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TORTS Common Law Decisions of the United States Are an Appropriate TORTS 1 TORTS Common law decisions of the United States are an appropriate source of guidance for this court for contract and tort issues unresolved by statutes, decisions of constitutional courts here, or custom and tradition within the Federated States of Micronesia. Review of decisions of courts of the United States, and any other jurisdictions, must proceed however against the background of pertinent aspects of Micronesian society and culture. Semens v. Continental Air Lines, Inc. (I), 2 FSM R. 131, 142 (Pon. 1985). Roughly stated, the general principle is that one person may be liable in tort to another only if the first intentionally or negligently violates a duty owed to the other, and the other is injured as a result. Semens v. Continental Air Lines, Inc. (I), 2 FSM R. 131, 142 (Pon. 1985). According to the Pohnpeian view of civil wrongs, if one damages another’s property, he must repair or replace it; if one injures another person, he must apologize and provide assistance to the injured person and his family; if one kills another person, he must provide the assistance that the victim would have provided and may have to offer another person to take the place of victim in his family. Koike v. Ponape Rock Products, Inc., 3 FSM R. 57, 70-71 (Pon. S. Ct. Tr. 1986). Primary lawmaking powers for the field of torts lie with the states, not with the national government, but the national government may have an implied power to regulate tort law as part of the exercise of other general powers. Edwards v. Pohnpei, 3 FSM R. 350, 359 (Pon. 1988). Although the FSM Supreme Court has often decided matters of tort law without stating explicitly that state rather than national law controls, there has been acknowledgment that state law controls in the resolution of contract and tort issues. When the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, decides a matter of state law, its goal should be to apply the law the same way the highest state court would. Edwards v. Pohnpei, 3 FSM R. 350, 360 n.22 (Pon. 1989). Chuuk State has adopted common law tort principles as the law of Chuuk State where no specific constitutional or traditional impediment to its adoption exists. Epiti v. Chuuk, 5 FSM R. 162, 165 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1991). Claims for torts that took place before 1951 accrued, at the latest, when the applicable Trust Territory statute took effect in 1951. Unless tolled, the statutes of limitation bar the FSM courts from adjudicating such claims. Alep v. United States, 6 FSM R. 214, 219-20 (Chk. 1993). Where a statute creates a cause of action and then places exclusive, original jurisdiction over all controversies arising from that cause of action in a particular court, another court will have no jurisdiction to entertain claims under that statute. Damarlane v. United States, 6 FSM R. 357, 360 (Pon. 1994). Various environmental acts that do not provide for a private citizen’s cause of action for monetary damages cannot be used to create a duty for the breach of which damages may be awarded. Damarlane v. United States, 6 FSM R. 357, 360-61 (Pon. 1994). Since state law generally controls the resolution of tort issues the duty of the FSM Supreme Court in a diversity case involving tort law is to try to apply the law the same way the highest TORTS 2 state court would. Nethon v. Mobil Oil Micronesia, Inc., 6 FSM R. 451, 455 (Chk. 1994). Common law tort principles from other jurisdictions have previously been adopted by the Chuuk State Supreme Court where there has been no constitutional or traditional impediment to doing so. Nethon v. Mobil Oil Micronesia, Inc., 6 FSM R. 451, 455 (Chk. 1994). A tort is a wrong for which the harm that resulted, or is about to result, is capable of being compensated in an action at law. The purpose is to afford compensation for injuries sustained by one person as the result of the unreasonable or socially harmful conduct of another. Primo v. Refalopei, 7 FSM R. 423, 430 n.13 (Pon. 1996). Any attempt to breathe new life into tort claims time barred by the relevant and analogous statutes should be approached with caution because they are the type of personal claims for money damages that become increasingly difficult of proof and difficult to defend with the passage of time. Ordinarily such claims are resolved by political and diplomatic efforts. Alep v. United States, 7 FSM R. 494, 498 (App. 1996). The defenses of estoppel, unclean hands and laches are all equitable defenses which do not apply in actions sounding in personal injury. Conrad v. Kolonia Town, 8 FSM R. 183, 193 (Pon. 1997). Should Pohnpeian custom and tradition not be determinative, the FSM Supreme Court will look to its earlier holding and decisions of United States courts for guidance as to relevant common law tort principles, and will evaluate the persuasiveness of the reasoning in these decisions against the background of pertinent aspects of Micronesian society and culture in Pohnpei. Mauricio v. Phoenix of Micronesia, Inc., 8 FSM R. 248, 253 (Pon. 1998). The general principle is that one person may be liable in tort to another only if the first intentionally or negligently violates a duty owed to the other, and the other is injured as a result. Pohnpei v. M/V Miyo Maru No. 11, 8 FSM R. 281, 293, 294 (Pon. 1998). United States common law decisions are an appropriate source of guidance for this court for contract and tort issues unresolved by statutes, decisions of constitutional courts here, or custom and tradition within the Federated States of Micronesia. United States courts have generally followed the provisions of the Restatement of Torts in situations where a plaintiff alleges that a defendant has negligently prevented a third party from rendering assistance. Pohnpei v. M/V Miyo Maru No. 11, 8 FSM R. 281, 293-94 (Pon. 1998). State law controls in the resolution of contract and tort issues. When the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, decides a matter of state law, its goal should be to apply the law the same way the highest state court would. When no existing case law is found the FSM Supreme Court must decide issues of tort law by applying the law as it believes the state court would. Pohnpei v. M/V Miyo Maru No. 11, 8 FSM R. 281, 294-95 (Pon. 1998). A tort is a wrong for which the harm that resulted is capable of being compensated in an action at law. The purpose is to afford compensation for injuries sustained by one person as the result of the unreasonable or socially harmful conduct of another. Generally, one person may be liable in tort to another only if the first intentionally or negligently violates a duty owed to the other, and the other is injured as a result. Asher v. Kosrae, 8 FSM R. 443, 449 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1998). TORTS 3 The states’ role in tort law is predominant. Phoenix of Micronesia, Inc. v. Mauricio, 9 FSM R. 155, 158 (App. 1999). A Kosrae state regulation that covers all persons wanting to fill in and construct on or over land below the ordinary high water mark does not provide any private right of action and cannot be the basis of a claim against the state for violation of law or regulation even if it did not have a specific plan for the seawall that was part of a road-widening project for which it had an overall plan. Jonah v. Kosrae, 9 FSM R. 335, 342-43 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2000). The purpose of tort law is to afford a victim compensation for injuries sustained as the result of the unreasonable or socially harmful conduct of another. This is true whether the tort is statutorily created, as are the civil rights claims under 11 F.S.M.C. 701(3), or is a creature of the common law, as is a battery cause of action. Atesom v. Kukkun, 10 FSM R. 19, 23 (Chk. 2001). The statute, 30 F.S.M.C. 104, does not impose a duty upon the FSM Development Bank to provide technical assistance to debtors to whom it has already made a loan, nor to assignees of those debtors. Nor does it give rise to a private cause of action. FSM Dev. Bank v. Mudong, 10 FSM R. 67, 76-77 (Pon. 2001). United States common law decisions are an appropriate source of guidance for the Kosrae State Court for tort issues unresolved by statutes, decisions of constitutional courts here, or custom and tradition within the Federated States of Micronesia. Talley v. Lelu Town Council, 10 FSM R. 226, 234, 236 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2001). State law generally determines tort issues, and the FSM Supreme Court in diversity cases must attempt to apply the law in the manner that the highest state court would. Amayo v. MJ Co., 10 FSM R. 244, 253-54 (Pon. 2001). A given for tort causes of action is that the alleged actor have some interest in or control over the instrumentality that brought about the tortious conduct. Kosrae v. Worswick, 10 FSM R. 288, 291 (Kos. 2001). The legislature has the power to modify or abolish common law rights or remedies and may supersede the common law without an express directive to that effect, as by adoption of a system of statutes comprehensively dealing with a subject to which the common law rule related.
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