Executive Outcomes

Against all Odds

Eeben Barlow

GALAGO Acknowledgements

The men of who read and corrected what I had written and who also gave me access to their photographs; the ex-SADF generals who added to what I have long suspected; the ex-Military Intelligence men who pleaded forgiveness for what they had done; the agents who ferreted out infonnation for us; the UN officials who gave me some glimpse of the organisation's duplicity; the governments that hired EO; publishers Peter and Francis Stiff for their input and indulgence; Peter Stiff who guided me and allowed me to quote from his works; and editor Tony Lavine and proofreader Rina Minervini for their assistance and guidance. · In particular, I would also like to thank the following people who gave me their time, opinions, accounts of their experiences and who were able to fill in many gaps: General Witkop Badenhorst, Riaan Bellingham, Rennie Blaauw, Louwrens Bosch, Harry Carlse, Carl Dietz, General Jannie Geldenhuys, Dries Hanekom, Mike Herbst, Renier Hugo, Bertie Jackson, Sonny Janeke, Juba Joubert, Craig Kotze, Jonathan Leach, Lafras Luitingh, Nico Palm, Rufan Palm, Pine Pienaar, Piers Pigou, Duncan Rykaardt, Lt Col Shikufa (Namibian Defence Force) General Phillip Sibanda (Zimbabwe Defence Force), Charlie Tait, Nic van den Bergh, Tony Viera, Arthur Walker-· and those who preferred to remain anonymous.

Photographic credits

Eeben Barlow archives, Rennie Blaauw, Jim Hooper, Sonny Janeke, Arthur Walker, Renier Hugo, Nico Palm, Kallie Coetzee, Nie van den Bergh, Al J Venter, Jannie Wools, Armed Forces, Raids, New African, Molotov Cocktail, New American and Sinar. The copyright of a few photographs are not acknow!edged, although the publishers have made every effort to establish authorship which has been lost in the mists of time or blown away by the winds of a changing South Africa. However, the publishers will amend or add credits in subsequent additions and make the necessary arrangements with those photographers not known at the time of going to print, or who have not been traced. Maps Riaan Bosch Contents

Chapter Page Picture credits ...... 6 Acknowledgements...... 6 In-text maps and illustrations, diagrams and picture sections ...... 9 Foreword...... 10 1 In the beginning...... 13 2 Ambush at Cahama...... 19 3 I spy with my little eye ...... 32 4 My life as a 'Civil Co-operator' ...... 52 5 Rising from the dust...... 77 6 : tom apart by war...... 94 7 A little town called Soyo ...... 99 8 Battle for Soyo and surrounding area...... 107 9 The investigation...... 124 10 A brief respite ...... 127 11 Planning for victory ...... 133 12 Preparing for war on several fronts ...... 142 13 Planning the redeployment of forces...... 177 14 The start of the 1994 offensive...... 189 15 The beginning of the end ...... 212 16 UNITA attack on Saurimo ...... 228 17 Prelude to Cafunfu ...... 240 18 Fall of Cafunfu ...... 258 19 Tragedy in Lunda Norte Province ...... 269 20 The war continues ...... 282 21 Staggering towards peace ...... 290 22 Angola returns to war...... 301 23 Epilogue to the Angolan War: blood diamonds and blood money... 308 24 The tragedy of ...... 315 25 Help us save Sierra Leone ...... 321 26 Move to Mile 91 ...... 327 27 Relief of Freetown ...... 333 28 Retaking the Koidu diamond fields ...... 356 29 Dominating the diamond areas ...... 361 30 Change of government in Sierra Leone ...... 368 31 We leave Sierra Leone ...... 377 32 Enter the United Nations ...... 389 33 Illegal support of RUF rebels and breaches of UN resolutions by South Africa, Israel and Liberia ...... 397 34 Taking and releasing hostages in Sierra Leone ...... 401 35 An assassination to order!...... 408 36 Rescue in Irian Jaya ...... 411 37 United Nations investigates ...... 422 38 Executive Outcomes: the Great Lakes myth ...... 439 39 The not so mysterious Dr Schultz ...... 450 40 fiasco ...... 453 41 Executive Outcomes at IDEX '97 ...... 463 42 Blowing the lid off past operations ...... 467 43 Saudi Arabia ...... 471 44 Leaving what I had started ...... 480 45 The disinformation war...... 490 46 Sting of the Scorpion ...... 506 47 Vindication ...... 509 48 Betrayal, closure and aftermath ...... 514 49 Rewards of disinformation ...... 523 50 Looking back in 2007 ...... 527 51 Afterword ...... 532 Executive Outcomes: Roll of Honour ...... 533 Bibliography ...... 534 Abbreviations ...... 536 Appendix A: Corporations Mission ...... 538 Appendix B: Counting the cost...... 540 Appendix C: Companies associated with Executive Outcomes ...... 543 Index ...... 544 Photographs, in-text maps, illustrations and diagrams

Page

Colour and black and white photographs...... 161-176 and 337-352 Map of Africa showing where Executive Outcomes had interests...... 12

Map of ambush at Cahama...... 23 The author's army paybook indicating that his danger pay while on border duty was the princely sum of R4.50 per day...... 31 The author's Military Intelligence identity card. Was the 'K9' meant as a portent of what was to come after he left Military Intelligence?...... 49

Map of Angola...... 93 Map illustrating capture of Soya...... 122

Executive Outcomes: training programme for FAA ...... 143 A 'secret' DCC list translated from Afrikaans containing so-called 'essential elements of information on Executive Outcomes'...... 196

Executive Outcomes: advance from Saurimo ...... 204

Map of Sierra Leone...... 328

Executive Outcomes' business permit issued by the Secretary for Defence, Pretoria...... ·. ; . . . 518

Schedules showing comparative costs of Executive Outcomes' operations...... 540-542 Foreword

I first met Eeben Barlow in 1982. As a young and eager reconnaissance officer with 32-Battalion, he was tasked to conduct an operation in my area of interest, Angola. It therefore came as no great surprise to me to learn that he remained active in the sphere of security and military operations after leaving the SADF. I would only much later discover the extent of his activities. He established Executive Outcomes (EO) in 1989 as a private security-and-advisory company but, through circumstance, changed its direction to become a military advisory company, or, to use the current term, a . Apart from giving specialist covert training to the SADF's Special Forces, EO provided high-level security advice, and training, to numerous foreign governments and large multi-national corporations. In addition, the company provided advice to a few NATO armed forces. It also became involved in fighting crime in South America. After the Cuban withdrawal from Angola, the situation in that country deteriorated to such an extent that UNITA gained almost total control of Angola's oil and diamond fields. This became a crisis for the Angolan government who were dependent on these natural resources. The election results of the 1992 Angolan election were rejected by UNITA, with some apparent encouragement by outside forces, which instead opted for a return to war. By 1993, Executive Outcomes had just completed a high-risk security operation in Angola on behalf of numerous international oil companies. It was at the time that a desperate Angolan government urgently needed help to end a decades-old conflict. The world had already turned its back on Angola. The Angolan government thus contracted EO to reorganise, retrain and provide a strategy for ending the . This contract called on a private South African company to support a legitimate government to ensure its sovereignty, all by means of a legitimate contract. The contract was, however, in direct opposition to the previous South African government's policy because South Africa had, for years, supported UNITA. Strictly speaking,. South Africa could not object to EO's contract with the MPLA, because South Africa no longer had an interest in the battle between FAPLA (and later FAA) and UNITA. The Cubans had long since withdrawn from Angola, and a democratic had been established. There was thus no longer a SWAPO threat. This was, however, still unacceptable to South Africa, and it had to devise a new method of attack on the company. Initially, oblivious to the concern it was creating, and in order to carry out its contractual obligations, EO recruited a number of men from the SADF's elite units such as the Reconnaissance Regiments, 32-Battalion, the Parachute Battalion as well as men from the South African Air Force. The majority of these men had already been retrenched from the SADF. Retrenched personnel from the police's elite counter-insurgency unit were also recruited as well as former members of the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe. EO's strong points lay in its strategy development, planning, training and execution of strategy and tactics. The men at EO realised that they could not help to end the war unless the FAA were able to regain control over the country's natural resources and thus deprive UNITA of the revenue it needed to fuel the war. With their training, they re-established the Angolan 16-Brigade. With an element of EO acting as a combat team for the brigade, they promptly set about implementing their strategy, which was approved at the highest level. This strategy led to UNITA being defeated on the battlefield and suing for peace.

Members of Military Intelligence as well as the Department of Foreign Affairs had, however, tried continuously to stop EO's activities in Angola. The other intelligence services, as well as the South African Police, were eventually drawn into a disinformation war against the company. Massive intelligence gathering operations were launched against it. Disinformation was generated and spread as far afield as the UN and other international parties and governments. Why, no-one knows - perhaps it was for their own gains? The onslaught against EO was brutally fierce and their antagonists eventually succeeded, with assistance from the Americans, to bring pressure on the MPLA government to terminate EO's contract. By then, fortunately, EO had already fulfilled its contractual obligations. The company went on to assist the government of Sierra Leone in a likewise manner and succeeded where few others had dared to tread. Again, this brought massive South African condemnation against EO. Ironically, ex-members of the SADF were engaged in training members of the Sierra Leoncan rebels in Liberia to continue the terror against the Sierra Lconean population, yet nothing was said about these men or the result of their actions. When EO's small contingent left Sierra Leone, the UN brought in many thousands of peacekeepers to do what a handful of men had accomplished. The UN's entrance into Sierra Leone, however well intentioned, allowed the situation to slide back into anarchy and chaos, at a cost of many millions of dollars and thousands of unnecessary deaths and mutilations. Despite intense media and political pressure on the company, Executive Outcomes then went on to assist several other governments with great success. Their successes in Angola, Sierra Leone and other countries can further be ascribed to brilliant intelligence, outstanding logistics, dynamic flexibility as well as constantly maintaining the initiative. Despite continuous allegations by the media of so-called atrocities being committed by EO, not a single shred of such evidence ever came to light. One can reasonably assume that this was part of the campaign to discredit and close the company down. EO, however, continued with its contracts and can be justly proud of what it achieved around the world. The company made a huge difference and directly helped to contribute to peace in southern Africa. EO has since been replaced by many thousands of UN troops who just stand by idly and watch the massacres of peoples continue. Of interest, Executive Outcomes never invaded another country, and always entered as guests and left as friends, something very few companies or even governments can boast about. They followed their own policy of client selection to the letter and never betrayed the governments they worked for. At a time when much has been written and said about EO, the author, Eeben Barlow, succeeds in validating events precisely in Executive Outcomes. It reads like an incident book that contains the sweet and sour of what was arguably one of the world's most controversial yet efficient private military companies. I am honoured to write the foreword to this book and proud to have once commanded some of these men, a number of whom died while honouring their word.

Lieutenant-General R (Witkop) Badenhorst, SSAS, SD, SM, MMM Chief of Staff Intelligence, South African Defence Force, April 1989-Nov 1991

DUGANDA

t,"RWAND Atlantic Ocean BURUNDI

Indian Ocean

Map of Africa showing areas where Executive Outcomes had an interest 1

In the beginning

became a soldier in the South African Defence Force in 1974. I For years I had secretly longed to d.on the uniform ofmy adopted country's anned forces and my only dream was to become a soldier. I had always considered the profession of arms to be an honourable one, charged with loyalty and devotion to duty - a profession where honour was held in high esteem. I believed that the military was free from the hypocrisy of politics and evil. Over the coming years I was to sadly learn that the reality was far removed from my idealistic notions. As a young boy I was keen to learn about the roles of my father and his brothers during World War II. My mother's brothers had also fought with distinction in the war. In addition to the normal campaign medals, my uncles brought home several decorations for gallantry, including the British Am1y's Military Medal and the American Bronze Star. From an undated yellowed-with-time newspaper clipping my mother gave me, I learned that US General Mark Clark had personally pinned the Bronze Star on my one uncle's chest. The action was thus described:

Sergeant Bob Roselt was also awarded the Bronze Star. He belongs to an anti- tank battery. On the night of November 11-12 last, while leading a patrol into enemy territory to secure information, he was fired on at close range by a machine gun and pinned down. Immediately three Germans attacked him, two tackling his arms and legs while the third clubbed him on the head with a rifle. Although beaten to his knees Sgt Roselt fought back and knocked two of them unconscious ... It is estimated that there were ten Germans in the ambush and that several of them were wounded by him before he led his men to safety. His action reflects great credit and bravery.

Although Ineverreallyknewmysoldier-uncles, they, along with my father, weremyreal- life heroes. We played many games of war as children, and even then I imagined I could smell the stench of gunpowder and see the blur of movement across our smoke-filled mock battlefields. I couldn't wait to become a real soldier, wear the uniform of the country that had become my home and defend it with pride and honour - even with my life if necessary. I was fortunate for I was able to realise my dream. T was commissioned into the South African Army's Engineer Corps (SAEC) in 1975. In the same year the South African Defence Force (SADF) went to war in Angola - a war that would continue for several years and still remains the cause of much anger, bitterness and pain to many people in southern Africa. It was also a war filled with betrayals that can never truly be forgotten or forgiven. Angola, strategically located on the western coast of the African continent, became a

13 colony of Portugal in 1491 and was declared an Overseas Territory of Portugal in 1951. Resenting Portuguese colonial rule, an organisation known as the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in 1956 set its sights on achieving complete independence from Portugal. In 1961 the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) entered into the fray. In 1964 it was joined by a third movement known as the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). It was a stmggle that would lead to a bloody and protracted war between Portugal and the three vastly different liberation movements. This war for independence lasted from 1961 until 1975 when the Portuguese metropolitan government, unable to continue with a sustained guerrilla war in Angola and brought to its knees by its own communist-infiltrated armed forces, decided to relinquish power to the Angolans and get out of Africa as fast as it could. There were numerous clashes between the MPLA and UNITA as both sides vied for power in the struggle to take control once the Portuguese had left Angola. To compound matters, a power struggle developed between the president of the MPLA, Augustinho Neto, and the commander of the MPLA's army, Daniel Chipenda. This internal squabble eventually culminated in Chipenda defecting to the FNLA with a large portion of the MPLA's army, which by then was known as FAPLA, which bolstered the FNLA's military position considerably. FNLA and UNITA, despite regarding the MPLA as a common enemy, were in no way allied. The FNLA, under the leadership of Holden Roberto, chose to operate from both the Congo and the power base Chipenda had established in the south of Angola while he was still with the MPLA. UNITA, under the control of Dr Jonas Savimbi - a supporter and student of China's Mao Ze Dong - also operated from southern Angola. Apart from fighting for a slice of Angola, Savimbi's UNITA was also supporting the South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) which in turn was fighting for independence in . SWAPO's cross-border activities were the reason that South African troops were deployed on the northern border of South West Africa (later Namibia). When the Portuguese granted independence to Angola in November 1975, they decided to relinquish power either to a coalition or to the strongest of the three movements. This could only lead to a chaotic result as each faction fought to grab as much territory as it could and achieve as much influence as possible. The help of Cuba was obtained by the communist-infiltrated Portuguese armed forces to restructure, re-equip and retrain FAPLA. The first Cuban military contingents had arrived in Angola bymid-1975. These units supported the well-equipped and retrained FAPLA, and it was not long before they were able to dominate central and most of southern Angola. They also had a strong presence in the east and north. The MPLA soon proved itself to be the strongest of the three factions fighting for power. Into this maelstrom of civil war and violence, stepped the super powers - the United States and the Soviet Union - and South Africa. America initially provided assistance to the FNLA but later, for reasons of its own, switched its support to UNITA. At that time it was speculated that it was because UNITA controlled the Angolan diamond-rich areas. South Africa also chose to assist UNITA, despite the fact that UNITA was supporting SWAPO. Again rumours were rife that it was because of diamonds. The bloody civil war that followed would finally culminate in an MPLA government under Augustinho Neto grabbing control of much of Angola. The FNLA and UNITA proclaimed a short-lived coalition government in the town of Nova Lisboa. It was against the background of this mess that Colonel Jan Breytenbach, the founder ofthe SADF's Reconnaissance Commandos, was tasked in 1975 with establishing contact

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