The Private and Public Sectors in Conflict Resolution

A Comparison Between the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone and the Private Military Intervention That Preceded It

Written by: Aleksandar Maricic Student number: s1782010 Supervised by: Dr. J. Matthys Second reader: Mr. S. Boeke Leiden University - Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs MSc Crisis and Security Management Word count: 28913 Abstract

The purpose of this study is to compare the performance of public and private sectors interventions as a means of conflict resolution in order to make recommendations that could improve their results and outcomes.

In the first part the phenomenon of public and private sector interventionism is discussed and the context of the research – the Sierra Leonean Civil War, is presented. This is followed by laying out the necessary theoretical framework in part two. The theories utilized in this thesis stem from studies of public management performance and conflict resolution theory. They are adapted and combined into a unified method for comparing performance at conflict resolution in part three. In part four this method is applied to two case studies, that of the private military intervention conducted by Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone and the subsequent United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. A detailed look into elements of performance: context, objectives, inputs, activities, outputs, efficiency, effectiveness for each individual case study is provided, followed by a comparative chapter on the three key aspects of performance – efficiency, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness.

The results suggest that the strengths of the public and private sectors in conflict resolution are complementary, while the possibility of collaboration promises to shore up their individual weaknesses. Taking that into account, the thesis argues that the best path for future interventionism is one of collective action by both private and public sectors. This discussion is presented in part five.

Table of Contents

List of Tables ...... v

List of Figures ...... vi

List of Abbreviations ...... vii

Part 1: Introduction ...... 1

1.1 The Proliferation of Private and Public Sector Interventionism ...... 1

1.2 Research Question and Sub-Questions ...... 3

1.3 Academic Relevance ...... 3

1.4 Societal Relevance ...... 4

Part 2: Theoretical Framework ...... 6

2.1 Private Military Companies ...... 6

2.2 Performance in the Public Sector ...... 8

2.3 Conflict Resolution and Interventionism ...... 13

Part 3: Methodology ...... 18

3.1 Methodological Framework ...... 18

3.2 Case Study Design ...... 20

3.3 Data Collection and Sources...... 21

3.4 Operationalization ...... 24

Part 4: Analysis ...... 28

Chapter 1: The Executive Outcomes Intervention in Sierra Leone ...... 28 1. 1 Context of the Intervention and the Roots of the Sierra Leone Civil War ...... 28

1.2 The Objectives of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone ...... 31

1.3 Organizational Inputs - Tallying the Costs of the Intervention ...... 33

1.4 Operations of the Executive Outcomes and their Immediate Results (Outputs) ...... 35

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Summary of Organizational Contribution: ...... 40

1.5 Efficiency of the Executive Outcomes Intervention in Sierra Leone ...... 41

1.6 Effectiveness of the Executive Outcomes Intervention in Sierra Leone ...... 44

1.7 Cost-Effectiveness of the Executive Outcomes Intervention in Sierra Leone ...... 50

1.8 A Summary of Executive Outcomes Performance in Sierra Leone ...... 51

Chapter 2: The United Nation’s Mission in Sierra Leone ...... 53 2.1 Interregnum: From the May 1997 Coup to UNAMSIL Intervention in October 1999 ... 53

2.2 The Objectives of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone ...... 55

2.4 Operations of the UNAMSIL and Their Immediate Results – Outputs ...... 60

Summary of Organizational Contribution ...... 74

2.5 Efficiency of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone ...... 75

2.6 Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone ...... 77

2.7 Cost-Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone ...... 80

2.8 A Summary of UNAMSIL Performance in Sierra Leone ...... 81

Chapter 3: A Comparative Discussion of the Aspects of Performance of the two Interventions...... 83 3.1 Efficiency and Effectiveness ...... 83

3.2 Cost-Effectiveness ...... 85

Part 5: Conclusion and Reflections ...... 89

Bibliography ...... 92

List of Tables

Table 1 - Operationalization ...... 27 Table 2 - Summary of Organizational Contribution: EO Intervention in Sierra Leone, May 1995 - March 1997 ...... 40 Table 3 - Summary of EO Intervention performance in Sierra Leone ...... 52 Table 4 - UNAMSIL Expenditures ...... 57 Table 5 - Financial Breakdown: 1 July 2001 – 30 June 2002 ...... 58 Table 6 - Resource Breakdown for 5 September 2002 ...... 59 Table 7 - Summary of Organizational Contribution: UNAMSIL, October 1999-December 2005; ...... 74 Table 8 - Summary of UNAMSIL Performance in Sierra Leone ...... 82 Table 9 - EO-UNAMSIL Efficiency and Effectiveness Comparison ...... 84 Table 10 - EO-UNAMSIL Cost-Effectiveness Comparison ...... 86

List of Figures

Figure 1 - “Tip of the Spear” Typology ...... 7 Figure 2 - Types of Performance ...... 9 Figure 3 - Production Model of Performance ...... 10 Figure 4 - Productivity and Efficiency ...... 12 Figure 5 - Conflicts by Type 1946-2008...... 14 Figure 6 - The Hourglass Model of Conflict Resolution ...... 16 Figure 7 - Research Framework ...... 18 Figure 8 - Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies ...... 20 Figure 9 - Map of Sierra Leone...... 28 Figure 10 - EO Objectives in Sierra Leone...... 31 Figure 11 - EO structure in Sierra Leone at deployment, 1995 ...... 33 Figure 12 - Distribution of requirements by cost component...... 58 Figure 13 - UNAMSIL Deployment: November 1999 – November 2005 ...... 59 Figure 14 - UNAMSIL Deployment progress March – December 2001 ...... 63 Figure 15 - Pace of UNAMSIL Drawdown ...... 64 Figure 16 - DDR Programme Progression ...... 65 Figure 17 - Affiliation of Disarmed and Demobilized Combatants ...... 66

List of Abbreviations

AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council CDF Civil Defense Forces DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group ECOWAS Economic Community of Western African States EO Executive Outcomes OAU Organization of African Unity PMC/PMF Private Military Company/Private Military Firm RSLMF Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces RUF Revolutionary United Front RUFP Revolutionary United Front Party SLA Sierra Leone Army UN United Nations UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone UNIOSIL United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone

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Part 1: Introduction

1.1 The Proliferation of Private and Public Sector Interventionism

The end of the Cold War signaled a tectonic shift in world politics. The disappearance of bloc based confrontation and the decline of Communism represented a triumph of historical forces with a wholly different perception of the relationship between the state and the markets. Spurred by the electoral victories of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States, proponents of their economic policies sought to prove that the market could more efficiently perform the role of what had become an overburdened, unwieldy state (Avant, 2005, p. 35). An ever increasing number of previously state exclusive functions shifted to the private sector and it is perhaps no surprise that the provision of security partially followed suit (Singer, 2008, p. 38). The impetus was not exclusively ideological but also driven by political realities on the ground and the changing nature of conflicts in the post-Cold War world.

The end of the struggle between superpowers ushered in conflicts that had no ideological backing (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009). With no overreaching narrative to spur political interventionism many former Cold War battleground states were abandoned to their internal political dynamics, forcing them to seek support from other sources – and the corporate world was well positioned to take advantage of this situation. The means for the private sector to offer these services became plentiful. Military downsizing ensured a constant stream of trained personnel without alternative employment opportunities and they quickly swelled the ranks of a new phenomenon – the (re)emergence of Private Military Companies, corporate entities that offer various military related tasks for hire (Singer, 2008, p. 42; Avant, 2005, p. 33). Concurrently, massive stockpiles of Cold War arsenals, often from former Eastern bloc countries were made available to whomever was able to afford them – providing these companies with the tools to pursue their trade (Griffiths, 2005, p. 530). Perhaps the apex of this new form of corporate activity was encapsulated by what Peter W. Singer termed “tip of the spear” companies, firms that offered direct military involvement on their clients’ behalf (Singer, 2008, p. 93). The best known of these was the South African PMC “Executive Outcomes”. It combined all of the trends mentioned above: a regulatory vacuum in its host country, a large pool of unemployed

1 apartheid era security personnel to draw from, leadership experienced in obtaining equipment and arms and a willingness to market their talents to states shaken by the disappearance of their Cold War sponsors. Executive Outcomes would eventually become a contentious symbol. To some it was a triumph of market organization and private sector initiative (Howe, 1998, p. 308). Others saw it as wanton mercenarism and the return of colonialism in a new guise (Pech, 1999, p. 81).

This narrative of triumphant privatization and state retreat, often repeated in popular and academic accounts of the era paints a somewhat misleading picture. While states did indeed accept a transfer of many of their former roles to the private sector this process was not universal. In the domain of international conflict resolution the new political status quo was seen as an opportunity for those forces that felt constrained by the preceding ideological mold. The United Nations, a product of statist idealism, had great difficulties in performing its intended role under the overbearing influence of the United States and the Soviet Union. Within the organization, the end of the Cold War was met with optimism – sparking a new era of UN interventionism (Sorenson & Wood, 2005, p. 2).

History would see these two very different forces meet on the same battlefield, neither opposed nor truly on the same side. Two interventions by Executive Outcomes and the United Nations would take place in the drawn out civil war in Sierra Leone. Both would go on to claim success, which lead to the creation of competing narratives. One side portrayed the private sector as undoubtedly more effective albeit controversial, the other proclaimed the UN missions a historical success (Howe, 1998, p. 331; Olonisakin, 2008).

The goal of this thesis is to reexamine those narratives and establish a unified theoretical framework that can be used to compare the effectiveness of the two in order to ascertain the particular advantages and disadvantages each form of interventionism. The conclusions of this research could hopefully be utilized toward the goal of achieving a superior model of international conflict resolution.

1.2 Research Question and Sub-Questions

In light of the preceding chapter, the basic question that guided this research was: How do the UN mission in Sierra Leone and Executive Outcomes intervention that preceded it compare in terms of performance at conflict resolution?

In order to provide an answer it is necessary to explore the following sub-questions:  What constitutes performance in the field of conflict resolution?  What are the criteria for success or lack thereof in this endeavor?  Do the interventions meet or fail to meet these criteria?

Further explanatory value is also provided by answering:

 What were the circumstances that facilitated the respective successes and/or failures in these interventions?  What did these interventions have in common, and where do they differ?

1.3 Academic Relevance

This thesis melds the public academic discourse on the privatization of security, public-private sector relationships with international relations, international law and conflict resolution. As states look toward the private sector more and more to share the burden of the provision of security the academic debate surrounding its privatization is still quite relevant. Within that debate there are two noticeable trends. The first is a current in favor of giving Private Military Companies a role in peacekeeping on the basis of several successful private sector interventions, in particular those of Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone. Their argument is usually performance related – PMC’s are portrayed as a more flexible, effective and cost-efficient alternative to the public sector (Shearer, 2008, p. 76; Howe, 1998, p. 331). Opponents of this line of thinking, a substantial group within academia, seek to expand the discussion by adding concerns regarding the legality, ethics and inherent market contradictions of a privatized use of

3 force (Singer, 2008, p. 133; McFate, 2014, p. 57). In their perspective, performance advantages recede into the background of these (often insurmountable) concerns.

This thesis also represents a performance comparison – but its goal is not to support either school of thought. Instead it aims to contribute to the academic debate by providing a more scientifically valid basis for comparison. The issues with existing analyses of the role of the UN or EO is that they are done either in isolation or that they do not use a common set of criteria.

Proponents of PMC’s compare the private and public sector, pointing to the success of the former and the failure of the latter. They take a historical outcome and use it as an argument in favor of inherent performance superiority. In the particular case of Executive Outcomes vis-à-vis the UN in Sierra Leone, it is usually a portrayal of how the company changed the military situation, the time-frame in which it was achieved and how much it cost. These points compare favorably to the subsequent UN interventions and therefore a broad conclusion in favor of the private sector is easy to make. However, establishing what happened does not necessarily explain why it happened. Only a clear understanding of “the why” provides the necessary point for a genuine comparison between the public and the private sector. Scott Fitzsimmons’s application of the normative theory of military performance to the EO interventions in Sierra Leone and Angola came the furthest in explaining the why the company succeeded in its task – but it is still limited to only the private sector (Fitzsimmons S. , 2010).

This thesis aims to also represent the “other half” by applying the same theory to subsequent UN interventions, operating on the assumption that similar or identical criteria allow for the most scientifically valid comparison. A thorough answer as to why the UN succeeded or failed in its goals – and why it did so would provide a basis from which more conclusive arguments in favor of either the public or private sector could be drawn.

1.4 Societal Relevance

The collapse of the Cold War order was followed by a proliferation of what Martin van Creveld termed “low intensity conflicts”, confrontations between states or groups below the level of a conventional war (U.S. Army, 1990; Van Creveld, 1991, p. 21). These struggles frequently led to

4 protracted instability, the collapse of state institutions and great suffering of the civilian populations. Consequently, the demands for state interventionism within the framework of UN Peacekeeping increased greatly. Examining the outcomes of these UN missions reveals a number of successes as well as many failures and enduring flaws. Similarly, private sector interventionism has been heavily criticized on an ethical and practical level – despite notable achievements. This research will show that both approaches possess unique advantages which could be harnessed to greater social benefit if the (uneasy) relationship between these two sectors could be reconsidered. The end goal would be to empower the state led conflict resolution mechanisms with the efficiency and dynamism of the private sector with the intent of lessening the economic and humanitarian damage in conflict zones, as well as bringing a speedier end to the protracted intra-state conflicts that continue to plague many areas around the world. The primary societal value of this research is therefore in empowering policy-makers with a stronger “toolbox” for conflict resolution in order to reduce the overall cost and impact of wars. The secondary societal value resides in resolving the problematic position of private sector interventionism within a traditionally state-dominated sphere. This research will show that the lack of cooperation between the UN and the private military company (influenced by a perceived lack of legitimacy of the private sector) negatively influenced the duration of the conflict and resulted in greater harm to the state and its population. A push for an accommodation in this matter would open up avenues for mutually beneficial cooperation between the two sectors.

Part 2: Theoretical Framework

The inherent challenge to a comparison between the interventions of Executive Outcomes and the United Nations lies in defining what is being compared and how this is to be done. The “what” can be summarized as performance at conflict resolution. However, taking into account that both of these concepts are broad and subject to a variety of contested interpretations, it is necessary to more narrowly define them. In the first part, the phenomenon of the Private Military Company is clarified. Subsequently performance as a concept, model and the process of its measurement within the public sector will be examined. This is followed by a historical and theoretical exploration of conflict resolution, performed through external intervention. Through the discussion of conflict resolution the role and methods of the United Nations within this process will be made clear - which comprises the final component of this framework.

2.1 Private Military Companies

Private Military Companies or Private Military Firms (PMF) are “corporate bodies that specialize in the provision of military skills, including combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence, risk assessment, operational support training and technical skills” (Singer, 2008, p. 8). Singer’s definition aligns with the two key characteristics of PMC’s established by Mandel: non-governmental ownership and control combined with a focus on the provision of coercive security (as cited in Carmola, 2010, p. 18). They are organized as registered businesses and integrated into the global marketplace, forming a coherent privatized military industry (Singer, 2008, p. 45; Avant, 2005). PMC’s “are considered legal entities bound to their employers by recognized contracts and in many cases at least nominally to their home states by laws requiring registration, periodic reporting, and licensing of foreign contracts.” (Singer, 2008, p. 46). Their potential employers can be states, international and non-governmental organizations, other corporations and even wealthy individuals (Avant, 2005, p. 7). The private military industry has been classified in a myriad different ways. Singer’s “Tip-of-the-Spear” typology, although dated for the purposes of understanding some of the more recent PMC’s (Carmola, 2010, p. 25), has explanatory value for the particular case study used in this thesis. “Tip-of-the-Spear” is a traditional military concept in which troops are distinguished based on their proximity to active

6 combat: units engaged in fighting form the “tip”, whereas support and logistics services make up the rear. In the same manner, PMF’s can be classified according to the “range of services and level of force” they offer and use (See: Figure 1) (Singer, 2008, p. 93).

Figure 1 - “Tip of the Spear” Typology (Singer, 2008, p. 93)

This research examines one specific type of Private Military Company, the Military Provider Firm. According to Singer, the role of this PMC subtype is “to engage in actual fighting, either as line units or specialists and/or direct command and control of field units” with the purpose of either replacing the client’s forces or, more commonly, improving their effectiveness as a “force multiplier” (Singer, 2008, pp. 92, 94). The provision of direct combat capability is indeed the differentia specifica of Executive Outcomes although it offered a broad spectrum of military related services (Executive Outcomes, 1998; Barlow, 2007; Howe, 1998, p. 312; Pech, 1999). Along with the (less successful) British firm Sandline International it presented a unique

7 phenomenon (Kinsey, 2006, p. 13). Subsequent private military companies would steer away from the wide-scale engagement in direct combat.

2.2 Performance in the Public Sector

Scholars of public management recognize that “quantification of government activity has been a recurring tendency” (Van Dooren, 2008, p. 15; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 106). According to Van Dooren, eight distinct performance related movements appeared in the twentieth century. The seventh of these, New Public Management, is particularly relevant to this thesis as much of the theoretical literature stems from authors ascribing to this theory. NPM originated from experiments with managerial approaches to the public sector in countries such as New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom in the 1980’s, spreading globally in 1990’s. One of its central tenets, established in Osborne and Gaebler’s key text “Reinventing Government” is that extensive performance measurement is an important tool for evaluation and improvement of public sector performance (Osborne & Gaebler, 2008, p. 146; Hood, 1991, p. 4; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 109). In fact, although it just one of the ideas put forth by Osborne and Gaebler, NPM practically became synonymous with performance measurement (Van de Walle & Van Dooren, 2008, p. 1). A simple definition of performance measurement identifies it as a “bundle of deliberate activities for quantifying performance” (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 32). The end goal of these measurement efforts is the incorporation of the resulting performance information into the management and policy systems of public institutions (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 87).

One of the greatest challenges of the measurement process is defining performance. Performance as a concept utilized in science possesses a variety of meanings and definitions, depending on the needs of particular disciplines (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 2). In the broadest sense Dubnick defines it as a form of behavior, “motivated or guided by some intent or purpose” and differentiated on the basis of two criteria: “(a) the quality of the actions being performed, and (b) the quality of what has been achieved as a result of those actions” (Dubnick, 2005, pp. 391-392). Depending on whether the focus on these two components is high or low Dubnick identifies four types of performance: competence, productivity, production and results (Dubnick,

2005). Van Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan modify Dubnick’s typology, changing “productivity” to “sustainable results” and “results” to “good results” (See: Figure 2) (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, Performance Management in the Public Sector, 2015, p. 3).

Figure 2 - Types of Performance (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015) Performance as production (P1) correlates to all intentional actions that are performed irrespective of success. In the public sector these are activities such as police patrols, judging in courts, medical treatments etc. - in other words, inputs. Performance as competence/capacity (P2) focuses on the quality of actions, the application of “higher levels of knowledge, skill and understanding” in carrying out a task on the assumption that higher competence leads to better quality outputs (Dubnick, 2005, p. 392; Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 3). Conversely, performance as good results (P3) neglects competences in favor of measuring the quality of achievements or outcomes. Finally, performance as sustainable results (P4) covers the whole gamut, potentially including inputs, outputs and outcomes in any performance measurement effort (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 4). The conceptual understanding of ‘performance as sustainable results’ is utilized in this thesis.

In order to operationalize it, it is necessary to adopt a more in-depth model of performance. Performance in the public sector is usually conceptualized as a form of ‘service production’, according to the logic of the production process, the basic model for which was derived from the private sector (Boyne, 2002, p. 17; Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 20). Most models of organizational performance in the public sector are based on two related models: the ‘economy-efficiency-effectiveness’ (3Es) model and the ‘inputs-outputs-outcomes’ (IOO) model

(Boyne, 2002, p. 17; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 133). These were eventually refined to form an ‘extended production model of performance’ (See: Figure 3), which sees wide use in the study of public management (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 20; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 134).

Figure 3 - Production Model of Performance (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 21) This model will serve as a framework for the evaluation and comparison of the two interventions featured in this thesis. Therefore, the process and its individual components must be examined in-depth. Loosely following the order shown in Figure 3: socio-economic issues (1) dictate certain needs (2) for action by the public sector. Through social and political processes these needs are transformed into more or less quantifiable objectives (3) for the individual organization or programme. The organization is then allocated (or mobilizes) certain inputs (4) in the forms of financial and human resources to stage activities (5) that yield outputs (6) (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 23; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 134). Outputs in the

10 public administration approach differ from the economic notion of outputs as consumed goods. They are “products or services that come out of the production process, regardless of whether they’re consumed or not” due to how difficult it is to quantify the consumption of some public needs – such as safety (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 23).

Several relationships emerge, the first of which is relevance (7). Relevance refers to the degree to which the objectives of a policy match societal needs. The second relationship is economy (8). It is defined as ‘the cost of procuring specific service inputs of a given quality’, often simplified as ‘expenditure’. The value of economy as an indicator of performance is contested due to the difficulty of proving its direct correlation to outcomes. Simply put, high or low expenditures do not necessarily lead to better or worse results, nor are either of these two options necessarily superior to the other (Boyne, 2002, p. 17). Efficiency (9) is the third, represented by the ratio of inputs over the outputs (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 15). Figure 4 illustrates this relationship. Four organizations: A, B, C and D are represented, with their respective inputs (X-axis) and outputs (Y-axis). The first three are perceived as efficient because no organization is able to produce the same output with equivalent inputs. Organization D is inefficient due to a comparatively lower output with same input (as organization B). This somewhat deterministic relationship is well suited for industrial production but requires further clarification for public sector activities. Efficiency in the public sector implies producing the maximum amount of “societal profit” with a given amount of input. “Societal profit” itself is difficult to define but it is a necessary substitute for the private sector equivalent of financial profit, as profit seeking is not the objective of the public sector (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 22).

Figure 4 - Productivity and Efficiency (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 22)

Cost-effectiveness (10) and effectiveness (12) are the fourth and fifth relationships respectively. Cost-effectiveness represents the ratio of input over outcome - how the invested resources relate to what has been achieved. Effectiveness on the other hand is the ratio of output over outcome, measuring to what extent the product of an organizations activities led to meeting the overall goals. (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 15; Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015, p. 24).

The model recognizes two different types of outcomes: intermediate (13) and final (14). The difference between them is the degree of influence that the organization exerts on each. Intermediate outcomes are usually the direct result of organizational activity, whereas final outcomes are influenced by the context (15) – circumstances on which the organization has limited or no influence. The sixth and final relationship, the assessment of sustainability and utility (11) results by contrasting needs with (final) outcomes.

The production model of performance incorporates all four of Dubnick’s perspectives on performance: performance as production (P1) correlates to inputs, performance as good results (P3) to outputs. Performance as competence (P2) loosely correlates to effectiveness – a more competent actor should be more effective at their chosen role. Finally, performance as sustainable results (P4) brings the first three together and is therefore encompassed by the model

12 itself. It is synonymous with what Bouckaert and Halligan define as the span of performance. However, this model is also flexible enough to be applied across several increasingly encompassing levels of vertical organization, or what they term the depth of performance. The individual levels are: micro (individual organization), meso (level of ‘consistent policy’, e.g. education) and macro (government or governance wide) (Bouckaert & Halligan, 2008, pp. 16, 18). The analysis of this thesis focuses on the micro level.

2.3 Conflict Resolution and Interventionism

The term “Conflict Resolution” as it is used in this research must be understood on two different levels: a broader, semantic meaning and as a specific strategy within international relations. The semantic approach is necessary in order to outline the core components of what is, within IR, a very disparate concept. “Conflict” in this case entails a “perception of incompatibility between two or more actors and the range of behavior associated with such perceptions” (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 20). It is considered resolved when: “(1) A discernible outcome has been reached; (2) conflict behavior terminates; and (3) a satisfactory distribution of values and resources has been agreed upon.” (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 20). Conflict resolution in international relations, builds on this basic meaning but encompasses very different approaches and values. A basic distinction is between the Cold War and Post-Cold War conceptions of conflict resolution.

The Westphalian, state-centric international order characteristic of the Cold War was formed by the experiences of World Wars I and II, the nuclear threat and the bipolar distribution of power. It posited state sovereignty as inviolable and states themselves as the only source of legitimate political action (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 6; Richmond, 2008, pp. 97-100). Inter-state conflicts were perceived as a dispute between equals and negotiations was the favored form of conflict resolution. However, for intra-state conflicts, state sovereignty meant that international conventions of territorial integrity and non-intervention effectively barred (non-consensual) foreign intervention (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 7; United Nations, 1945; Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1975). It also provided governments “a privileged position in any conflict resolution process, relegating opposition movements to the subordinate position

13 of ‘rebels’, and taking for granted the maintenance of existing state structures“ (Clapham, 1998, p. 194; Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, pp. 8,10). Recognition and international standing could be given to movements that challenged states only when there was an agreement between the superpowers, their allies and the “non-aligned”, as was the case with ‘liberation movements’ fighting against colonialism (as defined by relevant UN resolutions) (Clapham, 1998, p. 194). This is the crux of the Cold War concept of conflict resolution - a mechanism intended to maintain the state dominated status-quo. Outside of the specific legitimate causes for insurrection agreed upon by the international community, successful resolution of a conflict meant the reassertion of state authority and control.

The collapse of the Cold War order ushered in conflicts based on identity or access to resources (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009). It accelerated an already existent trend of an overall increase in the number of conflicts which peaked in the mid 1990’s (See: Figure 5). The overwhelming majority of these conflicts were intrastate in nature.

Figure 5 - Conflicts by Type 1946-2008 (Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2009)

It is at this time that according to Clapham, Western states, their civil societies, non- governmental organizations and the international institutions they established rewrote the rules of peacemaking (Clapham, 1998). The “traditional approaches” were described as ineffective, dedicated more to maintaining the state dominated status quo and “balance of power” politics – conflict management, as opposed to conflict resolution (Richmond, 2002, p. 75). This broadening of conflict resolution theory is best represented by the “hourglass model of conflict resolution responses” (See: Figure 6). Within it, conflict settlement and containment (grouped under the aforementioned term ‘conflict management’) are representative of Cold War conflict resolution efforts. However, only conflict transformation as the “deepest level of cultural and structural peacebuilding” can address the root causes of conflict and “rebuild societies (not just states) via both top-down high-level and bottom up grassroots methods” (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 10; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011, p. 12). The two forms of conflict resolution are said to mirror Galtung’s distinction between “negative peace” - the absence of direct violence and “positive peace”, a broader dedication toward human security, justice and the needs of the individual (Galtung, 1969, p. 183; Richmond, 2002, p. 76; Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 10). One of the basic assumptions of the new “second generation” approach, stemming from the shift toward human security is that “all parties to a conflict had a ‘standing’ which required that they be recognized as valid participants in any peacemaking process” (Clapham, 1998, p. 194). This shift may seem slight, but it is deeply disruptive to state authority because it provides legitimacy to a host of actors that would have otherwise been excluded from the ‘traditional’ conflict resolution mechanism.

Figure 6 - - The Hourglass Model of Conflict Resolution (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011, p. 12)

This Post-Cold War change in the basis of legitimacy paved the way for loosening the norms against intervention in the internal affairs of states, leading to the principal method of conflict resolution explored in this thesis: direct intervention in a conflict by a third party. When conducted by individual states, coalitions of willing states, regional organizations or the United Nations they fall under the concept of Humanitarian Intervention. Berchovich and Jackson define humanitarian intervention as a “form of third-party conflict resolution that involves attempts by external actors to deescalate the conflict and facilitate pacific settlement” (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 102). According to the United Nations, humanitarian interventions are complex peace operations that combine peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding – the sum of the methods shown in Figure 6. Berchovich and Jackson note that these operations also sometimes include the use of offensive military force to achieve their goals, also known as peace-enforcement (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009).

Humanitarian interventions represent an evolution of the Cold War conflict resolution method of peacekeeping, from which they differ in the following ways: actors, tasks, aims, principles and context. A host of new actors such as UN agencies, international and national NGO’s play a role

16 in these interventions. The scope of undertaken tasks has expanded from traditional military duties to humanitarian and political activities (such as election monitoring). The aims of a humanitarian operation are explicitly political with the purpose to achieve what are described as “humanitarian goals” - a concept whose meaning is still contested. Particularly important are the three crucial ways the principles of humanitarian interventions differ from peacekeeping:

1. Consent. Peacekeeping was strictly based on consent of the disputing parties, humanitarian interventions need not be. 2. Non-use of force. This was one of the key traits of peacekeeping missions. Humanitarian interventions entail “employing military means for humanitarian ends under a UN sanction” (as cited in Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 102). 3. Impartiality. Unlike peacekeeping operations humanitarian interventions differentiate between and “take sides” among disputing parties.

Finally, the post-Cold War context has changed. Humanitarian interventions take place in intrastate conflicts, often during their active phase (as opposed to after a ceasefire has been reached) (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 103).

There is no theoretical basis for a direct intervention in a conflict by a private entity – indeed, the only interventions recognized as such in conflict resolution literature are humanitarian interventions. During the state dominated Cold War political and military arrangements this form of action by the private sector was unthinkable. Furthermore, it failed to form in the subsequent period even after the intervention examined in this thesis, although some scholars as well as the private military industry made significant efforts toward enabling such a possibility. However, there is sufficient overlap in the tasks and goals these two interventions to allow for comparative study, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter.

Part 3: Methodology

3.1 Methodological Framework

There is no set way to evaluate the success or failure of conflict resolution efforts. Humanitarian interventions in particular, with their contested normative foundations and competing expectations are even more controversial to assess. In an effort to structure the analysis of the interventions in a way that facilitates a direct comparison this research combines the basic framework of the production process of performance, injecting conflict resolution theory into it.

Figure 7 - Research Framework

In order to provide points of comparison the broad concept of performance from the research question was broken down into three aspects: efficiency, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. It is along these three aspects that the interventions will be compared. Each of them is examined by contrasting a number of contributing factors that, taken together, reveal how the organization fared in those aspects.

Efficiency is the balance between two factors: budget/resource expenditure and the overall degree of goal attainment of the organization. At the simplest level we are interested whether

18 organization A expended more or less resources than organization B to achieve result X. Unlike effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, it is an internal assessment of the performance of the organization itself, regardless of its short or long term impact on the conflict.

The meaning of Effectiveness utilized in this thesis stems from the theory of conflict resolution. It establishes two basic criteria that can be used as benchmarks of success of an intervention:

1. Whether lives were saved and the destructive effects of conflict mitigated (in comparison to the preceding state). 2. Whether conditions for a lasting political solution were put in place (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 108).

Effective conflict resolution is therefore: a conflict resolution effort that has improved the humanitarian and security conditions existing in the area in question and helped put into place a lasting political solution. The beneficial aspect of these criteria is that they allow for a non-zero- sum outcome: an intervention can prove to have prevented casualties and destruction while perhaps failing to facilitate lasting peace – thereby allowing a portrayal more nuanced than blanket statements of failure or success. Put together, effectiveness is therefore the sum of three factors: the results of the organization’s activities, their intermediate effect of these results on the security and humanitarian conditions and the implementation or lack thereof of a long term peace.

Cost-Effectiveness is the third aspect of performance. It is comprised of the relationship between three factors: the resources expended and the intermediate and final outcomes of the intervention. What this means is that cost-effectiveness of an intervention is evaluated by contrasting what has been achieved at two junctures (short and long term) with the associated expenditures. As with effectiveness, it is not a binary evaluation – an organization can be cost- effective in achieving short term results, while not being cost-effective in the long run and vice- versa.

The contributing factors and aspects of performance presented here are further developed in: 3.4 Operationalization.

3.2 Case Study Design

In the process of selecting an appropriate research strategy to explore the topic of this thesis the case study sets itself apart from the other four strategies identified by Yin: experiments, surveys, archival analysis and histories (Yin, 2003). Yin recommends the selection of the appropriate strategy according to three criteria: the form of the research question, whether the researcher possesses control of behavioral events and whether the research focuses on contemporary events (See: Figure 8).

Figure 8 - Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies (Yin, 2003, p. 5)

As can be seen in Figure 8, a case study is “preferred […] when ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context.” (Yin, 2003, p. 1). The fulfillment of the first two criteria are clear, leaving only the differentating factor beween histories and case studies (contemporariness of events) to be addressed. Yin recognizes a degree of overlap between these two strategies, highlighting that case studies usually include two sources of evidence not included in histories: direct observation of the events being studied and interviews of the persons involved. The research presented here finds itself at a halfway point between these two strategies. Direct observation of the phenomenon is not possible. However, valuable primary sources have recently become available and are included in this research. Furthermore, the overall trend of public and private sector interventionism is still present and many of the actors active in their respective fields. As these are ongoing processes and the information is

20 revealed only gradually, it is natural for research to lag behind. Therefore, the case study is the more appropriate resesarch strategy.

The form it takes in this thesis takes is a Holistic Multiple-case Design. The overall context of the research is the Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002). Within it, I examine two cases. The first of these is the Executive Outcomes intervention in SL (May 1995 – March 1997). The second is the United Nations Mission that followed it (October 1999 – December 2005). The benefit of this approach is that it involves the same historical event (the Sierra Leone Civil War) and, changed circumstances on the ground notwithstanding – it is the best existing example of the public and private sectors engaged in conflict resolution.

The decision to examine the relatively short contract of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone was made based on the limited pool of private sector interventions to choose from. The only other viable alternative in terms of scale could have been the EO intervention in the Angolan Civil War and corresponding UN Missions. However, that conflict that is significantly more complex – it encompasses several distinct UN Missions over a time period of twenty-seven years. It would have been extremely difficult to examine within space of this thesis while maintaining a decent quality of analysis. On the other hand, an examination of the United Nations Peacekeeping efforts offers a far larger pool of possible case studies to choose from. However, there was no other situation that shared so many common points of comparison due to the fact that both interventions operated in the same conflict and were close temporally.

The primary challenge of this research is the small sample size. Simply put, there is a possibility that specific, unrepeatable circumstances represent the principal factors in the successes and failures of these interventions, thereby making it difficult to draw broader conclusions.

3.3 Data Collection and Sources

For data collection I used two of the six common sources of case study evidence, documents and archival records (Yin 2009). In order to incorporate the benefits of data triangulation into this thesis I examined each intervention from several different standpoints.

There are three fundamental topics and accompanying sets of sources that are relevant to this thesis. The first of these is the political history of the conflict in Sierra Leone. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to offer an in-depth examination there is still a necessity to contextualize the case studies utilized in it. Therefore a basic overview of the causes of the conflict and events leading up to the two interventions is provided based on the works of Hirsch, Harris and Francis. Hirsch, the former U.S ambassador to Sierra Leone offers a political and historical analysis of the war. Harris wrote extensively on civil wars and democracy in the West African region. Francis’s primary focus is on mercenary intervention in Sierra Leone but he provides valuable background information to the conflict.

The second set of sources it that relating to the role of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone. This was evaluated primarily by utilizing sources originating from within the company itself, as these represent the most valuable first-hand accounts. These were contrasted with relevant media reporting and scrutinized through already existing academic analyses of the company. The quality of sources pertaining to this intervention has improved significantly in the past decade but it is still somewhat burdened by a lack of impartiality and the resulting difficulty of precisely establishing important nuances of what was (in the West) a poorly covered and fairly obscure conflict. Nevertheless, two recently released first-hand accounts provide invaluable information. The first is the comprehensive portrayal of the company’s history and activities: “Executive Outcomes: Against All Odds” (2007) by its co-founder and CEO, Eeben Barlowe. The second: “Four Ball One Tracer: Commanding Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone” (2012) complements the preceding “top-down” perspective with a detailed narrative from the field by Roelf van Heerden, the firm’s second-in-command during the SL operation. Academic summaries of the firms’ performance in Sierra Leone were conducted by a multitude of authors of which the most thorough can be ascribed to: Peter W. Singer (2003), Sean McFate (2015) and Scott Fitzsimmons (2010). However, only Fitzsimmons incorporated most of the newly available sources as well as valuable interviews with company members – other accounts are either more generalized or written in the period when sources were quite poor and particularly dependent on journalistic coverage. Although much of the coverage was sensationalist in nature with dubious factual value, one important source is Khareen Pech’s dissection of EO for the South African “Institute of Security Studies” publication: “Peace, Profit or Plunder: The Privatization of Security in War-torn African Societies” (1999). Unlike other journalistic sources it is has a basis

22 in (limited) first-hand experience and offers a valuable counter-point to the dominant company narrative.

The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone was examined in a similar manner: through relevant UN documents, media sources and academic literature. As a case study, it is significantly better documented than the PMC intervention that preceded it. Relevant organization sources include Resolutions of the Security Council for the period of 1997-2006, Statements by the President of the Security Council made from1996-2005 and Reports of the Secretary-General for the period of 1995-2006 – a total of one hundred and ten documents. A summary of UNAMSIL is provided by the organization’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations in 2003 - “Lessons Learned from United Nations Peacekeeping Experiences in Sierra Leone” and several other documents touch upon this topic. Of the academic sources that comprehensively examine the mission Olonisakin’s “Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The Story of UNAMSIL” is particularly notable while Sorenson and Wood provide a broader look into peacekeeping into the Post-Cold War era.

The only standpoint left unrepresented is that of the Sierra Leone government itself whose media presence was weak at the time and still suffers from a paucity of official sources that present its position in detail. Motivation of some of the better known figures is necessary to explain certain political decisions and is incorporated into the research but the sources for this information are external and comprised of United Nations documents, Executive Outcomes accounts, academia and media reports.

An attempt was made to portray the events in as balanced a manner as possible. However it must be stated that the conflict in Sierra Leone and the interventions in particular were highly polarizing issues in their time which makes obtaining unbiased and credible information difficult. Most authors writing about PMCs such as Singer and McFate made comparisons between UNAMSIL and EO – but these take the form of commentary touching upon some basic observations of both interventions (such as financial costs, time, military successes) rather than rigorous analysis. EO representatives espouse the successes of the company and tend to portray the UN in a less than favorable light. The United Nations sources and academics focusing on UN themes in general and UNAMSIL in particular are likewise dismissive of the role of EO in Sierra Leone. The reason for this is an underlying competition between the two organizations for “status” in successful conflict resolution. Whether this competition truly necessary is a legitimate

23 question, but its existence is enough to incentivize a one sided approach to the events that transpired in Sierra Leone. The existence of strong vested interests in a particular narrative dominates every aspect of the issue and on occasion the researcher is left only with the option of accepting some claims at face value.

3.4 Operationalization

In order to operationalize the methodological framework presented in 3.1, I designed 11 questions that meld the production process with conflict resolution in a way applicable to the two case studies. They are loosely divided into two groups – the contributing factors and the relationships (efficiency, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness) that can be analyzed from their interplay.

Contributing Factors

1. What the politico-economic situation in Sierra Leone prior to the intervention? – This question is designed to place the intervention in the context of the political and military events as it entered the conflict in Sierra Leone. Its purpose is to provide data for the eventual reflection of the organization’s effectiveness. The answer is provided through examining contemporary accounts of the conditions in the country prior to the intervention.

The following four questions are intended to cover the sum of the organization’s contribution to the overall process.

2. What are the objectives set for the organization? - These objectives may be clearly outlined, as in the case of the relationship between EO and the SL government or self-imposed and more vague (UN Mission). Unforeseen objectives – those that emerged out of a changing situation on the ground are included as well. Goal attainment, or failing to meet set goals is a factor in the eventual effectiveness and cost-effectiveness comparison.

3. What are the resources (inputs) the organization expended in pursuit of those objectives? – The resources in question are the total costs of intervention either for the government of SL or UN member states. Along with budget information this includes a look into the manpower,

24 military hardware and other elements, the scale of which is useful for comparing the performance of the two organizations.

4. What notable activities has the organization undertaken to achieve its objectives? – This segment analyzes the major successes or failures of the organization. Objectives are used as a way to select and narrow down the activities analyzed, as their sum total goes far beyond the scope of this research.

5. What were the immediate results of those activities (outputs)? – The answers will be presented in line with their corresponding activity from preceding question for practical reasons. The principal dichotomy of interest is success or failure to meet the goals of the organization (whether the activity in question achieved the intended the goal or not), but relevant commentary on the implications of these results on the course of the intervention is provided as needed.

Efficiency

6. How do the funding and means of the organization compare with the results of organizational activities (inputs – outputs)?

Efficiency is the first relationship from the production model. At the simplest level we are interested whether organization A expended more or less resources than organization B to achieve result X. However, without a benchmark of expectations regarding the optimal relationship between expenditure and outputs, efficiency is difficult to evaluate. As there is no such benchmark in conflict resolution we are limited to comparing the organizations directly.

Effectiveness

This combination of conflict resolution theory and the production model of performance gives the following questions:

7. Has the intervention resulted in less casualties, material damage and otherwise improved the humanitarian situation (intermediate outcome 1)?

8. Has the intervention resulted in greater stability, thereby improving the security conditions within the country (intermediate outcome 2)?

9. Did the peace and stability instituted during and post intervention last (final outcome)?

10. If the peace did not last, were there any circumstances outside the organization’s control than influenced this outcome? This question represents an adjustment and necessary final link between intermediate and final outcomes, in order to shed additional light on the success or failure of an intervention.

Cost-Effectiveness

The final remaining relationship of note in the production model is the ratio of inputs to outcomes. At its simplest it seeks to answer the question what was “bought” with the invested resources and following that which result entailed the consumption of less resources – insofar as the results are comparable.

11. If the invested resources led to the desirable outcomes then which organization has shown a superior ratio (less costs for more lasting results)?

The questions presented here comprise the methodological framework that will be applied to each intervention in turn. Following that the results will be compared across the two organizations and reflected upon. A summary of the framework is provided on the following page.

Concept Variables Operational Definitions Measurement Source Performance Socio-political The starting socio-economic 1. What the politico-economic (Van Dooren, at conflict context situation and the needs as situation in Sierra Leone prior to Bouckaert, & resolution defined by government in the intervention? Halligan, question. Performance Management in the Public Sector, 2015) Organizational The sum total of 2. What are the objectives set for (Van Dooren, contribution organizational involvement the organization? Bouckaert, & in the conflict including: 3. What are the resources it Halligan, 1. The defined objectives; commands in pursuit of those Performance 2. Inputs – the resources the objectives? Management in the organization expended; 4. What notable activities has it 3. Specific activities undertaken to achieve its Public Sector, 2015; intended to realize set objectives (military combat Dubnick, 2005) objectives. missions, local peacekeeping, 4. Outputs – what the humanitarian programs etc.)? organization produced, after 5. What were the immediate objectives, inputs and results of those activities? activities are taken into account. Efficiency The relationship between the 6. How does the funding and (Van Dooren, inputs and outputs, resource budget information compare with Bouckaert, & expenditure and immediate results of organizational activities Halligan, results. (and subsequently to the same Performance results for the other case study)? Management in the Public Sector, 2015) Effectiveness The relationship between 7. Intermediate outcome 1 - has (Bercovitch & organizational outputs and the intervention improved the Jackson, 2009; Van outcomes, with the latter humanitarian situation? Dooren, Bouckaert, consisting of intermediate 8. Intermediate outcome 2 – has & Halligan, and final outcomes. Final the intervention improved the Performance outcomes entail adjustment security conditions? for environmental factors 9. Final outcome – did the peace Management in the that are beyond the and stability instituted during and Public Sector, 2015) organizations control. post intervention last? 10. If it did not, were there any circumstances outside the organization’s control than influenced this outcome? Cost The relationship between 11. If the invested resources led to (Pollitt & Bouckaert, Effectiveness inputs and outcomes, a the desirable outcomes then 2011; Van Dooren, measure of whether invested which organization has shown a Bouckaert, & resources superior ratio (less costs for more Halligan, lasting results)? Performance Management in the Public Sector, 2015) Table 1 – Operationalization

Part 4: Analysis

Chapter 1: The Executive Outcomes Intervention in Sierra Leone

1. 1 Context of the Intervention and the Roots of the Sierra Leone Civil War

As is often the case with civil wars, the conflict cannot be explained merely in the sequence of events leading up to it. Rather, it was an accumulation of underlying trends that reached a critical breaking point. In the case of Sierra Leone, those trends multiplied over the span of several decades. After achieving independence from the colonial rule of the United Kingdom in 1961 and a brief spell of progress, the fledgling multi-party democracy decayed under the governance of Prime Minister Siaka Stevens (Hirsch, 2001, p. 147).

Stevens ruled Sierra Leone from Figure 9 - Map of Sierra Leone (Van Heerden, 2012) 1968-1985, during which he consolidated and expanded his position, transforming the political system into a one-party state marred by corruption, powerless institutions and economic disintegration (Harris, 2012, p. 56; Shearer, Exploring the Limits of Consent: Conflict Resolution in Sierra Leone, 1997, p. 849; Francis, 1999, p. 324). Subsequent military rule of General Joseph Momoh (1985-1992) only exacerbated long standing ethnic tensions, poverty and state collapse, ending in a coup of junior military officers led by Captains Valentine Strasser and Julius Maada Bio in April 1992 (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 133). They inherited a precarious political and military situation.

The Civil War in Sierra Leone is inseparable from the ambitions of Charles Taylor, head of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia and subsequent President of the country. The beginning of the First Liberian civil war (1989-1997) found Taylor’s NPFL combatting the Liberian government. The regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) responded to the Liberian situation by forming a military force with the intent of containing the conflict - the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). When the ECOMOG forces intervened in August 1990 with the support of the government of Sierra Leone Taylor’s forces found themselves under pressure. In retaliation he decided to “open a second front” by fermenting instability within Sierra Leone. To that end he supported the creation of the Revolutionary United Front (Hirsch, 2001, pp. 147,150; Harris, 2012, p. 77; Shearer, Exploring the Limits of Consent: Conflict Resolution in Sierra Leone, 1997, p. 850).

Initially a small group of Sierra Leonean exiles, foreign mercenaries and Liberian fighters, the approximately 100 strong RUF invaded the south-east of Sierra Leone in March 1991. These forces were led by Foday Sankoh, a Sierra Leonean rebel who would remain at the head of the RUF for the majority of the war (Francis, 1999, p. 235). The gradual decay of the Sierra Leonean state, its armed forces and institutions along with economic corruption fed the rapid growth of the RUF, the support it initially had among the population and its early successes. Thus the instigators of the coup of 1992 found themselves in a war of attrition, gradually losing ground to the RUF forces. The army of Sierra Leone was enlarged by mass recruitment but the quality of these forces was low and its military activities were not economically sustainable even prior to these measures (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 134). The ability of the RUF to choose its engagements and the cross border support it enjoyed from Liberia ensured that by April 1995 it had taken such large swaths of territory that it was threatening the capital of Freetown (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 136).

Understanding the precariousness of the situation, Captain Valentine Strasser who had established himself as the de facto leader of the Sierra Leone government, sought foreign assistance but skeptical of the legitimacy of his rule the United Nations declined to intervene (Barlow, 2007, p. 322). It was western business interests (Branch Energy Ltd) operating in the diamond producing areas of Sierra Leone, concerned with the future of their mining concessions

29 that brought together Strasser and Executive Outcomes, pledging to financially support the subsequent EO intervention in May 1995 (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 144).

On the whole, the conditions for intervention can be deemed extremely unfavorable. Sierra Leone’s problems went deeper than the dire military situation as years of misrule brought about unstable and corrupt state institutions, a virtually bankrupt economy and a non-existent civil society that would make resolving the conflict exceedingly difficult.

1.2 The Objectives of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone

The initial objectives of Executive Outcomes reflected the immediate demands of the military situation. According to Barlow and Van Heerden they were comprised of five phases (See: Figure 10) (Barlow, 2007, p. 324; Van Heerden, 2012; Francis, 1999, p. 327):

1. An advance party would be deployed to Freetown to relieve pressure and strengthen the defense of the city. Simultaneously, training of the SLA troops under EO would commence. The goal of this phase was to clear the RUF threat east of Freetown. 2. Following the success of the first phase the main strategic objective would be securing the diamond mining area of Koidu (Kono) in order to deprive the RUF of resources to continue to war. 3. Phase three entailed clearing the roads east to Liberia, on the way to the main RUF stronghold at Joru. 4. Phase four was to be the destruction of the RUF HQ at Joru. 5. Finally, the remaining RUF Figure 10 – EO Objectives in Sierra Leone. Source: (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 147)

forces in Sierra Leone would be defeated.

Further objectives arose out of political and military necessities:

6. EO was tasked with administering the Kono district. This included building local institutions and consensus among the key stakeholders of the region, providing security capacities and ad hoc humanitarian aid (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 175; Barlow, 2007, p. 356). 7. Maintaining the security situation during February 1996 elections and forcing the RUF to participate in the subsequent peace process (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 228).

1.3 Organizational Inputs - Tallying the Costs of the Intervention

Estimating the expended resources (the inputs) of the Executive Outcomes intervention is both straightforward and deceptively difficult at the same time. When looking at purely the costs of EO’s operation, the budget information is available and consistent, as are the means the organization brought to bear in the realization of its first two goals (See: Figure 11). Executive Outcomes provided the manpower and some of the military support services such as parts of the air wing, while the government of Sierra Leone secured the equipment, small arms, fighting vehicles and other military hardware (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 146). Following the takeover of Kono, the framework in Figure 11 was expanded to a total of 150 operatives (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 204).

Figure 11 - EO structure in Sierra Leone at deployment, 1995. Source: (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 146) 33

The total funding of operational activities has been estimated to approximately US$33-35 million for the period of May 1995 – December 1996 (Barlow, 2007, p. 390; Singer, 2008, p. 112; Francis, 1999, p. 325; Francis, 1999, p. 326). The nature of how that funding was provided and the transaction it implied carries significant and unclear long term costs. Namely, the government of Sierra Leone did not possess the means to fund EO activities but the private mining corporations that were the link between them and the EO did. In return for bankrolling the intervention, the National Branch Mining Corporation was awarded a 25 year long concession for diamond mining in the Kono region – which was at the time under RUF control (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 144; Musah, 2000, p. 92). The terms of this contract allegedly include the firm paying a base $250,000 rent to the government per year in addition to 5% of the diamonds and 37% of the net profits (Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 2008, p. 294). In effect, the government sold the resources it did not control in return for military aid. While this has no bearing on the costs of EO activities due to the concession being principally a relationship between the government and the Branch Mining corporation, it difficult to estimate how this decision impacted the state of Sierra Leone and how favorable or unfavorable the terms of this contract were particularly in light of the difficult circumstances under which it was signed (Pech, 1999, p. 90). In short, while the inputs are clear within the scope of the analysis used in this thesis (the organization itself), there may have been hidden and difficult to measure long-term costs.

1.4 Operations of the Executive Outcomes and their Immediate Results (Outputs)

1.4.1 Operation Waterloo - Securing Freetown and expelling the RUF from its immediate vicinity

Following the deployment of the EO force in Sierra Leone in May 1996, on 6 June 1995 an EO column pushed outward from Freetown in the direction of Waterloo, one of the city’s suburbs with the task of locating the RUF presence in the area (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 153). Following a brief skirmish with the RUF forces and lacking intelligence regarding the location of the enemy base the operation was temporarily halted in favor of reconnaissance and further preparations. It was resumed on 14 June which marked first major engagement between the RUF and the EO. The RUF suffered a significant defeat (of approx. 30 casualties), while EO losses were disproportionately smaller (one wounded) (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 161; Barlow, 2007, p. 353). With this defeat the threat to the capital had been effectively removed and although sporadic contact between the two sides would resume, the first operational goal was achieved successfully.

1.4.2 The Push Toward and Liberation of the Kono District

The presence of the Sierra Leonean Army (RSLFM) in Kono had become unsustainable with troop desertions becoming commonplace and the RUF threatening a complete takeover. In order to rectify this situation the second phase of the operation was launched on 24 June, with a joint EO-RLFSM force advancing on Kono (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 165). Due to enduring problems with RFLSM troop discipline, this segment of the force was dismissed and the rest of the operation was conducted by EO troops alone (approx. 50 men) (Barlow, 2007, p. 356). In the span of three days and following two major engagements, EO took control Koidu – the largest town of the Kono region (27 June). Leaning on its superior military hardware and experience, Executive Outcome troops inflicted significant losses on the RUF (approx. 180-190 casualties) whilst suffering none in return (Barlow, 2007, p. 359; Van Heerden, 2012, p. 172). The outcome had a strong impact on the further course of the EO intervention – the government preserved the revenue stream from this key area, while denying the same to its opponent. (Shearer, Exploring the Limits of Consent: Conflict Resolution in Sierra Leone, 1997, p. 853)

1.4.3 Administration of the Kono District

Following the victory EO found itself it a difficult position. Regardless of its fighting capability, numerically it was a rather small force and was finding its capability to persist with combat operations stretched. Furthermore, not only was the Kono District was strategically important, RUF activities had also destroyed what remained of the dysfunctional government administration in the area. They had committed major crimes against the civilian population, scattering the population of the largest town in the area (Koidu) to the surrounding region. As the refugees started streaming back and with no effective government administration to take over it fell upon EO to establish rudimentary institutions. To that end they established the Kono Consultative Committee, which brought together the command of the RSLMF, local chiefs and leaders of the Kamajors (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 177). The Kamajors were traditional hunters of the Mende ethnic minority, which through EO recognition became an influential force in subsequent Sierra Leonean politics. EO utilized them for their knowledge of local terrain, greater reliability than the army troops and willingness to fight against the RUF.

By the virtue of their position as the de facto authority in the Kono District, Executive Outcomes was called upon to assist in several humanitarian efforts by various stakeholders in the region. This was neither stipulated in the contract nor an official goal of the company itself. However, its leadership structure recognized the value of swaying the “hearts-and-minds” of the population for the purpose of obtaining intelligence (Barlow, 2007, p. 362). The most notable achievement in this regard included using EO logistics (aircraft) to evacuate orphaned war children from the Kono region to Freetown, at the behest of local church leaders (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 197). Similarly, EO engaged in pseudo-law enforcement duties brought to their attention, from dealing with petty to serious instances of crime (Barlow, 2007, p. 362). A major difficulty faced by the company came from dysfunctionality of the Sierra Leonean government itself. Namely, the RSLMF troops, recruited en-masse for the war effort were commonly engaged in instances of pillaging and various other forms of criminal activity against the local population, earning the moniker “sobels” – soldiers by day, rebels by night (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 199; Shearer, Exploring the Limits of Consent: Conflict Resolution in Sierra Leone, 1997, p. 851). This caused increasing friction between the company, which had a vested interest in protecting its relations with the local population and the command of regular army troops whose reputation was

36 damaged by continuous incidents. The tensions reached their highest point as RSLFM soldiers took part in illegal diamond mining and instigated numerous skirmishes with the EO to protect this revenue stream (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 203). This pressured the government into making needed changes at the command level but illegal mining was never completely halted.

Although the RUF had suffered a significant defeat, the period of EO administration of the Kono District was marked by regular combat engagements, most notably of which was the Gandorhun attack. On 23 September a joint EO and RSLFM force attacked RUF troops preparing to stage an assault on Kono. The result was a final retreat of the RUF from the Koidu region (~40 casualties) with no EO casualties. By December 1995 Kono, had been fully cleared of RUF presence (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 1995).

1.4.5 Changing Priorities and the Elections of 1996

The internal political situation in Sierra Leone changed on 16 January 1996 as members of the circle of officers that deposed General Joseph Momoh removed Captain Valentine Strasser from power in a bloodless coup. Brigadier Julius Maada Bio, formerly Strasser’s second in command became the new head of state of the Republic of Sierra Leone. The coup was executed without the direct involvement of Executive Outcomes although there is substantial evidence to indicate that the company was aware of it and did not act to prevent it. Two primary motivations for the coup were alleged. First, that Strassers neglect of state affairs in favor of self-enrichment and propensity to monopolize power increased friction between him and the other military officers (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 216). Second, that Strasser had not paid EO for their services leading key figures within the company to silently condone and perhaps encourage the transfer of power to the more reliable Brigadier Maada Bio – who would be more willing to relinquish it in the upcoming national elections of February 1996 (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 217). This proved to be correct as Bio committed to the reinstatement of a democratically elected civilian government and did in fact step down in their aftermath (Lansana, 2011). The elections must be understood in the broader context of international involvement in the conflict. The UN and other members of the international community desired a “clean slate” in Sierra Leone, in order to for the government to have semblance of legitimacy and as a condition for future assistance (Gberie, 2017). In the first multi-party elections held in the country since 1986, Ahmad Tejan Kabba, a former UN administrator and candidate of the Sierra Leone People’s Party took the majority vote 37 and became the president of country on 10 March 1996 (Gberie, 2017). During this period the role of Executive Outcomes primarily entailed keeping the military and political situation stable as the new government engaged in ceasefire talks.

1.4.6 Final Operations, the Ceasefire Process and the End of the Intervention

The ceasefire process was fraught with difficulties. As part of political maneuvering, both sides accused each other of violating the ceasefire. EO intelligence indicated that the RUF was massing in several regions with the intention of resuming offensive operations if the negotiations were to fail. The newly elected government allowed Executive Outcomes, in conjunction with ECOMOG and RSLMF troops to act to prevent this and force the RUF to the negotiating table.

The overall plan to put pressure on the RUF was termed “Operation Zenith” and included three separate operations:

1. Operation Joru entailed disrupting the RUF headquarters in the Joru area. Commenced on 11 October 1996, this was a joint effort by Nigerian forces from ECOMOG and EO. They failed to establish the precise location of the base due to impassible terrain and resorted to air and artillery assaults on secondary targets. The effect was a temporary closure of the RUF headquarters.

2. Operation Golf Romeo 134 was intended to disrupt RUF forces concentrated between Magburaka and Njaiama-Sewafe. It lasted from 24-27 October and resulted in a mixed success. While EO forces suffered no casualties, the RUF was able to withdraw from the area and evade a major engagement (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 235).

3. Operation Levuma - an assault on the RUF forces in the Levuma area. Commenced on 5 November 1996 and conceived as a joint operation between EO and the RSLMF the operation collapsed as the RSLMF troops scattered, leaving the EO facing a much larger RUF force (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 238). The EO forces retreated, losing one helicopter to the rebels in the process.

Operation Zenith was the last of EO operations against the RUF in Sierra Leone. Although the individual operations resulted in mixed successes at best, the overall goal of pressuring the RUF to participate in the peace process was achieved. The government and the RUF signed the Abidjan Peace Accord on 30 November 1996. One of the conditions Foday Sankoh insisted upon

38 was that EO forces would leave Sierra Leone, a condition that President Kabbah accepted. By March 1997, Executive Outcomes forces left the country.

Summary of Organizational Contribution: Executive Outcomes Intervention in Sierra Leone, May 1995 – March 1997

Inputs and total costs Objectives Activities Results/Outputs Manpower and military 1. Relieving pressure Operation Waterloo (June 1995); Decisive EO Victory hardware: on Freetown and with minimal losses,  Initially ~50, expelling the RUF from RUF pushed out from subsequently ~140 its vicinity. Freetown. Troops; (+300 2. Securing Kono; Advance on Kono (25 -28 June Decisive EO Victory additional troops 1995); with minimal losses, for operation in the Koidu (Kono) secured. South East in late 3. Liberation of the Individual operations November Control over major 1996) eastern routes into the – December 1995 (lack of routes established.  6 Aircraft country; specific sources);  2 Armored Fighting 4. Destruction of RUF Operation Joru (11 October Temporary cessation of Vehicles HQ at Joru; 1996); RUF activities in Joru,  2 Troop Transports overall goal not achieved. Total costs: US$ 33-35 5. Sweeping operations N/A Goal not million on remaining RUF achieved/unsuccessful. troops; 6. Administration of the  Establishment of the Kono  A form of local Kono region; Consultative Committee administration  Rudimentary policing and reinstituted. humanitarian activities.  Return of refugees  Protection duties for the and improvement of mining areas. the humanitarian  Operation against RUF at situation. Gandorhun.  Diamond mining resumed.  Kamajors empowered as an independent faction.  RUF loses foothold in Kono region.

7. Securing the Operation Zenith (October –  Multiparty elections elections and forcing November1996): Operations held in February 1996 the RUF to participate Joru, Golf Romeo 134 and without incident. in peace negotiations; Levuma;  RUF agrees to sign Abidjan peace accord (30 November1997).

Table 2 – Summary of Organizational Contribution: EO Intervention in Sierra Leone, May 1995 - March 1997

1.5 Efficiency of the Executive Outcomes Intervention in Sierra Leone

This chapter will explore how the resources and means the organization utilized compare to the direct results of its activities. In the case of Executive Outcomes this implies primarily the way in which its fight against the RUF fared with the means being the manpower and military hardware contrasted with goal achievement and the human and financial costs (casualties and hardware lost) it entailed.

In both academia and popular literature the Executive Outcomes intervention is often claimed to be an exemplary case of efficiency, usually followed by the claim that several hundred mercenaries successfully defeated a 4000 strong RUF force (Fitzsimmons S. , 2013). This statement is problematic because it is a sweeping generalization borne out of an excessive focus on the organization’s successes. The efficiency of Executive Outcomes must be re-evaluated in light of the goals the firm committed to realize for the Sierra Leonean government. Table 2 summarizes them and their immediate results. They fall in two groups. The first five constitute the original plan of the intervention. The last two are were ad hoc developments based on the changing situation on the ground.

Within the first group it is usually the initial successes of the intervention that receive the most scrutiny. The relief of Freetown, followed by the speedy takeover of the Kono region indeed presented remarkably efficient endeavors. With minimal casualties the RUF force that had all but won the war was beaten back from the capital and lost one of its principal sources of income in the space of several weeks. There is a dearth of sources for the next phase, which constituted the liberation of the routes into the east of the country. This lack of sources is not remarkable as this was a transitory goal, meant to open the way for a strike at RUF’s headquarters in Joru. What is clear is that by December 1995, Executive Outcomes and the Sierra Leonean Army had effective control of these routes, established in the similar manner as the preceding goals (with minimal losses). These first three goals present the greatest achievements of the intervention.

At the same time they present a turning point in the firm’s approach to the conflict. The takeover of Kono found the private company performing static defense and administration of a region, a role which it arguably wasn’t suitable for. The principal reason for this seems to be that a stable revenue stream from the diamond mines was more important to the indebted Sierra Leonean

41 government as well as the firm itself than the continuation of offensive operations. This led to an overextension of the firm’s resources – even with superior training and military skills the EO group was small compared to the total RUF force. By having to devote resources to administrative and policing tasks the impact of the force on the conflict was dulled. If we examine EO’s administration of the Kono region as a goal, the company did indeed achieve the tasks that were set before it. It successfully expelled the RUF from the region at Gandorhun, ensured a measure of stability and instituted a form of local administration, albeit with itself at the helm. On the other hand, by being the only dependable security provider in the region (in light of the incompetence and corruption of RSLFM) it became “indispensable” to various stakeholders and thus was unable able to regain the focus with which it conducted its initial operations.

The final operations in the period from October – November 1996 reflect this. Two of the operations that comprised “Operation Zenith”, Operation Joru and Operation Golf Romeo 134 produced only limited gains while Operation Levuma was a failure. Operation Joru, the strike on RUF headquarters simultaneously represented a failure to meet one of the original goals of the intervention – to deliver the RUF a blow from which it could not recover. By extension, the ultimate goal of sweeping operations against the RUF couldn’t be completed. In the words of the EO Second-In-Command for Sierra Leone, Roelf Van Heerden: “As a unit we never did get the opportunity to complete the final two phases of the original plan […] instead we were handed a number of ad hoc tasks which, to my mind, never really achieved much due to the lack of a clear overall purpose.” (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 241). Whether this was the result of EO leadership decisions or mismanagement by the Sierra Leone government is difficult to ascertain due to how interwoven the relationship between the two became. Nevertheless, this is where the claims of those extolling the successes of Executive Outcomes have to be corrected. The end result of EO activities was indeed a situation in which the RUF was pressured into taking part in the Abidjan peace process. However, this was also equal parts a tactical decision on the part of Foday Sankoh who stipulated that the departure of the company would be a condition for his participation. President Kabbah accepted these conditions, and the result was that by the time EO had left Sierra Leone, the RUF, while suffering significant setbacks – was not defeated. Subsequent events brought this to light.

To summarize –Executive Outcomes showed exceptional efficiency in achieving limited military goals, particularly in the initial period. As the demands of the intervention grew beyond the scope of what was feasible with the available means this efficiency decreased. Even with a significant expansion of the mission in late 1996 it was unable to achieve all of its objectives, and the shortcomings of its relatively limited scope became more apparent. This does not take away from its commendable successes, but it shows the company’s efficiency tracked overall downward trend: the greatest outputs were achieved with the lowest inputs. As inputs/means rose, the outputs stagnated and then declined.

1.6 Effectiveness of the Executive Outcomes Intervention in Sierra Leone

At this juncture it is necessary to reiterate that effectiveness is comprised of two dimensions: short and long term. Short-term effectiveness or “intermediate outcomes” in conflict resolution demand an answer to the question whether the intervention has objectively improved the humanitarian and security situation in the country. Long-term effectiveness is measured to a more stringent criteria: whether the intervention has managed to implement a lasting state of peace.

1.6.1 The Effect of the Intervention on the Humanitarian Situation

Let us first address the short-term effectiveness, specifically its humanitarian aspect. One of the distinctive features of the Sierra Leone Civil War is the devastating impact it had on the civilian population. Subsequent trials at the “Special Court for Sierra Leone” (SCSL), set up by the United Nations and the Sierra Leonean government revealed the scale of these atrocities (Amnesty International, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 1999). This is also reflected in the experiences of former Executive Outcomes personnel, who describe numerous instances of RUF war-crimes that subsequently made the organization infamous (Van Heerden, 2012, pp. 251, 193; Barlow, 2007, pp. 359,363). What differentiated the RUF from similar insurgencies besides its lack of an ideological backing, was its open acceptance of methods targeting the civilian population in an effort to achieve its goals. The better known examples include sanctioned looting in a campaign titled “Operation Pay Yourself” and forced amputations of limbs, used as a way to prevent the population from growing rice that could feed government troops (Shearer, Exploring the Limits of Consent: Conflict Resolution in Sierra Leone, 1997, p. 850). EO sources also speak of the participation of Sierra Leonean Army troops in these crimes either intentionally or through inaction, with pervasive looting, executions of prisoners of war, desertions and failure to protect the civilian population (Van Heerden, 2012, pp. 171,199; Venter, 2006, p. 466).

For the purposes of this analysis it is necessary to establish the humanitarian conditions in Sierra Leone at the moment of intervention and how (if) EO activities impacted them. A declassified CIA report from late 1994 - early 1995 states the following: “Sierra Leone does not have a fully functioning government. Food production has halted in major farming areas, and the economic and social infrastructure of about two-thirds of the country has been destroyed. About 30% of the

44 population is at risk. As many as 1.25 million people are internally displaced due to conflict – particularly in the region bordering Liberia; 300,000 are refugees in Guinea and Liberia” (Director of Central Intelligence, 2017). UN sources paint a similarly dire picture, although the estimates differ with approximately 500,000 internally displaced individuals and 200,000 refugees in Guinea suffering from food and water shortages (UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1995).

The Executive Outcomes intervention had at least three quantifiable effects on the humanitarian situation. The first was the direct outcome of the EO takeover of Kono. Reports from the units entering Koidu, the largest city of the Kono region with approximately 30,000 people state that it was virtually empty – the majority of its inhabitants having fled to escape the RUF (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 171; Venter, 2006, p. 525). By extension the diamond driven economy of the region was suspended as well. The establishment of EO control over the region reversed this situation. Within weeks the internally displaced refugees started to return to the city (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 175). Of course, this was not the principal intention of the firm but a product of the reintroduction of authority in a lawless area. Nevertheless, eminent local individuals such as tribal chiefs, members of the Lebanese minority traditionally associated with the diamond trade and government officials coalesced around the firm’s management of the region in the aforementioned Kono Consultative Committee (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 178). Outwardly, a private firm supplanting the administration of the government it’s supposed to reinstate may seem odd. In this instance however, it was the product of a lack of instruction from the government itself and a bottom-up choice by the local stakeholders. Independent observers confirmed that the EO enjoyed broad popular support for its activities (Rubin, 1997; Venter, 2006, p. 526). Some of these included direct or indirect humanitarian assistance. This is the second, albeit minor way in which EO affected the humanitarian situation. In one instance, EO helicopters were used to transfer victims of the war to Freetown, where they were handed over to the Red Cross (Venter, 2006, p. 527; Van Heerden, 2012, p. 198). In another, the company shared its intelligence with aid agencies, enabling their work (Singer, 2006, p. 10). However, the third and most important outcome of EO’s activities for the beleaguered Sierra Leonean population were the consequences of the Abidjan Peace Accord which the company’s victories against the RUF had brought about. In the aftermath of the signing refugees started returning to their homes, with an estimated 200,000 displaced individuals returned by January 1997

45 subsequently rising to 500,000 by February 1997 (UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1996; 1997; 1997). It is important to note that this was facilitated in most cases by UN Aid agencies, NGO’s and the Sierra Leonean government. Nevertheless there were no other actors to whom the conditions for the return of displaced individuals can be attributed more than the private military firm. In this sense, and taking into account the firm’s conduct in Kono – the intervention objectively improved the humanitarian situation in the country, despite the fact that this was not one of its goals.

1.6.2 The Effect of the Intervention on the Security Situation

If there is a pervasive undercurrent to the Sierra Leonean civil war, it is one of insecurity – both for the population living under the rule of the government as well as the segments of the country where the RUF held sway. This blending of the two entities was aptly described by the “sobels” moniker, a trend in which allegiances shifted fluidly between the Sierra Leonean Army and the RUF, to the detriment of the civilian population. Instances of collusion between the RSLFM and the RUF were commonplace, aptly described by Shearer: “Conditions for ordinary soldiers had changed little under the NPRC. Salaries were late, rice rations were stolen, equipment was short, and the front-line soldiers remained poorly trained and unmotivated. Consequently this pattern of fighting was no longer aimed at winning the war. […] Troops adopted a safety-first tactic of arranging informal contacts with the RUF to avoid being caught in surprise attacks. Many found diversions, such as looting of civilians and illicitly mining the diamond fields […] lower echelons of the army used the RUF as an alibi to loot homes and businesses.” (Shearer, Exploring the Limits of Consent: Conflict Resolution in Sierra Leone, 1997, p. 850).

Widespread insecurity was coupled with the urgency of the military situation at the beginning of the EO intervention, with the RUF advancing on the outskirts of Freetown. The reversal of the military fortunes of the Sierra Leonean government has already been explored at length in this thesis and is indisputably an EO achievement. What is equally relevant is the EO approach to dealing with the aforementioned atmosphere of insecurity. EO commanders cite multiple instances of various RSLMF misconduct, but nowhere was this as prominent as when the firm took over administration of the Kono region and was pushed into representing the interests of the local population affected by RSLMF activities. In one instance, locals notified EO of an attack on their village and subsequently identified the aggressors as RSLMF soldiers (Van Heerden, 46

2012, p. 199). The men were apprehended and transferred to Freetown in an EO helicopter. Many incidents of this nature ensued, putting the firm in the unenviable position of having to protect its valuable local connections vis-à-vis the public image and interests of the RSLMF. Van Herdeen, the commander of the EO troops in Kono remarks on the difficulties of the situation: “what was EO to do with the sobels that were handed over to them by the local inhabitants? EO had no policing authority or responsibility and to hand them over to the RSLMF […] served no purpose as they were never prosecuted” (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 203). The resolution to these situations were haphazard – at times there were direct clashes between EO and RSLMF troops such as when the latter were engaged in illegal mining, in others situations the apprehended soldiers were handed over to their commanders who may have had them transferred or summarily executed (Van Heerden, 2012, p. 204). Nevertheless, outside observers noted that in the areas where EO was present the locals relied on the firm for security, in preference of other authorities (Rubin, 1997; Venter, 2006).

This concession of a net positive impact of the EO on the security situation is present even in those scholars that are against the idea of mercenaries in conflict resolution (Francis, 1999, p. 12). Some however, attribute the military successes of 1996 to the involvement of the Kamajors, an ethnic minority tribe that the EO empowered as a separate faction due to their willingness to fight the RUF and the inability of the RSLMF to fulfill the same role (Musah, 2000, p. 89). The Kamajors did indeed grow into a political and military force and EO sources considered their involvement to be vital to the war effort (Francis, 1999). However, it was on the firm’s initiative that this resource was harnessed in the first place and their successes cannot be entirely divorced from the overall EO involvement.

The short term effect of the intervention on the security situation can be summarized as follows:

The firm managed to reverse the government’s position in the war from near defeat to a clear advantage. In areas where it was present the security for the general population was arguably better than any other security provider present at that point in time. It stabilized the balance of power in the sense that the RUF could not win for as long as the company was present in Sierra Leone. Finally, it applied enough pressure on the RUF to ensure the signing of the Abidjan Peace Accords.

1.6.4 Long-term Effectiveness – the State of Peace Post-intervention

The ultimate question regarding the performance of any conflict resolution effort is whether it implemented a lasting state of peace. In the case of the Executive Outcomes intervention the outcome is well known – the Abidjan Peace was short lived. Barely two months after the firm left the country, on 25 May 1997 elements of the Sierra Leonean Army led by the Major Johnny Paul Koroma joined with the RUF to form the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and toppled the Kabbah administration (Musah, 2000, p. 96). At this juncture it is necessary to separate the broader context on which the Executive Outcomes had no influence from those factors that point to the failure of the firm to implement a lasting peace.

First, it is important to note that the Abidjan Peace Accords (and their subsequent disintegration) were formed by the confluence of several political forces and decisions that were outside EO’s sphere of influence. The Kabbah administration inherited a severely indebted state. As such it was under significant pressure from the International Monetary Fund to terminate the EO contract, as the organization threatened to withhold loans for as long as the firm was in the country on the grounds that it was too expensive to maintain (Barlow, 2007, p. 375; Musah, 2000, p. 91). Simultaneously, Kabbah was assured that a UN peacekeeping force would deploy immediately after EO’s departure. Finally, the RUF leadership demanded that the firm leave the country as a condition of the Accords (Hirsch, 2001, p. 147; Shearer, Exploring the Limits of Consent: Conflict Resolution in Sierra Leone, 1997, p. 855). Once the Accords were signed, the RUF refused to allow the deployment of the UN force, and the UN itself declined to intervene without expressed consent. This cascade of events led to a situation in which the EO left the country without a UN replacement and as a result, Kabbah’s hold on power quickly diminished. The motivation for the army’s involvement in the coup is traced by Musah to Kabbah’s decision to reduce its size and all but replace it with a more dependable Kamajor force (Musah, 2000, p. 94; Olonisakin, 2008, p. 24). Left without allies, Kabbah and his cabinet fled to neighboring Guinea.

It seems that the majority of the reasons for the disintegration of the peace point to EO’s departure from the country, but the pertinent question is why peace could not function without the company in the first place. This points to a state of dependence in which the firm was the glue holding the security situation together. However, it was never the purpose of the EO 48 intervention to supplant the Sierra Leonean security system – in itself an unrealistic proposition. Instead, the stated goals were to resolve the conflict by inflicting a defeat on the RUF from which it could not recover. This was not the state of the RUF prior to the signing of the Abidjan agreement and figures within the company and the Kabbah administration were aware of it - hence the President’s insistence that the UN force replace the EO as soon as possible (Barlow, 2007, p. 386; Musah, 2000, p. 91). In this sense, the company failed to achieve its ultimate goal, which was to create a situation in which there was no viable alternative to peace, and predictably, the instituted “peace” was quickly disrupted.

It is difficult, and ultimately fruitless to entertain the question whether the task could have been achieved given more time or whether external factors are solely to blame for the eventual outcome. The only reliable frame within which a conclusion can be formed is that of the intervention itself, and examined through those lens the effectiveness of EO in providing long term conflict resolution remains unproven.

1.7 Cost-Effectiveness of the Executive Outcomes Intervention in Sierra Leone

Cost-effectiveness is the third and final aspect of performance examined in this thesis. It represents a contrast between the inputs/expenditures of an organization and the outcomes of its activities, seeking to answer the questions: what the invested resources brought about and whether those results were achieved at the lowest possible cost.

As the preceding chapter showed, the EO intervention in Sierra Leone was effective across multiple dimensions. It successfully saved the Sierra Leonean government from defeat by the RUF, stabilized the security situation in areas where it was present and following a series of military victories pushed the rebels into the disadvantageous position of having to participate in peace negotiations. Although the subsequent Abidjan peace was short-lived, it allowed for a temporary reprieve from the war - somewhat alleviating the difficult humanitarian situation. All of these achievements ultimately cost the Sierra Leonean government an approximate US$ 33-35 million. For this sum it effectively bought a force it otherwise could not field, in a war that it was incapable of winning and thereby managed to bridge its security gap for a period of time.

Is it possible to envision a situation in which these resources could have led to a superior outcome or one in which the same outcome could be reached at lesser cost? At that particular moment of the war the answer is decidedly “no”. First, relevant public sector actors (namely the UN) refused to intervene and as such there was no one who could provide an equivalent service “free of charge”. Second, based of the firm’s successful counter-insurgency work in Angola, EO was the only private military company that could fulfill the role the government needed. Finally, with the Sierra Leonean Army being deeply dysfunctional channeling funds equivalent to the cost of the intervention into its improvement is unlikely to have yielded significant results.

Therefore it is possible to conclude that within a narrow scope of effectiveness, in which an actor needs to achieve a set of limited military objectives within a short time frame and act as a security provider the EO intervention in Sierra Leone was quite cost-effective. However, the impermanence of the changes it introduced suggests that if the envisioned goals of an intervention are the provision of long-term solutions, the cost-effectiveness of this type of private sector intervention is debatable.

1.8 A Summary of Executive Outcomes Performance in Sierra Leone

The analysis of the private military intervention in Sierra Leone revealed that the question of performance of private actors in conflict resolution is more complex than the usual discussions suggest.

By examining the company’s resources, objectives, activities and the results of those activities in detail it was revealed that the overall trajectory of the intervention started from the extraordinary and rapid successes of the liberation of Freetown and Kono to a long period of gradual entanglement in local affairs and ad hoc goals whose impact was at times valuable (such as the provision of local security and humanitarian assistance in Kono) but not conducive to the original mission goals. Toward the end, even the achievements of its military endeavors, such as Operation Zenith, seemed to produce only a temporary advantage.

Nevertheless, the majority of its activities were highly efficient when the committed resources are contrasted with results. The EO force inflicted numerous and painful defeats on the RUF at very little cost to the firm itself – an estimated half a dozen casualties over several major engagements and numerous skirmishes is in itself remarkable. Its administration of Kono was far and above what any of the other present actors could offer. But this initial burst of efficiency could not compensate for the actual needs of a far reaching civil war and paradoxically as the number of EO personnel increased over time the results seem to become slimmer and slimmer.

The intervention’s effectiveness and cost-effectiveness in the short term is indisputable. In this aspect it delivered on most of its promises. It reversed the military fortunes of the Sierra Leonean government, stabilized the security situation and had a positive influence on the dire humanitarian conditions affecting the population of Sierra Leone - even performing beyond its contractual obligations on several occasions. All this was achieved at a cost no other actor could match at the time.

Ultimately, it was ineffective at establishing a state of peace that could survive its departure. On one hand the security apparatus of the Sierra Leonean state was so corrupt and unreliable that it could not perform its role. On the other, Executive Outcomes failed to bring about the kind of victory that would make further conflict unlikely and ensure peace. Table 3 summarizes these findings.

Executive Outcomes intervention in Sierra Leone Duration of the Intervention: May 1995 – March 1997 (one year, eight months) Total manpower: ~ 440 contractors Cost: US$ 33-35 million Objectives: Achieved Failed + Defended Freetown and expelled RUF from its - Failed to destroy RUF headquarters at Joru. vicinity. - Failed to eliminate remaining RUF forces from Sierra + Liberated Kono and secured the diamond mines. Leone. + Liberated eastern routes into the country and suppressed the RUF. + Administered the Kono region, defended it from the RUF and ensured diamond extraction. + Ensured stability during the February 1996 elections. How efficient was the intervention? Successes Failures + Extremely efficient at small scale military operations. - Mission overstretch and resulting inability to + Demonstrated ability to leverage a small force/modest compensate for the weaknesses of the Sierra Leonean resources for disproportionate effect. security apparatus and inflict a lasting defeat on the RUF, even with increased manpower/means - decreasing efficiency over time. How effective was the intervention? Short term Successes Short Term Failures + Small scale direct impact on the humanitarian situation through ad hoc efforts. + Large indirect positive impact on humanitarian situation through pressuring the RUF to participate in Abidjan Peace Accords. + Rapid reversal of the near defeat of the RSLMF. + Its presence guaranteed security and the RUF could not win or regain initiative for as long as this was the case. Long term Successes Long term Failures - Unable to implement a stable peace. Stability and security entirely dependent on the organization’s continued presence in the field, government of Sierra Leone crumbles months after EO departure. How cost-effective was the intervention? Successes Failures + Successfully provided a service not offered by any - The methods that brought about short-term successes actors at the time, for a low cost relative to its numerous likely cost-ineffective in the long run. achievements. Table 3 – Summary of EO Intervention performance in Sierra Leone

Chapter 2: The United Nation’s Mission in Sierra Leone

2.1 Interregnum: From the May 1997 Coup to UNAMSIL Intervention in October 1999

The 25 May 1997 takeover of power by the combined forces of the RUF and the former SLA unraveled the strategic balance that existed prior to the departure of Executive Outcomes. Now referring to themselves as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the former adversaries overran the capital without much resistance and proclaimed themselves the new government of Sierra Leone.

International response to this development was one of uniform condemnation, with the UN and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) backing the exiled President Kabbah and demanding his return to power (US Department of State, 1998; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Olonisakin, 2008, p. 23). With the support of the UN Security Council and at the request of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), ECOWAS deployed its multilateral armed forces (ECOMOG) to pressure the AFRC into relinquishing power. Composed primarily of the Nigerian army, the ECOMOG Sea, land and air blockade of Sierra Leone that started in June 1997 failed to achieve the desired objectives and eventually escalated into a full military intervention. In February 1998 ECOMOG troops secured Freetown and nominally reinstated the Kabbah government - although the rebel forces retained control of the majority of the country beyond the city limits (International Crisis Group, 1998; Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1998; Reuters, 1998). Parallel to these events the interior was marked by combat between the AFRC and the Kamajors, organized as the paramilitary Civil Defense Forces (CDF). Over the course of 1998, the approximately 10,000 strong ECOMOG intervention force showed initial successes in liberating the larger urban centers but proved incapable of clearing the AFRC from the impassable bush that formed the majority of Sierra Leonean countryside (UN OCHA, 1998; UN Security Council, 1998). In July 1998 the UN Security Council voted to establish an observer mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) consisting of approximately 50 personnel. It deployed the following month in Freetown.

A turning point in the conflict was reached in January 1999 when the AFRC conducted an assault on Freetown, penetrating all the way to the city center. Although the rebels were

53 eventually driven back by ECOMOG troops, this event signaled that a military solution was likely out of reach in the present circumstances (UN Security Council, 1999). The stalemate and ensuing instability led to the signing of a ceasefire agreement in May 1999 and subsequent peace talks in Lomé, Togo (IRIN, 1999). The outcome of these talks was the Lomé Peace Accord, signed on 7 July 1999 between President Kabbah and the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh. The rebels received major concessions in this agreement – the RUF was allowed to transform into a political party and Sankoh himself was granted the position of vice-president (Olonisakin, 2008, p. 39). The agreement also stipulated the deployment of a neutral peacekeeping force that would start a general disarmament process (UN Security Council, 1999). Based upon the progress achieved with the Lomé Peace Accord, on 22 October 1999 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1270. The resolution announced the formation of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), detailing its size and mandate. The aforementioned UN observer mission (UNOMSIL) was subsumed within it and terminated with UNAMSIL’s deployment (UN Security Council, 1999).

2.2 The Objectives of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

The mandate of UNAMSIL was outlined in the UN Security Council resolution 1270 (22 October 1999):

1. “To cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and the other parties to the Peace Agreement in the implementation of the Agreement; 2. To assist the Government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan; 3. To that end, to establish a presence at key locations throughout the territory of Sierra Leone, including at disarmament/reception centers and demobilization centers; 4. To ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel; 5. To monitor adherence to the ceasefire in accordance with the ceasefire agreement; 6. To encourage the parties to create confidence-building mechanisms and support their functioning; 7. To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; 8. To support the operations of United Nations civilian officials, including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and his staff, human rights officers and civil affairs officers; 9. To provide support, as requested, to the elections, which are to be held in accordance with the present constitution of Sierra Leone.” (UN Security Council, 1999, p. 2)

On 7 February 2000, the UN Security Council resolution 1289 expanded the mission’s mandate with the following duties:

10. “To provide security at key locations and Government buildings, in particular in Freetown, important intersections and major airports, including Lungi airport; 11. To facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance along specified thoroughfares; 12. To provide security in and at all sites of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme;

13. To coordinate with and assist, in common areas of deployment, the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities; 14. To guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex- combatants and to assist in their subsequent disposal or destruction.” (UN Security Council, 2000, p. 3)

Prior to examining the conduct of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone it is important to situate the mission in terms of its mandate to use force. Namely, UN missions are usually differentiated between the consent based “peacekeeping missions” established under the Chapter VI of the UN charter and the coercive “peace enforcement” missions imbued with expanded ability to use force. The latter are established under Chapter VII of the UN charter. Article 14 of Resolution 1270 unequivocally equips UNAMSIL with Chapter VII powers, stating that “in the discharge of its mandate UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.” (UN Security Council, 1999, p. 3) . UNAMSIL was the first mission with the mandate to use force to protect civilians. (Olonisakin, 2008, p. 42)

2.3 Organizational Inputs - Tallying the Costs of the Intervention

The organizational inputs of the United Nation’s Mission in Sierra Leone are challenging to effectively portray. While the data of total financial expenditures is readily available, the ebb and flow of a mission that lasted over six years (October 1999 – December 2005) and involved nearly 17500 troops, combining the efforts of more than thirty countries is difficult to quantify in a way that provides the reader a total overview. Constant minute changes in the number of troops employed, civilian personnel, military hardware used etc. while relevant, are too numerous to cover in the scope of this research. On the other hand, the financial data alone is insufficiently informative. Therefore the data presented here is a compromise that seeks to break down the mission at its peak in terms of resources utilized in order to answer three questions.

The first and the most general is: how much did the mission cost overall? This broadest level is UNAMSIL Expenditures answered in Table 4. Provision of these funds is 1 July 1999 - 30 June 2000 $264,900,000 the shared responsibility of all member states of 1 July 2000 - 30 June 2001 $494,400,000 1 July 2001 - 30 June 2002 $617,700,000 the United Nations. The budgets themselves are 1 July 2002 - 30 June 2003 $603,100,000 prepared based on the mandate from the Security 1 July 2003 - 30 June 2004 $448,700,000 Council and presented in a yearly report from the 1 July 2004 - 30 June 2005 $265,000,000 1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006 $107,000,000 Secretary-General – to be subsequently Total estimated expenditures: $2,800,800,000 addressed and authorized by the General Table 4 - UNAMSIL Expenditures - Source: (UN.org, 2005) Assembly (General Assembly of the United Nations, 2007; 2001).

The second is: how do these costs break down at the peak expenditure, or in other words – what was the money spent on? As can be seen in Table 4 this is the 1 July 2001 – 30 June 2002 budget period. It is represented in detail in Table 5. A helpful breakdown from the UNAMSIL 1 July 2001 – 30 June 2002 Budget (A/56/487) in Figure 12 shows the overall percentile distribution of funds in several major groups – military personnel, operational requirements, civilian personnel etc.

Financial Breakdown:1 July 2001 – 30 June 2002

Military and Police Personnel Military observers $12, 742, 000 Military contingents $337, 188, 700 Civilian police $2, 996, 600 Formed police units - Civilian Personnel International staff $39, 140, 800 National staff $3, 108, 000 United Nations Volunteers $5, 015, 200 Operational Costs General temporary assistance $392, 100 Consultants $ 47, 800 Official travel $958, 200 Facilities and infrastructure $61, 398, 600 Ground transportation $9, 070, 100 Air transportation $60, 974, 900 Naval transportation - Communications $21, 642, 800 Information technology $2, 693, 100 Medical $15, 601, 600 Special equipment $7, 674, 300 Miscellaneous supplies, services and $37, 001, 600 equipment Total Expenditure $617, 646, 400 Table 5 – Financial Breakdown: 1 July 2001 – 30 June 2002 - Source: (General Assembly of the United Nations, 2002, p. 11)

Figure 12 – Distribution of requirements by cost component. Source: (General Assembly of the United Nations, 2001, p. 31)

The third question is really developing the previous one to its conclusion – what do these expenditures reflect “in the field”? As can be seen in Figure 13 peak deployment was reached in September 2002. Table 6 shows the means the organization had at its disposal at that moment. As can be expected, the individual contribution of countries toward this total was uneven. The fifteenth report of the Secretary-General on UNAMSIL details troop contributions by the countries with Bangladesh, Nigeria, Pakistan being the largest contributors with several thousand troops each, followed by Nepal, Kenya, Ghana, Guinea, Ukraine and Zambia (under one thousand troops) and the remaining twenty countries represented by military observers (UN Security Council, 2002). It would be remiss not to mention the Indian contribution which numbered in excess of three thousand troops by July 2000, but was subsequently withdrawn for political reasons.

UNAMSIL Deployment: November 1999 - November 2005 20000

18000 17398 - Peak deployment; 5 Sep 2002; 16000 14000 12000 10000 Departure of Indian troops; Mar 2001; 8000 6000 4000 2000

Jul-00 Jul-01 Jul-02 Jul-03 Jul-04 Jul-05

Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05

Sep-00 Sep-01 Sep-02 Sep-03 Sep-04 Sep-05

Mar-00 Mar-01 Mar-02 Mar-03 Mar-04 Mar-05

Nov-99 Nov-00 Nov-01 Nov-02 Nov-03 Nov-04 Nov-05

May-00 May-01 May-02 May-03 May-04 May-05

Troops Deployed Total Staff

Figure 13 – UNAMSIL Deployment: November 1999 – November 2005 (Sources: collected United Nations Security Council reports on UNAMSIL #1-#27)

Resource Inputs Breakdown: 5 September 2002 Military and Police Personnel Military observers 260 Infantry 13, 585 Logistic/support 3, 655 Total military personnel 17500 (17389) Civilian Personnel Civilian police 60 International staff 333 Local staff 576 United Nations Volunteers 145 Total civilian personnel 1114 Military and Civilian Vehicles/Hardware UN-owned civilian pattern vehicles 800 Contingent-owned Military pattern 2299 vehicles Armored personnel carrier 446 Helicopters (military and transport) 29 Fixed-wing aircraft 3

Table 6 – Resource Breakdown for 5 September 2002 - Sources: (General Assembly of the United Nations, 2001; UN Security Council, 2002)

2.4 Operations of the UNAMSIL and Their Immediate Results – Outputs

The lengthy and complex involvement of the United Nations in Sierra Leone is best examined along its individual components. The first of these (2.4.1) is a chronological presentation of the mission from deployment in November 1999 to its official termination in December 2005, demonstrating its ability to provide security (or lack thereof), its gradual expansion and overall course. This is followed by a detailed look into its Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (2.4.2) and its support for the 14 May 2002 National Elections (2.4.3). Its comprehensive efforts toward the consolidation of state authority are discussed in 2.4.4. Finally, its mandate to monitor the human rights situation and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance is examine in 2.4.5.

2.4.1 UNAMSIL’s Progressive Deployment, Provision of Security and the Overall Course of the Mission

By the time the first UN troops started to arrive in Sierra Leone in 29 November 1999, the Lomé Peace Agreement had already started to deteriorate as former allies, RUF and the AFRC engaged in combat for control over the Northern Province (UN Security Council, 1999, pp. 2,7). Small clashes erupted between the ECOMOG troops and the rebels and two UNAMSIL patrols were detained by RUF (UN Security Council, 1999, p. 3).

This trend of rebels targeting UNAMSIL would only increase with the announced repatriation of Nigerian troops from the ECOMOG forces on 23 December 1999. As the Nigerians provided the overwhelming majority of the ECOMOG troops, this effectively meant the withdrawal of that organization from Sierra Leone (Olonisakin, 2008, p. 43). Taking into account that the UN deployment plans counted on ECOMOG’s presence, in a 23 December 1999 letter the UN Secretary General recommended a corresponding expansion of the military component of UNAMSIL to compensate for the loss (UN Security Council, 2000, p. 1). By 7 December UNAMSIL military strength was 4,562 troops (UN Security Council, 1998, p. 11). This however did not prevent the security situation from escalating with numerous incidents between RUF and UNAMSIL reported in January 2000. On 10 January the RUF troops seized weapons, ammunition and vehicles from a UNAMSIL convoy. Even as UNAMSIL troop strength rose to

7,391 military personnel, UNAMSIL troops were forcibly disarmed by RUF elements on 14 January and 31 January (UN Security Council, 2000, pp. 3, 4, 17).

The gradual deterioration of the security situation would reach its highest level in May 2000, as UNAMSIL planned to deploy its forces to the Koidu diamond mining area. On 1 May the RUF detained several UNAMSIL personnel and destroyed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration facilities at Makeni and Magburaka (UN Security Council, 2000, p. 9). Concurrently, on 2 May the last of ECOMOG troops left Sierra Leone. On 3 May a company of the Nigerian contingent in Kambia was detained and stripped of their weapons and uniforms (UN Security Council, 2000, p. 9; Olonisakin, 2008, p. 57). A string of similar clashes followed eventually leading to a total of 461 United Nations military personnel imprisoned, with their vehicles and weapons impounded in the process. Furthermore, 25 UNAMSIL soldiers were wounded and 15 were reported as missing (UN Security Council, 2000, p. 10; 2000, p. 5). At that point the situation had become so dire that a renewed RUF assault on Freetown was feared and steps were being taken to prepare for evacuation of UNAMSIL (Olonisakin, 2008, p. 66).

A seeming total collapse of the mission was prevented by the direct military intervention of the United Kingdom, “Operation Palliser” in the same month. Numbering at 1,200 troops at its peak the UK forces secured Freetown, engaging the RUF on 17 May and defeating its forces on the outskirts of the capital. The British military presence lasted until September 2000, and proved a key deterrent against further attack – saving UNAMSIL in the process (Olonisakin, 2008, p. 65). The UN detainees were released between 16 and 28 May 2000 principally through the influence and pressure of the President of Liberia, Charles Taylor on Foday Sankoh and other RUF commanders (Olonisakin, 2008, p. 75; UN Security Council, 2000, p. 5). However, in the course of the crisis, nine peacekeepers were killed and eight remained missing (UN Security Council, 2000, p. 12) while the situation “remained tense and volatile under conditions that resemble civil war” (UN Security Council, 2000, p. 1).

In response the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1313 on 4 August 2000, which was supposed to strengthen the mission’s mandate, and reform it from the disarray in which the May crisis left it. The resolution notably committed the UN to “decisively counter the threat of RUF attack by responding robustly to any hostile action or threat of imminent and direct use of force” (UN Security Council, 2000). It was however, the RUF itself that gradually changed its posture

61 toward UNAMSIL. Following the designation of Issa Sesay as the new interim leader of the RUF (Foday Sankoh was imprisoned by the Sierra Leone government during the May crisis) and combined with diplomatic pressure from ECOWAS, ceasefire discussions were started in October, with an agreement reached between the Government and the RUF in Abuja on 10 November (Olonisakin, 2008, pp. 99, 101).

Although implementation of the Abuja cease-fire was slow and commenced in earnest only from renewed talks on 2 May 2001, it would prove to be an effective step toward ending the conflict. As part of this agreement the RUF allowed full UN deployment through the country, committed to return the weapons and other equipment seized and agreed to participate in the disarmament programme (Olonisakin, 2008, p. 103; UN Security Council, 2001, p. 1; UN Security Council, 2001). It was from this point onward, albeit with occasional incidents that the overall situation in Sierra Leone progressed toward de-escalation in tandem with a gradual expansion of UNAMSIL’s presence throughout the country. Whereas it was previously limited only to non- RUF held areas, the UN now had a presence in the North and East of the country - including key diamond producing regions (See: Figure 14). Concurrently the RUF started the process of transforming from a movement into a political party, as originally envisaged in the 1999 Lomé peace agreement (UN Security Council, 2001, p. 1). A December 2001 report of the Secretary- General of the UNAMSIL notes: “The peace process in Sierra Leone has reached an important juncture. A secure environment with increased freedom of movement, gradual returns of refugees, as well as a resurgence of economic activity […] is emerging as a result of the full deployment of UNAMSIL. “ (UN Security Council, 2001, p. 11).

(UN Security Council, 2001; UN Security Council, 2001) Council, Council, Security 2001; Security (UN UN

2001; Sources: 2001; Sources:

December December

–

Deployment progress MarchDeployment progress

UNAMSIL

–

14 Figure Figure

Consequently, the political and security climate was considered sufficiently stable to hold regular presidential and Parliamentary elections on 14 May 2002. Nine political parties participated including the RUF – now called Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP) as well as the Peace and Liberation Party led by Johnny Paul Koroma, the former leader of the AFRC. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah won the presidential elections and his Sierra Leone’s People’s Party took the majority of the parliament seats. The RUFP won only 1.7 per cent of the votes (UN Security Council, 2002, p. 1). More importantly, RUFP’s engagement in the political life of Sierra Leone led to a disintegration of its military structures (UN Security Council, 2002, p. 2).

Taking into account the overall favorable trajectory of the conditions in Sierra Leone, the UN Security Council approved a gradual UNAMSIL drawdown plan, with the first phase of reductions in troop strength completed on 8 November 2002 (UN Security Council, 2002, p. 1).

UNAMSIL Troop Reductions: September 2002 - November 2005 20000 18000 16000 14000 12000 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000

5-Jul-03 5-Jul-04 5-Jul-05

5-Jan-03 5-Jan-04 5-Jan-05

5-Sep-04 5-Sep-02 5-Sep-03 5-Sep-05

5-Mar-03 5-Mar-04 5-Mar-05

5-Nov-05 5-Nov-02 5-Nov-03 5-Nov-04

5-May-03 5-May-04 5-May-05

Troops Deployed Total Staff

Figure 15 - Pace of UNAMSIL Drawdown - Source: (UN Security Council reports on UNAMSIL #15-#27)

As can be seen in Figure 15, the UNAMSIL withdrawal from Sierra Leone was a gradual process. It was principally dependent on the ability of SL police and armed forces to maintain security as well as a number of other benchmarks set by the Secretary-General (UN Security Council, 2003, p. 3). That does not mean that Sierra Leone was entirely without political turbulence during this

64 period - but the crises that did arise had no lasting impact on the overall trend toward stability, which is why plans for UN’s departure from the country feature so prominently in Security Council reports of the time. The main dilemma facing the UN planners was the shape a follow- on mission post-UNAMSIL would take. The transfer to a new mission was originally conditioned on a set of ambitious benchmarks set in March 2005, of which only one was fulfilled (Olonisakin, 2008, p. 126). Nevertheless the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) took over from UNAMSIL on 1 January 2006, focusing on areas such as good governance, human rights and strengthening state institutions – a far cry from the critical security issues that faced the country at the beginning in of the UN’s involvement in 1999 (UN Security Council, 2005, p. 2).

2.4.2 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is one of core strategies of UN Peacekeeping Operations for stabilizing post-conflict situations. Disarmament entails the collection of small arms and other weapons within a conflict zone. Demobilization is the process of disbanding the military structures of the former belligerents, while reintegration programs serve to reintroduce ex-combatants to civilian life (UN Progression of the Disarmament and Demobilization Security Council, 2000). Taking Programme: 2 December 1999 - 17 January 2002 into account that UNAMSIL’s 50000 45000 responsibility lies primarily in the 40000 disarmament and demobilization 35000 sphere whereas reintegration is 30000 25000 mostly managed by Government 20000 projects only the former two will 15000 10000 be examined. 5000 0 Based on the Lomé peace 2-Dec-99 13-Jan-00 7-Mar-00 15-May-00 5-Jul-00 agreement the UN commenced 6-Aug-00 31-Oct-00 15-Dec-00 14-Mar-01 25-Jun-01 with opening disarmament and 7-Sep-01 13-Dec-01 17-Jan demobilization centers in Sierra Figure 16 – DDR Programme Progression – Sources: (UN Security Council Leone on 4 November 1999. reports on UNAMSIL #1-#13)

Taking into account estimates of more than 45,000 active combatants the initial response of 4217 total across all three major factions (RUF, AFRC, CDF) by 2 December 1999 was considered poor (UN Security Council, 1999, p. 3). At the outset the program faced two issues that would persist for much of its duration. The first is a poor ratio of turned-in weapons to combatants, likely due to centralized control of weapon distribution by the factions (UN Security Council, 2001). The second is a chronic lack of funding. With the DDR program financed from a Multi- Donor Trust Fund administered by the World Bank, it was heavily dependent on donor-countries making the funds available in time (UN Security Council, 1999).

The slow pace of the program continued into the following year, the number of combatants in disarmament centers growing to approximately 6000. With financial allowances for those willing to disarm and demobilize late due to funding shortfalls the incentive to disarm was low and unrest among ex-combatants high (UN Security Council, 2000, p. 3). Nevertheless, a comparatively high number of combatants disarmed by 7 March 2000 (17,191) and 15 May 2000 (24,042), suggests good progress (UN Security Council, 2000, p. 5). While encouraging, these figures are somewhat misleading. If we examine the affiliation of the fighters disarmed and demobilized by 15 May (See: Figure 17), the RUF as the most combative of the factions and thus the greatest threat to the stability of the country shows weak participation in the program.

Thus, the RUF’s ability to return to a Affiliation of Disarmed and Demobilized Combatants - 15 May 2000 state of civil war from the second half of May 2000 up until the November Total 24042 2000 Abuja agreements is unsurprising. CDF 9038 Consequently the programme could not AFRC/SLA 10055 function and was suspended in that RUF 4949 period, as is reflected by the period of

0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 inactivity in Figure 16 (UN Security

Figure 17 - Affiliation of Disarmed and Demobilized Combatants – 15 Council, 2000, p. 6). May 2000; Source: (UN Security Council, 2000, p. 5)

The arrangements that evolved from the Abuja agreements proved a more fertile ground for DDR. With the RUF allowing UNAMSIL deployment in previously inaccessible areas the organization was able to open new disarmament and demobilization camps and relaunch the 66 program on 18 May 2001 (UN Security Council, 2001, p. 4). With a greater commitment of the factions that had the greatest remaining number of fighters, (RUF and CDF) the program showed steady progress. From the 18 May 2000 up until its ceremonial closure on 17 January 2002 a total of 47,076 combatants were disarmed and demobilized (the overwhelming majority of which were affiliated with RUF or CDF) and nearly 25000 weapons destroyed – marking a successful end of to the programme.

2.4.3 Supporting the 14 May 2002 National Elections

One of the provisions of the UN mandate according to Resolution 1270 was to provide support to the Sierra Leone elections (UN Security Council, 1999, p. 3). Preparations for May 2002 elections started in December 2001 with the UN planning to offer technical and logistical assistance to the SL National Electoral Commission, as well as general security for the electoral process (UN Security Council, 2001, p. 7). To that end it established an electoral office in each of the country’s five electoral regions as “bases for electoral advice, support and monitoring activities”, in addition to a support team at UNAMSIL headquarters. Joint security arrangements with Sierra Leone police were developed in that period in addition to plans for more active UNAMSIL patrols during the polling period.

In March 2002 the electoral component of UNAMSIL was established. Its principal tasks were monitoring the electoral process and advising the National Electoral Commission as well as providing the logistical, security and public information (radio, election logos and posters etc.) support for the voter registration process (UN Security Council, 2002, p. 5).

Electoral campaigning lasted from 5 April to 11 May and was mostly peaceful. The sole incident of a clash between supporters of the ruling Sierra Leone People’s Party and the RUPF was resolved by intervention of UNAMSIL soldiers. The voting itself was conducted in a peaceful atmosphere with no incidents reported (UN Security Council, 2002, p. 1). During the elections UNAMSIL provided security by redeploying 11,000 troops to high risk areas throughout the country, patrolling and visiting the majority of the established polling stations. The elections were characterized as free, fair and transparent and the opposition parties (including the RUFP) accepted the results (UN Security Council, 2002, p. 2; Olonisakin, 2008, p. 113).

2.4.4 Consolidation of State Authority

One of the core strategies of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone included efforts toward the “consolidation of state authority”. This is an umbrella term used in UN Security Council reports that included a number of different programs at various times, depending on immediate priorities. While this makes an exhaustive summary difficult, UNAMSIL’s participation tended to coalesce around several tasks: rebuilding the Sierra Leone security forces, spreading civil administration to non-state controlled areas and helping the government establish and expand control over diamond mining. Note that the task of rebuilding security forces was split between UNAMSIL and the United Kingdom. The UK’s International Military Advisory and Training Team trained the Sierra Leonean Army while UNAMSIL undertook to rebuild the police forces.

Initial progress toward these goals was poor. As of March 2000 policing was limited only to the western part of the country, namely the immediate surroundings of the capital. Retrained police officers couldn’t be deployed due to a lack of infrastructure and equipment as well as general fear of violence (UN Security Council, 2000, p. 5). Although progress was made in retraining, reaching a number of 1300 officers by July 2000 (out of the 9,500 strong pre-war force) their effectiveness was still undermined by a lack of logistical and financial resources (UN Security Council, 2000, p. 8). Naturally, without a police force to guarantee a basic level of security, civil administration could not effectively return to the provinces. The signing of the Abuja agreement in November 2000 and the gradual implementation of a relative state of peace combined with the RUF’s acquiescence to UNAMSIL deployment within its territories sped up this process significantly.

In March and June 2001 Sierra Leone police deployed to Kambia and Kenema, in the Northern and Eastern provinces respectively – thereby beginning the gradual process of bringing RUF controlled areas under government authority (UN Security Council, 2001, p. 6; UN Security Council, 2001, p. 6). The expansion of civil administration lagged behind, constrained by a lack of qualified personnel and infrastructure. Nevertheless, in December 2001 government officials returned to Kambia, Porto Loko and Koinadugu in the Northern Province. Concurrently, the police force deployed for the first time to the Kono district, restoring a measure of state control over diamond mining (UN Security Council, 2001, p. 4). 69

Early 2002 was dominated by preparations for the May general elections but tangible progress toward consolidation of state authority continued. As of March 2002, the Sierra Leone police was deployed in all of the country’s districts. A slow recovery of the judiciary was apparent as well, with new courts opening in Kenema, Bo and Porto Loko, albeit plagued by a persistent lack of qualified personnel (UN Security Council, 2002, p. 4). By December 2002, 90% of government officials had returned to their posts across all districts (UN Security Council, 2002, p. 5). The government of Sierra Leone also enacted a new policy for diamond mining thus taking an important step in regulating the country’s key resource.

With the completion of the elections and the disarmament process, consolidation of state authority become a priority issue as its success was the benchmark against which UNAMSIL’s drawdown from Sierra Leone would be paced. One such benchmark was the restoration of the police force to the 9,500 strong pre-war level. Progress toward it would prove slow with the number of officers stalling at approximately 6,000 throughout 2003 (UN Security Council, 2003, p. 4). By June 2003 the judiciary had resumed work for the first time in all districts and full deployment of government officials across the country was completed (UN Security Council, 2003, p. 4). Restoration of control over diamond mining was still challenged by persistent illegal mining and trading issues (UN Security Council, 2003, p. 8).

It is important to note the progression presented here was expressed more in terms of quantity than quality and paints a picture of constant improvement. However, the regular 19 March 2004 Security Council report on UNAMSIL still evaluates state institutions as weak and states: “citing many concerns […] a number of Sierra Leonean and international stakeholders felt that the current political and economic situation in the country very much resembles that which existed on the eve of the outbreak of the conflict in 1991 […] most State structures are yet to attain the capacity to deliver essential services to the population” (UN Security Council, 2004, p. 11). As of April 2005 it would appear that limits to what the UNAMSIL could do were reached. The police forces had attained a strength of 8,200 officers while the judiciary and administration was still perceived as “weak”. Approximately 50% of diamond mining remained unlicensed and illegal and the “overall situation remained fragile”, as the mission departed from Sierra Leone in December 2005 (UN Security Council, 2005, p. 11).

2.4.5 Monitoring of the Human Rights Situation and Facilitating the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance

Under the mandate established by Resolution 1270, the principal tasks of UNAMSIL in the humanitarian sphere were to “facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance” and “foster accountability and respect for human rights in Sierra Leone” (UN Security Council, 1999, pp. 2,3). The former was envisioned as a result of the deployment of a military force that could guarantee security, thus fostering an environment in which aid agencies could operate. The latter included a number of projects through which the mission intended to directly improve the state of human rights in Sierra Leone. Human rights monitoring was also an element of the mission, conducted by its civilian component - specifically its Human Rights Office (General Assembly of the United Nations, 2001, p. 14).

The period of UNAMSIL’s initial deployment at the end of 1999 to the May 2000 crisis and its aftermath marked a problematic period for the state of human rights in Sierra Leone. With the mission present only in the Western and Southern provinces of the country, its monitoring abilities were limited. UN Security Council reports from the period Dec 1999 – Dec 2000 track a constant deterioration of humanitarian conditions with regular attacks on civilians, instances of rape, abduction, mutilation, executions and harassment as well as looting and destruction of property, particularly in the rebel controlled North and Eastern provinces (UN Security Council, 2000; 2000; 2000). Consequently aid agencies could not operate in afflicted areas and some even had to retreat after their staff was harassed and detained by the rebels in January and May 2000 (UN Security Council, 2000, p. 5; 2000, p. 8). By October 2000, as a result of the fighting there were 300,000 newly displaced individuals, from a total of 500,000 internally displaced, along with the 450,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea (UN Security Council, 2000, p. 7). UN Security Council reports mark some successes for the mission in this period. In March 2000 UNAMSIL managed to negotiate the release of a number of children hostages held by the rebels, and enrolled some of them into the demobilization programme (UN Security Council, 2000, p. 8). Its human rights section stepped up training of police officers, monitors and mission military personnel on matters such as gender and child rights. In October UNAMSIL provided assistance

71 to government-held enclaves on a limited basis with its air support and undertook to monitor conditions in government prisons (UN Security Council, 2000, p. 5).

As with other aspects of the mission tangible improvement was felt in the wake of the Abuja agreements, particularly from June 2001 onward as previously inaccessible areas opened up to UNAMSIL and aid agencies (UN Security Council, 2001, p. 9). From July 2001 to June 2002, the mission observed an overall decrease in human rights violations and over 50,000 refugees and internally displaced persons were able to return home (General Assembly of the United Nations, 2002, p. 5). In December 2001 its human rights officers were able to facilitate the release of a number of illegally detained persons by the RUF, including nearly four thousand children. A new human rights office was opened as well in Makeni, Northern Province thereby gradually expanding UNAMSIL’s ability to promote human rights in formerly RUF held areas (UN Security Council, 2001, p. 9).

With a relative state of stability achieved the mission gradually shifted from relief to recovery and development. Notable activities of the mid-2002 to mid-2003 include UNAMSIL’s support for the newly inaugurated Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the formation of its “National Commission for War-Affected Children” and security and logistical support for the functioning of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (UN Security Council, 2002, p. 7). By December 2002 the resettlement programme for internally displaced persons was officially completed with 223,000 persons resettled and 250,000 refugees repatriated (UN Security Council, 2004, p. 8).

The gradual drawdown of UNAMSIL brought the work of the aforementioned commissions to the fore. In May 2004 the Truth and Reconciliation Commission published its final report. In July of the same year repatriation of Sierra Leonean Refugees, mainly from Guinea and Liberia was completed (UN Security Council, 2004, p. 7). The overall level of respect for human rights showed positive improvement as well. Nevertheless, as the mission drew to a close there were concerns regarding the longevity of these improvements. A UN Security Council report notes: “the main root causes of the conflict have not been fully addressed, and there still exist a number of internal human rights challenges which are both causes and effects of the civil conflict. This includes the weakness of the judicial sector, and slow progress in the area of economic, social and cultural rights, which is compounded by a disturbing level of youth unemployment and inadequate basic services. Furthermore, a culture of respect for human rights and basic freedoms

72 has yet to be fully established. Civil society remains weak and does not have the capacity to serve as a countervailing factor for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms” (UN Security Council, 2005, p. 7).

Summary of Organizational Contribution United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, October 1999 – December 2005

Inputs and total costs Objectives Activities Results/Outputs Manpower and equipment 1. Progressive  Gradual deployment of up  Near mission failure at peak deployment in deployment and to 17,389 military and up until second-half of September 2002: provision of security 1,114 civilian personnel; 2000;  17,389 Military  Regular patrols and  Successfully provided personnel guarding duties in security and expanded  1,114 Civilian deployment areas; deployment post- personnel Abuja agreements;  2299 Military vehicles 2. Disarmament,  Opened and operated  47,076 Combatants  446 Armored demobilization and disarmament and disarmed and personnel carriers reintegration demobilization centers; demobilized;  800 Civilian vehicles programme  Approximately 25,000  29 Helicopters weapons destroyed;  3 Fixed-wing aircraft 3. Supporting the  Technical and logistical  Free, fair and May 2002 national assistance to SL National transparent elections Total costs: US$ 2.8 elections Electoral Commission; successfully held; Billion  Monitored electoral  Opposition accepts Total casualties: 192 process; results; (171 military/1 police/18  11,000 Troops redeployed civilians/2others) high risk areas, patrols and visits to polling stations; 4. Consolidation of  Trained SL police;  Sierra Leone police state authority  Reinstituted civil restored to 8,200 administration following officers; deployment;  All government  Patrolled diamond mines; officials returned to their posts;  Judiciary resumes work in all districts;  Diamond extraction improved but still plagued by illegality; 5. Monitoring of the  Created human rights  223,000 Internally human rights offices for monitoring and displaced individuals situation and trained personnel; resettled, 250,000 facilitating the  Ad-hoc humanitarian refugees repatriated; delivery of assistance;  Truth & Reconciliation humanitarian  Supported creation of Truth Commission assistance & Reconciliation successfully completes Commission ; its work;

Table 7 – Summary of Organizational Contribution: UNAMSIL, October 1999-December 2005;

2.5 Efficiency of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

The efficiency of United Nations is hard to evaluate due to a combination of immense expenditures and outputs that are often difficult to quantify. When the mission redeployed 11,000 troops to secure high-risk areas at the time of the May 2002 national elections was this a massive waste of resources or precisely the preemptive measure needed for the elections to succeed? Their generally non-violent course suggests that extensive security precautions may have been unnecessary but it is equally possible to argue that it was the UN’s presence that led to that particular outcome. The UN intervention is replete with dilemmas of this sort, forcing an analysis to lean more toward observations as opposed to verifiable conclusions.

If there is one area of the mission whose efficiency may be called into question, it is its military component. Consuming approximately 69% of the overall budget, its actual outputs within the first year of operation were remarkably poor (See: Figure 12). From 22 October 1999 to 18 May 2000 between 3,000 and 8,000 UN troops were powerless to prevent the RUF’s onslaught – and the rebels had previously been stopped by a significantly smaller, less supported force. Taking into consideration that the mission’s military personnel costs and operational requirements had already amounted to US$ 217, 7 million in that time frame - six times the budget of Executive Outcomes, it is difficult to interpret these results as anything other than a display of inefficiency (General Assembly of the United Nations, 2000, pp. 8,10). The subsequent course of UNAMSIL after the intervention of the United Kingdom proceeded without major challenges to its security arrangements. However, the size of the mission increased and the costs more than doubled, reaching a total of US$ 617, 7 million for the July 2001 – June 2002 budget period. Given the gradual reduction of the RUF threat and the overall trend toward stability the increase in the mission’s security component was likely excessive.

A further, albeit more favorable aspect of the mission whose efficiency is difficult to demonstrate due to the lack of a quantifiable input/output relationship were its diplomatic efforts. In May 2001, in what was subsequently called the “Kambia formula”, mission representatives exploited the weak position of a local RUF commander persuading him to disarm along with CDF troops his forces were engaging in the Kambia district, on the border with Guinea. This allowed the Sierra Leonean army to deploy on said border and cut the RUF off from some of Charles Taylor’s regional ambitions (Olonisakin, 2008, p. 103). In this way leveraging the UN’s 75 unique position of neutral platform yielded results that are likely beyond the ability of other actors in conflict resolution.

In a similar vein it would seem that the more modestly funded peacebuilding components of UNAMSIL’s mission led to demonstrably superior outputs. One example of that is the “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme”. For a total of US$ 36, 5 million the organization facilitated the disarmament and demobilization of all the factions in the war and destroyed or safely disposed of a large quantity of weapons (UN Department of Public Information, 2005). Likewise the often short-funded and donor dependent effort at resettlement of the internally displaced and repatriation of Sierra Leonean refugees was a complete success.

To summarize, the efficiency of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone is uneven across its individual elements. Its military and security related expenditures are demonstrably disproportionate to its successes in those areas. Conversely, its diplomatic efforts have influenced the course of events in Sierra Leone in beneficial ways at no great cost to the organization itself. Finally, the peace building components of the mission such as the DDR programme were a demonstrable success despite funding shortfalls.

2.6 Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

As was the case with Executive Outcomes, the effectiveness of UNAMSIL must be examined in both the short and long term. In the short-term (“intermediate outcomes”) the question whether the intervention has “objectively improved the humanitarian and security situation in the country” is answered. On the other hand, the stability and longevity of peace is the measure of long-term effectiveness (“final outcomes”).

2.6.1 The Effect of the Intervention on the Humanitarian and Security Situation

The provisions of the UNAMSIL’s mandate pertaining to matters of security are listed in Resolution 1270. The mission was charged with helping to implement the Lomé Peace agreement, establishing a presence at key locations throughout the country, ensuring the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance (UN Security Council, 1999, p. 2). Toward the realization of these goals it was imbued with Chapter VII powers of the UN Charter, “to ensure the security and freedom of moment of its personnel” as well as the ability to “afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” (UN Security Council, 1999, p. 3). In other words, notwithstanding its diplomatic efforts the mission had a legitimate right to use force in pursuit of its mandate – particularly in light of the fact that its deployment was agreed upon by all parties in the conflict.

UNAMSIL’s impact on the humanitarian and security situation in Sierra Leone is sharply delineated by the events of May 2000 due to the stark difference in competence and effectiveness of the mission before and after that crisis. From the events that transpired toward the end of 1999 and throughout 2000 it became apparent that the United Nations deployed to protect a rapidly disintegrating peace in a country sliding toward a renewed civil war. This situation was further exacerbated by the withdrawal of ECOWAS whose support was factored into the mission’s deployment plans (Olonisakin, 2008, p. 48; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2003, p. 10). However, these extenuating circumstances cannot justify the near collapse of the mission in May 2000. As the RUF detained, disarmed and in some instances wounded or killed UN troops in numerous incidents of the January-May 2000 period the organization seemed completely powerless to fulfill even the basic provision of its mandate – that to protect its own personnel. With the RUF encroaching on the capital the mission found itself in complete

77 disarray and on the verge of full retreat from Sierra Leone. Consequently, depending on one’s point of view it can be seen as ineffectual in providing security to Sierra Leone, or through its inadequacies – directly detrimental to it. Unsurprisingly, the rising insecurity led to a deterioration of the humanitarian situation. Aside from a constant influx of reports regarding human rights violations, UNAMSIL could do little to affect the course of events. Its mandate “to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance” remained unfulfilled as half of the country was under effective control of the rebels who actively prevented aid agencies from operating by detaining and harassing their staff. Likewise, the provision to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence could not but be a “dead letter”. This does not mean that UNAMSIL was entirely without successes in this period. For example, its representatives successfully negotiated the release of child hostages in March 2000 and support activities such as the training of human rights officers continued in the background of the more prominent political events (UN Security Council, 2000, p. 8). It was however, ineffective at performing its broader mandate.

A pertinent question at this juncture is whether it is unfair to perceive a mission that lasted over six years through a period of several months that was eventually resolved to a (mostly) satisfactory conclusion? The reason the crisis must weigh heavily in this evaluation is that focus is on the capacities of a single organization - and the May 2000 crisis was resolved mostly by elements external to it. The intervention of the United Kingdom reversed the military situation on the ground and the eventual release of UNAMSIL detainees was principally the product of West African diplomacy along the Charles Taylor (Liberia) and ECOWAS axis – albeit with some UN involvement (Olonisakin, 2008, pp. 65, 75). Without this assistance the mission would have had to cease its activities and leave Sierra Leone ahead of a likely RUF takeover of Freetown. Therefore, UNAMSIL objectively failed to perform its duties and this cannot be ignored in light of the reversal that followed and the subsequent course of the mission.

It was only with the RUF’s eventual acquiescence to full UNAMSIL deployment within its territories over the course of 2001 that the mission became truly effective. This enabled UN troops to patrol across the country and reinforce the stability that was gradually built after the Abuja agreements. Once this state of affairs became normalized the UN arguably became the best guarantor of security within the country. The successful completion of the May 2002 elections subsumed the RUF into the political mainstream of Sierra Leone, neutering its military

78 structures. With its largest opponent gone, subsequent security incidents were relatively minor and fully within UNAMSIL’s ability to control. Once a state of relative security was achieved both aid agencies and the mission could work on gradually rectifying the humanitarian conditions within Sierra Leone. In this aspect the mission proved to be effective, successfully completing the more supportive humanitarian objectives of its mandate while agencies such as UNHCR accounted for much of the actual field work.

2.6.2 The State of Peace in Sierra Leone post-Intervention

UN sources commonly refer to UNAMSIL as “a model for successful peacekeeping” and “one of the UN’s success stories” (UN Department of Public Information, 2003; 2005). Indeed, if the mission is evaluated based on its long term results there is merit to these claims. Concerns regarding the sustainability of the gains achieved post-UNAMSIL’s departure proved unfounded (UN Security Council, 2005, p. 16). Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) track a slow but consistent progress in peacebuilding and security throughout 2006 (UN Security Council, 2006, p. 13). In 2007 another electoral cycle was completed as the Sierra Leonean authorities successfully organized and conducted national elections for the first time after the withdrawal of UNAMSIL, which were followed by a peaceful transfer of power (UN Security Council, 2007). Lingering economic and developmental challenges aside - UNAMSIL had indeed established a lasting peace.

To summarize, the effectiveness of UNAMSIL is a lopsided affair. The mission could not successfully deal with a large security challenger, even with the generous means at its disposal. Once that issue was neutralized by external actors and the security environment became more permissive it came into its own and fulfilled most aspects of its mandate. Its greatest achievement is the enduring nature of the political and security arrangements it successfully fostered, proving that its model of conflict resolution can be indeed effective in the long-term – provided the right environment exists.

2.7 Cost-Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

As was the case with efficiency, the cost-effectiveness of UNAMSIL is difficult to evaluate. The provision of security and state building efforts of the UN in Sierra Leone cost the international community approximately US$ 2.8 billion over a period of six-years and three months. The generally successful outcome of these activities is indisputable: the humanitarian situation was mostly resolved, the authority of the Sierra Leonean state reestablished throughout the country and most importantly - upon the organization’s departure, Sierra Leone did not slide back into civil war.

The challenge of evaluating cost-effectiveness lies in answering whether the scale of invested resources was appropriate to the demands of the situation and the achieved results. A general breakdown of the UNAMSIL budget is useful in this regard. Although varying per budget year, the mission’s military component consumed approximately 70% of the total funds, operational costs amounted to 20% and the civilian component and other programmes accounted for the remaining 10% (General Assembly of the United Nations, 2001, p. 31). It is immediately striking that the best funded segment of the mission, by a wide margin, underperformed in the pre-Lomé peace agreement period. Although the various non-military activities of the organization such as the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programme and efforts toward the return of refugees and displaced ground to a halt as hostilities resumed, this was arguably a consequence of the UN’s military failings and not any particular flaw of the programs themselves.

While a failure to act as a security provider despite substantial resources suggests cost- ineffectiveness on the UN’s part the best way to provide a measure of what could have been achieved with equivalent or lesser means is to compare the organization’s performance against a benchmark. In this sense the EO intervention is a useful example of military cost-effectiveness against which the UN’s performance can be evaluated. Therefore a more in-depth discussion of UNAMSIL’s cost-effectiveness or lack thereof (including its non-military aspects) as well as possible reasons for those particular outcomes is reserved for Chapter 3: A Comparative Discussion of the Aspects of Performance of the two Interventions.

2.8 A Summary of UNAMSIL Performance in Sierra Leone

The performance of the public sector in conflict resolution within Sierra Leone was as varied and complex as that of its private counterpart. The corresponding strengths and weaknesses were however revealed to be significantly different.

An in depth look into the organization’s resources, activities and their results revealed that the United Nations followed an inverse path to that of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone. A poor start marked by declining cohesion and a near collapse of the mission in May 2000 led to a gradual but remarkable recovery (albeit one enabled by external actors) and mostly successful completion of its mandate.

Buoyed by the immense resources of the public sector the UN’s efficiency was at times questionable, particularly in its principal task as a security provider. In other respects UNAMSIL fared better – its peacebuilding programs made great strides toward enabling a long-term peace in Sierra Leone. Successful disarmament and demobilization of all combatants, the return of refugees and resettlement of the displaced were all conducted at considerably less expense than the military component of the mission.

The mission’s effectiveness showed great variation. The disastrously ineffective pre-crisis period saw UNAMSIL fail both its security and humanitarian mandate as it retreated under RUF assault. After a period of stabilization and recovery the UN was able to credibly provide security to Sierra Leone fostering a climate in which humanitarian conditions showed continual improvement.

Its greatest success however was transitioning these short term successes of the latter part of the mission into a sustainable peace. Without a major security challenger, the UN’s methods of conflict resolution proved effective in the long run. While they were understandably unable to fix all of the issues plaguing Sierra Leone, the civil war effectively ended and the country was placed on a path to full recovery.

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone Duration of the Intervention: October 1999 – December 2005 (six years, three months) Total manpower: ~ 18,500 Cost: US$ 2.8 billion Objectives: Achieved Failed + Full mission deployment throughout Sierra Leone. - Failed to ensure the safety of its own personnel in the + Mostly successful provision of security from 2001 1999-2000 period. onward. - Failed to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian + Supported and secured the May 2002 elections. assistance and protect civilian population in the 1999- + Completed the Disarmament, Demobilization and 2000 period. Reintegration programme. + Supported the extension of authority of the SL government and civil administration throughout the country. + Supported the creation and functioning of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (increased respect for human rights). + Ensured the completion of internal resettlement and refugee repatriation post-Abuja agreements. How efficient was the intervention? Successes Failures + Efficient at facilitating support programmes such as -Military/security component of the mission consumed Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. an immense amount of resources considering its 1999- + Demonstrable results from the mission’s diplomatic 2000 output. efforts. How effective was the intervention? Short term Successes Short Term Failures + Small scale direct impact on the humanitarian situation - Failed to provide adequate level of security from through ad hoc efforts. deployment in 1999 and throughout 2000. + Large positive impact on humanitarian situation post- - Failed to stabilize the humanitarian situation from Abuja agreement stabilization. deployment in 1999 and throughout 2000. + Successful provision of security post-Abuja agreements. Long term Successes Long term Failures +Implemented a stable peace that lasted post- intervention.

How cost-effective was the intervention? Successes Failures - High cost of the UN’s military component was not reflected in its overall effectiveness. Table 8 – Summary of UNAMSIL Performance in Sierra Leone

Chapter 3: A Comparative Discussion of the Aspects of Performance of the two Interventions

3.1 Efficiency and Effectiveness

The high and low points of the efficiency and effectiveness of Executive Outcomes and the United Nations performance in Sierra Leone are summarized in Table 9. From their particular strengths and weaknesses it can be inferred that the efficiency of the two organizations was largely a function of their original purpose and specialization. The private military company showed itself to be akin to a surgical tool, able to perform the narrow tasks for which it was created in a much more efficient manner than its public sector counterpart. For as long as the focus of the organization was on these tasks it performed admirably. Once the conflict bogged down into political jockeying between the Sierra Leonean government and the RUF with an ever increasing number of the roles Executive Outcomes was to perform, such as administering parts of the country, curbing illegal diamond mining or static security – the firm’s performance suffered. UNAMSIL followed a similar trajectory. The UN went into Sierra Leone armed with Chapter VII powers to enforce the peace and engage in “muscular peacekeeping”, a role it arguably wasn’t prepared for at the time, neither politically nor militarily. The subsequent crumbling of the mission and the military defeats it suffered even with thousands of troops on the field can be seen as a resulting tension between the role the organization was created for and habituated in performing and a situation that demanded a completely different response. Once this hurdle was overcome the UN’s state building and humanitarian efforts finally bore fruit.

The effectiveness of the two interventions further underscores the existence of differing strengths and weaknesses of the organizations, leading to better performance in specific situations. Executive Outcomes excelled in a short-term, pro-active provision of security within an unstable environment. It showed a remarkable capacity to mold that environment – but not an ability to make those changes permanent. The UN on the other hand proved more capable in the long-term, passive security and state building roles. However, it could perform then effectively only once the security situation was completely stabilized – something it proved incapable of facilitating.

EO-UNAMSIL Efficiency and Effectiveness Comparison Executive Outcomes United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone Strengths Weaknesses Strengths Weaknesses . Demonstrated ability . The organization’s . The mission’s role as a . Even with considerable to quickly introduce military efficiency political platform can resources at the major military and decreased when it was yield results with little organization’s disposal security shifts with forced into the role of resource investment. it was slow to react to a disproportionately replacing a state’s entire . Its nonmilitary programs changing security modest resources. security apparatus. showed good results situation and its military . While able to perform considering the persistent expenditures were

static security and roles funding shortfalls they disproportionate with similar to peacekeeping faced. the results when faced tasks, this is not the with a security

Efficiency most efficient use of the challenger. organization’s specific skillset. Observations: . Both organizations were shown to be efficient when called upon to use their specific field of expertise, whether it is the military experience of Executive Outcomes or the UN’s long standing role as a neutral platform for political discussion and a repository of state-building and development expertise. . Correspondingly, resource wastage and inefficiency was pronounced when the organizations were forced to step outside of these roles and provide a service they were not originally envisioned to perform.

Executive Outcomes United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone Strengths Weaknesses Strengths Weaknesses . Able to reshape the . Unable to implement . Due to the support of a . Unreliable performance security situation the political and large number of states as a security provider even when facing developmental changes the organization has that negatively affected unfavorable odds. needed to ensure long unparalleled “staying other aspects of the . Resilient and stable term conflict resolution power”, ensuring that mission. as a security provider. – reliant solely on the goals are eventually . Proven ability to provision of force and reached despite setbacks. achieve results therefore stability and . Proved to be a successful quickly, with minimal security is continually platform for state losses. dependent on the building in Sierra Leone. organization’s presence. . Able to tackle some of the root causes of the conflict, thereby

Effectiveness facilitating a lasting peace.

Observations: . As was the case with efficiency, the effectiveness of both organizations is a reflection of their particular strengths. Executive Outcomes performed well in the role of a force multiplier and security provider, albeit without the ability to “follow through” and conclusively resolve the conflict. Conversely, the UN failed at the role of “muscular peacekeeping” – but with external assistance was eventually able to stabilize and achieve long-lasting results.

Table 9 – EO-UNAMSIL Efficiency and Effectiveness Comparison

3.2 Cost-Effectiveness

Due to the extreme differences between the budgets and scope of the analyzed interventions a valid examination of cost-effectiveness is only possible by finding a common denominator that can serve as a point of comparison. In this case that means discovering which actions of Executive Outcomes, as the smaller intervention, have an equivalent within the sprawling framework of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone.

To reiterate, EO intervened in an active civil war to fight for the Sierra Leonean government as it neared a state of military defeat. It had a free mandate to use any means necessary to reverse this situation, which it managed within a very short span of time. It could not achieve total military victory but through force of arms it stabilized the government and provided a bulwark of security that the RUF could not penetrate. The peace it subsequently ushered was unstable because it wasn’t built on a genuine desire to end hostilities – rather, it was a (successful) tactical compromise of RUF leadership meant to get the company out of the country.

The UN deployed after the civil war had nominally ended with a mandate to guarantee the Lomé peace and with the right to use force to that end. As the RUF resumed hostilities over the course of 2000, the mission proved unable to use the military means at it its disposal to preserve its integrity and found itself on the brink of defeat - only to be saved by external forces. It would subsequently prove more successful, but it is principally this period of UNAMSIL (October 1999-May 2000) that is valid as a point of comparison as it is the only time in which its activities match that of EO - namely a situation in which it was called upon to engage in widespread use of force as a means of ensuring security and stability.

Taking into account that the analysis has already established that EO succeeded in this task, whereas UNAMSIL did not it may seem that a verdict on cost-effectiveness is a foregone conclusion. Nevertheless it is useful to examine the means at the disposal of each organization at the time and discuss the possible reasons and implications behind the different outcomes. Table 10 summarizes this information.

EO-UNAMSIL Cost-Effectiveness Comparison Executive Outcomes United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone Costs: Military personnel and operational Costs: Military personnel: requirements: (for 1 July 1999 - US$ 132,053 million Total: US$ 33-35 million 30 June 2000 Operational requirements: budget period) US$ 85,668 million Total: ~US$ 217,7 million Duration: May 1995 – March 1997; Duration: October 1999 - June 2000 period; (one year, eight months) (nine months) Means Means Troop strength: Troop strength:  50 (May 1995 – August 1995)  3006 (22 October 1999 – 7 February 2000)  140 (September 1995)  8028 (7 February – 19 May 2001)  ~440 (end of 1995 onward)  12182 (19 May – 30 June 2000) Military hardware: Military hardware:  6 Aircraft; *Detailed breakdown of contingent owned military  2 Armored fighting vehicles; 2 troop transports; hardware unavailable for this period; Outcomes Outcomes  Pressure on Freetown removed;  Successful deployment in Western and Southern  Kono (Eastern Province) liberated; Province;  RUF pushed back into the countryside, placed on the  Effectively barred from North and East Province by defensive and with limited holdouts in Sierra Leone; RUF;  RUF forced to seek peace;  Multiple defeats suffered from January-May 2000;  A galvanized RUF threatens Freetown; Table 10 - EO-UNAMSIL Cost-Effectiveness Comparison – Sources: (Van Heerden, 2012; Barlow, 2007; General Assembly of the United Nations, 2000, pp. 8, 10) As can be seen, the difference between the means and outcomes of the two organizations in the examined period is striking. It must be noted that neither organization was acting entirely alone - Executive Outcomes had a measure of support from the Sierra Leonean Army and ECOMOG whilst UNAMSIL could also call upon the latter up until that organization’s departure. In trying to account for these large differences five factors seem to have the greatest explanatory value:

1. Force composition. Although UNAMSIL troops were numerically superior by far to their EO counterparts, this says nothing regarding their differences in quality. Executive Outcomes was formed from the disintegrating army structures of the Republic of South Africa, namely members of the elite 32 Battalion of the South African Army and Koevoet special counter-insurgency units 86

(Barlow, 2007). These were mostly veteran troops experienced in fighting African wars, many of them mutually acquainted and with an already established working culture. Furthermore, they had additional experience working in a similar capacity within Executive Outcomes during the company’s significantly more challenging intervention in Angola. As such they were exceptionally well positioned to deal with the RUF. UNAMSIL’s troops were provided by a variety of countries from their regular armed forces and arrived with varying degrees of readiness and experience. In a review after the May 2000 crisis, a UN Security Council report notes that “some military units showed a lack of training and others had serious shortfalls in equipment” (UN Security Council, 2007, p. 9).

2. Clarity of objectives. The task Executive Outcomes was supposed to perform for the Sierra Leonean government was clear from the outset as well as the rules of engagement. In the aftermath of the May 2000 crisis it was discovered that contingents within UNAMSIL had “no commonly shared understanding of the mandate and rules of engagement” (UN Security Council, 2000, p. 5). Apparently, whereas some were ready to use force, others were briefed by their home governments that they were to perform Chapter VI “peacekeeping” duties and that “casualties would not be tolerated” (Olonisakin, 2008, p. 63).

3. Posture and willingness to project force. Stemming from the clarity of objectives or lack thereof, the willingness to utilize force was a major factor in influencing RUF behavior. EO established itself as a superior and hostile force from the outset, arguably projecting a threat disproportionate with its actual size and reach. As the RUF tested UNAMSIL’s resolve from January 2000 onward the UN’s weak or non-existent response motivated the rebels to intensify their operations in spite of the mission’s presence.

4. Speed of deployment. EO’s deployment was completed quickly and efficiently. What means the organization had at its disposal were available in a timely manner and put to full use. As a collaborative effort of a number of nation states, UN Peacekeeping missions are dependent on individual members fulfilling their obligations. Due to delays of this nature some UNAMSIL contingents were under strength or inadequately equipped, with the mission itself having to cover these deficiencies with its own funds in the course of the May 2000 crisis (General Assembly of the United Nations, 2000, p. 5).

5. Unified structure. Once deployed EO maintained regular communication with the Sierra Leonean government and was nominally integrated into its armed forces. However, the company’s actual command structure was completely independent to perform its duties as it saw fit. Every segment of EO organization was decided internally and a clear hierarchy was established. Likewise, UNAMSIL had an agreed upon organizational structure and an established hierarchy. Unlike EO the elements of this structure were provided by a number of different nation states whose political interests in the Sierra Leone did not always align. In an internal report written in May 2000 UNAMSIL’s Force Commander, Indian Major-General Vijay Kumar Jetley accused the Nigerian contingent of illegal diamond mining and covert non- interference agreements with the RUF (Olonisakin, 2008, p. 83). He was subsequently relieved of his post, prompting the withdrawal of the Indian contingent at a moment when it was most needed. His Nigerian replacement represented an apparent measure of the UN to appease the Nigerians, who felt their ECOMOG efforts were sidelined by UNAMSIL’s deployment (Olonisakin, 2008, p. 86). Instances like these serve as a reminder that UN missions represent a delicate balance of political compromises. While that is expected of any joint effort undertaken by a group of nation states it can undoubtedly take a toll on performance.

Taking these factors into account it is possible to conclude that in the specific situation where the actual state of security within a (former) conflict zone is unclear and could possibly result in a return to hostilities – a smaller, more focused and dependable force such as Executive Outcomes is simply a more cost-effective solution. On the other hand, once the issue of security is clearly resolved the UN appears to be the only actor with the means to perform a long term conflict resolution effort. Due to lack of comparisons, it is difficult to say whether it is the most cost- effective solution in this regard, but it has certainly proven to be effective on the whole.

Part 5: Conclusion and Reflections

The analysis presented in this thesis demonstrated considerable performance differences between the private and public sectors at conflict resolution. Based on the results a succinct answer to the research question - “How do the UN mission in Sierra Leone and Executive Outcomes intervention that preceded it compare in terms of performance at conflict resolution?”, would be as follows: the UN demonstrated an ability to successfully resolve a long standing conflict whereas the achievements of Executive Outcomes proved impactful but impermanent and therefore, in the long-term, the UN’s performance in this task was superior. However, the true value of this research stems from incorporating the various aspects of performance to provide a more nuanced perspective. When examining the results of each organization the degree of consistency between the tasks they were either successful or unsuccessful at performing suggests the existence of inherent sector-specific strengths and weaknesses.

The Executive Outcomes intervention was a strong display of rapid deployment, military efficiency and short-term effectiveness. The company intervened when others (including the United Nations) would not, in conditions that were extremely disadvantageous for their employer. Despite these challenges it showed itself capable of quickly reversing and stabilizing a dire security situation. Unfortunately, the Revolutionary United Front was only the most destructive manifestation of the myriad structural issues plaguing Sierra Leone. As a result, the company found itself in a curious position of being able to provide security for what had essentially ceased to be a functioning state. The reality was that Sierra Leone needed a much more comprehensive rebuilding effort in order to take advantage of the newfound measure of stability, which was something that EO could not provide.

The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone cannot pride itself on either speed or military efficiency. It was also lamentably late, mustered more than two years after Sierra Leone’s return to civil war. Furthermore, the intervention revealed an enduring problem with the UN model of conflict resolution – its dependence on the existence of a stable security situation. As the Lomé peace agreement collapsed, so seemingly did the mission as well. Even with Chapter VII powers, a forceful response to a major challenger was impossible for the UN to marshal – necessitating

89 yet another intervention to bring UNAMSIL back on course. Once the major parties to the conflict genuinely decided to cease hostilities the value of the organization’s methods became apparent. The successful-state building effort that followed is a testament to UN’s ability in this regard, and arguably no other actor could have undertaken a task of this magnitude.

Thus it would seem that the arguments of both the proponents and critics of private military companies and the UN were validated, lending support to both sides of the academic debate surrounding privatization. The private sector did indeed provide quicker, more cost-effective results - as advocates of privatization suggested. Yet its solutions were temporary and insufficient for a task as complex as conflict resolution. In a similar manner, the UN’s much maligned inefficiency and sluggish nature, burdened by politics and necessity of constant compromise proved costly in Sierra Leone – both for the organization and the beleaguered country. Once it achieved the necessary internal cohesion and a secure operating environment was created, its champions could rightly pronounce the mission a success.

A valuable conclusion that can be drawn from this study is the essentially complementary nature of the two interventions and by extension - the public and private sectors in conflict resolution. Put simply, the UN excels at keeping the peace within a post-conflict environment and providing the subsequent reconstruction such an environment needs. But it isn’t possible to “keep the peace” if there is none to begin with - and the actual point at which a ceasefire will yield results and lead to a cessation of hostilities in a contemporary conflict can be very hard to discern. If it is misjudged, as it was in the course of UNAMSIL, the results can be disastrous. This is precisely the situation that Executive Outcomes was capable of preventing, having already demonstrated the ability to enforce a state of peace - if by no other means than making the alternative too costly for potential challengers. Therefore, the results suggest that future efforts at conflict resolution would benefit from a form of collaboration between the private and public sectors. A smaller, more cost-effective private military force backing a larger UN mission could arguably lead to speedier and better outcomes in conflict resolution. In the worst-case scenario it could protect the mission and challenge any “spoilers” while the nation states that comprise it decide upon an appropriate response.

This research can serve as a stepping stone toward fostering that collaboration and within that possibility lies its societal value. When private military companies appeared in the last decade of

90 the twentieth century their relationship with the United Nations was one of mistrust and in some respects, competition. In the intervening period PMC’s have gradually become a known quantity, both in their positive and negative aspects. Therefore, it is perhaps time to reevaluate this relationship with the overall goal of developing a more successful model of conflict resolution.

It would be remiss not to shed light on some of the limitations faced by this research. Even after more than two decades of coexistence between the private and public sectors in conflicts across the world, private military participation in conflict resolution efforts continues to be rare. This places a burden on the researcher to draw conclusions and recommendations from a relatively modest sample of the few well-documented interventions. The benefit of the EO case study presented here is that the passage of time revealed a wealth of information, raising confidence in the validity of the lessons that can be learned from it. Nevertheless, an effort was made to clearly tie any conclusions to the specific context from which they arose and can consequently be applied to. More comparative studies following a similar methodology would be helpful in refining the results presented here.

Further research is also needed into the legal, political and other aspects of public-private collaboration in this field. Even as the UN increasingly turns to hiring private security for its missions its legal stance on mercenerism has yet to be adjusted to compensate for this new trend. The political impact of the use of private military companies in conflict resolution needs to be explored as well. Finally, the numerous technical aspects of oversight and accountability of PMC’s operating under the UN have to be developed and clarified in order to avoid the myriad issues the United States faced with contractor use in Iraq and Afghanistan. Once these hurdles are overcome however, a public-private partnership in conflict resolution shows clear potential for reducing the impact and longevity of future conflicts.

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