Emergency Intervention from Loreto by Floods in 2012

EMERGENCY INTERVENTION FROM LORETO BY FLOODS IN 2012

LESSONS LEARNED L RETO

LESSONS LEARNED L O RETO EMERGENCY INTERVENTION FROM LORETO BY FLOODS IN 2012 ESPAÑOL 001 y Plan Internacional, en el marco de la respuesta a la O A F , A H C O , F E C I N ), el Gobierno Regional de Loreto, el apoyo nanciero de Cruz Roja Peruana, I U C E D N I , Cruz Roja Peruana, I P O O C y el apoyo técnico de A H C O , F E C I N U Este documento ha sido elaborado con el Instituto Nacional de Defensa Civil ( Plan Internacional, emergencia por inundaciones en la Región Loreto en 2012. Presentation / 05 Presentation

The lived experience during the Regional Emergency caused by the floods and the unusual rise of the Amazonian rivers, which surpassed the levels registered in the previous years, allows us to prepare a situation analysis of the joint activities developed with local and national institutions and the valuable support of cooperation institutions, like UNICEF.

During all the process of supportive activities, the Regional Operations Centre for Emergencies (COER-LORETO), created by Regional Executive Resolution Nº202-2012-GRL-P, dated April 02, 2012, has played a major role in attention to victims of the floods from the Amazonian rivers in 2012.

It was this Regional Centre who brought together and channelled all the efforts for the installation of shelters in the city and their respective basic services such as health, drinking water and electric supply. It also coordinated with PRONAA daily the early delivery of food and provisions to all districts considered within the emergency.

Humanitarian aid was obtained from the National Institute of Civil Defence (INDECI), chaired by Alfredo E. Murgueytio Espinoza, General of Division (R) and from cooperation organizations like: the United Firemen Sans Frontiers/BUSF, Spanish Red Cross, German Red Cross, CESVI, COOPI, UNICEF, OIM, OPS, Plan International, FAO and SHERTER BOX, among others. Most certainly, the intervention and response of UNICEF to this emergency was relevant, as it joint efforts to give special attention to the most vulnerable victims of this tragedy, children.

We have absorbed the lessons learned from the emergency and gathered some valuable information for the future, which are captured in this book, named precisely, “Lessons Learned”.

Iván E. Vásquez Valera President, Loreto Region 06 / Lessons Learned Loreto

Executive Sumary

ecause of the floods produced by the overflowing rivers in the BPeruvian Amazon, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers declared a State of Emergency in 43 districts of the Loreto region. Due to more than 220 thousand victims and enormous damage throughout Loreto’s territory, national, regional and district public institutions— in collaboration with international aid organizations—provided support to the affected population, by organizing and implementing a comprehensive response to the emergency in the priority sectors of Food, Collective Centers, Housing, Livelihoods, Health and Water, as well as Sanitation, Nutrition and Food Safety, Protection and Emotional Recovery, Education and Social Communication.

This document aims to describe the good practices, the lessons learned and the limitations faced in the coordination and implementation of the humanitarian response actions and rehabilitation procedures that were carried out to deal with the emergency. This was possible thanks to the gathering and analysis of secondary sources of information; to the interviews to officers, authorities and specialists of 38 local, national and international, public and private institutions; to the involvement in the Provincial Workshop “Lessons Learned” in Yurimaguas; and to the results achieved in the thematic panels of housing and collective centres in the Regional Emergency Operations Center (REOC) of Loreto.

It also shows that the coordination processes implemented for the humanitarian intervention were strengthened by the inclusion of components of Disaster Risk Management in the governmental plans of some District Municipalities, by the installation of the Regional Emergency Operations Center, by the leadership of the Regional Government of Loreto, by the technical assistance provided by national institutions and by the ability to raise funds of organizations of the National Humanitarian Network.

At the operational level, the inclusion of institutional strengthening components was positive. And, for future emergencies, the organization of two workshops of lessons learned (one regional and one provincial) was extremely useful. Other good practices in response to this emergency were the transformation of the thematic panels of Collective centres and Housing in Loreto in permanent spaces for discussion; the transfer of funds to support response actions by the National Government to the regional Health and Agricultural sectors; the validation of only one plan of action shared in Water and Sanitation; the setup of Protection and Socio-emotional Recovery spaces, dedicated to minors in collective centres and affected areas; the inter-institutional development of a contingency plan and an emergency curriculum in Education; and the validation of a communication campaign common to the entire intervention. Executive Sumary / 07

UNICEF / E.Ursula

Table of Contents / 09 Table of Contents

PRESENTATION 5 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS 9 LIST OF ACRONYMS 11 INTRODUCTION 12

OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 14

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 16 20 RESULTS OBTAINED IN THE INTERVENTION: GOOD PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED

THE CONTEXT 20 THE EMERGENCY IN NUMBERS 24 COORDINATION 28 LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 28 REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS 30 NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 32 NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN NETWORK 34 OPERATIONS 36 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 36 COLLECTIVE CENTRES 38 HOUSING 40 LIVELIHOODS 42 HEALTH 44 WATER AND SANITATION 48 NUTRITION AND FOOD SAFETY 52 PROTECTION AND EMOTIONAL RECOVERY 54 EDUCATION 58 SOCIAL COMMUNICATION 62 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 66

List of Acronyms / 11 List of Acronyms

ADD Acute Diarrheal Disease Instituto Nacional de Defensa Civil (National Civil Defense INDECI Institute) Administradora Privada de Fondos de Pensiones (Pension AFP Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (National Fund Administrator) INEI Statistics Institute) ARI Acute Respiratory Infection IOM International Organization for Migration C&A Children and Adolescents kg Kilogram Centro de Emergencia Mujer de Loreto (Women's Emergency CEM Loreto Center of Loreto) km Kilometer Centro Nacional de Estimación, Prevención y Reducción del masl Meters above sea level CENEPRED Riesgo de Desastres (National Center for Disaster Risk Esti- MGP Marina de Guerra del Perú (Peruvian Navy) mation, Prevention, and Reduction) Ministerio de la Mujer y Poblaciones Vulnerables (Ministry of MIMP CERF Central Emergency Response Fund Women and Vulnerable Population) CESVI Cooperazione e Sviluppo (Cooperation and Development) MINEDU Ministerio de Educación (Ministry of Education) COOPI Cooperazione Internazionale (International Cooperation) Municipalidad Provincial de Alto Amazonas (Provincial Mu- MPAA CRP Cruz Roja Peruana (Peruvian Red Cross) nicipality of Alto Amazonas) Municipalidad Provincial de Maynas (Provincial Municipality DANA Damage Assessment and Needs Analysis MPM of Maynas) Dirección de Estadística e Información Agraria (Directorate of DEIA Ministerio de Vivienda, Construcción y Saneamiento (Minis- Statistics and Agricultural Information) MVCS try of Housing, Construction and Sanitation) Defensoría Municipal de Niños y Adolescentes (Municipal DEMUNA Ombudsman for Children and Adolescents) NGO Non-governmental organization Dirección Ejecutiva de Salud Ambiental (Executive Directora- NHN National Humanitarian Network DESA te of Environmental Health) United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian OCHA Defensoría Escolar de Niños y Adolescentes (School Office of Affairs DESNA the Ombudsman for Children and Adolescents) Oficina de Infraestructura Educativa (Educational Infrastruc- OINFE Dirección de Educación Comunitaria y Ambiental (Directorate ture Office) DIECA of Community and Environmental Education) OREC Oficina de Registro Civil (Civil Registry Office) DIRESA Dirección Regional de Salud (Regional Directorate of Health) Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organiza- PAHO/WHO DM District Municipality tion Dirección Regional de Agricultura (Regional Directorate of Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros (Presidency of the DRA PCM Agriculture) Council of Ministers) Dirección Regional de Educación de Loreto (Regional Directo- Programa Especial de Logros del Aprendizaje (Strategic DREL PELA rate of Education of Loreto). Learning Achievements Program) Dirección Regional de INDECI (Regional Directorate of IN- PNP Policía Nacional del Perú (Peruvian National Police) DRI DECI) Programa Nacional de Asistencia Alimentaria (National Food PRONAA DRM Disaster Risk Managment Assistance Program) Dirección Regional de Transportes y Comunicaciones (Regio- Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil (National DRTC RENIEC nal Directorate of Transport and Communications) Registry of Identification and Civil Status) European Commission’s Directorate-General for Humanita- REOC Regional Emergency Operations Center ECHO rian Aid and Civil Protection Programa de Soporte Socio Emocional para Niños y Adoles- EEII Educational Institutions SENA centes (Socio-emotional Support Program for Children and Adolescents) EOC Emergency Operations Center Servicio Nacional de Meteorología e Hidrología (National SENAMHI FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Meteorology and Hydrology Service) Programa de Formación de Maestros Bilingües de la Ama- FORMA- Sistema Nacional de Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres (Natio- zonía Peruana (Bilingual Teacher Training for the Peruvian SINAGERD BIAP nal System for Disaster Risk Management) Amazon) Sistema Nacional de Información para la Respuesta y la Gobierno Regional de Loreto (Regional Government of Lo- GOREL SINPAD Rehabilitación (National Information System Response and reto) Rehabilitation) Gerencia Regional de Desarrollo Social (Regional Social GRDS SITREP Situation Report Development Board) Unidad de Gestión Educativa Local (Unit of Local Education UGEL ha Hectare Managment) IFRC International Federation of Red Cross UN United Nations IGP Instituto Geofísico del Perú (Geophysical Institute of Peru) UNFPA United Nations Population Fund Programa Integral Nacional para el Bienestar Familiar (Na- INABIF UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund tional Institute for Infancy and Family) USD United States dollar 12 / Lessons Learned Loreto

UNICEF / E.Ursula Introduction / 13 Introduction

the end of 2011, there were heavy rainfalls in Peru that interviews to representatives from local, regional, national At caused a progressive increase of the water level in rivers and international institutions were done; and meetings of of the Amazon region. On April 20th 2012, in Iquitos, the two sectorial EOC and a provincial workshop of institutional Amazon River exceeded the overflow level in 1.97 meters and strengthening and lessons learned were held. reached a new all-time record of 118.97 MASL. In total, 23% of the population of the Loreto region was affected and 14% With the objectives and the methodology set, a chronology was in need. Given this situation, the President of the Republic of main events is established, followed by a brief description and the National Head of INDECI went to the region to know of the context of Loreto and of the damages caused by the about the scope of the tragedy and the PCM declared a State floods. Then, the good practices and the limitations in the of Emergency in 43 districts of 7 provinces. After setting the management and coordination processes are described. Thus, REOC up, international aid organizations, local authorities, the strengths and the weaknesses of the intervention are national institutions and civil society organizations started to evaluated, both at operational level and on the humanitarian collaborate in order to implement a series of actions and to response actions and rehabilitation procedure implemented in face the emergency situation. each priority sector: Damage Assessment and Needs Analysis, Collective centres, Housing, Livelihoods, Health, Water The objective of this research is to describe the implementation and Sanitation, Nutrition and Food Safety, Protection and of the humanitarian response actions and rehabilitation Emotional Recovery, Education and Social Communication. procedure due to floods emergency. Additionally, it is shown Finally, it is suggested a series of recommendations in case of how the abilities were strengthened in the communities and future flood emergencies situations. local, sectorial and regional authorities. To do this, primary and secondary sources of information were gathered and analyzed; 14 / Lessons Learned Loreto Objectives and Methodology

he objective of this research is to organize and synthesi- On the basis of the above, this work is considered as a qualita- Tze the implementation of the humanitarian response ac- tive research of descriptive scope, which analyzed primary and tions and rehabilitation procedure carried out due to the flood secondary sources of information. Thus, we gathered different emergency in the Loreto region in 2012. types of documents elaborated by the institutions involved in the response and rehabilitation processes to the emergency. In the following pages, the good practices and the limitations Moreover, we interviewed 56 officers of 38 key institutions are briefly described on the following aspects of the interven- (local, regional and national), cooperation agencies and diffe- tion: rent NGOs by means of semi-standardized surveys. Finally, we went to two meetings of the sectorial EOC of Housing and - The management processes of the national, regional and Collective centres in the REOC, and to a Provincial Workshop local coordination spaces as well as the contributions of Institutional Strengthening and Lessons Learned in Alto from the National Humanitarian Network and Loreto; Amazonas.

- The humanitarian response actions and rehabilitation in At the same time, due to the size of the Loreto’s territory and the priority sectors of Collective centres, Housing, Liveli- to the difficult access to some areas, the gathering of primary hoods, Health, Water and Sanitation, Nutrition and Food information was limited to the provinces of Maynas and Alto Safety, Protection and Emotional Recovery, Education Amazonas, especially because most of the interventions were and Social Communication. gathered there and there are located the headquarters of the Objectives and Methodology / 15

regional institutions. Besides, despite being away from Iquitos, emergency in 2012 in Loreto was available, allowing authori- the capital of the region, there was the intervention of two coo- ties to refocus efforts to improve care for the population. The perating agencies. Regarding the information from secondary perception of the population affected by the floods in Loreto sources, it is necessary to indicate that the lack of reports in was also collected in order to get to know their understanding most institutions was an important limitation for the analysis of how the felt affected by the flood, how they faced it and how of the interventions performed. they observed the disaster response of the institutions.

The report of the workshop “Lessons Learned towards Loreto Development” held with the aim of analyzing the actions taken by the actors in the Reactive Risk Management to face the flood 16 / Lessons Learned Loreto Chronology of Events

12 Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow of the Corrientes River. This damaged housing units and crops in the communities of the districts of Trompeteros, province of Loreto. 13 GOREL coordinated with PRONAA of Tarapoto regarding food aid for the affected families in the areas under 2012 their jurisdiction. 15 Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow of the Marañón River, which dama- JANUARY ged housing units in the district of 1 GOREL coordinated with PRONAA of Nauta, province of Loreto. Tarapoto regarding food aid for the Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow affected families. of the Nanay River, which damaged 2 Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow housing units, community centers of the Amazon and Itaya rivers, and animals in the communities of which damaged the housing units the district of Alto Nanay, province in the districts of Belen, Punchana of Maynas. 2011 and San Juan Bautista, province of 19 Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow Maynas. of the Ucayali River, which damaged 3 Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow housing units and EEII in the dis- NOVEMBER of the Huallaga and Marañón rivers, tricts of Padre Márquez, Contamana, Inahuaya, Pampa Hermosa, Vargas 16 Heavy rainfalls caused flooding of which damaged housing units and crops in the districts of Yurimaguas, Guerra, Sarayacu and Ucayali, pro- housing and damages to crops and vince of Ucayali. animals in some areas of the district Santa Cruz and Tte. César López, of Andoas, province of Datem del province of Alto Amazonas. 20 Heavy rainfalls damaged housing Marañón. 5 Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow units in San Lorenzo, district of of the Tigre and Corrientes rivers, Barranca, province of Datem del 17 The Regional Directorate of Health Marañón. (DIRESA) issued a Yellow Alert due which damaged housing units, EEII, to “Risk of Disease because of heavy health care centers and crops in the 25 Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow rains in Loreto”. communities of the district of Tigre, of the Ucayali River. This damaged province of Loreto. housing units, EEII, health care 21 Heavy rainfalls caused flooding of centers, rural roads, animals and housing in San Lorenzo, district of 6 Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow of the Amazon, Morona and Nanay crops in the districts of Capelo and Barranca, province of Datem del Puinahua, province of Requena. Marañón. rivers. This damaged people’s homes located in the lower areas of the district of Iquitos, province of Maynas. 7 Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow of the Ucayali River, which damaged housing units, EEII and crops in the communities of the district of Sa- quena, province of Requena. 8 Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow of the Tapiche River, which damaged housing units, EEII and crops in the communities of the district of Alto Tapiche, province of Requena. 10 Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow of the Marañón River. This damaged housing units and crops in the communities of the districts of Urarinas and Parinari, province of Loreto. Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow of the Nacho River, which damaged housing units, rural roads and crops in the communities of the district of Mazán, province of Maynas. Chronology of Events / 17

MARCH APRIL 2 GOREL began with the purchase of 1 A group of INDECI professionals materials, such as wood and nails to went to Iquitos in order to advise build pedestrian bridges, and of food the regional and local authorities for the affected families. regarding technical information and 5 Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow collective centres. of the Ucayali River. This damaged The program “A doctor in your nei- housing units, EEII and crops in 28 ghborhood” gave medical and hu- communities of the district of Emilio manitarian assistance to the victims San Martín, province of Requena. in the affected areas. FEBRUARY 7 Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow 2 The Regional Emergency Operations 10 Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow of the Amazon River. This damaged Center (REOC-Loreto) was created of the Amazon River, which dama- housing units, EEII, health care through the Regional Resolution Nº ged housing units, EEII, animals and centers and crops in the district of 202-2012-GRL-P. crops in the district of San Pablo, Indiana, province of Maynas. Through official communication Nº province of Mariscal Ramón Castilla. 8 Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow 206-2012-GRL-P, GOREL requested of the Amazon and Ucayali rivers, the extension of the State of Emer- 11 Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow which damaged housing units, EEII, gency in 13 districts of the Loreto of the Amazon River, which dama- health care centers and crops in the region. ged housing units, EEII, and crops in district of Las Amazonas, province The DRI-Loreto was restocked from the district of Ramón Castilla, pro- of Maynas; and of Maquía, province the DRI of San Martín and Amazo- vince of Mariscal Ramón Castilla. of Requena. nas. 15 Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow 12 The Amazon River exceeded the DREL sent to GOREL the list of EEII of the Amazon and Ucayali rivers. level of 117.00 masl and SENAMHI that will give shelter to the affected This damaged housing units, EEII, issued a Hydrological Red Alert. families. health care centers, and crops in the 13 Through the agreement Nº 3 Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow district of Fernando Lores, province 001-2012-SE-GRL, the Regional of the Napo River and of its tribu- of Maynas; and in the district of Council of Loreto declared a State of taries. This damaged housing units, Jenaro Herrera, province of Requena. Emergency in the seven provinces EEII, animals and crops in the dis- 20 Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow of the region for a period of ninety trict of Napo, province of Maynas. days. of the Amazon and Yavari rivers, DIRESA issued an Epidemiological which damaged housing units, EEII, 20 GOREL, in coordination with the Alert: “Risk of Outbreaks/Epidemics and crops in the district of Yavari, Civil Defense Institute of the Belen due to Floods in the Loreto Region”. province of Mariscal Ramón Castilla. District Municipality, provided hu- As a preventive measure, Electro 22 Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow manitarian support to 100 families installed in collective centres. Oriente interrupted the electricity in of the Ucayali and Tapiche rivers. the areas affected by floods. This damaged housing units, EEII, 21 GOREL, in coordination with the Civil health care centers, rural roads and Defense Institute of the MPM and GOREL coordinated—with the autho- crops in the district of Requena, the Punchana District Municipality, rities of the affected districts—the province of Requena. provided humanitarian support permanent relocation of families to families installed in collective to a 14-hectare plot, located on the 23 The first UN Situation Report (SI- Nauta-Iquitos road, km 12. TREP Nº 1) was issued. centres. The second UN Situation Report 4 SENAMHI-Loreto reported that the (SITREP Nº 2) was issued. Amazon River exceeded its all-time record of 118.58 masl by registering 25 GOREL delivered wood and nails to 118.64 masl. The authorities and build pedestrian bridges to the MPM the population were asked to take and to the District Municipalities of action. San Juan Bautista and Punchana. DRA-Loreto reported about the 27 MPM loss of crops from December 2011 29 Through the Supreme Decree Nº to March 2012. Given this situation, 037-2012-PCM, a State of Emergen- they requested a budget of S/. cy was declared in 24 districts of the 1’115,650 to recover the crops. 7 provinces of the Loreto region. 4-6 The Peruvian Red Cross evaluated 31 INDECI provided humanitarian the damages and analyzed the support to the warehouse of the needs in the region. DRI-Loreto from the DRI-San Mar- tín. 18 / Lessons Learned Loreto

APRIL 5 Heavy rainfalls caused the overflow of the Cachyacu River. This damaged housing units, animals and crops in a community of Balsapuerto, province of Alto Amazonas. About 60 affected families invaded private plots, located on the Iqui- tos-Nauta road, km 2.5. This caused MAY confrontation with the PNP. 2 OCHA approved the financing of 6 Through the Supreme Decree Nº nine projects with CERF funds to be 040-2012-PCM, a State of Emergen- implemented in the Loreto region, cy was declared in other 12 districts under the direct responsibility of of 5 provinces of the Loreto region. UNICEF, FAO, PAHO/WHO and IOM. The President of the Republic and 3 The NGO “The Shelterbox Trust” and the Minister of Health went to Lore- the Banco de la Nación (Peru’s state to to overfly the affected areas and bank) granted humanitarian support to provide humanitarian support. 16 DREL took a committee to the to the affected families. flooded areas in order to verify The collective centres in Iquitos were the development of regular school 4 DREL terminated the period of provided with portable toilets by classes. suspension of school classes in the MINSA. region. 16- The joint mission was held between 7 The Peruvian Navy provided three 20 ECHO, COOPI, SAVE THE CHILDREN, 5 INDECI reported the movement of planes to take the MINSA brigades FAO, UNICEF, the International humanitarian support to restore the to the areas affected by the flood. Federation of Red Cross (IFRC), and warehouse of the GOREL from the 8 A group of REOC officers went to the American, German and Spanish warehouses of the DRI Amazonas, Iquitos to advise the regional and lo- Red Cross. San Martín and Loreto. cal authorities on the management 17 The IFRC mobilized DREF funds to The organization Plan Internatio- of the REOC. the implementation of humanitarian nal—in coordination with MINSA, 09- UNICEF and PAHO evaluated the support in the region. MGP and the Punchana District 12 damages and needs. Municipality—inaugurated the So- 19 Humanitarian support was provided cio-emotional Support Program for 9 The GRDS of the GOREL distributed to the warehouse of the DRI-Loreto Children and Adolescents (SENA) in humanitarian support, collected from the DRI-Callao. four collective centres in the district in the Peruvian Telethon to the 20 The Amazon River reached its hi- of Punchana. districts of Punchana, Belen and ghest level at 118.97 masl and, thus, Iquitos. 7 The Chilean NGO Médicos Todo exceeded its all-time record. Terreno provided medical care by GOREL received portable toilets and The Peruvian Army delivered hou- taking seven professionals to the cleaning materials sent by the Cen- sing modules to GOREL to help the community of Padre Cocha, district tral Government. affected families. of Punchana. 10 The DREL authorized the suspen- 24 PRONAA-Pucallpa helped the The president of the GOREL provision of school classes during 30 days affected families of the districts of ded the acquisition of plots near to through the decree Nº RDR-000535- Padre Márquez, Contamana, Pampa the Iquitos-Nauta road in order to 2012. Hermosa, Inahuaya, Vargas Guerra build 10 thousand housing units for The third UN Situation Report (SI- and Sarayacu. the benefit of the affected families. TREP Nº 3) was issued. 26 PETROPERU helped with the elec- 7-9 MINEDU, through the Directorate 11 REOC installed free emergency lines. trification and painting of the EEII of Community and Environmental The EOC for Education was activa- 602196 to be used as a collective Education (DIECA) carried out a ted. centre by the affected families. Regional Workshop of Directors and Specialists of the UGEL in order to 28 MINEDU reported that the training 15 A group of MINSA professionals formulate a methodological model to the members of the Disaster Risk arrived to reinforce the tasks of to be applied at the beginning of Management Committee of the attending to the victims. school classes. Consequently, a UGEL began. As a humanitarian support, Rotary curricular plan was approved by Club sent tents from the US. 29 REOC reported 47 confirmed cases educational levels. of leptospirosis that were treated 8 Through official communications Nº The fourth UN Situation Report in the Regional Hospital of Loreto. 371 and 372, GOREL requested an (SITREP Nº 4) was issued. Three people passed away. extension of the State of Emergency 30 The company CWE Peru granted Nº 037-2012-PCM (issued on March food aid to the GOREL for the inju- 29th 2012) and Nº 040-2012-PCM red and affected families. (issued on April 6th 2012). Chronology of Events / 19 Chronology of Events

Specialists from the Directorate-Ge- neral of Environmental Health arrived to Iquitos in order to strengthen the logistics in the collective centres. 9 The NGO Operación Bendición Inter- nacional Perú donates 396 thousand de-worming tablets to the DIRESA program, “Chau Cuica”, against parasitosis. 10 The sectorial EOC of Protection was established, led by the Regional Social Development Board of the GOREL. The company AMASUFLAC donated emergency kits to the GOREL. AUGUST 17 AFP Integra-Iquitos delivered school kits to the district of Urarinas, pro- 7 The Midterm Review Workshop vince of Loreto. was carried out in Iquitos in order to develop a shared analysis on the 21 The National Humanitarian Network progress of the projects financed held a meeting in Lima. JUNE with UN funds. That workshop was 22 To reactivate the farmland, the DRA, carried out thanks to the GOREL 2 A cleanup day was performed on INIA and PEDICIP established a pur- and to the participation of GRDS, the Iquitos boulevard and 30 tones chase and distribution committee of DIRESA, DESA, DREL, DRA, the of garbage, mud and others were seeds (rice, corn and bean). Press, the Regional Directorate of collected. This activity was also per- Housing and INDECI. At the same The European Commission, with formed in the provinces of Requena time, GOREL received support from ECHO funds, financed COOPI, CESVI, and Ucayali. the UN agencies: IOM, FAO, UNICEF, and the German and Spanish Red 6 Through the Supreme Decree Nº PAHO, UNFPA and OCHA. Cross in order to develop four huma- 062-2012-PCM, the State of Emer- nitarian assistance projects. gency was extended in the twelve 24 Before the Executive, GOREL ma- districts provided in the Supreme naged S/. 405,925 to develop the Decree Nº 040-2012-PCM on April SEPTEMBER program Trabaja Peru that would 6th. generate temporary employment 8 Through the Supreme Decree Nº 27- The workshop “Lessons Learned” to clean and maintain the affected 064-2012-PCM, the State of Emer- 28 was carried out in Iquitos with the areas in 10 points of the districts of gency was extended in other seven participation of different institu- Belen, Iquitos, Punchana and San districts of four provinces of the tions. Juan and in three districts of the region. Loreto province. 13- IOM carried out a Training Works- DIRESA gave directions for the 14 hop about Camp Management and preventive treatment against lep- Human Trafficking. OCTUBER tospirosis. 14 The National Humanitarian Network 12 The workshop “Lessons Learned” 25 OXFAM and PREDES went to the met at INDECI headquarters. was carried out in Yurimaguas with districts of Urarinas, Parinari and the participation of different natio- Nauta to evaluate the situation and 18 The assessment mission of Shelter nal and international institutions manage support. Cluster was initiated to identify the families that did not go to the organized by COOPI and Caritas. 28 Through the Supreme Decree Nº collective centres and the conditions 057-2012-PCM, the State of Emer- of the damaged dwellings due to gency was extended to 60 days in the floods. the districts provided in the Supre- me Decree Nº 037-2012-PCM on March 29th. 29 SENAMHI-Loreto reported that the Amazon River registered 117.12 masl JULY so far. The Red Alert continued. 31 The Police, with the Plan Internatio- DREL reported that 100% of EEII are nal support, carried out a Training ready for the beginning of classes. Workshop, until August 3rd, for 70 Peruvian National Police members, 31 SENAMHI-Loreto reported that the regarding C&A Protection with parti- Amazon River registered 116.94 masl cular emphasis on collective centres. so far. An Orange Alert was issued. 20 / Lessons Learned Loreto

oreto occupies an area of 368,851.95 km2 and has a popu- THE CONTEXT Llation of 1’006,953 according to official statistics (www.inei. gob.pe). Of this total, 34.4% lives in rural areas1. Its capital is the city of Iquitos which has a total population of 422,055. That is why it is one of the most populated cities in Peru. In addition, Iquitos—which is a peninsula located between the Amazon, Itaya and Nanay rivers—is characterized by a disproportionate and disrespectful urban growth of the current regulatory plans. Because of these factors, a high percentage of its population is vulnerable to the floods that, each year, are repeated during winter.

According to INEI, in 2004, 66.9% of Loreto’s population lived in a state of poverty. By 2010, this number decreased to 49.1%. However, the amount of poor population was above-average in the Selva region, which 12.8% of the population is considered to live in a state of poverty.

Now, if we consider its territorial size, which is bigger than Ecuador; and its dispersed population, 2.7 inhabitants/km2, Loreto—along with Madre de Dios—is the region with the lowest population density in Peru. Added to this, there is a

1. Population data was based on the 2007 demographic census as at June 30, 2012. Results obtained in the intervention / 21

Results obtained in the intervention: Good practices and Lessons learned

lack of roads connecting the different localities since only exist In particular, Loreto is placed last among the other regions if we the Iquitos-Nauta and the Yurimaguas-Tarapoto roads. That is consider the level of accomplishment of second-grade students the reason why the vast river network of the region is the only regarding math and reading comprehension. Specifically, at the means of communication. Consequently, there are a lot of lo- end of the school year, the students from Loreto achieved only gistical difficulties in this region, particularly the high transport 6.1% in reading comprehension and 1.4% in math. costs and the amount of time to transport goods and people. Regarding the agricultural sector, it is worth mentioning that, Regarding the sanitary conditions, Loreto has a health care due to soils of higher fertility, the crops of most of the people network which covers almost all of its territory. Nevertheless, who live in rural areas are normally located at low and medium many factors contribute to the poor sanitary conditions of the shoals which make them easily floodable. Considering that the population, which is more vulnerable during times of flood. food safety of rural inhabitants depends on these crops, the Among them: shantytowns in areas at risk from flooding, poor high level of vulnerability to which they are exposed is quite hygienic conditions in peri-urban and rural areas, chronic pro- clear. blems regarding drinking water distribution and sanitation, logistical difficulties previously mentioned (lack of roads) and epidemic diseases such as malaria and dengue. Within this framework, Loreto shows infant and child mortality rates—38% and 51% live births, respectively—that are well above the national average: 16% and 21%, respectively. Additionally, according to information gathered by INEI, in 2010 and 2011, one of every three children under five years old (34.2%) had chronic malnutrition.

In relation to the Education, there are huge chronic deficits in Loreto, as evidenced by the results of the student census in 2011. Toma aérea de la inundación Fuente: Dirección Regional de Vivienda

24 / Lessons Learned Loreto THE EMERGENCY IN NUMBERS

ince November 16th 2011, heavy rainfalls caused the rise Sof the Amazon, Huallaga, Ucayali and Marañón rivers and 229,412 of its tributaries. According to the data given by the REOC, on April 20th, the Amazon River reached a new all-time record of Victims 118.97 masl, measured in Iquitos, when the overflow level was exceeded in 1.97 meters.

Due to Loreto’s hydrographic and geographical characteristics, not all the provinces were flooded at the same time. That is why the emergency occurred at different moments in different areas of the region. According to the data registered in the National Information System Response and Rehabilitation % (SINPAD), the first damages—caused by the rising waters— 23 were in November 2011, in the rural areas of the province of population Datem del Marañón. Then, in January 2012, the provinces of Alto Amazonas, Loreto, Maynas, Requena and Ucayali were flooded. Finally, in February, the province of Ramón Castilla was affected. Despite this time difference in the beginning of the floods, there is an element common to all the affected areas that is important to mention: the flood duration that, according to the gathered testimonies, was much longer than other years.

The material damage caused by the floods was huge in the entire region. Looking at the official data reported by the REOC, during the workshop Lessons Learned—carried out on Sep- tember 27th and 28th, 2012—the overflowing rivers caused a total of 229,412 victims, which is equivalent to 23% of the total population; and 138,161 were affected, that is approximately 138,161 14% of the total population. Official figures report that five children died by drowning. And always based on information Affected provided by the COER, 72,642 households, 1,724 educational institutions, 54 health centers, 170 community centers and 150.765 linear meters of rural road were affected by adverse events 14% populations The emergency in numbers / 25

Regarding the agricultural sector, the Directorate of Statistics and Agricultural Information (DEIA) reported—in its plan of work published in April and in its report submitted in May— Material Damage that the flood loss damaged 27,821 hectares of crops and affected 29,000 growers. In total, there was a loss of 50.3% of rice, corn, banana, yucca, peanut and papaya crops, whose estimated 72,642 households value exceeds S/.40 million2 .

The subsequent effects caused by the floods were the severe ero- 1,724 educational institutions sion in the communities located at rural areas, as happened in the district of Teniente César López Rojas in Alto Amazonas; the collapse of the sanitation, water and drain services in all 54 health centers the affected areas; and the increase of Acute Respiratory Infec- tions (ARIs), Acute Diarrheal Diseases (ADDs), and outbreaks of leptospirosis and malaria. 170 community centers In total, 3,417 families (equivalent to 16,016 people) were installed in 132 collective centres, 114 in Iquitos and 18 in the suburbs. 50 of them were placed in EEII, which meant the loss of 151 Km affected roads school time—240 hours in preschool, 240 in elementary school and 192 in high school—and the increase of the exposure of children and adolescents to situations in which their rights are threatened.

Additionally, according to the numbers given by the Regional Agricultural Sector Directorate of Education of Loreto (DREL), around 40% of the EEII in the region were damaged—1724 of 4339 EEII. This means that 92,077 students began their classes not timely, this is about 28% of the total school population. The educative institutions used as collective centres resulted in the loss of class hours, 240 in the pre-Elementary school, 240 in Elementary % school, and 192 in Secondary school. Facing this situation, through the agreement Nº 001-2012-SE- 50 GRL, on March 13th 2012, the Regional Council of Loreto declared a State of Emergency in the seven provinces of the region for a period of 90 days. Local, regional, national and international institutions, as well as public and private, went to implement the response actions to the emergency and the rehabilitation procedures, under the coordination of the REOC which lost areas sown was installed in the establishments of the Regional Government since April 2nd 2012

27,821 cultivation acres 29,000 producers affected 40 million in losses

2. DEIA. (2012). Report about Floods– Loreto Region. Iquitos: DEIA. DEIA. (2012). Damages caused by Floods in the Agricultural Sector– Plan of Work. Iquitos: DEIA. Family injured in Alto Amazonas Province Source: COOPI

Educational Institution used as temporary shelter Source: OIM

28 / Lessons Learned Loreto COORDINATION LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

This section analyzes the good practices performed, the les- Eventually, some Local Governments in Loreto have included sons learned and the weaknesses revealed in the management components of Disaster Risk Management to the Local Govern- and coordination processes in response to the emergency— ment’s own action. This has contributed not only to consolidate carried out by the National Humanitarian Network—and in the abilities of the Civil Defense offices, but the actions taken local, regional and national governments. due to the floods in 2012 have demonstrated a bigger leadership ability in the coordination and management of essential activities in case of emergency. Some of these essential activities are the damage and needs assessment, the creation of District Committees of Civil Defense and the fund-raising to meet the basic needs. Among the good practices performed, it is worth mentioning the implementation of an Early Warning System in the Shi- shinuahua River, province of Alto Amazonas, at the initiative of the authorities of the Santa Cruz District in collaboration with Caritas. Additionally, the District Municipality approved that implementation as part of its 2013 budget, thanks to a contingency fund for emergencies which includes activities such as reforestation and cleaning of river bed. Coordination - Local Governments / 29

On the other hand, in 2011, the district of Punchana carried out In second place, some municipalities of the rural areas did not a flood-risk study and awareness campaigns to the population, have a Civil Defense brigade, contingency plans or protocols placed boundary markers in the flood areas within its juris- of action during flood emergencies, even if this kind of phe- diction and registered the population that lived in flood areas. nomenon is recurrent in the region. This was due to the lack of Thanks to these efforts, the district could face the emergency in training to the specialists assigned to the Civil Defense offices 2012 with an approved contingency plan for floods. or to the activity planning on Disaster Risk Management which was not a priority in the agenda of several rural authorities. It has to be emphasized that the Belen Municipality has added For instance, the districts of Jeberos and Balsapuerto, located an innovative prioritization system of support in case of an ad- at the province of Alto Amazonas, were affected by the rising verse event: the lot-by-lot registration of all the population that waters but did not report damages or needs in any moment of lives in its territory. Finally, San Juan Bautista has worked for the flood. the activation of stable coordination means together with key institutions such as National Defense, INDECI and REOC. In third place, the lack of effective mechanisms of monitoring and surveillance by the governmental levels was a subsequent According to the Technical Secretaries who were interviewed, weakness. In that regard, there was not and there is not any the need for an organized municipal structure and a budget so kind of audit or effective sanction—even if it is established in as to facilitate the work of the National Civil Defense Institute the articles of the Law—to those officers and authorities that was one lesson learned essential to the municipalities affected have not fulfilled their obligations during floods. by the flood. In this regard, an exemplary case was what happened in the province of Maynas. The negative effects caused by Finally, the entry into force of the new SINAGERD law had sub- political problems in the Municipality were exacerbated by a sequent difficulties to the Local Governments. In many cases, complex institutional structure, which places the National Civil they had to adapt their structures and responsibilities to the Defense Institute as a unit within the Public Safety Sub-directo- new regulations without prior training. Consequently, several rate. At the same time, this depends on the Municipal Services officers from the municipalities did not know the current me- Directorate. Consequently, the above factors delayed the insti- chanisms to manage an emergency. It is necessary to mention tution responsiveness which, according to the interviewees, did that these weaknesses still remain. For instance, despite that the not demonstrate the expected leadership and decision-making SINAGERD law stipulates that each Municipality must have a levels. budget for 2013 to purchase and storage humanitarian support materials for emergencies, several districts have not yet fulfill It is important to add that the gathered testimonies proved this task up to date. that, to facilitate the municipalities’ response during an adverse event, it is essential to ensure stability in the technical positions In order to improve these weaknesses for future emergencies at the Civil Defense Institute, since the high turnover impedes caused by floods, the interviewees suggested that it is neces- the proper reinforcement of the institutional abilities. That is sary to carry out training sessions to the officers of the district why another lesson learned was that the officers in charge of and provincial municipalities located in the most remote areas Risk Management meet a series of requirements upon assu- in the region. They also suggested that mayors, managers and ming office, besides that their stability in the position does not officers should be involved in the activities of emergency pre- depend on the change of authority. vention and management, since their participation is essential to consolidate the institutional interest regarding the risk ma- According to the Article 14 of the SINAGERD law, during over- nagement and to prioritize the implementation of policies with flow and damages to the population, the Local Governments an approach in the Disaster Risk Management (DRM). represent the first level of response, since they have the duty of activating their Disaster Risk Management Work Groups and Platforms of Civil Defense, monitoring the situation evolution, conducting the damage and needs assessment, and reporting the information to higher levels of government in order to activate the corresponding aid mechanisms. Despite the highlighted strengths, a series of limitations impeded the proper development of these functions. Among some of these limitations, it is important to highlight that the District Municipalities did not have a budget to face this emergency or the implements necessary—boats, human resources and oil—in order to conduct the damage assessment throughout the territory of their jurisdiction. Here, it is necessary to remember two mentioned factors: the high level of dispersion of the shantytowns throughout the region and the difficult access to certain areas of the territory, provided that it is possible to get there only by waterway and this means a several-day trip and a high transport cost. 30 / Lessons Learned Loreto

nagers an planners—in the REOC working meetings. This had REGIONAL GOVERNMENT a negative impact on its functionality and reduced its approach and efficiency in some of its actions. Additionally, the typical logistic and access problems of Loreto’s territory impeded the As a result of the technical advice given by INDECI to the GO- participation of officers from remote provinces and districts REL, on April 2nd, the Regional Emergency Operations Cen- which limited the coordination to the urban and peri-urban ter (REOC) was established through the Regional Resolution context of the capital city. Nº 202-2012-GRL-P. Since its establishment and during the Consequently, another lesson learned was the need to establish emergency, the REOC was the official place for meetings and effective coordination means, between REOC and district and coordination. Every day, at 7:30 a.m., all actors involved—pu- provincial authorities throughout the region, giving preceden- blic and private—went there to know and to share the latest ce to the engagement of district and provincial mayors of di- scopes on the flood evolution. Every meeting began with SE- fferent political parties. In this respect, it is a priority to invest NAMHI’s report on the meteorological and hydrological situa- in technologies that allow real-time communication with the tion, followed by the presentation of different actors regarding authorities from the most remote localities. the crises in the emergency management. Regarding the regional sectors, not everyone reacted promptly Rapidly, the REOC became the main formal space of exchange during floods. For that reason, the most relevant learning was of information among the institutions involved in the response to verify that sectors with a greater responsiveness were those processes to the floods. As result of this effort, the leadership that had contingency plans, emergency protocols and internal taken by the GOREL represented, for most of the interviewed structures adapted in case of emergency. institutions, one of the most relevant good practices during the whole intervention. The daily frequency of the meetings was DIRESA was the first one to respond to the emergency, due to one of the Emergency Center’s strengths, as well as the conti- its huge health care networks, its ability to gather and process nuous presence of the Regional President, given that his parti- the information rapidly and the close coordination with SE- cipation not only was giving weight to the meetings, but it also NAMHI. Thus, on November 17th 2011, just a day after the was improving the decision-making process by the regional first report of flood damages in SINPAD, DIRESA issued a authorities. For instance, faced with the requirement to sys- yellow alert due to risk of disease because of heavy rains in tematize and to count on a regional management program all Loreto. the information relating to material damage and personal in- jury due to the floods, a good practice—as result of the REOC Among the strengths demonstrated by the regional sector, work—was the creation of the Regional System for Disasters. there must be highlighted the presence of a National Defense office, in the framework of the Prevention and Control Center; Currently, the COER is the permanent body within the Re- the existence of a contingency plan in case of floods and cold gional Government’s institutional architecture for the region waves; and the rapid activation of the sectorial EOC. In addi- and meets the objective of coordinating the contributions of tion, as a result of the prioritization and of the timely planning different stakeholders regarding the themes of Disaster Risk of DRM activities by DIRESA, the sector’s management abili- Management. In addition, priority was to increase the effecti- ty stands out, which managed to mobilize S/.3’160,000 from veness of the action of the COER, the adoption of appropriate MINSA as additional resources to surveillance and epidemio- reporting mechanisms on changes of the flow, increasing and logical follow-up, through the Urgency Decree Nº 013-2012. decreasing trends, of the rivers in the region. Similarly, the Regional Directorate of Agriculture (DRA) could Now, despite constituting a dramatic shift in the emergency have a decentralized structure and a strong territorial presence. management, the creation of the REOC came late in relation And, like DIRESA, it was able to manage additional resources to the time that a convenient management of the floods would with the Central Government and, thus, it achieved a supple- have required. Especially if we consider that its creation had mentary transfer of S/.1’024,080, in order to purchase certified already been envisaged and approved in 2008, in the flood-res- seeds of three crops essential to the regional food: rice, corn ponse regional plan “Yacumama”. As mentioned before, the and bean. Regarding the limitations faced by the DRA, the rise of the rivers in some remote provinces was being persis- agencies and agricultural institutions, that were in the provin- tent at the end of 2011 and the number of damages increased ces and districts of the region, felt obliged to carry out the da- 3 exponentially since November , according to SINPAD (see mage and needs assessment on a sampling basis, provided that Table 1). they did not have enough economic and material resources to cover the entire territory of their jurisdiction. It is worth mentioning that the structural weaknesses in the coordination mechanisms between the local and regional go- On the other hand, the close coordination between the Re- vernments, together with political affinity issues among the au- gional Directorate of Education of Loreto (DREL) and the thorities in charge, caused the lack of key figures—mayors, ma- DIECA of the Ministry of Education—in order to encourage the beginning of classes and the elaboration of an emergency curriculum—was a strength for the education sector. And 3. The Table 1 reports only the damages described in the SINPAD yet, the coordination in this sector was a significant difficulty under the category “damages caused by floods”. Coordination - Regional Government / 31

Table 1. Damage development per month and per province

Individuals Housing Victims Affected Deceased Destroyed Damaged NOVEMBER 1,923 66 - 0 249 Datem del Marañón 1,923 66 0 0 249 JANUARY 136,541 134,366 5 25 44,830 Alto Amazonas 8,737 0 0 0 2,078 Datem del Marañón 0 74 0 0 14 Loreto 45,453 4,725 1 0 10,272 M. Ramón Castilla 8,388 0 0 0 1,530 Maynas 32,659 125439 4 25 20,977 Requena 13,208 4128 0 0 4,076 Ucayali 28,096 0 0 0 5,883 FEBRUARY 47,790 3451 3 1 10,097 Datem del Marañón 2,718 107 0 1 615 M. Ramón Castilla 25,295 3344 3 0 5,945 Maynas 9,672 0 0 0 2,280 Requena 10,105 0 0 0 1,257 MARCH 35,659 180 - 6 7,676 Datem del Marañón 1,864 0 0 0 394 Maynas 18,658 180 0 6 4,030 Requena 15,137 0 0 0 3252 APRIL 6,816 - - - 1,437 Maynas 6,816 0 0 0 1,437

Fuente: SINPAD

to the DREL, since its reactivity was affected by the lack of a contingency plan and communication mechanisms between the regional headquarters and the eight Units of Local Educa- tional Management (UGEL). Particularly, the most important learning to this sector were the need to start an internal coordination system capable of guaranteeing a suitable flow of information between DREL and UGEL, and the creation of effective mechanisms of supervision and inspection of teachers, who most of them took advantage of the emergency situation to not go to classes in the rural areas.

Finally, it should be emphasized that a weakness common to all regional state sectors was not having the necessary human resources during the emergency. 32 / Lessons Learned Loreto NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

The dimension reached by the floods exceeded the responsiveness, both regional and locally and this alerted the Central Go- vernment. Consequently, on April 6th, the President of the Re- public, Ollanta Humala Tasso; the Minister of Health, Alberto Tejada Noriega; and the National Head of INDECI, Alfredo Murgueytio Espinoza; went to Iquitos. Once there, they over- flew, with the President of the Region, Iván Vásquez Valera, to evaluate the situation of the Amazon region and to develop the first negotiations with the local and regional institutions.

Additionally, from March, the National Head of INDECI, alerted by the alarming data that was reported by SINPAD, went on several occasions to the areas affected by the floods and decided to offer support to the local authorities, after confir- ming the seriousness of the situation during overflights and field visits. Besides taking huge amounts of humanitarian support from different Regional Directorates of INDECI (DRI) to Loreto, INDECI provided technical support to the Regional Government. This allowed that:

I. On March 29th, through the Supreme Decree Nº 037- 2012-PCM, the PCM declared a State of Emergency for a period of 60 days in 24 districts of the seven provinces.

II. On April 6th, through the Supreme Decree Nº 040-2012- PCM, a State of Emergency was declared in other twelve districts for a period of 60 days.

III. On May 28th, through the Supreme Decree Nº 057-2012- PCM, the State of Emergency was extended to 60 days in the districts provided in the Supreme Decree on March 29th.

IV. On June 6th, through the Supreme Decree Nº 062-2012- PCM, the State of Emergency was extended to 60 days in the twelve districts provided in the Supreme Decree on As for the food aid coordination, a good practice was the mana- April 6th. gement system used by the National Food Assistance Program (PRONAA), which supported the affected population from V. On June 8th, through the Supreme Decree Nº 064-2012- three different offices: Iquitos, for the provinces of Maynas, PCM, the State of Emergency was extended in the seven Loreto, Ramón Castilla, Requena; Pucallpa, for the province subsequent districts. of Ucayali; and Tarapoto, for the provinces of Datem del Mara- ñón and Alto Amazonas. In addition, due to its structure, the During the entire emergency, the proactivity from several Mi- PRONAA coordinated the food delivery directly with the dis- nistries was a strength, since they made arrangements with the trict municipalities which, in turn, informed the REOC. This regional sectors to strengthen the response actions and reha- mechanism led to a prompt food assistance to victims. Howe- bilitation in case of floods. For instance, MINSA planned, in ver, it is necessary to mention that, during the emergency, any coordination with DIRESA, the provision of goods, portable of the three PRONAA warehouses did not have food stocks in toilets and reservoirs to store water; sent specialists from the case of emergency. For that reason, the rations provided were Directorate-General of Environmental Health (DIGESA) in below those set by law and by the international standards of order to improve the sectorial abilities about logistical aspects food assistance. Additionally, the districts had to assume the in collective centres; and managed the arrival of a group of costs, and the transport and distribution logistics of the food professionals such as nurses and doctors. The MINEDU ca- delivered by the PRONAA. rried out an assessment mission in Iquitos and, through the DIECA, established channels of direct coordination with the DREL to promote the fulfillment of the right to the education. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Economy and Finances (MEF) authorized additional transfers of funds to DRA and DIRESA. Coordination - National Government / 33 34 / Lessons Learned Loreto

NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN and were led by the GOREL with the support of international coordinators. With the exception of the areas of Health, and Water and Sanitation that were working in DIRESA’s facilities, NETWORK the members of each sectorial EOC were meeting regularly in the REOC’s physical space to discuss the most urgent issues within their area of interest, to reach shared decisions and to take timely actions. Nationally, the Humanitarian Network represents an important gateway between the national authorities and the inter- The main achievement of this humanitarian coordination national aid organizations in order to reduce the impact of structure in Loreto consisted on the complementarity between disasters and emergencies in the vulnerable populations. Par- the tasks of the REOC (place where they shared news regar- ticularly, through the coordination of the main humanitarian ding the evolving situation) and the sectorial EOC (spaces of actors in the territory, each year, the National Humanitarian thematic analysis and of elaboration of actions). The coordina- Network (NHN) monitors the evolution of the humanitarian tion role to support the GOREL performed by UNICEF, under situation for the rainy season in Peru, centralizing the infor- direct delegation of the United Nations Resident Coordinator, mation provided by several institutions and coordinating the was recognized in a very positive way by the involved institu- implementation of humanitarian support. tions. Currently, some sectorial EOC established during the emer- In case of emergency in Loreto, the NHN represented an effi- gency are still functioning. For instance, the housing sector is cient coordination space regarding fund-raising. Besides the now the main space for inter-institutional dialogue in the re- humanitarian support managed by INDECI and different gion for the urban planning. And it is important to mention public institutions, on April 17th, the IFRC mobilized DREF that the ones who attend their weekly meetings are the repre- funds for the implementation of humanitarian actions throu- sentatives of INDECI, National Defense, Regional Infrastruc- gh the Peruvian Red Cross (CRP). On May 2nd, thanks to the ture Board, Directorate of Housing, Architects Association of financing by CERF, the United Nations approved nine projects Loreto, Electro Oriente, Sedaloreto, and Technical Secretaries to be carried out under the responsibility of UNICEF, FAO, from the Civil Defense institutes in Maynas, San Juan Bautista, PAHO/WHO and IOM. On May 22nd, through the Direc- Belen and Punchana. Similarly, the sectorial EOC of collective torate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection centres currently represents the regional space for the planning (ECHO), the European Commission, financed COOPI, CES- and preparation of future facilities for collective centres in case VI, and the German and Spanish Red Cross in order to deve- of emergency. In addition, this thematic panel not only works lop four humanitarian support projects. Finally, other organi- to identify appropriate and safe places to set collective centres zations such as Plan International y Caritas Peru, mobilized up, but it also coordinates the assignment of institutional res- institutional funds. ponsibilities regarding the housing issue. Another strength performed by the NHN was the decision of Though the sectorial EOC represented spaces of direct coor- the Global Task Force on Building Codes (Shelter Cluster), dination between the institutions involved in the emergency with the support of the IFRC, to carry out a mission in Peru management, several members expressed doubts about the to inform about the humanitarian situation and the housing efficiency level reached by this mechanism. According to some condition of most affected families who preferred not to go to people, in several occasions, the debate was unproductive, collective centres. since it was difficult to reach important decisions and a clear assignment of responsibilities. Nevertheless, this may be asso- With the aim to facilitate joint analyses, to ensure high stan- ciated with weaknesses in the group management and group dards in the emergency management processes and to guaran- decision-making. Additionally, the lack of key actors, such as tee the interventions’ complementarity, a good practice of the the district mayors, impeded the decision-making and execu- NHN intervention was the role delegation of humanitarian tion processes. international aid in Loreto to UNICEF by the UN Resident Similarly, other interviewees regretted the lack of adjustment Coordinator. This promoted cooperative efforts to support the mechanisms of the sectorial EOC to the local context. They Regional Government of Loreto. Also, during the entire emer- even stated that, in the long term, this aspect ended up weake- gency and to improve the coordination between specialists and ning the efficiency of this management channel. For instance, officers of the cooperating agencies, and the regional and local the lack of coordination among the sectorial EOC undermined authorities, UNICEF supported the REOC meetings and ma- the ability to plan interventions of major scope. Furthermore, naged a coordination space of international aid workers, called according to the interviewees, when there was coordination, Humanitarian Network of Loreto. Additionally, in coordina- it was for a particular interest and through informal manage- tion with the regional entities and agencies responsible for the ment channels. thematic coordination in the country, six areas for discussion (Health, Water and Sanitation, Housing, Collective Centres, Regarding the cooperating agencies, it is necessary to men- Communication and Protection) were established. These areas tion that a good practice was the activation of coordination for discussion were called sectorial EOC or ‘thematic panels’4 mechanisms among all government levels since it is the only way to avoid duplication in the interventions; ensure a suitable knowledge of activities by authorities and officers; and stren- 4. The expressions ‘thematic panels’ and ‘sectorial EOC’ are used gthen the local institutional capacities. For instance, COOPI as synonyms throughout the document. Coordination - National Humanitarian Network / 35 and the German Red Cross developed direct formalities with district, provincial and regional governments, and determined the intervention places—Alto Amazonas and Mariscal Ramón Castilla, respectively—taking as a base the prioritizations given by the Regional Secretary for National Defense and the REOC. On the other hand, UNICEF included in the coordination meetings the Municipal Ombudsman for Children and Adolescents (DEMUNA) from different districts. While Plan International coordinated with the Punchana District Muni- cipality through its DEMUNA, and with DIRESA through the Mental Health sector. Despite that daily critical news from Loreto had the SITREP support—elaborated by the UN Resident Coordinator’s Offi- ce—which reported that the aid provided to the region by national institutions was not enough to cover the humanitarian gaps; and even tough, in February 2012, given the rainfall increase, NHN meetings became constant and the rain monitoring became a priority issue to NHN members, they did not achieve the necessary consensus to organize and implement an inter-agency and intersectoral mission to evaluate damages and local needs of the areas worst hit by floods in the Amazon region. Given this situation, several organizations decided to act in- dependently. From 4 to 6 April, the Red Cross carried out the first damage assessment which revealed the seriousness of the situation. From 9 to 12 April, UNICEF and WHO representatives traveled to Iquitos to monitor the evolving situation and, at witnessing the situation, suggested that the UN agencies applied to CERF funds. From 16 to 20 April, a group of cooperating agencies—among these COOPI; UNICEP; FAO; Save the Children; German, Peruvian and Spanish Red Cross—carried out a subsequent mission together with representatives from the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Hu- manitarian Aid and Civil Protection. Finally, during that same month, the IOM carried out its own mission. Despite the results obtained by the NHN, it is worth mentioning that there was a lack of coordination amongst INDE- CI and the agencies, especially due to the lack of established protocols in case of floods. In the specific emergency case in Loreto, the lack of agreement on the minimal criteria for inter-agency assessments, and the lack of a clear methodology for its implementation caused a fragmentation in the collective action. This caused a decrease of the incidence and advocacy process of the NHN regarding the intervention. 36 / Lessons Learned Loreto OPERATIONS GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

In general terms, the presence of institutional strengthening This section describes the lessons learned, the good components in all sectors was one of the strengths of the ac- practices and the limitations of the activities carried out tions taken. In this regard, the organization of the Regional in response to the emergency in the priority sectors of Workshop “Lessons Learned” was of particular relevance. This Collective Centres, Housing, Livelihoods, Health, Water workshop—that was organized by the GOREL with the techni- and Sanitation, Nutrition and Food Safety, Protection and cal advice of INDECI, UNICEF and Plan International—took Emotional Recovery, Education and Social Communication. place on September 27th and 28th, with the participation of Before turning to the analysis of each sector, it is important 132 representatives from different institutions such as GOREL, to mention some general considerations regarding the Municipalities, INDECI, the Police, the Armed Forces and aid operations of the intervention system. organizations. During the workshop, apart from presentations, there were work groups. During the first day, the members worked to establish the good practices and limitations of the intervention in every sector. These members were organized in nine thematic panels: Health, Food and Nutrition, Housing, Water and Sanitation, Education, Agriculture, Transportation, Communications and Social Communication, Collective Cen- tres, Protection and REOC. While during the second day the members of every thematic panel identified action proposals for the future. Operations - General considerations / 37

A similar event was organized by COOPI, Caritas Peru, the S/.700 thousand in 2012. Provincial Municipality of Alto Amazonas and the IGP in Yu- rimaguas. This event, held on October 12, was attended by 50 A subsequent weakness consisted on the lack of an institution people from several institutions—Civil Defense, Public Safety, responsible for analyzing the humanitarian gaps that were ta- Municipalities, Sub-region of Alto Amazonas, health care cen- king place during the emergency and for redirecting the actions ters, universities, INABIF, companies and media—who partici- of the actors involved according the needs. The biggest conse- pated with presentations and work groups. quence was that there were not registrations of victims who re- fused to go to colletive centres and decided to remain in their Among good practices, it is necessary to mention the initiative flooded homes. That is why this situation constitutes a lesson of some organizations by prioritizing the intervention in most learned. In future emergencies, in coordination with the Local remote areas of the region. Thus, COOPI implemented respon- Governments, the REOC must take responsibility to monitor se actions and rehabilitation in four districts of the province the humanitarian gaps and to coordinate the registration of of Alto Amazonas which will continue until 2013, just as the people who is not living in collective centres. German Red Cross in the province of Mariscal Ramón Castilla and the Spanish Red Cross in the province of Loreto. For its Given the adverse events, it is essential to carry out a rapid and part, Caritas Peru took advantage of its institutional presence effective assessment process, since any aid provided by govern- in Yurimaguas in order to add—to its regular program in Alto ment institutions or cooperating agencies depends on an appro- Amazonas—a component in response to the emergency. priate report of damages and needs. Nevertheless, in the specific emergency case in Loreto, there was a considerable delay in the Given the logistical difficulties experienced by purchase and assessment accomplishment. In particular, the validation of the transport volunteers of humanitarian support goods from gathered information and its registration in SINPAD stretched Lima, the collaboration provided by the Peruvian Navy to the the activation time of the aid mechanisms, which exacerbated SENA program, run by Plan International, was one practice to the humanitarian gaps. Within this framework, it is possible to take into account in case of future flood emergencies. The Pe- identify two possible reasons that can explain what had happe- ruvian Navy not only provided its facilities for storage, but its ned. On the one hand, the logistical difficulties and the shortage contribution in the logistics through air transportation of ma- of financial, material and human resources obstructed the pro- terials from Lima was of paramount importance. Similarly, the cess of information gathering, specially in the most remote and decision to acquire necessary implements in Panama, which, rural areas. On the other hand, the fact that almost all district besides reducing costs, accelerated the delivery, was one of the and provincial municipalities did not updated census of its sett- greatest intervention strengths carried out by PAHO. lers complicated the elaboration of correct numbers.

According to the gathered testimonies, the concentration of hu- As the interviews to Local Government officers demonstra- manitarian actions in the urban and peri-urban areas in Iquitos ted, the need to have updated census was an important lesson and, especially, in the collective centres established to provide learned by the local institutions. In that regard, good practices protection to the displaced population was the main limitation represented all the initiatives undertaken by different munici- of the emergency response in Loreto. This is due to the fact that, palities in order to update the demographic and population sta- according to the numbers provided by the REOC, the 3,417 tistics. In this respect, it is worth mentioning the effort under- families that took refuge in 132 collective centres establish in taken by the GOREL in coordination with the districts to carry Iquitos and suburbs represented less than 7% of the total of the out the complete census of those living in flood areas in Iquitos, affected families. Belen, Punchana and San Juan Bautista.

Although several local and national public institutions provided humanitarian support to the victims in the entire region, it is necessary to indicate that, in several occasions, it did not get to fulfill the needs of the people living in provinces and rural areas. For instance, the province of Loreto that reported, according to data provided by the REOC, a total of 10,801 injured and 969 affected families received—as humanitarian support by GOREL and INDECI—9,707 units such as drums, mosqui- to nets, mattresses, buckets, bedspreads, shovels, knives, ladles, skimmers, ropes and prybars. In other words, families did not receive any unit. Additionally, the food aid given to the victims in Loreto by the PRONAA made a total of 91,171.55 kg, between rice, oil, coarse manioc flour and canned food. This quantity divided by the number of affected families hardly resulted in 8.4 kg per family during entire period of flooding.

Regarding the described situation, it must be mentioned that, according to the officers’ testimonies, the amount assigned for ten INDECI warehouses in the region significantly reduced: from S/.1’400,000 a year on average between 2008 and 2011 to 38 / Lessons Learned Loreto

results in the following actions: indentify the most adequate COLLECTIVE CENTRES areas for the establishment of collective centres; make a mapping of the available collective centers; produce a bigger institu- Given the need to leave the flooded homes, a total of 3,417 fa- tional ability to the coordination and management of collective milies—3,088 in Iquitos and 329 in the suburbs—were received centres; and elaborate protocols of inter-institutional action to in 132 collective centres (114 in Iquitos and 18 in the suburbs). the management and proper operation of the collective centres. It is important to clarify that some of the collective centres were groups of tents—given by INDECI—located in fields, while the To achieve these objectives, the IOM promoted the creation of a others were at collective centers. collective centre thematic panel in the REOC, which is a useful practice to future flood cases, given the fact that it served as In the report developed by UNICEF, during the damage as- a coordination space of actions and rehabilitation carried out sessment mission carried out with PAHO in April, is indicated in the collective centres during the emergency. In this respect, that the overcrowding in the established collective centres up to one of its main strengths was the efficiency level achieved in date together with the lack of educational actions, differed from the coordination established between sectors and organizations achieving the minimum conditions of hygiene, privacy and involved with the objectives to identify the needs of the popu- safety. This lack of security exposed children and adolescents lation living in collective centres, to solve the problems on an to risks of mistreatment, sexual abuse and human trafficking. organized basis and to avoid duplications. Thus, thanks to this According to the situation report Nº 2 by the Red Cross, in 45 thematic panel, the IOM achieved the mapping of collective collective centres established until April 5th, each family had centres, the registration of all lodged families, and the organi- approximately 8 m2 of space and was separated from the others zation of an efficient monitoring mechanism of the living con- by plastics of 1.70 m high. ditions and needs of the sheltered ones.

Given this situation, the local institutions in collaboration with Even if the emergency was over, the thematic panel of collecti- international aid organizations took a series of actions on hu- ve centre is still working to analyze, elaborate and implement manitarian support and rehabilitation in order to provide ade- specific measures regarding to the topic. However, despite the quate living conditions to the sheltered ones and to strengthen efforts made by the thematic panel members up to now, it is the management capacities of the same local institutions. essential that, in this post-emergency phase, the humanitarian actors present in the territory continue supporting the tasks of According to the Local and Regional Government officers who local institutions by doing strengthening and training activities. were interviewed, the lesson learned of major scope to the local In particular, it is essential to the public institutions that partici- institutions was the need to include in their agenda a working pated in the thematic panel to receive specific advice about bu- methodology that, prioritizing the disaster risk management, dget since any of them do not have funds to build and maintain collective centres. Operations - Collective Centres / 39

In order to improve local institutional capacities, it was essen- the interviewees indicated, the portable toilets did not answer tial to train 45 local officers. This training was carried out by adequately to the hygienic requirements of the sheltered ones. IOM and UNFPA, regarding collective centres management These problems were one of the lessons learned by the thema- and human trafficking—a worrying subject in the region. Simi- tic panel of collective centres, since for future emergencies it is larly, the accomplishment of workshops to the civil society to essential to have an inter-institutional work that allows identif- prevent gender-based and domestic violence and sexual abuse, ying local housing models and temporary toilets adapted to the as well as the technical assistance for the rehabilitation of da- requirements and typical living conditions in the area. maged homes were warmly welcomed. In addition, all actions turned out to be useful in order to involve the population in Finally, another weakness of the thematic panels was the lack collective centres in the organization of daily activities such as of awareness campaigns to the Iquitos population in order to routines and training workshops about different topics such as resist the diffusion of negative stereotypes on the sheltered ones DRM, hygiene, health, security, correct use of water and C&A and to generate an understanding culture towards the particu- rights. Among other positive aspects, the IOM encouraged me- lar requirements of the victims. asures to enable alternative spaces in order to empty occupied classrooms, and to repair collective centres to improve its ha- bitability.

Regarding the weaknesses of the local institutions about collective centres management, the interviewees mentioned the lack of specialists in collective centres management among the public sector specialists, the lack of knowledge about the topic and the lack of resources for its construction. These elements added to the lack of contingency plans to set collective centres up, led to the unlawful occupation of 50 educational institutions and the establishment of collective centres that did not respect the international standards.

A subsequent limitation was that collective centres structures could not be adapted to the climatic conditions in the area. In particular, the tents provided by INDECI were not suitable to the Selva region, since they were overheated by the intensive sun and filtered rain water during heavy storms. Another adjustment difficulty was the sanitary facilities since, as most of 40/ Lessons Learned Loreto

- Involve the population living in shantytowns, located HOUSING in flood areas not mitigated, in the decision-making process.

According to the numbers provided by the REOC, 109,699 - Ensure basic public services (electricity, water and dwellings were damaged by the floods, 8,195 became drainage) in the land cleared for the move. uninhabitable and 31 collapsed. The number of damages in this sector revealed the lack of DRM policies in the institutions in - Elaborate a global and sustainable plan that foresees rural areas and the permissibility of certain authorities that, the evacuation of settlers by priority blocks. despite the existence of regulatory plans, authorized the land titling and urban adaptation of areas declared in high flood risk. - Provide economic incentives to the families that decide Specifically, in the case of Iquitos, there was a lack of urban to be resettled. rehabilitation programs (private or public). In addition, the lack of municipal control and audit allowed a great rural - Create an efficient and subsidized service of public migration to the river banks which caused a disproportionate transportation between the rehabilitated areas and the urban growth in the capital city. downtown. A consequence of the lack of an establishment plan for collective centres and of the urgency of leaving the flooded homes, on April 5th, about 60 affected families invaded private plots, located on the Iquitos-Nauta road, km 2.5. In addition, this caused confrontations with the police.

Given this situation, a good intervention practice was the establishment of the thematic panel of housing that rapidly became the main place of inter-institutional dialog about the issue. Currently, this panel has also become an important space of analysis, suggestions and advocacy with the purpose of placing the issue of urban development in the center of the regional political agenda. And, to ensure the sustainability of decisions taken at the thematic panel, an important lesson learned has been the need to strengthen the current inter- institutional strategy adopted through measures to involve in the thematic panel tasks the mayors of district municipalities and the prosecutor’s office.

According to the opinions expressed by the interviewed officers, the proactivity demonstrated by the GOREL was one strength of the intervention in the housing sector. In particular, before the emergency occurred, the Regional Government had already identified—on the Iquitos-Nauta road, km 12.5— two plots where people living in areas of high risk of flooding would be relocated: Peña Negra I and Peña Negra II, of 16.5 and 50 hectares respectively. Currently, the GOREL is enabling these areas and, on them, the Regional Directorate of Housing has carried out a project of urban recovery and has foreseen the construction of 400 basic housing modules. Similarly, the District Municipality of Punchana is working to relocate families at risk in safe areas in Padre Cocha, which had been identified before.

Currently, despite the actions performed, the lack of confidence of the population towards the authorities and the customs of people who live in flood areas and refuse to be relocated are putting at risk the feasibility of the relocation process. As the housing thematic panel members confirmed, to guarantee that the relocation process, raised by the GOREL, is completely fulfilled and in order to prevent that plots left by relocated occupants are re-occupied by others, it is necessary to implement a series of actions, such as: Operations - Housing / 41

- Ensure municipal control and inspection by the Punchana. This demonstrates that local institutions must give authorities in charge in order to avoid the reoccupation priority in their agenda the individualization, rehabilitation of the unoccupied areas by new occupants. and urbanization of subsequent areas for housing.

With the aim to accelerate this process, it is essential that the During the intervention, a series of practices were carried out cooperating agencies continue offering technical assistance that must be taken into account in case of future floods. Among to the local institutions and especially to the thematic panel them, it is important to mention the following: of housing. In this regard, a good practice of the cooperating agencies intervention was the commitment assumed by CESVI - The rehabilitation of 1000 dwellings with of harvesting by implementing the necessary actions to relocate 50 families. system of rain water in the safer areas of the province of Alto Amazonas, performed by COOPI in rural Despite the efforts made to relocate the people living in flood areas of four provincial districts and in shantytowns in areas, it should be noted that it is necessary to relocate a total Yurimaguas. of 20,000 families, according to the evaluation carried out by PAHO/WHO. This number widely exceeds 2,000 plots - The housing relocation of two small villages—Atahualpa identified up to date by the GOREL and the Municipality of and Huatapi—in higher areas, thanks to Caritas and to the Santa Cruz District Municipality.

- This study was carried out by the Global Work Group on Shelters (Shelter Cluster) regarding the situation of dwellings in the affected populations.

- The identification of materials required for the rehabilitation of homes and the supply of these materials—from local sources—to the sheltered ones, implemented by the IOM.

- The setting-up of dry ecological latrines in elevated areas, carried out by CESVI.

Finally, it is important to indicate that—despite all actions carried out during the emergency and even though, according to the interviewees, it has been demonstrated that the flood areas not mitigated must be kept free of construction and housing units—the housing situation in Iquitos is still the same as before the emergency. In this respect, the families displaced by the flood have returned to live in houses located in flood areas, since it is not above the maximum overflow level and do not have the necessary measures of protection and contingency. The Technical Secretary of Civil Defense in Belen states that about 80% of the housing units built in the territory of his jurisdiction is in flood areas. 42 / Lessons Learned Loreto LIVELIHOODS

As mentioned before, the loss in the agricultural sector was huge and had a total of 27,821 hectares of crops. This represents In addition, it is necessary to mention that not all districts have an estimated amount of more than S/.40 million, according agricultural institutions and that, during the emergency, it did to the numbers submitted by DEIA in its May Report regar- not reach a specific coordination space, such as a thematic panel ding Floods. Additionally, the floods caused a series of colla- or a sectorial EOC. For that reason, the coordination between teral effects of great importance such as: significant losses in organizations and institutions involved in response actions and the livestock sector; decrease of the agricultural land due to the rehabilitation were developed sporadically and according to the erosion; shortage of local products in the markets and the con- institutional requirements of each actor. sequent increase of prices; decapitalization of producers; and forced migration towards the biggest population centers. Finally, a limitation found by most of the organizations was the difficulty to obtain large amounts of certified seeds in the Given this situation, the Regional Directorate of Agriculture region due to the lack of local growers. From the above, two reacted quickly and, thanks to a structure for the entire regio- lessons learned to the sector were: the need to prioritize the nal territory, could gather promptly the necessary information local production of seeds—especially regarding local and nati- to quantify the damage suffered by producers and to quantify ve-grown vegetables—and the possibility to hold stocks in case the sector needs. In particular, the DRA could have a series of of emergency. In order to encourage both processes, some in- strengths that facilitated its action. Among these: a previous terviewees demonstrated the need of establishing an inter-ins- contingency plan for emergencies, which assigned specific ro- titutional working meeting. les to agencies and agricultural institutions; an internal communication system, to which every agricultural agency submitted updated information daily about its jurisdiction area, both in damage assessment phase and monitoring of implemented actions; an statistics office, which consolidated the relevant information; and a high management ability that allowed to mobilize extra funds—S/.1’024,080—provided by the MINAG to purchase certified seeds. These funds, added to 127.8 tons of seeds acquired by the GOREL, allowed the distribution of a total of 400.05 tons of certified seeds of rice, corn and cowpeas.

In general, among the rehabilitation actions implemented by cooperating agencies—FAO, COOPI and CESVI—it was very useful the delivery of certified seeds (rice, bean and corn), quality tools and laying hens; the distribution of vegetable seeds to improve the rural population’s nutrition; the implementation of training workshops to improve producers’ knowledge; and the cooperation with agricultural agencies in the territory to organize activities and lectures. In addition, with the purpose to limit damage caused by the erosion of the areas, it is necessary to mention the construction of riverine barriers and pedestrian bridges by COOPI in the province of Alto Amazonas.

Despite the strengths mentioned, a series of limitations obstructed the task of specialists from agencies and agricultural institutions which led, in most cases, to carry out damage assessments by sampling. Among these are the logistical difficulties; the dispersion of affected communities; the lack of a budget to assist emergency situations; the lack of implements, such as boats and gasoline; the shortage of trained personnel to gather information; and the lack of a register of producers updated at regional level. DISTRICT OF INDIANA Community of Timicurillo Julio Alvarado Vásquez

The year 2012 marked a milestone in the lives of many This family was benefited by FAO, organization that in families in the Loreto region, when nature struck coordination with the Municipality of Indiana donated communities with heavy rains that led to uncontrollable seeds of rice, corn and beans that would enable them growth of the region’s rivers. The population, accustomed to restore their productive capacity, improving food to the growing of the river in the rainy season, that year and household economy. Julio and his family received saw the rivers grow on the usual levels, a situation that certified maize seeds, which have been planted and are led to the loss of homes and crops. now reaping.

Julio Alvarado Vasquez lives in Timicurillo community, “In the past, we planted another variety of corn. The corn district of Indiana (province of Maynas). His family seed delivered by FAO has more grains. As a family we consists of 11 children, he and his wife, but only four of are stronger and happier. Things we have received are his children live with him. The swollen river flooded their working and we are very happy. If we suffer again of fields of crops, affecting his and his family daily food. an emergency situation, this family is calm because we Heavy flooding led to food shortages in the area. Julio have saved seeds, we put seeds out to dry in the sun to said that he and his family had to walk through the avoid being attacked by the weevil. We have seeds for district looking for food, cassava, banana and fariña next years”. (manioc flour). As food prices were higher than normal high, the daily diet of the family must inevitably decline, a situation that would jeopardize the food security and nutrition of this family. 44/ Lessons Learned Loreto SALUD

Both in the collective centres and in the affected areas, the emergency situation increased the ARIs and DDAs, apart from According to testimonies of the health-care workers that were epidemic outbreaks of dengue, malaria and leptospirosis, which interviewed, the decision of setting up the Health Emergency caused the rise of the health care demand. Additionally, accor- Operations Center was an essential good practice. In com- ding to the data given by the REOC, a total of 54 health care pliance with the contingency plan and with the participation of centers were damaged in the provinces of Requena, Ucayali, all areas of DIRESA, the sectorial EOC was provided with the Maynas and Loreto. It is worth mentioning that the first dama- specific functions of analysis, decision-making and situation ges were registered in SINPAD since January. report. Additionally, during the intervention, it benefited from the presence and contributions from different organizations— Now, as previously mentioned, at the end of 2011, DIRESA was such as PAHO/WHO, UNICEF, Plan International, Firefighters the first sector to be activated during the floods, taking the first Without Borders (FWB), Kallpa and CRP—that provided eco- actions during the rainy season, which demonstrated a great nomic and technical assistance to develop different activities. responsiveness. Thus, in October, DIRESA updated its “Plan of Risk Management on emergencies and disasters during rainy Among the implemented activities, it stands out a series of use- seasons and extreme events within the framework of climate ful practices in case of future emergencies, as the following: change adaptation”. In November, DIRESA issued a Yellow Alert due to “Risk of Disease because of heavy rains in Loreto”. As of - The adjustment of the social program “A doctor in your that moment, a permanent monitoring of the river levels was neighborhood” to the emergency and its transformation started. Among the strengths that improved the intervention in a permanent program, and contemplating the possibili- of DIRESA, it is important to mention its operational structure ty of extending the attention coverage to complement the in networks, the annual update of the contingency plan in case offer of health services. As a result, the program was war- of floods and cold waves, the presence of a training program mly welcomed by the population, since they could receive about DRM and management of EDAN cards, and the existen- medical care, vaccination campaigns, growth and develo- ce of simulation plans. As a result of the sector’s management pment monitoring, informative meetings to prevent disea- ability, after requesting funds of 7 million to MINSA, DIRESA ses and psychological counseling. received S/. 3’160,000 through an urgency decree in order to prevent contagious, bronchial, viral and endemic diseases such - The prioritization of the assistance in the collective cen- as malaria, dengue, yellow fever and hepatitis which are caused tres, whose organization and management was under the by dammed-up rainwater and wastewater. responsibility of DIRESA. This allowed a total of more than 15,000 specialized visits and it was identified an ele- Testimony: Promotores de Vida

The results could not have been better. Due to the Mrs. Amalia Murallari Ipushima joined six of her friends lack of drinking water, the first thing the community in attending the meeting called by the Paujil Health promoters did was to establish a system for delivering Center, driven by the need and curiosity to find out and teaching people to use the hygiene kit to encourage what it meant to be a community agent. She lives hand-washing as a strategy for diminishing acute in the community 13 de Febrero, an hour away from respiratory illnesses and diarrhea. Then, with the drums the city of Iquitos. All the residents here experienced provided with the resources of the CERF project, they difficult times during the flood of 2012. The majority demonstrated how to prepare water that was safe to of the population makes a living in the fields, and drink by chlorinating it and covering it with a lid. The many of them lost all of their banana and yucca crops agents also found that the accumulation of garbage when disaster struck, reducing their possibilities of was another factor that added to the risks faced by obtaining food. Their economy collapsed and the the population. In response, they created messages diseases resulting from the overflowing river, such aimed at teaching families to dispose of their garbage as respiratory conditions and diarrhea, became a properly, not throwing it in the river and instead putting latent danger among this town of just one thousand it in bags that could later be sealed, and keeping their inhabitants, many of them children. Furthermore, the houses as clean as possible and waste-free. precariousness of their living conditions—their only drinking water came from a well—increased their risk of The community agents also stressed that each mother contracting diseases such as dengue and malaria. and father should have up-to-date healthcare records for their children. During each home visit and every For this reason, the intervention in the zone focused community meeting, they called upon parents to make on turning residents into decision-makers with regard sure their children had received all their vaccinations, to improvements in their quality of life. The technical participate in the growth and development sessions support provided by UNICEF, with the resources offered at local health centers, and seek out healthcare of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), services as soon as possible if they noted symptoms consisted of training people in the identification of of illness in their children. At the end of a hard day of their needs, after which they were able to propose work, Mrs. Amalia Murallami, tired but content, told ideas to help improve their health and quality of life. us, “A promoter’s job is hard, but it’s all worth it when As part of these actions, Mrs. Amalia Murallami and a family takes responsibility for the health of their the women who accompanied her that day decided to children, nourishes them, promotes cleanliness, and join in this process. The Directorate of Health and the monitors their growth. When I see how we’re achieving Kallpa Organization provided them with training to that goal, it makes my fatigue disappear,” she smiled undertake activities for prevention and the promotion as we walked through the streets of her town. of healthy habits, and they went on to form part of the community surveillance committee, addressing health problems with the participation of all the town’s residents.

The first part of their training consisted of learning how to identify the at-risk population, how to promote healthy habits, and emphasizing the importance of their work among the population. Because the community is situated in a zone affected by malaria, the entire group of agents was trained in taking thick blood films to identify cases of this disease. Finally, they were instructed on how to perform home visits, as well as the objectives and strategies of these visits, all with the participation of local authorities.

48 / Lessons Learned Loreto

vated incidence of ARI, ADD and parasitosis.

- Strengthening of the assistance provided to rural communities in the provinces of Maynas, Loreto, Requena, Ramón Castilla and Ucayali. This allowed carrying out medical care activities, growth and development monitoring, vaccination campaigns, de-worming, pregnancy care, educational meetings and spraying of infectious sources.

- The implementation of epidemiological monitoring activities, such as rat-extermination, disinsectization, elaboration of clinical guides and fumigation in collective centres and housing units in the flood areas. Within this framework, it is necessary to emphasize the participation of the PNP and the prosecutor’s office as strength in this sector, provided that they made the work easier towards the reluctant population. As a result, in April 2012, the index of Aedes aegypti infestation in Iquitos reached 2.4%, its lowest level ever.

- The accomplishment of health promotion actions and strengthening capacities: health-care workers, collective centre coordinators, health-care promoters in rural areas and school teachers were trained in DRM; and communication materials were elaborated in coordination with the thematic panel of communication.

In this context, the support offered by the cooperating agencies contributed to strengthen DIRESA’s responsiveness in an organized and coordinated way. Thus, besides providing technical assistance to the sectorial EOC, UNICEF, PAHO and CRP trained health-care workers and community actors; contributed to the equipment and mobilization of medical brigades; deployed national and international specialists for monitoring, diagnosis WATER AND SANITATION and treatment of diseases; encouraged prevention and protection measures in families; developed educational materials to support prevention campaigns; bought and distributed equip- With the objective to know the situation of basic sanitation in ments and medical supplies; and ensured compliance with high Iquitos, in June 2012, DESA and PAHO/WHO performed ins- standards to assist children and pregnant women affected by pections by sampling in the localities of return of the people li- the flood. ving in collective centres. In the document prepared from these inspections, the sanitary conditions of the water networks are Despite the results obtained, the limitations faced by DIRESA defined as “inadequate”, since it represents a high-risk factor of in case of emergency must be mentioned: shortage of heal- contamination. Regarding sanitation systems, it is pointed out th-care workers and local promoters; lack of a management that any of the villages, that were visited, do not have a drainage plan of the human resources in case of emergency; and chronic system and that, in most cases, there are only open pipes. The shortages of medicines and goods. Also, the weak level of coor- problem is that, by being aboveground, the sanitary disposal dination with local governments and the limited community of excreta creates critical situations in rainy seasons when the involvement in prevention activities represented limitations to overflowing pipes flood communities located in areas of level DIRESA’s action. ground. Finally, regarding the disposal of solid waste, this evaluation proves that there are no collection systems, so that waste A pesar de los resultados alcanzados, deben mostrarse las li- is left in gorges and river banks. mitaciones enfrentadas por la DIRESA ante la situación de emergencia: escasez de personal de salud y promotores locales; The 2012 floods exacerbated these structural problems in Iqui- ausencia de un plan de manejo de los recursos humanos, en tos and had several consequences, such as the collapse of the situaciones de emergencia; y desabastecimiento crónico de me- drainage system in several urban areas in Iquitos and of a drin- dicamentos e insumos. A esto, se le sumó el débil nivel de coor- king water plant in San Andrés, as well as flooding latrines and dinación con los Gobiernos Locales y la limitada participación fifteen public outlets—communal water points—were affected comunitaria en las actividades de prevención representaron li- in Punchana, Belen and San Juan. Also, in all peri-urban areas mitaciones a la acción de DIRESA. likely to flood, there was an increase of vectors of metaxenic diseases; and in the accumulation of aquatic vegetation, solid Operations - Water and Sanitation / 49

tion. In this respect, all the activities implemented by the different organizations were associated to the efforts made by DESA and contributed to meet the objectives set out by the regional sector. Among the actions that should be taken into account in case of future floods, it is important to mention:

- The strengthening of DESA, through training workshops and the provision of laboratory equipment, with the aim to improve the institutional capacity for the control and monitoring of the drinking water quality.

- The training of promoters about the correct methods to provide consuming water, and about the equipment management to control and monitor its quality.

- The distribution of equipments to produce safe water in rural and peri-urban areas, as well as the distribution of machines and goods for the chlorine production in collective centres and rural areas in Maynas, Requena and Ucayali.

- The provision of basic supplies to ensure the drinking water consumption, such as purification tablets and water containers; and the personal hygiene, such as hygiene kits.

- The accomplishment of monitoring campaigns of the water quality in different localities, and of fumigation and rodent control campaigns in urban and peri-urban areas in Iquitos.

- The organization of cleaning groups of streets and garbage collection in areas prioritized by DIRESA once waste and sticks. In addition, a number of criticisms emerged the flood is over, and the recruitment of unemployed in the temporary collective centres —especially regarding the people to accomplish the above-mentioned activity in distribution and storage of drinking water, and its correct use— collaboration with the Ministry of Labor. and the spreading of appropriate hygienic practices. - The execution of awareness campaigns to the popula- Facing this situation, the leadership by DIRESA was a strength. tion about the importance of safe water and hygiene Through the Executive Directorate of Environmental Health through the program “A doctor in your neighbor- (DESA), DIRESA assumed the coordination of all the activities hood”, as well as through communication campaigns to be implemented. And for that it was established, with the te- in different media such as radio, posters and flyers. chnical assistance from PAHO/WHO, a thematic panel of water and sanitation. - The implementation of 1,000 family systems of rain-water harvesting carried out by COOPI in the pro- The thematic panel, that weekly assembled approximately twel- vince of Alto Amazonas with the aim to improve the ve members—among these, Sedaloreto, the company that pro- quality of the water available to households. vides water and sanitation services in Iquitos; PAHO/WHO; UNICEF; Red Cross; CESVI; and FWB—turned out to be a - The systematization of all implemented activities du- tool of paramount importance since it was possible to approach ring the intervention into a single document. the main structural problems in Iquitos. Especially, according to the interviewees, the thematic panel facilitated the identification of criticism in the sector and accelerated the intervention of the involved actors. In addition, being the first of its kind to be established in Peru, the thematic panel represented an important precedent to the emergency coordination mechanisms all over the country.

A good practice implemented by the thematic panel was the validation of only one contingency plan—elaborated by DIRE- SA—regarding the actions to be taken about water and sanita- 50 / Lessons Learned Loreto / 51 52 / Lessons Learned Loreto NUTRITION AND FOOD SAFETY

According to a study by the World Food Program (WFP)5, the average index of children vulnerable to malnutrition in the Lo- Given this situation, the need to establish fast mechanisms of reto region, which is based on data obtained until 2007, was nutritional surveillance to monitor the food situation of the 0.35318 in 2010. This shows that 35% of the population in men- most vulnerable population–children younger than 5 years old, tion would be at risk of malnutrition. elderly people and expectant mothers–who live in rural zones, was a relevant “lesson learned” for future cases of emergency As the results of the nutritional tests conducted by UNICEF situations. Additionally, the need to activate inter-institutional and Plan International on 464 children under 5 years old from management channels to coordinate safeguard actions on the the damaged zones of the districts of Punchana, Iquitos and food safety of the victims and to carry out detailed analysis of Belen6 reveal, the floods contributed to aggravate the preca- the humanitarian gaps constitutes another type of learning. rious nutritional situation of the population. Considering that the agricultural activity represents the main economic activity The following chart (Chart 2) illustrates the food aid received of the population, the situation was even more serious in rural by the victims in each province. zones because crop and small animal loss put at risk the food safety of entire communities, particularly the ones of the most As it is exposed in chart 2, on average, each affected family re- vulnerable people. ceived 8 kg of food, corresponding to 1.8 kg per person. It is worth mentioning that 1.5 kg was delivered per family in Da- Given the serious situation, the GOREL carried out food deli- tem del Marañón, which means 300 grams per person. veries. Although the amounts were scarce and the distribution was limited to the provinces of Maynas and Requena, it is worth Now, considering the state of emergency lasted 120 days in 36 mentioning as good practice the distribution of large amounts districts; and 60 in another 7; it is obvious that the amount of of salt, element essential to preserve the abundant fish brought food received by the affected families was below the needs and by the river crescents. the international standards. Moreover, the fact that the food aid delivered by PRONAA was subject, by law, to the State of The largest amount of food aid was given by PRONAA which, Emergency Declaration by the PCM, contributed to aggrava- according to consolidated figures provided by REOC, distribu- te the situation of vulnerability of the victims because the first ted a total of 407,670.2 kg of food during the whole state of declaration was recently given at the end of March when, in emergency. Among the good practices implemented by PRO- several provinces, the fields had been already flooded several NAA, it is worth mentioning the sampling monitoring carried weeks before. out to control the effective reception of food by the beneficiaries.

Regarding the intervention of the voluntary organizations, it is worth mentioning the support provided to DIRESA by UNI- CEF. Such aid aimed to organize a supplementation plan for children, to train specialists in health care centers and to stock health care centers with multimicronutrients, vitamin A, nutritional supplements and zinc tablets. A point in favor of this intervention was the use of the media to promote the appropriate nutrition of children under 5 years old and expectant mothers through programs and radio spots.

Despite the efforts, the acts implemented by public institutions and voluntary organizations did not adjust to the needs of the population. Besides, although the absence of humanitarian gaps analysis prevents us from knowing in detail the shortage of the intervention, in the interviews carried out and according to the information on food deliveries, it was informed that food safety was the area that registered the widest gaps.

5. PMA. (2010). “Vulnerability Map of Chronic Child Malnu- trition from the Perspective of Poverty 2010 - Loreto Region”. PMA-Peru. 6. The evaluation reveals that 36.2% of children under 5 had chronic malnutrition and 1.3% suffered from acute malnutrition. Also, 56.5% of children under three years and 59.3% of pregnant women were anemic. Operations - Nutrition and Food Sefety / 53

Chart 2. Provincial distribution of food aid delivered by PRONAA per affected family and person

Food amount Food amount Food amount Affected families Affected people (kg) per family (kg) per person (kg)

Maynas 15,072 67,948 112,492.94 7.5 1.6

Alto Amazonas 2,097 8,737 14,621.91 6.9 1.7

Ucayali 5,88 28,096 58,511.12 9.9 2.1

Requena 9,155 38,798 92,927.61 10.1 2.4

Loreto 10,801 45,664 91,171.53 8.4 2

Ramón Castilla 6,779 33,683 35,992.19 5.3 1.1

Datem del Marañón 1,245 6,486 1,952.9 1.5 0.3 Total 51,029 229,412 497,670.2 8 1.8

Source: REOC

“Mrs Teresa told me that she had to start giving him Testimony: A dose of life the treatment so the diarrhoea would stop. I decided to do it, because my little boy didn’t want to eat or drink anything. He was so skinny.” The dose was not difficult Janina López is a 19-year-old mother with a young son to administrate. All she had to do was dissolve the pill named Norl, now one year and eight months old. They in a glass of water and give it to her son for ten days. live in the community of Masusa, district of Punchana, “Even if the diarrhoea stops, mothers need to give their in the city of Iquitos. In the middle of the dusty streets, children the complete treatment,” the doctor told her. surrounded by the great green jungle, tiny Norl plays Janina followed her instructions to the letter. There happily by his mother’s side. Anyone seeing him now were no restrictions on giving Norl zinc, donated with would never image what he and his mother went through the support of the Central Emergency Response Fund not so long ago. (CERF) nutrition project. It could be done at any time Janina tells us that when the flooding started in 2012, of day, before or after meals. The most important thing her little Norl began to experience diarrhoea, growing was just to give him his daily dose. It was essential to weaker and weaker. By then, the health centre in her treat him for the full ten days. zone was flooded, too, and cases of acute diarrhoeal Norl got better right away. “He felt like eating whatever I diseases among children in the region increased due to gave him, and he drank his serum. I think the zinc helped the contamination surrounding them, with the situation him, because I saw how he got better, he completely constantly worsening as the river swelled and swelled. recovered. I’m so thankful to the people who decided The toddler began to lose weight and show symptoms of to bring the zinc sulphate. I’m really very happy,” says fatigue and listlessness. Janina was preoccupied so she Janina with enthusiasm, as she watches her child play began to ask around about what she could do, and she animatedly by her side. “The important thing is that found out that the Health Post was giving out zinc. “I’d my little boy is well. He’s healthy. I’m so happy to see never heard of that cure before,” she comments. And so him like this. Playing, running around. The zinc was a she decided to take her son in to start his treatment. miracle; it cured him. I think this way, little by little, good When she arrived with Norl in her arms, the specialist, things will start happening for us.” Teresa, told her they had to give him a dose immediately. 54 / Lessons Learned Loreto

PROTECTION AND EMOTIONAL Regarding the identification topic, the need to strengthen the coordination mechanisms between RENIEC and OREC was visualized at the thematic panel. To achieve this, technical RECOVERY meetings between RENIEC Loreto and civil registrars of seven municipalities were encouraged, and these allowed organizing orientation courses for community authorities and leaders According to the data provided by INEI, 43.38% of 1’006,953 of the affected rural areas through OREC travelling squads. people who live in Loreto are under 18 years old, in other words, Campaigns in urban and metropolitan areas of Maynas to 436,766 individuals. The structural deficit that the region shows process birth certificates were carried out as well. regarding the abilities to protect the rights of the C&A, the high index of individuals without documentation, the high rates of Considering that emergency situations cause on the affected sexual exploitation and the latent problem of human trafficking people a series of feelings and emotions that can affect their self- place this area of the district population in a high risk situation esteem and their normal development, a subsequent practice where it can be subject to violation of its rights. implemented since the thematic panel of protection consisted in the execution of different activities of emotional recovery. With this situation and with the objective of strengthening Among these and from the integral care approach exposed in the coordination among public and private organizations in the program “A doctor in your neighborhood”, DIRESA carried the prevention, detection, assistance and derivation of cases of out recreational events and orientation workshops addressed violation of C&A rights, on May 10th, the thematic panel of to C&A, parents and mothers from the affected places about protection was set up. Headed by the Regional Management physical and emotional integrity of C&A. of Social Development, this coordination space was built by the media; two youth collectives; and 17 public and private Other points in favor in the efforts made by UNICEF and institutions such as CEM, districtal DEMUNAs, PNP, health DREL were the setting up and implementation of Protection care centers, district family law prosecution, the human and Socio-emotional Recovery spaces with recreational kits trafficking office, IOM, UNICEF, Save The Children, Plan for children. This initiative developed in 40 school-collective International, CHS, KALLPA,UNFPA, among others. centres, called “toddlers’ kollpas”, gave psychosocial support to approximately 1,670 C&A. Additionally, the coordination The involvement of different institutions in the work of the between local governments and CEDEC for the setting up of thematic panel of protection established an important point “toddlers’ kollpas” in 8 communities in Iquitos, Belen, San Juan, in favor, since the inter-institutional methodology adopted Punchana and Indiana constituted model actions for future allowed managing different activities on behalf of the affected emergency situations. About this, it is worth mentioning that population and of the service operators of local protection. in the intervention developed by CEDEC, the local authorities In alliance among GDS-GOREL, MIMP, UNICEF, Save the took care of the financing of the facilities of the kollpas. Children and CHS, workshops addressed to C&A were carried Meanwhile, CEDEC contributed with recreational materials out to strengthen their knowledge about rights; workshops and, through the training of young people from the same were given to parents about how to prevent violence against community, with game facilitators. It is worth mentioning that C&A; and training courses to community leaders and agents the methodology adopted in the kollpas was using recreational were carried out on prevention, assistance and recovery in fun events to identify abuse or exploitation signs in C&A and to violence. Additionally, a workshop with 40 operators of the educate them in key topics of risk prevention and management. protection system took place–operators who belonged to public institutions and civil society organizations–with the objective Concerning the intervention of Plan International, another of an assistance route against violence to children and sexual good practice implemented on emotional recovery consisted abuse. Moreover, a thematic panel for collective centres was in the strengthening of the Child Protection System of the created with 35 GOREL public officers trained by GDS-GOREL District Municipality of Punchana. This measure, headed by its and CEM, in detection and prevention of violence against C&A, DEMUNA, counted on the participation of families, collective child sexual abuse and exploitation. On the other hand, MIMP centre leaders and PNP members, institution that assumed the was in charge of training 28 defender operators and promoters commitment to improve the collective centres surveillance and of DEMUNAs, while the Public Ministry, in coordination with control with emphasis on the detection of possible cases of the Peruvian Ombudsman Office, carried out three training violation of C&A rights. workshops for public safety municipal workers. All the above mentioned activities were intervened in the districts of Iquitos, Additionally, as part of prevention efforts, the training of 70 Belen, Punchana, San Juan Bautista, Indiana, Urarinas, Parinari PNP members of Iquitos was carried out on C&A protection and Nauta. mechanisms with emphasis on collective centres. A subsequent point in favor was the setting up of “Maloquitas of Joy”– The close coordination developed by the thematic panel spaces built and culturally adapted to the area–in four school- members and Communications-EOC represented another collective centres of the district of Punchana. Among them, practice to apply in future emergency situations thanks to local psychologists carried out a socio-emotional recovery the design and diffusion of different kinds of communication program addressed to 1,614 C&A. During the nine sessions materials such as interviews, radio and television spots, banners, developed with each C&A, the program aimed to provide ads, brochures and folders, this strategy allowed increasing the techniques to overcome feelings of lack of safety, stress and fear; coverage level in the population. to promote the identification of diverse dangerous situations, Operations - Protection and Emotional Recovery / 55 which they could be exposed to; and to find personal tools to About the limitations of the intervention, the interviews protect themselves. Moreover, through an awareness process to revealed that the main weaknesses of the local system of parents and collective centre leaders, they were informed and prevention and response to violation of C&A rights consisted in trained on how to manage common areas in collective centres the lack of specialized training, the shortage of human, material with the objective of ensuring the protection of C&A rights. and economical resources, the lack of an effective mechanism to cover the entire population and the scarce inter-institutional Among other activities carried out by the volunteers, it is worth coordination in the region. mentioning: On the other hand, the decision to concentrate the attention of - The setting up of six mobile protection units and the the protection efforts on collective centres temporarily set up in training of six local promoters on the detection of cases the city of Iquitos – where, according to the situational reports of violence against C&A. made by different organizations, the high overcrowding, the scarcity of living conditions and the suspension of school - The carrying out of Soccer of Values Festivals; and classes contributed to aggravate the situation of violation of C&A rights – turned out in the lack of coordinated actions on - The carrying out of psychosocial support sessions to behalf of the C&A in the most remote districts and provinces children under three years old and expectant mothers, and in the lack of raising of precise and accurate information in prioritized areas of Belen, Punchana y San Juan about the condition of rights of C&A in such places. It is worth Bautista. mentioning that although GOREL emitted a regional directive for the topic of protection to be prioritized in every sub region, The efforts made allowed the identification of existing gaps in the logistic impossibility to participate in the thematic panel the protection of C&A regionally, as well as the recognition of meetings experimented by key actors of the most remote C&A as imperative actors in emergency cases. In this regard, districts and provinces contributed to complicate the range of the most relevant lesson learned for the thematic panel of this objective. protection members was the need to permanently strengthen the institutional abilities of key actors locally, regionally and nationally – the Ombudsman Office, Public Prosecution, DEMUNA, CEM, municipal patrol guards, PNP and community leaders – so these can appropriately respond to the need of protection and emotional recovery of C&A in future emergency cases. 56 / Lessons Learned Loreto

Testimony about the Maloca “I live here since the end of April. Before, in this same room there were 5 families, about 13 or 15 people. Now we are just 3 families, 13 adults and 7 children, 2 of them (house) of Joy adolescents.”

Iris: “I have learned to wash my hands, to draw and colour and also about the things that happened. I have Del Aguila Yahuarcani family: Antonia (39 years), learned to write about the bad things that happened and Orlando (49 years), Iris (13 years), Josué (8 years), Tirsa to leave them behind. This makes me feel better because and Raquel (6 year old twin sisters) I throw the bad things from the flood and I do not look back. I leave the past behind. The Maloca is a place where Antonia: “We are from Simon Bolivar human settlement. we all get united, as a family.” Every year it rains but we never thought it would swell that much. I bought some wood and built a false floor Antonia: “I participated as a volunteer. I was in thinking that it would be enough, but it wasn’t”. charge of taking children to the Maloca of Joy so they could participate according to their ages. It has been People from Civil Defense told us that they would give us something very stimulating for children in this stressful wood, but then they didn’t; afterwards they told us they situation. They said: “here comes the Maloca” and it would be leading us to the shelter in Generalisimo school meant something recreational, very nice” but then we couldn’t go there because it was already full. Instead they took us to the shelter in Clavero school. I Josue: “I had fun. There are a lot of toys. What I enjoyed grabbed what I could, some clothes and my two pans, most was drawing. I drew my mom and dad” wrapped them in a bed sheet and left. These, my two ducks, were from my sister… (she cries as she had died), Raquel: “I liked to play and I learned to draw” I brought them later on” The Huambrillo and Huambrilla a huge fair, full of people walking all around, taking and delivering groceries, going down to the dock, shouting Kollpa, an opportunity for Sarita and fighting for passengers all sweaty and smelly. All the dock boils with people, and, among them, Sarita.

Sarita Sifuentes Ahuanari is the oldest of three brothers Janet Angulo, CEDEC’s promoter, organized Sarita’s file but, in real life she is the smallest. She lives in Itaya, and channeled it to the DEMUNA from the Municipality Belen close to the river that borders the Loreto Region of Belen. They immediately make some coordination so and its capital, Iquitos. that the girl could attend school, exercising her right to education, and was registered in the Municipal Office of Within the framework of the support given to the Attention to Disabled Population (OMAPED). recovery from the floods in Loreto, in the Kollpas, places implemented to give emotional and psychological Since then, and with the creation of the Huambrillo and support, to prevent, detect and look after children facing Huambrilla communitarian Kollpa in Itaya, Sarita does violence conditions by means of playful activities and not go to the market anymore; she has a safe place socialization, a promoter from Centro de Desarrollo y near her home and goes there with her brothers. She is Educacion Comunitaria (CEDEC), NGO that supported learning how to make bracelets and earrings and does this initiative with UNICEF, noticed that Sarita had more them with such dedication that they end up perfect. problems than the slight mental retardation with which There, she had also learned to dance. Now, she doesn’t she lived. She did not attend school, nor had a proper feel alone anymore as she is in the company of other kids diagnose to her illness nor received any treatment or that love and respect her. participated in any support or inclusion programme.

When the promoter reached Sarita’s home, her mother explained that she had never received any support and, as she did not have someone to leave her with, as she behaved like a small girl, she had to accompany her to the Belen market, where she worked. Belen market is like 58 / Lessons Learned Loreto EDUCATION

The floods impede the appropriate development of school activities, which contributed to aggravate the chronic weaknesses of the educational sector in the Loreto region. The first damages caused to the schools of the region–in the province of Datem del Marañón–began registering in SINPAD in November 2011. Since then, the number of EEII and affected students started increasing gradually reaching 1,724 and 92,077 respectively, according to data provided by DREL.

Moreover, facing the need to temporarily relocate the victims of the metropolitan areas of Iquitos and, facing the lack of a concerted plan to set up temporary refuges, GOREL–in coordination with DREL–authorized the use of 50 EEII as collective centers. This measure infringed the right to education of 37,632 students. At the same time, the transportation difficulties to get to school experimented by the relocated students represented a subsequent problem to the appropriate fulfillment of school hours.

Facing the problems above mentioned, the strategy implemented by DIECA of MINEDU turned out to be a useful practice since, after carrying out an evaluation mission to the city of Iquitos in collaboration with OINFE, decided to established direct coordination channels with DREL and to provide technical assistance to its authorities and officers. As a result, besides introducing a technical squad to assist in emergencies, sectorial EOC was established under DREL coordination, which supervised the involvement of different institutions such as MINEDU, DIECA, PELA, UGEL, the Peruvian Ombudsman Office, UNICEF, Plan International, FORMABIAB, Coordinating Committee of the Human Rights Commission of Apostolic Church Judges of Iquitos and civil society organizations. actions to make aware the EEII authorities and the affected population of the importance of recovering the classrooms and Due to the intervention of DIECA and as a result of a multi- resuming classes took place. sectorial and inter-institutional coordination meeting, the need for an immediate intervention in the sector raised and it According to the compiled testimonies during the interviews, was decided to design a contingency plan and an emergency the biggest point in favor of the Education sector consisted in curriculum. To achieve this, a regional workshop headed the execution of a joint work and in the adoption of an inter- by DIECA took place and counted on the participation of institutional management methodology to form a common MINEDU, DREL, UGEL and Bilingual Education. Thanks to front and to appropriately respond to the emergency situation. such workshop, a curricular plan with educational levels was approved and it was established to organize training events in the eight UGEL of the region. This activity allowed informing There were different actors involved with the objective of 1,787 teachers and officers of DREL, UGEL and EEII about the providing a temporary educational environment to students, appropriate use of the emergency curriculum. strengthening the DREL institutional abilities, promoting the restoration of educational services and guaranteeing the right to education of in school age C&A. Among the interventions Once the collective centres were empty, DREL carried out carried out by the volunteers, the setting up of “Toddlers’ a series of activities with the objective of promoting the Kollpa”–promoted by UNICEF and developed in coordination return to school. Among these, it is worth mentioning the with DREL–constituted a good practice as an educational communication campaign launch called “Everyone together for proposal. With the objective of promoting the development the Education of Loreto”. This campaign aimed to make aware of basic abilities in the imperative axis of nutrition, health, male and female teachers of the importance of punctually coexistence, recreation and environment, this strategy allowed going to their EEII and of fulfilling the class hours; and a hot involving the affected students through the implementation of line was created to report the lack of teachers from any area of pedagogy for crisis and a methodology that linked the regular the region. Additionally, as part of the campaign called “Let’s curriculum to the development of non-traditional modules go back to school” in collaboration with Plan International, and to learning strategies based on games. With this objective Operations - Education / 59

in mind, 40 educational spaces in collective centres of Maynas does not represent a viable option for future emergencies. and Nauta were created and more than 150 EEII teachers from Finally, another lesson learned consisted in the need to design UGEL Maynas and Nauta were trained on the use of these effective monitoring and controlling mechanisms of the spaces. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that UNICEF and Plan activities developed in the diverse districts of the region to be International supported the sector through the distribution of able to analyze the existing gaps. About this, a good practice school supplies kits. recently implemented turned out to be the adoption by DREL of a pilot project from which networks of several EEII of the Despite the efforts made, a series of structural weaknesses same area are monitored by a common supervisor. complicated the appropriate articulation of the response process by DREL. Among these, the insufficient communication existing between DREL and UGEL, the scarce quantitative and qualitative information about EEII located in the most remote areas, the high level of teacher absences, the lack of effective monitoring procedures and the lack of a sectorial contingency plan for possible emergencies acquire particular relevance considering future interventions for flooding. A subsequent limitation of the intervention consisted in the fact that a monitoring system for the fulfillment of the emergency curriculum in the most remote areas of the region was never implemented.

All the interviewed actors agreed on affirming that the most relevant lesson learned for the sector consisted in realizing that the inappropriate use of EEII as collective centres meant the violation of a fundamental right of C&A and that such measure 60 / Lessons Learned Loreto / 61 62 / Lessons Learned Loreto

practice was the setting up of Communications-EOC inside SOCIAL COMMUNICATION REOC. Its creation aimed to coordinate, design and carry out communication campaigns that allowed reinforcing the At the beginning of 2012, the information that the media attention on the different estate sectors, informing and creating offered nationally about what was going on in the region of awareness about key topics in the population. Sectorial EOC Loreto was not accurate. Although the unusual rise of the was headed by GOREL with the technical assistance of UNICEF Amazon was being mentioned and that already in January they and it was formed by GOREL social communicators, DIRESA, said that this river had overcome its normal levels, the attention DREU, DRTC, MVCS, Journalists’ School of Loreto, National was focused on the lower areas of Iquitos and the situation of Association of Journalists–Iquitos Headquarters, the Loreto the most remote places was not being mentioned. This caused Sports Journalists’ Circle, and Plan International. that the magnitude of the emergency was not perceived outside the region. While the products of Communications-EOC were oriented to the achievement of objectives in the Health, Water and When the emergency was unleashed in the city of Iquitos, Sanitation, Protection and Education sectors, the creation of the local media presented vague and unreal information, direct coordination channels with the thematic panels of such focusing almost exclusively on the impact that the floods sectors meant a point in favor in the intervention. This joint were having in the capital city. At the beginning of April, after effort became the validation of a common communication the first declaratory of State of Emergency and the setting up campaign called “Together we beat the flood, join the winning of REOC, the media started to spread more specific details t e a m”. about the floods, highlighting the vulnerabilities suffered by people, homes and crops as well as the weaknesses shown by With the objective of presenting all the messages as the product the Health and Education sectors in the emergency. Finally, the of one single shared campaign and as the result of a joint, visit of the President of the Republic and the National Head of consensual work, another good practice of EOC consisted INDECI–who flew over the affected areas at the beginning of in the decision not to apply institutional logos or slogans to the April–was what caught the attention of the media about the produced radio, television and graphic products. Instead, it vulnerability situation that Iquitos was going through. However, was decided to adopt a slogan and a song originally made for once more, the condition of other districts and provinces of the the campaign so the population could identify the different region was not shown. key messages as pieces of the same strategy in response to the emergency situation. Given the demand to establish organized information mechanisms about the different actions implemented in It is also worth mentioning that, for the campaign, a series of response to the emergency, and to avoid that the imprecise imperative topics from which communication products were news spread by the media create dangerous situations, a good manufactured were identified. These were the prevention Operations - Social Communication / 63 of EDAs and IRAs; the appropriate ways to chlorinate water, subsequent point in favor of the intervention was the decision washing their hands and disinfecting food; the benefit of to include Civil Defense Technical Secretaries of the closest cleaning the collective centres and throwing the trash out districts in sectorial EOC meetings and call a training meeting before the garbage truck comes; the importance of improving with district majors and municipality key officers. However, the nutrition of children under three years old; the need for similarly to what happened at other thematic panels, an expectant mothers to take food supplements and to go to their important limitation was the absence of actors from the most prenatal care check-up; the different ways of protecting C&A remote areas of the region. from child sexual abuse; and the importance of keeping an eye on the compliance of school hours. Moreover, with the desire to capitalize the learning from the events and to improve response and recovery in flood Some of the implemented strategies to carry out public impact, actions, a good practice was the promotion of the design and to promote and to spread the identified key topics represented collectivization of a synthetic document of lessons learned useful practices for future flood emergency situations. Among about the emergency. these, it is worth mentioning: Finally, concerning the accountability process to the - The use of different radio spaces (daily programs of population, it is worth mentioning as good practices the inter- information, interviews, spaces for adolescents, among institutional organization of the Regional Workshop of Lessons others). Learned, as well as a series of actions implemented by the actors involved in the intervention. For instance, COOPI gave - The training of health care centers staff and of PNP in technical datasheets of the project to the authorities of different communication for development. Local Governments, organized a launch meeting which local authorities, the media, grass-root associations and people in - The making of television advertisements which included general were brought together to; and organized, with Caritas famous people (such as Marco Zunino and Monica Yurimaguas, the Provincial Workshop Lessons Learned. Sanchez). Similarly, CESVI kept direct contact with neighborhood boards and the same beneficiaries, which facilitated the information - The production and distribution of diverse graphic flow to the population. material such as banners, posters, brochures or stickers. Despite these efforts, it is worth mentioning that a shared - The evaluation of the communication campaign impact and clearly defined accountability towards the population through the use of 254 surveys. strategy was not implemented. This constituted a weakness of the intervention since, as the study of perceptions carried - The creation of workshops in DRM and Agricultural out by UNICEF and FAO shows, the interviewed beneficiaries Recovery developed by COOPI in the province of affirmed not to know from which organizations the received aid Alto Amazonas in communities, small villages and was coming 7. shantytowns of Yurimaguas.

Another need that was identified since Communications-EOC was to improve the quality of the information provided to the population. To achieve this, efforts were made to involve the media, considering them as strategic allies. It was decided then to train local journalists on the appropriate ways to inform about an emergency and to develop abilities for future emergency cases. Regarding this, they organized:

- Three workshops addressed to the journalists of the most important media of the city of Iquitos with the objective of improving the management of information related to C&A and of promoting the surveillance on the compliance of the class hours they have to make up.

- A contest addressed to journalists for the design of a feature with an approach on human development.

- A meeting to introduce the communication campaign “Let’s go back to school” to journalists and the delivery of materials about interest topics in an emergency.

Since the municipalities do not count on communicational 7. Úrsula, E. & Chiang, M. (2012). Qualitative Study of Experi- strategies established in risk prevention and management, a ences in the framework of the Flood Emergency in Loreto Region 2012. Lima: UNICEF/FAO.

66 / Lessons Learned Loreto

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Conclusions and Recommendations / 67

The floods that followed the heavy rain in Peru since November At the operational level, the usefulness of carrying out 2011 caused enormous damages in the seven provinces of the institutional strengthening activities, organizing lessons Amazon region of Loreto. Consequently, on March 13th 2012, learned workshops, transforming thematic panels of housing the Regional President declared a State of Emergency; and, and collective centres into permanent dialogue spaces, on April 2nd, after the first State of Emergency declaration on transferring extra funds from the National Government to March 29th by the PCM, he decided to activate the REOC. regional Heath and Agricultural sectors, validating a plan of action shared in Water and Sanitation, setting up Protection The objective of this document has been to describe the and Socio-emotional Recovery spaces for minors in collective good practices, the lessons learned and the limitations of centres and affected places, designing, inter-institutionally, a the coordination and implementation of the humanitarian contingency plan and an emergency curriculum in Education, response actions and rehabilitation procedures carried out by and arranging a communication campaign common to the public institutions and volunteering organizations facing the entire intervention has been demonstrated. emergency. In general, as the document shows, it is possible to conclude Regarding the coordination mechanisms, it has been that the intervention in response to the flood emergency in demonstrated as good practices the inclusion of DRM Loreto has represented an important learning opportunity for components in the government plans of some District the institutions involved in humanitarian actions. Facing the Municipalities, the leadership of the Regional Government possible event of another flood emergency, it is possible to offer of Loreto and its decision to activate REOC, the technical a series of recommendations. assistance provided by different institutions nationally, and the ability to move funds shown by NHN. 68 / Lessons Learned Loreto

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS REGIONAL GOVERNMENT

ÏÏ Adopting a rights approach in the RECOMMENDATIONS management of emergencies to be able to see the affected population in total, including the most remote areas. ÏÏ Encouraging the inter-institutional approach which involves the Public Prosecution, PNP, ÏÏ Adopting a gender and interculturality in Governance, the Peruvian Ombudsman Office, DEMUNA, municipal patrol guards and private emergency management approach. companies in the implementation of DRM actions and which secures the coordination ÏÏ Safeguarding the respect of the Sphere processes between Local Governments and standards in the actions implemented by regional sectors. humanitarian actors. ÏÏ Pleading for the creation of coordination inter- ÏÏ Encouraging the humanitarian gaps analysis institutional spaces in charge of designing in every sector of the intervention to guide concerted plans in response to the main structural problems of the region: Water the actions according to the needs found. and Sanitation, protection of C&A rights and Education. ÏÏ Prioritize the food safety topic for future emergencies. ÏÏ Implementing every existing administrative and legal measures to impede and correct the population of areas declared at risk and to forbid the setting up of basic services in such areas.

ÏÏ Establishing minimum criteria to hire staff in charge of the Civil Defense Institute, sectors and Local Governments and to promote its stability in the position to generate better abilities.

ÏÏ Training the people in charge of the Civil Defense Institute permanently and key district, provincial and regional officers about the SINAGERD law. RECOMMENDATIONS Recommendations / 69

ÏÏ Planning concerted mechanisms to pick up Sectors reliable information about affected people and victims due to an emergency in the whole region. ÏÏ Designing, updating and socializing contingency plans and protocols of action when facing ÏÏ Carrying out a regional population census. emergencies.

ÏÏ Organizing an estimated risk study in ÏÏ Planning the human resources management in shantytowns located in floodable areas of the emergency situations. city of Iquitos and designing a multi sectorial strategy for the relocation of the permanent resident population in non-mitigable floodable ÏÏ Identifying and training community leaders as areas. promotion agents of DRM activities.

ÏÏ Creating a physical or virtual platform which can ÏÏ Creating fast surveillance mechanisms to be used for the exchange of information among monitor the food situation of the most actors during an emergency and which allow the vulnerable population–children under five years spreading of good practices and lessons learned old, elderly people and expectant mothers–who at the end of the humanitarian intervention. live in rural areas.

ÏÏ Designing a list of regional suppliers of ÏÏ Prioritizing the mental health and emotional humanitarian aid supplies to fasten the shopping recovery of the affected population. processes in case of an emergency, pointing out the amounts that each supplier can provide and ÏÏ Including, in the damage and needs evaluation, the delivery times. specific data about the psycho social state of C&A in an emergency situation. ÏÏ Considering the press as a strategic ally and training journalists about DRM. ÏÏ Inserting prevention and DRM topics in the school curriculum. ÏÏ Monitoring the main media and offering technical information to avoid the spreading of gutter and ÏÏ Identifying appropriate local models of housing stereotyped messages during an emergency. and temporary toilets according to the typical living conditions of the area. ÏÏ Carrying out perception analysis of the beneficiaries. ÏÏ Designing strategies which encourage the production of certified non-perishable seeds in ÏÏ Organizing simulation and drill activities. the region.

ÏÏ Systematizing the information gathered by ÏÏ Stocking certified non-perishable seeds in the diverse actors involved in an emergency strategic places for assistance in emergencies. intervention. ÏÏ Training and making the population aware of the garbage disposal management.

ÏÏ Systematizing the intervention of every sector in consolidated reports. 70 / Lessons Learned Loreto

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS RECOMMENDATIONS

ÏÏAssuming the leadership of prevention and DRM ÏÏDesigning urban development plans and carrying actions implemented in its territory of competence. out a mapping of the areas at risk inside the territory of competence. ÏÏAdopting institutional structures able to fasten the work of the Civil Defense Institute. ÏÏKeeping the register of inhabitants updated.

ÏÏSecuring the key officers participation – majors, ÏÏEncouraging the creation of integral awareness municipal managers and planners – in DRM pro- campaigns about prevention and DRM towards the cesses. population.

ÏÏConforming Disaster Risk Management Work ÏÏInvolving the population, community leaders, Groups and Civil Defense platforms and adjusting grass-root organizations, and indigenous associa- to what is established by the SINAGERD law. tions established in floodable areas in the processes of making decisions for DRM. ÏÏPrioritizing the prevention and DRM approach in the Concerted Development Plans. ÏÏOrganizing committees with the communities to implement and manage early warning systems. ÏÏPromoting the creation of participatory budget projects in the topic linking them to the objectives ÏÏCarrying out the mapping of the most appropriate established in the Municipal Modernization Plan. places to set up collective centres and spaces available.

ÏÏOrganizing a security and patrol system in the affected areas due to floods to prevent theft in unoccupied homes.

ÏÏOrganizar un sistema de seguridad y guardianía en las zonas afectadas por las inundaciones para pre- venir robos en las viviendas desocupadas. RECOMMENDATIONS Recommendations / 71

NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN NETWORK RECOMMENDATIONS

ÏÏ Designing profiles which standardize the needs of the ÏÏ Involving a bit more state sectors nationally in NHN. victims in case of different types of emergency.

ÏÏ Coordinating more closely with Local Governments ÏÏ Predicting titles to hire human resources that can and with state sectors, in the damage and needs support the sectors staff. evaluation missions as well as in the response interventions. ÏÏ Designing a list of national suppliers of humanitarian aid goods to fasten the shopping processes in case ÏÏ Addressing humanitarian interventions to every of emergency, pointing out the amounts that each affected area to the extent possible without focusing supplier can provide and the delivery times. activities only in some areas. ÏÏ Pleading for the activation of a humanitarian aid ÏÏ Pleading for the implementation of a national good transport joint mechanism that allows reducing coordination and supervision request that monitors costs and optimizing intervention times. the appropriate fulfillment of the DRM functions by the authorities in charge. ÏÏ Establishing appropriate accountability mechanisms towards the affected population and the beneficiaries ÏÏ Pleading for the carrying out of DRM training plans in of all the actions implemented during an emergency. prioritized regions to generate local abilities. ÏÏ Sharing, nationally, the documents about lessons ÏÏ Pleading for the creation, nationally, of a scientific learned in interventions carried out in other areas of work group – similar to the multi sectorial committee the country (Ucayali). carried out by the ENFEN – in charge of observing, coordinating, recommending and advising the ÏÏ Taking advantage of the social networks (Facebook, activities linked to the variability and the climate Twitter) to increase the chance to be seen nationally, change in the Peruvian Amazon. in addition to using them as means of awareness.

ÏÏ Pleading for the density of weather stations to be incremented nationally according to the standards established by the OMM.

ÏÏ Designing and approving protocols of action when facing rain and floods.