Globally and Locally Applied Naturalistic Metaphysics*
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1 the Problem of Life's Definition the Philosophical Literature Is Positively
Chapter 1. The Problem of Life's Definition The 'mystery' of consciousness today is in roughly the same shape that the mystery of life was before the development of molecular biology or the mystery of electromagnetism was before Clerk-Maxwell's equations. It seems mysterious because we do not know how the system of neuro-physiology/ consciousness works, and an adequate knowledge of how it works would remove the mystery. (Searle 1992, 101-2) The philosophical literature is positively rife1 with claims similar to those made in the epigraph, claims to the effect that the nature of life no longer presents interesting philosophical questions. The field of Artificial Life — a field which bears essentially the relationship to biology that Artificial Intelligence research bears to psychology2 — is currently bringing the nature of life and 1 In addition to Searle's comment, see Searle (1997, 201), Cornman (1992, 5), Crane (1995, 4-5), McGinn (1991, 6, 8, & 45), & Chalmers (1996, 25). The view is commonplace in science as well. Boyce Resenberg says, "life is just so much chemistry and physics", and he quotes biologist Harold Erikson as saying, "The secret of life is not a secret anymore. We have known for twenty or thirty years now that life is not more mysterious than the chemical reactions on which it is based." Cell biologist Tom Pollard is quoted as saying (what may be something quite different) that "What molecular biologists have believed for two generations is now generally regarded as proved beyond any doubt. Life is entirely the result of physics and chemistry inside cells and among cells" (Rensberger 1996, 25. -
Would ''Direct Realism'' Resolve the Classical Problem of Induction?
NOU^S 38:2 (2004) 197–232 Would ‘‘Direct Realism’’ Resolve the Classical Problem of Induction? MARC LANGE University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill I Recently, there has been a modest resurgence of interest in the ‘‘Humean’’ problem of induction. For several decades following the recognized failure of Strawsonian ‘‘ordinary-language’’ dissolutions and of Wesley Salmon’s elaboration of Reichenbach’s pragmatic vindication of induction, work on the problem of induction languished. Attention turned instead toward con- firmation theory, as philosophers sensibly tried to understand precisely what it is that a justification of induction should aim to justify. Now, however, in light of Bayesian confirmation theory and other developments in epistemology, several philosophers have begun to reconsider the classical problem of induction. In section 2, I shall review a few of these developments. Though some of them will turn out to be unilluminating, others will profitably suggest that we not meet inductive scepticism by trying to justify some alleged general principle of ampliative reasoning. Accordingly, in section 3, I shall examine how the problem of induction arises in the context of one particular ‘‘inductive leap’’: the confirmation, most famously by Henrietta Leavitt and Harlow Shapley about a century ago, that a period-luminosity relation governs all Cepheid variable stars. This is a good example for the inductive sceptic’s purposes, since it is difficult to see how the sparse background knowledge available at the time could have entitled stellar astronomers to regard their observations as justifying this grand inductive generalization. I shall argue that the observation reports that confirmed the Cepheid period- luminosity law were themselves ‘‘thick’’ with expectations regarding as yet unknown laws of nature. -
Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Chemistry
Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Chemistry Jaap van Brakel Abstract: In this paper I assess the relation between philosophy of chemistry and (general) philosophy of science, focusing on those themes in the philoso- phy of chemistry that may bring about major revisions or extensions of cur- rent philosophy of science. Three themes can claim to make a unique contri- bution to philosophy of science: first, the variety of materials in the (natural and artificial) world; second, extending the world by making new stuff; and, third, specific features of the relations between chemistry and physics. Keywords : philosophy of science, philosophy of chemistry, interdiscourse relations, making stuff, variety of substances . 1. Introduction Chemistry is unique and distinguishes itself from all other sciences, with respect to three broad issues: • A (variety of) stuff perspective, requiring conceptual analysis of the notion of stuff or material (Sections 4 and 5). • A making stuff perspective: the transformation of stuff by chemical reaction or phase transition (Section 6). • The pivotal role of the relations between chemistry and physics in connection with the question how everything fits together (Section 7). All themes in the philosophy of chemistry can be classified in one of these three clusters or make contributions to general philosophy of science that, as yet , are not particularly different from similar contributions from other sci- ences (Section 3). I do not exclude the possibility of there being more than three clusters of philosophical issues unique to philosophy of chemistry, but I am not aware of any as yet. Moreover, highlighting the issues discussed in Sections 5-7 does not mean that issues reviewed in Section 3 are less im- portant in revising the philosophy of science. -
There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning
There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning 1. Empiricism and the Question of Empirical Reasons Empiricism may be defined as the view there is no a priori justification for any synthetic claim. Critics object that empiricism cannot account for all the kinds of knowledge we seem to possess, such as moral knowledge, metaphysical knowledge, mathematical knowledge, and modal knowledge.1 In some cases, empiricists try to account for these types of knowledge; in other cases, they shrug off the objections, happily concluding, for example, that there is no moral knowledge, or that there is no metaphysical knowledge.2 But empiricism cannot shrug off just any type of knowledge; to be minimally plausible, empiricism must, for example, at least be able to account for paradigm instances of empirical knowledge, including especially scientific knowledge. Empirical knowledge can be divided into three categories: (a) knowledge by direct observation; (b) knowledge that is deductively inferred from observations; and (c) knowledge that is non-deductively inferred from observations, including knowledge arrived at by induction and inference to the best explanation. Category (c) includes all scientific knowledge. This category is of particular import to empiricists, many of whom take scientific knowledge as a sort of paradigm for knowledge in general; indeed, this forms a central source of motivation for empiricism.3 Thus, if there is any kind of knowledge that empiricists need to be able to account for, it is knowledge of type (c). I use the term “empirical reasoning” to refer to the reasoning involved in acquiring this type of knowledge – that is, to any instance of reasoning in which (i) the premises are justified directly by observation, (ii) the reasoning is non- deductive, and (iii) the reasoning provides adequate justification for the conclusion. -
Continuity Thesis in World System History - B
WORLD SYSTEM HISTORY – One World System or Many: Continuity Thesis in World System History - B. K. Gills and R. A. Denemark ONE WORLD SYSTEM OR MANY: THE CONTINUITY THESIS IN WORLD SYSTEM HISTORY B. K. Gills School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK R. A. Denemark Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Delaware, USA Keywords: continuity, historical materialism, center-periphery-hinterland complex, hegemony, super-hegemony, oikos, humanocentrism. Contents 1. Continuity in World History 2. Historical Materialism 3. Economic Cycles 4. Core-Periphery Hierarchies 5. Hegemony and Super-Hegemony 6. Continuity Thesis and Historical Dialectics 6.1. Capital versus Oikos 6.2. Unfree Labor versus Free Commodified Labor 6.3. Organization versus Entropy 7. Humanocentrism Glossary Bibliography Biographical Sketches Summary The continuity thesis in world system history expresses the idea of long-term historical continuity in contrast to the idea of perpetual change and progression through a series of epoch-alteringUNESCO transformations. This perspective – hasEOLSS important conceptual roots in non- western philosophical traditions. Drawing much inspiration from historical materialism, the continuity thesis nonetheless problematizes any hypothesized transition to capitalism. There are vital processes that remain unchanged across the period of the alleged transition,SAMPLE and the model itself is (poor CHAPTERSly) drawn from the experience of a single world region. Important characteristics of the thesis include concern for economic cycles, the development of core-periphery-hinterland complexes, hegemony and super- hegemony, a set of three dialectical tensions including capital versus oikos, unfree labor versus free commodified labor, and organization versus entropy. In contradistinction to the profoundly Eurocentric nature of much contemporary social thought, the continuity thesis is humanocentric. -
C.S. Peirce's Abduction from the Prior Analytics
Providence College DigitalCommons@Providence Community Scholar Publications Providence College Community Scholars 7-1996 C.S. Peirce's Abduction from the Prior Analytics William Paul Haas Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.providence.edu/comm_scholar_pubs Haas, William Paul, "C.S. Peirce's Abduction from the Prior Analytics" (1996). Community Scholar Publications. 2. https://digitalcommons.providence.edu/comm_scholar_pubs/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Providence College Community Scholars at DigitalCommons@Providence. It has been accepted for inclusion in Community Scholar Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Providence. For more information, please contact [email protected]. WILLIAM PAUL HAAS July 1996 C.S. PEIRCE'S ABDUCTION FROM THE PRIOR ANALYTICS In his Ancient Formal Logic. Professor Joseph Bochenski finds Aristotle's description of syllogisms based upon hypotheses to be "difficult to understand." Noting that we do not have the treatise which Aristotle promised to write, Bochenski laments the fact that the Prior Analytics, where it is treated most explicitly, "is either corrupted or (which is more probable) was hastily written and contains logical errors." (1) Charles Sanders Peirce wrestled with the same difficult text when he attempted to establish the Aristotelian roots of his theory of abductive or hypothetical reasoning. However, Peirce opted for the explanation that the fault was with the corrupted text, not with Aristotle's exposition. Peirce interpreted the text of Book II, Chapter 25 thus: Accordingly, when he opens the next chapter with the word ' Ajray (¿y-q a word evidently chosen to form a pendant to 'Errctyuyrj, we feel sure that this is what he is coming to. -
Pragmatism Is As Pragmatism Does: of Posner, Public Policy, and Empirical Reality
Volume 31 Issue 3 Summer 2001 Summer 2001 Pragmatism Is as Pragmatism Does: Of Posner, Public Policy, and Empirical Reality Linda E. Fisher Recommended Citation Linda E. Fisher, Pragmatism Is as Pragmatism Does: Of Posner, Public Policy, and Empirical Reality, 31 N.M. L. Rev. 455 (2001). Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol31/iss3/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of Law. For more information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr PRAGMATISM IS AS PRAGMATISM DOES: OF POSNER, PUBLIC POLICY, AND EMPIRICAL REALITY LINDA E. FISHER* Stanley Fish believes that my judicial practice could not possibly be influenced by my pragmatic jurisprudence. Pragmatism is purely a method of description, so I am guilty of the "mistake of thinking that a description of a practice has cash value in a game other than the game of description." But he gives no indication that he has tested this assertion by reading my judicial opinions.' I. INTRODUCTION Richard Posner, until recently the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, has been much studied; he is frequently controversial, hugely prolific, candid, and often entertaining.2 Judge Posner is repeatedly in the news, most recently as a mediator in the Microsoft antitrust litigation3 and as a critic of President Clinton.4 Posner's shift over time, from a wealth-maximizing economist to a legal pragmatist (with wealth maximization as a prominent pragmatic goal), is by now well documented.' This shift has been set forth most clearly in The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory,6 as well as Overcoming Law7 and The Problems of Jurisprudence.8 The main features of his pragmatism include a Holmesian emphasis on law as a prediction of how a judge will rule.9 An important feature of law, then, is its ability to provide clear, stable guidance to those affected by it. -
A WIN-WIN SOLUTION the Empirical Evidence on School Choice FOURTH EDITION Greg Forster, Ph.D
A WIN-WIN SOLUTION The Empirical Evidence on School Choice FOURTH EDITION Greg Forster, Ph.D. MAY 2016 About the Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice The Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit and nonpartisan organization, solely dedicated to advancing Milton and Rose Friedman’s vision of school choice for all children. First established as the Milton and Rose D. Friedman Foundation in 1996, the Foundation promotes school choice as the most effective and equitable way to improve the quality of K–12 education in America. The Friedman Foundation is dedicated to research, education, and outreach on the vital issues and implications related to school choice. A WIN-WIN SOLUTION The Empirical Evidence on School Choice FOURTH EDITION Greg Forster, Ph.D. MAY 2016 Table of Contents Executive Summary .......................................................................................................................1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................3 Choice in Education .................................................................................................................3 Why Science Matters—the “Gold Standard” and Other Methods ....................................4 The Method of This Report .....................................................................................................6 Criteria for Study Inclusion or Exclusion .......................................................................6 -
Sacred Rhetorical Invention in the String Theory Movement
University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Communication Studies Theses, Dissertations, and Student Research Communication Studies, Department of Spring 4-12-2011 Secular Salvation: Sacred Rhetorical Invention in the String Theory Movement Brent Yergensen University of Nebraska-Lincoln, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/commstuddiss Part of the Speech and Rhetorical Studies Commons Yergensen, Brent, "Secular Salvation: Sacred Rhetorical Invention in the String Theory Movement" (2011). Communication Studies Theses, Dissertations, and Student Research. 6. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/commstuddiss/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Communication Studies, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Communication Studies Theses, Dissertations, and Student Research by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. SECULAR SALVATION: SACRED RHETORICAL INVENTION IN THE STRING THEORY MOVEMENT by Brent Yergensen A DISSERTATION Presented to the Faculty of The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Major: Communication Studies Under the Supervision of Dr. Ronald Lee Lincoln, Nebraska April, 2011 ii SECULAR SALVATION: SACRED RHETORICAL INVENTION IN THE STRING THEORY MOVEMENT Brent Yergensen, Ph.D. University of Nebraska, 2011 Advisor: Ronald Lee String theory is argued by its proponents to be the Theory of Everything. It achieves this status in physics because it provides unification for contradictory laws of physics, namely quantum mechanics and general relativity. While based on advanced theoretical mathematics, its public discourse is growing in prevalence and its rhetorical power is leading to a scientific revolution, even among the public. -
Human Visual Motion Perception Shows Hallmarks of Bayesian Structural Inference Sichao Yang1,2,6*, Johannes Bill3,4,6*, Jan Drugowitsch3,5,7 & Samuel J
www.nature.com/scientificreports OPEN Human visual motion perception shows hallmarks of Bayesian structural inference Sichao Yang1,2,6*, Johannes Bill3,4,6*, Jan Drugowitsch3,5,7 & Samuel J. Gershman4,5,7 Motion relations in visual scenes carry an abundance of behaviorally relevant information, but little is known about how humans identify the structure underlying a scene’s motion in the frst place. We studied the computations governing human motion structure identifcation in two psychophysics experiments and found that perception of motion relations showed hallmarks of Bayesian structural inference. At the heart of our research lies a tractable task design that enabled us to reveal the signatures of probabilistic reasoning about latent structure. We found that a choice model based on the task’s Bayesian ideal observer accurately matched many facets of human structural inference, including task performance, perceptual error patterns, single-trial responses, participant-specifc diferences, and subjective decision confdence—especially, when motion scenes were ambiguous and when object motion was hierarchically nested within other moving reference frames. Our work can guide future neuroscience experiments to reveal the neural mechanisms underlying higher-level visual motion perception. Motion relations in visual scenes are a rich source of information for our brains to make sense of our environ- ment. We group coherently fying birds together to form a fock, predict the future trajectory of cars from the trafc fow, and infer our own velocity from a high-dimensional stream of retinal input by decomposing self- motion and object motion in the scene. We refer to these relations between velocities as motion structure. -
Introduction Meta-Ethical Speculations About Rights and Obligations
NON-NATURALISM REVISITED; RIGHTS/OBLIGA TIONS AS EMERGENT ENTITIES Eike-Henner W. KLUGE University of Victoria Introduction Meta-ethical speculations about rights and obligations. as indeed meta-ethical speculations in general, are characterized by profound disagreement over the nature of the relevant terms. I Broadly spea king, we can distinguish three general types of approaches: realism, nominalism and non-cognitivism.2 Each of these occurs in several variations. For instance, realism may be naturalistic - which is to say, it may attempt to reduce the relevant expressions to claims dealing with ordinary properties; or it may be non-naturalistic - which is to say, it may claim that wh at ultimately grounds such expressions are properties sui generis: distinct from ordinary ones but ontologically on a par with them. 3 Nominalism, in turn, may analyze right/obligation locutions as statements about (explicit or implicit) contractual agreements, or as reportive of custom, convention or habit - but in any case will view their meanings as a matter of pure convention.4 Non-cognitivism, finally, may be either emotive, attitudinal or performative in focus - or any combination of these- 1. Cf. W.K. Frankena, Ethies (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963) pp. 4 ff. and "Recent Conceptions of Morality" in H.-N. Castaöeda and George Nakhnikian, eds. Morality and the Language 0/ Conduet (Wayne State U. Press, Detroit, 1965) pp. 1-24, and R.ß. Brandt, Ethieal Theory (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1959) pp. 7-10 et passim. Brandt also refers to it as "critical ethics". 2. This nomenclature is not quite that currently in vogue. -
Pre-Lecture Notes I.4 – Measuring the Unobservable Think About All of The
Pre-lecture Notes I.4 – Measuring the Unobservable Think about all of the issues that psychologists are interested in – these include depression, anxiety, attention, memory, problem-solving abilities, interpersonal attribution, etc. Notice how many of these cannot be directly observed; they are characteristics of the mind, not behavior, and, as of now, we don’t have a way of reading people’s minds. Given that psychology is an empirical science and, therefore, relies upon objective and replicable data, this is a problem. One option, of course, is to disallow any discussion of anything that cannot be directly observed. Under this approach, you would never talk about something like depression, since it cannot be observed. Instead, you would only talk about the behavioral manifestations (or symptoms) of depression, because these can be observed. This is the approach taken by behaviorists and some neo-behaviorists. The other approach, which is taken by a large majority of psychologists, is to create ways to convert or translate unobservable constructs, such as depression, into observable behaviors, such as responses on a questionnaire. In some cases, this translation is almost too obvious to discuss, such as defining the amount of time that it takes a person to mentally solve a problem as the lag or delay between the moment when they were given the problem and the moment when they give the (correct) answer. In other cases, however, which includes the definition of depression as the condensed score on a specific questionnaire, quite a bit of discussion and background research is needed. This brings us to the first of the four types of validity that determine the value or quality of psychological research.