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EaP Monthly Bulletin #1 (9) January 2021 https://centreforpolicystudies.org/en/EaP-Bulletin [email protected] SUBSCRIBE: Facebook Twitter Youtube Editor s note Dear readers, The EaP Monthly Bulletin is the ’ initiative of the Centre for Policy This issue reviews some immediate Studies. Its purpose is to exchange results of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, information about the European possibly related to international Union and the Eastern Partnership countries, to facilitate cooperation transportation. We have also included between experts and civil society materials related to our joint project with institutions interested in the the Experts for Security and Global region, and to provide analytical products for different Affairs Association (Romania) and the stakeholders. Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Protecting Democratic Values by Tackling The Bulletin s content is the sole Pandemic-related Disinformation. responsibility of the authors. The opinions expressed’ in external Needless to say, we are very much contributors articles do not necessarily coincide with the looking to possible cooperation with opinions of our’ editorial board, or many of you. Your suggestions are much with the position of any public or appreciated. private institution. Armen Grigoryan This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.or g/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ Contents Armenia and the transportation connectivity Interview 3 COVID-19: Infodemic with no panacea? by Sergiy Gerasymchuk 6 Belarus s response to the COVID-19 pandemic and propaganda assault on Belarusians by Andrei’ Yeliseyeu and Ekaterina Pierson-Lyzhina 10 EaP Monthly Bulletin #1 (9), January 2021 2 Armenia and the transportation connectivity Geopolitics of the South Caucasus Tomáš Baranec of Strategic Analysis (Slovakia) interviewed CPS vice president Armen Grigoryan Tomáš Baranec/Strategic Analysis (TB): In AG: Since then, the railway s role has been the USSR period, a reliable network of reduced to the transportation of cargo railways was built in the South Caucasus, ’ between Yerevan and Poti, Georgia, so ferry which, however, ignored the individual connections to Russia and, to a smaller extent, federal republics’ boundaries and instead to Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine could be reflected geographical and economic used. Low effectiveness and higher costs have needs of the state. After the collapse of the been influencing the economy since then, with Soviet Union, this network has been a number of negative effects including an broken in several places and as a whole, energy crisis in the early 1990s, high largely disrupted. What was the impact on unemployment, higher consumer costs and so Armenia and its citizens? forth. Armen Grigoryan (AG): In the Soviet era, the TB: Which steps did Yerevan conduct in railway was meant primarily to serve the the last 30 years to facilitate these needs of the military and the industry. problems? To which degree were they Certainly, it had been designed with successful? consideration of the complicated terrain mountains, gorges, canyons, and so forth but – AG: As a cease-fire was reached in 1994, it had been supposed to serve the needs of a – Armenia s first president, Levon Ter- state under unitary political and military Petrossian, attempted to pursue a policy ’ command. So, for example, Georgia s railway aiming at peaceful resolution, including including the Abkhazian section had a rather ’ – mutual concessions. In an essay published in limited capacity and was not normally used – September 1997, War or Peace? Time to Get for cargo transportation between Armenia Serious, he presented his vision, particularly and Russia. As Azerbaijan s early attempts to implying that stable peace would also mean impose a blockade on the railway connection ’ additional economic opportunities in a with Armenia started in 1989, even before the changing regional environment. It would not break-up of the USSR, and the Kremlin, be an exaggeration to say that the planned essentially, turned a blind eye, the logistics pipelines connecting Azerbaijan and Turkey had to be changed so the Georgian route could might pass via Armenia and that was only be used as a substitution, but with the war in one of the potential opportunities. However, Abkhazia, it also stopped operating in 1992. – then-prime minister Robert Kocharyan, jointly with the minister of interior and TB: Was there any use of this railway from national security Serzh Sargsyan (both Armenia to Georgia after that? Karabakh native), managed to pursue the EaP Monthly Bulletin #1 (9), January 2021 3 minister of defence Vazgen Sargsyan to turn operator under a concession agreement. against defeatist Ter-Petrossian, who There were also repeated promises to build a resigned in early 1998. During the Kocharyan railway link between Armenia and Iran by ‘ ’ presidency (1998-2008), the negotiations on successive cabinets during the Sargsyan the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution presidency; however, there wasn t any were going on, but there was a de facto policy success in finding potential investors. Besides, ’ aiming to preserve the status quo. As a result, after the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, and the Meghri-Kapan section of the railway was especially after ousting Mikheil Saakashvili fully dismantled. Apparently, that was from power in Georgia in 2013, Russian ordered by Kocharyan himself who boasted propaganda regularly exploited the narrative that Armenia even under blockade, could that an agreement with Georgia, allowing develop successfully for 100 years . In the operation of the Abkhazian railway section, ‘ Soviet period, that link, as a part of the route was imminent such speculations used to ’ Yerevan-Nakhichevan-Kapan-Baku, going create some hopes in Armenia, also in the – onwards to Russia, had also connected government circles, but nothing happened as Nakhichevan with mainland Azerbaijan. a result. TB: What about Armenia’s other important Since 2018, the Pashinyan cabinet also kept neighbour – Turkey. Ankara also closed its the habitual reliance on the limited operation borders with Armenia in solidarity with of the railway to Poti, as well as automobile Azerbaijan. Did Yerevan attempt to solve roads to Iran and Georgia. this issue separately? TB: Many analysts and columnists, AG: During the early period of Serzh Sargsyan especially in Armenia, claim, that the presidency (2008-2018), there were recent agreement on renewing transport suggestions that the transport connections infrastructure between signatories of with Turkey could be restored, based on the November 10 cease-fire is a significant so-called football diplomacy beginning in victory for Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkey 2008, which was followed by the Armenian- rather than for Armenia. Some say that ‘ ’ Turkish protocols in 2009. Supposedly, that there is no particular need for a direct link might, later on, reduce the tensions with between Armenia and Russia via Azerbaijan as well. However, as Azerbaijan Azerbaijan since both countries are pressured Turkey not to establish diplomatic already connected via Georgia and relations with Armenia and not to open the Verkhny Lars. Despite that, do you see border, the protocols were ultimately some substantial potential of the given declared null and void. agreement for Yerevan? Later during the Sargsyan presidency, the AG: Cargo transportation by TIR trucks is Ijevan railway station in north-west of considerably more expensive than by railway. Armenia, where was the other railway link to Besides, Verkhny Lars is closed for a few Azerbaijan operating, was dismantled as well. months each winter, because of snowfall. When that happened, the Armenian railways There could supposedly be some economic were already operated by the Russian railway potential, but neither the current cease-fire EaP Monthly Bulletin #1 (9), January 2021 4 agreement and its immediate outcomes, nor ensure the road and infrastructure safety, and the ongoing talks provide any substantial moreover, whether any similar level of safety guarantees for the Armenian side. will be provided for Armenians travelling via Azerbaijan. TB: How could be the railway connection between Armenia and Russia practically At the same time, with speculations about an implemented? extraterritorial status for the Azerbaijani connection, on the one side, and some Armenian politicians suggestions to allow a AG: In the current situation, as Azerbaijan new Russian military base in the southern keeps holding a number of Armenian part of Armenia, ’or even to consider prisoners of war and the negotiations on that membership in the Russia-Belarus union, on issue may have reached a dead-end, further the other side, the sovereignty issue has trust-building or reconciliation does not become an abundant source of rumours, as currently seem to be a goal. The suggested well as an opportunity for some people to availability of such a connection for Armenia seek Russian support for their domestic seems, therefore, an issue of a more distant political ambitions. future. Meanwhile, Russia s persuasion capacity may perhaps ensure transportation ’ ‘ TB: How might the agreement impact of Russian military cargo and supplements, ’ ordinary Armenians’ lives in the best-case but that would not mean any economic scenario, and what would be preconditions benefit for Armenia. for such a scenario? TB: According to the 9th clause of the AG: