The 1949 Lausanne Conference 39
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US Foreign Policy, the Arab-Israeli Dispute and the ‘Peace Process’ Mirage: Lausanne 1949 and Camp David 2000 Kristen Blomeley PhD 2009 Abstract The purpose of this thesis is to understand why the Arab-Israeli conflict has remained irreconcilable for sixty-one years. While the details and forms of the conflict have changed over time, the central factors dividing Zionists and Arabs in the Middle East have altered little. In this thesis I examine what these factors are and why they have been so effective in frustrating every peace effort. To understand the fundamental factors which keep the dispute alive I have conducted a comparative study of the two major peace initiatives which frame it diplomatically. The first formal peace conference between Israel and her Arab adversaries took place in Lausanne in 1949. The issues of borders, Jerusalem and refugees would not be seriously engaged with again until the last peace effort to date, the Camp David talks of 2000. Through a detailed comparative analysis of both conferences I seek to understand the positions taken by the warring parties towards these issues and the broader motivating factors separating them and preventing them from achieving peace. As the most important third party and supposed ‘honest broker’ in both talks, I also closely examine the behaviour and policy of the US at each case. I find that the positions taken towards each issue by Israel, on the one hand, and the Arab party, on the other, were remarkably consistent in 1949 and 2000. Israel was not fully committed to peace in either instance, while the Arabs twice refused to sign what amounted to documents of surrender. These consistent positions starkly contrasted with that of the US, which completely changed its positions in ways which, by 2000, had almost wholly aligned it with Zionist demands. I conclude that future peace will rest on the ability of each party to re-examine its past in order to produce a spirit of reconciliation. For Israel, this will mean honestly revisiting Zionism in order to confront what its triumph meant for the Palestinian inhabitants of the land. The Arabs must also seek a broader understanding of their role in the dispute and demonstrate forcefully to Israelis that they seek peace rather than retribution. Above all, if the US is to retain its role as mediator it must abandon its ‘special relationship’ with Israel and return to a more genuinely’ even handed alignment with the broader international consensus on the dispute. As it stands, the US’s more or less unconditional support of Israel has the effect of leading Israelis and Palestinians ever further from peace even as an ever more empty ‘peace process’ is rhetorically trumpeted abroad. Contents Glossary ii Maps iii Introduction 1 Part One: Lausanne 1 The Road to Lausanne 7 2 The 1949 Lausanne Conference 39 3 Understanding the Protagonists 77 4 The US and Lausanne 108 Part Two: Camp David 5 The Road to Camp David 133 6 The 2000 Camp David Summit 168 7 Understanding the Protagonists 196 8 The US and Camp David 244 Part Three: Comparison and Conclusions 9 Lausanne and Camp David: The Changing Protagonists 265 10 Lausanne and Camp David: The Changing Issues 283 11 Conclusions: Lessons of History 307 Appendices 1 The Ex-Im Bank Loan 320 2 The Economic Survey Mission 327 3 The Taba Negotiations: The Moratinos Non-Paper 334 Glossary of Acronyms AIPAC American Israel Public Affairs Committee CIA Central Intelligence Agency (US) DOP Declaration of Principles (Oslo I) DPs Displaced Persons FRD Further Redeployments (contained within the Oslo agreements) GA General Assembly (UN) GOI Government of Israel IDF Israeli Defense Forces NSC National Security Council (US) OPT Occupied Palestinian Territories PA Palestinian Authority PCC Palestine Conciliation Commission (UN) PGOI Provisional Government of Israel PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation SC Security Council (UN) UK United Kingdom UN United Nations US United States of America WINEP Washington Institute for Near East Policy Kristen Blomeley ii UN Partition Plan 1947 Rhodes Armistice line 1949 Source: The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) Kristen Blomeley iii The Allon Plan 1967 Source: The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) Kristen Blomeley iv West Bank arrangements provided by Oslo II Source: The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) Kristen Blomeley v The West Bank and Gaza Strip in March 2000 Source: The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) Kristen Blomeley vi Projection of the West Bank Final Status Map presented by Israel, Camp David, July 2000 Source: The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) Kristen Blomeley vii Partitioned Jerusalem 1948-1967 Source: The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) Kristen Blomeley viii Israeli settlements and Palestinian neighbourhoods in Occupied East Jerusalem, 2000 Source: The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) Kristen Blomeley ix Projection of the Israeli proposal for Jerusalem’s final status Camp David, 2000 Source: The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) Kristen Blomeley x Introduction Introduction Over fifty years separated the 1948 Arab-Israeli war from the final status talks which took place throughout 2000. The intervening years had witnessed the escalation and demise of the Cold War, unprecedented economic growth throughout the northern hemisphere, the invention of space travel and revolutionary changes in technology which have made societies and the individuals which fill them truly ‘global’. Yet amidst the frantic pace of change which characterises today’s world, the Arab-Israeli conflict has remained largely stagnant. Israel is as much an aberration in the Middle East today as it was at the time of her establishment. Despite forging two peace treaties, the Zionist state has failed to normalise relations with her neighbours and is commonly regarded as a hostile entity throughout the Arab world. Time has only acted to deepen the wounds inflicted at the conflict’s birth, leaving the dispute arguably more complicated and insoluble today than at the point of its creation. The dispute’s ability to adapt to changing world paradigms is truly unique. Locked in Cold War politics during most of its existence, the Arab-Israeli conflict has now become central to the West’s proclaimed war on ‘terror’. This adaptability has not just allowed the conflict to grow over time, but has also introduced outside actors, including the world’s superpowers and the three monotheistic religions, all of which claim to possess a personal stake in the dispute. As such the Arab-Israeli conflict has become much more than a local or regional dispute, but one which arouses passions around the world while leaving only hatred and intolerance in its path. For the people living within the borders of the dispute, the continuing conflict has brought only misery and loss. The Palestinians have lost all of their former lands while Kristen Blomeley 1 Introduction Israelis have never known what it is to live secure lives, despite the fact that security is the highest priority of the Government of Israel (GOI). While Israel has prospered into a highly developed society it has become a pariah state in the United Nations and both its economic and demographic growth has been impeded by its troubled relationship with its neighbours. The Palestinians have become a nation of refugees, both internal and external, without any control over their own lives or access to basic human and political rights. The fifty years marking the dispute to the year 2000 were not idle however. Many peacemaking attempts punctuated the years, almost all of which ended in failure. The purpose of this study is to try to understand why the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has taken countless lives, caused endless misery and generated ramifications well beyond its borders, has not been resolved and in fact has been allowed to remain unresolved. Countless peacemakers have attempted to break the DNA code of the dispute but almost all have come away with nothing for their efforts. Different mediating formats, formulas, protocols and locations have all turned up the same negative results. Rather than assuming that there was something fundamentally wrong with each mediating effort in the fifty years spanning the dispute, it must be acknowledged that there is a factor within the dispute itself which defies resolution. The purpose of this work is to determine what that factor is. Only once this riddle is solved can future peace efforts hope to finally draw the conflict to a close and bring peace to the Middle East. In order to achieve this understanding I have conducted a comparative study of the 1949 Lausanne Conference and the Camp David final status talks in 2000. While many peacemaking attempts took place during the years separating the conferences, these talks essentially bookmark serious peace efforts to date. The Lausanne Conference is unique in that it occurred while the dispute was still in its infancy and involved all of the major players, including the US, the latter adopting a key mediating role. The subjects under discussion at Lausanne would not appear on a summit’s agenda again until fifty years later at the 2000 final status talks. The Camp David summit, therefore, was effectively Lausanne II. While the parties at the peace-table had changed, each conference was an attempt to settle all of the fundamental issues which have been understood to frame the dispute. These issues of borders, refugees and Jerusalem, were considered ‘taboo’ during Kristen Blomeley 2 Introduction the intervening years, with their mere mention likely to incite strong protests outside the Arab world.