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The Problem of *

Adam was a laughing stock, who was made in forgery as an image of a man by the Seventh, as though (by that) he would have overpowered me and my brethren being with him (but) without guilt, and without having sinned. Abraham, too, was a laughing stock, along with Isaac and Jacob . . . . David was a laughing stock . . . . Solomon was a laughing stock . . . . The Twelve Prophets were a laughing stock . . . . Moses was a laughing stock . . . . Indeed, this was (himself) a laughing stock . . . . Indeed, it was a laughing stock, a (self-)condemnation and false prophecy. (Treat. , NHC VII p. 62,27–65,2) Truly, it is [not] I that they saw and punished, it was another—their father – who drank the gall and the vinegar, it was not I who was struck with the reed, it was another who bore the cross on his shoulder, namely Simon. It was another upon whom the crown of thorns was placed; but I was rejoicing in the height over all the “wealth” of the archons and the offspring of their error [and the . . .] of their empty glory; and I was laughing at their ignorance. (Treat. Seth, NHC VII p 56,4–20) said: “Blessed are the solitary and elect, for you will find the Kingdom.

* The SecCent 3 (1983) 73–87. Paper read during my lecture tour of October–November 1982 at The Catholic Univer- sity of America, Washington DC; Yale University, New Haven; Barnard College, New York; University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia; Iliff School of Theology, Denver; University of Oregon, Eugene; University of California, Riverside; University of California, Santa Barbara. I should like to express heartfelt thanks to my colleague and friend Bentley Layton for his emendation of my English style. the problem of gnosis 539

For you are from it, and to it you will return.” (Gos. Thom. § 49, NHC II p. 41,27–30) This is Gnosis. The figure of the laughing savior and injunctions like “become what you were” are typically Gnostic. But what is Gnosis as a whole? And what is the particular problem that it poses? I ask this question at a time when Gnostic research—now that the Nag Hammadi “library” has been published—has reached the top of its mighty new wave. However, the enormous increase of new primary materials and new insights also entails new uncertainty. Above all, the delimitation of Gnosis, the borderline between Gnosis and non-Gnosis, is in danger of becoming fuzzy. As scholars study the so-called Coptic Gnostic library of Nag Hammadi, more and more texts are turning out to be non-Gnostic. The more special varieties of Gnosis, such as , , , , and now also , stand out in relief, the more Gnosis as a whole seems to lose its distinctiveness. Dualism is no longer always considered to be an essential tenet of Gnosis. And at the same time, new and confusing definitions, semi-definitions, and pseudo- definitions of Gnosis or as some prefer , have begun to appear. Thus on the one hand, one can read that Gnosis is (nothing but) a special form of theological thinking—the view of Luise Schottroff and Barbara Aland—or only a characteristic mode of interpretation—the view of Klaus Koschorke and Helmut Koester. On the other hand, Gnosis is held by other scholars, such as Hans Jonas1 and Karl-Wolfgang Tröger, to be a religion. One might then ask, which noun (representing the genus proxi- mum of classical logic) is in fact most naturally modified by the adjective “Gnostic” (which thus would indicate the differentia specifica)? With these remarks, I have already touched on more problems than I can discuss, let alone set out to solve, in the present paper. All I want to do here is to start from the main issue of Gnosis, namely its definition, and move quickly through several principal problems. In this enterprise, I will summarize and revise in part the views I expressed some years ago in a paper entitled—after Wilhelm Bousset’s famous book—“Hauptprobleme der Gnosis,” or “Basic Problems of Gnosis.”

1 H. Jonas, The Gnostic Religion: The Message of the Alien and the Beginnings of , second edition revised, Boston 1963.