CAREY, CHARLES. Date: January 22, 1991. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: RAND. Length: 2 hrs; 25 pp. Use restriction: Not established. Carey's describes his education and work background prior to RAND; his first job at RAND. RAND's internal communication problems and reasons for it. Discussion of articles in RANDom News. Description of one-page summaries of technical material and why it was written for the Air Force. Herman Kahn and the civil defence study; description of Kahn's briefing for General White. Carey's interaction with the Board of Trustee and the Military Advisory Group. RAND's publication. The Helmer-Dalkey simulation as an example of RAND humor; rift between the Social Science and Math Department. "Escalation of Iran" film. Advertising in the mid-'50s. Carey's article on Housekeeping in Haunted House, and thoughts on nuclear deterrence. Departure from RAND. TAPE 1, SIDE 1 1-2 Carey's early life; educational and work background prior to RAND; hiring at RAND; initial impressions of RAND. 2-4 Carey's first job at RAND; discussion of RAND's internal communications problem and reasons for it. 4-5 Analysis of RAND's internal communications problem. 5-6 Carey's discusses the nature of RAND research in the early days of his career: competition between projects; sharing data; the effect of individual personalities on projects. 6-7 The role played by Carey in his communications position; description of his interactions with the research teams. 7 Carey's describes his written work; project summaries, report to the RAN Board of Trustee. 8 Discussion of carey's articles in RANDom News. 9-10 Carey discusses his role as editor of RANDom News, and the function it served at RAND; description of one-page summaries of technical material which was written for the Air Force. 10-11 The importance ot' the one-page summaries to RAND management; comparison of the different attitudes of Larry Henderson and Brownlee Haydon.

TAPE 1, SIDE 2 11 Carey describes the process of crafting the one-page summaries, and how he tried to relate them to specific Air Force needs. 12-13 Herman Kahn and the civil defense study; description of Kahn's briefings and personality. 13-15 Carey describes his interaction with Kahn; description of Kahn's briefing for General White and the Military Advisory Group; Carey's taping of that briefing, and why he taped it; how that transcript became the basis of Kahn's book on thermonuclear war; Carey's friendship with Kahn after leaving RAND. 15-16 Carey's interactions with the Board of Trustees and the Military Advisory Group; his assistance in writing briefings, and his attendance at Military Advisory Group meetings. 16-17 Carey discusses the various RAND publications he contributed to, and sums up what his major responsibilities were. 17 The special character and function of humor at RAND. 17-18 The Helmer-Dalkey simulation as an example of RAND humor; the resulting rift between the Social Science and Math Departments. 18-20 Carey discusses RAND's filming of briefings and his role in the filming; other uses of film at RAND, in games and simulations; "Escalation in Iran' film. 20-21 Carey's work with Jim Cook on films, and their differences of opinion, style, and technique; general discussion of the use RAND made of films. 21-22 Management's point of view about the function of communication at RAND.

TAPE 2 I SIDE 1 22 Discussion of RAND's foray into public advertising in the mid 50s; role of Jim Allen and Si Bourgin. 22-23 RAND's concern with the management of the research function in the late 50; reasons for the concern (inter-service rivalry, RAND going in many different direction); Ed Lindblom's analysis of the situation; Paul Kecskemeti and the surrender study. 23-24 Carey identifies the most significant and interesting research areas he was associated with; Carey's article, Housekeeping in a Haunted House, and thoughts on the subject of nuclear deterrence. 24-25 Carey discusses reason for his departure from RAND in 1965, and what the atmosphere at RAND was like at that time. CAREY-1

Interviewee: Mr. Charles Carey

Interviewer: Mr. Martin Collins

Date: January 22, 1991

Location: RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

MR. COLLINS: To get started, I'd be interested in a brief sketch of your background, where and when you were born, and your educational and work experiences before you came to RAND.

MR. CAREY: I was born in 1921 in New York. I came out here at a very early age, so I was brought up in California. I went to UCLA and worked in those days, the early days of the war, went to school part time and worked part time in frenetic activity at the aircraft plants. This was the center of Lockheed, North American, and so forth. I worked in the Aerophysics Laboratory, North American Aviation for much of the time.

COLLINS: You were working and going to school at the same time? What was your area of concentration?

CAREY: It was psychology and political science. I came to RAND in 1952, and I think I'm one of the few people who was hired from walking in off the street. I knew the area. I knew there was a mysterious building there with no marks, no signs or anything. So I put my head in to find out what they did, what went on, and I ended up coming back later and applying for a job. I had a talk with Brownlee Haydon.

My experience had been fairly broad. I'd also done some writing in connection with my earlier work writing of two kinds that were mixed. I had a mixture of part time jobs. I worked for a couple of newspapers, small newspapers, and I also turned into writing proposals for North American Aviation in the early days of the first missiles. Wernher Von Braun was here from Germany and they were developing what I think was called the Navaho Missile. So I think it was on the basis of that mixture that Brownlee, without much additional time, just hired me and I came to work.

COLLINS: Had you heard about RAND at North American?

CAREY: No, I hadn't. I knew almost nothing about it.

COLLINS: In addition to proposal writing-- I assume you were probably one member of a team of engineers who provided some input into that kind of thing. What were the other activities CAREY-2 that you were doing at North American?

CAREY: Well, earlier I had worked in a laboratory and did materials testing and, engineering. I was signed up to go into the Air Corps and I was pulled out because I had invented a little gadget that turned out to be important. It was a hose clamp for the airplane, for the P-51. A number of them had been crashing because of engines catching fire. So I invented this little clamp that helped take care of that problem. I was essentially inducted but then pulled out to finish that mechanical job.

COLLINS: Did you manage to finish up your work in UCLA somewhere along this path?

CAREY: I finished it up while I was at RAND. After I joined RAND.

COLLINS: This was a bachelors degree?

CAREY: Yes, and then various other studies, but once you got to RAND, it was like a university without students. It was a very rich environment. It was much more interesting and fun to work at RAND than it was to go back to school.

COLLINS: What were you initial impressions of the organization, if you can recall, after you had this first discussion with Brownlee as you walked off in the street?

CAREY: Well, I was immediately quite taken with it because of the openness of it and the informality of it. There aren't many places where you can walk into an office and talk to a mathematician, and the next office an economist, and down the hall a philosopher. Abe Kaplan was here at that time, and a new economist and, well, it was just wonderful. The people were--it was a family atmosphere at that time, I think. And there was no formality. You just introduced yourself. You walked into the office and introduced yourself, sat down and started inquiring.

After my initial job, one of my main jobs was to simply do that. The problem of internal communication was a very large one because the people were scattered. You had a lot of independent people, each person working on his own project or a few team projects no one being quite sure what was happening. Very loose coordination, and it became obvious that RAND had a big internal communications problem. That turned out to be much of my work.

When I came in 1952 the first job I actually had was to help write the original proposal that made RAND an independent nonprofit corporation. There was a transition of RAND and an Air Force project, and that was a proposal written to the Ford Foundation. The Ford Foundation had given a loan to RAND, and CAREY-3 that happened just before I came. The very first job I had was to help write that initial proposal. Brownlee was mostly concerned with external communications and management. So the job of internal communications was left to me and I took off on that.

COLLINS: You may have already outlined the answer to this, but how did you come to appreciate that this was a problem at the RAND organization? Was this something that was worrying Brownlee and others in the company at the time, or how did it manifest itself as a problem?

CAREY: Well, it's always a struggle to formulate a problem. When you formulate a research problem, you formulate it in a way in which you can study it. You limit the problem to your ability to study it with the research tools you have and so forth. And it became obvious that these problems were larger problems than any one discipline could handle. You would sit in on a meeting, and you would have an economist and an engineer, for example, talking about the problem of the range of aircraft. What kind of aircraft should we have ten years from now ? Obviously it's an economic problem. How much would such a thing cost, and so forth. And, it's also an engineering problem, what the design of the airplane should look like, and an intelligence problem, what would an enemy aircraft look like. RAND, I think, was the founder of what later became termed as systems analysis. But the system was never fixed. The system, to an aircraft engineer, is the particular characteristics of the airplane--the range, the weight, the payload, the speed and so forth. That's the little system of the airplane. And to the military planners, the system was that plus logistics plus all of the support structure. To the economist, the system was what all those things cost, plus the base where the resources--you have to give up resources in one area for another. So the view of the systems got larger and the diversity of people got larger.

COLLINS: The thrust of my question wasn't so much the nature of problems in the research process but a management problem, recognizing that internal communication needed to be improved.

CAREY: Well, you could sense it, partly in the halls. When a person was given a project, it was up to him to recruit some members of his team and he would do the best he could to get on whatever people he was able to. He would have to know who was doing what where, because RAND was a series of all little offices, and of course, the management had to know somewhat was going on, too. It was a dynamic situation. A project leader would go out and pull together a team, and he would, of course, clear it with the administrator of the section, with the department head, or whatever it would be. But that person would be working on his own little project and he'd be recruited for this team and someone else might come and recruit him for this CAREY-4 team. Nobody including management quite knew at a given moment, what was going on until the study got to a certain stage. The management occasionally would say, "We'd better find out what's going on. Let's have this guy give us a briefing on it." And they would do so, and suddenly it would be a briefing of this study that might have been going on with this invisible coalition of people. No one knew who was working on what. The briefing would be given and this would sometimes be the first time the management had heard about this study, in any detailed sense. Plus the first time other RAND people would hear about it. Each person was engaged in either a single one man study or a little coalition or network of people, getting data where they could. They exchanged data very freely.

COLLINS: I'm interested in this question of internal communications and how that functioned, and it might be useful to break down the nature of the problem. I think you've identified several areas. There would be communication between departments and the top management, Frank Collbohm and Goldy Dick Goldstein and Larry Henderson. There would be communication between departments and even, I think, communication within departments as a potential problem area in terms of being aware of what was going on. Also, there was the problem of sharing information at different stages along the progress of a particular project.

I wonder whether we might look at those different areas and get your sense of whether there was a problem there and how effectively it was dealt with and by what means?

CAREY: I think it happened very efficiently, simply at the lowest level where people were making informal contacts and holding informal meetings and inviting people whom they thought should attend. There might be a planning meeting, there might be a rehearsal briefing or a first time briefing. Generally, whoever was giving this briefing would invite other people. I remember being invited by someone in the next office to go to a briefing that I never heard of, to go in and sit in on it, and suddenly there was a whole new project going on that I knew nothing about. I knew there was a title and a project list, but I didn't really understand the significance of it until this first run through. The briefing would be conducted like an informal meeting. Someone would give an introductory summary and then call on members of his team to get up and informally, with charts or not, give a preliminary discussion of it.

The audience might just have a few people invited, or suddenly there might be twenty-five people who heard about it and showed up. There was no monitoring at the door or anything. That was quite remarkable in that there was, in Air Force terms, a formal need-to-know requirement. Everybody in the building had a clearance. Just to enter the building, you had to have at least a secret clearance. I think most people had a Q-clearance CAREY-5 and top secret clearance. I think virtually everybody I knew at least had those. Then there were some special clearances for intelligence that were more limited.

So it was this free flow that really was terribly important for the way things happened, because there would be studies going on and a piece of information or data would pop up in one of these briefings. You'd hear another briefing on an entirely different subject which would suddenly use that same data, usually, say, attributing to where they got it. But suddenly there was an exchange and flow of information that made life much more exciting and easier than anywhere else that most of us had worked.

COLLINS: Are you describing now what happens toward the end of a project, when you get to the briefing stage?

CAREY: No. No, even in the early stages. You see, some people would be working on one or two projects at the same time. There were people who were generating a certain kind of data, costs, for example, because costs were a basic part of a number of studies. So the data from this person would go to a study on tactical air, a study on strategic air, a study on intelligence. Sometimes the same data. As a few people know, there were some prima donas and some competition between certain studies as the studies got larger. That then became a question of whether some data was being withheld, and data was challenged as to its accuracy: how did you verify differences, apparent inconsistencies, and so forth.

COLLINS: Would it be possible to look at a specific example in that context that stands out in your mind, both in the nature of projects that had a competitive character and also this question about the professional handling of data?

CAREY: And then there were differences in personalities of the people in all this. For example, there was someone named Igor Ansoff, and he was a very bright, lively fellow who had a team, I think, on tactical air power. That's a very big system you're talking about. It has to do with bases and kinds of future aircraft and tactics and really was quite complicated. In these big systems studies the assumptions that you make are terribly important, the assumptions of what the other side has, the tactics he uses, the effect of weapons on the different kind of base structures, command and control, and so forth.

You might have another study going on for example, toward the end of Ansoff's Study and the beginning of another study by Albert Wohlstetter, which was more on so-called strategic air. But you know, there aren't hard lines between tactical air and strategic air. They're still defining those terms, because many of the airplanes were based overseas, and whether you called it CAREY-6 tactical or strategic or whatever, tended to be arbitrary. You could have two studies going on here with some different assumptions and some different data, and sometimes data was borrowed from one to the other. And watched both of them, since my job was to have an overview of various things going on. I don't know how apparent it was at the time to most people, but there was competition going on. And there were different assumptions, and they were going into different studies which would be presented eventually to the same decision makers. So there were some problems there, and I think there were what you could term personality problems that interfered with the free exchange of ideas at those times. But nevertheless they charged ahead in a hearty manner.

COLLINS: How did that fit into your concern about communication, or was this a different area of responsibility?

CAREY: That was one of the things, I think, that made me especially interested in this communications problem, because it was always a question. I tried to write up an account of these studies before the study was actually given, on the basis of the preliminary briefings. Sometimes the account that I wrote was the first account that anyone ever read of these studies, outside of the study team itself. So that gave me a lot of motivation to do these write-ups. Occasionally, in interviewing the people to make these write-ups, I would run into a sense of conflicted competition between them. But it was remarkable -- in any other institution I know of, a university or business, it would be far more. These things would be held much more tightly, and I don't think these studies necessarily suffered from the competition. When a briefing was give, it was usually attended by key people in the other group. They were challenged very often, right from the floor, about the numbers, the data, the assumptions, and sometimes the methodology: did they use the right variables or did they leave out some variable to which the system would be more sensitive? There were a lot of very critical things.

COLLINS: I want to get into this communications issue a little bit more. Was the nature of the communications problem a bare bones awareness that Larry, Moe, and Curly were working on a particular project and there was a project name, or was it more in the sense of sharing the information on the nature of the problem they were working on, the approaches they were going to be using, and abstract of what their effort was all about? Could you characterize it? It sounds like one of your functions was to provide a summary explanation of what people were doing, as opposed to the basic skeletal information that something was going on and these people were working on it.

CAREY: We tried to do that as much time and space would allow. I would write up a four - or five - page summary of a study while it was in progress, or after the first briefing had been given, CAREY-7 but the people that attended the first briefing would be a very small group. If there was some concern, I would usually clear it. There was no requirement at that time that I clear it with anybody. That's what was wonderful about my job. I would simply write it up, and if I made mistakes I would hear about it. Management did, not in those stages clear it. Brownlee would look it over to see if it read well.

COLLINS: When you say "at that time," you're referring to what period of years?

CAREY: Well, I would say around 1 55, 6, 7, the time of the Ansoff study and the Wohlstetter study. Ed Paxon had several studies going on. At the same time, I also wrote a regular review for the Board of Trustees. That was a letter of ten to fifteen pages because the Board of Trustees was a fairly prestigious group, but they also were very different people. We had the president of CBS, we had the head of MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology], and we had people, some of whom were scientist, and some of whom were well, Stanton of CBS was a ·psychologist and others were business people. So they were very general, and would seem very simple write-ups today. I made an effort not to make them technical, but more to give a sense of the framework of the study.

COLLINS: Okay. For the other summaries that you mentioned, who was the audience for those write-ups? CAREY: Well, the audience was RAND people generally. Since RAND people consisted of no homogeneous group, I thought of them as a group of intelligent, interested people.

COLLINS: Were they written at the same level as the trustee pieces?

CAREY: Yes. Sometimes I almost used--! would rewrite one or the other.

COLLINS: What was the vehicle for getting information to the RAND people?

CAREY: For one thing, I put out something called the RANDom NEWS. I don't know, you probably have a file of some of those.

COLLINS: I've seen them, but I haven't gone through them systematically.

CAREY: Some will be interesting, some will not. For example, there's one with a write-up of the base study, Albert's study. That was the first write-up ever made of that study. It caused quite a stir because at that time the study was very controversial. There were, I think, some personality issues CAREY-8

involved. There was someone named Dave Novick, and he considered himself a champion of certain things. He considered himself a kind of father, or grandfather, of cost benefit analysis. He was a special kind of character, a very outgoing, almost--! won't say bombastic, but he was one of the RAND personalities. Albert also had some training as an economist. His assumptions were quite different than some of Dave Novick's. In fact, I would say Albert looked down somewhat on Dave's studies as being overly obvious, trivial or lacking the weight and gravity and subtlety that his had. I think Albert was right. But there was some effort in those days to get Albert ejected, I think. Novick, Ansoff, and Wohlstetter were all part of the Economics Department or Division then, I forget which. It was thought that an economist made a good project leader because economics deals with these fundamentals of values and economists are usually able to integrate the various other technical disciplines better than any of the others. So I wrote up that story and I published it in, I think, the RANDom News at that time. I think it was secret, and I gave a more extensive write-up of it to the Board of Trustees, and I think that caused some consternation.

COLLINS: Among whom?

CAREY: Among the people who were against the study. They thought the study was overblown, I think. It turned out to be one of RAND's very best, not only to that date, but after. A most effective and important study. But Albert had to fight his way through.

COLLINS: How were you aware of these tensions and professional differences? Was this something that was evident in the hallways when you talked to people? Or did you have more direct involvement?

CAREY: Sure. Oh, no, I had no direct involvement. I guess I was able to keep myself fluid. I would go into Albert's office and sit down and go over the study with him in mid progress. I'd go into Igor Ansoff's office, or I'd talk to Dave Novick in the hall and you'd hear remarks. No open attacks, just," Well I don't know, those numbers, where did you get numbers like that? They're just wrong. This assumption is crazy, life isn't like that. It's a different assumption."

Albert was quite an unconventional fellow. He had a certain style about him. The other people were a little more different, were a little more doer, and I think his personality grated. You either really liked him or you were taken aback by his policy. But he was very good. He gave credit to all the people who worked for him. He got some of the best. He knew how CAREY-9

to get very good people, although unconventional some of them came in bare feet. There was one guy who used to show up that way and Albert gave him credit, worked with him, got the best out of him. He was a superb project leader.

COLLINS: I guess one would call you the editor of RANDom News. Would that be a fair way to characterize your role there? Did you, as part of your reporting, address these issues and differences in the RANDom News?

CAREY: No, I really didn't do that. I wrote a couple little spoof pieces about that. Briefings were an important thing going on all the time, so I wrote a little piece on briefmanship.

COLLINS: Okay. I have run across those.

CAREY: There was a whole other level of writing that were so - called--what was it? DL [Limited Documents]. Anybody could write a limited document anytime, and I think I did write, here and there, one of those. They only went to the person they were addressed to.

COLLINS: Now, the RANDom News was principally a vehicle that shared broadly with the RAND staff what was going on around the corporation?

CAREY: Yes, it was an attempt to keep things open. COLLINS: And you also dealt with the communication issue between the trustees and the corporation. Did you have any hand in working with communication problems in the other areas that we identified, whether it was between the departments and top management, within departments, or between departments?

CAREY: Well, I helped, although not on any formal basis. RANDom News took a certain amount of time, but in the process I was often asked to sit down and help them write a report or a proposal. I would sometimes stay late to read over their things. In those days, you know, one of the problems in the writing was because of the disciplinary limitations. You had a person who was an economist, trying to write about airplanes. I had written enough about airplanes, so I was able to help him on that. The economist could help an aircraft engineer write something about economics. It was a great educational experience for me. Later, the remark was relayed to us at some management meeting -- I think it might have been Larry Henderson who said it, "Whose going to read this?" We would come up with a study this thick.

COLLINS: Resuming after a brief pause, you were describing--

CAREY: Yes, I was saying that Larry Henderson remarked that [General] curtis LeMay, who was at that time Air Force Chief and CAREY-10 not a particularly easy fellow, made the comment, "Well, what the hell." He wasn't always a wild supporter of RAND's, I think, because certain studies, including Albert's went against Air Force doctrine. That was one of the interesting processes that went on. When the results of RAND went very much against the sponsors, some of that was a little sticky.

The remark was passed on that LeMay would never read more than one page anyway, about anybody, of anything. We were sending LeMay the Air Force 300 - page documents! So at the Management Committee meeting, somebody -- maybe Henderson -­ suggested, "Well why don't we do it. Why don't we give him one page." So the job of trying that fell to me, and it seems now like it should have been routine a routine, but at that time it wasn't. A study was written up with essentially no introduction, nothing. So for the better part of a year, I think, I spent a lot of time added to my other duties, writing this one page summary. I went back to Washington--

COLLINS: You're talking here about the major reports, the Rs and RMs that went out?

CAREY: Right. My job was to write a one page summary of a long technical report. COLLINS: Do you recall about what time this transpired?

CAREY: No, I don't, but I think it was mid to late '50s.

COLLINS: In going through Brownlee's papers, I've noticed that he raised this issue, and this genuinely seemed to be an issue, about how to craft these things in precisely the right way. And Larry Henderson seemed to have this intense fervor for making sure that these things were absolutely right. And it seemed to create some friction between him and Brownlee. What were you impressions about your ability to prepare these summaries in a way that satisfied all the people involved and your sense of the interaction between Brownlee and Larry?

CAREY: Larry was a real stickler, and without being right, he was a strong personality. He wasn't a technical person, more of a business person. I guess he was a lawyer by background, and Brownlee was a more classical kind of fellow with great respect for scholarship and subtleties. Larry was pounding in there. I think ~here was no right or wrong. They were just different viewpoints and they had to come together. In fact, in one place in these summaries, it did come together. So I went back and worked in the Washington office with Larry. I visited Lemay's office -- I sometimes would sit days in his office. I wanted to get a feel form him of how to do the job. In the beginning it sometimes took me a week to write one page, because I would get on the telephone. I wanted to know, who did this study? Why did CAREY-11 they do it? What good was it to anybody? I called Air Force bases and tried to trace down the things that were unsaid because I knew that LeMay and other people at that level would ask, " Why should I read this?" I tried, in the first two sentences to make it clear to them that it would be useful to them, because otherwise, they wouldn't read it.

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

CAREY: I spent a lot of time on the telephone, not just with the leader of the project, but also with the technical people. Anything where I could get some information about why they made this study. How good a study was it? What would it do, not for them, but for the Air Force? Who should read it? I think we developed a pretty good formula after awhile. The first one page summary was single spaced, typed, with almost no margins. It contained everything. I later learned to do it, I think, a little better. I formatted it better. We had nicer IBM proportional spacing typewriters, and we left out details but keyed in references. Not even Time magazine, in those days, did these summaries. I looked at popular publications such as Fortune and Time to see what I could learn about how to do this. And, of course, I think we finally got a fairly good product. But I found it very difficult in the first days because I wanted to include everything. I had to get a sense of what to leave out and what to reference.

COLLINS: Why was the decision made to have somebody like you to do the summaries and not the authors?

CAREY: The authors couldn't do it. It was absolutely hopeless. Maybe they later learned to do that, but after spending all that time and writing 300 pages, they couldn't do it in one page. Or else they'd pick out one part that they felt strongly enough about it, and it was just the sort of thing that the Air Force wouldn't be interested at all. We tried to have them do it at first. But it was only after doing this centrally first, for about a year as I recall, that we got them to help. It just became too much work for one person to do, so we then kicked it back. I would also sit down with the authors or get them on the telephone and try to bring out more information, " Why is this true?" and I got somewhat of a feel for that.

COLLINS: I guess I'm intrigued that as part of this process of crafting a summary, you found it was useful to call up different elements of the Air Force who might be the audience for this study. What it sounds like you're describing is that you got a sense of what their sense of the problems was and how this study might relate to their problems.

CAREY: That's true, you're exactly right. Often the study wouldn't even mention this specific problem until you got way CAREY-12 buried into the text. They just weren't written in that style. I think our writing has improved a lot. Basically most research writing has improved since those days. COLLINS: Is there anything else you want to describe about that experience?

CAREY: Not about that, but I was going to tell you a Herman Kahn story because I think it' s a classic. It's not well known.

COLLINS: I'd like to hear it.

CAREY: Herman was a great talker. He was a phenomenon all by himself. Here he was, this very closed in, overweight, strangely complex personality who was doing pure mathematical studies, Monte Carlo studies. Suddenly got--I think it was a discovery for him, he was a heavy stutterer so that you almost couldn't sit through a conversation with him. And right before our eyes we saw a miracle develop. He got involved in the civil defense study -- you know, nothing came out of these studies on shielding of nuclear radiation. But he developed this very funny, lumpy team of people to study the question of civil defense, and they were very imaginative. Although he was a very close friend of Albert's for a time, they later developed some rivalry because of the problem of data exchange and so forth.

Herman, would go to one of his briefings, and on the way he would stop in and have a conversation with somebody, he'd overhear another briefing, he'd pick up RANDom News or another paper, and then he'd go to his briefing. All of everything he had picked up would be included in his briefing as though, it was just basic information that we all knew. He was that kind of person, a very special character. Attending his briefings was always an experience. And he developed. He used to stutter so that you could hardly sit through then, and he dropped his stuttering. It almost disappeared and he became kind of the Billy Graham of civil defense.

There was the question about whether this material was classified or not. He would drag in information from wherever he got it. He would give these briefings without worrying a lot about classification clearance.

COLLINS: Do you mean in RAND? outside of RAND?

CAREY: Well, in RAND and then outside of RAND. He was so good at bringing in the most recent fragments of information, integrating it and giving this picture. He was just so dynamic that he really captivated people. I remember a few times he took care of the secret problem. You know, ordinarily a secret briefing is supposed to be announced before, and then you have people who make sure that all who attend are cleared and so forth. He would CAREY-13

simply invite a few high level Air Force people who did have a clearance and then expect them to object to it. If they attended and didn't object, he assumed that this meant he had somehow passed the secrecy test. He cut all the corners and became a little bit of a renegade, you know, almost like the Saddam Hussein of briefings.

COLLINS: What was the nature of your interaction with him? Did you have an official role in working with him in this capacity?

CAREY: Well, my job was to find out what was going on and to report it. I was always trying to chase him around and pin him down. When he gave a briefing here, I would always attend. But by the time he gave the briefing the next time, two weeks later, it could be completely different, you'd have a whole other segment, and it was almost a sleight of hand going on here, sleight of mind. He had been doing this before management itself had heard these briefings. They heard rumors that we had this wild man going around here giving these briefings that everybody thought were so great. But he had strong detractors, " This guy's just saying things that aren't true, he doesn't know what he's talking about, the data isn't right," you know, flights of fancy and imagination. There was what they call a Military Advisory Group Meeting, and I think it was General [Thomas] White, if I remember, was the chief man at that time. They wanted Herman to give a briefing, and Herman's briefings were often five or six hours long. To give a briefing for the Military Advisory Group, it was a program of three or four, and so they asked Herman to give his briefing. There was no written record of any of this and so people were a little edgy about this. But if I remember, it was kind of a command performance, The Air Force had heard about this guy, both a lot of complaints and a lot of great compliments. They wanted to hear him. So the management, I think with some reluctance, put Herman on the program. They gave him, I think, an hour instead of the usual 20 minutes for the particular audience, and they also backed it up with lunch on the patio, so we would have to stop. Finally he said okay, he would do it.

It was put on in the RAND Conference Room, I think, in this building. There was a projection booth and it was wired, so I sneaked in there before the briefing and I activated the recording machine. For my records, I wanted to have an account of what he had to say, what the latest was, because I hadn't really written him up well yet. So he gave his presentation and it went on, and the lunch was set out to be served, and Herman was still talking, and they finally, I think, essentially had to force it to a close. I sat there in the darkened projection booth listening to his briefing, and as far as I could tell, the audience was captivated, even though he had run overtime and made these wild jumps and fantasies. CAREY-14 So I had, I think, the first recorded record of this talk. General White and the Military Advisory Group was sufficiently interested that they asked if they could have a written version of the talk. Goldy and Frank got very stirred up. They suddenly discovered there wasn't any written version. They had no idea that there wasn't any documentation on this. Someone, I think Goldy's secretary, had spied me going into the projection booth, and as it turned out, they then found out that I had recorded it. No one knew I had recorded it. So I thought, " Well I'll get hell for this," but instead Goldy came in beaming, and he said, "Boy I'm glad we have that, because we have a request from General White to have a transcript of this. They said they found it so interesting they want to know more information. Just have it transcribed."

So my job was to do that as soon as possible. I had secretaries come in that weekend. We distributed the tapes and started typing, and I read this stuff and I couldn't make any sense out of it. Herman talked about two to three times as fast as the normal rate, and he talked in incomplete sentences. He stuttered a little and he back - tracked, and yet it was just a magnificent performance of near illusion. You got what he was saying, the sense of it, and yet if you looked closely at it, you couldn't make any sense of it. Even if you were there sometimes, the way he jumped.

COLLINS: I'm interested. You used the words fantasy and illusion. Those are pretty odd qualities to associate with a military briefing.

CAREY: Well, there was a quality of, fantasy about the situation, and then he would give an analysis. After all, he was a highly skilled mathematician.

So I had about four secretaries sitting here typing these tapes, and it was a miserable experience, so I called Herman. He came in on Sunday and I said, "Look, would you look at these." Saturday night I was a wreck, because I could not edit them and retype them -- it was silly. I said, "Herman, will you explain to me what this is? I can't make any sense of it. Could you sit down and rewrite it?" And he said he didn't understand them himself. It's always hard typing out verbal communication anyway, but this was absolutely, completely useless. So we sat down and tried to edit it, and finally, after about three hours on Sunday morning, it was just hopeless. I was really quite desperate.

I said, "I thought I understood sometimes what you were talking about, but this makes no sense at all." Somewhere I have about 20 pages of this stuff that I saved. The next week I came in and I sat down with Herman and made an outline, of more or less, of the topics and I said, "What do you want to say about CAREY-15 this?" By questioning, I made him repeat slowly, sentence by sentence or phrase by phrase, what he wanted to say and that's the way we did it. It took a week to get out the transcript, what we finally sent out. The document we sent out was nothing like his talk. We just tried to have it contain the same information.

COLLINS: I guess what you're saying is that you have some of the original transcript or edited transcript.

CAREY: I have a few pages. Well, it wasn't edited much, because it was hopeless.

COLLINS: Then you have this document that you sat down and crafted.

CAREY: The document that was sent. I don't have it because it was secret or top secret. But that turned out to be, I think, the beginning of Herman's book on thermonuclear war.

COLLINS: Why were you interested in recording Herman's talk? I assume, from the way you told the story, that it wasn't your usual practice to go in and record these presentations.

CAREY: Well, because it was the only way I could get him to sit down. He was off on a trip, he was -- I mean, he was a very nervous guy and I was a little awed by him, especially in talking to him because he talked so fast. I didn't have the confidence that I could sit down with him and have the kind of conversation I have with other people and go away with the semblance of what he was really saying in detail.

I think he finally saw the wisdom, too, of controlling himself a little. He had to, to get it into print. So I think that was I think the beginning of his book, when he saw that it was possible to have written communication as well. But it was very different than his briefing communication. I helped him on his book here and there, but he later hired somebody, I think, essentially full time, to help him on the manuscript that turned out to be on thermonuclear war.

COLLINS: So your interaction with him after this event of the Military Advisory Group meeting was occasional and not systematic?

CAREY: We became very close friends. You know, he left RAND because he generated so many problems. I would often go back, and I worked with him at the Hudson Institute later.

COLLINS: Since you had this communications role, I want to get a clearer sense of your interaction with the Board of Trustees and the Military Advisory Group. Apart from preparing the letter for CAREY-16 the Board of Trustees, or the summary report, did you have interaction at the meetings, were you part of preparing minutes? CAREY: I went to some meetings, but I didn't really--! did help people with their briefings. They got more and more concerned with the problem of communication and time and being a little better, so I would sometimes help them with their briefings. Later, Brownlee hired somebody to do this full time.

COLLINS: Was that Ed Lowe?

CAREY: Ed Lowe. Before Ed Lowe, I helped these people with their briefings. I ran through them and gave them a critique on it. I listened to their briefings and gave them a critique, but that was the extent.

COLLINS: But this was for all types of briefings?

CAREY: All types of briefings. For the Military Advisory Group, there was essentially a whole series of them. I helped with preparation for those. I would go to some -- not all -- of the Military Advisory Group meetings, just to be there. I wasn't a part of it.

COLLINS: Was the Trustee's Newsletter, as I believe it was called, -- or that may have been something different. Let me just backtrack here. In going through some of the things in Brownlee's papers, I see reference to different types of publication vehicles for communicating information. There was something called the Trustee's Newsletter and a Trustee's Publications Digest. These may have had different names at different times. There was also a Report of Operations, which was for the Board of Trustees and the Military Advisory Group. There was something called The RAND Management Notes: there was something called Current RAND Operations: there were things called Staff Reports. Did you have some role in helping to get these publications ready?

CAREY: Well, formally I didn't. Formally I was charged with the Newsletter for the Board of Trustees and with the RANDom News and the "Sum Briefings" and with the summaries, and then informally I worked on whatever was up. I helped Albert on his report. I helped Hans Speier edit a book manuscript. But that wasn't my formal job. They'd just ask would I look at this, would I help with that.

COLLINS: Okay. But the RANDom News activity and the Trustee's Newsletter were considered your primary and mostly full time responsibility. Is that a fair summary?

CAREY: Eighty percent of my time went into those things. CAREY-17

COLLINS: Okay. One thing that I'm interested in that you referred to earlier was, your question of humor at RAND. You mentioned that you crafted some of these things that appeared, I think, in RANDom News about briefmanship. They fell under this heading of something known as 11 RANDmanship."

I'll start out with a broad question and we can think about how we can break it down. But wonder if you have a sense of what the special character or function of humor was at RAND? It seems to occupy a little bit different place in the culture of the organization, as, say, compared to North American Aviation or an industry or university setting, I wondered whether you had any perspective on that?

CAREY: Oh, I think it did. I think occasionally someone would write simply a humorous piece, a parody or a maybe a DL paper or something like this. It could be very limited or quite broad. But there was a good spirit abroad most of the time. Often briefings were punctuated by a fair share of laughter and you good fellowship. They generally had a good feeling. There were some difficult times.

You know the names Olaf Helmer and Norm Dalkey?

COLLINS: Yes. CAREY: They were essentially mathematicians and they put together a simulation. I think it was called maybe "COW." This may not be written up very much. I tried to write this up. I don't know if I succeeded because it got to be so controversial. Did you come across that?

COLLINS: No.

CAREY: It was an astounding affair. They took over a building at the corner of 4th and Broadway, I think it was. They set up this simulation. They were sort of mathematicians, nothing else, and they set up this Cold War simulation in which different people played the heads of different nations and they sat at different desks. They were interconnected and they were the heads of, I don't know, the Commissar of Russia, France, and England and they worked very hard to make this a real simulation. They had the vision of a simulation, but they didn't have any of the subtleties. They also had some people come over from [Hans] Speier's department. They had someone called Paul Kecskemeti -­ I don't know if you've heard of him he's quite a special person. They had the lights turned low, kind of like spotlights, and they had messengers going back and forth with the latest logistics information as the troops moved in. It was a little like a movie version and nobody knew whether to treat it, serious 140. I would go over there, and I couldn't believe what I was seeing. Kecskemeti had a great sense of humor but Speier got quite angry CAREY-18 at the whole thing. He thought it was nothing but foolishness. Here you had these mathematicians who didn't know anything and they were trying to deal in the realm of social science. They were trying to deal in bargaining and trade negotiations and alliances and invasion, and some very bizarre things happened.

One of the things I remember was that in the game there were rules of engagement about how forces should move, and I think Kecskemeti had the British troops land on us soil and try to retake the country. They didn't deliberately try to sabotage it, but they made it look ridiculous.

That was a big effort. You had eight or nine people for a long time and all this backup preparation. I think Collbohm shot it down, ordered it closed because he was afraid that people outside of RAND would hear about and it would be a great embarrassment. But they did let it go for awhile, they let it develop.

COLLINS: I guess that's going out to the extreme edge of what might count as humor. I assume that Olaf Helmer and Norm Dalkey were doing this because they felt it was a useful professional exercise.

CAREY: Oh, they were very serious. They were very imaginative but it just got carried away. That caused a rift between the Social Science Department and the Math Department. And then there were other strains between Social Science and Albert's study they were quite deeply felt. I don't think it's clear yet, the story of the emergence of doctrine. I think Albert's doing some writing, but it's really an untold story. Since social scientists like Bernard Brodie, who in my humble opinion--Bernard Brodie and Hans Speier and these people were somewhat behind in their thinking on strategic doctrine. Albert was charging ahead with his studies, and we would discuss ideas that came up in them. Some of them didn't appear -- such as Brodie's and Speier's things -- until years and years later. Albert never stopped to write, but everyone was talking and briefing and studying and once in awhile giving a report. Albert didn't get, I don't think, full credit for some of the things. But it was very difficult: there was much interaction all the time. You'd be hard put to say what was seminal thinking and where ideas came from.

COLLINS: Let's go back to the Kahn incident and your audio taping of that. Some where around that time, a little bit later perhaps, there was a brief period of interest in which RAND filmed briefings. Did you have any involvement in that?

CAREY: Yes, that was my original suggestion to do that.

COLLINS: Can you tell me the background of that and how the CAREY-19 enterprise went?

CAREY: Well there was one motivation. I have an outside interest in films, because I had made a short film and it turned out to be very successful. So when the idea of filming came up, they asked me about it. It seemed to me that if we could make a good film briefing that would just, for reasons of economy -- you know, we didn't have videotape in those days and film was a more complicated process. I wrote a hundred page paper somewhere, maybe Brownlee has it about whether RAND should use films and the arguments for it and so forth.

COLLINS: I haven't seen that.

CAREY: Just from the standpoint of cost, you can reuse the film and you have some control over it. The idea of some control came from Herman Kahn. I did film some pieces of Herman Kahn's things. So film was seen simply as a vehicle at that time for packaging a briefing and mailing it out. It was just much cheaper and easier than sending a person, although you could have someone on a phone line to answer questions or something like that. I brought that up and I wrote a long paper on that idea.

Then I was looking at other possible uses of film, and one was to present a scenario initially for a game which would then be played out in the Social Science Department. We actually wrote a film and they actually filmed it. I might even have a piece of that film around somewhere. You see, a film in those days -- the film and the soundtrack are two different things. You cut the film and you cut the soundtrack. We had no equipment, so we did it as best we could. We actually did it here.

We did a film called ''Escalation in Iran." It was a dramatic piece. We got characters from anywhere. We had a maintenance man, we had someone from the Publication Department. We simulated a cast and it really was pretty good, I thought. We presented the initial scenario and then the game took off from there.

COLLINS: What's your sense of what happened to these documents, these films? I've been through the RAND Photographic and Media Services Division and they don't have any of these things. Did you keep copies?

CAREY: I don't really know. I think that some of them, particularly "Escalation in Iran," were used a couple of times here. The films required a double system projection. "Escalation in Iran" fulfilled its purpose, and I think it worked pretty well. The idea was to give the audience a common starting point, to start the game, because I noticed that originally people were quite confused in these simulations about what was CAREY-20 happening. It was also to dramatize it a little. They were primitive but it was useful at the time.

COLLINS: What eventuated from the idea of filming briefings and sending them off in lieu of the briefer, that sort of thing?

CAREY: Well I think it wasn't really pushed a lot further. It could have been. In fact, it would have been very helpful, but it was just something that I did on the side. They may have had a film person in here. Later I think they did. But at that time, everything was very primitive. I think I borrowed the equipment and brought it in, and we filmed and edited it ourselves. I forgot who wrote the script for that. Somebody, I think, in the Economics Division wrote a rough script.

COLLINS: I think, if I recall from a 1960 organization chart, there was an individual on there and his name was Ed Cook or Jim Cook.

CAREY: Jim Cook, yes. Well, he didn't have a lot to do with that. I think he had done film work for the State Department. In fact, I got into some--we had great differences of opinion, Jim and I, about that.

COLLINS: I think this was part of a--

CAREY: I think he might have been hired, in fact, to do some of that. But it never turned out, as far as I know. I had made a film, as a hobby, that turned out to be very successful and won the Venice Film Festival (Venice, Italy) for documentaries. I was the only person who knew anything about film. The idea of using film was very stimulating. And then, I think, Brownlee hired Jim to do that. But Jim's style was different. My style was to just go in and do it. Jim's style was to have a crew and do things, very conventionally. I remember we had some cost estimates. His costs per film were ten times what mine were, because I just got people to do the work. He hired people. I think it might have been that approach that turned people off, because film can get -- it's ludicrous, but at that time there were rules of thumb about how much it would cost. Let me see, I had a number and it escaped me.

COLLINS: We can fill that in later if it comes to you.

CAREY: But it was so much per minute, so much per foot.

COLLINS: Were you aware if there was an interest on the part of the military in this technique? And, did the military have people who were filming briefings when RAND went to give a briefing?

CAREY: Not a lot. I went out, I think, before Jim came. I did CAREY-21 some research. I went to military bases and looked at their films. I made a slide show or two that I thought were better than films and cheaper for certain reasons.

COLLINS: And when you say military films, you're not talking about a training film?

CAREY: Yes, I went to those places, out to San Bernadino, and there were film units. I had a few friends in the film business who were World War II film people.

COLLINS: I guess what I'm interested in broadly is this notion of the interest in filming these briefings, either as a tool for getting across the message or as a historical record. But whatever the purpose, what was the general interest in this technique? It was either in RAND or the military.

CAREY: Well, it was one of those things that had to be nursed along in the beginning stages or it would die. I sort of took my shot at it by writing this paper. It seems to me that was just before Brownlee had hired Jim Cook. Jim didn't fit into RAND. He just didn't fit. He was a state Department person. He was very square. He took offense at the way we did things, you know. He was never comfortable. I think he was here two years or a year and a half. Essentially nothing happened. He was very proper. He had been trained as a Foreign Service officer and he believed in absolute protocol. It just didn't work out.

COLLINS: So, to the best of your knowledge, there were only a few examples in which the filming of either scenarios or briefings was pursued.

CAREY: Yes, when I was here. It's too bad because we could have had some classic things. I'd give anything for a good film of Herman.

COLLINS: You don't think the bits that you filmed are--

CAREY: I don't know. I might have something, but probably not.

COLLINS: A broader question. What was your perception of Frank Collbohm's and Dick Goldstein's and Larry Henderson's -- the management's -- point of view about the function of communication at RAND? And to what degree did they get into the details of what particular vehicles would be used to communicate and how you did your job? Did they take a hands-on approach to the communication issue, or was it something that was largely left to Brownlee and his staff?

CAREY: No, they didn't. They were aware, they respected it as an important function, but they did not do much themselves. When I wrote the newsletter for the Board of Trustees, Goldy looked it CAREY-22 over, might have made a mark or two, and sent it out. They were three very different personalities and they really formed a kind of tripod on which RAND stood. I was amazed. I didn't know how they did this. I sat in on meetings with them. I didn't really know any of them intimately. They are all quite private people.

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

COLLINS: During the mid-50s RAND made a brief foray into public advertising about RAND. They ran a series of advertisements in Scientific American and I think in a few other places as well. Did you have any involvement in the discussions that led up to that or into the process of doing it?

CAREY: No, I didn't. I don't know much about that. There was someone named Jim Allen, I think. Did you ever come across that name?

COLLINS: No.

CAREY: I think it was Jim Allen, who was a friend of Goldie's. He didn't work for RAND but he was a New York high class advertising person. You see, RAND didn't have a Public Relations Department, or anything like that, at that time. My limited contact with Jim Allen was when we were writing the original Ford Foundation proposal: I worked with him on that. He was out there and would occasionally come in.

Another person who might have had something to do with the advertising was someone named Si (Simon] Bourgin. Do you know of him?

COLLINS: I've heard the name.

CAREY: Simon Bourgin. He is in Washington. He was a friend of Brownlee's. Somehow he became hired for a year or two years to work on RAND's public relations. I think he's a public relations person. He had been a writer on Newsweek and knew his way around. He didn't know a lot about RAND, but he had a respect for RAND and he was just a lively guy. I think he might have been the person who was consulted more than anyone on the RAND entrance into a more public life. I was in on a few of the early discussions about it, about whether this was a good strategy. Originally RAND went to the other extreme of not admitting people at all. And there were arguments presented on both sides. When you're back in Washington, Si Bourgin would be a good person to ask. Well, you can get his address. I saw him a couple of years ago back there. A very decent fellow.

COLLINS: There was a period at the end of the 1950s in which there was real intense concern within the corporation about the management of the research function, what direction RAND should CAREY-23 go in, and how it should relate to the Air Force. This had always been a concern at RAND, but it seemed to work up to a particular heat at this particular time, and a guy named Ed Lindblom was brought in to do an analysis. Did you have any contact with that activity or, as part of your RANDom News function, report on or be aware of that?

CAREY: Well, I might have in the Trustees Newsletter. I remember it was sort of a slow rising tide of dialogue. It was a natural extension of what happens when you begin to enlarge your system of information and concern. For example, you know that we were an Air Force project. Okay, studies very soon got in, we had to bring in the Army, we had to bring in the Navy, and we had to bring in the Atomic Energy Commission, and yet we were still under an Air Force contract. Then there were conflicts between those agencies, so that one reason for the role of RAND. Then there was a whole other reason. Ed Lindblom was very imaginative -- I remember he was an economist. This is the same problem I would say RAND must be concerned with today. Everything's connected to everything else, and how big should you try to spread your influence? It's all one picture, in a way. RAND has now since gone into public health, into ecology, and into a lot of other studies. At that time, though, with the inter-service rivalries and the competition from budget, RAND was getting into some sticky areas, because the studies naturally led on to other things.

This is a little aside, but I just mention it while I think of it. I mentioned Paul Kecskemeti. You've heard the term, the surrender study?

COLLINS: Yes.

CAREY: Okay, you know that story. That's another example of RAND going in different directions. Then people began to write some very thoughtful pieces that were beyond studies. Very philosophical pieces. You had people writing on the Soviet economy. Was that within RAND or not? We had Sandy Nimitz writing on the Soviet potato crop -- things that now and then made the Air Force say, " What are you spending our money on?"

COLLINS: Of the research areas that you were associated with, can you identify the most significant or the most interesting or stimulative or formative for the organization?

CAREY: Among those that were interesting, I think, were some of the speculative pieces that appear in DLs they were very simple, nice little pieces. You've probably come across John Williams' little essay Small World. Well, at that time everybody was so busy in all these technical studies, it was very refreshing to have that emerge. I wrote a piece -- I think it was a D or DL -- CAREY-24

called Housekeeping in a Haunted House. It was about 60 pages. I just passed it out to a few people. It was an attempt, a perspective piece on the meaning of deterrence. At that time people didn't really understand the so-called anatomy of deterrence, which I think was a subtitle of the piece. The whole dimension of what that meant, deterrence. On the basis of this little paper that I wrote, I also a few comments back from RAND people, but I also got an invitation from the Japanese to come over and give a talk in Japan on that subject. It didn't stir much of that kind of interest here.

COLLINS: This is an intriguing example. You're not someone who is on the research staff, but yet you felt an interest in setting down your thoughts about the subject and giving it some audience.

CAREY: Just a different, nonspecialist viewpoint, in a way. And yet, Olaf thought it was the best piece written to date on this subject. It was his main concern. He himself had written some short pieces on that. It just gives you a feeling that what seems obvious now wasn't so obvious then. You have to keep rethinking and retalking old points, and they sift themselves into a little different order. The people who invited me over there were a group called " The Committee of Seven". And somehow, someone had given them a copy of this paper. This was a peace group made up of seven industrial subscribers. Somehow the peace groups at that time were formed in different ways. They invited me to visit Japan for two weeks, and I gave a series of talks there on the nature of deterrence. [Ronald] Reagan never understood the essence of deterrence until very late in the term. He really didn't. If you look at it in a careful way, many things are this obvious now, but in those days it was very hard to explain it to the Air Force -- this whole calculus of first strike, second strike, counter air, all this whole thing that Albert had worked out so well. Then Herman later built on it.

COLLINS: When did you leave RAND?

CAREY: I left RAND, I think, in 1 65.

COLLINS: Why did you choose to depart at that time?

CAREY: Well, I'm not sure. A combination of things. I think I felt I wasn't being very useful, and I went to work for Systems Development Corporation for a short time. Then from there I went to UCLA, where I worked in the Psychology Department. They had a project on political/military simulation -- computer-based simulation. That seemed to me a very fascinating possibility at the time.

COLLINS: You mentioned that one of the things that struck you as you came here was here was the informality, the free - form character of the organization. Was that still the case in the CAREY-25 mid-60s?

CAREY~ It was drying out gradually. It was becoming more formal. I guess it had to be. There had to be more accountability in the budget. I'm not sure. I think it was partly personal, partly the fact that I didn't feel I had much more to contribute. I wasn' t as usefu l t o them as I h ad been. It was kind of running down. Albert had left. Herman h a d left. And I' m not sure, that's a hard question to answer. I got married, remarried.

COLLINS: Those are all the questions that I wanted to run through. Is there anything you want to add to what we've discussed?

CAREY: No, I don't thi nk so. I don' t have much contact h ere now. I see Charl ie Wolk and I u sed t o s e e Jim Digby. You 're f ami l i ar with the -- I 'm not sure what it's ca~led, The RAND/For d Foundation Funded Project. I t changed its name a couple of times. Well, Jim Digby was i n c h arg e of that. That was terribly important.

When I left, I went to the State Department and worked for awhile. I kept running into RAND people. By that time, Freddie Clay was made the head of the [US] Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

COLLINS: Well, why don't we break off. Thanks very much.