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Imagination and the Mind's IMAGINATION AND THE MIND’S EAR A Dissertation Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Margaret Elizabeth Moore August, 2010 Examining Committee Members: Noël Carroll, Advisory Chair, Philosophy David Wolfsdorf, co-chair, Philosophy Joseph Margolis, Philosophy Gerald Vision, Philosophy Susan Feagin, External Member, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, editor ii © Copyright 2010 by Margaret Elizabeth Moore All Rights Reserved iii ABSTRACT This dissertation provides an analysis of the phenomenon of musical imagery, or the internal 'hearing' of music. I uphold the view that musical imagery, as a kind of auditory imagery, is a kind of sensory or perceptual imagination, and cannot be incorporated into a propositional model of imagination. I further argue that musical imagery differs in important respects both from visual imagery and from other types of auditory imagery, such as inner speech. For this reason, this project makes a contribution to what would be a larger project (not necessarily carried out by a single researcher) of analyzing the sensory or perceptual imagination through careful comparative work in each sensory modality and their various combinations. Chapter 1 provides the background on theories of imagination necessary in order to make this argument, and demonstrates the lack of attention currently paid to auditory imagination in general and musical imagination in particular. The analysis of musical imagery then proceeds from three points of view: phenomenological, conceptual or analytical, and empirical. The goal of Chapter 2 is to describe our subjective experiences of musical imagery. While this description is a description of the phenomenological aspects of our experiences, it is not an example of work in phenomenology proper, as practiced by the followers of Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty or Heidegger. Rather, the method is necessarily first person, but appeals to the idea that musical imagery experiences occur along a spectrum of possible abilities. That is, while there is too much variation among iv reports of subjective musical imagery, it still makes sense to appeal to a kind of normal imaginative experience, and, as a result, the reliance on introspection does not result in hopeless idiosyncrasies. Chapter 3 discusses four topics related to content of musical imagery. First, I address the question of what makes auditory imagination specifically auditory; second, I examine the relationship between auditory imagination and imagining hearing; third, I address questions about the ontology of sounds and the ontology of music in the context of my claims about auditory imagination; finally, I discuss whether the contents of musical imagery, as a type of auditory imagination, should be thought of as conceptual or nonconceptual. Chapter 4 addresses the question of the ontology of the mental image, discussed both by Gilbert Ryle and by participants in the mental imagery debate in the field of psychology. Having demonstrated that scientific inquiry into the mechanisms of mental imagery does not involve commitment to ontologically problematic mental entities, I then survey empirical work in cognitive psychology and neuroscience that sheds light on the neural underpinnings of musical imagery. By way of conclusion, I discuss methodological issues regarding the integration of historical, empirical, conceptual, and phenomenological I use to develop a theory of musical imagery as sensory imagination. v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am fortunate to have many people to thank for their help with this project, and for their help and support throughout my time as a graduate student at Temple University. First, my advisor Noël Carroll has served as a terrific mentor and friend, and has taught me a tremendous amount not only about philosophy but also about the philosophy profession as well. He has been endlessly supportive of my work, and his enthusiasm for philosophical discussions of all kinds is both infectious and inspiring. My committee members, Gerald Vision, David Wolfsdorf, and Joseph Margolis, have been generous with their time, support and insightful suggestions. I am especially grateful to my external reader, Susan Feagin, for her support and years of friendship. The Center for Humanities at Temple, directed by Peter Logan, provided financial and intellectual support in the form of a dissertation fellowship during the spring of 2009. Audiences at the Southern Society of Philosophy and Psychology, the Pacific Division of the American Society for Aesthetics, and the New Jersey Regional Philosophical Association provided helpful feedback and valuable opportunities to present portions of this manuscript. Additional thanks and appreciation go to my many friends and colleagues, especially Tiger Roholt, Elisabeth Camp, and my graduate colleagues at Temple University and the University of Wisconsin. Finally, my deepest thanks go to Muriel Moore for her unwavering sisterly love. vi For my father, Donald K. Moore, who nurtured my musical ear. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. vi DEDICATION .................................................................................................................. vii 1. IMAGINATIONS ............................................................................................................1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................1 Imaginations .............................................................................................................8 Mapping the Imaginative Terrain: Varieties of Imaginative Functions .......9 A Single Imagination, or Many Imaginations? ..............................10 The Perceptual, or Sensory, Imagination .......................................12 The Constructive Imagination ........................................................16 The Creative Imagination ..............................................................16 The Propositional Imagination .......................................................18 Additional Schema for Mapping the Imagination .........................19 Theories of Imagination as Applied to the Philosophy of Music ..............22 Scruton and Walton........................................................................25 Miller and the Kantian Imagination ...............................................36 Trivedi ............................................................................................38 Conclusion .................................................................................................41 2. THE MIND’S EAR........................................................................................................44 Phenomenological Treatments of Auditory Imagery .............................................44 viii Ihde ............................................................................................................45 Casey ..........................................................................................................48 Mozart’s Musical Imagination ...............................................................................51 The Phenomenology of Auditory and Musical Imagery ........................................53 Properties of Musical Imagery ...................................................................53 Auditory Imagery vs. Hallucination ..........................................................54 Inner Sounds as Echos? .............................................................................56 Additional Comparisons of Hearing and Imagery .....................................56 Other Modalities of Sensory Imagination ..............................................................60 Musical Imagery as a Type of Auditory Imagery ..................................................61 Involuntary Musical Imagery, or “Earworms” ......................................................63 Other Modalities of Imagination Involved in Musical Imagination ......................64 Conclusion .............................................................................................................66 3. THE CONTENT OF AUDITORY AND MUSICAL IMAGINATION .......................69 Lopes and the Question of Specific Imaginables ...................................................71 Is Auditory Imagination Imagining Hearing? ........................................................78 A Puzzle about the Ontology of Sounds ................................................................85 DeBellis and Conceptual Content ..........................................................................90 Conclusion .............................................................................................................93 4. EMPIRICAL GROUNDING FOR MUSICAL IMAGERY .........................................95 Introduction ............................................................................................................95 Imagery in Psychology: The Ontological Problem of the Image Revisited ..........95 Results of Musical Imagery Studies in Cognitive Psychology ............................105 ix Results of Musical Imagery Studies in Cognitive Neuroscience .........................110
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