Emirates of Crisis: Why Is Morocco Blacklisted?

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Emirates of Crisis: Why Is Morocco Blacklisted? Policy Brief ORSAM No: 125 / May 2020 EMIRATES OF CRISIS: WHY IS MOROCCO BLACKLISTED? MEHMET RAKİPOĞLU ORSAM Copyright Ankara - TURKEY ORSAM © 2020 Content of this publication is copyrighted to ORSAM. Except reasonable and partial quotation and use under the Act No. 5846, Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works, via proper citation, the content may not be used or re-published without prior permission by ORSAM. The views expressed in this publication reflect only the opinions of its authors and do not represent the institutional opinion of ORSAM. Center for Middle Eastern Studies Adress : Mustafa Kemal Mah. 2128 Sk. No: 3 Çankaya, ANKARA Phone : +90 850 888 15 20 Fax: +90 312 430 39 48 Email : [email protected] Photo : Anadolu Ajansı (AA), Shutterstock Policy Brief No:125 ORSAM POLICY BRIEF EMIRATES OF CRISIS: WHY IS MOROCCO BLACKLISTED? About the Author Mehmet Rakipoğlu Mehmet Rakipoğlu graduated from the Department of International Relations of Sakarya University in 2016. During his bachelor, he was educated in Erasmus program in Szczecin city Poland during the 2015- 2016 academic year. Between 2015-2017 he served as students assistant Sakarya University Middle East Institute. He is currently pursuing his doctorate program in the field of Middle Eastern Studies at the same institute. He is also research assistant at Batman University. His research interests include foreign policy of the Gulf countries, Turkey- GCC countries relations, USA’s Middle East policy, non-state actors, political Islam, religion-politic relations. May 2020 orsam.org.tr 2 Emirates of Crisis: Why is Morocco Blacklisted? Table Of Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................3 Smear Campaigns ........................................................................................................................3 Growing Enmity ..........................................................................................................................4 Leaving the Emirates Alone..........................................................................................................5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................7 Endnotes........................................................................................................................................9 Policy Brief No:125 3 Emirates of Crisis: Why is Morocco Blacklisted? among Gulf rulers about a crisis in regime security. In this sense, the Gulf countries have With the Arab revolutions that developed a new policy without completely erupted in the late 2010s, the abandoning their close cooperation with the US. Accordingly, Gulf countries, which deepened overthrowing of dictators such as their relations with actors such as England, Mubarak of Egypt and Zeynel France, China and Russia, increased their military Abidin bin Ali of Tunisia had capacities and started to become detached/free shocked the Gulf. In addition, actors. In this sense, while Saudi Arabia intervened Obama’s silent reaction deepened in Yemen in 2015, the UAE started to carry out the concerns among Gulf rulers many unilateral activities in the region. Although about a crisis in regime security. it is claimed that the UAE’s recent activism has been shaped by the US, the fact that Abu Dhabi is getting closer with the Assad regime and Iran from time to time seems to refute this claim. Introduction Therefore, the UAE intends to punish all actors acting against Abu Dhabi’s interests. After Qatar The recent foreign policy assertiveness of and Turkey. Morocco is the latest target of the the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has contributed UAE’s unusual foreign policy tools. to chaos and caused instability not only in the Middle East1 but also in the other regions of the Smear Campaigns world. Over the last years, the UAE have backed Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been trying separatist movements in southern Yemen2, opened to manipulate the course of action in the region.7 a new chapter by establishing a new relationship Both have backed, shaped and consolidated anti- with the brutal Assad regime3, taken responsibility revolutionary movement after the 2010s. More- for the coup in Egypt by financing it4, launched over, they have been targeting pro-democratic a shameless pro-Israeli campaign in the Arab movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood world at the expense of betraying the Palestinian and countries such as Turkey. In addition to this, cause5, and defended Khalifa Haftar, who has recently they have also launched a smear campaign been trying to topple the legitimate government against Qatar. Their social media trolls have in Libya, which was recognized by international claimed that a coup attempt has happened in community6. These are only small portions of Doha, removing Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin the UAE’s aggressiveness in the region. Why Hamad Al Thani from power. As it turned out, has the UAE transformed its foreign policy? this story was fabricated. It is logical to say that Even though it is not a regional power, the UAE these troll armies have been used as a weapon has had to adopt a new foreign policy mentality by Arab authoritarian regimes especially Saudi due to developments that took place after 2010. Arabia and the UAE.8 Just as Saudi Arabia has With the Arab revolutions that erupted in the done, the UAE have instrumentalized social late 2010s, the overthrowing of dictators such media trolls. Abu Dhabi attacked the Moroccan as Mubarak of Egypt and Zeynel Abidin bin Ali administration with its funded social media ac- of Tunisia had shocked the Gulf. In addition, counts. In this sense, a smear campaign was Obama’s silent reaction deepened the concerns launched against the Moroccan government and orsam.org.tr 4 Emirates of Crisis: Why is Morocco Blacklisted? Prime Minister Saadeddine El-Othmani. The crisis? Why did the UAE put Morocco on its content of this smear campaign was the new target board? type of coronavirus (Covid-19).9 Throughout the smear campaign, an attempt was made to Growing Enmity convey the message that Morocco’s struggle There are reasons behind the UAE’s targeting with coronavirus failed. The Othmani government of the Morocco. Firstly, the reaction of King was accused of failing to respond adequately to Mohammed VI to Arab revolutions did not citizens’ needs during the pandemic.10 Moreover, satisfy the Gulf countries but the people of the allegations were made regarding that the country Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood. Adopting was against the hunger crisis. The purpose of all a new constitution and holding democratic elec- these unfounded claims was to open the gap be- tions11, which paved the way for the Islamist tween the people and the Moroccan government, Justice and Development Party, triggered the re- which was not on the radar of the UAE. Despite sponses from the Gulf. In this sense, $5 billion the baseless propaganda, the Moroccan people in economic aid was offered to Morocco to con- stand by the prime minister and the government strain the influence of Islamist party. Saudi on social media. Many activists also defended Arabia offered the GCC to integrate Morocco the government against this fraudulent campaign and Jordan as the new GCC members in order of the UAE. Where is the real mainstay of the not to shatter the so-called monarchical excep- Policy Brief No:125 5 Emirates of Crisis: Why is Morocco Blacklisted? tionalism during the Arab revolutions. Although On the other hand, the UAE invested more there was a concrete financial support to Morocco in Mauritania’s port and military facilities to from the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the Rabat ad- shatter the interest of Morocco. This was the ministration has never taken the same train with reason why the foreign minister of Morocco by- the UAE.12 For example, King Mohammed VI passed the UAE during his Gulf tour in 2019.13 was not in favor of Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Rather, he Leaving the Emirates Alone protested the decision and became the opposite It is noteworthy that this crisis has not occurred side of the crown princes of Saudi Arabia and suddenly. The UAE’s victimization of Morocco the UAE, respectively Mohammed bin Selman should be read as a continuation of a process. (MbS) and Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) that The stance of the Rabat administration on at are in favor of this decision. In this sense, being least three regional issues led the UAE to pursue against that decision, the Rabat administration harsh policies against Morocco. All these issues was trying to bypass the MbS and MbZ by are related to the UAE’s war on political Islam. dealing with those, elites who are against Trump’s unlawful decision. This also triggered the hatred The UAE started its war against political of MbS and MbZ toward Morocco. Islam by targeting Qatar and Turkey first. It is suggested that the two actors have somehow In February 2019, the adventurist policymakers supported or demonstrated an affinity to the (MbS and MbZ) instrumentalized al-Arabiyya’s Muslim Brotherhood. While Doha has been wel- documentary to depict Morocco as an illegitimate coming one of the important religious figures of power over the Western Sahara. This was the the Muslim Brotherhood, Yusuf al-Karadawi, latest straw for Rabat. It recalled its ambassador from the UAE on 16 March 2020. To respond to Istanbul hosts many Egyptian politicians and it as
Recommended publications
  • Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia: Key Trends in the Agrifood Sector
    Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan - and Jordan Tunisia Morocco, Egypt, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia Key trends in the agrifood sector in the agrifood Key trends Key trends in the agrifood sector Please address comments and inquiries to: Investment Centre Division Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Viale delle Terme di Caracalla – 00153 Rome, Italy [email protected] 22 Report No. www.fao.org/investment/en Report No. 22 - September 2015 I4897E/2/11.15 Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia Key trends in the agrifood sector Nuno Santos Economist, Investment Centre Division, FAO Iride Ceccacci Food Security Economist, EBRD COUNTRY HIGHLIGHTS prepared under the FAO/EBRD Cooperation FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS Rome, 2015 The designations employed and the presentation of material in this information product do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) concerning the legal or development status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The mention of specific companies or products of manufacturers, whether or not these have been patented, does not imply that these have been endorsed or recommended by FAO or the EBRD in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned. The views expressed in this information product are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of FAO or the EBRD.
    [Show full text]
  • United Arab Emirates (Uae)
    Library of Congress – Federal Research Division Country Profile: United Arab Emirates, July 2007 COUNTRY PROFILE: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE) July 2007 COUNTRY اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴّﺔ اﻟﻤﺘّﺤﺪة (Formal Name: United Arab Emirates (Al Imarat al Arabiyah al Muttahidah Dubai , أﺑﻮ ﻇﺒﻲ (The seven emirates, in order of size, are: Abu Dhabi (Abu Zaby .اﻹﻣﺎرات Al ,ﻋﺠﻤﺎن Ajman , أ مّ اﻟﻘﻴﻮﻳﻦ Umm al Qaywayn , اﻟﺸﺎرﻗﺔ (Sharjah (Ash Shariqah ,دﺑﻲّ (Dubayy) .رأس اﻟﺨﻴﻤﺔ and Ras al Khaymah ,اﻟﻔﺠﻴﺮة Fajayrah Short Form: UAE. اﻣﺮاﺗﻰ .(Term for Citizen(s): Emirati(s أﺑﻮ ﻇﺒﻲ .Capital: Abu Dhabi City Major Cities: Al Ayn, capital of the Eastern Region, and Madinat Zayid, capital of the Western Region, are located in Abu Dhabi Emirate, the largest and most populous emirate. Dubai City is located in Dubai Emirate, the second largest emirate. Sharjah City and Khawr Fakkan are the major cities of the third largest emirate—Sharjah. Independence: The United Kingdom announced in 1968 and reaffirmed in 1971 that it would end its treaty relationships with the seven Trucial Coast states, which had been under British protection since 1892. Following the termination of all existing treaties with Britain, on December 2, 1971, six of the seven sheikhdoms formed the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The seventh sheikhdom, Ras al Khaymah, joined the UAE in 1972. Public holidays: Public holidays other than New Year’s Day and UAE National Day are dependent on the Islamic calendar and vary from year to year. For 2007, the holidays are: New Year’s Day (January 1); Muharram, Islamic New Year (January 20); Mouloud, Birth of Muhammad (March 31); Accession of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi—observed only in Abu Dhabi (August 6); Leilat al Meiraj, Ascension of Muhammad (August 10); first day of Ramadan (September 13); Eid al Fitr, end of Ramadan (October 13); UAE National Day (December 2); Eid al Adha, Feast of the Sacrifice (December 20); and Christmas Day (December 25).
    [Show full text]
  • The Seven Emirates That Make up the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Have Contin- Ued to Withstand the Pressures of More Straightened
    1996 Loosely Structured Alliance – Oman-Qatar Axis – Qatar Coup – Employment Imbalances–TourismGrowth The seven emirates that make up the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have contin- ued to withstand the pressures of more straightened times better than many of their neighbours, thanks mainly to Abu Dhabi’s considerable enduring oil stocks and to Dubai’s imaginative investment programme in alternative eco- nomic strategies. There remain, however, enough ghosts of the past and pre-sentiments of the future within the Gulf region to ensure that the country willnotgetcomplacentagain. AStable StatusQuo The UAE has always been a loosely structured alliance between the ruling fami- lies of each emirate, with the major players being Abu Dhabi and Dubai, fol- lowed by Sharjah. Executive positions are granted a five year tenure and are, theoretically, up for renewal in 1996, but any significant changes from the cur- rent status quo are unlikely. Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan of Abu Dhabi is likely to remain President and Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid al-Maktoum Prime Minister. Sheikh Maktoum’s brother, Sheikh Mohammed, the UAE’s minister of defence, was appointed crown prince of Dubai in January 1995, an indicator of his eventual succession and a recognition of the greater role he is playing in day-to-daypoliticalaffairs. The GulfPerspective Relations with Iraq and Iran and the continuing peace process in Israel con- tinue to dominate Gulf affairs. In a speech in Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed indi- cated what many observers took to be a shift in the UAE’s position on Iraq. He drew comparison with the slow progress being made on the Israeli question and the continuing sanctions enforced against Iraq.
    [Show full text]
  • NH Final Thesis
    SOCIAL MARKETING AND THE CORRUPTION CONUNDRUM IN MOROCCO: AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS N. HAMELIN Ph.D. 2016 i SOCIAL MARKETING AND THE CORRUPTION CONUNDRUM IN MOROCCO: AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS NICOLAS HAMELIN A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of East London for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy February, 2016 ii Abstract The modern world is characterised by socio-economic disruptions, civil unrests, and weakening of many societal institutions, amongst many other challenges to our social fabric. Therefore, scholars are increasingly scouring a wide variety of conceptual prisms to seek explanations and possible solutions to those problems contemporaneously manifesting themselves. The pervading force of corruption, across the globe, remains a major concern among nations, multilateral agencies, such as Transparency International, and more profoundly in major business and public policy discourses. For many developing countries, especially those with weak institutions, high levels of corruption are causatively associated with high levels of poverty, poor economic performance and under-development. Against this background, using the Kingdom of Morocco as a contextual base, this thesis explores the growing incidence of corruption, which has stunted the nation’s positive development, as well as its triggers, antecedents and consequences. Whilst the literature is replete with treatments of corruption across time and space, such treatments have focused on social and macroeconomic underpinnings but largely lack rigorous marketing-framed explorations. Following on from this lacuna, this thesis situates the treatment of corruption in Morocco within the conceptual frame of social marketing — a demonstrably robust platform for analysing societal issues and, indeed, a validated behavioural intervention model.
    [Show full text]
  • Morocco Strengthens the Positioning of Local Products in the Middle East Market
    PRESS RELEASE Morocco strengthens the positioning of local products in the Middle East market Morocco is taking part in the SIAL Middle East 2018 International Food Show that will be held in Abu Dhabi from 10th to 12th December. Organized for the sixth year in a row by the Agricultural Development Agency (ADA), in the framework of the ambitious development strategy for the marketing and promotion of local products, set up in the framework of the Green Morocco Plan, which has given particular importance to this segment and made it one of its privileged objectives. 11 regions of the Kingdom will be present at this show through 24 exhibitors producing local products representing about 100 agricultural cooperatives and gathering more than 3130 small farmers. During the 3 days of this world food industry meeting, the Moroccan participants will present a wide range of finely selected products, amounting to more than 130 local products including 14 labeled products, which stands up as an opportunity to showcase the great diversity and dynamism of the Morocco offer to the 16,000 professionals expected during this event. Prior to this event, the exhibitors benefited from the marketing and commercial support needed by the ADA to assist them in order to highlight the potential of their products and prepare their meetings with prospects from the United Arab Emirates and Gulf countries. No less than 250 B to B meetings are scheduled on the margin of this fair with major customers, so as to introduce and further strengthen the presence of local products on the Middle East market, particularly with purchasing groups, retails, fine groceries as well as specialized organic stores.
    [Show full text]
  • 36687838.Pdf
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of Oregon Scholars' Bank AVOIDING THE ARAB SPRING? THE POLITICS OF LEGITIMACY IN KING MOHAMMED VI’S MOROCCO by MARGARET J. ABNEY A THESIS Presented to the Department of Political Science and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts June 2013 THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Student: Margaret J. Abney Title: Avoiding the Arab Spring? The Politics of Legitimacy in King Mohammed VI’s Morocco This thesis has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in the Department of Political Science by: Craig Parsons Chairperson Karrie Koesel Member Tuong Vu Member and Kimberly Andrews Espy Vice President for Research and Innovation; Dean of the Graduate School Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School. Degree awarded June 2013 ii © 2013 Margaret J. Abney iii THESIS ABSTRACT Margaret J. Abney Master of Arts Department of Political Science June 2013 Title: Avoiding the Arab Spring? The Politics of Legitimacy in King Mohammed VI’s Morocco During the 2011 Arab Spring protests, the Presidents of Egypt and Tunisia lost their seats as a result of popular protests. While protests occurred in Morocco during the same time, King Mohammed VI maintained his throne. I argue that the Moroccan king was able to maintain his power because of factors that he has because he is a king. These benefits, including dual religious and political legitimacy, additional control over the military, and a political situation that make King Mohammed the center of the Moroccan political sphere, are not available to the region’s presidents.
    [Show full text]
  • So Close, So Far. National Identity and Political Legitimacy in UAE-Oman Border Cities
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Open Research Exeter So Close, So Far. National Identity and Political Legitimacy in UAE-Oman Border Cities Marc VALERI University of Exeter This manuscript is the version revised after peer-review and accepted for publication. This manuscript has been published and is available in Geopolitics: Date of publication: 26 December 2017 DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2017.1410794 Webpage: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14650045.2017.1410794 1 Introduction Oman-United Arab Emirates border, Thursday 5 May 2016 early morning. As it has been the case for years on long weekends and holidays, endless queues of cars from Oman are waiting to cross the border in order to flock to Dubai for Isra’ and Miraj break 1 and enjoy attractions and entertainment that their country does not seem to offer. Major traffic congestions are taking place in the Omani city of al-Buraymi separated from the contiguous United Arab Emirates city of al-Ayn by the international border. Many border cities are contiguous urban areas which have been ‘dependent on the border for [their] existence’ or even ‘came into existence because of the border’. 2 Usually once military outposts (Eilat/Aqaba, on the Israel-Jordan border 3), they developed on either side of a long established border (Niagara Falls cities, on the Canada-USA border) after a border had been drawn (Tornio, on the Sweden-Finland border; 4 cities on the Mexico-USA and China- Russia 5 borders). Furthermore, split-up cities which were partitioned after World War II, including in Central Europe (e.g.
    [Show full text]
  • Psychiatric Healthcare in Morocco: Affordability and Accessibility for Lower
    Psychiatric Healthcare in Morocco: Affordability and Accessibility for Lower- Class Moroccans By: Julia Milks Humanities and Arts Course Sequence: AB 2542, Culture of Arabic Speaking Countries, D19 AB 1531, Elementary Arabic I, A19 AB 1532, Elementary Arabic II, B19 HU 2999, Moroccan Arabic, C20 HU 3999, Moroccan Film in Context, C20 Presented to: Professor Rebecca Moody Department of Humanities & Arts C20 HU 3900 Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of The Humanities & Arts Requirement Worcester Polytechnic Institute Worcester, Massachusetts 2 Abstract The Moroccan healthcare system is severely lacking in finances, staff, and resources for psychiatric care. In this paper, I aim to show the lack of accessibility and affordability of psychiatric care for lower-class Moroccans. I conducted interviews at Ibn Al Hassan Mental Hospital in Fes, Morocco that helped me determine that psychiatric care in public hospitals is lower quality due to the lack of resources and funding dedicated to the system, rather than incompetent medical professionals. 3 Introduction In Morocco, the first response is ‘she’s possessed.’ In the U.S., ‘she’s faking it for attention.’ Mental health is a stigmatized topic that brings many layers of shame, confusion, and negativity onto the sufferer. In this paper, I will focus on mental health1 in Morocco, although this problem is not specific to Morocco, the U.S., or any country: it is prevalent everywhere. Morocco severely lacks the tools and manpower needed to administer proper psychiatric care to the millions of people who need it.2 This problem is especially apparent in rural and poor areas. In this paper, I will argue that Moroccans of a lower socioeconomic class receive lower quality psychiatric healthcare due to the limited affordability and access to medications and hospitals; I will draw on my observations of one psychiatric hospital in Fes.
    [Show full text]
  • Morocco and United States Combined Government Procurement Annexes
    Draft Subject to Legal Review for Accuracy, Clarity, and Consistency March 31, 2004 MOROCCO AND UNITED STATES COMBINED GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT ANNEXES ANNEX 9-A-1 CENTRAL LEVEL GOVERNMENT ENTITIES This Chapter applies to procurement by the Central Level Government Entities listed in this Annex where the value of procurement is estimated, in accordance with Article 1:4 - Valuation, to equal or exceed the following relevant threshold. Unless otherwise specified within this Annex, all agencies subordinate to those listed are covered by this Chapter. Thresholds: (To be adjusted according to the formula in Annex 9-E) For procurement of goods and services: $175,000 [Dirham SDR conversion] For procurement of construction services: $ 6,725,000 [Dirham SDR conversion] Schedule of Morocco 1. PRIME MINISTER (1) 2. NATIONAL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION (2) 3. GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE GOVERNMENT 4. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE 5. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND COOPERATION 6. MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR (3) 7. MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATION 8. MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION, EXECUTIVE TRAINING AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 9. MINISTRY OF NATIONAL EDUCATION AND YOUTH 10. MINISTRYOF HEALTH 11. MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND PRIVATIZATION 12. MINISTRY OF TOURISM 13. MINISTRY OF MARITIME FISHERIES 14. MINISTRY OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRANSPORTATION 15. MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT (4) 16. MINISTRY OF SPORT 17. MINISTRY REPORTING TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND CHARGED WITH ECONOMIC AND GENERAL AFFAIRS AND WITH RAISING THE STATUS 1 Draft Subject to Legal Review for Accuracy, Clarity, and Consistency March 31, 2004 OF THE ECONOMY 18. MINISTRY OF HANDICRAFTS AND SOCIAL ECONOMY 19. MINISTRY OF ENERGY AND MINING (5) 20.
    [Show full text]
  • Regional Programme Gulf States the Yemen
    Regional Programme Gulf States Policy Report – October 2019 The Yemen War Actors, Interests and the Prospects of Negotiations Introduction Fabian Blumberg Recently, there have been important developments in the war in Yemen; a war which has, according to the UN reports, created the worst humanitarian disaster of the 21st century. On the one hand, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) withdrew significant part of its military forces from Yemen declaring the time has arrived for a peace settlement to the conflict. On the other hand, militants of the South took control over Aden from the internationally-backed government amid a fierce armed confrontation between the forces of the two sides leading to a crack in the Arab Coalition that is fighting the Houthis since March 2015. News also has erupted as the Houthis claimed that they managed to attack Saudi Arabia’s largest oil facilities at the 19th of September. Back in March 2019, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) had organized a workshop in Cadenabbia, Italy, to discuss the prospects of peace in Yemen after the Stockholm agreement between the international recognised government and the Houthis. Entitled “Yemen’s War: Actors, Interests and the Prospects of Negotiations”, the workshop was attended by experts on Yemen from Europe, Germany, US, and Yemen who provided informed opinions about the conflict in Yemen and on the best way to advance peace among the warring parties. Building on that, KAS has asked experts to write down their analyses on the situation and their recommendations on how to bring about peace in Yemen. They also provide ideas for the contribution German foreign policy could provide.
    [Show full text]
  • The United Arab Emirates As an Emerging Actor in the Western Balkans: the Case of Strategic Investment in Serbia
    Will Bartlett, James Ker-Lindsay, Kristian Alexander & Tena Prelec The United Arab Emirates as an emerging actor in the Western Balkans: the case of strategic investment in Serbia Article (Accepted version) (Refereed) Original citation: Bartlett, Will and Ker-Lindsay, James and Alexander, Kristian and Prelec, Tena (2017) The United Arab Emirates as an emerging actor in the Western Balkans: the case of strategic investment in Serbia. Journal of Arabian Studies, 7 (1). pp. 94-112. ISSN 2153-4764 DOI: 10.1080/21534764.2017.1322753 © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/69204/ Available in LSE Research Online: June 2017 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. The United Arab Emirates as an Emerging Actor in the Western Balkans: The Case of Strategic Investment in Serbia Will Bartlett, James Ker-Lindsay, Kristian Alexander & Tena Prelec Abstract: In recent years, the United Arab Emirates has increased its engagement on the international stage.
    [Show full text]
  • The Capital of the United Arab Emirates “Meet and Greet on Arrival…”
    ABU DHABI The Capital of the United Arab Emirates “Meet and Greet on Arrival…” When you arrive to Dubai Airport, disembark from the plane and head towards immigration and passport control. Before the queues, you will be met by a member of the Arabian Adventures airport team who will be paging your name prior to immigration. You will then be escorted through to baggage collection and through customs to your awaiting transfer vehicle. You will be privately transferred from Dubai Airport to your chosen hotel in Abu Dhabi. The transfer to Yas Island will take approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes. After your stay in Abu Dhabi, you will be collected from your hotel and privately escorted to your next hotel in Dubai. Jumeirah Mosque “Home of the Founding Father – Abu Dhabi City Tour” 09:00 – 11:00 Collection from hotel and head to Saadiyat to visit the Louvre Abu Dhabi 11:15 – 11:35 Drive to the Dates Market 11:35 – 12:30 Shopping opportunity at the Dates Market 12:30 – 13:30 Drive along the Abu Dhabi Corniche 13:30 – 13:50 Photo Stop for Panoramic City View from Flag Focal Point including Emirates Palace 14:00 – 14:30 drive to Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque 14:30 – 15:30 Tour of Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque 16:00 End of Tour You will receive a Bronze Ferrari World Ticket to enjoy at leisure. Dubai Creek Abra Al Fahidi Cultural Neighbourhood Yas Viceroy Abu Dhabi 5* Package Centro Yas Island 3* Package Meet and Greet with arrival transfer Meet and Greet with arrival transfer 2 nights in a Marina Room with Breakfast 2 nights in a classic Room with Breakfast
    [Show full text]