fact that the region experienced two full scale wars, both of which had the exile/refugee factor as one of the major causes. In the Somali-Ethiopian war of the later 1970s, the secessionist endeavors of the WSLF promoted from its 169
sanctuary in Somalia were undoubtedly the central, but by no means the only factor. In the Uganda-Tanzania war of the
late 1970s, Idi Amin of Uganda provoked Tanzania partly to punish it for its continued support for Ugandan exiles, whose presence next door constituted a constant threat to his regime. 170
CHAPTER IV
THE RELATIVELY LESS AFFECTED REGIONS: NORTHERN AFRICA, WEST AFRICA AND CENTRAL AFRICA
The purpose of this chapter is to show that the regions of Northern, West and Central Africa have also had relations among their member states affected by the exile/refugee problem. An attempt is made to present the facts which make that case and to explain why the experiences of these regions have not been as explosive as those of Southern and Eastern Africa.
In the case of Northern Africa, an attempt will be made to show how the Saharawi exile/refugee situation has
affected relations within the sub-region comprising Algeria,
Morocco, Mauritania and Libya. Another area of focus will be the extent to which Libya has used exiled dissidents to
destabilize Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali,
Egypt, Senegal and Gambia. In the case of West Africa, the
impact made by major exile/refugee groups such as the Portuguese Guineans, Chadians and Guineans will be examined.
Furthermore, Ghana's and Burkina Faso's alleged support for
exile/refugee subversion will be discussed. As for the
situation is Central Africa, the experiences of Cameroon,
the two Congos, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe,
and former Belgian Central Africa will be explored. 171
Finally, in an analytical summary at the end of the chapter, sonie comparison between the experiences of the three regions and those of Southern and Eastern Africa will be attempted.
Northern Africa
Relations among the states of the Northern African region - Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco,
Mauritania, and the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic
(Western Sahara) - have also been affeçted by the exile/refugee phenomenon. Of these seven countries, only
Algeria and the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) have generated large numbers of exiles/refugees because of the violent nature of the decolonization process in these territories. In the case of Algeria, some 80,000 exiles/refugees had to flee to Morocco and another 85,000 to
Tunisia in 1958 when the National Liberation Front (FLN) was fighting the French colonial regime in Algeria. When
Algeria became independent in 1962, almost all these exiles/refugees returned home before they could become a source of conflict between independent Algeria and its neighbors.
Saharawi Exiles/Refugees as a Cause of Conflict
The Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, initially known as Spanish Sahara, and subsequently as Western Sahara, has also generated thousands of exiles/refugees who sought asylum mainly in Algeria, Mauritania, and Morocco. The earliest exodus of Saharawi people took place in the late 172
1950s and in the 1960s in the wake of brutal Spanish colonial repressions. It was during this period that exiles/refugees fled into Mauritania and southern Morocco.
Algeria did not become the major country of asylum for the
Saharawi exiles until late 1975, when their territory became occupied by Morocco and Mauritania.- Following this occupation in late 1975 and early 1976, approximately
100,000 exiles/refugees from Western Sahara were given asylum in the Algerian area of Tindouf. Thus, the root cause of the flight of Saharawi exiles/refugees has been the double colonization by Spain and Morocco-Mauritania, which necessitated nationalist resistance on the part of the Saharawi people.
Organized Saharawi nationalist resistance against
Spanish colonialism took concrete shape in the 1960s. Of the resistance movements which were formed during that period, the Saharan Liberation Front was the best organized.
It was formed in 1968 by conservative Saharawi Muslim students in Rabat, Morocco. By 1970, it was able to organize an important nationalist demonstration in el-Ayoun.
The Spanish Army crushed the demonstration and went after its organizers. The latter and their sympathizers had to flee to Mauritania, from where they, under the naine of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguiet al-Hamra and
Rio del Oro (Polisario), launched a series of attacks on
Spanish troops in 1973. For the next couple of years,
Mauritania remained Polisario's major base until when, in 173
1975, the Front shifted its patronage to Algeria. This shift became necessary because the Madrid Accords, which granted administrative control over part of Western Sahara to Mauritania, ipso facto turned Mauritania against the Polisario Front. Exile/refugee exodus from Western Sahara was much less under Spanish colonialism than under the joint Morocco- Mauritania occupation of the territory. After 1975, the armies of Morocco and Mauritania subjected the Saharawi population to the horrors of modern warfare, whose intensity generated a large flood of exiles/refugees. By 1982, the population of Saharawi exiles/refugees in Algeria was about 167,000. The relationship between Algeria and the exiled Saharawi community has been too close for Morocco's liking. Morocco, which has been at war with Polisario since 1975, views Algeria as an enemy for having put Polisario in a strong military position. It is commonly believed in Morocco and, indeed, elsewhere that deprived of arms through and from Algeria, and its sanctuary in Algeria, Polisario would run into immense military difficulties. Algerian support for Polisario has been material, military and diplomatic. In ternis of material support, Algeria provided, above ail else, land upon which six refugee camps have been established and a significant fraction of the imputs which have sustained the livelihood of the refugees in these sanctuaries. John Damis has, for 174 instance, estimated that at a given time, Algeria spent US $36,000-50,000 a day on food and medicine ta support the refugee population in the camps in Tindouf.2 Militarily, Algeria has partly helped ta train Polisario forces. It has also at least allowed the passage of arms ta Polisario from external arms suppliers, if indeed it has not itself undertaken that supply function. In the area of diplomacy,
Algeria has consistently pushed, in different international fora, for the self-determination resolution in favor of the
Saharawi people.
Algeria's strong commitment ta support Polisario did not exist prior ta the date of the joint Morocco-Mauritania occupation of Western Sahara. In fact, before the tripartite agreement of November 1975, the Algerian government is said ta have even "confiscated arms sent ta the Polisario by Libya on the backs of camels or in Land
Rovers across Algeria."3 It is no wonder, therefore, that some analysts of the Western Sahara conflict view Algeria's involvement on the side of Polisario in terms of the former's regional balance-of-power interests.4 According ta this analysis, the Morocco-Mauritania takeover of Western
Sahara disturbed the regional balance of power in favor of Morocco, since Western Sahara's rich phosphates deposits would give Morocco an economic edge over Algeria in the supply of phosphates. As Algeria did not want ta directly attack Morocco in order ta restore the balance, it threw a strategic supportive weight behind Polisario ta keep 175
Morocco's power in check. The Saharawi's sanctuaries in Algeria have been an invaluable asset for the Polisario movement in its mission to struggle for the independence of Western Sahara. It was thanks to the existence of these sanctuaries that Polisario was able to mobilize the Saharawi people into a nationalist force and to create a national consciousness which did not exist before. The organizational capabilities which Polisario has demonstrated were nurtured by the reassuring safety of the sanctuaries. The existence of the sanctuaries further enabled Polisario to develop its military effectiveness which made Mauritania drop out of the fight in 1978, and which made the war extremely costly for Morocco. In sum, it was thanks to the existence of the sanctuaries in Algeria that Polisario had the confidence to declare the independence of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) on February 27, 1976. The Western Sahara exile/refugee phenomenon is somewhat unique. Whereas, in most cases examined so far, the exile/refugee situation pits the country of asylum against the country of origin of the exiles/refugees, the conflict in Northwest Africa has assumed a different modality. The Western Sahara exile/refugee phenomenon brought conflict between the asylum country (Algeria) and two occupying states (Morocco and Mauritania) in the region
- a situation more or less analogous to the current conflict involving Namibia's SWAPO, South Africa and, say, Zimbabwe. 176
This is because the SADR government has remained basically a government in exile, without full control of the entire territory of Western Sahara. Thus, in the Northwest African situation, the country of origin "is not part of the usual equation in which conflict normally entails: "exiles/refugees," "country of origin," and "country of asylum." Algeria's support for Polisario has been an important source of tension in its relations with Morocco and Mauritania, respectively. As far as Morocco is concerned, Algeria has been the major obstacle to the success of the former's irredentist policy which, once at its highest, called for the reunification of Morocco with part of
Algeria, northern Mali, Mauritania and Western Sahara into a single Moroccan Empire. Morocco currently views its claim over a portion of Western Sahara as an effort to reunify the Moroccan homeland seized in bits and pieces by Spain and France in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Having settled its irredentist claims over Algerian territory in the Algeria-Morocco border convention signed in 1972, and its claim over Mauritania in its recognition of the latter at the 1969 Islamic Conference in Rabat, followed by a treaty of friendship between the two countries, Morocco presently regards Western Sahara as the last part of its historic kingdom to be recovered. Annoyed by Algeria's obstruction of its irredentist pursuits, Morocco asserts that the basic dispute over 177
Western Sahara is with Algeria which provides vital support and sanctuary for the Polisario guerrillas. It justifies this assertion by arguing that Algeria is using Polisario as a proxy to promote its own regional ambitions. In Morocco's view, Algeria wants to see the birth of a weak Saharawi state which would be aligned with Algeria, thus increasing the latter's dominance in the Maghreb. Morocco's major handicap in its war with the Polisario
Front has been its inability to strike at Polisario's sanctuaries inside Algeria, because if Morocco invoked the right of hot pursuit to hit Polisario in its bases, that would be tantamount to declaring war with Algeria. This handicap frustrated Morocco so much that in February, 1976,
King Hassan of Morocco publicly called on Algeria to "come out and fight or negotiate."5 In November of the following year, King Hassan threatened hot pursuit but did not carry
it out.
Morocco's inability to strike at Polisario's
sanctuaries in Algeria was a source of frustration not only because it made the prospect of winning the war extremely remote, but also because the protracted war was costing
Morocco a great deal. A 1980 U.S. congressional report
revealed that in Morocco, war-related outlays were estimated
at "more than $1 million a day since the conflict began."6
The saine report pointed out that the war had also "put a
severe drain on manpower, resulting in troop diversions from key positions on the Algerian border to southern Morocco and 178 the Western Sahara."7 The strained relations between Algeria and Morocco due to the Saharawi exile/refugee factor manifested themselves
in several ways. Perhaps the mildest of these was the war
of words which characterized the two countries' media. Since 1975, each country's press has been attacking the hostile policies of the other. Occasionally, more severe forms of hostility have strained the relations between the two-countries. For instance, in 1976, Morocco dropped
napalm bombs on Saharawi refugees in Western Sahara, and
this prompted Algeria to commit its troops to the Polisario
war effort. It was on this occasion that Algerian and
Moroccan troops twice clashed at Amgala, on oasis settlement southeast of Smara in Saguiet al-Hamra.
In 1978, Morocco alleged that its troops had once
again clashed with Algerian troops. As a result of this
alleged direct participation of Algeria in the war, Morocco
declared the right of hot pursuit into Algerian territory
and urgently requested a meeting of the UN Security Council. None of these measures was effective. Hot pursuit was not
carried out for fear of setting off a Morocco-Algeria war,
and the UN Security Council could not take any action
against Algeria because Morocco failed to produce proof of
Algerian involvement in the alleged attacks. In 1980,
Moroccan planes crossed the Algerian border in pursuit of
Polisario guerrillas. The following year, Moroccan troops
followed Polisario guerrillas inside Algeria, after 179
Polisario had broken an agreement negotiated with Algeria, barring Polisario's attacks on pre-1975 Morocco from Algerian sanctuaries.8
The strained relations between Morocco and Algeria, in connection with the Saharawi exile/refugee situation, found expression in two other ways. In 1975-76, the Algerian government expelled between thirty and forty thousand
Moroccans, most of whom had lived for a long time in the
Oran region of western Algeria. Furthermore, Morocco and
Algeria broke diplomatic relations in 1976.
Mauritania's relations with its neighbors have also been affected by the Saharawi exile/refugee problem. I mentioned earlier that prior to 1975, many members of the
Polisario Front had found refuge in Mauritania. The latter severed its relations with the movement when it agreed to occupy and appropriate part of Western Sahara as stipulated in the Madrid Accords. Mauritania rationalized its acceptance to occupy part of Western Sahara on two grounds.
The first was a long-cherished irredentist vision of a greater Mauritania, aimed at uniting similar peoples, sonie of whom inhabited Western Sahara. The second ground was
Mauritania's wish to ingratiate itself with Morocco by being a partner in the annexation of Western Sahara, and in so doing, winning Moroccons support and hopefully getting
Morocco to renounce any potential territorial claims on
Mauritania. Such a policy was inevitably bound to turn 180
Mauritania and the Polisario Front into enemies almost overnight. Soon after Mauritania had reversed its policy towards Polisario, the latter turned its guns at its former keeper. The war which ensued drained Mauritania's fledgling economy and deeply wounded its political system. By 1977, the costs of war overwhelmed Mauritania's economy in the wake of Polisario's intensification of guerrilla activities inside Mauritania. The latter's vulnerability necessitated a defense cooperation with Morocco. Thus, on May 13, 1977, both governments signed a military assistance agreement covering such areas as: joint border security measures, military training and assistance, intelligence-sharing, etc. Morocco's limited assistance did not do much to alleviate the economic and political costs which the war was imposing on Mauritania. By 1978, the system could absorb no more of the costs, and President Ould Daddah's government was overthrown on July 10 by a group of army officers. Two days later, Polisario declared a unilateral ceasefire in Mauritania, in order to create a face-saving opportunity for the new government in Mauritania to honorably withdraw from the war. Throughout the remaining months of 1978, the new Mauritanian government agonized over the issue of whether it should continue to occupy its portion of Western Sahara or accept Polisario's offer of a ceasefire and withdraw. The decision was not an easy one to make. On the one hand, the 181 political and economic imperatives objectively suggested that the only rational choice was ta withdraw. On the other hand, there was a danger that after a peace agreement with
Polisario was concluded, Polisario guerrillas would be crossing Mauritanian territory ta attack targets in Morocco, an act that would pit Morocco against Mauritania. This scenario suggested the possibility of a large-scale invasion of northern Mauritania by Moroccan forces.
Amidst this hesitation, Polisario ended its ceasefire offer in July, 1979, and launched a massive attack on the
Mauritanian post of Tichia. Following this attack, the odds in favor of Mauritania's withdrawal option prevailed. Thus,
Mauritania withdrew its claim over part of Western Sahara in
1979, albeit without immediate formai recognition of the
SADR. This action gave a new complexion ta Mauritania's relations with its neighbors.
Needless ta say, relations between Mauritania and
Algeria were very much affected by the former's occupation of Western Sahara in 1975-76. When Algeria recognized the
SADR in March 1976, Mauritania responded by breaking diplomatic relations with Algeria. Ever since, the Algerian government made occasional threats ta Mauritania, capitalizing on the latter's vulnerability and short- sightedness in carrying out its policy of occupation. Ould
Laddah has paraphrased one of Algerian President
Boumediene's threats ta that effect:
Your country [Mauritania] is weak, fragile with borders difficuit ta defend. We [Algeria] have decided, against 182
ail comers, to support the Saharawis, in the narre of revolutionary solidarity. We are going to place at their disposai ail that we possess. And, if it is necessary, we will permit the involvement of fifty thousand, even one-hundred thousand, Algerian volunteers to occupy the Sahara. They will also be able to attack you inside your borders, destroy your economc installations, and even attack your capital. It makes sense to assume that threats of this nature added to the pressure which, in the end, made Mauritania opt out of the war in Western Sahara. Mauritania's ceasefire with Polisario cost the former its best friend and partner in the region-Morocco. When Morocco was abandoned by Mauritania in the occupation of Western Sahara, the former began to allege that the latter had switched sides and was positively giving assistance to
Polisario. For example, when Polisario shot down a Moroccan bomber and fighter over Guelta Zemmour in October, 1981, Morocco denounced Mauritania, claiming that the attack was mounted from Mauritania, and that Polisario guerrillas had a sanctuary in Mauritania. Subsequently, Moroccan planes flew into Mauritania to attack what Morocco claimed to be Polisario sanctuaries. Morocco's allegations were refuted by a Mauritanian government spokesman who said:
We do not want... to be drawn back into the war. To our knowledge, neither Polisario nor Morocco use our territory, but it is vast. Do you think we have a surplus of food or equipment to give abroad? Mauritania cannot afford the luxury of aiding another state. In its resolve to castigate the Mauritania government of President Haidallah, Morocco assisted an exiled Mauritanian dissident group to organize an abortive coup against the Mauritanian government in 1982. This pro- 183
Moroccan group, the Alliance for a Democratic Mauritania
(AMD), entered Mauritania via Senegal. In order ta
demonstrate that it had not been involved in the plot,
Senegal immediately expelled the AMD leadership from its
territory.
Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania have not been the only
countries affected by the Saharawi exile/refugee problem.
Libya has also been involved in the Western Sahara conflict
as a provider for Polisario. Libya's assistance ta
Polisario has been both financial and military. During
Polisario's infancy, from 1973 ta 1975, Libya was the
Front's major financial and military supporter. From 1976,
Libya's support has complemented that of Algeria in
financial aid, weapons, training of Polisario units, medical
supplies, and education in Libya for Saharawi children.
Libya provided this assistance in a variety of fields until
mid-1981, when its relations with Morocco became normalized.
Subsequently, Libya suspended its supply of military
equipment ta Polisario, "although it continued ta meet the payroll of Polisario leaders and perhaps provided stipends
for guerrilla forces."11
Libya's interest in supporting Polisario seems ta have
been motivated by Qaddafi's desire ta weaken Morocco-his
long-time ideological enemy. His strategy was ta strengthen
Polisario sa that the latter could overpower Mauritania and
force it ta sign a peace agreement. In Qaddafi's scheme,
the peace agreement would have the double effect of securing 184
Mauritania's withdrawal from Western Sahara and the isolation of Morocco.
Relations between Libya and Morocco had been bad even before Libya's support for Polisario. The Moroccan government has charged that the March 1973 outbreak of guerrilla activities in the mountains and cities of Morocco, which were timed to coincide with celebrations marking the
12th anniversary of King Hassan II's accession to the throne, was organized by the Libya-sponsored National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP). The members of this subversive movement were allegedly financed, armed, trained and backed up with radio propaganda against Morocco by Libya, in order to forcent revoit against the Moroccan regime. The
antagonism which existed between Morocco and Libya in the
early 1970s was scarcely discrete. In a typical Moroccan
counter-propaganda broadcast, listeners would hear a barking
dog, and the announcer would say: "Throw Qaddafi a bone."
The compound insult in this message was that "Qaddafi was a
dog" and that "dogs bark, but the caravan passes," meaning that Qaddafi's propaganda against Morocco was empty noise that would be of no consequence.
Libya's Use of Exiled Dissidents as a Tool for Destabilization of its Neighbors Since Qaddafi came to power in Libya in 1969, he has frequently used exiles/refugees as an instrument of foreign policy against regimes he dislikes. The example of his support for Morocco's members of the UNFP against King 185
Hassan has already been cited. Similar cases affecting other countries abound. Tunisia is a case in point. In
1980 and 1982, Tunisian guerrillas trained in Libya made raids into southern Tunisia and the west central part of the country, in the hope of triggering a revolution against
President Habib Bourguiba. In the 1980 incident,.a group of
Tunisian dissidents known as the Tunisian Resistance Army
(ATR) trained in Libya was flown from Tripoli to Rome, and on to Algiers, where they were taken by bus to the Tunisian border. After linking up with other dissidents inside the country, they attacked the town of Gafsa. The group was later overpowered by government forces.12 Consequently,
Tunisia expelled the Libyan ambassador and recalled its own
from Tripoli. Libya's support for opponents of its North
African neighbors seems to be just a part of a broader Qaddafi's scheme of "exporting revolution." From the
following description of guerrilla training establishments
in Libya, it seems that subversion using exiled dissidents
of a target country has become an institution in Libya:
...Beyond Benghazi, Tobruk and Tripoli, concealed in the Wadis and sand dunes of Cyrenaica, the Libyans built training camps and vast arsenals where militant Arabs and Africans were taught the arts of guerrilla warfare and where Soviet-supplied Kalashnikov rifles, RPF-7, rocket launchers, machine guns, laï l and sea mines were stored for judicious distribution.
Other African countries in the vicinity of Libya which have been affected by that Libyan subversion "project" besides Morocco and Tunisia are: Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali,
and Egypt. Complaints against Libya's subversion using 186 exiled dissidents have been heard from even further afield in Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, and Ivory Coast.
The scenarios described sa far in this chapter in relation ta the effect of the exile/refugee phenomenon upon relations between and among Algeria, Morocco, Western Sahara
(SADR), Tunisia and Libya have been limited ta the Northern
African intraregional dimension of the phenomenon in question. Nevertheless, there also exists an inter-regional dimension, as for example, the effect of Chadian exiles/refugees upon relations between Libya and Chad. As I pointed out in Chapter III, when I briefly discussed the strained relations between Sudan and Libya, the latter has been very deeply embroiled in the politics of Chad - initially on the side of the exiled wing of the Front for
National Liberation of Chad (FROLINAT), and subsequently on the side of Goukouni Woddeye's forces-after FROLINAT had been split by factionalism.
The problem of strained relations between Libya and
Chad stemmed from Libya's support for the Chadian exiles who had been carrying out a guerrilla war against the Chadian government since 1966. Libya's assistance ta the exiles included radio time ta beam propaganda broadcasts ta Chad, arms, cash, and training facilities for the guerrillas.
There were signs of improvement between Libya and Chad in
1970, following the coming ta power of Qaddafi in 1969.
Initially, Qaddafi's government was less sympathetic ta
Chadian exiles than Libya's ousted King had been. However, 187 the burgeoning rapprochement proved ta be very short-lived.
By 1971, relations between Libya and Chad were so bad that Chad's President Tombalbaye accused Libya of being behind a foiled coup plot. It was because of this alleged conspiracy that Chad severed diplomatic relations with Libya in 1971. From this time on, Qaddafi's government extend covert support ta FROLINAT, and attacks on President
Tombalbaye became a constant feature of Libyan radio.
At the peak of President Tombalbaye's anger, he declared, in 1971, that he was ready ta grant Libyan opposition elements a base in Chad. According ta Nouvelle
Afrique, the President said: "If anyone of Libyan origin asks me for a base within Chad ta make war on Qaddafi, I am ready ta grant it ta him."14 This seems ta be the first time that an African head of state had publicly said he would support subversion against a fellow OAU member.
President Hamani Diori of neighboring Niger offered ta mediate, and his efforts were somewhat fruitful. From 1972 until the overthrow of Tombalbaye in 1975, the conflict between Libya and Chad de-escalated. In December, 1972,
Chad's President Tombalbaye went on a state visit ta Libya, after which Libya pledged ta contribute ta the strengthening of unity in Chad and ta grant Chad development credits. On this occasion, Libya also promised ta turn over ta Chad any
FROLINAT guerrillas exiled in Libya. Although arms
smuggling across the Libyan border and guerrilla action did not cease altogether, official reports of the time indicated 188 a sharp decline in guerrilla activities following Libya's closure of sonie guerrilla camps. This Libya-Chad rapprochement was facilitated by another factor, besides Diori's mediation: Chad's decision to adopt an anti-Israel foreign policy. With the advent of the Malloum government in Chad, the Libya-Chad rapprochement came to a sudden hault. By April 1976, Malloum was denouncing Libya for supporting FROLINAT and occupying Chad's Aouzou strip. In October of that year, Chad closed its border with Libya, and later on, President Malloum notified Qaddafi that there would be no talk of cooperation between the two countries until Libya had withdrawn from the Aouzou strip.15 While all this was happening, the factionalism within FROLINAT had thoroughly polarized the feuding groups within the exiled wing of the Front. The Goukouni Woddeye faction and that of Hissene Habre forged alliances with Libya and the Malloum government, respectively. Goukouni Woddeye, characterizing his alliance with Libya as tactical, maintained FROLINAT's belligerent policy against Chad's government. In contrast, Hissene Habre negotiated with the government of Felix Malloum, which he entered as Prime Minister in 1978, claiming that the country was under invasion from Libya. The conflict between the factions of Woddeye and Habre pitted Libya against Chad once again.
It was in this unfolding decline in the two countries'
fragile detente that, at a meeting of the OAU Council of 189
Ministers in Libreville (Gabon), in June 1977, Chad's
Foreign Minister accused Libya of arming and aiding the rebels in Northern Chad, asking the OAU to use its authority to restore Chad's rights in the Aouzou strip. The following month, Chad complained that 4,000 Libyans had joined the rebels in an attack on the Chadian town of Bardai. In
February 1978, Chad suspended diplomatic relations with
Libya, which had already been severed once and restored.
The Libya-Chad conflict revolving around Libya's support for exiled Chadian rebels has persisted through the 1980s.
As pointed out earlier, Chad has not been the only victim of Libyans subversion using exiled dissidents. The government of the late President Seyne Kountche of Niger was under pressure from Libya, as the latter gave support to the exiled dissident movement led by the son of former President
Hamani Diori of Niger, in the movement's attempt to topple
Seyne Kountche's government. This exiled dissident movement's dependence on Libya undoubtedly encouraged and
facilitated Libyans claim and occupation of the northern
corner of Niger.
Libya has also supported exiled subversive movements
against Mali. Two such movements are the Liberation Front
for Southern Sahara, which facilitated Libyans occupation of
the northern corner of Mali, and the Front for the
Liberation of East Sahara, consisting mainly of Touareg
tribesmen. 190
Egyptian exiles have also found in Libya the kind of support they needed to pursue subversive activities against the Egyptian government, such as sabotage of public installations and assassinations. For its part, Egypt has retaliated by supporting an anti-Qaddafi movement called the
Libyan Nationalist Gathering. Members of this movement include rebel Libyan Army officers who began making daily anti-Qaddafi broadcasts from Cairo. Their main criticisms of Qaddafi were that he had deviated from the principles of the September 1969 revolution and that he had misused oil revenues to finance transnational terrorist activities. At times, mutual subversion has brought Egypt and Libya to the brink of war. For instance, in 1977, relations between the two countries got so bad that Egyptian aircraft attacked targets in Libya, including Libya's second largest air base at the Kufra oasis. In the political turbulence which ensued, nearly 100,000'Egyptians who had been working in
Libya left the country.
From what has been said so far about the effect of the exile/refugee factor upon interstate relations in Northern
Africa, the emerging picture is one of conflict with hardly any instance of cooperation. One exception to this dominant pattern was relations between Algeria and Mali in the 1960s.
Since the early 1960s, Mali has experienced the problem of
Touareg separatism. The Touareg of northern Mali, who did not want to pay their allegiance to the Mali state mainly controlled by people from the southern part of the country, 191 used to escape across the border into Algeria, whenever the
Mali government cracked down on separatist elements.
Since Algerian cooperation was essential to the success of Mali's operations against the Touareg, Algeria decided to please the government of Mali by cooperating.
Thus, towards the end of 1963, President Ben Bella of
Algeria granted Mali the right to pursue Touareg rebels across the Algerian border. On several occasions, the
Algerians captured Touareg rebel leaders who had crossed the border, and handed them over to the Malian authorities. The cooperation between Mali and Algeria was subsequently reinforced by a border agreement concluded in July, 1964 and by the visit of Mali's President to Algeria in August of the saine year.16
West Africa
For purposes of this study, West Africa consists of
Benin (formerly Dahomey), Burkina Faso (formally Upper
Volta), Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau (formerly
Portuguese Guinea), Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger,
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
Portuguese Guinea, Its Exiles/Refugees and the Neighboring Host Countries
One of the earliest exile/refugee situations in West Africa arose in former Portuguese Guinea (now Guinea Bissau) in the wake of the arduous decolonization struggles initiated by indigenous nationalists. In Portuguese Guinea, the decolonization process was well underway in the early 192
1950s. The major movement which ultimately won the country's independence--the Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) -- was founded in 1954 by Amilcar Cabral. The repressive policies of the Portuguese colonial regime forced the leadership of the PAIGC and other nationalist movements into exile. After neighboring French Guinea became independent in 1958, the PAIGC established its headquarters in Conakry, the capital of Guinea, where it received considerable assistance from President Sekou Toure. It was in Guinea that the PAIGC trained its guerrillas since 1960, when it resolved to embark on armed resistance. The PAIGC was not the only exiled nationalist movement fighting for the independence of Portuguese Guinea. There were rival, albeit less well organized groups. One such movement was the Movement for the Liberation of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (MLG) based in Senegal. A number of such other groups met in Senegal in July, 1961, and constituted a United Front for the Liberation of Guinea and Cape Verde Islands (FUL). The armed wings of these movements recruited their guerrillas from the many thousands of exiles/refugees in Guinea and Senegal, the two major countries of asylum for Portuguese Guinean exiles/refugees and the two major targets of the vindictive Portuguese military.17 By 1961, the colonial regime in Portuguese Guinea had embarked on military operations violating Guinea's and 193
Senegal's respective air space. In response ta one such violation against Senegal, members of the Senegal-based
Movement for the Liberation of Guinea and Cape Verde Islands
(MLG), which had been incorporated into FUL, attacked three border towns in Portuguese Guinea. For its part, Senegal responded ta the violation of its air space by breaking diplomatic relations with Portugal. These incidents marked the beginning of more than a decade of conflict between colonial Portuguese Guinea and the two countries hosting
Portuguese Guinean exiles/refugees - Senegal and Guinea. At the center of the conflict were the activities of the exiled groups, principal among which were the PAIGC and the Front
for National Liberation of Guinea (FLING). From 1964
onwards, the PAIGC intensified military activities against
the Portuguese colonial regime. For its part, FLING also
made some minor incursions into Portuguese Guinea along the
Senegalese border in 1966 and 1967. As the exiled movements intensified their military
activities, the Portuguese colonial regime also intensified
its military incursions into Senegal and Guinea. For
instance, towards the end of 1969, Portuguese colonial troops bombarded the Senegalese border village of Samine which was one of the supply bases for the PAIGC. One persan died and eight others were wounded.18 Subsequently, Senegal
lodged a complaint with the UN Security Council. The latter
severely condemned the Portuguese aggression by 13 votes ta
none. Despite this condemnation, Portuguese colonial troops 194 continued to pursue guerrilla units across the border into
Senegal and Guinea. In November 1970, heavy fighting broke out in Conakry, the capital of Guinea, and Guinea accused
Portugal of having invaded its territory. These occasional raids continued until Portuguese Guinea became independent in 1974.
Ghana at the Center of the Exile/Refugee Controversy in West Africa Ghana has been, by far, the most frequently accused West African country of supporting exiles/refugees in subversive activities against their countries of origin. This was partly because the progressive and somewhat radical nature of Nkrumah's politics tended to attract like-minded political activists from all over Africa, who hoped to use the Ghanaian safe haven to meditate, strategize, and ultimately bring about the kind of political change they deemed necessary in their respective home countries. It was for this reason that Nkrumah's Ghana was often accused on "maintaining large camps for the training of cadres to take over neighboring African governments with which he had ideological disagreements.1119 Ghana never admitted the contents of such accusations, although it never denied having a generous asylum policy. In a policy statement made by Nkrumah in June, 1963, he announced the principles that would henceforth govern the granting of political asylum in Ghana to nationals of other African countries, pointing out that his country would: 195
i. continue to grant hospitality to African kinsmen and brothers who leave their home states for any reason; ii. allow such refugees to work in Ghana in order to earn their living; iii. in no case give them any material assistance inasmuch as the independent African states maintain a central fund for the granting of assistance to freedom fighters; iv. forbid such refugees to do anything whatsoever against the government or the institutions of their country as long as they remain in Ghana. 20 Despite Ghana's declared commitment to forbid exiles/refugees to attack or subvert their home countries, its neighbors persisted in articulating the saine accusation. For example, in 1965, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) accused Ghana of being the all-Africa sponsor of subversion. Upper Volta's President Yameogo told a press conference in Ouagadougou that: It is no secret to anyone that President Nkrumah harbors in his country all the opponents of all regimes that are not similar to his. He not only harbors them, but educates them and trains them to use them against the states which do not share his ideas... His final objective is the physical elimination of all the hea5l of state who do not accept the policy of his regime. Two months later, the feelings of the government of Niger on the saure subject were disclosed when in an article published in Le Niger of June 1965, National Assembly
President Boubou Hama asked: Where is Ghana heading? Is Brother Nkrumah really in control of the situation in Ghana?... Can [he] tell us why 50 young Niger nationals are currently trained in secret camps in Odumassi-Konongo? Can he also tell us why the training camp of Mampong was removed to Half- Assini, from Half-Assini to Axim, and then abruptly removed from Axim to Odumassi-Konongo? Can Kwame Nkrumah tell us what Niger, Nigeria, Cameroun, and Upper 196
Volta nationals are doing in the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological nstitute at Winneba, the den of terrorists? 2 It was against this background that Niger, the Ivory Coast and Upper Volta made a joint move to attempt to disqualify Accra, Ghana's capital as the site of the September 1965
Conference of the OAU heads of state and government. The charge that Ghana's alleged sponsorship of subversive exile/refugee groups should disqualify it from hosting the conference was of such importance that it was deliberated at the 1965 extraordinary meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers in Lagos.
Although it is difficult to prove whether or not all these accusations against Ghana were justified, there is enough evidence to show that, at least in the case of the
Ivory Coast, the complainte were well founded. The validity of the Ivory Coast's complaint lies in the fact that in 1959, Ghana allowed an Ivory Coast separatist movement of the Sanwi tribe to establish a government-in-exile in Ghana. Members of this Sanwi movement were allowed to operate against the Ivory Coast from their Ghanaian base. From the information on Ghanaian assistance to the Sanwi movement presented to the 1965 Extraordinary Session of the OAU
Council of Ministers in Lagos, evidence was produced to the effect that Ghana also gave financial support to the movement. Another incident which tends to confirm Ghana's support for the Sanwi separatist movement took place in 197
1965. At the fourth Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity (AAPSO)
Conference held at Winneba, Ghana, in 1965, the AAPSO conference received an application for membership from the Sanwi separatist movement. The Ivory Coast then came up with the hypothesis that the separatist movement's confidence to apply for AAPSO membership was due to the firm support it enjoyed from the government of Ghana, which was also interestingly the host of the conference.
The issue of Ghana's support for the Sanwi secessionist movement was so central to Ghana's relations with its neighbors, particularly the Ivory Coast of course,
that when Nkrumah's government was overthrown in 1966, one
of the first steps taken by the new military government in
the area of foreign policy was to hand over to the Ivory
Coast members of the Sanwi separatists in exile in Ghana. The new regime expressed regret for the "wrongs committed by
the former Nkrumah government in organizing subversion
against the Ivory Coast" and it handed over six "subversive
elements," including leaders of the outlawed Sanwi
movement.23 This handover was effected by a Ghanaian good
will mission which visited the Ivory Coast in March, 1966. The forcibly repatriated separatists were condemned to making public confessions, after which the Ivory Coast
President boosted the image of his government by announcing
his clemency in their favor.24
Although Ghana's neighbors have frequently accused it
of supporting their respective exiles/refugees to engage in 198 subversive activities, some of these neighbors have done exactly the saure thing they have accused Ghana of. Ghana had had its own secessionist movement since the mid-1950s, initiated by members of the Ewe tribe of former British
Togoland which was incorporated into the Ghanaian state shortly before the latter's independence. The aim of this
Ewe secessionist movement was to unify the Ewes of Ghana and those of Togo within the Togo state.
Togo's President, the late Silvanus Olympio, began to voice his country's sympathy for the secessionist cause of the Ghanaian Ewes as early as 1958. By 1960, sonie Ghanaian Ewes were being detained for charges of conspiring to use violence in their claim to be unified with the Ewes of French Togoland. From mid-1960 through 1961, several thousand exiles/refugees fled from Ghana to Togo, for fear
of being detained under Ghana's Preventive Detention Act,
either because of their membership to the (opposition)
United Party or because of their advocacy of Ewe separatism. The government of Ghana believed that these exiles/refugees
enjoyed much support from the governmént of Togo in their
activities against the Ghanaian state. It was against this
background that in 1960, Ghana accused Togo of "serving as a
base, and providing facilities, for people organizing
subversion and preparing to create disturbances in Ghana."25
In a White Paper published on December 11, 1961,
President Nkrumah's government accused Dr. Kofi A. Busia,
the leader of Ghana's opposition United Party, then in exile 199 in Togo, of planning ta set up a government-in-exile in Togo. Ghana alleged that Togo's President Olympia had promised Busia assistance ta overthrow Nkrumah's government, and that in return Busia had promised ta cede former British Togoland ta the Togo Republic. By 1962, relations between the two countries were sa bad that a January 1962 attempt on Olympio's life precipitated Togo's charges of Ghana's complicity. An attempt on Nkrumah's life in December of the saine year led ta similar accusations by Ghana against Togo.26 Amidst these mutual accusations and counter- accusations, Ghana explicitly demanded the extradition of Dr. Busia and other Ghanaian exiles in Togo. For most of 1962, the border between the two countries remained closed ta road traffic. It was reopened for a brief period from January, 1963, when Ghana recognized the new government of President Grunitzky, following the assassination of President Olympio in a military coup on January 13, 1963. Togo closed its border with Ghana again until April 23, 1966, two months after the overthrow of President Nkrumah. Soon after the fali of Nkrumah, sonie Ghanaian exiles/refugees in Togo returned home, mainly members of the opposition United Party. The problem of secessionism in Ghana did not end with the fall of Nkrumah's government, nor did Togo's policy of giving shelter and assistance ta Ghanaian secessionists. The various military and civilian governments which ruled Ghana after Nkrumah have, in varying degrees, faced the 200 problem of Ewe secessionism. Strong manifestations of the problem resurfaced in earnest in the early 1970s. The issue of Ewe secessionism became prominent again on the public agenda in July 1973, when the government of Ghana.disclosed that there had been a secessionist conspiracy among chiefs of the Ewe tribe and that all those concerned had been temporarily arrested. The new agitation for secession was
organized by a movement created in 1972, under the narre of
the National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland (NLMWT
or Tolimo). This clandestine movement was believed by
Ghanaian authorities to have a training base in Togo and to receive some assistance from Libya.
Ghana sought to contain the activities of the NLMWT by
adopting a conciliatory policy toward the members of the
movement. Early in 1975, the government of Ghana offered an
amnesty to all NLMWT members who accepted to end their
secessionist activities by December 1, 1975, and it stated
that those who would avail themselves of the amnesty would
not be punished. Those in exile were assured that they could return to Ghana and live there as law-abiding
citizens. Just before the amnesty period expired, the NLMWT
published a declaration calling for UN action on Togo's
claim on the former British Togoland part of Ghana.
Three weeks after the amnesty deadline, Ghana's head
of state, Col. Acheampong extended the deadline to the end
of January, 1976. He also disclosed that a plot, by
secessionist elements, to overthrow his government had 201 recently been uncovered. Although many exiled NLMWT members took advantage of the amnesty to return home, sonie leading members of the movement chose to remain in exile. As these members persisted in their secessionist demands with overt backing by Togo, Ghana officially terminated the amnesty on March 3, 1976, under a decree which banned any organization, and specifically the NLMWT, whose objectives included advocating and promoting the secession from Ghana of the former British-mandated territory of Togoland or any part of it, or the integration of this territory with any foreign territory. In November, 1977, Acheampong warned the secessionists again, stating that his country was "prepared to shed blood to the last drop to defend the territorial integrity of the nation."27 The unresolved conflict between Ghana and Togo over the issue of using each other's exiles/refugees as proxies in an undeclared war has been inherited by the successive regimes in Ghana, and it has remained a political constant in the Eyadema government in Togo, which has been in place for over two decades at the time of this writing. This latent conflict flared up in 1984 and 1986. two decades at the time of this writing. This latent conflict flared up in 1984 and 1986. When the Ghanaian government headed by Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings thwarted a coup attempt against it in June 1984, it said that the abortive coup had been launched from Togo where, according to UNHCR statistics, there were about 202
250 Ghanaian refugees living there at the time. A government spokesman implicated Togo, saying: "It is very difficult to escape from the conclusion that if they [Togo] are not aiding, then, at least they are overlooking what these people are doing."28 This accusation was made despite the fact that Togo had lately threatened to arrest any group of Ghanaian exiles holding meetings on Togolese territory, and despite the fact that around January 1984, Togolese authorities had intercepted and turned away a ship carrying arms and ammunition to Ghanaian exiles/refugees based in Togo. For its part, Togo's complaints about Ghana's subversion subsided after the fall of Nkrumah in 1966, resurfacing only every once in a while during the two decades that followed. One such occasion was in October, 1977, when an investigation into an abortive plot to assassinate Togo's President Eyadema revealed that the would-be assassins (foreign mercenaries), allegedly employed by the sons of former President Olympio of Togo, had been trained on a farm in Ghana.29 The next major set of complaints occurred in 1986, when Togo accused Ghana and Burkina Faso of having armed and financed a 70-man commando squad which attempted to overthrow the government of Gnassingbe Eyadema on September 23, 1986. The basis for the accusation against Ghana was that the commandos had entered Togo directly from Ghanaian territory. Furthermore, some of the commandos who were captured and interrogated by agents 203 of the Togolese security services confessed ta having been recruited and trained in Ghana. In the tense political atmosphere which followed the attempted coup incident, both
Togo and Ghana closed their borders ta each other.
However, even at the height of the 1986 crisis, Ghana and Togo did not fail ta extend some token cooperation ta each other. Just before the September commando attack against Togo, the Interior and Foreign Affairs Ministers of
Togo visited Ghana at the beginning of August, where they held talks with their Ghanaian counterparts. The two delegations decided ta reactivate their joint border commission and their joint permanent commission for cooperation, whose role was ta reduce conflicts between the two countries. On the Ghanaian side, two Togolese dissidents were arrested in the aftermath of the abortive
September commando attack against Togo.
Occasional Allegations Against Burkina Faso, Togo and Ivory Coast As far as Burkina Faso's involvement in the training of the commandos who raided Togo is concerned, there has been no definitive proof. For its part, Togo has charged, in no uncertain terms, that the assailants had received their military training at Diallo camp, at the periphery of the Burkina capital, under the command of a Burkinabe officer, Captain Tchinguere. They received the arms from this captain who was working in collaboration with the Ghanaian ambassador in Ouagadougou. The training lasted about one month, from February 1 ta April 2, 1986, on which date the commando unit returned ta Accra aboard a Burkinabe plane. The unit met at Konbakope, in Ghana, on SeptembeS015, and infiltrated Lome the saine day via Akossombo. 204
Burkina Faso's rebuttal was unequivocal. The late President of Burkina Faso, Thomas Sankara, answered Togo's accusation as follows:
We like President Eyadema; we understand his problems. It is a pity that he is looking for scapegoats for his problems. It is a pity that hlshould corne up with that kind of story to implicate us.
In fact, according to Jeune Afrique's Sennen Andriamirado, both "Camp Diallo" and "Captain Tchinguere" cited in Togo's charge are fictitious categories. Lest one misses the exile/refugee connection in the 1986 commando operation against Togo, the latter viewed the operation as having been financed by Togolese exiles, the prime suspect being
Gilchrist Olympio, the son of the late President of Togo, Sylvanus Olympio.32
Burkina Faso's rebuttal was followed by a counter- accusation in November 1986, in which it told the visiting
Secretary General of the OAU, Ide Oumarou, that the Togolese secret service had planned acts of sabotage in Ouagadougou, to coincide with the state visit of Francois Mitterand-the President of France. Evidence produced included transcripts of taped telephone conversations between the would-be saboteurs inside Burkina Faso and their sponsors in Togo, as well as the confessions made by these would-be saboteurs.
Togo has not been the only country accused by Burkina
Faso (former Upper Volta) of supporting the latter's exiled dissidents' subversion. In 1984, the government of Burkina
Faso expressed its fears that anti-government elements might be allowed to infiltrate the country from the Ivory Coast, 205 and that more than one million Voltaic citizens working in the Ivory Coast could be victimized in case of a confrontation between the two countries. In 1985, Burkina
Faso's President Thomas Sankara posited the harboring and supporting of exiled dissidents as the central problem in the security of the region. In this regard, he remarked:
Summits would never be enough to bring about security, as long as member states [of the Entente Council] continued to support each other's opponents. For example, Houphouet-Boigny harbors many of Burkina Faso's foes, who could be extradited if Entente Counç3il leaders seriously sought to end regional insecurity.
Guineans Exiles/Refugees: a Source of Conflict with its Neighbors The political turbulence that characterized Sekou
Toure's regime in Guinea from the 1960s to the mid-1980s sent thousands of Guineans into exile. Some of the exiles sought refuge in neighboring Ivory Coast, Senegal, Niger,
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Upper Volta. For many years,
relations between Guinea and these neighbors have been
conflict-ridden, and the m.st frequently cited cause of this
discord has been the exile/refugee factor. Guinea has maintained relatively better relations with Ghana in the
West Africa region, partly because hardly any Guinean
exiles/refugees went to Ghana prior to Nkrumah's fall in
1966. If the two countries severed diplomatic relations in
1966, it was not because of Guinean exiles in Ghana, but on
the contrary, it was because Guinea gave asylum to Nkrumah,
granting him to status of "co-head of state." 206
Of all the West African countries which have given asylum to Guinean exiles/refugees, the Ivory Coast and Senegal have had the rockiest relations with Guinea, although even the rest of these countries allowed the anti- Sekou Toure Front de liberation nationale de Guiné (FLNG) to function on their respective territories.34 Agreement to establish the FLNG in the Ivory Coast was reached in March- April, 1966, by representatives of the large Guinean community living in the Ivory Coast. The aim of this movement was to promote the overthrow of Sekou Toure. Relations between the Ivory Coast and Guinea became so bad that the two countries resorted to ill-treating each other's diplomats. In a retaliatory move against alleged ill-treatment of Ivorian diplomats in Guinea, the Ivory Coast held hostage both Guinea's Foreign Minister and
Permanent Representative to the UN on June 26, 1967, when a KLM plane they were travelling in made an unscheduled landing in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, due to bad weather conditions. In the course of negotiations for the release of these hostages, Guinea insisted that in addition to the release of the hostages, the Ivory Coast had to put an end to the subversive activities of Guinean exiles/refugees living in the country, or even carry out a mass explusion of these exiles/refugees, numbering, nearly 200,000 at the time. The Ivory Coast did not yield to these demands. For many years, the issue of Guinean exiles/refugees remained the stumbling block in improved relations between 207
Guinea and the Ivory Coast. For example, on July 14, 1972, when President Sekou Toure of Guinea and President
Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast met in Guinea to discuss ways of improving relations between their two countries, they failed to reach any agreement partly because Sekou
Toure had adamantly demanded the return of Guinean exiles/refugees living in the Ivory Coast.
Guinea's accusations against Senegal to the effect that the latter was harboring and arming its exiled subversives were quite common by the mid-1960s. Senegal's typical response to Guinea's charges can be characterized by one of President Senghor's letters to his Guinean counterpart, in which he vigorously rebutted Sekou Toure's
speech broadcast by Conakry radio on June 19, 1966, accusing
Senegal of allowing unfriendly exiles to receive guerrilla training at a camp near St. Louis. Shortly thereafter, on
July 6, 1966, Senegal announced that it would suspend bilateral relations with Guinea. For many years, Guinea did
not give up pressuring Senegal about the exile/refugee
issue. For instance, on January 22, 1971, Sekou Toure urged
Senegal to hand over the thousands of Guinean exiles working there "against the Guinean revolution." Senegal reacted by
declaring the Guinean ambassador persona non-grata.
Chad: Its Relations with Other African countries Which Host its Exiles/Refugees
In Chapter 3 and the first part of Chapter 4, Chad has already been portrayed as a major exile/refugee-generating 208 country since 1965 - when a governmental suppression of an anti-government rebellion among the northern Toubou people forced sonie Toubou tribesmen and their leader, Sultan Woddeye Kedefini, into exile in Libya. The extent to which the Chadian exiles/refugees have affected their country's relations with Libya and the Sudan, respectively, need not be retold. Instead, a few words will be said about Cameroon, the Central African Republic and Nigeria, which also received major flows of Chadian exiles/refugees, particularly since the intensification of the civil war in Chad from 1979 onwards. Of these three countries, the Central African Republic has granted asylum to the largest number of Chadians. From an initial trickle of a few Chadian exiles/refugees in 1967,
the CAR had a Chadian exile/refugee population of 15,000 in 1986. The saine year, the figures for Cameroon and Nigeria were 5,000 and 4,900, respectively.35 An interesting fact to note is that despite the
presence of Chadian exiles/refugees in Cameroon, the CAR and Nigeria, this has not pitted the successive governments in Chad against these asylum states in any significant forms of conflict. This is because the asylum states in question have not involved themselves in giving military assistance to any of Chad's exiled guerrilla movements and factions. The fact that these states have steered clear of any military commitments to Chad's exiled warring factions becomes clear when one looks at the external links of the 209 major post-1979 factions in the Chadian civil war. Abdel
Kader Kamougue's Forces armées tchadiennes (FAT) representing the interests of the Sara people of Southern
Chad have had France as their major source of support.
Goukouni Woddeye's Forces armées populaires (FAP) was at least once firmly backed by Libya. Hissene Habre's Forces armées du nord (FAN) seized power with the'help of the
Sudan. Acyl Ahmat's Conseil démocratique de la révolution
(CDR), representing Arab interests, thrived on the backing it received from Libya.36 Nowhere do Cameroon, the CAR or
Nigeria feature as patrons of exiled Chadian armed groups.
In the case of the CAR, a consistent policy of not supporting Chadian exiled rebels is discernible. For instance, in 1970, the CAR expelled all Chadian exiles suspected of engaging in rebel activity. Later, in 1982, when exiles/refugees from southern Chad entered the CAR,
Président Kolingba gave assurances to the Chad government that the refugees would not be provided with any assistance for subversive activities. The Chadian government tried to reciprocate the CAR's good will in 1985 by joining the latter in a counter-insurgency opération to crush CAR's rebels known as Codos Rouges, who were based in southern
Chad. The opération, which was not successful, had been designed for Chadian government troops to force the Codos
Rouges south toward the CAR border, where they were to be ambushed by the CAR army stationed along the northwest frontier région of Markounda, Moyenne-Sido, and 210
Maitiowkoulou. Unfortunately, the Codos Rouges rebel forces managed to slip through the net westward to northern
Cameroun, avoiding direct clashes with the government forces
of either country.
Other Sporadic Exile/Refugee Situations Affecting Relations Between West African States There have been other diadic patterns of occasional conflict and cooperation in West Africa, revolving around the exile/refugee issue. Throughout the 1960s, relations between Niger and Dahomey (now Benin) were often strained by
a mutual suspicion of support for each other's exiled dissidents. The fall of Dahomey's President Hubert Maga in the October 1963 revolution in that country disrupted the harmonious relations between Dahomey and Niger-whose
President, Hamani Diori, had been a close friend of Maga. When Maga was overthrown, Niger began to suspect the new regime in Dahomey of aiding Djibo Bakary's Sawaba party - the outlawed Niger opposition movement which was known for its subversive activities against the Diori regime. By November, 1964, relations between the two countries had reached a crisis point, with both states accusing each other of supporting subversive movements. Fortunately, the crisis was shortlived, as both governments worked hard to re-establish mutual political confidence. The cooperation that followed, to enhance this confidence, was remarkable. By 1965, Dahomey had embarked
on a policy of crackdown against the exiled Sawaba party to 211 please the Diori regime. In this regard, the government announced that "the whole of Dahomey is mobilized to find the Sawaba commandos."37
Some ten years later, the exile/refugee problem was to impact on Dahomey's (Benin's) external relations in yet another way. This time, the parties to the conflict were
Mathieu Kerekou's regime in Dahomey (Benin), Morocco, and the Front for the Liberation and Rehabilitation of Dahomey
(a movement opposed to the Kerekou regime). The Front for the Liberation and Rehabilitation of Dahomey was,created in
1975 to oppose the socialist policies of Mathieu Kerekou.
Its members found in Morocco a willing ally and a source of
support, because the Moroccan government had been upset by
Kerekou's declared support for the Polisario Front in the
latter's war with Morocco. It was in this context that in
1977, sonie members of the Front for the Liberation and
Rehabilitation of Dahomey, along with mercenaries trained in
Morocco, carried out a coup attempt against the Kerekou government. A special UN committee confirmed Morocco's hostile role in the plotting of the coup. Finally, the problems which arose between Senegal and
Libya, on the one hand, and Gambia and Libya, on the other, had an aspect of the exile/refugee problematique. When the
Libyan Embassy in Senegal was ordered closed in June, 1980,
the Senegalese Foreign Minister denounced what he described
as a blatant attempt, on the part of Libya, to interfere in
the internai affairs of Senegal, referring to Libya's 212 support for exiled Senegalese dissidents. The saure allegation was made by the Gambian government when, some
four months later, it also broke diplomatic relations with
Libya, charging Libya of recruiting Gambian citizens ta
engage in subversive activities. Both Senegal and Gambia maintained that Sheikh Ahmed Niasse, a Senegalese who had been working openly ta overthrown former President Senghor
of Senegal - in order ta establish an Islamic Republic of.
Senegal - had been recruiting citizens from both countries,
from his base in Libya.38
Central Africa In this study, Central Africa refers ta the region
comprising the following vine countries: Burundi, Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, and Zaire. Some aspects of
the extent ta which the exile/refugee factor has affected
some of these countries' relations with other African states
have already been discussed in their respective inter- regional manifestations. Of the vine Central African
countries, six have, at some point in the past thirty years,
generated a significant number of exiles/refugees. These
six are Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic,
Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, and Zaire. As far as asylum-
giving is concerned, all but Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome
and Principe have at some point in time hosted significant
numbers of exiles/refugees. However, not all exile/refugee
situations in the region have greatly strained the relations 213 between the exiles/refugees' home and host countries in this region.
Cameroon, Its Exiled Opposition and the Neighboring Host Countries In the Central African region, Cameroon seems ta have taken the lead in generating exiles/refugees. Sonie five years before Cameroon became independent, it was already producing political exiles/refugees. Ali Mazrui and Michael Tidy have described the nationalist party activities undertaken by the Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC) in French Cameroun in 1955, leading ta the exile of the UPC's leaders. The militant activities of the UPC, which led ta a ruthless French colonial response, included demonstrations
which led ta attacks on police stations in Douala (the main
port) and Yaounde (the capital). Succinctly put, these
events hatched into an exile/refugee situation:
...The UPC was banned; its leaders fled ta the British Cameroons where they were sheltered by Foncha and other pro-unification leaders (until UPC refugees were expelled by the British in 1957); the UPC was banned from contesting the 1956 elections for a Cameroon as.embly under the Loi Cadre; in the saine year the party took ta the forests and began its four? en year armed revolt against the Yaounde government.
The UPC waged its guerrilla war against the
independent government of Cameroon from 1960 ta 1972, when
its last bands of guerrillas were defeated. The country
most frequently blamed by Cameroon for hosting and
supporting these exiled opposition elements was Ghana. For
example, in July, 1963, President Ahmadou Abidjo of Cameroon
lamented: 214
...We have always wished ta establish normal relations with Ghana, but we could not do this as long as Ghana showed hostility ta Cameroon by welcoming political refugees anddOdirectly or indirectly helping terroriste.
Thousands of Cameroonian exiles/refugees also found sanctuaries in Guinea and the Congo People's Republic. Even though it is possible that at sonie point Guinea might have supported the exiled UPC members against their home country,
Cameroon, it is very clear that around 1973 Guinea decisively moved against the UPC and restricted its guerrilla activities against the Cameroonian government.
This happened at a time when the exiled UPC leadership in Guinea was torn by ideologically motivated internal disunity. One of the manifestations of the resulting malaise was the UPC's attack on the Guinean government. As for the Cameroonian exiles/refugees in the Congo People's
Republic, the Ahidjo regime in Cameroon maintained, at least until 1983, a lingering suspicion that Brazzaville was serving as a place for plotting subversion against it by the exiled UPC.
The Two Congos
Cameroon has not been the only country ta associate the People's Republic of Congo (Congo Brazzaville) with support for exiled dissidents against their country of origin. From the early 1960s, the government of Congo-
Leopoldville (Zaire) frequently complained about Congo-
Brazzaville's support for subversive activities carried out by the former's opponents in exile in the latter. For 215 instance, when the Congolese rebels exiled in Congo-
Brazzaville proclaimed the establishment of the National
Council for Liberation (CNL) in October 1963, the newly installed government of Alphonse Massamba-Debat in Congo-
Brazzaville was said to have
tolerated active plotting, stockpiling of arms, training of commando squads, and (beginning in December 1963) the organization of half a dozen small milltary camps scattered along the Congo-Leo border.
The government of Prime Minister Tshombe made several protests accusing Conco-Brazzaville as a base for armed guerrillas preparing to overthrow the regime.
In particular, Congo-Brazzaville was accused of assisting the exiled (Lumumbist) Simba rebels. For example,
Gaston Soumialot, who revived the Congo rebellion often associated with Mulele, was known to have had guerrilla training in Congo-Brazzaville before he set up a rebel camp in Congo-Kinshasa near the Burundi border, in the narre of the Brazzaville-based C.N.L..
Perhaps no single incident has upset the relations between the two Congos than the 1969 execution of Pierre
Mulele by the Mobutu government, when the former rebel was repatriated from his exile in Congo-Brazzaville, following
Mobutu's declared amnesty, with assurances transmitted to the Brazzaville authorities concerning the returnee's safety. The execution of Mulele took place on October 9,
1969, after a secret mock trial, following his return with a guarantee of immunity from prosecution. The assurances of
Mulele's safety had been given to the Brazzaville government 216 by Mobutu's Foreign Minister, Justin Bomboko. The shocked reaction from Brazzaville was ta sever diplomatic relations with the Kinshasa government; the border between the two countries was closed, and traffic across the Congo river ceased. President Marien Ngouabi of Congo-Brazzaville stated that his government was deeply offended in its dignity and honour by the bad faith and treachery of the
Kinshasa government.
At the beginning of 1980, Zaire (Congo Kinshasa) voiced another serious allegation against the People's
Republic of Congo (Congo Brazzaville) ta the effect that the latter had sheltered rebels who planned ta launch a Shaba- style invasion of Zaire. Zairean authorities claimed that three Zairean rebel leaders - Antoine Gizenga, Nathanael
Mbumba and Nicolas Olenga had sought refuge in Brazzaville
and that the three were planning a campaign ta cause unrest
in Kinshasa and ta attack garrissons around the capital during the rainy season, sonie time between October 1979 and
April 1980. They also alleged that these three leaders had met Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso and the
Presidents of Benin and Guinea in September, 1979, and that
shortly thereafter, arms shipments had begun ta arrive in
the Congolese port of Pointe Noire.42
Relations between Zaire and the People's Republic of
Congo have also been affected by their respective policies toward support for the exiled Angolan Liberation Movements.
As I pointed out in chapter 2, the Congo-Leopoldville 217
(Zaire) government opted ta support Holden Roberto's GRAE-
FLNA and ta expel the MPLA in 1963. Congo-Brazzaville expressed its support for the MPLA by allowing its leaders ta transfer the movement's headquarters ta Brazzaville.
This polarized support for the two unfriendly and competing exiled liberation movements negatively affected relations between the two Congos in a way comparable ta the polarization of Libya and the Sudan around the competing exiled rebel groups from Chad.
Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe: Their Exiles and the Neighoring Host Countries
Equatorial Guinea, which became independent in 1968, began ta generage a large exodus of exiles/refugees in the early 1970s, because of the increasingly repressive policies of the government of Francisco Macias Nguema. It has been
estimated that between a quarter and one-third of the
Equatorial Guinean population fled the country. Some 60,000
found shelter in Gabon, another 30,000 in Cameroon, and
approximately 5,000 in Nigeria.43 Of these three host
countries, Gabon stands out as having experienced the worst deterioration in relations with the Macias Nguema regime.
It would seem that once Macias Nguema's reign of
terror forced a large number of Equatorial Guineans into
exile in neighboring Gabon, the dictator became scared into making Gabon the scapegoat of his self-inflicted insecurity.
Caught up in a growing paranoia, Nguema's disintegrating
regime began ta raily anti-Bongo elements from Gabon and ta 218 provide them with guerrilla training. A good number of these elements are said to have received training on Corisco Island in Equatorial Guinea.44 For its part, Gabon tried to pursue a policy of non- interference by keeping any open political activity by the exiles in check. Gabon often expressed concern over the use of its frontier with Equatorial Guinea's Rio Muni for refugee incursions. Bongo's government was also anxious about reports of a guerrilla training camp in the Gabonese jungles. However, Gabon's restraint did not rule out the ever-present option of using Equatorial Guinean exiles/refugees against the repressive regime they fled from. In this regard, President Bongo declared in an October 1972 Press conference: ...if [Macias] Nguema continues to worry me, i will advise his refugees in Gabon that if they want to live peacefully in Gabon they should return to Equatorial Guinea and fi%ht those who want to invade Gabon, and kill them... When the regime of Macias Nguema was overthrown in 1979, the government of Gabon quickly extended a hand of cooperation to the new government. The Gabonese authorities detained and returned prominent pro-Macias elements who sought refuge in Gabon following the coup, including Macias' first wife Clara who had fled with six suitcases full of money. Gabon also returned the money and weapons confiscated from these new exiles.46 For about ten years after 1969, the government of Macias Nguema occasionally put pressure on the government of 219
Cameroon demanding the extradition of Equatorial Guinean exiles/refugees wanted as fugitives by the dictator's government. Cameroon's refusai to yield to these pressures strained relations between the two countries. Yet, when
Nguema's government was overthrown, President Ahidjo of
Cameroon opened his country's border to the ousted members of Nguema's regime of terror saying that Nguema himself would be allowed to cross the border "for a few days" if he decided to go into exile.
Tiny Sao Tome and Principe also generated its share of exiles/refugees in the Central African region. Prior to its
independence in 1975, members of its nationalist movement
fighting for independence - the Movimento de Libertacao de
Sao Tome e Principe (MLSTP) - operated from a sanctuary in
Gabon.
After the countryes independence, a power struggle between President Manuel Pinto da Costa and his Health
Minister, Dr. Carlos da Graca, drove the latter back into
exile in Gabon. Subsequently, da Graca was accused by the
Gabonese government of plotting a mercenary invasion of his
country from Gabon. At the saine time, the government of Sao
Tome and Principe accused Gabon of aiding and abetting da
Graca in his subversive actions. Fortunately, the strained
relations between the two countries did not last very long,
as President da Costa took steps to restore friendly
relations with President Omar Bongo of Gabon in 1979. 220
Former Belgian Central Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire
The largest of the three countries which constitute former Belgian Central Africa, Zaire (the Congo), produced its first exiles/refugees in 1960, during the initial political upheaval at the time of its independence. Some 80,000 people fled at this time, followed by another 10,000 at the time of the United Nations' intervention in Katanga in 1962. Then during the anti-government revoit in Eastern Congo which lasted from 1963 to 1967, an estimated 77,000 people went into exile.47 Another major exodus took place at the time of the two Shaba invasions by the exiled elements of the FLNC from Angola in 1977 and 1978. More than 200,000 people fled Zaire in the wake of these two incidents. The major host countries for the Congolese (Zairean) exiles/refugees, over time, have been: Angola, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, the Sudan, the Congo People's Republic (Congo-Brazzaville), and Burundi. It is interesting to note that no Congolese exiles/refugees sought asylum in neighboring Rwanda. The reason for this might be that the rebels of Eastern Congo, who would under normal circumstances have sought asylum in Rwanda, just across the border, were not welcome to Rwanda because of their occasional collaboration with bands of exiled Rwandese guerrillas whose agenda was to overthrown the Rwandese government. Zaire's immersion in the exile/refugee problem in 221 southern Africa, Eastern Africa and the Congo People's Republic has hopefully been adequately demonstrated so far and needs no further elaboration. What remains to be said about Zaire will be put in the context of its interplay with its fellow former Belgian Central African countries of Rwanda and Burundi over the exile/refugee issue. As I pointed out earlier, Rwanda generated its exiles/refugees from 1959 through 1962, with sporadic outbursts thereafter, which ceased around 1973. Thousands of Rwandese exiles/refugees were given asylum in Zaire. There were approximately 24,000 Rwandese refugees in the Congo in the early 1960s and nearly half this figure in 1985. Burundi also absorbed thousands of Rwandese
exiles/refugees: 52,000 in 1966, a figure which had increased to 58,000 by 1985. For the first half of the 1960s, much of the politics of the exile/refugee problem among the former Belgian Central African countries centered on the activities of the Rwandese exile/refugee population, the politicized portionof which tried to organize an armed guerrilla movement called Inyenzi to fight their way back home. Burundi became the centre of this movement and subsequently the launching pad of Rwandese exile/refugee incursions into Rwanda. By 1963, Rwanda was accusing Burundi of giving the Inyenzi free rein to invade it. After Rwanda had experienced three invasions by Rwandese exiles/refugees from Burundi, it decided to appeal to the United Nations. 222
Burundi wasted no time in taking certain measures to show the world that it did not condone the exile/refugee attacks against Rwanda, and to possibly prevent a recurrence of the attacks. One of the measures was a deployment of 110 officers and men to create a military zone 20 kilometers deep from the Rwanda border. Some 7,000 Rwandese exiles/refugees were evacuated from this zone. In so doing,
Burundi blocked one of the incursion routes used by invading exiles/refugees. In addition, in February 1964, the Burundi police intercepted an invading band of some 107 Rwandese exiles/refugees coming from central Kivu in Congo-Kinshasa, marching towards the Rwanda border. The Burundi police disarmed, detained, and later drove these exiles back over the Congo border.48
For much of 1964, violent and inflammatory broadcasts by the radio stations of both countries filled the air, each attacking, in insulting terms, the regime of the other. For
its part, Rwanda seems to have opted for a policy of hot pursuit, because on January 31, 1964, Burundi's Permanent
Representative to the UN reported to the Secretary General
31 violations of the Burundi border by the Rwandese army.49
Some of the Rwandese exiles/refugees in Congo-Kinshasa were also involved in the struggle to oust the Kayibanda regime in Rwanda. However, in contrast to its behavior towards the Burundi government, Rwanda did not accuse the
Congolese government of supporting the subversive activities
of the Rwandese exiles/refugees. The explanation for this 223
is that, the incumbent Congolese government had no interest at all in supporting the Rwandese exiles/refugees, because occasionally the latter fought side by side with the Lumumbist rebels against the Congolese national army. In this regard, it is interesting ta note that it was during the saine first months of 1964 that the Lumumbist revolutionaries under Gaston Soumialot launched a rebellion in Kivu province against the Congolese government. In fighting on the side of the Congolese rebels, the relatively less well organized and poorly armed Rwandese exiles/refugees hoped that if the Congolese rebels came ta power, the latter would intervene militarily in their favor, by helping them ta overthrow the Rwanda government.
For Burundi, 1965 was an eventful year. On October 18, 1965, an anti-royalist coup was put down by loyalist troops led by Burundi's future President, Captain Michel Micombero. This was followed by a violent ethnic strife which produced Burundi's first generation of exiles/refugees. In 1966, Ntare V, son of King Mwambutsa forced his father off the throne with the help of Captain Micombero. Three months later, Micombero deposed Ntare and took over power as head of state. The political tensions produced by these events exacerbated ethnic strife, in the course of which thousands of Barundi of the Hutu ethnic group fled ta Congo-Kinshasa, Rwanda and Tanzania. By 1966, there were some 3,000 exiles/refugees from Burundi in Rwanda alone. 224
It was against this background that in 1966, mutual complaints and counter-complaints became more often heard between Rwanda and Burundi, concerning support for each other's exiled armed groups. In 1966, a Radio Bujumbura broadcast alleged that armed bands from Rwanda had crossed
into Burundi and attacked frontier posts. A Rwanda . government spokesman refuted the allegation, asserting in turn that in fact "bandits armed with automatic weapons" had crossed into Rwanda from Burundi. He also disclosed that
Rwanda had asked the UN to help repatriate 2,000 Barundi refugees who had recently entered the country. There was an attempt at normalization of relations between the two countries in April, 1966, when delegations
from both countries met at Gisenyi (Rwanda) and agreed on a stage-by-stage normalization of relations, particularly in the area of refugee subversion. However, the desired normalization of relations was soon undermined by renewed attacks by armed bands of Rwandese exiles on Rwanda from
Burundi. On November 6, 1966, the Rwanda government
submitted a complaint to the OAU Ministerial Committee, charging that this time Burundi army volunteers had fought on the side of the invading Rwandese exiles. Rwanda repulsed another invasion during the last two weeks of November. The controversy of the November 1966 attacks on Rwanda by armed bands of exiled Rwandese led to two positive developments. The first of these was Burundi's clear 225 statement of its policy with regard to the activities of Rwandese exiles/refugees in Burundi, in which President Micombero said: ...Their [exiles/refugees] behavior must not haret our foreign relations. They must abstain from any gesture or action likely to be interpreted as gocommitment on our part to any subversive enterprise. The second development was President Mobutu's mediation between the two countries at the request of the OAU. Mobutu's mediation bore fruit when, at the end of a three days conference at the Congolese town of Goma in March, 1967, Rwanda and Burundi signed the following three- point agreement: i. all dissident armed refugees should be required ta disarm within a month; ii. there should be no forcible repatriation; iii. a permanent political commission should be established to consider ways in which rglugees might return freely to their countries. There is a bit of irony in Zaire's qualification to mediate between Rwanda and Burundi, when one remembers that hardly two years earlier, Burundi had cabled Congo- Kinshasa's Prime Minister, Tshombe, protesting "aggressive acts" against the national sovereignty of Burundi, specifying four occasions between November 4-11, 1964, on which armed Congolese troops were alleged to have crossed the border into Burundi, presumably in pursuit of Congolese rebels. It seems that with the coming to power of Mobutu in Congo-Kinshasa in November 1965, Burundi had decided not to 226 hold the new regime responsible for the mistakes of the old one. For about five years since Mobutu's médiation, the conflict between Rwanda and Burundi emanating from the exile/refugee problem seemed to have been resolved. It flared up again after 1972, when a new political crisis in Burundi produced a new exodus of exiles/refugees into neighboring countries. This is the saine crisis which was responsible for the already described conflict between Burundi and Tanzania in the early 1970s. The infamous 1972 massacres in Burundi which sent thousands of Barundi into exile began on April 29, 1972, when armed gangs attacked villages in rébellion against Burundi's ethnic minority regime. The rebellion degenerated into a bloody ethnic strife in which over 150,00 members of the Hutu ethnic group fled the country. The politically active portion of the Barundi exiles/refugees who fled to Rwanda in 1972 formed an organization called the Front populaire de libération du Burundi (FPLB) which undertook guerrilla raids into the border areas of Burundi, with the probable connivance of the Rwanda government. Rwanda found some moral justification for assisting the FPLB guerrillas by considering the latter as victims of an outrageous génocide committed by the régime in power in Burundi. By 1973, Burundi and Rwanda were engulfed in a new crisis, more severe than that of the 1960s. 227
Around mid-1973, the Burundi government claimed to have stopped the advance of a two-pronged FPLB invasion a few days after it had been launched on May 11, 1973. The guerrillas were said to have entered Burundi from Rwanda in the north and from Tanzania in the south. President
Micombero publicly blamed Rwanda for the invasion and threatened the Rwanda government with military reprisais if the guerrilla activities were not brought to an end. Rwanda heeded the warning and stopped further guerrilla incursions by transferring Barundi refugees away from the common border. This marked the beginning of an era of rapprochement between the two countries. This rapprochement grew even further after a change of regime in Rwanda in mid-
1973.
An Analytical Summary I have referred to the above three regions as relatively less affected regions for two major reasons. In the first place, taken separately, each of these regions has had a relatively small number of organized, politically
active exiled groups. Northern Africa has had about 6 such
organizations-about 40 percent of those in Southern Africa
(with about 15 organizations) and 25 percent of those in
Eastern Africa (with about 24). West Africa has had about
10 organizations-about 67 percent of those in Southern
Africa and 42 percent of those in Eastern Africa. Central
Africa has had about 5 such organizations-about 33 percent
of those in Southern Africa, and 21 percent of those in 228
Eastern Africa. Taken together, the three regions have had a total of about 21 organized exiled groups-only exceeding the single Southern African region by 40 percent, and considerably falling short of those in Eastern Africa by 13 percent. The three regions have been relatively less affected by massive population dislocations due to exile/refugee exoduses. The urgency of massive refugee relief work, which is indicative of the damaging effect of such dislocations, has been less. Even those cases involving large numbers of exiles/refugees such as the Saharawis in Algeria or the
Chadians in the CAR and Cameroon, have come nowhere near the crisis level of the situation in Mozambique in Southern Africa, or Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan in Eastern Africa. Even when the exile/refugee factor is looked at from the point of view of its frequency as a political phenomenon in the impairment of inter-state relations, it seems to have occurred less frequently in the three regions of Northern Africa, West Africa and Central Africa than in the two regions previously discussed. In Northern Africa, support for exiled groups against their home or other states seems to have been an aspect of the politics of regional dominance, at least in the case of Algeria's support for the various groups mentioned. Algeria's support for Polisario, while undoubtedly motivated by political altruism, has also been motivated by economic and ideological dominance in the Maghreb, i.e. undercutting 229
Morocco's expansionism in search of a larger phosphates economy, and spreading a progressive socialist agenda. Libya's use of subversive exiled groups has been principally motivated by ideological dominance in the region in terms of the spread of Libya's version of the Islamic revolution and an anti-western militancy. In West Africa, incompatibility in political ideologies seems to have been the major factor which motivated governments to support exiled dissidents from neighboring countries against their respective home governments. Ghana and Guinea were sympathetic toward exiled leftwing groups from their more western-oriented neighbors. There were, however, exiled dissident groups whose agenda was not ideological in the sense of being pro- socialist or pro-capitalist, but rather ethnic-oriented. The Ewe secessionists of Ghana, the Sanwi secessionists,of the Ivory Coast or the Touareg separatists invoked reunion with their kinsfolks in a neighboring country. The states of these groups' formai nationality acted tough to avert their impending fragmentation. In the 1980s, there has emerged yet another tension between the old, conservative heads of state of the Houphouet-Boigny/Eyadema calibre and the young, dynamic and progressive type represented by Rawlings and the late Thomas Sankara. There has been noticeable mistrust between these two groups which has tended to degenerate into hostile 230 political subversion by proxy, using each other's exiled dissidents. In Central Africa, mutual fear because of ideological incompatibility is discernible as the major cause for neighboring countries supporting each other's exiled opponents. Socialist-oriented People's Republic of Congo and capitalist-oriented Zaire are a good illustration of this political phenomenon. Regime incompatibility for reasons of maldistribution of political power among ethnic groups has also caused the governments in Rwanda and Brundi to support the subversive schemes of each other's exiles/refugees. The minority Tutsi regime in Burundi has its majority Hutu exiles/refugees in Rwanda and vice versa. The Tutsi regime in Burundi with its Hutu exiles/refugees in Rwanda, and the Hutu regime in Rwanda with its Tutsi exiles/refugees in Burundi have always made each other nervous. These countries' nervousness and suppressed mutual hatred have from time to time been translated into subversive political action using the exiles/refugees. In all the cases discussed in this chapter, refuge in any given country placed the exiles/refugees in a political space not easily accessible to their respective countries of origin, where they could at best engage in sonie foret of political organization, and at least be free from persecution by their home governments. This by no means afforded them an unlimited opportunity structure to subvert their home governments. Even in Chad, where Tombalbaye had 231 unequivocally pledged ta fully support Libyans who would want ta get rid of Qaddafi, this pledge could no longer be honored when Libyans petrodollars began ta flow into Chad. As in Southern Africa, the exiles/refugees' opportunity structure has been greatest in anti-colonial situations. Algeria's permissiveness ta Polisario, in what both perceive as Morocco's colonial ambitions, has been considerable but not free from limitations. Also Portuguese Guinean exiles enjoyed much, but still circumscribed latitude in their Senegalese and Guinean sanctuaries when they were fighting for their independence from Portugal. What made the host countries avoid giving free rein ta subversive exiles/refugees was the former's fear of provoking war. Most of the host countries' economies are
too weak ta sustain a war without the risk of becoming unacceptably depleted. Host countries have also kept the exiled groups in constant check for fear that the latter's subversive activities might spill over into the arena of domestic politics. 232
CHAPTER V
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF THE EXILE/REFUGEE PHENOMENON IN INTER-AFRICAN STATE RELATIONS: AN ANALYTICAL APPRAISAL
The Conflict Proneness and Political Salience of the African Exile/Refugee Phenomenon
The foregoing survey of the politics of the exile/refugee phenomenon in the major regions of Africa reveals that this political issue has produced a very high incidence of conflict among African states. It further suggests that the phenomenon has been of high political salience, judging by the numerous and frequent governmental actions it has precipitated, some of which have been extremely costly in terms of the human, material and financial resources committed to meet the political challenges it has posed. The high incidence of inter-African state conflicts attributable wholly or in part to the exile/refugee factor becomes remarkably clear when one looks at the record of the
OAU in resolving or managing African conflicts for the
period 1975-80. During that period, the OAU handled a total
of 22 inter-African state conflicts, of which 19 were either wholly caused by the exile/refugee problem or bore a major exile/refugee component. This means that the exile/refugee 233 factor was wholly or partially responsible for 86.3 percent of all the inter-African state conflicts which were considered to be serious enough to call for OAU mediation during the six year period under review.1 Taking the conflicts within this period as a representative sample of the OAU's overali conflict resolution and management agenda since its inception in 1963, I cannot but conclude that the incidence of inter-African state conflicts associated with the exile/refugee factor has'been very high.
Regarding the political salience of the exile/refugee factor, I will content myself with an impressionistic view of the costs incurred by various African states and make the hard-to quantify assertion that the governmental responses elicited by the exile/refugee problem have been costly, relative to the weak economies of the countries concerned, and could therefore be characterized as bearing high political salience.
Budgets committed by states to support or counter military and other operations conducted by exiles/refugees in their subversive schemes are hardly ever made public in
Africa. However, the paucity of such figures would not prevent an observer to appreciate the fact that the frequent and often protracted closure of borders due to the exile/refugee factor make the poor African states involved lose a lot of trade-related revenues; that full-scale wars, where they have occurred, have had a devastating impact on the ailing economies of the countries concerned; that 234 suspension of on-going programs in bilateral or regional economic co-operation slows down the rate of economic progress towards self-reliance; that economic destabilization triggered by the exile/refugee factor as in the case of Southern Africa has a tremendous debilitating effect on the economic growth and political stability of the victim countries.
On South Africa's economic destablization of the
Southern African countries harboring the former's exiles/refugees, the figure of US $ 27.94 billion for the period 1980-86 has been computed by R.H. Green and C.B.
Thompson, designating the economic costs of destablization
and warfare in the region. Computation of this huge cost
incurred by the poor southern African asylum countries was based on the following items: direct war damage, extra defense spending, higher transportation and energy costs,
smuggling (looting), refugees (including internally
displaced persons), export loss, boycotts and embargoes,
loss of existing production, loss of economic growth, and
trading arrangements.2 The saine bleak picture, perhaps with
a slightly lower figure in terms of money lost, could be
envisaged with regard to the other regions discussed in this
study.
Even when the exile/refugee factor has generated
inter-state cooperation instead of conflict, such
cooperation has crystallized around collective defense
programs such as the mounting of joint-counterinsurgency 235 operations, joint-tightening of border controls, the
formation of various joint-committees ta look into a variety
of mutual national security safeguards, etc. Such measures
inevitably bring with them new administrative,
infrastructural and other costs which hurt the already
overburdened economies of these poor countries. It. is no wonder, therefore, that the African exile/refugee problem has tended ta be in the realm of high politics - a national
security issue of considerable importance, figuring
prominently in the speeches and diplomatic agenda of heads
of state and government themselves.
The Emerging Erosion of Generous Asylum Policies Most African countries have, until.recently, upheld
very generous asylum policies, despite the costly conflicts
often brought about by such hospitable policies. Costs like
those outlined in the previous section have sometimes
weighed heavily on the political consciousness of the
nationals of the asylum countries. In some cases, the
nationals of the asylum countries have experienci:d
immediate, concrete problems which have begun ta raise a
host of questions in their domestic political arena. In my
view, these problems which are internai imputs in the
political systems in question, are likely ta produce less
generous foreign policies with regard ta asylum-giving in
the future.
Ta illustrate the unfolding strain on the domestic
politics of the asylum countries, which may in turn erode 236 the generous asylum policies of those countries, I will highlight some of the problems experienced by Uganda, the
Sudan and Swaziland, respectively. According ta a 1988 OAU
Commission of Fifteen report on Uganda, a number of serious problems have been caused by the presence of refugees in that country. At least three of these problems are relevant ta the future prospects of asylum policy in Uganda.
The first problem identified by the OAU Commission of
Fifteen with regard ta the presence of Rwandese, Sudanese and Zairean exiles/refugees in Uganda is "socio-economic impoverishment." The report indicates that many of the refugees had the benefit of a cultural affinity with the
local population which enabled them ta settle spontaneously among their kinsmen with relative ease of social adjustment and integration. However, this process
...has led ta serious cases of disguised poverty within the areas where refugees have settled spontaneously. Many of these refugees are not known ta the government and their presence has helped ta drain the meagre social services - such as schools, health, transportation,... provided bî the government for the benefit of the nationals.
The second problem identified by the Commission is the high prevalence of land disputes:
...When refugees first came ta Uganda in the 1960s, the population of Uganda was barely 6 million. At that time, land was not a problem, and each refugee family was given ten acres or more ta cultivate and ta work towards self-sufficiency. Consequently, many refugees took ta farming, growing food and cash crops as well as keeping large numbers of heads of cattie. As the national population continued ta grow ta the present 16 million, and as the wealth of refugees became more and more conspicuous, the presence of refugees began ta be felt by the nationals. Nationals began ta encroach on 237
the land originally gazetted for the refugees, while refugees began to claim all the land originally designated for them by the government. The result.has been endless disputes between the local people and the refugees over land issues. There has also been some feeling among the locals that some refugees have in the past taken advantage of the political confusion in Uganda by using those in power to drive the nationale into exile so as to grab the land left behind. This may partly explain the eviction of about 31,000 Rwandes refugees back to Rwanda that took place in 1982/83. The third problem has to do with the refugees' demands for political rights in Uganda. Some of the refugees who have lived in the country for more than 25 years have begun to show their frustrations due to their inability to participate in the country's political process. The Commission has described the nature of the problem in the context of the political organizational structures under the Museveni regime: ... in areas where refugees live interspersed with nationals, two parallel but sometimes conflicting administrative structures have emerged: a service administrative structure known as the Refugee Welfare Committee (RWC) on the one hand, and a political structure for nationals known as the Resistance Committee (RC)... Refugees in Uganda have been agitating to set up Resistance Committees in order to actively participate in the emerging grassroot democracy in the country. The government, however, has refused to recognize refugees' demands for political rights and has appealed to refugees to regulate their conduct in conformity w th the international instruments governing refugees.... In Sudan, the Commission learned that Sudanese nationals blame refugees for the current socio-economic crisis in that country. The first problem attributed to the presence of refugees in the Sudan is depletion of natural resources. Arable land is said to have become a very scarce resource in the Sudan as a result of large influxes of rural 238 refugees. The overgrazing and deforestation which has resulted from the presence of large numbers of refugees and their livestock has posed a serious environmental hazard.
Another depleted resource is water:
Water supply, especially in the rural areas, has been adversely affected; even if not necessarily caused by the refugees, but at least aggravated by them. Now people have to cover long distances each day in searc of water for both'livestock and domestic consumption.
The large influx of refugees into the Sudan has also exacerbated the problem of housing shortage and inflated house rents, particularly in urban areas. According to the
Commission's report,
...The habitual sharing of housing units by a considerably large number of refugees, which implies the ability to pay relatively high rents by pooling resour9es, has also automatically pushed upward housing rents. The presence of exiles/refugees in the Sudan is also associated with rising inflation in that country. The Commission's report makes the following observation in that regard:
...Prices of various commodities, especially food stuffs, which have been going up unabated for mar:y years have been largely attributed to refugees' presence. Their presence in large numbers has resulted in high demand for various commodities especially dura, bread, charcoal, soap and cooking oil which in turn has forced up prices for these commodities.8
Depletion of social services has been identified as another problem aggravated by the presence of large numbers of exiles/refugees in the Sudan. This problem has manifested itself in the form of congestion, deterioration and shortage in services like public transportation, 239 education, health care, and water supply. Examples of indicators of the inconvenience suffered by the nationals have been given as: ...longer hours of waiting in clinics and hospitals, longer distances covered ta draw water and ta look for pasture or fir9wood,...shortage of drugs in health units for nationals. Two more problems have been cited in connection with the presence of large numbers of exiles/refugees in the
Sudan: the area of security and that of morality. The security problem has ta do with the fact that some of the refugees enter the country on their run away from war fronts, sometimes with lots of weapons. There have been incidents whereby refugees, especially army deserters, have clandestinely entered the country with weapons which they have either sold at a give-away price ta the nationals, or used ta commit acts of banditry. The presence of exiles/refugees, has also forced ta government ta raise its law-enforcement expenditure. In this regard, the Commission has observed that: ...The Government has had with limited finances, to establish at least a police station and ta provide the required personnel in every settlement, but there are no means of communication such as vehicles or radios between these policeOstations and the various parts of the settlements.... In the area of morality, refugees in the Sudan have occasionally been accused of brewing and distilling alcoholic beverages, an act which is sacrilegious from the point of view of the Islamic Sharia law in force in the Sudan. Besides this, there have been rumors of other types 240 of activities undertaken by refugees in the Sudan,
"bordering on immorality."11 The problems experienced by Swaziland due to the presence of ANC exiles/refugees serves as a good
illustration of how exiles/refugees can pose a threat to the internai security of the country of asylum. ANC exiles/refugees in Swaziland began to upset the government of their host country in 1965 when they started to illegally recruit Swazi youths into their organization. By 1966, the
ANC exiles/refugees had initiated illegal training in
logistics for their new recruits. Later,they embarked on mobilizing students of South African origin going to school
in Manzini, Swaziland, hoping to turn these students into
ANC converts. Subsequently, the ANC exiles/refugees began
to illegally import arms into Swaziland. On several
occasions between 1975 and 1984, the Swazi security forces
seized and confiscated arms caches smuggled into the country
by ANC exiles/refugees.
Armed confrontations between the Swazi security forces
and ANC exiles/refugees became a frequent occurrence. A
shoot-out that took place on April 19, 1984, between the ANC
exiles/refugees and a combined force of Swazi police and the
army resulted in the death of two ANC guerrillas and wounded
one Swazi police inspector. This incident, popularly known
as the "Bloody Thursday Night" exacerbated the outrage which
was already widespread among Swazi nationals. Allegations 241 had been made from time to time that armed ANC exiles/refugees had been going around terrorizing the local population, destabilizing their marriages and sometimes shooting at them at social gatherings. Ail this made the Swazi government express its indignation about the way the ANC exiles/refugees had treated their hosts who had selflessly befriended, fed and protected them. Needless to say, the above activities undertaken by the ANC exiles/refugees in Swaziland disturbed public peace and order in the country. To make matters even worse, the presence of the ANC exiles/refugees in Swaziland made the country more prone to infiltration by South Africa's intelligence agents whose presence constituted another national security risk. At one point, it was believed that out of 10 ANC members in Swaziland, 4 or 5 belonged to the South African intelligence. The presence of so many South African intelligence agents in the country was marked by an increased erosion of public safety as a result of their destablizing acts of terrorism, such as indiscriminate planting of bombs in the country. It was against this background that Swaziland adopted the tough measures against the ANC, which I described in Chapter 2. The problems of the type described above inevitably impact on the domestic policies of the host countries in a manner that makes the latter tend to adopt a less generous asylum policy. This tendency has already begun to surface in a number of African countries and, regrettably, these 242 include some of the most traditionally renowned for their generous asylum policies. This negative tendency has caught the attention of the current United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees - Mr. Jean-Pierre Hocke who, in his October 1987 statement about "reversing the trend of increasing hostility and mistrust towards refugees," pledged his office's best efforts to avert "progressive erosion in the principle of asylum" which if unchecked "will paralise every possibility of international co-operation and burden- sharing."12
Asylum countries' unwillingness to maintain a generous asylum policy due to the domestic problems caused by the presence of exiles/refugees has occasionally been publicly voiced. For example, in 1987, a Sudanese government official announced: ..Now that the increasing influx of refugees is beyond its carrying capacity, Sudan is...unable to receive more of them from any country...the Sudanese citizen has arrived at the utmost deglïee of tolerance which may lead to unhappy consequences.
The Mission of the OAU Commission of Fifteen on Refugees which visited Uganda at the end of 1987 observed the saine kind of weariness about continued hosting of exiles/refugees in that country. In its report, the Mission noted that: ...Many Ugandans feel that the price the country has had to pay for accommodating these refugees for over 25 years now is becoming too much and the nati9nnals can no longer simply keep quiet about the problem. Even Tanzania, whose well-known generous asylum policy earned its former President Julius Nyerere the Nansen medal 243 for outstanding service to refugees for 1983, has begun to feel uncomfortable about giving long-term asylum to exiles/refugees from certain countries. When in June 1986, seven members of Kenya's underground movement, Mwakenya, sought refuge in Tanzania, the latter assisted these exiles/refugees to look for a second country of asylum through the UNHCR because the government wanted to maintain
"good neighborly relations" with Kenya. Retaining those exiles/refugees might have endangered the blossoming trade and other bilateral relations between the two countries.
The normalization of relations between Kenya and Tanzania in
1983 had been a long-awaited and cherished event by the majority of Tanzanian nationals, and anything that would take away the current free movement of people and goods between the two countries would not be well received in the
Tanzanian domestic political arena.
Countries like Kenya which are traditionally known for their more restrictive asylum policies seem to have become even less generous, especially where considerations of the national interest have had to compete with the generous principle of asylum-giving. In December 1987, when the relations between Museveni's Uganda and Moi's Kenya were at their lowest ebb, Kenyan authorities refused asylum to
Ugandan rebel priestess, Alice Lakwena of the dissident Holy Ghost Movement. Besides refusing her asylum, the Kenya Government sentenced her to four months in prison for "entering the country illegally."15 Among the factors that 244 might have made Kenya behave this way is its fear of alienating Uganda, which is one of the main users of Mombasa
Port for its imports and exports, a relationship which earns
Kenya much cargo-handling and other related revenues. If this trend towards less generous asylum policies continues, and every indication points to that unfortunate eventuality, then one can foresee a further crisis in inter- African state relations down the road. Generous asylum policies in African countries have, in a way, helped to reduce the political tensions in the domestic political arenas of the exile/refugee-generating countries. Exile of victim groups from intense domestic political struggles has acted like a safety valve, without which the sheer intensity of relentless struggles would choke and suffocate many victims confined to a sealed off repressive political space.
The sealing off of such a safety value would produce untold human suffering in the countries experiencing severe internai political turbulence.
Under such circumstances, a worst case scenario could be envisaged whereby victim groups from distressed political systems would, out of desperation, try to stampede their way
across the border of a neighboring country which would be totally unwilling to receive them. To drive the victims back, the inhospitable neighbor would have to deploy its security forces in the border areas, most likely making a few casualties in the process of driving the resisting victims back to their side of the border. Such incidents 245 could be easily manipulated by the country of origin in a move to share at least part of the blame for its political crisis with the neighboring country, thus diverting sonie of the attention and thereby improving its political image. A
scenario of this kind does not augur well for relations between the countries concerned.
A more probable scenario would be one in which the
inhospitable neighbor deploying its troops in border areas would fail to effectively enforce the rules of deployment
among its troops. Deployment of troops in border areas is extremely difficult to administer. No matter how well the
troops are instructed to exercise restraint, the chances
that there will be at least one overzealous policeman or
soldier who will provoke some border incident are very high.
It is not inconceivable to have a handful or zealots
wrecklessly shooting at targets across the border or even
pursuing targets into the territory of the neighboring
country. Border patrols are also notorious for generating
skirmishes caused by increased contacts between the troops of the countries involved. These and similar scenarios will
raise the number of potentially explosive contacts between
neighboring states, thus making inter-African state
relations more prone to conflict.
The tendency towards less generous asylum policies is
a legitimate cause for concern at the present juncture in
African political and economic conditions. Generosity in
asylum-giving is declining at a time when the root causes of 246 the exile/refugee phenomenon in Africa at best remain constant. One could even argue that the root causes are becoming more severe, which means that African countries are likely ta continue generating exiles/refugees for along time ta come.
This pessimistic view of the African exile/refugee condition unfortunately bears corne credibility. What some, analysts have identified as the root causes of the
exile/refugee phenomenon in independent African states, e.g. violation of human rights, ethnic and religious tensions,
drought and famine, politics of exclusion in the area of
power sharing, and great power interference are symptoms of
a more fundamental problem: African countries' inability ta
build and control viable economies,governed by sound laws of
redistributive justice. Yash Tandon has aptly captured the
essence of Africa's bad record in the area of.human rights:
...Unable as the African governments are ta control their economies..., they try ta control the only "asset" they can control, namely the people. Unable ta discipline the economy, they try ta discipline the population instead. This is the essence of militarism and statism. And this, in contemporary Africa, is at the root of the violation of human rights by the states, and the often senseless and19xcessive brutality that accompanies this violation.
I could not agree more with Tandon's analysis, and
what makes the pessimistic prognosis of the African
exile/refugee condition credible is the fact that the
economies of most African countries seem ta get much more
out of control as time goes. It is not unreasonable ta
assume that the worsening economic conditions are likely ta 247 generate more political instability and repression. As
African regimes fail ta deliver economic development, they are likely ta lose their legitimacy and ta face increasing popular opposition. Under such circumstances, they are
likely ta resort ta brutal methods of control which will in turn produce victim groups that may be forced ta seek asylum
in other countries. If, in the future, most African
countries are going ta close their doors on prospective
exiles/refugees, then the victim groups will remain trapped
inside the unforgiving political strife obtaining in their
countries, and the damage this may cause in anybody's guess.
The Inadequacy of the Current Approaches ta Solving the Serious Exile/Refugee Problem in Africa Ever since the advent of the exile/refugee problem in Africa three decades ago, there has been talk among concerned actors about finding "durable solutions" ta the problem. In the inter-state relations plane, conflict resolution has taken the form of dialogue conducted either on a bilateral basis, or in a multilateral context between an exile/refugee-generating country and the asylum country. Examples of this practice have been frequently referred ta in this study. The terni "durable solutions" is commonly used in the register of organizations dealing with the welfare of exiles/refugees once the latter have been produced. The two commonly advocated "durable solutions" are: voluntary repatriation as the most desirable solution, and successful 248 integration in the host country, preferably culminating in naturalization. The actors involved in this quest for durable solutions have generally acknowledged the fact that a successful solution would require doing something about the root causes of the problem in question. Voluntary repatriation would be a durable solution to the African exile/refugee problem only if it could ensure that no new groups of exiles/refugees will be generated by the country receiving its returnees. However, experience has shown that successful repatriation of exiles/refugees has been followed, in a matter of a few months, by a new exodus of new victim groups, often including the recently repatrited returnees. Countries like Uganda, Mozambique, Angola, the Sudan, etc., have produced two-time or even three-time exiles/refugees, because of the persistence of the root causes of the exile/refugee phenomenon in those countries. Thus, although enactment of amnesty laws and repatriation operations are very commendable activities, they may merely amount to temporary victories that might be shattered by the recurrence of new and sometimes worse exile/refugee situations. The inadequacy of the voluntary repatriation option manifests itself in yet another way. There are African exile/refugee-generating countries which find it impossible to absorb their exiles/refugees because of reasons beyond their control. Rwanda, and possibly Burundi, are cases in point. Rwandese exiles/refugees, some of whom have been 249 living in exile for about thirty years seem to be excluded from the benefits of the voluntary repatriation solution because their country or origin has made a case claiming that even with the best of political wilis, it cannot possibly accommodate all the returnees. In 1986, the Rwandese government circulated a document entitled "Position of the Central Committee on the Problems of the Refugees of Rwanda" to all African Embassies in Addis
Ababa, and to the OAU Secretariat, advancing the view that due to Rwanda's demographic and other problems relating to shortage of land and unemployment, "...it is absolutely impossible..." for Rwanda to fend for the additional population as a result of massive return of Rwandese exiles/refugees. The document pointed out that under the obtaining circumstances, only a refugee who demonstrates his/her ability to be self-sufficient if allowed to return would be welcome back home. Such a test is definitely not easy to pass. Although the reaction of some Rwandese exiles/refugees and, indeed, that of the OAU Commission of Fifteen on Refugees has invoked the legal/philosophical principle of every human being's "right to return to the country of his/her nationality," it is difficult to ignore the reality and genuineness of the problem articulated by the Rwanda government. For instance, the OAU Commission in question has recommended the following: ...Rwanda's first step with regard to her nationals living in exile should be for the Government of Rwanda 250
ta admit in no uncertain terms that this problem is first and foremost Rwanda's problem whose solution primarily rests with the government of Rwanda. The second step should be for the Rwandese Government ta diplomatically negotiate with the host countries and then with the potential donors for assistance. The Mission also recognizes the need for countrieswithin the East African region together with Rwanda ta get together and work out a formulal;or solving the dilemma of Rwandese nationals in exile. Although the Commission has not clearly spelt out what the subject of the proposed negotiations between Rwanda and the other parties would be, I believe it is not by accident that the word "repatriation" was not mentioned in the recommendations. It would seem that what the Commission has in mind is the more realistic "integration" option, although it does not wish ta give the impression that it is letting the Rwandese government easily off the hook.
Another problem associated with the voluntary repatriation solution is that in some cases exiles/refugees might attach certain conditions ta their return home. For
example, when Bosotho dissidents of Lesotho exiled mainly in
Botswana and South Africa were amnestied and welcomed ta
return home in 1987, they agreed ta do sa on two conditions:
(i) return of their confiscated land and property, and (ii)
restoration of the constitution which was suspended
following the change of government in that country. It is
not inconceivable ta think of a situation whereby the government of the country of origin might refuse ta yield ta
certain conditions. In such a case, voluntary repatriation
of the exiles/refugees could be denied.
The second "durable solution," successful integration 251 of exiles/refugees in the host community and ultimate naturalization, also poses some problems. The first problem is that the exiles/refugees concerned may not like the integration option, even when their host country has done the best it could ta make them feel at home. The Barundi refugees in Tanzania serve as a good illustration of this situation. A survey conducted by Maurice Mbago and Ayok Chol Anthony among Barundi refugees relatively successfully settled in rural settlements in Tanzania indicated that 91.39.percent of the sample interviewed favored repatriation, meaning that they did not prefer the integration option.18 This very high percentage is surprising, given the fact that Tanzania is believed ta rank among the highest in good asylum country hospitality towards the refugees. An even more surprising finding is that good hospitality on the part of the host community and the host government does not necessarily mean acceptance of the exiles/refugees on a permanent basis. The above-cited survey revealed that 78 percent of a sample of Tanzanian nationals living around the refugee settlement areas were opposed ta the idea of granting citizenship ta the refugees.19 An even more alarming finding was that the government authorities in the district where the refugee settlements are located felt that the Burundi refugees should not be given citizenship because: (i) they are not committed ta Tanzania;... (iii) they are depleting the natural resources and giving them citizenship will mean that these resources 252
will be depleted further; (iv) they are too aggressive in business and very hard-working and this will cause a lot of conflict in the district if they are made citizens; ...(vi) they will take all pol ical posts in the district, given their large numbers.
The conclusion of the above cited study, even though it might require more substantiation, articulates the point I am making - that the integration solution may not be as
"durable" as its advocates view it. In that regard, Anthony and Mbago have concluded that:
In Tanzania, it is unlikely that the refugees can integrate fully. This is partly due ta the fact that the country is economically poor. Moreover, if the refugees are fully integrated, the country is likely ta be unstable politically [sic]. Therefore, refugees who may be absorbed and integrated in the short term (such as is the case with the Rwandese) may not be safe and stable o)(r a long time (note recent events in Uganda). The conclusion which emerges from the above short
discussion of the so-called "durable" solutions is that the
solutions in question are hardly "durable" after all. This
finding leads ta the challenging question of what, it any,
would be the really durable solution ta the African
exile/refugee problem. In my view, the most durable
solution is also, unfortunately, the most difficult ta achieve. Africans are exiles/refugees within the African continent not only because they fled their respective
countries due ta whatever causes, but also because their
fight ended up within the territorial boundaries of a
foreign African state. Theoretically all African
exiles/refugees who live in Africa would, by a stroke of a
pen, cease ta be exiles/refugees if the present national 253
boundaries ceased ta exist.
This notion is relatively easy ta conceptualize,
although not as easy ta implement. Although odds against
the political decision ta do away with the present national boundaries in Africa are formidable, that eventuality is not
not outside the realm of possibility. The process leading
ta that difficult political decision would entail a
conscious policy of self-dissolution on the part of all
African states, forgoing the futile, petty and deceptive
vanity of fledgling sovereignties for the benefit of
creating a single, more economically and politically viable
"Federated States of Africa" If that happened, African
exiles/refugees would instantly shed their exile/refugee
status ta assume all the citizen rights conferred upon them
by the new "African" nationality. They would, thus, choose
ta remain where they are or move ta any part of the
"Federated States of Africa" of their choice.
A logical question which follows from the above
proposition is whether or not under a "Federated States of
Africa," the root causes of the exile/refugee problem would
cease ta exist. This is a legitimate question for, indeed,
size alone and a restructured, unified political space do
not automatically promise an economic, political and social
paradise. However, a number of considerations seem ta
suggest that a "Federated States of Africa" would be better
equipped ta alleviate the unfavorable conditions which have
contributed ta exile/refugee-generation in African 254 countries. The inability of African governments_to control their national economies, hence concentrating on the control of their peoples, may be mitigated in the context of the larger, more balanced economy that a "Federated States of Africa" promises. First, from the point of view of a sound and enlightened economic policy, the new generation of leadership that would run the government of the new state would presumably be more knowledgeable about the past constraints and the more promising directions. The ignorance, fumbling or impotent enlightenment characterizing the management or mismanagement of national economies by the first generation of African leaders have hurt, disillusioned and demoralized the candidates of this second generation of African leaders. If this generation of leaders assumed power in a totally restructured political context suggesting a fresh start, this would enhance their chance of formulating more well thought-out, judicious economic policies. Besides, such a government would be better placed to take advantage of the diversity and complementarily of the abundant resources with which the continent is richly endowed. In the area of highly-trained manpower, which is one of the factors needed to bring African economies to their required buoyancy, a "Federated States of Africa" would encourage the return of exiled African experts who currently live in Europe and the Americas, especially those °255 who had to make a choice between the culturaily'alienating
life in these foreign countries and an equally alienating
life under despots in their home countries. This might prove to be the beginning of a reversai in the unforgiving
brain-drain inflicted upon Africa for so long.
The spirit of a "new beginning" in a "Federated States
of Africa" would also encourage unorthodox approaches to
economic aid for development. Instead of relying on the
failed economic aid policies of the past, relying on loans
and grants with built-in traps, such as.those conditions -
ridden aid packages from individual countries, banks, the
IMF and the World Bank, the new government leadership could
explore the uncharted sea of other development aid
opportunities. For example, the developed world, both in
the East and the West, is full of individuals who are highly
qualified in the technologies that Africa needs to take off
economically and ultimately catch up with the highly
developed countries of the world. A well thought-out
"missionary" approach of sorts would attract sonie of the
floating, frustrated or bored talent in the developed world,
by giving such individuals the challenge of a new frontier -
a new and noble mission to personally get involved in
creating a modern economy out of the shambles that history
and willful malevolence of human action have made of Africa.
I have in mind two types of talented individuals in
the developed world. The first is that of highly qualified
individuals who have been thrown out of work in their area 256 of expertise because of the vagaries of the capitalist economy in the West, or the vagaries of political/ ideological life in the East. In either situation, the resulting loss of the proper job frustrates the individuals' natural quest for self-realization in their respective chosen fields of expertise. Such people are suitable candidates for the new "development mission" in Africa. The second type is that of highly qualified individuals who are properly employed in their respective areas of expertise and who are materially well off, but are beginning to experience the boredom that sheer accumulation of material wealth may cause in post-industrial societies. Such individuals may find much attraction in directing their creative energies to the salvaging or Africa's ailing economy, partly due to lack of technological expertise. For such individuals, the "development mission" in Africa might be a value, the pursuit of which may constitute the ultimate means of self- realization. Obviously, mere infusion of technological expertise would not be a panacea to the economic development problem in Africa. A suitable, efficient political superstructure would be necessary to effectively utilize that technological expertise. This would call for a good, enlightened and self-confident governance. The voluntarism of the new "development mission" would require competent co-ordination and strict regulation. A clear modus operandi for the volunteers would have to be spelt out and enforced through a 257 strict code of conduct, lest a new form of loss of economic control by the government develops.
A number of other gains might accrue from a "Federated State of Africa" arrangement. Hopefully the huge defense bills currently caused by senseless arms races among the mutually suspicious states would become unnecessary. Africa would probably cease to be the dump site of often obsolete weapons pushed by shady international arms dealers, which are purchased dearly by ignorant or corrupt officiais using the poor citizens' hard-earned foreign currency. The arrangement would also necessitate the introduction of a single currency for the entire continent, a development that would in the long run enhance Africa's weight in the international monetary system. The economic scenarios portrayed above would hopefuliy enhance economic performance and control by the government, and this would factor into an overali improvement in the respect for human rights, which would in turn translate itself into a durable solution of the exile/refugee problem. A "Federated States of Africa" also seems to be the only hope for the eradication of chronic ethnic/tribal strife which generates exiles/refugees in countries like Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. Even if one were to skeptically assume that a "Federated States of Africa" would still produce some exiles/refugees, the new geopolitical and logistical realities would make it impossible to have massive exoduses 258 of the type African countries have experienced. Most of the African exiles/refugees are peasants who flee their countries en masse on foot and cross into a neighboring country. In the new situation, the prospective exile/refugee would have to cross the Atlantic Ocean, or the Indian Ocean, or the Mediterranean, or the Red Sea to flee in search of sanctuary in the nearest state. Under such circumstances, the logistics, economics and even cultural considerations would strongly mitigate the tendency of voting with one's feet. Only a few individuals with financial means and a highly politicized conscience would afford to go into exile. The rest would be forced to remain and struggle to change those aspects of the polity which oppress them from within. This may be one way of fostering a graduai political maturity in the system. The foregoing by no means suggests that African unity is around the corner. The very factors that made its realization in the eariy 1960s impossible are still there. The old vested interests in favor of balkanization have become consolidated and new ones have crystallized. Ail I am saying is that the magnitude of the African exile/refugee problem is a poignant reminder that the present fragmented state system in Africa has outlived its usefulness, in the face of colossal problems threatening the very existence of each separate unit. I hasten to add that an attempt to design what a "Federated States of Africa" would look like is beyond the 259
scope of this study. Suffice it to say that revisiting
Kwame Nkrumah's vision of a United Africa and the specific
recommendations he made to that effect would be as good a
start as any. If this discussion of the gravity of the
exile/refugee problem in Africa manages to stimulate sonie
interest to reinstate the issue of African unity on today's political agenda, then the suffering of African
exiles/refugees and the damage caused by this problem in
inter-African state relations will not have occurred in vain.
If no strides are made towards African unity in the
near future, the African exile/refugee problem will persist,
and so will the inter-state conflicts associated with it. I
have already mentioned the increasing negative trends in the
ability of African countries to control their economies,
which suggest more political unrest and probably more
exiles/refugees. I have also pointed out the negative
trends in the observance of the principles of asylum. None
of these trends are indicative of better prospects in inter-
African state relations. Ad-hoc measures will continue to
be taken by states bilaterally, or in multilateral contexts
to address the exile/refugee problem, but no durable
solutions are likely to be found, even with the massive
intervention of private voluntary organizations.
In my view, the OAU has already exhausted the actions
it could possibly take in addressing the exile/refugee
problem, within the framework of its very circumscribed 260 political mandate. Hardly any more radical measures could be taken without violating its charter. In the context of its circumscribed mandate, the OAU has, for example, asked member states to accede to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the 1969 OAU Convention governing the specific aspects of the refugee problem in Africa, and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. It has further asked member states to recognize the right of the individual refugee to return to his/her country of origin in peace and dignity, and to integrate the formulation and implementation of refugees/returnees' programmes into the national, medium and long terni development plans. Other OAU resolutions and recommendations have addressed such issues as the need to prohibit refugees residing in member states from engaging in any political and military activities likely to endanger the good relations between the host country and the country of origin, and in that regard the need to settle refugees, as far as possible, at a reasonable distance from the frontiers of their country of origin. Furthermore, the OAU has encouraged member states whose nationals live in exile to enact amnesty laws in order to encourage and facilitate the latter's voluntary repatriation. It has also been active in the area of relief assistance and rehabilitation of refugees.
No additional number of such resolutions and recommendations is likely to ever produce any breakthrough 261 in the solution of the African refugee problem. One reason for this is that once reached, these resolutions cannot be enforced by the OAU because it simply has no power to do so, beyond mere persuasion. The other reason has to do with the Charter's sacrosanct principle of non-interference in the internai affairs of a member state. In strict observance of this principle, deliberations about root causes leading to the generation of exiles/refugees in individual member states are taboo. As if to compensate for this shyness, the OAU is well known for showering condemnations on South Africa, which is not a member, accusing it of the very things occurring in the member states, but about which it dares not reapproach them. The frustrating nature of this hypocrisy is easily discernible in the following lament by President Museveni of Uganda: ...I must state that Ugandans were unhappy and felt a deep sense of betrayal that most of Africa kept silent while tyrants killed them. The reason for not condemning such massive crimes has supposedly been a desire not to interfere in the internai affairs of a member state...We do not accept this reasoning...While we accept and recognize the validity of the principle of non-interference in internai affairs of a member state we strongly hold that this should never be used as a cloak to shield genocide from just censure. African silence in the face of such gross abuses...produces severa2undesirable results prejudicial to our just goals.
The UNHCR is in no better situation than the OAU to corne up with a durable solution to the African exile/refugee phenomenon. Apart from providing material assistance and protection to refugees and returnees, a responsibility it has so far discharged commendably well, the UNHCR cannot be 262 expected to prevent new exile/refugee-generation situations from occurring. Its limited mandate does not allow it to attempt to do something about the root causes, and yet it is in this domain that the building blocks of a really durable solution can be found. Besides, like the OAU, it has the disadvantage of not being able to enforce whatever nice resolutions or even conventions it might in future add to the existing ones. The UNHCR is over-cautious when it addresses political issues concerning the behavior of states. For example, it took the member states of the UNHCR's Executive Committee six years (1981-87) to reach an agreement condemning military or armed attacks on refugee camps and settlements.23 Although the agreement was finally reached, the UNCHR would be completely helpless if situations requiring the enforcement of this agreement presented themselves. Furthermore, if the proposai of this modestly political agreement found itself under fire within the UNHCR Executive Committee ever since Ambassador Felix Schnyder submitted it in 1982, one can imagine what would be the fate of a more radical proposai addressing the fundamental root causes of the exile/refugee phenomenon itself. The private voluntary organizations (PVOs) will hopefully continue to play their important role in the area of relief and rehabilitation work, but their relations with the African states in which they operate may continue to degenerate to a point where some of them may have to 263 withdraw their services. I pointed out in Chapter one that there had sometimes been instances when the behavior of certain foreign PVOs bordered on encroachment upon the sovereign authority of their host states. This tendency seems ta have persisted.
African countries experiencing the heavy burden of meeting the needs of large influxes of exiles/refugees have always accepted the charitable interventions of
intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) or PVOs with a great sigh of relief.
However, the countries in question have also sought ta
jealously guard their sovereign authority whenever the PVOs have tried ta impose their will against the policy
preferences of the host governments. Over the years,
African governments hosting PVOs have developed defense mechanisms ta deal with badly needed PVOs, but which use the
muscle of their relief assistance ta challenge the former's sovereign authority.
For example, in a conflict involving a host government
and a PVO, the government might deliberately make the
conflict look as if it was incited by an individual member
of staff of the PVO in question. Thus, efforts would be made ta abstract the alleged actions of the staffer
concerned from the intent of the PVO for which he/she works,
hoping that the tensions would be dissipated in an induced
face-saving personnel manipulation, whereby the staffer would take the fall. Alternatively, during the era of 264 competition among PVOs to make their presence and impact
felt in refugee emergency situations, the government would
attempt to substitute the services of the troublesome PVO by those of another which is less inclined to be self- assertive. There is no evidence to suggest that conflicts between host governments and PVOs, concerning the latter's
encroachment on the sovereign authority of the former is on
the decline in Africa. With respect to the situation in
Somalia, for instance, the 1988 report of the OAU Commission
of Fifteen has implied that there still exists sonie tension
between the Somali government and some PVOs which have been
leaking negative information about the government to the
international press. In a non-judgmental, diplomatic language, the Commission has observed that "the security situation obtaining in the country is not one in which
international staff can discharge fully its duties in the
service of refugees, without fear or favor."24
In Ethiopia, the tension between the government and sonie relief agencies operating there, particularly the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), has
continued unabated. When, around mid-1988, the Ethiopian
government asked foreign relief workers to terminate their
services in its war-torn regions of Eritrea and Tigre,
leaving the relief operations in those areas under the
control of the government-run national Relief and
Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), the ICRC impugned the good 265 faith of the government which gave "safety for the expatriates" as the reason behind the policy. The government's frustration about voluntary agencies' encroachment on its sovereign authority is made abundantly clear by the following answer by Mr. Berhanu Jembere, a high-ranking Ethiopian officiai interviewed by Africa
Report:
...If I corne to your country, and present myself to be more concerned than you, the citizen in your country, tell me what you think. We are not toys. We don't want to be pushed around by anybody. This is Ethiopia, no other country. We have survived several difficulties. And we will survive. The Ethiopians will not live by the wheat which cornes from abroad. When there is a humanitarian gesture, yes, we have accepted willingly because we trusted everybody. But those who are not trusting us cannot continue with the present kind of arrogance. We do not expect any decision-maker from outside to tell us how to things in our country and what to do for our people. 2i
There is nothing to suggest that, in the future, relief agencies will desist from challenging the sovereign authority of asylum countries in Africa. In the 1980s, relief agencies such as those operating in Somalia have
learned to unite for a more effective response to refugee emergencies at hand. An example of this unity is the Inter-
Church Response for the Horn of Africa (ICR). This trend towards unity, a potential "cartelization" of sorts, may give more clout to the agencies, making them feel better
equipped to question those policies of the host governments
deemed unsavory. 266
Conclusion
The African exile/refugee phenomenon, in its various manifestations, has very adversely affected inter-African state relations. Both the conflicts and the acts of cooperation triggered between and among African states by the exile/refugee problem have been unacceptably costly.
The interstate conflicts related to the exile/refugee factor in Africa have been proportionaily higher than those caused by the other conflict-generating factors combined. The political salience of the problem, within the gamut of political issues adversely affecting the countries concerned, seems to have been quite high, judged by the high level in government at which the problem has often been articulated. Very frequently, concern about the problem has been repeatedly voiced by heads of state and government themselves. An instant solution of the already existing exile/refugee problem in Africa would be the creation of a
"Federated States of Africa," an act that would scrap the present national boundaries, thus making every African anywhere on the continent a legitimate citizen of the new state. Further generation of exiles/refugees would be prevented by a thriving economy and a better functioning political system which would hopefully follow from the opportunities of a fresh start presented by this fundamental political restructuring. The present African states can only embark on this controversial political restructuring 267
through a politically mature, farsighted resolve to espouse
a tactical policy of self-dissolution in order to
reincarnate in a healthier, more viable entity, amenable to
a steadier course of development.
If this does not happen, the problem posed by the
already existing exile/refugee population on the continent may never be solved in any durable manner. The current
trend towards less generous asylum policies in many African
states may make the exile/refugee problem even worse in the
future. As long as exiles/refugees continue to roam the
continent across national boundaries, the inter-state
problems of the types described in this study will continue
unabated. Once in the sanctuaries of the asylum countries, the exiles/refugees who consider themselves political
victims, will never cease to solicit sonie opportunities to
fight for their lost political interests. It can reasonably
be assumed that as in the past, at least a few asylum
countries will grant such opportunities, for whatever
motives. This is likely to pit such asylum countries
against the countries of origin.
No amount of diplomacy, bilaterial or multilaterial,
will be adequate to resolve the African exile/refugee
problem under the present state structure. No amount of
agreements, resolutions or recommendations authored by the
OAU or the UNHCR will bring under control the stubborness
that sovereign authority confers on individual states.
If no durable solution to the African exile/refugee 268 problem is found, the problem will continue to negatively affect inter-African state relations. It may even undermine
inter-African state cooperation in such areas as regional economic cooperation, which is seen by many political analysts as the last hope Africa has to overcome its current economic development problems. There have been precedents
in this regard. For example, during the formative years of the Organization for the Management and Development of the
Kagera River Basin (a regional economic cooperation
arrangement originally between Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and
Tanzania), the exile/refugee problems pitting Rwanda against
Burundi and Uganda against Tanzania, respectively, disrupted
the regional economic cooperation process in many ways. For
instance, Amin's negative attitude towards Tanzania, mainly
because of the presence of pro-Obote exiles in this country, made him pull Uganda out of the arrangement in 1972.
The exile/refugee issue affected the cooperation
process in another way. The director of the Kagera River
Basin project reported that the activities of the organization suffered because of the poor relations existing
among the member states. This problem was raised in a 1973
report which put it as follows:
...Our work was hampered to some degree by the various tensions within and between the participating and neighboring countries. The strained relations between Rwanda and Burundi, especially after the events of 1972, do not farlitate the co-operation in international proj ects . With all the above observations in mind, the effect of exiles/refugees upon inter African state relations can be 269 nothing else than a net negative. This reality is ample justification for a new, albeit more challenging approach to solving the African exile/refugee dilemma. The seeds of the solution lie in a new quest for African unity. The fact that creating a "Federated States of Africa" is an awesome undertaking does not justify resignation. Hard work, good judgement, able statesmanship and the imperatives of a stable economic and political future resulted in the founding of the United States of America, not because the
tasks of forming the Union were easy, but because a very able leadership tapped and nurtured the rationality and good will of the citizens of the separate states with a superb sense of timing. This is a historical precedent Africa can ignore only at its own peril. The idea of a "Federated States of Africa" may be easily misconstrued as utopian by skeptics. However, it only belongs to that order of grand ideas which, although apt to be realized, tend to overwhelm the limited scope of simple organizational experience. Such ideas, like Rawls' idea of justice,27 at least deserve the attention of rigorous scholarship. 270
Poiiticai map of Africa
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APPENDIX II
A Summary of African Conflicts* and the Role of the OAU in Their Resolution or Management, 1976-80**
Country/ Countries Conflict Type Role of the OAU Outcome as of June 1980 Involved
Algeria/ Territorial/Lib- Attempted mediation on Liberation war Morocco eration Movement. several occasions. The continues. Algeria con- Algerian support last attempt was Dec- tinues to support for the Polisario ember 1979 in Monrovia Polisario. and independence when the ad hoc Com- for Western Sahara. mittee on Western Sahara met.
Algeria/ Territorial/Lib- Attempted mediation on Resolved. Coup in Mauritania eration Movement. several occasions, but Mauritania in 1978 Algerian support for unsuccessful. brought pro-settlement the Polisario and government to power. independencefor It renounced claims to Western Sahara. its own section of the territory in favour ofindependencein 1979.
Angola Civil war/external Attempted mediation on Resolved. Military intervention. several occasions, e.g. victory by the M.P.L.A. 1975-1976 Nakuru in Kenya under under Neto and chairmanship of supported by Cuba and Kenyatta. Emergency and Soviet Union. summit in 1976 dead- locked. OAU did not secure withdrawal of Cuban and South Africa forces from territory.
Angola/ South African military Limited to verbal con- Unresolved. Liberation South intervention and sub- demnation and moral war in Namibia Africa sequent military support for Angola continues. 272
incursions in pursuit and SWAPO. 1975-1980 of SWAPO freedom fighters.
Angola/ Subversion/ Very minimal. Conflict resolved bi- Zaire Intervention laterally through diplomatic channels. 1975-1978
Benin External intervention/ OAU fact-finding Resolved. Invasion mercenary invasion. mission to Benin beaten off by Benin 1977 army.
Benin/Togo Border dispute. None. Resolved through bilat- eral diplomatic 1976 negotiations
Botswana/ Border clashes/ Diplomatic condem- Resolved. Rhodesian Rhodesia incursions. nation and moral incursions ceased at support. at Zimbabwean 1977-1979 independence.
Chad (i) Civil war. Limited to appeals Temporarily frozen for peace and end to through multilateral 1978-1979 hostilities. peace initiatives spearheaded by Nigeria. Nigeria sent peace- keeping force to enforce cease-fire. Government of National Unity formed.
Chad (ii) Civil war. Substantial. Peace- Unresolved. War con- keeping force ear- continues. 1980 marked but not yet mobilished.
Chad/Libya Military intervention. OAU committee set up to Resolved pro tem. Accu- Libyan support for mediate and ensure sations continue of 1978-80 rival nationalist Libyans' withdrawal. Libyan support for faction led by Goukouni by Hissene Goukouni Weddeye. Habre. 273
Comoros Power struggle/ None. Resolved militarily. external intervention, French mercenaries 1977 mercenary invasion. restored Ahmed Abdulla to power.
Ethiopia/ War of secession. None. War in progress. Eritrea
1975-80
Ethiopia/ Territorial irredent- OAU committee set up Resolved/quiescent. Somalia ist, open war, and to mediate in 1973. Ethiopian military external intervention Met in 1977 during victory. 1977 by Cubans and Russians conflict, but failed. on side of Ethiopia.
Ethiopia/ Subversion, border OAU 8-man mediation Resolved. Sudan clashes and refugee committee met in Free- problems. town, successfully 1977-1978 proposed a peace formula.
Ghana/Togo Border clashes. None Resolved through bilat- eral diplomatic negotiations.
Kenya/ Territorial irredent- Limited to appeals for Quiescent. Somalia ist. respect for OAU charter provisions. 1977
Libya/ Border clashes. None. Quiescent. Egypt
1977
Libya/ Subversion/invasion. None. 1976 conflict resolved Tunisia bilaterally. 1980 conflict quiescent 1976 and after invasion 1980 resisted. 274
Mauri- Boundary dispute. None. Resolved through bilat- tania/ eral mediation efforts Upper Volta of President Toure.
1975
Mozam- Border incursions by Limited to diplomatic Resolved through bique/ Rhodesian soldiers condemnation of Zimbabwean indepen- Rhodesia in pursuit of freedom Rhodesia and moral dence. fighters. support for 1975-1980 Mozambique.
Mozam- South African troop Limited to moral Quiescent. bique/ incursions. support for South Mozambique and dip- Africa lomatic condemnation of South Africa. 1976-1979
Nigeria/ Border clashes, in- None. Partial bilateral Chad cursions by Chadian resolution in 1976, soldiers, dispute but clashes continue. 1976-1980 over fishing rights.
Uganda/ Subversion, border OAU mediation by Remained quiescent. Tanzania clashes and ideo- Secretary-General, plus (i) logical/personality personal initiatives of conflict. other members. 1977-78
Uganda/ Territorial dispute, Substantial. Cease-fire Resolved militarily Tanzania border clashes, and appeala, committee of with Amin overthrown (ii) intervention by six to seek peaceful in April 1979. Ugandan exiles and solution, and calls 1978-1979 Tanzanian troops. for mutual respect of territorial integrity.
Uganda/ Murder of Kenyan None. Resolved bilaterally. Kenya citizens border tensions, and 1976-1978 refugees. 275
Zambia/ Rhodesian military Moral and diplomatic Resolved through Rhodesia incursions and raids support for Zambia and Zimbabwe independence. on Nationalist camps. condemnation of rebel 1975-1980 government forces.
Zaire Subversion, Katangese None. Invasion regarded Resolved. Zairean (Shaba i) exiles in Angola took as internat affair. military victory with over copper mines in the help of Moroccan, 1977 Shaba province. Egyptian, French and Belgian troops and U.S. logistical support.
Zaire Katangese exiles again OAU Khartoum summit Resolved. Zairean (Shaba ii) returned to Shaba condemned externat military victory with province. intervention in Africa, support of French and 1978 particularly the Belgian paratroopers. proposed Francophone "Pan-African" force.
Conflicts are here defined to include civil wars, boundary and border disputes, personality and ideological conflicts, and external military interventions.
** As of June 1980.
Source: Timothy M. Shaw and Sola Ojo (eds), The International Political System, New York: University Press of America, 1982, pp.178-185. 276
APPENDIX III
Agreement on military attacks
After six years of discussions, the Member States of UNHCR's Executive Committee have adopted by consensus the following conclusion condemning military or armed attacks on refugee camps and settlements.
The subject was first brought up in 1981, when the Executive Committee requested Ambassador Felix Schnyder, former United National High Commissioner for Refugees, to examine the question. His draft report had been submitted to the 33rd session of the Executive Committee, in October 1982.
The Executive Committee,
Remained gravely preoccupied with the continuing incidence of unlawful attacks on refugees and asylum-seekers in different areas of the world, including military or armed attacks on refugee camps and settlements and, in view of the tragic and indiscriminate consequences of these attacks, resulting in untold human misery for the refugees and asylum-seekers, believed it was necessary and timely at this session to express its humanitarian concern and condemnation in the strongest terras;
Noted with appreciation those Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, adopted by consensus, in particular General Assembly Resolution 39/140 (1984), which condemned all violations of the rights and safety of refugecs and asylum-seekers, in particular those perpetrated by military or armed attacks against refugee camps and settlements; Predicating this Conclusion on the assumption, inter alia, that refugee camps and settlements have an exclusively civilian and humanitarian charactcr and on the principle that the grant of asylum or refuge is a peaceful and humanitarian act that is not to be regarded as unfriendly by another State; hoping to assist in guaranteeing the safety of refugees and asylum-seekers, as well as to reinforce their rights, obligations and responsibilities and those of States and international organizations pursuant to relevant rules and principles of international law; and underlining that the rights and responsibilities of States pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations and relevant rules and principles of international law, including international humanitarian law, remained unaltered;
1. Condemns all violations of the rights and safety of refugees and asylum- seekers and in particular military or armed attacks on refugee camps and settlements.
2. Strongly urnes States to abstain from these violations, which are against the principles of international law and, therefore, cannot be justified. 277
3. Calls upon States and competent international organizations, in accordance with the principle of international solidarity and in order to alleviate the burden of the country of refuge, to provide, according to their means, all necessary assistance to relieve the plight of the victims of such military and armed attacks on refugee camps and settlements if ever they occur.
4. Urges States and other parties to be guided by the following considerations in promoting measures to enhance the protection of refugee camps and settlements:
(a) Refugees in camps and settlements have, together with the basic rights they enjoy, duties deriving from the refuge and protection granted or afforded to them by the country of refuge. In particular, they have duties to conform to the laws and regulations of the State of refuge including lawful measures taken for the maintenance of public order and to abstain from any activity likely to detract from the exclusively civilian and humanitarian character of the camps or settlements.
(b) It is essential that States of refuge do all within their capacity to ensure that the civilan and humanitarian character of such camps and settlements is maintained. Ail other States are called upon to assist them in this regard. To this end relevant organs of the United Nations, within their respective terras of reference, are also called upon to co-operate with all States in providing assistance whenever necessary.
(c) UNHCR and other concerned organs of the United Nations should make every effort, within their respective terms of reference and in keeping with the principles of the United Nations Charter, to promote conditions which ensure the safety of refugees in camps and settlements. For UNHCR this may include maintaining close contact with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and providing liaison, as appropriate, with all the parties concerned. It may also involve making appropriate arrangements with States of refuge on methods of protecting such refugee camps and settlements including, whenever possible, their location at a reasonable distance from the frontier of the country of origin.
(d) States have a duty to cooperate with the High Commissioner in the performance of his humanitarian protection and assistance functions, which can only be effectively accomplished if he has access to camps and settlements of his concern.
Source: Refugees, November 1987. 278
ENDNOTES
Notes to Pages 1-9
Notes to Chapter I
1. See Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 8, 1963, p. 18.
2. For an account of the deteriorating relations between Kenya and Uganda, see Jeune Afrique, No.1378, June 1987, p.22.
3. Charles Cooley, Social Progress, New York: Scribner, 1918.
4. See the 1969 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of the Problem of Refugees in Africa, Article I (l&2).
5. For a distinction between the ternis "conflict" and "crisis" see William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 8 (hereafter cited as William Zartman, Resolution).
6. Peter Woodward, "Relations Between Neighbouring States in North-East Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, 22, 2, 1984, p. 279.
7. For a brief mention of this kind of scenario, see Saadia Touval, The Boundarv Politics of Independent Africa, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972, pp. 162-163 (hereafter cited as Saadia Touval, Boundary).
8. I am using the terni "national interest" as it is commonly used in the "realist" theory in political science, e.g. Hans Morgenthau Politics Among Nations, New York: Knopf, 1967, although I am inclined to think that what passes for "national interest" is actually ruling class interest.
9. For example, it is sometimes argued that Idi Amin of Uganda put a high premium on supporting the Southern Sudanese exiles in Uganda against the Khartoum government, mainly because some of the exiles came from tribes closely related to his own and he wanted them to seize power in Sudan.
10. Saadia Touval, Boundary, p. 163. 279
Notes to pages 10-23 11. Peter Woodward, JMAS, p. 280.
12. Ibid, p.. 281.
13. The 1969 OAU Convention Concerning Specific Aspects of the Problem of Refugees in Africa, Article III, in Peter Nobel, Refugee Law in the Sudan-Research Report No.64, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1982, p. xx. 14. See, for example, Peter Woodward, JMAS, pp. 279- 281.
15. For a discussion of the population statistics relating to the African refugee problem, see Gaim Kibraeb, Reflections on the African Refugee Problem: A Critical Analysis of Some Basic Assumptions, Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1983, especially, pp. 23-34 (hereafter cited as Gaim Kibraeb, Reflections).
16. W. Gould., "Refugees in Tropical Africa", International Migration Review, 8,3, 1974, p. 414.
17. Astri Suhrke, "Overview: Refugees and World Politics," in Elizabeth G. Ferris (ed.), Refugees and World Politics, New York: Praeger, 1985, p. 15 (hereafter cited as Elizabeth Ferris, Refugees).
18. Aristide Zolberg, "The Formation of New States as a Refugee-Generating process,"in Elizabeth G. Ferris (ed.), ibid, p.41 (hereafter cited as Aristide Zolberg, "New States.") 19. Ibid. 20. William Zartman, Resolution, p.12. 21. Ibid. 22. Aristide Zolberg, "New States," p. 33. 23. William Zartman, Resolution, p.12. 24. Ibid, p.13. 25. See Gaim Kibraeb, Reflections, p. 49. 26. See "Les Stingers passent par Kinshasa," Jeune Afrique, No. 1391, 2 Septembre 1987, p. 28. 280
Notes to pages 25-31 27. Edward Soja, The Political Organization of Space: Resource Parer No.8, Washington, D.C.: Commission on College Geography, 1971, p. 33. 28. Soja describes "territoriality" as "the concentration of activities and communication within localized areas, inserting boundaries as it were into normal distance-decay relationships", ibid, p. 34.
29. Saadia Touval, Boundary, pp. 115-116. 30. See Elizabeth Ferris, "Overview: Refugees and World Politics," Refugees, p.20. 31. Myron Weiner, "On International Migration and International Relations," Population and Development Review, 11, 3, September, 1985, p. 442. 32. Gabriel Sheffer (ed.)., Modern Diasporas in International Politics, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986, p.l (hereafter cited as Gabriel Sheffer, Diasporas). He defines "trans-state networks" as "structured connections established by groups, institutions and corporations across national and state boundaries, that evoke loyalties and solidarities inconsistent with and sometimes even contradicting the traditional allegiances to territorial states. 33. Ibid, p.6. 34. Ibid, p.7. 35. Elizabeth Ferris, "Overview: Refugees and World Politics," Refugees, pp. 8-9 36. John RoSge, "Africa's Resettlement Strategies," International Migration Review, 15, (1-2), Spring-Summer, 1981, p. 196.
37. W. Gould, IMR p.416
38. See the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.
39. Julius Nyerere, "Settling Refugees: The Story of five loaves, two fishes" Daily News, Dar es Salaam, May 8, 1979. 281
Notes to pages 31-36 40. Contained in Paper REF/AR/CONF/WP5, "Treatment of Refugees: Movement of Refugees," Pan-African Conference on Refugees, Arusha, 1979. 41. Robert Gorman, "Private Voluntary Organizations in Refugee Relief," in Elizabeth Ferris, (ed.), Refugees, pp.97-98. 42. Ibid, p.99. 43. Ibid, p.100-101. 44. See Milton J. Esman, "Diasporas and International Relations," in Gabriel Sheffer, (ed.), Diasporas, pp.333- 349. 45. These determinants are adapted from Esman's study on diasporas; ibid, pp.336-339. 46. Ibid, p.338. 47. Tom Lodge, "State of Exile: The African National Congress of South Africa, 1976-86," World Population Quarterly, January, 1987, pp.2-3. 48. Ibid, p.l. 282
Notes to pages 39-45
Notes to Chapter II
1. This is a fairly conventional definition of the sub-region, used by most institutions interested in area studies. For example, the Library of Congress uses this definition in its division of sub-Saharan Africa into its major sub-regions. See Library of Congress, The United States and Sub-Saharan Africa: Guide to U.S. Official Documents and Government-Sponsored Publications-1976-1980, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984.
2. See Cas de Villiers, African Problems and Challenges, Sandton: Valiant Publishers, 1976, p.125.
3. Report of the UNHCR: UN General Assembly Records - Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 12 (A/10012), New York, 1975.
4. See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, "African Refugees," Gist, December, 1985.
5. Yassin E1-Ayouty and William Zartman, The OAU After Twenty Years, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984, p.216.
6. The total number of Zairean exiles/refugees living in Zambia since the early 1980s has fluctuated around 5,000. Shaba I and II refer to the consecutive attacks on the Shaba Province of Zaire in 1977 and 1978, respectively.
7. These figures have been obtained from the following sources: Gaim Kibraeb, Reflections on the African Refugee Problem: A Critical Analysis of Some Basic Assumptions, Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1983, p.28; and U.S. Department of State, "World Refugee Report," Washington, 1985, p.93.
8. The country called Zaire today has changed names several times. Initially known as the Belgian Congo, it became the Congo at independence, then Congo-Leopoldville, then Congo-Kinshasa and finally Zaire. All these names are used in this study depending on what the official name of the country was when the cited event took place.
9. U.S. Department of State, Gist, p.96. 283
Notes to pages 48-57
10. These early activities of Angolan exiles are narrated in a memorandum presented by the National Liberation Front of Angola (FLNA) to the Commission for the Reconciliation of Angola Nationalist Movements of the OAU which met in Leopoldville (Congo) on July 15, 1963. This memorandum is reproduced in Aquina de Braganca and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds), The African Liberation Reader: Vol.2, London: Zed Press, 1982. p.14.
11. Ibid.
12. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution; Conflict and Intervention in Africa, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985;p.123.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid, pp.122-123.
15. Kenneth Grundy, "Host Countries and the Southern African Liberation Struggle," Africa Quarterly, Vol.10, No.1, April 1970, pp.22-23. 16. Africa Report, Vol.13, No.10, 1968,p.41. 17. African Report, Vol.18, No.1, January-February, 1973, p.28. 18. Michael Schultheis, "Refugees in Africa: The Dynamics of a Global Justice Issue," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Denver, Colorado: November 19-23, 1987, p.15 (hereafter cited as Michael Schultheis, "Justice Issue.") 19. Ibid. 20. Michael Radu, "Ideology, Parties, and Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Richard Bissell and Michael Radu (eds.), Africa in the Post-Decolonization Era, London: Transition Books, 1984, p.37.
21. See Gerard Chaliand, The Strugcle for Africa: Conflict of the Great Powers, London: MacMillan Press, 1982, p.65 (hereafter cited as Gerard Chaliand, Struggle).
22. Africa Report, Vol.23, 3, 1978, p.21.
23. New York Times, April 12, 1977. 284
Notes to pages 57-56 24. See for example, Africa News, April 11, 1977. 25. Africa Report, Vol.23, No.1, 1978, p.6. 26. William Zartman, op.cit, p.143. 27. See Africa Report, Vol.30, No.2, 1985, p.48. 28. Jeune Afrique, No. 1372,.22 April, 1987.
29. Jeune Afrique, No. 1391, 2 Septembre, 1987. 30. See Africa Report, Vol.12, 1967, p.23. 31. Ibid, p.35. 32. The importance of these bases can be illustrated by the fact that FRELIMO intensified its Tete operations using bases in Zambia. See Ali Mazrui and Michael Tidy, Nationalism and New States in Africa, London: Heinemann, 1984, p.143 (hereafter cited as Ali Mazrui and Michael Tidy, Nationalism). 33. Africa Report, Vol.13, 1968, p.41. 35. Africa Report, Vol.18, No.1, 1973, p.27-28. 36. Ibid. 37. See Ali Mazrui and Michael Tidy, Nationalism, p. 143. 38. Ibid, p.146. 39. Africa Report, Vol.24, No.4, 1979, p.42. 40. Washington Post, July 1, 1977. 41. Financial Times, June 30, 1977. 42. Washington Post, June 24, 1978. 43. Ali Mazrui and Michael Tidy, Nationalism, p.150. 44. Africa Report, Vol.23, No.5, 1978, p.37. 45. Ibid, Vol.24, No.3, 1979, p. 31. 285
Notes to pages 67-77 46. Gerard Chaliand, Struggle, p.71. 47. For this summary of the Rhodesian government's support for the MNR, see Africa Report, November-December, 1982, p.5. 48. Ali Mazrui and Michael Tidy, Nationalism, p.150. 49. Africa Report, Vol.23, No.3, 1978, p.32. 50. Africa Report, Vol.22, No.6, 1977, pp.39-40. 51. Africa Report, Vol.23, No.3, 1978, p.32. 52. Africa Report, Vol.22, No.6, 1977, p.41. 53. At the time Botswana maintained refugee camps at Selebi, Pikwe and Dukwe. 54. See John Nelson, "Some External Aspects of Internai Conflict Within South Africa," unpublished PhD dissertation, George Washington University, 1975, p.193. 55. See "Mwalimu Slams at Vorster's Pact Offer," Tanzania News Review, Dar es Salaam, 29 January, 1971, p.8.
56. See Tom Lodge, "State of Exile: The African National Congress of South Africa," Third World Quarterly, Vol.9, No.l, January, 1987, p.7.
57. See Jeune Afrique, No.1374, 6 March, 1987. 58. See U.S. House of Representatives, "Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs," Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session, December 8, 1982, p.49. 59. Africa Report, Vol.26, No.l, January-February, 1981, p.33. 60. See Sunday Express, August 4, 1968. 61. See Africa Report, November-December, 1982, p.5. 62. Africa Report, May-June, 1982, p.37. 286
Notes ta pages 78-85 63. Carol Thompson, "Politics of Destabilization and Refugee Generation in Southern Africa," a paper presented at the Association of African Studies Conference, Denver, Colorado: 1987, p.9 (hereafter cited as Carol Thompson, "Destabilization.") 64. For this summary of South Africa's raids in Mozambique, see Tony Hodges, "Refugees as military targets," Africa Report, January-February, 1984, p.7. 65. Seé "Update," Africa Report, Vol.29, No.3, May- June, 1984, pp.27-28.
66. See Jeune Afrique, No.1355-1356,24 et 31 Decembre, 1986, pp.44-45.
67. See Africa Report, Vol. 30, No.6, 1985, p.50 68. U.S. House of Representatives, "Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs," Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session, December 8, 1982, p.88 (hereafter cited as U.S. House of Representatives, "Hearing.") 69. See U.S. Committee for Refugees, "Refugees from Mozambique: Shattered Land, Fragile Asylum," Issue Paper, November, 1986, p.20. 70. Ibid, p.3. 71. Ibid. p.21.
72. See Jeune Afrique, No.1386,29 Juillet, 1987, p.36. 73. See African Report, May-June, 1982, p.37. 74. Jeune Afrique, No.1386,29 Juillet, 1987, p.37. 75. Ibid, p.36. 76. Africa Report, Vol.30, No.2, March-April, 1985, p.49. 77. Jeune Afrique, No. 1355-1356,24 et 31 Decembre, 1986, p.44. 78. S.Phiri, "National Integration, Rural Development and Frontier Communities," in A. Asiwaju (ed.), Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africans International Boundaries 1884-1984, New York: St. Martin's, 1985, p.119. 287
Notes to pages 86-102
79. Tom Lodge, TWQ, p.6. 80. Ibid, p.3. 81. William Zartman, Resolution, p.166. 82. Michael Schuitheis, "Justice Issue," p.17. 83. Carol Thompson, "Destabilization," p.10. 84. See Africa Report, Vol.25, No.5, 1980, p.36. 85. U.S. House of Representatives, "Hearing," p.31. 86. Ibid, p.154. 87. Ibid. 88. Ibid. 89. Ibid, p.49. 90. Africa Report, Vol.13, No.2, February, 1968, p.30. 91. Africa Report, January-February, 1984, p.15. 92. Africa Report, Vol.28, No.1, 1983, p.38. 93. Africa Report, November, 1965, p.24. 94. Africa Report, February, 1965, p.53. 95. Africa Report, September, 1965, p.28. 96. See London Times, March 8, 1983.
97. See Tom Lodge, TWQ, p.19. 288
Notes to pages 113-121 Notes to Chapter III 1. This definition is adopted from the Library of Congress. See for example: Library of Congress, The United States and Sub-Saharan Africa: Guide to U.S. Official Documents and Government-Sponsored Publications 1976-1980., Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984. 2. The number of countries affected by Eastern Africans exile/refugee phenomenon outside the region is greater, but all-those countries in Southern Africa whose exiles/refugees were given asylum in Tanzania were discussed in Chapter II and need not be addressed again here. 3. Saadia Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972, p.112. 4. Ibid, p. 153. 5. Ade Adefuye, "The Kakwa of Uganda and the Sudan" in A. Asiwaju (ed.), Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africans International Boundaries 1884-1984, New York: St. Martin's, 1985, p.61 (hereafter cited as Ade Adefuye, "Kakwa.") 6. Edgar O'Ballance, The Secret War in the Sudan, London: Faber & Faber, 1977, p.88. 7. Ade Adefuye, "Kakwa," p.62. 8. The Israeli connection with the Southern Sudanese separatists can be understood within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since the Arab north in the Sudan had the monopoly of government power, Israel feared that the Khartoum government enhanced Arab power within the Organization of African Unity. Thus, Israel's intention was to weaken Arab influence in the OAU by supporting the Southern Sudanese separatists who would hopefully succeed in forming a pro-Israel black government. 9. Ade Adefuye, "Kakwa," p.63.
10. See Daily Telegraph of May 7, 1964.
11. See Africa Report, November, 1965, p. 48. 289
Notes to pages 121-138 12. See Africa Report, Vol.11, No. 5, May 1966, p. 35. 13. Obote was, for example, very much aware of the binding force of the Declaration on the Problem of Subversion and Resolution on the Problem of Refugees adopted at Accra in 1965 and Article III, para 2, of the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. For the text of the latter convention, see Goran Melander and Peter Nobel, African Refugees and the Law, Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1978.
14. See "News in Bref," Africa Report, vol. 11, No. 8, 1966, p. 26-7; and Vol. 12, No. 1, 1967, p. 28. 15. Anva-Nya II refers to a new guerrilla movement in Southern Sudan in the early 1980s, which became quickly overshadowed by the better organized SPLA of John Garang. The SPLA's philosophy is different from that of the Anya-Nya of the 1960s and early 1970s in many ways, principal among which is the movement's non-separatist approach to political change. Their concern is to see the current political problem in Sudan not defined as a "Southern Problem", but as a problem in the national system of government which has to be reformed. 16. See "Mission Report of the OAU Commission of Fifteen On Refugees to Djibouti, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and Ethiopia", BR/Mission/Rep/ 86, (Mimeo), p. 14.
17. Edgar O'Ballance, op.cit, p.77. 18. Ibid, p. 88. 19. Ibid, p. 63. 20. Ibid, p. 96. 21. Africa Report, vol. 22, No. 2, 1977, p.11.
22. Africa Report, vol. 12, 1967, p. 24.
23. Africa Report, vol. 17, No.5, 1972, p. 11. 24. These political demands were articulated in the Koka Dam Manifesto of July 31, 1983. 25. Quoted in Africa Report, September/October, 1982, p. 33. 26. See Africa Report, January, 1965, p.245. 290
Notes ta pages 139-154 27. At the time, Chad was experiencing internai political strife in whichMoslems from the north of the country were challenging the legitimacy of the government monopolized by Christians from the south. 28. These points have been reproduced in Africa Report, vol.11, No.9, 1966, p.23.
29. For a more detailed description of this process, see William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, p.92. 30. See U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Observations on the Impact of American Foreign Police and Development Programs in Six African Countries, Washington:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982, p.37 (hereafter cited as U.S. House of Representatives, "Observations.") 31. Africa Report, vol.29, No. 2, 1984, p.34. 32. Jeune Afrique, No. 1051, Fevrier, 1981, p. 48.
33. "Mission Report of the OAU Commission of Fifteen on Refugees ta Djibouti, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and Ethiopia", BR/MISSION/REP./86 (Mimeo), p.3. 34. Before Djibouti's independence, there were two rival nationalist movements fighting for independence from their Ethiopian and Somali bases, respectively. The Movement for the Liberation of Djibouti (MLD) was based in Ethiopia and the Front for the Liberation of the Somali Coast (FLCS) was based in Somalia. 35. Kenya Weekly Review, February 4, 1983.
36. Africa Report, Vol. 26, No.1, 1981. p.33. 37. Africa Report, Vol. 16, No. 6, 1971, p.10. 38. Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey, War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin, Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1982, p.34. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid, p.41. 41. Ibid, p.42. 42. Ibid, p.37. 291
Notes to pages 155-160 43. Ibid, p.36. 44. Kenya Weekly Review, cited in Africa Report, Vol. 29, No.2, 1984. 45. Africa Report, Vol. 14, Nos. 5&6, 1969, p.40. 46. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Observations," p.36. 47. The Morning Post, Lagos, March 27, 1968. 292
Notes to pages 172-185 Notes to Chapter IV
1. Moroccan and Mauritanian armed forces occupied the territory of Western Sahara after Spain's pulling out of its colony of Spanish Sahara, handing over its control to these two countries which were parties to a tripartite agreement formally known as the Madrid Accords.
2. John Damis, Conflict in Northwest Africa-The Western Sahara Dispute, Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1985, p.137 (hereafter cited as John Damis, Conflict).
3. Ibid, p.65. 4. This view is, for example, held by William Zartman, and he has articulated it in "Conflict in the Sahara, Background Paper," submitted to the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on Africa and on International Organizations, Washington, D.C.: Monday, July 23, 1979, p.131.
5. For a detailed description of this frustration, see Hassan II, The Challenge, New York: Macmillan, 1978, pp.166-168.
6. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Regional Stability in Northern Africa, Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1980, p.6. 7. Ibid, p.7. 8. See, for example, Marches Tropicaux et Mediterraneens, 17 Octobre, 1980, p.2543.
9. This paraphrase of Boumediene by Ould Daddah is quoted in John Damis, Conflict, pp.66-67.
10. See Africa Research Bulletin, April 15, 1982.
11. John Damis, Conflict, p.110.
12. For details of the incident, see Institute for the Study of Conflict, "Tunisia," Annual of Power and Conflict 1980-81, London: The Eastern Press Ltd., p. 447. 293
Notes to pages 185-201
13. Arthur Gavshon, Crisis in Africa: Battleground of East and West, New York: Westview Press, 1981, p.100. 14. Nouvelle Afrique, cited in Africa Report, November, 1971, p.5.
15. For a detailed account of the Chad-Libya dispute over the Aouzou strip, see Alan Day "Réactions in Chad," Border-and Territorial Disputes, Essex: Longman, 1982, p.101 (hereafter cited as Alan Day, "Reactions.") 16. Saadia Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972, p.132. 17. Senegal has, for instance, hosted thousands of exiles/refugees from Portuguese Guinea (Guinea Bissau) from the early 1960s to the present. At one point, around 1970, it had some 65,000 refugees from Portuguese Guinea. By 1984, Senegal had sonie 5,200 exiles/refugees from Guinea Bissau. 18. This casualty figure was reported in Africa Report, Vol.15, No. 1, 1970, p.67. 19. For this accusation, see Richard Bissell and Michael Radu (eds), Africa in the Post-Decolonization Era, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1984, p.3. 20. These policy points have been reported in Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 8, 1963, p.18. 21. See Africa Report, April, 1965, p.39. 22. Africa Report, June, 1965, p.26.
23. Africa Report, Vol. 11, No.5, 1966, p.42. 24. For a description of this event, see Jeune Afrique, No. 275, 3 Avril, 1966. 25. See, for example, New York Times, March 16, 1960.
26. Le Monde, 9 Janvier, 1962; 25 and 28 Decembre, 1962. 27. Alan Day (ed.), "Reactions," p. 130. 294
Notes to pages 202-216 28. Africa Report, Vol.29, No.2, 1984, pp.30-31. 29. See "La baraka du Chef de l'Etat", Jeune Afrique, No. 1344,8 Octobre, 1986, p.30. 30. Ibid. (My translation of the French original.) 31. Ibid, p. 32. (My translation of the French original.) 32. There are two major movements of Togolese in exile: Mouvement togolais pour la democratie (MTD) formerly headed by Gilchrist Olympio, and Front de liberation nationale du Togo (FLNT) led by Merlaud and Franciso Lawson. Gilchrist has reportedly severed his links with MTD because of the movement's leftwing radicalism which conflicts with his capitalist ideological inclinations. 33. Africa Report, Vol.30, No. 6, 1985, p.50.
34. For a report on the existence of FLNG in the countries mentioned, see Le Monde, 6 Avril, 1966. 35. See U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refuaee Survey, 1986 in Review, Washington, D.C.: 1978, pp.36-37. 36. For a summary of Chad's main factions, their ethnic bases, leaders, theaters of operation, and external patrons as of 1981, see Rene Lemarchand's "Prepared Statement", Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa, US House of Representatives, October 29 and November 4, 1981, pp.32-33. 37. Africa Research Bulletin, June, 1965, p.313. 38. For these charges against Niasse and Libya, see for example West Africa, November 10 and 17, 1980. 39. Ali Mazrui and Michael Tidy, Nationalism and New States in Africa, London: Heinemann, 1984, p.131. 40. Africa Report, Vol. 8, No.8, 1963, p.18. 41. Africa Report, April, 1965, p. 8. 42. For this version of the allegations, see Africa Research Bulletin, March 15, 1980. 295
Notes to pages 217-225 43. For these standard figures, see Colin Legum (ed), Africa Contemporary Record, London: Rex Collings, 1979, p.B554. 44. Ibid, 1972-73, p.B547. 45. Ibid, p.B548. 46. Ibid, 1979-80, p.B433. 47. These estimated figures are from Cas de Villiers, African Problems and Challenges, Sandton: Valiant Publishers, 1976, p.125.
48. For a description of these measures, see Africa Report, Vol. 9, No.4, 1964, p.8. 49. Ibid. 50. Africa Report, Vol.12, 1967, p.26. 51. Ibid, p.25. 296
Notes to pages 233-242
Notes to Chapter V
1. See "Table 1: A Summary of African Conflicts and the Role of the OAU in their Resolution or Management, 1975- 80," Timothy Shaw and Sola Ojo (eds.) Africa and the International Political System, New York: University Press of America, 1982, pp.178-185.
2. These categories used as a basis for the computation of the US $27.94 billion figure are laid out in Annex I, "Economic Costs of Destabilization and warfare 1980-1986: A Note," Report of the OAU Commission of Fifteen Mission to Southern Africa, BR/Mission/REP/86, April 1988, (Mimeo).
3. See Mission Report of the OAU Commission of Fifteen On Refugees to Djibouti, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and Ethiopia, BR/Mission/Rep./86, 1988, (Mimeo), p.42 (hereafter cited as BR/Mission). 4. Ibid, p.42-43. 5. Ibid, p.43. 6. Report of the Mission of the OAU Commission of Fifteen of Refugees to Sudan, BR/Mission/REP./86, 1988, (Mimeo), p.17.
7. Ibid, p.18.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid, pp.18-19.
11. Ibid, p.19.
12. See Refugees, No. 47, November 1987, p.8.
13. Ibid, p.11.
14. "Report of the Mission of the OAU Commission of Fifteen on Refugees to Uganda," BR/Mission/REP./86, 1988, (Mimeo), p.54. 297
Notes to pages 243-269
15. Africa News, Vol. 29, No.l, 1988, p.17.
16. See Yash Tandon, "Independent Africa and Human Rights," Report 89: Commission on International Affairs of the All Africa Conference of Churches, Cairo-Egypt, 8-13 September, 1986, p.6. 17. Ayok Chol Anthony and Maurice Mbago, "Problems and Prospects for integration of Burundi Refugees in Tanzania: A Case Study of Katumba and Ulyankulu Settlements", Refugee Management Series No.2, January 1987, p.34, (Mimeo). 18. Ibid, p.36. 19. Ibid, pp.36-37. 20. Ibid, p.38. 21. "Mission Report to Djibouti, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and Ethiopia," BR/Mission, p.54. 22. President Yoweri Museveni's address at the meeting of the 22nd Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa, July 29, 1986.
23. For the text of the agreement see Appendix III
24. "Mission Report," BR/Mission, p.33.
25. Africa Report, vol. 33, No.4, 19998, p.25.
26. Benoit G. Joubert's Progress Report on the Kagera River Basin Project, February 28, 1973.
27. I am referring to Rawls' scholarly treatment of the grand idea of justice in John Rawis, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971. 298
*List of Abbreviations
AAPSO - Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference ALF - Azania Liberation Front AMD - Alliance for a Democratic Mauritania ANC - African National Congress ANC-SA - African National Congress of South Africa ATR - Army for Tunisian Resistance BDF - Botswana Defense Forces CAR - Central African Republic CDR - Democratic Council for Revolution CNL - National Council for Liberation DFSS - Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia EDU - Ethiopian Democratic Union ELF - Eritrean Liberation Front ELF-PLF - Eritrean Liberation Front - Popular Liberation Forces EPLF - Eritrean People's Liberation Front FAN - Armed Forces of the North FAO Food and Agricultural Organization FAP Popular Armed Forces FAT Chadian Armed Forces FLCS - Front for the Liberation of the Somali Coast FLEC - Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave FLING - Front for the Liberation and Independence of Portuguese Guinea FLNA - Front for the National Liberation of Angola FLNC - Front for National Liberation of the Congo FLNG - Front for National Liberation of Guinea FLNT - Front for National Liberation of Togo FPLB - Popular Front for the Liberation of Burundi FRELIMO - Front for the Liberation of Mozambique FROLINAT - Front for National Liberation of Chad FUL - United Front for the Liberation of Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde Islands GRAE - Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile ICR - Inter-Church Response for the Horn of Africa ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross IGO - Intergovernmental Organization LESOMA - Socialist League of Malawi LLA - Lesotho Liberation Army MAFREMO - Malawi Freedom Movement MLD - Movement for the Liberation of Djibouti MLG - Movement for the Liberation of Guinea and Cape Verde Islands MLSTP - Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe MNR - Movement for National Resistance MPL - Popular Liberation Movement MPLA - Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola MTD - Togolese Movement for Democracy NGO - Non-Governmental Organization NLMWT - National Liberation Movement of Western 299
Togoland OAU - Organization of African Unity PAC - Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa PAIGC - Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde Islands PIDE - Portuguese Secret Police PLAN - People's Liberation Army of Namibia PMLC - Popular Movement for the Liberation of Congo POLISARIO - Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguiet al-Hamra and Rio del Oro PRP - People's Revolutionary Party PVO - Private Voluntary Organization RC - Resistance Committee RRC - Relief and Rehabilitation commission RWC - Refugee Welfare Committee SACDNU - Sudan African Closed Districts National Union SADCC - Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference SADF - South African Defense Forces SADR - Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic SALF - Somali-Abo Liberation Front SANU - Sudan African National Union SoDAF - Somali Democratic Action Front SoSaF - Somali Salvation Front SPLA - Sudanese People's Liberation Army SPLM - Sudanese People's Liberation Movement SUM - Save Uganda Movement SWAPO - South West African People's Organization TMC - Transitional Military Council TPLF - Tigre People's Liberation Front UDI - Unilateral Declaration of Independence ULM - Uganda Liberation Movement UNFP - National Union of Popular Forces UNHCR - United Nations High Commission for Refugees UNITA - National Union for the Total Independence of Angola UNO - Uganda National Organization UPA - Union of the Populations of Angola UPC - Union of the Populations of Cameroon WSLF - Western Somali Liberation Front ZANLA - Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army ZANU - Zimbabwe African National Union ZAPU - Zimbabwe African People's Union ZIPRA - Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
*Where the spelt-out form is orginally in a language other than English, the original abbreviation has in some cases been maintained, but an English equivalent of the spelt-out form has been given after the abbreviation. 300
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Aiboni, S.A., Protection of Refugees in Africa, Uppsala: Swedish Institute of International Law, 1978. Aluko, Olajide, Ghana and Nigeria 1957-70: A Study of Inter- African Discord, London: Rex Collins, 1976. Asiwaju, A.I. (ed.), Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africans International Boundaries 1884-1984, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. Betts, Tristram, Spontaneous Settlement of Rural Refugees in Africa, London: Euro Action-ACORD, 1980. Bissell, Richard E. and Michael S. Radu (eds.), Africa in the Post-Decolonization Era: London: Transaction Books, 1984.. Bozeman, Adda, Conflict in Africa: Concepts and Realities, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976. Brooks, H.D. and Yassin E1-Ayouty (eds.), Refugees South of the Sahara: An African Dilemma, Westport, Conn: Negro Universities Press, 1970. Carter, G.M. and Patrick O'Meara (eds.), African Independence: The First Twenty-Five Years, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985. Chaliand, Gerard, The Strugale for Africa: Conflict of the Great Powers, London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1982. Cervenka, Zdenek, The organization of African Unity, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. Cook, Chris and David Killingray, African Political Facts Since 1945, London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1983.
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, The Status of Refugees in International Law, Vol. 2: Asylum, Entry and Solourn, Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1972. Goodwin-Gill, Guy, S., International Law and the Movement of Persons Between States, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. Gorman, Robert, F., Political Conflict on the Horn of Africa, New York: Praeger, 1981.
Grundy, Kenneth W, Guerrilla Struggle in Africa: An Analysis and Preview, New York, Grossman Publishers, 1971.
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Hansen A. and A. Oliver-Smith, Involuntary Migration and Resettlement: The Problems and Responses of Dislocated Peoples, Boulder: Westview Press, 1982. Holborn L.W., The International Refugee Organization: A Specialized Agency of the United Nations - Its History and Work, 1946-1952, London: Oxford University Press, 1956.
Refugees: A Problem of Our Time: The Work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1951- 1972, 2 volumes, Metuchen: Scarecrow Press, 1975. Kibraeb, Gaim, Reflections on the African Refugee Problem: A Critical Analysis of Some Basic Assumptions, Research Report No.67, Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1983. Kritz, Mary (ed.), U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983. Markovitz, Irving L., Power and Class in Africa: An Introduction and Change in African Politics, Englewood Cliffs,N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1977. Mazrui, A.A., Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change, Boulder: Westview Press, 1979.
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Sheffer, Gabriel (ed.), Modern Diasporas in International Politics, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986.
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Synder, Glenn H. and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-Making and System Structure in International Crises, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977. 'Tandon, Y.A., Readings in African International Relations, Vol.1, Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1972.
, Readings in African International Relations, Vol.2, Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1974. Touval, S. The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1972. Wallerstein, I., Africa: The Politics of Unity, New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1967. Widstrand, G.G., African Boundary Problems, Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1969. Zartman, William I., International Relations in Africa, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966.
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Articles, Papers, Theses, Reports:
Adeniran, Tunde, "Pacific Settlement Among African Sta.;es: The Role of African Unity," Conflict Quarterly, 2, Fall, 1981.
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Brown, E.G., "Refugees and Political Instability in Sub- Saharan Africa," Unpublished Research, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Washington, D.C.: Tuffts University, March, 1975. Chartrand, P.E., "The Organization of African Unity and Refugees: A Progress Report," World Affairs, 137, Spring, 1975. Gould, W.T.S., "Refugees in Tropical Africa," International Migration Review, 8,3, 1974. Grundy, K.W., "Host Countries and the Southern African Liberation Sturgle," Africa Quarterly, X,1, April- June, 1970. Hansen, Art, "Managing Refugees: Zambia's Response to Angolan Refugees: 1967 to 1977," Disasters, 3,4, 1979.
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Kolenie, P., "African Refugees: Characteristics and Patterns of Movement," Unpublished Master's Thesis, Ohio University, 1974. Kunz, E.F., "The Refugee in Flight: Kinetic Models and Forms of Displacement," International Migration Review, 7,2, 1973.
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, "A Compendium of Resolutions on the African Refugees," Addis Ababa, (Mimeo). Peil M., "The Expulsion of West African Aliens," Journal of Modern African Studies, 9, 1970. Rivett, K., "Does a Refugee's Politics Matter?" The Australian Ouarterly, 51,2, June, 1979. Rogge J.R., "A Geography of Refugees: Some Illustrations from Africa," The Professional Geographer, 29,2, May, 1977.
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Stoltzfus M., "Refugees in Tanzania: A Reflection of Tanzania's Commitment to African Unity," Unpublished Master's Thesis, Duquesne University, 1971. Teitelbaum M.S., "Immigration, Refugees, and Foreign Policy," International Organization, 38,3, 1984. "Political Asylum in Theory and Practice," The Public Interest, 76, Summer, 1984. U.S. Department of State, "World Refugee Report: A Report Submitted to the Congress as Part of the Consultations on FY-1986 Refugee Admissions," Washington, 1985. 306
Weiner, Myron, "On International Migration and International Relations," Population and Development Review, 11,3, September, 1985.
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Zolberg, Aristide and Astri Suhrke, "Social Conflict and Refugees in the Third World: The Cases of Ethiopia and Afghanistan," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1984.
Basic Journals and Periodicals Africa Confidential, London: 1960 - Africa Contemporary Record, Exeter: Africa Research Ltd., 1968 - Africa News, Durham, N.C., Africa News Service, Inc. Africa Report, Washington, D.C.: African-American Institute, 1956 - Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social, Cultural, and Economic Series, Exeter: Africa Research Ltd., 1964 - Annual of Power and Conflict, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1970 - Refugees, Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 3 07
BIOGRAPHY Charles Gasarasi, who is a Tanzanian national, attended the University of Dar es Salaam where he obtained his B.A and M.A. degrees in 1978 and 1979, respectively. As part of his undergraduate program, he was an exchange student at the University of Besanfon (France) in 1977, where he obtained a "Certificat de Stage, Cours de Français Pratique." After his successful completion of the M.A. program, he joined the academic staff of the Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam, where he assisted and subsequently lectured. In the spring of 1984, he took a study leave to embark on his Ph.D. program, first at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and later transferring to Tulane University. His publications to date are as follows:
(i) "The 'Pooling of Resources' Approach to Development in a Regional Integration Grouping: The Organization for the
Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin - Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda," TAAMULI, Vol. 11, No.1, 1982; (ii) Book Review: Goran Melander and Peter Nobel "International Legal Instruments on Refugees in Africa," UTAFITI, Vol. 5, No.l, 1980; (iii) Book Review: Reginald
Herbold Green, "From Sudwestafrika to Namibia - The Political Economy of Transition," UTAFITI, Vol.6, No.2,
1981; (iv) The Tripartite Approach to the Settlement and Integration of Rural Refucees in Tanzania: Research Report No.71, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies,
Uppsala, 1984; and (v) "The Manual Laborer in the Political Theories of Aristotle and Marx: His Predicament and Potential for Self-Realization," African Review, Vol.13, No.1, 1986.