The Progress of the Domestic Renewable Energy Transition Compared, with a Special Focus on Wind Energy

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Dutch Delay, Successful Norway: The progress of the domestic renewable energy transition compared, with a special focus on wind energy

Source: by author.

MSC THESIS POLITICAL SCIENCE: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS RESEARCH PROJECT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENERGY 2017-18 JUNE 18TH 2018, AMSTERDAM

Author: Irene Niet UvA-ID: 10786090 Supervisor: Dr M.P. Amineh Second reader: Dr R. Pistorius

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Abstract

In light of climate change mitigation, the European Union established the 2020-goals, of which one is that 20 percent of energy consumption should come from renewable sources. However, for the Netherlands it is doubtful whether this goal will be achieved. As fossil fuels are becoming increasingly scarce and the consumption of fossil fuels has detrimental effect on the environment, a domestic renewable energy transition is not only necessary to reach the 2020- goals, but also for economic sustainability. Therefore, with concepts of both transition theory and political economy, this research answers the following question: why have the state-market relations hampered the domestic renewable energy transition in the Netherlands, but not in Norway? Using a comparative analysis, this research indicates that (a) the most influential factor is whether the government has enough power over the corporations and is willing to use this power to progress the renewable energy transition, which is the case in Norway, but not in the Netherlands. Additionally, (b) it is helpful when big energy corporations are already transforming their business models towards renewable energy, such as Statoil Asa. Finally, (c) radical and severe pressure from civil society actors, as is the case in Norway, aids the transition, as it influences the government and public support in favour of the transition. Thus, the content of state-market relations and how these relations are used, influence the domestic renewable energy transition.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements 7

Maps 9

List of abbreviations 13

List of figures and tables 14

List of tables 14 List of figures 14

Chapter 1 - Introduction 15

1.1 Introduction 15 1.2 Literature review 17 1.3 Theory and concepts 20 1.4 Brief argumentation and hypotheses 26 1.5 Methods and data 27 1.6 Structure of the thesis 28

Chapter 2 – A comparison of the current Dutch and Norwegian Energy Situation 31

2.1 Introduction 31 2.2 The Dutch and Norwegian domestic energy production 31 2.3 The Dutch and Norwegian domestic energy consumption 34 2.4 The Dutch and Norwegian energy trade: import and export 37 2.5 Energy policies of the Dutch and Norwegian governments 39 2.6 Conclusion 43

Chapter 3 – The relations between the government, energy corporations and civil society actors in the Netherlands and Norway concerning the renewable energy transition 45

3.1 Introduction 45 3.2 Dutch state-energy corporations relations 47 3.2.1 The direct ties between the Dutch state and the energy corporations: shares and networks 47 3.2.2 The indirect ties between the Dutch state and energy corporations: policies 48 3.3 Norwegian state-energy corporations relations 50 3.3.1 The direct ties between the Dutch state and the energy corporations: shares and networks 50 3.3.2 The indirect ties between the Norwegian state and energy corporations: policies 51 3.4 Lateral pressure in the Dutch society 53 3.4.1 Actions taken by the Dutch civil society actors 53 3.4.2 The effect of the actions taken by the Dutch civil society actors 54 3.5 Lateral pressure in the Norwegian society 56 3.5.1 Actions taken by the Norwegian civil society actors 56 3.5.2 The effect of the actions taken by the Norwegian civil society actors 57 3.6 Conclusion 58

Chapter 4 – Comparison of the strategies and interests of the big energy corporations regarding the renewable energy transition 61

4.1 Introduction 61 4.2 Energy corporations’ investment in wind energy 62 4.3 Energy corporations’ cooperation and merging with other corporations 67 4.4 Future outlooks and ambitions of the energy corporations 69 4.4.1 Future outlooks of the Dutch energy corporations 69 4.4.2 Future outlooks of the Norwegian energy corporations 72 4.4.3 The Dutch and Norwegian energy corporations’ outlooks and their effects compared 74 4.5 Conclusion 74

Chapter 5 – Comparison of the challenges in the Dutch and Norwegian domestic renewable energy transition 77

5.1 Introduction 77 5.2 Challenges for the Dutch domestic renewable energy transition 77 5.3 Challenges for the Dutch domestic renewable energy transition 81 5.4 The Dutch and Norwegian domestic renewable energy transition challenges compared 84 5.5 Conclusion 85

Chapter 6 - Conclusion 87

6.1 General conclusion 87 6.2 Expected challenges and recommendations 89 6.3 Discussion 91

References 93

Full list (alphabetic order) 93 Categorized list 106 Interviews 106 Primary sources 106 Secondary sources 114

Annex 1: Overview of interviews 121

Acknowledgements

I would first like to thank my supervisor, Dr Amineh, for his intensive supervision and useful feedback. He always made sure that all deadlines would be met and that I would hand in only my best work (and not an excessive number of pages). Second, I would also like to thank my second reader, Dr Pistorius, for taking the time to review my work. I am profoundly grateful to all my interviewees. Due to their selfless offering of their time to a student, I was able to add new information and important perspective to my research, making it much more valuable, relevant and interesting. Also my sincere thanks to Suzanne, Rein, Tim and Max, who were always willing to critique my work and give me detailed feedback. They helped me to make sure my line of arguing is clear and understandable. Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for giving me the much needed love and support, and keeping me motivated.

Maps

Map 1: Map of Europe.

Note: Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein are also part of the European Economic Area. Source:Nations Online (2018a).

Map 2: Map of the Netherlands

Source: Nations Online (2018b).

Map 3: Map of Norway

Source: Nations Online (2018c).

List of abbreviations

CBS Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek CEEP Central Europe Energy Partners CEO Chief Executive Officer EBN Energie Beheer Nederland B.V. EEA European Economic Area EREF European Renewable Energies Federation EU European Union FNV Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging IEA International Energy Agency IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency ktoe Thousand Tonnes of Oil Equivalent KVGN Koninklijke Vereniging van Gasfabrikanten in Nederland LO Norge Landsorganisasjonen i Norge Mtoe Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent MW Megawatt hours SDE Stimulering Duurzame Energieproductie SDE+ Stimulering Duurzame Energieproductie + SER Social Economische Raad SSB Statistik senstralbyra TWh Terawatt hours US United States VEMW Vereniging voor Energie, Milieu en Water WWF World Wide Fund for Nature

List of figures and tables

List of tables

Table 1: Big energy corporations' investments in wind energy projects______66 Table 2: The enabling and constraining factors in the Dutch and Norwegian domestic renewable energy transition compared ______85

List of figures

Figure 1: Concepts used in this thesis and their relation to each other ______22 Figure 2: The key actors of this thesis and their position on a domestic renewable energy transition ______25 Figure 3: Total Dutch domestic energy production from 2006 to 2015, in ktoe. ______32 Figure 4: Total Norwegian domestic energy production from 2006 to 2015, in ktoe ______33 Figure 5: Total Norwegian domestic wind energy production from 2006 to 2015, in MW ______33 Figure 6: Total Dutch domestic renewable energy production from 2000 to 1016 in Mtoe ______34 Figure 7: Final Dutch and Norwegian domestic energy consumption in 2016, in percentages ______35 Figure 8: Dutch domestic energy consumption per sector in 2016, in percentages ______36 Figure 9: Norwegian domestic energy consumption per sector in 2016, in percentages ____ 37 Figure 10: Dutch and Norwegian energy trade (import and export) in 2016 compared, in percentages ______39 Figure 11: Renewable energy transition progress (until 2015) and 2020-goals in percentages. ______42 Figure 12: The Dutch state-market relations and constraining or enabling factors in the energy transition ______80 Figure 13: The Norwegian state-market relations and constraining or enabling factors in the energy transition ______83

Chapter 1 - Introduction

1.1 Introduction The topic of this research is the progress of the renewable energy transition, particularly in the area of wind energy, in Norway and the Netherlands, and how this is influenced by the state- market relations in the societies of both countries. The main objective of this comparative analysis is to show why the state-market relations in the Netherlands are slowing down the renewable energy transition, while this is not the case in Norway. This can bring clarity and form the basis for recommendations on progressing the renewable energy transition, which is necessary to make the current economy sustainable. To this end, this research will focus on the developments the renewable energy transition, specifically wind energy, in Norway and the Netherlands since 2006, as both countries responded to the establishment of the Green Paper of the European Union and subsequent 2020-goals. Specifically, this analysis will focus on five key actors involved in the renewable energy transition per country to represent the different societal groups (namely, the political elite, the energy corporations and the civil society groups). This will be further explained in section 1.3, Theory and concepts. Researching why the state-market relations are slowing down the renewable energy transition in the Netherlands but not in Norway, is important, because its conclusions will identify the enabling and constraining factors for a renewable energy transition. This will add to the energy and sustainability studies, as there is not much clarity on why the difficulty of a renewable energy transition varies so greatly between quite similar, but different societies. Often, arguments used to explain an unsuccessful renewable energy transition are either not grounded on solid empirical research, insufficient or applicable to only very few cases. As this research analyses the society as a whole, instead of only limited parts of the renewable transition process, a more complete view can be given of the enabling and constraining factors for a successful renewable energy transition. This can bring clarity to the currently haphazard field of renewable energy studies. Additionally, knowing what the enabling and constraining factors are for a renewable energy transition is key to ensure an effective advancement of the transition. This insight can aid the Netherlands and other not yet successfully transitioning Member States of the European Union, increasing the European energy security and boosting climate change mitigation (Hache 2017). A renewable energy transition is needed for an increase in energy security, because the current fossil fuel-based European energy consumption is not sustainable (reserves will run out), is dependent on imports and not diversified enough to manage a sudden (import) decrease

15 in fossil fuels (Amineh and Crijns-Graus 2017: 348; Eurostat 2017; Kirby 2014). A renewable energy transition will result in more diversification, growth in domestic production and increased sustainability (Escribano and Garcia-Verdugo 2015: 26–27; Scholten and Bosman 2016; Twidell and Weir 2015: 3). At the same time, the transition will cut greenhouse gas emissions produced by fossil fuel consumptions (Kingston et al. 2017). This will be a huge boost for climate change mitigation, which is necessary to keep this earth liveable (CICERO 2018; Kingston et al. 2017; Policy Expert WWF Europe 2018). This research will analyse the renewable energy transition and specifically the development of the wind energy sector in the Netherlands and Norway from 2006 until now, June 2018. In 2000, the Green Paper of the European Union was published, which called for a greater share of renewable energy in the renewable energy consumption, initiating the start of many renewable energy projects (European Commission 2000). A few years thereafter, in 2006, the talks establishing the 2020-goals had started (20 percent reduction of CO2-emissions with 1990 as reference point, 20 percent increase in energy efficiency, and 20 percent of final energy consumption coming from renewable sources) and it would not be long before the Member States had all gotten a clear, mandatory national goal concerning the share of renewable energy in the total energy consumption (European Commission 2007a, 2007b, 2018). Now, in the year 2018, with the 2020-goals in sight, it becomes clear how different countries are progressing in the renewable energy transition (Eurostat 2018). Additionally, the European Union is in the process of trilogue-meetings about the European renewable energy transition, which will determine the renewable energy goals for 2030 (Expert Policy Advisor EREF 2018; Member of Committee of the Regions 2018). The country-cases of Norway and the Netherlands are alike in many societal aspects, but are on different levels in the renewable energy transition. Both Northern-European countries have a similar state-society structure and fall under European Union Energy Law (although Norway is not a European Union Member State, it is part of the European Economic Area) (CIA 2017a, 2017b; European Commission 2017). The Netherlands, however, only has a 5.8 percent share of renewable energy in its gross final energy consumption; Norway has a share of 69.4 percent (Eurostat 2018). Therefore, comparing these countries will show which differences in the state-market relations of these countries form enabling or constraining factors for the renewable energy transition. The research question of this thesis is: Why have the state-market relations hampered the domestic renewable energy transition in the Netherlands, but not in Norway? In order to answer this question, a few sub-questions should be answered first.

1. What is the current energy situation (production, consumption and policies) in the Netherlands and in Norway? 2. What do the power relations between the government, the two biggest energy corporations, the green movement and the biggest labour union look like in the Netherlands and Norway? 3. How do these relations influence the domestic renewable energy transition, specifically the development of wind power, in the Netherlands and in Norway since 2006? 4. How have the strategies and interests of the two biggest Dutch and the two biggest Norwegian energy corporations changed, and, with that, affected the national energy transition since 2006? 5. What have been, and still are, challenges for the Netherlands and for Norway in the renewable energy transition? The concepts used in these sub-questions will be further explained in section 1.3 Theory and concepts.

1.2 Literature review There are many explanations for the variation of progress of domestic renewable energy transitions in different societies. The four most common explanations, set out below, are insufficient technology, presence of fossil fuels, economic loss and civil doubt. First, the explanation of insufficient technology argues that the progress of a renewable energy transition is dependent on the production, processing and consumption technologies available. In slowly progressing transitioning societies, these technologies are not (yet) advanced enough. Focusing on wind energy, there is a lack of good storage methods for the produced energy (Egging and Tomasgard 2018; Lewiner 2018). This makes dependability on wind energy dangerous, as the production of wind energy is heavily reliant on the weather conditions and is thus a very volatile and variable form of energy production (Egging and Tomasgard 2018; Ertürk 2017; Janevska 2017; Lewiner 2018; Scholten and Bosman 2016). Furthermore, there is not a sufficient infrastructure for wind farms yet, which makes it especially hard to establish the highly profitable offshore wind farms (Lewiner 2018). This theory only explains part of the difference between the Norwegian and Dutch renewable energy transition. Norway has less problems with the lack of storage technology than the Netherlands, as Norway has good back-up options, namely hydropower energy and its own natural gas reserves (Egging and Tomasgard 2018). The countries, however, have an equal level of technology, as they both fall under European energy legislation, which insists countries share

17 their technologies to mitigate climate change. Additionally, the level of technology in both countries is relatively advanced (Janevska 2017). Thus, this theory does not explain why the Netherlands is progressing so much more slowly than Norway. Second, the presence of fossil fuels also does not have as big an effect as some research makes it seem. Some research claims that the presence of fossil fuels in a country makes this country less aware of the need to transition to renewable energy sources, which results in an underdeveloped energy sector, hampering the renewable energy transition. This is part of the resource curse of resource rich countries becoming too dependent on their natural resources and not diversifying their economy and industry (Amineh and Crijns-Graus 2017: 396–400; Le Billon 2004). The Dutch society has fallen prey to this problem since the discovery of the natural gas field in the north of the Netherlands during the 1960s (Favennec 2011: 68). The Norwegian society, although the country is very resource rich, has avoided this problem by putting the resource revenue into funds for developing their economy and industry (ibid). Although this could explain the difference between the Dutch path of renewable energy transition and the Norwegian path of renewable energy transition, again, it is unclear why the Netherlands has fallen so much behind. Furthermore, many resource rich countries are currently transitioning to renewable energy in a much faster pace than the Netherlands; this explanation of resource richness does not explain why the Netherlands is unable to make significant progress in the transition (Vidadili et al. 2017). The third explanation commonly given for this difference is the unwillingness of energy corporations, because of the economic losses these corporations would face and the economic disadvantages for these corporations when transitioning to renewable energy. First of all, renewable energy is not fully profitable yet, making it a bad business case for most energy corporations to undergo a full transition to renewable energy (Cai et al. 2018; Darvishi and Varedi 2018; Fagerberg 2017). Second, these corporations have invested in their fossil fuel resources (gas fields, oil fields, coal mines), and therefore want to maximize profit on their fossil fuel investments, before transitioning to renewable energy (Expert Policy Advisor EREF 2018). Thus, according to this explanation, energy corporations are slowing down the energy transition, for example by not investing in renewable energy, as the transition would damage the economic profits of these corporations. This explanation, however, is proven wrong on a lot of points. First of all, due to the heavily subsidizing of the renewable energy developments by almost all governments, investing in renewable energy has become profitable (Cai et al. 2018; Egging and Tomasgard 2018; Hache 2017; Mirvis and Googins 2017). Additionally, investing in renewable energy is good

18 for a company, because this increases the societal status and credibility of a company, which can increase the number of customers and heighten company morale (Cai et al. 2018; Mirvis and Googins 2017). Thus, a lot of energy corporations are investing in renewable energy (Beöthy 2017; Hache 2017). Furthermore, the costs of renewable energy are decreasing, which would make renewable energy even more profitable for energy companies, resulting in an increase in investment in and development of renewable energy sources by energy corporations (Appiott et al. 2014; CEEP 2017; Darvishi and Varedi 2018; Ertürk 2017; Janevska 2017). Most importantly, there is no reason to assume this positive factor, the (growing) profitability of renewable energy, is different between the Netherlands and Norway (Appiott et al. 2014). The fourth and final common explanation concerns civil doubt and restraint. A renewable energy transition, although important, costs money, so unless citizens request the transition, it is not politically opportune (Appiott et al. 2014; Darvishi and Varedi 2018; Member of Committee of the Regions 2018). It might be the case that citizens are indifferent about the renewable energy transition, because they do not see the benefits of such a transition or they are not aware of the reason a transition is needed (Van Leeuwen et al. 2018). Additionally, it could also be the case that citizens protest against the energy transition, because they are confronted with the disadvantages, such as the visual impacts of wind energy parks (Jobert et al. 2007; Lewiner 2018). Most implementation of the renewable energy transition, however, is based on local projects (Appiott et al. 2014; High Representative of Directorate-General Climate Action (European Commission) 2018; Leal-Arcas 2017; Member of Committee of the Regions 2018; Van Leeuwen et al. 2018). These are supported or initiated by the many movements in favour of the renewable energy transition (Expert Policy Advisor EREF 2018; Policy Expert WWF Europe 2018). These movements, together with some television programs, make sure there is a lot of awareness with citizens about the need for the transition (Gitsels and Van Engen 2018; Member of Committee of the Regions 2018). This makes the renewable energy transition very politically opportune; almost every political party currently mentions it as something that needs to be focused on (Member of Committee of the Regions 2018). In short, none of the common explanations sufficiently clarify the slow progress of the Dutch domestic energy transition compared to the Norwegian domestic energy transition. Thus, there is a part of the renewable energy transition that is key in the progress of renewable energy transitions which is not yet uncovered. By using concepts of two different methods, which will be explained in section 1.3 Theory and concepts, another part of the renewable energy transition puzzle will be highlighted, which will expand the existing explanations.

1.3 Theory and concepts In order to understand the process of the domestic renewable energy transitions in Norway and the Netherlands, a combination of concepts and elements from change management theory and geopolitical economy is needed. It is important to note here that neither of these theories are fully applicable to the process of a domestic renewable energy transition; instead, concepts of both theories will be used and combined to form an applicable framework and theory. In the case of change management, the theory is mostly used for intra-corporate transitions, such as mergers, cut-backs and changes in the business model; geopolitical economy is based on the analysis of external relations, the global economy and cross-border activities (Amineh and Yang 2017: 30–31; Desai 2015: 201, 2016: 4; Hayes 2018; Warner Burke 2018). From change management theory, however, a framework can be derived that functions as an analytical tool to understand the complex of factors affecting a domestic renewable energy transition, making it easy to compare the Netherlands and Norway, while not forgetting basic factors. Therefore, this framework will be explained first. Next, concepts of geopolitical economy will be explained, which will give an in-depth understanding of the state-market relations that affect these factors and, by that, affect the renewable energy transitions in both countries. The analytical tool to understand the domestic renewable energy transitions of Norway and the Netherlands was established by Hope-Hailey and Balogun (2002), two change management theorists, who distinguish eight different factors that can either be enabling factors, helping the domestic renewable energy transition, or constraining factors, hampering the transition. These factors are time, scope, preservation, diversity, capability, capacity, readiness and power. The first of these factors is time, which concerns how much time is given for a transition and whether there are any deadlines (idem: 160). As the transformation from a fossil fuel-based to a renewable energy-based domestic economy is extensive, any time limitation forms a constraining factor. The second factor is the extent of the transformation, termed scope (ibid). In contrast to time, a limited scope is an enabling factor, as a greater extent of change always results in greater difficulties. This is largely connected with the third factor: preservation. Preservation indicates how much can remain unchanged (ibid). As a bigger preservation makes the necessary transformation smaller, big preservation forms an enabling factor. The fourth factor is diversity, meaning the homogeneity or heterogeneity of actors undergoing the transition (ibid). In this, heterogeneity forms a constraining factor, as a heterogeneous group would contain different interests and preferences, some of which will be incompatible. The fifth factor, capability, is a lot like the sixth factor, capacity. Capability is about human resources: the skills and experience that are available (idem: 159). Capacity is

20 about material resources available, such as money and land (ibid). For both these factors applies: the more, the better. Bigger capacity and capability are both enabling factors, as more resources are available for the transition. The seventh factor is readiness. This entails the support of the transition by the different actors involved (idem: 160). A lack of readiness will result in non-cooperation with the transition and can lead to protests against the transition. Therefore, a low readiness forms a constraining factor. The eighth and final factor is power. For this factor, it is important to ask the following question: is the actor(-group) driving the transition relatively stronger than the actor(-group) opposing the transition (idem: 158-159)? If the answer is no, the limited power forms a constraining factor, because it will be very hard to undergo a transition if the powers hindering the transition are stronger than those supporting the transition. An overview of all eight factors and how they can be either enabling or constraining, is shown in figure 1. In addition to these eight factors, state-market relations affect the domestic renewable energy transition as well. Therefore, concepts of geopolitical economy are needed. First of all, it is important to understand why the Netherlands and Norway both need a domestic renewable energy transition. This has to do with both the Norwegian and Dutch wealth-power structures being based on fossil fuels, as a result of the Industrial Revolution, which means that the survival of these wealth-power structures is dependent on their access to fossil fuels (Amineh and Yang 2017: 27). The wealth-power structure of a society is the pattern of accumulation and distribution of wealth and power and the configuration of the network of actors (the domestic society and its institutions) based on this pattern (Amineh and Yang 2014: 501, 2017: 27). Resource scarcity of fossil fuels, however, makes it impossible for fossil fuel-based wealth- power structures to survive unchanged. Resource scarcity of fossil fuels consists of three types of scarcity. First, supply scarcity indicates the unavailability of fossil fuels, due to decreasing reserves, reserves being increasingly concentrated in politically unstable areas and very slim chances of new reserves being discovered (Amineh and Crijns-Graus 2017: 342; Amineh and Yang 2017: 17). Second, demand scarcity is the result of a rising demand in fossil fuels, because of the industrialisation of not yet industrialised countries and growth of consumption (Amineh and Crijns-Graus 2017; Matsumoto et al. 2017; The World Bank 2015). Third, structural scarcity refers to the fossil fuel producing countries strategically decreasing their fossil fuel export, in order to keep fossil fuel prices high and increase their strategical power (Amineh and Yang 2017: 18–20). Due to these scarcities, the wealth-power structures of Norway and the Netherlands cannot remain fossil fuel-based. Instead, they need to transition their energy source to something more sustainable, like renewable energy.

Figure 1: Concepts used in this thesis and their relation to each other

Source: by author.

The state-market relations existing in the Dutch and Norwegian fossil fuel-based societies, however, can make such a transition difficult. State-market relations (sometimes referred to as state-society complex) refers to the network of relations between the political elite and different societal groups, namely businesses and civil society groups (Amineh and Yang 2014: 498–501). As this research is limited in time and focuses solely on the domestic renewable energy transition in the Netherlands and Norway, these three groups will be represented in this research by five key actors per country, of which the position on the domestic renewable energy transition is illustrated in figure 2. The relations between these actors are extensively analysed in chapter three. The first social entity that this research focuses on, is the political elite, which consists of the national government and affiliated political parties and official institutions. In the Netherlands, the main actor is the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate, headed by two governing parties not highly in favour of a renewable energy transition (Rijksoverheid 2017a). This Ministry is supported by the institute Energy Beheer Nederland B.V. (EBN). The revenues from fossil fuels are significant for the Dutch state, but the Dutch government is pressured by international actors to transition to renewable energy (Provoost et al. 2013). therefore, the Dutch elite is neither in favour or against the renewable energy transition. The main actor of the Norwegian political elite on the issue of energy, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, is slightly more in favour of the renewable energy transition. Despite the Norwegian state also receiving much revenue from the fossil fuel industry, the goal of the current Minister is “to ensure high value creation through efficient and environment friendly management of Norway’s energy resources” (High Representative of the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2018; Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2018a, 2018b). The second group, businesses, will in this research be represented by the second and third key actors, which are the two biggest energy corporations in both countries. This is bcause this research focuses on an energy transition, making energy corporations the most important business-actors for this research. The energy corporations are expected to form a strong power against a renewable energy transition: transitioning would most likely result in a shrinkage of their wealth, power or both (Lintsen et al. 2018: 365–371). In the current wealth-power structure, these corporations have a lot of power, due to society’s dependence on fossil fuel. They can use this power to form a strong group opposing the renewable energy transition and influence the public opinion against renewable energy transition, decreasing both the power and readiness in favour of the transition (Cox 1987: 358–359, 372–378; High Representative of GasTerra 2018; Representative of the Dutch Research Institute For Transitions 2018).

Therefore, these corporations are important to analyse. In the Dutch society, the biggest energy corporations are Royal Dutch Shell, the largest private energy corporation, and GasTerra, which is partly state-owned and has as the main aim “to maximise the value of natural gas revenues in the Netherlands” (GasTerra 2017a; Shell 2017a, 2018a; Statista 2018). Neither corporation is in favour of a Dutch domestic renewable energy transition, as this would be in conflict with their business interests. In contrast, the two biggest Norwegian energy corporations, Statoil Asa and Norsk Hydro Asa, are both in favour of renewable energy. the biggest shareholder of both corporations is the state and both corporations already depend to some extent on renewable energy (Hydro 2017a; Statoil 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d). The third group, civil society groups, consist of groups which are associations of people asserting shared values, ideas and interests, with no direct support form market transactions or the direct authority the government has (Smith 2012: 182). These groups can use lateral pressure to persuade the political elite to be more in favour of renewable energy and make sure the readiness of different actors, including citizens, is increased in favour of the transition (Smith 2012: 182–190; Turmes 2017; Van der Heijden 2017). Lateral pressure is the pressure socio-economic groups can exert on the political elite, using their power in the domestic and international market (Amineh and Yang 2014: 509; Smith 2012: 182–190). As the renewable energy transition is very intensive and the opposing powers are rather strong and well- established, it is important that there is enough effective lateral pressure in favour of the transition, in order for the transition to advance (Cox 1987: 355–360; Nollert 2005). The civil society groups will be represented by the fourth and fifth key actors, which are the biggest green movement and the biggest labour union of each country, respectively. The green movements that will be focused on, are the Dutch GroenLinks and the Norwegian Miljøpartiet de Grønne. Neither party has ever been part of the national government coalition, but both have developed plans for a renewable energy transition (GroenLinks 2014, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c; Miljøpartiet de Grønne 2018a, 2018b, 2018c). Miljøpartiet de Grønne’s plans are rather radical, as the party calls for fossil fuel profits to be spent on renewable energy development, while GroenLinks’ plans are more focused on transitioning in a socially just way (ibid). Regarding the labour unions, the Dutch Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging (FNV) is rather against a domestic renewable energy transition, because it fears for major job loss in the industry sector (FNV 2016a: 201, 2016b). In contrast, the Norwegian Landsorganisasjonen i Norge (LO Norge) is in favour, as long as it happens is a socially just way (LO Norge 2014). Taken all this into account, the Dutch and Norwegian domestic renewable energy transition entails the transition of changing from a domestic fossil fuel-based wealth-power

24 structure to a domestic renewable energy-based wealth-power structure. The progress of this transition is influenced by the factors time, scope, preservation, diversity, capability, capacity, readiness and power. These factors and the transition as a whole is influenced by the behaviour of the political elite of the country, which is influenced by the energy corporations and the civil society actors.

Figure 2: The key actors of this thesis and their position on a domestic renewable energy transition

Note: The actors on the top-half of the figure are the actors in the Dutch society; the actors on the bottom-half are the actors in the Norwegian society. The colours represent the societal group: blue actors belong to the political elite, grey actors belong to the energy corporations, yellow actors belong to the green movements and red actors belong to the labour unions. Source: by author.

1.4 Brief argumentation and hypotheses As explained in the previous section, the state-market relations in the Dutch and Norwegian societies affect the progress of the domestic renewable energy transitions in these societies. One difference that has resulted in a slower progress of the Dutch domestic renewable energy transition could be that the Dutch energy corporations are more in favour of the domestic consumption of fossil fuels than their Norwegian counterpart due to a difference in business model. This would hamper the Dutch renewable energy transition relative to the Norwegian renewable energy transition, because the Dutch energy corporations would support the transition less compared to the Norwegian energy corporations. Additionally, if the relation between the Dutch energy corporations and the Dutch government is strong, the Dutch energy corporations would form even more of a constraining factor for the Dutch renewable energy transition, as they would have major influence on Dutch renewable energy policy. At the same time, the strong relation between the Norwegian government and the Norwegian energy corporations would form an enabling factor, as the Norwegian energy corporations support domestic consumption of renewable energy instead of fossil fuels. Furthermore, the difference in progress of the renewable energy transition can also be explained by a difference in power and opinion between the civil society groups (the green movements and the labour unions) in each country: significant lateral pressure in favour of a renewable energy transition forms an enabling factor for such a transition. This argumentation can be translated into the following three hypotheses:

H1: Differences in the interests of the key actors involved in the domestic renewable energy transition result in differences in the progress of the domestic renewable energy transition.

— H1a: The Dutch energy corporations are more in favour of domestic use and consumption of fossil fuels than the Norwegian energy corporations.

— H1b: The lateral pressure in the Norwegian society is more in favour of the renewable energy transition than the lateral pressure in the Dutch society.

H2: Differences in state-market relations result in differences in the progress of the domestic renewable energy transition.

— H2a: The strong relation between the Dutch energy corporations and the Dutch political elite forms a constraining factor for the renewable energy transition, because the Dutch energy corporations are in favour of domestic use and consumption of fossil fuels.

— H2b: The strong relation between the Norwegian energy corporations and the Norwegian political elite forms an enabling factor for the renewable energy transition, because the Norwegian energy corporations are in favour of domestic use and consumption of renewable energy.

— H2c: The lateral pressure in the Norwegian society is stronger than the lateral pressure in the Dutch society, forming an enabling factor for the Norwegian renewable energy transition, because the lateral pressure in the Norwegian society is pushing towards a renewable energy transition.

1.5 Methods and data To test these hypotheses, a comparative analysis will be conducted, using policy and statistical data analysis, semi-structured interviews, and an in-depth corporation strategies and interests comparison, which are all mainly qualitative. These methods complement each other, though some methods will be used more in certain chapters of this research than other methods. First, the policy and statistical data analysis is used to determine the main differences between the progress and development of the Dutch and Norwegian renewable energy transition and the development of wind energy. This will show whether there is a difference in the number of constraining or enabling external factors between the two countries for this transition. Additionally, it can give a first overview of the power relations between different societal groups. To these ends, the climate accords of both countries will be used (SER 2013, 2018; Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2016), as well as data from Eurostat (Eurostat 2017, 2018), the International Energy Agency (IEA) (IEA 2014, 2017a) and IRENA (IRENA 2018), and the yearbooks, outlooks and policy plans of some energy corporations (mentioned later) and other involved actors (FNV 2013, 2016a, 2016b; GroenLinks 2018c; LO Norge 2014; Miljøpartiet de Grønne 2018c) will be used. Second, these insights will be supported by data derived from semi-structured interviews. ‘Energy data’, especially the relations between different societal groups on the issue of energy, is often very sensitive, and therefore not openly available. Interviews are necessary

27 to obtain this data. The interviews will be conducted with policy makers, business representatives and academics. A list of interviewees can be found in Annex 1. The third method is an in-depth comparison of the strategies and interests behaviour of the two biggest Dutch and Norwegian energy corporations. This shows how supportive the behaviour of the energy corporations really is for a renewable energy transition and how a change in this behaviour affects the overall successfulness of a nations renewable energy transition. The comparison will be based on information that can be found in either yearbooks or scenario’s (also known as perspectives or outlooks), but will also be supported by the conducted interviews (GasTerra 2018; KVGN 2016; Hydro 2013a, 2007; Shell 2018a, 2016a; Statoil 2018e, 2017a).

1.6 Structure of the thesis This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter two, “A comparison of the Dutch and Norwegian Energy Situation”, discusses the current energy situation of the Netherlands and Norway, with special focus on the energy production, energy consumption and energy policies. This will answer sub-question 1 (“What is the current energy situation (production, consumption and policies) in the Netherlands and in Norway?”), using the Dutch climate accord, the Norwegian climate accord, and above mentioned data from research institutes. Chapter three, “The relations between the government, energy corporations and civil society actors in the Netherlands and Norway concerning the renewable energy transition”, explains the composition of the Dutch society and the Norwegian society, and examines the power relations between the five aforementioned social entities per country. This will answer sub-question 2 (“What do the power relations between the government, the two biggest energy corporations, the green movement and the biggest labour union look like in the Netherlands and Norway?”). The chapter then proceeds to analyse how this composition and how these power relations affect the domestic renewable energy transition. This answers sub-question 3 (“How do these relations influence the domestic renewable energy transition, specifically the development of wind power, in the Netherlands and in Norway since 2006?”). To answer these questions, again the Dutch climate accord and Norwegian climate accord, and the data from above mentioned research institutes will be used (though, analysed with a different perspective), as well as the yearbooks and scenarios of the two biggest energy corporations of each country and information from interviews. In chapter four, “Comparison of the behaviour of the big energy corporations regarding the renewable energy transition”, an analysis will be made on the behaviour of the two biggest

28 energy corporations of each country. This analysis will revolve around sub-question 4 (“How have the strategies and interests of the two biggest Dutch and the two biggest Norwegian energy corporations changed, and, with that, affected the national energy transition since 2006?”), and to this end it will use the yearbooks and scenarios of the energy corporations and some of the conducted interviews. In chapter five, “Comparison of the challenges in the Dutch and Norwegian domestic renewable energy transition”, the major challenges of the energy transition in both countries will be critically analysed, using the information from chapters two, three and four. This will answer sub-question 5 (“What have been, and still are, challenges for the Netherlands and for Norway in the renewable energy transition?”). The final chapter of the research “Conclusion”, will thoroughly compare both countries, explicitly test the hypotheses and answer the research (sub-)question(s), discuss the strengths and limits of this research and give recommendations for both policies and further research.

Chapter 2 – A comparison of the current Dutch and Norwegian Energy Situation

2.1 Introduction This chapter focuses on the current energy situation of the Netherlands and Norway. Specifically, it analyses the current domestic energy production and consumption of both countries, the Dutch and Norwegian energy import (dependency) and export, and the related policies of the Dutch and Norwegian government. This is important to understand, as this will show to what extent the renewable energy transition has already progressed (how much is the economy of Norway or the Netherlands already based on renewable energy). The central question of this chapter is: What is the current energy situation (production, consumption and policies) in the Netherlands and in Norway? This question will be answered in the six sections of this chapter. In section 2, the domestic energy production of the Netherlands and Norway will be discussed. There will be extra attention for the production of wind energy and how this has developed since 2006. Next, in section 3, the Dutch and Norwegian energy consumption will be examined, using data from Eurostat, IRENA and the IEA (Eurostat 2017, 2018; IEA 2014, 2017a; IRENA 2018). In section 4, the energy trade (dependency), both import and export, of the Netherlands and Norway will be analysed, using different data from Eurostat, but the same comprehensive datasets from IRENA and the IEA (Eurostat 2017; IEA 2014, 2017a; IRENA 2018). In section 7, the Dutch and Norwegian energy policies will be examined to identify any impending drastic changes in the Dutch and Norwegian energy situation. For this, mainly the recent amendment on the Dutch climate accord and the Norwegian White Paper will be used (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2016; SER 2018). The chapter will end with a conclusion in section 6.

2.2 The Dutch and Norwegian domestic energy production To give a good analysis of the domestic energy production in each country, first, the full picture of the domestic energy production is shown. Then, the development will be analysed. This will mainly focus on the development of wind energy. The total production of primary energy in the Netherlands has drastically decreased since 2006, especially in the period after 2011. From a production of 62.5 Mtoe in 2005, the energy production in the Netherlands reduced to 47.6 Mtoe in 2015 (Eurostat 2017). The Dutch energy production has always been, and is still dominated by natural gas; only a very small percentage is made up of oil and a growing, but still limited, share of the total energy production consists of renewable energy, such as biofuels, waste, geothermal, solar or wind power, as can

31 be seen in figure 3 (IEA 2016a, 2017b). About half of this natural gas production is used by the country itself; the other half is exported (IEA 2014: 20). This will be further explained in section 3 and 5.

Figure 3: Total Dutch domestic energy production from 2006 to 2015, in ktoe.

Source: IEA (2016a).

The domestic energy production of Norway also has decreased. In absolute terms, the energy production has decreased just as much as the domestic energy production in the Netherlands: about 20 Mtoe (Eurostat 2017). Though, because Norway has a much greater amount of energy production (224.2 Mtoe in 2005, decreased to 207.8 Mtoe in 2015), its decrease in energy production is relatively much smaller than the decrease in the Dutch energy production (ibid). Additionally, the production of fossil fuels account for 200,000 jobs, is heavily taxed and thus brings in the most government revenue (IEA 2017a: 24). Most of the energy was produced by extracting fossil fuels, such as oil (44 percent) and natural gas (49.1 percent); only a very limited share (6.4 percent) is produced using renewable sources (Eurostat 2017). The oil production has slowed down since 2001, but this gap has largely been filled up by an increase in gas production, as can be seen in figure 4 (IEA 2016b, 2017b: 9). Nonetheless, the renewable energy production of Norway has been pretty large in absolute terms, which is mainly due to the electricity production using hydropower. The wind energy production of Norway is pretty small, amounting to only 0.22 Mtoe, though it has significantly increased since 2006, as is shown in figure 5 (IEA 2017a: 17, 103). All in all, the

32 domestic energy of Norway is very large, but only a limited amount of that energy is produced using renewable resources.

Figure 4: Total Norwegian domestic energy production from 2006 to 2015, in ktoe

Source: IEA (2016b).

Figure 5: Total Norwegian domestic wind energy production from 2006 to 2015, in MW

Source: IEA (2017a).

Although the total Dutch domestic energy production is decreasing, the domestic production of renewable energy is increasing. The decrease of energy production in the Netherlands is mainly due to a decrease in natural gas extraction and production. The energy production from renewable sources, shown in figure 3, is increasing, however it is still small

33 compared to the share of domestic natural gas production (Partijgedrag 2017). In comparison: the share of natural gas in the total energy production in 2015 was 82 percent, while the share of renewable energy was 10.1 percent (Eurostat 2017). Wind energy is the renewable energy source most rapidly increasing, growing from the second best renewable energy source in 2006 to being the largest renewable energy source in 2016. It has grown from approximately 0,2 Mtoe electricity production to over 0,7 Mtoe electricity production in ten years, as is shown in figure 6. All in all, the domestic energy production of the Netherlands is decreasing, though the production of electricity using renewable sources is increasing.

Figure 6: Total Dutch domestic renewable energy production from 2000 to 1016 in Mtoe

Source: Partijgedrag (2017).

2.3 The Dutch and Norwegian domestic energy consumption For a good analysis of the domestic energy consumption, it is necessary to first look at the full energy consumption. Second, the sectoral energy consumption will be analysed. The Dutch energy mix is dominated by fossil fuels. As is shown in figure 7, the share of oil and oil products in the total final energy consumption is about the same size as the share of natural gas, accounting for 39 percent of the total energy consumption of 2016 in the Netherlands, while natural gas accounted for 40 percent (CBS 2018). Renewable energy sources, including wind and solar energy, have the fourth-largest share of consumed energy, with only a five percent share of total consumption (ibid). In total, the Netherlands consumed 75.4 Mtoe in 2016. This is more than a 10 Mtoe increase since 2012 (IEA 2014: 31).

Even though Norway is producing large amounts of fossil fuels, its domestic energy consumption, shown in figure 7 as well, consists largely (for 53 percent) of electricity consumption (SSB 2017a). This electricity comes largely from renewable energy sources, mainly hydropower, though this is not shown in the figure. Norway’s statistical data centres do not separate electricity produced by renewable energy sources which are not biofuels, as most domestically used electricity is produced using hydropower (IEA 2017a). Only a very small, insignificant percentage of Norway’s domestic electricity is produced using fossil fuels. Oil and oil products is the second largest source used for domestic energy consumption, with a share of 32 percent (SSB 2017a).

Figure 7: Final Dutch and Norwegian domestic energy consumption in 2016, in percentages

Note: for Norway, the renewable energy section consists solely of biofuels. Other renewable energy sources, such as hydropower, are included in electricity. This is because electricity in Norway is produced using hydropower; only a small share of the electricity is produced using fossil fuels. Source: CBS (2018), SSB (2017a).

Dividing the Dutch total energy consumption per sector, it becomes clear that not every sector uses the same energy sources. The transport sector, shown in figure 8, is responsible for almost 10.5 Mtoe energy consumption in 2016 and uses almost solely oil and oil products (CBS 2018; IEA 2014: 51). Only a very small amount of electricity is used (ibid). Households account for a little less consumption than the transport sector, with a total of 9.85 Mtoe energy

35 consumption (Rijksoverheid 2018). As can be seen in figure 8 as well, most of this energy consumption (72 percent) consists of natural gas (ibid). A considerable size (20 percent) consists of electricity and only 5 percent of the energy that is consumed by households, is produced using renewable sources. With a total of 50.93 Mtoe energy consumption in 2016, the industry sector (including the energy industry sector) is by far the biggest consumer. As can be seen in figure 8, oil (and oil products) and natural gas were used the most for energy, closely followed by coal (CBS 2018). It must, however, be noted that this sector also produced 6.85 Mtoe electricity and 1.39 Mtoe heat, lowering the total net energy consumption of this sector (ibid).

Figure 8: Dutch domestic energy consumption per sector in 2016, in percentages

Source: CBS (2018), Rijksoverheid (2018).

Looking more closely at the Norwegian energy consumption per sector, it becomes clear that the energy consumption also differs per sector. The transport sector is, again, consuming almost solely oil and oil products, as can be seen in figure 9: 93 percent of the energy that is consumed in this sector, still comes from oil or oil products, such as diesel, gasoline or kerosene (IEA 2017a: 45). For households, the share of energy from oil or oil products is much less, but still accounts for about 30 percent of the total energy consumption, as can be seen in figure 9

36 as well (SSB 2017b). In the industry sector, the share of electricity is also rather large, though slightly smaller than the share of natural gas usage, as is shown in figure 18 (ibid). Thus, mainly households and a part of the industries use energy from renewable sources; the transport sector and part of the industry sector still use fossil fuels.

Figure 9: Norwegian domestic energy consumption per sector in 2016, in percentages

Source: IEA (2017a), SSB (2017b).

2.4 The Dutch and Norwegian energy trade: import and export To understand the extent of the energy trade of both countries, first, the basic import numbers of the country will be looked at. Second, it will be analysed how this import leads to a dependency. Next, this will be repeated with the exports: first, the basic export numbers will be presented, and, second, the dependency of the economy of the country on the export will be analysed. The figures on the Dutch domestic energy production and consumption have shown that the Netherlands consumes more energy than it produces. Especially the large amount of domestic oil demand cannot be satisfied with the very limited amount of oil and oil products

37 that are produced domestically. Thus, import is necessary. The Netherlands imports over 270 Mtoe energy per year, which is more than the Netherlands needs (CBS 2017). Most of it will be exported again. From figure 10, it is clear that the import of oil and oil products account for the largest share of import (ibid). There is also a relatively big amount of import of coal and import of natural gas (ibid). As the Dutch domestic demand for most of these resources is much larger than what is domestically produced, the Netherlands is largely dependent of its energy imports. Most of this comes from Russia, but the United Kingdom, a handful of countries in the Middle East and Norway also contribute to the Dutch energy import (IEA 2014: 151). It is also important for the Dutch industry to stay a competitive exporter of energy, which partly relies on stable and affordable energy import (idem; 18). As Norway produces a large amount of energy domestically, it hardly ever relies on energy imports to meet its domestic energy demand. The country is self-sufficient and not dependent on any other country for its energy (IEA 2017a: 16). Only at peak times or in dry years, Norway imports a small amount of energy (in the form of electricity) from neighbouring countries (idem: 32). In 2015, only 0.8 Mtoe of coal was imported, mostly to meet the demand from year-round industries (idem: 61, 82, 118). Although Norway also produces and exports coal, the coal supply stops in the winter season, because the coal mines in Norway, located in the Spitsbergen area, are unreachable and thus closed in winter (idem: 82). Norway also has to import much of its jet fuel and kerosene; this amounted to 8,000 barrels per day in 2016 (idem: 73). Norway’s total energy imports amounted to 8.08 Mtoe in 2016 (SSB 2017b). The division of this import into energy products is shown in figure 10 (ibid). The Netherlands is not only a major importer of different sorts of energy, it is also an exporter of most of this energy. Profiting from its geographical location and its strong trade relations in other sectors, the Netherlands has made itself an energy hub for many Member States of the European Union (IEA 2014: 18). This is also due to the advanced Dutch technology in the area of oil refinement (idem: 151). Approximately 161 Mtoe consisting of oil and oil products was exported from the Netherlands in 2016; this forms the biggest share of the energy exports (CBS 2017). Natural gas accounted for the second-largest share of energy exports, and coals was the third-largest, as is shown in figure 10 (ibid). The strategic position of the Netherlands as the main energy hub in the EU is important for the Dutch economy, as it results in many jobs and boosts the refining and petrochemical industry (IEA 2014: 161). The energy exports of Norway exceed its imports. This makes Norway a net exporter. As is shown in figure 22, the energy exports of Norway mainly consist of natural gas and crude

38 oil (and oil products) (SSB 2017b). Although the export of oil has decreased vastly, due to the decrease in oil extraction and production, this gap has largely been filled by an increase in the natural gas extraction and exports (IEA 2017a: 61). Norway is still the tenth-largest oil exporter in the world, exporting about 1.3 million barrels per day, and the third-largest gas exporter in the world, exporting 114 billion cubic metres per year (ibid). As only about 20 percent of the total oil production is consumed domestically, it is important for the economy of Norway to keep exporting oil (idem: 70). The domestic consumption of natural gas is even more limited, making export of natural gas essential for the country’s economy (idem: 78). EU Member States rely largely on Norway’s energy export: in 2015, 25.9 percent of the EU gas demand and 11.4 percent of the EU crude oil demand was covered by Norwegian energy exports (Eurostat 2017; IEA 2017a: 78). This includes the Netherlands.

Figure 10: Dutch and Norwegian energy trade (import and export) in 2016 compared, in percentages

Source: CBS (2017), SSB (2017b).

2.5 Energy policies of the Dutch and Norwegian governments To understand the current situation and developments of a country concerning energy and the renewable energy transition, relatively recent energy policies will be analysed. This can show upcoming (planned) changes in the energy situation of a country. First, it is important to understand that currently, the goals for 2030 and beyond for all European Member States and

Economic Area Members are being discussed. Currently, the goal is set on a 27 percent share of renewable energy in the total final energy consumption as a mandatory goal for the whole EU. This is different from the 2020-goal of renewable energy: for 2020, each Member State had an own mandatory renewable energy target, as is shown in figure 11. Not all Member States, however, will be able to reach this goal. One of the Member States that will most likely not reach its renewable energy goal for 2020 is the Netherlands. The Netherlands has a long history with energy transition, which started with the establishment of the Nathional Environmental policy plan in 2001, and has always been focused on reducing CO2-emissions (thus not directly on developing renewable energy) (High Representative of the Dutch Ministry of Economy and Climate 2018; Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu 2001). The Dutch energy transition has always been focused on cost-effectiveness and reducing CO2-emmissions; the goals of energy efficiency and renewable energy production have been less central. The Dutch government has, therefore, always protested against goals regarding energy efficiency and renewable energy set on the level of the European Union (Energy Policy Adviser to a Member of the European Parliament 2018). However, a few measures have been implemented to develop renewable energy especially. In 2008, a support scheme, called Stimulering Duurzame Energieproductie (SDE, later SDE+) was implemented (IEA 2014: 108). This is a market-based, cost-effective scheme, implemented as a subsidy individuals or local associations can receive if they produce renewable energy (Rijksoverheid 2017b). In 2011, however, the Netherlands was already behind on its indicative pathway for the 2020-goal on renewable energy (IEA 2014: 108). A few years later, in 2013, the Dutch Government accepted the Energy Agreement for Sustainable Growth, in which the government stated the ambition to become fully based on renewable energy in 2050 (SER 2013: 5). Additionally, it was still planning on reaching its 2020 goal of a 14 percent renewable energy share in the final energy consumption, and 16 percent in 2023 (idem: 11, 17). This development of renewable energy would be cost-effective, would create jobs and would ensure a competitive position on the energy market for the Dutch economy (ibid). In this development, the focus would be on wind power, both on- and offshore (idem: 17-19). The Dutch government also aimed its attention at the whole society in order to reach the renewable energy goals. It gave its society the title ‘Energetic society’ (Energieke samenleving), and discussed the importance of the balance between the responsibility of citizens and businesses at one side and limiting the (economic) burdens of an energy transition at the other side (idem: 31). Even with all these measures, the share of renewable energy will most likely stay limited to 13 percent of the Dutch final domestic energy consumption (SER

2018: 2). It is estimated that 1.93 Mtoe will be generated using wind power onshore and offshore, 0.6 Mtoe by biomass and 4.16 Mtoe using other renewable sources (ibid). To accelerate the renewable energy transition, the Dutch government can accelerate wind power projects on land, use government grounds to build sun power parks, realise geothermal projects, and spend more money on the SDE+ and similar subsidies to attract more investment (idem: 2- 3). This should generate an additional 0.64 Mtoe electricity from renewable energy, enough to close the gap between current estimations and the 2020-goal. There is much scepticism on whether this intensification will really work (High Representative of Royal Dutch Shell New Energies business 2018; Member of Committee of the Regions 2018; Representative of the Dutch Research Institute For Transitions 2018). Especially now that it has been announced that the domestic natural gas production will drastically decrease in the coming years, the concern exists that this will result in an increase the import of natural gas and oil to meet the domestic energy demand (Berg and Giebels 2018; High Representative of GasTerra 2018; High Representative of the Dutch Ministry of Economy and Climate 2018; Representative of the Dutch Research Institute For Transitions 2018; Wiebes 2017). As can be seen in figure 11, Norway has already reached and exceeded its 2020-goal. Norway’s goal for 2020 was set on 67.5 percent of renewable energy in its total final energy consumption; in 2015, Norway had a share of 69 percent of renewable energy in its total final energy consumption (IEA 2017a: 130). In order to reach this level of renewable energy, Norway joined the Swedish electricity certificate market, which supports renewable energy generation and makes renewable energy generation more economically feasible (ibid). Initiated in 2012, the project had contributed 1.41 Mtoe in new renewable energy supply by mid-2016 (idem: 130-131). According to the Norwegian government, this system currently encourages the economy enough to use renewable energy and invest in renewable energy, so it is unnecessary to set new goals (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2016). This is mainly due to the large energy amount of energy produced using hydropower, which has been a major energy supply system for Norway since the 19th century (High Representative of the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2018). The government does, however, want to focus on developing the less mature renewable energy technologies (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2016). At the moment, investment in new renewable energy techniques is discouraged, because the oversupply of energy in the Scandinavian region has resulted in declining electricity prices (IEA 2017a: 131). The government wants to counter this by facilitating long-term development of on- and offshore wind power projects, and levying taxes on hydropower production (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2016).

Figure 11: Renewable energy transition progress (until 2015) and 2020-goals in percentages.

Note: The share of renewable energy (in percentage) in the gross final energy consumption starting in 2004 and its growth by 2012 and up until 2015. The 2020 Target for share of renewable energy in the gross final energy consumption is also shown. For Hungary, only the start-share in 2004 and its growth by 2015 is shown, because between 2012 and 2015, the share of renewable energy in the gross final energy consumption has declined, which would give a false, too high growth in the graph. Source: Eurostat (2018).

2.6 Conclusion Comparing the energy production of both countries, Norway clearly produces much more energy than the Netherlands. Much of this, however, are fossil fuels; only a small part comes from renewable sources, mainly hydropower; only 0.22 Mtoe was produced using wind power in 2016. In comparison, in 2016 the Netherlands produced 0.71 Mtoe using wind power. The consumption of energy in Norway, though, does consist for over 50 percent of electricity from renewable sources, because electricity, due to the large generation of hydropower electricity, is clean and cheap. Little over 30 percent comes from oil and related sources, which is largely due to the high amount of oil products use in the transport sector. In the Netherlands, the share of renewable energy in the final domestic energy consumption is much smaller, accounting for only 5 percent, while natural gas and oil (and oil products) each account for 40 and 39 percent of the Dutch final domestic energy consumption respectively. Households mainly use natural gas, the transport sector almost solely uses oil (and oil products) and the industry sector uses an almost equal share of natural gas and oil, followed by a relatively large amount of coal (and coal products). As the country produces a large amount of energy itself, Norway is not as dependent on energy imports as the Netherlands. The total energy import of Norway in 2016 amounted to 8,08 Mtoe, which largely consists of refined oil products. This is much smaller than their export of over 186 Mtoe in 2016. The main energy that is exported, is natural gas, though oil (and oil products) also account for a big share in the energy exports. A similar pattern can be found in the Netherlands, though the country imports much more energy and uses much more imported energy for domestic consumption. A total of 270.16 Mtoe was imported in 2016, and 228.77 Mtoe was exported again. The Netherlands does export more natural gas and renewable energy than it imports, but it exports much less oil than it imports. Still, the Netherlands functions as an energy hub for the whole EU, importing mainly crude oil and exporting refined oil products. From the policies it can be derived that the Norwegian government is much less focused on climate change mitigation than the Netherlands. The Norwegian government does want to improve the investment climate for investments in not yet fully matured renewable energy sources (such as wind power), but has not and will most likely not set new goals for the future in the area of renewable energy. The Dutch government, in contrast, has already set goals for 2023 and 250, and will most likely set a renewable energy transition goal for 2030 as well. It also has not given up on its 2020 goal, though it is unlikely this will be met. Though, all measures and goals are focused on reducing CO2-emission; the Netherlands does not view renewable energy as standalone goal.

Chapter 3 – The relations between the government, energy corporations and civil society actors in the Netherlands and Norway concerning the renewable energy transition

3.1 Introduction This chapter analyses the state-society complexes in the Netherlands and Norway. Following the theory set out in chapter one (section 3), a renewable energy transition often encounters complications in fossil fuel-based societies. From the imports, exports, production and consumption of different kinds of energy, shown in chapter two, it can be derived that the Dutch domestic society relies more on domestic fossil fuel consumption than the Norwegian domestic society. The question remains why the Dutch society has so far not been successful in transforming to a society that is less fossil fuel-based. That puzzle will be the focus of this chapter, which will revolve around two questions ‘What do the power relations between the government, the two biggest energy corporations, the green movement and the biggest labour union look like in the Netherlands and Norway?’ and ‘How do these relations influence the domestic renewable energy transition, specifically the development of wind power, in the Netherlands and in Norway since 2006?’. Following the theory explained in chapter one, to understand the state-market relations affecting a domestic renewable energy transition, it is necessary to analyse the relation between different societal groups or entities and their individual interests. In this research, these groups are narrowed down to the government, the two biggest energy corporations, the main green party and the biggest labour union of the country. Specifically, for the Netherlands, the relations between the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate, Royal Dutch Shell, GasTerra, GroenLinks and the Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging will be analysed. For Norway, this research will focus on the relations between the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Statoil Asa, Norsk Hydro Asa, the Miljøpartiet de Grønne and Landsorganisasjonen i Norge. First and foremost, the relation between the government and the two biggest energy corporations will be investigated in this chapter in section 2 for the Netherlands and section 3 for Norway. Research has pointed out that these corporations have gained power over politics and are highly influential in the policy-making and implementation process regarding energy (Hall and Soskice 2001: 6, 248–250; O’Brien and Williams 2016: 142–144, 305–307). It is widely known that the big fossil fuel-based energy corporations have actively tried and succeeded to influence the climate change polices on the level of the European Union, by becoming involved in the debates surrounding the 2020-goals (Kolk and Pinkse 2007; Youngs

2009: 153). Research has pointed out that these energy corporations also have a significant amount of political power on a national level, and exert this power to steer policies to be more in their favour (Hall and Soskice 2001: 248–250; Kolk and Pinkse 2007; O’Brien and Williams 2016: 142–144, 305–307). To analyse this relation, a few critical aspects of the relation between the state and the energy corporations will be analysed: the amount of shares the government has in the corporations and the overlap of the networks of the political elite and the corporations (these are the direct relations), and the effect of policies on these corporations (the indirect relations). This last point will mainly analyse whether the policies (including taxes, subsidies and the revenues the state received) established since 2006 have generally benefitted or disadvantaged the energy corporations, and whether the corporations were consulted when new policies were established. This last relation is termed indirect, as it does not directly influence the relation between a specific corporation and the political elite, but rather the relation between the state and energy corporations in general. The analysis of the relation between the political elite and the energy corporations will be based on information from policy documents, different research institutions, conducted interviews, yearbooks from the energy corporations, and, where needed, it will be supported by secondary sources (GasTerra 2018; Hydro 2018; IEA 2014, 2017a; IRENA 2018; Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2016; SER 2013, 2018; Shell 2018a; Statoil 2018e). Next, in sections 4 for the Netherlands and 5 for Norway, the influence two civil society entities have on the acceleration or deceleration of the domestic renewable energy transition will be analysed. Although these groups are able to exert lateral pressure on the government, as is explained in chapter one, and, in doing so, these groups are able to accelerate or decelerate the renewable energy transition (Hall and Soskice 2001: 248–250). These groups can exert such pressure by protesting and petitioning, writing position papers, and filing official complaints and law suits. The amount of pressure these groups have exerted on their government by organising or carrying out such actions will be analysed using information from policy documents, conducted interviews, different research institutions and the groups themselves (FNV 2016b; GroenLinks 2018c; IEA 2014, 2017a; IRENA 2018; LO Norge 2014; Miljøpartiet de Grønne 2018c; Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2016; SER 2013, 2018). Finally, in section 6, the structure and relations of the Dutch state-market relations and the Norwegian state-market relations will be compared. This will show which differences between the two societies form either an enabling factor or a constraining factor for the domestic renewable energy transition. This section will therefore also be the conclusion of this chapter.

3.2 Dutch state-energy corporations relations 3.2.1 The direct ties between the Dutch state and the energy corporations: shares and networks To understand the direct relation between the Dutch political elite and the Dutch energy corporations, it is first important to analyse the shares the Dutch government owns of both Royal Dutch Shell and GasTerra. For Royal Dutch Shell, the case is clear cut: the Dutch government has no (official) shares of the corporation (Shell 2018a). In fact, Royal Dutch Shell states “[i]t is not directly or indirectly owned or controlled by another corporation or by any government and does not know of any arrangements that may result in a change of control of the company” (idem: 187). This is different for GasTerra. The shares of GasTerra are divided as follows: 10 percent is directly owned by the Dutch state, 40 percent is owned by Energie Beheer Nederland B.V. (EBN), which is a company owned by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate, 25 percent of the shares are owned by Royal Dutch Shell and the last 25 percent of the shares is owned by Esso Nederland B.V., a subsidiary of Exxon Mobil Corporation (GasTerra 2017b: 18). Thus, the Dutch government holds about 50 percent of the shares of GasTerra, and the other 50 percent is owned by other energy corporation; the Dutch state owns no shares of Royal Dutch Shell. The networks of both GasTerra and Royal Dutch Shell, however, do have overlap with the network of the Dutch political elite. Two Board Members of Royal Dutch Shell are former Ministers. Deputy Chair and Senior Independent Director of Royal Dutch Shell, Hans Wijers, used to be Minister of Economic Affairs from 1994 until 1998, and one of the Non-executive Directors, Gerrit Zalm, used to be Minister of Finance from 1994 until 2002 and 2003 until 2007 (Shell 2017b: 61–62). They are affiliated with the now governing parties D66 and VVD respectively; both parties not known to be against the fossil fuel industry. The Dutch government is even more involved with GasTerra and its management. The CEO of GasTerra is appointed by the Supervisory Board of GasTerra, but has to be accepted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate (GasTerra 2017b: 18). This appointment is for unlimited time (ibid). In addition to this heavy involvement, many of the current and former members of the Supervisory Board have worked for at least one Ministry; most have worked for the Ministry of Economic Affairs (and Climate) in the recent past (GasTerra 2017b: 122–130). Thus, the relation between the management of both energy corporations and the Dutch government is very close. By owning only a limited amount of shares of the energy corporations, but having very close network ties with these the board of both GasTerra and Royal Dutch Shell, the Dutch political elite is influenced by the energy corporations, rather than being able to steer these

47 corporations. As the Dutch government has no shares of Royal Dutch Shell, it is not on its board and has no influence when the business model and strategies are established, resulting in the business model and strategies revolving around increasing the corporation’s economic profit. At the same time, big corporations often try to establish good networking ties between themselves and policymakers to ensure that the interests of the corporation will be considered when establishing new policies (Hall and Soskice 2001: 248–250; Kolk and Pinkse 2007; O’Brien and Williams 2016: 142–144, 305–307; Van Apeldoorn and De Graaf 2014). Though the government does own 50 percent of the shares of GasTerra, an equal amount of shares is owned by big energy corporations, which will steer the corporation to be more focused on business interests and profits. Thus, because the Dutch government has a limited share of the energy corporations, but the networks are majorly overlapping, the relations between the energy corporations and the government are rather one-sided: the big energy corporations can influence governmental policy, but the Dutch government will find it difficult to influence the big energy corporations.

3.2.2 The indirect ties between the Dutch state and energy corporations: policies The policies of the Dutch government have always taken into account the effects of the policies on big businesses, especially the fossil fuel-based energy corporations. In contrast to other Member States of the European Union, the Netherlands is not transparent on its fossil fuel subsidies or otherwise environmentally harmful policies. The former Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs, Henk Kamp, claimed that this was because the Dutch government did not (and does not) have policies and subsidies benefitting the fossil fuel-based energy corporations, according to Kamp. Investigative research, however, points out that the fiscal support for fossil fuels between 2014 and 2016 accumulated to 4.4 billion euro (Burg and Runkel 2017: 3; Van der Heijden 2017: 131–133). This includes support for the transport sector, fiscal support for oil and gas production and investment by state-owned enterprises (ibid). It also includes energy tax exemptions (for example, international passenger transport services by air and sea are taxed at zero rates, and lower tax rates for red diesel than gasoline), and compensation for energy- intensive industries to counter the negative effects of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (Burg and Runkel 2017: 4–6). These high investments are not exceptional. In 2005, when the government launched the gas roundabout (gasrotonde) policy project in order to transform the Netherland into a hub for natural gas, the fully state-owned corporations GasUnie and EBN invested approximately 820 million euro per year until 2014 (Algemene Rekenkamer 2012). These investments were often approved without inspection on their public benefits, for

48 example by contributing to the security of supply of energy or economic growth (Algemene Rekenkamer 2012). The production of gas and investing in the production of gas in the Netherlands is still very profitable. EBN participates in all natural gas projects in the Netherlands with a share of at least 40 percent, limiting the risks for private parties (Burg and Runkel 2017: 4; High Representative of GasTerra 2018; Representative of the Dutch Research Institute For Transitions 2018). Additionally, GasTerra is forced to buy the gas from small fields, and since 2010, operators of small fields can deduct 25 percent of their investment costs from their taxable profit (Burg and Runkel 2017: 4–6; High Representative of GasTerra 2018; Representative of the Dutch Research Institute For Transitions 2018: 2). Corporations can also deduct over half of their investments in energy projects from their taxable profits, using the Energy Investment Deduction (Energie Investerings Aftrek) (Burg and Runkel 2017: 6). Furthermore, the infrastructure and transportation of natural gas is 100 percent state-owned, through GasUnie (Burg and Runkel 2017: 4–6; High Representative of GasTerra 2018). Regarding taxes and revenues the Dutch government earns from Royal Dutch Shell specifically, the corporation is rather vague on how much it pays the state. Royal Dutch Shell states that in 2014, “total amount of income taxes and royalties paid and accrued indirect tax collected on behalf of the government amounts to $ 8.6 billion” (Shell 2015a: 8). How and when this was payed, however, is unclear; it is not included in the Annual Report (Shell 2018a). Additionally, Shell states it has a co-operative compliance relationship with the Netherlands, which entails that the corporation “provide[s] the authorities with timely and comprehensive information on potential tax issues, while we receive treatment that is open, impartial, proportionate, responsive and grounded in an understanding of our commercial environment” (Shell 2015a: 4). This indicates that the Dutch government has special tax and revenue agreements with Royal Dutch Shell. These will most likely also include subsidies. In the past ten years, the Dutch government has tried to help Royal Dutch Shell politically, by voting in favour of the interests of the corporation during international decision- making or by implementing beneficial policies (Persson 2012; RTL Nieuws 2017). The most recent policy that the Dutch government has implemented which is very beneficial for Royal Dutch Shell, is the abolishment of the dividend tax, a measure that will save foreign shareholders of Royal Dutch Shell 15 percent on taxes they would normally pay to the Dutch government over their shares (Garretsen 2017). One of the main research and policy-advisory institutes of the Netherlands even advises the Dutch government to keep making policies that

49 are beneficial for Royal Dutch Shell, as the corporation gives the Netherlands a certain status and voice on the international (political and economic) playing field (Putten 2017). The amount of GasTerra pays to the Dutch state is a bit clearer. In its annual financial statement, it accounts for 12 million euro payed in taxes in 2016 (GasTerra 2017b: 83). This was the same for 2015 (ibid). Additionally, the profits of 36 million euro will be divided over all shareholders, which means that the Dutch government will receive another 18 million euro as revenue (idem: 92). GasTerra does not mention receiving any subsidies from the government, though, as the government is involved in many joint projects with GasTerra, it is very likely GasTerra has received financial government support, be it by the government investing relatively more in a project than it should (Burg and Runkel 2017; GasTerra 2018). Additionally, the Dutch political elite have supported Gasterra politically very much, but this is declining slightly. All Dutch climate agreements emphasize the role of natural gas, supplied by GasTerra, as a bridge fuel between ‘traditional’ fossil fuels (coal and oil) and renewable energy (SER 2013, 2018). The extraction of gas from the gas field in Groningen, however, has many negative consequences for citizens in the proximity. Therefore, the government has announced to drastically reduce extractions and stop extracting altogether by 2030 (Berg and Giebels 2018). At the same time, the government has allowed for extraction of gas using fracking, a technique that has a higher risk than traditional gas extraction methods, but is more effective (Berg 2018). Thus, the Dutch government, although it is shutting down the extraction of natural gas and with it the essence of GasTerra, the corporation and the government are still working together closely, and the government is still supporting the corporation with its policy decisions.

3.3 Norwegian state-energy corporations relations 3.3.1 The direct ties between the Dutch state and the energy corporations: shares and networks The Norwegian government has a significant size of shares of both Statoil Asa and Norsk Hydro Asa. For Statoil Asa, the Norwegian state owns 67 percent (Statoil 2018e: 17). The Norwegian government used to own all the shares of the corporation, though this changed in 2001, when the corporation was listed on the Oslo and New York stock exchanges and became a public limited company (ibid). The shares are managed by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (idem: 37). The goal of holding the majority of shares, is to ensure that the highest revue is created for the Norwegian state (idem: 38). The Norwegian government is also the biggest shareholder of Norsk Hydro Asa, another public limited corporation. Although it only owns 34.7 percent of the corporation’s shares, the Government Pension Fund Norway holds another

6.2 percent and all other shareholders own less than 3 percent of the shares of the corporation (Hydro 2017a: 43, 174–175). Thus, the Norwegian government holds by far the greatest amount of the shares of Norsk Hydro Asa. Both corporations are also in some way steered by the Norwegian government by its official overlap in networks. For Statoil Asa, the policy exists that the operator of the day-today management of an oil field is appointed by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (Statoil 2018e: 38). Concerning the relation with the Board of Directors and other Management, the Norwegian government, however, has very limited ties: only one Member of the Board used to work for several Ministries before being a member of the board (idem: 92-100). In contrast, the Norwegian government has no active role in the day-to-day management of Norsk Hydro Asa (Hydro 2017a: 174). There is one member of the Board of Directors who has ties with the government, though, she has not worked for a Ministry (idem: 183). None of the Members of Corporate Management has worked for the government. Both the Board of Directors and Corporate Management, however, have great ties with the Board of Directors and Management of Statoil Asa. By being the biggest shareholder of both energy corporations, and having only official network ties with the managers of the corporations, the Norwegian political elite holds quite some power over the energy corporations. As the biggest shareholder, the Norwegian government is able to influence the business model and strategies of both corporations to include societal objectives, such as a renewable energy transition. This will steer the corporations away from solely focusing on increasing economic profit. As the government takes on this steering role, it is very hard for the corporations to influence governmental policies in the favour of the increasing the economic profit of the corporations. As the Norwegian government chooses who is in charge of the day-to-day management of Statoil Asa, and networks are again formed with a steering role from the government, the relations between the Norwegian government and the energy corporations are also one-sided: this time, the government influences the corporations greatly, but it is difficult for the corporations to influence governmental policy.

3.3.2 The indirect ties between the Norwegian state and energy corporations: policies Norwegian policies have not been very beneficial for the biggest Norwegian energy corporations. Although the Norwegian state is heavily involved with Statoil, the corporation still needs to pay the normal tax rate. This means that Statoil Asa needs to pay both corporate income tax and a special petroleum tax for the production and transportation of oil (Statoil

2018e: 39). These tax rates were respectively 25 percent and 53 percent in 2016, and changed into 24 percent and 54 percent in 2017 for the Norwegian government (ibid). Additionally, dividends are taxed at a rate of 3 percent, unless the shareholder is not a Norwegian resident, in which case the dividends are taxed with a rate of 25 percent (idem: 238). Next to these taxes, the Norwegian government also gains revenues from Statoil Asa’s activities through its shares. Nothing is stated on subsidies, though it is not unlikely that a part of the revenues the state received trough taxes or shares is spend on infrastructure that supports the activities of the corporation. The Norwegian government also gains great revenues from Norsk Hydro Asa. The corporation pays out 40 percent of its net income to its shareholders, and as the Norwegian state owns approximately 40 percent of the shares of Norsk Hydro Asa, the revenues the state gains from the corporation account for approximately 16 percent of the total net income of the corporation (Hydro 2017a: 43, 176). In addition to this, the corporation pays a 58 percent marginal tax rate for its power production (idem: 145). Combined with the taxes on other activities of the corporation, the taxes amounted to 690 million Norwegian krone in 2016. This high tax rate is due to the special resource rent tax, which is set at 33 percent in 2016, and the income tax set at 28 percent (idem: 162, 167). Again, nothing is stated on received subsidies, though it is likely that the Norwegian state contributed to infrastructure projects. Additionally, using the power as host state, the Norwegian government has established rather strict policies for both Statoil Asa and Norsk Hydro Asa. Two policies, the Petroleum Act and the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Northeast Atlantic, have set up strict procedures and rules for Statoil Asa regarding the removal and disposal of offshore oil and gas installations (Statoil 2018e: 25). Additionally, Statoil Asa needs to apply for licenses and other forms of approval for most of its activities from the Norwegian state, though it does not receive any preferential treatment compared to other corporations (idem: 37). These licenses include production licenses, exploitation licenses and a plan of development (idem: 37-38). In fact, under the Owner’s instruction act, the Norwegian state ensured that the specific terms for the marketing and sale of oil and gas needs to be agreed on by the Norwegian government first (idem: 38). Norsk Hydro Asa has had to deal with relatively high taxes (which have increased from 2015 to 2017) on hydropower and hydropower generation (IEA 2017a: 10). This has made investing in hydropower economically not as viable as it used to be, endangering the maintenance of hydropower systems (idem: 25). Additionally, the Norwegian Industrial Concessions Act, implemented in 1917, ensures the government of the right of reversion: the government can resume ownership of privately owned hydropower assets without compensation once the original 60 year licence expires (idem: 113). This has resulted in a slow

52 reversal of the privatisation of energy production (ibid). What also has not helped increase investment in hydropower generation, is the fact that Norway has not set new renewable energy targets after 2020 (idem: 125). Thus, the policies of the Norwegian government have done little to support Norsk Hydro Asa and Statoil Asa in their energy business.

3.4 Lateral pressure in the Dutch society As stated in the introduction of this chapter, green movement GroenLinks and labour union Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging are the two civil society actors that will be analysed in this research to understand the lateral pressure put on the Dutch political elite, energy corporations and the public. First of all, the activities of these groups will be analysed by looking at the protests and petitions organised by these groups, the position papers these groups have published and the official complaints and lawsuits these groups have filed. Next, the effect of these actions will be analysed.

3.4.1 Actions taken by the Dutch civil society actors The political party and green movement GroenLinks has initiated protests and petitions on many different issues concerning energy and has lobbied in favour of the renewable energy transition. One of the issues they have protested for a long time, is the production of (shale) gas in the Netherlands. Since 2011, the group has questioned the government on the production of shale gas and its effects, and the movement has mobilised protests both with civilians and more local governments (GroenLinks 2018f). They have also organised protests against the production of gas from the Groningen gas field, as this has damaging effects for the environment and citizens living near the gas field (GroenLinks 2018e). To this end, they have also directly protested against Royal Dutch Shell (GroenLinks 2018d). Additionally, GroenLinks has lobbied for diversification in the Dutch renewable energy transition (Member of House of Representatives for GroenLinks 2018). Despite this large range of actions, GroenLinks has not published a position paper on the renewable energy transition. The movement does publish an election programme each election, and although these plans do give an insight to what the party would like to achieve once elected, it does not urge the government to do the same, nor does it have the evidence- based background a position paper should have. The party did attempt to create a special project group to establish a position paper on energy, but that project has been inactive since 2015 (GroenLinks 2015).

Furthermore, GroenLinks has not filed any official complaints or lawsuits. The movement seems to rely on motions filed by Members of the Dutch Parliament. With more than 25 motions filed by the party’s Parliament Members on the renewable energy transition, this method is used frequently (Partijgedrag 2017). The reason for focusing on motions is two-fold. At one hand, the movement prefers to compromise and find solutions by negotiating, as is the preferred method in the Netherlands (also known as ‘polderen’); on the other hand, the movement leaves filing official complaints and lawsuits to other green movement groups, which are more focused on radical actions instead of politics (Member of House of Representatives for GroenLinks 2018). The biggest labour union in the Netherlands, the Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging (FNV) has for a long time not been active on the issue of the domestic renewable energy transition. The FNV did sign the Climate Accord in 2013, but not has happened since (FNV 2017: 6–7). This is because it is a difficult subject for the labour union: although the union realises that a transition is necessary, many members hold jobs in fossil fuel-based sectors (FNV 2017: 4). The union also states that it does not have the right level of knowledge yet to be able to efficiently contribute to the debate (idem: 5). As a result, not much organised protesting or petitioning has happened. The FNV’s split position regarding the renewable energy transition has also resulted in no official position papers being published. As the union is still trying to find a balance between renewable, clean energy and job security, it has been unable to bring out sound advice (FNV 2017). The FNV has not filed any lawsuits either, but it has made official complaints. When the energy transition results in the loss of jobs or insecurity of jobs, for example, the FNV is vocal. Additionally, in the letter to the Minister in 2016 in reaction to the announced climate laws and goals, the FNV was critical of the governments approach and made an official complaint (FNV 2016b). The union stated that the too ambitious goals would cause civil unrest and unwillingness (ibid). Thus, the actions of the FNV are largely against the domestic renewable transition.

3.4.2 The effect of the actions taken by the Dutch civil society actors It is clear that some of the actions of the green movement and the labour union have yielded the desired effects, though the overall effect is limited. Especially the actions of GroenLinks for a faster progression of the renewable energy transition have influenced new policies. In December 2017, the current Minister of Economic Affairs and Climate, Eric Wiebes, wrote a

54 letter to the chairman of the Parliament to announce the plans of amendments and new policies for a more effective energy transition (Wiebes 2017). One of those amendments, the ‘wetsvoorstel Voortgang Energietransition’, has already been accepted by the Parliament (VEMW 2018). Among other changes, this amendment makes sure that the obligation to have a connection to the gas grid has become void (ibid). Additionally, the current government of the Netherlands is debating on a new climate law (‘Klimaatwet’), which is planned to be put up for voting later this year (Wiebes 2017). Another success was booked very recently, with the acceptance of the legislation to stop the production of shale gas in the Netherlands (GroenLinks 2018f). Furthermore, in a letter to the Dutch Parliament, the Minister explained that, although the focus would still be on reducing CO2-emissions, the government would not protest other goals related to renewable energy (Wiebes 2018). The amount of official motions that are filed by GroenLinks, however, yielded less of an effect: most of the motions are rejected (Partijgedrag 2017). In contrast, the actions of the FNV seem to do little to affect the energy transition. Partly, this is due to the fact that the FNV is split on the issue of the renewable energy transition: it is unsure whether this is beneficial for society or not. The union, however, also feels unheard. The union states that it is not being included as a stakeholder in the many debates (mainly with the government) on the renewable energy transition (FNV 2016b). The union therefore fears that the government will not strike the right balance between climate and job security, and is also concerned that the transition will be only cost-effective and not socially just (ibid). The overall sphere in the Netherlands, however, is still not in favour of renewable energy. Many corporations and corporations and a big share of Dutch citizens remain unconvinced of the necessity of a renewable energy transition (Van der Heijden 2017: 138). Corporations and corporations are often not convinced, because a full renewable energy transition would go against their business model or because they consider it impossible for their sector to (quickly and completely) transition to renewable energy (Burg and Runkel 2017). Corporations and corporations also often use the term ‘energy transition’ in a way that fits their interests, thus making use of the popularity of the term, without making the drastic changes the term actually entails. For the citizens, it seems to be a case of not-in-my-back-yard-ism: most citizens accept and support renewable energy, as long as it does not disadvantage themselves (Member of House of Representatives for GroenLinks 2018; Van der Heijden 2017). There have been, for example, many protests against wind parks, as these would distort the view, cause more shade, make too much noise and cause a rise in death of birds (High Representative of Royal Dutch Shell New Energies business 2018; High Representative of the Dutch Ministry

55 of Economy and Climate 2018; Representative of the Dutch Research Institute For Transitions 2018; Sommers 2018). Moreover, the recent policy to ban natural gas from houses, has also led to protests, as the implementation of this policy would cost home-owners thousands of euros (for both renovating their house and monthly payment of the energy bill) (High Representative of GasTerra 2018; Huisman 2018; Kooger et al. 2017; Representative of the Dutch Research Institute For Transitions 2018). Thus, even though one of the main activities of green movements would be to mobilise citizens to be in favour of the renewable energy transition, this has failed in the Netherlands.

3.5 Lateral pressure in the Norwegian society For Norway, the green movement Miljøpartiet de Grønne and labour union Landsorganisasjonen i Norge (LO Norge) will be focused on. Again, first the actions of these groups will be analysed, with special attention for petitions, position papers and lawsuits. This will be followed by an analysis of the effects of these actions on policies.

3.5.1 Actions taken by the Norwegian civil society actors Miljøpartiet de Grønne and Landsorganisasjonen i Norge have both been quite active regarding the renewable energy transition. Miljøpartiet de Grønne, first, has petitioned to use private property and revenues of (partly) state-owned fossil fuel-based corporations, such as Statoil Asa, to produce more renewable energy (Miljøpartiet de Grønne 2018d). The party wishes to change the business model of these corporations in a way that it will be based on renewable energy, and that no corporation produces fossil fuels anymore (ibid). The party also wants to change the current legislation on hydropower to make investing in hydropower plants more attractive (ibid). Like the Dutch green party, Miljøpartiet de Grønne reveals most of its positions using the election programme. Though, again, this is not as based on scientific evidence as is normally the case with position papers. The party has, however, published an alternative budget, which gives the government concrete suggestions on how to make the current budget ‘greener’ (Member of House of Representatives for GroenLinks 2018). Miljøpartiet de Grønne has been involved in several lawsuits in the past two years and has officially questioned the government on numerous issues. It has not filed any official complaints, though it has asked the government to explain the subsidy-schemes for fossil fuels and the absence of subsidy-schemes for renewable energy (Miljøpartiet de Grønne 2017, 2018c).

Although LO Norge has not organised many protests, it has searched for opportunities to work together and create more jobs based on renewable energy (LO Norge 2014, 2018a). The fact that jobs might be endangered by the transition, does not seem to be that much of a problem for the Norwegian labour union. The union emphasizes instead on the importance of a fair transition, with a focus on decent and green jobs (LO Norge 2017). Therefore, LO Norge advices the government of Norway strongly to invest in a renewable based economy, though it has not published an official position paper on this. Rather, it has set up different projects and networks to actively support this transition (LO Norge 2018b). LO Norge also has not been involved in any lawsuits regarding renewable energy nor has it filed official complaints. There was no necessity for this as LO Norge’s criticism of the government have not been severe enough to require such drastic measures (LO Norge 2017).

3.5.2 The effect of the actions taken by the Norwegian civil society actors The actions of these organisations have yielded mixed results, though, in general they have helped to advance the renewable energy transition. The radical ideas of the Miljøpartiet de Grønne have not been accepted by the government. The government of Norway has stated that it is not planning on setting new goals regarding renewable energy or changing the rules and regulation surrounding renewable energy, including the legislation on hydropower (IEA 2017a: 125). Thus, none of the major proposal for which the party petitions, have been accepted. However, in the beginning of 2017, the party had a major victory when the new Climate Act was accepted, which entails that the government now has to explain how the budget affects the Norwegian environment and climate (Miljøpartiet de Grønne 2017). LO Norge has mainly yielded its own effects. It has been an active participant in shifting the economy from fossil fuel-based to renewable-based (LO Norge 2014, 2018a). It has arranged for several meetings between different corporations and institutions to promote renewable based businesses (ibid). These actions have already had the desired effect according to LO Norge (LO Norge 2018b). Thus, LO Norge is directly influencing the society by its actions. Additionally, Norwegian citizens and corporations have been relatively in favour of the renewable energy transition. Big energy corporations have been very accepting of renewable energy and have already gone a long way to base their business models more on renewable energy. Citizens, because their energy consumption is already based on renewable energy, have grown to the idea of renewable energy. The public support for renewable energy is relatively

57 high in Norway and, as the government is not planning on implementing ay drastic measures on the renewable energy transition, chances are slim this support will decrease.

3.6 Conclusion Comparing the state-market relations of the Netherlands and Norway, a few differences stand out, which are crucial for the progress of the domestic renewable energy transition. First of all, there is no doubt that Dutch energy corporations are more supported by the government, even if the government is not a shareholder of the corporation, as is the case with Royal Dutch Shell. Policies are more in favour of the corporations and the government has strong networking ties with the corporations, as a large part of the members of the board used to be Ministers or held another government position. In contrast, the Norwegian government owns a significant amount of shares of the two biggest energy corporations, but the corporations are often subjected to unfavourable policies, such as high taxes. Furthermore, the business models and strategies of the corporations are steered by the Norwegian government, acting as the major shareholder. Thus, the Dutch government, with its limited shares of and close networking ties with the energy corporations, is very favourable towards the energy corporations and has less control over the corporations, while the Norwegian government is much less favourable in its laws and regulations towards its energy businesses and has more control, because it is the major shareholder. Second, comparing the lateral pressure, it becomes clear that the civil society entities in both countries approach the renewable energy transition in very different ways. Whereas GroenLinks holds relatively moderate positions on the renewable energy transition and tries to accelerate the renewable energy transition through the long, official path of filing motions and carrying out a limited amount of petitions and protests, the Norwegian Miljøpartiet de Grønne has more radical positions, has gotten involved in lawsuits and tries to influence the government directly by submitting alternative plans, such as an alternative budget. Additionally, the FNV and LO Norge could not be further apart on their position on the renewable energy transition. FNV is split on the domestic renewable energy transition: it understands the need for the transition, but fears for major job loss. The position of LO Norge, in contrast, is very clear: the union is highly in favour of the domestic renewable energy transition and has taken it upon itself to help organisations transition from a business model based on fossil fuels to a business model based on renewable energy. Thus, the lateral pressure in Norway is pushing more strongly for a renewable energy transition than the lateral pressure in the Netherlands. Both Norwegian non-business social civil society entities under investigation in this research form

58 an enabling factor for the renewable energy transition: Miljøpartiet de Grønne is very vocal on its desire for radical changes, while LO Norge has taken on an active role. The Dutch non- business social civil society entities under investigation in this research are more hesitant with their proposals for and positions on the renewable energy transition. In fact, the FNV is more of a constraining factor. This difference has also resulted in citizens and corporations in Norway being much more in favour of the domestic renewable energy transition, while those in the Netherlands are much more hesitant.

Chapter 4 – Comparison of the strategies and interests of the big energy corporations regarding the renewable energy transition

4.1 Introduction In this chapter the strategies and interests of the two biggest energy corporations of each country will be analysed and compared. Specifically, it will be research how the interests and strategies of Royal Dutch Shell, GasTerra, Statoil Asa and Norsk Hydro Asa have changed in light of the renewable energy transition and how this has affected the nations’ renewable energy transition. As is explained in chapter one and chapter three, the behaviour and position of the major (energy) corporations can have a big influence on the government. In the Netherlands, policies tend to cater to the corporations’ interests. The Norwegian policies cater much less to the interests of the big energy corporations. This was explained in chapter three. There is no doubt that with the current focus on climate change mitigation and developing sustainable business models, the two biggest energy corporations of both Norway and the Netherlands have felt the pressure to address the issues of climate change, sustainability, and focus on renewable energy. Especially the pressure exerted by shareholders has affected the corporations’ strategies (Brown 2017; Krauss 2017; Zhong and Bazilian 2018). It is, however, always questionable to what extent these big energy corporations have truly changed their business models. Analysing the possible change in corporations strategies and interests regarding renewable energy, insight can be gained in a major enabling or constraining factor that has changed over time, namely the attitude of the big energy corporations regarding the energy transition and whether these corporations will thus help advance this transition or will form an impediment. This affects the factor of power greatly. To this end, this chapter will answer the following question: How have the strategies and interests of the two biggest Dutch and the two biggest Norwegian energy corporations changed, and, with that, affected the national energy transition since 2006? This analysis will be carried out in four sections. In section 2, the corporations will be compared on how much they have invested in the past 10 years in wind energy. To this end, the yearbooks of the different corporations will be used, as well as secondary literature for better understanding of the data (GasTerra 2018; Hydro 2018; Shell 2018a; Statoil 2018e). In section 3, using the same yearbooks, but also more strategic outlooks and secondary literature, the corporations will be compared on their cooperation with other corporations and companies that are focused on the development of renewable energy, specifically wind energy (ibid). In section 4, a comparison will be made between the different corporations on the basis of their future

61 outlooks and ambitions regarding the development of wind energy, using the future outlooks (sometimes also referred to as scenarios) (KVGN 2016; Hydro 2013a; Shell 2016a; Statoil 2017a). The chapter will end with a conclusion, in section 5.

4.2 Energy corporations’ investment in wind energy First, it is important to understand the investments of Royal Dutch Shell, GasTerra, Statoil Asa and Norsk Hydro Asa in renewable energy, specifically wind energy, in the past 10 years. Comparing the investments of these corporations in wind energy can help understand the extent of change in the corporations’ business model (Zhong and Bazilian 2018). Additionally, by taking such a big time frame, it is possible to analyse a constant and lasting pattern of change, instead of short bursts of development. With this, it is possible to analyse the absence or presence of change in the overall energy business environment. The wind energy investments of Royal Dutch Shell over the past ten years have been discontinuous. In 2006, the corporation was investing in wind energy, especially in the United States and the Netherlands (Shell 2007: 3, 52). Additionally, Shell had established a slightly independent branch, named “Shell Wind Energy”, focused solely on wind energy development (idem: 52). Furthermore, the corporation was investigating wind energy opportunities in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, the Netherlands and China (ibid). This, however, soon changed: just a year later, wind energy development was integrated in the “Gas and Power” branch of the corporation, and in 2008, the wind energy project in the United Kingdom was sold (Shell 2008: 4, 2009: 35). The development of wind energy projects was slowed down and stalled, as it was not profitable enough and the market did not seem ready for it yet (High Representative of Royal Dutch Shell New Energies business 2018). In 2009, wind energy was split up over different branches, making it hard to make the investments and developments of wind energy clear (Shell 2010: 11). This also made it difficult to efficiently allocate budget to renewable energy projects and not let these projects be overshadowed by fossil fuel projects, which remained the corporation’s priority (High Representative of Royal Dutch Shell New Energies business 2018). A year later, Royal Dutch Shell’s wind energy projects became part of the “Upstream” branch of the business, and the corporation only remained involved in its projects in the United States and the Netherlands (Shell 2011: 26, 106, 2012: 11, 27, 2013a: 11, 2014: 10, 2015b: 10, 2016b: 14). It was also in these years that gas was named as a reliable “partner” fuel that would support the somewhat unreliable renewable energies (Shell 2012: 5, 2016b: 55). Wind energy remained a sub-part of Royal Dutch Shell until 2016, when the development of renewable energy has become interesting for Royal Dutch

Shell once again. After some pressure from environmental groups and its own shareholders, the corporation established a separate department purely concerned with the development of renewable energy in 2016: New Energies Business (Brown 2017; Krauss 2017; Shell 2017b: 6; Zhong and Bazilian 2018). Royal Dutch Shell has now pledged to spend approximately 1 to 2 billion US dollars a year on the development of renewable energy (Brown 2017; Krauss 2017; Shell 2018a: 7). Although this is still less than 10 percent of the corporation’s total investment, it is almost double what Royal Dutch Shell said it would invest in renewable energy in earlier reports (ibid). A portion of these investments has been spent on the wind energy projects of Royal Dutch Shell in the United States, but mostly in the Netherlands. The biggest of these projects are Borssele III and IV, an offshore wind farm 20 kilometres off the Dutch coast (Shell 2017b: 23, 2018b: 25). Royal Dutch Shell works in a consortium for this project, with an interest of 20 percent; it used to be 40, but was reduced when in the beginning of 2018, Partners Group joined the consortium (High Representative of Royal Dutch Shell New Energies business 2018; Shell 2018b: 25). Royal Dutch Shell also has a 50 percent interest in Noordzeewind, another, much smaller, offshore wind farm (Shell 2018c: 22). This share and project originates from the early investments of the corporation in wind energy (Shell 2007: 3, 52). The corporation has not and will most likely not invest onshore wind farms in the Netherlands, as these projects are often of a too small scale to be truly interesting for the corporation (High Representative of Royal Dutch Shell New Energies business 2018). In the United States, however, Shell does have a 50 percent share in 6 onshore wind farms, which exist of minimally 40 turbines and have been operating since the early 2000s; these, also, are a result of the earlier investment of the corporation in wind energy (Shell 2007: 52, 2008: 7, 35, 2018d). An overview of these projects, their size and output, can be found in table 1. In contrast, GasTerra is not and has never been directly involved in any wind energy projects. Instead, the corporation supports the energy transition by focusing on making natural gas more ‘renewable’, developing energy efficiency, reducing CO2-emissions and supporting research concerning the renewable energy transition (GasTerra 2017b: 31). The corporation has always emphasised using gas as a renewable energy partner, but has not actively supported the development of renewable energy, especially not wind energy (GasTerra 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017b). Statoil Asa seems to have already made major steps in reshaping the business model in order to include renewable energy. This development started in 2007, with the establishment of of “New Energy” as a slightly independent business branch and the development of Hywind, a floating wind farm (Statoil 2007, 2008: 17, 60). To quickly gain knowledge, Statoil Asa decided

63 to work together with other corporations and to take over Norsk Hydro Asa’s wind power business (idem: 60, 173). The corporation kept investing in wind energy, developing its Hywind technology and its wind farms in the United Kingdom (Statoil 2009: 5, 12, 23, 24, 78, 2010: 6, 15, 26, 27, 28, 78, 2011: 6, 7, 8, 11, 17, 20, 79, 80–81, 83, 260, 2012: 7, 11, 16, 59, 76, 131, 2013: 9, 35, 42, 43, 45, 2014: 9, 44, 2015a: 5, 14, 2016: 12, 13, 42–43, 64, 2017b: 15, 34, 63). The goal of the corporation was to develop its wind energy technology in such a way that the technology would become profitable and competitive (Statoil 2009: 23, 77, 2010: 78, 2014: 9, 2016: 14). In the most recent years, Statoil Asa states that “Statoil will continue its journey from a focused oil and gas to a broad energy company” (Statoil 2018e: 7). Going even further, the board of directors of the corporation have proposed to change the name of the corporation to Equinor, to represent all the energy business of the corporation (idem: 8). The corporation has set up a separate branch within its corporation, called New Energy Solutions, which has as a goal to complement the oil and gas business of Statoil Asa with profitable renewable energy, other low-carbon energy solutions, and carbon capture and storage (Statoil 2017b: 34, 2018e: 18). This branch of the corporation receives about 15 to 20 percent of the corporation’s total investments (Statoil 2018e: 15). In 2017, it has mainly focused on offshore wind, solar and carbon capture and storage (idem: 36). In total, the corporation has invested over 100 million US dollars in renewable energy, most of it in offshore wind farms, and has pledged to spend another 200 million US dollars on expanding the renewable energy portfolio beyond wind farms (Zhong and Bazilian 2018: 82–84). Statoil currently has three active wind farms, all located near the United Kingdom, and one active wind turbine located in Norway (Statoil 2018e: 7, 2018f). Most notable is Hywind Scotland, the first floating wind farm (Statoil 2018e: 9; Zhong and Bazilian 2018: 85). This project was initiated, developed and is still operated by Statoil Asa (Zhong and Bazilian 2018: 85). Before this large-scale project was initiated, Statoil Asa tested and developed its abilities concerning floating wind farms with their own stand-alone wind turbine in Norway, called the Hywind Demo (Statoil 2018f). This operation has been active since 2009. Furthermore, two projects are still in development, including the huge Dogger Bank area project, which is expected to produce 3600 MW (Statoil 2018e: 36). The corporation has also very recently begun to invest in US wind farms (Zhong and Bazilian 2018: 85–88). An overview of all Statoil Asa’s wind farms that are in production or for which serious plans have already developed, can be found in table 1 (Statoil 2018e: 36, 2018f). Norsk Hydro Asa has also invested in wind energy, though on a much smaller scale than Statoil Asa has. It used to invest a lot, but Statoil Asa took over this branch of the corporation in 2007, and since then, little development has taken place (Hydro 2007: 8, 11, 13, 41, 110,

2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013b, 2014, 2015, 2016a, 2017a). Instead, Norsk Hydro Asa signs power purchase agreements, which entails that Norsk Hydro Asa invests in energy projects, to later receive a certain amount of energy for its own aluminium industry (Hydro 2016b). Although Norsk Hydro Asa has only signed two such power purchase agreements, the corporation has acquired the largest wind power purchase agreements in the world (Hydro 2017a: 83). The first is with the Fosen wind power project, an onshore wind power project that will start production in 2020, and of which Norsk Hydro Asa has bought between 0.6 and 1 TWh in the period from 2020 to 2039. The second project with which Norsk Hydro Asa has a purchase agreement with, is a part of the Markbygden wind farm project, also an onshore wind project, which will start production in 2021 and of which Norsk Hydro Asa has bought 1.65 TWh in the period from 2021 to 2039 (Hydro 2017b). In the overview of table 1, these investments are taken as full investments in wind parks and calculated as an annual mean in MW. Additionally, Norsk Hydro Asa is using its knowledge of aluminium and aluminium products to develop renewable energy technology. For example, the corporation develops parts of solar cells to make it more absorbing and raise their temperature resistance (Hydro 2013a: 3). More important for this research, however, is the fact that Norks Hydro Asa also develops wind turbines, using their lightweight, corrosion resistant aluminium (idem: 3-4). This makes the turbines more efficient and longer-lasting (ibid). The corporation is not clear, however, how much it spends on these developments. In short, how much is invested in wind energy depends very much on the kind of corporation, its focus and the need to do well on the market. In the Netherlands, Royal Dutch Shell is increasing investments in wind energy (and other forms of renewable energy), but is only investing in those projects that have a high return rate. GasTerra, on the other hand, is not involved in any wind energy projects, as its main focus is natural gas and making natural gas more ‘renewable’; this is in accordance with the main goal it was given by the government. Statoil Asa, the biggest Norwegian energy corporation, is, in contrast, very much in the process of reshaping its business model in a way to also include new energies. With large investments, big projects and high ambitions, it seems to have stricken up the leader position in renewable energy, especially regarding offshore wind farms. Norsk Hydro Asa supports wind energy projects in a different way, by signing power purchasing agreements with many big, onshore wind projects. A comparison of the number and size of the wind farms developed by these huge energy corporations, is shown in table 1.

Table 1: Big energy corporations' investments in wind energy projects

Note: The energy production from Norsk Hydro Asa’s projects are calculated from the power purchasing agreements, from TWh to MW, as an annual mean. As GasTerra has no investments in wind energy projects, it is not included in the table. Source: Hydro (2016b, 2017b), Shell (2018d, 2018b, 2018c, 2018e), Statoil (2018e, 2018f).

4.3 Energy corporations’ cooperation and merging with other corporations Another way of analysing the change in strategies and interests of corporations, is by researching how much the corporations are collaborating with other corporations, or how much take-overs these corporations have initiated. Wind projects are often very much large-scale, thus energy corporations prefer to work in a consortium: a work group of different investors. This way, risks and costs are spread. Collaboration, therefore, often is a sign of these kinds of large-scale projects developing and progressing. Take-overs, however, can be both a sign of progress and a sign of stagnation. It is true that the fossil fuel corporation taking over a renewable energy corporation would gain its knowledge and techniques, with which its renewable energy projects can be advanced, but the fossil fuel corporation can also choose to slow down the renewable energy corporation, to fit it in better with the slower pace of transitioning fossil fuel corporations can have. Therefore, the effect of take-overs of renewable energy corporations by fossil fuel corporations should be analysed very carefully. All of the wind energy projects of Royal Dutch Shell are in cooperation with other corporations or by taking over smaller renewable energy corporations. In fact, the corporation states that “[t]he New Energies portfolio is largely being built through acquiring established companies or through start-up companies” (Shell 2018a: 28). For the wind farm projects, Royal Dutch Shell usually works in consortium with other big energy corporations (like Nuon) first, and, at a later stage, with investors that invest in secure projects with stable returns, like pension funds (High Representative of Royal Dutch Shell New Energies business 2018; Shell 2018b: 25, 2018a: 28). For the smaller scale projects and connectivity activities, Royal Dutch Shell often takes over smaller renewable energy corporations. For example, the corporation took over NewMotion, one of the major electric vehicle charging providers in Europe (Shell 2018a: 7). Such take-overs often include a strong integration of these corporations within the Royal Dutch Shell business model, including the control framework and business vision and focus (High Representative of Royal Dutch Shell New Energies business 2018; Shell 2018a: 28). As earlier stated, GasTerra has no projects concerning wind energy. Though, all the renewable energy and climate change mitigation projects the corporation does engage in, are in cooperation with other corporations. GasTerra supports other corporations in becoming more energy efficient or reducing their CO2-emissions (GasTerra 2017b: 31). It also works together with the Energy Transition Centre, a research centre for energy transitions to broaden the knowledge about the energy transition (ibid). The corporation also works together with other corporations when it comes to establishing the infrastructure necessary for gas (idem: 32). Finally, the future scenarios of GasTerra are made in cooperation with all other gas corporations

67 of the Netherlands, a cooperation labelled Koninklijke Vereniging van Gasfabrikanten in Nederland (idem: 33). Like Royal Dutch Shell, Statoil Asa also works in consortium for most of its wind farms. These consortia mostly exist of other big energy corporations. For the development of the Arkona offshore wind farm, for example, Statoil Asa works together with E.On (Statoil 2018e: 15). However, sometimes Statoil works independently, for example with the bid on the Dutch offshore wind tender for Hollandse Kust Zuid I and II (ibid). Statoil Asa does not seem to take over smaller renewable energy corporations to integrated them with their own business model. Rather, the corporation develops its in-house knowledge and relies on itself for progress on renewable energy projects (Zhong and Bazilian 2018). The best example of this is the Hywind project, of which the Hywind Demo turbine in Norway was a part of (Statoil 2018f). In the early years of its wind energy development, however, the corporation did take over Norsk Hydro Asa’s wind energy branch (Statoil 2008). This branch formed the basis for what is now the corporation’s own renewable energy branch. As Norsk Hydro Asa does not produce any wind energy itself, but rather relies on power purchasing agreements and developing wind turbines, it has to work together with other companies. For the Fosen wind power project, Norsk Hydro Asa works together with the consortium consisting of Statkraft, TrønderEnergi and Nordic Wind Power DA (created by Credit Suisse Energy Infrastructure Partners and other, smaller firms) (Hydro 2016b). The Markbygden wind farm project is developed by two other wind energy corporations, namely Svevind, a privately owned Swedish corporation, and Enercon, a German wind turbine manufacturer (Hydro 2017b). Norsk Hydro Asa has not published any information on collaborations with renewable energy companies regarding the deployment or development of wind turbines. In short, most big energy corporations are working together with other corporations to some extent to develop renewable energy projects. As GasTerra is not focused on wind energy, it does not have any projects concerning the development or deployment of wind energy, but it does collaborate with other organisations on projects mitigating climate change and reducing

CO2-emissions. Norsk Hydro Asa also does not seem to be focused on the deployment of wind energy, as it already has a major share in the production of hydropower, though it does support wind energy projects by its huge power purchasing agreements, for which the corporation works together with wind power producers. Royal Dutch Shell mostly works together with other big energy corporations to develop wind farms, but also takes over smaller renewable energy corporations. As these corporations are integrated into the Royal Dutch Shell business model,

68 it is doubtful whether this will result in a quicker advancement of renewable energy deployment. Statoil Asa, finally, works together with big energy corporations on some of its wind energy projects, but also develops projects individually, to increase their in-house knowledge and abilities, mainly concerning Hywind. .

4.4 Future outlooks and ambitions of the energy corporations To understand the trends of the energy development in Norway and the Netherlands, it is necessary to analyse the future outlooks and ambitions of the biggest energy corporations in both countries. This is because the strategies of these organisations will strongly affect the strategies of the state. Therefore, the next subsection will look at the most recent available reports of the Royal Dutch Shell and GasTerra regarding renewable energy, followed by a discussion on how this will affect the Dutch policies. In the subsection thereafter, a similar analysis will be carried out using documents from Statoil Asa and Norsk Hydro Asa, and their effects on the Norwegian policies. In the last subsection, the Dutch and Norwegian situation will be compared.

4.4.1 Future outlooks of the Dutch energy corporations

Regarding climate change mitigation, Royal Dutch Shell is mostly focused on reducing CO2- emissions. Many of the investments focused on mitigating climate change are solely for the reduction of CO2-emissions, be it by investing in low-carbon solutions or by developing systems that capture CO2-emissions (Shell 2018c: 5, 2018b: 3). Investing and developing renewable energy falls under investing in low-carbon solutions. Royal Dutch Shell has also made numerous plans as to how the corporation will transition to a more resilient and focused corporation that responds to “society’s desire for more and cleaner, convenient and competitive energy” (Shell 2018b: 10). The corporation has set this out in different scenarios, named Mountains, Oceans and Sky (Shell 2018e: 18). In the Mountain scenario, the big economic actors will work together closely with governments to create a more sustainable economy, without losing sight of their own interests (Shell 2013b: 23–26, 2018e: 18). In the Oceans scenario, the government plays a much smaller role and there is little coordination (Shell 2013b: 47–50, 2018e: 18). In the Sky scenario, all societal actors (government, businesses and non- economic social actors) pursue the goal of CO2-emission reduction in collaboration (Shell 2018b: 2, 2018e: 18). This last scenario is the most ambitious and most in agreement with the Paris Climate Accord (Shell 2018b: 2). In all the scenarios, however, Royal Dutch Shell emphasizes there is a continued need for oil and gas. In fact, the oil and gas demand will rise

69 until approximately 2030; after that peak-year, the demand will slowly decrease with about 0,5 to 1 percent per year (Shell 2013b: 35–40, 2018e: 22–23). This is due to heavy transport and chemical manufacturing having great difficulty to transition to renewable energy. The corporation states that: “We aim to grow our business in areas that will be essential in the energy transition, and where we see growth in demand over the next decade. We expect these will include natural gas, chemicals, electricity, renewable power, and new fuels such as biofuels and hydrogen. We are also growing our oil business, including in deep water and shales, to meet continued demand” (Shell 2018e: 26). This clearly indicates that Royal Dutch Shell, even though it is developing renewable energy, is still also focused on oil and gas and sees continued opportunities in these fields during and after the energy transition. GasTerra does not have its own future scenario, but joined the Gas Op Maat scenario, written by Koninklijke Vereniging van Gasfabrikanten in Nederland (KVGN) called. Like the scenarios of Royal Dutch Shell, it is mainly focused on reducing CO2-emissions (KVGN 2016).

KVGN does acknowledge that reducing CO2-emissions will mean that the role of natural gas in the domestic energy consumption needs to be limited to only those moments in which there is no other option, and even in those moments, the gas should be altered in a way that it is ‘renewable’, for example by adding hydrogen or by producing it from biomass (idem: 3, 8). KVGN does not think Dutch natural gas should be phased out in the coming years (idem: 6). Instead, it is a good alternative for coal, oil and imported gas, as these energy sources are less secure and more environmentally unfriendly. If coal, oil and imported gas are all phased out, Dutch natural gas can be transitioned to renewable gas and eventually renewable energy. The Netherlands would not only benefit ecologically, but also economically from this transition (idem: 10). KVGN does state that 100 percent clean electricity production is the ambition, though this depends on the technological innovations and acceptation by the society (ibid). In all scenarios, natural gas still plays a role as a better fossil fuel alternative to oil and coal (idem: 12, 13). According to the future scenario of KGVN, it would be good if the revenues from the gas production would support the renewable energy transition, for example financially supporting the research and development sector for renewable energy (idem: 13). Additionally, the infrastructure put in place for gas should be reconstructed in a way that it can support a system based on renewable energy (ibid).

Analysing the renewable energy policies of the Dutch government, it becomes clear how the strategies of the energy corporations have influenced the Dutch renewable energy transition. First of all, the text of the energy policies of the Dutch government have been established using ‘Energy tables’ (energietafels), which can best be described as a closed discussion platform (SER 2013: 32). The results of these discussions will directly be implemented in the energy accords (ibid). Additionally, every year, there is another discussion, on an even higher level of policy making, between a select group of eight actors, including the Ministry of Economy and Climate, a select few social groups and major businesses (High Representative of the Dutch Ministry of Economy and Climate 2018). The conclusions of this discussion affect the Dutch policies even more severely (ibid). The country’s biggest energy corporations are a major actor in both these discussions.

Second, the Dutch energy transition policies focus on reducing CO2-emissions. At one side, it could be argued that this is pragmatic: the problem that needs to be solved is climate change, which is caused by the overabundance of CO2-emissions (High Representative of the Dutch Ministry of Economy and Climate 2018; Representative of the Dutch Research Institute For Transitions 2018). The most straightforward solution to climate change mitigation would be to reduce the CO2-emissions (ibid). The reduction CO2-emissions, however is only partly a solution to the current global problems concerning energy. The broader energy problems also concern the issue of resource scarcity, as explained in chapter one (Amineh and Crijns-Graus

2017: 342). This would not be solved by solely focusing on the reduction of CO2-emissions.

Additionally, even for climate change mitigation only investing in CO2-emission reduction has a limited effect: CO2 will still be discharged and the devastating effects of the extraction of oil and gas on the climate will not be countered. However, precisely because the economy and broader society structure does not have to be structurally changed, focusing on the reduction of

CO2-emissions is the preferred method of the big energy corporations: with this method, the business models do not have to be severely changed, as the economy and broader society will still heavily depend on the consumption of fossil fuels (Representative of the Dutch Research Institute For Transitions 2018). In short, the focus of the Dutch government on the reduction of

CO2-emissions could be written up to pragmatically and straightforwardly mitigating climate change, but it could also be the result of an effective, one-sided lobby by the big energy corporations and a high-level resistance to structural transition. Third, the Dutch energy transition policies echo the position of the big energy corporations when it comes to natural gas. In the scenarios of GasTerra and Royal Dutch Shell, natural gas is seen as the crucial fuel both during the energy transition and for many years after.

This is because natural gas is the least polluting fossil fuel energy source and can be deployed flexibly, making it a good alternative to meet the rising energy demand and a secure back-up energy source supporting the renewable energy sources. These ideas and the importance that is put on natural gas, is shared by the Dutch government, as can be seen in the different energy transition policies. However, it must be noted that very recently the Dutch government has announced to decrease the natural gas production in the Netherlands. This can result in either increased imports of natural gas from neighbouring countries, or a decrease of the natural gas consumption (High Representative of GasTerra 2018). Thus, on many issues, the Dutch energy policies correspond with the scenarios of the big energy corporations of the country. Many strategies and long-term visions are similar. This will most likely not change in the near future, as the corporations are consulted by the government when new policies are established. This can, for example, be seen by these corporations’ participation in the Energy Tables.

4.4.2 Future outlooks of the Norwegian energy corporations As is shown through their investments in numerous wind power projects, Statoil Asa is very much concerned with climate change mitigation and transitioning to a business model that is based more on renewable energy. Especially the plans for the deployment of Hywind are ambitious (Statoil 2015b, 2015c). For this transition and fitting their own transition into the world’s transition, Statoil Asa has made three scenarios (Statoil 2017a: 7). In the Reform scenario, national regulation and incentives (subsidies) drive businesses to use more renewable energy and reduce their CO2-emissions, but the rising population number and GDP nullify the effects of these changes, as the energy demand keeps growing (idem: 7-8). The Renewal scenario, in contrast, is sustainable and is the result of climate change mitigation progress, based on international cooperation and national policies focused on investments and development of renewable energy and Carbon Capture and Storage (idem: 8-9). The third scenario is the Rivalry scenario, in which climate change mitigation is lower on the priority list of national policies than national (economic) interests, making this scenario the most unsustainable (idem: 9-10). All three scenarios do see fossil fuels as a necessary part of the energy consumption, especially in heavy industry (idem: 22). To help along the Renewal scenario, as this is the most optimistic one, Statoil Asa has set up Statoil Energy Ventures as part of its New Energy Solutions branch. This corporate venture fund, established in 2016, invests in renewable energy projects (Statoil 2018g). With its total of 200 million US dollars investment capital, investments between 1 and 20 million US dollars per corporation and investment periods of 4 to 7 years, Statoil Asa can

72 effectively support many renewable energy projects, as the corporation has shown with ChargePoint, the largest operator of an electric vehicle charging network, and Oxford PV, a solar technology corporation (ibid). In contrast to Statoil Asa, Norsk Hydro Asa has not published a scenario or future outlook. It has published other documents concerning the corporation’s role in climate change mitigation. In these documents, the corporation pledges to support the renewable energy transitions by helping build solar cells, wind turbines and heat pumps that are more sustainable and long-lasting (Hydro 2013a). Additionally, the corporation tries to help other corporations in becoming more energy efficient, though this is heavily intertwined with the corporation’s interests. For example, the corporation tries to convince transport companies to use Norsk Hydro Asa’s aluminium, because this makes the vehicles lighter, thus less energy consuming (Hydro 2013c: 12). In a similar way, using aluminium in buildings and construction also has the potential to save energy and even produce energy, by integrating solar cells (idem: 14-15). The corporation also wants increase its efforts concerning recycling (Hydro 2013a, 2013c). The production of aluminium costs a lot of energy, but because aluminium can be recycled using very little energy, in the long run, it can save a lot of energy that would otherwise be spend producing products with a smaller lifecycle (Hydro 2013c: 18). As a concrete goal, Norsk Hydro Asa wants to recover one million metric tons of contaminated and post-consumer scrap each year by 2020 (idem: 23). The Norwegian government partially follows the advices of the big energy corporations. The most recent policies support long-term development of wind power projects, in line with Statoil Asa’s Renewable scenario advice, including investments in research and development (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2016). Like Norsk Hydro Asa, the government pays much attention to energy efficiency and, in that way, saving energy and reducing CO2-emissions (High Representative of the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2018). The Norwegian government, however, puts much more emphasis on the importance of the renewable energy sector than the two biggest energy corporations show. As the sector employs over 20 thousand people in Norway, it is one of the most essential sectors, and the development of this sector influences the development of other sectors in the country (High Representative of the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2018; Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2018c). Therefore, developing the renewable energy sector is taken as the basis for climate change mitigation (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2016). The Norwegian government has ambitious plans that should support the development of this sector, including the in 2016 implemented law that prohibit households from installing heating installations based on fossil

73 fuels, and the establishment of Enova, a state-owned corporation that should help the transport and industry sector in transitioning towards renewable energy (ibid).

4.4.3 The Dutch and Norwegian energy corporations’ outlooks and their effects compared Comparing the outlooks of the Dutch and Norwegian energy corporations and their effects on policies, it becomes clear how these differ. The Dutch energy policies are much more in line with the outlooks of the big energy corporations. There is a focus on reducing CO2-emissions and not on a transition of the economy and broader society. This is different from the Norwegian energy policies, which take the development of the renewable energy sector as the basis of climate change mitigation. This prominent role for renewable energy results in an emphasis on an economic and societal transformation, with shifting the dependence from fossil fuels to renewable energy as a goal. The renewable energy transition is thus a supporting part of the Dutch policies, while the renewable energy transition is a main part of the Norwegian policies. As a result, the governments of both countries have different ambitions. In the Dutch policies, there is a clear continued dependence on fossil fuels, especially gas. Due to the focus on CO2- emission reduction, and gas emitting relatively little CO2, natural gas becomes a good option to mitigate climate change. Additionally, it is easier than transitioning to an economy and society based on renewable energy. There is ambition to become fully renewable, though, this ambition is not as strong as it is with the Norwegian government, which is much more focused on renewable energy. Furthermore, as the ambitions with the of the Dutch government are lower, the big energy corporations become leading in the renewable energy transition, whereas the higher ambitions of the Norwegian government are leading the big energy corporations. The different mentalities of the government therefore result in different positions of the governments relative to the big energy corporations.

4.5 Conclusion In conclusion, this chapter analysed the strategies and interests of the two biggest energy corporations of the Netherlands and Norway to research how the strategies and interests of the two biggest energy corporations have changed in light of the renewable energy transition and how this has affected the nations’ renewable energy transition. What has become clear is that the corporations very much vary in the way they handle the renewable energy transition. GasTerra and Norsk Hydro Asa are a lot less active in the renewable energy transition. In the case of GasTerra, this is due to the corporation’s strong, but narrow focus on gas. Norsk Hydro Asa has invested a lot in another source of renewable energy, namely hydropower, and is

74 therefore less interested in wind power projects. Royal Dutch Shell has a lot of experience with wind energy production, but mainly invests in large-scale projects. This means that the only projects Royal Dutch Shell invests in, are offshore. In the United States, however, the corporation owns onshore wind power projects, but these are large-scale. Statoil Asa has less history in wind power projects, but has developed quickly over the last ten years. The corporation is involved in many large-scale, mainly offshore, wind power projects in Europe. The big energy corporations do not only differ in the investments, but also in the way they cooperate with other corporations. The major development of Statoil in wind power was possible because the corporation developed some projects on its own, in combination with deploying the bigger scale projects in a consortia. Royal Dutch Shell only works in large consortium and hardly ever takes on a share bigger than 50 percent of a wind energy project. GasTerra mainly supports other organisations, as it does not develop its own truly renewable energy. Norsk Hydro Asa also does not actively develop any wind power projects itself, but supports these projects with power purchasing agreements. The strategies and interests of the corporations has affected the different governments.

In the Netherlands, the focus of the corporations on CO2-emission reduction has been copied by the government. In Norway, the quick transition of Statoil Asa toward renewable energy has affected the Norwegian government: the government now also has a major focus on renewable energy. In this, it is visible that Statoil Asa is affecting the government more than Norsk Hydro Asa, as the government is specifically focusing on renewable energy that is not hydropower. A similar situation seems to be taking place in the Netherlands: although the Dutch government is copying the ideas and position of both big energy corporations, as these are very similar, it has also announced to stop the extraction of natural gas from the gas field in Groningen, which will significantly reduce GasTerra’s production. Additionally, the ambitions of the Dutch government are lower, and the renewable energy transition is seen as having a supportive role in climate change mitigation, resulting in the Dutch government not taking the lead in the renewable energy transition. In contrast, the ambitions of the Norwegian government are much higher and the renewable energy transition is seen as one of the main goals of the government, which has resulted in the Norwegian government actively supporting, advancing and steering this transition. This, then, has led to a much quicker renewable energy development in Norway compared to the Netherlands.

Chapter 5 – Comparison of the challenges in the Dutch and Norwegian domestic renewable energy transition

5.1 Introduction In this chapter, the challenges Norway and the Netherlands face during their energy transition will be analysed and compared using the framework of Hope-Hailey and Balogun (2002). Both countries face the challenge of infrastructure, as the energy production and distribution based on renewable energy is less centralised than the energy production and distribution based on fossil fuels. However, regarding the eight factors of the framework, the Netherlands and Norway face also many different challenges in the (remainder of the) domestic renewable energy transition. Analysing and comparing these challenges will help to understand the differences in the barriers in the energy transition in the different countries, and can explain why there is such a big difference in the progress in renewable energy consumption and development between the Netherlands and Norway. This way, the following sub-question can be answered: What have been, and still are, challenges for the Netherlands and for Norway in the renewable energy transition? In section 2 of this chapter, the energy transition challenges for the Netherlands will be discussed. Next, in section 3, the energy transition challenges for Norway will be discussed. In section 4, these challenges will be compared and it will be analysed how these differences are the reasons behind the major differences between the progress of the domestic renewable energy transition of both countries. The chapter will end with a conclusion in section 5.

5.2 Challenges for the Dutch domestic renewable energy transition Regarding the eight factors distinguished by Hope-Hailey and Balogun (2002), the Netherlands has relatively more constraining factors than enabling factors, as can be seen in table 2. Time, for the Netherlands, clearly has not been and most likely will not be a challenge: The Netherlands has been busy transitioning since 2001 and there is no deadline for the transition. Though the Netherlands has ‘deadlines’, such as the renewable energy goals established by the European Union and goals set by the country itself, but the consequences of not meeting these deadlines have been thus far very limited (European Commission 2007a, 2007b, 2018; Expert Policy Advisor EREF 2018). Time therefore forms an enabling factor. The scope, on the other hand, is very extensive, and the preservation is limited, forming two major constraining factors. This is because the wealth-power structure and the industrialised economy of the Netherlands is based on fossil fuels. As is shown in figure 3 and 7, the energy production and consumption

77 of the Netherlands are based on fossil fuels (Eurostat 2017; IEA 2017b; Partijgedrag 2017). Therefore, a major remodelling of current domestic wealth-power structure is needed. This change is especially important in light of current government plans to drastically decrease the natural gas production from the Groningen gas field (Berg and Giebels 2018). If the Dutch domestic energy consumption pattern remains unchanged, this would result in an increase in fossil fuel imports (CBS 2017). This will be difficult, taking into account the global resource scarcity (Amineh and Crijns-Graus 2017: 342; Amineh and Yang 2017: 17–20). Thus, much needs to be changed and little can stay the same. Another constraining factor for the Dutch domestic renewable energy transition is the diversity of the actors involved. There are three main groups involved: the political elite, the major energy corporations and the civil society groups. The political elite, with as its main actor the government, has thus far been unable to formulate a common renewable energy goal and actively steer towards this goal. This has resulted in a big variety of interests, especially within the civil society groups, which have been hesitant regarding a domestic renewable energy transition, as has been explained in chapter three. The great veriety of interests and the absence of a common renewable energy goal, has a lot to do with the readiness in the Dutch society for a domestic renewable energy transition, which is limited and thus forms a constraining factor for the transition. Especially the public support for a renewable energy transition is lacking in the Dutch society (Van der Heijden 2017: 138). At one hand, this has to do with the severe negative consequences the transition the political measures regarding the energy transition would have for the public, such as high costs for reforming houses (High Representative of GasTerra 2018; Member of House of Representatives for GroenLinks 2018). At the other handthe Dutch labour union fears for job loss and is thus slightly against a domestic renewable energy transition, while the Dutch green movement has been keen on making compromises (Representative of the Dutch Research Institute For Transitions 2018). Increasing public support will only become more challenging in the future, as the renewable energy production on land will most likely increase to meet the energy demand. As the Netherlands has limited space, this will mean that renewable energy production will invade more space of the citizens (High Representative of GasTerra 2018; Member of House of Representatives for GroenLinks 2018; Representative of the Dutch Research Institute For Transitions 2018). Public support, or rather the lack thereof, will thus be one of the main challenges for the Netherlands in the renewable energy transition (High Representative of GasTerra 2018; High Representative of the Dutch Ministry of Economy and Climate 2018; High Representative of Royal Dutch Shell New Energies business 2018; Member

78 of House of Representatives for GroenLinks 2018; Representative of the Dutch Research Institute For Transitions 2018). This limited space also poses a challenge for the capacity of the Netherlands to the transition as well, but the Netherlands has the capability and experience in renewable energy to neutralise this barrier. The Netherlands has been active in the renewable energy transition since the early 2000s, and has thus gained extensive knowledge in the area of renewable energy techniques and combining renewable energy production with living space. This makes capability an enabling factor. With this knowledge and a long coastline, the Netherlands should also have enough capacity, making capacity an enabling factor as well. The final factor affecting the progress of the Dutch domestic renewable energy transition, power, is however not extensive, resulting in a major challenge. The Netherlands owns officially no shares of the Royal Dutch Shell, and only owns 50 percent of the shares of GasTerra (Shell 2018b; GasTerra 2018). The government currently supports both corporations with all kinds of policies, such as tax exemptions and decreasing investment risks (Burg and Runkel 2017). Thus, the government does have quite some power over these corporations, as it can decide to be less cooperative if the corporations do not actively support the energy transition more extensively than they do now. However, if the Dutch government does decide to implement policies that are unfavourable for fossil fuel-based energy corporations, like Royal Dutch Shell, it risks losing these countries: as the Dutch government does not have any or the majority of shares of the corporation, the corporation can decide to move (parts of) its business abroad. This would greatly hurt the Dutch economy. Therefore, the Dutch government faces a major challenge in balancing renewable energy transition policies and remaining a preferred country for energy businesses. The enabling and constraining factors mentioned above, of course, influence each other. For example, the rather weak and mixed lateral pressure from the societal groups in the Netherlands, do not exert a strong enough pressure on the political elite to make serious steps in the renewable energy transition. The ties between the political elite and the business sector, in contrast, are very strong. This business sector is based on fossil fuels. They will thus increase the fossil fuel consumption and be in favour of fossil fuel production. The increased fossil fuel consumption, then, will heighten the need for fossil fuel imports, which is hampered by resource scarcity. These connections and the influence the different actors in the Dutch state society complex have on one another are shown in figure 12. This figure shows that there is not one barrier for the energy transition in the Netherlands, but there are multiple, in different sectors of the state-market relations.

Figure 12: The Dutch state-market relations and constraining or enabling factors in the energy transition

Source: by author.

5.3 Challenges for the Dutch domestic renewable energy transition Though the Norwegian domestic renewable energy transition has progressed much faster than the Dutch renewable energy transition, the country too faces constraining factors for the remainder of its transition, albeit significantly less than the Netherlands and less than Norway’s enabling factors. An overview of the factors affecting the Norwegian domestic renewable energy transition is given in table 2. First of all, time, again, is an enabling factor, as Norway has had plenty of time to develop its renewable energy technologies and there is no time limit by which the renewable energy transition should be completed. The scope of the change is not extensive, though some changes are necessary. Although Norway is not dependent on fossil fuels for its general domestic consumption, the transport sector still needs to undergo major changes in order to become renewable energy-based (IEA 2017a; SSB 2017a, 2017b). Additionally, big parts of the trade of Norway consist of fossil fuel: most produced fossil fuel is exported to neighbouring countries (SSB 2017b). This is not necessarily bad for the domestic renewable energy transition, but the extraction of these resources still has detrimental effects for the environment. Thus, some change is necessary, but it is not extensive, and it is therefore not a constraining factor. This also leads to preservation being an enabling factor, but there is a challenge in this. The two biggest energy corporations in Norway are already largely based on renewable energy sources (Norsk Hydro Asa) or are making big steps to change their business model to become (more) based on renewable energy (Statoil Asa) (Statoil 2018e). Thus, these corporations do not have to extensively change their processes; in fact, the path these corporations are on, is very beneficial for the renewable energy transition. The challenge the Norwegian government faces, however, is to keep this progress going. Current policies are not always stimulating the renewable energy transition; policies seem especially hard on hydropower recently (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2016). The Norwegian government should keep stimulating the renewable energy transition to remain their head position in these technologies. A constraining factor that Norway shares with the Netherlands, is the diversity of the actors. Like in the Netherlands, the actors that will be affected by the change form a very diverse group: citizens, businesses, civil society actors and the political elite all are affected by this fundamental transition. However, in Norway, these actors are all supportive of the renewable energy transition, as is shown in figure 13. Although there is some protest, making the readiness of citizens a factor that is neither enabling or constraining, these protests are limited and mostly concerned with preserving nature. The challenge the Norwegian government faces, however, is to keep the public support for the transition high. As a full renewable energy transition will

81 most likely require more invasive renewable energy production systems (wind turbines, solar cells) to be placed, there is a possibility that the public support will decrease. Making sure all involved actors benefit from the transition, would help keep the support high. Finally, there is the slightly constraining factor of capability, but this is covered by the enabling factors of capacity and power. Norway has always produced renewable energy, but it entirely relied on the technique of hydropower for this. The development of other renewable energy production techniques was absent until approximately ten years ago. This limits the capability of Norway. Norway, however, has a lot of space available for renewable energy production systems, as the country is rather sparsely populated, especially in the north. This makes capacity a highly enabling factor. Additionally, the Norwegian government has a lot of power over its biggest energy corporation, as it is the biggest shareholder of these corporations. This gives the Norwegian government a lot of possibilities for renewable energy policies, without having to fear repercussions by the energy corporations, such as these corporations moving their business abroad. It can directly steer these corporations to develop their renewable energy knowledge, thus countering the lack of capability. Thus, in Norway, most factors are enabling a domestic renewable energy transition, as can be seen in table 2, and these factors influence each other as well. As shown in figure 13, most state-market relations are supportive of a domestic renewable energy transition. This results in a fast progress of the domestic renewable energy transition.

Figure 13: The Norwegian state-market relations and constraining or enabling factors in the energy transition

Source: by author.

5.4 The Dutch and Norwegian domestic renewable energy transition challenges compared It has become clear that both countries face constraining factors and challenges, though these are more severe and higher in number in the Dutch society than in the Norwegian society, as can be seen in table 2. First, both countries face the challenge of infrastructure, which will become greater as the energy transition progresses, due to an increase in decentralised renewable energy production. Second, both countries have to deal with the constraining factor of diversity, as in both countries the fundamental transition affects all kinds of actors. Third, both countries have to deal with the fact that they will need to transition from a wealth-power structure based on fossil fuels, to one that is based on renewable energy. On the positive side, for both countries, time and capacity are enabling factors, as there is no deadline for which the transition needs to be successful and fully completed, and both countries either have enough money or space available for the renewable energy transition. As for the factors of scope, preservation and readiness, these are all constraining for the Dutch energy transition, but not for the Norwegian energy transition, which leads to the Netherlands facing some extra challenges. As the Dutch energy corporations, civil society actors and political elite are less convinced of and have made less progress in the renewable energy transition, the scope of the transition is extensive, little can be kept the same and all actors are less ready to change fundamentally, especially as this transition will cost money or will negatively affect the visible environment. In contrast, in Norway all actors are very supportive of the renewable energy transition; the big energy corporations are even already transitioning to become based on renewable energy or are already largely based on renewable energy. Therefore, the scope of what needs to be changed is much smaller, and the preservation bigger, making the transition easier. The Norwegian government does face the challenge to maintain the high public support for the transition and a good innovation climate. The Netherlands does have a great advantage in its capability, but is unfortunately not able to realize this advantage, as there is not enough willingness to invest in this. As the Netherlands has considered the renewable energy transition for a long time, there has been a great build-up of knowledge and good development of technology. However, as the major energy corporations do not seem to be ready to transition just yet, this knowledge is not being applied.

Table 2: The enabling and constraining factors in the Dutch and Norwegian domestic renewable energy transition compared

Note: These factors are based on Hope-Hailey and Balogun (2002). Source: by author.

5.5 Conclusion In conclusion, the factors Hope-Hailey and Balogun (2002) have distinguished as being enabling or constraining for a transition, differ greatly between the Netherlands and Norway. The Netherlands has much more constraining factors, which interact in a way that slows down the progress of the domestic renewable energy transition. For example, the lack of power the Dutch government has over the Dutch energy corporations leads to these corporations not transitioning, which results in a lower readiness. In contrast, Norway has more enabling factors, which interact in a way that advances the progress of the domestic renewable energy transition. For example, Norway’s big capacity results in a decrease of the hindrance citizens experience from onshore renewable energy production, which increases the public readiness. Many of the major factors are greatly affected by the state-market relations. All in all, the Netherlands seems to be in a negative spiral regarding he domestic renewable energy transition, while Norway is experiencing a positive spiral.

Chapter 6 - Conclusion

6.1 General conclusion This thesis discussed the difference in progress of the renewable energy transition in different societies. To this end, the progress of the Dutch and Norwegian domestic renewable energy transitions, specifically the development of wind energy, were compared. The Dutch renewable energy transition has progressed much slower than Norwegian renewable energy transition. To understand why there is such a big difference between these two countries, this thesis answered the following question: Why have the state-market relations hampered the domestic renewable energy transition in the Netherlands, but not in Norway? In order to answer this question, concepts of both change management theory and political economy were applied. Neither theory could be fully applied, as they are focused on intra-organisational change and external relations and the global economy respectively. Change management theory has discerned eight factors that affect the pace of the transition and together were used as the analytical framework for this research: time, scope, preservation, diversity, capability, capacity, readiness and power. These factors can either be enabling or constraining the transition, as was shown in figure 1. Concepts of geopolitical economy were needed to gain an in-depth understand why a renewable energy transition is necessary and how state-market relations strongly affect the progress of the renewable energy transition (specifically, two of the eight factors: readiness and power). One of the concepts from geopolitical economy that was used, is the wealth-power structure, which is the pattern of accumulation and distribution of wealth and power and the configuration of the network of actors (the domestic society and its institutions) based on this pattern. Since the Industrial Revolution, both the Norwegian and the Dutch domestic wealth-power structure are fossil fuel-based. Due to resource scarcity and risks to the environment, this is not sustainable. Thus, a renewable energy transition is necessary. However, due to the great reliance of the Norwegian and Dutch domestic economy on fossil fuels, energy corporations hold major power over the political elite of both countries. As energy corporations are usually not in favour of a renewable energy transition, these corporations can use their power to hamper the transition. Civil society actors can, however, use their lateral pressure to influence the political elite, corporations and the public to advance the transition. Using these concepts, five key actors per country have been identified, which greatly affect the domestic renewable energy transition. First, the political elite, which consists of the national government with affiliated political parties and institutions. The second and third key actors are the biggest and second biggest energy corporations in both countries: Royal Dutch

Shell and GasTerra for the Netherlands, and Statoil Asa and Norsk Hydro Asa for Norway. The fourth actor is the biggest green movement of the country, which is GroenLinks in the Netherlands and Miljøpartiet de Grønne in Norway. Fifth, the biggest labour union of both countries, the Dutch Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging and the Norwegian Landsorganisasjonen i Norge were also analysed. The position of these actors regarding the domestic renewable energy transition of their country is shown in figure 2. Based on those key actors, the following hypotheses regarding the research question have been established:

H1: Differences in the interests of the key actors involved in the domestic renewable energy transition result in differences in the progress of the domestic renewable energy transition.

H2: Differences in state-market relations result in differences in the progress of the domestic renewable energy transition.

H3: The wealth-power structure of the Netherlands is based more on the domestic consumption of fossil fuels than the Norwegian wealth-power structure, resulting in a slower progress of the Dutch domestic renewable energy transition compared to the Norwegian domestic renewable energy transition. After analysis of the five key actors per country and comparing the Dutch and Norwegian state-market relations, there is supporting evidence for all three hypotheses. First, there are big differences in the interests of the key actors in both countries. The Dutch major energy corporations have not progressed as much in transitioning their business models to change from fossil fuel-based to renewable energy-based, as the Norwegian major energy corporations have. There are also differences between the interests of the Dutch and Norwegian green movements and labour unions. GroenLinks is more interested in making compromises and transitioning in a socially just way; Miljøpartiet de Grønne takes harsher and more radical actions, putting large lateral pressure on the political elite, energy corporations and the public. Additionally, the Dutch FNV is very concerned with the possible job loss in the fossil fuel industry, while LO Norge is mainly focused on transitioning. The Norwegian lateral pressure in favour of the transition is thus more severe than the Dutch lateral pressure, resulting in a bigger overall readiness for the transition and a bigger power in favour of the transition compared to those factors in the Dutch society. Second, the differences in the Dutch and Norwegian state-market relations, especially the differences in the relation between the government and the major energy corporations, have hindered the Dutch domestic renewable energy transition, relative to the Norwegian domestic renewable energy transition. The Norwegian government holds great power over its major

88 energy corporations, as it is the biggest shareholder. The Dutch government, in contrast, officially holds no shares of Royal Dutch Shell and 50 percent of the shares of GasTerra. It is beneficial if the government is the major shareholder of the biggest energy corporations. As the biggest shareholder, the government can influence the business model of the corporations to be focused not only on profits, but also on societal benefits, such as becoming less dependent on fossil fuels and developing renewable energy technology. Additionally, the Dutch political elite and energy corporation networks overlap more than is the case in the Norwegian society, which helps the energy corporations with promoting their interests at the level of the political elite. This has resulted in more energy corporation-friendly policies in the Netherlands than in Norway. Thus, the power of actors (traditionally) opposing the renewable energy transition is much bigger in the Netherlands than in Norway, resulting in a slower progress of the Dutch domestic energy transition. Third, taking all this into account and looking at the domestic energy consumption of the Netherlands, the Dutch wealth-power structure is based more on the domestic consumption of fossil fuels than the Norwegian wealth-power structure. Despite both countries producing fossil fuels, Norway largely exports this production, while the Netherlands uses a large part of its fossil fuel production domestically. Thus, the Dutch wealth-power structure is partly based on domestic fossil fuel consumption, causing more resistance against the domestic renewable energy transition than in Norway. All in all, the state-market relations have hampered (and are still hampering) the domestic renewable energy transition in the Netherlands, but not in Norway, because (a) the Dutch government has much less power over its big energy corporations, as it is not the major shareholder, (b) the Dutch big energy corporations are much slower in transforming their business models to become renewable energy-based, and (c) Dutch civil society groups have put less (lateral) pressure in favour of the of the renewable energy transition on the government, corporations and public. Thus, it is mainly a difference in the content of the state-market relations and how these relations are used, that has resulted in a different pace of progress of the renewable energy transition.

6.2 Expected challenges and recommendations The slower pace of progress of the renewable energy transition in the Netherlands compared to Norway results in the Dutch society facing more severe challenges in the coming years. First, steering the energy corporations to change their business models to become more based on renewable energies will be much harder for the Dutch political elite than for the Norwegian

89 political elite. The Norwegian government has a direct way of incorporating certain societal objectives in the business models, such as the renewable energy transition, as the government is the major shareholder of the energy corporations. The Dutch government, not being the major shareholder, has more limited control over its biggest energy corporations. As a consequence, if the Dutch government would implement policies that are too unfavourable for Royal Dutch Shell, there is a risk that Royal Dutch Shell will move (part of) its business abroad, where policies are more favourable. This would cause major damage to the Dutch domestic economy. Dutch policymakers are thus limited to making policies that are not too unfavourable to fossil fuel-based energy corporations, which makes it more difficult for the Dutch political elite to steer energy corporations towards incorporating renewable energy. Second, increasing the public support for the renewable energy transition will be challenging in the Dutch society. The major Dutch energy corporations are not (yet) in favour of the renewable energy transition, and neither is the biggest labour union. The green movement, meanwhile, is more in favour of making compromises. This has resulted in the Dutch public support for the renewable energy transition having increased less than the Norwegian public support. The low public support makes a domestic renewable energy transition in the Netherlands politically inopportune, making it likely that the Dutch political elite will try to avoid taking hard measures for a renewable energy transition as long as possible. With these challenges in mind, a few recommendations can be made. First, it is important for governments to take immediate action on the renewable energy transition. This transition will have a major impact on the economy of a country and it is therefore better to progress in a gradual pace. Additionally, an earlier transition to renewables has the advantage that energy supply security will increase and domestically produced fossil fuels can be exported, while the country can gain first-mover advantages in technology and infrastructure. Second, national governments should focus more on increasing public support. Nation- wide campaigns on why a renewable energy transition is necessary can increase public support, as a nation-wide campaign can emphasize the importance of the transition and accentuate the opportunities that are created, opposed to the negative impacts of the transition. Third, it is advisable for national governments to gain (more) direct control over the energy industry in its own country. The absence of direct control from the Dutch government on Royal Dutch Shell limits the policy options of the government. As the importance of GasTerra will most likely diminish in the upcoming years, the Dutch government will lose most of its direct control over its domestic energy industry. This increased dependence on non-state

90 energy corporations is a dangerous situation, as the economy is based on fossil fuel. Thus, it should be avoided.

6.3 Discussion This research has been valuable for several reasons. First of all, it relates to earlier studies concerning the environment, energy and the renewable energy transitions, because it focuses on the constraining and enabling factors in societal relations. Most studies focus on insufficient technology, presence of fossil fuels, economic loss and civil doubt, however, state-market relations bring these problems into existence or amplify their effects. This a fundamental transition to renewable energy requires the state-market relations to be changed. What exactly needs to be changed in the societal relations of countries not included in this study, is hard to say. Societal relations are different in each country, therefore the outcomes of this study are difficult to generalise beyond the Netherlands and Norway. The framework used in this research to analyse the societal ties of countries, however, is broadly applicable. By combining the theories of change management and political economy, general factors specified to the area of energy have been set up, which can enable or constrain a transition. These factors keep into account the great dependence of today’s economy on energy and the global scarcity of resources. Not only does this framework give insight in the enabling and constraining factors in a renewable energy transition, it also makes both theories easier to apply on different societies and their energy issues. As the study is about abstract issues, such as state-market relations, using a comparison between two similar countries with different levels of progress has made this study more concrete and easier to understand. Although there was a small language barrier (Norwegian), this was often not a problem as most documents were available in English or easy to translate. Most documents that were needed for this research were openly available in both countries. There is, however, always an issue with interviews: who the interviewees are, mostly depends on the willingness and availability of the interviewees. Thus, in this research, there is a slight overrepresentation of Dutch interviewees. These interviewees, however, sometimes were also knowledgeable on the Norwegian situation, or I was able to compare the information from Dutch interviewees with data I found on similar issues in Norway. Thus, in the end, the method has proven adequate to answer my research question and make a fair comparison between Norway and the Netherlands.

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Categorized list Interviews Energy Policy Adviser to a Member of the European Parliament (2018). ‘Interview 30 March 2018.’, Conducted myself on 30 March 2018. Expert Policy Advisor EREF (2018). ‘Interview 2 February 2018.’, conducted myself on 2 February 2018. High Representative of Directorate-General Climate Action (European Commission) (2018). ‘Interview 13 April 2018.’, conducted by myself on 13 April 2018. High Representative of GasTerra (2018). ‘Interview 2 May 2018.’, conducted by myself and Rein Schaafsma on 2 May 2018. High Representative of Royal Dutch Shell New Energies business (2018). ‘Interview 16 April 2018.’, conducted by myself and Rein Schaafsma on 16 April 2018. High Representative of the Dutch Ministry of Economy and Climate (2018). ‘Interview 16 April 2018.’, conducted by myself and Rein Schaafsma on 16 April 2018. High Representative of the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (2018). ‘Interview 24 April 2018.’, written answer on my questions, posed on 27 March 2018. Member of Committee of the Regions (2018). ‘Interview 19 February 2018.’, conducted myself on 19 February 2018. Member of House of Representatives for GroenLinks (2018). ‘Interview 16 May 2018.’, conducted by myself and Rein Schaafsma on 16 May 2018. Policy Expert WWF Europe (2018). ‘Interview 2 February 2018.’, conducted myself on 2 February 2018. Representative of the Dutch Research Institute For Transitions (2018). ‘Interview 26 April 2018.’, conducted by myself and Rein Schaafsma on 26 April 2018.

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Annex 1: Overview of interviews

Interviewee Date Place Medium Interviewed by Energy Policy Adviser to a Member of the European Parliament 30 March 2018 Almere Skype Irene Niet Expert Policy Advisor EREF 02 February 2018 Brussels In person Irene Niet High Representative of Directorate-General Climate Action (European Commission) 13 April 2018 Brussels In person Irene Niet High Representative of Irene Niet, GasTerra 02 May 2018 Groningen In person Rein Schaafsma High Representative of Royal Dutch Shell New Irene Niet, Energies business 16 April 2018 Amsterdam In person Rein Schaafsma High Representative of the Dutch Ministry of Economy Irene Niet, and Climate 16 April 2018 The Hague In person Rein Schaafsma High Representative of the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 24 April 2018 N.A. E-mail Irene Niet Member of Committee of the Regions 19 February 2018 Lelystad In person Irene Niet Member of House of Representatives for Irene Niet, GroenLinks 16 May 2018 Amsterdam Phone Rein Schaafsma Policy Expert WWF Europe 02 February 2018 Brussels In person Irene Niet Representative of the Dutch Irene Niet, Research Institute For Rein Schaafsma, Transitions 26 April 2018 Rotterdam In person Suzanne Nieuwveld

For further information on the interviews, please contact the author.

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