Prospects for Shale Gas Development in Asia Examining Potentials and Challenges in China and India
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
a report of the csis energy and national security program Prospects for Shale Gas Development in Asia examining potentials and challenges in china and india 1800 K Street, NW | Washington, DC 20006 Authors Tel: (202) 887-0200 | Fax: (202) 775-3199 Jane Nakano E-mail: [email protected] | Web: www.csis.org David Pumphrey Robert Price Jr. Molly A. Walton August 2012 ISBN 978-0-89206-742-8 Ë|xHSKITCy067428zv*:+:!:+:! CHARTING our future a report of the csis energy and national security program Prospects for Shale Gas Development in Asia examining potentials and challenges in china and india Authors Jane Nakano David Pumphrey Robert Price Jr. Molly A. Walton August 2012 CHARTING our future About CSIS—50th Anniversary Year For 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has developed practical solutions to the world’s greatest challenges. As we celebrate this milestone, CSIS scholars continue to provide strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and de- velop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Since 1962, CSIS has been dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. After 50 years, CSIS has become one of the world’s pre- eminent international policy institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global development and economic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since 1999. John J. Hamre became the Center’s president and chief executive officer in 2000. CSIS was founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). Cover photo: Drilling rig and worker, © iStockphoto.com/shuda/Huiping Zhu. © 2012 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. ISBN 978-0-89206-742-8 Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006 Tel: (202) 887-0200 Fax: (202) 775-3199 Web: www.csis.org 2 contents Acknowledgments iv Executive Summary v 1. Shale Gas in China 1 2. Shale Gas in India 10 3. Challenges and Opportunities for Asia 16 4. Future of Gas Markets and LNG Trade in Asia 23 5. Conclusions 26 Appendix A: Shale Gas Technologies 27 About the Authors 31 | iii acknowledgments The authors gratefully acknowledge the valuable assistance of their CSIS colleagues throughout the production of this report: Frank Verrastro, Sarah Ladislaw, Lisa Hyland, and our studious interns—Clare Richardson-Barlow, Youngji Jo, Lin Shi, and Mallory Lee Wong. Also, our gratitude goes to Bo Kong, Dagmar Graczyk, Don Juckett, Kang Wu, Ksenia Kushkina, and Mark Stern for sharing their valuable insights into Chinese and Indian energy sectors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors. iv | executive summary China and India are two of the world’s fastest-growing economies, and their economic growth drives a strong demand for energy and natural resources. Between now and 2035, global energy consumption is forecast to grow by 50 percent, and China and India together will account for more than half of this global growth. The scale of their energy consumption affects global supply and demand and, inherently, the price levels of various energy commodities—including natural gas—in the global marketplace. The development of unconventional gas resources, especially shale gas, in China and India warrants close observations because of a host of potential economic and energy security benefits successful development may bring for the two growing economies. An April 2011 assessment of international shale gas resources by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) cited technically recoverable shale gas resources (not reserves) in China at 1,275 trillion cubic feet (tcf) and in India at 63 tcf, compared with 1,250 tcf for the United States and Canada combined. China and India have already begun exploring their substantial indigenous shale gas resources, but the question of how well they can replicate the U.S. experience—and over what time period—still looms large. The geological characteristics of shale deposits can vary widely, affecting the potential production profiles. However, the volume of geological resources is only one side of the coin. A host of “above- ground” conditions are essential in fostering the successful development of these resources. In the United States, the so-called shale gas revolution resulted from the confluence of factors, including access to shale gas resources on private lands, economically attractive natural gas prices (2007– 2008) that spurred investment interest, innovative operational and technological step changes that combined hydraulic fracturing (fracking) with extended-reach lateral wells, an evolving under- standing of how shale formations react to stimulation, and availability of infrastructure to process and transport the gas. The results have thus far been nothing short of extraordinary, and shale development, which accounted for a negligible amount of U.S. natural gas production less than a decade ago, now makes up almost 50 percent of domestic output. Both policy pronouncements and emerging investments into North American shale basins suggest that Chinese and Indian interests in exploring the potential of their unconventional gas resources, especially shale gas, are real. However, much still needs to be known about the commer- ciality of their resources. China and India would benefit from the availability of reliable data and processing capability. Additionally, both countries have yet to fully formulate—although China appears ahead of India—policy frameworks concerning regulatory and physical infrastructure, pricing mechanisms, and environmental and resource management as well as issues associated with societal challenges that may accompany a large-scale development of their unconventional gas resources. | v Also, the availability of technical expertise to manage and deploy advanced exploration and production technologies would be another factor in determining the pace and scale of shale gas development in China and India. All of these factors suggest that the pace of development of China’s and India’s shale gas resources could be significantly slower than the North American experience. vi | prospects for shale gas development in asia 1 shale gas in china As one of the world’s largest and fastest-growing energy consumers, China is focused on securing new and diverse supplies of energy to maintain a healthy rate of economic growth and societal de- velopment. Natural gas has recently become a key area of focus for domestic resource exploitation and increased areas of trade (i.e., imports). China has significant shale gas potential that it wishes to develop, although significant investment, infrastructure, and policy and market barriers must be resolved to realize the full potential. Natural Gas—A Burgeoning Fuel Choice Throughout the 1990s, Chinese leadership largely dismissed natural gas, believing it to be too expensive to compete with domestic coal resources. In the early 2000s, driven mainly by growing environmental concerns, China began pushing gas development: domestic production, expansion of the gas pipeline network, and imports of both pipeline gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG). Demand continues to outstrip supply, making China a net importer, but domestic production has been on the rise. China increased domestic production from 27.2 billion cubic meters (bcm) (960.56 billion cubic feet [bcf]) in 20001 (approximately 106 percent of domestic consumption) to 94.5 bcm (3.34 trillion cubic feet [tcf]) in 2010 (approximately 89 percent of domestic consump- tion). It has constructed the 4,200-km West-to-East pipeline to carry gas from Xinjiang Province in the west to Shanghai, opened the TransAsian pipeline in 2009 to bring gas from Turkmenistan to China, and brought four LNG receiving terminals online, allowing LNG to meet some 10 per- cent of Chinese gas demand. A few more LNG receiving terminals are under construction. The main method of encouraging expanded production and use of natural gas is through government-set targets and mandates, which state-run companies, with some participation from private companies, then follow up with investments and projects. So far, China has increased the share of natural gas in total energy requirements from 2 percent to 4 percent, but it plans to reach 8 percent by 2015 and 10 percent by 2020. China’s Ministry of Land and Resources’ (MLR) hydrocarbon research arm is forecasting shale gas production in China to reach 6.5 bcm (229.55 bcf) a year by 2015, which is equivalent to 6.4 percent of China’s total gas production today. China’s 2020 production target—issued jointly by the National Development and Reform Com- mission (NDRC), Ministry of Finance, MLR, and National Energy Administration—at 60–100 bcm (2.12–3.53 tcf) per year2 would be equivalent to the entire volume of natural gas the country produces today. 1. BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2010, London. 2. China Capital Stock Daily, “Shale gas will have market-based pricing and all kinds of incentives could be higher than traditional natural gas” [Ye Yan Qi Jiang Shi Xing Shi Chang Ding Jia. Ge Xiang Bu Tie You Wang Gao Yu Mei Ceng Qi], March 19, 2012, http://business.sohu.com/20120319/n338141282.shtml. | 1 Estimates of China’s longer-term natural gas production and consumption vary according to institution. BP’s long-term outlook released in January 2011 posits natural gas demand growing in China at 7.6 percent per year over the next two decades, resulting in gas use of 444 bcm (15.6 tcf) in 2030, about 10 percent lower than current gas demand in the European Union.