COUNTERING RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA SPECIAL EDITION 2016 Table of Contents Features

SPECIAL EDITION per 2016

ConcordiamJournal of European Security and Defense Issues COUNTERING RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA SPECIAL EDITION 2016 Table of Contents features

ON THE COVER

Russia’s manipulative use of media throughout Europe has masked its aggressive intentions in places like Ukraine. PER CONCORDIAM ILLUSTRATION

4 Director’s Letter 14 Estonia Confronts Propaganda 5 Contributors By Prof. Viljar Veebel, Estonian National Defense College Control of information is key to Russia’s use of 6 Hybrid Conflict 2.0: psychological warfare. Targeting the West By Dr. Graeme P. Herd, George C. Marshall European 20 Avoiding Death by a Center for Security Studies Thousand Cuts Russian propaganda seeks to breed By Capt. David P. Canaday, U.S. Army strategic instability among NATO members. Moscow uses hybrid warfare to foment crises among its neighbors. 14 36

26 The Pro-Russian Disinformation 36 Russian Propaganda in Campaign in the Czech Republic Ukraine and Slovakia By Roman Shutov, program director, Telekritika, Kyiv By Ivana Smoleňová, Prague Security Studies Institute Ukraine struggles to defend itself against Local news outlets are exploited to foster discontent an aggressive Russian propaganda and disseminate pro-Russian messages. campaign. 31 Russkiy Mir By Capt. Brian P. Cotter, U.S. Army Russia uses state media to manipulate countries it considers part of its orbit. DIRECTOR'S LETTER

Welcome to this special edition of per Concordiam. In this issue we discuss some of the arguments and debates related to the highly charged and topical issue of Russia’s strategic narrative and how it is disseminated. Propaganda, in numerous forms, creates a barrier to more constructive engagement and dialogue. This issue’s contributors find that Russia’s narrative is based on notions of encirclement by the West as part of a deliberate contain- ment strategy that Russia feels duty bound to resist if it is to remain a great power. The West, for its part, acknowledges Russia’s power status and its legitimate right to seek such status, but questions the means it uses to that end. Propaganda constructs an artificial information reality and sows doubt by questioning the very existence of objective, reliable and credible facts. It can mobilize popular support against an external threat, as well as toward a positive goal. Propaganda thrives when notions of journalistic objectivity are sacrificed. The notion that there must be two sides to any given issue or event can undermine rational conclusions when one side relies on the power of implausible denials and direct lies. “You have your truth, and I have mine” Keith W. Dayton is the mantra and motto of contemporary Russian information warfare. Director, George C. Marshall European While it is interesting to “admire a problem,” it is all too easy, especially when study- Center for Security Studies ing propaganda, to get lost in arguments and the rhetoric of “you started this,” and Keith W. Dayton retired as a “whoever started it, both sides do it.” Such a regressive and circular outcome is not the Lieutenant General from the U.S. purpose of this special edition. Rather, we seek to consider the modern Russian narrative Army in late 2010 after more in a contemporary context to address more constructive questions, such as: Why is Russia than 40 years of service. His last behaving this way? What does such behavior mean for security in Europe, Eurasia and assignment on active duty was as the Trans-Atlantic space? Do Russian elites and society distinguish between the narrative U.S. Security Coordinator to Israel advanced by some that the West is the enemy and the reality as felt in Europe — namely and the Palestinian Authority in that Russia is a part of Europe, not apart from Europe? Most important, what can we do Jerusalem. An artillery officer by to balance this narrative so that Russia and its neighbors know there is a different “truth?” training, he also has served as The answers to such questions, and the process of raising and discussing them, are the politico-military staff officer for the necessary prerequisites for rebuilding trust and confidence between Russia and the West. Army in Washington, D.C., and Trust is necessary to collectively face a larger set of looming complex threats. Together, U.S. defense attaché in Russia. Europe, Russia and the United States can focus on immediate transnational threats such He worked as director of the Iraqi as ISIS, organized crime and radicalism, which no single state, no matter how power- Survey Group for Operation Iraqi ful, can manage alone. There is a cooperative imperative we should grasp: Engagement, Freedom in Iraq. He earned a dialogue and partnership are the prerequisites for success, and mutual indispensability is Senior Service College Fellowship the only sustainable security paradigm for the contemporary era. to Harvard University and served We invite your comments and perspectives on this subject and will include your as the Senior Army Fellow on the responses in our next two editions. The first will focus on cyber security and explore Council on Foreign Relations in lessons from our cyber security studies program, and the second will address how efforts New York. Gen. Dayton has a to counter transnational criminal organizations shape national decision-making. Please bachelor’s degree in history from contact us at [email protected] the College of William and Mary, a master’s degree in history from Sincerely, Cambridge University and another in international relations from the University of Southern California.

Keith W. Dayton Director

4 per Concordiam CONTRIBUTORS per

Journal of European Security Capt. David P. Canaday is a U.S. Army foreign area officer working and Defense Issues in the Army Stability and Security Cooperation Division. He graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point with a bachelor’s degree in Russian language and literature, the Defense Language Special Edition: Institute, and more recently, the College of International Security Studies Countering Russian at the Marshall Center. Propaganda Volume 7, 2016

George C. Marshall Capt. Brian P. Cotter is a U.S. Army foreign area officer with a focus European Center for on Eurasia. He has served nearly 10 years in the U.S. Army, with two Security Studies tours in Iraq, and has led multiple commands. He is currently studying at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., and pursuing a master’s Leadership degree in East European, Russian and Eurasian studies. Keith W. Dayton Director Ben Reed U.S. Deputy Director

Dr. Graeme P. Herd is professor of transnational security studies at the Johann Berger Marshall Center. He supports the Program on Terrorism and Security German Deputy Director Studies (PTSS), Countering Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC), the Senior Executive Seminar (SES) and the Program on Applied Security Studies (PASS). During his 22-year academic career, he has published Marshall Center nine books, written over 70 academic papers and has given over 100 The George C. Marshall European Center academic and policy-related presentations in 46 countries. He has a for Security Studies is a German-American doctorate in Russian history from the University of Aberdeen. partnership founded in 1993. The center promotes dialogue and understanding between European, Eurasian, North American and other nations. The theme of its resident Roman Shutov is program director of Telekritika, a Kyiv-based courses and outreach events: Most 21st nongovernmental organization devoted to dispelling false Russian century security challenges require inter- narratives planted in the media. He has a background in nonprofit national, interagency and interdisciplinary management and media in Ukraine. He earned a doctorate in political response and cooperation. science in 2007 from East Ukraine National University in Luhansk.

Contact Us per Concordiam editors Marshall Center Gernackerstrasse 2 Ivana Smoleňová is communications and outreach manager at the 82467 Garmisch-Partenkirchen Prague Security Studies Institute, where she is responsible for public relations and alumni programs. Her academic focus is on the geopolitics Germany of Russia and its use of soft power projection and hybrid warfare tactics in [email protected] Eastern Europe, in particular pro-Russian disinformation and propaganda. She holds a master’s in corporate economics and development studies from the University of Economics in Prague.

per Concordiam is a professional journal published quarterly by the George C. Marshall Euro- pean Center for Security Studies that addresses defense and security issues in Europe and Eurasia Prof. Viljar Veebel is an associate professor at the Estonian National for military and security practitioners and experts. Defense College. His research focuses on European Union-Russia Opinions expressed in this journal do not neces- relations, including the impact of political and economic sanctions, the sarily represent the policies or points of view of this institution or of any other agency of the Ger- propaganda war related to the Ukrainian conflict and security strategies man or United States governments. All articles are for small states in Central and Eastern Europe. He consults on EU-related written by per Concordiam staff unless otherwise projects in Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine and the Balkans. He received his noted. Opinions expressed in articles written by doctorate in 2012 from the University of Tartu. contributors represent those of the author only. The secretary of defense determined that publication of this journal is necessary for conducting public business as required of the U.S. Depart- ment of Defense by law.

ISSN 2166-322X (print) ISSN 2166-3238 (online)

per Concordiam 5 Hundreds of ethnic Germans who left Russia demonstrate against violence in Villingen-Schwenningen in January 2016. The demonstration took place in connection with the alleged rape of a 13-year-old girl by a refugee, an event police said did not happen. State-controlled Russian media is using emotionally charged disinformation to try to splinter public opinion in the West. EPA

6 per Concordiam HYBRID CONFLICT 2.0 TARGETING THE WEST

Russian information operations seek strategic realignment in Europe

BY DR. GRAEME P. HERD, GEORGE C. MARSHALL EUROPEAN CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES

per Concordiam 7 Activists block the entrance to the Ukrainian TV Channel “Inter” in Kyiv in February 2016, accusing the channel of distributing pro-Russian propaganda. AFP/GETTY IMAGES

8 per Concordiam “All the revolutions in history of humanity, beginning he Russian state- against targets in Syria and almost with Lucifer’s owned Rossiya-1 come to blows with Turkey. And Putin rebellion television channel reportedly boasted privately to Ukrainian premiered the film President Petro Poroshenko: “If I against God, Miroporyadok (World wanted, Russian troops could not only have been Order) during prime be in Kyiv in two days, but Riga, Vilnius, designed by time on Sunday, Tallinn, Warsaw or Bucharest, too.” T December 20, 2015. The strategic agenda of the next the United It included extensive clips from inter- 20 years will be dominated by defense, States in order views with Russian President Vladimir deterrence and dialogue with a recalci- to detract from Putin and powerfully expressed, as Ivan trant, revanchist and chauvinist Russia. Krastev said in The New York Times at While analysts are able to map a dispar- the glory of the time, “the Kremlin’s present state ity between Russia’s actions and words, Russia.” of mind. It views the world as a place the breadth and depth of Euro-Atlantic on the edge of collapse, chaotic and ignorance as to Putin’s motivations and ~ Leon Aron, dangerous, where international institu- intent are staggering. Kremlinologist remarks at the American tions are ineffective, held hostage to the Edward Lucas wrote in European Voice: Enterprise Institute, West’s ambitions and delusions. Nuclear “We do not know how Putin thinks. We Washington, D.C., weapons represent the sole guarantee of do not know what information he gets. December 17, 2014. a country’s sovereignty, and sovereignty is We do not know whose advice he takes, if demonstrated by a willingness and capac- anyone’s. We do not know what he really ity to resist Washington’s hegemonic fears, or what he really wants.” And Gleb agenda.” Pavlovsky, a former Putin advisor and Since February 2014, Russia has architect of “Putinism,” noted: “The annexed Crimea, destabilized eastern fact that the NATO countries do not Ukraine, aggressively penetrated NATO understand how Putin will react is not an airspace in the Baltics, undertaken advantage for us, but an additional risk. submarine operations near vital undersea When you do not know what threats to Internet communications cables in the expect from your former partner who An Emergencies Ministry member Atlantic, launched Kalibr cruise missiles has suddenly decided to become your walks at the crash site of a Malaysia from the Caspian naval flotilla and a adversary, the normal reflex that arises is Airlines Flight MH17 in the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine in July submarine in the eastern Mediterranean to play it safe.” 2014. The plane was brought down by a Russian-made missile, killing all 295 passengers. REUTERS

per Concordiam 9 This article highlights the new ways and means by which between state and society, as well as inter- and intra-societal Russia seeks to achieve its strategic goal of establishing a sphere fissures, and has the ultimate goal of severing relations among of influence in its neighborhood and projecting its status as a the states themselves. Unexpectedly for Russia, Hybrid Conflict “global player.” To that end, it identifies the tools and instru- 1.0 only served to unify the West; arguably Hybrid Conflict 2.0 ments Russia has at hand, including information operations, would break that unity. and suggests the propaganda effects of such a strategy on the domestic Russian population. It concludes by touching on the INSIDE RUSSIAN POLITICS very real risks of miscalculation, escalation and a further dete- Why does Russia adopt this strategy? As political authority rioration in relations between Russia and the West. in Russia is now legitimized through charismatic-historical means, Putin needs to secure continuous “victories.” EXPANDING HYBRID CONFLICT Charismatic leaders do not preside over defeats, and in the Facilitating and enabling factors for an effective hybrid conflict Russian media, Putin will never suffer such a fate. “Neoprop” were present in Crimea, but less so in the Donbass. First, is the contemporary equivalent of Soviet Agitprop. As Russia constantly asserted that the collapse of “legitimate Pavlovsky said, “In Russia there is neoprop — the machinery executive authority” had taken place in Ukraine — with of stultifying television propaganda. It pumps up the popu- President Victor Yanukovych fleeing the country — and that lation’s loyalty by keeping the mass consciousness in a state the interim authorities in Kyiv were a far-right, neo-Nazi of hysteria. Russia’s people are being moved to the world junta supported by the West. Second, Crimea boasted a of a sinister political serial, and that is where they live.” In majority ethnic Russian population with a common language, his book, Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible: The Surreal heritage and identity linked to Russian economic and infor- Heart of the New Russia, Peter Pomerantsev said he was told mation space, as well as supportive local elites. Lastly, there by a Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network were pre-existing Russian military bases in Crimea, as well as executive: “The news is the incense by which we bless Putin’s proximate military forces based on Russian territory. actions, make him the President.” The tools and capabilities needed to act are threefold: Russian However, Putin is self-handicapped in that he is a highly state-controlled media propaganda provided compelling, one- popular charismatic-historical leader who oversees a failing sided claims of Western hypocrisy, double standards and interfer- economy. He is trapped by opinion polls and the need for ence in the domestic affairs of Ukraine, which was said to have popular support; instability increases if support falls because resulted in chaos and had the potential to spill over into Russia. no bezalternativnost, or political alternative, to Putin exists. The Putin had the political will to act and was supported by compli- notion of “No Putin, no Russia” highlights how elections ant state institutions such as the Duma, or Russian parliament, are delegitimized as a means of transferring power and that the Constitutional Court, the Russian Orthodox Church and Russia lacks autonomous, accountable and transparent institu- the media. Strategic directives from the Kremlin were translated tions (media, law, political parties) to manage a post-Putin into action by Russian military intelligence exercising operational transition. Putin projects the notion that Russia is a restored control through local paramilitaries, the samoobrona (separatist “great power” and ties this strength to his own unique and self-defense force), on the ground supported covertly by Russian indispensable ability as an effective manager to stand between special forces (the so-called “polite little green men”). order and chaos. However, inflation is running at 10-15 In 2014, the means to establish this regional sphere of percent, real earnings have fallen 10 percent, the middle class influence included exploiting gaps between government and is shrinking, and corruption is endemic. The state budget is society, hard and soft power, political and military commands, dependent on high hydrocarbon prices, and Russia is unable and war and peace in the states on Russia’s periphery. Hybrid to affect the price. The same clear strategic vulnerability that war in Crimea moved from preparation to attack and then to accelerated the collapse of the Soviet Union is present in consolidation phases, whereas in Donbass, we have witnessed Putin’s Russia. Putin has chosen not to address the root causes preparation and attack phases, and in the Baltic states, of this strategic vulnerability because the network of his very Moldova and Georgia, the preparation phase only. This we wealthy, close associates who run Russia also manage and own could call Hybrid Conflict 1.0. Russian strategic economic sectors, the large state conglomer- By 2016 we can argue that Russia’s hybrid toolbox and the ates that thrive in a rent extraction economy. To undertake scope and purpose of its goals is being expanded from seeking a structural economic reform, under the mantra of import regional sphere of influence in the former Soviet space to a much substitution, would entail rebalancing the economy away from more ambitious and longer term project — the re-establishment raw material extraction to manufacturing, agriculture, light of Russia as a key international player. The means to this end are industries and the service sector. It would mean regime leader- becoming clearer: create and exploit rifts in the West, delegitimize ship and political system change. NATO, weaken the European Union and divide the West. This In the context of steadily deteriorating socio-economic constitutes Hybrid Conflict 2.0 and operates alongside Hybrid trends and given not just the absence but the impossibility of Conflict 1.0, but its scope, scale and objectives differ. genuine economic reform, how else can the ideology of great- The wholesale, deliberate, targeted destabilization of the EU power restoration and Putin’s indispensability be maintained and NATO is designed to break European and trans-Atlantic and the Russian population mobilized in support of the solidarity by exploiting pre-existing vulnerabilities and seams regime? Putin could stoke the fires of Russian nationalism, but

10 per Concordiam this would open Pandora’s Box. Russian nationalism in the scapegoats can be identified and publicly punished, and the service of a Russian national state would entail the dismem- populace would be entertained by the circus, which distracts berment of the Russian Federation. Putin’s regime is already from the lack of bread. aware of the destabilizing dangers of nationalism and has had However, destabilization of Russia’s elite could lead to the to constantly constrain nationalist actors in Novorossiya, the regime unraveling. First, balance between clans could be lost separatist-controlled region of eastern Ukraine. Given that 27 if “warriors” turn on “traders,” or a second “Chekist war” Russian regions have autonomous non-Russian ethnic political breaks out. Putin would lose his ability to balance factions, status — 32 percent of all constituencies covering 40 percent the source of his autonomy and power, and could be held of Russian Federation territory — inciting unrestrained hostage by one clan. This is not in his interest. Second, where Russian nationalism would be inherently destabilizing and would the process end? How would it be calibrated and could spin out of control as pressures to secede from non- spillovers contained? The entire elite could be contaminated Russian ethnic entities would grow, both at the center and the in the process. This approach is as toxic as the “Russia for the periphery. Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus that Russians” nationalism project. depend on massive federal budgetary subsidies would revert to a low-intensity conflict zone. ACTING BADLY ABROAD Alternatively, Putin could eschew Russian ethnic national- Not only is Russia’s domestic policy infected by a corrosive ism for a broader more inclusive populist project. Further sense of drift, but it is also helpful to realize that after 16 years demonization of “fifth columnists,” “national traitors” and in power, Putin’s foreign policy strategy cupboard is bare. A “foreign agents” to mobilize society in support of the regime destabilization strategy can act as a placeholder and fill the is an option, but how effective will the self-declared “effective foreign policy vacuum. When Putin came into office in 2000, managers” that run the regime appear when such subver- he attempted to integrate Russia into a “Greater West,” but sive activists still pose a threat after a 10-year crackdown? could not do so on his own terms so he abandoned the strat- In reality, following the assassination of opposition activist egy. “Sovereign globalization” was successful between 2000 Boris Nemtsov on February 27, 2015, the extra-parliamen- and 2012, but it, too, reached the end of its shelf life. By 2008, tary opposition is cowed, while the so-called parliamentary Putin switched to a strategy centered on building a “Greater opposition supports the government and does not qualify as a Eurasia,” but his own economic and foreign policies sabotaged suitable target to mobilize against. Rather, a variant populist this effort. The notion that a non-western Brazil, Russia, India, project could target a part of the elite — false income declara- China and South Africa (BRICS) bloc can be translated into an tions are a noose around everyone’s neck — and accuse it anti-Western bloc is a nonstarter — China determines its own of corruption, lack of patriotism and even sabotage. The major state relations and is at best a situational and transac- benefits of 1930s-style kangaroo-court show trials are appar- tional partner for Russia. Under the pressure of sanctions ent: Society would understand that “we all suffer together,” and countersanctions, EU solidarity has held. In 1939, Stalin

Lyudmila Savchuk worked as part of the Kremlin’s information troops, or “trolls,” filling Internet pages with praise for Russian President Vladimir Putin while mocking his critics. Such trolling is central to Russia’s media disinformation campaign.

AFP/GETTY IMAGES

per Concordiam 11 was able to find a Western partner and divide the West (as the Orthodox Church can support the concept of a Russkiy Mir Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact attests), but there is no clear weakest (Russian world), as can Russian funded nongovernmental orga- link to be peeled away in 2016. nizations. Within the post-Soviet Russkiy Mir, history, ethnicity, At the end of 2015 and following the Syrian intervention, language and religion can all be politicized, and the rights and Putin appeared to be signaling to the West that the lessons of interests of 30 million ethnic Russians, 300 million Russian Yalta should be relearned. A great-power conference would speakers — and even those who feel culturally close to Russia bestow respect and allow Russia to be seen as leading, with its — can be defended from so-called external “aggression” and voice and veto in evidence, as global strategic issues are discussed. “provocation.” Iconic and symbolic Russian and Soviet historical A “grand bargain” with the West would involve recognition of sites such as graveyards, war memorials and monuments can all Russia’s sphere of influence, allow the buffer zone to be formal- be leveraged for effect. ized and minimize direct borders with the West. In Europe, Russia is able to fund and otherwise support Rather than gaining respect, however, from his perspective, anti-EU, anti-U.S. and anti-migrant parties by spotlighting Putin has had insults and humiliation heaped upon him and his issues that mobilize their members. These parties include: leadership. Personal, public and persistent criticisms of Putin Jobbik and Fidesz (Hungary), UKIP and BNP (U.K.); Golden have emanated from Western leaders and institutions in an Dawn and Syriza (Greece); AfD and PEGIDA (Germany); unprecedented fashion. In January 2016, the presiding judge ATAKA (Bulgaria); National Front (France); and in the in a United Kingdom judicial investigation concluded that European Parliament, the Europe of Nations and Freedom Putin himself “probably” had direct involvement in the murder group, which has 25 percent of the vote and consists of 35 far of former KGB agent Alexander Litvinenko in London in right and anti-EU parties, 32 of which are pro-Russian. 2006 through polonium-210 poisoning. Then, a United States With regard to Ukraine, the chief of staff of Ukraine’s Treasury official, backed by the White House press spokesper- intelligence service, Oleksandr Tkachuk, outlined for VICE son, confirmed it was the position of the U.S. government that News in February 2016 the characteristics of Russia’s 10-year Putin is a criminal who runs a corrupt regime. It is clear that a destabilization plan in Ukraine. The plan involves “creating negotiated grand bargain will not be forthcoming. political instability, causing gradual disintegration of govern- What are the means — the tools and instruments — Russia ment structures, emphasizing grievances among the population, can use to achieve its strategic goals? Nontraditional international and disrupting all aspects of political, economic and social life.” actors are available to destabilize Russia’s neighbors and the That same month, Finnish Prime Minister Juha Sipilä region. Command and control is organized through the presi- accused Russia of channeling migrants into Finland to desta- dential administration (Kremlin) kurators, or political advisors, bilize it, echoing Norwegian protests from late 2015. Hans- and through them onto Russia’s security services, the FSB, GRU Georg Maassen, the chief of Germany’s domestic security and SVR. Vladislav Surkov is considered to be one such kurator, agency, was quoted in Der Spiegel saying that Russia was using responsible for Donbass, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russian KGB-style “old measures” of misinformation and destabiliza- media, particularly television and mainstream newspapers, give tion against Germany, including increased intelligence activ- the appearance of variety, but according to Aleksei Venediktov, ity, hacking of Bundestag computers and helping organize chief editor of the independent Russian radio station Ekho demonstrations by Russian-Germans over the Lisa case — a Moskvy, the unity of pro-Kremlin messaging betrays the govern- fabricated story of the rape of an ethnic Russian migrant in ment’s tight control. Government-controlled media outlets such Berlin. The U.S. and European allies have accused Russia of as Russia Today and Sputnik, supported by “troll factories,” work breaching international humanitarian law in Syria by killing alongside pro-Russian nongovernmental organizations, public civilians through indiscriminate bombings with nonprecision intellectuals and personalities in Europe itself to provide and then weapons to “weaponize refugees,” an accusation leveled by amplify a narrative of Western dysfunctionality, and so influ- then-French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius at the February ence policymakers, political elites and European youth. Andrew 2016 Munich Security Conference. Wilson, professor in Ukrainian studies at the School of Slavonic The role of Russia’s media is to demonstrate that the and East European Studies at University College London, writes Western liberal democratic model is dysfunctional by imply- that Russian propaganda can serve four functions: aim to distract ing things such as Jews are fleeing Europe and ethnic Russian and confuse Western audiences; in a “nudge propaganda” migrants are being raped in Berlin. European stock exchanges manner, “affect and strengthen opinions which already exist”; in London, Frankfurt and Warsaw are under cyber attack mobilize the Putin majority; and create a parallel alternative real- and can collapse, or critical national infrastructure such as ity. And according to a 2016 paper by the Institute of Modern nuclear power plants, energy and transport infrastructure can Russia, money is the most influential tool for obtaining local influ- malfunction. The U.K. “Brexit” referendum in June 2016, ence and shaping the attitudes of opinion makers. the expected large-scale arrival of migrants and refugees Russia can mobilize a number of actors and resources for this through the spring and summer of 2016 and the stress this effort. In its immediate neighborhood, protracted conflicts prolif- places on the Schengen and eurozones, and increasing anti- erate. These include Transnistria, Crimea, Donbass, Abkhazia, German and anti-EU feelings in Poland or anti-Polish feelings South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and North Cyprus. Proxy in Lithuania all demonstrate real difficulties that can be forces can be found in Chechnya and the rest of the North exploited. Russia can simply amplify existing tensions rather Caucasus. Russian compatriots and the influence of the Russian than instigating and fabricating new ones.

12 per Concordiam TARGETING THE WEST crime groups), the greater the ability of Russia to direct and Although a destabilization strategy might be a last resort, it meets calibrate destabilizing attacks, but the less its ability to claim Russian domestic and foreign policy legitimacy needs in that it plausible deniability. The use of a Russian-supplied BUK anti- helps maintain Putin’s popularity at a time when economic reform aircraft weapons system to down Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 is not on the table and all viable alternatives are exhausted. How over Donbass in July 2014 demonstrates that momentum and is this so? For Russian domestic politics, destabilization of the inertia are factors, because they degrade command and control West has benefits. It allows for a semi-mobilization of the Russian over time. In addition, as many conflicts have demonstrated, people against the West, while at the same time undercutting calls when state services employ irregular proxy forces, these forces for reform, liberalization and democratization of politics in Russia. have their own priorities, agendas, mentalities and views of a Essentially, Putin’s state-controlled media can argue: “Things may preferred outcome. The interests of Russian security services be bad in Russia but they are worse in Europe;” “you may be and those of organized criminal groups or local warlords and poor but you are poor in a great country — greatness has a price, corrupted businessmen may be compatible, but they are not people must sacrifice.” necessarily shared and can diverge. In addition, managed chaos has its attractions as conflicts The Russian national security decision-makers who initiate are a business. As Gleb Pavlovsky wrote in an October 2015 and supervise implementation of such a strategy are well- article for The Moscow Times, “We help to create crises that spin versed in brinkmanship and scorn the notion of abdication. out of control and then escalate them further — all so that Russia’s national security decision-making community is Russia’s leaders can be the saviors who protect everyone from wedded to an end-of-the-world, “no surrender” mentality and the worst outcome.” Vested interests, not least Putin’s own has a vested interest in not finding accommodation — under- professional security service and inner circle, will increasingly stood as capitulation and treason — with the West. This group exaggerate threats to optimize their share of resource alloca- is increasingly volatile, weakened and exhausted, with no alter- tion and access to extra-budgetary sources of money. Indeed, native strategy to offer, and determined to strike out and throw money laundering and other sources of illicit revenue will fund the first punch to gain respect. the destabilization effort, as this maintains the fiction that it In terms of Western responses, the first challenge is analyti- would not be state directed. cal. “Implausible culpability” complements the notion of In foreign policy terms, there is a logic at work: If Russia plausible deniability. It’s in Russia’s interest to exaggerate its cannot strengthen itself, it can weaken the West — power is influence and hint at its ability to organize or trigger crises and relative after all — and this very ability to destabilize demon- exacerbate and antagonize pre-existing tensions. This further strates that there can be no security in Europe with Russia. confuses analysis and, therefore, undercuts a unified and cali- Power is power and it should be respected. In addition, accord- brated response from the West. ing to leading opposition politician and former Russian Prime At heart, there is a fundamental perception and misper- Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, the Putin leadership “believes that ception problem: The West thinks Russia lashes out from a everything in the world can be bought and sold. This is their position of weakness; Russia thinks it is strong and that failure main credo, this is why they believe that, sooner or later, they to act defensively to prevent encroachments would itself consti- will be able to exert even stronger pressure on the West, which tute weakness, and that the West is poised to exploit vulnerabil- they think must agree with their understanding of life, must ities. What is the optimal balance among defense, deterrence cancel the sanctions, and so on.” “A bit more pressure and all and dialogue in such a context? When does research into will be well” is the governing logic. We can also assume that Russian-backed organized-crime cyber attacks escalate into an Russia believes it can calibrate the destabilization and maintain offensive against these groups? plausible deniability, as it has attempted to do in the Donbass. Russia’s own elite is becoming more destabilized as it becomes The “controlled instability” paradigm is well-practiced and is a increasingly apparent that, not only does Putin not have a clear well-developed lever of influence. Putin will calculate that after strategy for addressing fundamental structural and systemic weak- the presidential election in 2018 with a divided West on his nesses within Russia, but that his policies, or lack of them, actually doorstep, rapprochement with some Western countries will be accelerate the malaise. When the perception of suicidal statecraft possible and Russia will be able to secure finances and invest- confronts the elite’s well-developed instinct for self-preservation, ments again. what gives first? How many of the current elite lose and how much tension is acceptable? What follows afterward? RISK OF MISCALCULATION In 2017, the stabilization fund will be spent and siloviki clan The risks of escalation, crisis, and then conflict are much competition for control over corrupt rents will be the only arbiter higher because miscalculation is inherent in the DNA of of power. How will it end? Nearly 100 years ago, conservative Hybrid Conflict 2.0. There are at least three potential sources noble elites withdrew support for Czar Nicholas II. He fell, and of miscalculation: first, Russia’s implementation; second, the caretaker Kerensky government was overthrown by the Western responses; and third, how this cycle combines to Bolsheviks. Then, 25 years ago, the elite fought a war of “all further destabilize the Russian elite, raising the ultimate pros- against all,” as the events of August 1991 and the October 1993 pect of regime implosion and federal disintegration. illustrated. A strategy to destabilize the West may well destabilize In terms of Russia’s implementation, the more command Russia’s elites, initiate a mismanaged regime change and cause and control is exercised over autonomous actors (e.g., organized the disintegration of the Russian Federation. o

per Concordiam 13 ESTONIA CONFRONTS PROPAGANDA

RUSSIA MANIPULATES MEDIA IN PURSUIT OF PER CONCORDIAM ILLUSTRATION PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

14 per Concordiam By Prof. Viljar Veebel Estonian National Defense College

The international community faces serious challenges arising from a new mode of information warfare that Russia has deployed during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2014-2016. This ongoing “propaganda war” is the most recent and frightening example of information warfare. It reflects the wide array of nonmilitary tools used to exert pressure and influence the behavior of countries. When skillfully combined, disinformation, psychological pressure, and malicious attacks on large-scale information and communication systems can be even more dangerous than traditional weapons systems since they are extremely difficult to discover and combat.

This article examines Russian conflict are convinced that they are “propaganda machinery” and focused only on self-defense and are discusses Estonia’s experience in acting pre-emptively. combating threats from Russian As practiced today, psychological information warfare. warfare involves certain best practices. Disinformation, media propaganda, TOOLS OF MANIPULATION threats and psychological techniques Psychological warfare follows the are used to deter or to destroy same logic as traditional warfare. opponents. The actions of one party involved in Defending against such attacks a conflict create the need for actions requires an open and balanced model by the other party to balance the that is based on facts, reflects real- situation. Preventive actions provoke ity and is not prejudiced. The best counteractions, and each successive antidote to information warfare is step can be more aggressive than the for the public to assess the situation previous one. This leads to conflict rationally and individually, and to escalation, even as the parties to the guarantee that communication is not

per Concordiam 15 filtered or manipulated. Facts should take precedence, as should the assessment of alternative viewpoints. Knowledgeable and critical consumers of news do not expect simplified and exaggerated solutions. They expect a thorough analysis of all aspects of a story. But providing this model of careful journalism is resource-intensive. When starting to lose while using a fact-based and open model in information warfare — as was the case for the Russian government during the Ukrainian conflict — a solution is often found in reconstruct- ing or manipulating images of oneself and the enemy, allowing a government to retake the initiative with fewer resources. As a general rule, replacing an objective image in the media with a distorted or manipulated one is first justified by a practical need to retaliate, to mislead an adversary, or to help mobilize and motivate the “man in the street.” This use of reconstructed information neither requires nor involves in-depth analysis of the facts nor the use of scientific methods, because it would no longer be credible by applying them. Instead, self-legitimizing “expert opinions,” presented by confident government officials or so-called opinion leaders, glorified with a fancy title, tend to prevail. In the process, the essayists of propaganda depart- ments gather wind under their wings, while factual news reporters are forced out of the media, labeled as boring skeptics, defeatists or even influence agents of the opponent. The disbelievers are equated with the enemy (“You’re either with us or against us!”), and a difference of opinion in one matter is considered a sign of disloy- alty in all other matters. Anyone seeking comparative information from alternative sources will be seen as dangerous and negative. Once experts and academics have been tarred with the label of skeptic or opponent, they can be excluded from further debate. The main objectives of a reconstructed information campaign are to: • demonize the adversary • deter and demoralize the adversary • legitimize one’s own activities to the general public • mobilize target populations • promote one’s own political elites

The methods in this stage include mixing truth with NEED FOR DEFENSE lies so that the news consumer — while recognizing a Despite the cost, it is important to combat psychological familiar fact — also trusts the information that has been attacks, for two reasons. First, as the scale and signifi- manipulated. As a general rule, quantitative information cance of information warfare grows in scope, it draws is not source-referenced and, in case of conflicting data, attention away from the objective circumstances of a more favorable version is presented. Later on, if a the conflict, including from self-criticism and potential piece of information turns out to have been fabricated, solutions to the conflict. Second, distorted information it is suppressed. The main criterion for producing news initially intended to distract opponents takes on a life and press releases is conformity to the correct ideology of its own, believed even by the initial source of the and terminology. One of the keys to popularity is clear, disinformation. Once falsehoods begin to circulate, it is resolute and increasing confrontation with rival parties. difficult to limit their spread.

16 per Concordiam A makeshift memorial with signs reading “Propaganda kills!” and “Fight!” is seen near St. Basil’s Cathedral in Moscow in March 2015. It’s where Boris Nemtsov, a charismatic Russian opposition leader and critic of President Vladimir Putin, was gunned down in February 2015. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

A psychological war can be won — regardless of RUSSIAN TACTICS ideology — by using certain best practices, methods and Russia has placed information war tactics at the center patterns. Showing empathy for the opponent scores no of its foreign policy. The Information Security Doctrine points in this game and has no place in the history books. of the Russian Federation, published in 2000, describes Interestingly, in the Ukrainian case, in light of public national interests in the information sphere. The main opinion polls on support to their respective governments objectives of the doctrine are as follows: to protect and opposition to their adversaries, all three parties strategically important information, to protect against (Russia, Ukraine and the Western allies) have mostly deleterious foreign information, and to inculcate in the reached their objectives. But should this standoff be people patriotism and Russian values. Indeed, the decla- considered evidence of tactical success and a sustainable ration refers to the importance of the “spiritual renewal strategy in the longer run? of Russia,” “civic responsibility for the destiny of the

per Concordiam 17 country” and “moral values of society and traditions Convention on Cybercrime, which aims to increase of patriotism.” cyber security and counteract cyber threats. The Furthermore, the doctrine warns that “foreign convention was signed in 2001, came into force in special services use media operating within the 2004, and is active in more than 40 countries. But Russian Federation to inflict damage to the nation’s Russia has declined to sign because it uses such tech- security and to spread disinformation.” All of these niques to further its political ambitions. statements reflect Russia’s deployment of its domestic Recent history has seen several prominent media as a propaganda tool. The Kremlin focuses on examples of this. In 2007, when Estonia removed a creating an image of Western countries as “dangerous memorial to Soviet soldiers, Russia responded aggres- and aggressive” toward Russia. sively, deploying a wide array of info war resources Yet Russia’s propaganda efforts are also directed to damage its neighbor. Russian politicians arrived abroad. Russia has refused to join Europe’s in Estonia to “rile things up” while Russian-language

Estonian Army chaplains perform a reburial service for the remains of Russian soldiers moved from the Tallinn city center to a military cemetery in July 2007. REUTERS

18 per Concordiam websites offered instructions on how to attack Estonian been a main tool of Russian propaganda sites. On top of this, Russia’s Federation Council during conflicts. The targets of Russian called on its government to cut diplomatic relations media are labeled “fascists” or “crimi- with Estonia. The Estonian Embassy in Moscow was nals,” which is intended to discredit those blockaded by Russian youth movements, and Russian countries in the eyes of the West and to officials called for boycotts of Estonian goods. Trade on convince the Russian people that their the Russian-Estonian border ground to a halt as truck government’s actions are just. In this traffic at the main bridge into Estonia was blocked and light, providing balanced information to the delivery of oil, coal and petroleum products was Russians is an important policy goal. cut off. Cyber attacks accompanied the psychological • In Estonia, the local public broadcasting onslaught. opened a new Russian-language televi- The Russian-Ukrainian war has revealed just how sion channel called ETV+ in September damaging this new type of warfare can be. Russia uses 2015. The aim of the channel is to keep a variety of channels to transmit its preferred content. the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia Recent research by Vladimir Sazonov has described informed about local and international the different channels used in Russian information issues (two one-hour programs per day operations to transmit messages that include misin- and regular daily news in Russian) and to formation: Russia-controlled TV channels (such as provide the audience entertainment (such LifeNews, Russia1, Russia24, Channel 1, NTV and as shows and films purchased by ETV+, REN TV), as well as Ukrainian TV channels (like such as the television and Web programs Inter and Ukraina 24) run by pro-Russia oligarchs or of Deutsche Welle in Russian) . Russian news providers, occupy prominent positions in • However, as Estonia’s current experiences Ukraine and are key tools. with integrating its Russian-speaking But the battle is moving to the Internet as well. The population into Estonian society have resources of the online media (Russian newspapers, but shown, there is a vast gap in the resources also Ukrainian newspapers like Komsomolskaya Pravda allotted. The financial resources directed in Ukraine, the Ukrainian edition of a Russian-based to the Estonian Russian-language media newspaper), and Web pages (such as LiveJournal have not been comparable to the resources and Liveinternet), are instruments of disinformation. with which Russia feeds its propaganda Massive Internet trolling on social media, the Russian machine. In this regard, co-operation radio (e.g., Radio Majak), separatists’ information between European Union member states channels (such as Novorus.info), and even mobile is necessary to optimize resources and phone operators (KyivStar and MTS) round out the share reliable information. Russian arsenal. During the Ukrainian-Russian war, More generally, Europe needs to devote more Russia’s strategy has focused not only on destroying the money to creating balanced sources of information morale of Ukrainian soldiers, but also attacking their that are based on facts rather than prejudice. The relatives by splitting families along the lines of ethnicity, EU’s initiative from March and June 2015 to counter religion, politics and region. Russian media propaganda with “positive messages” Russian information channels have relentlessly serves as a first step. The initiative includes several portrayed the Ukrainian Army as murderers, criminals activities, such as the establishment of the permanent and Nazi perpetrators, while ignoring the causes of the EU communication unit EastStratCom Team, promo- war or discussion of Russia’s involvement. This image tion of media freedom in EU Eastern Partnership has been created methodically using aggressive and countries and making communication materials avail- emotional rhetoric. Demonstrably false stories of cruci- able in Russian. o fied children and raped women were created and repli- References cated to discredit the Ukrainian Army. By bombarding 1. Roth, Mathias. “Bilateral Disputes between EU Member States and Russia,” Centre for European Policy Studies Working Document 319 (August 2009). http:// the Ukrainian population with this information — all www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=105021 of it skewed and some of it false — Russia hopes to 2. Sazonov, Vladimir, et al. (2016) “Russian Information Warfare against the Ukrainian State and Defence Forces: April-December 2014.” Riga: NATO undermine support for the government in Ukraine. Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. 3. Smith, David J. “How Russia Harnesses Cyberwarfare,” American Foreign Policy Council: Defense Dossier 4 (August 2012): 7-11. http://www.afpc.org/files/ RESPONDING TO RUSSIA august2012.pdf. What should the international community learn from 4. Veebel, Viljar. (2015a) “From Psychological Defence to Propaganda War,” Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Riga. http://liia.lv/en/blogs/ Russia’s information warfare techniques in Estonia in from-psychological-defence-to-propaganda-war/ 2007 and Ukraine in 2014-2015? There are several 5. Veebel, Viljar. (2015b) “Russian Propaganda, Disinformation and Estonian Experience,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, key lessons: E-Notes, October 2015. http://www.fpri.org/article/2015/10/ • Over the past decade, disinformation has russian-propaganda-disinformation-and-estonias-experience/

per Concordiam 19 Avoiding DEATH by a THOUSAND CUTS A WESTERN RESPONSE TO RUSSIA’S HYBRID THREAT

By Capt. David P. Canaday, U.S. Army

PER CONCORDIAM ILLUSTRATION

20 per Concordiam ybrid war is a term that is sweeping the strate- CONTINUUM OF CONFLICT gic security community worldwide. Much like Hybrid Conflict the torture technique noted in this article’s title, hybrid war has the ability to bleed its target through myriad attacks conducted below the perceived threshold of conflict. Assorted, seem- State ingly inconsequential actions, when combined, Conflict can plunge an otherwise functioning nation into chaos. To many NATO nations living in Russia’s shadow, the implications of this threat are deeply troubling. Nonstate As Russia’s forceful intervention in Ukraine grinds CONSEQUENCE Conflict on, the question that all other former Soviet countries in Russia’s “near abroad” and NATO must answer is: “What are effective responses to Russia’s version of hybrid warfare?” An examination of the aspects that PROBABILITY have made it successful provides insight into deterrence Employs large-scale military technologies across multiple and allows us to apply different techniques to disrupt domains to defeat the enemy. May include use of future Russian hybrid threats. Analyzing how these tactics weapons of mass destruction, anti-access/area denial are deployed in neighboring countries to exploit seams systems, global strike systems, undersea platforms, advanced cyber tools, and counterspace systems, among between these governments and their ethnic Russian other capabilities. citizens — using Latvia as a case study — gives us a reference point to discuss how to respond. Blends conventional and irregular forces to create ambiguity, seize the initiative and paralyze the adversary. May include use of both traditional military and DEFINING HYBRID WAR asymmetric systems. The term hybrid warfare is often misused, so our first Employs small units and networks to undermine task is to define it. Fortunately, the U.S. Department of government and gain control over populations. May include Defense (DOD) has already done this in the latest U.S. use of IEDs, small arms, propaganda and terror. National Military Strategy (NMS). The NMS describes hybrid warfare as the following: PER CONCORDIAM ILLUSTRATION Source: U.S. National Strategy, June 2015 “… warfare that blends conventional and unconven- tional forces to create ambiguity, seize the initiative and paralyze the adversary. Hybrid war may include use of Military-Industrial Courier that hybrid warfare consists of both traditional military systems and asymmetric systems. six stages that use military, economic and diplomatic … Such conflicts may consist of military forces assuming mechanisms to pressure a nation or group to elicit desired a non-state identity.” reactions and responses. Hybrid war is an ambiguous concept and cannot be • Stage 1 is “hidden emergence,” when differences of narrowly defined. The DOD understands hybrid war opinion or policy conflicts begin to emerge. as a point on a linear progression of consequence and • Stage 2 is “aggravation,” when these differences probability. transform into contradictions that are noticed by The Potomac Institute, which completed an analysis political and military leadership. of Russian hybrid war in Ukraine, also addresses the • Stage 3 is the “beginning of conflict,” which features subject and effectively describes the term using common the deepening of contradictions and the start of language. Like the NMS, it characterizes hybrid war open strategic deployment of military means. as a steadily increasing function of intensity and state • Stage 4 is “crisis,” which consists of crisis reactions responsibility. The Potomac Institute defines hybrid and a full range of actions (note that the ratio of war as “incorporating a range of different modes of military to nonmilitary actions is still only 4:1). warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular • Stage 5 transitions to “resolution” and features tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indis- isolating and neutralizing military conflict. It is in criminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.” this phase that leadership shifts to a more political Janis Berzins of the Latvian National Defense College’s and diplomatic relationship and when the search for Security and Strategic Research Center likens it to conflict regulation begins. mafia activity — something that exploits a country’s • Stage 6 is the “establishment of peace” and post- weaknesses. conflict operations. At this point, gains from the Gen. Valery Gerasimov, chief of the general action are consolidated, and the main goal segues staff of the Russian Armed Forces, wrote in Russia’s into lowering tensions between the two countries.

per Concordiam 21 Percentage LITHUANIA GEORGIA* UZBEKISTAN of Ossetian 3.0 Karakalpak 2.1 Other 3.6 Azeri 5.7 Tatar 2.4 Russian 6.3 Azeri 5.7 Polish 7.7 Kazakh 4.1 Other Russian 8.6 6.8 Other 7.0 ETHNIC Armenian 8.1 Russian 8.3 Lithuanian 80.1 RUSSIANS Georgian 70.1 Uzbek 71.4 in the Population 3.8 million Population 5.4 million Population 22.2 million BELARUS ARMENIA* TAJIKISTAN Other 1.9 FORMER Other 2.0 Russian 3.5 Ukrainian 2.9 Russian Other Polish 4.1 2.0 6.6 Russian 13.2 Azeri 3.0 Uzbek 25.0 SOVIET Belarusian 77.9 Armenian Tajik 93.0 64.9 STATES Population 10.4 million Population 3.7 million Population 5.7 million

ESTONIA UKRAINE AZERBAIJAN* KYRGYZSTAN German Other 2.9 2.4 Ukrainian 3.2 Ukrainian 2.5 Other 5.0 Dagestani Other 5.0 3.2 Other 8.3 Russian 22.0 Armenian 5.6 Russian 30.5 Uzbek 12.9 Russian 5.6 Russian 21.5 Estonian 61.5 Ukrainian 73.0 Azeri 82.7 Kyrgyz 52.4

Population 1.6 million Population 52.1 million Population 7.4 million Population 4.5 million

LATVIA MOLDOVA TURKMENISTAN KAZAKHSTAN Polish 2.3 Bulgarian 2.0 Tatar 2.0 Kazakh 2.0 Ukrainian 3.4 Other 3.2 Uzbek 2.1 Other 4.2 Gagauz 3.5 Other 5.9 German 4.7 Russian Uzbek 9.0 Ukrainian 5.2 Belarusian 4.5 13.0 Other 7.1 Russian 33.8 Ukrainian 13.8 Russian 9.8 Russian 37.0 Latvian 51.8 Moldavian 64.5 Turkmen 73.3 Kazakh 41.9

Population 2.7 million Population 4.4 million Population 4.4 million Population 16.9 million

* Ethnic percentages for Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan taken from the 1989 Soviet census — may not accurately reflect present-day conditions

Gerasimov’s depiction of hybrid war is notable for several country. These actions are usually successful because the more reasons. First, it identifies the start of conflict at the point when technical the coordination required to respond, the more two states have a difference of interests, a much lower thresh- likely the response will arrive too late to be effective. Russian old than Western definitions. Second, it abandons the linear strategy capitalizes on seams in a country’s defense, such concept of hybrid war for more of a parabolic progression. In as the seam between ethnic Russians and the governments other words, military and nonmilitary operations reach a criti- of the states in which they live. By applying pressure along cal tipping point, then begin to decline in severity and repetition these seams, Russia is able to enact a kind of reflexive control as the strategic goals of the hybrid operations are accomplished. described by Berzins as “making your opponent do what you This difference in understanding is apparent as we examine want without the opponent realizing it.” the significant center of gravity that ethnic Russians represent within every neighboring country, and those nations’ often CITIZENSHIP AND PROPAGANDA lackluster efforts in addressing this phenomenon. To realize the advantage offered by a seam between these As every small-unit leader knows, the most vulnerable ethnic Russians and their governments, one need look no place in any defensive position is at the “seams” between further than Russia’s military doctrine, which states that subordinate units. Russia chooses to launch its hybrid attacks the use of Russian military force is justified to “ensure the along seams that exist within a targeted government or protection of its citizens located beyond the borders of the

22 per Concordiam White Sea

Significant concentration of ethnic Russians Lake Finland Onego Scattered presence of ethnic Russians

Baltic Sea Lake Ladoga Population totals for the Baltic states taken from The World Estonia Factbook 1994. Population totals for all other countries Russia taken from CIS Statistical Bulletin #20 June 1994.

Latvia

Lithuania Rus.

Belarus

Ukraine Kazakhstan Moldova Lake Romania Aral Balkhash Sea

Black Sea Bulgaria Uzbekistan Georgia Kyrgyzstan

Armenia Azerbaijan Turkmenistan Greece Turkey Caspian Tajikistan Sea China

Cyprus Syria Lebanon Afghanistan Mediterranean Sea Iraq Iran Israel Jordan Pakistan Egypt Saudi Arabia India Nepal

PER CONCORDIAM ILLUSTRATION

Russian Federation.” Russia used this doctrine as an excuse Russia offered a respite from such feelings by providing to conduct military operations in Georgia and Ukraine, Russian passports that entitle the bearer to the benefits of while destroying significant portions of those countries’ Russian citizenship. As Vincent Artman noted in his article militaries and embroiling them in unresolved border “Annexation by Passport,” by making Russian passports conflicts that hinder attaining NATO or European Union available to all who asked, Russia was able to create a membership. significant enclave of Russian citizens inside the Abkhaz and In both Georgia and Ukraine, Russia’s hybrid war began South Ossetian regions of Georgia. In the case of Abkhazia, by exploiting seams created by breakaway ethnic groups. about 80 percent of citizens received Russian passports, Breakaway republics in Georgia and ethnic Russians in Ukraine according to then-Abkhaz Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei felt isolated by their countries’ policies. For example, a June Shamba. This provided ample justification, from the Russian 2014 Russia Today poll showed that a significant percent of the perspective, for military intervention when Georgia attacked Crimean population felt that life would be better in the Russian the breakaway republics in response to escalated provoca- Federation. Also, eastern Ukraine and western Ukraine were tions. Artman notes that Russia also handed out thousands polar opposites in their opinions of the EU, Russia and NATO, of passports in Crimea and eastern Ukraine and, by doing as indicated by a March 2014 Gallup poll. Such disconnect left so, not only contested Ukraine’s sovereignty, but also set the ethnic Russian Ukrainians feeling isolated. conditions for annexation.

per Concordiam 23 aims to unite pro-European Russians, noted in an interview that Latvia is the weakest link in NATO’s chain because of its pro-Putin contingent of ethnic Russians. Of the 575,195 Russians listed in the latest Latvian population census, only 356,482 are Latvian citizens, which leaves 172,372 noncitizens (30 percent) and 46,228 people in “transition” (8 percent), all remaining without the right to vote or serve in the military. This led Andrew Higgins to note in The New York Times that some Russian analysts are suggesting that such ethnic Russians could provide the leverage needed to force the revision of borders in places like the Baltic states. All these factors combine to create an uneasy and sometimes hostile relationship between Russia and other former Soviet republics. According to Mike Collier of BNE IntelliNews, Russian-language media dominates the

AFP/GETTY IMAGES landscape, broadcasting information in Russian all day, compared to the hours Pro-Russian activists In both cases, Russia painted a positive impres- broadcast by their Latvian counterparts. And wave flags of the sion of what life would be like under the Russian IHS Janes Defense Weekly observes that Russia Russian-backed rebels Federation compared to Georgia or Ukraine. This spends over $300 million annually on state-run in eastern Ukraine during a gathering of juxtaposition, along with an increased desire by news agency Russia Today, greatly outpacing its Latvia’s large ethnic both Georgia and Ukraine to pursue NATO and competitors. Since Latvian news agencies cannot Russian minority in EU membership, did nothing but fuel anti-state compete with Russia’s massive broadcasting Riga, marking an sentiments in these regions and increase the desire budget, its Russian population remains psycho- anniversary of the end of ethnic Russians to join the Russian Federation. logically isolated from the country it lives in. This of World War II. Once that stage was set, the fate of Crimea and divide can lead to ethnic tensions and potential Georgia’s breakaway republics was the same — isolation. Given the proper catalyst, civil unrest swift Russian military intervention and annexation on a large scale could result. as soon as the seam between people and govern- The Latgale region of Latvia hosts a large ment had been fully exploited. cohort of ethnic Russians and Latgalians — Russia’s use of this strategy places any state separate ethnic groups with their own languages with a population of ethnic Russians at risk — and is the logical location for any Russian of Russian meddling. Of all the former Soviet intervention. The Latgale region remains loyal Republics, none has been more concerned with to Latvia. Despite Russian efforts to exacerbate Russia’s new hybrid war strategy than the Baltic differences between the Latgalians and Latvia, states. Of those, Latvia has the highest concentra- the majority believe that the benefits of living as tions of ethnic Russians. noncitizens in European Latvia far outweigh living as Russians under Russian authority. Therefore, A LATVIAN CASE STUDY the immediate threat of Russian intervention According to The World Factbook, ethnic Russians could be considered low to medium. account for 26 percent of Latvia’s population, However, as long as this population remains which leads to complicated politics between isolated and relegated to noncitizen status, the the state and local governments and the ethnic potential for Russian intervention will remain. In Russian minority. Often, city mayors and other August 2015, BNE IntelliNews noted that unem- local leaders, representing the interests of ployment in the Latgale region of Latvia remained ethnic Russians, act contrary to the policies of the highest in the country at 18.4 percent, even the Latvian president and government leader- as the rest of the country dropped to 8.5 percent. ship. Igors Vatolins, leader of the Movement This kind of disparity in opportunity means that of European Russians in Latvia, a group that until citizenship and economic issues can be

24 per Concordiam resolved, or at the very least improved, the door to Latvia for their children. This act, and the large-scale response remains wide open to Russian influence. to it, is significant as ethnic Russians, who could have remained isolated from the Latvian government, become STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION RESOURCES more invested in a Latvia that is independent of Russian One technique that can be used to head off a poten- intervention. tial hybrid war scenario in Latvia is to offer a convinc- In addition to re-evaluating citizenship, the Latvian ing counternarrative to that being peddled by Russian government can also identify small-scale, easily imple- news media. One resource is the NATO Strategic mented projects to invest in either business or infrastruc- Communications Center of Excellence (StratCom COE) ture in the Latgale region. A brief visit to Daugavpils was in Riga. A newly founded NATO center of excellence, all it took to notice that roads, buses and other infrastruc- StratCom COE is establishing itself in NATO as the ture badly needed improvement. I observed a project subject matter expert on strategic communications and is repairing an orphanage, aided by the U.S. Army National seeking proposals from NATO members on how best to Guard. The positive emotion garnered by this project utilize the center, via training or advising. serves as an example of how goodwill can be built at low As of March 2015, the main focus of the StratCom cost to the government. Even something as simple as road COE was combatting use of social media by the Islamic repairs would be a sign of real government investment State. But in January 2016, a new paper on Internet that would demonstrate to the Latgale area that it was trolling as a hybrid tool in Latvia was published, the first important to the Latvian government. publication that deals specifically with Latvia. While this The recent European Reassurance Initiative has created constitutes progress, much more needs to be done. Since the conditions to identify areas where improvements can my time in Latvia in 2015, the center has not shown much be made. Each Security Cooperation Office has the ability enthusiasm for pursuing a program to counter Russian to identify Humanitarian Civic Assistance programs that disinformation in the Baltic countries, nor for provid- will complement existing U.S. DOD and State Department ing suggestions for effective information operations in missions inside a country. These projects can be anything the Latgale area. If Baltic States want to produce more that serves the basic economic and social needs of the ideas for countering Russian propaganda, they need to be people. They can even involve host nation military and more vocal in requesting use of the StratCom COE for paramilitary elements to enhance relationships in the that purpose. Only then can they leverage the intellectual region, provided they are not paid directly to these groups. power at this center for messaging ideas and goals. Such actions, while a monetary investment in the short- The EU has a similar resource, East StratCom Team, term, will be more effective in stopping Russian anti-Latvian which is working toward countering the Russian infor- narratives than the cleverest messaging or the hardest- mation campaign and is helping highlight and disprove hitting sound bites. much Russian propaganda. It produces a weekly break- down of all the disinformation directed at European CONCLUSION audiences. This resource is a good start and should be When the Russian Federation applies hybrid warfare in expanded to actively counter the Russian propaganda its near abroad to create wedges between a state and its machine. people, the Russian diaspora in these countries becomes a source of potential tension. It is a continual pressure REFORM EFFORTS point that can be easily targeted and exploited by Russian The best way to thwart potential hybrid war threats is to propaganda. Even if the worst case scenario — a Russian connect ethnic Russians to their countries of residence. invasion — does not happen, the potential for meddling Latvia’s citizenship requirements are strict. Those desir- is a constant. Ethnic Russian populations will always be ing citizenship must pass tests on the Latvian language, seen as pawns by Russian military strategists because they history and constitution. Some view these requirements as provide not only a justification for Russian action, but also discriminatory against ethnic Russians who do not speak in many cases a fifth column of support for Russian poli- Latvian. While such nationalism on the part of Latvia is cies and agendas. certainly understandable, given its historic relationship As Russia enjoys success and learns from setbacks with Russia, in this case, it is doing Latvia more harm than while implementing hybrid warfare strategies, it will use good by isolating ethnic Russians. Regardless of the true similar tactics to control its near abroad. The best defense difficulty of these tests, perception of discrimination and for Russia’s neighbors must be more than simply react- isolation is all the Russian Federation needs to conduct ing to Russian propaganda and accusations; it must be to effective and convincing information operations. proactively target the needs of the ethnic Russian’s who Recently, Latvia has made positive changes in its citi- are often isolated from their governments. Integrating zenship laws; noncitizens who have a child in Latvia can ethnic Russians is a problem that all states with significant now elect for their children to receive Latvian citizenship, Russian populations will have to solve before they can according to Saema News. More than 90 percent of ethnic move past the threat of Russian intervention and on to a Russian parents in Latvia are now choosing citizenship more peaceful and productive future. o

per Concordiam 25 The Pro-Russian DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

Types of media spreading pro-Russian propaganda, their characteristics and frequently used narratives

By Ivana Smoleňová, Prague Security Studies Institute

“Today, nobody questions the fact that Putin has waged leadership, every Western-leaning politician is corrupt, an information propaganda war in our country,” says media outlets not of their persuasion are biased, and the Juraj Smatana, a Slovak political and anti-corruption future is bleak, hopeless and full of conflict. In this world, activist, referring to a new phenomenon — a pro-Kremlin Russia emerges as both the savior and moral authority, the propaganda campaign in the Czech and Slovak languages guarantor of political stability and peace. spread by media. Although both countries have relatively Despite the similarities and strong rhetoric, pro-Russian small Russian minorities and only a handful of Russian- sources have no formal links to Russia. Their motives, language media outlets, the pro-Russia disinformation origins and organizational and financial structures remain campaigns appear to be spreading. unknown in most cases. To date, efforts by investigative In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, pro-Russian journalists and activists have found no direct proof of disinformation campaigns originate from multiple sources. Russian involvement. Their pro-Kremlin messages are amplified through The lack of transparency is one of their strongest extensive social media activity, and the organization assets, as any accusation of ulterior motives is depicted of public events and gatherings. These disinformation as an attempt to suppress “alternative opinions” and any activities feature frequently used narratives and show high- challenger is branded “America’s propaganda puppet.” level similarity of arguments and messages. The most important role of new pro-Kremlin media, and The goal of the pro-Russian campaign is to shift especially their social media channels, is that they facilitate public opinion against democratic institutions and depict vivid platforms where like-minded criticism and discontent a world in which the United States intends to exert global can be shared, spread and amplified.

26 per Concordiam SECRET RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN In Europe, Russia approaches the manipulation of media and information on a country-by-country basis, creating separate strategies for different regions and countries, while taking advantage of local infighting and weaknesses. As Common Ben Nimmo pointed out in a paper for the Central European Policy Institute, the Russian propaganda network is sophisticated, utilizing a network of officials, journalists, sympathetic commentators and Internet trolls to deliver CHARACTERISTICS its messages. It is also built on the lack of transparency, where the public OF THE PRO-KREMLIN MEDIA WEBSITES is unaware that various spokespeople, in fact, work for the Kremlin, Peter & Pomerantsev explained in an interview with Radio Free Europe. Such is the case in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where pro-Russian disinformation messages originate from multiple sources that are often supported by, and interconnected through, pro-Russian public personalities. Claim no allegiance to the For example, Radka Zemanová-Kopecká is a founder of the pro-Russian Kremlin nongovernmental organization Institute of Slavic Strategic Studies, which organized a public discussion in the Czech parliament and a demonstration Send very similar messages and at Prague Castle. In addition, Zemanová-Kopecká writes articles for Czech use similar arguments pro-Russian websites, Russian-language platforms, is active on social media and contributes to online discussions in response to articles. Another example is the former Slovakian Prime Minister Ján Čarnogurský, director Are strongly anti-Western, most of the Slovak-Russian Society, who is frequently cited and interviewed by frequently targeting the U.S., pro-Russian media outlets, such as the Slovak magazine Zem & Vek and Ukraine and the West in general Czech magazine Vědomí. In addition, he writes articles for various websites and has spoken at pro-Russian public discussions. The frequent and most visible disseminators of the pro-Russian To a lesser extent, are disinformation campaign include numerous pro-Russian websites, informal pro-Kremlin and pro-Putin groups and communities on social media, several printed periodicals, radio broadcasts and nongovernmental organizations. In addition, these media Heavily use conspiracy theories, sources amplify their discourses through extensive social media activity and combining facts and half-truths the organization of public events and gatherings. Examples include a protest that was recently initiated by the Institute of Slavic Strategic Studies, public discussions regularly organized by Zem & Vek magazine and anti-NATO Have negative undertones, demonstrations supported by the Slovak-Russian Association. usually depicting moral, Discussions regarding the pro-Russian disinformation campaign economic, political and social accelerated in February 2015 when Juraj Smatana published his “List of degradation, and predict a bleak 42 websites that intentionally or unintentionally help to spread Russian future, including the collapse or propaganda in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.” The list continues to clash of civilizations grow as more and more like-minded websites are discovered. Over the last two years, a number of questionable print periodicals began Frequently use loaded language appearing. These included: Vědomí, founded by the website AC24.cz (that and emotionally charged words, also appeared on the aforementioned list) in 2014; Zem & Vek, which began stories and pictures publishing in 2013; and radio stations such as Slovak Slobodný Vysielač (Free Transmitter), founded in January 2013. While spreading information benefiting Russia, their articles are frequently based on conspiracy theories Are interconnected and and a mixture of facts, half-truths and outright lies. supported by various public personalities that give the DIFFERENT COUNTRIES, DIFFERENT PROPAGANDA campaign credibility and public According to Russian activist Elena Glushko, the information war entered visibility a new era in 2013, when new types of media — claiming no allegiance to Russia — were added to Russia’s information war toolbox. In each country, Predate 2014, but their rhetoric different types of media outlets are being invented with content created and activities hardened and locally. Therefore, it can be presumed that pro-Kremlin media in the Czech intensified with the crises in Republic and Slovakia will be somewhat different from pro-Kremlin media Ukraine in other European countries. Four Czech and Slovak media outlets (three of which claim no connection or direct link to Russia, but appeared on Smatana’s list) were analyzed to

per Concordiam 27 determine narratives and compare the similarity between Most of these common characteristics apply to similar arguments used by various disseminators of pro-Russian pro-Kremlin websites and social media that have recently messages. The May 2015 issues of Zem & Vek and Vědomí, emerged in the region. Yet, the new pro-Russian platforms and April and May 2015 postings to the Czech-language are also characterized by a high level of opaqueness — news portal Aeronet were evaluated. To compare these their motives, origins and organizational and financial media with no formal links to the Kremlin with Kremlin- structures are, in most cases, unknown. controlled media, the reference group included May 2015 The most important role of new pro-Kremlin media Web postings to the Czech branch of international media — especially the social media channels — is to facilitate outlet Sputnik News, founded by the government of the platforms where similar criticism and discontent can be Russian Federation in 2014. shared and, to Russia’s benefit, spread and amplified. In all four cases, the arguments and narratives employed Their success is built on existing and growing public by the authors were similar, if not identical, though outlets distrust toward Czech and Slovak mainstream media and with no links to the Kremlin were more straightforward politicians, plagued by corruption scandals, oligarchs and in delivering their anti-Western messages, and often use arrogant public figures. conspiracy theories, provocative language and emotionally Finally, the goal of pro-Russian disinformation is charged words and pictures. Czech Sputnik News, however, to shift public opinion against the West and Western used a more informative and descriptive journalistic style, institutions, in line with the “divide and conquer” strategy often citing experts or official sources. that the Kremlin pursues throughout Europe, creating a The analysis found these common themes: fictitious world in which the U.S. intends to overrun the globe and Russia emerges as a savior and guarantor of THE UNITED STATES stability and peace. • Wants to dominate the world and aims to control PRO-RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION every nation Russian information warfare theory derives directly • Is constantly sowing the seeds of conflict globally and from spetspropaganda, or special propaganda, first taught is behind all “color” revolutions as a subject at the Russian Military Institute of Foreign • Is in decline, and its global hegemony is collapsing • Failed at its interventions (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, Languages in 1942. It was removed from the curriculum Syria, Libya), making the U.S. responsible for global in the 1990s and reinstated in 2000. In a 2014 report terrorism for the Institute of Modern Russia, Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss refer to Russia’s assault on media NATO & THE EU and its disinformation activities as the weaponization of • Are instigators of aggression information, conducted alongside the weaponization of • Are alien powers and are disadvantageous to the money and culture. Czech and Slovak republics The pro-Russian discourse has already entered Czech • Are about to collapse and Slovak mainstream media. Its appearance correlates with the Ukrainian crises; however, many outlets were UKRAINE founded before 2014, suggesting that the system might have • Is not democratic, but ruled by fascists and Bandera’s been years in the making. followers In 2013, the Juvenilná Justícia, or Juvenile Justice • Has a government and president that are U.S. puppets campaign, an effort to protect children from violence, was described by the Slovak pro-Russian website Stop MEDIA & POLITICIANS Auto-Genocide as a “multinational system that brutally steals and unjustifiably takes children away from normal • Are manipulative and biased • Are controlled by business elites and healthy families. Using physical violence, the state • Are using propaganda to manipulate public opinion social authority abducts children from their homes or kindergartens.” RUSSIA The campaign started with a 32-minute-long YouTube video that accused France, Germany and Nordic • Is not perfect, but is less aggressive than the West countries of “the most brutal tyranny in human history.” • Is only responding to Western aggression The video appeared to be of Russian origin, using the Cyrillic alphabet and referring to Russian sources. The THE FUTURE story, coupled with a petition against this fabricated child • Will be full of conflicts abuse, soon spread to other websites and finally reached • Lies in the alliance of China and Russia, which will the mainstream media in May 2013 when the Slovak TV bring an end to American terror station Markíza reported on it. A year later, protests in Prague and elsewhere against

28 per Concordiam Flags fly in front of the Czech President Milos Zeman, at sectors and democratic institutions that are headquarters of Radio Free a strong supporter of Czech- most frequently targeted. Europe/Radio Liberty in Prague, Russian relations, resulted in a • Deconstruct and expose the pro-Russian Czech Republic. The U.S.-funded station provides an alternative similar campaign. Pro-Russian campaign. To properly understand and publicly news source to government- Czech websites falsely accused expose the system, more effort should be invested controlled media in many the U.S. Embassy in Prague of in researching its various aspects, especially countries. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS organizing the demonstrations. uncovering its structures, personalities and The story was then picked up backgrounds. by some more respected media, which prompted the • Educate civilians. Initiatives that seek to expose respective foreign ministries to actually inquire about propaganda techniques, such as a new school the embassy’s involvement. Both the U.S. Embassy textbook by the Slovak nongovernmental and the protest’s organizer, Martin Přikryl, repeatedly organization Human Right Institute, should be refuted these false claims. supported. In addition, a public campaign should The media assault goes beyond the Internet. Czech be introduced showing how disinformation and Television (CT), a public television broadcaster, recently propaganda operate, and how methods to deliver warned about an increased number of complaints such information to the broader public can be regarding its foreign news coverage. “This new developed. phenomenon is placing pressure on our foreign affairs • Rebut and explain frequently used arguments. department,” Michal Kubal, head of CT’s foreign Complaints such as “the West also uses news editorial department, observed in April 2015. “It propaganda” or “the world is collapsing” should appears that somebody is purposefully trying to search be quickly rebutted and discredited. for errors made by CT that fall in line with Russian • Give “information security” the status of an propaganda — you don’t have to trust the Kremlin, just academic science. Czech, Slovak and other don’t trust anybody.” European institutions of higher education, think tanks and government facilities should develop RECOMMENDATIONS analytical capabilities and support research on Here are some things that European countries can do to how information, the Internet and propaganda weaken Russian propaganda efforts: can be used to achieve foreign policy goals. o • Map the impact on public opinion. To properly assess the effect of pro-Russian campaigns, it is

necessary to study changes of sentiment through This is a condensed version of a paper published by the Prague Security regular opinion polls, surveys and studies directed Studies Institute in June 2015.

per Concordiam 29 Russkiy Mir HOW THE KREMLIN EMPLOYS NARRATIVES TO DESTABILIZE THE BALTIC STATES By Capt. Brian P. Cotter, U.S. Army

PER CONCORDIAM ILLUSTRATION

30 per Concordiam he Russian annexation of the Crimean renewed push to modernize and reform Russia’s conventional Peninsula grabbed headlines in March 2014, military forces and a re-evaluation of how Russia would wage just a short time after Ukrainian President wars in the future, Nichol said in his Congressional Research Viktor Yanukovych was ousted from power. Service paper, “Russian Military Reform and Defense Policy.” Protests began in November 2013 when Enter Gen. Valery Gerasimov, chief of the general Yanukovych backed out of an economic pact with the staff of the Russian Armed Forces. In 2013, he published TEuropean Union at the behest of Russian President Vladimir an article in the relatively obscure Russian periodical The Putin and signed a separate deal that more closely aligned Military-Industrial Courier that introduced a new approach to Ukraine with Russia. The overthrow of Yanukovych, a waging war, a strategy that has come to be known as hybrid Kremlin ally, and the events that followed — beginning warfare. The shift to a hybrid, nonlinear warfighting strategy with the annexation of Crimea and the violent birth of represents at least a tacit acknowledgement that Russia’s self-declared, pro-Russian autonomous republics in Russian- conventional forces suffered a capabilities gap and that alter- speaking eastern Ukraine — illustrated the stark divide native methods of circumventing an enemy’s conventional between ethnic Ukrainians in the country’s west and those in superiority were necessary. In his article — translated and the east who identified more strongly as Russian. published by Robert Coalson of Radio Free Europe/Radio Since the seizure of Crimea, Russia has remained active Liberty — Gerasimov recognized that the exploitation of in eastern Ukraine, where its military involvement has been the information sphere could allow Russia to overcome its both covert and, in spite of repeated denials, overt, as attested limited conventional capabilities. to by U.S. Army Europe Commander Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, The Gerasimov Doctrine emphasizes that “the role of in March 2015, when he estimated Russia had around nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals 12,000 troops operating in Ukraine. While Russia’s support has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power to the Ukrainian rebels has predominantly been in arma- of force of weapons in their effectiveness.” Coupled with the ments and provisions, the implementation of its own, state- careful employment of small-scale military operations and the controlled Russian-language media has been used to great influencing of multiple political, economic, social and cyber effect in the battle for public opinion throughout the wider levers, dominance of information can dramatically alter the Russian-speaking world. Putin has leveraged the fact that battlefield without ever creating the impression that there is a most Russian-language media available throughout the world battlefield in the first place. is broadcast or rebroadcast directly from Russia, where the Kremlin maintains a tight grip on the media. This has created The Russkiy Mir a series of exclusive narratives, carefully crafted to influence The current state of Russian geo-political thought approxi- specific population groups, including those beyond the borders mates similar ideologies in modern history. Throughout the of Russia and eastern Ukraine. early- and mid-20th century, the concept of pan-Arabism Russia’s divisive media campaign and the efficacy of its permeated the greater Middle East. The movement sprung narratives on targeted groups has exposed an alarming fault from the belief that people belonged together as a commu- line along the eastern seams of Euro-Atlantic institutions. While nity, bound by linguistic, cultural and religious ties. No longer Ukraine has generated headlines, in northeastern Europe, the under domination by the Ottoman Turks, many Arabs Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia — members of believed their future was inexorably tied to one another; a NATO and home to significant Russian minorities — represent unified pan-Arab world would fill the void left as Ottoman a strategic vulnerability to the Euro-Atlantic order. One Russian rule faded into history. Early incarnations of pan-Arabism political analyst, Andrei Piontkovsky, observed that Putin’s were ultimately “short-lived as political considerations ultimate desired end state is “the maximum extension of the overrode ideological consistency,” Christian Porth noted in Russian World, the destruction of NATO, and the discrediting Al-Jazeera, but the notion that a people bound by a common and humiliation of the U.S. as the guarantor of the security of culture, language, religion or ethnicity can and should gravi- the West.” Large ethnic Russian populations in the Baltic region tate toward one another is neither unique nor extinct. present an opportunity for the Kremlin to cultivate pro-Russian Twenty-first century Russians, like the Arabs in the first fervor and discredit the West by leveraging carefully conceived half of the previous century, are emerging from a period narratives to influence and potentially destabilize these three of empire, a period during which, for better or worse, the NATO members — and the alliance as a whole — from within. so-called Russkiy Mir, the Russian world or community, grew considerably. Russkiy Mir implies that national borders are The Gerasimov Doctrine viewed as secondary to ethno-linguistic ties; at its core, it In August 2008, Russia engaged in a brief conflict with the describes Russia not as a country, but as a people. In his Republic of Georgia over the status of the Georgian regions article for The Daily Caller, Ukrainian human rights activist of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Although Russia ultimately Volodymyr Volkov explains it this way: prevailed, the war “revealed large-scale Russian military operational failures,” Russia expert Jim Nichol noted. This triggered In [the] Russian language this term is used as “Russkiy” a period of self-evaluation that resulted in two developments: a world. This is significant because the name of [the]

per Concordiam 31 country is “Rossiya”; thus, Russians, by citizenship, are media, which is largely state-owned or state-controlled, is the called “Rossiyane,” while Russians by ethnicity are called primary vehicle through which Russia disseminates its messag- “Russkiye.” The concept of the “Russkiy mir,” or the ing. Former CNN contributor Jill Dougherty said in The Russian world, is an ethnic-centered concept. Atlantic that “as a former KGB officer and head of the KGB’s successor agency, the FSB, Putin knows the value of informa- Today, the notion of the Russkiy Mir has been revived by tion.” She concludes that “for him, it’s a simple transactional Putin in developing his policies toward countries of the former equation: Whoever owns the media controls what it says.” Soviet Union, many of which host sizable Russian-speaking This is predicated on control of the television networks. In minorities. In a July 2014 speech to the Russian parliament, fact, data from the Levada Center, an independent Russian Putin remarked: “When I speak of Russians and Russian- research organization, indicate that 90 percent of Russians are speaking citizens, I am referring to those people who consider television news watchers. themselves part of the broad Russian community. They may Not surprisingly, the government in Moscow now controls not necessarily be ethnic Russians, but they consider them- the majority of television and print media in the country. selves Russian people.” Further supporting this thought, Max Freedom House, an independent human rights watchdog Fisher notes, in an article for the online news outlet Vox, that organization, evaluated Russia’s press status as “not free” the ethno-linguistic boundaries of the Russkiy Mir conve- in 2014, citing a “vast, state-owned media empire” and the niently align with the Kremlin’s perceived geo-political sphere consolidation of several national media outlets into one large, of influence. state-run organization, Rossiya Segodnya (Russia Today):

Russia, NATO and the Baltics The state owns, either directly or through proxies, all Prominent among the narratives the Kremlin has built within five of the major national television networks, as well as its version of the Russkiy Mir is the assailing of Western national radio networks, important national newspapers, institutions, the most conspicuous of which has been NATO. and national news agencies. … The state also controls Indeed, in a late 2014 revision to its military doctrine, more than 60 percent of the country’s estimated 45,000 Moscow labeled NATO as Russia’s primary threat. NATO regional and local newspapers and periodicals. State-run and its eastward expansion have long been a key source of television is the main news source for most Russians and Russian discontent, and it has now manifested itself as one generally serves as a propaganda tool of the government. of the central narratives in its information campaign, though NATO categorically denies the Kremlin’s contention that, in Coupled with continued harassment of journalists and the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, alli- the use of intimidation or violence against reporters delving ance leaders promised there would be no eastward expansion. into sensitive topics, the overall climate — and forecast — of Regardless of whether it’s justified or not, Joshua media freedom in Putin’s Russia is grim. Shifrinson of Texas A&M University told the Los Angeles Times, The reduction of free and independent media in Russia Putin genuinely feels that Russia has been done wrong by the has allowed the Kremlin to dictate and disseminate its own West. Putin’s convictions create a volatile friction point when narrative. This permits Putin to maintain an advantage over considering the Baltic states, the former Soviet republics- political opponents and emerge from crises unscathed by turned-NATO members nestled along Russia’s northwestern domestic and international public opinion. Indeed, Levada border. Though Article 5 of NATO’s charter guarantees Center polling shows Putin’s approval ratings soared after mutual, collective defense, rendering it unlikely that Russia the start of the crisis in Ukraine and standoff with the West, would ever conduct any overtly hostile acts against a member reaching 87 percent by July 2015, even as the Russian ruble state, particularly of the first-strike variety, to Putin, the Baltics faltered under the weight of sanctions and falling oil prices. still embody a perceived Western encroachment on Russia’s Downplaying the effects of sanctions on the economy, the traditional sphere of influence. Russian media routinely points a finger at the EU, NATO and the U.S., drumming up support for the Kremlin as it Russian State Media nobly defends the Otechestvo, or fatherland, against an alleged Freedom of the press in Russia has been gradually rolled coordinated Western conspiracy to stymie the re-emergence back since Putin became president on New Year’s Eve 1999. of a powerful Russia. Any Western accusation against In April 2001, the Kremlin took over NTV, taking “Russia’s Russian actions is quickly met with a response from the state- only independent national television network off the air after controlled media, calling into question even easily proven months of denying it planned to do any such thing, ” noted empirical data and simply writing off anything anti-Russian Steven Baker and Susan Glasser in Kremlin Rising: Vladimir as farcical and based on dubious information sourced from Putin’s Russia and the End of Revolution. “NTV had proven to be Western conspirators. a choice target, the most potent political instrument in the The goal is to discredit Russia’s enemies through disinfor- country not already in state hands.” Thus began the assault mation, described by Michael Weiss and Peter Pomerantsev on independent media in Russia. in an article for online journal The Interpreter as “Soviet-era The pattern has only continued and worsened. Mass ‘whataboutism’ and Chekist ‘active measures’ updated with

32 per Concordiam News program directors at the Russian-language First Baltic Channel Engineers work in the control room of the new Russian language TV channel supervise a broadcast in Riga, Latvia, in January 2015. In response to Kremlin ETV+ in Tallinn, Estonia, in September 2015. The channel was established to propaganda over Ukraine, the Baltic states are stepping up their own improve the quality of Russian-language information in Estonia. REUTERS Russian-language broadcasts. REUTERS

a wised-up, postmodern smirk that insists everything is a channel with an estimated 4 million viewers across the sham.” They further elaborate on how “the Kremlin exploits region, has come under suspicion of being yet another the idea of freedom of information to inject disinformation Kremlin mouthpiece. In fact, the Lithuanian State Security into society. The effect is not to persuade or earn credibility, Department described PBK as “one of Russia’s instruments of but to sow confusion via conspiracy theories and proliferate influence and implementation of informational and ideologi- falsehoods.” cal policy goals” in a 2014 Baltic News Service report. Essentially, the Kremlin policy is to discredit everyone and Moscow has exploited its nearly exclusive control over everything and, in so doing, create a climate of doubt in which Russian-language information, investing heavily in its state-run it is nearly impossible to believe anything at all. Weiss and media apparatus, including a 2015 budget of “15.38 billion Pomerantsev remark how “the Kremlin successfully erodes rubles ($245 million) for its Russia Today television channel and the integrity of investigative and political journalism, produc- 6.48 billion rubles ($103 million) for Rossiya Segodnya, the state ing a lack of faith in traditional media.” By accusing Western news agency that includes Sputnik News,” the Guardian said. By media — or even the last vestiges of independent media within saturating a market already devoid of moderate independent Russia — of acting in the very manner in which the Kremlin- Russian-language media outlets with Kremlin-orchestrated controlled media behaves, then no one can be trusted. This information, Putin is able to expand the reach of his message has proven effective, especially among native Russian speakers. throughout the Russkiy Mir with virtual impunity. In Estonia, for example, numbers show that in the event of The Guardian further suggests that it is in the Baltic arm of conflicting reports, only 6 percent of the ethnic Russian popula- the Russkiy Mir, along NATO’s Russian-speaking fringe, that tion “would side with Estonian media accounts,” according to a the populations are particularly susceptible to exploitation by study by Estonian Public Broadcasting. the Kremlin information campaign: Complicating matters is that a significant portion of the Russian-speaking Baltic population receive their international Concerns about the aims of expanding Kremlin-backed and regional news through the Russian media, according to media outlets are especially palpable in Russia’s EU a paper from the Latvian Centre for East European Policy member neighbours, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia Studies. Indeed, a report by Jill Dougherty for Harvard and Lithuania, which all have significant Russian-speaking University’s Shorenstein Center confirms that “in coun- minorities. … In such a sensitive political climate, there are tries that were once part of the Soviet Union, where many concerns that Kremlin media outlets could spark tensions ethnic Russians reside and the Russian language is still between ethnic Russians and national majorities. spoken, Russian state media penetration has been effective.” Additionally, The Associated Press noted in 2014 that This area, where attitudes are being molded to view the though much of Russian-language media consumed in the West as anything from suspicious to hostile, represents a Baltics is produced from within Russia itself, even the First significant vulnerability to the national governments in the Baltic Channel (PBK), a Riga, Latvia-based Russian-language Baltic states as well as NATO.

per Concordiam 33 The Russian Minority in the Baltics Russia as adversarial to them as well. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia each boast a sizable Russian Andrei Baikov, a Russian commentator at Nezavisimaya minority. Russians account for roughly a quarter of the popu- Gazeta newspaper sums up Russian attitudes this way: “NATO lations of Estonia and Latvia and 5.8 percent of Lithuania’s. and European peace are incompatible.” Other sources have The percentage of people who speak the Russian language in been less subtle in describing the perceived threat from the these countries is even higher. Euro-Atlantic alliance, such as the radio network Voice Complicating matters is the history of the Baltics from 1939 of Russia (recently rebranded as Sputnik News and, as until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 1939 nonaggression mentioned previously, owned and operated by the state-owned pact, the so-called Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, between Stalinist Russia Today conglomerate), which proclaimed it was a U.S.- Russia and Nazi Germany, partitioned Europe and would later led, NATO-sponsored coup that led to the toppling of the be used to justify the Soviet annexation of Latvia, Lithuania Yanukovych regime in Ukraine. and Estonia. As Orlando Figes notes in his book, Revolutionary The notion of the U.S. as the overlord of NATO is Russia: 1891-1991: A History, after World War II, “in the Baltic another recurring theme. Headlines such as “The USA Wants lands and west Ukraine, there were mass deportations of the to Dismember Russia,” in Moskovskaya Pravda, indicate how population — the start of a broad campaign of what today the Kremlin seeks to portray the U.S. One article published would be called ethnic cleansing — to make room for mainly in Krasnaya Zvezda, or Red Star, an official publication of the Russian but also east Ukrainian immigrants.” Russian Defense Ministry, stated that NATO’s eastward Thus, when the Soviet Union collapsed, there were signifi- expansion was fueled by a genuine anti-Russian campaign cant Russian populations remaining in the Baltics. In Estonia within the alliance, that the Baltic states were forced into the and Latvia, laws were introduced after independence in 1991 alliance and that NATO considers the Russian Federation as that effectively rendered their Russian populations as stateless, a “new evil empire that, along with the extremist IS [Islamic euphemistically referring to them as “noncitizens.” While they State], should be removed from history.” This essentially sums have made it possible for these people to naturalize, Estonia up the Kremlin message as it relates to NATO: The alliance and Latvia, in their respective citizenship or naturalization seeks to surround, destabilize and ultimately destroy Russia. acts, require Russians to prove proficiency in the Estonian or Latvian languages and to pass exams in civics and national Impact on NATO history. In Latvia, where, according to an August 2014 article Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its subsequent in The New York Times, “many of these Russian speakers have support to separatists in eastern Ukraine, the West imposed been in limbo, as noncitizens squeezed out of political life, sanctions that have contributed to a downturn of the Russian largely unable to vote, hold office or even serve in the fire economy and largely isolated it on the international stage. brigade,” the language requirement extends beyond a mere However, a number of NATO allies were hesitant to become citizenship requirement, permeating many sectors of everyday involved militarily in Ukraine — a country to which the life. In Estonia, by law, the requirements are similar. On the alliance has no formal obligations — at the risk of provok- other hand, in Lithuania, all people living within its borders ing Russia, which was among Europe’s primary suppliers received citizenship on independence. of energy and still possessed formidable military assets. Ultimately, divisions continue to exist between the Baltic Disagreement within the alliance on how to confront Russian majorities and ethnic Russian minorities. So the climate is ripe revanchism has led some to postulate that Russian aggression, for Russian exploitation and an opportunity to weaken the particularly that which employs hybrid tactics, could threaten strength of the state and, consequently, impact NATO unity the cohesion of NATO. The fear is that the employment from within. Indeed, U.S. Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, the of hybrid tactics may not be enough to build the consensus top military commander in NATO, noted that at the onset of necessary to invoke Article 5, especially considering the lack of the crisis in Ukraine, the Russians executed perhaps “the most popular support in many key NATO members. A recent Pew amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in Research poll found that the public in many key NATO states the history of information warfare.” would be reluctant to provide military aid to a fellow NATO member in need, prompting Vox columnist Max Fisher to A Hybrid Assault remark: “If it were up to German voters — and to at least Building upon the Russkiy Mir narrative, the Kremlin has some extent, it is — NATO would effectively surrender the favored a multilayered approach to its information campaign Baltics to Russia in a conflict.” in the Baltics: Delegitimize NATO and its affiliates — Yet it remains doubtful that Putin would ever fully succeed rebranding its own concerns about the alliance as a threat to in dislodging the Baltic region from NATO and re-establishing order and peace in Europe — and assail Baltic membership Russian hegemony. Even if NATO were unable to mobilize in the organization, suggesting they are unwitting pawns in a collectively, there would likely be a unilateral response from conspiratorial anti-Russian plot. The intent, by design, is to the U.S., which has publicly declared its commitment to drive a wedge between those in the region who seek greater defend its Baltic allies. However, the Kremlin can use softer, Western integration and those, who as members of the wider hybrid techniques to influence conditions within the region, Russkiy Mir, consider Western attitudes and actions toward such as investment in pro-Russian political parties in the Baltic

34 per Concordiam states and, of course, a robust information campaign. In wielding its narratives to build pro-Russian and anti-Western THE ETHNIC RUSSIAN MINORITY IN THE BALTICS sentiments, Moscow can weaken NATO institutionally and relegate the Baltic states to pariah members without risking FINLAND potentially harmful provocations. Gulf of Finland Conclusion Baltic residents who speak Russian at home are most suscep- Tallinn RUSSIA tible to the Kremlin’s narratives. Countering Russian disin- ESTONIA formation will be critical in the battle for public opinion in 24.8% the Baltic states as Russia poses as both a protector of ethnic Russians and a counterweight to NATO. Failure to respond to the Russian information campaign leaves those sizable Gulf Russian minorities open for exploitation by the Kremlin. of Riga Responding to Russia cannot be a NATO-exclusive LATVIA endeavor. Twenty-two NATO members are also members of 26.9% the EU, including Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Considering Riga the economic impacts of Russian meddling in the Baltic states — also recent additions to the eurozone — it is in the interest of the EU to contribute to sustained stability in the region. The Baltic states recently discussed the formation of a Baltic LITHUANIA % Baltic-based Russian-language news outlet to be broadcast Sea 5.8 BELARUS throughout the region. The EU would benefit from support- Vilnius ing such an initiative. While financial backing would almost KALININGRAD certainly be pounced upon by Russian media as indicative of (RUSSIA) Western propaganda, the establishment of Russian-language POLAND public service broadcasting (PSB), defined by the United PER CONCORDIAM ILLUSTRATION Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization as Source: Stratfor, 2014 “broadcasting made, financed and controlled by the public, for the public,” would provide a reliable alternative infor- that which the Kremlin seeks to exploit: freedom of the press. mation source. The Kremlin would likely attack any source Additionally, the Baltic states, particularly Latvia and that runs counter to its own narrative, Nadia Beard writes Estonia, should consider greater inclusion of their Russian- in the The Calvert Journal, but the fact that PSBs are “neither speaking minorities and wider acceptance of the Russian commercial nor state-owned” and are “free from political language. With laws in place that essentially force ethnic interference and pressure from commercial forces” would Russians to become more Latvian or more Estonian to fully lend credence to their reports while serving to discredit claims participate in the political process, these states have put that the network is simply a NATO or EU mouthpiece. EU their Russian populace in the precarious position of having support would be necessary in the application of available tax to choose between culture and citizenship. If they hope to breaks and assistance in securing the network’s widest possible compete against Russian influence, it may be time to accept dissemination without interference or disruption by third the Russian minority as an integral part of their respective parties. A transparent Russian-language news source widely states. Ultimately, failure to accommodate the Russian minori- available throughout the Baltic states would be critical to ties only pushes them closer to Putin and further under the addressing the exclusivity of the Kremlin’s narrative. sway of the Kremlin’s media machine. Combating Russian propaganda cannot be limited to the In conclusion, in March 2014 Lithuanian Minister of establishment of one television station, however. The recently Foreign Affairs Linas Linkevicius remarked, fittingly on established Meduza, a Riga-based online news source, is one Twitter: “Russia Today’s propaganda machine is no less example of an independent Russian-language news outlet that destructive than military marching in Crimea.” Russia Today, can be a useful tool against Russian disinformation. However, one weapon in Vladimir Putin’s vast information arsenal, is these news organizations are fledgling and struggle to compete indicative of the entire Russian media campaign — widely with Russia-based competitors. While Western institutions available and unencumbered by the burdens of journalistic would be unwise to try to unduly influence these news outlets, integrity. The broad reach of the Kremlin’s information providing independent Russian-language networks with unfet- blitz and its use of harmful, divisive narratives could have tered access to NATO, the EU and their respective decision- a dramatic impact on the future of European security and makers will lend them greater credibility. Additionally, this economic stability. o will give NATO and the EU a platform from which to convey a message counter to the Russian narrative without forfeiting Unless otherwise noted, all translations are the author's

per Concordiam 35 RUSSIAN

PROPAGANDAIN UKRAINE PER CONCORDIAM ILLUSTRATION

KYIV LACKS THE TOOLS TO FIGHT PHANTOMS CONJURED UP BY MOSCOW

36 per Concordiam By Roman Shutov, program director of Telekritika, Kyiv or Ukrainians, the war in and residents of the Donbass were By December 2015, the list of banned eastern Ukraine has become frightened by Russian propaganda and channels included 25 names. an everyday reality. Only two believed that “fascists” were coming to The next step was to limit the share years ago, though, no one kill them. Something had to be done to of Russian films on Ukrainian television in the country believed war limit the onslaught of propaganda. channels; on some days, these could Fwas possible — and certainly no one constitute up to 87 percent of content. expected that propaganda would be Staying Democratic As these films (especially those produced one of its main weapons. Many societies have had to bridge recently) often had elements of Kremlin Since Ukraine’s independence in the dichotomy between security and propaganda, Ukrainian experts consid- 1991, little attention had been paid to democratic values. This quandary arose ered them another weapon in the ongo- building a system that would ensure the for the United States and the West ing information war. In March 2015, security of information — security that after 2001. Ukraine has faced a similar a law was issued prohibiting television

would actively counter false propa- dilemma in its search for solutions to its broadcasts of Russian films that either ganda. State security services ignored propaganda-related problems. had been created after January 1, 2014, even the most basic anti-Ukrainian The first solution was the easiest: or glorified the Soviet regime or Russian messages. Limit the broadcasting of Russian tele- militarism. This decision also caused As a result, when the new govern- vision. Quite popular among Ukrainian protests in Moscow, but Ukrainians and ment faced aggressive propaganda, audiences, it became a constant and the European community understood it appeared completely incapable of aggressive source of lies and hatred, the need for these measures. acting. State functions related to infor- combined with a glorification of All of these limitations only mation security were divided among Stalinism and other attributes incompat- concerned broadcasting via air or at least seven agencies and ministries. ible with democracy. cable — Ukrainians still have access to They lacked proper coordination, their When Kyiv responded, Russian Russian television and films through functions were often duplicated, and media accused it of violating freedom satellite and the Internet. Nevertheless, some important tasks were not imple- of speech. But that was not the case: the effect of the measure has been mented at all. There was no state unit Ukrainian authorities referred properly evident. Telekritika, the Ukrainian responsible for monitoring the situation to national and international norms, in the field or identifying threats, which and the legitimacy of this decision made simple decision-making impos- provoked no genuine doubts. Five Ukrainian activists hold symbolic ears near the Dutch sible. Furthermore, there were no clear Russian channels were initially banned Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine, in February 2016. The activists warn the Netherlands to disregard anti-Ukrainian mechanisms for implementing such in March 2014, and the state media propaganda ahead of a referendum on an association decisions. regulator then began to tightly moni- agreement of the EU, which took place in April 2016. The During that time, Crimea was lost, tor the content of Russian channels. slogans read, “Don't listen to Russian propaganda.” EPA

per Concordiam 37 website that reviews media content and Ministry of Ineffectiveness seizure of power, and 28 percent believe trends, reported that before the war, The decision to establish a Ministry of that Ukraine is at war with its own 22.7 percent of Ukraine’s population Information Policy in December 2014 population in the east. watched news on Russian television, but met strong resistance inside Ukraine Meanwhile, the propaganda has the figure decreased to 12 percent by and confusion abroad. Both national evolved. Increasingly, it aims not only June 2015. The share of Russian-made and foreign analysts considered it to to spread Russian myths (for example, films on Ukrainian television decreased be an instrument of state censorship. false stories about Kyiv Nazis and cruci- by almost three-quarters. These fears have not been realized. The fied boys), but also to seed instability Another important decision new agency has been too weak to apply and hatred within Ukrainian society. occurred in October 2015, when pressure or any other influence on For example, 60 percent of Ukrainians Ukraine’s parliament adopted a law media, and its real impact and purpose admit they have a negative attitude obligating broadcasters to report on remain obscure. toward internally displaced people, their owners and beneficiaries. In The ministry didn’t push for but only one-third have had any actual Ukraine, the “oligarchization” of media changes in legislation that required contact with them. It is likely that such significant corrections prejudice is conditioned by negative to improve information discussions in the media. Efforts have security. The Ukraine been detected to destabilize other Information Security interethnic and interreligious relations Concept, recently in Ukraine as well. drafted, is a rather The government appears helpless in doubtful achievement; a situation like this. It seems unable to the Organization produce a single national narrative that for Security and could oppose Russian myths, and even Co-operation in if it could, the government has no tools Europe has sharply with which to spread it. Moreover, there criticized it, while are doubts whether the government has domestic experts have a clear understanding of what’s going proved that the docu- on in society — which is to be expected, ment cannot be the given that monitoring and analysis are basis of further policy still absent. in the field. The minis- Consequently, at the moment, try has also launched nothing is being done to overcome some patriotic commu- the stereotypes and fears cultivated by Protesters in front of the Security Service of Ukraine building demand a ban on Ukrainian newspapers they say contain Russian nication campaigns, propaganda, to prevent hate speech propaganda. The sign behind them reads: "Vesti, thank you for including online and in the media or to remove the grow- supporting Russian propaganda.” EPA outdoor campaigns ing barriers between different social titled “Crimea is groups. The government and the and its nontransparent ownership made Ukraine” and “Defending Ukraine,” president have communicated little with it a strong tool to manipulate public but they are not enough to “ensure the public about the conflict, and the opinion, and a particularly danger- informational sovereignty.” vacuum is filled by suggestions, fear and ous one when key media connected propaganda. with pro-Russian business interests to Phantoms Spread Only nongovernmental organiza- promote Russian propaganda. At the same time, the situation remains tions are actively trying to combat But no single media outlet has been extremely dangerous. Despite the bans propaganda in Ukraine; they aim to particularly inconvenienced because and restrictions, Ukrainians still have monitor trends, reveal fake messages of its pro-Russian orientation. Even access to Russian television channels and develop recommendations. the most obvious agents of Kremlin and films. Meanwhile, the Kremlin uses Sometimes they gain support from propaganda continue operating, though social networks to disseminate phony Western donors and governments, but one journalist has been arrested for and manipulative messages, and a because they are not coordinated, they conducting anti-mobilization agitation. number of influential Ukrainian media largely produce a cacophony with little The government’s position has been affiliated with pro-Russian business impact. Instead, emotions and fears opposed by some right-wing media and interests transmit “softer” propaganda. continue to rule the game, ensuring politicians demanding firmer actions This propaganda has been quite favorable conditions for phantoms to to restore security, but the government effective. According to Telekritika and continue spreading. o says it will undertake no action that KIIS polling, 42 percent of people in The author is a contributor to the Atlantic Council's Dinu could be viewed as a violation of free- Ukraine’s south are convinced that the Patriciu Eurasia Center's Ukraine Alert publication. This dom of speech. events on the Maidan were a violent article was previously published in February 2016.

38 per Concordiam SECURITY JAM 2016 Conducted by Friends of Europe with the support of USEUCOM, the European Union and IBM

Security sector leaders are invited to a three-day Start: 25 April global brainstorming session held online. Several 14:00 CET / 8 A.M. EST thousand participants, including senior political and military officials, NGOs, academia and the private sector, will unite around a virtual table to End: 28 April develop solutions to the world’s security challenges. 19:00 CET / 1 P.M. EST

• STRATEGIC FORESIGHT AND EARLIER-WARNING • GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION • A REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST • FOREIGN MILITARY ENGAGEMENT 2025 • POLICING 2025: NEW STRATEGIES AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME TOPICS • ANSWERS TO RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Tobias Metzger, Project Manager, Security Europe Tel: +32 2 893 98 18 | F: +32 2 893 98 29 | Email: [email protected]

Pauline Massart, Deputy Director, Security & Global Europe Tel: +32 2 300 29 91 | F: +32 2 893 98 29 | Email: [email protected] CONTACT

www.friendsofeurope.org

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MARSHALL CENTER 40 per Concordiam