The Art of Intelligence—Lessons from a Counterterrorism Center, which deservedly Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service constitutes the majority of the book. Prior for- mative positions, such as serving as an opera- By Henry A. Crumpton tions officer in Africa and working with the Penguin Press, 2012 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as the 338 pp., $27.95 deputy chief of the International Terrorism ISBN: 978-1-59420-334-3 Operations section, are chronologically pre- sented. These, along with accounts of his ReViewed BY NATHANieL L. MOIR upbringing in Georgia, his tenacious efforts to join the CIA, and his development as a he nexus of conflict, intelligence, gov- career trainee, are recounted anecdotally and ernment, and society is perhaps the with a great deal of humility. Early in chapter T most complex realm to navigate as a 2, “Training,” for example, Crumpton writes, career intelligence professional. To accom- “I was the youngest in my CIA Career Trainee plish that feat through distinguished service class, the least educated, and the least expe- and then, upon retirement, concisely delineate rienced. I had no military service, no foreign these intersections through shared personal language, no graduate degree, no technical experience in a publication is a rare achieve- skill, and no professional pedigree” (p. 25). ment. The Art of Intelligence—Lessons from a What becomes apparent through the course Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service compel- of The Art of Intelligence is how Crumpton lingly recounts a critical period of transfor- mobilized his keen self-awareness and strong mation in conflict. It also presents significant work ethic to create an evolving and downright analysis and reflection on the failures and suc- fascinating career. cesses of intelligence and what should ideally A number of narratives, particularly in be its symbiosis with policy formulation. As chapters 3 and 4, demonstrate how the author Henry Crumpton demonstrates, the relation- developed as an officer by describing the ship between intelligence and policy is often recruitment of sources and collection of intel- messy, but it is an increasingly critical key to ligence. In one case, Crumpton details how wise and effective decisionmaking. he and a member of the Office of Technical As a career operations officer in the Services conducted an operation in Africa to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Clandestine recover a listening device emplaced to record Service, Crumpton served in diverse positions the conversations of a potential informant. and contributed to national security in sev- Unfortunately, over the span of 6 months, eral pivotal roles. Foremost of these was his nothing of use was divulged by the individual, experience as a deputy to Cofer Black in the and the device had to be retrieved to close the operation. What follows is a riveting sequence of events. While it makes for great reading Captain Nathaniel L. Moir, USAR, is a Military and is just one example, Crumpton uses the Intelligence and Psychological Operations incident as a mini–case study to explain how Officer currently working as a Senior Research Analyst in the Program for Culture and Conflict both technical and human-based intelligence Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. skill sets form a composite that exemplifies 148 | BOOK REVIEWS PRISM 4, NO. 1 moiR the most reliable intelligence. In this particu- nonexistent. The FBI sought justice, not lar incident, the operation would have failed prevention. Their information was poten- without integration of both, the lesson being tial evidence, which they had to protect for that no single source of intelligence pro- the prosecutors to use in courts. The agents, vides everything needed to formulate good for the most part, could not envision others decisions, even at small-scale, tactical levels. outside the Department of Justice having a Such lessons learned through the course of legitimate need for FBI-derived informa- Crumpton’s early and middle career demon- tion. Sharing evidence as intelligence was strate the cumulative preparation that led to anathema to them (p. 110). him becoming Cofer Black’s deputy and the individual responsible for the CIA’s global The differing bureaucratic cultures and the counterterrorism operations in September disconnected approach to intelligence between 1999. This was a position through which the CIA and FBI were further compounded by Crumpton would have significant impact as disjointed relationships between intelligence events unfolded in 2000 and 2001. agencies and policy decisionmakers. This is Established in February 1986, the CIA’s notable in Crumpton’s frustration with the Counterterrorism Center was developed in Clinton administration’s failure to address the response to the April 1983 bombing of the al Qaeda attacks on U.S. Embassies in Nairobi U.S. Embassy in Beirut and the October 1983 and Dar es Salaam as acts of war. However, it bombing that killed 241 U.S. military person- is notable that Crumpton later discusses how nel, also in Lebanon. Crumpton details the the United States was entering a new type of growing importance of the center’s mission as conflict that was clearly difficult to understand; the later 1980s, and especially the later 1990s, the confrontation with asymmetric warfare progressed. Of the six key geographic regions would be further complicated by the decision he noted once he arrived, Afghanistan was a to invade Iraq. particular focus. This, as is well known, was Returning to the incidents in East Africa, because of al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan, these, as well as the attack on the USS Cole which provided it with the sanctuary to plan in late 2000, foreshadowed problems that attacks in Kenya and Tanzania in August prevented the Intelligence Community from 1998. The East African attacks also provided stopping the attacks of September 2001. On Crumpton with further lessons learned regard- the other hand, Crumpton provides a bal- ing the role of law enforcement as practiced anced look that includes successes, such as by the FBI and limits to how both the CIA and preventing the December 1999 Millennium FBI shared information and common operat- Plot. This event “underscored the importance ing procedures: of understanding Al-Qaeda’s plans and inten- tions as an intelligence collection imperative. My disappointment had to do with the FBI’s This meant penetrating their primary safe exclusive focus on law enforcement, on cap- haven in Afghanistan” (p. 145). Crumpton ture and indictments of specific criminals then focuses chapters 9 and 10 on Afghanistan, for specific crimes. Forward-looking intel- which, along with Gary Schroen’s First In and ligence collection and analysis were almost Gary Berntsen’s Jawbreaker, provide perhaps PRISM 4, NO. 1 BOOK REVIEWS | 149 moiR the most detailed look at CIA operations in In 2002, Crumpton attended the School Afghanistan from September 2001 to early of Advanced International Studies at The 2002. Johns Hopkins University to examine public There are few authors able to provide first- policy. Through this experience, due to hav- hand accounts of meeting with Ahmad Shah ing time and room to reflect, the analysis Masood prior to September 2001 or Hamid provided in The Art of Intelligence is thought- Karzai shortly thereafter, and the portray- provoking and it deserves a wide readership. als of these and other events are cogent and The author’s desire to further expand his edu- well written. Furthermore, Crumpton’s pro- cation is also demonstrated by another influ- fessional experience and interactions were ential individual in U.S. national security, far-ranging. Concerning technical innova- U.S. Special Operations Command’s Admiral tions, he and his close associates have had an Bill McRaven, who completed his study, impact on equipment used in current opera- Special Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations tions, both conventional and unconventional. Warfare Theory and Practice, while at the Naval He describes the increased incorporation of Postgraduate School. Perhaps there is irony in Geographic Information Systems into target- that Crumpton directly contributed to, and ing, which in the Intelligence Community is McRaven oversaw, the eventual demise of highly significant, and also his involvement Osama bin Laden. While perhaps not a direct with the development of the Predator from a result of furthering their education, it is likely collection platform to a weaponized one with that their greater contributions to the United Hellfire missiles. Despite the contentious States are a result of being afforded time to debate surrounding drones, Crumpton indi- reflect on how operations and policy must cates that had this platform contained weap- work together to more effectively achieve ons earlier, Osama bin Laden could have been national security. targeted in the summer of 2000 when he was The Art of Intelligence is a major contri- viewed through the video stream provided by bution and, when carefully considered by the a Predator over Tarnak Farm in Kandahar: “We reader, it reveals how Henry Crumpton pro- had Bin Laden in our electrical-optical sights, vided both a positive example and a lifetime but we had no realistic policy, no clear author- of dedication to his country. The reflection and ity, and no meaningful resources to engage analysis the author gives to this, as to most the target with lethal speed and precision. It of his recounted operations, demonstrates the was all sadly absurd” (154–155). Despite this book’s edifying value. In sum, this may indi- missed opportunity and the obvious frustra- cate that the art of intelligence itself is learn- tion in Crumpton’s narrative, it is possible that ing from experience and having the humility had he not taken the next step in his career, and perseverance to honestly assess and adapt many of the important lessons learned from to change not only on an individual level but an intense 3-year period (1999–2002) might also on a strategic level as a nation.