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PARTY POLICY and GOVERNMENT COALITIONS Also by M PARTY POLICY AND GOVERNMENT COALITIONS Also by M. J. Lover PLAY1NG POLmCS THE POLmCS OF PRIVATE DESIRES THE CRIME GAME SOCIAL CHANGE AND PUBLIC POLICY INVITATION TO POLmCS MULTIPARTY GOVERNMENT (with N. SchofleId) Also by lan Budge SCOTTISH POLmCAL BEHAVIOUR (with D. W.Urwin) AGREEMENT AND THE STABll.ITY OF DEMOCRACY POLmCAL STRATIFICATION AND DEMOCRACY (with J. A. Brand) BELFAST: APPROACH TO CRISIS (with C. O' Leary) PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND BEYOND (editor wiih I. Crewe and D. J. Farlie) VOTING AND PARTY COMPETmON (with D. J. Farlie) EXPLAINING AND PREDICTING ELECTIONS (with D. J. Farlie) THE NEW BRITISH POLmCAL SYSTEM (editor with D. Mackay) IDEOLOGY, STRATEGY AND PARTY MOVEMENT (editor with D. Robertson and D. J. Hear/) PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY (with H. Keman) Party Policy and Government Coalitions Edited by M. J. Laver Professor ofPolilical Science and Sociology Unlversity College ofGalway and IanBudge Professor of Governmenl University of Essex C M. J. Laver and Ian Budge 1992 Softcover reprint of the hardcover I st edition 1992 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No Jl8l'8lraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright. Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency. 90 Tottenham Coun Road. London WIP 9HE. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. First published In Oreat Britain 1992 by TIlE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke. Hampshire R021 2XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-1-349-22370-1 ISBN 978-1-349-22368-8 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-22368-8 1098765432 05 04 03 02 01 00 99 98 First published in the United States of America 1992 by Scholarly and Reference Division. ST. MARTIN'S PRESS,INC •• 17S Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 ISBN 978-0-312-07979-6 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Pany policy and government coalitions I edited by M. J. Laver and Ian Budge. p. em. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0-312-07979-6 I. Political panies-Europe. 2. Coalition governments-Europe. I. Laver. Michael. 1949- • II. Budge. Ian. JN94. A979P377 1992 92-3447 324.2'094-dc20 CIP Contents List o/Tables vii List 0/ Figures xiv Notes on the Contributors xvi Introduction xix Coalition Theory, Government Policy and Party Policy 1 lan Budge and M. J. Lover 2 Measuring Policy Distances and Modelling Coalition Formation 15 M. J. Lover and lan Budge 3 Coalition and Party Policy in Ireland 41 M. J. Lover 4 Norway: Policy Pursuit and Coalition Avoidance 61 Kaare Strom and Jorn Leipart 5 Sweden: Social Democratic Dominance in One Dimension 109 Kaare Strom and Torbjorn Bergman 6 Party and Coalition Policy in Denmark 151 Tove-Lise Schou and Derek John Hearl 7 Coalition Governments in the Federal Republic of Germany: Does Policy Matter? 189 Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Andrea Volkens 8 Party and Coalition in Luxembourg 223 Derek John Hearl 9 Policy and Coalition in Belgium 244 Derek John Hearl 10 The Role of Policy in Dutch Coalition Building, 1946-81 277 Pierer Tops and Karl Dittrich 11 Party Policy and Coalition Bargaining in Italy, 1948-87: Is There Order Behind the Chaos? 312 Alfio Mastropaolo and Martin Slater v vi Contents 12 Party Policy and Coalition Bargaining in Israel 346 Judith Bara 13 Coalition Bargaining in the French Fourth Republic. 1946-58 380 Franfois Petry 14 Tbe Relationship Between Party and Coalition Policy in Europe: An Empirical Synthesis 409 lan Budge and M. J. Laver Bibliography 431 Index 439 List of Tables 1.1 Govemment viability in a hypothetical party system 7 2.1 West European countries included in empirical analysis of coalitional politics 18 2.2 Category headings and domains used in the comparative coding of party election programmes 20 2.3 Combination of 54 policy-coding categories into 20 24 2.4 The relation of various policy variables to the potential left-right scale 27 2.5 The relationship of the other policy variables to the left-right scale 28 3.1 Constraints and influences upon coalition bargaining in Ireland 46 3.2 Left-right scores of parties and coalitions in Ireland, 1957-87 49 3.3 Distance between coalition and party policy on standard left-right dimension, Ireland, 1981-82 51 3.4 Twenty-dimensional city-block distances between party and coalition policy, Ireland, 1981-82 53 3.5 Parties controlling median legislator on 20 dimensions, Ireland, 1981-82 54 3.6 Success rates of policy-based coalition theories in Ireland 56 [A.l Votes cast and seats won in lrish elections 1957-82 57] [A.2 Govemments formed in Ireland, 1957-88 57] [A.3 Twenty-dimensional distances matrices, Ireland 58] 4.1 Constraints and structural influences upon coalition bargaining in Norway 71 4.2 Left-right position of parties and govemments in Norway 75 4.3 Policy payoffs for unidimensional space, Norway 80 4.4 Policy payoffs in 20-dimensional space, Norway 84 4.5 Parties controlling the median legislator on 20 dimensions, Norway, 1961-89 88 4.6 Success rate of policy-based coalition theories in Norway, 1961-89 91 [B.l Norwegian election results, 1945-89 95] vii viii List ofTables [B.2 Norwegian governments 1945-88 97] [B.3 Twenty-dimensional poliey distanees between Norwegian parties in election years, 1945-89 98] 5.1 Constraints and structural influenees upon eoalition bargaining in Sweden 115 5.2 Left-right positions of Swedish parties and governments 123 5.3 Poliey payoffs in left-right unidimensional spaee, Sweden 126 5.4 Twenty-dimensional party distance matrix, Sweden, 1988 128 5.5 Poliey payoffs in twenty-dimensional spaee, Sweden 131 5.6 Parties controlling the median legislator over 20 dimensions, Sweden, 1944-88 133 5.7 Suecess rates of policy-based coalition theories in Sweden, 1944-88 136 [C.1 Swedish election results, 1944-88 138] [C.2 Swedish governments, 1945-88 140] [C.3 Twenty-dimensional distances between parties in eleetion years, Sweden, 1944-88 141] 6.1 Constraints and influences upon coalition formation in Denmark 155 6.2 Party and government scores on the left-right dimension in Denmark, 1945-84 157 6.3 Regressions of government poliey on poliey positions, Denmark, 1945-82 160 6.4 Distanee between party and government poliey on the left-right dimension, Denmark, 1945-82 166 6.5 Distances between party poliey and government policy on the left-right eontinuum, by membership and non- membership of the government, Denmark, 1945-82 167 6.6 Distances between party and government poliey in 2O-dimensional policy space, Denmark, 1945-82 169 6.7 Party controlling median legislator on each of 20 policy dimensions, Denmark, 1945-82 171 6.8 Suecess rate of policy-based coalition theories in Denmark, 1945-82 174 [D.l Seat distributions in the Danish legislature, 1945-82 176] [D.2 Danish governments, 1945-84 177] [D.3 Twenty-dimensional distanees between Danish parties in election years, 1945-75 178] List ofTables ix 7.1 Constraints and influences on coalition bargaining in Federal Germany 194 7.2 Party and coalition policy in the Federal German Republic on the common left-right dimension, 1949-87 198 7.3 One dimensional coalition bargaining in the Federal Republic by 'coalition era' 201 7.4 Distance between party and coalition policy in the Federal German Republic on the common left-right dimension, 1949-87 203 7.5 Distances between party and coalition policy in the Federal German Republic on 16 dimensions, 1949-87 206 7.6 Party controlling median legislator on 16 dimensions, Federal Republic of Germany, 1949-87 209 7.7 Success rate of policy-based coalition theories in Federal German Republic, 1961-87 211 [E.l Results of West German Federal elections: second votes as a proportion of the electorate 213] [E.2 The German parties's power in parliament: distribution of seats in the Bundestag 215] [E.3 Coalition govemments in the Federal Republic of Germany 216] [E.4 Matrices for West German parties on 16 dimensions, 1949-87 218] 8.1 Constraints and influences on coalition bargaining in Luxembourg 226 8.2 Party and govemment scores on standard left-right dimension, Luxembourg 227 8.3 One-dimensional distances between party and govemment, Luxembourg 230 8.4 Twenty-dimensional city-block policy distances between party manifestos and govemment statements in Luxembourg 233 8.5 Parties with the median legislator over 20 dimensions, Luxembourg 235 8.6 Success rates of policy-based coalition theories in Luxembourg 236 [F.I Results of Luxembourg legislative elections, 1945-84 238 [F.2 List of Luxembourg govemments, 1945-81 239 [F.3 Matrlces for cluster diagrams for Luxembourg parties in 20 dimensions, 1951-79 240 x List ofTables 9.1 Party and government positions on common left-right dimension, Belgium 248 9.2 Constraints and influences on coalition bargaining in Belgium 250 9.3 One-dimensional differences between party and government policy, Belgium 253 9.4 Summary of results of 20-dimensional analyses, Belgium, 1946-81 255 9.5 Summary of 'policy payoffs' in 20-dimensional space, Belgium, 1946-81 256 9.6 Parties with median legislator over 20-dimensions, Belgium, 1946-81 258 9.7 Results of testing hypotheses derived from unidimensional analysis, Belgium 259 9.8 Summary of results of test of one-dimensional hypotheses
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