ISSUE 150 December 2013

The British expedition to Somaliland in 1904: A case study of the use of logistics The Key Drivers Behind China’s Naval Modernisation and their Consequences for Regional Security The Importance of Audience Perception in Communications from the Maritime Battlespace Environment of the Future Speech from Chief of Army, Seapower 2013 RN / RAN Junior Officer Development: Comparisons and Contrasts Australia-Indonesia: Towards a Maritime Strategic Partnership Scurvy: A Story of Medical Adventure & Bureaucratic Nonsense

Journal of the

International Fleet Review Special Edition

Issue 150 3 Letter to the Editor Contents

Dear Editor, strong off Rabaul. International Fleet Review Tax Deductions and With , Centaur and the Sydney - October 2013 4 Donors for AE1 Search nation’s other naval wrecks having been The Australian Taxation Act was found it is appropriate for the nation now The British expedition to Somaliland amended in July 2013 to give AE1 to find its first loss and properly honour in 1904: A case study of the use of Incorporated a Deductible Gift Recipient those lost in her. Donors are sought for logistics 15 (DGR) status. It was announced by the the search and they are requested to th Minister for Defence on 14 September be in touch with Honorary Treasurer The Key Drivers Behind China’s Naval 2011, shortly before the commemoration Michael Dunne by email to mbdunne@ Modernisation and their Consequences ceremony and unveiling of a plaque bigpond.com. for Regional Security 18 to AE1 at the Garden island Heritage Michael White Centre, Sydney, that AE1 Inc. would have President, AE1 Incorporated The Importance of Audience DGR status for three years from that date Perception in Communications but it has taken until now for the Act to from the Maritime Battlespace be amended to this effect. As the grant Dear Editor, Environment of the Future 24 was only for three years unless AE1 Inc. Ursula Hewat has been kind enough to applies next year for an extension of this send me free of charge, the September Speech from Chief of Army time then this status will expire on 14th magazine containing the K IX article. As Seapower Conference 2013 30 September 2014, which is the Centenary a matter of historic accuracy you should of the anniversary of the loss of AE1 with be aware that for as long as the Dutch K all hands off Rabaul in PNG. IX was in RAN hands she was officially Indian Carrier Developments The DGR status means that the AE1 titled “HMAS K9” as shown in the All at sea via the Russians 34 Inc. Honorary Treasurer, Commodore attached appointment. Michael Dunne AM RAN Ret‘d, can give Her history as K9 is set out in Michael RN / RAN Junior Officer Development: a valid receipt to any donor that a gift for White’s book Australian Comparisons and Contrasts 38 the search of AE1 is a tax deduction. The published in 1992. tax deduction only applies to gifts for the Regards, Our at War: HMS New search, or near related activities, for the Bryan Cleary Zealand in the First World War 44 and not, unfortunately, for (Ed: Bryan was thoughtful enough to send the commemoration plaques that have us his appointment to the submarine as a Admiral Helfrich RNN, Captain Waller Front page : been are being erected in Australia and .) RAN, Captain Rooks USN & the Loss HMAS Yarra plays the UK. ofHMAS Perth and USS Houston 51 her part in the AE1 Inc. is grateful to Ms Glenys Pyrotechnics Display Hodges and her firm, Allens Linklaters Australia-Indonesia: Towards a and Lightshow Lawyers, for pursuing this DGR matter Maritime Strategic Partnership 56 Spectacular as with the Government over the years on part of the Royal a pro bono basis. The Reports into the Scurvy: A Story of Medical Adventure Australian Navy’s likely circumstances of the loss and the & Bureaucratic Nonsense 58 International Fleet likely costs of a search, which are on the Review (IFR) 2013 in AE1 Inc. web site at www.ae1.org.au, Obituary By Captain Peter Hore RN 64 Sydney Harbour. By show that between A$6m and $8m ABCIS Kayla Hayes, Navy Imagery Unit - East is needed to charter a suitable ship, Book Reviews 66 equipment and crew to conduct the search for AE1 in the deep water and Visions from the Vault 79 Issue Number 150 Printed in SPONSORS: Style Notes for Headmark 81 Queensland Australia - DMS Maritime - Lockheed Martin - Austal - Saab Systems - ISSN 1833-6531

- QinetiQ - Australian Defence Credit Union - Raytheon Australia - ANI Membership Application Form 83 Design & DTP by - ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems Australia - Thales Naval Group - Diane Bricknell [email protected] Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 4 International Fleet Review Sydney - October 2013

Sydney Harbour awash with action. A large flight ofR AN helicopters conducting a flypast of theR e-enactment Fleet proceeds past the reviewing ship HMAS Leeuwin, while a Seahawk proudly displays the Australian White Ensign to the spectators of the Ceremonial Fleet Review. By ABIS Cassie McBride, Navy Imagery Unit – East

An escort of NSW Water Police vessels and a flotilla of pleasure craft accompanyH MAS Sydney as she leads the ‘Magnificent Seven’ during a recreation of the initial entry of the RAN Fleet into Sydney Harbour. By Leading Seaman Peter Thompson, HMAS Sydney Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 5

RAAF Hawk-127 aircraft from 76 Squadron and F/A-18 Hornets from 77 Squadron conduct a flypast over SydneyH arbour in formation for the International Fleet Review. By CPL David Gibbs, 28SQN AFID-EDN

RAAF Hawk-127 aircraft from 76 Squadron and F/A-18 Hornets from 77 Squadron fly in formation toward Sydney harbour to conduct a flypast for the InternationalF leet Review. By CPL David Gibbs, 28SQN AFID-EDN Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 6 International Fleet Review Sydney - October 2013

The tall ship fleet departs ydneyS at the completion of the International Fleet Review 2013. By LSIS Bradley Darvill, Navy Imagery Unit - East

Long queues are formed to look over HMAS Darwin as some expected 22,000 members of the general public visit Sydney’s Garden Island, to view the Australian and International warships on display for the Navy Open Day as part of the International Fleet Review 2013. By LSIS Brenton Freind, Navy Imagery Unit - East Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 7

Warships from Africa, China, Europe, New Zealand, South East Asia and Australia docked alongside Garden Island and Fleet Base East for the Warship Open Day as part the International Fleet Review. By ABIS Nicolas Gonzalez

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 8 International Fleet Review Sydney - October 2013

His Royal Highness Prince Harry of Wales walks with Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, AO, CSC, RAN down the wharf at Fleet Base East after inspecting the International Fleet Review in Sydney Harbour, onboard HMAS Leeuwin. By LSIS Jo Dilorenzo

A HMAS Sydney hat, with a wreath at the memorial service at Bradleys Head to commemorate HMAS Sydney (I) and SMS Emden. By LSIS Jo Dilorenzo, Navy Imagery Unit - East Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 9

HMAS Sydney leads HMA Ships Darwin, Perth, Parramatta, Bundaberg, Gascoyne, Diamantina and Huon into Sydney Harbour for the International Fleet Review 2013. By LSIS James Whittle, Navy Imagery Unit - East

Crowds pack vantage hot spot Bradleys Head to view the Ceremonial Fleet Review 2013. By ABIS Chantell Bianchi, Navy Imagery Unit – East

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 10 International Fleet Review Sydney - October 2013

A formation of RAAF F/A-18 Hornet and Hawk aircraft fly overhead asH MAS Sydney leads the ‘Magnificent Seven’A ustralian Warships through Sydney Harbour for the International Fleet Review, before the reviewing officer, the Governor-General of Australia, Her Excellency the Honourable Quentin Bryce, AC, CVO and her guest of honour, His Royal Higness Prince Harry of Wales. By Leading Seaman Peter Thompson, HMAS Sydney

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 11

The Sydney Harbour Bridge is transformed during the International Fleet Review Fireworks Spectacular where thousands of people watched stories unfold with pyrotechnics and lightshows. By ABIS Sarah Ebsworth, Navy Imagery Unit - East

Sydney Harbour comes alive during the Pyrotechnics Display and Lightshow Spectacular in Sydney Harbour. By WOIS Shane Cameron, Navy Imagery Unit - East Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 12 International Fleet Review Sydney - October 2013

Fireworks explode overhead as the Sydney Opera House is illuminated by the lightshow display during the International Fleet Review Spectacular. By ABIS Jesse Rhynard, Navy Imagery Unit - East

HMAS Yarra plays her part in the Pyrotechnics Display and Lightshow Spectacular as part of the Royal Australian Navy’s International Fleet Review (IFR) 2013 in Sydney Harbour. By ABCIS Kayla Hayes, Navy Imagery Unit - East Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 13

Thousands of spectators lined the harbour foreshore as the Sydney Harbour Bridge lights up with the Royal Australian Navy emblem during the International Fleet Review Firework Spectacular. By ABIS Sarah Ebsworth, Navy Imagery Unit - East

The Royal Australian Navy Crest is projected onto the Sydney Opera House during the International Fleet Review 2013 Pyrotechnics Display and Lightshow Spectacular. By POIS Paul Berry, Navy Imagery Unit - East Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 14

Australian Government Department of Veterans’ Affairs

Gallipoli 2015 ballot opening soon

Australians planning to attend Anzac Day commemorations at Gallipoli in 2015 can apply for the ballot from 1 November. But there’s no need to rush – the ballot is open for 3 months, closing on 31 January 2014.

The Anzac Commemorative Site at Gallipoli can safely, securely and comfortably accommodate 10,500 people. In 2015, this will comprise places for 8,000 Australians, 2,000 New Zealanders and up to 500 official representatives of the countries that served in the Gallipoli campaign.

Some of the places available to Australians will be reserved for special representatives including: direct descendants of Gallipoli veterans, widows of Australian First World War veterans, veterans of other conflicts, Australian secondary school students and their chaperones.

Widows of First World War veterans do not need to apply for the ballot and will be contacted separately by DVA regarding their interest in attending. Places for secondary school students and their chaperones will be allocated outside the ballot by State and Territory Governments.The remaining places (3,000 double passes) will be open for all Australians to apply.

Advice will be provided to individuals on the ballot outcome in March 2014, to ensure those successful have enough time to organise and pay for their trip.

Those who have already booked a tour to Gallipoli in 2015, which includes attending official Anzac Day commemorative services, should speak to their travel agent or tour operator regarding arrangements if they are not successful in the ballot. Tour operators are not in a position where they can guarantee a place at the commemorations.

For information on ballot eligibility or to apply from 1 November 2013, visit the Gallipoli 2015 website www.gallipoli2015.dva.gov.au

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 15 The British expedition to Somaliland in 1904: A case study of the use of logistics B y MikeFogarty

he British expedition to Somaliland in 1904 is a case Tstudy in military and naval logistics. This fourth campaign to attack and destroy an enemy redoubt at Illig, in Somaliland, was conducted from 20 to 26 April. Its purpose was to suppress, if not subdue, the threat of the Dervish forces led by the so-called “Mad Mullah”, Muhammad Abdulle Hassan (sic). One author, Jardine, wrote that the Mullah had been soundly beaten in battle and had lost the greater part of his following and stock.1 In contrast, the British logistical effort and its forces prevailed over its enemies. Few were killed. One of the forts Aden was a nearby hub. India those functions which always fall to the an army. Somalia had little available of the Majeerteen also serviced logistics. Another Service afloat, such as “patrolling the fresh stocks of the former, outside Sultanate in Hafun author asserts the obvious in a coast”, “embarking and disembarking of the rainy season. It required local (Public domain) general principle on warfare, which troops and stores”, and which, though knowledge to find streams and potable is no less applicable to Somaliland. at times unseen, and unadvertised, are water sources. Some water had to be New demands could only be met yet no less important than the military shipped in and rationed accordingly. 1 by continuous replenishment from operations proceeding concurrently. The commanders recognised the need base.2 The and the Royal The Somaliland hinterland was for an assured supply. As the normal Hampshire Regiment effected an mostly an unknown region. The supply of water was likely to prove amphibious assault to re-assert Britain’s topography, climate, hydrographical inadequate for the large increase of national interests. and sea state factors affected the troops and transport, water supply The duties of the Navy were application of logistics. Intelligence plants were shipped from England constant and unrelaxing, and involved from friendly natives allowed planners and installed with satisfactory results to proceed with an appreciation of local at the various posts on the line of 3 1 Douglas Jardine, The Mad Mullah of resources. communication. The need for water Somaliland, Herbert Jenkins, London, 1923, p. 153. The British force neutralised many of was no less so on embarkation after the his followers. Coupled with that, the enemy Water campaign. The Admiralty noted that lost a considerable part of its logistical back- up, which nullified its ability to successfully GC Shaw in Supply in Modern War the task of feeding and watering the prosecute its campaign. The country lacked observed that a desert has always garrison had become arduous and even all civilised transport. Jardine also notes 4 the dietary conditions which complicated proved to be the most formidable dangerous. supply. Religious and cultural factors meant frontier against invasion, owing to that food sources were variegated. Water Food was short in the desert. its lack of water. Forces of heavy 2 Martin van Creveld, Supplying War, manpower and particularly of heavy The expeditionary force had to victual Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, animal power (camels and horses) itself with adequate provisions of food. 1990, p. 233. The author provides some consume an immense amount (of It required a determined endeavour intellectual ballast, using examples to water) and its carriage in bulk presents to garner food stocks, land them, and correlate logistics with strategy. For that he 2 applies a sound theoretical base to any case many difficulties. Grain may be sustain their continuing replenishment. study. In his introduction (page 1) he defines suitable for Indian camels but Somali Religious and cultural sensitivities logistics as the practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied. He puts camels graze. Water (and food) are also impacted on food shipments. logistics in their correct perspective. At the prime logistical needs to nurture The meat supply was principally once, their supply is twinned with strategy. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 16 The British expedition to Somaliland in 1904: A case study of the use of logistics furnished by sheep for British troops and goats for Indians. 3 Volume II of the official history provides a voluminous inventory of stocks. It demonstrated the need for their integration and disbursement. For example, in a joint operation, it required a high level of liaison and co-ordination to furnish the soldiers in the field.

Supply and Transport In recognition of the need to coordinate the supply functions it was found necessary to appoint a senior officer who could take responsibility for that role. The overall commander, English camel troopers in 1913, between Berbera and Odweyne in General Egerton, decided to put supply the terrain and conditions. Beadon British Somaliland (Public domain) and transport under one head. Supply argues in The Royal Army Service was to greatly depend on transport. Corps that the Somali baggage camel   Lieutenant-Colonel WR Yeilding is a small and wiry animal, capable of contended that the supply situation prolonged exertion on scanty food and 6 would appear to be impossible in water. Post offices, medical services Somaliland, unless administered by one and sanitation units also augmented officer with the interests of supply and logistics. Aden 5 transport equally at heart. French Somaliland    Somaliland had a primitive and Logistical Arrangements Italian undeveloped infrastructure. Camels on Landing Zelea Berbera Somaliland provided the transport, but though The beachhead is a key determinant British Hergeisa Somaliland some of the (Royal) Hampshire had in landing men and equipment at an Tug Argen experienced them and their ways on opposed site. Why Illig? There were few Odweina the Frontier, they found the Aden options available, as Gordon indicated. Ethiopia camel, and even more its driver, far Illig was little more than a bay partially more intractable than those they protected by nearby headlands of had already met. 4 Conversely, the which Ras Illig to the south was much with men and equipment was fraught local camels were more amenable to the larger, where the beach extended with danger. But with ingenuity, the

3 General Staff War Office, Official History back to a semi-amphitheatre and sailors, soldiers and marines took of the Operations in Somaliland, Volume fishing boats could be hauled up their equipment ashore. Illig proved to II, p. 525. Local food acquisition, like water, 5 was parlous and of poor quality which could behind the surf. Hauling ships’ boats be perilous for its small rocky beach only supplement those rations shipped in. 5 Andrew Gordon, “Time after time in the strip. Several small boats were either That said, there were some grazing areas Horn of Africa”, Journal of Military History, which were dependent on good seasons. The Society for Military History, Lexington, swamped by waves or dashed on rocky 4 C.T. Atkinson, Regimental History, The , Volume 74, No. 1, January, 2010, p. outcrops. Some camels drowned or Royal Hampshire Regiment, Volume I to 112. This is an authoritative source drawing 1914, Robert Maclehose, The University much from the standard histories. The died of exhaustion on beaching. Press,, Glasgow, 1950, pp 413-415. These landing is vividly described. The difficulty Another writer provided a concise troops formed a punitive expedition of landing animal transport in the breaking Kili to suppress the “Mad Mullah”, Mullah surf can only be imagined. Logistical operational order. The commentator Mohammed (sic) Abdullah. Ponies were support also demands of commanders and HamiltonMombasa gave the results faint also used for raiding attacks by the local their staff a capacity for innovation and praise as the intended capture of the Dervishes. Too few were available for the endurance in difficult conditions. The troops British forces. Horses were also used in the carried a few Maxim machine guns. They significance of Illig. The British gained campaign. Some animal transport could also carried heavy boxes of its ammunition. valuable experience in amphibious sometimes be hired from local sources. Gordon also summarizes the evacuation operations at Illig. An army needs to draw This was often resisted by sheiks and tribes. and departure phase. The surf had worsened from its combat experiences. Logistical Stock represented a capital investment they and a small ship’s boat was also destroyed support has to be fine-tuned. Illig educated were loath to shed. on the rocks. The author highlighted the British war-fighting doctrine. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Lindi Issue 150 17

R.H. Beadon, The Royal Army Service Mullah was not achieved. He did, Corps, A history of transport and supply though, agree that Somaliland was an in the British army, Volume II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1930. unmapped and waterless wilderness. T.A. Brassey, editor, The Naval Annual, 1905, The need for water was paramount. “The Navy and the Somaliland Expedition”, The order stipulated that all boats will Chapter IV, J. Griffin and Co., Portsmouth, 1905. carry a plentiful supply of water, as in C.E. Callwell, Small Wars, Their Principles all probability the force, after the work and Practice, third edition, General Staff War 7 is done, will be exhausted. Office publication, HMSO, London, 1906. To summarize, the British were Andrew Gordon, “Time after time in the reasonably well prepared to campaign Horn of Africa”, Journal of Military History, The Society for Military History, Lexington, against the Dervishes. Callwell has Virginia, Volume 74, No. 1, January, 2010. enunciated a general principle. If no General Staff, War Office, Official History of supplies can be obtained from the the Operations in Somaliland, Volumes I and II, H.M.S.O., London, 1907. theatre of war, as is often the case in Angus Hamilton, Somaliland, Hutchinson these operations, everything in the Mike Fogarty is a retired diplomat who and Co., London, 1911. way of food for man or beast has to 8 has served in Singapore and Hanoi Douglas Jardine, The Mad Mullah of be carried. Callwell also re-stated an Somaliland, Herbert Jenkins, London, 1923. during his DFAT career (1973-2001). imperative for desert warfare. Camel G. C. Shaw, Supply in Modern War, Faber corps are in fact of use only under given A former SLSU officer, he served from and Faber, London, 1939. conditions. 6 The British often relied on 1966-1972. He has a BA (Social Sciences) Martin van Creveld, Supplying War, Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, Cambridge camels to move logistics. They could from the CAE. He is now a part- University Press, Cambridge, 1990. not have succeeded without them as time postgraduate student at UNSW (Endnotes) they needed more and not less. Hiring undertaking an M.Phil at ADFA. 1 T.A. Brassey, editor, The Naval Annual, was tentative. 1905, “The Navy and the Somaliland To conclude, the logistics of supply Expedition”, Chapter IV, J. Griffin and Co., Portsmouth, published 1905, p. 58. and transport are decisively enmeshed 2 G. C. Shaw, Supply in Modern War, Faber in all military operations. They are and Faber, London, 1939, p. 314. symbiotic dynamics and that was well 3 General Staff, War Office, Official History demonstrated in the Horn of Africa in of the Operations in Somaliland, Volume I, H.M.S.O., London, 1907, p. 217. 1904. The naval logistical contribution 4 Admiralty, Intelligence Department, at Illig, and elsewhere, resourced the Papers on Naval Subjects, Capture of Illig, qualified success of the campaign, Somaliland, 1904, No. 747, published despite the escape of the Mullah. London, February, 1905, p. 10. This report has useful facts on Somaliland. Lessons learned informed future 5 General Staff, War Office, Volume II, as doctrine. Somaliland is a compelling above, p. 489. case of the need for thorough logistical 6 R.H. Beadon, The Royal Army Service planning in warfare. t Corps, A history of transport and supply in the British army, Volume II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1930, p. 22. 7 Angus Hamilton, Somaliland, Hutchinson and Co., London, 1911, pp. 337 and 343. 8 C.E. Callwell, Small Wars, Their Principles and Practice, third edition, General Staff War Office publication, HMSO, London,1906, p. 59. References Admiralty, Intelligence Department, Papers on Naval Subjects, Capture of Illig, Somaliland, 1904, No. 747, published London, February, 1905. C.T. Atkinson, Regimental History, The Royal Hampshire Regiment, Volume I to 1914, Robert Maclehose, The University Press,, 6 Callwell, p. 428. Glasgow, 1950. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 18 The Key Driver’s Behind China’s Naval Modernisation and their Consequences for Regional Security by Lieutenant Jennifer PARKER

‘China has been modernising its military forces, with the rapid and continuous increase it its total defence spending. However, with clarity on neither the present condition nor the near future of its military power, there is concern how the military power of China will influence the regional state of affairs and the security of Japan’.1

ince the late 1990s China has undertaken a Revolution in SMilitary Affairs (RMA) which has focused on the production of technologically advanced platforms and weaponry.1 Supported by a defence Key Drivers Behind Chinese Navy budget that has more than doubled predominantly focused on submarines, members with the in size over the past five2 years, the China’s Naval with over 50 operational submarines to missile destroyer People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Modernisation Program date, the structure of its surface flotilla Shenzhen is undergoing an unprecedented era of is slowly changing. A key headmark in (Public domain) naval modernisation. There are three key drivers behind this change has been the acquisition First, I will focus on the three key China’s naval modernisation program: and restoration of the ex-Soviet aircraft aspects that are driving China’s naval firstly, the desire to provide protection carrier now known as the Liaoning. modernisation. China’s rapid naval of Sea Lines of Communication Commissioned in 2012 and widely modernisation is creating a degree (SLOCs). Secondly, a growing trend thought to be a training vessel, this of tension within Asian region, a of naval nationalism and thirdly, acquisition none the less indicates tension which is clearly evident in the increasing financial and technological China’s desire to possess a power unprecedented acquisition of naval capacity to build platforms. projection capability. platforms, particularly submarines and The acquisition of the Liaoning anti-ship cruise missiles by China’s Protection of Sea Lines of is coupled with rumours that China neighbours. The tension within the Communication is in the early stages of building Asian region has manifested itself in two indigenous aircraft carriers. a number of escalating minor naval China’s desire to possess a navy China has also sought to increase skirmishes between China and its capable of protecting its major SLOCs the technological edge of its surface neighbours. The second section of is evident in its changing maritime fleet through the development of the this article will discuss the developing strategy. Historically focused on access Luyang II class indigenous destroyers tension within the Asian region and its denial,3 China’s naval acquisitions rumoured to have a radar similar in effects on long term regional security. centred on a submarine force with a performance to the American Aegis number of old surface units, many of phased array radar systems, and the which lacked basic capabilities such as purchase of four Russian Sovremenny combat systems. destroyers. 1 Japan Ministry of Defence, Defence of Although China’s force remains Recent platform acquisitions Japan, Japan, Tokyo, 2009 (White Paper) 4. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 19

indicate an evolution in maritime appetite for energy. China is no longer strategy from access denial towards self sufficient in terms of energy a limited power projection capability production and this has been the case capable of protecting China’s SLOCs. 2 since 1993.9 The country has become However, China’s power projection the third largest importer of Crude Oil capability is currently considered with approximately a third of this oil limited due to the small number of being shipped through key SLOCs such aircraft carriers being built and the as the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca.10 paucity of replenishment vessels within China’s concerns over energy its fleet. security in part explain its aggressive The development of a limited approach to territorial disputes in the power projection capability to provide South China Sea. Securing sovereignty protection of SLOCs is driven by three of disputed islands such as the Spratly China’s - Liaoning key factors; trade, energy security or Diaoyu/Senkaku islands ensures and strategic vulnerability. As China access to the sea bed and the potential C  emerged from the stark economic energy sources held within. As J times of the “great leap forward”, Buszynski highlights, China ‘has been Senkaku Islands East China Sea Naha trade became a crucial component of diversifying energy supplies to reduce the Chinese economy. Given China’s its dependence upon imported oil’.11 location in Asia, 95% of China’s traded China’s attempt to diversify energy Yonakuni Island goods flow across the oceans. 4 In a supplies shows an acknowledgement of deliberate policy to facilitate this trade, its current dependence on oil supplies, T Pacific OceanN Iriomote Island Ishigaki Island China has built one of the largest and its change in maritime strategy Okinawa Prefecture merchant fleets in the world.5 15% of signalled by naval modernisation 100km the world’s oil-tanker fleet are currently demonstrates a desire to protect these owned by China, a figure which is oil supplies. order to avoid this form of strategic expected to rise to 40% in the near Furthermore, China’s naval encirclement China must develop a future.6 modernisation program ensures it has power projection capability; crucially Any major interruption to China’s the naval assets to support its claims in aircraft carriers and mine clearance maritime trade would have a major the South China Sea. In developing a assets will be essential in keeping the impact on the countries economy limited power projection force, China SLOCs to the Indian and Pacific oceans and subsequently China’s security. is ensuring its ability to enhance energy open. China’s naval modernisation China is designing a force capable security. program includes a number of key of protecting both its major trade The third facet of China’s desire to assets including those listed above routes, and its mercantile fleet. China’s provide naval protection to key SLOCs which are vital to ensuring they can objective to the PLAN employ in a is China’s geographical vulnerability. transit to the Indian and Pacific oceans maritime security role is evident in its China is geographically isolated from in the event of hostilities. deployments of Surface Action Groups the Indian and Pacific oceans by the China’s geographic vulnerability to the Gulf of Aden since 2008,7 and is first and second island chains. In order extends beyond a hostilities context clearly defined in its most recent white to gain access to either of these oceans and is a clear concern for her modern paper.8 Chinese vessels must transit through day political elite, a factor driving The development of the Middle a number of chokepoints between China’s naval modernisation. Hu East as a strategic focal point is a clear the island chains. Adding to China’s Jintao’s coining of the ‘Malacca indication that world powers have geographical isolation, the majority of dilemma’ in 2007,12 highlights that become concerned by energy security, islands within both island chains are China’s geographic vulnerability is a as a world power this is also a major allied with the US. key concern when it comes to trade. concern of China. China’s growth Subsequently, in the advent of a The Malacca Strait is a key trade route has been marked by an insatiable conflict between the US and China, for China and 80% of China’s imported 2 M Taylor Fravel, ‘China’s Search for China could quite easily be contained oil passes through the Strait.13 Any Military Power’, The Washington Quarterly to the South and East China seas. In disruption to mercantile traffic 31, No. 3 (2008): 134. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 20 The Key Driver’s Behind China’s Naval Modernisation and their Consequences for Regional Security through the Malacca Strait would have a dramatic effect on both China’s economy and energy security. In recognition of this, China has investigated other methods of transporting goods to China clear of this strategic chokepoint, including enhancing Chinese presence at its base in Gwadar, Pakistan or building a canal to transport oil through Thailand.14 Neither of these have come to fruition in part due to the cost, but also due to the political uncertainty of the two nations concerned. The only immediate solution to the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ is increasing China’s ability to protect the Malacca Strait, against both a terrorist action or a conventional adversary’s Taiwan and Japan attempt to block it. In order to do this media reports.17 China’s maritime the increasing frustration with the Coast Guard in China recognises it requires a limited strategy has gained increasing lack of resolution of the Taiwan issue. disputed waters in power projection naval force and prominence in debates within journals A powerful navy is seen as a way to 2012 (US Navy photo) China’s focus on protection of SLOCs and think tanks. Many of these debates ensure a resolution. The importance of is partially driven by this geographic have been centred on the purchase a power projection navy to resolve the vulnerability. of an aircraft carrier for China; some Taiwan issue became apparent during extreme examples of naval nationalism the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996 when Naval nationalism have involved the mayor of a major city the US Navy deployed two carrier offering to provide financial backing to battle groups, centred around Nimitz The second factor in driving naval build an aircraft carrier for China.18 and Independence, to the Strait.22 The modernisation in China is a growing The growth of naval nationalism deployment of the carrier battle groups sense of naval nationalism. It is well within China can be attributed to highlighted the maritime capability gap known that China is experiencing a a number of factors; however, one between China and the US. China’s resurgence of nationalism on all fronts; of the prominent arguments is that naval nationalism extends beyond the a by-product of this is an increase in possessing a blue water navy has issue of Taiwan; it centres on a desire naval nationalism. Naval nationalism is become a matter of prestige.19 Ross,20 for regional influence. characterised by the desire to possess a keen proponent of this argument, is In 2004 China was struck by a navy comparable to other key players correct in his assertion that maritime their lack of naval capability when on the world stage. Academics such as capability has historically been used they observed both the US and Ross,15 have highlighted it as a pivotal as a measure of prestige, however, to Australia’s effective disaster relief in factor in China’s maritime thinking. assume this is the case in the instance the devastation following the Tsunami Although Ross somewhat oversells of China is to underestimate China’s in South East Asia.23 China is keen to the point, grouping a number of strategic thinking. assert itself in the region; this is clear in complex issues under the idea of naval Having endured what many China’s interactions with neighbours, nationalism,16 it nevertheless is an in China refer to as a decade of particularly Japan and the Philippines important driving force. The growth of humiliation, China is keen to assert over territorial water disputes. China’s naval nationalism in China is evident itself on the world stage. This is evident aggressive stance towards the Diaoyu/ in the increased presence of the PLAN in China’s increased involvement Senkaku islands in particular is evident within the media. in UN deployments; China is now of her strategy. China’s drive to assert China’s contribution to counter a major contributor to UN Peace itself as a regional and global actor piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden Keeping Missions.21 A prominent has resulted in naval nationalism, have been a focal point in national facet in China’s naval nationalism is particularly because a blue water navy Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 21

is seen as a way of achieving greater regional and global influence. Capacity

The third facet in China’s naval modernisation is an increased capacity to fund, build and fight modern naval craft. The opening up of China post- Mao led to strong economic growth. Since the mid-nineties this growth has resulted in annual double digit increases in the defence budget.24 Due to the increasing security of China’s land borders, which are as secure The Guangzhou, one as they have been for ‘200 years’,25 naval modernisation has been a China, but appears to be a regional of China’s front line and a greater focus on the capability revolution in the training afforded theme. A comparison of gross warships, pictured in a maritime force can deliver, the to PLAN Officers and Sailors. The tonnage of Japan, China and South Leningrad PLAN’s budget has also increased. The PLAN has made a conscious effort in Korea conducted by the International (Public domain) increasing budget has been coupled recent years to increase the skill levels Strategic Studies Institute demonstrates with increased capacity for building of its personnel through formalised dramatic increases in regional fleet complex maritime vessels. training in understanding technological sizes between 2000 and 2012.29 The increased capacity for building advances in core capabilities but also Not only are fleet sizes naval vessels has come from two areas; core maritime skills. The combination increasing, but regional countries firstly, China’s growing mercantile fleet of increased funding, shipbuilding are seeking dramatic advances in has driven an increase in the number knowledge, science and technology capability. Vietnam has committed of ship yards within China creating and increased skill levels of personnel to the acquisition of six Kilo Class greater capacity to build large numbers has been a significant driver in China’s submarines, with the first expected of vessels. Ship builders within China naval modernisation. to be delivered in 2013. Malaysia have also managed to hone their skills has accepted two French Scorpene building merchant vessels and are now Likely consequences class submarines into service whilst able to translate the lessons learnt in of China’s growing sea Japan has sought to increase their building naval vessels.26 The second submarine fleet from 16 to 22.30 increase in building capacity is due power for regional Underwater Warfare aside, South to the strengthening of science and security Korea is substantially ‘modernising technology within China. China is now and expanding its previously coastal becoming quite adept at engineering There are a number of consequences focussed navy’.31 India has plans for a advanced technological systems from of China’s growing sea power; two fleet containing three aircraft carriers missiles, advanced anti-air radars to in particular have a direct impact on and has commissioned its first nuclear nuclear submarines. Technological regional security. The first is what may submarine. It is clear something is advances within Chinese industry be termed a naval arms race within happening in the Asian region that is indicate that China may ‘well have Asia. The second is increasing political creating an unparalleled era of naval caught up with the tail of the West’s tension within the region, most often modernisation. current technology’.27 As Ji correctly displayed in rhetoric over territorial There are a number of justifications highlights, the long-held view of water disputes between China and a for what may loosely be termed a a generational gap in technology number of its neighbours including naval arms race within Asia. The between China and the West may no Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and first rationale is that unprecedented longer be correct.28 Taiwan. economic growth has resulted in this The final transformation that has The trend of naval modernisation developing region having the capacity given China the capacity to drive within Asia is not only confined to to fund technological advancements in Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 22 The Key Driver’s Behind China’s Naval Modernisation and their Consequences for Regional Security order to replace obsolete platforms. To radar,34 and Chinese submarines China’s uneasiness about its a certain extent this is true, and I have suspected of breaching Japanese geographic vulnerability is reflective touched on previously how this aspect territorial waters. Any one of these of increasing tensions within the has affected China’s drive to naval tactical miscalculations could result region. China’s naval modernisation modernisation. The second and most in a reaction that creates a regional fuelled by a desire to protect SLOCs, compelling rationale is that the naval conflict. growing naval nationalism and a new build up is a direct reaction to China’s China’s growing sea power has found capacity to fund, build and fight naval modernisation and increased resulted in a naval arms race and modern naval platforms has created aggression within the region. increased political tension within the a naval arms race in the Asian region Political tension within the region region. The likely consequences of and increased political tension within is increasing. There are a number these two by-products are increasing the region. With tensions running of factors contributing to this, but regional instability and an increased high in the region, a number of minor undoubtedly China’s growing sea potential for a strategic or tactical naval skirmishes have broken out over power is one. This political tension miscalculation to create a regional territorial water disputes with China. It has manifested itself in a number of conflict. is clear that one tactical miscalculation regional disputes since 2000. Of note is China’s acquisition of naval could have strategic consequences that the increasing tension between China, platforms from submarines to aircraft lead to regional conflict. t Japan and Taiwan over the Diaoyu/ carriers demonstrates an era on Senkaku islands. As eluded to above, unparalleled naval modernisation as it the tense territorial water disputes refocuses its maritime strategy away can be partially attributed to regional from access denial to limited power concerns about energy security, but projection. China’s naval modernisation it can also be attributed to strategic is being driven by three key factors. positioning as neighbours become The first and most prominent influence increasing concerned about China’s on naval modernisation is the drive intentions. China’s military might to provide protection to SLOCs. The has resulted in a number of South prominence of the protection of SLOCs East Asian nations reassessing their as a key strategic task of the PLAN is strategies towards China. Hedging has reflected in the recent Chinese defence become the predominant strategy used white paper and stems from three key to deal with China in South East Asia,32 concerns: trade, energy security and thereby increasing tension within the strategic vulnerability. region. Disruption to trade flows, The combination of a naval arms particularly in the Indian Ocean and race and the increased political tension Malacca Strait would have a dramatic has led many observers to assess that effect on China’s economic growth. Lieutenant Jennifer Parker RAN joined a strategic or tactical miscalculation China is also cognisant that the could lead to a regional conflict. majority of its imported oil travels the Navy in 2002, graduating from China’s Defence Minister General through the Malacca strait, which is the ADFA in 2005 with a Bachelor Liang Guanglie alluded to this in 2010 clear by its attempts to find alternatives of Arts in Mathematics and Political when he stated, ‘looking at the current to this strategic chokepoint whilst Science. She is currently serving on situation, full scale war is unlikely, at the same time developing a navy exchange with the Royal Navy as the but we cannot exclude the possibility capable of protecting its mercantile that, in some local areas unexpected fleet as it passes through the strait. Operations Officer inH MS Lancaster events may occur, or military friction Geographic vulnerability is inherent whilst studying her Master of Arts in may take place due to a misfire’.33 In in China’s location in Asia, encircled Strategy and Security through UNSW 2013 alone, tensions on the seas due by the first and second island chains, and her Post Graduate Bachelor of Laws to territorial disputes have resulted in the event of hostilities China would through UNE. in a Chinese warship illuminating a not enjoy free access to the Pacific or Japanese Warship with a fire control Indian oceans. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 23

Bibliography Kraska, James, ‘How the Lost Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response’, International Security 34, the Naval War of 2015’, Orbis (2008): 139- no. 2 (2009): 58. Journal Articles 157. 4 Nan Li, ‘The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capability: Buszynski, Leszek, “The South China Sea: O’Rourke, Ronald, China Naval From ‘Near Coast’ and ‘Near Seas’ to ‘Far Seas’2. Asian Security 5, No. Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.–China Modernization: Implications for US Navy 2 (2009): 161. Strategic Rivalry”, The Washington Quarterly Capabilities – Background and Issues for 35, No. 2, (2012): 139-56. Congress, Congressional Research Service 5 Nan Li, ‘The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capability’, Bitzinger, R., ‘A New Arms Race? Report for Congress, October. 161. Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153. 6 Geoffrey Till, ‘Chapter One: Naval modernisation, action-reaction Acquisitions’, Contemporary Southeast Asia pdf. dynamics and their drivers’, Adelphi Series 52 (2012): 53. 32, no. 1 (2010): 50-69. Panda, Jagannath, “Debating China’s ‘RMA- 7 You Ji, ‘The Chinese Navy, Its Regional and Global Reach’, Cheng-Chwee, K. ‘The essence of hedging: Driven Military Modernisation’: Implications Strategic Analysis 36, No. 3 (2012):481. Malaysia and Singapore’s response to a rising for India”, Strategic Analysis 33, No. 2 (2009): 8 Information Office of the State Council, The Diversified China.’ Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, No. 287-299. 2(2008): 159-185. Employment of China’s Armed Forces, The People’s Republic of China, Rahman, Chris, ‘China’s Maritime Strategic Beijing, 2013. Erickson, Andrew S. and Gabriel Collins, Agenda’, Policy Analysis No. 60 (2010), 9 Yves-Heng Lim, ‘The Driving Forces behind China’s Naval ‘China’s Maritime Evolution: Military and Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Modernization’, Comparative Strategy 30, no. 2 (2011): 109. Commercial Factors’, Pacific Focus 12, No. 2 Institute. (2007): 47-75 10 Ibid. Http:// www.aspi.org.au/publications/ France-Presse, Agence, Defence Talk, 22 Oct publicationlist.aspx?pubtype=9 11 Leszek Buszynski, ‘TheSouth China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, 2010, Viewed 22 May 2013. and U.S.–China Strategic Rivalry’, The Washington Quarterly 35, No. Ross, Robert, ‘China’s Naval Nationalism: 2, (2012): 141. http://www.defencetalk.com/japan-to-add- Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response’, six-submarines-to-fleet-reports-29619/ International Security 34, no. 2 (2009): 46-81. 12 Chris Rahman, ‘China’s Maritime Strategic Agenda’, Policy Analysis No. 60 (2010): 2. Glosny, Michael A, Phillip C. Saunders, Roy, D. ‘Southeast Asia and China: Balancing Robert Ross, ‘Debating China’s Naval or Bandwagoning?’ Contemporary Southeast 13 Marc Lanteigne, ‘China’s Maritime Security and the ‘Malacca Nationalism’, International Security 35, no. 2 Asia 27, no. 2 (2005): 305-322. Dilemma’’, Asian Security 4, No. 2 (2008): 149. (2010): 161-175. Singh, Amit, ‘South China Sea Disputes: 14 Ibid. Goh, E. ‘Southeast Asian perspectives on the Regional Issue, Global Concerns, Maritime China challenge’, Journal of Strategic Studies Affairs’,Journal of the National Maritime 15 Robert Ross, ‘China’s Naval Nationalism’. 30, no. 4 (2007): 809-832. Foundation of India 8, No. 1 (2012): 116-135. 16 See Glosny, Michael A, Phillip C. Saunders, Robert Ross., Holmes, James ‘Japan and China: Tensions Taylor Fravel, M., ‘China’s Search for Military “Debating China’s Naval Nationalism”, International Security 35, no. 2 Mounting’, The Diplomat, 6 February 2013, Power’, The Washington Quarterly 31, No. 3 (2010): 161-175. Viewed 29 May 2013. (2008): 125-141. 17 Robert Ross, ‘China’s Naval Nationalism’, 64. http://thediplomat.com/the-naval- Till, Geoffrey, ‘Chapter One: Naval 18 Ibid, 62. diplomat/2013/02/06/japan-and-china- modernisation, action-reaction dynamics tensions-mounting.pdf and their drivers’, Adelphi Series 52 (2012): 19 Ibid. Holmes, James R. and Toshi Yoshihara, 31 - 64. 20 Ibid, 61. ‘China’s Naval Ambitions in the Indian Zhongying, Pang. ‘China’s changing Ocean’, Journal of Strategic Studies 31, No.3 21 Pang Zhongying, ‘China’s changing attitude to UN Peacekeeping ‘, attitude to UN Peacekeeping ‘, International International Peacekeeping 12, No. 1 (2007): 87-104. (2008): 367-394. Peacekeeping 12, No. 1 (2007): 87-104. Ji, You, ‘The Chinese Navy, Its Regional and 22 James Kraska, ‘How the United States Lost the Naval War of 2015’, Global Reach’, Strategic Analysis 36, No. 3 Orbis (2008): 17. Government Documents (2012): 477-488. 23 Robert Ross, ‘China’s Naval Nationalism’, 66. Information Office of the State Council, The Lanteigne, Marc, ‘China’s Maritime Security 24 Ibid 46. and the ‘Malacca Dilemma’’, Asian Security 4, Diversified Employment of China’s Armed No. 2 (2008): 143-161. Forces, The People’s Republic of China, 25 You Ji, ‘The Chinese Navy, Its Regional and Global Reach’, 481. Beijing, 2013 (White Paper). Li, Mingjiang, ‘China and Maritime 26 Ibid, 482. Cooperation in East Asia: Recent Japan Ministry of Defence, Defence of Japan, 27 Ibid. Developments and Future Prospects’, Journal Japan, Tokyo, 2009 (White Paper) Viewed 22 May 2013. of Contemporary China 19, No. 64 (2010): 28 Ibid. 291-310. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_ 29 Geoffrey Till, ‘Chapter One: Naval modernisation, action-reaction paper/2009.html dynamics and their drivers’, Adelphi Series 52 (2012): 35. Japan Ministry of Defence, Defence of Japan, Li, Nan and Christopher Weuve, ‘China’s 30 32 Agence France-Presse, Defence Talk, 22 Oct 2010, Viewed 22 Japan, Tokyo, 2012 (White Paper) Viewed 22 Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: An Update’, May 2013. Naval War College Review 63, No. 1 (2010): May 2013. 31 Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel Collins, ‘China’s Maritime 13-31. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/ Evolution: Military and Commercial Factors’, Pacific Focus 12, No. 2 Li, Nan, ‘The Evolution of China’s Naval pdf/2012/07_Part1_Chapter1_Sec3.pdf (2007): 47. Strategy and Capability: From ‘Near Coast’ and ‘Near Seas’ to ‘Far Seas’’. Asian Security 5, 32 K Cheng-Chwee, ‘The essence of hedging: Malaysia and No. 2 (2009): 144-169. (Endnotes) Singapore’s response to a rising China.’ Contemporary Southeast Asia 30. No. 2(2008): 161. Lim, Yves-Heng, ‘The Driving Forces behind 1 Ibid, 27. 33 Geoffrey Till, ‘Chapter One: Naval modernisation’, 51. China’s Naval Modernization’, Comparative 2 Ibid, 30. Strategy 30, no. 2 (2011): 105-120. 34 James Holmes, ‘Japan and China: Tensions Mounting’, The 3 Robert Ross, ‘China’s Naval Nationalism: Diplomat, 6 February 2013, Viewed 29 May 2013. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 24 The Importance of Audience Perception in Communications from the Maritime Battlespace Environment of the Future By Dr Tom Lewis

At the beginning of the 21st century, the world media shows little sympathy for the challenges and awful ironies facing those who wield power; it upholds the safer virtue of sympathizing only with the powerless. Warrior Politics – Robert D. Kaplan

I hate newspapermen. They come into camp and pick up their camp rumors and print them as facts. I regard them as spies, which, in truth, they are. – General William T. Sherman

nly when the schooner Pickle of the message was also significant: important ramifications both from the reached Britain, bearing news of Lebanon’s forces, it proved, were able perspectives of the tactical commander, Osuccess at Trafalgar, was the effect of and willing to operate in a theatre organic intelligence, and strategic the battle realised. Perhaps half of the previously unrealised by themselves, high command. If, and how, such impact had already been seen: much of and their perceived calibre as an enemy realisations will be understood in the French and Spanish navies’ effective was instantly ratcheted upwards future conflicts is an important part of force lay smashed at the bottom of by a significant degree. I will repeat military success. the sea.1 But the realisation of the “perceived calibre” again: perceptions One appreciable difference between new limits of Napoleon’s Empire was matter, and can be the difference the Iraqi war, to pick a single example, contained in the other fifty percent of between your enemy continuing to and Trafalgar, is that there are wildly the equation: communication of the fight, and laying down his arms: if he different levels of media coverage: success. Now the trade lines of the thinks you are the undoubted winner from none at all, to the enemy and the French were limited; now her power that might be all that matters. general public knowing everything. was hemmed in by sea rather than The two incidents, two hundred Does information being released mean advanced by it; now her global reach and two years apart, are significant much, apart from the obvious technical would be fully contained by those for both their message and the secrets which deny a weapon to the waters dominated by the Royal Navy. realisation that the delivery systems enemy? Yes, it does. In the case of the The importance of the victory lay of the messages have changed over Pickle, it mattered quite a bit, especially in the news of the triumph. So from time. The message from Pickle was if you wanted to get rich. If you gained 1808 Wellington’s armies were able weeks in the carriage. The message the information of Trafalgar’s victory to operate in Spain, and be supplied about the Israeli Navy’s loss – and first, perhaps with an advance warning from Britain; a course of action only its vulnerability – was immediately of a few hours – a hoist of flags saying allowable by the fruits of Trafalgar. transmitted around the world in a such and such, or perhaps a ship’s So too was such a message matter of hours. Significantly, it was company member able to transmit understood – at least dimly – by the realised by Israel’s enemy in the same something to a waiting, faster, vessel – Israeli Navy in 2006 when one of their timeframe, and within hours the effects then you were off. Get that information warships was hit by a missile launched of that message’s reception were being to the right people holding the right by Lebanon’s forces. The immediate analysed, and pursued further for what stocks and bonds ashore, put about a effect was bad enough, with the could be gained. So too, will any future rumour of a terrible loss, sell hard on damage, to people and material, deadly images and messages of war at sea be an uncertain market, buy frantically - and shocking. But the secondary transmitted. and you were made financially when and perhaps more important impact Does this matter? This paper the news of victory came in and the 1 In fact, Nelson did not sink any enemy argues that modern media, and market soared. Not that anyone on the ships at Trafalgar, but rather captured many communications from the battlespace, Pickle was any part of such a scheme, as – a course of action much to be preferred, as they could then be added to the forces of the play an important part of warfare far as I know. Royal Navy. Unfortunately, a storm after the today, and this realisation will have So too does all sorts of information battle did succeed in sinking many ships. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 25

reaching public ears matter. Yes, for a and its doings a direct extension of the supporting public is essential – without body politic? A military force is a part public support for your war your best of the society it serves and protects, efforts can collapse, as an angry public and therefore the societal group which demands answers, changes, and better brought it into being has a right to results, rather than seeing their military know of the successes and failures of its personnel come home dead. forces. Should that though come from Public opinion changed the progress journalists or from the military itself? of the Crimean war, for example, It is difficult for journalists to get perhaps the first where communication their work published in a war. They from the battlefield – into the public face a considerable range of difficulties: area – made an appreciable difference. direct harm, eg; getting murdered, (However, as in the case of Trafalgar, which was the leading risk in Iraq the time the news took to reaching the from2003, where “137 journalists waiting public, was a significant factor.) and media staff have been killed Billy Russell, of Britain’s The Times, [making it]… the deadliest conflict for lived alongside the British, French and media professionals since the Second 2 Two French officers Turkish allied soldiers in the appalling World War”, according to UNESCO. for many journalists, and in general, we seated and a conditions, caused mainly by appalling Other difficulties include collateral would agree that in a free society there Zouave standing incompetence, which saw initial risk – getting in the way of a random should be truthful representation of with arm resting on possible success literally bog down rocket; the fact that quite often the what goes on in the battlespace, even rifle in the Crimean into mud and cold. Soldiers died of the information the journalist is after is though with some journalists it seems War (Public domain) cold in the first winter on the Crimea, protected; a degree of communication to be a matter of inserting their opinion within 10 miles of the beachhead, difficulty – you’re on an aircraft carrier rather than simply reporting the facts. where stores such as blankets and in the Atlantic and signals bandwidth But how far do we go? In World heaters lay piled in heaps because of is rare; and some degree of editorial War II it was simply a matter of a lack of a railway, or horses, to move interference back home. Some analysis allowing the journalists to come along the stores to where they were needed. though might lead us to brood over for the ride. They mostly provided Lord Cardigan, later to become famous the difficulties of several wars – and their own rationing, sometimes their in the Charge of the Light Brigade, was perhaps the job is getting harder. own transport, and just reported. allowed to live on his heated personal But even then there was enough For a time-travelling journalist covering steam in the harbour, while his opinion inserted to become a men suffered. Poor strategic planning these wars, what were the chances of concern. Consider these cartoons of and equally poor tactical command death and difficulty in the job? Bill Maudlin, the famous American saw disasters such as the Charge, Footnotes explain why the assessments correspondent and cartoonist, whose where the only praiseworthy aspect have been given this numerical score works appeared in Stars and Stripes. was the steadiness of the cavalry under The cartoons beautifully capture the fire as they made a frontal assault on Nevertheless, the “truth is out there”, phlegmatic nature of many a soldier; artillery, losing most of their 600. Billy Conflict Degree of Degree of Degree Degree of Degree of Russell, and others, reported on this, direct risk collateral risk of source communication editorial and the stories in the newspapers had a protection of difficulty interference direct effect on the political to military information 1 Crimea 0%1 10%2 50%3 70%4 20%5 co-operation. By the next winter, US Civil War 0% 15% 40% 80%6 20% conditions and progress had improved WWI 0%7 10% 60% 60%8 40%9 remarkably. WWII 5% 10% 80%10 40%11 30%12 But should there be free journalism Vietnam 10% 10% 80% 40% 50% communication from the battlespace? Falklands 30%13 30% 90% 60% 40% It was a good thing in the Crimean I 20% 20% 80% 30% 40% war, and we might argue it is a good Gulf War II (Iraq) 80% 40% 80% 10% 40% thing in all wars, for is not the military Afghanistan 20% 30% 80% 20% 40% Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 26 The Importance of Audience Perception in Communications from the Maritime Battlespace Environment of the Future

Just give me another asprin, I already got a “Fresh spirited American troops, flushed with “I guess it’s okay. The replacement center says purple heart” victory, are bringing in thousands of hungry, he comes from a long line of infantrymen” ragged, battle-weary prisoners. (news item) “Hit th’ dirt boys!” and the inevitability of the situation from the soldiers in the Task Force? British Army colonel resigned over they found themselves in, but also Soldiers at their most basic duty are a description of nicknames used in 6 sometimes the despair of the situation. inside a world of life and death which is physical training. Admiral Sir Henry Personally, I think they’re all great not suitable for the at-home consumer Leach, First Sea Lord, commented on value at accepting your risky job on the of the evening news. Imagine the the BBC leak in the Falklands: “None front lines, but imagine the effect of effect of this communication from the of us had any experience of modern 7 the last two especially on newly arrived maritime battlespace inside a troop- war with modern media technology”. infantry. carrying vessel as it proceeded south Indeed, but they very quickly had Moving to the more modern and to the Falklands. To the tune of the to learn to adapt to what they had the maritime, we might brood over the Cliff Richard hit “Summer Holiday” then – and a quarter of a century later, 4 wisdom of bringing along journalists, members of 42 Commando sang (with the messages from the front are still as was done in the Falklands conflict. some translation alongside) - see below. evolving in speed and type – and the As the 2nd Parachute Regiment was T-shirts proclaimed the intentions military is still playing catch-up – preparing to make a land advance: of the wearer. “Falk off, Galtieri” sent hence this paper... “…it was at this moment that men a message to the Argentine leader; but The brave new world is much more listening to the BBC’s World Service others simply proclaimed the lethality savage, as Tony Blair commented: news bulletin heard its London defence of the British. “Start Crying for Us, The media had become dangerous correspondent’s statement that 2 Para Argentina, we’re Coming to Bomb the because of its desire for stories was within five miles” of its target. Shit out of you” recalled the famous with “impact” that would allow it “The battalion, and above all its colonel rock-opera song “Don’t Cry for Me to stand apart from the rest of the [“H”. Jones] were first shocked and Argentina”, and shirts proclaiming “X media. 3 then enraged.” They hastily began to Troop, Plastic Killers” spoke of the This, he said, came second to 5 disperse and prepare defences against effectiveness of the plastic bullet. accuracy. “It is this necessary the air or artillery attacks which This was in 1982, and in the days devotion to impact that is seemed inevitable – it is not known before the Internet. When instant unravelling standards, driving whether the defences would include communication from the battlespace them down…something that is Robert Fox, the BBC correspondent was the norm 25 years later, a interesting is less powerful than accompanying the soldiers. We’re all going to the Malvinas, - the Argentine name for the islands So not only could the accompanying We’re all going to kill a Spic or two, journalist influence the audience at We’re all going on a pusser’s holiday, - slang term for navy people and equipment home, he could influence the action For a month or two… on the ground. Like most wars, the We’re going to kill the wops with - phosphorous grenade, usually used as a Falklands conflict saw divided support phosphorous smoke marker to show initial fall of shot, from the (in this case British) public but extremely harmful at large. And governments are acutely aware of this. What would the effect We’ll get them with our GPMG’s - General Purpose Machine Gun have been of the general public hearing They’d better not try to take cover, ‘Cos there ain’t no fucking trees. of the bloodthirsty statements below Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 27

Hanit (Israeli Navy) something that makes you angry or 8 shocked.” So what are the implications of today’s communications on the modern maritime battlespace. Timeliness is one. In 1982, when HMS Glamorgan was hit by an Exocet land-based missile, it took hours or days for the news to reach the front pages – the communications from the ship were strictly controlled. Now mobile phones, Below: Phalanx whenever they come within coastal being checked range, can leak information quickly, during Exercise and the front pages are screens linked Gulfex (RAN photo) to the Internet. Back then, the only program running on British TV at Mr Rumsfeld said al-Qaeda and 3am in the morning was the Open other Islamic extremists were University, and the bad news had to bombarding Muslims with negative wait until morning. Now, it’s a 24 hour images of the West… a day game. Then, journalists worked Michael Novak, the George Frederick for newspapers and radio and TV; now, Jewett Scholar at the American anyone can be a reporter in the big bad Enterprise Institute, suggests that world of “blogging” – web logs, sites the war in Vietnam was lost “when set up by anyone, and run for very little America’s leaders decided that they cost. Then, there was some control, and could not resist the unrelenting some censorship, even self-imposed. storyline of the enemy, which had long Now, so-called celebrities such as Paris prevailed in their own press”. Similarly, Hilton become dubiously famous the Cold War was lost by the USSR because her boyfriend “posted a clip “when the Soviet elites no longer 9 on the Net”, and the comments and believed their own storyline.” He information released of many a person thinks that the war against terrorism is is uncontrolled and uncontrollable psychological, and Islamists know that by their own country, because the if they can keep constant defeat in front computer servers upon which the blog of the West’s cameras, then eventually sits are in another nation. the perception will be instilled into But enough whinging. Today the the minds of its people that there is no media is becoming a tool in the war solution for victory. of perceptions being fought against It is clearly admitted enough by terrorism. And it is one we are losing, terrorists. In a letter to a colleague as the-then US Secretary of Defence the-then second-in-charge of al Qaeda, noted in 2006: Ayman al-Zawahiri, wrote to the leader Phalanx engaging In a speech to the Council of of al Qaeda in Iraq, saying “I say to you: (“the Light”), a monthly magazine (US Navy) 11 Foreign Relations, Mr Rumsfeld that we are in a battle, and that more Kabdat Alla (“The Fist of God”)” , and said some of the US’s most than half of this battle is taking place in of course a website. 10 critical battles were now in the the battlefield of the media.” Let me return to more maritime “newsrooms”. The Hezbollah movement, matters. On 14 July 2006 an Israeli “Our enemies have skilfully proclaimed a terrorist organisation by warship, the Hanit (translation: Spear) adapted to fighting wars in today’s the United States “operates a satellite was operating in waters off Lebanon, media age, but... our country has television station, Al-Manar TV (“the firing shells into the airport, not,” he said. Lighthouse”), a radio station al-Nour as part of the ongoing war between Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 28 The Importance of Audience Perception in Communications from the Maritime Battlespace Environment of the Future

Israel and Hezbollah, their sworn Silkworm is not known, but it also effect caused by the story was done. enemy operating out of Lebanon. The seems true that Israel was not counting As one analyst put it: conflict, precipitated when Hezbollah on being attacked by such a missile. …the worldwide outcry over kidnapped two Israelis, was seeing What is of interest here is the Israel’s purported malfeasances short and medium range missiles fired behaviour of Hezbollah following the grew so strident that the country into Israel from the north, and attacks strike. The next day their television was pressured into a ceasefire. The by Israel’s air and sea assets preceding a station broadcast “a videotape showed media’s depictions of Israel’s actions land push. a blurred object looking like a small so influenced public opinion that TheHanit was hit by a missile, in unmanned aircraft purportedly Israel felt compelled to end the the starboard stern area underneath packed with explosives exploding in fighting right at the moment it was 16 18 her flight deck. By the looks of the the water.” This was an attempt at starting to gain the upper hand. damage caused the warhead did deceiving the Israelis into thinking Hezbollah calculated quite rightly that not explode, but the impact and the they had a capability they didn’t. Next world perception is what matters in a resultant fire were enough to kill came a supposed picture of the Hanit political fight, not how much damage four men, and injure many others. exploding. This actually was – as they could inflict on the other side. An Egyptian vessel, according to the many Australians naval personnel The world’s naval fights in the 12 Israelis , was hit by the second missile, recognized – a cropped and blurred foreseeable future are going to and sunk. version of HMAS Torrens being used as increasingly be fought in the littoral, The weapon, either a C801 or a test target by the Australian Collins- with the presence of cameras, drones, more likely a C802 “Silkworm” was class submarine Farncomb firing a mobile phones, small civilian craft probably fired from a mobile platform: Mk. 48 . Lacking a picture and many other attendant problems “…a truck-mounted launcher cued of their victim, Hezbollah doubtless being present. I would never go so far 13 by a coastal radar installation”. The figured that in a world where Western as to say the day of the ship to ship Hanit’s onboard defences should reporters stand in front of pictures blue water engagement is finished, but have been enough to deal with the of aircraft carriers and call them it would seem on hold for the time incoming threat: she had a Barak , that it would convince being. So the Hezbollah-Israel scenario anti-missile system installed, and also many. might be the first of many such “public” possessed further defences: a Phalanx It sounds incredible Hezbollah clashes. Close-In Weapons System, two 20mm believed it could get away with such How to cope? This needs thought anti-aircraft guns, and probably deception, but indeed it was part and analysis, but timeliness of response 14 numerous .50 calibre machine guns. of ongoing media manipulation would seem at once to be paramount. If It seems from later analysis that the operations conducted throughout Israel’s response to the supposed Hanit Barak system was turned off. Jane’s the whole war. The point is though photo (which wasn’t) was immediate Information Group later noted: that the immediate message is the derision, then the photo loses its value, Although Hanit should have been one that gets the attention. A denial and indeed there is “blowback” from able to defend itself against an by the adversary is about as valuable the attempt to deceive, and Hezbollah anti-ship missile attack, the ship as a “correction” printed in the next would have been left with some of the was operating with its self-defence edition of a newspaper. These were proverbial egg on its metaphorical face. systems deactivated, according standard Hezbollah tactics. Supposed Not enough to give Israel a victory as to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz. bodies were paraded for the cameras much as the Silkworm achieved, but The newspaper suggested that this via supplied footage to show that Israel something all the same. The timeliness decision had been taken in part routinely targeted civilians, although in needs to be in hours though, not days because of the number of Israeli some shots they appeared to have made – fast enough to catch the attention of combat aircraft operating in the a mistake, for some “bodies” were seen those who are still fulminating over the area and a perceived risk that the to getting up too soon. And there was story. 17 ship’s defensive systems might fail the famous case of the ambulance Another response might be not to to recognise these as ‘friendly’ and that wasn’t: how could this vehicle join with the enemy at his own game 15 initiate an engagement. be the survivor of a missile strike – a – or at least don’t get caught if you However, why the ship’s chaff launchers missile that apparently did not kill the do engage in deception operations. or machineguns did not intercept the people inside the ambulance. But the This way you can take the moral high Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 29

open to theft; it took a long time to reach 6 Guardian Unlimited. “Tory MP sacked over ‘black bastard’ ground, and show yourself off as a home, and the transport system was less comments”. March 8, 2007. “The Conservative homeland security non-deceiver, and everyone likes one reliable – a communication could “go down spokesman, Patrick Mercer, today stepped down after saying that with the ship”. being called a “black bastard” was part-and-parcel of life in the of those. armed forces. The party leader, David Cameron, said the remarks 5 It was difficult for an editor to physically One final awful thought. Does this by the MP for Newark and Retford were “totally unacceptable”. Mr interfere; the reputations of some Mercer becomes the first frontbench resignation of Mr Cameron’s mean an unholy alliance of the public journalists preceded them and made them 15-month reign as leader. In an interview with Times Online he said independent. relations expert and the intelligence it was “the way it is” a black soldier would be called a “black bastard”, 6 Crimea was further away than the and that some “idle and useless” ethnic minority soldiers “used officer – a union of formerly oil and American newspapers for which you might racism as cover for their misdemeanours”. http://politics.guardian. water? t work. co.uk/conservatives/story/0,,2029424,00.html 15 June 2007. 7 Very big battles; lots of artillery, and 7 Hastings, Max and Jenkins, Simon. Battle for the Falklands. rather set-piece in approach. Unless you London: Michael Joseph, 1983. (p. 256) were deliberately foolish the chances of 8 The ustralian.A “Blair’s last spray at ‘feral’ media.” 14 June 2007. being hit was slight. (p. 8) 8 The telegraph was in wide use. 9 Novak, Michael. “What the Islamists Have Learned: 9 Newspaper owners saw it as very much How to defeat the USA in future wars.” The Weekly their duty to promote patriotism; very Standard. http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/ little questioning of the evidence is seen, Articles/000/000/012/991gvxyi.asp?pg=1 (22 November 2006.) 16 especially once London was bombed, or June 2007. indirect fire sources such as V1 rockets 10 CNN. “Al Qaeda letter called ‘chilling.’” http://www.cnn. began to hit Britain. com/2005/WORLD/meast/10/11/alqaeda.letter/index.html (12 10 Newspapers found it more and more October 2005) 16 June 2007. difficult to get information out of militaries 11 Wikipedia. “Hezbollah”. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hezbollah who were learning that information 16 June 2007. leaked could be very dangerous. The disinformation campaigns of D-Day worked 12 Israeli Government Official website. very well, for example, as a result of not letting journalists near them, although the http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/ footnote preceding is of importance. Terrorism+from+Lebanon-+Hizbullah/Summary+of+attack+on+ID F+missile+ship+15-Jul-2006.htm 16 June 2007. 11 Telephones were in widespread use. 13 Situational Awareness. http://edefense.blogspot.com/2006/07/c- 12 The British newspapers, for example, 802-missile-likely-shore-launched.html 16 June 2007. were still patriotic but sometimes would question official reports. For example, RAF 14 Free Republic discussion website. http://www.freerepublic.com/ losses in the Battle of Britain were doubted focus/f-news/1666151/posts 16 June 2007. by many US newspapers. 15 Jane’s Information Group 13 Anti-ship missiles and gravity bombs did http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/jmr/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/ DrA Tom Lewis O M’s Lethality in Combat not discriminate. content1/janesdata/mags/jmr/history/jmr2006/jmr70100.htm@ current&Prod_Name=JMR&QueryText= 17 June 2007. was published in 2011, and analysed (Endnotes) 16 Free Republic discussion website. http://www.freerepublic.com/ the reality versus the public perception focus/f-news/1666151/posts 16 June 2007. 1 Martin van Creveld reports: “In the of what goes on in war zones. newspapers, sob stories took the place of 17 See, for example, Human Rights Watch’s investigation: “The strategy. A large reading public was made Hoax that wasn’t”, at http://www.nogw.com/download/2006_hoax_ aware of the fate of troops at Sebastopol. that_wasnt.pdf 17 June 2007. Their sufferings were widely believed to be 18 Zombietime website. “The Red Cross Ambulance Incident: How the outcome of shortcomings in signals, the Media Legitimized an Anti-Israel Hoax and Changed the Course logistics, organisation, auxiliary services, of a War”. http://zombietime.com/fraud/ambulance/ 17 June 2007. (Footnotes) and a competent staff organisation to co-ordinate the lot.” Creveld, Martin van. 1 Newspaper sources in the Crimea were The Training of Officers. London: Collier clearly marked individuals, such as Billy Macmillan, 1990. (p. 46) Russell for The Times, who remained within their own country’s lines. 2 United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation. “World Press 2 The risk of indirect fire sources such Freedom Day 2007”. http://portal.unesco. as long-range artillery being well off- org/ci/en/ev.php-URL_ID=23540&URL_ target were remote: artillery by then was DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201. reasonably accurate. html 15 June 2007. 3 Knowledge was not freely available to 3 Hastings, Max and Jenkins, Simon. people who did not have a clearly defined Battle for the Falklands. London: Michael reason for having access to it; nevertheless Joseph, 1983. (p. 239) a good reporter would have been able to learn much from loose talk; embittered 4 McGowan, Robert, and Jeremy Hands. conversations, and deliberate leakage. Don’t Cry for Me, Sergeant-Major. London: Futara, 1983. (p. 63-64) 4 Information was very difficult to get home: it was physically brought as opposed 5 McGowan and Hands, Don’t Cry for Me, to electronically transmitted; it was well Sergeant-Major, 40. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 30 Speech from Chief of Army Seapower Conference Sydney 7 Oct 2013

hief of the Navy, Vice Admiral consider overly that much of it is also Ray Griggs, distinguished guests, underwritten by the United States as Csenior naval and military officers the leading global power of our era. from all over the globe, ladies and While many of Mahan’s insights gentlemen. are today of primarily historical value, Before proceeding further, I want his assertion that the oceans of the to congratulate the Chief of Navy world constitute ubiquitous highways and all ranks of the RAN on attaining is so profoundly obvious as to conceal that marvelous milestone in your its genius, in much the same way that service to the nation. Yet tempering Clausewitz’s observation that war is that joy is the recognition that many the violent prosecution of policy now of your ranks have also died during sounds self-evidently banal, having that service and it is imperative and become conventional wisdom. That most appropriate that we mark their Australia is an island, albeit one of sacrifice as well. immense mass, is equally as obvious. Despite some good natured rivalry, So our survival, even in peace time, the bonds between our services are depends on the sea. deep and enduring, forged in the Yet, despite universal lip service to crucible of war with its shared perils the innately maritime character of our and losses. Ray ­– on behalf of the geography, the western civilization Army, I salute you and the Navy team. that has grown here since European For reasons, which I intend to settlement has not, in my view, thinkers currently working in address, I believe that we as a nation developed a deep, intrinsic link to that Australia. He expounded on the sometimes fall prey to a collective character. lack of sea mindedness to which Ray amnesia about the extraordinary As another Maritime theorist, my Griggs had alluded in that eloquent service of the Royal Australian Navy. friend Ray Griggs told the Australian quip in 2011. Over a century ago, the great Strategic Policy Institute in 2011, that He described Australia as a sea power theorist Alfred Thayer a more appropriate wording in the maritime nation with a continental Mahan wrote eloquently of the silent, first stanza of our national anthem culture. His hypothesis was carefully inexorable and invisible operation may have been ‘girt by beach’ rather arrived at through delving into the of the blockade which crushed the than ‘girt by sea.’ He was pointing to national psyche and soul. He analysed innards of Napoleon’s Empire. the underdeveloped consciousness the narrative of the Australian The achievements of our soldiers, which should properly underscore settlement, and the degree to which we enhanced, indeed perhaps even mature, true sea mindedness in define ourselves as a sunburnt country. distorted by the ANZAC mythology, Australia. His point was well made Scrutiny of the stories we tell ourselves has, in my view, created a foundation and it concerns me every bit as much about who we are, show a people narrative that has led to our Nation as it bothers him. pitted against a harsh, implacable accepting the fruits of our maritime Our strategic culture, and the and ultimately forbidding continental security as a free public good. It is as strategic policy which incubates in environment. invisible as Mahan’s blockade. it, are the poorer for that cognitive And so, while we revere the sacrifice Our trade flows freely, our failure, which is derived from a deeply of our diggers at Gallipoli, how many petrol stations are replenished, entrenched continental mindset. people really understand the naval our supermarket shelves are full to Last week I conducted my military and amphibious campaign which meet our whims and our commerce history conference, the theme of lodged us on what Chris Masters has flourishes. Yet, Australians collectively which was Armies and Maritime termed The Fatal Shore? The digger do not reflect on the enormous Strategy. There I heard an insightful legend is powerful, but it skews the way national investment involved in presentation from Professor Michael Australians view security, especially sustaining the maritime conditions for Evans, who I believe to be the most the wider contribution of this nation that happy state of affairs, nor do they innovative and influential strategic to the global order of the last Century Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 31

and our obligations to maintaining that made from the aberrant years when we achieve limited force projection in benign order in this one. sought to secure Australia behind the coalition with our allies. Yet, this absence of pervasive moat of the so called sea-air gap. We are well on the way to achieving oceanic consciousness, disguises the There is a warning in this – that that level of maritime capability fact that European settlement of this because of our lack of an oceanic in Australia with political support Great Southern land was achieved by mindset, we risk forfeiting all those other across the spectrum. That vision, of the leading maritime power of that era. natural elements of maritime power a seamlessly joint ADF, structured to Likewise, it ignores the reality that our with which we are lavishly endowed. implement a maritime strategy in the security was initially foundered in no However, as soldier and capability defence of Australia, through denial small part on Great Britain and, later, manager I am optimistic about our of the use of our land, sea and air on its liberal democratic successor the current strategic focus. Here is why. approaches to our nation is correct. United States. We have come a very long way since It is supported by the ADF senior In plain language, our prosperity the strategic shock of 1999 in East leadership and is underpinned by a and role in the world is reliant on Timor roused us from the torpor of the Defence Capability Plan which will put freedom of navigation and the mindset of the Defence of Australia, flesh on the bones of that vision. unimpeded use of Mahan’s great narrowly construed as continental Of course it will require a shift in highways which is guaranteed by the defence. In that regard, I would demur national resources to fund and sustain dominant maritime power of the from John Howard in a minor, though it. And in the aftermath of our longest day, at a most significant discount to not purely semantic, manner. As he war, fought primarily in a land-locked the expenditure of our own national sagely argued, we need not make country, we must take the intellectual treasure. a false, binary choice between our lead in explaining this to the Australian The naval and military professionals European origins and Asian geography public. in this room grasp this reality, but too to achieve Paul Keating’s vision of After all they must fund it, and few of our fellow citizens do as well. security ‘in Asia.’ But we must choose provide their sons and daughters More worryingly, I fear the same may our TRUE history. to serve in this joint force in an era be true of many of some who seek to We need to recognise that despite when individual opportunity and self- advise our policy makers. the prodigious feats of arms of our actualisation have reduced the appeal However, this is not the counsel soldiers, and the romance of the bush, of service careers. That is why our of despair. Australians are nothing our soldiers have never fought a battle deficit in oceanic consciousness has if not pragmatic. Regardless of this on our continent. May that remain so. the potential to undermine our centre myopia, our strategic practice has But as long as the gap between myth of gravity in the pursuit of professional been intuitively shrewd. We have and reality in our national identity and mastery of joint maritime warfare. collaborated with the dominant liberal, ancillary strategic culture remains so Perhaps the thousands of proud democratic maritime power du jour great, we will struggle to achieve our Australians who cheered the arrival since Federation and have benefitted potential as a second tier maritime of that first flotilla 100 years ago immensely from that choice. power. understood better than we do the Again, as I reflected on Mike Evan’s For that classification I am indebted nexus between an actively engaged call to raise public consciousness about to that fine strategic scholar Beatrice citizenship and maritime power than our maritime future in the rapidly Heuser who would situate Australia we do. growing, dynamically changing, Indo among relatively sophisticated medium As senior advisers to the Pacific region, I recalled former Prime powers for whom local sea control, Government, we must take a moral and Minister John Howard’s pithy, yet albeit for particular periods of time, professional lead in this. Moreover, we insightful, warning that Australia need is both possible and indeed a strongly must be truly joint in our advocacy. As not choose between its history and its desirable capability objective. However, I have stated somewhat ad nauseam, geography. area sea control is unachievable for us Australia needs its ADF more than it Read in conjunction with Paul and it remains the monopoly of great needs its Army, Navy and Air Force Keating’s similarly profound insight naval powers. and a joint maritime strategy is only that Australia must seek its security Of necessity we can only collaborate as strong as its weakest service. None in Asia rather than from Asia we can with compatible major powers and of us can afford the dubious luxury discern the rapid progress Australia has contribute to good order at sea and of short term single service ‘wins’ at Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 32 Speech from Chief of Army Seapower Conference Sydney 7 Oct 2013 Australian Regiment in 1997 and 1998. the expense of the coherence of our group on operations in the immediate maritime capability. neighbourhood. Lieutenant General Morrison was made Again, I have never been Plan Beersheba rounds out the a Member of the Order of Australia more optimistic as to our future improvements begun in the wake of the (AM) in 1999 for his services as Brigade notwithstanding the climate of 1999 East Timor crisis, which spawned Major, Director of Preparedness and austerity which is setting the tenor of that guidance and the derivative roles Mobilisation and as CO 2RAR. our strategic debate. In my remaining and tasks for the Army and ADF. time today I shall explain how Army’s Significantly, the introduction of He was promoted to Colonel in October modernisation axis of advance is the Landing Helicopter Docks (LHD) 1999 and took up the position of inherently joint and postures us to take will be a transformative development. Colonel Operations, Headquarters play our role in our maritime strategy Developing an army component as described under extant strategic capable of ‘wet soldiering’. International Force East Timor guidance. The devil will be in the detail. (INTERFET). He was promoted to In general, Armies modernise by The range of specialist skills, trades Brigadier in November 2002 and drawing lessons from their operations and employment codes to conduct commanded the 3rd Brigade from and calibrating their experience against even permissive entry operations is December 2002 until December 2004. history and the changing character of formidable. Delivering land effects war as determined by technological from sea platforms is the most He was appointed as Land Commander change and politico-cultural trends. demanding military task that can be Australia in December 2008 and After a decade at war, and even longer asked of a joint force. Few nations on became Army’s firstF orces Commander on sustained operations across a earth can achieve it. We will soon be on 1 July 2009. On 24 June 2011, he diverse range of threat environments, joining that elite club. But the price of was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant against a range of foes, we have moved admission is high and we need to bring quickly to enhance our firepower, to our society with us if we are to achieve General and on 27 June 2011 he digitise our sensor shooter links and it. It requires a national commitment assumed his current appointment of better align our command and control not an ADF plan. Chief of Army. systems to our higher joint-operational There is much to be done. But as headquarters. Internally we have also we reflect on the challenges that our For his service to the Australian Army better aligned our force generation remote nation overcame to fund, in the fields of training and education, cycles to strategic guidance. design and build that majestic fleet military strategic commitments and We are in the midst of the most which steamed into this great harbour force structure and capability; in comprehensive re-equipment and 100 years ago, we must surely conclude particular, as Commander Australian modernisation program since the end that we are capable of meeting any of World War II. The end state will be future challenge if we can muster Defence College, Head Military Strategic an army that can generate combined even a portion of their resolve and Commitments and Deputy Chief of arms effects in a joint coalition setting patriotism. t Army he was appointed as an Officer while surviving against either a peer in the Order of Australia in the 2010 competitor or a potent irregular enemy. Australia Day Honours list. We are re-organising to field three standard multi-role medium weight Lieutenant General DL Morrison, AO combat brigades. We are shifting Lieutenant General David Morrison from a light infantry army to a light mechanised army deployable by sea joined the Army in 1979, after rather than just air and capable of completing a BA at the Australian implementing the guidance of the National University. He graduated government which decrees that we from the Officeradet C School, Portsea be able to deploy a battalion group to the Royal Australian Infantry Corps. for a contingency with our Primary Operating Environment, while He was the Commanding Officer simultaneously sustaining a brigade of the Second Battalion, The Royal Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

34 Indian Carrier Developments all at sea via the Russians by DR NormanFriedman

arly in July the Indian Navy announced that it was finally Erunning acceptance trials for its Russian-built carrier Vikramaditya. The ship, which began life as the Soviet carrier Admiral Gorshkov, was rebuilt by the north Russian yard Sevmash for the Indians. The deal must have seemed good at the time: the Russians were desperate. In return for an order for carrier-capable aircraft, they offered the carrier, the Indians to pay only for the cost of modernization. As a Soviet carrier, Gorshkov operated STOVL Yak-38 fighter-bombers plus various missiles, most notably a battery of long-range anti-ship missiles. They filled both part of the flight deck and a considerable volume forward of her the Chinese, and probably the Indians, other Russian steam-powered warships Varyag 2 under hangar. Reconstruction, including are currently working on catapults for may not be as capable as might be construction for the Indian Navy (Public removal of the missiles, suited the future carriers. Without those lower- imagined, and they may exemplify a domain photo) ship to higher-performance MiG-29K performance radar aircraft, a carrier deeper problem the Russians face. They aircraft, which are to take off using is much more vulnerable to air attack are still contending with the effect of a ski-jump forward and to land on from beyond her horizon. The Indians the breakup of the old Soviet Union an angled deck using arrester gear. are relying on a Russian-supplied radar two decades ago. Before the breakup, All of that had to be built in. The helicopter (the Ka-31), but it cannot fly supply chains stretched throughout combination of ski-jump and arresting as high as a conventional airplane, nor the country. The Soviet Union had a gear is used on board the somewhat does its radar have anything like the deliberate policy of placing different larger (55,000 rather than 45,000 ton) performance of that on board an E-2. parts of its supply chains in different Russian carrier Admiral Kuznetzov and Perhaps more significantly, when Republics, in attempts both to bind the her Chinese half-sister Liaoning (the the Russians sold her, the carrier had country together and to industrialize former Russian Varyag). no usable powerplant, due to a fire all the Republics. For example, when None of these ships has US-style in her boilers. Replacing or repairing Khrushchev was in power, a steam catapults. Conventional (non- the boilers was a major job, given the development center was set up in his STOVL) aircraft can operate off their amount of ship structure between native Ukraine, supplementing (and ski-jumps, the ship providing the them and the flight deck. When competing with) the main center necessary wind over her deck, but they Vikramaditya ran her first sea trials in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg). suffer a penalty in payload compared last year, when she was to have been The Ukrainian center produced, for to aircraft which can rely on catapults. delivered, her engines suddenly cut example, the sonar in a ‘Charlie’ class Moreover, it takes a high ratio of out when she reached 30 knots. It cruise missile submarine, and all Soviet thrust to weight to operate off a ski- turned out that seven of her eight dipping and sonobuoys. When jump, as the airplane benefits heavily boilers had failed because the fire Ukraine broke with the other Republics from the upward force its engines (insulating) bricks in them had melted. in 1991, the Russians lost their source exert as she is forced up by the deck. The Russians later blamed that on of airborne sonars. Ski-jump carriers are ill-equipped to low-quality Chinese brick (the Chinese The Ukrainians would still sell to the operate lower-performance aircraft hotly denied that). Russians, but the operative word was such as E-2 Hawkeyes. That is why The fire-brick problem suggests that sell, and for that the Russians needed Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 35

UA S F -18F Super cash. In the past, all that had been the components going into weapons order (47 percent of the submarines Hornets (foreground) needed was an order from the Kremlin. and weapon systems have been starved involved are to be delivered this year, fly in formation with Soviet internal documents certainly of that business for two decades. They which means that they represent long- two Indian Navy Sea referred to payments in rubles, but have disappeared altogether, or they past orders). In the past, the Russian Harriers, bottom, and from a Western point of view that have gone into other businesses and forces were fortunate to receive six two Indian Air Force Jaguars, right, over was nearly meaningless. We still have have lost the necessary expertise. This new aircraft per year. Undoubtedly Indian Navy aircraft no way of calculating what defense capacity has to be recreated if large money is being allocated, but it is carrier INS Viraat in actually cost the old Soviet Union. orders for new equipment, even of not clear that the Russian Ministry of 2007(Courtesy US Once the Soviet Union had collapsed, existing design, are to be fulfilled. Defense understands what it will cost Navy) the Russians and the other republics The Russian government is to bring component (Tier II and below) found themselves operating Western- painfully aware that the hiatus in suppliers on line. style cash economies. Some of the big buying equipment has left it with an The Russian Ministry of Defense Russian defense organizations, which ageing force, and now that it has more cannot afford the mass of inspectors were in deep trouble, were willing to money it is trying to make up for lost and other officials who guaranteed work the old way, trusting for later time. The Russians are now publishing quality. Problems with some ballistic payment, but that could not last. That their planned defense programs for missiles, such as the Bulava planned for is why Russian forces have found the period through 2020 (a shocking strategic missile submarines, have been themselves so badly starved in recent departure from past secrecy), and blamed on sub-component failures. years. Their situation is beginning they show just how much production There have also been suggestions that to improve only because Russia is is needed. The announced plans the normal extended test programs benefitting heavily from its trade in oil are to provide 70 to 100 new aircraft of the past, which would have caught and other natural resources. by 2020, plus 120 helicopters, 600 minor (but fatal) design flaws, have That does not solve the supply- armored vehicles, and eight or nine been curtailed as unaffordable. As chain problem. Many of the ships (including submarines). These a consequence, much of what is organizations which used to produce numbers include what is already on currently produced is far less reliable Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 36 World Naval Developments

than one might imagine. Customers Sevmash delivered at a promised side protection spaces. Sevmash asked INS Mumbai of the have sometimes complained publicly. price. Sevmash may also have diverted for more money. It had bought into Indian navy (photo Algeria went so far as to return payments made for some tankers for the project, and it could not complete by Chris Sattler) some MiG-29s because of engine Norway. it. Several times the Indians talked unreliability. Sevmash had no deep carrier of walking away, but the Russians Moreover, the businesses which experience; the Soviet carriers were all knew they had no other way to buy remain are desperate for cash to keep built in Novorossisk, which is now in an carrier to replace their ageing ex- them afloat. They sometimes find Ukraine. Its last experience building British Viraat. The Indians announced themselves taking advances for one large surface ships was with Sverdlov- a project for an indigenous carrier project and spending them on a more class cruisers in the 1950s. It had (now to be named Vikrant), possibly to urgent one, leaving them without the also laid down (but never completed) goad the Russians. The latest estimate ability to complete what they have a Stalin-era battleship. None of that of the total cost of the Vikramaditya promised. The Indian carrier is the had much to do with rebuilding a is $2.3 billion. That may not seem most public example. Originally the carrier. The lack of expertise beyond much compared to the estimated modernization was to have cost the Novorossisk was so bad that the cost of the new U.S. carrier Gerald Indians $947 million (as stated in 2005), Russian Navy discarded three of its R. Ford (currently estimated as $9 which would have been a bargain price VSTOL carriers because they could billion, including considerable entirely for a modern carrier. While the project not be refitted in Ukraine. Admiral new equipment) but then again the was beginning, Sevmash (which was Gorshkov would have followed them Indians are not getting nearly as much basically a submarine-building yard) off the Russian navy list had the Indians carrier capability for their money. The was struggling to complete new missile not turned up as willing buyers. current estimate is that the ship will and attack submarines for the Russian Sevmash engineers knew about the operate no more than 16 MiG-29s. A Navy – a much higher-priority project. boiler problem. They do not appear U.S. carrier can operate nearly 100 The Russian Navy, moreover, was in a to have taken into account the need to aircraft, although in practice air wings far stronger negotiating position than replace internal wiring and to renew are considerably smaller. That is aside the Indians. It had its own limited considerable hull plating, presumably from the advantages associated with budget, and it could make sure that much of it inside a double bottom and nuclear power. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 37

The Indian Navy is trying to to be completed in 2025. An official expand, which means trying to shift drawing of Vikrant shows a ski- its government’s outlook from the jump like that on Vikramaditya, but land to the sea. Senior Indian naval presumably the much larger carrier will officers often point to the country’s have catapults. t dependence on seaborne trade, including for critical energy supply. They also claim that China is building a naval presence in the Indian Ocean (the Chinese generally deny that claim). They have managed to increase Navy spending towards a quarter of the Indian defense budget, which means that plans have been approved for Norman Friedman’s latest book is The two home-built carriers. The first, Naval Institute Guide to World Naval now described as 40,000 tons, is to be named Vikrant, after the first Indian Weapon Systems carrier. Work has been proceeding since 2007, and current reports have the ship ready for launch in August 2013 and at sea in 2018 (the date was formerly given as 2017). A much larger carrier, the 65,000 ton Vishal, is

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 38 RN / RAN Junior Officer Development: Comparisons and Contrasts B y Lieutenant Matthew Winwood

his article is the result of the Naval personnel, equipped with the latest first training the Officer Cadet (OC) Review Centenary Fellowship warship technology and the capability will receive prior to undergoing TAward 2013, sponsored by Ultra to regularly patrol the defence and specialist training, or attending the Electronics. The award provides six economic interests of Australia, Academy weeks for a Royal Navy Junior Officer covering 10% of the Earth’s surface. (ADFA). Unsurprisingly, the main to attach to the Royal Australian Navy Spread at bases across a vast country, modules of the course are very similar for a chosen area of study. I chose to the RAN has extensive capabilities to that of the Initial Naval Training study Junior Officer Development; in patrol boats, submarines, escorts (Officers) – INT(O), course at BRNC primarily due to the prominence of and soon, an enhanced amphibious Dartmouth - militarisation, recent NR articles on the topic, and of capability utilising the Canberra Class ‘marinisation’ and sea training. Very the dynamic nature of training which LHD. None of this comes without broadly, these modules have the aim of will always be a balance between challenges, and in many areas strains turning the OC from a civilian in to a the fleet requirements, and training on procurement, maintenance, military officer, then preparing them resources. Without doubt, both Navies manning and operational tempo are for the maritime environment, and have met significant changes and evident – symptoms common with finally consolidating this through a challenges in this area in recent years many naval forces today. The variety period of training onboard an active – and will continue to do so for the of tasking, travel and force expansion warship. In both establishments, the foreseeable future. attracts many potential officers to the modules are arranged around key RAN. The tasking provides significant leadership assessments as cadets Methods of Research challenges to them both in training progress through the course. Like In order to build the best picture and on operations, such as Middle East many naval training organisations, the of Junior Officer Training and deployments, or the daily struggle to key challenges are resources and Development, I attempted to see deter illegal immigration to Australia’s manning. as much of the training ‘pipeline’ as Northern Coast. Resources at Creswell are notably possible during my time in Australia. different to BRNC with regards to The very definition of ‘Junior Officer’ Initial OfficerT raining boatwork and early ‘marinisation’ is open to debate, however, for the All types of Officer entry to the RAN training. BRNC uses a robust fleet of purposes of my research I have taken attend HMAS Creswell, Jarvis Bay, motor whalers, picket boats and a few this as from recruitment and selection ACT. The main throughput is the New powerboats to progressively introduce ADFA, with a parade through to PWO or charge equivalent. Entry Officers Course (NEOC), the OCs to boathandling and basic under way (ADF) Using my own knowledge base, and the need to confine this potentially vast research area; I have for the most part confined my study to Officers of the Warfare branch, but many areas are equally relevant to other branches. As far as possible, the study is based on the current RN training pipeline as a model for comparison. However, the dynamic nature of training design means that some elements of training may have changed in the time from my own career training, and the writing of this study. The Australian Navy Today From beginnings as a small colonial force, the RAN has grown to 14,000 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 39

seamanship. These boats are effective instructors can become fully engaged progression of the Junior Officer and reliable for training, but it has been in the training, whilst the real-world trainer could both be met by this some time since motor whalers were safety is covered by the civilian master reinforcement of the concept used as RN ships boats. Creswell has of the ship. From my own experience that instruction can be at least recently changed their initial training in training the 2OOW, whilst balancing as demanding, and therefore to incorporate teaching each OC to the need for safety of the ship – merit worthy, as a seagoing drive the modern, powerful Jet-RHIB sometimes training will be limited appointment at the boats. They are required to pass a by the capacity of the supervising same career stage. stringent test, including bringing the OOW. A similar vessel, the DMS boat alongside a moving ship at night Seahorse Mercator operates within the Professional for personnel transfer. This training Sydney area for navigation training, Training is given to all branches; in many cases fulfilling the role that P2000s fulfil for As explained in my introduction, the post graduating the OCs may not be basic navigation training, through to professional training pipeline studied is required to operate a RHIB again, the equivalent for Frigate Navigating that of a Junior Warfare Officer, titled however, this relatively minor training Officer (FNO) training and Command Maritime Warfare Officer (MWO) module provides some significant familiarisation/refresher training. The in the RAN. Over the previous year, benefits. The most important gain contract provides a training platform the RAN has made major changes to is the realistic appreciation of boat very similar to a warship, for a fraction the process of MWO training, most operations and the limitations and risks of the price of running a Frigate or notably by a substantial increase in involved. In my short experience as an Destroyer, and with a fraction of the Bridge simulator training. The bulk OOW, I have seen many requests for crew required. of this simulator training occurs at boat transfers by personnel clearly with With regards to personnel the point where a RN officer would be no regard for either. Furthermore, for challenges, the quality of staff engaged undergoing training for their Bridge those actually responsible for the safety in Phase One training has been noted Warfare Qualification (BWQ), already of boat transfers, having completed the as vital for the OCs development1, and appointed in their first complement training course on the boat can only RN Phase 1 staff now require a positive job. Indeed, the RAN MWOs will be a positive aid to understanding the recommendation for instructional leave Training Authority-Maritime evolution. Finally, it provides some duties before appointment at BRNC. Warfare (TA-MW), HMAS Watson credibility to the officer detailing the The Commanding Officer of HMAS – the training establishment roughly coxswain to conduct a transfer or Creswell, Captain Chandler RAN, has equivalent to the RN Maritime Warfare recover a man overboard that they recently undertaken benchmarking of School (MWS) at HMS Collingwood understand the task they are ordering. recruit training through Europe and the – already with their Bridge Warfare BRNC also has the static-moored US – and has acquired a remarkable Certificate. The positives and Sandown minehunter Hindustan (ex- depth of knowledge of the different negatives of simulation training Cromer) providing an appreciation of training systems and styles. He is form another substantial debate, but living on a warship, with an additional committed to ensuring there is a high what is guaranteed is availability and seamanship classroom and functioning quality of staff at Creswell, and also that uniformity of training. Put simply, foc’sle for training. Creswell has the the training roles compare favourably there are always plenty of available DMS Seahorse Horizon (ex-HMAS with other seagoing or operational escorts, helicopters and submarines in Protector), a former torpedo trials appointments. Whilst realising that virtual company in the simulator, and vessel converted for the underway it is unrealistic to handpick each role, the trainee can always be the OOW training of cadets. It is large enough Capt Chandler is adamant he retains for the serial. In the UK, FOST can to hold 20 OCs, crew and staff for a the right to veto unsuitable candidates achieve this, and frequently does on week. This may sound similar to the for Phase One instructional roles, many a memorable ‘Thursday War’, and long-gone Dartmouth , and works closely with the career to a much larger scale than is usually but is actually a civilian owned and managers to integrate an appointment available by the RAN Sea Training crewed vessel – with RAN instructors to the staff of Creswell into a Junior Group (STG). However, during an embarked for training the OCs only. Officer’s career structure. The parallel OST it is unlikely that the Junior This becomes a substantial advantage requirements for quality instruction of OOW will be able to have charge of whereby, for example, the navigation trainees, and that of the positive career the ship for all the serials, either due Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 40 RN / RAN Junior Officer Development: Comparisons and Contrasts to watch patterns and programming, endorsement and RN BWQ in a first had been pressed to summon the or because there is a minimum level complement appointment, on an active appropriate service. The Australian of competence required for the FF/DD. The financial cost of running approach is for applicants to join the specific serial, and the ship needs a and manning the simulators also Australian Defence Force (ADF), ‘satisfactory’ pass. The other element involves a significant investment. TA- without being confined to a particular of uniformity in the Australian BWC, MW provides 24-hour running of two service, and the initial process reflects is that it provides training to the tactical simulators for BWC training this accordingly. All applicants, highest standard required – based on with a qualified PWO and Yeoman regardless of their preference of service an ANZAC-class Frigate simulation, closed up for each watch. Other or enlistment/commission, are invited currently the RANs most modern smaller simulators are provided for to a comprehensive presentation on the platform. The British system, endorsed navigation training. ADF, a filter interview from an NCO of by the CO on the first platform the Apart from the experience and any service, and an aptitude test. complement OOW serves on, may be numbers of professional training staff Why does this Joint Service element a MM/PP, FF/DD or Capital Ship. The required, the support organisation is matter at this stage? The gains appear types of Warfare knowledge will clearly also configured for the training, with twofold. An applicant may find be radically different for each platform, technical support and even catering that, unsuccessful or unsuitable for a and inevitably the type of exercises the arranged to provide the watch system. certain specialisation, they find that OOW predominantly undertakes will These are delivered by many different they are able to undertake a similar reflect the capability of the ship. contractors with a balanced mix of specialisation in a different service. One other, more general value of Naval and civilian staff. In theory, it Conversely, they can find they are the simulator BWC, is that it allows seems viable that MWS could run in fact qualified for many positions the OOW to make developmental a similar system, but would require they had not previously considered. ‘mistakes’ out of the way of immediate significant resources, investment The other wider training benefit is subordinates.1 Of course, much of and probably contract-renegotiation the increase in general Joint Service being a Young Officer is just about to support the already very busy knowledge acquired by the Careers learning from these mistakes, but by Navigation staff. office staff. Whilst a level is only this career point the Junior OOW The first of the RAN simulator- required to probe the applicants’ will have a variety of other wholeship trained OOWs are only now in their knowledge to the level of the initial and divisional responsibilities, and first appointments. However, early filter, this is nonetheless a broad errors in the relatively specific area feedback from their Navigating Officers range of knowledge which rapidly of Bridge Warfare can easily be suggest that the level of Warfare accumulates during the SNCO’s three transposed by subordinates to make knowledge is considerably higher, year tours. The view of Captain AIB2 is wider generalisations of competence, and allows plenty of extra capacity to that they must increase the throughput however accurate or otherwise that deal with other training challenges of applicants to AIB – surely this means assumption may be. and consolidation. So much so, that we cannot afford to miss the qualified The cost, perhaps, is that many of the legacy system OOWs are and competent applicants that have the simulator time is not used understandably jealous of the new made it as far as the Careers office, understanding the running of a ship system trainees! The value of equal, even if initially for another service. (including mechanical, systematic and high, standards for BWQ/BWC award The Australian Defence Force human terms), or of the wider roles of is hard to contest. Academy (ADFA) is the next clear a Naval Officer – somewhat limited example of Joint Service interaction whilst watchkeeping at a shore training Joint Service Training in training. ADFA is a unique mix of establishment. Trainees spend 22 When applying to join the British academic study for Officer Cadets, weeks in total at TA-MW training for Armed Forces, the applicant will provided by the University of New the BWC – in comparison, it is also a usually have made a decision to apply South Wales, and regular Joint Service reasonable time to obtain a platform for the Army, RN or RAF. Indeed, it military training and leadership used to be the case that the applicant enhancement over the course of 1 The TA-MW simulators have serving was quite literally left in the cold three or four years. The RAAF/Army AB quartermasters (who can also qualify as a QM for the ANZAC platform in them) outside the Chatham AFCO until cadets will join ADFA direct from but the training OOW has no reporting one of the three appropriate buttons selection whilst RAN cadets will have responsibility for them. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 41

already completed NEOC and a sea training appointment. Remarkably in comparison with Britain, all the ADFA cadets study on full salary, benefits, and do not pay tuition fees. Unsurprisingly, most cadets interviewed stated that the education provided by ADFA, and the financial stability whilst doing so, was a significant factor in their decision to join the ADF. So whilst the financial cost to the ADF is obviously Retention and Career Ships participaiting substantial; what are the benefits? on study and support available has in the exercise Ocean At this early stage of professional a positive return on pass rates. For Progression Protector at anchor development the cadets are unlikely Engineering, ADFA has achieved a “Expand their horizons faster than they in Jervis Bay, NSW, to have substantial service experience 75% pass rate, compared with just with HMAS Creswell can themselves” to share their individual service 54% being the average for a regional in the foreground (RAN photo) knowledge. RAAF and Army Cadets University.3 Comparison with the Rear Admiral J Goldrick RAN currently join ADFA before Initial British system is difficult, as there Retention of Junior Officers, Training, whilst the RAN midshipmen simply isn’t an equivalent. The nearest particularly Warfare Officers, usually now attend ADFA post sea training, environment may be establishments makes a regular appearance on RN some returning with operational such as Welbeck Defence Sixth personnel policies. This seems to be experience. It seems that more Form College, or the training and a challenge for RAN alike; though could be made of the shared service sponsorships available by University the ‘push/pull’ factors may differ, and experience by all services attending Air Squadrons, Officer Training Corps the structure of career progression post Initial Training, and thereby also or the University Royal Naval Units. differs considerably. Indeed, the reducing the duplication of training All these establishments offer some RN has formed a dedicated team that occurs for the RAN midshipmen level of financial support, but are to analyse and identify trends, not in the current arrangement. However, fundamentally different in the level just of retention, but wider issues they will all work alongside cadets of support offered and the objectives concerning the efficient management from the other services, developing an of ADFA. Political will is probably of RN personnel and the formation appreciation of service cultures and unlikely to favour construction of a of a more flexible career structure. networking valuable future colleagues. dedicated UK MoD Officer Training Considerations such as ‘talent Indeed, as the early ADFA graduates University at present in a background management’, flexible regular/reserve now reach OF-5 and beyond in Joint of the wake of the SDSR and soaring transitions and realistic career break Service appointments, the value of this higher education costs. However, options are just a few of the examples networking is all the more evident. the power of such establishment being considered.4 The RAN also operates a separate as a modern recruiting tool and an Though there may be many factors Undergraduate Sponsorship effective system for developing and in the decision to continue a career programme, which may be undertaken broadening Junior Officers cannot be as a Naval Officer, one almost always at a civilian University. However, underestimated. appears early in the list: that of career ADFA has shown the additional focus progression. The differences between Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 42 RN / RAN Junior Officer Development: Comparisons and Contrasts

RN/RAN Warfare Officers seem quite marked. A RN Warfare officer will usually have a very clear route to Command – so clear that it is easily available as a flow chart from the Career Manager. The Command Qualification (CQ) exams and boards must be passed, and a suitable progression of seagoing appointments will be required. Junior Warfare Officers will either be working towards this, or a specialist role, or at the very least will be able to provide the above command ‘staff answer’ when asked. The declining number Boating on the River of seagoing command opportunities for many career courses, there is and continued link to officer career Dart, near BRNC appears to increase the competition an element of selection or Aptitude development is not yet established. further. testing. This can vary from short The RAN has proposed a variation The RAN does not use the CQ recommendations from the divisional on the usual aptitude process, by process in the same form as the officer, through to a thorough requiring course applicants to RN. Though subject to a Command assessment – such as aircrew aptitude complete ‘Diagnostic Testing’ at least appointments board, they do not testing or Mine Clearance Diving six weeks before attending a course.6 require the same progressive exams Officer selection. The important The computer-based exams would or CQ assessments. There is a consideration for any career course is be sent directly to the Maritime comparable CO Designates course – that the candidate is correctly prepared Warfare Training Authority, and the but of course, this is only relevant once for the course, and has the academic or results signalled back to the ship or appointed to Command. Observation physical potential to pass the course. establishment. The aim is to ensure of my RN colleagues has shown that By ensuring this is so, maximum that candidates arrive on the course the RN CQ process provides not only benefit can be gained from the training, with a minimum of sustained base a competence check, but a significant and the risk of withdrawing a candidate knowledge, and identify any shortfalls measure of motivation on the route to from training should be reduced. early and sufficiently far in advance command – and recognition for doing The RN People Strategy team have that they can be addressed. This could so. RAN officers of a similar seniority, recently completed a review of all the also reduce the potential ‘learn-exam- whatever their aspirations, do not have aptitude testing that takes place for all forget’ cycle – hence cutting down on this measurement of competence – and courses, including RN, RM, RAF and the necessary course content and time so early Command potential may be Army. The study details the various for professional courses. easier to overlook. Early Command, course aptitude tests and concludes of course, being a strong indicator of that “long term usage of the test data Divisional potential career progressions, and as is in its infancy.”5 Essentially, whilst The very concept of formal Divisional previously described, likely to be a key there are many different types of test Training is something of a relative motivating factor. (with 12 RN tests detailed in this paper newcomer in Officer Training. Where For Junior Officers to qualify alone), the combined use of the results in the past, the vast majority of Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 43

divisional training could be learnt ‘on have considered this before, but it is the job’, the recognition of modern not currently in use. Though it is fair employment practices means that the to say nothing can ever prepare you Junior Officer will need a minimum for every possible divisional challenge skillset to deal with the potential – this seems a very effective way to litigation challenges – on top of those prepare for the inevitable awkward caused by the highly irregular living conversations that are part of being and working conditions of a warship. It a Divisional Officer, and providing a is the variety of, for example, a case of service that the Division deserves. discipline or substance abuse, or simply guidance for domestic issues when Conclusions there seems to be no one else for the Contained within this paper are some rating to talk to. of the more prominent contrasts Both the RN and RAN recognise I have observed in Junior Officer Lieutenant Matthew Winwood RN this, and have formal Divisional Training. In particular I believe the completed Navigation and Warfare training at the Royal Navy Leadership aspects of Joint Service officer training training in the Arabian Gulf as an Academy (RNLA), and the RAN and recruitment, in addition to the Institute of Leadership, Training new training for the Bridge Warfare Officer of theatch, W before his first and Management (ILTM). Both Qualification, appear to be most appointment in the RN Flagship, HMS provide legal and litigation framework applicable and beneficial for adoption Bulwark. Following deployment for knowledge, and enable the Junior by the RN. Meanwhile, a defined the London 2012 Olympics, he was Officer to practice their Divisional Command Qualification system for the awarded the annual Naval Review manner in a training environment RAN could rapidly help focus Junior before being faced with real issues, with Officers with strong Naval career Fellowship to Australia. On returning real consequences for getting it wrong. ambition. to the UK, he joined OP ATALANTA, the Two things can be drawn from A direct comparison for training EU contribution to counter-piracy in the the differing approaches that can be systems between the two Navies Somalia region. learned from. The first is the concept becomes a challenge due to the of ‘360 degree feedback’ – reports variety of external political and collected on a Junior Officer prior to cultural factors, and the difference in attending a RAN leadership course. scale. However, Australia has some Unlike the standard ‘First/Second evolving and innovative solutions Reporting Officer’ report, this also to the challenges of Junior Officer gives an opinion from other Junior Development and continues to

Officers and subordinates. This experiment and reform training (Endnotes) is also compiled in their normal systems. The background and ethos of 1 Bradford, G: Junior Officer Development working environment, away from a their historical training establishments in the Royal Navy: Pay, Rank and Responsibility. Naval Review V99 p384. more directed training environment has been preserved, whilst new ideas, – and may lead to some significant staff and resources strive to meet the 2 Interview with Capt R G Stewart, Captain Admiralty Interview Board, March Leadership and Management traits ever-evolving demands of the service. 2013. that would otherwise be missed in a Many of the ideas and training systems 3 Interview with RAdM J Goldrick, Former traditional report. studied in this paper may be suitable ADFA Commandant, April 2013. The second is the use by the RNLA for application to the other Navy, 4 Draft Paper, CNPS: Naval Service Management of Talent and Talent of a dedicated CCTV system to allow and serve to demonstrate that both Management, March 2013. a training Divisional Officer to face navies are adapting to modern training 5 Loose Minute, RN People Strategy role-playing divisional members in challenges. This should then ensure Team: Psychometric Testing Current a realistic environment (the two way the Junior Officer is prepared for the Baseline, 27 Mar 2013. discussion will happen ‘alone’, whilst wide variety of challenges presented 6 Loose Minute, RAN School of Maritime Warfare: Diagnostic Testing – SMW the rest of the class can observe the during a commission in a modern Course, 19 Apr 2013. CCTV in another room). The RAN versatile Naval force. t Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 44 Our Battleship† at War: HMS New Zealand in the First World War B y Michael Wynd

n 1907, the pulsating extremity of 1 the Maritime Entity known as the IBritish Empire celebrated its elevation to Dominion status. Its joyful citizens sang lustily: God Defend Our Freeland Guard Pacific’s Triple Star From the Shafts of Strife and War And Make Her Praises Heard Afar Keep that last line in mind as New Zealand sought praise far from home by the means of a battleship. Why a battleship? When the offer was made it was understood that the Dominion was promised a battleship rather than the Indefatigable-class that eventually arrived. “That splendid piece of practical from the uttermost ends of the earth. New Zealand in Australia, May 1919 (New Zealand Navy) 2 patriotism” , the gift battlecruiser Ward explained his decision in his HMS New Zealand, played a role in usual colourful rhetoric: Ward of dancing to a jingo tune but Churchill described the 5 the war at sea during the First World We distant sons desire to stand in gift as far-seeing statesmanship. War. This ship had a unique history any peril beside the lion mother of In 1913 she was sent on a cruise to New Zealand to show before the war and fought at all three our race, and to the utmost of our the Dominion what its money had purchased. She was major engagements in the North resources prove to her and to the proudly displayed as a symbol of the Royal Navy’s might, Sea. Using contemporary accounts, world how dear to us is Britain’s British industry, and of New Zealand’s nationhood – our newspaper reports, and objects will name and greatness. We recognise country’s name proudly borne by one of the front line units illustrate experiences aboard the ship in that Britain’s acknowledged of the Navy that would defend the Empire. She arrived at order to explain the unique story that supremacy of the seas goes for the Wellington on 12 April 1913 and during her time in New the Dominion’s gift played in the war. maintenance of peace, and that any Zealand waters she hosted nearly 500,000 visitors, equal to These are lasting evidence of a special weakness, either in the Homeland half the population at the time. She left New Zealand at the connection between the Dominion or abroad, makes what ought to be end of June to return to Britain. In July 1914 New Zealand and its “battleship” which was a “source a dominant position a dangerous requested two Bristol-class cruisers. It was reported in of joy and pride to every loyal New one. Sacrifices must be made to London that the zealous nature of New Zealand’s request 3 Zealander.” show competitive nations that, was worthy but not realistic. It did acknowledge that the In 1909, the newest Dominion although separated by seas, we are Dominion had a right to be annoyed based on the gift of New 6 filled with Imperial spirit agreed to in reality one for the preservation Zealand that the Admiralty had not met its promise for 4 fund the purchase of one battleship of our Empire’s greatness. three to be maintained on the New Zealand for the defence of the Empire. The The cost was £2.3 million pounds Station. Prime Minister Joseph Ward made the [approx. $350m NZ], or 2 pounds & From a naval historical perspective, what marks New decision unilaterally and after getting 3 shillings for every man, woman and Zealand’s wartime service is the objects that were presented approval, suspended parliament so child living in New Zealand in 1909. when she visited New Zealand in 1913 and became he could attend the 1909 Imperial Not every New Zealander was happy talismans for her ship’s company. Firstly, there were pieces Conference. There he bathed in the with Ward’s generosity. That socialist of greenstone [jade] given by the Maori to the ship when glow of admiration of this noble gesture rag the Maoriland Worker accused it visited ports around the country. We have some in the

† This title is deliberate. There are many references to ‘our battleship’ in the press of the period and although it was known to be a battlecruiser it is often referred to as a battleship. See Ohinemuri Gazette, Volume XXV, Issue 3289, 4 September 1914, p. 2 and ‘The Battleship Gift’, New Zealand Herald, Volume XLVIII, Issue 14723, 4 July 1911, p. 7. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 45

collection that was kept in the Warrant Officers and 7 Officers’ mess during the war. men who were Secondly, there was the piupiu and tiki. in the Conning When Halsey visited in 1913 he was Tower… were presented with a sacred tiki and piupiu1 so startled by a Maori Chief at Rotorua. The at seeing Chief asked the Commanding Officer, me in this Captain Halsey whether he would wear extraordinary the gifts if he was ever in battle. Halsey clothing that agreed to do so not thinking he would they appeared 8 ever have to honour this promise. to be quite Finally, there was the national flag incapable of which had been presented to the ship carrying on Assembled officers of HMS New Zealand together with Winston Churchill in May 1913 by the proud Women of with their very important personal and King George V (Lewis Collection) New Zealand’s Timaru Branch. duties and I had quickly to explain 12 21 The Navy Museum has identified why I was thus attired. times spent aboard the ship. Three hundred and seventy four New Zealanders who served in The ship was not damaged or hit pounds was collected, enough to provide an oilskin for every 22 the battlecruiser during the First World during this action and a rating reported member of the ship’s company. War. Lieutenant Alexander Boyle back to New Zealand that the whole By mid-January 1915 New Zealand was part of the 13 served in the ship during all three engagement had lasted 14 minutes. battlecruiser element of the anti-invasion force under Beatty. engagements was in command of X He also mentioned that the “torpedoers At the Battle of Dogger Bank she carried the flag of Rear 14 Turret at the . He was in the fight had a hot time. It was Admiral Sir Archibald Moore. Halsey again wore the tiki joined by Midshipman H. Anderson. reported that she fired 82 rounds from and piupiu. Before the action he “got many messages from Chief Quartermaster Eddie Fitzgerald her guns and one of her torpedoes sank all over the ship hoping that the [piupiu & tiki] was again 15 brought the ship out to New Zealand the SMS Koln. This was going to be worn”. At 9.35 New Zealand was within range of in 1913 and served in New Zealand for also the first time that the new national Blücher which had dropped somewhat astern, and opened the duration of the war. Alongside him flag of New Zealand was taken into fire on her along with Tiger and Princess Royal. Most of her 9 16 23 was Petty Officer Allan Mclnnes. combat. During the action it was 139 rounds fired in the battle were directed to this target. In August 1914 New Zealand was laced to the foremast. Reportedly Blücher was the only German vessel to have fired 24 part of the and would After the battle New Zealand on New Zealand. serve alongside her sister battlecruisers papers reported that praise for the Once again there were no hits on the ship. In his for all three major engagements. At ship was being reported in Britain and Despatch Beatty gave credit to the Engineering staff aboard 17 the outbreak of the war Halsey was Canada. A rating wrote to his parents New Zealand for being able to steam at 28.5 knots, “greatly 25 still in command. After the declaration letting them know that the ship was exceeding their normal speed.” Moreover, the excellent of war he sent a message to the Prime safe and sound. He went on: “We have steaming of the ships engaged in the operation was a 26 Minister William Massey that “all a fine recipe in this ship for cooking conspicuous feature of the battlecruisers. The Official on board HMS New Zealand will German sausage, and I must say that History notes that the men in the engine room of “knew it 27 endeavour to uphold the honour of the it goes down very well with a little was a chance of a lifetime.” The Engineer Commander and 10 18 Dominion.” Jellicoe sauce.” In 1917 bounty money senior ratings of the engineroom were given a Mention in 28 New Zealand’s first action was for the battle was paid ranging from Despatches. The national flag was laced to the foremast Bight on 28 August 1914. ninety-two pounds for flag officers to during the chase and engagement. After the battle it was 19 She was part of the First Battlecruiser a shilling for a humble Able Seaman. much blown out and had to be repaired. Tattered parts were Squadron and fought alongside HMS As an example of how the battlecruiser cut off and given to Captain Halsey and sent back to New 11 29 Invincible. Before she went into was followed in New Zealand, at the Zealand as trophies. action Halsey donned the piupiu over beginning of January 1915, the wife On 26 January the Times reported that: his uniform, and as he recalled: of the Governor General opened a One point requiring further emphasis is the proof of 1 A tiki is a ceremonial wood and stone fund to purchase extra oilskins “at Imperial solidarity supplied by the participation of the 20 carving of humanoid forms found in Central this strenuous time” for the men New Zealand in the fight. The whole Empire Eastern Polynesian cultures of the Pacific Ocean. A piupiu is a ceremonial skirt-like of the ship. She asked the donors to may be proud of this fine warship built by our brethren garment made of flax strands that hang reflect on the 1913 visit and the happy at the other end of the world. It was able to do excellent from a belt. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 46 † Our Battleship at War: HMS New Zealand in the First World War 30 service. A few days later Halsey telegraphed the New Zealand High Commissioner that the ship’s company “are proud to have represented the Dominion” at the 31 battle. At the same time New Zealand papers were reporting that German accounts of the battle claimed that New 32 Zealand had been sunk. In 1917 it was announced that the battlecruiser would share prize money totalling fifty- two hundred pounds for Blücher with 48 other ships. Senior officers would receive seventy-nine pounds while the most junior rating would receive a 33 shilling. In May 1915, when Halsey was promoted and appointed to another command, he passed the piupiu and tiki over to his successor patriotism and foresight on the next ”Pelorus Jack”, the ship’s mascot, in the muzzle of a twelve-inch gun in 37 1914 (Lewis Collection) as Commanding Officer of New occasion of a naval battle. Zealand, Captain John Green who had Now let me turn to a moment 34 39 commanded the cruiser HMS Natal. of unpleasantness in the Anzac to port. The wound to the ship’s company was such that As he left, Halsey wrote to the Navy relationship. It is the precursor to the the Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes had to visit the League in Wellington: infamous 1981 “underarm incident.” jinxed battlecruiser in May to exhort the ship’s company. We fully realise how much we are This was the collision between New A month later New Zealand was flagship of Rear- thought of in the Dominion, and I Zealand and HMAS Australia on 22 Admiral William Pakenham, commanding the 2nd trust that New Zealand will always April 1916. At the time both vessels as Battlecruiser Squadron consisting of New Zealand and HMS have a good reason to be proud of part of the 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron Indefatigable. Normally Australia was the Squadron flagship her ship. I can only say without any were cruising north of Jutland in line but it is fair to say Rear-Admiral Pakenham wanted to use hesitation that all on board fully abreast. As an anti-submarine measure the “lucky ship” rather than the ill-starred ship that managed realise how the eyes of the whole they were on this day zig-zagging to miss all three major engagements. It should be pointed Dominion are on us, and we are at 19.5 knots. Suddenly thick fog out that Pakenham upon his appointment to command fully determined that, come what descended and in limited visibility the the battlecruiser force in November 1916 was directed to may, we shall do our utmost for two battlecruisers collided twice. retain Australia as his flagship but pointed out that HMS 35 ‘New Zealand and the Empire.’ New Zealand was damaged above Lion was a more suitable ship and allowed to move his flag 40 Taking over command, Captain Green the waterline which was never properly to her. If more evidence is required of underarm tactics it was told of the Maori Chief’s request repaired. Australia sustained such should be noted that Australia was at it again in 1917. On 12 and agreed to wear the piupiu and tiki damage that she had to go into dock December she collided with HMS Repluse which kept her in 41 into action. Unfortunately Green was for repairs. This left her out of the dock for three weeks. more rotund than Halsey and could fleet for the forthcoming battle. The not wear the piupiu. Halsey wrote to a Australian Official History states that The Battle of Jutland friend in Dunedin that Captain Green the collision was no way her fault – but In May 1916 New Zealand was part of the 2nd Battlecruiser 38 was made aware that “every New then the author would say that. In Squadron with her sister ship Indefatigable still under the 42 Zealander has the welfare of the ship late 1918 Sydney papers reported an flag of Rear-Admiral Pakenham. Captain Green, while not 36 in mind.” Later in 1915 Green wrote Australian rating’s claim that New being able to wear the piupiu, wore the tiki and had a hook to the New Zealand government that Zealand was at fault and it was due for the piupiu mounted in the where it hung 43 he would maintain the standards of the to an error in executing an order and during the battle. Just before the ship entered battle a rating ship to be a credit to the Dominion and the fog had saved Australia from was seen climb a ladder to the bridge and on sighting the 44 to be a worthy response to the people’s being torpedoed as she crawled back talismans shouted down “it’s all right, he’s got them on.” Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 47

It is suggested that the reason that However the turret still wouldn’t the ship was hit during the battle was train and a further inspection was because the piupiu was not worn. necessary. This revealed some more On 30 May New Zealand weighed splinters which when removed cleared anchor and proceeded to sea with the problem and the turret returned to 45 51 the rest of the Battlecruiser Force. action. The next afternoon she was scouting One large splinter entered the 46 southward ahead of the Battle Fleet. engineer’s workshop and wrecked the She sighted five German battlecruisers grindstone without injuring anyone. about 3.30pm and both forces opened Two of the ship’s boats were holed fire at 3.50pm as New Zealand was by splinters; the silk jack had a shell 47 called into line astern by Beatty. She pass through it, and the ensign staff 48 trained her fire onto SMS Moltke. At was damaged. Later on the Gunnery 4.26pm HMS Queen Mary received a Officer of New Zealand reported that salvo which caused a massive explosion at around 5.50pm the Paymaster had and caused her to begin to sink by the come on deck for some fresh air and A chunk of armour knocked from New Zealand’s ‘X’ turret during the Battle of Jutland on display at the Torpedo Bay Navy Museum in bows as HMS Tiger passed to port and was standing abaft the foremast when 49 Auckland New Zealand to starboard. A piece ‘P’ turret opened fire, and the blast was of Queen Mary landed on the deck of such that he lost his uniform and was 50 59 New Zealand from the explosion. thrown stunned on the deckhouse. He back at the battlecruiser. It is believed that New Zealand 52 Lieutenant Alexander Boyle in X was the ship’s only casualty. assisted in the destruction of two German cruisers during 60 Turret wondered if New Zealand’s turn As evening descended, New the battle. Her 12” guns fired 430 shells during the battle to blow up was coming. He chose not Zealand and Indomitable engaged but it is recorded that she only achieved three hits on her to tell his crew that two battlecruisers another enemy vessel which was opponents. had been lost to catastrophic reported to have hauled out of the As the news of Jutland reached home the proud explosions. He looked out of his line, heeling over and on fire. New Dominion celebrated her success. Massey telegraphed armoured slit and noticed: Zealand’s target was SMS Seydlitz, Captain Green: 53 I have never seen anything like it as which was hit three times. Around The whole Dominion is thrilled with pride at the we seemed to be not only fighting 8pm a strong shock was felt aboard the conspicuous bravery and gallantry displaced by the German battle cruisers but ship. The popular explanation was an her officers and men. We rejoice that New Zealand most of the High Sea Fleet as well. unexploded torpedo but no damage was in the battle a played a magnificent part…the 54 There were literally miles of ships was reported. After the Grand Fleet Dominion knows that British sailors can be depended and the sea was boiling with the returned to port, Beatty was able to upon worthily to uphold the fighting traditions of His 61 falling shells. It seemed utterly report that New Zealand was ready and Majesty’s Navy. 55 impossible that a ship this size able to go to sea if required. In response Captain Green replied: could live in this inferno. She did The New Zealand ensign hoisted Officers and men HMS New Zealand very highly without being hit again. in the afternoon and kept flying appreciate congratulations from New Zealand. We are all Immediately after her sister-ship and throughout the battle was badly torn proud to belong to New Zealand’s ship, and to have the 62 Queen Mary had been destroyed, New and was returned to New Zealand in opportunity of upholding the honour of the Dominion. 56 Zealand received a hit on ‘X’ Turret, late 1916. Pieces were cut off and In the Anzac spirit the Australian Governor-General from SMS Von Der Tann. The turret given to Captain Green who returned telegraphed his counterpart in New Zealand and offered 57 was filled with dense yellow smoke, but them to the Dominion for exhibition. Australia’s no one was injured. At first the turret It was accompanied by pieces of the …hearty congratulations to its sister Dominion on the continued to operate, but then it was damaged staff, silk jack, and some success of the battle-cruiser in action in the North Sea 58 found it would not train. Lieutenant splinters. After the battle, Jellicoe and hopes that the Australia will go into action alongside 63 Boyle and a rating exited the turret to stated that the probable reason New the New Zealand. inspect the roller path. They found Zealand only received one hit was I can well imagine the Australians’ hurt feelings that they a 500kg piece of amour plate on the that her fire had crushed the fire of the missed Jutland but they did get a conciliatory visit from rollers, which they moved and some enemy and thought it a sign of good His Majesty George V in early June to compliment them on splinters which they also removed. shooting when the enemy did not hit their services to the Empire including trying to take New Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 48 † Our Battleship at War: HMS New Zealand in the First World War 64 Zealand out of action. The Secretary of State for the Colonies telegraphed the Government “to place on record the debt of the Mother Country to New Zealand for the generosity which enabled the navy to place so valuable a 65 unit in the fighting line.” As was the practice the Grand Fleet was showered with medals and decorations. Captain Green was made a Companion of the Bath and also received the French Legion of Honour. Chief Quartermaster Eddie Fitzgerald and Stoker James Sims were awarded the Distinguished Service Medal and Lieutenant Boyle received a Mention 66 in Despatches. The New Zealand the Maori face we have painted on 4-inch gun from HMS New Zealand in front of the Auckland Museum in June 2012 press reported that the ship’s part in the the central top saved the ship. If we battle was being given prominence in painted it out now I am sure they Empire navy and it was their duty to provide a large portion 67 72 the British papers. would mutiny [so] we are not going of that cost. Later in 1916 a medal was struck to try. When the enemy fire you Also in 1917, Green was replaced by Captain Richard by New Zealand War Contingent can see the dull red flash of their Webb. He wrote to his brother back in New Zealand that Association for the ship’s company guns and then a cluster of dots “New Zealanders will have every reason to be proud of 73 to celebrate her part in the battle and getting bigger and bigger as they the vessel.” In October 1917 the New Zealand High 68 sent to the ship for issuing. Many tear towards you. One knows it is Commissioner visited the battlecruiser and was assured accounts noted at the time that she no good ducking or getting behind by Webb that in all his years of command he had not was “singularly fortunate” and she had anything as the only thing to do is found a ship with such an imbued spirit of discipline and 74 come through the fight “practically sit still and hope they do not hit duty. The following month the battlecruiser took part in 69 unscathed.” Green in a letter to a you. It is like somebody throwing another action in the Heligoland Bight. Reinforcing the 1st friend in Christchurch remarked heavy stones at you whilst you sit Battlecruiser Squadron, she took part in the sweep across that “we certainly bore a charmed still in a chair. the North Sea to a point outside the German minefields. life at the Jutland Battle, and I trust From June 1916 to December 1918 From the accounts it seems as if she did not play any part in 70 we may continue that luck.” The the “lucky” battlecruiser served with the main action between the fleets and seems to have been 75 ship’s charmed life was also noted in a the Grand Fleet. The tiki and piupiu an onlooker. meeting of the British Imperial Council remained on board the ship until At Christmas 71 of Commerce. war’s end when they were returned time the A few days after the battle to Halsey as a gift. In November 1916 Admiralty gave Alexander Boyle wrote to his parents ratings from New Zealand were given permission for about his part and impressions of the the honour of taking the bridal car a flag presented battle: through the streets of London when to Captain The conclusions I draw from the Prince George of Battenberg married a Webb by Nga show are that the Huns are very Russian countess. Prince George was a Tahu which good at the beginning of an action gunnery officer on the battlecruiser as was the 1834 but cannot keep it going. At the well as movie officer. Sir Joseph Ward, independence end they were rotten and defeated. the instigator of the gift, speaking on a flag. This is a New Zealand was in the thick of it visit to the Grand Fleet in 1917 stated very unusual and came out with hardly a scratch that the Dominion had a right to have a and unofficial to ship or person. The other ships voice in the peace terms. He also stated flag to have in the fleet where hit many more that the Dominions were entitled in the been flown on New Zealand’s bell; previously used on the times than we were. The sailors say future to equal responsibility for the a warship of battleship of the same name (Auckland Museum) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 49

76 Michael Wynd is a researcher at the Name: HMS New Zealand the Royal Navy. The Christmas card Namesake: Dominion of New Zealand sent to New Zealand in 1917 from the Navy Museum in New Zealand. battlecruiser features three ratings Builder: Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering, Govan drinking from mugs labelled Jutland, Laid down: 20 June 1910 Heligoland and Dogger Bank with the Launched: 1 July 1911 motto “another little drink wouldn’t do Commissioned: 19 November 1912 77 us any harm!” Struck: 19 December 1922 On 21 November 1918 [Der Tag] Fate: Sold for scrap, 19 December 1922 the ship was present for the surrender General characteristics of the joined aboard Class & type: Indefatigable-class battlecruiser by Australian representatives. The Bibliography Displacement: 18,500 long tons (18,800 t) at normal load New Zealand flag was displayed at the Campbell, J., Jutland: An Analysis of the starboard yardarm for the occasion. Fighting, London: Conway Maritime Press, 22,130 long tons (22,490 t) at deep load 1986. The surrendered SMS Derfflingerwas Length: 590 ft 3.5 in (179.9 m) assigned to New Zealand boarding Corbett, Sir Julian S., History of the Great Beam: 80 ft (24.4 m) 78 War: Naval Operations Vol. III, London: parties. Longmans, Green and Co, 1923. Draught: 27 ft (8.2 m) So what are we to make of this? Fawcett, H.W., Hooper, G.W.W., Fighting at Installed power: 44,000 shp (33,000 kW) The Dominion’s Gift had a proud war Jutland: Personal Experiences of Forty-Five Propulsion: Four-shaft Parsons direct-drive steam turbines[1] Officers and Men of the British Fleet, London: service and was indeed a very lucky Macmillan, 1921. 31 Babcock & Wilcox water-tube boilers[1] ship when the fate of the battlecruisers Grove, Eric, Tsushima, Jutland, Speed: 25 knots (46 km/h; 29 mph) is considered. It is amazing to think Philippines Sea: Big Fleet Actions, London: Range: 6,690 nautical miles (12,390 km; 7,700 mi) at 10 Brockhampton Press, 1998. that two Royal Navy Captains would knots (19 km/h; 12 mph) Hawke Edward G., the British Empire and Its wear a native grass skirt and a token in History, London: John Murray, 1911. Complement: 800 a three major naval engagements. This Jane, L. Cecil, ‘The Action of Heligoland Armament: 4 × 2 - BL 12-inch Mk X guns act alone says a lot about the place of August 1914’, The Naval War of 1914: Two 16 × 1 - BL 4-inch Mk VII guns talismans in the psyche of the ship’s Actions at Sea during the Early Phase of the First World War, n.p.: Leonaur, 2011, pp. 2 × 1 - submerged 18-inch torpedo tubes company in wartime. 7-52. Armour: Belt: 4–6 in (102–152 mm) Despite never visiting home London Gazette, Supplement dated 15 Decks: 1–2.5 in (25–64 mm) during the war and having few New September 1916 : 7 in (178 mm) Zealanders serving in the ship, the gift www.paperspast.natlib.govt.nz The following papers were accessed: Turrets: 7 in (178 mm) warship always maintained its identity as a New Zealand battlecruiser through Auckland Star Conning tower: 4–10 in (102–254 mm) the strong links with the Dominion, Colonist [Nelson] Torpedo bulkheads: 2.5 in (64 mm) reporting in the local papers, Dominion [Wellington]

fundraising for the men, and personal Evening Post [Wellington] 1916, p. 8. contacts. At the battles of Heligoland Fielding Star [Fielding] 3 Free Lance, Volume XV, Issue 832, 9 June 1916, p. 8. Bight, Dogger Bank and Jutland, the Free Lance [Wellington] 4 ‘The avalN Crisis’, The Evening Post, 24 March 1909. gift battleship repaid the smallest and Grey River Argus [Greymouth] 5 Marlborough Express, Volume XLIX, Issue 84, 12 April 1915, p. 8. proudest Dominion with honour and Hawera & Normanby Star [New Plymouth] 6 Marlborough Express, Volume XLVIII, Issue 157, 7 July 1914, p. 5. glory. And so our lucky ship defended Marlborough Express [Blenheim] The piece had been run in the Pall Mall Gazette by their ‘naval expert’. the freeland, guarded Pacific’s triple New Zealand Herald [Auckland] 7 This is the best guess of the museum. Te Papa Museum has a large star from the shafts and strife of the piece of greenstone that was donated and returned to New Zealand Ohinemuri Gazette [Hamilton] when she was scrapped. war at sea, and made the throbbing Poverty Bay Herald [Gisborne] extremity of the Maritime Empire’s 8 Diary of Mrs Joan Wood, entry for Monday 4 December 1933 [provided by John Wood] Press [Christchurch] praises heard afar. t 9 Both men’s medals are in the Museum’s collection. Waiarapa Daily Times [Wellington] 10 Evening Post, Volume LXXXVIII, Issue 41, 17 August 1914, p. 8. 11 Beatty’s Despatch No. 28948 on the Battle of Heligoland Bight (Endnotes) dated 1 September 1914. His flagship was HMS Lion 1 I thank Norman Friedman for the term. 12 Copy of letter from , dated 17 February 1939 in the 2 Free Lance, Volume XV, Issue 832, 9 June Museum’s collection. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 50 † Our Battleship at War: HMS New Zealand in the First World War 13 Marlborough Express, Volume XLVIII, Zealand Fares’, Dominion, Volume 8, Issue Longmans, Green and Co, 1923, p. 334. Issue 225, 24 September 1914, p. 8. See also 2466, 20 May 1915, p. 6. Halsey sent a article published on 10 September 1914, p. 5. letter to New Zealand which was published 49 Sir Julian S. Corbett, History of the Great War: Naval Operations expressing the same sentiments he had Vol. III, London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1923, p. 337. This object is 14 Marlborough Express, Volume XLVIII, expressed publicly. in the Museum’s collection. Issue 213, 10 September 1914, p. 5. 32 Evening Post, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 30, 50 This is on display in the Museum. 15 Grant Howard, The Navy in New Zealand: 5 February 1915, p. 8. See also Marlborough An Illustrated History, Wellington: Reed, 51 ‘Three Battle Honours’, New Zealand Herald, Volume LIII, Issue Express, Volume LXIX, Issue 24, 29 January 16422, 27 December 1916, p. 8. 1981, p. 31. See also ‘Record of HMS New 1915, p. 5. Both reports originated in London Zealand’, New Zealand Herald, Volume LVI, and were reported across New Zealand. 52 H.W. Fawcett, G.W.W Hooper, Fighting at Jutland: Personal Issue 17272, 23 September 1919, p. 9. Experiences of Forty-Five Officers and Men of the British Fleet, 33 Fielding Star, Volume XIII, Issue 3269, 18 16 Colonist, Volume: LVI: Issue 13565, 4 London: Macmillan, 1921. See also ‘Three Battle Honours’, New June 1917, p. 4. See also ‘HMS New Zealand Zealand Herald, Volume LIII, Issue 16422, 27 December 1916, p. 8. September 1914, p. 6. Halsey sent a telegram Prize Bounty’, Otago Daily Times, Issue to New Zealand to “inform the women of 16951, 13 March 1917, p. 6. 53 Eric Grove, Tsushima, Jutland, Philippines Sea: Big Fleet Actions, New Zealand that their ensign flew on board London: Brockhampton Press, 1998. HMS New Zealand during the action of 34 Evening Post, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 139, Heligoland. 14 June 1915, p. 8. 54 ‘Record of HMS New Zealand’, New Zealand Herald, Volume LVI, Issue 17272, 23 September 1919, p. 9. 17 Wairarapa Daily Times, Volume 44, Issue 35 Evening Post, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 107, 13693, 22 November 1918, p. 6. 7 May 1915, p. 6. 55 Henry Newbolt, History of the Great War: Naval Operations Vol. IV, London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1928, p. 1. 18 ‘With Jellicoe Sauce!’, Colonist, Volume 36 New Zealand Herald, Volume LII, Issue LVI, Issue 13608, 24 October 1914, p. 3 16022. 14 September 1915, p. 5. 56 ‘The New Zealand Flag’, Otago Daily Times, Issue 17019, 1 June 1917, p. 6. 19 Auckland Star, Volume XLVIII, Issue 304, 37 Poverty Bay Herald, Volume XLII, Issue 21 December 1917, p. 5. 13795, 22 September 1915, p. 7. 57 Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2941, 29 November 1916, p. 6. 20 Hawera & Normanby Star, Volume LXIX, 38 Arthur W. Jose, Official History of 58 ‘Record of HMS New Zealand’, New Zealand Herald, Volume LVI, 9 January 1915, p. 5. Australia in the War of 1914-18: Volume Issue 17272, 23 September 1919, p. 9. See also, ‘General News’, Press, IX The Royal Australian Navy 1914-1918, Volume LIII, Issue 15834, 24 February 1917, p.8. 21 Hawera & Normanby Star, Volume LXIX, Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1928, p. 274. 9 January 1915, p. 5. 59 Grant Howard, The Navy in New Zealand: An Illustrated History, The RN official history does not apportion Wellington: Reed, 1981, p. 31. See also ‘Dominion’s Honour Safe’, New 22 Press, Volume LI, Issue 15198, 9 February any blame, see Sir Julian S. Corbett, History Zealand Herald, Volume LVI, Issue 17244, 21 August 1919, p. 8. 1915, p. 10. of the Great War: Naval Operations Vol. III, London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1923, p. 60 Grant Howard, The Navy in New Zealand: An Illustrated History, 23 Beatty’s Despatch No. 29088 on the Battle 298 Wellington: Reed, 1981, p. 31. Other accounts state it was 420. of Dogger Bank dated 2 February 1915. See also Grant Howard, The Navy in New 39 Wairarapa Daily Times, Volume LXVI, 61 Evening Post, Volume XCI, Issue 136, 9 June 1916, p. 8. Issue 12070, 31 August 1914, p. 5. Zealand: An Illustrated History, Wellington: 62 Evening Post, Volume XCI, Issue 40, 14 June 1916, p. 8. Reed, 1981, p. 31 and also ‘Record of HMS 40 Arthur W. Jose, Official History of 63 Marlborough Express, Volume L, Issue 138, 13 June 1916, p. 2. New Zealand’, New Zealand Herald, Volume Australia in the War of 1914-18: Volume LVI, Issue 17272, 23 September 1919, p. 9. IX The Royal Australian Navy 1914-1918, 64 Arthur W. Jose, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18: 24 ‘Record of HMS New Zealand’, New Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1928, p. 263. Volume IX The Royal Australian Navy 1914-1918, Sydney: Angus & Zealand Herald, Volume LVI, Issue 17272, 23 See footnote. Robertson, 1928, p. 274. September 1919, p. 9. 41 Arthur W. Jose, Official History of 65 ‘In the Thick of the Fight’, New Zealand Herald, Volume LIII, Issue 25 ‘The North Sea Fight’, Grey River Argus, Australia in the War of 1914-18: Volume 16251, 9 June 1916, p. 8. 4 March 1915 that carried a report of IX The Royal Australian Navy 1914-1918, 66 Supplement to the London Gazette, 15 September 1916. Beatty’s Despatch. See also a transcript of Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1928, p. 281. Beatty’s Despatch No. 29088 on the Battle 42 Jellicoe’s & Beatty’s Despatch No. 29654 67 Evening Post, Volume XCI, Issue 136, 9 June 1916, p. 8. of Dogger Bank dated 2 February 1915. on the Battle of Jutland dated 24 June 1916. 68 Evening Post, Volume XCI, Issue 138, 8 December 1916, p. 7. HMS Indomitable was also given credit for See also Sir Julian S. Corbett, History of her efforts and was signalled by Beatty in the Great War: Naval Operations Vol. III, 69 Free Lance, Volume XV, Issue 832, 9 June 1916, p. 8. appreciation for its speed. London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1923, pp. 70 Press, Volume LII, Issue 15726, 20 October 1916, p. 4. See also 319, 327. 26 Beatty’s Despatch No. 29088 on the Battle ‘Three Battle Honours’, New Zealand Herald, Volume LIII, Issue of Dogger Bank dated 2 February 1915. 43 ‘The New Zealand’s Mascots’, New 16422, 27 December 1916, p. 8. Zealand Herald, Volume LVI, Issue 17247, 25 27 Sir Julian S. Corbett, History of the Great 71 Marlborough Express, Volume L, Issue 136, 10 June 1916, p. 5. War: Naval Operations Vol. II, London: August 1919, p. 8. 72 Evening Post, Volume XCII, Issue 126, 24 November 1916, p. 7. Longmans, Green and Co, 1929, p. 89. 44 Grant Howard, The Navy in New Zealand: 28 See Beatty’s Despatch No. 29088 on the An Illustrated History, Wellington: Reed, 73 ‘On H.M.S. New Zealand’, Fielding Star, Volume XIV, Issue 35225, Battle of Dogger Bank dated 2 February 1915 1981, p. 31. 10 June 1918, p. 2. – his flagship was HMS Princess Royal 45 Sir Julian S. Corbett, History of the Great 74 Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 15, 12 October 1917, p. 5. 29 Evening Post, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 22, War: Naval Operations Vol. III, London: 75 Henry Newbolt, History of the Great War: Naval Operations Vol. V, 27 January 1915, p. 8. Halsey sent a telegraph Longmans, Green and Co, 1923, pp. 313-424. London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1931, pp. 165-177. advising that the ‘flag was ready to fly again’. 46 Jellicoe’s & Beatty’s Despatch No. 29654 See also ‘Battle and the Breeze’, Evening Post, on the Battle of Jutland dated 24 June 1916. 76 ‘HMS New Zealand’, Dominion, Volume II, Issue 223, 8 June 1918, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 112, 13 May 1915, p. 2. p. 9. 47 Sir Julian S. Corbett, History of the Great 30 ‘The Naval Engagement’, Grey River Argus, War: Naval Operations Vol. III, London: 77 Hawera & Normanby Star, Issue LXXIV, 19 February 1918, p. 5. 27 January 1915, p. 5. Longmans, Green and Co, 1923, p. 332. 78 ‘The Armistice Terms’, Dominion, Volume 12, issue 52, 26 31 ‘Message from HMS New Zealand’, 48 Sir Julian S. Corbett, History of the Great November 1918, p. 5. Dominion, Volume 8: Issue 2375, 3 February War: Naval Operations Vol. III, London: 1915, p. 5. See also ‘How H.M.S. New Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 51 Admiral Helfrich RNN, Captain Waller RAN, Captain Rooks USN & the Loss of HMAS Perth and USS Houston By Matthew B Wills

he individual with the greatest twin mountings. Admiral Helfrich was battleships in a surprise attack on Pearl responsibility for the loss of justly proud of De Ruyter. In 1942 she Harbor and the Royal Navy would THMAS Perth and USS Houston was would become the flagship of an Allied lose one of its newest battleships and a Dutch admiral who was in overall striking force in the Battle of the Java a battle cruiser in the South China command of all Allied warships during Sea, the largest surface engagement Sea with the consequence that no the Battle of the Java Sea (27 February since the Battle of Jutland. American or British battleships would 1942) and Battle of the Sundra Strait Long before the Japanese onslaught be available to reinforce the Dutch (28 February 1942 to 1 March 1942). Admiral Helfrich had ambitious plans Navy. Admiral Helfrich, born in Java, for expanding the size of the Navy and The only Australian ship to undoubtedly felt closer emotional ties the capacity of his main naval base participate in the Battle of the Java Sea to the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) at Surabaya on the island of Java. In was HMAS Perth, a light cruiser armed than he did to distant Holland. the spring of 1941 a correspondent with eight 6-inch guns in twin turrets Unlike France, who surrendered to for National Broadcasting Company and eight 21-inch torpedo tubes in Germany, the Netherlands continued and a writer for National Geographic quadruple mountings. her war with Germany after that magazine, Dee Bredin, spent several Her captain, Hec Waller, was country was overrun. On 13 May 1940 weeks in Java. She was extended every considered by the British and by his Queen Wilhemina narrowly avoided courtesy by the NEI government in peers as one of the most distinguished capture by boarding a British destroyer part because she was born in Sumatra captains in the Royal Australian Navy. which took her and her family to and spoke Dutch fluently. She learned He had won his spurs commanding England. The Netherlands set up a that the Dutch manufactured their a division of destroyers in the government-in-exile in London. Most own shells and mines. At the Surabaya Mediterranean. He quickly came to the of its small but modern Navy escaped Naval Base she went aboard one of attention of Admiral Andrew Browne destruction as did the Netherlands’ the Navy’s brand new all-steel torpedo Cunningham, the Commander-in- large merchant marine. motorboats that had been built in Java. Chief of the British Mediterranean By far the Netherlands East Indies Ms Bredin was given an interview fleet. In his autobiography were that country’s most important by Admiral Helfrich who showed her Cunningham recounted Waller’s role colony and their Navy was assigned the plans for a new naval base three in HMAS Stuart on 22 January 1941. the task of defending that far-flung times the size of the present one. In Cunningham wrote: archipelago. The obvious threat was her article for the National Geographic Captain Waller, Royal Australian from Japan. Admiral Helfrich was magazine she quoted Admiral Helfrich: Navy, in the Stuart with the appointed Commander-in-Chief This one [the new naval base] will destroyers Vampire and Defender, of all Dutch naval forces in the East accommodate the biggest Allied broke into the outer defences at Indies. His largest warships were Java warships. A whole river is being Tobruk at dawn on January 22nd, (launched in 1921), De Ruyter (1935) diverted in the construction, but and by midday the town and and Tromp, dating from 1937. Of the that is no problem for a Dutch harbour were in our hands.2 three De Ruyter was his most powerful. engineer.1 This naval attack coincided with a land Her main armament consisted of In the spring of 1941 Admiral attack by the 6th Australian Division. seven 5.9-inch guns. For a ship that Helrich had no way of knowing Cunningham’s greatest victory was commissioned pre-war she that before the year was out over the Italian fleet was the Battle HMAS Perth (Graphic was exceptionally well equipped with the US Navy would lose four of Matapan. The British admiral by Peter Ingman) antiaircraft guns. She had ten 40mm was fully apprised of Stuart’s AA in twin mountings and eight participation 12.7mm AA also in

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 52 Admiral Helfrich RNN, Captain Waller RAN, Captain Rooks USN & the Loss of HMAS Perth and USS Houston in an exciting night action between successful engagement with Japanese command for health 10:25 pm and 11:36 pm on 28 March cruisers, much less with Japanese reasons and yield his 1941. Ironically, exactly one year later battleships. command to Admiral in the South Pacific Waller, as Captain American naval historians have Helfrich. of HMAS Perth, would fight his final never questioned Captain Rooks’ The overall battle. fitness to command Houston. One of commander of ABDA, In the latter part of 1941 Captain them described him: Field Marshal Sir Waller relieved Commander Sir Philip By acclamation Rooks was one Archibald Wavell, had Bower-Smyth RN in command of of the brightest lights to wear lost confidence in Hart HMAS Perth. The Australian Naval four gold bars in the pre-war US and had conveyed his Board had intended to retain Perth Navy. He had been Admiral Hart’s concern to Churchill. Admiral Helfrich (Courtesy in the ANZAC area until HMAS aide when the Asiatic fleet boss Indeed Hart had lost confidence Netherlands Navy) Canberra, an 8-inch gun cruiser, had was superintendent of the Naval in himself. There is completed her refit; however due to an Academy. On the teaching staff at historical evidence that urgent request from Washington Perth the Naval War College in Newport, Hart, who was 64, felt was allotted to the ABDA (American, Rhode Island in 1940, Rooks that he was too old for British, Dutch and Australian) area for showed a keen analytical mind, the demands of his job. the desperate effort to save Java. and it was with no evident sarcasm A few days after that colleagues called him the King’s telegram Helfrich Ultimately Perth would become second coming of the great naval became the top naval part of a strike force which would strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan. In commander of all Allied include the Dutch cruiser De Ruyter the few months since taking over ships operating in the (flag), the Dutch cruiser Java, the the Houston in Manila, the quietly theatre. Helfrich had British heavy cruiser Exeter and the authoritative skipper had moved wanted the top job all American heavy cruiser Houston. out of the shadow of a beloved along and had bitterly Hec Waller on board The US ship was under the command predecessor and won, it seems, a resented having to serve under a HMAS Perth in one of of one of the US Navy’s best and reputation as a sort of minor deity.3 foreigner in his own country. the last photographs brightest, Captain Albert Harold Houston’s last two battles were surface In the next few weeks Helfrich taken of him (Courtesy Navy) Rooks. engagements which she fought without would make the decision that would Captain Rooks, who had graduated the benefit of her after turret. The loss seal the feat of Perth from the United States Naval Academy of one third of her main armament and Houston. He was in 1914, had made captain in February was caused by a 500 lb. bomb dropped determined to use Perth, 1941 and seemed bound for flag rank. from a Japanese naval aircraft, a Houston and Exeter On 30 August 1941 Captain Rooks G3M Nell, the same aircraft type together with his own relieved Captain Jesse B. Oldendorf as instrumental in sinking the Prince of light cruisers to attack commanding officer of Houston in a Wales and Repulse two months earlier. any Japanese invasion ceremony in Manila Harbour. She was The day after Houston absorbed fleet that approached the flagship of the US Asiatic fleet; she the Japanese bomb Admiral Hart, who Java. What would be would be a prime target of the Japanese commanded the naval component the consequences in Captain Albert H in the event of war. of ABDA which included American, the event that such Rooks USN (Courtesy In 1941 few American naval officers British, Dutch and Australian ships, attack failed? Unless this makeshift, US Navy) faced such odds as did Captain Rooks. received a telegram from Admiral multinational force Unless the US Asiatic fleet Ernest J. King, the commander of destroyed the Japanese was immediately reinforced by the United States fleet, urging him the remnants of Helfrich’s the main battle fleet to request that he be relieved fleet might well be USS Houston - cruiser at Pearl Harbor there of his trapped in the Java (Graphic by Peter was no possibility of a Sea. Ingman)

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 53

The escape routes were the Sundra been seriously damaged in this eight- Priok harbour where they were sitting Strait west of Java, the Bali Strait east hour battle. Immediately after taking ducks for Japanese dive bombers. of Java, and the Lombok Strait east of command of the force Captain Waller They were unable to obtain 6-inch Bali. The Bali Strait was too shallow for issued the order to break off the and 8-inch shells because there were ships larger than destroyers. The other engagement and to steam to Tanjung none available. The Dutch ships used two straits would not remain open for Priok, the port for Batavia. Captain 5.9-inch shells. There was difficulty any appreciable time. The Japanese had Waller clearly made the right decision. in refuelling because the Dutch sufficient naval assets in the area to He had no destroyers. Houston’s six authorities had been ordered to save close the Sundra Strait and the Lombok 8-inch guns were no match for the fuel for the Dutch warships. Eventually Strait whenever they chose to do so. twenty 8-inch guns of the Japanese Perth got enough fuel to bring her The Battle of the Java Sea lasted heavy cruisers Nachi and Haguro. bunkers to half capacity. Houston from 1616 to midnight on 27 February Furthermore, Perth and Houston received somewhat less. 1942. Admiral Doorman, who had were getting low on fuel and they had The last meeting between the been placed in command by Helfrich, both expended most of the shells for Australian captain and the American made valiant efforts to destroy that their 6-inch and 8-inch guns. Long captain took place ashore. They were Japanese fleet consisting of two heavy afterward Helfrich would claim that taken by staff car to the British Naval cruisers, one light cruiser and 10 to Waller, by breaking off the engagement, Liaison Office in Batavia. The office 15 destroyers. The Dutch admiral was had disobeyed his orders to engage was in a building that also housed the severely handicapped by the lack of a and destroy the enemy. His claim failed headquarters of Maj. Gen. Wijbrandus common code of tactical signals and by to appreciate the impossible situation Schilling, commander of the Dutch a multinational force that had not had with which Waller was faced. East Indies First Army in western Java. the opportunity to work together. Helfrich could have played a vital Schilling possessed the latest Dutch air The almost simultaneous loss role in facilitating Captain Waller’s intelligence on the sightings of Japanese of Java and De Ruyter guaranteed a efforts to extract Perth and Houston ships, but Waller and Rooks never saw decisive Japanese victory. Both ships from the deadly Java Sea. He could him. were hit by Long Lance torpedoes at have ordered them to proceed to the Schilling was an expert horseman about 2300. Java blew up and sank Sundra Strait as soon as possible. He who had represented his country in almost immediately. De Ruyter sank could have ordered that Perth and the 1936 summer Olympics. He was after she had been dead in the water for Houston be refuelled forthwith. He apparently a youthful and brave officer, 40 minutes. Admiral Doorman went could have, perhaps, provided these but it was the worst of times for the down with his ship. Exeter had already ships with limited fighter cover. Most Dutch. When the ABDA command departed the scene due to extensive importantly he could have informed was dissolved on 25 February Helfrich, damage to a boiler from an 8-inch Captain Waller and Captain Rooks of Schilling and the other senior officers shell. Captain Waller was now the the most recent Dutch intelligence. in the Dutch military knew that their senior officer afloat and, therefore, the Admiral Helfrich did none of this. situation was virtually hopeless. commander of the now sadly depleted From approximately 1330 to While Waller and Rooks were HMAS Perth in WWII, strike force. approximately 1900 Perth and receiving their intelligence briefing date unknown (Tom Neither Houston nor Perth had Houston languished in the Tanjung from an unknown Royal Navy officer Lewis Collection)

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 54 Admiral Helfrich RNN, Captain Waller RAN, Captain Rooks USN & the Loss of HMAS Perth and USS Houston they could hardly have failed to be Corregidor, and aware of the pervasive atmosphere of to the Chief of defeatism in the military command Naval Operations. centre. After receiving word that the Captain Rooks sent Sundra Strait was clear Waller and out three words: Rooks returned to their respective ‘ENEMY FORCES ships. Each was in a state of near ENGAGED.’5 exhaustion from the stress of battle and Perth and lack of sleep. These two exceptional Houston had captains never saw one another again. unknowingly As they steamed out of the harbour, steamed into the with Perth in the lead, ‘Captain Waller middle of the … received new air intelligence of an largest Japanese enemy convoy (ten transports escorted amphibious by two cruisers and their destroyers) operation of World USS Houston in about 50 miles north-east of Batavia at War II. Dozens of enemy troop ships The Japanese reported their entire Darwin Harbour, 4.00 pm steering east.’4 were anchored in the shoal waters of losses as one minesweeper and one with British Motorist Waller discussed this report with his Bantam Bay. Their escorts included troop transport and several vessels behind her, shortly navigator, Lieutenant JA Harper RN. two light cruisers, eight destroyers and seriously damaged. It is believed that before the loss of They agreed that it was unlikely that a minelayer. Nearby were two heavy three other transports were sunk but the tanker on 19 February, and the these Japanese warships would trouble cruisers and another destroyer. later salvaged. The Houston in the last cruiser’s loss in early Perth and Houston because they had a Perth and Houston’s only advantage stage of the battle sank two enemy March 1942 (Darwin convoy to look after. was their sudden appearance that motor torpedo boats. Military Museum) Was there a window of opportunity totally surprised the Japanese. With Around midnight Captain for these two proud vessels to reach a surfeit of targets it was difficult for Waller learned that very little 6-inch Sundra Strait earlier that day? On Captain Waller and Captain Rooks ammunition remained. He decided to a straight course the distance from to take full advantage of the situation. force a passage through Sundra Strait Batavia’s port to the entrance of the The quiet night was completely and ordered full speed and set a course Sundra Strait is less than 80 miles. One transformed into a battle scene the for Toppers Island. At five minutes An Ensign and nautical mile equals approximately 1.15 like of which few of the participants past midnight a torpedo struck on wreath laid on the statute miles. If both ships steamed had ever seen before. The noise of the starboard side knocking out the wreck of HMAS at 25 knots they could have reached guns firing and shells exploding was forward engine room. After a brief Perth on the 60th the strait in approximately 2 ¾ hours. overwhelming. As Perth zigzagged interval when Perth was steaming at anniversary of her sinking (Public Assuming a departure time of 1500 on a north-westerly course she fired reduced speed a second torpedo struck domain) Perth and Houston would have arrived everything she had, at the entrance to the strait at 1745, not her eight 6-inch guns, long before the brief tropical twilight. her eight 4-inch guns, The most that can be said is they might and her torpedo tubes. have avoided the Japanese invasion Houston astern of Perth fleet which did not enter Bantam Bay made good use of her until shortly after 2200. two forward turrets That night Perth and Houston and her secondary hugged the Java coast. The sea was armament of eight calm, the air still; there was a clear sky 5-inch guns. Houston and full moon. Around 2330 Houston had no torpedo tubes. sent a signal that was the last from It is impossible either ship. It was sent to Admiral to know exactly how Glassford (senior American naval many hits the guns of officer in Java) to the commander of the two ships inflicted the Sixteenth Naval District, to Radio on the Japanese ships. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 55

under the bridge also on the starboard gallant captains. Most of the details side. Captain Waller ordered abandon surrounding their final battles would ship to which Lieutenant PSF Hancox, not be known for three and one half his gunnery officer, asked: ‘Prepare years after the Japanese surrender. to abandon ship, Sir?’6 ‘No. Abandon Captain Albert H Rooks US Navy was ship.’7 The captain was last seen posthumously awarded the Medal of standing with his arms on the front of Honor in June 1942. It was unusual for the bridge looking down at his silent America’s highest military decoration guns that had no shells. to be awarded before the witnesses to Houston’s first hit was to the his valour were carefully interviewed. forecastle that started a fire in the Nevertheless the stories of Houston’s paint locker which was put out in 15 survivors that finally emerged were minutes. Houston was then hit by more than sufficient to persuade naval Matthew B Wills is an historian based numerous other shells, none of which historian James D Hornfischer that in Colorado, USA. His latest book In the struck a vital point. When Captain Rooks richly deserved the Medal of Highest Traditions of the Royal Navy: Rooks saw Perth dead in the water Honor. Few historians would question and apparently sinking he realized his opinion that the final battle of Perth The Life of Captain John Leach MVO DSO that escape was impossible. He turned and Houston was ‘one of the great naval was favourably reviewed in The Times. Houston back towards the transports epics of this or any century.’ determined to sell his ship dearly. At Captain Waller was not given his about 0015 Houston took a grievous hit country’s highest military decoration. from either a shell or a torpedo on the Awarding the Victoria Cross to Waller starboard side. This was the beginning was reconsidered as recently as 2013. of the end because it shattered the after It was denied. It appears that the engine room. When Houston’s Turret paramount reason for refusing to grant Two was struck by a heavy shell that him the Victoria Cross was a lack failed to explode there was an intense of evidence from officers and rating array of sparks. These ignited powder whose action stations were near him bags causing a flash fire. Only seven during his ship’s final battle. Nothing, of 58 men in Turret Two’s assembly however, will gainsay his uncommon escaped alive. valour or his place of honour in the (Endnotes) Moments later two enemy torpedo annals of the Royal Australian Navy. 1 Bredin, Dee, Java Assignment, National boats sped towards Houston from the Over sixty years ago a great admiral Geographic magazine, Volume LXXXI, starboard side. Houston’s 50 calibre wrote of Waller: Number One, January 1942, p.112. machine gunners and 1.1-inch gunners Hector Macdonald Laws Waller 2 Cunningham, Visciunt Cunningham of Hyndhope, KT GCB OM DSO, A sank both, but not before the second will always remain in my mind Sailor’s Oddysey (New York: E.P.Dutton & launched a torpedo that hit Houston as one of the very finest types of Company, Inc. 1951) p.307. forward of the catapult tower. The ship Australian naval officer. Full of 3 Hornfischer, James D., Ship of Ghosts was already sinking, but this torpedo good cheer, with a great sense of (New York: Bantam Dell a division of Random House Inc., 2006), p.9. hit accelerated the end. humour, undefeated and always 4 Gill, G. Hermon, Royal Australian Navy When the flames from Turret Two burning to get at the enemy, he 1939-1942 (Canberra: Australian War forced Captain Rooks to leave the conn kept the old ships of his flotilla Memorial, 1957) pp.618-619. he summoned the ship’s marine bugler – the Stuart, Vampire, Vendetta, 5 Hornfischer, James D., Ship of Ghosts, p.108. and ordered, ‘Bugler, sound abandon Voyager, Waterhen – hard at it ship.’8 Rooks was fatally wounded just always. Greatly loved and admired 6 bid., p.124. as he descended a ladder from the by everyone, his loss in HMAS 7 Ibid. signal bridge. He was struck in the head Perth in the Java Sea in March, 8 Ibid., p.1. and the upper torso by a torrent of 1942, was a heavy deprivation for 9 Cunningham, Viscount Cunningham of 9 Hyndhope, KT GCB OM DSO, A Sailor’s shrapnel. the young Navy of Australia. Oddysey, p.308. Thus ended the lives of two Well said, Sir. t Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 56 Australia-Indonesia: Towards a Maritime Strategic Partnership B y RistianAtriandi Supriyanto In light of emerging trends in the regional strategic environment, Australia and Indonesia should expand their defence cooperation in the maritime domain.

haring a long maritime boundary, Australia and Indonesia should Smate their futures together at sea. The maritime security challenges that both nations face mainly revolve around non-traditional security issues, particularly people smuggling, illegal fishing, and marine pollution. However, in light of three Indonesian Navy inter-related emerging trends in the US ally. Aside from the US Marines for operations and safe navigation of Parchim I-class regional strategic environment, both deployed in Darwin, the rebalancing nuclear submarines. Besides the US, (Kapitan Patimura- countries should move beyond these also involves rotational deployments Chinese and Indian nuclear submarines class) , KRI Hasan Basri-photo to expand their defence cooperation in of US navy and air force in Western might also transit these straits to by Michael Nitz the maritime domain. Australia and Northern Territory. conduct patrols along the Indo-Pacific While the rebalancing has been rim. A recent Indian Navy report, New emerging trends well-publicised throughout the region, which confirmed Chinese submarine First, as noted in the white paper some countries are still suspicious operations in the Indian Ocean, further “Australia in the Asian Century” of an increased US regional military supports this possibility. the world’s economy is gradually presence, especially China. Beijing As a result, the Sunda and gravitating toward Asia, which gives could respond by, for example, Lombok Straits, as well as the more strategic weight to the region. conducting surveillance activities maritime areas along the Australia- As a result, many regional countries, within the exclusive economic zone Indonesia boundary, could become including Australia and Indonesia, are (EEZ) of countries which host US more crowded with submarines and modernising their militaries, with a military forces, like Australia. These other types of maritime forces from priority on maritime capabilities. A US kind of activities would require different countries. These maritime naval analysis firm, AMI International, China’s maritime forces, particularly areas, however, form the backyards of projects that Asia-Pacific navies will submarines, to expand into the littoral states Australia and Indonesia, spend a combined US$180 billion on Indian Ocean through the Indonesian which have direct interests at stake. almost 800 new ships, surface craft, archipelago. For example, a collision between and submarines through 2031. Third, het Indonesian archipelagic opposing maritime units, like While military modernisation is a waters could become more saturated nuclear submarines, could result in legitimate consequence of economic by transiting foreign maritime forces, politically and militarily destabilising rise, it could provoke misunderstanding particularly along the maritime consequences which undermine the and miscalculation if not cautiously chokepoints like the Sunda and security of littoral states, apart from deployed. In response to this trend, the Lombok Straits. Owing to their creating an environmental disaster. US has engaged in the “rebalancing,” greater depth and lesser commercial Moreover, these areas harbour including repositioning more maritime shipping traffic than the Malacca a large number of offshore forces in Asia, to maintain regional Strait, the Sunda and Lombok Straits infrastructures, which could risk stability. offer an attractive transit alternative collateral damage from incidents at sea Second, the military rebalancing for maritime forces. For instance, the between naval forces. also emphasises Australia’s role as a Lombok Strait has the required depth Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 57

Maritime strategic partnership

In response to these trends, Australia and Indonesia should deepen defence cooperation in the maritime domain, especially along their shared maritime boundary, as provided for by Article 14 of the 2006 Australia-Indonesia Security Cooperation Framework Agreement, also known as the Lombok Treaty. Indonesian Navy AB- At the strategic level, both such as the Timor Sea and southern is also impossible. Indonesia’s central 212 Naval Helicopter- photo by Michael Nitz governments should form a maritime approaches of the Lombok Strait. position along the Indo-Pacific rim strategic partnership and strategic For instance, Australia’s future means it could be caught in the discussion forum, to complement acquisitions of high-end surveillance crossfire should there be a Sino-US the existing meetings of foreign and platforms, such as the Triton drones conflict. By partnering with Canberra, defence ministers, as well as annual and P-8A Poseidon aircraft, could Jakarta could at least have a cushioning military leaders’ meetings. support Indonesia’s awareness over buffer down under from the potential To start with, both countries could the waters to its south. Joint maritime flashpoints to its north. t hold more substantive and frank warfare training and exercises could discussions leading to a genuine contribute to enhanced interoperability ‘strategic trust’ about the potential in a combat environment, specifically implications of Australia’s role in the in undersea warfare. Indonesia could Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto is a Senior US military rebalancing for Indonesia’s also participate in the US-Australia Analyst with the Maritime Security national security, as well as China’s bilateral security arrangements, such as potential military responses. More trilateral naval exercises in the Indian Programme of the S. Rajaratnam importantly, they should conduct Ocean. School of International Studies (RSIS), mutual strategic consultation with As Indonesia and Australia also the Nanyang Technological University. regards to specific responses to these plan to field a large submarine fleet, He was a researcher at the Centre trends. For example, there should be they should discuss the possibility of for East Asian Cooperation Studies a consultation about whether and bilateral submarine search and rescue how they could be militarily involved (SAR) cooperation. Finally, a joint (CEACoS), University of Indonesia. in regional flashpoints, such as the maritime doctrine planning should territorial disputes in the South and be contemplated to ensure smooth East China Seas. operational and tactical collaboration At the operational and tactical between their maritime forces during levels, both countries may translate joint deployments. their strategic initiatives into joint operational arrangements. For Potential challenges example, a joint maritime surveillance Challenges to such a deep partnership system could improve mutual should be expected, especially on situational awareness, which should the Indonesian side. Many would include a joint operational command criticise and protest that Indonesia and control centre. Manned by defence has abandoned its “free and active” personnel from both countries, this foreign policy by joining a coalition centre could coordinate the activities to contain China’s military rise. Like of military surveillance assets, such Australia, Indonesia might well as ships, aircraft, and radar systems, reject choosing between the US and to generate a common picture of China. However, juggling between mutually designated surveillance areas, Washington and Beijing indefinitely Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 58 Scurvy: A Story of Medical Adventure & Bureaucratic Nonsense ‘The use of the juice of Lemmons is a precious medicine and well tried, being sound and good; let it have the chief place, for it will deserve it’ - John Woodall (1556-1643) Surgeon-General of the East India Company By Commander Stewart Dunne RAN

n perusing maritime and naval history food provisioning and scurvy in the Ithe enthusiast is almost always drawn military and maritime history of China to feats of exploration and naval battles. and wider East Asia as an informative In deciphering how battles were won, and educative source. often thoughts turn to a commander’s The medical science history of most decisions, superior forces and tactics or disease shows that its understanding just plain luck. and eventual treatment/cure typically Similarly, nautical exploration goes through four phases. First is featured exploits of superior navigation, the description of the symptoms or ships.4 While earlier journeys at sea were Lower extrem- incredible curiosity and tenacity. presentation of a disease, more often short, the conditions onboard were of ity abnormalities in Arguably the greatest determining factor than not of an unknown cause. Second no real account and could be managed, scurvy. Patient’s foot is edematous and in naval warfare and exploration for may be the chance discovery of remedies particularly with provisioning. As demonstrates ecchy- a great period of nautical history was for the disease. This is often followed by exploration flourished and empires grew, moses, xerosis, and disease and in particular scurvy. the identification of the specific cause the vast distances travelled and the time hemorrhagic bullae Scurvy was responsible for more of the malady, which again is not always needed to undertake them made the in the skin. This con- deaths at sea than storms, shipwreck, obvious. Relevant to this particular problem of diet and food storage difficult stellation of findings suggests severe and combat and all other diseases combined. period, the arrived at approach must to solve. As a result, the ordinary protracted vitamin C Historians have conservatively estimated fit the accepted concept of disease sailor’s food at sea was always scarce and deficiency. that more than two million sailors treatment among medical practitioners frequently putrid. Salt beef, salt fish, beer, From: http://www. perished from scurvy during the Age of that specific time. biscuit and cheese were staple items, healthyhippie.net/ of Sail - a period that began with The final phase is finding the offering the best hope of preservation, scurvy-causes-symp- Columbus’s voyages across the Atlantic mechanism of action or cause of the but often it didn’t. toms-picture and ended with the development of disease so that the affliction can be The difficulty of long term storage steam power and its adaptation for completely understood. Norton in was often exacerbated by the quality engines on ships in the mid-nineteenth his treatise, Maritime Occupational of the foodstuffs procured in the first 1 century. Disease, highlights that scurvy is a classic instance, where margins were kept at Noting the effect this disease had on example of this linkage, but what makes a minimum.1 For example, beer was voyages and campaigns, it must follow the disease somewhat unique is the brewed without hops and often quickly that those that worked towards a cure impact and relationship of scurvy to the soured and promoted disease such as of such a devastating disease must maritime history of the western world.2 enteritis. rate alongside other maritime heroes, A mariner, in particular the sailor, Not only did the quality of victuals such as Nelson and John Harrison, but had to be tough to survive the rigours suffer, quantity was lacking, often their efforts often are lost amongst of service in a ship of the line or a seeing a portion greatly reduced from the romanticism of other aspects of merchantmen in the days of sail. He that required for healthy living. The maritime history and naval warfare and lived in acute discomfort in overcrowded victualling and allocation of provisions the feats of well known heroes. ships, and that his food was insufficient also did not take into account wastage This article sheds some light on and unwholesome and his pay was from decay and putrefaction. The lack the scourge of scurvy, its historical negligible can be deduced from the of food and its poor quality led to a significance and those that strove to manning and victualling figures of the degenerating cycle, where weakened cure it. While it centres primarily on the earliest surviving naval inventories.3 men became more susceptible to disease, European experience it is interesting It wasn’t until Victorian times that exacerbated by the food they consumed. to compare the experiences of Asian the lot of the mariner started to progress, 1 In 1565, the agent victualler was paid four mariners. Unfortunately the scope will bringing improvements to pay and health pence halfpenny per day per man in harbour and five pence per day per day per man whilst not allow further investigation but I care, in the provision of uniform and at sea. In 1587, the sum paid was sixpence commend Mathieu Torck’s work into regular leave and in the habitability of halfpenny and seven pence, in spite of the cost of living having doubled. (Kemp, p.4) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 59

While often calorie intake was sufficient it was estimated that 10000 men had and vitamin levels were adequate early in died from this disease alone. a voyage, perishable foods were quickly All of the conditions above were consumed and the diet at sea became merely symptoms of a larger societal monotonous and uneven. norm, where living and health conditions The Rules of Oleron, introduced were not often better and the treatment in 1154 into England by Eleanor of of disease often left unchallenged. The Aquitaine, established for the sailor proliferation of scurvy in Admiralty ships certain rights of care, but long voyages lasted longer than was needed due to a only allowed for this to be undertaken level of intransigence in supporting a cure. onboard ships barely suitable to live in let We know now that scurvy is caused but sources of fruit were often elusive Lower extremity ab- alone recover from illness.5 Article VII of by a deficiency of vitamin 2C and that the and as raised before, storage for the long normalities in scurvy. the Rules of Oleron stated: provision of fresh fruit and vegetables term was problematic.12 In 1590, Sir In this patient xerosis is present, companied by If it happens that sickness seizes on is a remedy, but this was not fully acted Richard Hawkins bought hundreds of ecchymoses and in- any one of the mariners, while in the upon until the late 1700’s, with the citrus fruits for his crew whilst in Brazil creased pigmentation service of the ship, the master ought British Admiralty seemingly unwilling and remonstrated: from repeated cutane- to set him ashore, to provide lodging to address the issue. Kemp, in his novel that which I have seen most ous hemorrhages. and candlelight for him, and also to The British Sailor, goes further stating fruitful is sower oranges and A linear superficial wound covered with spare him one of the shipboys, or that the Admiralty view was that scurvy lemons….. I wish some learned hemorrhagic crust has hire a woman to attend him, and was an automatic hazard of the sea man would write of it, for it is the been present for an 9 likewise to afford him such diet as which had to be accepted. Although plague of the sea, and the spoyle of extended period, is usual in the ship; that is to say, so Lind’s treatise, The Diseases of Seaman, mariners. Doubtlesse, it would be indicating impaired much as he had on shipboard in his and other illustrious scholars like Robert a meritorious work with God and wound healing. health, and nothing more, unless it Boyle publicised the worth of lemons as man, and most beneficial for our please the master to allow it him; and a cure, this was not enacted as a Fleet countrie, for in twenty yeares, since if he will have better diet, the master wide initiative for many years. Ship’s that I have used the sea, I dare not shall not be bound to provide it for captains often took up medical advice as take it upon me to give accoumpt him, unless it be at the mariner’s own an individual prerogative. Unfortunately of ten thousand consumed with the cost and charges’.6 the term “scurvy” became generic for disease.13 14 The code of maritime law dealt mainly a number of ills especially nutritional The difficulty was that to some extent Gingival abnormalities with the rights and responsibilities of deficiencies exhibiting similar symptoms learned medical men and scientists in scurvy. The gingival ship’s captains in relation to discipline, and outcomes. This imprecision essentially obscured the known facts swelling and dusky mutiny, pay, cargoes, sickness on board, in diagnosis made tracing scurvy’s of proven ad hoc and informal medical color just above two of pilotage and similar matters. They were appearance and treatment in the medical trials at sea, which had been documented the teeth indicate hem- 10 orrhage into the gums subsequently codified into the Black literature of the time very confusing. but not scientifically proven. 7 th of this patient with Book of Admiralty in 1336. Lind wasn’t the first to identify the By the 17 Century there were poor dentition. The Cramped conditions, poor food effects of citrus juice on the symptoms numerous, frequent reports of cures by gingival abnormalities and fetid conditions below decks led of scurvy. There is enough evidence to citrus and other fruits, vegetables and of scurvy occur only in to much disease. Often these were suggest that remedies existed reasonably plants.15 The therapeutic properties the presence of teeth, compounded by the effects of battle. early into the start of long ocean voyages of citrus fruits and other fresh fruits which presumably provide portals of entry In these times, one dreaded illness was – during Vasco De Gama’s voyage and vegetables were known to another for microbes into the responsible for more deaths at sea than in 1497 the disease was treated with famous English seafarer, James Lancaster. gums. One hypothesis piracy, shipwreck and all other afflictions citrus fruits, Jacque Cartier used spruce In 1600 he was given command of the suggests that vitamin combined and in Elizabethan times led bark and leaves in 1536 and oranges C deficiency impairs to naval ships being manned at three and lemons were used on a voyage neutrophilmediated 8 11 killing of bacteria, lead- times that used in merchantmen. to the in 1564. Similar ing to chronic gingivitis, Inhibiting maritime enterprise and observations were made by Dutch which is then compli- th cruelly debilitating and then killing seafarers throughout the 16 Century, cated by bleeding from mariners, this curse was scurvy and in 2 Fundamentally the essential food factor the fragile vessels char- the first twenty years of Elizabeth’s reign is ascorbic acid that in adequate quantities acteristic of scurvy. prevents and cures the disease. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 60 Scurvy: A Story of Medical Adventure & Bureaucratic Nonsense

East India Company’s first fleet which John Woodall, a long serving did much to emphasise the importance of this disease to sailed from Torbay on 22 April 1601, and ship’s surgeon, delivered an influential mariners. Most physicians ignored evidence of the lay therapy conducted probably the first controlled and perceptive work in 1617 – The use of oranges and lemons to overcome the disease, favouring scurvy trial. On the recommendation Chirugeon’s Mate – in which he favoured instead extant, baseless theories or excessive or unnecessary of natural scientist Sir Hugh Platt, fresh food and plenty of alcohol as a polypharmacy. As discussed, one of the chief protagonists in Lancaster embarked lemon juice on means to preserving health, with lemon this extensive but conflicting medical history was James Lind. his flagship Red Dragon, which was juice, and failing that lime or orange Lind initially joined the Royal Navy as a surgeon’s mate in 1739 dispensed to his crew of 202 each day. juice or tamarind pulp, as the prime and spent his first eight years solely at sea, which incorporated The other three platforms in the fleet remedy for scurvy. Woodall’s work voyages to Africa, the Caribbean and the Mediterranean. did not partake due to a provisioning was interesting as he later became the The longest intervals at sea were spent on patrol in the error. Whilst there were essentially equal first Surgeon-General of the East India English Channel and it was these periods that provided the time amounts of deaths on each of the vessels Company and later again a surgeon at St to use and comment on the numerous treatments for scurvy due to provisioning during the voyage, Bartholomew’s Hospital in London. The and other ailments. This included the Admiralty endorsed what did emerge from the experience cure for scurvy was a medical idea that Doctor James’ Fever Powder, concocted by Robert James who was an understanding of the problem of was picked up and run with by numerous obtained his medical degree through royal mandate. Consisting the loss of efficacy of citrus juices over persons over the course of maritime of a concoction of antimony and phosphate of lime, John Millar time.16 The Dutch East India Company medical history, in a revolving pattern. in his Observations on Antimony (1774), claimed that Dr James’s kept scurvy at bay by the same means By the middle of the 1700’s, England’s Fever Powder was ineffective and dangerous. Anson’s voyage and also planted fruit trees along the scientific and medical community had was similarly provisioned with another “remedy” peddled Cape of Good Hope where its ships for the most part arrived at the belief that by William Cockburn called Electuary, which earned him stopped to reprovision.17 In contrast, fresh fruit and vegetables, particularly influence and wealth but ultimately contributed to the deaths there was also a persistent belief that citrus varieties, could cure scurvy.19 of many of Anson’s men. Lind was very aware of James and scurvy was caused by damp or fetid air, The challenge still lay in establishing the Cockburn’s position, of which the later believed that scurvy was lazy sailors or overcrowding. cause of the disease. caused by the ‘abidingly work-shy nature of sailors’.22 In 1607, Sir Hugh Platt, published a Anson’s voyage of 1740-1744 reiter- In 1746 Lind became surgeon on HMS Salisbury, and it book on the provisions and foodstuffs ated this need. In his circumnavigation was during this tenure that he conducted a small clinical trial of seaman which identified lemon juice of the world, centuries of experience of in 1747 that established that scurvy was primarily a disease as an infallible cure, based largely on mariners was essentially ignored by the which could be cured by citrus fruits. He chose 12 sufferers of Lancaster’s and others experiences. Admiralty and instead the advice of the scurvy, at comparable stages of the disease and placed them This ‘evidence’ was at odds with and College of Physicians was taken which in a controlled environment within the ship’s sickbay. With all challenged by the unyielding adherence led to the fleet being supplied with elixir having a similar diet, pairs were given individual treatments of the profession to Galen’s Theory of of vitriol – a mixture of sulphuric acid, for two weeks of either a quart of cider a day, 25 drops of elixir Humours, which essentially precluded alcohol, sugar and spices – with the view vitriol three times a day, two spoonfuls of vinegar three times any view that an ailment could be caused that the value of citrus fruits lay in their a day, a half-pint of seawater every day or a dose of electuary by the deficiency of a crucial ingredient acidic nature.20 This of course had dire three times a day with none being cured. The exception was rather than the presence of something effects with Anson’s fleet of six warships the pair that was given two oranges and one lemon every day harmful. Galen’s Theory of Humours and two supply ships carrying 1854 men, for six days, with this pair showing the curative effects of the was derived from the ancient medical returning to England with only one ship treatment.23 works of the Greek medical practitioner, crewed by 188 men. Nine hundred and As detailed in his later work in 1753, A Treatise of the and influenced western medicine ninety-seven of the 1415 deaths were at- Scurvy, the results were that ‘sudden and visible good effects well into the 19th century. The theory tributed to scurvy and only four to battle. were perceived from the use of the oranges and lemons; one of substantiated that within every individual While Anson was feted as a hero on those who had taken them being at the end of six days fit four there were humours or principal fluids his return, the voyage had a significant duty . . . [I] observe that the result of all my experiments was (black bile, yellow bile, phlegm and impact upon him and drove a need to that oranges and lemons were the most effectual remedies for blood) produced by various organs in the reform within the Admiralty. It was likely this distemper at sea. . . ‘.24 body, which had to be in balance for a his patronage and influence enabled Lind left the Royal Navy in 1748, returning to his hometown person to remain healthy.18 The balance James Lind to undertake his investigation of to work towards the academic award of his of humours in humans could be achieved into scurvy and publicise the results.21 medical credentials and practice as a physician. This time by diet, medicines and by bloodletting The very high mortality rate during was spent conducting a literature review of scurvy and using leeches or the scalpel. Anson’s circumnavigation in 1740–4 expounding his views, eventually publishing his Treatise Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 61

dedicated to Anson, who provided constituent that acted against scurvy.26 the first group exhibiting signs of recovery. He later published much patronage and support. Jeremy It wasn’t until years later that Lind had to his findings, having been convinced that citrus juice could save Baron, in his article Sailor’s scurvy before accept that his process was flawed and he lives at sea. Trotter also advanced Lind’s process, but instead of and after James Lind – a reassessment, again championed the use of fresh fruit. boiling the residue of squeezed lemons, he instead strained the highlights deficiencies in Lind’s Whereas Lind was on the right track, juice, bottled it and added some olive oil to better preserve the work. He particularly detailed Lind’s other more well placed interlocutors in liquid.29 lack of reference to works by other the scurvy debate were not and as result It took the influence of Gilbert Blane to overcome the authors recommending citrus fruits the Admiralty recommended ‘cures’ such bureaucratic stasis. Whereas many of Blane’s peers had as preventative cures. This deficiency as MacBride’s Malt rather than lemon served as naval surgeons for many years, Blane through included Woodall’s publication The juice as a scurvy prophylaxis even as late friendships and patronage was employed as Admiral Rodney’s Chirugeon’s Mate, with its suggestion as the time of the voyages of Captain (Commander of the West India Station) personal physician to provision ships with lemon juice to James Cook. Again, the Admiralty failed and later appointed to the special position of Physician to the prevent scurvy. to appreciate the worth of citrus fruits. It Fleet. It was during a voyage to the West Indies that Blane was Other commentators have criticised was a blot on the naval administration of exposed to the scourge of scurvy and in 1780 he wrote advising Lind’s approach and his Treatise is often these years that it was left to individual the Admiralty of his conclusions and called for the provisioning said to be monumental yet muddled, captains to work out ways to combat of all naval vessels with lemons and limes. The Sick and Hurt whereas Lind thought many written disease onboard.27 Board, which oversaw medical provisioning, dismissed the efforts on scurvy were nonsensical. On Cook’s first voyage of 1768-1771, appeal citing that the ‘rob of lemon and orange’ had proved Without a doubt Lind was a well- there were three outbreaks of scurvy unsatisfactory and that there was no reason to conduct further respected and successful physician, and renowned botanist, Sir Joseph trials with the juice. Blane reintroduced the issuing of orange whose papers were often presented Banks, cured his own bout of scurvy and lemon juice, substituted wine for brandy, and one year later at renowned scientific and medical using a personal supply of lemon juice was able to report to the Admiralty that the mortality from Society gatherings. His other published after taking the advice of Naval Surgeon scurvy had dropped to one in twenty.30 classics, on naval hygiene and tropical Nathaniel Hulme to take his own supply Blane, now employed as a surgeon in London at St Thomas’ diseases, were equally highly regarded. on the voyage.28 Cook was asked to test Hospital, continued to lobby through influential friends Subsequent work by Gilbert Blane a range of antiscorbutics on his three for supplies of citrus fruits to be provided and repeated the (1749–1834) and Thomas Trotter (1760– world voyages, but the lack of scurvy is recommendation in his work, Observations on the Diseases 1832) established the accuracy of Lind’s best attributed to his insistence of the of Seaman, in which he reiterated Lind’s earlier findings.31 In observations, with Blane’s 1815 summary use of fresh vegetables and fruit at every early 1795, the Admiralty finally succumbed to overwhelming confirming the virtual disappearance of opportunity. support for the use of citrus juice as a preventative to scurvy. scurvy from the Royal Navy.25 Certainly from the 1760’s onwards The curative was issued initially to individual Fleets when Lind’s chief disappointment was it became increasingly accepted by supported by the controlling Admiral and by 1799 all naval perhaps his failure to persuade the mariners and naval physicians that Lind’s ships on foreign service as well as all ships on the British coast influential and aristocratic regime that remedy in using lemon juice was correct were issued. In an incredible turnaround, between 1795 and could have furthered his work and and more and more medical writers 1814, 1.6 million gallons of lemon juice were issued to fleet promoted his ideas. His self-effacing referred to it. Ironically, the slave trade units. The cure wasn’t universally administered though, and approach coupled with his support for did much to advance the need for a cure. scurvy still pervaded some maritime endeavours, for example, his boiled citrus juice (which was largely Thomas Trotter, who briefly worked convicts being transported to Australia regularly suffered the ineffective as a cure) proved to defeat under Lind in Edinburgh, served as a effects.32 him again and again. Lind in recognising surgeon in the slave-ship Brookes. At An 8 December 1841 entry in Henry Mahon’s (surgeon the need to maintain the effect of lemon that time the thought that stale, fetid air of the convict ship Barossa) journal shows vivid, remarkably juice for long voyages sought to preserve in ship’s holds was the cause of scurvy intimate sketches in a report on scurvy. Each picture depicts the curative power by urging the use was preeminent. It was during one the swellings, bruising and eruptions of scurvy in the groin and of ‘rob’, an extract that was prepared voyage that he noted that the slaves were limbs of several of the convicts.33 In addition, the affliction by boiling orange and lemon juice into discarding ripe guavas in favour of green, was also common amongst the fledgling American navy and syrup that was then bottled for easy unripe fruit. He devised a trial where he was reported by those sailing for the American gold rush storage. While the result was added to found nine scurvy affected slaves and and even whaling fleets well into the 19th Century. In 1867, rum or water and could be stored for divided them into three groups. To one Lachlan Rose patented a method used to preserve citrus juice years, the boiling process destroyed group he gave ripe guava, another unripe without alcohol, creating a lime juice concentrate known as the ascorbic acid which was the active guava and the last lime juice, with all but Rose’s lime juice, which exists today. The Merchant Shipping Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 62 Scurvy: A Story of Medical Adventure & Bureaucratic Nonsense

6 Ibid. Act of that same year required all ships relatively untrained man to enlist as 7 J. Levingston. “Seamens’ entitlements and priority in Admiralty”. 23 of the Royal Navy and Merchant Navy a surgeon’s mate, to gain promotion April 2012. , p.8. to provide a daily lime ration to sailors to by observation, imitation and — if he 8 Kemp., p. 7. prevent scurvy. Under the Act, it became was lucky — a touch of patronage.35 9 Ibid., p.94. 10 Norton, p.60. compulsory for the ship’s captain to His statement is generous and apt, and 11 Baron, Jeremy. “Sailors’ scurvy before and after James Lind – a provide lime juice of good quality to all quite rightly places this unlikely outcome, reassessment”. Nutrition Reviews, Vol. 67(6), p.316. men under his command. which saved countless lives, at the feet 12 Gratzer, Walter. Terrors of the Table: The curious history of nutrition. The Act stipulated that only lime or of those persons who worked towards Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p.18. 13 Ibid. lemon juice containing 15% of proper a cure. The search for the treatment of 14 Hope, Ronald. Poor Jack. London: Chatham Publishing, 2001, p.97. and palatable proof spirits obtained from scurvy, particularly at sea, is a story that 15 Gratzer, p.18. a Bonded Warehouse was acceptable mixes pioneering feats with medical 16 Baron, p.317. and that it must be accompanied by officialdom often mired in bureaucratic 17 Gratzer, p.18. a Certificate signed by an Inspector stasis. This one disease profoundly 18 Torck, Mathieu. Avoiding the Dire Straits: An Inquiry into Food Provisions and Scurvy in the Maritime and Military History of China and appointed by the Board of Trade. The affected early maritime history and wider East Asia. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2009, p.27. master of every ship was required to warfare when much of the world was 19 Norton, p.64. serve out an ounce of lime or lemon juice being explored and contributed to 20 Baron, p.318. or other such anti-scorbutics every day to horrendous loss of life. Those that 21 Gratzer, p.19. each member of the crew as soon as they doggedly sought a cure should rate 22 Ibid., p.25. have been at sea for 10 days, and during alongside other maritime heroes. t 23 Baron, p.318. 24 Norton, p.64. the remainder of the voyage, except 25 Cook, p.224. when they were in harbour and supplied Commander Stewart Dunne joined the 26 Gratzer, p.24. 34 with fresh provisions. There was a RAN in 1990, and served in a variety of 27 Kemp, p.111. sharp decline in the numbers of cases of postings, both at sea and ashore. In 1999 28 Baron, p.322. 29 Ibid., p.323. scurvy admitted to naval hospitals after he completed the Hydrographic Officers this Act had come into effect, but despite 30 Kemp, p.142. the stringent provisions outlined in the Basic Course at Penguin, and is now a 31 Gratzer, p.25. Charge qualifiedH ydrographic Surveyor. 32 Foxhall, Katherine. Health, Medicine and the Sea. Manchester: Act, cases of scurvy continued to be seen Manchester University Press, 2012, p.14. (albeit at a lesser rate) often due to the He has commanded an SML, MHC and an 33 Ibid., p.119. individual’s choice not to partake. HS and is currently posted to HQJOC as 34 Cook, p. 225. Where Lind had arguably failed, 35 Harvie, David. Limeys: The Conquest of Scurvy. Gloucestershire: the Military Options Regional Planner. Sutton Publishing, 2002, p.4. others – notably Trotter and Blane – had succeeded. Blane’s doggedness proved He has achieved a Master of International Bibliography the eventual determiner but Lind’s Relations from Deakin University and Baron, Jeremy. “Sailors’ scurvy before and after James Lind – a contribution shouldn’t be underrated. In is currently studying towards a Master reassessment”. Nutrition Reviews, Vol. 67(6), 315–332. his broad work on scurvy, entitled Limeys: Cook, Gordon. “Scurvy in the British Mercantile Marine in the 19th of Arts (Strategy and Security) through century, and the contribution of the Seamen’s Hospital Society”. The Conquest of Scurvy, David Harvie ADFA. He has never suffered from scurvy. Postgraduate Medical Journal, Volume 80 2004, 224–229. made an fitting observation in saying: Foxhall, Katherine. Health, Medicine and the Sea. Manchester: The conquest of scurvy by ill- Manchester University Press, 2012. Gratzer, Walter. Terrors of the Table: The curious history of nutrition. resourced and professionally despised Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. naval surgeons is one of the great Harvie, David. Limeys: The Conquest of Scurvy. Gloucestershire: Sutton triumphs of eighteenth-century Publishing, 2002. (Endnotes) Hope, Ronald. Poor Jack. London: Chatham Publishing, 2001. medicine. The men who went to sea 1 Norton, Louis. “Maritime Occupational Kemp, Peter. The British Sailor. London: J.M.Dent & Sons, 1970. as naval surgeons were not paragons; Disease: The Scurvy”. The Northern Mariner/ Levingston, John. “Seamens’ entitlements and priority in Admiralty”. 23 these often were ill-trained men le marin du nord, XX No. 1, January 2010, p.57. April 2012. . who practiced their craft in the most 2 Ibid., p.58. Norton, Louis. “Maritime Occupational Disease: The Scurvy”. The 3 Kemp, Peter. The British Sailor. London: J.M Northern Mariner/le marin du nord, XX No. 1, January 2010, 57-70. difficult of physical circumstances Dent & Sons, 1970, p. ix. The Admiralty and Maritime Law Guide. “The Rules of Oleron”. 23 April … Most doctors at sea were known 4 Ibid., p. xiii. 2012. . as naval surgeons, and they did 5 The Admiralty and Maritime Law Guide. Torck, Mathieu. Avoiding the Dire Straits: An Inquiry into Food not enjoy high standing. The usual “The Rules of Oleron”. 23 April 2012. . Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

64

Obituary By Captain Peter Hore RN, naval obituarist at the Daily Telegraph, London

dmiral Sir John ‘Sandy’ fail because the RN couldn’t possibly Woodward, who has died aged 81, survive in the face of an Argentine Acommanded the carrier battle group, air onslaught. And of course the then Task Force 317.8, during the Falklands Defence Secretary, John Nott, was War in 1982. against the operation because if it was a In March 1982 Woodward was a success it would prove that his decision rear admiral and as Flag Officer, First to get rid of our assault ships and Flotilla commanded a group of ships on carriers in his 1981 Defence Review was their spring exercise off . On wrong.” March 29, as the news from the South On the other hand, his commanding Atlantic worsened, Woodward joined officers and the staff at the Northwood the Commander in Chief Fleet, John headquarters of the Commander in Fieldhouse in his temporary flagship, Chief knew each other, had attended the destroyer Glamorgan. That evening, the same schools and courses, and with Captain Mike Barrow, the captain read each others’ minds well. Also in of Glamorgan, they discussed ‘what if’ his favour was the rapid development the were to be invaded of Ascension as a logistics base, albeit and they were asked to re-take them. still 2,500 miles away. And, of course, Admiral Woodward makes an address in retirement Argentina had long claimed the Woodward was the right man in the (Courtesy Salon magazine) islands and on April 2, 1982, impatient right man at the right time. at the progress of diplomatic talks and On the passage south Woodward allow Conqueror to open fire as he considered the cruiser and wishing to distract their people from visited as many ships as he could, its escorts a threat to the British task force, and Conqueror, domestic woes, the Argentine junta though his message to the various ships’ controversially, sank the Argentine warship. As a result the Ar- ordered their forces to invade the companies of the destroyers and frigates gentine fleet remained in port for the rest of the war. Two days Falklands. Woodward divided his fleet, was uncompromising: “You’ve taken later, an anti-ship missile, launched from the air, struck the part to rush south immediately, others the Queen’s shilling. Now you’re going destroyer Sheffield, one of Woodward’s previous commands, to follow, and yet others to return to the to have to bloody earn it. And your best setting her ablaze. UK for more stores and ammunition. way of getting back alive is to do your On May 21, the , reinforced by the army, Woodward’s problems were acute: while absolute utmost. So go and do it.” landed at San Carlos, and on June 14 the ability of the Royal it was clear that the Argentines would The war was a maritime campaign Navy to project power was amply demonstrated when the not give in without a fight, he lacked from beginning to end, characterised Argentines Port Stanley were compelled to surrender. good intelligence about the Argentine by a struggle for air superiority between Woodward was seen by many as the architect of victory, navy and air force, and even charts of Woodward’s ships and aircraft and but the victory was marred by there not being a ‘band of the region. The time of year and the the Argentine air force, and by a series brothers’ at the Falklands. There were some who, from the 8,000 miles distance to the islands gave of amphibious landings. On April 25 outset, expressed their view that the Flag Officer Third Flotilla only a two-month window in which to British forces recaptured South Georgia (in charge of carriers and amphibious shipping) should be achieve success. No opportunity could after sinking the Argentine submarine in command of the Task Force and criticised Woodward’s be lost. Santa Fe. Five days later Woodward’s tactics in deploying the carriers too far to the east of the Other dice were stacked against him, ships closed the Falklands to begin a islands. Woodward himself thought that some of his captains as Woodward recalled: “The United bombardment, and Sea Harriers from were not fitted for their role, and after the war he was States considered the recapture of the carriers Hermes and Invincible dismayed to learn that it was policy that other officers, who the Falklands a military impossibility. attacked several targets, while an aerial had proved themselves in battle, would not be recognised by The Ministry of Defence at Whitehall battle continued over the islands in suitable appointments and promotion afterwards. However, regarded the whole venture as simply which three Argentine aircraft were shot there was a surprising empathy between the intellectual too risky. The British Army considered down. Woodward (who some thought too submariner-minded) the operation ill-advised because we On May 1, the submarine Con- and mavericks such as the air ace Sharkey Ward. Woodward didn’t out-number the Argentineans by queror on patrol south of the islands strongly endorsed the importance of organic, maritime air enough on land to guarantee success. sighted the light cruiser General Bel- power and warmly applauded the fighting achievements of The Royal Air Force agreed with grano. Woodward sought a change to Ward’s Sea Harriers. everyone else that the operation would the rules of engagement which would Woodward was knighted KCB. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 65

John Forster Woodward was also known as the Nott Review, in realised that she had missed a point of detail and raised a hand born in Penzance on May 1, 1932, the first term of Margaret Thatcher’s to attract her attention: “If looks could kill, I was done for, but I the son of a bank clerk, and educated administration, Woodward had fought persisted, gave her the information she had missed and bought at Stubbington House School, once and lost John Nott’s determination time for the other officials to gather their wits before further known as the cradle of the Navy, and to meet the threat of Soviet forces decisions were made.” Woodward’s opinion of her skills was he entered the Royal Naval College in Germany at the expense of severe one of respect, but not of great liking. Later when a senior civil Dartmouth in 1946. cuts to the Navy. The cuts included servant told him, “You were very lucky today. You interrupted As a junior officer Woodward one-fifth of its destroyers and frigates, the PM – most don’t survive that,” Woodward replied: “She spent time in the Home Fleet, before one aircraft carrier, which was to be was talking – and needed some fearless advice, which she got.” specialising as a submariner in 1954. sold to the Royal Australian Navy, and Woodward believed that his relations with Mrs Thatcher were He served in three generations of two amphibious ships, and the ice founded on mutual respect, and he regarded her as the best submarines: the Second World War patrol ship Endurance whose declared top executive he had ever met. vintage submarine Sanguine; the withdrawal from the Antarctic cued Of politicians generally Woodward had no respect, post-war designed, diesel-powered the Argentine invasion of the Falkland believing that they did not “have a clue about Defence,” and he Porpoise; and Valiant, the second of Islands in April1982. Woodward felt was a virulent critic of the Coalition government’s Strategic Britain’s nuclear-powered submarines. keenly the irony that as Flag Officer, Defence and Security Review in 2010. In 1960 he passed the Navy’s First Flotilla, 1981–83 he should have to His detractors thought he was a cold fish and were irritated rigorous submarine command course, clear up the mess created by politicians. by what they thought was private in him, paranoid, and the ‘Perisher’, and commanded the After the Falklands war Woodward school-masterly. He had an open mind and enjoyed vigorous diesel-powered submarines Tireless was Flag Officer Submarines and debate, but could be ruthless if anybody argued against him 1960-61 and Grampus. Subsequently he Commander Submarines Eastern without full possession of the facts. If Woodward lacked what was second in command of the nuclear- Atlantic, 1983–84. His chief of staff is commonly thought of as the outward and visible signs of a powered Valiant, before promotion recalled that he was a tremendous leader, the wife of one of his officers in Warspite commented: to commander when he became the man to work for “I have very fond “We may not like him very much, but we do expect to get our officer-in-charge or ‘teacher’ on the memories of him as the Flag Officer husbands back”. Those who knew him even better realised that ‘Perisher’. Submarines clearing the dining table he was sensitive, humorous, highly-intelligent and self-critical. In December 1969 he took after a jolly good lunch with his senior He had been a maths prodigy at school and an avid bridge command of Warspite which was staff officers, spreading out large charts player since school days. His personal philosophy was that a newly repaired after an underwater of the North Norwegian Sea and lying truly good leader should seek respect and regard any liking collision, according to government prone on the table top as we discussed simply as profit. He was also modest and never sought to sources in northern waters with an and plotted our reaction to a breakout exploit his fame except in his memoirs, which are a frank ‘iceberg’: several members of the crew of Soviet submarines from the Barents account of the pressures on a commander fighting a war. One were still shaken by the incident and Sea heading into the Atlantic. He was Hundred Days: the memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Woodward did much to restore their thoroughly in his element and he was Commander, co-written with Patrick Robinson, have been confidence in the safety of the boat just like one of the boys.” revised three times and are told with self-deprecatory humour. and its manoeuvrability. He recalled Although Woodward had made His last appointment in the service was as Commander-in- the discovery that his nickname in prolific use of the radio-telephone Chief Naval Home Command, 1987–89 when he retired after submarines was ‘Spock’: “I was quite during the war, talking to some of his 45 years in the Navy, aged 57, and he was knighted GBE In pleased because Spock does everything subordinate commanders and to the retirement he was chairman of the Falklands Islands Memorial by logic.” Promoted to captain in1972 Task Group Commander at Northwood, Chapel Trust, which raised £2.3 million and was opened at he attended the Royal College of he never spoke to Mrs Thatcher. Indeed Pangbourne College by Her Majesty The Queen in 2000, and Defence Studies, where he did not like he did not come to know her until he an honorary liveryman of the Glass Sellers’ Company. the paperwork, and in 1974, he became was Deputy Chief of Defence Staff He settled in Bosham where he could indulge his life-long Captain of Submarine Training. In 1976 (Commitments) 1985–88 when he passion for sailing: in 1983 he won his class at Cowes week in Woodward returned to general service, attended several Cabinet meetings. At his Sonata Cry Havoc. for the first time in over 20 years, to his first meeting, the Prime Minister’s Woodward, who died on August 4, 2013, married command the Type 42 guided missile advisers had not all taken their seats Charlotte McMurtrie in 1960: they separated and since 1993 destroyer Sheffield. when she announced that she had read his companion has been Winifred ‘Prim’ Hoult. Both ladies As Director of Naval Plans, 1978–81, all the papers and began to explain what survive him as does a son and a daughter. t during the Strategic Defence Review, the government should do. Woodward Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 66 Book Reviews

but its coverage presents significant combat commanders whereas the others were Washington- difficulties. based throughout the war. For the sweep and nature of A Parting Shot is well illustrated the global conflict, these so-called desk warriors at home with both black and white photographs were hardly idle as they accompanied their president, F D of the times, and modern colour shots; Roosevelt, on top-level diplomatic missions abroad or to the and numerous maps. Recommended. extreme fringes of the sea battlefields themselves. To survive on the political front, whether at home or abroad, was not without inherent dangers, whether personal or career- wise. The war was total. Even flying or sailing to obscure conferences in foreign lands posed as much a risk as a heavily contested sea war. Two recent books are reviewed under. To be blunt, Admiral Nimitz, The Commander of the Pacific Ocean Theatre is an unashamed hagiography. Yet it is still a worthy study as there is much to like about Chester Nimitz. Of German stock, he was clearly ambitious, yet in a modest way. He had sufficient reserves of personal A Parting Shot character, mental toughness and moral courage, as expected in any sailor, of whatever rank and in any navy. Surely he By Terry Jones and Steven Carruthers was avuncular and connected with those men and women Cooper Publishing under his command. He could be forgiving and was prepared to back his navy people if they had done their best, despite 319 pages; soft cover often failing in their assigned task. For that quality, he was Reviewed by Jack Aubrey The art of leadership conscious of morale effects and public relations generally. This officer sought to encourage the best out of those he led. Even small actions of World War II – the USN and World At once, he earned fierce loyalty from those who respected history are now being covered by the War II the responsibilities invested in him. Clearly, he was not efforts of researchers. This new book vain-glorious or ego-centric like a rival, General Douglas by Terry Jones and Steven Carruthers Brayton Harris, Admiral Nimitz, The MacArthur. “Chesty” was measured in his command role is only about a small part of Australia’s preferring to delegate responsibility to trusted subordinates. Commander of the PacificO cean war, but it is a welcome addition to Equally, he was prepared to share any blame, which might papering over the cracks. Theatre. also reflect on his own judgement. The shelling of parts of Sydney and Palgrave MacMillan, New York, The book is replete with countless examples of his Newcastle by Japanese submarines in 2011, pp. 230, price not stated. adroit touch of command. Far removed from the events, 1942 has been known about for many Walter Borneman, The Admirals: seventy years on, any naval type can only regard with awe years – the incidents were widely The Five-Star Admirals who won the the weight of command responsibilities placed upon him. covered by the press at the time. But a We may never see the like of these people again in such a war at sea. forensic analysis of the events has not life and death experience when the very vestiges of Western been attempted, as far as I know. This Little Brown and Company, 2012, civilisation were being threatened. Nimitz stood by fellow book rectifies that gap, and does it well. price not stated. combat commander “Bull” Halsey. This feisty junior was Eleven chapters cover the incidents Reviewed by Mike Fogarty everything Nimitz was not. To his credit, Nimitz backed themselves, where the shells ended up; Halsey when less-confident seniors might have abandoned the damage they did, and even which The promoted four him as personally and professionally dispensable. For all his actually exploded – many did not. of its admirals to five-star rank during setbacks, Halsey was as much an architect of victory as any A mix of archival research; WWII and after. Effectively, they were senior officer during those perilous wartime days. interviews with those subjects still all styled and titled in the rank of Fleet Nimitz was punctual and expected no less in others. available, and analysis of the events Admiral. This was a subtle tilt at the Socially, he was also considerate and solicitous of his and their timeline constitutes the Royal Navy, some of whose own top- personal retinue in celebrating birthdays and making teams narrative. The Japanese angle is not ranking (and equivalent) naval officers function. Moreover, he knew how to relax and achieve the covered in anything more than outline, were appointed as Admiral of the work-life balance in his career, even amidst the crushing and this would have been nice to see, Fleet. Some USN officers were theatre demands of wartime command. Nimitz enjoyed a sound Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 67

working relationship with his president Ernest J. King (17 December, 1944), reviewing Borneman, he makes a compelling observation in FDR. Nimitz could mediate and Chester W. Nimitz (19 December, 1944 (Naval Review, February, 2013, page 91). “There is no single cope with all the inter and intra- and William F. Halsey (11 December, successful model of leadership. You have to forge your own service rivalries. He may have been 1945). For that, this review obviates individual style, hone it to perfection, drive yourself hard occasionally exasperated but he played the need to return to Nimitz who is and hope that events give you the opportunity to show what the ball and not the man. He looked more adequately covered in the book you’re made of. These four were all tested to the limit they for the best in people and invariably by Harris. Borneman is thus a better passed, in the main, with flying colours.” In the promotion he was rewarded by them. Obviously, book, in many ways, as it allows us stakes, and for naval valour itself, there are more stars than he proved to be both resilient and to compare and contrast all the four there are stars to give. They were not just in the right spot at flexible in his myriad of relationships. admirals. Nimitz and Halsey spent the right time. They were leaders. Chesty got his fifth star and also the their war at sea. In contrast, Leahy and coveted appointment as Chief of Naval King saw the war from Washington. Operations. He will be remembered Both proved as indispensable as their as a great leader. The Chiefs of Staff two distant peers, tied down by the during wartime America always backed War in the Pacific, and doing their best his command role. to advance a victorious war to Japan The question must be both asked where they would lead the US Fleet, and answered. How relevant is and was and other allied navies, into a silenced Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, USN Tokyo Bay. Leahy and King helped FDR to the RAN, or in fact, any navy? The win the war. They, too, were resolute Nimitz career service provides its own leaders. answer. He was personally ambitious Leahy was the President’s Chief as his guild expected of him. In time, Military Adviser. Not as flamboyant he became a consummate professional, as Halsey, he proved to be a skilled worthy of the increasingly higher diplomat. He had a role to play which level appointments he was assigned he performed admirably. King was the to discharge. He outfitted them to Chief of Naval Operations and also a S teel Cat: thestory of HMAS optimal advantage which rewarded Chief of Staff. King had a formidable the confidence of his political leaders. presence and he proved his worth Brisbane, Vietnam and Gulf War His highest personal quality was the by backing Nimitz and Halsey. King Veteran respect and loyalty he garnered from was never given to self-doubt and his his navy folk. In good and bad times, he contribution was just as effective as by Ken Doolan: Grinkle Press, 2009. ISBN led and set a shining example so others General George Marshall. Both men 9780980282115. 208PP. could instinctively follow. In short, he were leaders, but to survive, they also treated his people well by encouraging had to display an array of political and RRP $22 +$10 postage them to do their best in the grim face diplomatic skills. In WWII, Nimitz Reviewed by Ian Pfennigwerth of telling adversity. He led and created as CINCPAC, commanded two Proud veteran of DDGs Brisbane and Perth the conditions where his sailors would million men (and women) and the 1, willingly follow. Nimitz had a capacity 000 ships which won the war in the Why review a four-year-old book? Because I think that it for leadership which would make any Pacific. He suffered reverses but he is worth consideration, even more so now as international navy go forward to achieve its stated could only share in the USN victory. events have demonstrated ever more clearly the value to remit. For this, history will regard him The complexity of those management Australia of ships like our lost guided missile destroyers. as a fine sea warrior. tasks could only be imagined. History Ken Doolan was one of 25 fortunate men to have The Admirals: The Five-Star has shown that FDR picked wisely and commanded Her Majesty’s Australian Ship Brisbane, last of Admirals who won the war at sea is he was well-served by all his four five- three guided missile destroyers (DDG) commissioned into a wider survey as it also includes the stars. Despite that, a navy is only as the RAN in the 1960s, and the story he tells is not of the three other five-star admirals who were good as the sum of its parts. All proved ‘Boys’ Own’ variety, although the ships themselves inspired promoted alongside Nimitz during the vital in winning the war. that kind of reaction. war. In order of seniority, they were: The last word should go to Vice At Brisbane’s decommissioning in October 2001 the William D. Leahy (15 December, 1944), Admiral Sir Tim Laurence, RN. In Chief of Navy, another DDG veteran, remarked; ‘They were Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 68 Book Reviews the first, post-Second World War demanded of Brisbane a high standard served in and supported Brisbane and the other ships. The ships…that had real grunt. They had a of professional competence she DDG spent a continuous 46 days in the front line in the missile system that worked. They had demonstrated repeatedly. Arabian Gulf – a tribute to her company and command. guns that were accurate and hit the A short chapter describes the The final chapters concern the rundown of the ship target. They had sonar that worried ship’s role in Operation NAVY HELP towards her decommissioning and an interesting one on the submariners – and they travelled at a DARWIN in the wake of the Cyclone disposal of the ship, by no means a simple task of knocking real destroyer’s speed’. Tracy disaster. First ship to reach the holes in her bottom and sinking her off the Sunshine Doolan’s account, however, is stricken city on 31 December 1974, Coast. However, as a result there are plenty of reminders of measured and methodical, and his first Brisbane was the last to depart on Brisbane, not least her bridge superstructure and forward chapter on the origins of the decision 31 January 1975. With an average of gun mount outside the in to purchase the DDGs is a significant 160 of her men ashore during that Canberra. contribution to Australia’s naval month, the DDG accomplished much And the ‘Steel Cat’ nickname? It was certainly adopted history. Whether one can conclude that for the citizens and their city in that during in Vietnam, as Doolan describes in his Preface, but the RAN owed the DDGs to the Royal critical period. The following chapter it also alludes to the leopard that tops the crest of the City Australian Air Force overreaching itself outlines the ship’s 1977 deployment of Brisbane and which appears on the ship’s crest. Heraldry in its purported capacity to provide to Europe for the Queen’s Jubilee experts tell us that the leopard conveys the attributes of air defence to the Fleet is a matter for Review and exercises with NATO ‘valour, honour and high-mettle’, all very surely associated the individual reader, but it was far navies, an opportunity to test the ship’s with the long and distinguished career of HMAS Brisbane. from an off-the-cuff decision by Vice operational readiness in a different Admiral Burrell on his visit to the environment. US in 1960. That it was a decision of Chapter 8, dealing with the ship’s enormous consequence, to the fighting capability upgrades in the 1980s power of the RAN and in cementing and her North West Indian Ocean relationships with the United States, deployments of the late 1980s, is an Doolan clearly demonstrates. interesting and timely introduction The author then describes the to the following chapter. More process of ordering and construction, space could have been devoted to fitting out, working up and reaching an discussing the ramifications on the appropriate level of proficiency in the RAN and Australian Defence of operation of this new weapon system, the modernisations which took the which provided the RAN with its first RAN’s DDG’s from post-World War II real opportunity to benchmark itself competency into the late 20th century. against the performance standards Ken Doolan rose to the rank of of the larger navy. As he says, the Rear Admiral and was the Maritime flow-on effects on the rest of the fleet, Commander during the first Gulf War regardless of its origins, were important in 1991. In this book he has lifted the Lostor : The st ies of all ships lost by for an RAN still struggling with post- corner of the veil over what admirals Voyager issues. really do, just a little, to describe the the Royal Australian Navy The chapters on the ship’s two activities behind the scenes which Vietnam deployments follow familiar accompanied the RAN’s deployment by Allen Lyne, Moana Heights SA, Self-published, 2013. lines, although it is worth noting the – Operation DAMASK. His remarks ISBN: 9780646903750. care and attention that went into on p.124 on how the Government RRP $32 + $3 postage within Australia the preparation of the ship for her selects ships for its navy are worth the Reviewed by Ian Pfennigwerth deployments and the improvements price of the book, as is his description these demanded in RAN practice for of how the RAN struggled to get so- Who knew that the RAN had lost 45 ships in its hundred preparing ships for active service. called ‘Tier 2 ‘ ships up to the standards years of existence? Probably nobody, until Allen Lyne spent The author notes the distinct drop required for a ‘Tier 1’ war in a matter of five years researching the issue. His book describes the in the operational tempo of the weeks. The deployment was a triumph background, circumstances and the events leading to these second deployment in comparison of hard work and ingenuity, and the losses, some of them well known, others far from so. Those with the first, but her duties still commitment of men and women who not overly familiar with the history and circumstances in Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 69

which the RAN has operated and Matafele probably foundered because the ship and these men lost because of the desire to salvage fought will be grateful for the author’s the alterations made to her structure parachute silk from flares? thorough explanations. Lyne has also had not been properly assessed for the There are points in the book over which one might used his researcher’s prerogative to effects they might have on her stability: quibble. It is not appropriate to criticise the RAN for having pass judgment on who or what was to her wreck remains unlocated. no aircraft carriers in 1939: only three navies did, and the blame for the losses. Lyne is understanding of the perils RAN had staged a remarkable comeback from almost A summary of Lyne’s research which faced Lieutenant Commander disappearing during the Great Depression. Similarly, I’ve yet reveals that ten of the vessels, mostly Robison at Betano in September to see any evidence that a shortage of experienced senior those of the Naval Auxiliary Patrol 1942 and which led to the stranding NCOs affected the performance of the RAN in World War (NAP) in WWII, were lost to fire, of Voyager and her complete loss II. On the contrary, there is much to show that the RAN, six to groundings or strandings, five – there were certainly extenuating while expanding from a force of 7,500 to close to 40,000, to collisions and four to unknown circumstances. He is less kind to performed pretty well, especially as most of the new recruits causes. Two were lost in storms, one Commodore Pope who launched were “hostilities only” personnel. hit an Australian-laid mine and sank, Operation HAMBURGER, exposing But these are quibbles only. Lyne’s book is an interesting and one was sunk when the wharf it two and the patrol vessel and thought-provoking addition to our naval history, was secured to collapsed on it! The Kuru on a similar mission to Timor one which throws light on the debit side of the ledger. I remaining 16 were lost though enemy in December the same year to serious thoroughly recommend it to a general audience and to action, a terrible toll but, possibly, a Japanese reprisals, and ordering it to experts alike. source of pride in Australia’s navy as continue when it was clearly fatally a fighting service – and preferable to compromised. Perhaps it was the “fog running ships aground or having them of war” which clouded his judgement, collide. but it cost the lives of 100 men and the Lyne has clearly spent his research RAN the corvette Armidale. time wisely and well. His analysis of A board of inquiry into the loss the collision in Port Phillip that sank of HMAS Canberra at Savo Island in the minesweeper Goorangai with all August 1942 was unable to determine hands in 1940 demonstrates that it the reason she was lost so easily and was probably the liner Duntroon that the attempt by Bruce Loxton to sheet caused the accident, but that a smart the blame home to a US destroyer’s lawyer can work wonders to obscure torpedo was not totally satisfactory. the facts. Of course, there are no Lyne comes up with no new evidence. blameless parties in any collision, but There are no such mysteries about this one seems to have been especially the loss of Vampire in April 1942, hard on the victim. He covers the overwhelmed by Japanese bombs. loss of Sydney to SMS Kormoran, ML-430 was the victim of an attack and introduces some interesting by fellow ML, very obviously a’ fog of Force Z Shipwrecks of the South observations on a similar incident – war ’incident, which fortunately cost fortunately ‘blue-on-blue’- involving no lives. China Sea the cruiser HMS Neptune. A lack of Of the peacetime losses, Lyne sensible precautions while approaching correctly observes that Voyager should By Rod McDonald a suspicious merchant ship is the have kept out of the path of Melbourne Whittles; softback, 156 pages common factor in both incidents. on 10 February 1964 and that why she Reviewed by Jack Aubrey For reasons not entirely clear (petrol did not will forever remain a mystery, in the bilges?), the NAP vessels were whatever Royal Commissions might The shipwrecks of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse particularly prone to fire. The Japanese say. In the sinking of the stores ship lie in relatively shallow water compared with the wrecks of aerial attacks on Darwin accounted Woomera in 1960 with the loss of four HMAS Sydney and its opponent Kormoran. For many in for five of the small craft lost to enemy lives, human cupidity seems to be Britain in WWII, the loss of the two British ships resonated action, precious vessels at a time when involved although if there was a board throughout the community much as the loss of our own 645 anything that could float and move of inquiry – as there should have been brave sailors did with Australia’s sinking in 1941. was a valuable item. The stores tender – Lyne does not cite from it. Were On 9 December 1941, both of these immense vessels – a Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 70 Book Reviews battleship and a battlecruiser – were Beachmaster during 1943, becoming one of the first allied lost to overwhelming air attack off officers ashore in both Sicily and at Reggio on the Italian Malaya. Swarms of Japanese torpedo- mainland. At the latter he achieved some notoriety when bombers overwhelmed their defences General Montgomery started to address troops on a narrow and smashed them with their air- trackway off the beach and Buckle ordered him to clear the launched weapons, which were often landing area so that vital supplies could be moved towards in the water racing towards the RN men in action who needed them. The General and his ships in groups and from different audience moved. directions. The warships fought well, Subsequently Buckle took part in operations with but their anti-aircraft defences were Yugoslav partisans during which he was captured, escaped, simply inadequate. Prince of Wales and betrayed and captured again, together with the war artist Repulse sank quickly, taking with them John Worsley. Together they ended up in Marlag O prisoner hundreds of their crews. of war camp where he helped Worsley to build a ‘dummy Force Z Shipwrecks of the South prisoner’ which subsequently became famous as ‘Albert China Sea is an interesting book. It is RN’. Buckle repaired watches as a hobby and his input was not a minute recounting of the loss of to make a clockwork system inside the papier-mâché head the two ships, nor an analysis of the Through Albert’s Eyes that made the eyelids appear to blink; the eyeballs themselves command decisions that sent them to were made from table-tennis balls. The dummy was their doom. Rather, it is a discussion of By Tony Bentley-Buckle dismantled and hidden in towels when prisoners marched their technical design; some chapters Edited by Captain Peter Hore RN out to a bath-house outside the wire, then assembled and devoted to the background of their loss, ‘marched in’ to cover the absence of a single prisoner who and then at the end, sections dealing Whittles Publishing, Caithness, 2013 escaped once the bath-house was vacated. Unfortunately with the wrecks as they are today, and www.whittlespublishing.com Buckle himself was not able to escape before the Germans what they can tell us about the physical Hardback; 143 pages with 44 b/w spotted the ruse. aspects of the battle. illustrations and end notes. After the war Worsley made a replica ‘Albert’ for the As such, if you know the story of British film ‘Albert RN’ in 1953 and a second, without the these two vessels well already – and ISBN 978-184995-066-4 blinking mechanism, which is now on display in the National many readers of Headmark will do Reviewed by David Hobbs Museum of the Royal Navy. so – then you will skip over the first Post-war Buckle made his own way back to the UK sections, although they are well written. This is the second in a series of before the official repatriation scheme got under way and The story of how the design of the autobiographical books, edited by Peter underwent training to become a pilot in the two vessels came to be will hold such Hore, that focus on people connected but, like many other former prisoners, could not settle back readers’ interests more. In particular, with naval warfare and the sea. Tony into the peace-time Navy and resigned. He subsequently the textual wreck descriptions and Bentley-Buckle led a particularly bought a small coaster and began what proved to be a very colour photographs of the sites at the adventurous life; he was the son of successful shipping business in East Africa, despite bitter end of the work are quite fascinating. a rubber planter in Ceylon, born in opposition from larger, more well-established concerns that They are well shot, with enough light Belgium while his parents were on tried to prevent him from breaking their monopoly. and detail to ponder over what exactly holiday and subsequently raised in This is a well-written and fascinating story and the caused such damage, and various England by aunts before joining the descriptions of amphibious and asymmetric warfare have ancillary effects. There are labelled Royal Navy as a cadet in 1938. In the topical value in Australia as the RAN begins to establish graphics which render assistance. For early war years he served in the cruisers its own ‘beachhead commando’ equivalents. Buckle was anyone who has studied the works of Dunedin and Edinburgh before joining clearly a resourceful and determined man in both his naval analysis dealing with Bismarck and the battleship Revenge in the Eastern and civilian careers; his story is an interesting one and it is Titanic this is familiar territory. Fleet during 1941. enhanced by a number of John Worsley’s wartime sketches. The rest of the book is well Whilst on leave, staying with friends It is a good read and I thoroughly recommend it. illustrated, and there is a good near Mombasa, he broke an arm badly bibliography. Recommended. riding and during his convalescence he volunteered for special service. After training in Scotland he joined the Royal Navy’s ‘G’ Commando as a Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 71

the instruments of state terror such as to reverse Mossadegh’s nationalisation of this most precious the secret police, by mobilising their British overseas asset. Given that the Labour Party had been discontent on the streets of Arab and nationalising key industries, such as coal and gas, in the UK, even Western capitals and pressuring it had no sympathy with the fortunes of AIOC. the army or the Western powers to In contrast, when the Conservative Prime Minister, remove the dictators. Anthony Eden, refused to bow to US pressure not to The result has been the replacement intervene militarily against Nasser during the Suez Crisis in of a Sunni nationalist dictator in Iraq 1956, he was deposed from power by a American-led run on by a Shi’ite strongman, Nuri al-Maliki; sterling and a ministerial cabal in London. Ballantyne recalls an increase in Iranian power in the the aggressive actions of the US Sixth Fleet towards the Fertile Crescent and the Persian Gulf, Anglo-French naval task force as it operated against Egypt. underlined by the development of a This was symbolised by a US Navy helicopter hovering civil and military nuclear weapons over the flight deck of the Royal Navy carrier HMS Eagle to capability; an emerging proxy war prevent the launch of Fleet Air Arm jets! Such an act would between Sunni and Shia Islam on be unimaginable today, when the US and the UK armed Strike from the Sea. several fronts, in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, forces, and especially their respective navies, co-operate so The Royal Navy & US Yemen and North Africa and, lastly, effectively in theatre. distinct signs that the United States But in the 1950s and 1960s US and UK strategic and Navy at War in the and the United Kingdom are again military interests were not aligned in the Middle East. Middle East, 1949-2003 gearing up for military action in the The US was not interested in the region and franchised Middle East to protect their friends its defence to the UK. This was undermined, however, by By Iain Ballantyne and their interests from the eastern the anti-colonial ethos of US policy which saw Arab or Pen & Sword Maritime, Barnsley, Mediterranean to the Gulf of Aden, Iranian nationalism as the wave of the future and the British 2004, pp.256; ISBN 1-84415-059-3. and thence to the Persian Gulf. imperial position as a hangover from the past which needed In doing so, the US and UK to be liquidated. Reviewed by Dr Saul Kelly, King’s governments will rely, as they have When the UK obliged by relinquishing its control over College, London. in the past, on the deployment of the key world choke points of the Suez Canal, the Bab their considerable naval power to al-Mandab Strait and the Hormuz Strait between 1956 The author wrote this book within a shape events and the outcome. It and 1971, the US government believed that its strategic year of the toppling of the regime of will demonstrate again the utility of allies, Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia would be able to act Saddam Hussein in Iraq by an Allied maritime power in defending Western as the new guardians of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Coalition led by the United States interests in a region which has been The fallacy of this policy was soon revealed, following the and the United Kingdom. It has been traditionally reluctant to accept the continued closure of the Suez Canal, the steady rise in oil reissued by Pen & Sword Books Ltd, permanent basing of Western forces prices by OPEC, the intervention of the Soviet Union and is presumably to coincide with the tenth on land. surrogates in South Yemen, Oman and the Horn of Africa anniversary of that significant event, This is the aftermath of the period and the fall of the Shah in 1979. The coming to power of a which can now be seen as sounding covered by Ballantyne’s book, which weak Islamist regime in Iran presented Saddam Hussein the death knell of the old nationalist provides some useful detail on UK and with the opportunity to make a bid for paramouncty in the dictatorships in the Middle East and US naval deployments to the Middle Gulf, a bid which led to three successive wars in the region, the emergence of their old enemies, East from the Abadan Crisis of 1951 between Iran and Iraq from 1980-88, over Kuwait in 1990- the Islamists, in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, to the Iraq War of 2003. He reminds 91 and in Iraq from 2003-2011. the Yemen, and Syria. us that the US and the UK did not This is the overall strategic context for this book, which The peoples of the region took always see eye-to-eye on how to react helpfully details the nature of US and UK naval operations note that dictators were at their most to the antics of the nationalist leaders, in the region, particularly in the period after 1979. That the vulnerable when trying to hand over whether it be Mossadegh or Nasser. US and the UK governments felt the need to send naval power to their sons and/or when they US pressure persuaded the British units back into the Persian Gulf, to keep the maritime peace were exposed to coercion, active or Labour Prime Minister, Clement there, as the UK had done for a century and a half before its latent, from the United States and the Attlee, not to sanction the Royal Navy’s over-hasty retreat in 1971, shows both the folly of leaving United Kingdom. All they had to do intervention at Abadan, the site of the a strategic vacuum there in the 1970s and the endemically was to overcome fear itself, induced by Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s refinery, fractious nature of the region. Given the importance of Gulf Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 72 Book Reviews hydrocarbons to the world’s economy Peninsula en route to Basra. Qaeda suicide squad. HMS Argyll cancelled a run-ashore in its policing simply could not be left to Ballantyne is correct to highlight the Gibraltar in May 2002 because of the heightened terror threat the littoral powers, who were divided imminent collapse of the UN sanctions from an al-Qaeda cell operating from the Moroccan coast by deadly rivalries. regime against Saddam Hussein in 2002 against US and UK navy ships in the Strait. The US and the UK have since 1979 and the danger that he would re-arm, The continuing threat to Western interests in North Africa tried to put the genie of insecurity in with French and Russian help, as the and the Middle East posed by the rising of militant Islam, the Gulf back into the bottle. But the reason for the decision of the US and whether of a Sunni or Shia hue, means that, as the overall genie, in the shape of Saddam Hussein, UK governments to remove him from commander-in-chief of coalition naval forces in the Gulf, or the Thief of Baghdad, grew to such power. This fateful decision remains Vice-Admiral Keating, USN, put it after the defeat of the Iraq great proportions that it required an controversial to this day and Western in 2003, the clear and present danger remains and the story of increasing military, and especially liberals in particular are keen to vilify conflict in the Gulf region is far from over. naval, effort by the two main western the reputations of the key decision- The question remains, however, whether after four powers to accomplish this herculean makers, George W. Bush and Tony military interventions in the Gulf region (including feat. As evidence of this, during the Blair. But it is difficult to see what else Afghanistan) since 1979, the two key Western powers, the US Iraq War in 2003 no less than five could have been done if the US and the and the UK, and their Anglo-phone allies, Canada, Australia carrier battle groups were deployed UK were not to suffer a catastrophic and New Zealand, have the continuing will and the means to by the US to the region, as Ballantyne lost of prestige and position in the all- defend those interests. The brewing crisis in the Middle East details. important Gulf, with its vital oil and since the revolts of 2011 will soon bring an answer. What is noteworthy is that the US gas supplies. Sanctions could no longer Navy and the Royal Navy became contain Saddam. bolder with regard to the deployment Ballantyne reveals that only about of their ‘big ships’ into the Gulf in the a quarter of all the oil smuggled out of three wars fought there after 1979. In Iraq by sea for sale on the black market the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, the was intercepted by the naval blockade. US and the UK kept their carriers This reviewer remembers witnessing out of the Gulf because of the mine in the steamy August heat of 2002 in threat. In the later stages of the Kuwait the northern Gulf the sterling efforts War, especially in February 1991, of Royal Marine and Royal Navy the US Navy was prepared to put its boarding parties from HMS Argyll to amphibious assault ships into the stop and search likely oil smuggling northern Gulf, alongside the battleship dhows as they emerged from the KAA. USS Missouri. But even here ‘Mine What was especially striking was the Danger Red’ led to both the USS Tripoli vulnerability of the Argyll and other and the USS Princeton being struck Coalition warships to sudden attack by mines and having to limp into dry- from passing dhows or fast Iraqi craft dock for repairs in Dubai. The Missouri packed with explosives based on their The Battleship Builders - would have joined them if it had not old oil terminals at Kaaot and Mabot Constructing and Arming British been for the fast-reactions of HMS out in the Gulf. It would have been capital Ships Gloucester, and its Sea Dart SAMs touch and go if the 50 calibre MGs that brought down an Iraqi Silkworm mounted by the Royal Marines on the by Ian Johnston & Ian Buxton missile seconds before it hit the iconic wings of the bridge would have stopped World War II symbol of US power. such attacks in time. It is for this reason Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley By the Iraq War in 2003, the US that this reviewer is not as confident as www.seaforthpublishing.com Navy and the Royal Navy had such Iain Ballantyne about the effectiveness ISBN 978-1-84832-093-2 confidence in their multi-tiered of the new counter-terrorism measures £30.00 in the UK defences that they deployed their put in place by the Royal Navy by the carriers into the northern Gulf and had summer of 2002, as evidenced by the Reviewed by David Hobbs naval units up the Khaur al Abdullah visit of HMS Campbeltown to the (KAA) in support of the Royal Marine notorious port of Aden, where the USS The British built more battleships than any other nation commando landings on the Fao Cole had been attacked in 2000 by an al- and this fascinating book contains a wealth of detail about Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 73

the shipyards, dockyards, ordnance orders when re-armament began works, steel works, foundries and in the late 1930s. All of this is other sites where the hulls and their presented in a readable style that systems were built as well as the makes this book difficult to put design and functioning of the ships down. Appendices give further themselves. There are maps of the information including an account various yards with explanatory notes of the industry created to scrap about the processes that went on in battleships at the end of their their buildings; descriptions of how operational lives. gun barrels, working chambers, turrets, I found information that was boilers and turbines were assembled both new to me and interesting on ashore and then dismantled to be taken nearly every page and this must to the ships for installation and a wealth be considered the definitive book of other detail, including the manpower on the design and construction in the factories. of these iconic vessels and the Much of this might have industries that created them. It been largely forgotten and lost also has a great deal to say about L and BasedAir Power or were it not for this book which the relationship between British Aircraft Carriers? makes a unique contribution to industry and the Royal Navy in the the available published material years between the late nineteenth A Case Study of the British Debate about Maritime Air about the battleship era. It is well and mid twentieth centuries. The Power in the 1960s illustrated with photographs of authors must be congratulated by Gjert Lage Dyndal ships, weapons and machinery for locating the surviving archives under construction and many together with the fascinating ISBN 978-1-4094-3335-4 other detailed elements including collection of images. Battleship Ashgate Publishing both in the UK and USA workshops and components. Builders is one of the best naval www.ashgate.com Tables give details of construction titles I have seen and I am delighted and cost; the battlecruiser HMAS to have added it to my collection. I 180 pages, 5 maps, 4 photographs Australia, for instance, is listed as understand that it is selling rapidly Reviewed by David Hobbs costing £1,783,190 or £94.85 per in both the UK and the USA. I ton. The ship’s four twin turrets, wholeheartedly recommend it and This is the sixth in a series of studies by the Corbett Centre each containing two 12 inch Mark suggest you obtain a copy before for Maritime Policy Studies. The author is a Lieutenant B.VIII* guns were constructed stocks of the first edition run out. Colonel in the Royal Norwegian Air Force and Dean of under contract 121G by Vickers Academics at the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy who at Barrow-in-Furness although was awarded his PhD by the University of Glasgow in 2009. the hull was built by John Brown He has written three earlier books on military subjects. & Co on Clydebank. Each turret This work has a bibliography that runs to 16 pages of cost £59,123 and their total cost published and unpublished reference material together was £236,494, yielding a substantial with an index and useful list of abbreviations. The succinct profit for Vickers. preface is written by Professor Geoffrey Till who has lectured In addition to the processes frequently in Australia; he notes that the origins of this needed to build a battleship, the debate can be traced back to the ‘battleships versus bombers’ book describes the expansion debate of the 1930s, through the debate in the 1960s that of the industries prior to 1914, forms the subject of this book into the present. their dramatic decline after The book has relevance in Australia as many of the the Washington Naval Treaty, arguments are very similar to those which led to the especially of those specialising withdrawal from service of HMAS Melbourne in 1982. in armour and gun manufacture Comparisons can also be made with the rationale behind and the inability of the run-down the contemporary Australian Government position that industry to cope with all the land-based air power will meet all the nation’s requirements, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 74 Book Reviews no matter what their distance the RN and RAF for a share of the that wrecked British defence policy in the mid-1960s but from Australia may be, leaving no shrinking defence budget, the core of which provides neither opinion nor strong conclusions about requirement for the LHDs to operate the problem surely lay with politicians the wealth of documents referred to. It really needs a chapter Australian STOVL fighters in support who failed to articulate a sustainable on British aircraft procurement in this most difficult period of amphibious operations. defence policy and forced the Services to give the full picture but It can, however, be considered a The author has located and into polarized arguments for the ‘stepping-stone’ towards gaining an understanding of what identified a number of original replacement of equipment they relied happened. The reader is left to form his or her own view on documents that are relevant and on to perform the designated tasks. the arguments and, while some might prefer it that way, my informative but he uses them without On page 179 the author states that own view is that, given the author’s military background and wider explanation to provide context; politicians used the expert advice “of status at the RNoAF Academy, he could have added more nor does he comment on which their choice” but offers little comment value to his work by discussing the relative practical merits arguments, in his opinion and with on how this impacted on the eventual and de-merits of the arguments he outlines. If arguments the wisdom of hindsight, had the outcome in which no-one got what over the need for aircraft carriers interest you, I would get greater merit. Similar arguments in they wanted. a copy of this book from your library; it will give you some the USA over whether to build B-36 The strongest aspect of the work useful information but not all the answers you will want. bombers or the aircraft carrier United is that Dyndal quotes a number of States in the late 1940s are surely previously unpublished papers that worth a mention if only to compare shed their own new light on aspects of the outcomes. The author makes no the debate. However, wider research mention of the Admiralty’s attempts and conclusions that are based on to order new aircraft carriers from analytical judgement are needed to set 1951 onwards or the reasons given the 1960s debate into its full context. by the Government for not funding This book does not provide them them. There had been a good measure and the statement that “advocates of inter-Service harmony in Britain for British carrier forces will most during the 1950s with a succession likely have to fight for this potent but of joint projects including the SR- costly capability in the coming years” 177 fighter which was cancelled by is a weak conclusion which seems one of the UK Government’s less to indicate that the author is unable comprehensible decisions in 1958; its or unwilling to decide between the continuation might have provided a arguments he has set out in order to B uritish Cr isers more harmonious atmosphere in the answer the question in his own title. of the Victorian Era 1960s and it surely deserves a mention. He notes that the RN case for CVA-01 The Hawker P-1154 supersonic was less robust in 1965/66 than it had By Norman Friedman STOVL strike aircraft is mentioned been in 1962/63 but fails to explain the ISBN 978-1-84832-099-4 but the author fails to explain the full different staff structures that followed story of the politically inspired clash the Admiralty secretariat being Seaforth Publishing over the very different carrier and land- subsumed into the unified Ministry www.seaforthpublishing.com based variants of the type that led to of Defence in 1964 or postulate 352 pages including Bibliography, Notes, Appendices rapidly increasing costs, its cancellation what a major difference this made. and ship Data. Extensively illustrated with photographs and the subsequent purchase of the A comparison with the Canadian American F-4 Phantom for both roles. decision to scrap the aircraft carrier and drawings. As arguments unfolded in the 1960s Bonaventure soon after the creation Reviewed by David Hobbs and it was clear that British politicians of the unified had little comprehension of what they might have been interesting and The term “cruiser” came into general use in the 1880s were asking the Services to achieve in relevant, as would a comparison with to describe ships capable of both long endurance for the longer term. Any sort of forward- the arguments over the replacement of the protection of Britain’s Imperial trade routes and, in deployed policy relied on a maritime Melbourne. the case of some of the larger examples, acting as a fast strategy to underpin it and, rather than In summary this is a book that wing of the battle fleet. The new description replaced being seen simply as a fight between stimulates interest in the arguments the terms frigate, sloop and corvette which gradually fell Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 75

out of use with the result that ships that led to the design of battlecruisers described as cruisers covered a very as an intelligence-informed strike wide range from under 1,000 to force intended to hunt down hostile over 10,000 tons. Some of the later commerce raiders. armoured ships were more expensive As always, Norman Friedman to build and hardly less capable than has carried out extensive research contemporary battleships. All but into his subject and has a masterly one of the ships covered in this book grasp of detail. The resulting book had reciprocating steam engines, is written in a lively and informative some early examples had paddle- style and includes a great deal of wheels but most were propelled by information about the ships that were screws; all of them burned coal. deployed in the Australian Station of The subject matter includes the Royal Navy and the cruisers that searching descriptions of why the equipped the early RAN, including ships were designed the way they Encounter, Pioneer and Psyche. The were and how they were operated final chapter gives insight into the B ritishDestroyers and employed. The author begins design of the ultimate expression of J-C and Battle Classes with an introduction that explains the cruiser genre, the battle cruiser, how cruisers evolved and how their of which Australia was an important by Les Brown machinery and armament progressed example. Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley throughout the nineteenth century. Cruisers of the Victorian Era The need for sails to provide cruising contributes a great deal to our www.seaforthpublishing.com endurance in the early ships is also understanding of how warships ISBN 978-1-84832-180-9 explained. The book is published evolved after the era of sail and is Reviewed by David Hobbs in Seaforth’s usual large format so well up to the author’s usual high that photographs and drawings can standards. It must be considered Number 21 in Seaforth’s Ship Craft series, this book follows be made as large as possible, often as the primary reference work on logically on from number 11 which described the ‘A’ to ‘I’ and filling pages with striking images. the Victorian cruiser force, giving ‘Tribal’ classes. Although aimed primarily at ship model- When one considers that the newest fascinating insight into the ships makers, the book is well illustrated with black and white ship covered was completed more that formed an important element photographs of the actual ships; colour photographs of models than a century ago the quality of the of the Australian Station for many and accurate coloured profile drawings showing representative photographs is generally excellent years as well as the early RAN. It also wartime camouflage schemes. There are also line drawings in and they are matched by very detailed helps us to understand the thought plan and profile and technical details for each class including drawings by A D Baker III and several processes of those who held high text descriptions of their equipment fits and armament. reproductions of ‘as fitted’ drawings command in having I have often thought that accurate scale models can give a from the National Maritime Museum been trained in these ships. The better idea of a ships’ fixtures and fittings than the real vessel Collection at the Brass Foundry in book will be an essential acquisition since you can see the whole thing in perspective and this Woolwich. for the collections in naval libraries, book underlines that belief; some of the illustrated models are Seven chapters are devoted to of course, but beside its obvious superb, especially that of HMS Vigo which could taken for the descriptions of the evolving classes of importance, it is also a thoroughly actual ship against the right background. Surprisingly, given cruiser, beginning with the wooden- absorbing read and I recommend it the level of detail, it was originally intended to be a powered, hulled ships of the mid-nineteenth highly for everyone with an interest floating model for use on a boat pond but it was completed century and ending with the fast, in the generations of warships that without machinery and is now on display in the National armoured ships that were completed preceded our own. Maritime Museum at Greenwich. in the first years of the twentieth There is a fair amount of Australian interest with ships of century. Ships built in British yards the ‘N’, ‘Q’ and ‘Battle’ classes having served in the RAN. This for export to countries including book will be of interest to those who want an easy reference the United States are included for book that covers the British and Australian destroyers of comparison and a final chapter covers this period, especially with regard to camouflage and overall Admiral Fisher’s revolutionary ideas appearance in service. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 76 Book Reviews

Anyone who might have considered Whereas the Marder-Roskill feud member of parliament sorely strained the Admiralty’s making a model destroyer will find was history-related, the Fisher-Beresford attempts to control him. From the age of 28, Beresford would the section listing kits and accessories campaign went to the core of the mighty periodically go on half pay and contest House of Commons invaluable and the illustrations of Royal Navy, convulsing serving officers seats which he invariably won, due to his immense popularity. completed models really do give a level and politicians alike. Some readers How Beresford rose to the rank of admiral in command of the of sophistication and skill to strive may find their patience stretched Royal Navy’s premier fleets, despite the Admiralty’s constant for. Overall this is good book that will in the face of Beresford’s disruptive reprimands, speaks of the power of influence in the Victorian appeal both to modellers and a wider insubordination – difficult to reconcile in and Edwardian era. readership interested in the ships a disciplined service. The book exposes The book records 23 official reprimands and expressions themselves. I thoroughly recommend it. the divisiveness that both Fisher and of disapprovals issued against Beresford – from his demotion Beresford engendered in the service and from cadet captain on the same day he was promoted in 1860 is a fascinating window into the times. to the 1908 circulation of letters criticising Home Fleet officers Both actors in this drama are well when he was Commander-In-Chief of the Channel Fleet. In known to naval history buffs. Fisher parliament Beresford thundered against the Admiralty, which and Beresford were chalk and cheese. he continued when he returned to active service as a fleet Fisher, born into the large family of an commander. His ultimate ambition was either First Sea Lord (to unsuccessful colonist in Ceylon, entered replace Fisher) or to be political head of the navy as First Lord. the Royal Navy “…penniless, friendless He seethed with rage when Fisher was promoted to Admiral and forlorn” and rose to become First of the Fleet and extended as First Sea Lord in 1905. Had Fisher Sea Lord through ruthless pursuit of retired Beresford would, in all probability (and as Beresford reform, both in officer education and in expected), have assumed the leadership of the navy. naval technology, scrapping dozens of TheGreat Edwardian Naval Feud is well researched ships “which could neither fight nor run and painstakingly details Beresford’s rise and eventual fall, away” and introducing the revolutionary following the government enquiry established to investigate ”” and his favourite design his complaints. The book requires the reader’s perseverance to – the battlecruisers. His reforms caused negotiate the labyrinthine details; however, as a record of the The Great Edwardian great division within the service; those culmination of Beresford’s disruptive career, that perseverance Naval Feud - opposing him resenting his relentless is needed to fully appreciate the issues of the feud and its effect mission of change, while his supporters on the navy and the government. Beresford’s naval demise prior Beresford’s vendetta – those in the ”Fishpond” – were to World War I freed the service from the imponderable ”what against ‘Jackie’ Fisher progressives who rode to high rank in if…” he had assumed the post of First Sea Lord in the immediate his wake. pre-war period. By Richard Freeman Beresford, on the other hand, was Royal Navy enthusiasts of the Edwardian era will find in Pen and Sword Maritime the scion of a wealthy Irish family who this book all their favourite tales of stultifying and hidebound Reviewed by Dr Tim Coyle lacked for nothing either materially or in attitudes which engendered in officers a narrow view of their influence. A magnificent seaman, totally profession, where they were not encouraged but actively Regular readers of Headmark book fearless in action, charming to all, he was dissuaded from thinking. The greatest navy in the world reviews will recall the recent review of loved by officers and seamen alike and by operated as appendages of the respective commanders-in-chief. Historical , the ‘history the general public. However, his lifelong Even Fisher, as commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean fleet, wars’ between Professor Arthur Marder passion was incessant complaints to rarely allowed his second-in-command, Beresford, to exercise and Captain Stephen Roskill, the great the Admiralty regarding his perception the fleet independently. Beresford complained that he had historians of the Royal Navy in the of the service’s lack of preparation for nothing to do on the Mediterranean station in 1899. When 20th century. This book, The Great war. As he reached Fisher arrived at Admiralty House Malta to assume command Edwardian Naval Feud, is the story of an status, he added a constant tirade against he reported “an absence of detailed preparation for war.” earlier struggle, that between the titans the claimed shortage of ships in his The author continues: “This was an understatement. What of the Royal Navy, the volcanic genius command, which he maintained was a he witnessed and indeed would have done so in any British fleet Admiral John ‘Jackie’ Fisher and the slight against him personally. To this he of the last 80 years, was an eye-catching collection of beautiful patrician and folk hero Admiral Lord added an intense detestation of Fisher. ships, brass sparkling, decks spotlessly whited, guns glistening Charles Beresford (universally known as In this campaign his unique parallel with fresh paint…and not much more. “ ‘”Charlie B”). career as naval officer and sometime The gunnery reformer, the firebrand Rear Admiral Percy Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 77

Scott (who Beresford would pillory) Admiralty as a parliamentarian. Fisher embittered man. wrote that It was a time when “a ship had also suffered as his retirement occurred The author ends with this summary of Beresford: to look pretty; prettiness was necessary within three months of the enquiry’s ..the feud must remain the defining feature of Beresford’s for promotion.“ It was this attitude which end. While Fisher returned to the life; for all his courage, for all his skill as a seaman, for all Fisher fought so fiercely and why the Admiralty as First Sea Lord under his popularity, he was a man of feeble intellect and poor likes of Beresford, as his influence grew, First Lord Winston Churchill in late judgement…Beresford turned competition for high office treated his later Channel Fleet command 1914, Beresford remained a member into a vendetta. In doing so he took on the Admiralty and as a personal yacht club which he used of parliament until his elevation to the the Government and lost. as an prop to his exalted persona. The peerage in 1916. His political influence Beresford and Fisher live on in this book. The reader will commander-in-chief’s flagship dictated waned and while he anxiously awaited become infuriated with Beresford and the Admiralty’s every activity and all ships had to the expected recall to the fleet during the weakness in not controlling him, but this is history and it is conform to the C–in-C’s movements; war, this never came. He died in 1919 an enthralling. even as to when washing could be hoisted to dry. Junior squadron flag officers rarely exercised independence and initiative. “War plans“ remained in the heads of the First Sea Lord at the Admiralty. C-in- C’s were not privy to these plans, and this was at the core of Beresford’s relentless campaign against the Admiralty. This then was the setting for the great Edwardian naval feud. Fisher made a strategic error when he appointed Beresford as C-in-C Channel Fleet in April 1907 as this further strengthened Beresford’s decades-old crusade. From the outset Beresford bombarded the Admiralty with complaints regarding the perceived lack of ships under his command and the absence of war plans communicated to him as C-in-C. Finally the Admiralty struck back and terminated Beresford’s nominal three year command after two years under the pretext of fleet reorganisation. The government set up an enquiry, comprising five cabinet ministers, within weeks of Beresford’s hauling SMARTER AND SAFER down his flag in March 1909. The enquiry extended over 15 days and the UNDERWATER SOLUTIONS proceedings are exhaustingly detailed in the book and it is the extent of this detail which might strain some readers’ ...Since the beginning forbearance. While the enquiry found against Beresford’s claims, it was hardly critical of him and his constant insubordination. For more information, please contact: [email protected] This gave Beresford more room to www.thalesgroup.com.au continue his campaign against the Photograph © Australian Department of Defence Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Is Your CAreer TreADIng water?

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FIRST RED ROO

t the end of World War II the submarine mortar, a new aluminium for a time with a Royal Navy squadron Royal Navy provided the RAN superstructure, and the provision of which used the ‘Red Hand of Ulster’ as Awith five ‘Q’ class destroyers on an enclosed bridge and a dedicated a funnel emblem. permanent loan as replacements for operations room – the latter Determined to retain a visible the wartime ‘N’ class. increasingly important as commanding Australian identity, Queenborough With the post-war Soviet threat officers sought to make best use of the also displayed her own red kangaroo. increasing the need for improved information provided by the expanding Although kangaroo insignia had long ASW capabilities, in 1950, the RAN variety of ship’s sensors. been used by Australian warships to proposed converting the ‘Q’s to Type HMAS Queenborough completed signify their nationality, this remains 15 fast anti-submarine frigates. The her conversion at the end of 1954 and the first known use of a red kangaroo conversion involved some major the following year completed a global on the funnel. By the 1980s the insignia redesign work, including the reduction circumnavigation, in part to show had been adopted across the RAN’s of the gun armament in favour of off Australian technical capabilities. major surface fleet. t the Limbo triple-barrelled anti- While in British waters she operated

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 80 ANI On-line: A guide to the new website.

Our new website is now on-line! In addition to the features available on the Changing your details previous site, the new site also features a library of past journals, a discussion When your account is created, only your member ID and password are stored in the system for privacy reasons. However, you may provide forum, a news section and member list. This short guide is designed to help other details that are visible to other ANI members. In order to change you take full advantage of the new features. your details, login and click the “Change Your Details” menu item (figure 5). Then select the “change” link (figure 6) next to either your personal details or password. Change the text appropriately and click the “save” button (figure 7). Figure 1 The personal information that you provide will be visible to other Obtaining an account members of the ANI but will be hidden from members of the general In order to access the new features of the site you must have a user public. You may provide as much or as little detail as you wish but account for the website. If you have a current subscription to the ANI, none of the fields are compulsory. However, you may not change your navigate to the website www.navalinstitute.com.au using your web member ID as it is the link between the on-line database and our off- browser (figure 1), click the “Members Login” menu item (figure 2), line records. then click the link to download an application form. Fill in the form, then fax or post it to the ANI Business Manager. Once your account has been created, you will receive an email that outlines your member

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Participating in the forum Figure 2 Figure 3 In order to post topics and replies in the discussion forum, first login Logging in to your account and click the “Forum” menu item (figure 8). Then select a forum that Once you have your account details, you are ready to login and access you would like to view by clicking its “View Topics” button (figure the new features of the site. In order to login, navigate to the website 9). Select a topic that you would like to read by clicking its “View this (figure 1) and click the “Members Login” item (figure 2). Enter your topic” link (figure 10). If you are not interested in any particular topic, member ID and password as they were provided to you, then click you may add your own by clicking the “Add New Topic” button (figure the “Login” button. The case of the member ID and password are 10). Similarly, once you are viewing a topic, you may post a reply by important: i.e. “CaSe” and “case” are considered entirely different words clicking “Add New Post”. Fill in the heading and body of your reply and by the authentication system. Each letter of the password will appear as click the “Submit” button to add your reply to the topic. If you change a single “*” to prevent others from seeing your password as you type. your mind while writing your reply, you may click the “Cancel” button If you have entered your details correctly, you will be presented with and your reply will not be added to the topic. the news page. The grey status bar at the top notifies you of the account you are using (figure 4). You are now able to access all of the new features of the site.

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 81 Thinking of Making a Contribution? Style Notes for Headmark

In general, please present your work So: the end of the article, please supply full honours - Lieutenant with the minimum of formatting. Adkin, Mark. Goose Green. London: Commander Bill Crabbe, CSC, RAN - unless you would Paragraphs: Leo Cooper, 1992. prefer not to use them. Then please supply a paragraph Don’t indent, and leave left justified. Adler, Bill (Ed.) Letters from Vietnam. on yourself, to a maximum of 50 words, including any Separate paragraphs by one line. Single New York: EP Dutton and Co., 1967. qualifications you would like listed, and any interesting spacing only. Use one space only after Articles use quotation marks around biographical aspects. If possible please supply a colour or stops and colons. their title, which is not in italics. greyscale head and shoulders e-photo of yourself for use Conventions: If citing web sites please use the alongside the article title. Use numbers for 10 and above, words convention: Illustrations: below. Ship names use italics in title Australian Associated Press. “Army Do not embed graphs or figures in your text without case; prefixes such as HMAS in capitals admits mistakes in SAS investigation”. sending a separate file as well. If supplying photographs use and italics. Book and Journal titles use 17 February, 2004. Forwarding your article: Citations: So, web site name. Article title. Full Please send to the Editor on Endnotes rather than footnotes. Use date of accessing the site. Full URL. Editorial considerations: footnotes to explain any points you want Bylines: The Editor eservesr the right to amend articles where the reader to notice immediately. Book Supply your everyday title for use at the necessary for the purposes of grammar correction, and to titles follow Author surname, first name, beginning of the title, so: Lieutenant delete tables or figures for space considerations. title if any. Title. Place of publication: Commander Bill Crabbe, or Jack publisher, year of that edition. Aubrey, or Reverend James Moodie. At

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 82 Australian Naval Institute

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The Editorial Board seeks from 3000-7000 words, but smaller collection, or to make arrangements for letters and articles on naval or maritime issues. Articles articles will be considered, as will book/journal donations is the SPC-A concerning operations or administration/policy are of the occasional larger piece of work. Information Manager on (02) 6127 6512, particular interest but papers on any relevant topic will be Submissions should be sent to the Editor email: [email protected] Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 150 83 The Australian Naval Institute ABN: 45 988 480 239 PO Box 241, Deakin West ACT 2600, AUSTRALIA PHONE: +61 2 6290 1505 FAX: +61 2 6290 1580 EMAIL: [email protected]

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute The Ship’s Company of JDS Makinami heave in on lines as they depart Fleet Base East on completion of the Royal Australian Navy’s International Fleet Review 2013