Sovereignty Issues in the Post-Soviet Conflicts of the Caucasus: the Case of Abkhazia
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Sovereignty Issues in the Post-Soviet Conflicts of the Caucasus: The Case of Abkhazia David Matsaberidze Introduction This paper aims to reflect on the different visions of the concept of sov- ereignty in the post-Soviet Caucasus relative to the regional conflict over Abkhazia. Considering the limited space for discussion, the present study will draw on the case study of the post-August War scenarios. To this end, the paper offers analysis of peace plans of the Georgian au- thorities and explores reactions of the Abkhazian and Russian sides. In this respect, the possibility of emergence of shared sovereignty could be seen in the sphere of economy, as, at a glance, this does not lead to an urgent determination of political status; nevertheless, it will be also demonstrated that this is not such a simple problem and economic coop- eration brings political aspects to the forefront, first and foremost in terms of border issues. It should be mentioned from the very beginning that the main policies of the Rose Revolution government towards national minorities were based on the principles of building civil society and inclusive citizenship, with promises and guarantees of minority rights protection and integration into the Georgian society. The right to self-government, representation in the central governing structures of the country and the rights of main- tenance of the minority languages and cultures were the central issues in the peace plans offered by Georgia to the Abkhazian and the South Os- setian communities. The elaboration of a new approach on the part of the Georgian authorities towards the occupied territories became the main concern for the Georgian government with the end of the hot phase of the August War of 2008. A new approach was necessary due to two in- terrelated aspects of the developments around the conflict zones: firstly, the August War was the first overt demonstration of the previously latent rivalry between Georgia and the Russian Federation, as up to August 2008 the northern neighbour pretended to be a peacekeeper. Secondly, 241 from the very beginning, the Rose Revolution government had not en- dorsed the idea of Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian “confrontation” and was vehemently striving to substitute them either with the neutral terms (e.g. using the “Tskhinvali Region” to denote the conflict in South Ossetia) or openly declaring the former separatist re- gions as occupied territories (after the August War 2008). Political issues The final initiative on the part of Saakashvili for the settlement of the conflict before the August War 2008 came in March of the same year. The initiative offered far-reaching autonomy through a federal arrange- ment, as well as guarantees of the rights of preservation of the culture, language and identity of the Abkhazians. Saakashvili, speaking at an international workshop entitled “The Role of Non-Governmental Or- ganizations in the Processes of Reintegration in Georgia,” organized by the Office of the Georgian State Minister for Reintegration (SMR), un- veiled a series of new proposals designed to resolve the Abkhazian con- flict. A joint free economic zone, Abkhaz representation in the central government of Georgia with an Abkhaz vice-president, the right to veto all Abkhaz-related decisions, unlimited autonomy, and various security guarantees were among the newly proposed initiatives.1 The new developments over the conflict regions as a result of the 2008 August War necessitate a re-consideration of Georgian relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On August 26, 2008, according to the de- cree of President Dimitry Medvedev, Abkhazia and South Os- setia/Tskhinvali Region were unilaterally recognized by the Russian Federation as independent states, while they were declared as occupied territories by the Georgian central authorities. The promotion of interna- tional recognition of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia became a main concern for Russia, while containment of this process 1 “State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation,” http://www.smr.gov.ge/uploads/file/SMR-Strategy-en.pdf (Retrieved May, 2011) and “Action Plan for Engagement,” endorsed on July 6, 2010. http://www.smr.gov.ge/uploads/action_plan_en.pdf (Retrieved May, 2011). 242 was seen as the main task by the Georgian authorities. In this respect, the main Georgian efforts concentrated on promoting the concept of Occu- pied Territories as an appropriate term for the conflict regions on the international scene in the post-August War reality. Additionally, a great deal of effort was made to persuade the international community and different state alliances (mainly South America) not to follow suit.2 The policy of non-recognition on the part of the Georgian government was accompanied by specially tailored plans from Tbilisi, called the State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Coopera- tion3 and Action Plan for Engagement4 both devised and elaborated by the Georgian State Ministry of Reintegration (SMR). These are complex documents that lay the ground for the development of new relations (po- litical, economic, cultural) with the separatist regions, termed as occu- pied territories, while on the other hand looking for a favourable balance in the post-August War perception of the territorial conflicts of Georgia. The main aim is to change the image of these conflicts from intra-state to inter-state ones and to replace the label ethnic conflict with broader contextualization of the regional conflicts through post-Soviet Russia’s geopolitical aspirations in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The political elite of Abkhazia did not welcome the peace initiatives of Tbi- lisi, as they still promoted the idea of the vertical subjugation whereby peace projects give Georgia the leading position in future relations and Abkhazians are merely the recipients of the benefits of the peace plan. The unwillingness of the belligerent sides to compromise in their con- flict resolution projects may become the main obstacle in future negotia- tions; even with the Russian “blessing” of the peace plan. 2 The list of countries which acknowledged the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia includes Russia (26 August 2008), Nicaragua (5 September 2008), Vene- zuela (10 September 2009), and Nauru (Abkhazia - 15 December 2009; South Os- setia - 16 December 2009). It is important that in spite of heavy pressure from the Russian Federation on Belarus, this country refused to follow the Russian policy on the international recognition of the occupied territories of Georgia. 3 State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement Through Cooperation,” http://www.smr.gov.ge/uploads/file/SMR-Strategy-en.pdf (Retrieved May, 2011). 4 “Action Plan for Engagement,” endorsed on July 6, 2010, http://www.smr.gov.ge/uploads/action_plan_en.pdf (Retrieved May 2011). 243 On January 27, 2010 a new State Strategy on the Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation5 was approved by the Georgian gov- ernment, followed by the Action Plan for Engagement in July 2010, which is the main policy document for the implementation of state strat- egy towards the occupied territories. State Strategy on the Occupied Ter- ritories: Engagement through Cooperation was elaborated to reach a breakthrough in the stalemate created in the relations between Tbilisi and Sokhumi after the August War 2008. The new peace plan is based on common principles and values shared by all European states, as re- flected in the Helsinki Final Act. The document is aimed at full with- drawal of troops from Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region (South Os- setia). According to the state strategy, “the process of annexation of these territories should be reversed and they should be peacefully reinte- grated into Georgia’s constitutional order.”6 Overall, the strategy seeks to counter the isolation and division resulting from occupation by creat- ing frameworks, incentives and mechanisms for engagement. The Georgian government believes that this should come through the promotion of economic interaction between the communities across the dividing line, rehabilitation and development of infrastructure, en- hancement of the existing mechanisms and developing new means for the promotion of the basic human rights, improvement of the accessibil- 5 It should be mentioned that the State Strategy on Occupied Territories does not come on an empty basis and it builds on the previously signed agreements and reso- lutions of the International Organizations. It is based on the Law on Occupied Terri- tories, endorsed in October 2008; Ceasefire Agreement of August 12, 2008; the Conclusions of the September 1, 2008 meeting of the EU Council; the August 28, 2009, United Nations General Assembly resolution on “Status of IDPs and Refu- gees;” Resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on “The Consequences of the War Between Georgia and Russia” (#1633 (2008), #1647 (2009), #1648 (2009), #1644 (2009), #1683 (2009), “Reports on the Human Rights Situation in the Areas Affected by the Conflict in Georgia (SG/Inf(2009)7, SG/Inf(2009)9, SG/Inf(2009)15); and the November 27, 2008 report of the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and High Commissioner for National Minorities on “Human Rights in the War-Affected Areas Following the Conflict in Georgia” (ODIHR/HCNM report). SOURCE: “State Strategy on Occu- pied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation,” http://www.smr.gov.ge/uploads/file/SMR-Strategy-en.pdf. 6 Ibid. 244 ity of health care in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and promotion of the freedom of movement. In addition, the engagement strategy aims to pre- serve cultural heritage and identity, promote the free flow of information and find a legal foundation for the implementation of the above- mentioned points.7 Naturally, all of these approaches set the territorial integrity of the Georgian state as the ultimate precondition, after troop withdrawal from these territories and complete return of IDPs through a peaceful and negotiated process. At the same time, these approaches contribute to the process of confidence building between the war- affected communities.