By Christopher Twardawa [email protected]

To be presented to the Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform

January 2007 Version ONE-070.131

www.ctess.ca www.TwardawaModel.org

Any opinion or view presented in the document is that of and only of the author, Christopher Twardawa, and may not necessarily reflect those of any organization he is or has been associated with.

Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is permitted, provided the source (Christopher Twardawa and www.ctess.ca or www.TwardawaModel.org ) is fully acknowledged.

© Christopher Twardawa, 2007

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

Sometimes the simplest solution is the best.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution ii

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

About CTESS

The Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution (CTESS) is the creation of its author – Christopher Twardawa and is designed to provide a better electoral system than what and its provinces now have. With the belief that the current system is good but requires improvements, CTESS strengthens it by identifying deficiencies and proposing innovations. Unlike any other electoral system currently in use and which all have tradeoffs, CTESS has no tradeoffs and therefore eliminates the need to change electoral systems as a whole.

Christopher first started thinking about this after the 1993 Canadian federal elections, since the results of those elections appeared to him to be inconsistent with how the voters voted. Ten years later in 2003, while still in university, he came up with the current model (the Twardawa Model) which is a simple yet considerate and sophisticated model. It can be applied to any democratic state under the Westminster model of government and similar systems.

As per the Lobbyists Registration Office of the Government of Ontario’s definitions of consultant lobbyists, in-house lobbyists (persons and partnerships) and in-house lobbyists (organizations) and the Office of the Registrar of Lobbyists of the Government of Canada’s definitions of consultant lobbyists, in-house corporate lobbyists and in- house organization lobbyists, CTESS does not have or retain the services of any lobbyist.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution iii

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

About the Author

Christopher Twardawa was born and raised in Quebec City. He graduated from Université Laval in Economics and Political Science. He has worked in many governmental organizations such as Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Department of National Defence, Public Works and Governmental Services Canada and the Canadian Parliament, Ontario’s Ministry of Consumer and Business Services, the Financial Services Commission of Ontario and Ombudsman Ontario and Quebec’s Ministry of Industry and Commerce.

In addition to his involvement with government, he has been active politically as well. He has campaigned in various provincial and federal elections. Also, he served as vice- president of his riding association for a well-known Quebec provincial party.

Christopher currently works in in the private sector and is studying towards his CFA. He is no longer a member of any and is not a member of any political organization including Fair Vote Canada or Fair Vote Ontario.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my family for their support as well as the educators and professors I had throughout my academic years. In particular, I would like thank the teachers who taught me my first few political science courses at CÉGEP Champlain Regional College – St. Lawrence Campus as well as all the professors I have learned from at Université Laval.

Ironically, as much as the results provided by several elections held in Canada in the 1990s were mind-boggling and unfair, they contributed in fostering the concerns and the repugnance I have towards our electoral system and fuelled in me the determination required to create a better electoral system.

Finally, I would also like to thank Ontario’s Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform for allowing me to observe their sessions during the members’ learning phase.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution iv

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

Table of Contents

ABOUT CTESS III

ABOUT THE AUTHOR IV

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS IV

PREFACE 1

THE CORE VALUE OF CTESS 2

THE BEAUTY OF ONTARIO’S CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLY ON ELECTORAL REFORM 3

THE EVOLUTION OF ONTARIO’S POPULATION 4

THE DEGREES OF COMPLEXITY OF AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM 7

THE THREE CTESS FUNDAMENTALS 8

CTESS FUNDAMENTAL I: DEFINING DEMOCRACY 8 CTESS FUNDAMENTAL II: THE GETTYSBURG ADDRESS 8 CTESS FUNDAMENTAL III: THE CONCEPT OF MAJORITY 8

PREMISES 9

CTESS PREMISE I: ASSESSING THE POWER OF EVERY POLITICAL PARTY IN THE LEGISLATURE . 10 CTESS PREMISE II: THE UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES OF MINORITY OR COALITION GOVERNMENTS 13 CTESS PREMISE III: DIFFERENT ROLES FOR THE PARTIES FORMING THE LEGISLATURE 17

THE DEFICIENCIES OF OUR CURRENT SYSTEM 19

SMP DEFICIENCY I: THE ELECTION AT THE ELECTORAL DISTRICT LEVEL 20 SMP DEFICIENCY II: LEGISLATURE MAKEUP DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE POPULATION AS A WHOLE 25 SMP DEFICIENCY III: HIGH PORTION OF VOTES ARE WASTED 31

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution v

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

SMP DEFICIENCY IV: CREATING WEAK GOVERNMENTS OR WEAK OPPOSITIONS 35 SMP DEFICIENCY V: EVERY ELECTED OFFICIAL IS EQUAL DESPITE THAT ELECTORAL DISTRICTS ARE NOT 38

THE CTESS MECHANISM 40

CTESS STEP I: IMPROVING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AT THE ELECTORAL DISTRICT LEVEL 42 CTESS STEP II: ESTABLISHING WHICH PARTY WILL FORM THE GOVERNMENT 43 CTESS STEP III: ESTABLISHING WHICH PARTIES WILL FORM THE OPPOSITION AND ASSIGNING THEIR RESPECTIVE POWER WITHIN THE LEGISLATURE 45 CTESS STEP IV: ALLOCATING COMPENSATORY SEATS 46 CTESS STEP V: ASSIGNING THE VOTING POWER PER ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE 47

OTHER ATTRIBUTES OF CTESS 48

HOW CTESS WOULD TRANSPOSE INTO TODAY’S LEGISLATURE WITH THE RESULTS OF THE 2003 ONTARIO GENERAL ELECTIONS 49

THE ADVANTAGES OF CTESS 53

THE SIMPLICITY OF CTESS 54

PRESENTING CTESS TO ONTARIO’S CITIZENS 55

LISTING OF THE CTESS CUSTOMIZABLE VARIABLES 56

THE VALUES DETERMINED BY ONTARIO’S CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLY ON ELECTORAL REFORM 57

THE BICYCLE ANALOGY 59

ACRONYM GLOSSARY 60

APPENDIX A: DUAL-CLASS SHARE STRUCTURES AND BEST PRACTICES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 61

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution vi

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

Preface

This document proposes a new electoral system model named CTESS – Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution. As explaining CTESS right from the start without any foundations on the electoral process and deficiencies of Ontario’s current system – Single Member Plurality (SMP) would be unconstructive, this document first starts by establishing what the core value present in the whole system is. This document then presents a short background Ontario’s Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform and a few facts about Ontario’s population. The document then offers three fundamentals which CTESS builds on and the document proposes three premises which shape CTESS as a whole. Before elaborating on CTESS, the document examines the current electoral system in Ontario and points out its main deficiencies and refers to examples of past elections were such deficiencies occurred. The document then focuses on CTESS and presents the CTESS mechanism as well as defining every step involved. The document then continues on with a listing of the advantages of CTESS, its simplicity and its customizable variables. The document also tried to simulate what the current legislature of Ontario would look like had the 2003 Ontario general elections results been similar under CTESS to what they were in actuality. The document finishes with an evaluation as per criteria the values determined by the Citizens’ Assembly.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 1

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

The Core Value of CTESS

When designing CTESS, there is one value that is unmistakably the centerpiece of the whole system. The core value of CTESS is the Citizen .

It is the view of the author that the Citizen is the most important element when developing an electoral model. Elected officials are there to represent citizens and to govern the state in a fashion that will primarily be beneficial to Citizens all across its jurisdiction. After all, Citizens are at the heart of democracy and, unequivocally, the Citizen is the central element in CTESS.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 2

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

The Beauty of Ontario’s Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform

On November 18, 2004, the Dalton McGuinty announced that Ontario’s Democratic Renewal Secretariat would create a “jury” consisting of Ontario citizens to look into Ontario’s electoral system. In his statement, he said that “democracy belongs to its citizens, not just its elected officials.”

On March 27, 2006, the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs and Minister Responsible for Democratic Renewal Dr. announced the creation of a Citizens’ Assembly.

Much like the Canadian province of British Columbia did in 2004, 103 Ontario citizens were selected in the way comparable to a jury selection. Each one of them coming from Ontario’s 103 electoral districts (ridings), they frequently met in the fall of 2006 to learn about our and other electoral systems. Together, they are to recommend to the legislature whether Ontario should retain its current electoral system or adopt a new one.

The beauty of having citizens decide on the electoral system is that they are more likely to prefer a system that is beneficial to citizens as opposed to a system that is more beneficial to elected officials or a specific political party.

The reason for this is, as the saying goes, “he who owns the gold makes the rules” and in Ontario, it is not the sovereign who has the gold but the legislature and most specifically, the party in power. As the party in power has the power as its name suggests, it may be tempted to use it to its own advantage. For example, instances when Quebec underwent electoral reform, it was done by the legislature and it favoured a specific party. Case in point, in the late 1970’s, the party in power noticed that the business community was not contributing much funds to them and the party in opposition was getting massive contributions from the business community. The party in power then banned corporate donations to political parties and in doing so, it crippled the opposition party. Just a few years ago, this same party was in power and it noticed that newcomers to Quebec tended to favour the same other specific party so it introduced new voter-identification requirements in order to perhaps discourage and intimidate newcomers to Quebec from voting – although it is their legal right and duty.

Being independent from political parties, Ontario’s Citizens’ Assembly is more likely to provide an unbiased view when evaluating electoral systems, except for the bias of favouring citizens which is totally laudable. Furthermore, citizens happen to be the core value of CTESS. Giving such importance to citizens is what, in the view of the author, constitutes the true beauty of this process.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 3

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

The Evolution of Ontario’s Population

The population of Ontario has undergone many changes. It is now ten times larger than at the time of Confederation. The settlement patterns have shifted and Ontario now has a very ethnically diverse population. Also, at election time, there are more candidates per electoral district (riding) than ever before. The following graphs illustrate these transitions.

Total Population of Ontario

12 000 000

10 000 000

8 000 000

6 000 000

4 000 000

2 000 000

0 1851 1865 1879 1893 1907 1921 1935 1949 1963 1977 1991 2005

Data from: http://www.statcan.ca

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 4

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

.

Rural and Urban Population Patterns for Ontario

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1851 1865 1879 1893 1907 1921 1935 1949 1963 1977 1991 2005

Percentage of Urban Population Percentage of Rural Population

Data from: http://www.statcan.ca

Data from: http://www.statcan.ca

English (70.6%) English and non-official language (1.0%) Ontario Population by Mother Tongue English and French (0.3%) English, French and non-official language (0.03%) in 2001 French (4.3%) French and non-official language (0.1%) Chinese (3.6%) Italian (2.6%) German (1.4%) Portuguese (1.3%) Polish (1.2%) Spanish (1.0%) Punjabi (1.0%) Arabic (0.8%) Tagalog (Pilipino) (0.8%) Dutch (0.6%) Greek (0.6%) Vietnamese (0.5%) Ukrainian (0.4%) Cree (0.4%) Inuktitut (Eskimo) (0.001%) Other non-official languages (7.7%)

Data from: http://www.statcan.ca

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 5

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

Number of Candidates per Riding in Ontario

6

5

4

3

2

1

0 1867 1881 1895 1909 1923 1937 1951 1965 1979 1993

Ridings Excluding Uncontested Ones All Ridings

Data from: http://www.electionsontario.on.ca/results/history/candidates/number.jsp

At the time of Confederation, there were about two candidates per electoral district (riding) and this pattern continued until the 1937 elections (20 elections in total). From 1943 to 1987 (14 elections in total), most electoral districts had three contenders and since 1990 (4 elections in total), electoral districts often see five or more candidates running for election.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 6

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

The Degrees of Complexity of an Electoral System

As the previous section suggests, Ontario currently has a very diverse population mosaic and its population has transformed itself since the time of Confederation. In order to preserve the many different elements of Ontario’s population Mosaic in the legislature, the system selected must be considerate of and reflective of these characteristics. A system that is too simplistic will fail to do this. Therefore, a system with a fair degree of sophistication is required.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 7

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

The Three CTESS Fundamentals

CTESS Fundamental I: Defining Democracy

Democracy:

Origins Comes from the Greek: δηµοκρατια : δηο s (demos): the commons, the people; and κρατια (cracy): rule, sway, authority

Definition: Government by the people; that form of government in which the sovereign power resides in the people as a whole, and is exercised either directly or indirectly by them or by officers elected by them. In modern use often more vaguely denoting a social state in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or arbitrary differences of rank or privilege.

Source: The Oxford English Dictionary

CTESS Fundamental II: The Gettysburg Address

On November 19, 1863, President Abraham Lincoln pronounced an address in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. In this address he said the words that have now become a symbolic way of defining government:

“Government of the people, by the people, for the people”

Source: The Library of Congress http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/gadd/images/Gettysburg-2.jpg

CTESS Fundamental III: The Concept of Majority

It is only when more than half of a population (50% + 1) is of the same view that it can unequivocally be said in all certainty that this view is that of the majority.

CTESS considers that a simple majority is required to govern.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 8

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

Premises

There are three premises on which CTESS is founded and they shape the whole system. The first assesses the power each party has within the legislature. The second discusses minority and coalition governments and the third examines the different roles of political parties within the legislature.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 9

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

CTESS Premise I: Assessing the Power of every Political Party in the Legislature.

CTESS Premise I : The power a political party has within the legislature is not necessarily equal to the proportion of seats it has.

Very few people (elected officials, experts and specialists included) truly understand the power political parties have within their respective legislature. The common belief is that all one has to do is take the number of elected officials a party has, divided it by the total number of seats and multiply that by 100%.

For example, the common belief is that if Party A has 120 elected officials in a 200-seat legislature, Party A gets 60% of the power:

120 ÷ 200 × 100% = 60%

Suppose Party B gets 60 Seats and Party C gets 20 seats, the power in the legislature will be distributed as per the table below:

Commonly Believed Distribution of Power

Number of Seats Percentage of Power Party Party A 120 60% Party B 60 30% Party C 20 10%

Total 200 100%

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 10

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

As per the CTESS Fundamental III (the concept of majority), a political party only needs 50% + 1 of the vote to govern and with CTESS Fundamental III in mind, the distribution of power is as follows:

Distribution of Power in Reality

Number of Seats Percentage of Power Party Party A 120 100% Party B 60 0% Party C 20 0%

Total 200 100%

Therefore, any party who gets more than 50% of the vote (whether it gets 65% or 95% for example) can govern in any manner it wishes. Obviously, a party would prefer governing with 95% rather than 65% as the margin with the 95% is much more comfortable but nevertheless, in either scenario, the governing party can govern as it wishes. As for the parties who, once combined, get less than 50% of the vote, their votes in the legislature are symbolic and weightless should one party have the majority of seats. Incidentally, in 1997, the Very Honourable Jean Chrétien won the federal election with 51.50% of the seats in the House of Commons and he easily achieved what he wanted to in his mandate.

This reality also begs the question as to why so many people are in favour of proportional representation (PR). Although proportional representation has its pros and cons, if there is a legislature with a majority government, no matter the size of an opposition party (whether it gets 20% or 30% of the seats), it will always have 0% of the power. Again, for the same obvious reasons that the party in power would prefer getting 95% of the seats rather than 65%, an opposition party would prefer getting more seats than less.

It becomes trickier determining the distribution of power when no political party in a legislature has more than 50% of the seats. To illustrate the distribution of power in such a case, the following example is used.

Suppose there is a very contentious issue in a legislature of 100 seats and Party A has 48 seats, Party B has 47 seats and Party C has 5 seats. The commonly believed distribution of power would be as per the table below.

Commonly Believed Distribution of Power

Number of Seats Percentage of Power Party Party A 48 48% Party B 47 47% Party C 5 5%

Total 100 100%

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 11

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

Once again, this is a very contentious issue so that Party A and Party B must share different views. Since 48% of the legislature sees things one way and 47% of the legislature sees things another way, this gives great importance to Party C who holds the remaining 5% and whose input is required so that one side gets the required majority of votes [as per the CTESS Fundamental III (the concept of majority)]. Consequently, this 5% will be determinant on how this issue is carried forward and this makes Party C the most important party by putting all the power in its hands.

Distribution of Power in Reality

Number of Seats Percentage of Power Party Party A 48 0% Party B 47 0% Party C 5 100%

Total 100 100%

Bluntly put, Party C, who has 5% of the seats and constitutes a clear minority and nearly a fringe party, has 100% of the power.

The distribution above is perfectly democratic should legislatures only be elected for a single issue but as soon as a legislature deals with more than one issue, such a the current legislatures do as they are elected for many years and deal with numerous issues in each one of their powers of jurisdiction during their mandate, the distribution of power gets hijacked by the minority party as bargaining, compromises, game playing and negotiations take place. Such events happen in every legislature that has a minority or coalition government. More about these undesirable consequences are discussed in CTESS Premise II .

This also begs the question as to why so many people are in favour of proportional representation as proportional representation is associated with more than two political parties and often produce minority or coalition governments.

nb: CTESS Premise I presumes that all elected officials vote according to their party lines. (For mathematical reasons, even during free votes, a party either votes one way or another unless being split in the middle, so elected officials of the same party often vote in the same way regardless of the type of vote therefore it is safe to use this presumption.)

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 12

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

CTESS Premise II: The Undesirable Consequences of Minority or Coalition Governments

CTESS Premise II : Minority and coalition governments do not govern as well as majority

governments do.

We live in a world where people complain about issues that touch them and not about issues that are irrelevant to them. For instance, in Canada in mid-January, Canadians complain about the cold weather. In mid-July, Canadians complain about the unbearable heat waves. In mid-January though, no one ever complains about how hot it gets in July and conversely, in mid-July, no one complains about our cold winter weather. Likewise, Canadians complain about our Single Member Plurality (SMP) electoral system and are not concerned about deficiencies of other systems as these systems do not pertain to them.

Since the mid-1930’s, around two-thirds of democracies who have given themselves a brand new electoral system or have changed their electoral system chose one with elements of proportional representation, some of them going with proportional representation outright but most of them with mixed systems. Without a surprise, those who scrutinize and assess electoral systems with elements of proportional representation live in these systems, notably in Europe. Just like here in Canada where many academics and public policy experts challenge the Simple Member Plurality electoral system, European academics and public policy experts challenge their own electoral systems which have elements of proportional representation.

Some of these specialists include Torsten Persson (Professor of Economics and Director of the Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden, and Centennial Professor at the London School of Economics, London, United Kingdom) and Guido Tabellini (Professor of Economics and President of the Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy). Together they wrote several papers on electoral systems and how electoral systems with elements of proportional representation are ineffective.

Their papers can be bluntly summarized by saying that proportional representation elections are strongly associated with more than two political parties vying for votes. Also, these systems are more likely to produce minority or coalition governments.

It is very clear that minority governments are challenged and sometimes unable to adopt important pieces of legislation. It is also clear that minority governments last less long in Canada than do majority governments. In fact, in Canada, the average length of a parliament with a majority government is 4.2 years whereas it is only 1.5 years for

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 13

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

minority governments. This makes government unstable. Université de Montréal Professor André Blais, who studies electoral systems, informed the Citizens’ Assembly that under SMP, the average stay in power is 35 months and 75% of governments last longer than 1,000 days whereas under proportional representation, the average stay in power is only 26 months and only 50% of governments last longer than 1,000 days. However, some areas in Europe and in other legislatures where there are minority or coalition governments, the governments can last much longer. The fact that they last longer does not make them effective though.

Even in minority or coalition governments, CTESS Fundamental III holds true. That is, 50% + 1 votes in the legislature are required for passing decisions. What political parties do in this case is they try to build alliances and agreements with other political parties to find ways they could work together and have a combined vote of more than 50% of the total vote. If there is a formal agreement that is made, this would mean there is a “coalition government”. Minority governments try to bridge alliances on a per-issue basis.

Whether it is a minority or a coalition government that takes place, there is much bargaining, compromises, game playing and negotiations involved. When it comes to bargaining, compromises and negotiations, by their very nature, the compromises reached between the different sides are never optimal for citizens (violation of the CTESS Core Value : the Citizen) as if they were, they would have been accepted to start with and no bargaining, compromises and negotiations would have been necessary. Poor decisions are never beneficial to citizens yet they will be the ones who will carry the burden.

Where there is bargaining, compromises and negotiations, it is at most beneficial to the parties involved in the coalition and these parties are niche parties representing a small number of voters or target specific interests. Therefore, these small parties are getting a far greater influence then what they truly deserve as in the last example of the previous section.

If the last example of the previous section seems sporadic and unrealistic, please consider the true example below.

After the 2004 general federal , the formed a minority government with 43.8% of the seats in the Canadian Parliament and 44.2% of the seats once MP Belinda Stronach joined that party. The NDP had 6.2% of the seats.

After the 2006 general federal elections in Canada, the Conservative Party formed a minority government with 40.3% of the seats in the Canadian Parliament and 40.6% after MP’s and Wajid Khan joined that party and MP Garth Turner was ousted. The NDP had 9.4% of the seats.

In both cases, the NDP, the smallest party in the House of Commons but just the right size to give a majority to the government at the time played (and, as of today, plays) a crucial role. In fact, no longer than on January 8, 2007, the NDP Leader told the CBC that:

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 14

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

“The NDP will use its new sway with the government to get the Conservatives to shift gear on an "issue-by- issue" basis, just as the party did to get concessions with the former minority Liberal government.”

Source: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/01/08/layton-power-070108.html

Some Canadians may like what the NDP is making the government do and some Canadians may dislike this, but no matter what side Canadians are one, all must agree that the NDP only had 6.2% and 9.4% of the seats.

As for the games being played, this refers to games that fall under the Competition game, the Coordination game, the Downsian model, the Nash bargaining game, the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Stag hunt and the Ultimatum game. These games will always render less-than-optimal decisions (unless the most competent party can out-manoeuvre its counterparts right from the beginning which is unlikely as if so, theory of games would not exist as it would be redundant) which is a violation of CTESS Core Value : the Citizen as citizens will not benefit as much from less-than-optimal decisions as they would from optimal decisions by the very reason that these decisions are less-than- optimal. Furthermore, elected officials are not elected to play games, they are elected for other reasons as per the next section: CTESS Premise III .

Should bargaining, compromises, game playing and negotiations really being taken place in minority and coalition governments, there should be concrete proof of this and there is. It is hard to prove if for sure a small party greatly influenced a piece of legislature, a particular subsidy or a specific government program but as a whole, it all adds up. This is where the papers published by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini come in. Together, their research indicates that compared to majoritarian governments, proportional rule leads to larger overall spending. Depending on the study, they analysed 50, 60 or 80 democracies and to be sure the larger overall spending of the government compared to the GDP of the respective democracy was due to the fact that the electoral rule was either majoritarian or proportional and not due to other variables, they used cross sections and considered many exogenous variables such as the age of the democracy, its Gastil Indexes, its constitutional inertia (or “iron law”), its cultural and geographic variables and other co-variates. Thanks to the quality of their studies, the results they found are robust and reliable. Furthermore, many other experts have conducted research and written papers which either found similar conclusions or supported those of Persson and Tabellini. This includes David Austen-Smith, Yianos Kontopolous, Alessandro Lizzeri, Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, Roberto Perotti, Nicola Persico and Massimo Rostagno.

Of course, as in any other government, coalition governments have limited means, cannot spend as much as they wish and must control and limit their spending. With all the bargaining, compromises, game playing and negotiations taking place, coalition governments have difficulty controlling their spending and it is therefore not surprising that in order to appease the small parties forming the coalition, the overall spending is larger than if the government were a majority government.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 15

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

As this excess in spending benefits only some decision-brokers, that is the small parties in the coalition and who have been elected by a small portion of the electorate, the government is disproportionately favourable to these electors. This is a clear violation of the CTESS Fundamental I which states that in a democracy, everyone should be equal.

This excess in spending also underlines another negative consequence of minority and coalition governments. Should a minority or a coalition government do a lousy job during their mandate, whose fault is it? For example, if Coalition government X consists of an official agreement between Party A, Party B and Party C and together they do a lousy job, is it the fault of Party A and Party B and Party C? Or is it the fault of Party A solely? Or Party A and Party B? Or Party A and Party C? or Party… Furthermore, Party A will blame Party B or Party C, or both, and Party B and Party C will also blame one of the other parties, or both. When there is a majoritarian government and it does a lousy job, it is always clear who is responsible. This is no longer the case when there is a coalition government.

So that electoral systems with elements of proportional representation would be consistent with CTESS, either one of the next three conditions would be necessary:

1. General elections would be required after each and every single decision the legislature makes as new elections would make obsolete any agreement between any two parties because as soon as the first issue is dealt with, the agreement would become null and void as there would be elections and all agreement-making would need to start from zero after each elections however, such agreement-making would always be useless as there would always be elections between any two decisions the legislature makes. (In itself, this defeats the very nature of having elected officials.)

2. Within the legislature, only votes with perfectly unanimous outcomes would be sufficient for decisions to be made. (100% would be required for a decision to pass.) Or,

3. The responsibilities associated with each jurisdiction given the legislature by the constitution should be shared proportionally according to the share of the popular vote, each party would receives. (Should there be five political parties who each won 20% of the popular vote and therefore 20% of the seats within the legislature, each party would manage 20% of the budget, each party would have 100% control on the Ministry of Health 20% of the time, 100% control of the Ministry of Education 20% of the time, etc.)

For obvious reasons, all three of the above conditions are unreasonable, unworkable and in practice, would lead to a chaotic state which clearly violates the core value of CTESS: the interest of citizens as a whole.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 16

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

CTESS Premise III: Different Roles for the Parties Forming the Legislature

CTESS Premise III : Elected officials have two main duties: rule and represent citizens.

When speaking about electoral reform, it is crucial to understand the reason why we have elected officials. There are two main roles CTESS associates with elected officials. Before defining them, the following question is relevant.

Question: Does Ontario really need an opposition in its legislature? Answer: YES and NO

The reason the answer is “Yes and No”, is because elected officials have two very different roles: to govern the city/province/country and to represent its citizens.

CTESS Premise III, Role I: Elected Officials as Rulers

One of the two roles elected officials have is to rule the city/province/country (henceforth referred to as “the jurisdiction”). This role pertains to all the elected officials of the party in power (also known as the “government party” or simply the “government”) and most specifically, the members of the executive branch (Prime Minister or Premier, and Cabinet Members).

Most laws are initiated by the rulers and the public programs are managed by them. They provide leadership and executive decisions to the jurisdiction’s bureaucracy. They are also responsible for all the powers given to the legislature by the constitution. They are those who represent the jurisdiction abroad and ultimately, ensure the whole jurisdiction is running well.

To answer the question above, when in comes to ruling, NO, the Ontario legislature does not really need an opposition. In Westminster models of government, the leader of the official opposition is referred to as the “Leader of the Opposition”. In all other forms of governance, no such position exists. For instance, Canada’s Governor General and Ontario’s Lieutenant Governor do not have any such counterpart, nor does the President of France or of the , nor does the Governor of the , nor do the heads of any crown corporation in Canada or Ontario. No CEO of any private company has any such counter part, nor does the Executive Director of any not-for-profit

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 17

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

organization and even in co-operatives, the most democratic form of corporations, no such position exists. So to reiterate the answer of the question above, NO, the Ontario legislature does not really need an opposition to rule this province.

CTESS Premise III, Role II: Elected Officials as Representatives

The other of the two roles elected officials have is to represent their respective constituents. This means presenting the views of their constituents and local and regional issues to their caucus, to committees and to the legislature as a whole or to the appropriate Minister. The elected officials participate in Committee work and examine bills. They also meet with their constituents and respond to their needs (answering questions and directing them through the appropriate government process).

All elected officials, including those who are not part of the government, also serve as a government watchdog and question the government to keep it accountable, its bureaucracy and all of its business. CTESS considers that one of the opposition mmebers’ most important roles is to be a credible “government-in-waiting”. That is, should there be general elections held at any time, the “government(s)-in-waiting” will be a credible alternative(s) to the current government and will provide voters a real choice. Many experts agree that a real choice is necessary for there to be a good democracy and a good choice of credible candidates is beneficial to citizens.

To answer the question above, when in comes to representing the population, YES, the Ontario legislature does need an opposition and it should be strong enough to be a credible “government-in-waiting”.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 18

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

The Deficiencies of our Current System

The current electoral system of every province in Canada as well as the system at the federal level are all identical. The systems are all based on the Single Member Plurality (SMP) vote, commonly known as the “First Past-the-Post” (FPTP or FTP) system. CTESS identifies four major deficiencies specific to it as well as another deficiency of our current system that is not inherent to the SMP system but does exist. The first is at the local level: the representative elected at the district may not be the one the majority of constituents want. The second is that the legislature can misrepresent how the population as a whole voted. The third is that many votes are worthless. The fourth is that SMP can lead to weak governments and weak oppositions. Finally the last one, not inherently related to SMP, is that the size of the population within each electoral district varies from one district to the other. Examples of all five of these deficiencies are explained and exposed in the following pages.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 19

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

SMP Deficiency I: The Election at the Electoral District Level

When we elect our representative (city councillor, mayor, MPP, MP), Single Member Plurality (SMP) vote, commonly known as the “First Past-the-Post” (FTP) system is used. In this system, no matter how many candidates are contending the election, the one who gets the greatest number of votes wins. This system is absolutely fair if and only if there are only two candidates or if one of the candidates gets more than 50% of the votes. Should the candidate with the greatest number of votes have less than 50% of all the votes, he or she is nevertheless proclaimed the winner in SMP. These days, it is often not the case that a candidate wins with more than 50% of the vote.

To illustrate this SMP deficiency, the following fictive example is used. Suppose there is an election with five candidates (A, W, X, Y, Z) and 100 citizens vote. The candidates are from both extremes of a spectrum, which ranges from A to Z. The results are below:

Election Results with Five Candidates

21 20 20 20 19 Number Number of Votes

Candidate A Candidate W Candidate X Candidate Y Candidate Z

In this case, the candidate with the most votes (plurality of votes) is Candidate A. Therefore, clearly, Candidate A wins. However, Candidate A only won by one vote. Furthermore, all four other contenders were from the other extreme of the spectrum. One could argue that the electorate is 79% in favour of the ending zone of the spectrum and therefore a candidate from the ending zone of the spectrum should represent the 100 electors. The next graph shows the same results but in a different manner.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 20

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

Election Results with Five Candidates

Candidate W Candidate A 20% 21%

Candidate X Candidate Z 20% 19%

Candidate Y 20%

The graph above shows just what 21% is and how small it is compared to the four candidates from the ending zone of the spectrum combined who make 79% of the total votes. Perhaps if Candidate Z were not a contender, all of its votes would have gone to the closest candidate within the spectrum: Candidate Y. If that were the case, the results would have been as follows:

Election Results without Candidate Z

39

21 20 20 Number Number of Votes

Candidate A Candidate W Candidate X Candidate Y

In this case, Candidate Y would have won 39 votes which is more than any other contender and therefore it would have won the privilege to represent the 100 electors. However once again, the winner has less than 50% of the votes therefore it is hard to

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 21

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

claim that Candidate Y deserves to represent the 100 citizens. If one of the candidates would have won more than 50% of the votes, unequivocally, the winner would have won a clear victory and fully deserves to represent the 100 citizens. Had there only been two candidates, mathematically one would have got more than 50% of the votes and the other less (unless there is a tie).

SMP Deficiency I is only a recent deficiency as for the 20 first elections (out of a total of 39) since Confederation (and until 1937), the vast majority of electoral districts only had two contenders.

For the past three Ontario general elections, the average candidate who won did so with just above the 50% bar. This is an indication that a large portion of the candidates who win their election do so with less than 50%. In 1995, the average Ontario MPP won with 50.12% of the vote (89 out of 130 MPP’s won with less than 50%). In 1999 it was with 52.21% of the vote (40 out of 103 MPP’s won with less than 50%) and in 2003, it was with 50.37% of the vote (56 out of 103 MPP’s won with less than 50%). For each one of these elections, the three electoral districts where the elected MPP won with the lowest percentage of votes are listed.

True Ontario Examples

2003 General Provincial Elections of Ontario

LONDON-FANSHAWE: Elected with only 35.87% of the vote Number Percentage Political Candidate of votes of votes Party 13,920 35.87% L 12,051 31.05% NDP 11,777 30.35% PC 568 1.46% GP BRYAN SMITH 493 1.27% FR MIKE DAVIDSON Data from: http://www.electionsontario.on.ca/results

OSHAWA: Elected with only 37.32% of the vote Number Percentage Political Candidate of votes of votes Party 14,566 37.32% PC JERRY J. OUELLETTE 13,547 34.71% NDP 9,383 24.04% L CHRIS TOPPLE 636 1.63% GP KAREN TWEEDLE 518 1.33% FR PAUL MCKEEVER 383 0.98% FCP DALE CHILVERS Data from: http://www.electionsontario.on.ca/results

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 22

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

HAMILTON WEST: Elected with only 39.97% of the vote Number Percentage Political Candidate of votes of votes Party 15,600 39.97% L JUDY MARSALES 13,468 34.50% NDP ROY ADAMS 8,185 20.97% PC DOUG BROWN 750 1.92% FCP LYNNE SCIME 727 1.86% GP JO PAVLOV 303 0.78% IND JAMILA GHADDAR Data from: http://www.electionsontario.on.ca/results

1999 General Provincial Elections of Ontario

HAMILTON WEST: Elected with only 37.84% of the vote Number Percentage Political Candidate of votes of votes Party 15,625 37.84% NDP 12,261 29.70% PC LILLIAN ROSS 12,037 29.15% L FRANK D'AMICO 495 1.20% GP PHYLLIS MCCOLL 403 0.98% FCP LYNNE SCIME 236 0.57% IND WENDELL FIELDS 231 0.56% NLP RITA RASSENBERG Data from: http://www.electionsontario.on.ca/results

OTTAWA CENTRE: Elected with only 38.17% of the vote Number Percentage Political Candidate of votes of votes Party 17,956 38.17% L 15,403 32.74% PC RAY KOSTUCH 11,977 25.46% NDP ELISABETH ARNOLD 1,231 2.62% GP CHRIS BRADSHAW 174 0.37% C MARVIN GLASS 170 0.36% NLP WAYNE FOSTER 132 0.28% IND MISTAHI CORKILL Data from: http://www.electionsontario.on.ca/results

ETOBICOKE NORTH : Elected with only 38.27% of the vote Number Percentage Political Candidate of votes of votes Party 13,065 38.27% PC JOHN HASTINGS 11,619 34.03% L 8,166 23.92% NDP ED PHILIP 580 1.70% FCP MARK STEFANINI 489 1.43% IND DIANE JOHNSTON 223 0.65% NLP MARILYN PEPPER Data from: http://www.electionsontario.on.ca/results

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 23

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

1995 General Provincial Elections of Ontario

SARNIA: Elected with only 33.80% of the vote Number Percentage Political Candidate of votes of votes Party 9,260 33.80% PC DAVID BOUSHY 8,626 31.49% L JOAN LINK 7,487 27.33% NDP 1,642 5.99% FCP RON RAES 217 0.79% IND ANTHONY BARBATO 159 0.58% IND ANDREW FALBY Data from: http://www.electionsontario.on.ca/results

ST. GEORGE-ST. DAVID: Elected with only 33.87% of the vote Number Percentage Political Candidate of votes of votes Party 10,662 33.87% PC 10,325 32.80% L TIM MURPHY 9,672 30.72% NDP BRENT HAWKES 326 1.03% IND LINDA GIBBONS 241 0.76% GP CHRIS LEA 151 0.47% NL RON ROBINS 98 0.31% IND ALEX NOSAL Data from: http://www.electionsontario.on.ca/results

CHATHAM-KENT: Elected with only 36.28% of the vote Number Percentage Political Candidate of votes of votes Party 10,461 36.28% PC JACK CARROLL 9,915 34.39% L MIKE FERGUSON 7,444 25.82% NDP RANDY HOPE 1,008 3.49% FCP DAVID K. EDWARDS Data from: http://www.electionsontario.on.ca/results

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 24

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

SMP Deficiency II: Legislature Makeup Disproportionate to the Population as a Whole

Because no Ontario electoral district (riding) votes unanimously behind one party and because the electoral results of Ontario’s districts are not homogeneous, discrepancies can occur when comparing the makeup of the legislature and how Ontario electors voted as a whole. Because to win an election it only takes one more vote than the candidate with the second largest number of votes and the legislature is the “gathering of winners”, the legislature may not reflect how the province voted as a whole. This discrepancy also translates into discrepancies between electors of different political parties as these citizens would not be represented in the legislature at the same ratio.

For instance, a political party could get 62% of the popular vote throughout the jurisdiction but in the legislature, it only gets 40% of the seats. For example, suppose elections are being held to elect a 10-seat legislature and suppose there are 10 electoral districts of 100 voters who must chose between two parties, Party A and Party B. The results follow:

Electoral District Party A Party B Winner Riding 1 21 79 Party B Riding 2 9 91 Party B Riding 3 10 90 Party B Riding 4 10 90 Party B Riding 5 55 45 Party A Riding 6 55 45 Party A Riding 7 55 45 Party A Riding 8 55 45 Party A Riding 9 55 45 Party A Riding 10 55 45 Party A

Overall (Vote-wise) 380 (38%) 620 (62%) Party B Overall (Riding-wise) 6 4 Party A

The numbers above suggest that of the ten electoral districts, six of them voted for Party A and four of them for Party B. However, when looking at the popular vote as a whole, the voters voted massively in favour of Party B yet a SMP legislature would not reflect this.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 25

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

Overall Popular Vote

Party A; 38%

Party B; 62%

Riding by Riding Results

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% Party B 50% 40% Party A 30% 20% Percentage of votes Percentage 10% 0%

1 2 5 8 g g g 10 ing ing 4 in g id idin id idin iding 6 iding 7 id iding 9 in R R Riding 3 R R R R R R d Ri

When looking at the graphs above, it is apparent that there are more Party B votes than Party A votes (62% vs 38%) however, due to how the system is structured, Party A gets six ridings and Party B gets four. It can also be said that Party B needs 155 votes to win one seat whereas Party A only needs 64. This translates into electors of Party A being worth 2.45 times more than electors who voted for Party B.

Such discrepancy between the outcomes of the legislature and the popular vote, which are inversed, is henceforth referred to as “wrongly elected governments”, are uncommon in Canada however they do happen. Moreover, nearly every election in Canada, provincial and federal, creates either under-representation in the legislatures of political

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 26

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

parties based on the popular vote or over-representation. Both unfair representations go hand in hand as if one party is over-represented, another must conversely be under- represented. What is worst, it can happen that the party who forms government as it has the majority of seats actually received fewer votes than a political party in opposition. Provincial and Federal elections combined, Canada has seen more than a dozen wrongly elected governments since Confederation. Examples of disproportionate representation and wrongly elected governments follow.

Examples of Disproportionate Representation

Ontario General Elections of 1919 Number Percentage Number Percentage Political Party of Votes of Votes of Seats of Seats Conservative 396,737 33,72% 25 22,52% Liberal 303,854 25,83% 27 24,32% United Farmers 254,923 21,67% 44 39,64% Labour 110,968 9,43% 11 9,91% Independent 38,377 3,26% 0 0,00% Labour-Unitd.Farm 25,324 2,15% 1 0,90% Conserv.Independent 14,213 1,21% 0 0,00% Soldier 9,618 0,82% 1 0,90% Soldier-Labour 9,088 0,77% 0 0,00% Liberal-Unitd Farm. 7,448 0,63% 1 0,90% Liberal Independent 5,354 0,46% 1 0,90% Socialist 637 0,05% 0 0,00% Data from:

In the case above, the Conservative Party got the same amount of votes as the United Farmers, plus fifty five percent more. Yet, the United Farmers won nearly twice as many seats in the Legislature. The Liberal Party only got nearly three-quarters of what the Conservative Party got, yet they got two more seats than them.

Canadian 1993 General Elections Number Percentage Number Percentage Political Party of Votes of Votes of Seats of Seats Liberal Party of Canada 5,598,775 41.23% 177 60,00% 2,537,189 18.69% 52 17,63% Progr. Conserv. Party of Canada 2,178,303 16.04% 2 0,68% 933,688 6.88% 9 3,05% Bloc Québécois 1,835,784 13.52% 54 18,31% National Party of Canada 189,778 1.40% 0 Natural Law Party of Canada 85,450 0.63% 0 The 33,049 0.24% 0 Christian Heritage Party of Canada 30,455 0.22% 0 Libertarian Party of Canada 15,079 0.11% 0 Abolitionist Party of Canada 9,851 0.07% 0 7,665 0.06% 0 Party for the Comm’lth of Canada 7,502 0.06% 0 Marxist-Leninist Party of Canada 5,202 0.04% 0 Independent 98,438 0.72% 1 0,34% No affiliation 12,111 0.09% 0 Data from: http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/about/process/house/hfer/hfer.asp

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 27

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

In the 1993 general elections of Canada, nearly as many Canadians voted for the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada than for the Reform Party of Canada, yet, the Reform Party won 26 times more seats than the PC. This translates into citizens who voted for the Reform Party are worth 22 times more than those who voted for the PC’s. The NDP received half of what the Bloc Québécois received in terms of votes, yet the Bloc received six times more seats. This translates into citizens who voted for the Bloc Québécois are worth three times more than those who voted for the NDP. The PC’s received more votes than the Bloc Québécois, yet the Bloc received 27 times fore seats. This translates into citizens who voted for the Bloc Québécois are worth 32 times more than those who voted for the PC’s.

Canadian 1997 General Elections Number Percentage Number Percentage Political Party of Votes of Votes of Seats of Seats Liberal Party of Canada 4,994,277 38.46% 155 51.50% Reform Party of Canada 2,513,080 19.35% 60 19.93% Progr. Conserv. Party of Canada 2,446,705 18.84% 20 6.64% New Democratic Party 1,434,509 11.05% 21 6.98% Bloc Québécois 1,385,821 10.67% 44 14.62% The Green Party of Canada 55,583 0.43% 0 Natural Law Party of Canada 37,085 0.29% 0 Christian Heritage Party of Canada 29,085 0.22% 0 Canadian Action Party 17,502 0.13% 0 Marxist-Leninist Party of Canada 11,468 0.09% 0 Independent 34,507 0.27% 1 0.33% No affiliation 26,252 0.20% 0 Data from: http://www.elections.ca

In the 1997 federal general elections, while the Reform Party of Canada received 0.5% more votes than the Progressive Conservatives, they won three times mores seats. This translates into citizens who voted for the Reform Party are three times more valuable than those who voted for the PC’s. The NDP, who received a million less votes than the PC’s, won one more seat than them. As for the Bloc Québécois, although they received 0.4% less than the NDP, they won twice the number of seats. This trickles down to mean that a Bloc voter is worth nearly four times as much as a PC voter. Another interesting observation is that while the Progressive Conservative Party increased their percentage of the popular vote by 2.8% compared to the previous general elections, its number of seats in the House of Commons increased tenfold.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 28

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

Examples of Wrongly Elected Governments

2006 New Brunswick General Elections: The Progressive Conservative Party won more votes than the Liberal Party but won less seats and failed to form Government Number Percentage Number Percentage Political Party of Votes of Votes of Seats of Seats Progr. Conservative Party of NB 177,744 47.49% 26 47.3% Liberal Party 176,410 47.13% 29 52.7% New Democratic Party 19,212 5.13% 0 Independent 935 0.25% 0 Data from: http://www.gnb.ca/elections

1999 Saskatchewan General Elections: The Saskatchewan Party won more votes than the NDP but won less seats and failed to form Government Number Percentage Number Percentage Political Party of Votes of Votes of Seats of Seats Saskatchewan Party 160,603 39.61% 25 43.10% New Democratic Party 157,046 38.73% 29 50.00% Saskatchewan Liberal Association 81,694 20.15% 4 6.90% New Green Alliance 4,101 1.01% 0 Progr. Conserv. Party of Saskat. 1,609 0.40% 0 Independent 422 0.10% 0 Data from: http://www.elections.sk.ca/history.php

1998 Quebec General Elections: The Québec Liberal Party won more votes than the Parti Québécois but won less seats and failed to form Government Number of Percentage Number Percentage Political Party Votes of Votes of Seats of Seats Québec Liberal Party 1,771,858 43.55% 48 38.40% Parti Québécois 1,744,240 42.87% 76 60.80% Action démocratique du Québec / 480,636 11.81% 1 0.80% Équipe Mario Dumont Parti de la démocratie socialiste 24,097 0.59% 0 Parti égalité / 12,543 0.31% 0 Bloc-pot 9,944 0.24% 0 Natural Law Party of Québec 5,369 0.13% 0 Parti marxiste-léniniste du Québec 2,747 0.07% 0 Parti innovateur du Québec 2,484 0.06% 0 Parti communiste du Québec 2,113 0.05% 0 Independant 12,441 0.31% 0 Data from: http://www.electionsquebec.qc.ca

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 29

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

1996 British Columbia General Elections: The BC Liberal Party won more votes than the NDP but won less seats and failed to form Government Number Percentage Number Percentage Political Party of Votes of Votes of Seats of Seats BC Liberal Party 661,929 41.82% 33 44.00% New Democratic Party of BC 624,395 39.45% 39 52.00% Reform Party of BC 146,734 9.27% 2 2.67% Progr. Democ. Alliance 90,797 5.74% 1 1.33% Green Party Political Assoc. of BC 31,511 1.99% 0 BC Party 6,276 0.40% 0 The Family Coalition Party of BC 4,150 0.26% 0 Natural Law Party 2,919 0.18% 0 BC Libertarian Party 2,041 0.13% 0 *Other Affiliations 11,952 0.76% 0 Data from: http://elections.bc.ca/elections/sov96/polpart.htm

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 30

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

SMP Deficiency III: High Portion of Votes are Wasted

The third deficiency of the SMP system is that it creates a large number of “wasted” votes. Under this system, the only votes which are important are those that are for the winner and of those, only those that were needed to win are important. The other votes the winner got are excess votes (or surplus votes) and had the winner not gotten them, they would have won anyway. As for the votes for the other candidates, they are wasted as well as they did not serve to elect anyone anywhere. If once again we take the last example outlined under SMP Deficiency I , there are 78 wasted votes and 22 important votes. The 22 important votes are the first 22 votes Candidate Y received. The amount of 22 is equal to the number of votes the second most popular candidate received plus one. All 78 other votes are wasted: the 61 votes Candidates A, W and X got as well as the 17 surplus votes Candidate Y got. For instance, had Candidate W received 19 votes, 18 votes or 0 votes, the outcome for the election would be the same: Candidate Y would have won. Had Candidate Y won 38 votes, 37 votes or 22 votes, the outcome for the election would be the same: Candidate Y would still win. In other words, out of the 100 votes cast in this election, only the 22 first votes for Candidate Y are important and the others are wasted.

Election Results without Candidate Z

39

21 20 20 Number Number of Votes

Candidate A Candidate W Candidate X Candidate Y

For each of the three last Ontario general elections, the three electoral districts with the highest percentage of wasted votes are listed in the following pages.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 31

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

True Ontario Examples

2003 General Provincial Elections of Ontario

On average, 67.35% of the votes were wasted when voting at the district level. At the provincial level, that number would be higher.

SUDBURY: 85.81% of the votes were wasted Number Percentage Political Candidate of votes of votes Party 24,631 68.98% L 5,068 14.19% PC MILA WONG 4,999 14.00% NDP HARVEY WYERS 1,009 2.83% GP LUKE NORTON Data from: http://www.electionsontario.on.ca/results

THUNDER BAY-SUPERIOR NORTH: 84.98% of the votes were wasted Number Percentage Political Candidate of votes of votes Party 21,938 72.45% L 4,548 15.02% NDP BONNIE SATTEN 2,912 9.62% PC BRENT SYLVESTER 882 2.91% GP CARL ROSE Data from: http://www.electionsontario.on.ca/results

PARKDALE-HIGH PARK: 83.82% of the votes were wasted Number Percentage Political Candidate of votes of votes Party 23,008 57.83% L 6,436 16.18% PC STEPHEN SNELL 6,275 15.77% NDP MARGO DUNCAN 2,758 6.93% GP NEIL SPIEGEL 591 1.49% FCP STAN GRZYWNA 349 0.88% C KARIN LARSEN 204 0.51% IND JOHN STEELE 165 0.41% FR DICK FIELD Data from: http://www.electionsontario.on.ca/results

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 32

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

1999 General Provincial Elections of Ontario

On average, 65.12% of the votes were wasted when voting at the district level. At the provincial level, that number would be higher.

WINDSOR WEST: 83.27% of the votes were wasted Number Percentage Political Candidate of votes of votes Party 24,388 65.50% L 6,229 16.73% PC DAVID MCCAMON 5,762 15.48% NDP LIAM MCCARTHY 420 1.13% GP TIMOTHY DUGDALE 270 0.73% IND ROBERT CRUISE 162 0.44% NLP LYNN TOBIN Data from: http://www.electionsontario.on.ca/results

THUNDER BAY-SUPERIOR NORTH: 81.45% of the votes were wasted Number Percentage Political Candidate of votes of votes Party 19,249 60.90% L MICHAEL GRAVELLE 5,864 18.55% NDP NATHALIE GALESLOOT 5,683 17.98% PC ED LINKEWICH 431 1.36% IND ROBERT WOITO 382 1.21% GP CARL ROSE Data from: http://www.electionsontario.on.ca/results

THUNDER BAY-ATIKOKAN: 80.79% of the votes were wasted Number Percentage Political Candidate of votes of votes Party 20,268 64.03% L LYN MCLEOD 6,081 19.21% PC JOHN HENDERSON 5,304 16.76% NDP JACK DREWES Data from: http://www.electionsontario.on.ca/results

1995 General Provincial Elections of Ontario

On average, 70.69% of the votes were wasted when voting at the district level. At the provincial level, that number would be higher.

SIMCOE WEST: 84.86% of the votes were wasted Number Percentage Political Candidate of votes of votes Party 24,346 68.24% PC JIM WILSON 5,499 15.41% L JAMIE SHORTT 4,937 13.83% NDP KATHY SIMPSON 894 2.50% FCP JAMES GAULT Data from: http://www.electionsontario.on.ca/results

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 33

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

BURLINGTON SOUTH: 84.18% of the votes were wasted Number Percentage Political Candidate of votes of votes Party 24,831 72.55% PC 5,415 15.82% L RAY RIVERS 3,507 10.24% NDP DAVID MILES 470 1.37% FCP EMIDIO CORVARO Data from: http://www.electionsontario.on.ca/results

MISSISSAUGA SOUTH: 83.25% of the votes were wasted Number Percentage Political Candidate of votes of votes Party 23,116 69.76% PC 5,551 16.75% L IEVA MARTIN 3,282 9.90% NDP DAVID MESSENGER 334 1.00% NL SCOTT KAY 309 0.93% IND ADRIAN EARL CREWSON 287 0.86% IND WOLFGANG G. MUELLER 256 0.77% GP MATTHEW WOOD Data from: http://www.electionsontario.on.ca/results

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 34

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

SMP Deficiency IV: Creating Weak Governments or Weak Oppositions

Canada, Ontario and other provinces have been very fortunate in the past to have been affected by the fourth deficiency of the SMP system only on an infrequent basis however, this is only due to a coincidence. As soon as there are more than two political parties who are getting seats in the legislature, there is a possibility of minority governments. A minority government is when no party in the legislature has more than 50% of the seats. Minority governments tend not to last as long as majority governments and while minority governments are in power, it is more challenging to them to exercise their power. More about minority governments is discussed under the “roles of the parties forming the legislature”.

Examples of Weak Governments

2004 Canadian General Elections: The minority government below lasted 16 months Number Percentage Number Percentage Political Party of Votes of Votes of Seats of Seats Liberal Party of Canada 4,982,220 36.73% 135 43.83% Conservative Party of Canada 4,019,498 29.63% 99 32.14% New Democratic Party 2,127,403 15.68% 19 6.17% Bloc Québécois 1,680,109 12.39% 54 17.53% Green Party of Canada 582,247 4.29% 0 Christian Heritage Party 40,335 0.30% 0 33,276 0.25% 0 Progressive Canadian Party 10,872 0.08% 0 Canadian Action Party 8,807 0.06% 0 Marxist-Leninist Party of Canada 8,696 0.06% 0 Communist Party of Canada 4,426 0.03% 0 Libertarian Party of Canada 1,949 0.01% 0 Independent 47,068 0.35% 1 0.32% No Affiliation 17,796 0.13% 0 Data from: http://www.elections.ca/scripts/OVR2004/default.html

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 35

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

1985 Ontario General Elections: The Progressive Conservative minority government below lasted 55 days Number Percentage Number Percentage Political Party of Votes of Votes of Seats of Seats 1,377,965 37.90% 48 38.40% Progr. Conserv. Party of Ontario 1,343,044 36.94% 52 41.60% New Democratic Party 865,507 23.81% 25 20.00% Ontario Libertarian Party 12,831 0.35% 0 The 5,345 0.15% 0 Communist Party of Ontario 3,696 0.10% 0 The 1,583 0.04% 0 Unregistered Political Interests 25,728 0.71% 0 Data from: Elections Ontario

1979 Canadian General Elections: The minority government below lasted 9 months and in which there were only 49 House of Commons sitting days Number Percentage Number Percentage Political Party of Votes of Votes of Seats of Seats Liberal Party of Canada 4,595,319 40,11% 114 40,43% Progressive Conservative 4,111,606 35,89% 136 48,23% New Democratic Party 2,048,988 17,88% 26 9,22% Social Credit Party of Canada 527,604 4,61% 6 2,13% Parti Rhinocéros 62,601 0,55% 0 Union Populaire 19,514 0,17% 0 Marxist-Leninist Party of Canada 14,231 0,12% 0 Communist Party of Canada 9,141 0,08% 0 Libertarian Party of Canada 16,042 0,14% 0 Independent 30,518 0,27% 0 No Affiliation 21,444 0,19% 0 Data from: http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/about/process/house/hfer/hfer.asp

Examples of Weak Oppositions

2001 British Columbia General Elections: How can a “government-in-waiting” be effective with only two seats? Number Percentage Number Percentage Political Party of Votes of Votes of Seats of Seats BC Liberal Party 916,888 57.62% 77 97.47% New Democratic Party of BC 343,156 21.56% 2 2.53% Green Party Political Assoc. of BC 197,231 12.39% 0 Party of BC 51,426 3.23% 0 BC Marijuana Party 51,206 3.22% 0 Other Affiliations 31,399 1.98% 0 Data from: http://elections.bc.ca/elections/sov01/polpart.htm

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 36

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

2000 Prince Edward Island General Elections: How can a “government-in- waiting” be effective with only one seat? Number Percentage Number Percentage Political Party of Votes of Votes of Seats of Seats Progressive Conservative 40,009 57.62% 26 96.30% Liberal 26,817 33.59% 1 3.70% Island New Democrats 6,670 8.35% 0 Data from: http://www.electionspei.ca/provincial/historical/ceoreports/general/ general-2000-04-17.pdf

1987 New Brunswick General Elections: How can a “government-in-waiting” be effective with no seats? Number Percentage Number Percentage Political Party of Votes of Votes of Seats of Seats Liberal Party 246,745 60.39% 58 100% Progr. Conservative Party of NB 116,815 28.59% 0 New Democratic Party 43,106 10.55% 0 Independent 1920 0.47% 0 Data from: http://www.gnb.ca/0100/FinalReport-e.pdf

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 37

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

SMP Deficiency V: Every Elected Official is Equal despite that Electoral Districts are Not

Under all models of government, every elected official is equal to each other. Under the Westminster model of government, groupings of population are divided up into electoral districts (ridings in Canada) and in Canada and Ontario, the size of population in these electoral districts can diverge greatly. However, even when so, the value of each elected official is not reflected and this imbalance trickles down to citizens themselves who then become unequal compared to citizens from other electoral districts. Please consider the following example.

Electoral Population Number of Number of Votes Value of Constituent District Elected Officials per Official per Vote A 100 1 1 0.01 B 200 1 1 0.005

In the example above, a citizen from Electoral District A has twice the value in this democracy than a citizen from Electoral District B. This is a violation of CTESS Fundamental I , the definition of democracy as the citizens are no longer “equal” anymore. This is also a violation of CTESS Fundamental II as this government does not comply to the Gettysburg Address (“Government of the people, by the people, for the people”). Under such democracy, it is more appropriate to state “Government of the people, by the electoral districts, for the people” as every elected official, hence electoral district, is equal despite the fact that every electoral district is not equal. This ambiguity suggests that in reality, this government would not be “of the people” and “for the people” neither.

True Ontario Example

Number of Number of Value of Population Electoral District Elected Votes per Constituent (2001 Census) Officials Official per Vote Timiskaming— 69,900 1 1 0.000 014 306 Cochrane 122,566 1 1 0.000 008 159 East—Cooksville Data from: http://www.electionsontario.on.ca/en/new_electoral_boundaries_en.shtml

In the case above, a citizen from Timiskaming—Cochrane has 1.75 times more value than a citizen from —Cooksville in Ontario’s legislature. In the case above, it is for when Ontario has 107 electoral districts as per the passing of Bill 214 and the Representation Act, 2005 . In the 1999 and 2003 Ontario General Elections, there were only 103 electoral districts in Ontario. Federally-wise, Ontario is divided into 106 electoral districts and the smallest one is Kenora with a population of 60,572 as of the 2001 Census and the largest electoral district remains Mississauga East—Cooksville with the population of 122,566. With these figures, a citizen from Kenora has 2.02 times

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 38

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

more value than a citizen from Mississauga East—Cooksville in the Canada’s House of Commons.

As per the 2001 Census and the 106 federal electoral districts of Ontario, the average electoral district in Ontario has a population of 110 777 citizens. CTESS would ignore this discrepancy if the greatest disparity were 10% but there are 29 electoral districts (28% of all electoral districts) that have less than 95% of the average population size and 17 (17% of all electoral districts) have more than 105% of the average population size. This means 46 (45% of all electoral districts) fall outside of the 10% gap.

True Canadian Example

Electoral District Population Number of Number of Value of (2001 Census) Elected Votes per Constituent Officials Official per Vote Nunavut 26,745 1 1 0.000 037 390 West Vancouver— Sunshine Coast— 124,572 1 1 0.000 008 027 Sea to Sky Country Data from: http://www.elections.ca/scripts/OVR2006/

In the case above, a citizen from Nunavut has 4.66 times more value than a citizen from West Vancouver-Sunshine Coast-Sea to Sky Country in Canada’s House of Commons.

As per the 2001 Census, the average electoral district in Canada had a population of 97 426 citizens. CTESS would ignore this discrepancy if the greatest disparity were 10% but there are 92 electoral districts (30% of all electoral districts) that have less than 95% of the average population size and 148 (48% of all electoral districts) have more than 105% of the average population size. This means 240 (78% of all electoral districts) fall outside of the 10% gap.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 39

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

The CTESS Mechanism

CTESS proposes five innovations to the current system to strengthen Ontario’s electoral system. The first is to improve the system at the electoral district (riding) level, and the other four are to improve the system within the legislature.

CTESS keeps the constituencies principle as it is now, that is Ontario would continue to have electoral districts that are in the same format as they are now.

As for the structure of the ballot, its looks would be identical to what Ontario currently has but instead of electors marking an “X” beside the candidate they vote for, they rank them ordinal numbers beside the candidates (1, 2, 3, etc). They would assign a “1” beside their first choice, a “2” beside their second choice and so on.

Under CTESS, the voting would be conducted Example of a completed ballot under through non-compulsory ranking which means CTESS minimal ordering. Under this condition, electors CANDIDATE A assign a “1” beside there first choice, a “2” beside _ PARTY X 333 their second choice and so on but they do not have to rank every candidate. Only those they know and support will suffice. Of course, it is always better to CANDIDATE B _ vote for more than not enough as it improves the PARTY Z 111 chance of that ballot being counted although voting for the big names and candidates from big political CANDIDATE C _ parties is often sufficient. It would be unreasonable PARTY W 222 to ask electors to rank every candidate as there may be a long list of candidates and knowing CANDIDATE D enough information on every candidate to know 222 _ how to rank them may be difficult. For instance, in INDEPENDANT the 2006 election to become Mayor for Toronto, there were 38 candidates. It simply would be CANDIDATE E _ unrealistic to expect electors to have an informed PARTY Y 3 vote for all of them.

Also under CTESS, just like under SMP, only a single candidate gets elected to represent his or her constituency, or in other terms, the district magnitude under CTESS is 1. Having a district magnitude any larger than 1 has proven to be problematic. Constituents are less sure who their elected official is (actually, there would be many elected officials for every district) and there is less accountability. At times, Ontario and other provinces had more than one elected officials per district in the past however wherever this got implemented, the status quo was always reinstated afterwards. In fact, in 1997, Toronto had two councillors per ward and it immediately went back to one councillor per ward by following general elections.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 40

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

Diagram of the CTESS Mechanism

Electors rank their

preferred candidates

with ordinals

AV is used at the electoral district

level to see which candidate wins CTESS Step I

AV is used at the jurisdiction-wide level to see which party will form CTESS Step II government and get 60% of the voting power within the legislature

PR is used among the opposition parties to determine the distribution CTESS Step III of the remaining 40% of the voting power within the legislature

Compensatory seats are allocated to political parties whose voting CTESS Step IV power per representative is greater than 2

District seats voting power gets

readjusted according to the CTESS Step V population in each electoral district

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 41

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

CTESS Step I: Improving the Electoral Process at the Electoral District Level

During an election, when the polling stations close, it is then time to tally the votes. Under CTESS, those who retrieve the ballots and count them would sort them candidate by candidate as it is currently done under SMP. Except this time, instead of there being “X”’s beside the candidate who received a vote, there would be numbers. There would be a “1” beside the first choice, a “2” beside the second choice and so on. Those who count the ballots would sort the ballots according to the number “1’s” per candidate name.

Once all the ballots are sorted, they would discard the rejected ballots and assess the total number of valid ballots. They would also count the number of ballots per candidate and would transmit this information to the Electoral Officer who oversees the ballot counting for the whole electoral district. Should no candidate have more than 50% of the votes in the whole electoral district, the candidate with the least number of “1’s” would be eliminated and those who count the ballots would sort those ballots according to the number “2’s” per candidate name.

The process outlined in the previous paragraph would be repeated and repeated until a candidate has over 50% of the votes. This candidate is the winning candidate of his or her electoral district and this is the person who will represent that electoral district in the legislature.

This way of voting is called “Preferential Vote” as electors indicate what their preference order is of the candidates. It is also known, and hereafter referred to as “Alternative Vote” (AV). It can be seen as instant run-offs and every political party in Canada chooses their leaders through run-offs as it is an effective way of selecting a leader.

The beauty of AV is that, among other things, the candidate-elect enjoys more than half of the votes of the electoral district and therefore has more legitimacy than had he or she received less than 50% of the votes. Also, electors no longer need to vote strategically.

CTESS Step I is consistent with CTESS Fundamental III (the concept of majority) and resolves SMP Deficiency I and helps reduce SMP Deficiency III .

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 42

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

CTESS Step II: Establishing which Party Will Form the Government

Once the CTESS Step I is completed in every electoral district across the jurisdiction, the same process is repeated but this time, instead of only reporting to the Electoral Officer who oversees the ballot counting for the whole electoral district, the ballot count is jurisdiction-wide and is per party and it gets reported all the way to the Electoral Officer who oversees the ballot counting for the whole jurisdiction. In Ontario general elections, this refers to the province as a whole, and the Chief Electoral Officer would get a picture of how Ontario voted for every run-off.

The party who ends up winning more than 50% of the total vote would form government regardless of the number of candidates it elected.

Under CTESS, a dual-class vote structure would be implemented just like some companies have dual-class share structures. In short, a dual-class vote structure means that there are two classes of votes. In the case of CTESS, there are “Government- Class” votes and there are “Opposition-Class” votes. The total voting power of the Government-Class” votes is 60% of the aggregate voting power within the legislature and the total voting power of the “Opposition-Class” votes is 40%. Notwithstanding CTESS Step V , votes are evenly distributed amongst members of the same political party.

CTESS Customizable Variable I : Government-Class votes and Opposition-Class votes have respective values of 60% and 40% of the aggregate voting power within the legislature

What this means is that if there is a 100-member legislature and the political party who wins the AV at the jurisdiction level only got 30 candidates elected, each one of these members would be worth, on average (see CTESS Step V ), 2 votes (see CTESS Step IV ). Instead of winning 30 seats, if that party won 80 seats, each member would be worth, on average, 0.75 votes.

CTESS Step II ensures that the government will always have a majority of the votes. As per CTESS Premise II , minority and coalition governments are undesirable as they are detrimental to interests of citizens as a whole. CTESS Step II also ensures that the majority of the population is in favour of the party in power as that party received more than 50% of the total votes at the last instant run-off. As for determining the 60%-40% split, as noted in the CTESS Premise I , it does not really matter what percentage of the vote the party in power has as long that it is more than 50%. The 60% that was chosen for the voting power of the Government-Class votes total is that should there be a portion (17%) of Government members who do not feel comfortable with the position of

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 43

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

the Government on an issue, they can defeat that position if the opposition also wants to defeat it.

Appendix A is a research paper conducted by the Library of the Canadian Parliament and offers an insight on how dual-class share structures work. Although its lists some disadvantages of dual-class share structures, they can be ignored as they are not applicable to legislatures under CTESS. One reason is that every four years Ontario citizens decide who would get the superior class of shares (Government-Class votes) and most of the disadvantages are associated with financial risk and financial gain, both not comparable to what legislatures are involved with.

CTESS Step II is consistent with CTESS Fundamental III (the concept of majority) and builds on the CTESS Premise III (different roles for the political parties forming the legislature). It resolves SMP Deficiency II for wrongly-elected governments and SMP Deficiency IV for electing minority governments. It also helps reduce SMP Deficiency III for the wasted votes in favour of the political party who forms government.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 44

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

CTESS Step III: Establishing which Parties will form the Opposition and Assigning their Respective Power within the Legislature

The third step of CTESS deals with determining what the opposition will look like in the legislature. To start, the total voting power of the opposition will be 40%. CTESS Step II explains why the 60%-40% ratio.

During the counting process of the ballots for the jurisdiction-wide level (Ontario level), a record is made of the tally of votes for every political party when each one of them has 1% or more of the total vote and until there are no more than 5 political parties, excluding the one who eventually forms government. This phase of the CTESS process is named “ CTESS Phase 1-5”.

CTESS Customizable Variable II : Vote threshold of 1% when compiling the jurisdiction-wide AV tally

CTESS Customizable Variable III : Ceiling of fiv e political parties excluding the one who eventually forms government when compiling the jurisdiction-wide AV tally

Once the results at CTESS Phase 1-5 are recorded, the share of the votes for the non- government political parties (henceforth referred to as the opposition popular vote) is calculated. Every remaining political party gets the share of Opposition-Class votes corresponding to its share of the opposition popular vote. If a political party received 60% of the Opposition popular vote, it will receive 60% of the Opposition-Class votes and 24% of the aggregate voting power within the legislature no matter what their seat- count is. What this means is that if there is a 100-member legislature and this opposition party gets 16 candidates elected, each one of these members would be worth, on average (see CTESS Step V ), 1.5 votes. Instead of winning 16 seats, if that party won 30 seats, each member would be worth, on average, 0.80 votes.

CTESS Step III ensures that the composition of the opposition will always mirror the opposition popular vote. Furthermore, it always encourages a credible government-in- waiting as the opposition will always have the 40% of the aggregate voting power within the legislature.

CTESS Step III builds on the CTESS Premise III (different roles for the political parties forming the legislature) and it alleviates SMP Deficiency II regarding disproportional makeup of the legislature compared to the popular vote. Combined with the previous phase, it eliminates the SMP Deficiency III regarding wasted votes and SMP Deficiency IV for producing weak oppositions.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 45

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

CTESS Step IV: Allocating Compensatory Seats

It could happen that a political party wins 5% of the popular vote but fails to elect a single member. It could also happen that a political party ends up winning 20% of the aggregate voting power within the legislature but only 2 members (giving them each 10% of the aggregate voting power within the legislature). In both cases, the political parties would have an impossible time or hard time exercising their power appropriately. To accommodate this possibility, CTESS Step IV makes way for “Compensatory Seats”. No political party could have members worth more than 2% of the aggregate voting power within the legislature (notwithstanding CTESS Step V ) and would bring in the minimum number of compensatory members required so that within the party, no member is worth more than 2% of the aggregate voting power within the legislature. These members would be chosen by the political party from a closed list consisting of and only of party members who were candidates in their respective electoral district election and in which obviously they lost. This is known as “mandatory dual-candidacy”.

CTESS Customizable Variable IV : Ceiling of 2% per member of the aggregate voting power within the legislature

For example, if a political party is allocated 11% of the aggregate voting power within the legislature but only has two members elected, it will be able to bring in four more members who will be given compensatory seats. That party would then be said to have two district members and four compensatory members. Each member would then be worth 1.83% of the aggregate voting power (11% ÷ 6 = 1.83%).

Should a political party be given compensatory seats, they can target specific demographics the party may be missing in the legislature, for instance the party may be underrepresented in terms of women, youth, visible minorities, members from a particular region in the jurisdiction, and so on.

CTESS Step IV builds on CTESS Premise II (different roles for the political parties forming the legislature) as it ensures that the party forming government and the opposition have enough member to either run the government or to try building a credible government-in-waiting. It also distributes the power among a larger number of members of the same political party instead of creating a power concentration in the hands of a few.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 46

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

CTESS Step V: Assigning the Voting Power per Elected Representative

The last CTESS Step distributes the voting power each district member has according to the number of people living in his or her electoral district. To determine the final percentage of the aggregate voting power within the legislature each district member has, the voting power assigned to each member is multiplied by their “district population adjustment coefficient” (DPAC). The DPAC is calculated by dividing the number of people living in an electoral district by the average number of people living in the electoral districts of all the district members of one same political party.

CTESS Step V addresses the imbalance between electoral districts with respect to population sizes and makes it so that in the legislature, every citizen whose district is represented by a particular political party will be equal to a citizen of any other district that also is represented by the same political party. CTESS Step V consequently accommodates urban electoral districts that are very dense and would facilitate rural districts that cover large areas to be redefined so that they cover smaller areas without creating unfair imbalances between urban and rural districts.

Under CTESS Step V , once the voting power is “population size-adjusted”, the voting power of some members may be greater than 2%.

Once all the voting power of every district member is “population-size adjusted”, the voting power of every district member and compensatory member is multiplied by the total number of districts in the province and divided by 100%. The final result is the votes every member gets in the legislature. On average, it will be exactly equal to 1.

CTESS Customizable Variable V: The final number of votes in the legislature is equal to the number of districts (and not to the number of district members plus compensatory members)

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 47

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

Other Attributes of CTESS

Under CTESS, should a district seat become vacant, the full value of that seat is non- existent in the legislature until a new member is elected from that electoral district and it is fully transferred to the new district member, no matter which party he or she represents.

Should a compensatory seat become vacant, the full value of that seat is non-existent in the legislature until the next general elections.

During a parliament, should either a district member or a compensatory member switch political allegiances, the full value of his or her seat would remain with him or her.

In the legislature, when comes time to count votes, instead of every member being equal to 1, they would have their own vote value assigned to them. During the counting of the votes, instead of the votes being 1 + 1+ 1+ 1 +1 +… they would be like 1.23 + 1.33 + 0.99 + 1.06 + 0.87 + …

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 48

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

How CTESS Would Transpose into Today’s Legislature with the Results of the 2003 Ontario General Elections

With the results of the 2003 Ontario general elections, this section attempts to simulate what the legislature composition would be under CTESS. It is easy to determine what the outcome would have been in some of the electoral districts using CTESS Step I however it is also difficult to do so in others and for that reason, this section simply supposes that at the electoral district level, the results would have been identical to what they were after the 2003 Ontario General Elections. The results follow.

2003 Ontario General Elections Number Percentage Number Percentage Political Party of Votes of Votes of Seats of Seats Ontario Liberal Party 2,090,001 46.47% 72 69.90% Progr. Conserv. Party of Ontario 1,559,181 34.67% 24 23.30% New Democratic Party 660,730 14.69% 7 6.80% The Green Party of Ontario 126,651 2.82% 0 Family Coalition Party of Ontario 34,623 0.77% 0 The Freedom Party of Ontario 8,376 0.19% 0 Communist Party of Ontario 2,187 0.05% 0 Ontario Libertarian Party 1,991 0.04% 0 Ontario Prov. Confed. of Reg. Party 293 0.01% 0 Independents 13,211 0.29% 0 Data from: Elections Ontario

Under CTESS Step II , it is most likely that the Ontario Liberal Party would have won the provincial-wide alternative vote and therefore, they would have been given 60% of the aggregate voting power within the legislature. With 72 seats, each member would get 0.83% of the aggregate voting power within the legislature.

The next step is assigning the composition of the opposition. For the purpose of simplicity, this section supposes that during the AV process until CTESS Phase 1-5, the votes of the political parties with the lowest votes remain together and get transferred in the following way:

Initial Political Party where the votes end Political Party Votes up at CTESS Phase 1-5 Family Coalition Party of Ontario 34,623 Progr. Conserv. Party of Ontario The Freedom Party of Ontario 8,376 Progr. Conserv. Party of Ontario Communist Party of Ontario 2,187 New Democratic Party Ontario Libertarian Party 1,991 Progr. Conserv. Party of Ontario Ontario Prov. Confed. of Reg. Party 293 The Green Party of Ontario Independents 13,211 Ontario Liberal Party

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 49

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

Votes at CTESS Phase 1-5 Initial Vote Stage CTESS 1-5 Vote Political Party Number Percentage Number of Percentage of Votes of Votes Votes of Votes Ontario Liberal Party 2,090,001 46.47% 2,103,212 46.77% Progr. Conserv. Party of Ontario 1,559,181 34.67% 1,604,171 35.67% New Democratic Party 660,730 14.69% 662,917 14.74% The Green Party of Ontario 126,651 2.82% 126,944 2.82%

Opposition votes at CTESS Phase 1-5: Number Percentage Percentage of Votes Political party of Votes of Votes within the Legislature Progr. Conserv. Party of Ontario 1,604,171 67.01% 26.80% New Democratic Party 662,917 27.69% 11.08% The Green Party of Ontario 126,944 5.30% 2.12% Total 2,394,032 100.00% 40.00%

As per the table above, if an opposition party gets 20% of the opposition popular vote in the province, they get 20% of the Opposition-Class votes in the legislature. In this case, as the PC’s received 67.01% of the opposition popular vote and elected 24 seats, each member would get 1.12% of the aggregate voting power within the legislature. With 7 seats, each member of the NDP would get 1.58% of the aggregate voting power within the legislature. At this stage, it cannot be determined what percentage of the votes within the legislature each Green Party of Ontario Member gets as no member was elected.

This is where CTESS Step IV comes in place. As the Green Party is allocated 2.12% of the aggregate voting power within the legislature, it is awarded two compensatory seats. The Green Party then gets to decide which two candidates will become members of the legislature and they will each be worth 1.06% of the aggregate voting power in the legislature.

The following page has a table with the value of the vote for every MPP as elected on election day in the 2003 Ontario General Elections.

Legend:

Column A: Percentage of power of every MPP of the aggregate voting power in the legislature before “population-size adjustment” Column B: Population in the electoral district as per 1991 Census Column C: District Population Adjustment Coefficient (DPAC) Column D: Percentage of power of every MPP of the aggregate voting power in the legislature after “population-size adjustment” Column E: Value of vote of every MPP of the aggregate voting power in the legislature after “population-size adjustment” and accounting for the number of districts in Ontario

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 50

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

CTESS Simulation with the 2003 Ontario General Elections Results Electoral District Member A B C D E

LIBERAL PARTY MEMBERS Algoma-Manitoulin Mike Brown 0.83 75,120 0.72 0.60 0.62 Ancaster-Dundas-Flamborough- Ted Mcmeekin 0.83 95,568 0.92 0.76 0.79 Aldershot Bramalea-Gore-Malton-Springdale Kuldip Kular 0.83 120,699 1.16 0.97 0.99 Centre 0.83 106,393 1.02 0.85 0.88 Brampton West-Mississauga 0.83 133,554 1.28 1.07 1.10 Brant 0.83 105,679 1.01 0.85 0.87 Chatham-Kent Essex Pat Hoy 0.83 105,174 1.01 0.84 0.87 Davenport 0.83 103,074 0.99 0.82 0.85 0.83 113,338 1.09 0.91 0.93 0.83 108,254 1.04 0.87 0.89 Eglinton-Lawrence Mike Colle 0.83 108,410 1.04 0.87 0.89 Elgin-Middlesex-London Steve Peters 0.83 101,573 0.97 0.81 0.84 Essex 0.83 110,713 1.06 0.89 0.91 Etobicoke Centre 0.83 104,398 1.00 0.83 0.86 Shafiq Qaadri 0.83 109,253 1.05 0.87 0.90 Etobicoke-Lakeshore 0.83 115,067 1.10 0.92 0.95 Glengarry-Prescott-Russell Jean-Marc Lalonde 0.83 100,204 0.96 0.80 0.83 Guelph-Wellington 0.83 110,836 1.06 0.89 0.91 Hamilton East Dominic Agostino 0.83 97,491 0.94 0.78 0.80 Marie Bountrogianni 0.83 105,316 1.01 0.84 0.87 Hamilton West Judy Marsales 0.83 100,149 0.96 0.80 0.82 Hastings-Frontenac-Lennox And 0.83 97,025 0.93 0.78 0.80 Addington Huron-Bruce 0.83 95,981 0.92 0.77 0.79 0.83 111,411 1.07 0.89 0.92 Kitchener Centre 0.83 109,398 1.05 0.87 0.90 Lambton-Kent-Middlesex Maria Van Bommel 0.83 98,542 0.95 0.79 0.81 Centre 0.83 103,511 0.99 0.83 0.85 Chris Bentley 0.83 104,291 1.00 0.83 0.86 London-Fanshawe Khalil Ramal 0.83 106,531 1.02 0.85 0.88 Markham Tony Wong 0.83 119,462 1.15 0.96 0.98 Mississauga Centre Harinder S. Takhar 0.83 114,855 1.10 0.92 0.95 Mississauga East 0.83 108,843 1.04 0.87 0.90 Mississauga South 0.83 100,260 0.96 0.80 0.83 Mississauga West Bob Delaney 0.83 128,029 1.23 1.02 1.05 Niagara Falls Kim Craitor 0.83 93,103 0.89 0.74 0.77 Nipissing 0.83 76,047 0.73 0.61 0.63 Northumberland Lou Rinaldi 0.83 98,971 0.95 0.79 0.82 Oakville 0.83 105,572 1.01 0.84 0.87 Centre Richard Patten 0.83 109,903 1.05 0.88 0.91 Dalton Mcguinty 0.83 100,659 0.97 0.80 0.83 -Nepean Jim Watson 0.83 111,532 1.07 0.89 0.92 Ottawa-Orléans Phil Mcneely 0.83 103,418 0.99 0.83 0.85 Ottawa-Vanier 0.83 108,564 1.04 0.87 0.89 Parkdale-High Park Gerard Kennedy 0.83 105,740 1.01 0.85 0.87 Perth-Middlesex John Wilkinson 0.83 94,576 0.91 0.76 0.78 Peterborough 0.83 109,902 1.05 0.88 0.91 Pickering-Ajax-Uxbridge Wayne Arthurs 0.83 119,171 1.14 0.95 0.98 Prince Edward-Hastings Ernie Parsons 0.83 93,743 0.90 0.75 0.77 Sarnia-Lambton 0.83 90,697 0.87 0.73 0.75 Sault Ste. Marie 0.83 80,054 0.77 0.64 0.66 Scarborough Centre 0.83 107,030 1.03 0.86 0.88 0.83 114,844 1.10 0.92 0.95 0.83 108,644 1.04 0.87 0.89 Scarborough-Agincourt 0.83 120,264 1.15 0.96 0.99 Scarborough-Rouge River 0.83 108,178 1.04 0.87 0.89 St. Catharines 0.83 106,105 1.02 0.85 0.87 St. Paul's Michael Bryant 0.83 103,725 1.00 0.83 0.85 Stoney Creek 0.83 103,863 1.00 0.83 0.86 Stormont-Dundas-Charlottenburgh Jim Brownell 0.83 95,834 0.92 0.77 0.79 Sudbury Rick Bartolucci 0.83 86,243 0.83 0.69 0.71 Thornhill Mario G. Racco 0.83 106,628 1.02 0.85 0.88 Thunder Bay-Atikokan 0.83 78,360 0.75 0.63 0.65

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 51

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

Electoral District Member A B C D E

Thunder Bay-Superior North Michael Gravelle 0.83 79,680 0.76 0.64 0.66 Timiskaming-Cochrane David Ramsay 0.83 75,769 0.73 0.61 0.62 -Rosedale 0.83 114,416 1.10 0.91 0.94 Vaughan-King-Aurora 0.83 119,117 1.14 0.95 0.98 Willowdale 0.83 107,416 1.03 0.86 0.88 Windsor West Sandra Pupatello 0.83 106,108 1.02 0.85 0.87 Windsor-St. Clair 0.83 108,119 1.04 0.86 0.89 0.83 107,370 1.03 0.86 0.88 York South-Weston Joe Cordiano 0.83 110,264 1.06 0.88 0.91 York West Mario Sergio 0.83 104,957 1.01 0.84 0.86 TOTAL 60.00 7,502,988 72.00 60.00 61.80

PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE PARTY MEMBERS Barrie-Simcoe-Bradford Joe Tascona 1.12 124,450 1.15 1.29 1.32 Bruce-Grey-Owen Sound Bill Murdoch 1.12 98,317 0.91 1.02 1.05 Burlington Cam Jackson 1.12 99,763 0.92 1.03 1.06 Cambridge Gerry Martiniuk 1.12 115,848 1.07 1.20 1.23 Dufferin-Peel-Wellington-Grey 1.12 110,571 1.02 1.14 1.18 Durham John O'toole 1.12 106,045 0.98 1.10 1.13 Erie-Lincoln 1.12 94,672 0.88 0.98 1.01 Haldimand-Norfolk-Brant Toby Barrett 1.12 98,989 0.92 1.02 1.05 Haliburton-Victoria-Brock Laurie Scott 1.12 108,011 1.00 1.12 1.15 Halton Ted Chudleigh 1.12 119,537 1.11 1.23 1.27 Kitchener-Waterloo 1.12 114,390 1.06 1.18 1.22 Lanark-Carleton 1.12 124,295 1.15 1.28 1.32 Leeds-Grenville 1.12 96,284 0.89 0.99 1.02 Nepean-Carleton John Baird 1.12 111,886 1.03 1.16 1.19 Oak Ridges 1.12 129,379 1.20 1.34 1.38 Jerry J. Ouellette 1.12 107,771 1.00 1.11 1.15 Oxford 1.12 97,142 0.90 1.00 1.03 Parry Sound-Muskoka 1.12 82,853 0.77 0.86 0.88 Renfrew-Nipissing-Pembroke John Yakabuski 1.12 97,571 0.90 1.01 1.04 Garfield Dunlop 1.12 111,559 1.03 1.15 1.19 Simcoe-Grey Jim Wilson 1.12 106,630 0.99 1.10 1.13 Waterloo-Wellington 1.12 107,797 1.00 1.11 1.15 Whitby-Ajax 1.12 113,924 1.05 1.18 1.21 1.12 117,859 1.09 1.22 1.25 TOTAL 26.80 2,595,543 24.00 26.80 27.61

NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY MEMBERS Beaches-East York Michael David Prue 1.58 108,997 1.16 1.84 1.90 Kenora-Rainy River 1.58 79,550 0.85 1.35 1.39 1.58 102,510 1.10 1.73 1.79 1.58 82,576 0.88 1.40 1.44 Timmins-James Bay 1.58 79,627 0.85 1.35 1.39 Toronto-Danforth 1.58 100,678 1.08 1.70 1.75 Trinity-Spadina 1.58 101,104 1.08 1.71 1.76 TOTAL 11.08 655,042 7.00 11.08 11.41

GREEN PARTY MEMBERS Compensatory Seat 1 Member 1 1.06 1.06 1.09 Compensatory Seat 2 Member 2 1.06 1.06 1.09 TOTAL 2.12 2.12 2.18

OVERALL TOTAL 100.00 10,753,573 103.00 100.00 103.00

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 52

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

The Advantages of CTESS

Below is a listing of advantages of CTESS:

• District members would always enjoy the majority of votes from his or her riding, making him or her more legitimate; • As there is only one member per electoral district, he or she will be more accountable to his or her constituents; • The party forming government would always be a majority government allowing it to be effective and stable; • The party forming government would always enjoy the majority of votes for the jurisdiction (the province of Ontario) as a whole; • As there is only one party forming government (there is no coalition), the government will be more accountable to the citizens; • The legislature would be more reflective of the population makeup; • CTESS encourages a credible “government-in-waiting” and the opposition would have a strong voice (total of 40% of the aggregate voting power within the legislature); • Once all the votes for political parties getting less than 1% of the popular vote are redistributed, every political party gets a seat in the legislature up to a maximum of five political parties forming the opposition ( CTESS Phase 1-5) and therefore the opposition fully mirrors the non-government popular vote; • No strategic voting is necessary; • CTESS inherently makes it so that parties who aspire forming government must be strong all across the jurisdiction (the province of Ontario) as they will need more than 50% of the aggregate popular vote and to accomplish this, they will need a provincial-wide agenda. Therefore, the parties are more likely to look out for the whole province rather than focussing on specific regions; • Under CTESS, there is no need to change the electoral district structure; • Under CTESS, political parties will be very competitive in every electoral district as it will influence the overall popular vote. (in SMP, if a political party knows it will win or lose a specific district, there is no incentive to campaign harder); • The number of wasted votes is marginal; and, most importantly: • CTESS is simple! (see next section)

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 53

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

The Simplicity of CTESS

The transition for Ontario to go from its current SMP system to CTESS would be virtually seamless to Ontario’s citizens. The only thing different for them is that instead of marking an “X” beside the candidate they want to vote for, they would write a “1” beside their preferred candidate, a “2” beside their next preferred candidate and so on.

It is hard to predict how or if the voting pattern of Ontario citizens would change under CTESS as there is not data to support it but if the pattern of voting for umbrella parties as opposed to niche parties does not change (which may be unlikely), and if the same pattern is applied to the second preference as it is to the first preference, simply writing a “1” and a “2” will be sufficient in most cases for the votes not to be wasted. In fact, in 1995, 96,57% of Ontario electors voted for one of the three Ontario umbrella parties, in 1999 it was 97,49% and in 2003 it was 95.83%. This means, and if the assumptions in the paragraph are accurate, it could be said:

One, Two, is all you have to do! (true for more than 93.25% of electors in 1995) One, Two, is all you have to do! (true for more than 95.06% of electors in 1999) One, Two, is all you have to do! (true for more than 91.84% of electors in 2003)

In other words, if you can count to 2, you will like CTESS!

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 54

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

Presenting CTESS to Ontario’s Citizens

Presenting CTESS to Ontario’s Citizens is easy. CTESS can be summarized in a dozen lines:

• When you vote, instead of marking an “X” to your favourite candidate, you rank as many as you wish from your favourite to your least; • When they count the votes, if your favourite candidate does not get enough votes, they will look at your second choice. They do that to ensure that every vote counts and that the winner gets more than 50% of the vote. • They also do that to ensure that the party who forms government gets 50% of the vote and always gives a majority government. • The parties in opposition proportionally represent those who voted against the party in power and if a party fails to elect enough members but gets lots of votes, the big names of that party will be granted a seat anyways. • Finally, members who represent more populous electoral districts will have more voting power than those who come from under-populated districts.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 55

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

Listing of the CTESS Customizable Variables

The CTESS Customizable Variables are elements of CTESS that can be modified from one legislature to another depending on the size of the jurisdiction and of the legislature. Also, different values and political culture may lead to changes in the following variables.

CTESS Customizable Variable I: Government-Class votes and Opposition-Class votes have respective values of 60% and 40% of the aggregate voting power within the legislature

CTESS Customizable Variable II : Vote threshold of 1% when compiling the jurisdiction-wide AV tally

CTESS Customizable Variable III : Ceiling of five political parties excluding the one who eventually forms government when compiling the jurisdiction-wide AV tally

CTESS Customizable Variable IV : Ceiling of 2% per member of the aggregate voting power within the legislature

CTESS Customizable Variable V: The final number of votes in the legislature is equal to the number of districts (and not to the number of district members plus compensatory members)

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 56

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

The Values Determined by Ontario’s Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform

Value How Does CTESS Fare?

Legitimacy Excellent. The electoral system should have the For a member to be elected, he or she confidence of Ontarians and reflect their needs the majority of votes in his or her values. riding. The same goes for the government.

Fairness of Representation Excellent. The Legislative Assembly should reflect Should there be some kind of under- the population of Ontario in accordance representation, there are compensatory with demographic representation, seats if the party did not elect enough proportionality and representation by district members. The legislature would population among other factors. have a proportional representation as the government requires the support of the majority and the opposition reflects the non-government votes. The AV limits the number of wasted votes.

Voter Choice Excellent. An electoral system should promote voter CTESS encourages a credible choice in terms of quantity and quality of “government-in-waiting” so come election options available to voters. time, the contenders will be competitive. The AV allows voters to vote freely as there is no need to vote strategically.

Effective Parties Excellent. Political parties should be able to structure CTESS promotes parties to be Ontario- public debate, mobilize and engage the wide as regional parties could never gain electorate, and develop policy alternatives. power. With a 1% threshold, it is easy for a party to gain a seat however, CTESS limits the parties to the 5 most popular ones plus the one who forms government.

Stable and Effective Government Excellent. The electoral system should contribute to Under CTESS, the government always has continuity of government, and 60% of the aggregate voting power within governments should be able to develop the legislature no matter how many seats it and implement their agendas and take has. This makes the government both decisive action when required. effective and stable.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 57

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

Effective Parliament Excellent. The Legislative Assembly should include a Under CTESS, the opposition always has government and opposition, and should be 40% of the aggregate voting power within able to perform its parliamentary functions the legislature no matter how many seats it successfully. has.

Stronger Voter Participation Excellent. Ontario’s electoral system should promote As AV is used, the number of wasted votes voter participation as well as engagement is marginal. Also, the one vote counts both with the broader democratic process. for the district election and for the election that will determine the distribution of the Government-Class and Opposition-Class votes.

Accountability Excellent. Ontario voters should be able to identify There is only one member per electoral decision-makers and hold them to account. district so accountability is easy to keep record of. The same goes for the government, there would always only be one single party forming government so it is easy to keep track of.

Simplicity and Practicality Excellent. The Citizens’Assembly would like to know All voters have to do is rank their preferred how important you think simplicity and candidates and full ranking is non- practicality are in an electoral system. compulsory.

Overall Excellent.

Tradeoffs None.

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 58

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

The Bicycle Analogy

Ontario’s legislature is like a bicycle. The front wheel serves to bring the whole bicycle in the proper direction. The rear wheel serves to propel the bicycle. The legislature should reflect what direction the population wants the bicycle to go and the back wheel should have enough power to propel the desire of the legislature. Right now, the front tire is flat as many claim that SMP is not bringing the bicycle in the right direction. As for the back tire, it is missing a little pressure (during minority governments). The real issue is the front tire and this is what needs to be fixed.

With all the systems which use elements of proportionality and lead to minority or coalition governments, although the front tire is great, the back tire is flat. They lack propulsion.

When looking for a new system, instead of going from one bad bicycle to another, why not go with CTESS?

CTESS simply fixes the front tire and puts pressure in the back tire to make the bicycle ride right once and for all!

Alternatively, if you were forced to ride a bicycle with a flat tire, would you prefer the flat tire to be the front one or the rear one?

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 59

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

Acronym Glossary

AV Alternative Vote (Also known as Preferential Vote) CTESS Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution DPAC District Population Adjustment Coefficient FPTP First Past the Post (Also known as SMP) FTP First Past the Post (Also known as SMP) MP Member of Parliament (Federal representative in Ottawa) MPP Member of Provincial Parliament (Ontario representative at Queen’s Park, Toronto) PR Proportional Representation SMP Single member plurality (Also known as FTP) TM Twardawa Model

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 60

TwardawaModel.org CTESS.ca

Appendix A: Dual-Class Share Structures and Best Practices in Corporate Governance

The following is a research paper conducted by the Library of the Canadian Parliament and offers an insight on how dual-class share structures work. This paper is part of this document as it is helpful to understand CTESS Step II and III , both of them refer to dual- class votes. Although its lists some disadvantages of dual-class share structures, they can be ignored as they are not applicable to legislatures under CTESS. One reason is that every four years Ontario citizens decide who would get the superior class of shares (Government-Class of votes) and most of the disadvantages are associated with financial risk and financial gain, both not comparable to what legislatures are involved with.

URL of the paper: http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0526-e.pdf

Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution 61