US Foreign Policy, the Arab-Israeli Dispute and the ‘Peace Process’ Mirage: Lausanne 1949 and Camp David 2000
Kristen Blomeley
PhD
2009
Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to understand why the Arab-Israeli conflict has remained irreconcilable for sixty-one years. While the details and forms of the conflict have changed over time, the central factors dividing Zionists and Arabs in the Middle East have altered little. In this thesis I examine what these factors are and why they have been so effective in frustrating every peace effort.
To understand the fundamental factors which keep the dispute alive I have conducted a comparative study of the two major peace initiatives which frame it diplomatically. The first formal peace conference between Israel and her Arab adversaries took place in Lausanne in 1949. The issues of borders, Jerusalem and refugees would not be seriously engaged with again until the last peace effort to date, the Camp David talks of 2000. Through a detailed comparative analysis of both conferences I seek to understand the positions taken by the warring parties towards these issues and the broader motivating factors separating them and preventing them from achieving peace. As the most important third party and supposed ‘honest broker’ in both talks, I also closely examine the behaviour and policy of the US at each case.
I find that the positions taken towards each issue by Israel, on the one hand, and the Arab party, on the other, were remarkably consistent in 1949 and 2000. Israel was not fully committed to peace in either instance, while the Arabs twice refused to sign what amounted to documents of surrender. These consistent positions starkly contrasted with that of the US, which completely changed its positions in ways which, by 2000, had almost wholly aligned it with Zionist demands.
I conclude that future peace will rest on the ability of each party to re-examine its past in order to produce a spirit of reconciliation. For Israel, this will mean honestly revisiting Zionism in order to confront what its triumph meant for the Palestinian inhabitants of the land. The Arabs must also seek a broader understanding of their role in the dispute and demonstrate forcefully to Israelis that they seek peace rather than retribution. Above all, if the US is to retain its role as mediator it must abandon its ‘special relationship’ with Israel and return to a more genuinely’ even handed alignment with the broader international consensus on the dispute. As it stands, the US’s more or less unconditional support of Israel has the effect of leading Israelis and Palestinians ever further from peace even as an ever more empty ‘peace process’ is rhetorically trumpeted abroad.
Contents
Glossary ii
Maps iii
Introduction 1
Part One: Lausanne
1 The Road to Lausanne 7
2 The 1949 Lausanne Conference 39
3 Understanding the Protagonists 77
4 The US and Lausanne 108
Part Two: Camp David
5 The Road to Camp David 133
6 The 2000 Camp David Summit 168
7 Understanding the Protagonists 196
8 The US and Camp David 244
Part Three: Comparison and Conclusions
9 Lausanne and Camp David: The Changing Protagonists 265
10 Lausanne and Camp David: The Changing Issues 283
11 Conclusions: Lessons of History 307
Appendices
1 The Ex-Im Bank Loan 320
2 The Economic Survey Mission 327
3 The Taba Negotiations: The Moratinos Non-Paper 334
Glossary of Acronyms
AIPAC American Israel Public Affairs Committee
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (US)
DOP Declaration of Principles (Oslo I)
DPs Displaced Persons
FRD Further Redeployments (contained within the Oslo agreements)
GA General Assembly (UN)
GOI Government of Israel
IDF Israeli Defense Forces
NSC National Security Council (US)
OPT Occupied Palestinian Territories
PA Palestinian Authority
PCC Palestine Conciliation Commission (UN)
PGOI Provisional Government of Israel
PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation
SC Security Council (UN)
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
US United States of America
WINEP Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Kristen Blomeley ii
UN Partition Plan 1947 Rhodes Armistice line 1949
Source: The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)
Kristen Blomeley iii
The Allon Plan 1967
Source: The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)
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West Bank arrangements provided by Oslo II
Source: The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)
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The West Bank and Gaza Strip in March 2000
Source: The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)
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Projection of the West Bank Final Status Map presented by Israel, Camp David, July 2000
Source: The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)
Kristen Blomeley vii
Partitioned Jerusalem 1948-1967
Source: The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)
Kristen Blomeley viii
Israeli settlements and Palestinian neighbourhoods in Occupied East Jerusalem, 2000
Source: The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)
Kristen Blomeley ix
Projection of the Israeli proposal for Jerusalem’s final status Camp David, 2000
Source: The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)
Kristen Blomeley x Introduction
Introduction
Over fifty years separated the 1948 Arab-Israeli war from the final status talks which took place throughout 2000. The intervening years had witnessed the escalation and demise of the Cold War, unprecedented economic growth throughout the northern hemisphere, the invention of space travel and revolutionary changes in technology which have made societies and the individuals which fill them truly ‘global’. Yet amidst the frantic pace of change which characterises today’s world, the Arab-Israeli conflict has remained largely stagnant. Israel is as much an aberration in the Middle East today as it was at the time of her establishment. Despite forging two peace treaties, the Zionist state has failed to normalise relations with her neighbours and is commonly regarded as a hostile entity throughout the Arab world. Time has only acted to deepen the wounds inflicted at the conflict’s birth, leaving the dispute arguably more complicated and insoluble today than at the point of its creation.
The dispute’s ability to adapt to changing world paradigms is truly unique. Locked in Cold War politics during most of its existence, the Arab-Israeli conflict has now become central to the West’s proclaimed war on ‘terror’. This adaptability has not just allowed the conflict to grow over time, but has also introduced outside actors, including the world’s superpowers and the three monotheistic religions, all of which claim to possess a personal stake in the dispute. As such the Arab-Israeli conflict has become much more than a local or regional dispute, but one which arouses passions around the world while leaving only hatred and intolerance in its path.
For the people living within the borders of the dispute, the continuing conflict has brought only misery and loss. The Palestinians have lost all of their former lands while
Kristen Blomeley 1 Introduction
Israelis have never known what it is to live secure lives, despite the fact that security is the highest priority of the Government of Israel (GOI). While Israel has prospered into a highly developed society it has become a pariah state in the United Nations and both its economic and demographic growth has been impeded by its troubled relationship with its neighbours. The Palestinians have become a nation of refugees, both internal and external, without any control over their own lives or access to basic human and political rights.
The fifty years marking the dispute to the year 2000 were not idle however. Many peacemaking attempts punctuated the years, almost all of which ended in failure. The purpose of this study is to try to understand why the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has taken countless lives, caused endless misery and generated ramifications well beyond its borders, has not been resolved and in fact has been allowed to remain unresolved. Countless peacemakers have attempted to break the DNA code of the dispute but almost all have come away with nothing for their efforts. Different mediating formats, formulas, protocols and locations have all turned up the same negative results. Rather than assuming that there was something fundamentally wrong with each mediating effort in the fifty years spanning the dispute, it must be acknowledged that there is a factor within the dispute itself which defies resolution. The purpose of this work is to determine what that factor is. Only once this riddle is solved can future peace efforts hope to finally draw the conflict to a close and bring peace to the Middle East.
In order to achieve this understanding I have conducted a comparative study of the 1949 Lausanne Conference and the Camp David final status talks in 2000. While many peacemaking attempts took place during the years separating the conferences, these talks essentially bookmark serious peace efforts to date. The Lausanne Conference is unique in that it occurred while the dispute was still in its infancy and involved all of the major players, including the US, the latter adopting a key mediating role. The subjects under discussion at Lausanne would not appear on a summit’s agenda again until fifty years later at the 2000 final status talks. The Camp David summit, therefore, was effectively Lausanne II. While the parties at the peace-table had changed, each conference was an attempt to settle all of the fundamental issues which have been understood to frame the dispute. These issues of borders, refugees and Jerusalem, were considered ‘taboo’ during
Kristen Blomeley 2 Introduction
the intervening years, with their mere mention likely to incite strong protests outside the Arab world. However, they were finally put back on the peace agenda in 2000 so that Camp David essentially picked up where the Lausanne Conference had left off over fifty years before.
Understanding the Lausanne Conference and the Camp David summit is thereby key to appreciating how the positions of each protagonist changed or remained the same throughout the years and what bearing this has had on the success of peacemaking efforts. The comparative study can also allow our understanding of the elements involved in the dispute to go beyond the immediate issues dividing the protagonists to the more underlying motivating factors. In order to achieve this aim it is necessary to look beyond public statements and question why these positions were taken. This means looking not just at the internal factors driving the parties but also the broader political environment in which they operated. While the world has undergone enormous change in the fifty years separating the conferences, the persistence of the parties’ fundamental aims and goals throughout this time can explain why each peace effort has foundered in the same way.
I will begin my study by providing a detailed narrative of each conference. Study of the Lausanne Conference has been simplified by the release of all the relevant archives by the Government of Israel, the United States and the United Nations. These documents provide an enormously detailed account of the conference events, including pertinent information regarding the motivations of the United States, the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) and Israel. Unfortunately the Arab files have not been released, but the vast documentation in the above files record many frank and personal statements by Arab delegates and provide an adequate picture of the Arab states’ positions, motivations and goals throughout 1949.
No archives have yet been released for the Camp David talks and even when they are it is not expected that they will provide the type of detailed information found for the Lausanne Conference. This is because official notes were rarely taken, at least by the US team, for fear of leaks. However, many of those involved in the talks have now come forward to tell their story through articles, books, interviews and debates. While their
Kristen Blomeley 3 Introduction
analysis of the negotiations may differ, all accounts largely agree on the details of not just Camp David but the entire final status talks which took place throughout 2000.
After each conference narrative chapter I will offer an indepth analysis of the events in order to understand the positions of each party during the negotiations and how these contributed to the conferences ultimate failure. The Lausanne Conference has received comparatively little attention by Middle East commentators relative to other major events in the Arab-Israeli conflict. For many years information on the conference was limited to a few personal accounts of individuals involved, namely James McDonald1 (US Ambassador to Israel) and Pablo Azcárate2 (Secretary of the PCC). Rony Gabbay3 and David Forsythe4, are two of very few authors to extensively study the conference academically but failed to generate much interest in the subject or alter the collective intellectual amnesia regarding Lausanne5. However, with the opening of archives in the 1980s a newfound interest in the events surrounding Israel’s birth emerged. The re- examination of Israel’s history, by what has become termed the ‘new historians’, led to a ‘remembering’ of the Lausanne Conference as the ‘new historians’ sought to gain a fuller understanding of Israel’s attitudes and actions in its early years than had been previously provided by traditional Zionist doctrine. Armed with the freshly released official documentation, historians such as Ilan Pappé and Avi Shlaim6 exhumed the skeleton of Lausanne, reinvigorating widespread interest in the summit, particularly within Israel, and restoring the conference to its rightful place in history.
To gain a full appreciation of the events at Lausanne it was necessary to broaden my research beyond the accounts and analysis of the actual conference in order to understand the ambitions influencing the players involved. Key to this process was gaining an understanding of the US Government, which assumed an exclusive and active role as the most powerful member of the mediating body (the PCC). I was aided in this by a great number of works on President Truman which deal, in greater or lesser extent, with his
1 McDonald 1951 2 Azcárate 1966 3 Gabbay 1959 4 Forsythe 1972 5 Fred Khouri provided a valuable exception in his piece in his 1975 piece entitled ‘United Nations Peace Efforts’ 6 Shlaim 1988, Pappé 1992
Kristen Blomeley 4 Introduction
attitude to the UN Partition Resolution and his recognition of the State of Israel7. While these works do not generally cover Truman’s activities during the Lausanne period, they provide an intriguing insight into the factors motivating his Palestine policy, factors which were active throughout 1948 and 1949.
In comparison to the relative neglect the Lausanne Conference has suffered, the Camp David summit has been the subject of voluminous works by individuals involved and by commentators interested in the Arab-Israeli conflict. As opposed to Lausanne, the final status talks were immediately politicized by the creation of the Camp David ‘myth’ by President Clinton and Ehud Barak. The beginning of the intifada quenched immediate debate surrounding this myth as the world’s attention became focussed on fighting taking place in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) and Israel. However, Deborah Sontag’s piece in The New York Times which identified the myth, provoked a veritable earthquake of debate and agonizing worldwide. The many works which have followed Sontag’s piece8 have made research of the Camp David summit a relatively simple enterprise, with detailed information being provided by many of the participants including Shlomo Ben-Ami, Ehud Barak, Gidi Grinstein, Mahmoud Abbas, Saeb Erekat and Akram Hanieh9 and by those on the US mediating team – including Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright, Dennis Ross, Rob Malley, Aaron Miller and Martin Indyk10. Valuable insight has also been provided by many secondary sources, the most notable of which are by Clayton Swisher and Charles Enderlin11.
My final chapter will compare and contrast the Lausanne Conference to the Camp David summit. In this chapter I will draw out the key factors which not just contributed to the breakdown of each conference but doomed the peace efforts to failure even before they
7 The people who worked around Truman who have given their stories around the events leading up to the creation of Israel include Acheson 1971 and 1969, Clifford 1971-73 and 1991, Connelly 1968, Ethridge 1974, Henderson 1973, Jessup 1974, McGhee 1983, Rusk 1990, while the most prolific commentators include Horowitz 1953, Koenig 1956, Snetsinger 1974, Bain 1979; Heald and Kaplan 1977, Ganin 1979; Wilson 1979, Stevens 1970, Cohen 1990, Benson 1997 8 Sontag 2001 9 Ben-Ami 2005, Ben-Ami 2001, Shavit 13 Sep 2001, Shavit 6 Sep 2002, Barak 2003, Morris 2002, Grinstein 2001, Ross and Grinstein 20 Sep 2001, Abbas 2001, Abbas 1 Aug 2001, Abbas 6 Aug 2001, Erekat ‘Interview on Frontline’, Hanieh 2001 10 Clinton 2004, Albright 2003, Ross 2004, Ross et al 14 Aug 2001, Haberman 2001, Malley 8 Jul 2001, Agha and Malley 2001, Miller 2008, Indyk et al 2005 11 Swisher 2004, Enderlin 2003
Kristen Blomeley 5 Introduction
had begun. While each conference took place in vastly different circumstances and were attempting to solve essentially different immediate problems, the fundamental grievances and ambitions which acted to frustrate the peace talks remained remarkably fixed. Clearly, what is separating Israel from her interlocutors transcends the issues under discussion at the peace table at any given point in time.
Finally I will examine the fundamental lessons which the comparative exercise draws out. Rather than focussing on possible solutions to the conflict, my analysis will focus on the change of perception and understanding needed to create the ideological space necessary to enable the parties to reach a negotiated peace. Here I define peace not as merely a final status agreement but a genuine peace characterised by friendly relations in which enmity and hatred are replaced by mutual understanding and empathy. While this definition of peace has rarely been attached to the goals of peacemakers in the Arab- Israeli conflict, I believe it is not altogether fantastical and if the lessons offered in my work are genuinely absorbed may even be within reach.
Kristen Blomeley 6
PART ONE
Lausanne
Chapter One The Road to Lausanne
Chapter 1
The Road to Lausanne
Resolution 194 and the establishment of the Palestine Conciliation Commission
The Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) was established through the United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution 194, which was passed on 11 December 1948 by a vote of 35 to 15 with 8 abstentions. The passage of this resolution was far from straightforward and in itself represented a compromise between many opposing positions. The seed of Resolution 194 was planted by the report of the UN Palestine Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, which was presented to the General Assembly (GA) in Paris on 20 September 1948. Tragically, Count Bernadotte had been assassinated by Jewish extremists in the Israeli-held area of Jerusalem12 three days before the report was presented. Whilst the mediator did not survive to present his recommendations to the GA, his report quickly became the locus of heated and controversial debate both within the Assembly and through alternative political channels.
Count Bernadotte authored the report after the imposition of the second Arab-Israeli truce on 4 November 1948. At the time conditions were vastly different to what they were when the GA voted on 29 November 1947 to partition Palestine into an Arab and a
12 Although the perpetrators were never found and convicted the assassination is widely believed to have been carried out by the right-wing extremist Jewish Organisations, the LEHY (Lohamei Herut Yisrael) also known as the Stern Gang. This organisation, together with many within Israel, saw Bernadotte as an enemy of the State following his First Report to the General Assembly which gave Jerusalem to Arab Palestine, ceded much of the territory allotted to Israel in the Partition Resolution to the Arab entity and severely curtailed several aspects of Israeli sovereignty. See UNTSO Report to the Secretary General by Acting Mediator Ralph Bunche, delivered 27 September 1948 on the Assassination of the United Nations Mediator, S/1018, contained in Burdett to Secretary of State, 16 October 1948, US National Archives (USNA) 501.BB-Palestine/10-1648
Kristen Blomeley 7 Chapter One The Road to Lausanne
Jewish state. The UN Mediator recommended that the final boundaries should reflect the realities on the ground rather than those designated in the Partition Resolution. As the respective armies were in occupation of them, Bernadotte suggested that the Galilee be awarded to the State of Israel and the Negev be awarded to Arab Palestine (contrary to the November Resolution). The Bernadotte report also called for the annexation of Arab Palestine into Transjordan (dropping the Partition Resolution provision to establish an independent Arab state), the repatriation of the refugees and the internationalisation of Jerusalem. Due to the complexities involved in Israeli/Arab relations, Count Bernadotte also recommended that a Palestine Conciliation Commission be established to oversee and carry out instruction of the UN.
The 20 September 1948 plan was Bernadotte’s second attempt to resolve the conflict, and was formulated to be more conciliatory to the Israeli position than his first report of 27 June 1948, which had been rejected by both sides, most vociferously by Israel. Yet the second report did little to appease the Israelis who were violently against any limitation to their territorial aspirations, and indeed the plan limited their territory to little over 20 per cent of mandatory Palestine. Israel resumed its campaign against the former UN Mediator’s recommendations, which had been postponed temporarily upon his assassination13. Still unable to accept a Zionist state on their doorstep, the Arab states also rejected the plan14.
Though rejected by both parties it was still hoped that the plan would form the basis of a UN resolution due to its support from the Big Powers. Immediately after the report was released, United States (US) Secretary of State, General Marshall, proclaimed himself in agreement with the plan “in its entirety”15. The United Kingdom (UK) also declared themselves strongly in favour of the Bernadotte recommendations, due partly to King
13 Burdett to Marshall, 16 October 1948, USNA 501.BB Pal/10-1648 14 Though the Arab states publicly rejected the Bernadotte Plan the British privately believed that the Arabs would acquiesce to a UN resolution based on the proposal providing that the UN would assume responsibility for drawing up a definite settlement, including boundaries. See Douglas to Marshall, 17 November 1948, USNA 501.BB Pal/11-1748 15 Press Release 1, United States Delegation To The Third Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 21 September 1948, USNA 501.BB Pal/9-2148
Kristen Blomeley 8 Chapter One The Road to Lausanne
Abdullah of Transjordan being the main beneficiary of the resolution16. The US and UK worked closely on formulating a mutual understanding on the report as they saw this as their best chance to resolve the conflict17.
Yet US-UK understanding was compromised when US electoral considerations overtook events at the UN. President Truman was at the time fighting an election campaign he was widely expected to lose against Republican Party candidate Governor Thomas E Dewey. Following Marshall’s statement in support of the Bernadotte recommendations, Governor Dewey duly broke an understanding between himself and President Truman to keep foreign affairs out of politics by attacking Truman’s support for the plan, which he saw to be a contradiction of the Democratic Party Platform18. Following Marshall’s statement President Truman had come under enormous pressure from within his own party and the Zionist lobby to reverse his support for the recommendations. Constrained by his understanding with Dewey, Truman had resisted the pressure and remained silent. However, Dewey’s renunciation of the agreement delivered Truman the opportunity to break his silence and on 28 October 1948 he declared his support for Israel and the Israeli plank in the Democratic Party Platform19. Part of the Israeli plank asserted
“We approve the claims of the State of Israel to the boundaries set forth in the United Nations resolution of November 29th and consider that modifications thereof should be made only if fully acceptable to the State of Israel.”20
The statement effectively repudiated US support for the Bernadotte Proposal and the possibility of a UN imposed resolution to the conflict. The statement further
16 The cornerstone of UK Palestine policy was the annexation of Arab Palestine into Transjordan. Although the Bernadotte Report stopped short of specifically calling for this, Bernadotte did conclude in the report that he saw ‘compelling reasons’ for the merging of Arab Palestine into Transjordan. For a discussion of British Policy towards Palestine in 1948/1949, see Pappé 1988 17 See Marshall to Lovett, 26 October 1948, USNA 501.BB Pal/10-2648 18 Both the Democratic and Republican Party Platforms for the 1948 election campaign included declarations of support for Israel. In fact it was one of the elements of the 1948 campaign that both parties were in a race to be the ‘best friend’ of Israel 19 President Truman was particularly upset by Secretary Marshall coming out publicly in support of the plan without his approval. Truman later berated US Ambassador to the UK, Douglas, who took responsibility for the language of the statement, saying that it had caused him “a great deal of trouble in his campaign”. Douglas to Marshall, 12 November 1948, USNA 501.BB Pal/11-1248 20 Donald Johnson and Kirk Porter, eds (1973). National Party Platforms, 1840-1972. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, p432. See Clifford to President Truman, 23 October 1948, Truman Library, B File for a full explanation on why the statement was made
Kristen Blomeley 9 Chapter One The Road to Lausanne
compromised a US State Department struggling to find not just a consensus between themselves and the British, but also within their own department, their delegation at the UN, and the White House. The UK and Arab world reacted to the reversal of policy with a sense of betrayal as the statement acted to reinforce their conviction that American foreign policy on Palestine was formulated primarily in the light of domestic political concerns21.
The Truman statement led to a shift in direction of the US delegation at the UN. Rather than trying to gather support amongst other delegations for the recommendations of the Bernadotte Plan the delegation now worked towards a negotiated settlement, whilst trying to keep the British on board. Though the UK was dismayed by the American reversal, given its newly diminished status in international affairs it had little choice but to continue to work with the US for a settlement acceptable to both nations22.
Though willing to work with the Americans, the British continued to push for a resolution endorsing the recommendations proposed by Bernadotte. The British position was based both on their belief that the Negev should be awarded to Arab Palestine23 and that a strong resolution was needed if it was to lead to an end to the conflict. Support for an imposed settlement represented a marked departure from previous British policy under the Mandate in which they had refused to support any proposal which was not agreed by both sides. It was Britain’s failure to find such a solution which led it to hand the matter over to the United Nations in 1947. Freed from their Mandate responsibilities, the British now dropped their support for a negotiated settlement and supported an imposed solution. This change of stance may be partly or wholly attributed to their own thirty years of
21 For reaction within the British press, see the Editorial which appeared in the Manchester Guardian on 3 November 1948, this article was attached to G Lewis Jones to Marshall, 9 November 1948, USNA 501.BB Pal/11-948. For an example of the Arab reaction see Keeley to Marshall, 28 October 1948, USNA 501.BB Pal/10-2848 22 Douglas to Lovett, 14 November 1948, USNA 501.BB Pal/11-1448, Douglas to Lovett, 18 November 1948, USNA 501.BB Pal/11-1848 23 Prior to the 1948 the vast majority of inhabitants of the Negev were Arab. The British also favoured the Negev for the Arabs for geographical reasons as an Israeli Negev would drive a wedge through the Arab world. Pappé (1988 p48) also contends that the primary motivation for British support for an Arab Negev was due to its Treaty agreements with Transjordan and Egypt whereby either country’s control of the Negev would have allowed the stationing of British bases in the area, thereby protecting British strategic interests. The Israelis shared this suspicion, leading them to conclude that Bernadotte was a British agent due to his support of the scheme (p39, Touval 1982 p42, Eytan 1958 p24)
Kristen Blomeley 10 Chapter One The Road to Lausanne
failure to bring the parties to agreement, the events of the 1948 war, or their realisation that the Arab states would acquiesce in an imposed settlement whilst no Arab government could safely enter peace negotiations with Israel and maintain their own regimes. Regardless of the motivation, by November 1948 the British were convinced that negotiation alone would not resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict24.
During his months working on the conflict and his many talks with each party, the UN Mediator had reached the same conclusion. After the vehement rejection by both parties to his first report, Bernadotte concluded that the nature of the dispute was such that it was impossible to find a solution equally acceptable to both sides. In fact, Bernadotte had found that it was impossible to find a just and equitable solution which was acceptable to even one of the protagonists25. Yet rather than trust the experience and wisdom of the British and the UN Mediator, the Americans, who were somewhat new to the intricacies involved in the dispute, labelled this a “defeatist position” and remained hopeful that the parties could somehow be brought to agreement26.
During this time Israel worked on a basic draft resolution closer to their position. The resolution merely called for an extension of the armistice and an appointment of a Palestine Conciliation Commission to assist parties in reaching a settlement27. While the US Delegation saw it as their duty to “bridge the gap between these two extremes”28, in the end the resolution which was passed on 12 December 1948 looked closer to the Israeli draft than the British, with no mention of the Bernadotte Plan as a basis for discussion and a call for a negotiated, rather than an imposed settlement29.
24 See Marshall to Lovett, 20 November 1948, USNA 501.BB Pal/11-2048 25 There is some debate as to whether Bernadotte intended his proposals to form the basis of an imposed settlement. While Pappé (1988 p46) asserts that Bernadotte wished his report to form a basis for discussion only, Touval (1982 p39) contends that Bernadotte lost faith in a negotiated settlement after the adverse reaction to his first report and thereby accepted the necessity of an imposed settlement. The wording of the Bernadotte Report seems to verify Touval’s contention; “I am convinced, however, that it is possible at this stage to formulate a proposal which, if firmly approved and strongly backed by the General Assembly, would not be forcibly resisted by either side” [emphasis mine] (United Nations Mediator on Palestine 1948) 26 Marshall to Lovett, 20 November 1948, USNA 501.BB Pal/11-2048 27 Marshall to Lovett, 19 November 1948, USNA 501.BB Pal/11-1948 28 Marshall to Lovett, 22 November 1948, USNA 501.BB Pal/11-2248 29 Dulles jubilantly conveyed to Acting Secretary of State Lovett on 20 November 1948 that the UK and US had finally agreed on the text for what was to become Resolution 194. USNA 501.BB Pal/11-3048
Kristen Blomeley 11 Chapter One The Road to Lausanne
While Resolution 194 did not include Count Bernadotte’s territorial provisions, it did contain key aspects of his other recommendations. Most notably, Resolution 194 called for the repatriation of the refugees and the internationalisation of Jerusalem. Paragraph 11 of the resolution reads:
11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and to live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return… Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation…
The Question of Jerusalem is addressed in Paragraph 8:
1. Resolves that the Jerusalem area, including the City of Jerusalem, should be accorded special and separate treatment and should be placed under effective United Nations control.
Resolution 194 also called for the establishment of a Palestine Conciliation Commission. The Commission was given a specific mandate in the two areas above while their instructions were deliberately vague on all other issues. While the Commission was first recommended by Count Bernadotte, the functions it had been awarded under Resolution 194 were somewhat different to those the Count had envisaged. Rather than supervising the implementation of a GA settlement, the Commission was entrusted to assist the parties to reach a settlement in such areas as boundaries, railroads, free ports and other arrangements, and thereby “reach a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them” (UNGAR (3)). Rather than enforcing the will of the UN, the PCC found itself with a mandate to foster a negotiated settlement between the parties, a feat which had proved impossible in the fifty year history of the dispute.
Additionally, the powers of the Commission were kept deliberately vague. Rather than be given the role of arbiter with powers to suggest a settlement themselves, the Commission was to ‘assist’ the governments and authorities to reach agreement. Exactly how the Commission was to ‘assist’ the parties was open to considerable interpretation30.
30 This confusion seems to have been shared by the Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Shertok, where in a conversation with members of the US delegation to the UN he refers to the PCC on several occasion as
Kristen Blomeley 12 Chapter One The Road to Lausanne
The resolution provided for the PCC to be composed of three members representing three states which were to be nominated by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (SC). The UK, France and China immediately supported US, France and Turkey. The theory behind these nominees was that the US was considered to be pro- Israeli, Turkey pro-Arab and France somewhat neutral. The passing of the nominations with only minor acrimony and dissent31 was viewed by at least one American official as a good omen for the future of the Commission32.
Eventually each country nominated their representative. France put forward Claude Marie Thomas Raphael Breart de Boisanger, a career diplomat with over twenty years of diplomatic experience. The Turks nominated Huseyin Nahit Yalcin, Vice President of the Peoples Party assembly group and a well respected editor of the semi-official Ulus newspaper. The Americans experienced a tougher time finding somebody to fill the role, with their first nominee resigning before even assuming his position33 and their second, Mark Ethridge, a newspaper editor with significant diplomatic experience in the Balkans, Greece and Turkey, having to be coerced by President Truman himself to accept the position34. Truman’s White House Counsel, Clark Clifford, advised the State Department that the position would last for about three months and that he did not foresee many difficulties in bringing the parties to agreement, observing that it; “looks like the
‘arbiter’. It was pointed out to Shertok by Dulles that he assumed the term ‘arbiter’ was the last thing Israel would want attached to the PCC as it would then give the Commission the power to decide, rather than to merely persuade. Shertok quickly retracted his reference to ‘arbiter’ and agreed with Dulles’ analysis. Memorandum of Conversation. Shertok, Dulles and Rusk. 13 December 1948. USNA 501.BB Pal/12-1348 31 Israel lobbied hard to have the pro-Israeli states of Australia, Norway and Colombia elected to the commission while USSR insisted upon Poland’s inclusion if the US was to be represented (Memorandum of Conversation. Shertok, Dulles and Rusk. 13 December 1948. USNA 501.BB Pal/12-1348 and Memorandum of Conversation. Epstein, Heyd, Ben-Azri, Satterthwaite, Colquitt and Rockwell. 14 December 1948. USNA 501.BB Pal/12-1448) 32 Rusk to Lovett, 12 December 1948, USNA 501.BB Pal/12-1248 33 Joseph B Keenan was appointed US Rep to the PCC on 27 Dec 1948 but wrote to the President with his resignation on 12 January 1949 explaining that “recent events’ had caused him to doubt that he could complete the mission in the time he had available. See Keenan to Truman, 12 January 1949, Truman Library, OF 85 JJ. In his Oral History Interview, Mark Ethridge gives a more interesting analysis of why Mr Keenan was unable to take up the position by claiming he had sense enough to realise what the situation was and ‘went on a binge’. See Mark Ethridge, Oral History Interview, Truman Library, 4 June 1974, Truman Library 34 Ethridge was initially offered the position by Acheson but turned it down as he did not agree with US policy towards the dispute (the “hourglass division”). Acheson instructed him to go to the White House and see President Truman. Ethridge continued to decline the nomination, advising Truman that it was too late and they were stuck with the mess. Ethridge was only persuaded to accept the position after Truman lost his temper. Oral History Interview, Mark Ethridge, 2 June 1974, Truman Library
Kristen Blomeley 13 Chapter One The Road to Lausanne
time for a killing”35. Pablo de Azcarate, a Spanish diplomat with experience in the Arab- Israeli conflict through his roles as the Principal Secretary of the SC's Truce Commission in Palestine and the Deputy Municipal Commissioner for Jerusalem, was selected as Secretary of the Commission. Azcarate’s experience in the area caused him to be far less optimistic about the success of the PCC from the first36.
The Path to Lausanne
The PCC first met in Geneva on 17 January 1949. There they dealt with administrative details whilst en route to their headquarters in Jerusalem37. The Commission deliberated on whether they should begin contacts with the parties or await the conclusion of the armistice negotiations. As it was unknown if and when the armistice agreements would be reached and the commission was anxious to begin its considerable task, they decided to carry out their work whilst the military discussions were still proceeding38.
Before he left for Jerusalem, Ethridge received specific instructions from the Acting Secretary of State, Robert Lovett, outlining US policy regarding their task and the general framework within which he was expected to work. The nexus of the US territorial position was that Israel was entitled to keep all the territory she was awarded in the 29 November 1947 GA resolution. Modifications to the territory Israel had been awarded under the partition resolution could only be made with Israel’s consent. But if Israel wished to retain any of the additional territory she had acquired in the 1948 war, she should make territorial concessions elsewhere, ie Israel was not entitled to keep the whole of the Negev, in addition to the western Galilee and Jaffa. This position became known as the ‘Jessup Principle’, after the US Delegate to the UN, Philip Jessup, introduced the formula to the GA on 30 November 1948. Ethridge was also instructed to ensure that the refugees’ right of return as contained in Paragraph 11 of the 12 December 1948
35 Memoranda, 22 January 1949, Truman Library, Papers of Dean Acheson, Memoranda of Conversation, Jan – July 1949, Box 64 36 Patterson to Marshall, 17 December 1948, USNA 501.BB Pal/12-1748 37 Ethridge did not join the team until early February after a brief stopover in Rhodes where he visited Ralph Bunche, who was mediating the Israeli-Egyptian armistice negotiations at the time 38 United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Summary Record of the Tenth Meeting, 3 February 1949, A/AC.25/SR.10
Kristen Blomeley 14 Chapter One The Road to Lausanne
resolution was realised and that Jerusalem should retain a special status. While these understandings formed the State Department policy towards the resolutions of the dispute, Ethridge was warned to only express these views if absolutely necessary and focus his efforts on assisting the parties to reach their own agreement39.
In the meantime Israel had conducted its first elections, with David Ben Gurion’s party, MAPAI, winning the majority of votes. Ben Gurion was predictably returned to the role of Prime Minister. In the US, President Truman shocked all the experts by defeating Governor Dewey in an astounding victory. Truman was quick to honour his election pledge following the Israeli elections and extended de jure recognition to the State of Israel on 31 January 1949, much to the dismay of the Arab world40.
On 12 January, Ralph Bunche began the first armistice negotiations following the 1948 war. The first government to accept the invitation by Bunche to enter armistice talks with Israel was Egypt, who had suffered severe military losses at the hands of Israeli forces. The talks were slow and arduous and complicated by truce violations perpetrated by Israel to gain control of the whole of the Negev. The Israeli operations had been successful in chasing the Egyptians out of the Negev and had encircled an Egyptian garrison at Faluja which they were refusing to release. Egypt was insisting Israel free their troops and return to 14 October military lines in accordance with the SC truce41. Discouraged by Israeli rejection of his proposals which incorporated an attempt to find a middle ground42, and the submission of their own list of intransigent counter-proposals, Bunche was threatening to hand the matter over to the SC43. In response, Patterson, the US Chargé in Egypt, appealed to Washington to exert pressure on Israel to bring her around from her hardline position44. Secretary Acheson45 responded to the appeal and
39 Lovett to Ethridge, 19 January 1949. Foreign Relations of the United States 1949 (Vol 6) (FRUS) pp681- 683 40 The Egyptians saw the US extension of de jure recognition of Israel during the armistice negotiations as an unnecessary step and one which led Israel into adopting a more intransigent attitude than previously. Patterson to Acheson, 2 February 1949. FRUS p718 41 Memorandum of Conversation. Rockwell, Rahim, Satterthwaite, Jenkins. 24 January 1949. FRUS p693 42 Egypt had reluctantly accepted the Bunche proposals, McClintock to Acheson, 4 February 1949. FRUS p724 43 Patterson to Acheson, 2 February 1949. FRUS p719 44 Patterson to Acheson, 2 February 1949. FRUS p718
Kristen Blomeley 15 Chapter One The Road to Lausanne
Israel was asked to be more forthcoming and statesmanlike46. The Americans were particularly desperate for a successful conclusion to the Israeli-Egyptian armistice negotiations as invitations to Rhodes had also been extended to Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Iraq47 and their chance for success was almost wholly contingent upon the outcome of the Egyptian talks48.
The Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement was finally signed after six weeks of negotiations on 24 February 1949. The final agreement was highly favourable to Israel as it included territory she gained in violation of the SC truce resolutions of 14 October and 4 November. Egyptian troops were thereby instructed to withdraw from all areas of Mandatory Palestine except for the Gaza Strip while Israel agreed to release the Faluja garrison and keep limited numbers of troops along the Israeli/Egyptian border.
In an effort to canvass the opinions of the parties involved, the PCC began their work on 7 January with an informal four and a half hour meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Shertok (later Sharett), followed by a tour of the Arab capitals from 12 to 25 January 1949. The commission found Shertok in a bellicose mood and with little intention of yielding on any of the major issues. The PCC first questioned the Minister on the issue of Jerusalem. The Commissioners were particularly concerned about the proposed internationalisation of Jerusalem due to several moves the Israeli government had made which threatened to change the political nature of the city. These included moving the Israeli constituent assembly to Jerusalem, extending Israeli civil law to Jerusalem and the GOI’s pronounced intention of holding municipal elections in the city in March. Shertok affirmed each of these moves and enunciated the Israeli position on the city of Jerusalem which would not change at any time in the future. Shertok explained that though the Provisional Government of Israel had agreed to the internationalisation of Jerusalem through its acceptance of the 29 November 1947 Partition Resolution, the situation had drastically changed due to the 1948 war. Rather than the international community coming to the rescue of Jerusalem’s Jewish population,
45 After General Marshall was forced to resign his position due to health reasons, Dean Acheson assumed the position Secretary of State of the United States on 21 January 1949 46 Memorandum of Conversation by Acheson, 5 February 1949. FRUS pp727-729 47 The Iraqi government declined the invitation to attend armistice negotiations 48 Memorandum by McClintock to Acheson, 4 February 1949. FRUS p724
Kristen Blomeley 16 Chapter One The Road to Lausanne
which had been under attack by the Arab armies, Jerusalem’s Jews were forced to defend themselves. As such, the Jewish residents of Jerusalem could never again entrust their security to an outside entity, nor could their economic security be guaranteed by anything other than integration into Israel49.
Shertok was no more forthcoming on the refugee issue. Shertok outlined the Israeli policy that there could be no discussion of a return of the refugees outside of a formal peace agreement and there could be no significant return before this date and possibly after. Shertok went on to explain to the PCC what would become a very familiar argument throughout the course of negotiations, that Israel was not responsible for the refugees, that their flight was voluntary and due to the aggression of the Arab armies, and that their return would place an impossible economic and security burden on the State of Israel. Shertok informed the Commission that he saw the best solution to the refugee problem to lie in their repatriation to the Arab states. Israel did recognise their responsibility to provide compensation, though this would be of limited sums only due to Israel’s economic status at the time.
When questioned by the Commissioners as to his feelings regarding a general peace conference, Shertok expressed his preference for bilateral negotiations, similar to those taking place on Rhodes.
The Israeli Minister also rejected the territorial arrangements contained in the Partition Resolution, claiming that the situation had changed so that now an independent Arab state was no longer envisaged, and instead it was likely that Arab Palestine would be annexed to Transjordan. Shertok questioned why Israel should cede any land to Transjordan50 and instead called for modification of the boundaries contained within the November 1947 Resolution51.
49 Burdett to Acheson, 8 February 1949. FRUS p736 50 Israel also questioned why the Arab states should be rewarded for their aggressive war against Israel and their violation of the November 1947 Partition Resolution, McDonald to Secretary of State, 15 November 1948, USNA 501.BB Pal/11-1548 51 Burdett to Acheson, 8 February 1949. FRUS pp735-738
Kristen Blomeley 17 Chapter One The Road to Lausanne
Later that day Ethridge wrote to Secretary Acheson clearly worried by what he had heard. Ethridge was convinced that, contrary to Resolution 194, Israel intended to incorporate Israeli-occupied Jerusalem into the State of Israel. Of even more concern to Ethridge and the other Commissioners was Shertok’s attitude towards the refugees. Ethridge likened this to Hitler in 1933 and labelled it anti-Semitism against the Arabs52.
Israel’s belligerent manner may have been fuelled by a letter their President, Chaim Weizmann, had received from the US President shortly after Truman’s election victory which effectively undermined the Commission’s search for a compromise in Israel’s position. Truman and Weizmann had been long-term friends and shared a deep and abiding respect for one another53. Truman’s letter was full of praise for the Jewish state and proclaimed his continuing devotion to its success through financial and economic support. Truman neglected to mention the issues of the refugees or Jerusalem and stated in regard to the Negev; “I deplore any attempt to take it away from Israel. I had thought that my position would have been clear to all the world, particularly in the light of the specific wording of the Democratic Party Platform.”54
News of the letter had clearly spread through Jerusalem, prompting Acheson to cable Ethridge on 9 February in an attempt to reconcile the instructions Ethridge had received from Lovett with the letter the President had written to Weizmann. Acheson defended the President’s assurances to Weizmann as consistent with US policy regarding territorial compensation as set forth by the Jessup Principle55. Though there can be little doubt that Ethridge felt his position compromised by the letter, he was encouraged to proceed with his former instructions.
The next point of call for the Commissioners was Jericho where they visited Tawfiq Pasha, the Transjordanian Prime Minister. The meeting proved considerably more
52 Acheson to Ethridge, 8 February 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/2-849 53 Truman’s Administrative Assistant and Advisor in Jewish Affairs, David K Niles, once remarked to Eban; “only way be certain Truman reads and believes what we [Zionists] say is to say it over signature Weizmann”. See Eban to Sharett, 16 June 1949, State of Israel, p138 54 Truman to Weizmann, 29 November 1948, Truman Library, B-File. In the letter Truman refers to a conversation he had previously had with Weizmann regarding the Negev, he is no doubt talking about the discussion he had with Weizmann on the eve of the vote for partition at the UN where Weizmann convinced Truman to include the Negev in the proposed Jewish state 55 Burdett to Acheson, 12 February 1949, , USNA 501.BB Pal/2-949.
Kristen Blomeley 18 Chapter One The Road to Lausanne
congenial than their meeting in Jerusalem. The Prime Minister declared his country intent on peace and willing to enter peace negotiations even if the other Arab states refused. Pasha did not at this stage see any reason for arranging a general peace conference. Whilst the Prime Minister did not openly declare himself hostile to the Commission’s mandate on Jerusalem, he questioned the practicality of the resolution and queried whether the Jews would abide by it. Regarding refugees Pasha was keen for Transjordan and Arab Palestine to accommodate any refugees who chose not to return to their homes, provided his country received external financial assistance. Pasha’s views on the Negev were a little more concerning to the Commissioners. Transjordan was insisting upon a port in the Mediterranean, preferably in the Gaza Strip and a land corridor through the Negev connecting Transjordan to the port56.
The PCC then visited King Abdullah at Shuneh on 20 February where he restated most of what the Prime Minister had covered. However the King added that he would welcome the PCC to extend invitations to the Arab states to enter peace talks with Israel. The King believed that the other Arab states would decline the invitation which would leave him free to enter into separate talks57.
Next on the PCC’s itinerary was Cairo where they held a meeting on 15 February with the recently appointed Egyptian Prime Minister, Ibrahim Abdel Hadi Pasha58, who was also accompanied by his Foreign Minister. The Egyptians were still in the middle of negotiating an armistice agreement with Israel and were particularly anxious that this be concluded before peace talks could begin. The Egyptians were worried about Israeli truce violations. These were in contravention of SC resolutions but had not as yet incurred sanctions. The Egyptians expressed their view that a successful conclusion at Rhodes or for the Commission was impossible so long as the Jews did not feel compelled to respect GA or SC decisions59.
56 Burdett to Acheson, 12 February 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/2-1249 57 Stabler to Acheson, 21 February 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/2-2149 58 King Farouk appointed Abdel Hadi Prime Minister in December 1948 after his predecessor, Mahmoud Fahmy Nokrashy Pasha, was murdered by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. 59 Patterson to Acheson, 15 February 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/2-1549
Kristen Blomeley 19 Chapter One The Road to Lausanne
The Egyptians were categorical in their views towards the refugee issue. The Prime Minister insisted that the PCC had a mandate to ensure that the principles of return and respect for property rights were realised. The Prime Minister viewed prior acceptance of this right as a sine qua non of peace negotiations. The Egyptians expressed little interest in the Jerusalem issue, assuring the committee that they would uphold the provisions contained within the 12 December resolution, though they saw no reason to remove control from the Arabs due to the long and successful history of Arab rule over the city.
The Prime Minister refused to discuss the subject of boundaries with the Commission. They preferred to see what transpired at Rhodes and their attitude in this regard would be determined by the “good faith” which the Israelis displayed60.
The PCC then met King Ibn Saud in Riyadh on 19 February. Though geographically removed from the conflict, the King had taken a keen interest in the affair over the years and was anxious to work with the PCC to resolve the conflict. The King outlined three prerequisites which in his view were necessary for a successful settlement; 1) real guarantees by the UN and the Big Powers that the settlement would be effective; 2) immediate action to be taken by the UN to ensure the refugees could return to their homes; and 3) present GA and SC resolutions regarding Palestine to be made effective and parties failing to comply to be penalised accordingly61. These prerequisites reflect a genuine concern in the Arab world at the time regarding Israeli goodwill and the integrity of the UN. The Israelis were seen to be wilfully violating UN resolutions, notably the truce resolutions of 28 October 1948 and 4 November 1948 and Resolution 194 provisions on refugees and Jerusalem. The Arabs were therefore concerned that any agreement reached with Israel would be violated with impunity and were seeking assurances that the Big Powers would take concrete measures to protect UN resolutions and enforce the will of the international community.
60 Patterson to Acheson, 15 February 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/2-1549. The interview with the Egyptians convinced Ethridge that a quick and successful conclusion to the Rhodes talks was needed to aid the Commission in its work. Ethridge sent a telegram to Acheson later this day advising that the timing might be right to exert some pressure on Israel to this end. Ethridge to Acheson, 15 February 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/2-1549 61 Dorsz to Acheson, 19 February 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/2-1949. FRUS p756
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When the PCC visited the Syrian Prime Minister on 21 February they found him in an equally acerbic mood. The Prime Minister was adamant that a religious state had been established on his doorstep without reference to justice. The Prime Minister saw the repatriation of the refugees as the fundamental issue and one between Israel and the UN rather than Israel and the Arab states. Whilst the Prime Minister refused to discuss peace until the right of return was recognised, he did agree to attend a future meeting between the PCC and the other Arab states to progress the issues further62.
The Lebanese Prime Minister restated the views of his Syrian counterpart when the PCC arrived in Beirut. Once again the PCC were told that Israel had shown only bad faith towards UN decisions and it was the responsibility of the Commission to ensure that these were respected. The Lebanese were particularly concerned by the matter of the refugees63. As a consequence of the fighting in Mandatory Palestine, 120,000 refugees were currently residing in Lebanon. As Lebanon was a small, densely populated country struggling to maintain a fragile balance between its Christian and Muslim communities, it was concerned that the refugees would stretch its already over-burdened economy and destabilise the ethnic balance. As such the primary goal of the Lebanese government was the repatriation of the refugees to their former homes.
By the end of the Middle East tour Ethridge was convinced that the refugees were the key to peace. Ethridge believed that there was a genuine desire for peace by the Arab states and that a conciliatory gesture by Israel on the issue would allow the peace talks to move forward64. The Commission therefore turned all its efforts to extracting the necessary conciliatory gesture from Israel. Ethridge’s first attempt occurred during his next visit with Shertok on 24 February. Whilst Shertok was in a more conciliatory mood than before, he was unyielding on the request for a gesture, claiming that Israel “could not accept abstract principles”65. Shertok was adamant that the solution to the refugee crisis lay in resettlement in Arab countries but allowed the PCC a thread of hope by promising to broach the question of a gesture with his government.
62 Pinkerton to Acheson, 24 February 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/2-2449. FRUS pp766-767 63 Pinkerton to Acheson, 24 February 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/2-2449 64 Ethridge to Acheson, 28 February 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/2-2849. FRUS pp778-780 65 Burdett to Acheson, 26 February 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/2-2649. FRUS pp772-774
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The next day the Commission met with Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. In his usual unequivocal manner, the Israeli leader dismissed the request for a conciliatory gesture and explained that what Israel was concerned with most of all was her security, to which she regarded the refugees a threat. When it was pointed out to Ben-Gurion that Israel could not have security if she was not at peace with her neighbours, the Prime Minister responded that Israeli security would rest firstly on immigration and only secondarily on such peaceful relations66.
Having met with a polite, but persistent refusal from Israel on the ‘conciliatory gesture’ Ethridge turned to enlist the support of the State Department in the hope that direct representations from Washington might prove more effective67. In his appeal Ethridge offers an insight into his own feelings in an effort to impress upon the State Department how crucial he perceived the resolution of the refugee crisis:
My own feeling is that the United States has accumulated an enormous moral and even financial responsibility in the situation in our justifiable zeal for the creation of a state. Nevertheless these people have been displaced either by force, or terrorism or have fled because of their own fear. Even if the American public has not been told about Deir Yassin massacre68, all Arabs know about it and all Arabs with whom [the] Commission has talked have either implicitly or directly blamed [the] US and UN for displacing 700,000 persons.69
Another factor which was brought to the Commissioner’s attention throughout their tour of the Middle East capitals was the strong Arab preference for an imposed rather than a negotiated settlement70. The reasons for this were two-fold. Firstly, the Arab states had no confidence in the UN to enforce the terms of an agreement and therefore wanted the Big Powers behind it. Generally they favoured a joint US-UK imposed settlement. Secondly and perhaps more importantly, the Arab states did not feel that they could take
66 Burdett to Acheson, 28 February 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/2-2849. FRUS pp775-776 67 Ethridge to Acheson, 28 February 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/2-2849. FRUS p776-777, Ethridge to Acheson, 28 February 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/2-2849. FRUS p778-780 68 The Deir Yassin massacre occurred on 9 April 1948. Over one hundred Palestinian civilians were killed by members of the extremist Zionist parties; the Irgun and the Stern Gang (LEHI). The massacre is widely believed to have sparked the flight of the refugees for fear of becoming another Deir Yassin 69 Ethridge to Acheson, 28 February 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/2-2849. FRUS p778. Here Ethridge is explicitly disputing the Israeli claim that the flight of the refugees was caused by incitement from the British and Arab armies, see Burdett to Acheson, 12 February 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/2-1249 70 Ethridge to Acheson, 28 February 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/2-2849. FRUS p781
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a negotiated settlement back to their people and retain power. The Arab publics were still reeling from their countries’ defeat by the Israeli army, the full extent of which was still being hidden from them. As a result they were unprepared for a settlement with Israel involving any form of concession. The only way the Arab governments felt they could sell such a settlement was if it had been forced upon them by the Big Powers.
Yet Secretary Acheson had little inclination to impose a settlement so the Arab governments could gain political capital or rescue some of their lost pride. Acheson remained dismissive of calls for an imposed settlement, pointing out that the Arabs had rejected the Bernadotte Plan, which contained several favourable aspects for the Arabs. Instead Acheson subscribed to three principles to guide the resolution of the dispute; a) that it must be through peaceful means; b) that it must be through the UN; and c) that it must not contain acceptance of unilateral responsibilities by the US71. These principles were derived directly from the wishes of the President, who had categorically ruled out the option of an imposed settlement.
Ethridge’s request for pressure to be exercised on Israel in order to extract a conciliatory gesture met with a more favourable response from Acheson. On 9 March, the US Ambassador to Israel, James McDonald, was handed a strong note from Acheson which was to be passed onto the Israeli Foreign Minister. The note recalled the obligations contained within Resolution 194 and its establishment of the right of return for the refugees. Acheson reminded the Israeli Minister of the considerable assistance the US had provided to Israel in assisting in the migration of the European DPs and hoped that Israel would show the same humanity in its treatment of the Arab refugees72.
Israel resisted this and parallel overtures emanating from Washington and Tel Aviv and in fact became even more defiant of UN resolutions. On 10 March, in violation of the SC truce, Israel moved two brigades down to the Red Sea and planted their flag in an abandoned Police Station in Umm Rashrash73. Circumventing King Abdullah’s intention to annex the Southern Negev himself, Israel now controlled the entire Negev through its
71 Acheson to Ambassador Stanton Griffis (Egypt), 25 February 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/2-2949 72 Acheson to McDonald, 9 March 1949. FRUS pp804-805 73 Tom Segev 1986 p15
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policy of fait accomplis74. In addition, Ben-Gurion delivered a speech stating that Jerusalem was no different to any other part of Israel and would be incorporated into the Israeli state75. Ethridge felt that these moves, in addition to Israel’s opposition to a conciliatory gesture76 compromised the work of the PCC and its chances in brokering a peace deal. Once again Ethridge appealed to Washington to impress upon the Israeli Foreign Minister the importance of the gesture and of Israel’s abiding by SC resolutions77. Ethridge sense of disempowerment was growing as he began to realise that the Truman Administration was failing to give him the necessary level of support he needed78.
Ethridge was particularly concerned by Israel’s uncooperative stance due to the upcoming Beirut Conference. In an endeavour to canvass the opinions of all the Arab governments on subjects relating to Resolution 194, the PCC had extended invitations to Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and a number of Palestinian refugee groups to attend a conference in Beirut on 21 March 1949. Ethridge was growing increasingly convinced that the conference would be a failure, due both to the PCC’s inability to procure a gesture towards refugees from Israel, and the UN’s diminishing authority in the Arab world because of its continued failure to defend and enforce its own decisions. Ethridge observed that if this persisted “Palestine may become even holier as the burial place of the UN”79.
Whilst the PCC were deliberating on whether it was worth proceeding with the Beirut Conference, Israel issued its own warnings over the desirability of the event. Shertok wrote to Ethridge and cautioned that holding a conference with the Arab governments
74 The American Ambassador to Transjordan, Mr Wells Stabler, deplored the use of fait accomplis and the international communities to take measures to restrain Israel. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State, USNA 501.BB Pal/3-1249. FRUS p824 75 Burdett to Acheson, 11 March 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/3-1149. FRUS p817 76 In a meeting with Acheson on 22 March, Shertok gave his government’s official negative response to the request for a conciliatory gesture, reiterating once again that Israel would not discuss the subject of refugees outside of general peace talks and the logical solution to the problem lay in resettlement. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 22 March 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/3-2249. FRUS p855 77 Ethridge to Acheson, 14 March 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/3-1449. FRUS pp825-826 78 Ethridge’s words were “I am sure [Shertok] considers Washington more friendly than the Commission and has not been sufficiently impressed with US interest in UN settlement. I wish he could be shown that this is not the case.” Ethridge to Acheson, 14 March 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/3-1449. FRUS pp825-826 79 Ethridge to Acheson, 14 March 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/3-1449. FRUS pp825-826
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would promote intransigence and lead to “an all-round stiffening of their positions”80. Israel’s conviction that getting the Arab delegates together would only lead to a competition of belligerence amongst themselves underscored their preference for direct negotiations and inherent suspicion of the concept of a general peace conference.
The situation being as it was, the PCC flew to Beirut with two aims;
1. To convince the Arab states to drop their demand that the right of return of the refugees be accepted by Israel before they would enter peace negotiations;
2. To point out that Israel could not possibly repatriate all of the refugees and thus the Arabs would have to accept the principle of resettlement for an unspecified number of refugees81.
During the course of the week-long conference the PCC were presented with similar ideas to those they had encountered during their shuttle diplomacy earlier in the month. The Arab delegates expressed concern as to the repeated truce violations perpetrated by Israel in her quest for territory through fait accomplis, the failure of the international community to take steps against Israel, and Israel’s continuing refusal to offer a conciliatory gesture. The PCC found itself strongly rebuked as they broached the question of resettlement, with the Prime Minister of Transjordan accusing them of merely carrying out Jewish wishes rather than fulfilling the principles contained within the GA’s resolution82.
By the end of the week Ethridge was even more convinced that a gesture from Israel would open the door to peace negotiations and was becoming more and more despondent at the lack of progress being made on this front. Ethridge was clearly becoming frustrated with what he perceived to be a lack of support from the UN and the US in bringing Israel into line;
80 Ethridge to Acheson, 14 March 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/3-1449 81 Pinkerton to Acheson, 22 March 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/3-2249. FRUS p857 82 United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Summary Record of a meeting between the Conciliation Commission and his Excellency Tewfik Pasha Abulhuda, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Transjordan, 23 February 1949, A/AC.25/SR/BM/5
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“My own position is most unhappy. It is bad enough to realise UN prestige in this part world already gone, but worse than that is realisation that US prestige constantly declining and feeling toward the US increasingly despairing. Since we gave Israel birth we are blamed for her belligerence and her arrogance and for cold-bloodedness of her attitude toward refugees. Of course everybody expects US to pass miracle but none is needed in this case. All that is needed is effective pressure direct toward making Israel realise that her own interests and ours also are being jeopardised in this strategic area by her intransigence.”83
The Armistice negotiations
Whilst the Beirut Conference was proceeding, Israel and Lebanon, who had been conducting armistice negotiations at Naqoura, finally reached agreement on 23 March. The negotiations proved simpler than those between Israel and Egypt, with the only problem arising from Israel’s wish to have her withdrawal from Lebanese territory linked with a Syrian withdrawal from territory it was currently occupying in Mandatory Palestine84. Eventually the Israeli delegation was persuaded to drop this demand and they agreed to withdraw their troops to the international border.
During the Lebanese-Israeli armistice negotiations, Transjordanian and Israeli delegates entered parallel talks in Rhodes. Whilst they were ostensibly discussing the issues involved in the armistice negotiations; free access to Jewish Holy Places in Jerusalem, border rectification, the presence of Iraqi forces in the West Bank, the Arab refugee question and the question of Arab passage from the Old City of Jerusalem to Bethlehem, the real talks were happening far away in Shuneh. Rather than entrust his delegates in Rhodes to negotiate the terms of the armistice, King Abdullah entered into secret negotiations with Israel in his winter palace. Away from the interference of external mediation the delegates were free to discuss the issues openly and without fear of international pressure. Yet events did not go exactly as planned for the King and in retrospect he may well have regretted not sticking to the Rhodes formula and the assistance of the venerable Dr Bunche. The first problem arose for King Abdullah when Israeli troops marched to the Red Sea and raised their flag. The King, who had been hoping to negotiate control over the Southern Negev, was faced with a fait accomplis
83 Pinkerton to Acheson, 28 March 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/3-2849. FRUS pp877-878 84 McDonald to Secretary of State, 8 March 1949. FRUS, 802.
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which he could do little about and with which the international community showed little inclination to assist him.
Worse was yet to come for King Abdullah when Israel presented him with a list of demands over Jerusalem, including moving the border eastwards which would result in Israel taking over an additional fifteen villages85. As well as losing hopes for a Transjordanian Negev, King Abdullah now also had to confront the possibility of losing additional territory in the Arab Triangle. Abdullah would not have considered agreeing to this condition had Israel not backed up the demand with the threat of military action threatening Transjordan with losing all of the remainder of Arab Palestine still under its control.
Without the protection of Bunche and the UN, Abdullah was forced to appeal to the US for assurance that it would prevent Israel from taking military action against Transjordan86. The American Chargé in Amman, Wells Stabler, also appealed to his government to stop what he considered to be “blackmail”87. Both Stabler and the King were working against the clock, with Israel demanding a reply that night. The deadline proved too tight for the Americans and Abdullah was forced to sign an agreement containing the handover of the villages that night. The King did, however, add a clause into the agreement which required the agreement be ratified by the Transjordanian parliament by 30 March. This in effect bought Abdullah a little more time in hope that the US would step in and come to his rescue. Unfortunately for the King all he received from Secretary Acheson was a polite refusal, simply stating that; “view fact that TJ reps have now signed agreement, Dept does not believe that US representation Tel Aviv would be productive”88.
Unperturbed Abdullah wrote directly to President Truman and appealed to him to prevent the modification of the frontier. Truman’s reply was in essence a snub which merely
85 The area in question was at the time occupied by Iraqi forces who were preparing to hand the area over to the Arab Legion. Israel was specifically threatening to move their troops into the region when the Iraqi troops vacated. 86 Stabler to the Secretary of State, USNA 501.BB Pal/3-2349. FRUS pp861-862. 87 Stabler to the Secretary of State, USNA 501.BB Pal/3-2349. 88 Secretary of State to the Wells Stabler, 25 March 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/3-2549. FRUS p871.
Kristen Blomeley 27 Chapter One The Road to Lausanne
restated US support for the Jessup Principle and concluded by wishing Abdullah the best of luck89. With all hope ending of American intervention, the agreement was ratified by the 30 March deadline. The agreement formed part of the armistice agreement which was signed in Rhodes on 3 April 194990. Once made public King Abdullah was forced to endure the outrage of the Arab world, particularly the 35,000 Palestinian Arabs who were the inhabitants of the land to be ceded to Israel and who were now expected to become refugees91. As a consequence of entering secret talks with Israel, Abdullah had lost territory, in addition to a significant amount of prestige in the Arab world, and may well have been the most hated man in the region at the time92.
Invitation to the Lausanne Conference
As the Beirut Conference came to an end the PCC was anxious to maintain the momentum by offering invitations to the Arab states to attend further talks for an ‘exchange of views’ with Israel. Whilst the UN Secretary General did not feel that the time was yet ripe for formal peace talks, the Americans disagreed and urged Ethridge on93. During the penultimate joint meeting in Beirut on 5 April, delegates from Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria formally informed the PCC of their governments’ acceptance of the invitation. The PCC refused to extend invitations to any groups representing the Palestinian Arab population, but a delegation from the Arab Higher Committee (AHC)94 decided to attend on an informal basis. Iraq was alone in
89 President Truman to King Abdullah Ibn el-Hussein of Transjordan, 28 March 1949. FRUS p878-879. 90 Apparently Dr Bunche, who was all the while conducting what he thought was the armistice negotiations on the island, had no idea of what was transpiring in Jerusalem, Amman and Shuneh, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr Robert M McClintock, 25 March 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/3-2549. FRUS p868-869. 91 Burdett to Acheson, 8 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-849. FRUS pp900-901. 92 Interestingly, Ben-Gurion also came under fire in his own Knesset, with the leader of the right-wing Herut party, Menahem Begin labelling the signing of the treaty as a ‘historic crime’ and a ‘defeat inflicted upon our people’. The Herut Party was against any concession of land to the Arabs in Mandatory Palestine due to their belief in the biblical birthright of the Jews to all of Palestine. (Tom Segev 1986 pp284-285). 93 Acheson favored peace talks to promptly follow the armistice agreements, Acheson to Ethridge, 28 March 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/3-2849. FRUS, 879 94 Established in 1939 at the beginning of the Arab riots, the AHC was the political representative of the Palestinian people. The AHC was headed by Haj Amin El-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who was exiled by the British in 1937 to Cairo. The Mufti continued to head the AHC and orchestrate its actions up to and throughout the 1948 war but failed to gain any form of international recognition for the organization as representative of the indigenous Palestinian population due to hostile resistance from Jordan and the British, who were both keen for Arab Palestine to be incorporated into the Hashemite state.
Kristen Blomeley 28 Chapter One The Road to Lausanne
refusing to attend the conference, insisting that the right of return be recognised by Israel beforehand95. Feeling that they had made their concession, the Arab states impressed upon the PCC that now was the time for them to assert pressure on Israel to extract a corresponding concession on the refugee issue.
Ethridge was obviously ecstatic over the surprise Arab acceptance of the invitation and described it as a “real concession”96. Before this point the Arab governments had insisted upon Israeli recognition of the right of return as a prerequisite of entering peace talks97. With the Arabs on board, Ethridge now saw the only obstacle to peace to be the elusive Israeli concession on refugees. To overcome this, the Americans planned a two- pronged attack through diplomatic channels in both Washington and Tel Aviv. Secretary Acheson set up a meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett (formally Shertok) on April 5 and the PCC were to meet with Ben-Gurion in Tel Aviv on April 7.
During his meeting with Sharett, Acheson outlined his three phase formula for the solution of the refugee problem. The formula became the cornerstone of Acheson’s reasoning throughout the peace talks and he often showed signs of agitation with the Israelis for not taking up what he considered to be very reasonable advice. Acheson’s three step formula involved:
1. The Israeli Government should first state that it is prepared to repatriate a considerable number of refugees. Whilst no number need be given, this will allow the PCC to move forward with a political settlement and would also make it easier for the US administration to acquire the assistance of Congress to gain financial support for the solution of the problem;
Whilst peace talks continued, as a gesture of goodwill, Israel could begin actual repatriation of a small number of refugees, while taking into account the requirements of her national security;
95 Ethridge to Acheson, 5 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-549. FRUS p894 96 Ethridge to Acheson, 4 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-449 97 Due to concern over how their respective publics would react to their governments entering peace talks with Israel the Arab governments preferred to refer to the Lausanne Conference as an ‘exchange of views’ rather than as a peace conference
Kristen Blomeley 29 Chapter One The Road to Lausanne
2. Once a peace settlement had been concluded Israel would continue to make whatever additional contribution was incorporated into the agreement98.
Sharett listened to Acheson’s advice but steadfastly maintained Israel’s position that there could be no repatriation outside of a formal peace agreement and that the solution to the problem lay in resettlement in the Arab states99.
Representations to Ben-Gurion through Ambassador McDonald and Mark Ethridge fared no better. The Israeli Prime Minister reiterated the security implications involved in a return of the refugees and stated his position that the goodwill of the international community could not take precedence over Israel’s security. Ben-Gurion was willing to endure the wrath of the international community regarding the refugees if it meant keeping Israel safe. In this, McDonald commented, Ben-Gurion was “unshakable”.100 Though resisting all efforts from the PCC and the Americans to procure a conciliatory gesture, Ben-Gurion did agree to send an envoy to talks with the Arab states at a neutral location101. Whilst it was far less than the PCC had hoped for, it was all they were able to take from their meeting with the esteemed Israeli leader.
Following the meeting with Ben-Gurion, Ethridge wrote a frank letter to President Truman which showed little sign of optimism for the upcoming conference and requested the President to “keep the pressure up”. Ethridge provided the President with his analysis of events so far:
“This is by far the toughest assignment you have ever given to me. The Arabs are shocked and stupefied by their defeat and have great bitterness toward the UN and the United States. The Jews are too close to the blood of their war and their narrow escape, as they regard it, from extinction, and too close to the bitterness of their fight against the British mandate to exercise any degree of statesmanship yet.”
98 Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 5 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-549. FRUS p893 99 Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 5 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-549. FRUS p893 100 McDonald to Acheson, 8 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-849. FRUS pp899-900 101 Ethridge to Acheson, 9 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-949. FRUS pp902-904
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Ethridge concluded that; “The Arabs have made what the Commission considers very great concessions; the Jews have made none so far.”102
On 9 April 1949 the PCC announced that the ‘exchange of views’ would begin on April 26 and take place in Lausanne. Whilst Ethridge preferred the conference to take place in the Middle East region103, all parties involved were keen for the talks to take place a little further away104.
On 11 April, in preparation for the conference the PCC issued the Government of Israel (GOI) with a memo of preliminary measures which it suggested it might take to create a favourable atmosphere for the talks. The memo listed seven points, including;
A declaration by the GOI that it will cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the solution of the refugee problem;
A declaration by the GOI that it accepts the proprietary rights of the refugees from its territory and is prepared to pay them compensation;
A declaration by the GOI that it respects the rights of minorities within its borders and intends to punish any infringement on these rights;
An assurance by the GOI that it has no intention of confiscating blocked Arab accounts in Israeli banks and that these funds will be available to the proper owners on the conclusion of peace;
102 Ethridge to the President, 11 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-1149. FRUS pp905-906 103 Ethridge was concerned that the Arab delegates would not be given the authority to negotiate an agreement leading to a great deal of shuttling back and forth between Europe and the Middle East which would ultimately slow the pace of the talks. Ethridge to Acheson, 29 March 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/3- 2949. FRUS p884 104 Apparently Ethridge preferred the talks to take place on Rhodes, the same location as the armistice talks but the suggestion did not receive the support of his colleagues or the Israelis and had little hope of being agreed to by the Arab states as the armistice agreements were seen in the Arab press as documents of surrender and Rhodes was being labeled the ‘island of shame’. Ethridge to Acheson, 9 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-949. FRUS p905
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3. Suspension of the application of the absentee law105 until the final peace settlement, and the placing of refugee property in the category of ‘enemy property’ under a custodian;
4. The undertaking of the necessary measures to prevent further deterioration of refugee property in Israeli territory;
5. The employment of a certain number of refugee workers in Israel, eg in the port of Haifa, the orange groves, etc106.
The US Delegate to the PCC also received some new instructions from the Secretary of State regarding Jerusalem which differed slightly from the GA resolution. Acheson quickly realised that the stiff resistance the Israelis, and to a lesser extent Transjordan, were exercising against making the entire city a corpus seperatum meant that the resolution had practically no chance of success. Acheson therefore gave Ethridge a more flexible and realistic mandate which would seek only a “minimum of internationalisation of Jerusalem”107. The new plan would involve granting trusteeship to Israel and Transjordan with international control to be limited to the Holy Places. The new US policy toward Jerusalem would put Ethridge at odds with his colleagues on the PCC108. Boisanger was insisting upon full internationalisation of the city and Yalcin largely supported this demand109.
During the months of the Commission’s work, the Americans had made representations, overtures, requests and promises in hope to bring Israel’s position around. However it was becoming obvious that rather than softening her position, Israel was stiffening her resolve as time went by and becoming more belligerent in her manner. When speaking with Michael Comay, Sharett’s second-in-charge, Ethridge pointed out that the GOI
105 The Property Absentee Law, which came into force in December 1948, allowed the GOI to confiscate property in which the owners were decreed ‘absent’ and was typically used to appropriate recently vacated Arab homes and villages in order to settle Jewish immigrants 106 United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Memorandum, 11 April 1949, A/AC.25/IS.9 107 Acheson to Ethridge, 13 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-1349. FRUS pp910-911 108 Ethridge to Acheson, 13 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-1349. FRUS p913 109 On 16 April the Commissioners were able to reach a compromise on Jerusalem featuring UN administration of Holy Places, that Jerusalem be a demilitarized zone and administrative control for public services, Ethridge to Acheson, 16 April 1949. FRUS pp920-921
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position that the Zionist state needed to obtain more territory conflicted with US policy. In reply, Comay simply stated “Yes, but we hope to change Washington’s mind”110. After countless efforts from all diplomatic levels within the Department of State, the Americans had failed to impress upon Israel the importance they attached to their positions. In response the Americans decided to revaluate their relationship with Israel and investigate avenues through which the department might assert some ‘positive pressure’ in an attempt to secure a fair settlement111.
By 19 April, Ethridge felt that he had reached the end of his usefulness to the Commission and requested that he be relieved of his position to return to his newspaper in Louisville. Although Ethridge had been sending increasingly despondent telegrams back to Acheson, he somehow found some hope when writing his letter of resignation and concluded “we are beginning to see the beginning of the end”. Ethridge justified this observation by stating that it was likely that the Jerusalem issue could be resolved through a working paper acceptable to both parties. He then predicted that Egypt and Israel would quickly find agreement and Lebanon and Syria should not present any serious troubles. Ethridge warned that the refugee problem would not be resolved at the conference but that it would “hang on for two or three years”112.
The Israeli quest for UN membership
It was at this time that the perfect opportunity for the US to exert some ‘positive pressure’ on Israel arose. Israel was desperate to receive UN membership and had been fighting for it since the beginning of the year. As a plank in the Democratic Party platform, Israel’s membership application had to date received the full support of the US delegation113. Once the application was passed in the SC on 4 March, with the assistance of US Ambassador Austin, it was then passed to the GA for vote. Rather than offering it
110 Ethridge to Acheson, 13 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-1349. FRUS p915 111 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Humelsine), 5 April 1949. FRUS p918 112 Ethridge to Acheson and Truman, 19 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-1949. FRUS pp923-924 113 US support of Israel’s application for UN membership caused a great deal of bitterness and resentment in the Arab world. The Arabs felt that Israel continued to be rewarded for her defiance of UN resolution, as opposed to their faithful compliance, for the most part. See Dulles to Marshall, 29 November 1948, USNA 501.BB Pal/11-2948
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to immediate vote the GA then referred the matter to Committee One. Israel was worried that this would lead to a full debate on her policy towards the refugees and Jerusalem issues, and were seeking the continued support of the Americans to circumvent delay. Ethridge thought that the issue of UN membership was an ideal avenue through which to exert pressure on Israel and suggested that “it would probably be salutary to have world public opinion brought to bear upon her through [the] UN”114.
Acheson responded to Ethridge’s suggestion affirmatively, assuring him that Israel would be advised that the US delegation would ensure the smooth passage of their application for UN membership on condition they set reasonable positions for a peace settlement115. The US Ambassador to the UN, Warren Austin, took this up shortly thereafter and suggested to the Israeli Representative at the UN, Abba Eban, that Israel’s case for membership may be helped by a conciliatory statement at the beginning of the Lausanne Conference116. President Weizmann was visiting the US at the time and took the opportunity to question both Acheson and Truman on US support for the application117. Acheson was evasive in his response and merely replied; “the Israeli representatives would really be of more assistance than we could if they would show a conciliatory attitude along the lines mentioned to Mr Weizmann by the President”118.
Acheson’s comments alarmed Israel, prompting the Israeli Ambassador, Eliahu Elath and Abba Eban to be sent to Washington to argue the Israeli case. Restating Israel’s case for UN membership, they also suggested that a conciliatory statement would be made at Lausanne in hope of expediting the process. Acheson responded by reprimanding the Israeli’s for their unhelpful positions thus far. The Secretary also warned Israel against seeking an agreement based on threats, as this would not represent a permanent peace and
114 See Ethridge to Acheson, 19 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-1949. FRUS p923 (in footnote) 115 Acheson to Ethridge, 20 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-2049 116 Austin to Acheson, 25 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-2549 117 It is unclear exactly what President Truman said to President Weizmann during this discussion. In a follow-up telegram to Truman, Weizmann said “I was especially heartened by your observations regarding the admission of Israel to the United Nations” (Weizmann to Truman, 26 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4- 2649. FRUS p947), whilst the US President told Acheson that he did not believe Israel’s position on refugees allowed the US to actively lend their support to their UN membership application. (Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 25 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-1949. FRUS p923) 118 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 25 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-1949. FRUS p923
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would lead to political turmoil in the Arab world, which would ultimately be against Israel’s interests. Whilst Acheson reassured the Israelis that their application for UN membership would continue to receive US support, he doubted that their present attitude could allow the US delegation to actively encourage other nations to vote for the resolution119.
The following day talks opened in Lausanne between the PCC and the Israeli delegation120. Israel used the opportunity to respond to Acheson’s implied threat with a warning of its own. Hirsch informed the PCC Commissioners that if the subjects of refugees and Jerusalem were debated in the GA, the Israeli delegation would be unable to discuss them at Lausanne. As this would slow progress at Lausanne and threaten the entire conference with collapse, the Delegation suggested to the Commissioners that they recommend to the GA that it refrain from debating those issues and leave them entirely to the Lausanne forum121. In private, the Commissioners disagreed strongly with the Israeli Delegation’s suggestion and unanimously agreed to decline the advice122. Rather than helping the progress at Lausanne, Ethridge advised the Department that his work would be made immeasurably more difficult if Israel received UN membership, forecasting that it would make the Zionist state even more intransigent123.
Eventually the US pressure had its desired effect, and the Israeli UN representative delivered a speech on 5 May to the Ad Hoc Committee with was markedly more conciliatory than any previous statement. The US were handed a copy of the speech first by the Ambassador who advised them that the statement was the result of the US suggestion124 and that it was a reflection of Israel’s attempt to meet the views of the US
119 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 26 April 1949. FRUS pp944-947. This position seems to have had the support of President Truman, who agreed with Acheson that Israel’s position on refugees was not satisfactory and therefore the US was unable to bring pressure on other delegations to vote for their application for UN membership. Memorandum of Conversation with the President, by the Secretary of State, 28 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-2849. FRUS p954 120 Walter Eytan, the Head of the Israeli Delegation had not yet arrived at Lausanne and the talks were held with his colleagues Gershon Hirsch and Eliahu Sassoon 121 Ethridge to Acheson, 28 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-2849. FRUS p955 122 UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Summary Record of the Forty-Sixth Meeting, 27 April 1949, A.AC.25//SR/46 123 Office Memorandum from UNP Mr Halderman to Mr Rusk, 29 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-2949 124 Acheson to Ethridge, 4 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-449. FRUS p979
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government125. The statement delivered by Eban maintained that while the refugee crisis was not of Israel’s making, she was still anxious to contribute to its resolution for humanitarian reasons and for the stability of the region. Eban restated Israel’s belief that the primary solution to the problem lay in the resettlement of the refugees in Arab countries where they would not cause minority issues and where they could be better assimilated economically, culturally and religiously. However, he did concede that;
“My government will be ready to make its own contribution to the solution of the problem. At present it is not yet ascertainable either how many wish to return under the conditions prescribed by the Assembly or how many Israel can receive in the light of political and economic considerations. The first objective at Lausanne will be to reach agreement by direct negotiations on the contribution to be made by each Government towards a settlement of this grave problem. The extent of my Government’s contribution will, inter alia, depend on the formal establishment of peace and relations of good neigbourliness between Israel and the Arab states.”126
On 10 May Israel followed up this statement with a response to the PCC’s 11 April memo127. The reply was conciliatory in tone and stated that the “Israeli delegation [is] prepared to tackle [the refugee problem] with sincerity and in spirit of optimism. We believe problem to be soluble and are prepared to do everything possible to help in arriving at solution. We shall cooperate with UN and with Arab states in implementing solution of problem on assumption that cooperation with Arab states will extend to other spheres as well”128. On the same day the Israeli delegation announced their willingness to sign a preamble of general principle at Lausanne129. It was hoped that the document would present a point of departure for the parties and help overcome the obstacles encountered thus far in negotiations. The document in question became the May Protocol, which was signed two days later on 12 May.
The combination of these steps was enough to satisfy President Truman, and on 12 May Ambassador Elath jubilantly reported to Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett that he had received information that the President had instructed Acheson to actively support
125 W Eytan to M Ethridge (Lausanne), 4 May 1949, State of Israel, p14 126 W Eytan to M Ethridge (Lausanne), 4 May 1949, State of Israel, p15-16 127 The 11 April memo offered Israel a number of suggestions as to how they might create an atmosphere more conducive to peace 128 Ethridge to Acheson, 10 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-1049. FRUS p992 129 Ethridge to Acheson, 10 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-1049. FRUS p993
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Israel’s application for UN membership. Israel’s ‘friends’ in the Whitehouse, David Niles and Clark Clifford, informed the Israeli’s that the decisive factor had been Weizmann’s visit to President Truman which had taken place on 25 April130.
This information from Clifford and Niles is difficult to believe in context of Truman’s next steps. Two days after Weizmann’s visit, Truman advised Acheson to withhold active support of the UN membership application131. The day after this (29 April), Truman wrote to Ethridge; “I am rather disgusted with the way the Jews are approaching the refugee problem. I told the President of Israel in the presence of his Ambassador just exactly what I thought about it”132. Yet Weizmann’s visits to President Truman had always had a profound affect on the American President. It is for this reason that the Jewish leadership constantly sent Weizmann to the White House at crucial points in Israel’s history and is no doubt why he was sent on his 25 April visit. Truman held the veteran Zionist leader in high regard and considered his promises to Weizmann as written in stone. The face of moderate Zionism, Weizmann was the only Zionist leader with sufficient influence over President Truman to usually get what he asked for. Weizmann had followed up his visit with Truman with a letter on 1 May outlining the soundness of Israeli policy and assuring his old friend “that the moderate tendencies which I try to represent would be greatly strengthened by Israel’s admission and weakened by any deferment”133. Apparently Truman was impressed by the letter, particularly on its provisions regarding Jerusalem134. Though Weizmann’s claim that UN membership would provoke a more moderate approach by Israel was in direct conflict with the view expressed by Ethridge, Truman chose to accept the President’s recommendation. It is most likely that it was this letter, along with the moves taken by Israel at Lake Success and at Lausanne, which prompted the President to change his mind and honour his election pledge of assisting Israel in joining the community of nations.
130 E Elath to M Sharett (Washington), 10 May 1949, State of Israel, p39 131 Memorandum of Conversation with the President, by the Secretary of State, 28 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-2849. FRUS p954 132 President Truman to Ethridge, 29 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-2949. FRUS p957 133 President Weizmann to President Truman (Washington), 1 May 1949, State of Israel, p6 134 E Elath to M Sharett (New York), 4 May 1949, State of Israel, p19
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Israel gained UN membership on 11 May 1949. The US had co-sponsored the draft legislation and actively lobbied for its support amongst other member states. The GA voted 27 to 12 in favour, with 9 abstentions, including the UK and Turkey. The Israeli Ambassador wrote Secretary Acheson, thanking him for his support in the resolution135. Acheson’s reply impressed upon Elath that the US government looked forward to witnessing the steps Israel was expected to take towards the repatriation of the refugees136.
The Arab reaction was expressed swiftly through the Egyptian Under Secretary of the Foreign Office, Hassouna Pasha, who described his feelings as “disillusioned acquiescence in an accomplished fact with regret that UN had found precipitate action necessary in respect of new state which had not yet shown regard for international obligations, respect for which customarily precedes recognition or acceptance into a fraternity of nations”137. Pasha questioned why Israel’s application for UN membership could not have been delayed until the September session when the results of the Lausanne Conference would have been known.
The reaction from the American staff working with the PCC was one of bitterness and betrayal. The Consul at Geneva, Harry Troutman, wrote to Acheson wondering why the US had co-sponsored the membership resolution when the delegation at Lausanne had received assurances that no such help would be given until Israel had reversed her position on refugees. Troutman was especially bitter that this assurance had been passed onto the Arab states, who were now questioning his integrity138. Troutman’s sense of betrayal was no doubt equalled by Ethridge, who recalled years later;
“I got a promise out of the President that we would withhold recognition of Israel in the UN. Hell, I hadn’t been out there a month before we moved for recognition of Israel in the UN. We moved it. We just didn’t vote for it, we moved it.”139
135 Elath to the Secretary of State, 11 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-1149. FRUS pp996-998 136 Acheson to Elath, 11 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-1149 137 Patterson to the Secretary of State, 12 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-1249 138 Troutman to the Secretary of State, 12 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-1249. FRUS p1003 139 Mark Ethridge, Oral History Interview, Truman Library, 4 June 1974
Kristen Blomeley 38 Chapter Two The 1949 Lausanne Conference
Chapter 2
The 1949 Lausanne Conference
The Lausanne Conference opened at the Hotel Beau Rivage on 27 April 1949. The format of the conference was quite unusual due to two conditions imposed by the Arab states. Firstly, the Arab delegates refused to deal with Israel directly. As direct negotiations would imply de facto recognition of the Zionist state, the Arabs were adamant that they would not sit at the same table with their Jewish counterparts. This led to a curious situation where the PCC was forced to act more as a go-between than a conciliatory body. Secondly, the Arab governments would only negotiate en bloc. This was an attempt to both express Arab solidarity and to strengthen their position140. Though this format applied to the formal sessions throughout the conference, in actual fact there were many informal bilateral meetings which took place between both the PCC and Israel and the individual Arab states.
The Israeli delegation was headed by Walter Eytan. Eytan was Director General of Foreign Affairs at the time and a long serving officer in the Jewish administration. He was aided by Elias Sassoon, Director of the Middle East Department of the Foreign Office, Gershon Meron, Director of the Economic Department of the Foreign Office and Gershon Hirsch, Acting Director of the Western European Department of the Foreign Office. The Head delegate for Transjordan was Fawzi Pasha Mulki, the Minister of Defence. The Transjordanian team consisted of several Palestinian representatives and also included the former Arab League Commander Major Radi Hindawi. The Egyptian delegates were led by Abdul Monem Mustafa, the Director of the Political Section in the Arab Affairs Department. He was assisted by Abdul Chafi Labbane, also of the Arab Affairs Department. Lebanon was represented by Fuad
140 The Arabs felt they had been blackmailed into signing the armistice accords through the threat of military force. See Burdett to the Secretary of State, 20 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-2049. FRUS p929
Kristen Blomeley 39 Chapter Two The 1949 Lausanne Conference
Ammoun (Head) and Jamil Mekaoui, the Minister at Bern, and Sabri Hamade, a Foreign Office Official. Syria was represented by Adnan Atassi, the Ambassador to Paris and Farid Zeineddin, the Ambassador to Moscow.
The initial talks at Lausanne proved only that the position of the protagonists had not changed since their last conversations with the PCC. The Arab states refused to discuss anything until the right of return had been accepted and Israel refused to address the refugee issue outside the framework of a general peace agreement. Whilst the Arab delegates would not discuss boundaries at all, the Israelis insisted on her right to keep all of the territories allotted to her under the partition of November 29th, plus all the territory which she acquired through the 1948 war141. As in the exchanges leading up to the conference, these diametrically opposed views brought the Commission’s work to a swift halt and left the Commissioners scrambling for a method to unlock the impasse. Firstly, pressure through both the UK142 and the US143 was placed on the Arab states to agree to accept the principle of resettlement. Secondly, pressure was kept up on Israel in Washington and at Lake Success to procure the long awaited conciliatory statement.
Interestingly, while Ethridge and Troutman were cabling the Secretary of State to exert pressure on Israel to be more generous in her negotiating positions, the Israeli delegation were attempting to enlist Washington to exert pressure on the PCC to be more sympathetic to their position; “I think the time has come for the exercise of some powerful pressure by the US Government on the work of the Conciliation Commission. A strong injection of realism and a sense of urgency administered by the State Department would do the Commission a lot of good”144.
The Lausanne Protocol
An opportunity to overcome the impasse was presented by the Israeli delegation. In a meeting with the PCC Eytan suggested that they formulate a statement of general principles such as those used by Dr Bunche to commence negotiations at Rhodes. In
141 W Eytan to M Sharett, 5 May 1949, State of Israel, p21 142 Acheson to Ambassador in London (Patterson), 29 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-2949 143 The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, 29 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-2949. FRUS pp959-960 144 W Eytan to M Sharett, 9 May 1949, State of Israel, p32
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aid of this, the Israeli delegation drew up a preamble and submitted it to the PCC145. The Israeli preamble was rather lengthy and mentioned the armistice agreements, the right of each state to security, freedom and sovereignty, the peaceful resolution of disputes and included an Article devoted to boundaries. The Article is very vague, stipulating only that the boundaries would be negotiated in a permanent settlement, with the proviso that these could be modified at a later date based on the needs and interests of each party. Importantly, the preamble did not make any reference to the refugee crisis146.
Largely ignoring the Israeli draft, the Commission met with all the delegates to procure their suggestions for the preamble. Based upon these discussions, the Commission Secretary, Pablo de Azcarate, drafted a ‘Declaration of Principles’ which would serve as a “basis of discussion for further negotiations and for further agreement”147. The preamble Azcarate presented to the Commission was brief and made reference to the November 29 resolution as the ‘base de travail’. When the Commission handed this to Eytan he found himself in a dilemma. The Israelis were reluctant to agree to the partition resolution forming the basis of discussion as their position was now that the armistice lines should become permanent, thereby allotting the new State approximately 26 percent more territory than she was awarded on 29 November. Yet Israel was reluctant to reject the resolution outright for two reasons. Firstly, Israel had evoked the same 29 November resolution as justification for her occupation of the Negev just a few weeks earlier and secondly, news of her refutation of the GA resolution would have travelled back to Lake Success and Washington and severely impaired her efforts to attain UN membership. Under such circumstances, Eytan decided to give his assent to the preamble, with the condition that it in no way bound Israel in her negotiating positions and that acquiescence on paper did not imply acquiescence in substance148. In his analysis, Eytan made an error of judgement which would come back to haunt Israel for many years. Eytan believed that Israel’s approval would be merely academic as the Arabs would not sign. Eytan’s reasoning was based on the fact that the Arabs had never before accepted partition or the
145 W Eytan to M Sharett (Lausanne), 3 May 1949, State of Israel, p12 146 W Eytan to M Ethridge (Lausanne), 4 May 1949, State of Israel, pp17-19 147 Azcarate 1966 p150 148 W Eytan to M Sharett, 9 May 1949, State of Israel, pp29-32
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existence of the State of Israel. Their signature on the document would imply acceptance of both.
When the Arab delegates were presented with the draft they insisted on two amendments. Firstly, that the preamble state that the first objective of conversation be the resolution of the refugee problem; and secondly, that a map of the 1947 partition lines be attached. Whilst the Commission and Israel agreed to the second amendment, the PCC was opposed to the first as they did not want the Lausanne discussions to be limited to the refugee issue alone. Through the Protocol the Commission was trying to link the two issues of refugees and territory in a form which would allow discussions to progress without having to put one before the other. The Arab states finally agreed to drop their insistence on prioritising the refugee problem and much to Eytan’s surprise, signed the Protocol149.
The preamble, which became known as the Lausanne Protocol, was signed on 12 May and is still seen as the finest, if not the only, accomplishment of the PCC. The Protocol represented a watershed in that it was the first time, and the last time until 1973, that an Arab state recognised the existence of a Jewish state on its doorstep. Whilst the Arab signing of the agreement was important for these reasons it also had significant practical benefits because it committed the Arab states to negotiate on all outstanding matters in conjunction with the refugee issue. Throughout the Lausanne conversations and the next few years the Arab governments would often justify their position through the Lausanne Protocol and used it as a symbol of international support for their position.
The May Protocol compelled the Israelis to recognise the borders contained in the 29 November resolution as a basis of discussion. It also required them to accept the 12 December resolution and its provisions regarding refugees (including paragraph 11 which calls for their repatriation inside Israel). Although the Israelis clearly signed the agreement to help secure their bid for UN membership, their signature on the Protocol was nevertheless significant.
It seems that Eytan may have immediately regretted signing the Protocol and was anxious to justify his decision to his Foreign Minister. Eytan explained to Sharett that
149 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 12 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-1249. FRUS pp998-999
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the “document in fact binds neither party to anything except [to] begin talking” and reassured his Minister that in the next meeting with the PCC the delegation had “stiffened necks” and presented a list of hardline positions where they declared that the Arab states had no rights in Palestine and that their armies should withdraw to the former international borders. The delegation also suggested a plebiscite in Arab Palestine and defended their entitlement to the Galilee. While Eytan reported that the Commissioners were “startled” and “confused”150, the report Ethridge sent back to Acheson does not seem to convey these emotions151. Rather than express shock and disappointment with Israel’s attitude, Ethridge clung to the hope that Eban’s statement at the UN would produce real gains. On 16 May, he cabled home to Washington that he was convinced that due to the pressure applied by the US and the UN debate, the Israeli’s would be willing to repatriate “more refugees that she was two months ago” and stated that he would press her to accept 250,000152. This in fact was the figure the Americans had in mind for Israel to accept.
Throughout the remainder of the conference Eytan and the Israeli delegation worked towards the elimination of what they perceived to be the main threat contained within the Lausanne Protocol; the use of the 29 November 1947 Partition resolution as the basis of discussion. In order to eradicate this provision in favour of the armistice lines, some clever political gymnastics would be required and Israel’s delegate at the UN, Abba Eban, was just the man for it.
By early June, Eban had constructed what he considered a water-tight argument in aid of eliminating the threat of the Protocol and a potential ‘revival of Bernadottism’, ie an imposed settlement which would undoubtedly be based on the Jessup Principle. Eban’s argument began by claiming that every inch of land that Israel currently occupied was sanctioned through the UN through the armistice agreements. These agreements effectively replaced the partition boundaries as they were agreed to by both parties and could only be changed by the mutual agreement of each party. The armistice agreements could therefore not be overturned by an external body, such as the UN, the PCC or even the US153. The result of this legal reasoning, Eban argued,
150 W Eytan to M Sharett, 14 May 1949, State of Israel, p51 151 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 17 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-1749. FRUS pp1018-1020 152 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 16 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-1649. FRUS pp1014 153 Eban to Eytan, 8 June 1949, State of Israel, p101
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was that Israel was currently in legal occupation of the land she held and her consent was legally required for her to give any of it up. When presented with this legal case the Commissioners were resolutely unimpressed and voted unanimously to reject replacing the partition lines with the armistice lines as the basis for discussion in light of the fact that both parties had formally endorsed the May 12 Protocol154.
As Eytan set about undoing the harm his signature on the Protocol had caused Israel’s negotiating position, the Arabs were interpreting the document in a unique way which essentially denied one of its greatest achievements. Though the Protocol effectively linked the issues of boundaries and refugees, the Arabs continued with their familiar position that the return of the refugees be given priority over the other issues155. The Commissioners were dismayed by this Arab abrogation and informed the delegates that they found their position unacceptable156.
The Arab demand to negotiate en bloc was by this time taking its effect on the pace and success of negotiations. Whilst appearing categorical in their demands at the formal meetings, each delegate was privately expressing a more reasonable attitude to the Commissioners once outside the conference rooms. Ethridge reported that at least two of the delegations would accept any peace plan imposed upon them and both the Syrian and Jordanian157 delegations had informally expressed their willingness to repatriate a substantial number of refugees. Ethridge concluded that “It is obvious that while Arab delegation are willing to tell me and perhaps other members of Commission what they want, they have not yet brought themselves to where they will tell each other”158.
The Arab en bloc format was not aided by the fact that the Arab delegates were as suspicious of each other as they were the Israelis159. Whilst displaying a belligerent attitude in regard to Israel in public forums, the Arab delegations were privately arranging direct talks with the Israeli representatives. Fawzi Mulki, the head of the
154 Hare to the Secretary of State, USNA 501.BB Pal/6-2049 155 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 17 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-1749. FRUS pp1018-1020 156 United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Summary Record of the Fifty-Ninth Meeting, 19 May 1949, A/AC.25/SR.59 157 Transjordan became known as Jordan in April 1949 158 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 9 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-949. FRUS p989 159 Ethridge was showing signs of frustration by 17 May and surmised that ‘at moment Arabs are mainly occupied watching each other’. Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 17 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-1749. FRUS pp1020
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Jordanian Delegation was the first to meet with Eytan on 3 May, followed by the Egyptian and the Lebanese delegations160. While it was the Israelis who usually initiated the contact, the Arab delegations appeared almost as anxious as their Jewish counterparts to meet away from the glare of the UN, not to mention their fellow Arab delegates. There they could negotiate more freely and with the ability to put their personal and countries’ interests first. The initial meetings produced little, but as Eytan concluded, were important in that first direct contact had been made161.
As the talks at Lausanne proceeded, conversations continued between Israel and Jordan through a ‘Special Committee’ which the two countries had formed to aid with the implementation of the armistice agreement. Though both parties seemed eager for an agreement the gulf between their demands proved insurmountable. The US Chargé in Transjordan reported that the talks were going the same way as the armistice negotiations, with Israel presenting her demands and threatening action if these were not met. Yet the King had learned his lesson from the armistice agreement. The anger and resentment the King had incurred since the signing of the agreement had the potentiality to threaten his and his government’s grip on power. Rather than signing another agreement with Israel, the King was willing to risk the military action Israel was implying162.
When Israel sent out feelers to Transjordan to launch secret negotiations away from the Lausanne format, the King was forced to decline for fear of the demands Israel would place on him163. Washington and London shared the King’s concerns, feeling that any agreement signed without the supervision of the PCC would not lead to a just settlement, and would instead create an unstable peace and political unrest throughout the region. With these fears in mind, both the US and UK strongly discouraged Abdullah from accepting the invitation164.
Towards the end of May frustration was mounting at Lausanne. Washington continued to exert pressure on Israel, demanding that now was the time to act on the
160 Israel and Syria were still in the middle of difficult armistice negotiations at Rhodes 161 Eytan to Sharett, 3 May 1949, State of Israel, p11 162 The Chargé in Transjordan to the Secretary of State, 24 May 1949. FRUS pp1049-1051 163 The Chargé in Transjordan to the Secretary of State, 26 May 1949. FRUS pp1056-1057 164 The Secretary of State to Ethridge, 1 June 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/6-149. Also see Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State, 16 June 1949, , USNA 501.BB Pal/6-1649. FRUS pp1144-1146
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promises she had made to the UN165. However, Ethridge was pessimistic that the speeches at the UN would turn into real guarantees and felt that the US support for Israel’s UN membership had undermined his authority with both the Israeli and Arab delegates. Demoralised and disaffected with the entire situation, including the support he was receiving from Foggy Bottom, Ethridge was now speaking of an impasse which might only be overcome at the next session of the GA in September166.
Ethridge’s fears that UN membership would increase Israeli intransigence were confirmed when he met with Eytan on 20 May. Back from a meeting with his Ambassador in Geneva, it was clear that Eytan had returned to Lausanne in an uncompromising mood. When Ethridge expressed the hope that Sharett had issued him with new instructions so as to break the stalemate, Eytan answered that, on the contrary, Sharett had been shocked at the PCC’s reaction to the Israeli position so far, and he had come back to restate these in order to demonstrate the ‘self-evident truth’ of their argument. Eytan then listed Israel’s full territorial demands on the Arab states;
6. Lebanon. Israel has no demands at the moment and agrees to accept the previous international boundary, with the proviso that if either party wishes to open negotiations to discuss border rectification it might be done. Upon questioning, Eytan admitted that Israel was interested in obtaining a slice of South-eastern Lebanon which she considered essential to her development schemes in the future;
7. Egypt. Israel wished the previous international border to remain the frontier between Egypt and Israel. This would mean that Israel would acquire the Gaza strip, including its current Arab population;
8. Syria. Israel made the same demands as the Lebanon case; acceptance of the previous international border with the understanding that in the future negotiations may be opened as to border rectification if either party so desired;
165 Secretary of State to the Israeli Ambassador, 18 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-1849. FRUS pp1021-1022 166 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 18 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-1849
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9. Jordan. Israel questioned the right of any Arab state to acquire territory in Mandatory Palestine through war. Eytan added that Israel was unhappy with the present line for water development reasons and therefore desired some extra territory in ‘Samaria’. Eytan explained that this would be compensated by handing Jordan a few villages in the Latrun area167.
Eytan then informed the Commissioners that Israel had no intention of giving up any areas which she currently occupied, including the Negev and Western Galilee. On the issues of refugees Eytan explained that the Arab states were only interested in the issue for political expediency and as such Israel was not willing to do more about it at this stage. Upon hearing Eytan’s statement, Ethridge became resigned to an imminent collapse of the talks168.
Rather than see his latest instructions as precipitating a breakdown of the Lausanne Conference, Eytan chose to press on with his program in hope that it might form the nexus of a peace agreement, if not between all of the Arab states, at least with Egypt. On 20 May, Israel formally informed the PCC that they were willing to accept the Gaza strip, including its residents, the majority of which were refugees. Believing that Egypt had no territorial ambitions in Palestine, Eytan thought that his offer was reasonable, if not generous, and that it should not cause much trouble to Egypt to accept. The only obstacle Eytan saw in obtaining agreement to the proposal was the PCC Commissioners, who were less than enthusiastic when they were presented with the offer. Fearing the reaction of the Arab delegates, the Commissioners declined to formally convey the proposal. Eytan saw this as yet another sign that the “Commission lacks guts” and called upon Eban and Elath to bring pressure on the Commission through Lake Success and Washington169.
Whilst the PCC were grappling with the Gaza proposal, the Arab delegates handed them a memo dated 21 May which listed their demands, framed within their particular interpretation of the May 12 Protocol. The memo stated that under the Protocol the most important aspect was the resolution of the refugee problem through the implementation of the 11 December Resolution. As a first step the Arab delegates
167 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 20 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-2049. FRUS pp1036-1037 168 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 20 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-2049. FRUS pp1036-1038 169 Eytan to Eban, 21 May 1949, State of Israel, pp58-59
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asked that the refugees be allowed to return immediately to the areas listed as Arab under the partition map which was attached to the Protocol. The memo concluded by pointing out that the steps Israel had taken in Jewish Jerusalem would be obstructive to a settlement on the Jerusalem question170. When questioned on the memo, Transjordanian delegate, Fawzi Mulki responded that the Arab states were unwilling to make any more concessions due to their belief that their signing of the Protocol, with the implicit recognition of partition, had been concession enough171. The Arabs clearly assumed that the next move would have to be made by Israel.
The Israelis reacted to the note with frustration and exasperation. In a formal reply, Eytan stated; “The memorandum as a whole is based on the particularist and unrealistic view of the Palestine question which has marked the approach of the Arab delegations throughout, and which fails altogether to take account either of the situation as it exists to-day [sic] or of the aim of peace we must strive to attain”. Eytan rejected the memo as a basis for discussion and implored the Commission to urge the Arab delegates to approach the issues at hand with greater realism172.
The Presidential note
Yet as Eytan was labelling the Arab position as unrealistic, particularist and dogmatic, moves were being made in Washington and Lake Success to turn up the heat on Israel. On 24 May, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, sent a proposed letter to Ethridge for his comments. The letter was to be sent to Ben-Gurion by President Truman and contained a firm rebuke of Israel’s stance at Lausanne thus far and a demand for her to bend her position in a manner more in line with UN and US policy. The note, which had not yet been seen by either the American Secretary of State or the President, concluded with a threat that the US would be “forced to the conclusion that a revision of its attitude towards Israel has become unavoidable”. Rusk cautioned Ethridge that the dispatch of the note would presuppose a decision that if Israel did not comply with the President’s demands firm action would follow173. Ethridge considered that the note would not be as effective as it might have been if issued earlier and before Israel’s views on refugees and territory had
170 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 23 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-2349. FRUS pp1043 171 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 28 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-2849. FRUS pp1071-1072 172 Eytan to Boisanger, 25 May 1949, State of Israel, pp64-65 173 Rusk to Ethridge, 24 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-2449. FRUS pp1051-1053
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fully crystallised, but nevertheless thought that it would strengthen his hand at Lausanne174.
Once Ethridge had given his approval, the Acting Secretary of State, James Webb, constructed a memorandum for the President outlining Israel’s behaviour at the Lausanne talks and in particular Eytan’s statement of 20 May. Webb then attached the draft letter to the memorandum. The memorandum concluded by warning the President that if the Israeli Government does not respond favourably to the note it will be necessary for the US administration to take stronger actions. In particular, the memorandum recommended; 1) refusal to send technical advisers to Israel or to allow the training of Israeli officials in the US; and 2) withholding approval for the allocating of the remaining $49,000,000 of the $100,000,000 loan approved to Israel from the Export-Import Bank. Acting Secretary Webb asked President Truman to think carefully about sending the note, as although the Department of State thought it absolutely necessary in order to protect US interests; it would undoubtedly arouse strong criticism in American Jewish circles175.
President Truman was no doubt impressed by his Acting Secretary’s argument because on 29 May the note bearing his signature was sent to Ambassador McDonald in Tel Aviv, to be hand-delivered to the Israeli Prime Minister. The US Ambassador recalled later the deep shock with which the letter was received by Sharett and Ben- Gurion176. While pressure from the State Department and the PCC had become almost expected in Israeli circles, the strongly worded note from the American President was unprecedented. Ben-Gurion immediately sat down to script an informal reply, which became the basis of an official reply one week later. In it Ben- Gurion restated that the Partition Resolution was no longer applicable due to the 1948 war which had been launched by Arab aggression. He went on to question to whom any territorial concessions were to be made. Finally he restated the Israeli policy that they were unable to accept the return of one refugee outside of a general peace agreement due to security concerns. He ended the statement defiantly by adding “the United States is a powerful country; Israel is a small and a weak one. We can be
174 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 26 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-2649. FRUS pp1043 175 Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President, 27 May 1949. FRUS pp1060-1063 176 McDonald, 1961, p166
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crushed, but we will not commit suicide”177. Israel then published a press release denouncing foreign intervention on the issues at hand178.
To defend themselves against the charges contained within the note and advocate their position the Israelis set about launching an ‘assault on all fronts’179. Representations were made at the UN, in the State Department and even within the White House. The Israelis were resentful of the US’ attempt to impose its will on a settlement rather than allowing the disputants to come to an agreement themselves180. In defence of their position the Israelis also went on the attack and strongly criticised the performance of the PCC. The Israelis suggested that the slow progress being made at Lausanne was in part due to the structure and actions of the Commission. Eban was critical that the three member body, representing three different countries, each with their own interests, in addition to their Secretariat, represented a “four ring circus”. Eban questioned the Commissioners commitment to their duties and accused them of doing everything within their power to discourage direct negotiations181.
Ethridge was clearly angered by the Israeli attempt to discredit the Commission, predicting that Israeli tactics were to work towards the “objective breaking up [of the] Lausanne Conference and blaming [the] PCC”. Ethridge defended the PCC’s failure to establish formal direct negotiations, claiming that no Arab state would agree to it and blaming Israel at the failure of the unofficial negotiations due to frequent press leaks emanating from Tel Aviv182.
On 8 June the GOI finally sent their formal reply to the Presidential letter. Israel defended the positions she had taken at Lausanne and blamed the Arab state’s unwillingness to enter direct negotiations and to discuss anything other than refugees as the cause of the stalemate. The note added another particularly audacious claim that Israel’s admittance to the UN showed that her position was acceptable to the GA. The letter challenged the Jessup principle and held that it was contrary to UN resolutions. Sharett defended Israel’s stance on refugees, explaining that while Israel was aware of the humanitarian aspects of the problem, their ability to contribute to the
177 McDonald, 1961, p166 178 Forsythe, 1972, p53 179 Eban to Sharett, 1 June 1949, State of Israel, p88 180 Eban to Sharett, 1 June 1949, State of Israel, p88 181 Ross to the Secretary of State, 1 June 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/6-149. FRUS pp1051-1053 182 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 8 June 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/6-849. FRUS pp1085-1086
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resolution of the problem was limited by both economic183 and security concerns. Sharett summed up that “Israel cannot in the name of humanitarianism be driven to commit suicide”. The note finished by expressing hope that it would “restore the sympathetic understanding of the United States Government for the problems and anxieties facing Israel”184.
The following day Deputy Under Secretary Rusk constructed a memorandum addressed to Acting Secretary Webb in order to discuss the note. Rusk saw the note as a firm rejection of US policy and UN resolutions. As such he saw no reason why the letter should ease the pressure on Israel and recommended the Department go to Phase Two of their initial plan by taking firm action towards the recalcitrant State. It was advised that Webb should discuss this matter with the President and procure his approval to investigate what options were at their disposal185.
Yet when Webb met with President Truman the response he encountered was not exactly what he anticipated. Apparently the President had read the Israeli reply with satisfaction and saw it as an indication that “Israel appeared to be reacting well to the essential objectives which he and the Department are trying to achieve”186. During the meeting Webb handed to Truman a memo which had been drafted within the Department which outlined the course of action the US might take to provoke a more conciliatory attitude in Tel Aviv. The steps included;
10. Immediate adoption of generally negative attitude toward Israel, including refusal of US assistance and no more than ‘a correct attitude’ towards Israeli officials and organisations
11. Export-Import Bank Loan. Should hold up allocation of the thus far unallocated $49,000,000 of the $100,000,000 earmarked loan for Israel from the Ex-Im Bank
183 Israel was at the time embarking upon a massive Jewish immigration drive, with large numbers of DPs from Europe and poorer classes from Northern Africa. This put a massive strain on the new State’s budget, because housing, work, food and all sorts of goods were in short supply. All of the new Governments resources were at the time utilized to support the push for new immigrants. For a thorough account of Israel in 1949 read; Segev 1986 184 Sharett to McDonald, 8 June 1949, State of Israel, pp107-111 185 Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State, 9 June 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/6-949. FRUS pp1107 186 Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State, 10 June 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/6-1049. FRUS pp1109
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12. United States Contributions to Israel. Re-examine if US contributions to the United Jewish Appeal and other Jewish fund-raising organisations should be exempted from income tax as having been made for charitable purposes, as such contributions are now of direct benefit to a sovereign foreign state
13. Reply to Israeli Note. A reply should be drafted which reiterates US expectations that Israel will take action along the lines suggested by the US187
Due to President Truman’s approval of Israel’s reply, the memorandum remained a dead letter188. Rather than imposing sanctions on Israel, the US reply sought only to clarify a few misunderstandings.
Mark Ethridge, on the other hand, did not share his President’s satisfaction with the Israeli reply and clearly infuriated, took the opportunity on 12 June, to vent his rage189. Ethridge opened by stating: “If there is to be any assessment of blame for stalemate at Lausanne, Israel must accept primary responsibility”. He goes on: “There has never been a time in the life of the commission when a generous and far- sighted attitude on the part of the Jews would not have unlocked peace”. Ethridge concluded with an ominous warning that if Israel failed to adopt a more generous attitude “there will be no peace in the Middle East, no security for Israel and no possibility of lifting the economic blockade with which she must remain a remittance- man nation”190.
The Gaza Proposal
As the Presidential note was being discussed in Washington and Tel Aviv, the Israeli delegation at Lausanne continued to advocate the Gaza Proposal. Whilst the proposal initially received little attention at the negotiating table, it did succeed in creating a diplomatic storm . The controversy arose not over the merit of the offer but its origins. On 20 May, Eytan formally proposed to the PCC that Israel take control of
187 Memorandum by the Department of State to the President, 10 June 1949. FRUS p1110 188 That Truman was contented by the note seems confirmed by Heyd’s report to Sharett that Abe Feinberg, a leading American Zionist Jew, had met with the President on 9 May to advocate Israel’s negotiating positions. Feinberg reported that Truman seemed impressed and was “not critical at all”. See Heyd to Sharett, 9 June 1949, State of Israel, p88 189 The Acting Head of the US Delegation, Raymond Hare, was also clearly incensed by Israel’s note. See Hare to the Secretary of State, 13 June 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/6-1349. FRUS pp1129-1130 190 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 12 June 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/6-1249. FRUS pp1124-1125
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Gaza and its population191. Eytan followed this up by writing a letter to the PCC explaining Israel’s reasons for making the offer. Eytan explained that it made both logistical and geographical sense for Israel to administer the region rather than Egypt as the Sinai Peninsula effectively isolated the small strip of land from mainland Egypt192. Later, Eban elaborated further on the motivations behind the offer, which combined to overcome the economic disadvantages the move would entail. The GOI were concerned by the prospect of Egyptian troops so close to their Capital and considered the security risk the extra Arab population would pose to be less than the risk of having the Gaza area in enemy hands193. Yet once President Truman’s note was delivered to Ben-Gurion on 29 May, Israel used the offer to gain some political advantage and alleviate the criticism emanating from Washington. With the full weight of American pressure bearing down on them and with diminishing hope that their friends in the White House could save them from the anger of the State Department194, Israel was very much on the back-foot and in need of some skilful diplomatic manoeuvring to save them.
Israel first made a move in this direction on 31 May, two days after Truman’s letter was handed to the Israeli Prime Minister. Herlitz, the Acting Director of the American Division of the Israeli Foreign Office spoke to US Ambassador McDonald in Tel Aviv and asserted that the offer was originally proposed by Ethridge to Eytan in Lausanne. Herlitz pointed out that the offer, which posed a tremendous financial burden on the burgeoning state due to the 250,000 – 300,000 inhabitants residing in the strip, had only received Israeli quiescence after lengthy debate in the Knesset195. Sharett took this theme up in his response to the American President’s letter, maintaining that the offer “came not from the delegation of Israel but from Mr Ethridge”196. Sharett was keen to have Ethridge appear as the source of the Gaza
191 Eytan to Eban, 21 May 1949, State of Israel, pp58-59 192 United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Submission of Communications - Letter from Israel, 30 May 1949, A/AC.25/IS.19 193 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistance Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs. 7 July 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/7-749. FRUS pp1208 194 Israel thought that they were losing the support of President Truman due to an anti-Israel State Department, headed by Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, with whom the President was renowned to share a close working relationship. See Elath to Sharett, 27 May 1949, State of Israel, p71 195 McDonald to the Secretary of State, 31 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-3149. FRUS pp1075 196 Sharett to McDonald, 8 June 1949, State of Israel, p107
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offer for dual purposes197. Firstly, by accepting the offer ostensibly proposed by Ethridge he could make it appear to be a major concession on Israel’s behalf. And secondly, as the offer was viewed as yet another land-grab by an expansionist Israel198, the claim that the offer was first conceived by the US would negate accusations to this affect199.
While the origins of the Gaza proposal were being debated, the offer itself was running into intense resistance from the Egyptians. The Egyptian Ambassador to the US labelled the offer “cheap barter” and contended that what was needed was for the refugees currently residing in the Gaza Strip to be permitted to return to their homes in Mandatory Palestine. The Ambassador also hinted that Egypt would soon have some minor border rectification proposals of their own to bring forward200. Ethridge suggested that Israel may have been responsible for the emphatic Egyptian rejection of the proposal through their leak of the offer as soon as they had formally suggested it to the PCC201. Due to pressures from their population and the other Arab states, Egypt was hardly in a position to discuss the offer publicly.
With the Lausanne conversations languishing in a state of deadlock, the Americans began to see the proposal as their best, if not only, hope for a solution. Though the State Department did not particularly favour the proposal in the form it had been made, they nonetheless thought it was something to work on and shape to its own idea of a just settlement. In line with US policy, this entailed adding the Jessup formula to the proposal. In practice this meant that Egypt would receive territorial compensation for the land they would cede in Gaza, if they indeed desired it202. The Americans
197 Morris also claims that the origin of the plan was deliberately obscured by Israel due to its diminishing enthusiasm for the scheme upon a) learning the true number of refugees residing in the Strip (200,000 – 250,000) and failing to receive a positive Egyptian response. Morris 2004 p565 198 Wilkins from the US Department of Near Eastern Affairs described the offer as ‘refugees for real estate’. See Memorandum of Conversation, by Deputy Under Secretary of State, 28 July 1949, 501.BB Pal/7-2849. FRUS p1264 199 Eban tried another tactic at the UN when speaking to US Delegate Ross. Eban claimed that Egypt had first approached Israel with the offer, but for ‘tactical reasons’ were reluctant to propose it themselves. See Ross to the Secretary of State, 1 June 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/6-149 200 The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt, 11 June 1949. FRUS p1116 201 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 2 June 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/6-249. FRUS pp1086 202 Ethridge elaborates on this idea in Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 12 June 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/6-1249. FRUS pp1024-1025
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thought there was a good chance of Egypt accepting the offer in this form and thereby instructed their delegation at Lausanne to pursue the proposal203.
By this time Ethridge had left Lausanne to return to the US. Eytan reported that he had left the conference with “great bitterness”204 and indeed the reports he sent back to Washington confirm this205. The US had not yet found a replacement for Ethridge so acting in his place was Raymond Hare, the Under Assistant Secretary of Near Eastern, African and South East Asian Affairs. Hare had been at Lausanne with Ethridge so was well versed to take on the role, but he was forced to continue with a conference which was for all intents and purposes going nowhere. All delegations were frustrated and growing increasingly impatient with the Commission and the US. The Department of State continued to vent its wrath upon the Israelis, wondering why they found it possible to absorb 230,000 refugees plus 80,000 normal Arab inhabitants if they gained possession of the Gaza strip, yet none whatsoever without territorial acquisition206.
It was around this time in mid-June that the Americans started to discuss a recess at Lausanne in order to allow the delegates to return to their capitals and hopefully come back with different instructions to break the deadlock. Ethridge was keen to recess until 15 August and reconvene in New York, one month before the GA assembly would meet for the September session207. The logic of this was to have the full force of the UN felt at the next round of negotiations, with the accompanying threat that a continued stalemate would result in the matter being handed back once more to the international community. The Turkish and French representatives on the PCC, Yalcin and Boisanger, were furious at this proposal and suggested instead a three week recess until 20 July which would give the parties time to reconsider their proposals and come back to Lausanne with something more helpful208. Washington was also
203 The Acting Secretary of State, 4 June 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-2849. FRUS pp1090-1091 204 Eytan to Sharett, 13 June 1949, State of Israel, p121 205 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 12 June 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/6-1249. FRUS pp1024-1025 206 The Secretary of State to Hare, 14 June 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/6-1449 207 Elath to Sharett, 14 June 1949, State of Israel, p130 208 Eytan to Eban, 15 June 1949, State of Israel, p132
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reluctant to give up on the Lausanne conversations just yet209 and contrary to the advice of both Hare210 and Ethridge, recommended the three week recess211.
Having decided on the recess the US set about making productive use of the time by concentrating on what they considered the best chance for an agreement thus far; the Gaza Proposal. For this purpose the US decided to extend their ‘good offices’ to Egypt and Israel by inviting their UN representatives to stay in New York to discuss the matter212. While Israel was ready to accept the offer it was anticipated that there would be more difficulty in persuading Egypt to attend. To overcome this problem, Washington attempted to enlist the services of the UK as it was thought that London’s close ties with Cairo could persuade her to show more flexibility213. However, London declined the request, explaining that their Foreign Office thought it best that Egypt keep the strip and Israel accept 150,000 refugees from another area214.
Undeterred, the US State Department pressed on with the Gaza Proposal. Washington employed a two-pronged strategy where they firstly encouraged Israel to make a commitment to repatriate a substantial number of refugees without the Gaza scheme215, and secondly utilised some strongly worded diplomacy to persuade Egypt to consider the proposal. The US met with hostile resistance on both fronts, particularly in their endeavour to persuade Egypt to come to New York. When the American Chargé in Cairo, Patterson met with Egyptian Foreign Minister, Khashaba Pasha, he found him in an irritable mood, which only increased when he was confronted by the American accusation that his government had displayed a “negative attitude” towards the solution of the refugee problem. Pasha questioned how Egypt’s steady insistence on the implementation of UN resolutions could be called negative and labelled the Gaza Proposal a reward to Israel for merely fulfilling her UN
209 Webb reasoned that a long recess might produce a psychological atmosphere unfavourable to further negotiations. See The Acting Secretary of State to Hare, 21 June 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/6- 2149. FRUS pp1164 210 Raymond Hare disagreed with this decision, questioning what use a small recess would have and encouraging Webb to reconsider Ethridge’s suggestions in order to make use of GA pressure. See Hare to the Secretary of State, 20 June 1949, , USNA 501.BB Pal/6-2049. FRUS pp1155 211 The Acting Secretary of State to Hare, 18 June 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/6-1849. FRUS pp1155 212 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State, 25 June 1949. FRUS pp1177-1178 213 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 25 June 1949. FRUS p1179-1180 214 The Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State, 28 June 1949. FRUS p1180 215 See McDonald to the Secretary of State, 28 June 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/6-2849. FRUS pp1190
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obligations. Although clearly unenthusiastic about the scheme, the Foreign Minister did agree to discuss the matter further with his Prime Minister216.
Meanwhile Egypt was not the only party alarmed at US support for the Gaza Proposal. Eytan predicted that Secretary Acheson, who was back in Washington to resume his role, would use the opportunity to enforce his concept of territorial compensation. Eytan was concerned that Egypt would agree to the Gaza Proposal if they were offered territory elsewhere, most likely in the Negev, forcing Israel into a very awkward position where they may have to retract their support for the offer217. Apparently unconcerned about or oblivious to Eytan’s anxiety, Eban lobbied hard for the Gaza Proposal in New York. Eban considered the security implications of Egyptian troops so close to the heart of Israel to be of paramount importance and was very eager to assume control of the area for this reason. Eban framed his argument around the concept of security, maintaining that Israel could only consider such a sizeable absorption of refugees if their other security concerns were diminished, as in the Gaza Proposal218.
The deliberations and discussions within Israeli diplomatic circle were academic only at this stage as Egypt was showing no inclination to reconsider the offer. The British made a small attempt to change her mind but their efforts were extremely limited as they did not believe in the justness of the scheme themselves219. Rather than advocate the Gaza Proposal, which the British thought only covered an isolated aspect of negotiations, the British Foreign Office drew up an Eight Point Plan which sought to incorporate the proposal into wider aspects of the Arab-Israeli dispute220. Aware that any successful peace plan would need the backing of the US, the British sent the plan to Washington for comment. The plan and the US State Department (SD) comments (in italics) are listed below:
216 Patterson to the Secretary of State, 27 June 1949. FRUS pp1188-1189 217 Eytan to Sharett, 1 July 1949, State of Israel, p191. It seems that Israel may have been willing to cede some territory as compensation for Gaza in the Northern Negev (Sharett to Elath, 21 July 1949, State of Israel, p237). This would most likely have been rejected by Israel as what they most desired was a land bridge to the Arab world which would have involved assuming control of land in the Southern Negev (Patterson to the Secretary of State, 19 July 1949. FRUS p1243 (in footnote)) 218 Eban to McGhee, 8 July 1949, State of Israel, p212 219 Douglas to the Secretary of State, 15 July 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/7-1549 220 British Palestine policy at the time was centred on their support for the annexation of Arab Palestine into Transjordan, which would protect British strategic interests in this area. Pappé contends that the Eight Point Plan was fundamentally an attempt by Britain to receive international endorsement of their Greater Transjordan policy. See Pappé 1988 p121
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14. Acceptance of refugees by Arab and Israelis for resettlement and repatriation. SD: Department agreed and expected Israeli could not repatriate more than quarter million;
15. Gaza strip proposal should be accepted on conditions safeguards to Arab population and territorial compensation SD: Department agree but specify Egypt must first want territorial compensation;
16. Israel should make territorial compensation for areas it occupies outside of the 1947 boundaries. SD: Department agreed but stated US would accept agreement if parties agreed without compensation;
17. If compensation took form of a land bridge through the Negev between Egypt and Jordan, Israel should be guaranteed freedom of access to the Red Sea – FonOff believed territorial continuity between Arab states most important element in settlement as far as Arabs were concerned. SD: Department enquired how much territory envisaged for this;
18. Free port at Haifa. SD: Department doubted possibility or desirability of port completely free of Israeli control;
19. Partition of Jerusalem with international supervision, particularly of Holy Places. SD: Department agreed in general;
20. Incorporation of Arab Palestine into Jordan. SD: Department agreed;
21. Israel and Arab states should agree to share waters of Jordan and Yamuk. SD: Department agreed221.
In the end the push for the Gaza Proposal had to be abandoned by the Americans due to the uncompromising stand by the Egyptians. Egypt was not ready to give up the one gain it had obtained from an unfortunate and humiliating war. The transfer of 300,000 inhabitants of Gaza to Israel threatened to make the Egyptian government as unpopular and hated as Abdullah after he handed over the fifteen villages in the Arab
221 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 13 July 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/7- 1349. FRUS pp1223-1224
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Triangle to Israel under the armistice agreement222. The American pursuit of the Gaza Proposal served only to further strain relations between Egypt and the US, with the Egyptian Foreign Minister expressing surprise that the US would lend itself to such a “disreputable scheme”. The Egyptians viewed American support of the plan as another sign of it helping an expansionist and aggressive Israel223. The formal Egyptian rejection of the proposal which came on 25 July was the final nail in the proposal’s limited and unsuccessful life and signalled an end to the whole unhappy affair.
The 100,000 offer
While the Gaza Proposal was being taken up by the Americans, the Israelis had largely moved on and were preoccupied with what they considered to be more important matters. Throughout June they were growing increasingly alarmed by reports that they were losing the support of their long-term ally, US President Truman. The Jews had always been convinced that there was a pro-Arab (and some even said anti-Semitic) disposition in the State Department, but felt that their friends in the White House; David Niles224 and Clark Clifford, were able to ensure that they could rely on the President’s support whenever times got tough. However, recent reports from the White House warned that the President was extremely concerned about the refugee issue for humanitarian reasons and was growing impatient with Israel for her refusal to make any firm gesture towards repatriation225. At the time Truman was trying to procure funding from Congress to finance the needs of the Palestinian Arab refugees, and was running into trouble. Many Congress members objected to the US ‘picking up the tab’ when Israel refused to accept any responsibility herself. Eban quickly realised the enormous implications for Israel if she lost Truman’s support and determined that a gesture on Israel’s behalf would make the President’s life easier and in turn theirs226.
222 It was later learned that contrary to the Armistice Agreement, Israel had effectively expelled all of the Arab refugees residing in the villages she gained from Jordan through the agreement. See Burdett to the Secretary of State, 15 August 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/8-1549. FRUS pp1314 223 Patterson to the Secretary of State, 19 July 1949. FRUS p1243 (in footnote) 224 An emphatic supporter of Zionist aims, David K Niles worked in the White House as Administrative Assistant to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman from 1942 to 1951 225 Eban to Sharett, 22 June 1949, State of Israel, p150 226 Eban to Sharett, 22 June 1949, State of Israel, p150
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On 25 July, Sharett alerted Eban that he was considering making an offer towards repatriation in order to pacify the US. Sharett reasoned that 25,000 refugees had already made their way back to Israel, if this figure was added to the family reunification scheme to which Israel had already pledged their support, and if Israel announced their intention to repatriate an additional 50,000 refugees; the total figure might be substantial enough to appease the Americans. The main concern which preoccupied Sharett in making the offer was whether it would alleviate the pressure coming from Washington or if it would only yield more227.
Sharett’s equivocal stance on the issue may have been altered by reading a report from his colleague in Washington. Heyd warned that Israel was losing support and prestige at all levels of American society, from Supreme Court judges to the man on the street. The Americans were bitter that, having only just overcome their own refugee crisis, the Jews were refusing to show any remorse or sympathy for the creation of another. Heyd strongly advised that in order for Israel to diffuse the situation and save her worsening relationship with the US, she make a concrete statement contributing to the alleviation of the refugee’s suffering228.
As a result of the mounting US pressure229, Sharett advised Eban on 6 July to informally approach the Americans with what would become known as the 100,000 offer. The 100,000 number was to include the refugees who had already found their way back into Israel and the refugees which would be approved under the family reunification scheme. This in effect meant that under the 100,000 offer the GOI was pledging herself to absorb an additional 60,000 – 65,000 refugees outside of her pre- existing commitments230. Sharett asked Eban to approach the Americans privately before making the offer and assess if it would alleviate the pressure on Israel. If
227 Sharett to Eban, 25 June 1949, State of Israel, p176 228 Heyd to Herlitz, 1 July 1949, State of Israel, p194 229 McDonald reported that what had impressed Ben-Gurion most as to the need for Israel to make a conciliatory gesture was the ‘advice’ given by the US that international financial assistance would not be forthcoming to assist in repatriation and resettlement until the parties committed themselves to accepting a certain number of refugees each. See McDonald to the Secretary of State, 28 July 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/6-2849. FRUS pp1265 230 It was later estimated that the number of refugees to be repatriated under the family reunification scheme would be less than 25,000. This means that only an additional 50,000 refugees would be allowed to return under the 100,000 offer. See McDonald to the Secretary of State, 6 July 1949. FRUS p1206
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Washington proved unenthusiastic about the offer then he advised it should not be announced231.
Rather than approach the Americans himself, Eban used Andrew Cordier, the Executive Assistant to the UN Secretary General, as his intermediary232. Cordier’s enquiries found that the US State Department found the figure too low and he suggested Israel keep with the Gaza Proposal for the moment and see where that went233.
Yet the disapproval of the State Department was not enough to convince Israel to drop the offer, or even increase it, as the Department was not really their true target. It was the approval of President Truman which the GOI were seeking. To help them gauge the President’s feelings regarding the proposal, the Israelis once again enlisted the help of an intermediary. This time they selected Major General John Hilldring, who had been sent by the President on a tour of the Middle East to assess the situation. The General was due to report his findings so Israel took the opportunity to ask him to mention the 100,000 offer and assess his reaction. Hilldring reported that while the President had the figure of 250,000 in mind (the same as his State Department), he nevertheless seemed pleased with the 100,000 offer and thought it might break the current deadlock. Truman did however refuse to issue a formal statement of agreement to Israel which Hilldring concluded might mean he was looking for a better deal234.
Having acquired a positive reaction from the American President, the Israelis found new impetus to press forward with their 100,000 offer. Sharett acted by instructing Ambassador Elath to formally propose the offer to Secretary Acheson235. Elath was ordered to make clear, however, that the Gaza Proposal and the 100,000 offer were mutually exclusive and could not under any circumstance be implemented in conjunction with each other236.
231 Sharett to Eban, 6 July 1949, State of Israel, p207 232 Cordier was a close ally of Israel and a valuable source of information for the Israeli leadership 233 Lourie and Rafael to Sharett, 12 July 1949, State of Israel, p219 234 Lourie to Sharett, 19 July 1949, State of Israel, p227 235 The offer was first conveyed to Secretary Acheson by General Hilldring on 25 July. See Major General John H Hilldring to the Secretary of State, 25 July 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/7-2549. FRUS pp1249-1252 236 Sharett to Elath, 21 July 1949, State of Israel, p237
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On 28 July, Ambassador Elath met with Dean Rusk and two colleagues (George McGhee, from the Department of Near Eastern and African Affairs and Fraser Wilkins, from the Department of Near Eastern Affairs), and formally submitted the offer. Elath explained that his government had made the decision to allow 100,000 refugees to return to; 1) demonstrate Israel’s cooperation with the US; and 2) to contribute what it could to the solution of the refugee problem. Elath also explained that the offer could only be implemented through the signing of formal peace agreements with the Arab states and that the present SC arms embargo would stay in place. When questioned if the number could be increased Elath was adamant that this figure was the highest possible number Israel would consider237. On the same date the offer was also conveyed to Ambassador McDonald in Tel Aviv and to the PCC, which had reconvened in Lausanne.
The offer to the PCC was made in a slightly different manner than in Washington and Tel Aviv. Israel merely stated that it was ready to commit itself to repatriate a ‘specific number’ of refugees outside the context of a final settlement238. The Israeli delegation outlined two conditions to the offer; 1) that an overall plan for repatriation and resettlement be drawn up along with the means to put it into operation, as Israel did not want to accept refugees under US pressure only to find that the remainder continued in relief camps; and 2) that there must be evidence that real progress was being made towards a final settlement239. On 2 August the Arab delegations accepted these terms as a basis for discussion.
In the meantime Israel continued to receive more encouragement from the White House. On 28 July Ambassador Elath met with President Truman and discussed the offer. Truman apparently “expressed his satisfaction” with Israel’s cooperative attitude and stressed that the plight of the refugees was of the greatest concern to his government.240 Elath did warn however, that Truman appeared to lack knowledge on
237 Memorandum of Conversation, by Deputy Under Secretary of State, 28 July 1949, 501.BB Pal/7- 2849. FRUS pp1261-1264 238 Porter to the Secretary of State, 28 July 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/7-2849. FRUS p1266 239 Porter to the Secretary of State, 28 July 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/7-2849. FRUS p1266 240 There was some confusion over exactly what transpired in Ambassador Elath’s meeting with President Truman. Eban apparently reported to Rueven Shiloah that Truman had declared to Elath that he would personally oppose any attempt to take the Negev away from Israel. Having learned of this, Acheson requested his delegation at Lausanne to restate US policy regarding settlement of the dispute and make them aware that there was no difference of opinion in this matter between the President, the
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the subject and therefore might still be susceptible to the influence of the State Department241. Truman was undoubtedly impressed with what Elath had to say and told his Secretary that “his attitude was more conciliatory” than previously242. The threat of losing Truman’s friendship having abated, Eban surmised that Israel could now take a stronger line regarding the territorial issues at hand243.
On 3 August the PCC conveyed to Israel the Arab delegation’s acceptance of the offer forming the basis of discussion. Reuven Shiloah, who had taken over from Walter Eytan as the head of the Israeli Delegation at Lausanne, then took the opportunity to elaborate on the offer. He advised the PCC that the number of refugees Israel was willing to accept under the offer was 100,000. This figure was based on Israel retaining all of the territory she currently occupied. The refugees would not be returning to their own homes but rather to locations to be prescribed by the GOI. Finally, the offer did not contain an acceptance of responsibility for the refugee crisis, merely recognition of the problem244.
At hearing the figure the Commissioners were appalled and selected not to formally transmit the offer to the Arabs for fear of its instant rejection. Informal conversations with the Arabs however did reveal a highly antagonistic reaction to the figure of 100,000. The newly appointed US delegate, Paul Porter, described the Arab response as a “violent reaction” where the offer was dismissed as “mere tokenship”245. The US Consul in Jerusalem also joined the chorus of those disparaging the offer. Burdett rejected the idea that the offer represented a fulfilment of Israel’s responsibilities under Resolution 194 and dismissed it contemptuously as a “sham” to “fit him (the refugee) as [a] cog in Israeli collective society”246.
The PCC Commissioners were no more sympathetic to the offer than the Arab delegations. Porter had only recently received instructions from Secretary Acheson that the figure the State Department believed Israel could absorb was a total of
State Department and the US Delegation at Lausanne. See The Secretary of State to Porter, 9 August 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/8-149. FRUS pp1291 241 Elath to Sharett, 28 July 1949, State of Israel, p261 242 Memorandum by the Secretary of State, 1 August 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/8-149. FRUS p1272. Truman Library, Papers of Dean Acheson, Memoranda of Conversation, Jan – July 1949, Box 64 243 Eban to Shiloah, 28 July 1949, State of Israel, p258 244 Porter to the Secretary of State, 5 August 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/8-549. FRUS p1281-1282 245 Porter to the Secretary of State, 5 August 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/8-549. FRUS p1287 246 Burdett to the Secretary of State, 2 August 1949, FRUS pp1277
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400,000 Arab refugees and residents. According to Israel there was already 150,000 Arabs residing in Israel, which would imply that Israel was expected to receive an additional 250,000 Arab refugees247. When Porter conveyed his disappointment at the offer to Shiloah and asked him if it was possible for the offer to be increased, Shiloah responded that “US policy [was] linked to no specific refugee figure and that [the] Israel proposal did not necessarily produce adverse reaction in Washington”248. While Porter requested Secretary Acheson to make the State Department’s position clear to Ambassador Elath so that there would be no more confusion, it is more likely that Shiloah was referring to Pennsylvania Avenue rather than Foggy Bottom249. As the Israelis thought they had done enough to retain the friendship of the President they were relatively unconcerned how the offer was received in Lausanne or at the State Department. When Shiloah expressed his concern to his Minister regarding the hostile reception the 100,000 offer had received, Sharett responded that he should not be alarmed as he believed the offer had improved their tactical position and had alleviated the risk of a UN imposed agreement250.
In the end the 100,000 offer suffered the same ignominious fate as the Gaza Proposal. The Arabs dismissed the offer as totally insufficient and contrary to the Lausanne Protocol. They pointed out the inconsistency of Israeli policy in that the GOI claimed they could not afford to accept a substantial return of refugees while they were actively encouraging Jewish immigration in large numbers from around the world251. In the end it is doubtful whether the Zionists considered the Arab rejection as a failure, for it had won them a valuable diplomatic victory in the White House.
The Zaim initiative
Whilst the Lausanne Conference was showing little signs of a successful conclusion, hopes for peace were raised by an unexpected overture from the new Syrian leader, Colonel Hussni Al-Zaim. Taking advantage of the widespread discontent which had arisen as a consequence of the 1948 war, Colonel Zaim had seized power in
247 The Secretary of State to Porter, 28 July 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/7-2849. FRUS p1267 248 Porter to the Secretary of State, 5 August 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/8-549. FRUS p1288 249 Elath to Sharett, 9 August 1949, State of Israel, p310 250 Sharett was referring to the two-thirds majority vote which would be needed at the GA to impose a settlement upon Israel and the Arab states. See Sharett to Shiloah, 10 August 1949, State of Israel, p313 251 Rockwell to the Secretary of State, 16 August 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/8-1649. FRUS p1319
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Damascus after a bloodless coup on 30 March. Shortly thereafter, Zaim dissolved the Syrian parliament and assumed executive power. On 28 April it was reported that Colonel Zaim had expressed his willingness to repatriate 250,000 refugees as part of a general settlement, provided he received “realistic land adjustments” and was “given substantial development aid in addition to compensation for refugee losses”252. It was envisaged that the refugees would be settled in the Jazireh area in northern Syria which was both fertile and relatively unpopulated. Several factors prompted Zaim’s offer. Firstly, Zaim was less concerned about political rivalries than he was the economic development of his country. He saw the refugee issue as an opportunity to both boost his country’s population and secure significant international funds. Secondly, the Colonel was also worried about the instability the presence of the 100,000253 refugees currently residing within the Syrian border might cause to his regime. Like the Americans, Zaim felt that their misery presented a real opportunity to the Soviets to penetrate the Middle East and he was anxious to eliminate this threat254.
Zaim followed his overtures with an invitation for direct negotiations with Israel outside of the Rhodes and Lausanne contexts. By appealing for direct negotiations, Zaim hoped to circumvent the armistice agreement stage and negotiate a peace settlement without delay. Whilst Zaim was anxious for a peace agreement which in turn would resolve the refugee crisis, he was also clear that he expected a settlement to represent a give and take situation where concessions would have to be made on both sides255. The concession Zaim had in mind was a border adjustment in Syria’s favour between the two States. Zaim did not specify exactly how much land the border adjustment would entail.
Dr Bunche, who was at the time bogged down in the difficult armistice negotiations between Syria and Israel, saw Zaim’s offer as the best opportunity for armistice and peace he had yet seen256. Israel had just rejected a compromise proposal drawn up by
252 Keeley to the Secretary of State, 28 April 1949, FRUS p962 (footnote) 253 100,000 was the total estimated Palestinian refugees residing in Syria in 1949 according to reports the Americans received from the US Embassy in Cairo. McGhee, 1983, p28 254 Keeley to the Secretary of State, 2 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-249. FRUS pp965-966 255 Keeley to the Secretary of State, 28 April 1949, FRUS p962 (footnote) 256 The major point of dispute between Israel and Syria in the Armistice negotiations was the stretch of land Syria had occupied beyond the previous international boundary in former Mandatory Palestine.
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Bunche and he was clearly exasperated by the position of the GOI which he labelled “recalcitrant”257. In hope to overcome the impasse, he wrote to Ben-Gurion on 9 May inviting him to enter direct conversations with Zaim, in which the UN would “provide every assistance”258. To Bunche’s disappointment the GOI rejected his invitation, insisting that direct contact could only be made after the signing of an armistice agreement259.
However by this time the Department of State had had time to consider Zaim’s proposal and agreed with Bunche that it represented the best opportunity to date. Acheson labelled the offer “humane and statesmanlike” and foresaw that “if exploited [the] back of [the] refugee problem can be broken”. Acheson instructed his Chargé in Syria to pursue the offer but to avoid any direct commitment as to US financial backing of the proposal due to his apprehension that this assistance could then be interpreted as US bribery of the Arab states to accept refugees260.
In Tel Aviv, Ambassador McDonald approached Ben-Gurion on the matter and was met with determined resistance. Ben-Gurion was inherently suspicious of the Army Chief who had snatched power from the democratically elected Prime Minister and described him as a “little Mussolini”261. Once again Ben-Gurion insisted that an armistice agreement must be signed before direct talks between the two countries could take place. Israel was particularly anxious for the signing of an armistice which included her territorial demands due to the extreme importance she attached to the armistice lines262. Although the Armistice Agreements specifically stated that their contents did not prejudge the outcome of a final settlement, Israel had always considered that the armistice lines would act as the basis for permanent status talks.
Israel considered this land to belong to them and demanded Syria withdraw while Syria protested that as the land had been conquered before the first truce, it formed legitimate war booty. 257 Austin to the Secretary of State, 13 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-1349. FRUS pp1005-1007 258 Austin to the Secretary of State, 9 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-949 259 Austin to the Secretary of State, 13 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-1349. FRUS p1007 260 The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria, 13 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-1349. FRUS pp1007-1008 261 McDonald to the Secretary of State, 16 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-1649 262 The Chargé in Damascus, Keeley, summed up Israel’s position regarding the importance she attached to the armistice lines in regard to her position in the armistice negotiations; ‘Israeli contention that natural boundary desired by Syria as armistice demarcation line might become permanent alteration in frontier between two countries seeks to confirm Syria’s conviction that if Syria retires to old political frontier as armistice demarcation line, Israel will subsequently accept no alteration in that frontier particularly as Syria knows of no offer of Israel to withdraw from Western Galilee or other areas outside partition frontiers as earnest of willingness to have final sovereignty all such areas for determination in peace talks.’ (Keeley to the Secretary of State, 1 May 1949, FRUS p961
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Ben-Gurion was thereby eager to acquire a signed document establishing Israel’s control over the territory up to the previous international border. Only once Israel was in possession of Syria’s acquiescence on this point would she feel comfortable to enter peace talks with Zaim.
Ben-Gurion’s resistance was received in Damascus with anger and condemnation. US Ambassador Keeley railed against Israel’s refusal to even discuss the matter with Zaim. Keeley attested to Colonel Zaim’s sincerity and broadminded attitude in making the offer and deplored Israel’s steely resistance to any proposal that involved a quid pro quo. Keeley concluded that Israel wanted “its cake and gravy as well”. The most serious point Keeley raised was the negative effect of this attitude on the Arab states. The Ambassador observed that the Arabs were quickly realising that peace could only be reached with the GOI if they made all the concessions and got nothing in return. As such the Arab governments were resigning themselves to a long and protracted conflict with their Jewish neighbour263.
Whilst the Zaim proposal met with diplomatic resistance from Tel Aviv, Dr Bunche submitted a new compromise proposal which reflected significant gains to Israel, including the withdrawal of all Syrian troops from all territory outside its former international border264. Syria finally succumbed to the demands and the Armistice Agreement was signed on 20 July.
Zaim continued to be tempted by the economic advantages presented by the absorption of the refugees into Syria and concerned about the threat of Soviet penetration the presence of the refugees offered265. Yet Zaim did not operate in a political vacuum and as with Abdullah in Jordan, was reluctant to unilaterally enter an agreement with Israel without the support of his Arab ‘allies’ or a Big Power. Zaim signalled to the US that he was eager for an agreement involving large-scale Syrian resettlement of the Palestinian refugees but that he would require the US to lead the initiative in order to be able to sell it to the “powerful opposition” which would accuse him of “selling out to the Jews and their backers”266. Yet Zaim met with the same brick wall his Arab counterparts had encountered in their calls for a US imposed
263 Keeley to the Secretary of State, 19 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-1949. FRUS pp1031-1032 264 Austin to the Secretary of State, 25 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/7-2549. FRUS pp1053-1055 265 Keeley to the Secretary of State, 14 July 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/7-1449. FRUS pp1226 266 Keeley to the Secretary of State, 14 July 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/7-1449. FRUS pp1226
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settlement267. Acheson politely refused Zaim’s request and encouraged him to make his proposal public through the PCC and use his powers to influence the other Arab states to come forward with similar proposals of their own268. While Zaim’s request for American intervention came three months after the beginning of negotiations at Lausanne and at a time where the prospects of a settlement were looking increasingly bleak, the Americans refused to modify their official policy of “friendly persuasion” to one of political intervention. Rather than review their policy in light of the realities the PCC had encountered at Lausanne, the US continued to cling to their preference for a negotiated settlement despite all the evidence suggesting its unlikelihood.
In the end time ran out for Zaim. He was overthrown on 14 August by a second miliary coup and executed. With him died the Syrian offer to resettle 250,000 Palestinian refugees.
The issue of Jerusalem
The PCC received a specific mandate on the internationalisation of Jerusalem from the GA. Realising that the implementation of Resolution 194 provisions on Jerusalem would be time-consuming, complex and require a high degree of expertise, the PCC Commissioners established a Subcommittee on the Jerusalem issue to work alongside it. The Jerusalem Committee began its work in early February to consider the task of developing the city into an international enclave. However, the Commission soon determined that the Jerusalem provisions within Resolution 194 would be impossible to implement without the support of the occupying forces and decided that they would strive for a “scheme that would be both acceptable to the two parties and satisfactory in itself”269.
The Subcommittee conducted a series of meetings with each side and produced a variety of working papers which endeavoured to be fair and acceptable to all concerned. On 2 September the PCC submitted a Draft Resolution on Jerusalem to the SC. The draft proposal represented a compromise on the instructions they had
267 Jordan made a similar appeal on the same day as the Syrian request, stating that it was willing to contribute to the resettlement of the refugees but could not publicly declare this without the assistance of a great power. See Stabler to the Secretary of State, 14 July 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/7-1449 268 The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria, 22 July 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/7-2249. FRUS pp1245 269 United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine: Subcommittee on Jerusalem. Summary Record, 3 March 1949. ComJer/SR/2.
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received from the GA which they considered to be impractical and unrealistic270. Rather than call for the internationalisation of the whole city, the draft provided for administrative autonomy to Israel and Jordan in the areas which they currently occupied, with internationalisation being limited to the Holy Places.
Israel immediately rejected the Draft and offered to instead give formal guarantees of access to Holy Places and freedom of worship271. An unusual alliance consisting of the Soviet bloc, the Arab states (except Jordan) and Australia together with a number of Latin American countries (under Vatican pressure), joined Israel in actively opposing the Draft, but for profoundly different reasons. These governments felt that the proposal did not go far enough in the internationalisation of the Holy City and astonished the PCC member nations and Israel by introducing a draft which adhered more faithfully to the provisions set down in Resolution 194272. The Draft Resolution calling for full internationalisation of Jerusalem passed on 9 December but failed to have any chance of implementation due to the opposition of both Israel and Jordan, the impracticality of the Resolution, and lack of support from the only country powerful enough to enforce compliance – the United States273.
The Second Session
The second session of the Lausanne Conference opened on 27 July. Paul Porter, a Washington lawyer with close ties to President Truman, was appointed as the new Head of the US Delegation to the PCC. George McGhee encouraged Acheson to strengthen Porter’s hand at Lausanne by furnishing him with instructions to privately convey to the Israeli delegation:
22. That the US continues to stand firmly behind the principles enunciated in the 29 May note;
23. That pending an adoption of a more conciliatory attitude by the GOI, the US was finding it difficult to give positive consideration to the following issues;
270 The French delegates were in favour of full internationalisation of the city (Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 13 April 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/4-1349, FRUS p912), but it would seem that the direction of the Subcommittee was controlled by the instructions of the US government 271 Editorial note, FRUS p1357 272 Azcárate 1966 p183 273 As a member of the PCC the United States backed the PCC Draft Resolution
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a. Further allocation of funds under the $100,000,000 Ex-Im Bank loan274;
b. Ways and means by which the US, through the UN, might contribute to an overall program of repatriation and resettlement of Palestinian refugees.
McGhee also recommended that Porter be given instructions to exert pressure on the Arab states to make constructive suggestions regarding the resettlement of the refugees unable to return to Israel275. While it is unclear if McGhee’s recommendations were authorised by Secretary Acheson and the President, subsequent developments would imply that at least the first recommendation and part two of the second recommendation were authorised in full.
The American delegation was not the only delegation to change in composition and instructions for the second session. The Israeli delegation was now headed by Rueven Shiloah. It was rumoured that the removal of Eytan was due to the Israeli Prime Minister’s disapproval of his signing the Lausanne Protocol. Shiloah was a close ally of Ben-Gurion and his appointment signalled a desire by Ben-Gurion to keep a closer eye on Lausanne. Before arriving at the conference, Shiloah announced that he would have a “more elastic program”276 and a “broader and more conciliatory approach”277.
Israeli declarations of a more conciliatory attitude were matched by that of the Arab delegations. Upon US encouragement, the Egyptian, Lebanese, Jordanian and Syrian delegations all announced that they had received instructions to negotiate on all matters, rather than just refugees, and were keen to cooperate fully with the PCC. The Syrian Prime Minister expressed his commitment to the success of the Lausanne Conversations by attaching the Palestinian Ahmad Shuqari to his delegation. Shuqari was seen as a realistic and moderate Palestinian278 who was keen to reach an agreement with Israel due to his belief that a general peace would serve the best interests of the Palestinian Arabs.
274 275 McGhee to the Secretary of State, 19 July 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/7-1949. FRUS pp1235-1237 276 McDonald to the Secretary of State, 19 July 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/7-1649 277 McDonald to the Secretary of State, 19 July 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/7-1949. FRUS pp1238 278 Keeley to the Secretary of State, 21 July 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/7-2149. FRUS pp1238
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Yet all the talk of flexible attitudes and better intentions failed to convert into any real change of behaviour at the sessions. Shortly after the recommencement of the talks Porter gloomily observed that there did not appear to be any significant changes in attitudes to offer much hope of success279. Foreseeing trouble ahead and anxious to avoid the same stalemate which had overtaken the first round of talks, Porter wanted a firm approach and plan of action to take into the negotiations. Porter requested his Secretary approve his plan for a two week exploratory period of talks and if agreement was not reached in this time the PCC submit proposals of their own280. Acheson agreed with Porter’s plan but warned that their policy for a negotiated settlement still applied and therefore any plans submitted by the PCC should be able to be amended or withdrawn according to the reactions of the parties involved, ie they were not to represent an imposed settlement281.
While Porter was receiving instructions from his seniors in Washington, Shiloah was receiving advice from UN Ambassador Eban in New York. The Israelis were increasingly viewing Lausanne as a battlefield in which the future of Israel would be won or lost, just as in the 1948 war. While the method of battle was diplomatic rather than military, the stakes were just as high. Eban warned Shiloah that Lausanne was a “crucial front”, the goal of which was to make as few concessions as possible whilst giving Porter enough hope that protracted talks would lead to compromises sometime in the future. Israel was keen to prevent Porter from “reaching the despair which overtook Ethridge” due to their overriding ambition to keep the Question of Palestine out of the GA in September where it could opt for an imposed settlement after the failure of the negotiating option.
Paul Porter was aware of Israel’s fear of an imposed settlement and their unease regarding the prospect of the PCC recommending that the dispute be added to the UN agenda. Porter saw this fear as an opportunity for the PCC to gain some leverage against the Israeli delegation and apply pressure on her to “take concrete steps forward”282.
279 Porter to the Secretary of State, 26 July 1949, USN A 501.BB Pal/7-2649. FRUS pp1254 280 Porter to the Secretary of State, 26 July 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/7-2649. FRUS pp1255 281 The Secretary of State to Porter, 28 July 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/7-2849. FRUS pp1267 282 Porter to the Secretary of State, 29 July 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/7-2949
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The US Consul in Jerusalem, Burdett, also saw the imminent GA Assembly as the ideal opportunity to apply strong pressure upon Israel to make some positive changes to her negotiating positions. Burdett warned that the postponement of decisions on such issues as Jerusalem, refugees and boundaries would further impair the small chance which remained for a resolution based upon UN principles, US policy and justice. The Consul saw that time only worked for the State of Israel to further consolidate her position and then announce that the clock could not be turned back. Burdett thereby recommended that the PCC draw up a list of proposals which could be presented to the GA in September and warned that Israel would only comply with GA resolutions if they were backed up with the threat of force283.
However, Secretary Acheson was reluctant to put the Palestine issue on the GA agenda prematurely. Acheson was cognisant that the French did not want the issue to be discussed at the UN at all, preferring the PCC to continue their work in finding a solution284. The placement of the issue on the GA agenda would also have acted as a disincentive to the Arab states to negotiate at Lausanne. Acheson recommended that the issue be kept off the agenda for the time being as it could always be added at a later date. The Secretary felt that this tactic would exert maximum pressure on both sides to reach agreement285.
Meanwhile, discussions continued between the US Department of State and the British Foreign Office in an attempt to form a unitary position regarding the resolution of the conflict. Acheson alerted his Ambassador in the UK on 1 August that “the British and ourselves now appear in substantial agreement in principle” on the Eight Point Plan286. Yet while the two countries had reached an agreement on the key principles through which the conflict should be resolved, they failed to reach an agreement on exactly how this agreement should be presented and the weight it should carry. The British were keen to have the Eight Point Plan presented as a joint UK-US proposal which would form the basis of an (imposed) settlement. Yet the US continued to adhere to their view that the dispute should be settled through
283 Burdett to the Secretary of State, 1 August 1949, FRUS pp1273-1274 284 Pappé accounts Boisanger’s desire for continuing the talks to his political ambitions in that he was a candidate at the time for the Directorship of the Near Eastern Department in the French Foreign Ministry. 1988 p117 285 The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lausanne, 6 August 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/8-649 286 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 1 August 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/8-149. FRUS p1275
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negotiation. While the Americans saw the Eight Point Plan as a fair and judicial document, they were only prepared to see the proposal put forward as a flexible guideline for discussions rather than a rigid position287. Acheson’s refusal to give the full weight of his support to the proposal effectively signalled the death of the plan. Though the British were in no position at the time to oppose the policy of their most powerful ally, Foreign Secretary Bevin was clearly frustrated by America’s refusal, asking rather poignantly; “when it would come to a head?”288
Two weeks into the second round of negotiations at Lausanne the 100,000 offer was showing no sign of leading to a breakthrough and the conference was looking increasingly like falling into the same stalemate as the first. Paul Porter was convinced that further negotiations were futile and threatened to harm the prestige of the US and the UN289. In an attempt to overcome the inevitable impasse, the PCC drew up a questionnaire to ascertain each delegation’s exact positions on the issues at hand in hope that the Commissioners could find some “middle ground” which could form the basis of a compromise proposal. The Turkish and American delegates were keen to place the matter before the GA if the compromise proposal was rejected, with only Boisanger dissenting and preferring to continue the negotiations290. Boisanger was also against the PCC putting forward a compromise proposal as he argued that their role was to conciliate rather than to arbitrate and they thereby must be willing to fulfil this role so long as both parties were willing to continue the discussions291.
The divergence of opinion within the PCC member states was matched by that between the interlocutors. Whilst Israel was fearful of the Palestine issue being placed on the GA agenda and was employing all her resources to prevent this from happening, the Arab states looked forward to GA intervention. Assuming that an imposed solution would be formed around resolutions 181 and 194, the Arabs were convinced that such a settlement would be on far more favourable terms than those
287 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 7 August 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/8-749. FRUS pp1289-1290 288 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 13 September 1949, 501.BB Pal/9-1349. FRUS p1377 289 Heyd to Sharett, 14 August 1949, State of Israel, p336 290 Rockwell to the Secretary of State, 11 August 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/8-1149. FRUS pp1299- 1301 291 Stuart Rockwell, a member of the US Delegation at Lausanne, suspected that Boisanger was acting according to his own personal interests rather than through instructions from his Government. Apparently he was later able to persuade Boisanger that the matter might need to be taken up at the GA. See Rockwell to the Secretary of State, 16 August 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/8-1649
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they could extract from Israel in a negotiated settlement. Furthermore, Arab fears of the ramifications of bringing a negotiated settlement home to their publics could be avoided, while they would become recipients of expected financial compensation for their compliance in an imposed scheme. With the shadow of the impending GA session spreading over Lausanne the Arabs felt they had everything to lose by continuing the negotiations and everything to gain from the Conference’s failure292.
Yet even with the failure of Lausanne practically assured, the American administration refused to throw its support behind an imposed agreement, including the option of handing the issue over to the GA. In effect, Washington had already resigned itself to continued conflict in the Middle East.
On 15 August, the questionnaire was delivered to the delegations at Lausanne. The questionnaire asked:
24. Is the delegation prepared to sign a declaration according which;
a. Solution of refugee problem should be sought in repatriation to Israeli- controlled territory and resettlement in Arab countries of zone of Palestine not under Israeli control;
b. If a survey group should be established through the UN would all parties be prepared to facilitate the task of the group and take all possible measures to aid the implementation of such solutions as the group might propose?;
c. All parties will state that above mentioned understanding concerning refugees will not prejudice rights which parties reserve in connection with a final settlement;
d. Funds for emergency aid extended to refugees must be renewed until above- mentioned technical and financial aid shall have been allotted by international community?;
25. Is the government prepared to provide a provisional estimate of the approximate number of refugees the government might be willing to accept?;
292 Rockwell to the Secretary of State, 11 August 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/8-1149. FRUS pp1299- 1301
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26. What territorial adjustments does the delegation desire to be made to the working document annexed to the 12 May Protocol?293.
By the time the questionnaire was delivered the American representative had packed his bags and returned to Washington, declaring upon his arrival that “no real basis for conciliation between the parties exists at the present time”294. Porter had lost all faith in the possibility for agreement and reportedly told an Israeli associate upon his departure from Lausanne that the questionnaire was little more than a ‘face-saving measure’ to facilitate the conclusion of the conference295. Having spent six weeks encountering the formidable forces arrayed against a peace agreement at Lausanne, Porter turned his belief to an economic, rather than political approach, which George McGhee had been developing for some time296.
Without even awaiting the results of the questionnaire, which were more or less predictable297, Acheson prepared his staff in the Middle East for the impending collapse of the conference. Acheson concluded that:
“Although both sides wld welcome peace, neither side is prepared at this time to make concessions which wld make settlement possible. Israeli offers re Gaza strip or repatriation 100,000 Arab refugees are unacceptable to Arabs. Arab position which is based on rigid adherence to para 11 of GA res Dec 11 and May 12 protocol with its map indicating 1947
293 Rockwell to the Secretary of State, 15 August 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/8-1549. FRUS pp1313- 1314 294 Memorandum by McGhee to the Secretary of State, 16 August 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/8-1649. FRUS p1315 295 Heyd to Sharett, 14 August 1949, State of Israel, p336 296 Following the failure of the PCC, Paul Porter influenced the US to switch its focus to finding an economic solution to the dispute around the model of the Marshall Plan. However, this initiative also failed as the will for regional cooperation was not present in the Middle East as it had been in Europe. For a full discussion of how the economic solution took preference over a political solution, see Appendix II. 297 Israel replied on 23 August. In her response she asserted that all the territory currently under Israeli control through the Armistice Agreements should be formally recognised as part of the State of Israel. She restated her belief that the solution to the refugee problem lay in resettlement in the Arab states and declared herself willing to cooperate with an Economic Survey Mission but would not commit herself in advance to the implementation of their findings. (FRUS p1335). The Arab delegates submitted their reply on 29 August. They declared that the refugees should be repatriated to Arab Palestine, Israeli- controlled territory and the international zone of Jerusalem. Syria and Jordan declared themselves willing to accept a portion of the refugees who chose not to return home while Egypt and Lebanon were unable to accept any. Egypt demanded land contact with the rest of the Arab world and Jordan expressed its desire to have a corridor to the Mediterranean. The delegates expressed themselves willing to cooperate with an economic survey. (USNA 501.BB Pal/8-3049. FRUS pp1337-1338)
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partition boundaries is unacceptable to Israelis. No real basis for conciliation therefore appears possible at Lausanne”.298
As I feel that Secretary Acheson’s summary of the factors which he considered led to the failure of the conference were both succinct and accurate, I will quote him in full:
“Israel: Israel is concerned with domestic problems and has allowed public opinion to develop within Israel to such an extent that it is almost impossible for Israeli Govt to make substantial concessions re refugees and territory which wld open way to settlement and friendly relations with Arabs. Israel prefers instead to maintain status quo in Palestine. Objectives seems to be (1) Absorption of almost all Palestinian refugees by Arab states and (2) de facto recognition of armistice lines as boundaries. Arab states: Arab states are also concerned with domestic problems and are reluctant to take any forthright action for time being. Basically Arabs believe agreement with Israel at Lausanne wld require new concessions or at minimum formal acquiescence in status quo re refugees and territory. Arab reps consider agreement on either basis politically impossible for them because of polit repercussions which might result at home. Status quo is therefore preferable pending GA.”299
In a final effort to achieve at least an incremental step towards peace before the demise of the six month conference, the PCC drew up a draft declaration based upon the responses they had received from their 15 August questionnaire. Whilst the declaration was a vaguely worded document which strove to be accommodating to all parties and did not in itself bind them to any firm commitments, each delegation nevertheless refused to sign300. The Arabs cited pressure from public opinion at home for their refusal to sign a document which even hinted at possible concessions on the issues of refugees and territory as the reason for their refusal. In turn, the Israelis declared that they could not sign a document which accepted Egypt and Lebanon’s claims regarding their inability to resettle a portion of the Arab refugees301. The Commissioners were forced to discard their hope for a signed document, which might have become the “face-saving gesture” Porter had spoken about, and merely provided
298 The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, 16 August 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/8-1649. FRUS pp1317 299 The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, 16 August 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/8-1649. FRUS pp1317 300 A full copy of the Draft Declaration can be found in Sasson to Sharett, Date unknown, Appendix II, State of Israel, pp434-435 301 Rockwell to the Secretary of State, 6 September 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/9-649. FRUS p1362 (footnote)
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the delegates with their observations regarding their responses, in hope that these might assist negotiations in the future.
With all hope for a political agreement abandoned, Boisanger wrote to each party that it “would be opportune to suspend its conversations for a few weeks”. The Lausanne conference officially ended on 15 September and was to be resumed in New York one month later. Israel had therefore succeeded in its campaign to keep the issue off the UN agenda. Although the PCC continued talks in New York in October and throughout the next year, and in fact still exists today, the termination of the Lausanne Conference effectively ended the PCC’s search for a political settlement.
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Chapter 3
Lausanne: Understanding the Protagonists
Why is the study of Lausanne important? It is easy to view the Lausanne peace effort as just another failed attempt to bring reconciliation between two fundamentality irreconcilable communities. Jews and Arabs are destined to share the same earth, and with that earth, a future. But what future will this be? One of incommensurable and interminable suffering, pain, loss and violence? Two fates played out in a zero-sum game? This is the reality of the Middle East we are presented with every day. When faced with the horror of suicide bombings, military incursions, land expropriations and targeted killings it is difficult to not hark back to what seems now to have been a time of hope. A time before the conflict between Jews and Arabs had appeared as inevitable and timeless. A time when the dispute was in its infancy, when the terms of the conflict had not yet become intractable and the mutual enmity almost limitless. Was there ever such a time? And was this in 1949?
Most commentators agree that there was, however limited, a certain opportunity for peace throughout the year 1949302. The Lausanne conversations took place when the dispute was fresh and hopes for its resolution still real. The exclusive and hopelessly irreconcilable narratives had not yet been written and the myths they gave birth to had not yet been created. The policies, on both sides, which assumed implacable long- term hostility, had not yet solidified. Israel was an infant state with her future not yet drawn. The Arab nations were shaken and showing interest in finding a means to live
302 Khouri 1975 p27, Pappé 1992 p237, Forsythe 1972 p36, Safran 1969 p37-38, Morris 2004 p580, Touval 1982 pp103-105. Whilst Touval does not directly answer his own question ‘A Golden Opportunity?’ (p77), his subsequent discussion of the factors leading to the failure of the conference would imply that he considered that an opportunity was indeed lost. Similarly, participants in the Conference, McDonald 1951 p164 and Eytan 1958 p49, suggest that an opportunity for peace was lost through their criticisms of the parties whom they deem responsible (the actions of the PCC in both cases)
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with their uninvited neighbour. The attainment of a peaceful modus vivendi between the communities did not seem unrealistic.
There were other reasons to believe 1949 was the year peace was most possible as it was the year that the international community were most galvanised to resolve the dispute post 1948 to date. The United Nations was facing its first test of post-War reconciliation and was giving the conflict its urgent attention. The US and UK would not tolerate an ongoing conflagration in the sensitive Middle East which might act to jeopardise their national interests. It had to be resolved. The Lausanne Conference was how they planned to resolve it.
With the conditions more favourable than they would be at any time in the future, it can only be asked why this opportunity was lost. For once it has been established that there was a potential for peace, one must then explore why it was not realised. If there was a chance for peace; who lost it? Who is most at fault in squandering an opportunity which would fail to present itself again during the participants’ lifetime? The apportionment of blame has most usually centred on the positions of the protagonists themselves, the complexity of the issues involved, the effectiveness of the mediating body and the influence of the Big Powers, namely the US.
Commentators have regularly apportioned blame and/or responsibility by looking to the events which transpired in Lausanne during the six month conference, while giving only rudimentary attention to the broader factors surrounding the talks. While the events which took place in Lausanne are of course important, it is necessary to contextualise the conversations in a wider political universe to reach a fuller appreciation of the many forces at work during the conference and the bearing these undoubtedly had on the outcome of the talks.
The year 1949 marked a watershed for all parties involved. Israel had just won a convincing military victory against the Arab states and was in the process of consolidating its statehood through the creation of institutions and the expansion of its population through mass immigration. Elated by its unqualified victory, Israel remained mindful of the aberration its birth represented to its Arab neighbours and looked towards security as its only insurance for survival. The Arab world was haemorrhaging due to its decisive loss at the hands of its bitter enemy. Fuelled by a
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burgeoning nationalism combined with an incendiary pan-Arabism, the massive discontent aroused by military defeat was threatening to unseat Arab governments and plunge their populations into internecine conflict. The United Nations was in its infancy and struggling to establish itself in a state system which was increasingly becoming defined through a dichotomy of West versus East. Having emerged as a Super Power following the Second World War, the United States was finding its feet and remained overwhelmed by the problems of European reconstruction and Soviet expansion. Events in Eastern Europe began to dictate the American response to all foreign policy issues, which were duly viewed through the prism of Cold War logic. Whilst many of these issues were not directly verbalised during the Lausanne Conference there can be little doubt of their impact on the course of the conversations. It is therefore crucial that these factors are taken into account and given appropriate weight by a student of Lausanne.
In an attempt to understand the failure of Lausanne I will explore the complex motivations and relationships which guided the actions of the key players. While most research on the Lausanne Conference has focussed on the Palestine Conciliation Commission, my research will focus primarily on the role of the US, in addition to the protagonists at the peace table. As the most powerful member of the Commission, the US largely controlled events at Lausanne through its delegation at the conference and its staff in Washington and the Middle East. In fact, the influence of the US was felt so keenly within the Commission and during the conversations that one commentator surmised that the PCC was actually an arm of American foreign policy303. As such it is necessary to explore what American foreign policy was at the time and where the PCC fit into this.
303 Touval 1982 p95
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I. Israel: Peace-loving or aggressive expansionist?
When the war [of Independence] was over, we knew that a second round of fighting was inevitable. We harboured no illusions throughout these seven years regarding [the likelihood of] peace after the war.304
Ben Gurion
Overview
The behaviour of Israel during the Lausanne Conference has been both praised and condemned by participants and commentators. Israel no doubt approached the conference with maximal demands which left little room for compromise or negotiation. These demands were based upon Israel’s concept of security, and the terms she would require to feel “secure”. Yet in her obsessive campaign for security the Israeli government may have sentenced its young state to a future of insecurity, violence and fear. If the GOI had prepared for the Lausanne conversations as an opportunity to find a common dialogue with her neighbours, as a means to negotiate a peace based upon understanding, shared destiny and commonality, the course of the Conference may have been far different. Yet Israel felt she was a small state fighting to carve out her existence in a treacherous and hostile Arab world. There could be no compromise on her absolutist aim of survival, not even in her quest for peace.
Territory
The year 1948 was one of unprecedented success for Zionism. On 15 May, the State of Israel was proclaimed in Mandatory Palestine, according to the provisions laid down in the United Nations Partition Resolution of 29 November 1947. Eleven minutes later, US President Truman shocked the world by extending de facto recognition to the nascent state305. On the same day, Israel’s Arab neighbours attacked, but contrary to popular expectations, suffered a spectacular and convincing
304 Quoted in Shalom 2002 p4 305 Truman’s decision to recognise the Provisional government of Israel astounded his own Delegation at the UN as much as other nations’ delegations. The US Delegation had been working towards a trusteeship for Palestine since March after it had been recognised that Partition could not be peacefully enforced. The Delegation had no prior warning of Truman’s decision, which appeared to mark a reversal of policy, and felt shocked and betrayed as a result. See the account by Philip Jessup, a member of the US Delegation, for reaction in the UN to Truman’s announcement of recognition. (1974 pp283-285)
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defeat by their Zionist adversary. Israel gained land on all fronts and extended her territory far beyond the borders the Partition Resolution had envisaged.
The submission of the Bernadotte Report in November caused considerable alarm to the Israeli leadership306. Rather than allowing the Jewish State to consolidate her territorial acquisitions, the UN was discussing proposals which were aimed at their reduction. Concerned by the threat to curtail her territorial aspirations the Israeli team went on the attack and energetically argued against a resolution containing reference to the Bernadotte Proposals on territorial boundaries307. The Israeli Foreign Minister railed against any suggestion that the Arab states should be rewarded for their aggressive war and asserted that the territorial issue should be settled through negotiation rather than prejudged through a UN Resolution308.
Israel’s almost singular focus on the territorial issue during the UN debates reflects her priorities at the time. The UK and Colombian Draft Resolutions contained provisions regarding the return of the refugees and the internationalisation of Jerusalem, to which Israel was manifestly opposed. Yet these two issues received very little attention from the Israeli Delegation during the discussions. In his study of the UN Debates, Rony Gabbay expresses surprise at the lack of attention the Israeli team paid to the refugee and Jerusalem provisions contained within the Draft Resolutions and explains this as “probably because of tactical reasons and other considerations”309. While Israel may well have not wanted to open too many fronts during the UN debate, Israel’s overwhelming focus on the territorial issue more accurately reflects her priorities at this time. Rather than relinquishing a portion of her territorial gains Israel was planning further military incursions to consolidate her control over the Negev and the Galilee310. Far from being in a reductionist frame of mind, the Israeli leadership were looking to expand her territories further still.
306 Eytan 1958 p24 307 Both the UK (United Nations General Assembly, 30 November 1948) and Colombian (United Nations General Assembly, 24 November 1948) draft resolutions contained territorial provisions which were to be based on the Bernadotte Plan 308 United Nations General Assembly, 1 December 1948 309 Gabbay 1959 p236 310 Israel occupied the entire Negev and Western Galilee in March 1949. Israel also gained three villages in the Arab Triangle through her armistice agreement with Transjordan, signed on 3 April 1949
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Though the Israeli leadership accepted the borders contained within the partition plan when they were announced in 1947, it is evident that Ben-Gurion did not see these as the Jewish state’s final boundaries. The decision not to incorporate the new state’s boundaries in the Declaration of Independence on 15 May 1948 was significant. Years later, Ben-Gurion was to recall;
“I told my colleagues that it was unnecessary to demarcate the borders. The state would not come into existence through power of the United Nations’ authority, and the Partition Plan would not decide our Permanent Borders. The state…would be established only through the strength of the Jewish people; in other words, Jewish military power that was still in the process of being created… The army would determine the borders.”311
Many years earlier in 1937, when the idea of partition was first raised by the British as a possible solution to the conflicting aspirations of the two nations residing in Mandatory Palestine, Ben-Gurion reacted with similar pragmatism;
I am an enthusiastic advocate of the Jewish State, even if it involves partitioning Palestine now, because I work on the assumption that a partial Jewish State will not be the end, but the beginning. When we acquire 1,000 or 10,000 dunums of land we are happy. Because this acquisition of land is important not only for its sake, but because through it we are increasing our strength, and every increase in our formation of a State, even if its only a partial State, will be the greatest increase of strength we could have today, and it will constitute a powerful lever in our historic effort to redeem the country in its entirety.312
That Israel had ended the 1948 war with significantly more territory than she was awarded in the Partition Resolution was no accident of war, rather it was the fulfilment of a dream Ben-Gurion harboured since 1937. The fact that Israel had won the additional land in a bloody conflict was all the more reason for her to refuse to give it up. The possibility of conceding land back to the Arabs – as Bernadotte was suggesting – was the absolute antithesis of Zionist thinking. In fact, Israeli perceptions were so removed from international thought at the time that, rather than viewing her military gains at armistice with satisfaction, many Israelis considered it a
311 Quote given on 18 June 1970. Cited in Shalom 2002 p152 312 Ben-Gurion 1971 p154
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‘missed opportunity’, in that the IDF should not have stopped until it occupied the entirety of Mandatory Palestine313.
The enormous significance the territorial issue received within the Israeli leadership was indelibly linked to their one, over-riding preoccupation at the time and indeed ever since; that of security. The Zionist project in 1896 grew out of the conviction that the Jewish people required a nation-state in order to free itself from persecution314. Ben-Gurion and his colleagues were mindful that when Israel was threatened with annihilation after its proclamation of statehood, nobody came to her rescue. This fact reinforced Ben-Gurion’s conviction that “survival meant security for Israel”. Ben-Gurion viewed security as an asset which could only be achieved through strength; militarily, territorially and demographically315. Israel could only survive as a viable state if she possessed adequate territory for development and settlement, in addition to defensible borders. The expansion of territory was therefore intrinsic to the state-building enterprise Israel was embarking upon in 1949 and it was assumed it would protect her from threats in the future316. In short, the overriding Zionist goal of foundering a state to provide refuge and security to Jewish citizens precluded Israel of entertaining any notion of giving up even one dunum of land.
The close inter-relationship between territory and security within Zionism became the cornerstone of Israeli policy during the Lausanne Conference. As Ilan Pappé observed, what was apparent during the negotiations was “Israel’s determination to refuse any peace offer based on territorial compromise – everything was negotiable except the state’s borders”317. Israel based her territorial claims not on negotiation or UN Resolutions but on the policy of fait accomplis, a policy she has continued to this day. Israel was not content to haggle for territory she deemed vital to her security at the negotiating table, nor was she content to leave it to the international community to determine its fate. Instead, Israel relied on her military superiority to gain, and retain, the territory she considered fundamental to her future. Israel used this policy
313 See Shalom 2002 pp154-159 for a discussion on the considerable debate which took place within Israel regarding the possibility of expansion into territories beyond the armistice demarcation lines 314 For traditional Zionist historical accounts, see Shapiro and Reinharz (eds) 1996, Patai (ed) 1971, Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1972 315 Burdett to the Secretary of State, 28 February 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/2-2849, FRUS p775 316 See Segev 1986 for a fascinating account of the state-building projects Israel was embarking upon at the time 317 Pappé 1992 p177
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effectively in her campaigns in the Negev and Western Galilee where she obtained territory in contravention of the Security Council Truce Resolution. Rather than barter for the territory in armistice negotiations or during peace talks, Israel opted simply to occupy the areas in question. The Security Council did not move to penalise Israel for her infractions and she retained the additional territory. In this Israel had learned a valuable lesson regarding the importance of occupation and the reluctance of the UN to enforce its decisions.
While Israel was successful in thwarting the imposition of the Bernadotte Plan during the UN debates, it soon became apparent that the Lausanne Conference posed a new threat to her territorial ambitions. As the conference loomed, the US began to exert pressure on Israel to implement the Jessup Principle by conceding territory in the Negev or elsewhere318. Israel reacted to the persistent US pressure throughout the conference in an unequivocal manner. Rather than offering to reduce her territory, she actually made further territorial claims on the Arab states and made it clear that there would be more to come sometime in the future319.
So serious was Israel in her determination to keep every inch of land she occupied that the US did not press her particularly hard on this matter. While bemoaning her “voracious territorial appetite”320, the US seemed to understand that they would gain little ground with Israel on this subject and focussed their efforts instead on the refugee issue. The US Ambassador to Israel, James McDonald, was so convinced of Israel’s unswerving desire to retain her territory that he warned his government that the GOI could only be convinced to cede land through the use of force321.
Refugees
When preparing for the Lausanne Conference the Israeli leadership hardly touched on the subject of refugees. Most of their briefings focussed on retaining the territorial status quo as they assumed that this issue would form the major battle during the Conference. Almost nobody predicted the level of attention the refugee issue was to
318 Papers of Dean Acheson, Memorandum of Conversation, 5 April 1949, Box 64, Truman Library. 319 The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State, 20 May 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/5- 2049. Naval Aide to the President Files, 1945-53, Summary of Telegrams, 23 May 1949, Box 23, Truman Library. 320 This remark was actually made in reference to Israel’s territorial demands in the armistice negotiations with Transjordan. Stabler to the Secretary of State, 24 May 1949. FRUS 1050. 321 McDonald to the Secretary of State, 8 June 1949. FRUS 1100.
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receive. When the matter was considered by the Israelis at all, it was decided that her position would centre on the security threat a return of the refugees would represent322.
When the Lausanne Conference began it became obvious to the Israelis that the refugee issue would pose considerably more problems for them than the territorial issue. Firstly, the PCC had a specific mandate on the refugee issue to facilitate a return to their homes “at the earliest practicable date”. Secondly, the Arab states had propelled the issue to the top of the agenda by insisting on their return as a sine qua non of peace talks. Thirdly, the PCC Commissioners were in full support of the Arab demand for Israel to recognise the principle of return. And finally, most alarming of all to the Israelis, the Americans, with the support of President Truman, were giving the matter their unqualified attention and using every lever to prompt a change in Israel’s position.
Though the Israelis appeared to be more malleable on the refugee question, in fact their resolve to prevent a significant return at all costs was as strong as their determination to retain territory. While Israel’s insistence on blocking a return for security reasons was at least partially real, their opposition was also based on more complex considerations323. There can be little doubt that the Israeli leadership considered a return of the refugees to pose serious security issues, but it seems plausible to assume that this concern was not based merely on the ‘fifth column’ argument which they cited324. A return of the refugees would also have posed an existential threat to the survival of the Jewish state. The Partition Resolution envisaged that the Jewish state would contain just under fifty percent Arab population. Though the Jews were planning to increase their population rapidly through immigration, the relatively high growth rate of the Arab community would have ensured an ongoing threat to the Jewish character of the state, the maintenance of which was the raison d’étre of the Zionist project.
322 Morris 2004 p556 323 For an example of the Israeli position which emphasised the security issues posed by a return of the refugees, see the discussion of the Technical Study of the Arab Refugee Problem which was conducted by Israel in March 1949. Burdett to the Secretary of State, 18 March 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/3-1849 324 Burdett to the Secretary of State, 9 April 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/4-949, FRUS p903
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The exodus of the Arab refugees solved Israel’s demographic concerns in a spectacular fashion and they considered any thought of a return a “backward step” for the young State325. While the US and the PCC, and even the Arabs, were not expecting Israel to accept a return in the numbers the Partition Resolution had set out, any sizeable return would invariably cause Israel demographic issues in the future.
The Israelis were also worried about the more immediate threat a significant return of Arabs would represent; the establishment of a large and formidable minority population. Ironically, the GOI employed much the same arguments which had been used against Jewish populations in Europe in order to justify their regressive policies towards the refugees. For example, Eytan labelled minority populations as troublesome and leading to instability and suggested that the recreation of such a minority within Israel would “be a retro-step for peace of [the] Middle East and of [the] world”326.
It was their own negative and traumatic experience as a minority group that formed the lens through which the Jews viewed the solution to the refugee problem. Through their memory of Jewish inability to assimilate into the nation-states of Europe, Zionists became convinced of the futility of assimilation and the necessity for an ethnically homogenous state. This belief meant that there was no room in Israel, physically or ideologically, for a minority population. Accompanying this belief was the conviction that any potential minority population, such as the Palestinians, would be better off outside Israel and ‘amongst their own’. Shertok expressed this belief when he pointed out to the Commissioners that the “Arab refugees are essentially unassimilable in Jewish Israel”. As such, Shertok called for their resettlement into the neighbouring Arab states, namely Iraq, Syria and Transjordan. Shertok just assumed that the Palestinian Arabs were assimilable in these countries due to an unquestioning belief in their cultural, religious and linguistic homogeneity327.
Israeli belief in the resettlement of the Palestinian refugees into Arab areas was also fuelled by their sense of ‘looking after your own’. The fundamental reason for the existence of the State of Israel was for the Jewish people to be able to look after
325 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 4 May 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/5-449, FRUS p975 326 Vincent to the Secretary of State, 10 June 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/6-1049, FRUS p1113 327 Burdett to the Secretary of State, 8 February 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/2-849, FRUS p737
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themselves and care for Jewish peoples the world over. Any Jewish person wanting to immigrate to Israel was welcome. The Israelis were thereby confounded by the Arab state’s reluctance to take in the Palestinian refugees and accept them into their communities. Years later, Abba Eban, the Israeli Ambassador to the UN would write:
“Israelis could not understand why an Arab government would not absorb and rehabilitate an Arab refugee with the same sense of duty and pride as that which inspired Israelis to take Jewish refugees into their society.”328
Yet when the Israelis equated their own experience as a minority group with the Arab refugees’ experience, they intentionally or unintentionally, missed one fundamental element. By assuming that the Arab refugees would be happier resettling to Arab countries rather than staying in their former homes within the new State of Israel, the Jews underestimated the attachment the Palestinian Arabs felt to their land. For, to the Palestinians, it was not simply a question of living in one country or the other, but of living in a land where they had been for thousands of years and to which they shared a deep attachment329. In a letter to President Truman, the Israeli President, Chaim Weizmann, speaks “as a scientist” about the positive factors involved in the resettlement of the refugees into the neighbouring Arab states. Weizmann writes of the fertile, unpopulated land in Iraq and the opportunities for development in the whole of the Middle East330. Yet what Weizmann does not talk about is the enormous connection the Palestinians felt towards the land in which they and their forefathers had lived. Zionism’s failure to grasp this is even more astounding considering that Jewish claims to the lands of Palestine were based on a deep and continuing attachment to the land in which they had not lived for two thousand years.
It is doubtful if more concrete forms of pressure from Washington could have prompted the GOI to agree to a largescale return. This is because the GOI actively (and violently) ‘encouraged’ Palestinians to leave the lands of Palestine after the passing of the Partition Resolution331. In turn, the GOI was quick to appreciate the
328 Eban 1972 p98 329 A survey taken in January/February 1949 showed that most refugees wanted to return to their homes even if these were now in the Israeli State. Burdett to Secretary of State, 14 February 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/2-1449 330 President Weizmann to President Truman, 26 April 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/4-2649, FRUS p53 331 There exists a vigorous debate amongst historians regarding the many actions taken by Israel before and during the 1948 war which contributed to the dispossession of the Palestinian Arabs. While some, such as Benny Morris, deny that these actions contributed to a blanket policy of expulsion by the GOI,
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enormous boon the emptying of Palestine’s lands of its indigenous population represented to Zionist aims and considered their departure an unmitigated victory to the nascent Jewish state. Acting upon this understanding, the GOI immediately set about ensuring that there never could be a ‘return’ of the dispersed refugees. In fact, while the Lausanne conference was progressing, the Israelis continued to take steps to make a refugee return impossible. As revealed by Benny Morris;
“In the course of 1948 and the first half of 1949, a number of processes definitively changed the physical and demographic face of Palestine. Taken collectively, they steadily rendered the possibility of a mass refugee return more and more remote until, by mid-1949, it became virtually inconceivable. These processes were the gradual destruction of the abandoned Arab villages, the cultivation or destruction of Arab fields and the share-out of Arab lands to Jewish settlements, the establishment of new settlements on abandoned lands and sites and the settlement of Jewish immigrants in empty Arab housing in the countryside and in urban neighbourhoods. Taken together, they assured that the refugees would have nowhere, and nothing, to return to.”332
Given this, it is hardly surprising that the huge amount of pressure on Israel to change her position from both Washington and the PCC met with such little success. Yet Israel did make two concessions on the refugee issue during the conference through the Gaza Proposal and the 100,000 offer. I will now look at these proposals to determine how much of a departure in Israel’s position the offers represented.
The Gaza Proposal is difficult to understand in terms of Israeli refugee policy unless it is situated in the kaleidoscope of Israeli concerns at the time. The offer to accept hundreds of thousands of Arabs into Israel through the Gaza scheme marked a stark departure from the Israeli position on the return of the refugees. Yet as Mordechai Gazit concluded, the offer really just emphasised where the refugee issue sat in the Israeli leadership’s order of priorities333. Israel’s primary concerns at the time were territory and security. Though Israel had no wish to increase its Arab population, this concern was secondary to its desire for further territorial acquisition and the achievement of defensible borders. In this way the offer may be understood as part of Israeli security policy. That Israel did not feel that the security ramifications of the
while Ilan Pappé, argues that there was indeed a blanket policy of expulsion developed by the GOI and that the actions taken as a result of this policy amounted to a campaign of ethnic cleansing. (Morris 1987 p289, Pappé 2007) 332 Morris 2004 p341. 333 Gazit 1987 p226
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acceptance of such a large number of refugees were serious enough to offset the security benefits of annexing the Gaza Strip is revealing. Either it implies that the GOI did not feel that the Arab Palestinians were quite as serious a security risk as they suggested in the Lausanne negotiations, or it may be that it was secretly planning to forcibly expel the strip’s population following the Israeli takeover, as occurred in the Arab Triangle following the withdrawal of Transjordanian troops334.
The 100,000 offer was similarly a reflection of the GOI’s priorities at the time. In this instance however it was not Israeli security concerns which took precedence over their refugee position, but Israel’s need to appease the President of the United States. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the Israelis were becoming increasingly concerned at the time by their diminishing support in the White House. Truman had been expressing a similar concern for the Palestinian refugees as he had for the Jewish Displaced Persons (DPs) following the Second World War. The Zionists knew from experience that the President’s interest in the humanitarian aspect of the problem was real and would not subside as a result of diplomatic forestalling. The fact that the Israeli delegation chose the figure of 100,000 is likely to have been an attempt to appeal directly to Truman, as it was this same figure of Jewish refugees that Truman had insisted be permitted immediate entrance into Mandatory Palestine following the end of World War Two335. The Israeli leaders were aware that the 100,000 figure would be considered unacceptable to both the Arab states and the American State Department, but gambled correctly that it would be enough to appease the White House.
Rather than representing a serious offer regarding the repatriation of the refugees, and therefore a compromise on previous Israeli refugee policy, the offer was merely a political manoeuvre designed to alleviate US pressure on Israel336. In fact, the 100,000 offer was not really an offer at all in that it never would have been made if it had any chance of being accepted. The offer failed to receive the support of Ben-
334 It was reported by Transjordan that following the Israeli takeover of the Arab Triangle as stipulated in the Israel/Transjordanian Armistice Agreement, the Arab populated had been expelled by Israeli forces. Burdett to the Secretary of State, 15 August 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/8-1549, FRUS p1314 335 Due to the 1939 British White Paper the British had strict immigration controls in place which seriously restricted the number of Jewish DPs allowed entrance into Palestine. 336 The offer was also made to alleviate pressure from the UN. Sharett assumed that Israel’s show of compliance to UN Resolutions on this matter through the 100,000 offer would be enough to offset a two-thirds majority vote in the GA to impose a settlement upon Israel. See Sharett to Shiloah, 10 August 1949, State of Israel, p313.
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Gurion337 and it was therefore extremely unlikely that it would have been implemented in the unlikely scenario of its acceptance.
Jerusalem
During discussions in the United Nations prior to Resolution 194, Israel was adamant that she would accept nothing less than full sovereignty over the part of Jerusalem she currently occupied338. During her discussions with the PCC, Israel never deviated from this position and during the course of the Lausanne Conference took steps to change the political nature of the city, such as the holding of municipal elections and the moving of governmental departments from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem339.
As with the territorial issue, Israel’s insistence on its sovereignty over Jerusalem stemmed from both practical and mystical considerations. Firstly, as Israel was to state throughout their talks with the PCC; 100,000 Jerusalem Jews had been attacked by the Arab armies in 1948 and cut off from food and water, without receiving any assistance or support from the international community. Therefore, Israel was simply not prepared to entrust their safety to another entity340. Israel had learned in the war that the only power they could trust for their survival was themselves, and after fighting determinedly for the lives of the Jerusalem Jews, they were not about to surrender their fate to an external force. Yet while Israel’s security concerns for retaining Jerusalem were no doubt real, they were secondary to more ethereal considerations. As Ben-Gurion stated in December 1949:
“Jerusalem is not only one hundred thousand Jews – it is the City of King David. If Eretz Israel is the heart of the Hebrew nation, then Jerusalem is the heart of hearts.”341
As Israel went about its task of nation-building, the holding of Jerusalem was integral in both giving the nation its mystical ‘heart’ but also of attracting Jewish immigrants through the deep emotional associations the ancient city of Jerusalem commands.
Whilst opposed to the steps Israel had taken to change Jerusalem’s political character, the US quickly realised that without the support of Israel and Jordan the full
337 Shiffer 1986 p18. 338 United Nations General Assembly, 1 December 1948 339 Burdett to the Secretary of State, 8 February 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/2-849, FRUS p735 340 Burdett to the Secretary of State, 8 February 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/2-849, FRUS p736 341 Quoted in Shalom 2002 p70
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internationalisation of the city was not a viable alternative. It therefore instructed its delegate at the PCC to work for a more realistic and logical proposal which might win the support of each party342. Having struggled to achieve a reasonable solution which in itself represented a compromise on Resolution 194, the Americans were dismayed by Israel’s vociferous rejection343 of the plan344. However, Israel was saved from incurring the wrath of the US on this issue by the surprise coalition of states who opposed the Draft Resolution at the UN. While Israel was alarmed by the strict resolution which was eventually passed, the fact that it did not possess the backing of the US meant that it was a dead letter and therefore no threat to the Israeli position.
It seems doubtful that Israel would have responded positively to any pressure which the US may have exerted in any case due to the steps it had taken to prevent the internationalisation of the city and the constant articulation of its opposition to this concept. By December 1949, Israel had already witnessed the US retreat after the May Presidential note and also on the Ex-Im loan issue345. While Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett was concerned about the international reaction Ben-Gurion’s hostile and open opposition to the Resolution might provoke, Ben-Gurion had become convinced that while the US and the international community might grumble over issues, they would fail to act militarily346. This gamble by the Israeli leader paid off. Although deploring Israeli claims to sovereignty over the Holy City, the international community and the US did nothing to prevent it. Once again Ben-Gurion’s policy of fait accomplis had proved highly effective. By the end of the year 1949, Israel had learned that the creation of facts on the ground was a far more potent method to realise their goals than adherence to the will of the international community.
342 The Secretary of State to Ethridge, 13 April 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/4-949, FRUS p911 343 The GOI launched an intense press and publicity campaign against the Draft. Condemnation was universal in Israel, with the terrorist organisation, the Irgun, even threatening to take up arms to oppose the Draft. McGhee to the Under Secretary of State, 22 September 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/9-2249, FRUS pp1396-1397 344 Memorandum of Conversation, 28 September 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/9-2849 345 The ‘loan issue’ refers to the matter of the Ex-Im Bank loan the US had promised to the GOI to assist in her state-building enterprise. The loan was subsequently used by the US as a political bargaining chip to force concessions from the GOI during the Lausanne Conference. The controversy around the loan, including President Truman’s role in the affair, is discussed fully in Appendix I. 346 When writing about this era in his memoirs, Ben-Gurion states that he had come to differentiate between the political and military will of the international community and believed that while they were happy to make political decisions they would not enforce them militarily. Ben-Gurion 1971 p273
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Desire for a peace agreement
There is little doubt that at the time of Lausanne, Israel genuinely desired a peace agreement. As Zaki Shalom has noted:
“As far as Israel’s leaders were concerned, there was no need to elaborate on the benefits of a peace settlement. It was obvious that a cease-fire was preferable to flying bullets; an armistice agreement to a cease-fire; and a political settlement to an armistice.”347
A peace agreement would have allowed Israel to partially demilitarise and concentrate on the immediate need of state-building. The GOI were busy overseeing the immigration of hundreds of thousands of Jews into the new state, a process which was severely stretching its limited resources. There were also economic advantages to be gained by an agreement. The stability peace provided would have made Israel more attractive to international investors and enabled her to trade with her neighbours. On the political level a peace treaty would have allowed Israel to improve her political status and gain credibility at the United Nations.
Yet although Israel’s desire for peace is self-evident, what is less clear is how strong this desire was and what costs Israel was willing to bear to attain it. At their first meeting with the Israeli leader, Ben-Gurion informed the Commissioners that “security would rest on [the] steady increase in [the] country through immigration. [The] Second element would be peace and cooperation with [the] Arabs”348. This order of priorities persisted throughout the conference and in fact acted to preclude a real chance of settlement. The need to receive as many immigrants as possible to strengthen Israel’s security position was intrinsically linked to her desire to retain all land and to resist any significant return of refugees349.
When Sharett was briefing his staff in May during the Lausanne Conference, he shared the same equivocal position towards peace as his Prime Minister:
“The question is whether it is sufficient to remain passive and merely react to the other delegations at the negotiations, or take the initiative? What do we really want? Do we want the talks to stretch out indefinitely? There are arguments to both sides. On one hand, what do we lose by stalling? Why should it bother us? A peace treaty signed with the Arab states is
347 Shalom 2002 p182 348 Burdett to the Secretary of State, 28 February 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/2-2949, FRUS p776 349 McDonald to the Secretary of State, 8 April 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/4-849, FRUS p900
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not in our vital interest. On the other hand, perhaps we should be serious about seeking a quick solution.”350
The GOI’s hesitation regarding peace was derived from her resistance to the terms she knew the Arabs and the international community would demand to obtain it. Israel would have to make concessions on both territory and refugees, which led them to conclude that perhaps the price for peace was too high. The Israeli leaders’ fear of being asked to pay such a price caused them to look upon the conference as a battle to be survived rather than a forum to be engaged in positively. This position enormously impacted Lausanne as the Israelis were often more intent on putting up obstacles preventing the conference’s success than they were in engaging in the process.
As the Lausanne conversations progressed, Israel’s equivocal position towards a general peace agreement fell away as her perception of the value of an agreement further diminished. The signing of the armistice agreements meant that she could put the war behind her and concentrate on the absorption of the refugees and her state- building enterprise. Israel also realised that the passage of time would help her consolidate her gains and continue to impose facts on the ground. The lack of urgency Israel felt towards a peace agreement is exhibited in Ben-Gurion’s famous statement:
“I am prepared to get up in the middle of the night in order to sign a peace agreement – but I am not in a hurry and I can wait ten years. We are under no pressure whatsoever.”351
At the UN, Abba Eban shared this view, prompting Ben-Gurion to note in his diary:
“He sees no need to run after peace. An armistice is sufficient for us; we run after peace – the Arabs will demand of us a price – [in the coin of] borders [ie, border rectification] or refugees or both. We will [ie, can afford to] wait a few years.”352
Major concessions on borders, refugees and Jerusalem were simply not in the Israeli lexicon at the time. While peace with the Arabs may have brought some benefits, they were simply eclipsed by Zionism’s overriding aim to founder an ethnically homogenous state in as much of the lands of former Palestine as it possibly could.
350 Shalom 2002 p178 351 Quoted in Shlaim 1988 p465 352 Quoted in Morris 2004 p577
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Yet Ben-Gurion’s low estimation on the value of a peace agreement was based upon more than the painful concessions his country would have to make to attain it. Ben- Gurion was well aware of the hatred in the Arab world towards his country, caused not just by Israel’s birth but of the humiliating defeat they had suffered at the hands of Israeli forces. Ben-Gurion believed that the Arab need for revenge was far too deep to be diminished through the simple signing of a peace agreement. As such, any peace agreement reached now would not lessen the danger of a second round of fighting later. Therefore Ben-Gurion concluded that not only was the price of peace too high, but that it might not be worth the paper it was written on353.
Israel’s apprehensions towards a peace agreement did not extend to one negotiated on a bilateral level. Israel’s preference for bilateral negotiations was essentially based on her conviction that the presence of an intermediary shielded the Arab states from the military might of the Israeli Defence Forces. Rather than imposing a peace upon her vanquished enemy, the PCC and the Great Powers were insisting Israel negotiate a peace with concessions354. Israel quickly realised that the terms she could obtain in a bilateral agreement would be far more favourable to those in an agreement overseen by the UN or the Big Powers. However, Israel’s only signed bilateral document precluded her from reaching more. The humiliating terms she demanded from Transjordan in the Armistice Agreement, and her accompanying threats of military action if Transjordan did not submit, guaranteed that no other Arab state would trust Israel in a bilateral format throughout the life of the conference. As Israeli historian/journalist Tom Segev has noted, by forcing Transjordan into a humiliating armistice agreement, Israel had raised the price of peace and thereby reduced the chances of forging an agreement – even bilaterally355.
When the pressure on Israel to make concessions became particularly overbearing, the GOI switched to a tactic of ending the conference and blaming the PCC for its failure356. From this time Israeli criticism of the Commission became more intense
353 For a thorough and indepth analysis of Ben-Gurion’s thinking toward a peace agreement, see Shalom 2002 pp184-191 354 Shalom 2002 p188 355 Segev 1986 p38 356 For an example to Israel plotting against the PCC, see Eban to Sharett, 7 June 1949, State of Israel p100. By 8 June, Ethridge had noticed the Israeli tactic to breakup the conference and warned Acheson of the Israeli scheme against the PCC. Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 8 June 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/6-649, FRUS p1096
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and regular until by the end Israel was actively campaigning for its dismantlement. Israel gambled once again that time would act to consolidate her gains and that the international community would do nothing to prevent this. Ben-Gurion only made one error in his assessments; he would have to wait a lot longer than ten years to achieve peace.
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II. The Arabs: Seeking peace or committed to Israel’s destruction?
Overview
Throughout the Lausanne Conference the behaviour of the Arab delegations was a source of constant frustration to the Commissioners. Their generous, flexible and cooperative stance in private was in stark contrast to the belligerent, hostile and unreasonable conduct they displayed as a bloc. The gap between the private Arab promises and the bellicose threats and declarations made in public was so large that it is extremely difficult to ascertain exactly where their real feelings and positions lay. It appears that the Arab delegations saw the Lausanne negotiations as an opportunity to gain ascendency in the Arab world (through competition with their rivals) and as a means of gaining international financial support rather than as an opportunity to make peace with a country with which they shared a common future. By keeping their gaze firmly set upon each other, the Arabs may have missed the hand that was being extended, however hesitantly, by their Jewish neighbour.
Territory
During the course of the Lausanne Conference, all the Arab Delegations, with the exception of Lebanon, put territorial demands on the table. Egypt was eager to gain territory in the Negev, namely the Gaza-Beersheeba Dead Sea line357. Syria was anxious for a ‘border rectification’ in exchange for her acceptance of a large number of refugees358. And Jordan was intent on annexing Arab Palestine, west of the Jordan River, whilst also gaining a land corridor to the Mediterranean Sea359. What these claims reveal most of all, is that the Arab states were anxious to pick over the remains of the ill-fated Arab Palestinian State which the UN had intended to establish.
The Arab signatures on the Lausanne Protocol suggest that the Arab states had come to support the concept of partition. However, it seems evident that they did not view partition as the UN had when it passed Resolution 181; ie the establishment of an independent Arab state; but that they envisaged that the Arab territory would fall under their control. For, through claiming lands in former Mandatory Palestine, the
357 Rockwell to the Secretary of State, 20 July 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/7-2049 358 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 9 May 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/5-949, FRUS p988 359 Eytan to Sharett, 1 July 1949, State of Israel, p191
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Arab states were ensuring that an independent Arab Palestine never became a reality. At the time the Palestinian Arabs were disorganised, fragmented and struggling to come to terms with their new circumstances. It is therefore highly unlikely that they possessed the resources to form an independent state in any event360. Yet the land claims of their ‘fellow’ Arabs revealed that they were not of a mind to help them.
King Abdullah of Jordan, particularly, was actively working against the establishment of an independent Arab state due to his own territorial ambitions. Long before the 1948 War, the King had firmly set his sights on the annexation of Arab Palestine into his own Kingdom. Abdullah’s Greater Transjordan policy left him at odds with the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin Al Husseini. The Mufti was the only figure with a powerbase capable of challenging King Abdullah for leadership of the area and he therefore viewed Husseini as his primary enemy, far more so than Israel361. During the Lausanne Conference, Transjordan’s dual objectives were to attain international and Israeli recognition of its annexation of Arab Palestine and to deny any opportunity for the creation of a “Mufti state”362.
Egypt appeared to be more enthusiastic about the idea of an independent Arab state in Palestine. It did at least establish the All-Palestine Government in September 1948. Yet this action was little more than a tactical move to confound the ambitions of their Hashemite rival in Transjordan. Egypt and the Hashemites were at the time competing for leadership in the Arab world. Rather than revealing any firm commitment to the right of Palestinian Arabs to self-determination or statehood, the Egyptian move was a political one to foil a hated rival363. Throughout Lausanne the Egyptian delegation continued formally to support the concept of partition364 rather than agree to Abdullah’s moves to annex the land between Israel and the Jordan.
360 The British certainly considered the idea of establishing an independent Palestinian state an impossibility, with Sir Alec Kirkbride, the British representative in Transjordan, concluding that the creation of a state containing 400,000 residents and 400,000 refugees was an absurdity (Shlaim 1988 p509). 361 King Abdullah and Israel colluded together before the 1948 war and had an ‘unwritten understanding’ that King Abdullah’s forces would not attack the future Jewish in return for Israeli recognition of Transjordanian control over the territories allotted to the Arabs in the UN partition plan. Pappé 1988 p10 362 For an indepth analysis of the intrigues surrounding King Abdullah’s Greater Transjordan policy, read Shlaim 1988 and Pappé 1988 363 Pappé 1988 p84 364 Rockwell to the Secretary of State, 20 July 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/6-2049. FRUS p1238 and 21 May 1949, Eytan to Eban, State of Israel, p58
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Egypt’s own territorial claims in the Negev however indicated that it did not seriously support self-government for the Palestinians and was in fact working against it in order to gain territorial advantage itself.
It is not inconceivable that the Egyptians were secretly eager to rid themselves of the Gaza Strip and the financial and administrative burden it represented. The Israelis were certainly convinced that Egypt was keen to divest itself of the highly populated and resource-free narrow strip of land365. But if Egypt did at one point favour the cession of the Gaza Strip to Israel, she certainly changed her mind to become adamantly against it. US Acting Secretary of State Webb believed that Egypt was only holding onto the Strip as a bargaining chip to force Israel to make territorial concessions in the Negev366. Yet if this had been the case, Egypt would have entered talks with Israel, under the “good offices” of the US. If Egypt had agreed to discuss the proposition in Washington as invited, the Americans would have insisted that Egypt receive territorial compensation elsewhere, as already noted. The fact that Egypt steadfastly refused the invitation reveals that she had already decided against it. It is more likely that having seen the mass hostility to King Abdullah of Jordan following his cession of territory to Israel in the Armistice Agreement, Egypt had become reluctant to sign a bilateral treaty without the support of the Arab world.
The Arab state’s territorial claims also reveal the individualistic and mutually suspicious manner in which the Arab states acted at the time. All of these claims were made in a private capacity, away from the gaze of other Arab delegations. Rather than adhering to their en bloc formula, the Arab states were eager to break this solidarity if it meant material gains. The fractional rivalries had a debilitating effect on the discussions, as the Commissioners grew tired of individual Arab delegates approaching them with offers, yet refusing to voice them in front of their colleagues367.
The Lausanne Conference did not progress to the point where Arab territorial ambitions were challenged. Therefore it is difficult to ascertain if these claims were merely starting positions or ‘red lines’. The Arab positions may merely have been a
365 Vincent to the Secretary of State, 20 May 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/5-2049, FRUS p1036 366 Webb to Ethridge, 4 June 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/6-449, FRUS p1090 367 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 9 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-949. FRUS, p989
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response to the maximal territorial claims Israel was making at the time. In the Syrian case, it seems plausible that Colonel Zaim was asking for ‘border adjustments’ (the extent to which were never explored) as a face-saving measure so that he could sell a peace agreement to his people. Without a territorial gain, it would have been extremely difficult, and even dangerous, for an Arab country to sign a peace agreement with their bitter rival and accept the resettlement of refugees within their borders. Therefore, with the exception of King Abdullah, whose serious territorial goals has been well documented, it seems likely that the other Arab states might well have moved some way from their opening positions if serious negotiations ever did transpire, and if concessions were made elsewhere.
Refugees
Throughout the Lausanne Conference the Arab Delegations propelled the refugee issue to centre stage by insisting upon the recognition of the principle of return as a sine qua non of negotiations. Neither their acceptances of the Lausanne invitation nor their signatures on the May Protocol reflected a departure from this position. Both the Israelis368 and the PCC Commissioners369 were to become agitated and dismayed throughout their months at Lausanne by the Arab dogged insistence on the right of return. Yet while the Arab position on the refugee issue is clear, their genuine interest in the welfare of the refugees themselves is rather more uncertain.
The Arab refusal to enter peace negotiations until the right of return had been recognised was interpreted by Israel as a sign of their intransigence and unpreparedness for peace. The Jews were highly suspicious of the Arab concern for the refugees and interpreted it as pure political opportunism370. Israel was only too aware of the international attention the refugees were receiving and their value as a political weapon at the UN and in other forums. As long as the Arab states emphasized the refugee question, they would continue to receive sympathy from the international community and perhaps more importantly the support of the American Administration. The misery and suffering of the refugees was starkly obvious and was clearly the most emotive item on the Commission’s agenda. Although the
368 Eytan to de Boisanger, 25 May 1949. State of Israel, p64 369 Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Summary Meeting, 19 May 1949. SR/59 370 See Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 20 May 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/5-2049. FRUS pp1037- 1036
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American public were relatively uninformed on the Arab refugee issue371, their President was not, and his concern for the plight of refugees was genuine. Whilst the refugee issue persisted, the Arabs would have the attention of the most powerful political figure in the world and Israel would be condemned by the entire international community372.
The Israelis were so convinced that the Arabs were exploiting the refugee issue for purely political purposes that Eytan considered accepting the principle of return at Lausanne, just to call their bluff:
“Personally, I consider the Arab insistence on this point [the principle of repatriation], and consequently the Commission’s (perhaps sincere but undoubtedly naïve) acceptance of it, as pure bluff; and I am sorely tempted to call it. I know that their insistence on repatriation is purely tactical. They know that it is impossible to practice, but it is a strong humanitarian and legalistic card, and they mean to play it for all they are worth. It is so easy to mobilize public opinion on a thing of this kind, and we appear to be cruel and heartless, and – what’s more – defiant of the General Assembly resolution.”373
Undoubtedly there was a significant grain of truth in this argument. During the conference the Arab states showed very little concern over the plight of the refugees, witnessed by their lack of cooperation with the Palestinian representatives attending the conference374. Far from accommodating the needs of the Palestinian groups, the Arab delegations were resentful of their involvement and often saw them as a threat to their own power375. The Arab states concern for the refugees appeared only to extend to exploiting their misfortune for their own national ambitions. During Lausanne these “national ambitions” nearly always took the form of territorial and financial demands. By holding onto the refugee “card”, the Arab states were waiting for Israel to offer more attractive terms on these items. That the Palestinian refugees were
371 At least until March 1949 very few newspapers had covered the issue at all, with only a handful of articles being written about it. See Policy Paper Prepared in the Department of State, 15 March 1949. FRUS p838 372 The US Coordinator of Palestine Refugee Matters, George McGhee, was convinced that Arab interest in the refugee issue was a matter of political expediency. See McGhee 1983 p32 373 Eytan to Eban, 13 June 1949. State of Israel, p128 374 During the Lausanne Conference, groups representing the Palestinian Refugees approached the Arab Delegations and requested then to ‘fight or to come to peaceful terms with the Jews, provided that in so doing the refugee problem might be solved’. According to Gabbay, they received only ‘nice words and big promises’. Gabbay 1959, p266 375 The lack of cooperation between the Arab states and the Representative of the Palestinian Refugees, Muhammad Nimr al-Hawari, was most evidenced by Hawari finding more common ground with the Israeli delegation, what Avi Shlaim refers to as ‘collaboration’. Shlaim 1988 p496
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being used by the Arab states as political pawns can be evidenced through a conversation the Transjordanian Prime Minister, Tawfiq Pasha had with the American Chargé (Stabler) at the beginning of the Lausanne talks where he implied that the refugee question could be resolved easily if the Arabs were to receive territorial compensation376.
The offers of resettlement made by the Transjordanian and Syrian governments were not based on humanitarian concern, or the acceptance of any responsibility for the creation of the refugee crisis, but on the financial gain and development potential offered by the refugees. Egypt, who had no economic incentive to resettle the refugees due to its high population density, was “little disposed” to find a solution which might alleviate the problem377.
The Arab state’s also failed to take into account the best interests of the refugees by framing their arguments on general, sweeping principles, rather than practical details. The refugees were most interested in a swift peace so that their needs could be addressed378. They needed practical discussions of numbers and locations rather than grand gestures and broad generalisations which brought them no closer to their former homes. The Arab states’ unwillingness to use the Gaza Proposal or the 100,000 offer as a basis for discussion shows how, in their strict adherence to ‘principles’, the opportunity for refugees to be repatriated to their former homes was lost. Principles are for those with time on their side. With the bitter onset of winter and Israel continuing to impose facts on the ground, time was something the refugees did not have.
The persistence of the refugee issue also offered the Arab states another advantage. The Arabs were aware that the US State Department was primarily concerned about the refugee issue due to their potentiality to act as a springboard for Soviet influence in the area379. Just as it was assumed the refugees represented a security threat and a potential fifth column to Israel, so too were they seen as a threat to the states to which
376 Stabler to the Secretary of State, 1 May 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/5-149. FRUS p964 377 Patterson to the Secretary of State, 23 May 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/5-2349. FRUS p1045 378 Shlaim 1988 p495 379 Policy Paper Prepared in the Department of State, 15 March 1949. FRUS p838
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they had fled. It was feared that 700,000 or 800,000380 homeless and destitute people would spread anger and unrest to Arab populations and destabilise the entire region. Throughout the Lausanne conversations, various Arab representatives expressed their apprehensions regarding the Soviet threat to US officials381. Yet while the Arab governments were anxious that the presence of the refugees would pose a threat to their grip on power, with the exception of Jordan, it was not enough to provoke them into meaningful action on the matter. It seems more likely that, aware of the singular importance the State Department attached to Soviet containment, the Arabs used the communist threat as a negotiating lever with the Americans. If the Arabs could convince the Americans that the Soviet threat was real, financial assistance to both prop up their own governments and resettle the refugees would be forthcoming382.
Jerusalem
During the Lausanne Conversations the Arab states’ concern with Jerusalem appeared to be based around internal rivalries and suspicions rather than concern for the Holy City itself. As part of his Greater Transjordan policy, King Abdullah was keen to partition Jerusalem between himself and Israel383. Yet aware that he could not publicly proclaim this policy because of the opposition of the Arab states; the King limited himself to questioning the practicality of the internationalisation resolution and pointing to the nonconformity of the Jews on this matter384.
As Syria, Egypt and Lebanon had no national interest in the Jerusalem issue other than the curtailment of King Abdullah’s influence, they supported the PCC’s mandate to internationalise the city, both during Lausanne and in discussions in the GA later
380 The exact number of refugees was not certain and often changed for political purposes. Whereas Israel estimated their number at 500,000, the British thought they were closer to 900,000 and the US worked from an estimate of 700,000. For Israeli figure see Ethridge to Acheson, 9 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-949. FRUS p903. For the British and American estimate see Memorandum of Conversation, prepared presumably by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Jones), 13 April 1949. FRUS p906-910 381 See Pinkerton to Acheson, 28 March 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/3-2849. FRUS pp876-878. Acheson to Patterson, 3 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-349. Acheson to the Embassy in Egypt, 19 May 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/5-1949. FRUS p1034. Keeley to the Secretary of State, 14 July 1949. FRUS p1226. 382 This formulation was in line with the Truman Doctrine, where US financial assistance would be extending to countries feared to be in danger of the Soviet menace 383 Stabler to the Secretary of State, 15 January 1949. FRUS p667 384 Burdett to Acheson, 12 February 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/2-1249
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that year385. By voting for the more extreme Jerusalem Resolution (which provided for the full internationalisation of the city) rather than the PCC’s more practical Draft Resolution, the Arab states showed that they were more interested in confounding the plans of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and King Abdullah than in finding a practical, workable solution for the administration of the city and its Holy Places.
Desire for a peace agreement
The ostensible, if not stated386, reason for the parties to attend the Lausanne Conference was to reach a comprehensive peace agreement and end the state of war between themselves and Israel. Yet just as Israel’s genuine commitment to finding a peace agreement can be questioned, so too can that of the Arab states.
Israel was certainly sceptical of the Arabs’ desire for peace. The Israeli leader, Ben- Gurion, was convinced that the Arabs were committed to the destruction of the Israeli State and were therefore seeking a temporary arrangement rather than a permanent peace at Lausanne387. But the PCC and the US State Department genuinely believed that the Arab state’s will for peace was real. A memorandum prepared for Mark Ethridge before he set out to join the PCC, noted that “most of the Arab leaders seem to realise that their cause against the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine is now hopeless”388. Ilan Pappé agrees that it is unthinkable that the Arabs were committed to the abolition of the Israeli State at this time as its existence was already a fait accomplis, especially after its admittance to the UN389.
Throughout the conference, Ethridge remained convinced that not only had the Arab state’s given up the attempt to destroy the Jewish State, but that they were open to signing a formal peace agreement with it. By pointing out that Israel held the “key to peace”, Ethridge was assuming that a conciliatory gesture from Israel would provoke a similar response from the Arabs390. Ethridge felt that the Arabs’ had proved their commitment to peace both by accepting the invitation to Lausanne391 and by signing
385 The Arab states, with the exception of Jordan, voted for the more extreme Resolution which provided for the full internationalization of the city 386 The Lausanne Conference was officially only an ‘exchange of views’ rather than a peace conference 387 Rockwell to the Secretary of State, 19 July 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/7-1949 388 Memorandum by Samuel Kopper to Ethridge, 27 January 1949. FRUS p704 389 Pappé 1992 p209 390 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 28 May 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/5-2849, FRUS pp1071 391 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 4 April 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/4- 449
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the Lausanne Protocol. Ethridge’s scathing condemnation of Israel upon his resignation was categorical: “If there is to be any assessment of blame for stalemate at Lausanne, Israel must accept primary responsibility”392. That Ethridge’s colleagues in Washington shared this view is evidenced through the massive pressure they asserted on Israel throughout the Conference’s life. Washington appeared to agree with their delegate at Lausanne that the Arabs had gone as far as they could towards peace without some show of reciprocity from Israel. Yet, Washington and Ethridge’s single-minded focus on Israeli actions acted to shield the Arab states from intensive scrutiny over their personal and national ambitions and objectives.
The Arabs professed to desire peace so that they could concentrate on developing their economic and social systems393. It was certainly true that there were some economic benefits to be gained through a peace agreement, but as Nadav Safran has pointed out, these were relatively minor compared to the material and psychological disadvantages an agreement presented. On the material side, Israel would compete with her neighbours in trade and for status as a financial capital. But more importantly, signing a peace agreement with their Zionist enemy would put the Arab governments at risk of political overthrow. Having indoctrinated their citizens with hatred for the Zionist project for decades (through state-controlled media), the Arab Governments had put themselves in a position where their publics would not accept a negotiated peace treaty with Israel. The scale of the Arab armies’ defeat in the 1948 war had largely been hidden from the Arab population. Any agreement which did not involve significant Israeli concessions would have been an open admission of that defeat, and would in turn have placed their governments in a precarious position394. Throughout 1949 it was clear that Arab anxieties about the political cost of a peace agreement were real. In 1948, the Egyptian Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha had been assassinated by the Muslim Brotherhood after accepting a cease-fire with Israel395, and in early 1949 Colonel Zaim was able to capitalise on the widespread discontent aroused in Syria by armistice talks to overthrow the ruling regime. It would not be
392 Bruce to the Secretary of State, 12 June 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/6-1249, FRUS pp1124 393 Memorandum of Conversation by Samuel C Kopper, 7 January 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/1-749, FRUS pp624-625, Keeley to the Secretary of State, 2 May 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/5-249, FRUS p966 394 Safran 1969 pp40-41 395 The assassination also occurred after Nuqrashi Pasha ordered a crackdown on the Society, which was undoubtedly another contributing factor to his death.
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long before Lebanon and Jordan too were to experience the cost of perceived capitulation to Israel through the assassinations of King Abdullah of Jordan and Prime Minister Riad al-Sohl of Lebanon, both in 1951.
Arab incentives to sign a peace agreement were also diminished by the fact that Lausanne did not take place “under the gun”. The UN and the Big Powers had made clear that they would not tolerate any further fighting. Any ideas Israel may have harboured to defy the international community were all but dashed when the UK threatened to invoke her treaty obligations with Jordan and Egypt if Israel attacked396. The shield provided by the UK, UN and US to the Arab states meant that Israel could not dictate the terms of an agreement to the conquered Arab armies, and that therefore they would not be forced to sign what they considered to be an “unjust peace”397.
Yet although the Arabs were not prepared to sign an agreement based on the terms Israel was demanding (the retention of the status quo), they did show a considerable amount of interest in 1949 in signing another kind of agreement. Throughout that year, the Arab governments represented at Lausanne made frequent overtures to the US and the UK to impose a settlement on the parties398. The Arabs envisaged that the settlement would be based on the enforcement of United Nations resolutions 181 and 194. In effect, the Arabs were willing to recognise partition (and thereby the existence of the Israeli State) inside the borders delineated by the partition plan, and the principles of both repatriation and resettlement. Unwilling to accept partition in 1948, the Arabs now wished to turn the clock back to one day before the war began by implementing the very international resolutions they had fought so vociferously against.
The benefits of such an imposed agreement to the Arabs were substantial. Firstly, as the establishment of an independent Arab Palestinian State as envisioned by the Partition Resolution, had all but vanished from the international horizon, they would be able to take the territory allocated to the ill-fated state for themselves. While Transjordan would have been the major beneficiary of this, the other Arab states
396 Britain also threatened to extend their peace treaty with Jordan to Jordanian-controlled Arab Palestine. Acheson to Webb, 1 June 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/6-149, FRUS p1081 397 Rockwell to the Secretary of State, 20 July 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/7-2049, FRUS p1238 398 Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 4 March 1949. FRUS p791, Vincent to the Secretary of State, 9 May 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/5-949, FRUS p988
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would probably have been able to pick up some scraps for themselves. The repatriation of the Arab refugees would have freed them from the economic and political burden they posed whilst offering a side benefit of weakening the Israeli state internally. Above all, an imposed settlement would have significantly reduced discontent within their populations as the governments could simply say that peace was forced upon them by the UN and the Big Powers. Arab rage could thereby be redirected to the international community while their governments enjoyed the benefits of a regional peace, which would no doubt have been financed through American currency.
When the Arabs realised that the PCC was unable or unwilling to impose a settlement their interest in the Lausanne Conference waned. Hamstrung by US opposition to an imposed settlement, the PCC Commissioners immediately saw their influence over the Arab delegates diminish. Rather than concentrating their attention on the proceedings at Lausanne, the Arabs began to focus on the upcoming GA in September399. Aware that they could not accept what the Zionists were offering, that the pressure emanating from Washington on Israel to offer further concessions was largely ineffective, and that the Big Powers were unwilling to impose a solution through the PCC400, the Arabs once again placed their faith in the UN and turned their back on the Lausanne formula. Ultimately they would be disillusioned on this front too, with the concept of an imposed settlement failing to gain official US support at any time following the passing of the Partition Resolution.
399 Ethridge predicted that the Arabs may be moving in this direction as early as 18 May after Israel had hardened her position. Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 18 May 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/5-1849, FRUS p1029. By 11 August Rockwell concluded that some Arab delegations were looking forward to the GA so that they could be ‘forced’ into a decision. Rockwell to the Secretary of State, 11 August 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/8-1149 400 The British were eager to do just this through their Eight Point Plan but failed to gain the support of the US, who continued to support a negotiated settlement. Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 13 September 1949. FRUS p1377
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Chapter 4
The US and Lausanne
A large proportion of readings covering the Lausanne Conference are centred on understanding the positions of the parties involved and a critique of the effectiveness of the PCC as a mediating body. Yet I am more concerned with the motivations and actions of the most important power present at the conference; the US. By 1949, the US was the only state powerful enough to bring the parties to agreement. In addition, its formative role in the passage of the 1947 Partition Resolution meant that it had a personal stake in ensuring a peaceful resolution to the conflict it had invoked. The turmoil in which the Middle East was plunged due to the decision to partition Mandatory Palestine weighed heavily on the US Administration; for both strategic and humanitarian reasons. The enormous amount of correspondence which took place between the US delegation at Lausanne and the State Department in Washington is testament to the intense interest the US took in reaching a successful conclusion to the talks. Yet in the end, all the power, influence and interest of the US counted for little. The parties walked away in an uneasy non-peace and the refugees continued to languish in camps outside Israeli borders. My analysis in this chapter will explore the motivations of the US in resolving the dispute, to what extent these dictated US policy and how these ultimately influenced the result of the 1949 Lausanne Conference.
I will begin my analysis with a brief history of US involvement in the Palestine issue in order to appreciate where the US stood at the time of the Lausanne Conference. An enormous wealth of material exists on the US recognition of the State of Israel. Witnesses and commentators have long since debated both the motivations and policy of President Truman and those within the State Department. While there have been a large
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amount of studies conducted around America’s Palestine policy up to its recognition of Israel, there has been very little discussion of the positions President Truman and the State Department followed after this event. I will take advantage of the tremendous amount of research which exists on the period leading to America’s recognition of Israel as the factors influencing policy during this time continued to be relevant throughout 1949 and the Lausanne Conference.
A brief history of US involvement in the Question of Palestine
American involvement in the future of Palestine began with Woodrow Wilson’s declaration of support for the Balfour Declaration in 1917. This document expressed British sympathy with Zionist aims and pledged British support for a Jewish National Home in Palestine. Following the First World War, Britain inherited the Mandate for Palestine in 1922, under the League of Nations system. During this time the US government considered the Question of Palestine to be a British affair and took little interest in the clashes between the Zionists and Arab populations which exploded during the Mandate period.
The outbreak of World War Two and the onset of the Holocaust however, acted to propel the American Zionist community into fervent activity. In 1939 the British Government had published a White Paper severely limiting the number of Jewish immigrants entering Palestine. The White Paper was a response to the massive outcry by Palestine’s indigenous Arab population, who vehemently and violently objected to the usurpation of their homeland by a growing Jewish immigrant population. At the time when European Jewry was being decimated by the Hitler regime, the British White Paper represented a catastrophe not only for the Zionist project but for the general attempt to rescue European Jewry from the Nazi “Final Solution”. In order to fight the British and their closed door policy, a small group of Jewish leaders met in the Biltmore Hotel in New York in May 1942. The result of this meeting was the Biltmore Program, where the Zionist leadership declared their intention to found a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine. For the first time, the Zionist community had publicly announced their intention to establish a Jewish State in the lands of Mandatory Palestine.
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The Zionist lobby in the US was highly organised, extremely active and enormously well connected. By 1944 the lobby had rallied support for the Zionist cause within all sectors of American society and posted their first major political successes with the introduction of Zionist resolutions in both Houses of Congress401 and the inclusion of Zionist planks in both the Democrat and Republican Party platforms. However, these successes did not automatically produce any clear policy by the American Administration on the Palestine issue. President Roosevelt was reluctant to interfere with British affairs and preferred to steer a ‘middle course’ so as to not lose the friendship of Arabs or Jews. Roosevelt’s confused and equivocal approach to Palestine finally resulted in the President offering contradictory assurances to each group so that American policy on Palestine was entirely unresolved at the time of his death402.
When President Truman took office in April 1945 he inherited the dual commitments of his predecessor and almost immediately became deeply entangled in the Palestine issue. Truman came under enormous pressure from the Zionist lobby to publicly declare his support for the Biltmore program, but his attention to the issue was really only aroused by the issue of the Jewish DPs. In August 1945, Earl G Harrison returned from a mission in Germany and reported to the President that Jewish DPs were living in conditions not much better than which they had endured in the camps in Nazi Germany403. Although Harrison did not visit Palestine, he nevertheless linked the fate of the Jewish DPs to the opening up of the doors to the Mandatory province and recommended that additional immigration certificates be made available immediately. Truman was appalled by the plight of Europe’s surviving Jews as described in Harrison’s report404 and immediately called on Britain to admit 100,000 of these unfortunate persons into Palestine405. Truman’s request to Britain to revoke the White Paper marked the turning point of US
401 The Resolutions were shelved due to State Department intervention as it was deemed the Resolution would be detrimental to US interests at a time of war. See Stevens 1970 p54 402 In 1943 President Roosevelt wrote to Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia and assured the King that no decision would be made to alter the basic situation of Palestine without fully consulting both Jews and Arabs, yet at Zionist prodding, issued a statement in 1944 declaring his opposition to the British White Paper. See Stevens 1970 p80 403 The Harrison Report is published in full in Hurewitz (ed) 1972 pp249-257 404 President Truman’s horror at the Jewish DPs conditions can be witnessed in the letter he wrote to General Eisenhower upon receiving the report. For a full transcript, see Truman 29 September 1945 405 President Truman first broached the issue of allowing 100,000 Jewish DPs into Palestine at the Potsdam Conference in July, before the Harrison Report had been released
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involvement in the Palestine issue. From this time onward the Palestine affair became as much of a concern to America as to Britain.
To appease the demands of the Americans the British offered to establish a joint Committee of Inquiry on the issue. The findings of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry were delivered in May 1946 and supported Truman’s demand for 100,000 immigration certificates to be made available to the Jewish DPs. Yet the British government failed to endorse this recommendation due to the havoc it would invariably wreak in Palestine. The British faced a violent and explosive situation in the province where each community was fighting both itself and each other in a bitter struggle over demography, land and power. While the British no doubt shared Truman’s concern for the plight of the victims of Nazism, they were also mindful of the inevitable political ramifications of admitting another 100,000 Jews into Palestine. The Zionists were actively seeking to become a majority in Palestine so that their aspirations to found a Jewish State could be realised. Though sympathetic to Truman’s demands, the British could not afford to divorce these humanitarian ideals from the political realities of the situation. The admission of 100,000 Jewish DPs threatened to alter the demographic and political status quo and set the entire region aflame406.
Although President Truman’s humanitarian interest in the Palestine issue was keen, it did not extend beyond the need to admit 100,000 Jewish refugees until domestic politics intervened in October 1946407. Congressional elections were taking place in November of that year and a massive amount of pressure was being exerted on Truman by Congressman and the Zionist lobby alike to enunciate a clear, pro-Zionist policy on Palestine. The President responded on 4 October by issuing a statement on the eve of the important Jewish holiday, Yom Kippur. The Yom Kippur statement once again endorsed Truman’s support for the admission of 100,000 Jewish DPs into Palestine but went one step further. President Truman announced his unprecedented support for a “viable
406 See Benson 1997 pp65-66 for Prime Minister Attlee’s reply to President Truman’s endorsement of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry’s recommendation to allow 100,000 Jewish DPs into Palestine 407 President Truman denies that the statement was politically motivated (Truman 1956 p154) yet due to the timing of the statement it is difficult to read it as anything other and there is a general consensus amongst commentators that the statement was at least in part made for political purposes
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Jewish state in an adequate area of Palestine”408. This marked a watershed in US Palestine policy, as Truman had now gone on record as supporting Zionist political aims and abandoned Roosevelt’s pledge to consult the Arabs before making a decision on the issue of Palestine.
The statement caused considerable consternation to the British, who were still scrambling to find a negotiated solution to the Palestine problem. Aware that they could not continue to oppose the wishes of the US, Britain announced that they would hand the Palestine issue over to the UN on 14 February 1947 on the grounds that the Mandate was unworkable. The UK was to abandon the Mandate in May 1948.
The UN immediately established the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) in order to recommend a solution as to the future of the area. On 1 September 1947, UNSCOP submitted to the GA both a majority and a minority report. The majority report recommended the region of Palestine be partitioned between the Jews and Arabs while the minority report advised the establishment of a Federation between the two communities within the boundaries of Palestine. The US endorsed the provisions laid out in the majority report and lent their weight behind partition. While the US at first supported the Negev region’s (in the South of Palestine) inclusion in the Arab state (contrary to the UNSCOP recommendations), President Truman was finally persuaded to change his mind and support Jewish claims to the region after a visit from Chaim Weizmann409.
The recommendation to partition Palestine came to the vote in the GA on 29 November 1947. Due to a rare convergence of policy between the US and the Soviet Union410, in addition to a considerable amount of pressure from the Zionist lobby and Zionist supporters within the American Administration, the resolution was passed with the required two-thirds majority. Jews celebrated around the world as the Zionist ambition to establish a Jewish state was finally embraced by the international community. By stark
408 Benson 1997 p70 409 The circumstances and controversy over this visit will be discussed in the following section 410 The Soviet Union was thought to have supported the partition resolution in order to remove Anglo- American influence from the area in addition to creating weak, independent states (which would then be malleable to Soviet penetration). See Kohler to the Secretary of State, 1 July 1949, FRUS p1194
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contrast, Palestinian Arabs were incensed that over half of their ancestral lands were to be awarded to an immigrant group who owned only 6 percent of Palestinian territory at the time. The Arab states reacted with shock and anger and promised to invade the Jewish State at the cession of the Mandate.
Clashes soon broke out between the Zionist and Palestinian communities. As the violence spread and the area was plunged into a bloody chaos it became obvious that the Partition Resolution could not be implemented without the use of force. Contrary to what had been hoped411, the passing of the Partition Resolution had not diminished the conflict between Jews and Arabs and had in fact exacerbated it to the point of all-out war in the region. The State Department, National Security Council and the Policy Planning Staff became alarmed that the disruption and turmoil in the area would be exploited by the Soviet Union who would use the opportunity to spread their influence. As such, the situation in Palestine represented a direct threat to US interests.
The State Department advised President Truman that a successful implementation of the Partition Resolution would require the deployment of US troops to protect the nascent Jewish State from being overwhelmed by Arab forces. However, the State Department advised against the commitment of US forces for several reasons. Firstly, the deployment of American troops to protect the Zionists would result in a loss of Arab friendship, contrary to US strategic and oil interests. Secondly, American troops would need to be deployed under the UN umbrella, leading to the opportunity for the USSR to station its troops in the region, a scenario to which the US was implacably opposed. Finally, the legality of this option was dubious as it was contrary to the Charter of the UN to impose a settlement by force on the people of Palestine. The option to continue to support partition without assigning troops in the area was dismissed as the continuing disorder and disintegrating situation would present too great an opportunity for Soviet expansion. It was therefore recommended that the US switch their support to an
411 State Department report, author unknown, ‘The Position of the United States with Respect to Palestine’, 17 February 1948. Harry S Truman Library, Student Research File, B File, Recognition of Israel
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International Trusteeship option until a solution more amenable to both sides could be found412.
The recommendation received the tacit approval of President Truman and on 19 March 1948, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Senator Austin, announced to the Security Council that due to the special circumstances prevailing in Palestine, the US supported a temporary trusteeship until the parties could be brought to a peaceful agreement. Austin’s speech angered and embarrassed President Truman, who had not been informed of the timing of the speech and who had only the day before given assurances to his old friend Chaim Weizmann that the US would continue to support partition413. Truman, who was running for re-election in November, suddenly came under enormous pressure from the Zionist lobby who viewed the Trusteeship Proposal as an abandonment of the partition plan414.
As the 14 May deadline for the departure of the British from Palestine loomed, the US delegates at the UN worked towards finding a majority amongst other delegations for the Trusteeship Proposal. However, President Truman was eager to honour his promises to Weizmann by recognising the new Jewish state when it was to be proclaimed on 15 May. In order to do this, President Truman first had to overcome resistance from the State Department and his greatly respected Secretary of State, General Marshall. Accordingly, the President arranged a meeting on 12 May between Marshall and his Zionist advisers in the White House in order for them to argue the case for recognition to Marshall and other State Department officials. The meeting turned into a fiery confrontation which has become known as the “Showdown in the Oval Office”415. Clark Clifford, President Truman’s aide, failed to overcome State Department objections416 and General Marshall
412 State Department report, author unknown, ‘The Position of the United States with Respect to Palestine’, 17 February 1948. Harry S Truman Library, Student Research File, B File, Recognition of Israel. Also see United States Department of State 1983 413 President Truman’s frustration is evidenced in his calendar entry for that day; “The State Dept pulled the rug from under me today”. Cited in Ganin 1979 p161 414 Truman 1956 p163 415 This term was coined by Clark Clifford and was the title of the first chapter in his memoirs. See Clifford 1991 p4 416 Statement by Clark M Clifford, 9 May 1948, Harry S Truman Library, Student Research File, B File, Recognition of Israel
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became so infuriated by White House meddling in Foreign Policy affairs that he threatened to break with the President417.
While President Truman lost the showdown, he did subsequently manage to impress upon his Secretary of State the seriousness of his intent to recognise the Jewish State and overcome the General’s opposition. On 14 May, eleven minutes after the proclamation of the State of Israel; President Truman shocked the world, including his Delegation at the UN, who had been faithfully working towards the Trusteeship proposal418, by announcing that;
“The United States recognises the Provisional Govt as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel”419.
As in the case of the British partition of India, Truman’s decision to support partition without the commitment of any troops to enforce it, resulted in the deaths and destruction of unknown thousands of Palestine’s warring inhabitants420.
Israel’s neighbours invaded the following day and violence and bloodshed ensued. The struggle raged while the US and the UN did nothing other than call for a truce. Contrary to State Department predictions, the State of Israel was not quashed in the conflict but emerged victorious with possession of 78 percent of Mandatory Palestine, far more than the Partition Resolution had granted. The Arab community had been devastated and dispersed by what was to become known as the Nakba (catastrophe); the creation of the Arab refugee crisis. Around 750,000 Arabs had been displaced and were now completely dependent on the aid and goodwill of the international community. Thanks to the efforts of the US, the Zionists had realised their ambition to establish a Jewish State in Palestine but at great cost to its indigenous population. Ironically, Truman’s solution to the plight
417 Clifford gives a fascinated account of this meeting in his interview with the Truman Library. See Oral History Interview with Clark M Clifford by Jerry N Hess, Washington, DC, 13 April 1971, Harry S Truman Library 418 The US Delegation felt extremely betrayed by President Truman’s sudden and unannounced reversal of policy which they felt hurt US credibility in the eyes of other nations. See Jessup 1974 p284 419 Truman 14 May 1948 420 For a gripping account of the partition of India, including its disastrous ramifications, see Alex Von Tunzelmann’s Indian Summer, 2007.
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of the Jewish victims of Nazi Germany had in the end resulted in the creation of yet another refugee crisis, as emptied Arab villages were filled by incoming Jewish DPs.
The White House and the State Department: The struggle over Palestine policy
Until Truman’s recognition of the Jewish State, the US generally followed a rather curiously inconsistent path. While prior to recognition the US Administration generally sympathised with Jewish aims, it frequently confounded the Zionist lobby by stopping short of endorsing and actively promoting the Zionist agenda. The contradictions in US policy included; its initial support of the admittance of 100,000 Jewish DPs into Palestine without supporting the establishment of a Jewish State; its subsequent support of the creation of a Jewish State without taking firm action to ensure this came about; its inclusion of the Negev into the Arab Palestinian state, followed by an abrupt volte face which awarded it to Israel, its reversal of policy from partition to trusteeship, and then back again to partition, and the support of partition without the commitment of troops to enforce it.
Many commentators explain the contradictions in US Palestine policy between 1945 and 1948 as an indication of the internal struggle taking place within the US Administration between the White House and the State Department. It is assumed that due either to electoral exigencies or to humanitarian concerns the White House was largely pro- Zionist, while as a result of Cold War preoccupations the State Department was generally “pro-Arab”421. I will explore the evidence in support of this interpretation, as the inherent leanings of the White House and the State Department had an enormous impact on the course of the Lausanne negotiations.
The support of Zionist aims was generally popular in the US following WW2 due to widespread sympathy for the victims of Nazi persecution422, the relative power of the Jewish voting bloc423, and the effectiveness of the Zionist lobby424. However, President
421 Stevens 1970 p85 422 An American Institute of Public Opinion poll of June 19, 1946, showed 78 per cent of those polled in favour of the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. Heald and Kaplan 1977 p244 423 While the Jewish population living in the US was comparatively small relative to other groups (only 5,600,000 in the late 1940s), they wielded far greater powers than their numbers suggest as they were
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Truman consistently denied that his support for Zionist aims had any domestic political dimension. In his Memoirs, Truman ascribes his sympathy for Zionism to his concern for the “fate of the Jewish victims of Hitlerism” and the “solemn promise that had been made to them [the Jews] by the British in the Balfour Declaration of 1917”425. When reflecting on his role in the creation of the Jewish State, President Truman continuously reiterates that the driving forces were the lofty ideals of humanitarianism and the principle of self- determination426. Those that worked closely with the President at the time agree. Clark Clifford, Truman’s important Special Counsel and advisor on Palestine, confirms that the President was indeed motivated by his belief in the justness of the Balfour Declaration and his determination to assist the Jewish DPs427. Dean Acheson, President Truman’s Undersecretary of State and later Secretary of State, concurs with Clifford on this point428.
Yet a number of officials serving within the State Department and subsequent commentators have proven more sceptical of President Truman’s Zionist sympathies. In his study of the President’s recognition of the State of Israel, Evan Wilson, who served on the Palestine Desk within the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, concluded that:
“I began this study with the opinion, which I had held since my days on the Palestine desk, that Truman’s principle motivation had been humanitarian, but after examining all the evidence, including data that were not available to us in the State Department at the time, I have been forced reluctantly to the conclusion that on certain key occasions (October 1947 and May 1948) he was more influenced by domestic considerations than by humanitarian ideals.”429
Similarly, Dean Rusk, who served under President Truman as Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs and later for Far Eastern Affairs, agreed that Truman was at
concentrated into three pivotal electoral states; New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois (Snetsinger 1974 p12). Jewish voting power was further enhanced when Zionist leaders encouraged members to vote as a ‘bloc’ 424 This highly organized lobby group boasted some remarkable achievements by 1945 when some thirty- three states with 85 per cent of the nation’s population had passed resolutions favoring a Jewish homeland. 425 Truman 1956 p132 426 Truman 1956 p133 427 Clifford 1991 p7-8 428 Acheson 1969 p169 429 Wilson 1979 p149
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least in part motivated by domestic political concerns on the Palestine issue430. John Snetsinger, in his critique of Truman’s recognition of Israel, asserts that between May and November 1948, Truman was increasingly willing to accept recommendations based upon domestic political considerations due to the approaching Presidential election in November that year431. Certainly there seems to be a substantial amount of evidence to support the claim that President Truman was, at least in part, politically motivated in his treatment of the Palestine issue. The timing of his Yom Kippur statement and his November 1948 speech in support of the Zionist plank in the Democratic Party’s platform, which were made shortly before the Presidential election, were undoubtedly electorally motivated. For an experienced politician such as Harry Truman, vote winning was an essential element of political life and he would never have held the office of US President if he had not been astute at this activity. On the issue of Palestine itself, President Truman sometimes even admitted the domestic political pressures involved. Truman once famously remarked to four Chiefs of Mission from the Near East who had come to advise him of Arab unrest due to his Palestine policy:
“I’m sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism: I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents”432
Yet the domestic political rewards involved in following a pro-Zionist policy are not sufficient to account for Truman’s behaviour. Firstly, even though the Zionist lobby was enormously prolific and well connected, and represented a relatively powerful voting bloc, at 3 percent of the American population, the Jewish community did not represent a significant enough amount of votes to command the foreign policy of the President. Secondly, if the President had been intent on capturing every Zionist vote in his 1948 election campaign, there were many further steps he could have taken in this direction, such as extending de jure recognition to the State of Israel, lifting the arms embargo and guaranteeing a loan to the nascent State433. More likely, President Truman found that
430 Rusk 1990 p145 431 Snetsinger 1974 p97 432 Wilson 1979 p58, Chace 1998 p132 433 President Truman received hundreds of thousands of postcards during his election campaign from Zionist supporters demanding he take these steps, indicating the tremendous amount of pressure he was under to change his policy on Israel. Truman only guaranteed the loan and extended de jure recognition to
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following a Palestine policy favourable to Zionist aims happily converged with his natural sympathies – his concern for the Jewish DPs, his belief in the Balfour Declaration and his biblical teachings which had led him to the conviction that the Jews possessed a mystical entitlement to the lands of Eretz Israel434.
While President Truman’s multiple reasons for supporting Zionist aims are evident, in themselves they do not explain his vacillations on the issue. For Truman was not always a champion of the Zionist cause and throughout his presidency often came under vicious attack by the Zionist lobby for lacking clear direction on the issue. Zionist annoyance with Truman was most often directed at the President’s “refugee Zionism”435. This term refers to the President’s predilection for supporting the Jewish refugees but not the creation of a Jewish state, which was in fact the Zionists’ overriding purpose. While Zionists were appreciative of Truman’s attempts to encourage the British to admit 100,000 Jewish DPs into Palestine, they did not feel that this went far enough in supporting their political aims. Even when President Truman did publicly support the creation of a Jewish State in October 1946, he failed to translate this shift into policy. Zionists were further infuriated when the US Delegation to the UN came out in support of an International Trusteeship rather than continuing their support for partition. When President Truman surprised everybody with his immediate recognition of the State of Israel, the Zionist lobby continued to be upset that he had only extended de facto recognition rather than de jure.
President Truman’s resistance to fully support the Zionist agenda frequently left him at odds with Zionist leaders, with some of whom the President shared a highly antagonistic relationship436. In his Memoirs, Truman recalls, “I think I can say that I kept my faith in the rightness of my policy in spite of some of the Jews”437. President Truman often lost
Israel after he had won the election. Many of these postcards can be found in the Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri 434 In his study on Harry S Truman, Michael Benson asserts that Truman’s religious upbringing and his familiarity with the Bible heavily influenced his Palestine policy. Benson 1997 pix 435 This term is used by both Michael Cohen (1990 p56) and Michael Benson (1997 p58) when describing President Truman’s Palestine policy 436 Truman was most confounded by the actions of Rabbi Silver and his militant and confrontational style of leadership. See Benson 1997 p96 437 Truman 1956 p160
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his patience with the Zionist leadership whom he determined could not be satisfied and only ever asked for more438. The cause of the underlying tension between President Truman and the Zionist leadership was that Truman was not free to fully support Zionist objectives because they often conflicted with broader US national interests. As President, Truman was duty bound to follow a policy which would best protect US interests, and for this he had to rely on the advice of the State Department and his Secretary of State.
In 1946, when President Truman was beginning to take an interest in the Palestine issue, his State Department were becoming increasingly concerned with the activities of the Soviet Union. The release of the Long Telegram on 22 February 1946 by the persuasive American Chargé in Moscow, George F Kennan, clearly articulated the perceived hostile intentions the Soviet Union held towards the US in which no ‘permanent modus vivendi’ could be found. Kennan advised the use of ‘containment’ against Soviet pressure and thereby defined what was to become the Cold War439. The adoption of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 established American Cold War policy to actively support “free peoples” in their struggle against external subjugation. US strategic assistance to nations struggling against the imposition of Soviet influence was complimented later by economic support under the Marshall Plan, which was signed into law on 3 April 1948. The establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization represented the final apparatus the US initiated to declare their intentions against the spread of Soviet power into areas currently under the Western sphere of influence.
The period 1946 to 1949 was clearly a period of fervent Cold War activity in which the fear of Communist revolution was pervasive. During this period State Department officials viewed all foreign policy decisions, including the Question of Palestine, through a Cold War prism. The Soviet Union was perceived to have shown its desire to spread its influence into the Middle East through its operations in the Turkish Straits, Azerbaijan and Greece440. Although Palestine did not fall into the ‘Northern tier’, in which the USSR was thought to be most directly engaged, it was nevertheless felt to be a Soviet target area in which Soviet tactics including propaganda, penetration and diplomatic
438 For an example of one of Truman’s outbursts regarding Zionist leaders, see Ayers 1991 p268 439 Kennan, 22 February 1946. 440 Campbell 1960 p24
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manoeuvre could be utilised441. The State Department considered the Middle East of vital strategic importance due to its location near the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean and for its vast oil reserves which were instrumental to the success of the Marshall Plan, and would more and more define the “center of gravity” in the future442. The State Department concluded that:
“For these reasons, and particularly in view of the Soviet pressure against the periphery of that area, and Soviet infiltration into the area, it is important that political, economic, and social stability be maintained there.”443
The fear within the State Department that the Soviet Union would endeavour to spread its influence over the Near East is difficult to overstate. George McGhee described the mood within the Department as:
“To those of us within the US government responsible for this area at the time, there appeared to be a clear threat that the Soviet Union, which had been probing for weaknesses in Western Europe, China, Greece, Turkey and Iran, would also attempt to penetrate the weak new states of the Middle World.”444
The State Department’s “obsessive preoccupation”445, with Cold War politics made it irresistibly opposed to some Zionist aims. The need to keep the Middle East calm and stable ran counter to the opening up of Palestine to Jewish immigration and the establishment of a Jewish State within its borders. Jewish immigration into Palestine had acted to plunge the area into social upheaval and the whole Middle East region into discontent. Zionist claims on the lands of Palestine threatened to act as a lightning rod for existing Arab resentment, anti-colonial feeling and burgeoning nationalist trends in the region. US policy in Palestine was informed not just by the requirements of that area but of the whole Arab world, and by the necessity to retain Arab goodwill toward American strategic and oil interests. As such, the State Department’s Palestine policy
441 Campbell 1960 p27 442 By 1948 American oil experts were already predicting that ‘the “center of gravity” of world oil resources has already shifted from the Caribbean Sea-Mexican Gulf area to the Middle East.’ (Roosevelt 1948 p364) 443 United States Department of State 1983 p35 444 McGhee 1983 p5 445 McGhee 1983 p5
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was part of a regional strategy to keep the Middle East “friendly or at least neutral” in order to solidify US interests in the area and guard the area from Soviet expansion446.
State Department hostility to Zionism was often construed by the Zionist lobby and its supporters as anti-Semitism447, yet as author Kenneth Ray Bain points out, what proscribed State Department thinking was not anti-Semitism but rather a “virulent form of anti-Communism”448. The support of all Zionist aims in Palestine was simply antithetical to US Cold War policy. The State Department was supported in this formulation by the Department of Defence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council. It was the task of these divisions to protect US interests, and Zionism, regardless of the humanitarian concerns involved, was in direct contravention to these requirements.449
A corollary of State Department opposition to Zionist aspirations was that it often left the Department at odds with the desires of their President. President Truman dealt with the divergence of views between himself and his State Department by largely ignoring the department’s advice and following his own course. Instead of heeding guidance on the Palestine issue by his usual foreign policy advisors, Truman turned to his aides within the White House to help him formulate policy on this matter. President Truman was surrounded in the White House by Zionist sympathisers. David Niles, Clark Clifford, Max Lowenthal and Judge Samuel Rosenman450 were all Zionists and enjoyed almost unlimited access to the President. In fact, Truman later described Max Lowenthal as the true “benefactor to the State of Israel”451. Aided by his White House staff, President
446 State Department report, author unknown, ‘The Position of the United States with Respect to Palestine’, 17 February 1948. Harry S Truman Library, Student Research File, B File, Recognition of Israel 447 Loy Henderson, who served as Director, Near Eastern and African Affairs, between 1946-48 was often labeled anti-Semitic due to his Palestine policy which was formulated under Cold War concerns and was eventually removed from his position due to Zionist pressure (see Oral History Interview with Loy W Henderson by Richard D McKinzie, Washington DC, 14 June 1973, Harry S Truman Library). President Truman himself accuses his State Department of anti-Semitism in his Memoirs. See Truman 1956 p164. For other allegations of anti-Semitism against the State Department, see Crum 1947 p294 and Clifford 1991 p5 448 Bain 1979 p145 449 Writing in April 1948, Kermit Roosevelt argued that the problem with recent American Middle East policy, contrary to the charges of Zionist sympathisers, was not that it paid too much attention to oil, but too little, thereby endangering US interests in the area (Roosevelt 1948 p367) 450 Clark Clifford replaced Judge Samuel Rosenman as Special Counsel to the President in February 1946 451 Truman 1980a p402
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Truman simply shut the State Department out from Palestine policy. Truman was assisted by his respective Secretary of States in this task as they each washed their hands of the issue when they realised that their views were at variance with the Presidents452.
In addition to his White House staff, President Truman was heavily influenced on the Palestine issue by his long term friend, Eddie Jacobson, and the noted Zionist leader, Chaim Weizmann. Truman had met Eddie Jacobson during the First World War and they had become business partners. While their haberdashery business failed during the Depression, their friendship had remained close. Jacobson was an ardent Zionist and had become a valuable tool in the Zionist lobby’s armoury. Dean Acheson ascribed Truman’s faith in the Zionist project as having been implanted by Eddie Jacobson453 and in his Memoirs Truman confirms that it was only through the intervention of Jacobson that he was persuaded to receive Chaim Weizmann to discuss US adherence to the Partition Resolution454. The Zionist lobby were aware of Weizmann’s influence over the American President and would send him to visit Truman whenever an emergency arose455. Weizmann was to visit Truman on the eve of the partition vote in the GA (to ensure the Negev was awarded to the Jewish State), in March 1948 (to shore up US support for the partition resolution) and in April 1949 (to confirm US sponsorship of the Israeli application for UN membership). On each occasion Weizmann was rewarded with the President’s approval.
The strong support for Zionism within the White House and from Jacobson and Weizmann allowed President Truman to pursue his Palestine policy without regard to the policy advice emanating from the State Department. It is often alleged that the State Department worked against Truman’s Palestine policy and attempted to thwart it
452 Byrnes and Marshall both took this approach to the Question of Palestine. See Wilson 1979 p3. While Acheson was opposed to Truman’s Palestine policy he faithfully followed it when he took over as Secretary of State in 1949. See Chace 1998 p132 453 Acheson 1969 p169 454 Truman 1956 p160 455 The use of Weizmann as a political instrument by the Zionist Lobby can be evidenced through an exchange between Eban and Sharett in June 1949. Eban was concerned over Truman’s disillusionment with Israeli policy and cautioned Sharett that the only way Truman could be made to believe Israel’s view point was over the signature of Weizmann. See Eban to Sharett, 16 June 1949 State of Israel p138
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whenever possible456. Indeed this is the way the contradictions in US Palestine policy are usually explained, as noted previously. Yet those that worked within the State Department at the time vehemently deny this allegation457. Rather than working to contravene the President’s Palestine policy, the State Department simply did not know what it was. They were not informed, consulted or warned of Truman’s Palestine decisions, as they were all formed within the White House. Dean Acheson later observed that: “By the time I took up my duties as Under Secretary in September 1945 it was clear that the President himself was directing policy on Palestine”458.
In his memoirs, Dean Rusk attributes the contradictions in US Palestine policy to the contradictions which existed in Truman’s own mind. Rusk asserts that Truman was “a little schizophrenic about Israel” due to his conflicting objectives of supporting Zionism and protecting US interests459. It seems that President Truman never lost hope that these two objectives could somehow be reconciled. During the ‘Showdown in the Oval Office’, this hope is evident. General Marshall’s refusal to accept Clifford’s arguments and put what he saw to be domestic political concerns over the interests of the US460 put President Truman in the position he had most feared; having to choose between his Zionist inclinations and the foreign policy advice of his respected Secretary of State. In the end Truman decided to prioritise his Zionist proclivities over US foreign interests (as defined by the State Department).
While there appears to be little evidence to support the claim that the State Department were engaging in intrigues to undermine the President’s Palestine policy, there is some indication that the President and his White House colleagues were formulating Palestine policy in a manner that was itself rather contradictory and deceptive. In November 1948, Israeli President, Chaim Weizmann, received a letter from President Truman which was very familiarly warm in tone. The letter praised the achievements of the State of Israel
456 For allegations of this see Crum 1947 p294, Clifford 1991 p4, Weizmann 1972 p472 457 The denial of this allegation by officials working within the State Department at the time can be found in Oral History Interview with Loy W Henderson 1973, Rusk 1990 pp147-148, Wilson 1979 p11, Jessup 1974 p264, McGhee 1983 p14 , Acheson 1969 p170 458 Acheson 1969 p169 459 Rusk 1990 p147 460 Clifford 1991 p12
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and declared Truman’s entrenched opposition to any attempt to remove the Negev from the Jewish State461. Truman’s letter came at a time when his Delegation at the UN were working towards the concept of territorial compensation for the additional territory Israel had won as a result of the 1948 war. The State Department and the UN Delegation were also working towards a resolution of the refugee issue and a settlement on Jerusalem, both of which the US President failed to mention. The result of the letter was to undermine the efforts of the US State Department and UN Delegation, both of whom were faithfully following policy orders. As a matter of protocol, all letters sent by the President on foreign policy matters were to go through the State Department but on this occasion this procedure was ignored. When questioned on this, President Truman claimed not to have read the letter before signing it and blamed David Niles for sending the note without proper authorisation462, both of which were rather dubious claims463. It seems that it was the President who was on this occasion engaging in intrigues.
The one fundamental policy objective of the State Department to which President Truman faithfully adhered was their opposition to the deployment of troops in Palestine. During his first conference on Palestine upon coming to office, President Truman outlined his Palestine policy as:
The American view on Palestine is that we want to let as many of the Jews into Palestine as it is possible to let into that country. Then the matter will have to be worked out diplomatically with the British and the Arabs, so that if a state can be set up they may be able to set it up on a peaceful basis. I have no desire to send 500,000 American soldiers there to make peace in Palestine.464
By April 1948 fighting had broken out between Palestine’s Jewish and Arab communities, leaving no possibility of a peaceful resolution of the issue. Clearly aware of this fact, the Palestine Commission called upon the Security Council to send forces into the area to prevent imminent “administrative chaos, starvation, widespread strife, violence, and bloodshed”465. However, the US Delegation to the UN was instructed to
461 Truman to Weizmann, 29 November 1948, Truman Library, B-File 462 Ayers 1991 p293 463 Truman was in fact so proud of the letter he had sent Weizmann that he published it in full in his Memoirs, making his claims to have never read the letter even more unbelievable. See Truman 1956 p169 464 Quote found in Ganin 1979 p32 465 Quoted in Snetsinger 1974 p94
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block the request and so the area descended into further violence and eventually regional war. That the President failed to address the military aspects of his decision can only be seen as a confirmation of his very limited understanding of the Palestine issue. He would neither admit nor confront the fact that the establishment of a Jewish state on Arab lands would produce violent and bloody conflicts and necessarily entail the dispossession of some or all of the land’s indigenous population. Of course it will never be known if Palestine could have been saved from the bloody battle and its tragic consequences, but what is certain is that President Truman’s irresponsible approach to the conflict did nothing to prevent it.
The US and the Lausanne Conference
The deliberations which took place in November and December 1948 in the General Assembly were an attempt to deal with the bloody consequences of its partition resolution and its refusal to commit troops in its support. The internal debates which took place in the American camp indicated that the recognition of the State of Israel and Israel’s subsequent victory in its war against the Arab armies had still failed to produce an alignment of Palestine policy between the US President and his State Department. President Truman was dismayed by Secretary of State Marshall’s endorsement of the Bernadotte Proposal and instructed his delegation to work towards a set of proposals which represented an almost complete capitulation to Zionist aims. Rather than the US finally having a clear and coherent Palestine policy, the White House and the State Department continued to work towards very different objectives. The divergence of understanding between the White House and the State Department was to leave an indelible mark on the proceedings of the Lausanne Conference.
John Snetsinger concluded that President Truman’s recognition of Israel represented the end of his vacillation on the Palestine issue and thereafter the President was fully committed in his support of Israel466. Certainly, President Truman took a number of steps after May 1948 to affirm his support of the nascent State. These steps include the blocking of the Bernadotte Proposal; the undermining of the British initiative to introduce
466 Snetsinger 1974 p116
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sanctions against Israel for committing truce violations; the opposition to any move to excise the Negev from the Israeli State except by negotiation; the commitment to guarantee an Ex-Im Bank loan467; and the unprecedented appointment of James McDonald, a known Zionist sympathiser, as US Ambassador to Israel. Yet despite all this, their continued to be vacillations in Truman’s Palestine policy. These did not stem from any doubts he may have harboured about Zionism, but from the lingering Cold War concerns he was forced to address by his State Department. Following recognition, the preoccupations of the State Department remained relevant and continued to guide its Palestine policy, forcing President Truman to continue to navigate the treacherous path between his allegiance to Israel and his protection of US interests.
Throughout the Lausanne Conference, State Department objectives continued to be informed by Cold War perceptions. Department officials were continually worried that the resentment and discontent created in the Arab world as a result of Israel’s recognition and their subsequent defeat in the 1948 war would be exploited by the Soviets to gain a foothold in the area. It was considered that the anguish of the refugees who had lost their ancestral homes and lands, livelihoods, and in many cases family members, would become a locus of unrest and disillusionment in the Middle East. State Department officials were especially sensitive to the misery of the refugees given the formative role the US had played in the establishment of the State of Israel and thereby the creation of the refugee catastrophe. In early May, Secretary of State Acheson wrote to the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, explaining his concerns regarding the Palestinian refugees:
From the political point of view, the Dept considers that failure to resolve the refugee problem would serve to perpetuate conditions of insecurity and unrest in the Near East, and that the refugees would serve as a focal point for the breeding of political extremism of both a leftist and rightest character.468
The keen interest of the US State Department in resolving the refugee crisis resulted in the formulation of policy which was primarily directed at persuading Israel to accept the principle of repatriation. The GOI’s obstinate refusal to follow US directives and cede to
467 Yet even the Ex-Im Bank loan approval became an example of Truman’s vacillating Palestine policy, see Appendix I. 468 Acheson to Johnson, 4 May 1949. FRUS p972
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their demands placed them on a collision course with the State Department. Israel in turn was frustrated that the department, just like the Arabs, attached such importance to the refugee issue. Rather than allow Israel as the victor to prescribe her terms to her vanquished Arab adversaries, the State Department was determined to prevent this at all costs469 as they feared that such a “peace” would lead to the entire Middle East falling into the Soviet sphere of influence. Thus, US Cold War concerns led the State Department’s objectives to be far closer to Arab positions than those of Israel. This was not a result of State Department pro-Arab leanings, but of a strategic logic which simply subordinated all other objectives to the containment of the Soviet threat.
The enormous amount of pressure the US exerted on Israel throughout the Lausanne conversations generally enjoyed the blessing of the American President. Truman came to support State Department efforts to pressure Israel into changing her position for two reasons. Firstly, Truman and Acheson shared an extremely close working relationship, with the President usually accepting his Secretary’s foreign policy advice470. Moreover, rather than simply wash his hands of the Palestine issue as his two predecessors had done, Acheson worked hard to formulate a policy with Truman which bridged the divergent interests of the President and the department471. The harmonisation of policy between the President and the Secretary of State acted to diminish the power of Truman’s White House advisers; David Niles and Clark Clifford. Rather than controlling Palestine policy through the White House, Clifford and Niles now witnessed the State Department gaining ascendency over the issue. The shift of control over US Palestine policy caused considerable disquiet in both the White House and Israeli circles. David Niles was clearly concerned that he no longer commanded the President’s ear on the issue, prompting Abba Eban to write a worried note to Foreign Minister Sharett, warning:
469 Throughout 1949 the US advised King Abdullah from entering into direct talks with Israel ‘in the interests of a just settlement’. See Memorandum of Conversation by the Acting Secretary of State, 16 June 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/6-1649 470 McGhee 1983 p14 471 Acheson’s biographer, James Chace, observed that while Acheson did not agree with Truman’s Palestine policy regarding the establishment of the Jewish State, he was nevertheless prepared to carry out the President’s policy (Chace 1998 p132). The countless archives which exist on Acheson’s involvement in the Palestine issue during 1949 attest to his faithfulness in carrying out Truman’s policies
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“Long talk Niles. Describes Truman’s mood as follows: (1) Is only informed by [State] Department of our refusals, rejections, not of any proposals or concessions; is thus annoyed, says: “your friends must show more good will”…”472
The level of agreement between President Truman and Acheson was most forcefully felt by Israel on 29 May 1949 when Ben-Gurion received the American President’s note which threatened to review the US relationship with the Jewish State473. The note was unprecedented in tone and content and was a warning to Israel that their “friends” in the White House were losing influence over the President474.
The second reason why President Truman grew to support State Department efforts was his continuing humanitarian concerns regarding refugee issues. Just as the plight of the Jewish DPs had invoked Truman’s concern a few years earlier, so the American President now showed a compassionate interest in the fate of the Palestinian refugees475. Truman was annoyed by Israel’s obstinate refusal to display a moral concern for the refugees and supported the State Department’s attempts to induce her to be more sympathetic476.
Yet while there was a large amount of cohesion between the American President and the State Department in their aim to persuade Israel to accept the principle of repatriation, there were significant fractures within the partnership which acted to limit its effectiveness. Though the President and the State Department agreed on the need to influence Israeli policy, it soon became clear during the Lausanne Conference that a significant amount of disagreement existed on the means to do this.
This problem first arose early in the conference around the State of Israel’s application for UN membership. Officials within the State Department were eager for the question
472 Eban to Sharett, 16 June 1949, State of Israel p137 473 The note can be found in The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland, 24 May 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/2-2849. FRUS pp1051-1053 474 Elath refers to Niles and Clifford as ‘friends White House’ in a letter to Sharett when explaining information he had received from them pertaining to the President’s contentedness with a letter he had received from Weizmann. Elath to Sharett, 4 May 1949, State of Israel, p19 475 Eban to Sharett, 22 June 1949, State of Israel p150. 476 President Truman’s genuine concern of the refugee issue can be evidenced through the representations he made to President Weizmann on this issue which exhibited unprecedented pressure from the President on the Zionist leader (Acheson to Patterson, 29 April 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/4-2949), inducing Weizmann to write the American President in a bid to justify Israel’s position (Weizmann to Truman, 26 April 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/4-2649, FRUS pp947-948)
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of US support for the Israeli application to be contingent on Israeli cooperation on the refugee question in Lausanne. President Truman agreed with this tactic, and endorsed State Department moves to inform the GOI that American support for its application for UN membership would not be forthcoming until a gesture was made on the refugee front477. President Truman’s collaboration with the State Department on this matter was enough to prompt the Israelis into delivering a conciliatory speech at the UN which alluded to concessions on the issue at some point in the future478. However, this rather vague and noncommittal speech was all that the President needed to appease his concerns and convince him to support Israeli UN membership, in open defiance of State Department recommendations.
A second occasion in which the inherent differences between the President and the State Department in their Palestine policy were bought to light was in the issue of the Ex-Im Bank US$1 billion loan to the State of Israel (see Appendix II). Having lost the leverage of withholding UN membership as an instrument of “persuasion”, the State Department began to view the Ex-Im Bank loan as the only card left to influence Israel. The State Department was anxious to exploit the loan issue in order to induce Israeli concessions in the Lausanne forum. The fact that Acheson approved this initiative suggests that the proposal at least received the tacit support of the President. Yet when the link became known to the Israelis and they made it a matter of controversy, President Truman again backed down and disassociated himself from the entire initiative479.
Each of these examples illustrates the fundamental difference between the State Department and the American President on the Palestine issue. Whereas the State Department was prepared to employ coercion against Israel if necessary, the American President was not. President Truman’s ‘red lines’ became clear during the Presidential
477 Acheson informed Ethridge that this would be the method of persuasion would be used against Israel (Acheson to Ethridge, 20 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-2049). There is evidence that Truman cooperated with this tactic in Acheson’s subsequent account of his meeting with Israeli officials to discuss Weizmann’s visit to the White House where he had discussed the membership issue with the President. Acheson informed the officials that; ‘the Israeli representatives could really be of more assistance than we could if they would show a conciliatory attitude along the lines mentioned to Mr Weizmann by the President’. (Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 25 April 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/4- 1949. FRUS p923) 478 Eytan to Ethridge, 4 May 1949, State of Israel, pp15-16 479 For a personal account of the loan affair, see McGhee 1983 p37
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Note affair. While Truman agreed to sending very clear signals to Israel regarding US expectations, he remained fundamentally opposed to implementing any of the implied or suggested threats made. In the end, the use of sanctions against Israel was simply an anathema in the President’s eyes.
Truman’s continuing allegiance to the State of Israel in 1949 was clearly not based upon electoral imperatives. The President had just won an extraordinary election victory in November 1948, while losing the key Jewish States of New York and Pennsylvania. President Truman’s enduring support of the Zionist project was simply based on his belief in the Zionist State and his commitment to its survival and prosperity. Truman did not enter office in 1945 with a deep and clear commitment to a Jewish State but his faith in Zionism grew during his time in office. While Truman was willing to lend his support to State Department efforts to obtain concessions from Israel, he was unwilling to oppose the Jewish State through sanctions or to break any of the commitments he had previously made. President Truman’s 1948 Democratic Party campaign platform clearly stated:
We look forward to the admission of the State of Israel to the United Nations and its full participation in the international community of nations. We pledge appropriate aid to the State of Israel in developing its economy and resources.480
Truman took these campaign promises very seriously and never broke with them. In his November letter to Chaim Weizmann, which Truman felt important enough to include in his Memoirs, Truman wrote:
“…I had thought that my position would have been clear to all the world, particularly in the light of the specific wording of the Democratic Party platform. But there were those who did not take this seriously, regarding it as “just another campaign promise” to be forgotten after the election. I believe they have recently realized their error. I have interpreted my re-election as a mandate from the American people to carry out the Democratic platform – including, of course, the plank on Israel. I intend to do so.”481
Indeed, Truman’s policy was “clear to all the world” all along. While not opposed to back-door jostling, President Truman would never have opposed Israel’s application for
480 Johnson and Porter (eds) 1973 p432 481 Truman 1956 p169. Truman is initially referring to his policy on the Negev
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UN membership or the full allocation of the Ex-Im Bank loan. Ultimately, Truman’s commitment to the Zionist project eroded the efficacy of State Department and PCC attempts to influence Israeli policy and brought the Lausanne talks no closer to a successful conclusion and the Palestinian refugees no closer to their former homes.
Truman’s aversion to sanctioning Israel also taught the GOI that it was free to pursue its policies without the threat of open confrontation with the US. This knowledge alleviated any pressure for them to accept concessions and caused them to harden their positions further. It also taught the Arabs that the US would be of no concrete use to them in their dispute with the Zionist state, and that they were more likely to be an obstacle to their aims. By the end of 1949 therefore, the US’ position in the Arab-Israeli conflict had already been established.
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PART TWO
Camp David
Chapter Five The Road to Camp David
Chapter 5
The Road to Camp David
From 1949 to the Oslo peace process – the intervening years
With the abandonment of peace efforts in 1949 the Palestine Question was left in an inherently unstable and explosive condition. Through refusing to pay a price for peace, Israel retained possession of over three quarters of mandatory Palestine. Crucially, Israel’s territories were left with only a fragment of their original Arab population, less than 150,000 individuals, easily subjugated through a system of military rule. The 750,000 Palestinian refugees, created through the 1948 war, quickly dropped out of the world’s political sight and became just another post-war humanitarian issue. Israel gained implicit recognition of the armistice borders through the Tripartite Declaration of 1950482 and would not again come under the kind of intense and concerted pressure experienced during Lausanne to make concessions it found unacceptable.
The Arab states also enjoyed the benefits of the failed peace. The deep antipathy Arab populations felt towards the Zionist entity on its borders, together with the deep sympathy for the lot of their Palestinian brothers, was a powerful force easily exploited to garner support for leaders and their policies. Arab governments were free to play the Palestine card to unite and mobilise their populations, and to ferment rage towards Israel and away from themselves, under the guise of pan-Arab unity.
Border skirmishes on all fronts became the norm of Israeli existence throughout the 1950s, though these were most usually kept to manageable levels as neither party was yet
482 The 25 May 1950 Tripartite Declaration committed the United States, Britain, and France to take action to prevent violation of the armistice lines established in 1949.
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ready for a wider conflagration. The next round however, as Ben-Gurion had predicted, did eventually come in 1956 when Israel allied herself to Britain and France and attacked Gamal Adel Nasser’s Egypt in what became known as the Suez crisis. However, the attack on Egypt had taken place without the blessing of the United States, and under intense American pressure, Israel was forced to leave the Egyptian territories she had occupied during the invasion.
The passage of time worked against rather than for Middle East peace prospects. Continuing border skirmishes throughout the 1960s and increasing warlike rhetoric on all sides fuelled tensions between Israel and her Arab neighbours, eventually leading to the next full-scale regional war after Israel launched a ‘pre-emptive counter-offensive’ against Egypt on 5 July 1967483, with hostilities quickly spreading to Syria and Jordan. The six day war ended with a complete routing of the Arab armies by Israeli forces, which were now in occupation of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, Syria’s Golan Heights, and the Shaaba Farms area in Lebanon484. In addition, Israel had captured the entire area of mandatory Palestine, including East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
The Israeli leadership and population were exuberant over their quick and decisive victory. Israel now controlled land more than three and a half times its original size. All of Jerusalem, plus the lands of Judea and Samaria485, were now in its grasp. Shlomo Ben-Ami, former Israeli Foreign Minister and key negotiator during the final status negotiations, refers to Israel’s reaction to the six day war as an “orgy of political drunkenness and military triumphalism”486. Buoyed by her unquestionable military superiority, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and his Government were in no mood to seek peace with their humiliated Arab neighbours and return the land. Fortunately for
483 This term was used by the GOI to defend its 1956 and 1967 campaigns (Allon 1976 p38), the term would again gain currency during the US invasion of Iraq in 2002. 484 The rightful ownership of the Shaaba farms area which is on the border of Lebanon and Syria’s Golan Heights and was occupied by Israel in 1967 remains contentious. Lebanon (who did not take part in the 1967 war) claims that the land belongs to them, a claim which is supported by Syria, while Israel continues to insist that the area was part of the Syrian Golan Heights, which they subsequently annexed illegally in 1981. 485 The biblical names by which Israelis refer to the West Bank. 486 Ben-Ami 2005 p116
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them, the United States quietly abandoned its commitment to the armistice lines and, unlike in 1956, no longer demanded that Israel abandon her captured territories487.
In fact, the sweeping Israeli victory had captured the imagination of the United States in a way which would shape the future of the Arab-Israeli conflict. While the relationship between the United States and Israel had remained cool since the momentous decision by President Truman to support the creation of the Jewish State488, Israel’s stunning performance during the six day war impressed the Johnson administration to such an extent that the United States relationship with Israel was unofficially upgraded to ‘strategic ally’. During the remaining Cold War years America would rely on Israel as its proxy in the Middle East to keep the Soviet-aligned Arab states in check.
An outcome of the newfound United States enthusiasm for Israel was its commitment to the security and survival of the Zionist State. This entailed ensuring United States centrality in peace-making efforts. The first outcome of this involvement was a new American-devised formula for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. This would become known as the land-for-peace formula, whereby Israel would agree to give up land but only in return for peace. The land-for-peace formula became the cornerstone of Middle East peacemaking after it was included in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. While ‘emphasizing’ the inadmissibility of territory captured through war, the resolution then establishes the land-for-peace principles:
1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: (1) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (11) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
487 For an interesting analysis of how the United States departed from its policy encapsulated in the Tripartite Declaration, see Parker 2004 488 See analysis of the transforming relationship between Israel and the United States during this period by former United States Ambassador to Israel, Samuel Lewis 1999
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Through providing for Israeli withdrawal from ‘territories occupied in the recent conflict’ rather than ‘all territories occupied in the recent conflict’, the resolution was kept intentionally ambiguous489. Israel, of course, interpreted the resolution as meaning ‘some territories’ while Arab states, Palestinians and most of the international community have consistently interpreted the resolution as ‘all territories’.
But ambiguous or not, Resolution 242 dramatically altered the dimensions of the Arab- Israeli dispute. From that point onwards the locus of the dispute would be the lands occupied by Israel in the 1967 war, rather than in her War of Independence in 1948. Future peace efforts would be wholly concentrated on the territories occupied in 1967, with the 1948 armistice lines becoming internationally accepted as demarcating ‘Israel proper’ and from thence on referred to as the ‘Green Line’. What this amounted to was international acceptance that the State of Israel could hold 78 percent of mandatory Palestine.
United Nations efforts to broker a peace deal, as called for in Resolution 242, soon crashed upon the rocks of bitter Arab resentment and unbridled Israeli arrogance. Israel was obsessed with her new territories which became embedded in messianic longings for redemption and salvation. The capture of ancient biblical lands within East Jerusalem and the West Bank proved an irresistible drug to religious and secular Israeli-Jews alike, and like most drugs, formed a habit difficult to break. Rather than entertain any ideas of giving up these territories, Israel’s revered Defence Minister, Moshe Dayan, in defiance of the Fourth Geneva Convention490, embarked upon a settlement enterprise designed to establish Israel’s permanent ownership of the land491.
Israel’s post-war national euphoria prevented it seriously addressing peace overtures which were emanating from its Arab neighbours, particularly from Egypt, which was
489 Through considerable United States pressure. 490 The Fourth Geneva Convention, ‘Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War’ stipulates ‘The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.’ The State of Israel, through complex legal arguments, has consistently upheld that the Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank de jure, though it claims to apply the convention nevertheless to these territories de facto. 491 Whilst the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula were also settled, Daylan was particularly concerned with the West Bank, Ben-Ami 2005 p122
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now under the rule of President Anwar Sadat492. It took another war in 1973 to shake Israel out of its intoxication and re-evaluate what the ongoing price of its 1967 victory might be. The 1973, or ‘Yom Kippur’ war, which was fought by Egypt and Syria, resulted in an Israeli military victory but it was hard fought, uncertain and came at the price of heavy casualties. Israel’s dawning realisation that it could not rely on its unassailable military superiority alone to provide it security, combined with restored Arab pride, created a new opportunity for peace. Security Council Resolution 338, adopted on 22 October 1973, ordered the termination of hostilities, the implementation of Resolution 242, and required that the conflict must be solved through negotiation, and it was this provision which would shape future peace making efforts.
President Sadat took this as an opportunity not to be missed. He made his peace efforts difficult to ignore by making a historic visit to Jerusalem to speak to the Israeli Knesset in November 1977. After arduous and often unpromising negotiations with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, United States President Jimmy Carter invited the parties to a summit at Camp David in September 1978 in an attempt to kick-start the stalled peace negotiations. The surprising result was the first peace agreement between Israel and an Arab state493. The result of the Camp David Accords was that Israel agreed to withdraw from all Egyptian territory which it had captured in the 1967 war, including the removal of the settlements it had established during the intervening years, in return for full peace with its Egyptian neighbour494.
President Sadat’s peace with Israel, although applauded internationally495, met with intense hostility throughout the Arab world. Through signing a separate peace agreement Egypt had abandoned the official Arab commitment to a comprehensive peace which had been initially adopted during the Lausanne Negotiations. In effect, Egypt left Israel’s other protagonists, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan – and the Palestinian people – to their own
492 Gamal Abder Nasser died of a heart attack, age 52, on 29 September 1970 493 For the surprised reaction of the international community, see Eban 1978/79 p343 494 The agreement did not include the return of the Gaza Strip, which had been under Egyptian control until 4 June 1967. 495 President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin were awarded the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts.
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devices496. President Sadat had gambled that his bold move towards peace would set in place a momentum which the Arab world would inevitably follow497. However his gamble did not pay off and instead led to his isolation in the region and to his tragic assassination (by extremists opposed to the peace accords) on 6 October 1981.
The entrance of the Palestinians into Arab-Israeli peacemaking
With the occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1967, Israel suddenly found itself responsible for nearly one million Palestinians in these territories. Unwilling to annex the territories due to the demographic implications of this for the Jewish state, and unwilling to cede the land to either its inhabitants or King Hussein of Jordan498, Israel instead remained in occupation of the land, establishing a similar form of military rule it had exercised over the Arab population within Israel proper since 1949499.
The trauma of the second Nakba which witnessed the loss of all Palestine’s former lands and many Palestinians becoming refugees for a second time, gave rise to a more assertive and strident form of Palestinian consciousness – one which would no longer accept the denial of their unique ethnicity. Using the language of human rights which had been developed in the post war period, Palestinians demanded their right to be recognized as a nation. The embodiment of the new Palestinian nationalism was Yassir Arafat, a Palestinian based in Jordan, who through his Al Fatah Party, became Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1969500. This marked a new chapter where Palestinians would assume control of their own destiny and fight their own battles. The PLO’s objective was the creation of a Palestinian state in all of mandatory Palestine,
496 The Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt did contain important provisions regarding the establishment of autonomy for the Palestinian people living in the Occupied Territories, however as this was not included as an obligatory part of the peace deal it was widely understood at the time that it would not be implemented by Israel, an expectation which has been justified since. 497 This was a view not held just by Egypt, but the US and Israel also, Quandt 1986 p358 498 Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and his Cabinet, which included Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon, did briefly consider a form of statehood for the Palestinian population in the West Bank and then considered ceding some of the territory to King Hussein of Jordan, however the proposal, which is known as the ‘Allon Plan’ was rejected by King Hussein as “wholly unacceptable”. See Pedatzur 1995 p285 499 Israel removed the system of military rule for Israel’s Arab population in 1967 though they continue to incur structural and institutional forms of discrimination. See Azmi Bishari 2001 pp139-163 500 Up to this point the PLO had been controlled by the Arab states.
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thereby rejecting not just Resolution 242, but partition Resolution 181 also. Israel found the PLO’s raison d'être not just a security threat but an open declaration of war.
Yassir Arafat appeared on the front cover of the Time Magazine in 1968 but his road to attracting international support and recognition of the Palestinian people was slow. As Henry Kissinger noted; “In 1973 they were still treated as refugees in the UN, as terrorists in the United States and Western Europe, as an opportunity by the Soviets, and as simultaneous inspiration and nuisance by the Arab world”501. However, following the 1973 war the PLO became increasingly prominent, culminating in the United Nations General Assembly granting it ‘observer status’ in 1974. The PLO’s diplomatic initiatives under Yassir Arafat ran in parallel to its commitment to armed struggle, leading cross- border raids into Israel from their Jordanian base. These initiatives, together with a high- profile terrorist campaign502 ran by some factions within the Palestinian national movement, acted to give the Palestinian people and their plight a newfound worldwide visibility.
Despite the growing awareness of the PLO, Israel continued to deny the existence of the Palestinian nation it represented503. As a result it refused to establish any contacts with the organisation and received a boost from US Secretary of State Kissinger in 1975 when he provided Israel with an assurance that the United States would also refuse to negotiate with the PLO. While Kissinger had stated merely no negotiations, rather than no contacts, the commitment was followed to the letter by subsequent American Administrations and effectively severed all ties between the United States and the PLO504.
501 Henry Kissinger 1982 p625 502 The most prolific of these being the abduction and murder of 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics by the Black September group , and the seizing of the shipliner Achille Lauro and subsequent murder of the American-Jewish wheelchair-confined passenger, Leon Klinghoffer in 1985 by the Palestine Liberation Front. 503 Perhaps the most famous denial of the existence of a Palestinian people came from Golda Meir, then Israeli Prime Minister, in June 1969, where she stated that “there were no such thing as Palestinians…they don’t exist”. 504 Former United States Ambassador to Israel, Samuel Lewis, believes it was never Henry Kissinger’s intention to sever all contacts with the PLO. See Lewis 1999 p367.
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The PLO was an umbrella organization for a number of groups within the Palestinian national movement, and was dominated by Palestinians living outside of the borders of what was once mandatory Palestine. The Palestinians living inside the occupied territories had largely been kept quiet and subordinate by the institutions and structures of the Israeli occupation. However in 1987, tensions exploded in the Gaza Strip, quickly spreading to the West Bank, when Palestinians rose up in a spontaneous intifada (uprising) in protest at the twenty year occupation. The intifada received worldwide coverage, with images of stone-throwing Palestinian youths facing the armed military might of the Israeli Defense Forces being broadcast into living rooms around the globe.
The powerful images together with soaring casualty rates could not be ignored and a diplomatic solution was called for. The United States had quickly and decisively ended the occupation of Kuwait through their victorious war against the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. The Arab states, which had cooperated with the United States, were demanding that something now be done to end the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land. United States President George Bush and his Secretary of State, James Baker concurred, and in 1991 dragged the reluctant Israeli right-wing Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to the Madrid Peace Conference. The Madrid Conference was an effort to revitalize peace efforts between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinian people505. Keeping to their commitment not to negotiate with the PLO, which was a central condition of Shamir’s attendance, the Palestinian people were represented by residents of the occupied territories, who ably demanded that international human rights covenants, including the right to self-determination, be applied to their people. But as the Madrid negotiations became bogged down in diametrically opposed policy positions, unexpected progress was being made far away, in Norway.
505 In keeping with GOI policy that the West Bank was a bilateral issue between itself and Jordan rather than an issue affecting a Palestinian nation, Shamir demanded that the Palestinian representative form part of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation, a demand which was subsequently agreed to by the US and Soviet sponsors.
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The Oslo peace process – dreams, disillusionment and disaster
With little progress being made in the Madrid negotiations in Washington, a change of Government in Israel from Yitzhak Shamir’s Likud Party to Yitzhak Rabin’s Labor Party reflected a shift within Israel towards peace506. As Palestinian negotiators kept unswervingly to their demands in the official negotiations, a chance meeting between Norwegian Terje Larsen and Labor Party veteran Yossi Beilin in 1992 gave rise to a secret channel of negotiations in Oslo. Rather than negotiate with Palestinian residents from the occupied territories (who had been receiving their instructions from the PLO leadership in Tunis all along), Israelis would for the first time be negotiating directly with the PLO.
The negotiations, which began in January 1993 and involved countless advances, setbacks, breakthroughs and breakdowns, finally led to an agreement on 13 September 1993507. The Declaration of Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements, also known as the Oslo Accord (DOP), was an interim agreement which was expected to lead to a permanent settlement within five years with negotiations to commence no later than May 1996. The Oslo Accord, which surprised the United States as much as the rest of the world, was signed on the White House lawn with much fanfare and a famous handshake between Yassir Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin.
The Accord provided for the transfer of power and responsibilities within the occupied territories (excluding East Jerusalem) to a newly created Palestinian Authority (PA). Control of population centres would slowly be handed over to the PA with the redeployment of Israeli troops from these areas. The Oslo Accord stipulated that Gaza and Jericho would be the first areas to be handed over, after which an interim agreement would be negotiated requiring further redeployments from areas within the West Bank and preparing the PA for self-government.
506 Rabin was elected with a mandate to reach an agreement on autonomy with the Palestinians within six to nine months. 507 For eyewitness accounts of the turbulent negotiations, see Beilin 1999 and Abbas 1995
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The Oslo Accord was celebrated not only in the international community but within the Israeli and Palestinian communities too. After years of bloody struggle the document offered hope of a new life of peace and security in which both communities could put the traumas of the past behind them and forge a new future. The tumbling of Communist Russia and Eastern Europe had sent shock waves across the world which had also hit the shores of the Middle East. No longer confined to the strict terms of the old Cold War world order, the parties were free to change the course of history. The Oslo Accords offered the Israeli and Palestinian communities their stake in this new world which both peoples assumed would be better.
However, not everybody found the Accord a reason for hope. Extremist both within Israel and the Palestinian community finally found cause for agreement through their rejection of the Accord. Underscoring the Accord was the acceptance by both parties of Resolution 242. To Israelis this meant abandoning their dreams of greater Israel, stretching from the Mediterranean to the Jordan Valley. And for Palestinians this meant the permanent loss of 78 percent of their historic homeland. Some on both sides found this too bitter a pill to swallow.
More thoughtful criticisms were also being heard from those considered to be moderates, particularly within the Palestinian camp. Their criticism, led by Hanan Ashrawi, spokesperson for the Palestinian negotiation team in Madrid, and Edward Said, a Palestinian intellectual based in the United States, centred around the deficiencies in the written document, particularly its absence of reference to human rights covenants and international law. Respected Middle East commentator, Rashid Khalidi, who advised the Palestinian delegation during the Madrid talks, also gave the DOP a lukewarm response, labelling it as no more than ‘an agreement to agree’, given the many issues it simply did not address508. The Accord was also criticized for failing to define where the peace process would end, the terms ‘statehood’, ‘self-determination’ and ‘end to occupation’ were nowhere mentioned. Crucially, the most serious aspects of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict – Jerusalem, refugees, Israeli settlements and security – were deliberately left
508 Khalidi 1994 p62
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open in the Accord. They were to be settled during the final status negotiations509. This was a stark departure from the language of human rights and international legitimacy the Palestinian movement had long relied upon – by leaving these crucial issues open to negotiation, rather than to be determined through international law, the PLO had in fact provided legitimacy to the occupation.
Yassir Arafat’s acceptance of an agreement which would never have been signed by the Palestinian team in the Madrid negotiations was symptomatic of the weakness of the PLO at the time. The PLO, based in Tunis after being ejected from its Jordanian and then Lebanese bases, had become geographically and politically irrelevant to the Palestinian cause which, through the intifada, was increasingly focussed within the occupied territories. Leaders who were based in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank were assuming control of the grassroots struggle and day-to-day demonstrations against the occupation. At the time that the PLO needed all its resources to reassert control of the Palestinian movement, it was facing financial bankruptcy. Yassir Arafat’s impetuous support of Saddam Hussein’s occupation of Kuwait had not just lost him moral credibility in his fight against the Israeli occupier, but had cost the PLO their wealthiest financial backers; the Gulf States. Yassir Arafat’s signature on the Oslo Accord acted to bring him world (and Israeli) recognition as the leader of the Palestinian people while also allowing him to return to the occupied territories and exercise his rule. Arafat’s compliance with the DOP also solved the PLO’s financial difficulties by unlocking millions of dollars in international aid to establish a system of self-government. While the agreement may have been second-rate, it was a lifeline to the PLO.
Hanan Ashrawi’s fears that Israel would exploit the gaps in the Accord and continue to put ‘facts on the ground’ – facts which would inevitably shape the terms of the final agreement – were realized during the Oslo years. Since the Accord had not prohibited settlement construction, the Rabin Government, and the subsequent Peres, Netanyahu and Barak governments, embarked upon an enormous settlement drive which saw the Israeli population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip increase by 77 percent during the seven
509 Ashrawi 1995 p260, Said 2002
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years after the Oslo Accord (from around 110,000 to 195,000510). In addition, a complex network of Israeli-only by-pass roads, totaling around 250 miles and requiring the expropriation of 35,000 acres of Palestinian lands, were constructed between 1994 and 2000 to link the Israeli settlements to each other and Israel proper511.
Palestinian freedom of movement was also severely restricted through a system of checkpoints and closures which effectively cut Palestinian towns into 227 isolated enclaves. This seriously impacted every aspect of Palestinian life. Palestinians were often unable to visit relatives, get to hospitals, travel to work and frequently could not even leave their homes for days at a time. Checkpoints brought with them daily humiliations and lengthened journeys to an extent where they were no longer viable. Together, the system of checkpoints, closures and curfews wreaked havoc on the Palestinian economy as well as Palestinian lives, with unemployment figures rising as high as 70 percent in the Gaza Strip and 50 percent in the West Bank during periods of comprehensive closure512.
The Oslo years also witnessed a dramatic decline in the Palestinian economy. Soaring unemployment and declining GNP led to 21 percent of Palestinians living below the poverty line by mid-2000. These trends can be directly attributed to the instruments of checkpoints, closures and economic dependence put in place after the Oslo peace accords513. Rather than seeing an end to the occupation, the Palestinian people only saw its tentacular grip spreading into every aspect of their life; taking their land, taking their freedom and impoverishing their population. By 2000, the Palestinian people were no longer celebrating.
Disillusionment with the peace process was not confined to those living outside the Green Line. Israelis had experienced ongoing terrorist attacks during the Oslo period, which claimed nearly 300 Israeli lives between 1993 and 1996, leading to a collective
510 These figures are derived from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. 511 Roy 2001 p96 512 B’tselem, ‘Restrictions on Movement’ 513 Roy 2001. In her memoirs, former Secretary of State Albright disingenuously blames the declining economic situation in the territories during Oslo on a ‘combination of corruption, intermittent violence, and an exploding population’, 2003 p462
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sense of trauma, vulnerability and rage514. While Israel gave Palestinians land, they continued to be denied the security of peace. Yassir Arafat’s inability to stop the flow of violence from the territories into Israel caused the Jewish population to question Arafat’s commitment to peace, and wonder if they could ever make peace with their troublesome Palestinian neighbors. Rather than build trust and confidence between the two nations, the Oslo peace process had left them further apart than ever.
The road to the final status talks – a bumpy ride
The assassination of Prime Minister Rabin by a fundamentalist Jewish terrorist shortly after the signing of the 1995 interim agreement (Oslo II) and the subsequent electoral victory of right-wing Likud candidate, Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996515, caused the peace process to come to a grinding halt. Oslo II stipulated that Israel withdraw from seven Palestinian population centres in three phases over a period of eighteen months. However, having never supported the Oslo process, Netanyahu was reluctant to honour its agreements. With terrorist attacks and violence continuing516, Netanyahu informed Clinton and his peace team that, “neither his cabinet nor his conscience would allow him to turn over additional land, except in return for real peace.”517
To add to these problems, the wording of the interim agreement on land for peace was ambiguous. Thus the Palestinians believed that Israeli withdrawal would entail their leaving the whole of the West Bank except for settlements, military posts and Jerusalem. However the Israelis considered that the extent of withdrawal was entirely at their discretion – and left to Netanyahu’s preferences would not be much. While Netanyahu dragged his feet, Arafat was becoming increasingly agitated. After three years of the peace process Arafat had little to show for it other than more settlements, more land
514 Rabinovich 2004 p68 515 Shimon Peres, Rabin’s Foreign Minister, served as Prime Minister after Rabin’s death but was defeated by Netanyahu when Israel went to the polls in May 1996. 516 Twenty-two civilians were murdered in terrorist attacks inside Israel during three separate incidents in March, July and September. The attack was in response to the construction of a new settlement in Jebel Abu Ghneim (what Israelis call Har Homa), which effectively cut Arab East Jerusalem from Palestinian towns to the south and east, a clear challenge to their desire to realise East Jerusalem as the future capital of a Palestinian state. 517 Albright 2003 p455
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expropriations and more checkpoints. The Palestinian population were growing restless with no sign of the occupation abating.
As the peace process threatened to collapse the Clinton Administration stepped up their mediation role from ‘facilitator’ to something more approaching ‘arbitrator’. Determined to keep the peace process alive, Dennis Ross, President Clinton’s Special Middle East Coordinator, and chief negotiator during the Oslo period, kept up the pressure on both sides to come to some arrangement on the implementation of the interim agreement. After months of stalled negotiations the Americans were finally able to broker a deal.
The Wye Agreement committed Israel to the handing over of 13 percent of the West Bank, 1 percent of which would be under full PA authority, and 12 percent of which would be under PA civil authority only518. Netanyahu also agreed to release 750 prisoners from Israeli jails in addition to the creation of a safe passageway linking Gaza to the West Bank, and the building of a port in Gaza. In return, Arafat agreed to a series of security guarantees, ranging from cutting the size of the Palestinian police force, rounding up of illegal weapons and terror suspects, halting incitement to violence and eliminating the articles in the Palestinian Charter calling for the destruction of Israel.
On 20 November 1998, following Knesset approval519, the Israeli army carried out its first redeployment. After five years of Oslo, the PA was now in full control of 10 percent of the West Bank (3 percent prior to the first redeployment) and in partial control of a further 18.6 percent520. However, the peace process broke down once again soon after when Netanyahu refused to implement the second or third redeployments. On 4 January 1999, the Knesset chose to go to elections.
Opposing Netanyahu for the Prime Ministership was Labor Party candidate, Ehud Barak. Barak was the most decorated soldier in Israel’s history and brought with him an
518 These categories were created in the 1995 Interim Agreement, whereby the occupied territories are divided into 3 zones, Area A to be under PA administrative and security control; Area B to be under PA civil administration but Israeli military control, and Area C was to be under total Israeli control for both security and civil matters. 519 Netanyahu refused to take the Wye Agreement to the Knesset until President Clinton agreed to give US approval to the construction of the controversial Har Homa settlement in East Jerusalem, in defiance of US policy to date and international law. See Ross 2004 p467 520 Enderlin 2003 p96
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experienced team of military commanders. Having served under Yitzhak Rabin as Chief of Staff and Interior Minister, Barak had both military and peace credentials. Barak campaigned on a mandate of ensuring Israel’s ongoing security through seeking peace with her neighbours. Barak felt that Israel and the Middle East were headed for “an iceberg and a certain crash and that it was the leaders’ moral and political responsibility to try to avoid a catastrophe”521.
Although becoming disillusioned with the peace process, Israelis still overwhelmingly supported peace with their Palestinian neighbours522, sweeping Barak to a landslide victory on 17 May 1999. Named Rabin’s ‘political heir’, Barak’s victory was celebrated by Israel’s Left with joyous celebrations in Rabin Square523. Israelis had now put their faith in Ehud Barak to finish what Yitzhak Rabin had started six years earlier.
Though remaining officially neutral throughout the election campaign, US support for Barak was hardly a secret and his election was met with unbridled delight in the White House. Eager to get the peace process going again, Barak was seen as the key that would unlock all doors and pave the way for the long-awaited final status negotiations. With unconcealed elation after the difficult Netanyahu years, President Clinton even remarked that he was as “eager as a kid with a new toy” to meet with the new Israeli Prime Minister524.
Reaction in the Arab world to Barak’s victory was far more cautious than in Washington525. While guardedly optimistic, Arabs were nervous about the lack of detail in Barak’s peace policies526. More worrying still for the Arab world was that he had consistently stated what he would not do to reach peace. Barak’s much repeated ‘red lines’, included no return to the 4 June 1967 borders, no ceding of sovereignty over
521 Benny Morris 2002 522 A poll taken by the Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre in February 1999 found that 60.2% of Israelis and 68.2% of Palestinians felt either optimistic or very optimistic about the peace process. 523 Laura Blumenfeld and Lee Hockstader, ‘Rabin’s faithful bask in protégé’s triumph; thousands in square cheer Barak’s win’, The Washington Post, 18 May 1999 524 John Broder,’”Kid with a new toy” (and a red face)’, The New York Times, 16 July 1999 525 Lee Hockstader, ‘Among Palestinians, a tinge of optimism; while distrusting Barak’s military past, many harbour guarded hope for future’, The Washington Post, 19 May 1999 526 Michael Theodoulou, ‘Cautious neighbours see change of style, not substance’, The Times (London), 19 May 1999
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‘unified’ Jerusalem or major Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and no military force between Israel and Jordan (other than the IDF). These policies were each incompatible with Palestinian final status ambitions and while not totally dampening all expectations, certainly signalled trouble on the horizon.
Trouble came sooner than expected for the Palestinians when the Israeli government agreed to enlarge the controversial Ma’aleh Adumin settlement by 10km2. The settlement is particularly hated by Palestinians as it acts to cut the West Bank from Arab East Jerusalem, seriously impacting their final status ambitions to realise a contiguous Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. The decision was made by the outgoing Netanyahu Government as Barak struggled to form his coalition and was seen as the first test of Barak’s settlement policy. Barak’s refusal to reverse the decision infuriated the Palestinians who promptly called for a ‘day of rage’ to protest Israel’s ongoing settlement construction. The US did little to assuage Palestinian anger and refused to intervene on the Palestinians behalf, simply calling the move “a provocative act by an outgoing government”527.
Relations between Palestinians and Barak were further degraded when Barak used his first meeting with Arafat as Prime Minister to inform him that he intended to delay implementation of the Wye Agreement (which had already been delayed by Netanyahu’s stalling). Barak’s aim was to by-pass implementation of Wye in favour of accelerated final status negotiations. Though Barak had been wrapping himself in the mantle of Rabin, Barak had never in fact supported the Oslo process – viewing it as giving something away to the Palestinians and getting only “vague promises” in return528. Barak was therefore keen to proceed directly to final status talks, reasoning that the Palestinians would get the land contained within the Wye Agreement anyway, making the interim stage redundant.
Barak’s reservations about the Wye Agreement were further complicated by his choice of coalition partners. Barak chose to form a broad coalition, including parties with
527 Danna Harman, ‘US, PA denounce Ma’aleh Adumim expansion plans’, The Jerusalem Post, 30 May 1999 528 Barak 2003 p86
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extremely different agendas and ideologies. Included in Barak’s coalition was the right- wing Russian Yisrael B’Aliya party, the settler’s National Religious Party (NRP), and the ultra-Orthodox parties Shas and United Torah Judaism. These parties were expected to take an extremely hardline in final status negotiations and Barak did not want to lose any of his political capital on interim agreements when he would need it for the end game.
The Palestinians however, viewed the implementation of the interim agreements in a wholly different light. The Palestinians saw the honouring of these agreements as confidence-building measures, which in fact is the reason why the concept of an interim phase was included in the Oslo Accords529. Having already had to renegotiate the 1995 interim agreement with Netanyahu, only to have him throw Wye into the dustbin shortly afterwards, the Palestinians felt that such measures were needed more than ever. As Palestinian spokesperson Saeb Erekat commented, the Palestinians were looking for a sign that Barak was going to be a different partner than his predecessor, delaying Wye was not the sign that they were looking for530.
Palestinian reaction to more Israeli delays of land transfers was compounded by Israel’s settlement policy which remained unaffected by the change of premiership. Israel’s acute unwillingness to cede land to the Palestinians was particularly infuriating when it continued to take more and more land for itself. With final status negotiations fast approaching, the Palestinians were well aware that any land they did not yet control would have to be renegotiated and any land which Israel expropriated for settlement construction in the meantime would have to be negotiated back. The few cards the Palestinians did possess to bring to the negotiating table were slowly being whittled away.
Barak’s intention to by-pass Wye would certainly have come as a major blow to the US peace team, however he was able to convince Clinton during his first visit to Washington in July to abandon the agreement and back him in his chosen course of action. Faced
529 The concept of a five year interim phase leading to Palestinian ‘autonomy’ was first introduced during the Camp David I agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1978. 530 Danny Harman, ‘PM to ask Arafat to reopen Wye accords. PA leader expected to press for quick withdrawal at; todays Erez summit’, The Jerusalem Post, 11 July 1999.
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with Barak’s pronouncement that he would achieve peace with Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians within fifteen months, President Clinton found the Israeli leader’s demands irresistible. Barak’s fifteen month plan would bring Middle East peace during the Clinton presidency and provide him with a lasting legacy as peacemaker531.
During his visit to Washington Barak also demanded that the US roll back its role in the peace process which had been stepped up during Netanyahu’s tenure. Barak did not want America acting as policeman or arbitrator and insisted that it reduce its role to that of facilitator. The Palestinians protested, demanding the US remain as “witness and judge” to afford them some protection against their stronger ‘partner’532. However, Bill Clinton eagerly complied with Barak’s request, announcing that he was “happy to serve as host and caterer, providing the peace table at which the parties can dine alone”533.
Barak’s final message to President Clinton was a private one. Barak informed Clinton of his intention to pursue the Syrian track first. Barak’s preference to pursue peace with Israel’s long-time Syrian foe Hafez al-Asad before the Palestinians, was based on a number of considerations. Firstly, Barak had pledged during his election campaign to get Israeli troops out of their unpopular campaign in Lebanon within a year534. Under fire from Syrian-backed Shiite resistance group, Hizbullah, Israel was keen to ensure that attacks organised against Israel from Lebanese soil would not continue after the withdrawal535.
However, Barak’s Syria-first preference was also based upon his view that peace with Syria was far more valuable, and would offer Israel far more security, than an agreement with the Palestinians. As Mr Barak was quoted as saying; “The Syrians, …have 700 airplanes, 4,000 tanks, 2,500 artillery pieces and surface-to-surface missiles that are neatly organized and can cover the whole country with nerve gas. The Palestinians… are
531 Barak’s intention to delay Wye was sweetened by his announcement that Israel would purchase 50 more F-16s from America’s Lockhead Martin, worth $2.5 billion, preserving thousands of jobs at the firm and underwriting refinements in American aircraft development. See John Broder, The New York Times, 21 July 1999 532 Author not cited, ‘Palestinians want active peace role for United States’, The Jerusalem Post, 18 July 1999 533 John M Broder, ‘The empty US seat at Mideast talks: a boon for all’, The New York Times, 21 July 1999 534 Israeli troops had been stationed in southern Lebanon since the Israeli invasion in 1982. 535 Dennis Ross 2004 p509
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the weakest of our adversaries. As a military threat to Israel, they are ludicrous.”536 Barak’s enthusiasm for peace with Syria first was not supported within his own Cabinet but met with more enthusiasm in Washington537. Martin Indyk, former Ambassador to Israel who was serving at the time as US Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs538, had been advocating the Syria option since Barak took office539. Dennis Ross, who was very close to Indyk, also supported the move, which would keep the Palestinians waiting just a little longer.
Shlomo Ben-Ami, Barak’s Interior Minister (and who later became Barak’s chief negotiator during the final status talks), explains Barak’s predilection for peace with Syria through the ‘capsule theory’. The ‘capsule theory’ is a long-held view amongst Israeli leaders that Middle East peacemaking should be pursued with Arab states, while the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is afforded only secondary status540. Implicit in the ‘capsule theory’ is the belief that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict can be separated from the wider Arab-Israeli conflict, and that peace with the Palestinians will be far easier to achieve (on favourable terms) or will not be necessary at all, once they are isolated from their Arab allies through peace treaties. Central to the ‘capsule theory’ is Israel’s determination to keep hold of us much of the West Bank as it possibly can, as it considers this territory to be part of Israel’s ancient (and biblical) heritage. The Sinai peninsula and the Golan heights, by contrast, were never incorporated into Zionism and are therefore far less problematic (in relative terms) for the GOI to negotiate around (and cede) than the lands in the West Bank.
But before Barak could focus on the Syrian track he first had to put the dispute over Wye to bed. Infuriated over Barak’s refusal to implement the Wye Agreement, Arafat’s security chief and confidant, Colonel Mohammed Dahlan, complained; “We understand it
536 Milton Viorst, ‘Barak’s Palestinian Question’, The New York Times, 13 July 1999. 537 Ben-Ami 2005 p241 538 In October 1999, President Clinton was make the unprecedented move of appointing Indyk for a second term as US Ambassador to Israel. 539 Danna Harman, ‘Indyk, praising PM-elects piano virtuosity, says: Barak can move forward on all peace fronts’, The Jerusalem Post, 28 May 1999 540 Ben-Ami 2005 p241
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when we sign an agreement with the Labor party and the Likud wants to change it, but not if Likud signs an agreement and Labor wants to change it.”541
However, as the US had already lent their quiet support to Barak’s plans542, there was little the Palestinians could do other than vent their rage. Eventually Arafat acquiesced and agreed to renegotiate an agreement which was itself a renegotiation. The resulting document was the Sharm el Sheikh Memorandum, signed 4 September. Barak proclaimed that “The people of the Middle East are ready for the dawn of a new era”, while Arafat attempted to mask the humiliation of the occasion by referring to it as “the peace of the brave”.543 The document imposed a new timetable for the Phase One and Phase Two of the further redeployments, which were to be implemented in phases, as below:
a. 5 September 1999, transfer 7% from Area C to Area B;
b. 15 November 1999, transfer 2% from Area B to Area A and 3% from Area C to Area B;
c. 20 January 2000, transfer 1% from Area C to Area A, and 5.1% from Area B to Area A.
These three stages were part of the second phase of the redeployment initially planned in the 1995 Oslo Agreement. The third stage, which was also mentioned in the 1995 document, was not referred to at all in the Sharm el Sheikh Memorandum and thereby remained unresolved. Other provisions within the document included the release of 350 Palestinian prisoners in two phases in September and October, the establishment of safe corridors between Gaza and the West bank, the construction of a harbour in Gaza together with a series of Palestinian security commitments similar to those contained in the Wye Agreement.
541 Ilene Prusher, ‘Barak meets Arafat to rekindle peace’, The Guardian, 28 July 1999 542 The US refused Palestinian requests to intervene to ensure that the Wye provisions were honoured, instead delaying a visit by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to the region until the Palestinians had agreed to Barak’s demands. See Philip Shenon, ‘To help Israel, Albright delays visit to Mideast’, The New York Times, 10 August 1999 543 Danna Harman, ‘Barak, Arafat sign Sharm accord. Prisoner release and pullback shortly, final status to be completed in year’, The Jerusalem Post, 5 September 1999
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Arafat’s bitterness at being forced to renegotiate an agreement which had been mediated and co-signed by the US, was not improved when the Sharm Accord was branded a “sell- out” by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the founder of the Islamic group, Hamas544. Hamas had become the key rival of Arafat’s Fatah party and long-term opponents of the peace process. Arafat attempted to regain some control of events and credibility on the Palestinian street by vowing to unilaterally declare Palestinian statehood if a peace settlement was not reached by the planned date of September 2000545.
Trust seemed to be rebuilding when the first prisoner release went ahead on time and the first withdrawal occurred three days early. Final status negotiations were officially launched at the Erez Junction on 13 September by Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy and Palestinian Deputy Chairperson, Mahmoud Abbas (also known by his patronymic Abu Mazen). While delivering wildly conflicting statements regarding their respective final status ambitions, the negotiations were nevertheless ushered in with hopes of peace and reconciliation. However Barak did not appoint a delegation to the talks until November546 and when negotiations finally got underway, very little progress was made as Palestinians understood that Barak’s gaze was focussed on the “other woman”547; Syria.
Barak intentionally slowed the Palestinian talks while he grappled with Syrian President Assad548. Assad had consistently and unequivocally demanded a return of all of Syrian territory occupied in the 1967 war in return for peace and Barak’s ambition was to persuade him to drop this demand. But this aim proved doomed to failure as Assad was clearly unwilling and unable to accept anything less than Egypt’s Sadat had received. Barak’s Syria-first policy was dealt a further blow when it became clear that he was out
544 The Islamic organisation Hamas was established in the Gaza Strip in 1987 by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. The organisation, which primarily focussed on charity work and preaching in mosques, was initially supported by the GOI who were keen to establish a rival authority to the PLO. Hamas, which has since become politically active as evidenced through its 2006 legislative election victory, was consistently highly critical of Oslo, which it considered an abrogation of Palestinian rights. 545 Ian Black, ‘Arafat holds on to statehood card’, The Guardian, 6 September 1999 546 Barak appointed career diplomat Oded Eran to head his five-man delegation while Arafat appointed experienced negotiator, Yassir Abed Rabbo to head the Palestinian team. 547 Dennis Ross 2004 p573 548 Danna Harman et al, ‘Israeli negotiator: Barak not paying attention to Palestinian track’, The Jerusalem Post, 6 April 2000
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of step with both the Israeli public and his own Ministers in prioritising Syria over the Palestinians. After six years of Oslo, Israelis felt that Palestinians were ready for peace and they themselves were willing to pay a price to achieve it549. They were less ready to make concessions to a hardline dictator who had never shown any signs of softening his policies towards Israel550.
The Palestinian leadership’s rapidly diminishing trust in Barak was dashed further when settlement construction figures were released in early December 1999. The Barak government had approved 3,196 new housing units in its five months in office – far higher than the average 3,000 approvals per year during Netanyahu’s tenure551. The accelerated rate of settlement construction was a predictable consequence of Barak’s decision to give the pro-settler National Religious Party (NRP) the Ministry of Housing portfolio. Palestinian chief negotiator, Yassir Abed Rabbo warned that the parties were heading towards a crisis if settlement expansion was not stopped and called off further final status talks until the issue was resolved552. The Clinton Administration once again refused Palestinian pleas to intervene, declaring that the Palestinians should not impose preconditions on the resumption of talks553.
Matters did not improve when Prime Minister Barak presented his map for the second phase of the second further redeployment (FRD) to Arafat. This revealed that he would hand over only virtually unpopulated land to the PA. Barak further informed Arafat that he would no longer include Palestinian prisoners imprisoned for acts committed before the Oslo process in the prisoner release program. Arafat rejected the changes to what was agreed through the Sharm el Sheikh Memorandum but once again found himself isolated when the Americans refused to come to his aid, preferring to let the parties sort it out
549 Polls conducted in February 2000 indicated that a majority of Israelis favoured giving up Arab neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem as part of a peace agreement (Swisher 2004 p177) 550 Polls on Israeli support for the return of the Golan Heights as part of a peace deal with Syria varied widely at the time – from 60% in favour in the poll conducted by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University (Arieh O'Sullivan, The Jerusalem Post, 10 March 2000) to 21% in favour by a poll conduced by a Tel Aviv University Professor (David Zev Harris, The Jerusalem Post, 10 January 2000). 551 Lee Hockstader, ‘Dispute stalls Middle East talks; on eve of Albright visit, Palestinians balk over Jewish settlements’, The Washington Post, 7 December 1999 552 Lamia Lahoud, ‘Abed Rabbo: settlement expansion endangers peace process’, The Jerusalem Post, 30 November 1999 553 Lee Hockstader, ‘Barak plan speeds up West Bank settlement; expansion threatens to derail peace talks’, The Washington Post, 6 December 1999
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amongst themselves554. Having little other choice, Arafat eventually capitulated to Barak’s map and the handover of predominantly desert areas was carried out on 6 January 2000, nearly two months late.
With the final increment of the second FRD due on 20 January Arafat made it clear to Barak that he needed something to show for it in order to gain some credibility amongst his people in preparation for the final status negotiations. Specifically, Arafat personally requested that Barak upgrade three villages on the outskirts of East Jerusalem, Abu Dis, Azariyya and Ram from Area B to Area A as part of the 6.1 percent transfer. The upgrade was of deep symbolic importance to Arafat as it would provide linkage between the West Bank and Arab East Jerusalem.
But news of the possible transfer soon became a launch pad for opposition to the peace process within the Israeli Knesset, spearheaded by Ariel Sharon, the new leader of the Likud party and long-term rejectionist of the peace process. Opposition to the transfer of the villages were based around passionate accusations of dividing Jerusalem. Although the three villages were outside the municipal borders of the city, it was construed as providing a stepping stone for the Palestinians into the city. As Ehud Olmert, then Likud Mayor of Jerusalem, claimed, “as soon as you let the Palestinians control such a commanding position, you are inviting them to continue the struggle over Jerusalem”555
As the villages would inevitably become part of a Palestinian state in a permanent agreement, there was a more strategic reason behind opposition to the handover. It was a long-held belief within Israel that the capital of a Palestinian state would be Abu Dis.556 Not prepared to cede any of Jerusalem to Palestinian sovereignty, it was thought that Abu Dis, from where a clear view to the Dome of the Rock can be seen, would form Al Quds, (the Holy City) and serve as the capital of the Palestinian state. Many within Israel therefore considered that the Abu Dis ‘card’ should be kept until the final status negotiations, allowing it to be played as a trump hand557.
554 Swisher 2004 p165 555 Ross Dunn, ‘Barak Softens Line on State for Palestine’, The Times (London), 28 April 2000 556 Reinhart 2002 pp35-37 557 Swisher 2004 p174
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Barak responded by signalling to Arafat through the Israeli media that the villages would not be part of the pending handover. Once again humiliated, Arafat froze final status talks until Barak agreed to change his position.
Despite his preoccupation with the Syrian track, Barak was coming under increasing pressure to conclude a final agreement with the Palestinians. Barak’s two security chiefs, Shaul Mofaz, Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and Ami Ayalon, the head of Shin Bet, pleaded with him to drop his pursuit of Syria and start serious negotiations with the Palestinians. Both men feared that frustrations on the Palestinian street would soon explode into violence – leaving all hopes of peace in tatters558. Intelligence reports were showing that Palestinians were quickly losing patience with both their Israeli occupiers (for showing no signs of ending the occupation) and with their own leadership (for their ineffective negotiating performances and their autocratic and corrupt rule)559. By February 2000, polls showed that 43 percent of Palestinians supported attacks against Israel, up from 36 percent in December. Faith in Barak was down to 16 percent, from 29 percent when he first took office560.
With pressure coming from not just within Israel but also emanating from Washington, Barak was going to have to produce something. He agreed to a secret deal put together by Dennis Ross to hand over the villages as part of the third FRD. Two villages were to be transferred on April 23 and the third on May 23, with the rest of the third FRD taking place on 23 June, whether a final status deal had been concluded by this date or not. With trust between the two sides at a low, Arafat demanded the deal be guaranteed by President Clinton himself, which was subsequently agreed561.
In the meantime, the transfer of the 6.1 percent contained in the third Sharm el Sheikh Memorandum increment was still pending. One of the villages to be upgraded to Area A from its present Area B status was Anata, also on the outskirts of Jerusalem. Once again
558 Ross, 2004, p593 559 The Palestinian leadership were also acutely aware of the building discontent on the Palestinian street, with Palestinian Planning Minister Nabil Shaath warning that ‘there will be an explosion if we can’t reach some sort of framework agreement by March’ (Danna Harman and Lamia Lahoud, ‘Indyk convenes negotiators: PA warns talks could explode’, The Jerusalem Post, 6 February 2000) 560 Samar Assad, The Jerusalem Post, 14 February 2000 561 Ross 2004 p596
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Barak ran into trouble on the move, this time from within his own coalition when Shas, the NRP562 and Yisra'el Ba'aliyah563, threatened to oppose the transfer. It was a fight Barak had no stomach to contest as he had never seen the value in interim moves anyway. He had only made the commitment as a show of goodwill and questioned what Arafat had done to deserve the gesture in the first place564. Anata was promptly dropped from the third increment which was finally carried out on 20 March. Palestinians responded with disbelief, Saeb Erekat commenting; “We were really surprised… Every time we begin a serious effort to regain the momentum of the peace process, the government sets off a political balloon test at our expense. What does this do to the peace process except damage it?”565
In late March Barak’s Syria ambitions were finally crushed when President Assad was as good as his word and turned down Barak’s offer of something less than the 1967 borders. But still Barak’s attention was not fully turned to the Palestinians. First he had to fulfil his electoral pledge to withdraw Israeli troops from Southern Lebanon566. The move enjoyed widespread support amongst the Israeli public, who were tired of Israeli lives being sacrificed in a conflict which had little emotional hold for them. However, the withdrawal could not have come at a worse time for Arafat. Pictures of Israeli troop positions being overran by Hizbullah fighters as the IDF withdrew sent a strong message to the Palestinian people – fighting works. While Hizbullah had managed to liberate their territory through a policy of uncompromising armed resistance, Arafat’s PA had exceedingly little to show for their six year collaboration with the GOI.
562 Shas were threatening to oppose the transfer if funding to run its religious schools was not approved by Yossi Sarid, the Minister of Housing, the NRP’s opposition was based around its objection to giving the Palestinians a foothold to Jerusalem (Ross 2004 p601) 563 Natan Sharansky, leader of Yisra'el Ba'aliyah wrote an Oped in The New York Times opposing the transfer of Abu Dis as a move which rewarded the Palestinians without any reciprocal move on their behalf towards containing violence. Sharansky also worried that the transfer of the village would threaten future Jewish sovereignty over an undivided Jerusalem and not prepare the Palestinians for the inevitable compromises which would be needed to reach a permanent status settlement (Natan Sharansky, ‘Too Eager to Close the Deal’, The New York Times, 6 June 2000) 564 Ross 2004 p602 565 Danna Harman and Lamia Lahoud, ‘PM reverses on Anata. Erekat: This can only damage the peace process’, The Jerusalem Post, 15 March 2000 566 Israel had been occupying Southern Lebanon since its 1982 invasion.
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Frustrations began to boil over in the occupied territories, exploding on 15 May, the 52nd anniversary of the Nakba. Watching IDF troops fire on unarmed protesters, PA policemen responded by returning fire on the Israeli forces. Unfortunately, Barak had managed to get approval for the transfer of the three villages through the Knesset that day, but after news of the violence reached him decided to put the transfer on “indefinite hold”567. In fact, Barak signalled to President Clinton that the entire third FRD would be dispensed with and that he would also not honour his commitments to give back tax monies Israel had illegitimately withheld from the PA. Worse still, he cancelled the pending prisoner release which was the cause of the riots in the first place. Sensitive to Barak’s coalition troubles, President Clinton chose to abandon his commitment to Arafat on the transfer rather than place the Israeli Prime Minister under pressure. With Syria and Lebanon now out of the picture, Barak was talking about an end-of-conflict summit, possibly within two weeks568. Concentrating on interim issues seemed rather short- sighted in light of Barak’s ‘big picture’ assurances, and once again the Clinton Administration found his logic irresistible.
Pre-summit final status talks – the disintegration of trust
While the Oslo Accords had provided the basic infrastructure for Palestinian autonomy within the occupied territories, they had left the core issues of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict unresolved. The important issues of Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements and borders were to be determined during permanent status negotiations. Importantly, the Oslo Accords failed to provide specific instructions on how these issues were to be resolved569. The peace process was thereby a rudderless barge, floating along with no clear destination in mind and no clear means to get there. Each consecutive agreement moved the process forward towards an endpoint that was wholly unknown.
567 Swisher 2004 p216 568 Ross 2004 p623 569 Article 1 does state that a permanent settlement would be based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 – a general formula which leaves itself open to the conflicting interpretations of these resolutions by all the parties involved, including the US.
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With no substantive final status talks taking place after Rabin’s death570, the two sides were no closer to understanding each other’s positions in 2000 than they were in 1995.
What were known were the issues that any resolution would need to address. Perhaps the most important of these for the Palestinians was the plight of the five million refugees, created by both the 1948 and the 1967 wars. Many of these people were languishing in camps in bordering countries, living in immense poverty and without hope for a normal life. When negotiating a peace agreement, it was these Palestinians, as well as the population living within the occupied territories, which Yassir Arafat represented.
The core issue of Jerusalem was understood to denote the fate of the area of East Jerusalem which had been occupied by Israel in 1967. While the Palestinians claimed East Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian state, the GOI saw it as part of ‘Greater Jerusalem’ which it had claimed as Israel’s capital following its occupation571.
The question of settlements and territory were two sides of the same coin. The coin represented the twenty-two percent of mandatory Palestine which was not overrun by Israeli troops in the 1948 war. The Palestinians had accepted Israeli control over the remaining 78 percent of former Palestine in 1988 and viewed this as their enormous concession towards peace. The Israelis, however, were anxious to keep as many of the 155 settlements it had constructed as possible, in addition to the military zones and road systems it had established to service these settlements.
Agreement on security arrangements would also form an essential element of final status negotiations. The security issue was fundamentally defined as those arrangements which would need to be made to ensure that the creation of a Palestinian state did not threaten or impede Israel’s overall security. The GOI was anxious to ensure that a Palestinian state would not in itself pose a security threat and that its creation would not result in the loss of security arrangements it determined to be vital to Israel’s security needs.
570 The final status issues were first discussed by Yossi Beilin and Mahmoud Abbas in 1995, resulting in a document named the ‘Beilin-Abu Mazen understandings’. This document would form the basis for Israeli final status negotiations during 2000. 571 Jerusalem has never been recognised as the capital of Israel by the international community, including the US.
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The Stockholm ‘back channel’
As the initial February 2000 deadline for a framework agreement passed, Ehud Barak’s focus on the Syrian track had left the talks throughout 1999/2000 winter “going nowhere”572. After the collapse of the Syrian track in March, Barak authorised the launch of a secret back channel. While the official track, headed by Oded Eran and Yassir Abed Rabbo was achieving very little, it was considered that more progress could be made away from the glare of the media.
The secret bilateral negotiations, which began in March 2000, have become known as ‘the Stockholm track’. Shlomo Ben-Ami headed the Israeli negotiating team and was joined by Gilead Sher while Ahmed Qurei (also known by his patronymic, Abu Ala), the Speaker of the Palestinian Parliament and long-time advisor to Yassir Arafat, headed the Palestinian team and was assisted by Hassan Asfur. After beginning negotiations in Jerusalem, the talks were then continued in the more private setting of Harpspund, the Swedish Prime Minister’s official residence. The outstanding issues of borders, refugees, and security were discussed in what has been described as a positive atmosphere573.
According to Shlomo Ben-Ami, progress was made on all of the outstanding issues, excluding Jerusalem. Barak personally prohibited any discussion of Jerusalem before the final summit as he wanted to be in a position to be able to deny that any talks on the issue had taken place, for internal political reasons574. Both Ben-Ami and Shaul Arieli, head of the Israeli ‘Peace Administration’575, would later bemoan this decision as it denied the negotiating teams the opportunity even to catch a glimpse of the other party’s position prior to the Camp David summit. During the Stockholm talks the Israelis produced a map which Ben-Ami has incorrectly referred to as the 12-88 map576. The map in fact marked out 76.6 percent of West Bank territory to the Palestinian state, with Israel annexing 13.3 percent to accommodate the
572 Quote taken from an unidentified ‘top Israeli negotiator’ (Danna Harman, ‘Israeli negotiator: Barak not paying attention to Palestinian track’, The Jerusalem Post, 6 April 2000) 573 Sontag 2001 574 Shavit 2001 575 Eldar 2003 576 Shavit 2001
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large settlement blocs, and ‘leasing’ a further 10.1 percent for ‘security zones’577. There would be no exchange of land. The Palestinian team refused to even discuss the map, but in later discussions indicated that the most they would accept would be 96-4578. In regards to refugees, a variety of solutions were discussed including absorption into their Arab-host countries, the Palestinian state, and countries such as Australia and Canada. While refusing to recognise the ‘right of return’ Israel proposed to accept small numbers, perhaps 10,000 – 15,000 on a ‘family reunification’ basis. The Israeli team saw the negotiations as cause for great optimism – although no agreement was reached they viewed the talks as a positive sign that the issues could be resolved579. Dennis Ross, who dropped in on the discussions, was also wildly enthusiastic; believing a significant step towards a final agreement had been achieved580. Compared to the Israeli and US reaction, the Palestinian response to the talks was decidedly luke-warm, describing the Stockholm ‘non-paper’ as purely an Israeli document581. Any chances of further progress on the Stockholm track were cut short when news of the talks were leaked to the press582. Recriminations of reported concessions were launched at both teams and acted to harden their positions at the negotiating table. Fearing that the continuation of the back channel would threaten his fragile coalition and never allow him to get to the ‘end game’, Barak broke off the talks and decided to move to a formative, end-of-conflict summit. Shlomo Ben-Ami has revealed that Barak was supported by the Israeli negotiators in this decision, adding “We didn’t feel there was a purpose in eroding our positions further before a summit, where we’d have to give up more”583.
577 Enderlin 2003 p148 578 Shavit 2001 579 Shavit 2001 580 Swisher 2004 p211 581 Enderlin 2003 p158 582 Shlomo Ben-Ami blames internal Palestinian rivalries for the leak which would prove fatal to the Stockholm track, see Ben-Ami 2005 p252 583 Sontag 2001
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Prelude to the summit
Concerned at the lack of progress on final status talks after the termination of both the Track I and Track II negotiations584, Yassir Arafat wrote to President Clinton pleading with him to push the negotiations forward. Arafat had been under increasing pressure from the Arab world to ‘take a lesson from Hizbullah’ following the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. “Hizbullah is being portrayed as heroes in the Arab world, while the Palestinians look like losers”, Arafat complained585. But Barak had already dismissed the idea of further negotiations and began to press the American President to stop Arafat ‘dragging his feet’ and issue invitations to a three-way peace summit. Barak began to cite Arafat’s demand that the provisions within the Oslo Accords be honoured as a sign of his unwillingness to conclude a permanent status deal, because he was focussing rather on “less important interim issues”586. The Clinton team were eager to comply with Barak’s demands but considered a summit still premature, with the gap between the parties too wide to present much chance for success587. Instead, Clinton sent Madeleine Albright to the region to narrow the gaps in order to pave the way for the conference. Albright met with an unhappy Palestinian leader, who demanded that the third pullback be implemented before the commencement of a final status summit. The Palestinians were also concerned about the large disparity in positions between the two sides and urged the US to try to find some common ground by submitting their own bridging proposals. Albright refused (aware that Barak would not welcome such a paper), but succeeded in getting Arafat to agree to meet with President Clinton in the White House and to authorise the resumption of final status talks in the US588. Any hopes Clinton may have harboured regarding the Palestinians readiness to attend a summit were exploded during his meeting with Arafat. Arafat was extremely angry over
584 The head of the official Palestinian negotiating team, Yassir Abed Rabbo resigned after discovering the existence of the back channel (Brian Whitaker, ‘Palestine Negotiator Quits’, The Guardian, 16 May 2000. 585 Danna Harman and Lamia Lahoud, ‘Arafat Asks Clinton For Peace Push’, The Jerusalem Post, 30 May 2000. 586 Janine Zacharia and Danna Harman, ‘Following Barak-Clinton summit: Albright coming to bridge gaps’, The Jerusalem Post, 2 June 2000. 587 Miller 2008 p294 588 David Franklin and Lamia Lahoud, ‘Albright leaves after securing renewed talks in Washington’, The Jerusalem Post, 7 June 2000.
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Barak’s recent announcement that the third redeployment would not go ahead as planned and that only three Palestinian prisoners would be released from Israeli jails. Any trust Arafat had in the Israeli Prime Minister had now been completely expunged. Arafat used the opportunity to reiterate his final status positions (which he feared were not correctly understood by Barak) and confided to Clinton that he feared that Barak was setting the Palestinians up to be the guilty party if negotiations failed. Clinton reassured Arafat that if a summit did collapse he would not be blamed589. The final status talks, which commenced at the Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland, were impeded by Arafat’s instructions to his delegation to discuss only ‘generics’ until Israel had made good on its interim commitments590. As the negotiations limped on throughout June, Barak was losing support within Israel from both the Left and the Right. Dan Leon, managing editor of the Palestine-Israel Journal, complained that Barak had been a “terrible disappointment” to the Left, having offered no concessions to the Palestinians in his year in office. Shas meanwhile were threatening to walk out of the coalition591 and declared that they may not support a peace agreement592. As the wave of popularity which brought Barak to power receded a new urgency was brought to the final status talks. Barak could no longer walk the line between peaceful and hardline rhetoric. Rather than maintaining the support of both the Left and the Right through his confused language, he was rapidly losing the backing of each. Barak would either have to produce a peace agreement or abandon his dovish proclamations to shore up the support of the coalition hawks. Barak, therefore, was increasingly viewing a summit as a lifeline which would save his political skin through holding his coalition together593. He repeatedly declared that his intentions were to negotiate hard for an agreement, based around his ‘red lines’. If the Palestinians signed an agreement based on these guidelines he could return to Israel and
589 Enderlin 2003 p164, Clinton’s promise was verified by Dennis Ross and Miller in their memoirs (Ross 2004 p633, Miller 2008 p294) 590 Swisher 2004 p224 591 Shas were only persuaded to stay in the coalition after Barak negotiated the resignation of the left-wing Meretz Party over the religious school funding issue, leaving a coalition which closely resembled that of his Likud predecessor, Netanyahu. 592 Sam Kiley, ‘Peace hopes fade as Barak gives in to religious party’, The Times (London), 23 June 2000. 593 Barak apparently assumed that if he could produce a peace agreement it would preclude his coalition partners from being able to play petty politics (Ross 2004 p622).
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rightly reveal that he made a peace which strengthened Israel while sacrificing little. If the summit failed, and the Palestinians refused to accept Barak’s proposals, he could claim that he had ‘turned every stone’ to look for peace but had not found a partner. Either outcome could be sold politically – to the Left in that he had tried, and to the Right in that he had stood firm594. Declaring that “the hour of real decision-making” is near, Barak turned up the pressure to hold a summit595. Barak sent his negotiators to meet with Arafat to convince him of the urgent need to advance to the ‘end game’. However, the Palestinians were operating on a different timetable to the Israeli Prime Minister. Aware of Arafat’s slumping popularity596 and the heightened mood of anger and disillusionment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Palestinians feared the consequences of a failed summit. “We’re not ready. We haven’t even talked about Jerusalem or the refugee issue…You’re headed for failure,” Arafat protested at Israel’s insistence on a summit597. However, with Barak’s pleas becoming more persistent, Albright was dispatched to the region once again to convince the Palestinian leader to agree to a summit. But Arafat was insistent that too much ground existed between the sides to provide any hope for a successful summit and considered two weeks of preparatory negotiations vital to bridge it. The Palestinian leader cautioned Albright, “Madam Secretary, if you issue an invitation to a summit, and if it is held and fails, this will weaken the Palestinian people’s hopes for achieving peace. Let us not weaken these hopes”598. Later, Palestinian negotiator Hassan Asfur issued a darker warning that “a summit without results would lead to an explosion on the Palestinian street”599. Madeleine Albright was acutely sensitive to Barak’s coalition woes. While Arafat put forward a persuasive argument that more preparatory work was needed, she “found it
594 This logic was appreciated within the Israeli media at the time; see Aluf Benn, ‘Barak’s win-win plan’, Ha’aretz, 11 July 2000 595 Lamia Lahoud and Danna Harman, ‘In an effort to ease tension with Palestinians, Abu Dis may be handed over by Friday’, The Jerusalem Post, 19 June 2000 596 In a recent poll, Arafat’s popularity plunged to a mere 32%, with 60% of Palestinians doubting that an agreement would foster genuine peace (Danny Rubinstein, ‘PA grudgingly accepts the US invite’, Ha’aretz, 6 July 2000). 597 Enderlin 2003 p167 598 Hanieh 2001 p76 599 Janine Zacharia, Danna Harman and Lamia Lahoud, ‘Albright will urge PA to attend summit’, The Jerusalem Post, 27 June 2000
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hard to argue” with Barak when he ruled out further talks before a summit. Barak’s assurance that “substantial negotiation will begin only if and when there will be a summit meeting”600 was enough to persuade Albright to return to Washington to recommended to her President that the conditions were ripe. President Clinton’s decision to extend invitations to the parties to attend an end-of- conflict summit at Camp David in July 2000 was not an easy one. The Palestinian leadership was both privately and publicly warning that it would fail. They were well aware of Barak’s ‘red lines’ and saw little point in going to negotiations when these were so far away from Palestinian minimum aspirations601. Worse still would be the ramifications of a failure, which the Palestinians predicted would lead to the end of the peace process and the onset of more violence. As the former President noted in his memoirs; “There was not a high probability of success for the summit”602. However, President Clinton had other concerns on his mind. Firstly, Barak was quickly losing control of his unwieldy coalition. If the small window to make peace which Barak’s election had opened was closed due to a disintegration of his coalition, it might be many years before the opportunity existed again. Clinton was well aware of the degenerating mood in the occupied territories, with both sides preparing for violence603. The 13 September deadline for Palestinian unilateral declaration of statehood was also looming, a move which would inevitably trigger reprisal actions from Israel and place the US in a difficult diplomatic position internationally. Yet it was not just factors in the Middle East which were troubling Clinton. The President was anxious to forge a peace pact, but his own time in office was also drawing to a close. His ability to negotiate an agreement would soon be arrested as he was overtaken by the ‘lame duck’ syndrome. Further still, the US Presidential elections would be in full swing by August and Clinton did not want to “supplant the US
600 John Lancaster, ‘Albright says Mideast not ready for summit; Secretary leaves open possibility of Decisive talks with Clinton next month’, The Washington Post, 29 June 2000 601 Abbas, 1 August 2001 602 Clinton 2004 p912 603 Palestinian police forces had begun to illegally stockpile weapons while the IDF were preparing for confrontation within the territories which intelligence reports were suggesting was almost inevitable.
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campaign”. July, then, became the deadline which the American political system imposed in Clinton’s reasoning604. Barak’s demand for a July summit thereby ideally converged with Clinton’s own requirements. Clinton’s misgivings about the chances for success were swept aside by Barak’s promises regarding the bold initiatives a summit would provoke. As Secretary Albright surmised, Clinton did not want to “substitute his judgement for that of an Israeli prime minister so determined to make history”605. Yet while Barak made many sweeping statements, Clinton and his team had to operate on blind faith for they had no concrete idea what concessions he planned to make. In fact, Clinton and the US Middle East team did not know even one of Barak’s bottom lines606. What they did know however was that Barak was expecting the President to ‘shake’ the Palestinians into an agreement, by turning up the temperature of the ‘pressure cooker’, which a summit environment invariably created607. Concerns emanating from Israelis608 and Palestinians in the Middle East over the repercussions of an unsuccessful summit were drowned out by the rising chorus of commentators championing a summit, and soon. Thomas Friedman, Foreign Affairs Editor of The New York Times with a lifelong interest in the conflict, wrote an editorial on 4 July succinctly titled “Just Do It” while former Ambassador to Israel, Samuel W Lewis had been equally impatient in a piece called “The Summit That Can’t Wait” appearing in The Washington Post just two days earlier609. On 4 July, Clinton informed Barak and Arafat that he would be issuing invitations to attend a summit at Camp David for 11 July. Arafat, certain that the summit was a ‘trap’610, was extremely reluctant to accept but, as one commentator noted, did not “have
604 Ross et al, 14 August 2001 605 Albright 2003 p757 606 Ross 2004 pp639-640 607 Albright 2003 p756 608 Meretz leader, Yossi Sarid, told journalists on 30 June, “If must be clear to everyone that if there is no agreement, the situation will be very bad. There will be conflict” (Janine Zacharia, ‘Clinton weighs timing for three-way summit’, The Jerusalem Post, 30 June 2000) while Barak also commented, ‘if it does not succeed we will be headed for a conflict with the Palestinians (Nina Gilbert, ‘Barak: Arafat not ready for peace’, The Jerusalem Post, 4 July 2000 609 Thomas L Friedman, ‘Just do it’, The New York Times, 4 July 2000 and Samuel W Lewis, ‘A Summit That Can’t Wait’, The Washington Post, 2 July 2000 610 Enderlin 2003 p171
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the stature to decline a US invitation”611. He requested only that the negotiators meet beforehand to find more common ground and asked once again that the Palestinians not be blamed in the event of the summits failure. Arafat would be ultimately disappointed on both accounts. Attempts by the Palestinian team to float the idea of a series of summits rather than one all-or-nothing event were also resisted by both Israel and the US, keen to ensure that Camp David was where the peace would be won or lost612.
611 Danny Rubinstein, ‘PA grudgingly accepts the US invite’, Ha’aretz, 6 July 2000 612 John Lancaster, ‘Mideast summit set next week at Camp David; Clinton cites challenges for Barak- Arafat talks’, The Washington Post, 6 July 2000
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Chapter 6
The 2000 Camp David Summit – Pressure Cookers, Traps and Tangos
Camp David was the venue where Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin had reached their historic peace accord in 1978. It was therefore, the natural location for the Palestinians and Israelis to negotiate a final settlement between their two peoples. Set in the beautiful vistas of Maryland’s Catoctin Mountains, the isolated settings was designed to free leaders of the worries and concerns facing them at home and allow them to “make the last tough decisions”613. Seclusion from external pressures is just what the leaders needed when they arrived at Camp David. Following news of the impending summit a flurry of speculation, accusations and doomsday predictions ensued in both the Middle East and America. The need to fight criticism from the Right was matched by the necessity to curtail expectations from the Left. The Palestinians were joined in this endeavour by both Barak and Clinton who were careful publicly to show only limited optimism614. Barak’s tenuous coalition finally unravelled on the eve of his departure when Yisrael B’Aliyah, the NRP and Shas walked out; depriving him of six cabinet ministers and leaving him with the backing of just 42 out of 120 Knesset Members. While Barak stood defiant and appealed directly to the Israeli people for support, it was apparent that his plan to maintain his fractious coalition for ‘the moment of truth’ was ill- conceived and doomed to failure. The many concessions which Barak had made to
613 Bill Clinton, ‘Excerpts from the President’s news conference at the White House’, The New York Times, 29 June 2000 614 Barak likened the summit’s chances of success to a ‘toss of the coin’ (Richard Beeston, ‘Outcome as unclear as ‘toss of a coin’, The Times (London), 7 July 2000 while Clinton limited the purpose of the summit to ‘start drawing the contours’ of peace (Jane Perlez, ‘US is trying to be upbeat on the talks in Maryland’, The New York Times, 11 July 2000). The Times, were indeed receptive to the leaders’ pessimism, labelling Camp David ‘the summit of the wounded dove, the uncertain hawk and the lame duck’ – referring to Barak’s shrinking coalition, Arafat’s poor home standing and Clinton’s limited time still in office (Editorial, ‘Clinton’s calculation – an interim Middle East peace deal is still possible this year’, The Times (London), 11 July 2000
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these parties, concessions which had alienated the Palestinians, were now rewarded by their total abandonment of him at the moment he needed them most615. Barak was dealt another blow when his Foreign Minister, David Levy, unhappy at the lead role Barak had given to Shlomo Ben-Ami, refused to attend the conference616. Barak arrived at Camp David late after having to delay his departure to face a no- confidence vote at the Knesset. Having only narrowly survived the vote, Barak was well aware of what he would face on his return to Israel if his ‘red lines’ were crossed. To circumvent the changing whims of his motley coalition, Barak had vowed to let the people decide on a peace agreement through a referendum. Polls in Israel were still showing strong support for the negotiations617 and Barak was convinced the Israeli public would be more amenable to a peace agreement than the cantankerous Knesset. Arafat departed his home in Gaza for Camp David with little more support than his Israeli counterpart. While Barak had support on the street but faced opposition within the parliamentary system, Arafat enjoyed the political backing of the Palestinian Authority, but was the object of deep suspicion on the Palestinian street. A poll taken shortly before the summit found 54.7 percent of the 1,200 Palestinians polled were “unsure and worried” about the Palestinian leadership’s handling of the final status talks. Even more alarming, Arafat finished only second in the category of “most trusted leader”, the most trusted being “Nobody”618. Leaving the turmoil and speculation behind, the American hosts set out to ensure that the delegations were isolated from the outside world by creating a media blackout designed to eliminate all opportunities for leaks. Mobile phones were confiscated and communications with the outside world had to first be sanctioned by the US team. The delegations lodged in cabins named after local flora, with Clinton residing in Aspen, Barak occupying Dogwood (which had previously accommodated Anwar Sadat), and Arafat residing in Birch, home to Begin during Camp David I. The Israeli delegation boasted a formidable array of military, legal and intelligence experts. Gilead Sher, a close confidant of Barak and an IDF colonel and lawyer, was
615 Barak would concede in a later interview that his settlement expansion policy which had even outpaced Natanyahu’s, was designed to ‘mollify the Israeli right which he needed quiescent as he pushed forward toward peace’. Morris 2002 616 Danna Harman and Janine Zacharia, ‘Barak appeals for public support. Foreign Minister Levy opts out of summit delegation’, The Jerusalem Post, 10 July 2000 617 Editorial, ‘The stakes at Camp David’, The Washington Post, 11 July 2000 618 Larry Derfner, ‘Arafat’s Camp David baggage’, The Jerusalem Post, 14 July 2000
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assigned ‘chairman of the negotiating team’. Internal Security Minister Ben-Ami, would continue his prominent role in negotiations. Amnon Lipkin Shahak, the Transportation and Tourism Minister who was considered a ‘moderate’619 was joined by the hawkish Attorney-General Elyakim Rubinstein. Barak’s Chief of Staff, Danny Yatom, retired IDF major general Shlomo Yanai, former Likud party member and leader of the centrist party Dan Meridor, secretary and coordinator of the negotiation team Gidi Grinstein, spokesman Gadi Baltiansky, and some 35 lower level military officers and Prime Minister’s Office officials made up the remainder of the Israeli team. Joining the delegation was a special ‘media team’ who would be instrumental in spinning Barak’s messages during and after the conference620. The Palestinian team was dominated by those closest to Arafat, including ‘old guard’ regulars (Mahmoud Abbas and chief negotiator Ahmed Qurei, Yasser Abed Rabbo, the Palestinian equivalent to Foreign Minister, Nabil Shaath, Saeb Erekat, and head of the Negotiations Affairs Department and former negotiator on the Stockholm track, Hassan Asfur). The ‘new guard’ included Arafat’s security chief Mohammed Dahlan, business partner Mohammed Rashid, Nabil Abu Rudeineh (Arafat’s Chief of Staff) and newcomer Akram Hanieh, a journalist and adviser to Arafat 621. Only twelve members of each team were allowed to reside within Camp David, with the remainder staying down the hill, at an off-site location in Emmitsburg. These officials were there to lend economic, legal, military and strategic support to the team at Camp David, but were only permitted to visit their respective delegations with US authorisation. The subsidiary final status issues – including water, the environment, control of electromagnetic space, and economic arrangements, were to be discussed by these delegates at the Emmitsburg location. Dennis Ross hand-picked the fifteen US participants at the negotiations, with Arabists within the State Department entirely absent622. Ross was joined by both State Department and White House officials. The team from State included Secretary Albright, Deputy Special Middle East Envoy Aaron Miller, Martin Indyk, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Near East Affairs Toni Verstandig, consul general in Jerusalem John Herbst, and Gemal Helal, advisor and translator. The White House team
619 Beilin 2004 p22 620 Beilin 2004 p22 621 Swisher 2004 p254 622 The only member of the US team who had lived in the Arab Middle East was Gemal Helal, the Egyptian-born Coptic Christian who acted as Clinton’s interpreter. Swisher 2004 p257
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consisted of National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, John Podesta, Clinton’s Chief of Staff, Maria Echaveste, the President’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Bruce Reidal, Senior Director of the Near East, NSC and Robert Malley, Advisor for Arab-Israeli Affairs, NSC. These members were joined by lesser officials and CIA Chief George Tenet in the later days of the talks. The delegations were divided into four committees which would each discuss one of the final status issues; refugees, Jerusalem, borders and settlements and security. Many discussions would take place within these committees as the delegates endeavoured to find some common ground for an agreement. However, formal proposals would only be delivered through President Clinton during private meetings with the leaders, which they could either accept or decline. President Clinton’s departure for Okinawa on 19 July to attend a G-8 summit provided the conference with an unofficial deadline. The US President lectured journalists that there “can be no success without principled compromise” as he set off for Camp David623, however compromise was far from the minds of the protagonists when he arrived at the summit. Barak was intent that nothing much happen for a while and talks moved slowly. His motivations for slow- walking the negotiations were twofold. Firstly, he could not come home with a permanent settlement after only just a few days – any agreement had to appear as if he had put up a good fight to protect Israel’s interests. Barak could ill-afford an agreement which might be construed as one which he could have gotten a little more if he had argued a little harder for a little longer. Secondly, Barak was keen to let the pressure build within the Palestinian camp until there was a crisis, thereby readying them for the ‘end game’624. While both Ross and Albright disagreed with this approach, feeling that the Palestinians needed something to draw them into the summit, Clinton again gave way to Barak’s logic625. The Palestinian team were awaiting a US paper, which could then form the basis of discussions. This device had been used very effectively during the Egypt-Israel talks in 1978 and the Palestinians had been asking for it for months. However, the US team only put their minds to drafting the US paper once Camp David commenced. Refusing to use international resolutions 181, 194, 242 and 338, as the basis for
623 John Lancaster, ‘Seize the moment, President urges; Barak, Arafat given goal of ‘principled compromise’, The Washington Post, 12 July 2000 624 Albright 2003 p758 625 Albright 2003 p758, Ross 2004 p656
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discussions, the Americans had to find their own ‘red lines’. Dennis Ross, who led the process, decided to base the paper on his concept of ‘needs’. Palestinians ‘needs’ to settle the dispute would be balanced with the “very real and legitimate Israeli concerns about security” in addition to Israel’s “practical needs”, which included the need to accommodate 75-80 percent of settlers626. The hastily written paper was a blend of Ross’ and Israeli ideas, as Ross also incorporated a paper drafted by the Israeli team into his own627. Clinton had already agreed to Barak’s demand for ‘no surprises’ so the paper was duly shown to the Israeli team first on Day Three of the summit. The Israelis were unhappy with many of its aspects, leading to a complete redraft. Last-minute changes insisted upon by Barak were inserted in Ross’ own handwriting628. When the paper was presented to the Palestinians it caused uproar. Convinced that the paper was in fact Israeli and firm proof that the US had aligned itself totally with Israel, the Palestinians were certain that their worst fears over the summit were now realised. The fiasco around the US paper led the American team to abandon the concept altogether629, leaving the protagonists without guidance and the Americans without a strategy. By the end of day five, the positions had moved only fractionally from the Stockholm talks. Israel was categorical in its refusal to use the 4 June 1967 lines as the basis for discussion and was seeking to annex 10.5 percent of the West Bank630 while retaining an additional 10 percent of the Jordan Valley for ‘security purposes’. In addition, Israel insisted on retaining five military positions within the West Bank which would be linked to each other by road and taken over by Israel in case of an emergency. Israel would also retain control over Palestinian airspace. On Jerusalem, Israel was prepared to acknowledge Palestinian sovereignty over the outer Arab suburbs but the remainder of the city, including the inner suburbs, Old City and holy sites would remain under Israeli sovereignty, though the Palestinians could claim ‘custodianship’ over Muslim holy places. There would be no recognition of the right of return and the
626 Ross 2004 pp654-655 627 Ross 2004 p657 628 The change related to the clause on Jerusalem which read, ‘The Jerusalem municipal area will host the national capitals of both Israel and the Palestinian State’, Ross changed this to read, ‘The expanded area of the Jerusalem…’, allowing Israeli ambitions of a Palestinian capital in Abu Dis to remain alive. 629 The issues around the paper apparently caused great consternation within the American team, causing internal fights within the team and arguments so loud they could be heard by the Israeli delegates (Swisher 2004 p272) 630 This figure did not include the waters of the Dead Sea, ‘no mans land’ near the Latrun Salient or East Jerusalem, which altogether totaled 5 percent.
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Palestinian state would be demilitarised. The Palestinians dismissed these proposals out of hand and continued to insist on their oft-stated negotiating positions – return to the 1967 borders with minor border modifications, recognition of the right of return for Palestinian refugees and Palestinian sovereignty over Arab East Jerusalem631. While the US team were impressed by how far Israel had moved by making the above proposals632, Palestinian insistence on negotiating around international resolutions only provoked the ire of the US President. Ben-Ami describes an amazing scene which took place on 15 July when Abu Ala was responding to a territorial map which the Israeli team had produced, which was in fact the very same map which the Palestinians had already rejected at Harpsund633;
“He talked in absolute terms: the 1967 borders, international legitimacy etc. Clinton sat in front of me. I could see how his red head was fuming. Next thing I knew, Clinton lashed out at Abu al-‘Alaa in a very degrading style. He yelled at him ‘Sir, this is not the [UN] Security Council, this is not the General Assembly. You can give your lectures there, but don’t waste my time. I have a lot at stake here as well.”634 As hopes for his place in Middle East history drifted away, it would appear that Barak’s ‘pressure cooker’ tactics were also starting to take their toll on the American President. Clinton’s hopes were revived on the sixth day when a breakthrough came from the Palestinian camp. In a startling meeting with Clinton, Arafat revealed that he would leave the President to decide the territorial arrangements, which he added could be between 8 and 10 percent, and that flexibility would be shown on the security and refugee issues, if an adequate solution could be reached for Jerusalem. Arafat’s proposal shifted the focus of negotiations to what had been quietly understood all along – the summit’s fate would be almost wholly linked to that of Jerusalem635. The solution Arafat was demanding was Palestinian sovereignty over Arab East Jerusalem, including the Muslim and Christian quarters of the old walled city and the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount. That Arafat was not at liberty to show the same flexibility on Jerusalem as he could the other issues was predictable, as King Fahd of Saudi Arabia had reminded him a few weeks earlier, the city belonged to all
631 Enderlin 2003 p207-208 632 Ross 2004 p674 633 The map, which Ben-Ami erroneously refers to as the 12-88 map, would be the only map the Israelis would produce during the Camp David summit. 634 Ben-Ami 2001 635 Shavit 2001
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Muslims636. An agreement which compromised Arab authority over East Jerusalem would be condemned by the Arab world, and like Sadat before, Arafat would be isolated and perhaps even share Sadat’s tragic fate637. Arafat had put the ball squarely in Israel’s court; if they could be flexible on Jerusalem, he would show flexibility on the other outstanding issues. Unfortunately, Israel was just as determined to bring back an agreement which gave Jews worldwide a symbolic victory over the city. Rather than provide Arafat a face-saving proposal on the issue, the Israelis were expecting the Palestinian to assist them with theirs. As Ben-Ami admits,
“You have to understand one thing: we [the Israelis] at Camp David were moving toward a division [of Jerusalem] in practice but with the aspiration of reaching an agreement that didn't look like a division. The big problem there was that the Palestinians weren't willing to help us with that. They weren't ready for any face-saving formulation for the Israelis. Not on the issue of the Temple Mount, not on sovereignty, not on anything…”638 When the Israeli delegation finally sat down to discuss the issue of Jerusalem for the first time, the result was a stark retraction from their previous concessions. The presentation Barak delivered to President Clinton at 1.30am in the morning on 18 July offered no concessions on Jerusalem. Worse still, Israel now wanted to annex over 12 percent of the West Bank, including all of the Jordan Valley. Now it was Barak’s turn to feel the wrath of the President as he exploded:
“I can’t go see Arafat with a retrenchment! You can try to sell it [to the Palestinians]; there’s no way I can. This is not real. This is not serious. I went to Shepherdstown [for the Israeli-Syrian negotiations] and was told nothing by you for four days. I went to Geneva [for the summit with Assad] and felt like a wooden Indian doing your bidding639. I will not let it happen here!”640 The President’s outburst had its desired affect when Barak came back with a revised offer later that night. Feeling that the offer represented Barak’s bottom line and was
636 Enderlin 2003 p179. 637 Arafat was convinced that a compromise on Jerusalem would result in his assassination, as he told Secretary Albright when she was pressing him on compromise proposals ‘The next time you see me will be when you are walking behind my coffin’ (Albright 2003 p764). 638 Shavit 2001 639 During the Shepherdstown summit Barak had decided shortly before arriving that the expected concession regarding a full return to 4 June 1967 was politically untenable and slow-walked the negotiations, while later at the Geneva summit, Barak gave Clinton a text which he insisted the President read to Assad, word for word, the text, which contained only a partial return to the 1967 borders was rejected outright by the Syrian leader and ended the Syrian track. 640 Malley and Agha 2001
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“both far reaching and brave”641, Clinton took the proposal to Arafat, insisting that it was the “best deal” the Palestinians would get642. The Palestinians would be ‘custodians’ of the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount and have ‘administrative responsibility’ over the Muslim holy places. They would have sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian quarters in the walled city while Israel retained sovereignty over the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount, Christian holy sites and the Jewish and Armenian quarters. Inner Arab suburbs outside the wall would have Palestinian ‘control’ over municipal affairs, such as rubbish collection, but not over the crucial planning, zoning and security areas. Palestinian sovereignty would be realised in “most of the outer suburbs”643. The proposal also contained additional provisions on the territorial issue, with Israel now seeking to annex 9 percent of the West Bank with a 1 percent land swap and a military presence in 15 to 20 percent of the Jordan Valley which could entail an international force. In return for this offer, Israel insisted upon a total ‘end of conflict’ agreement, eliminating all past, present and future claims. Arafat rejected the offer, declaring that he could not be put into the position where he transformed the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem and the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount into Israeli sovereignty644. Barak was furious at the rejection645, and wrote to Clinton, blaming the Palestinians for the failure of the summit by “not negotiating in good faith” and ominously warning that “the Palestinians will have to bear the tragic consequences of this missed opportunity on their part”. Barak then announced the imminent departure of the Israeli delegation from Camp David646. After the letter was immediately leaked the Palestinians joined the media war, with Justice Minister Freih Abu Medein commenting; “Barak did not come to the summit to make peace…he came to prove to his nation that he can stick to the Israeli red lines.”647. President Clinton delayed his departure for Okinawa by one day and sprung into action, attempting to ‘shake’ the Palestinian leader into an agreement, as Barak had
641 Albright 2003 p765 642 Enderlin 2003 pp231-232 643 Albright 2003 p765 644 Ross 2004 p686 645 There is some dispute over the origins of the Jerusalem proposal – while Clinton and Barak deny that the proposal was put down by the Israeli Prime Minister, Ross, Albright and Malley suggest that the offer, which was sold to the Palestinians as a US proposal, was indeed Israeli, as the Palestinians suspected at the time (in fact Malley suggests that all proposals submitted by Clinton to the Palestinians were first sanctioned by Israel, in line with Barak’s ‘no-surprises’ rule). See Clinton 2004 p194, Ross 2004 pp688-689, Albright 2003 p765 and Malley and Agha 2001 646 Aluf Benn, ‘Clinton in final push, Barak set to leave’, Ha’aretz, 20 July 2000 647 Aluf Benn, ‘Clinton in final push, Barak set to leave’, Ha’aretz, 20 July 2000
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advocated. As reported by Joe Lockhart, the White House Press Secretary, who was listening to the conversation while hiding behind a door, Clinton pulled “out everything, pleading with him, bullying him, using everything he could to try and push him to take the step toward this deal”648. But Arafat would not budge, pointing out that the agreement he was being asked to accept would give Israel sovereignty over virtually the entire city, a concession which he could not accept without the backing of the Arab world649. Arafat’s point was duly noted by the US President, who then telephoned Arab leaders and asked that they encourage Arafat to accept the latest proposal on Jerusalem, or failing that, accept a limited agreement without Jerusalem650. However, due to a prior pledge to Barak that he would not divulge details of offers due to fear of leaks, Clinton was unable to enlighten the leaders as to what the proposal was, leaving them with little option but to refuse the President’s request651. On the ninth day, after Clinton abandoned his pledge to Barak and informed Egypt’s President Mubarak as to the Jerusalem offer, Mubarak advised Arafat against it, warning that “changing the status of this Muslim holy place (the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount) might have serious consequences for the entire region”652. The Americans and Israelis would later show extreme bitterness and disappointment over the lack of assistance they received from their Arab allies during the negotiations653. In the dying hours before Clinton had to set off for his delayed departure to Okinawa he had one more bash at Arafat. Deciding on threats rather than entreaties as the preferred course of action, Clinton threatened to “wash his hands of the peace effort if the Palestinians wasted a historic opportunity”654. His words managed to upset and
648 Quoted in Swisher 2004 p300 649 Enderlin 2003 p235 650 Dennis Ross claims that Clinton called the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia to ask only that they encourage Arafat to accept a settlement which deferred the resolution of the question of Jerusalem, however it is unclear as to why the President would have taken this line when Ross also states that Barak had unequivocally rejected this course in favour of a comprehensive settlement or none at all (2005 p692 and p694). 651 In his memoirs President Clinton attributed the Arab leaders’ initial refusal to ‘fear of undercutting Arafat’. Clinton 2004 p915 652 Enderlin 2003 p236 653 Ben-Ami 2006 p175, Albright 2003 p766. The key facts on Camp David, released on the day of the summit’s demise by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, states, ‘The leadership of the Arab world did not provide Arafat with sufficient backing for a more flexible stance, and demonstrated a lack of willingness to exert the necessary influence on the Palestinian delegation to bring about an internalization of the need for real compromise.’ (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 25-Jul-2000) 654 Hanieh 2001 p70
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disillusion the Palestinian leader but did not change his mind as he refused to set aside international resolutions in favour of the American solution. Late on 19 July the White House Communication Office announced that the summit was over. As the media gathered for the closing press conferences they were brought the surprising news that the summit would in fact continue. While President Clinton had been unable to persuade Arafat to accept the Jerusalem offer, he had scored a last- minute success by convincing the parties to stay until he returned from Okinawa655. With the protagonists staring down the barrel of a failed summit and its expected ramifications, Clinton’s work to persuade them to stay presented a welcome lifeline. Secretary Albright assumed the role of ‘nanny’ to keep the delegates in the right frame of mind and negotiations moving forward until the President’s return on 24 July656. However, Albright’s newfound duties proved more difficult than first expected. Having been under enormous pressure with very little sleep since the summit’s commencement, the delegates took the opportunity to catch up on some well-needed rest and relaxation. Barak, who had refused to hold face-to-face discussions with Arafat throughout the entire summit657, closeted himself in his cabin in a state of depression658 for three days and refused to see anybody, including his own delegation659. However, Barak was not wasting his time doing nothing. With the prospect of failure starting to dawn on him, Barak used the time to keep in touch with his political contacts back home and contact influential American Jews in a bid to shore up support. Thinking that what was needed was to step up the pressure on the Palestinians with less carrots and more sticks, Barak even telephoned First Lady Hillary Clinton and Vice President Al Gore, both at the time in the middle of their respective electoral campaigns660, to encourage the American team to exert greater
655 This was achieved through some underhanded dealings by the US President, whereby he allowed Barak to believe that the Palestinians had accepted the Jerusalem offer as a basis for discussions, the condition Barak had set upon his agreement to stay at the summit. It was Secretary Albright who was left to calm Barak as he discovered the falsity of this belief after the President’s departure (Clinton 2004 p915). 656 Aluf Benn, ‘Thank God its Friday’, Ha’aretz, 21 July 2000 657 Clinton 2004 p913 658 While Barak would later deny that he was depressed, Ross was told by Dan Meridor and Shlomo Ben-Ami at the time that ‘they had never seen him so depressed’ (Ross 2003 p698) 659 An attempt by Albright to cheer Barak up by putting a piano in his room was turned down flat but he did accept her invitation to visit Gettysburg. 660 Hillary Clinton was running for the New York Senate seat while Al Gore was fighting Republican George W Bush in the Presidential elections.
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influence on the Palestinians661. Specifically, Barak was keen that President Clinton let Arafat know in no uncertain terms that the US would break all contact with him and the Palestinian leadership if they would not yield662. Clinton arrived back at Camp David reinvigorated and immediately signalled to the delegates it was time to get down to work. Firstly he tackled the issue of security in a marathon session which lasted throughout the night. While a little progress was made, stark points of contention remained. Disagreement surrounding Israeli emergency access roads to the Jordan Valley, Israeli troop presence in the Jordan Valley and at Palestinian international border crossings, and the classification of Palestine as a ‘demilitarised’ state, remained unresolved at the conclusion of the session. However, the Americans did not lose all hope, feeling that the differences were not insurmountable663. After a five hour rest, Clinton tackled the issues of refugees which proved no more successful. The Palestinians were still unwilling to give up the symbolic principle of the ‘right of return’. Throughout negotiations the Palestinians had clearly indicated that they were willing to accept a ‘practical’ implementation of the right of the return to limit the numbers of refugees returning to Israel and thereby minimise the demographic threat to the Jewish state. As Ben-Ami confirmed;
“Throughout the entire negotiation process, Arafat has not once explicitly demanded the return of refugees into the borders of Israel. All he wanted is that we get him out of this ‘trouble’, he asked us to put together some kind of formula. He agreed, for instance, to the principle that some of the refugees be relocated to Canada and others to Australia…”664 The ‘trouble’ to which Arafat eluded referred to the need to obtain symbolic recognition of the right of return, and thus have something to bring back to the five million Palestinian refugees closely watching the summit in fear of being sold out. However, the Israeli’s were wary of the implications of any official recognition of the principle; a move they assumed would lead to international questioning of the ‘original sin’ of the birth of Israel and lead to fresh claims in the future665. To Israel,
661 Enderlin 2004 p314-315 662 Barak asked this of Martin Indyk (Ross 2004 p700) and Secretary Albright (Albright 2003 p770) on two separate occasions. 663 Albright 2003 p771 664 Ben-Ami 2001 665 Rabinovich 2004 p180
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the recognition would invariably open ‘Pandora’s box’ with unknown and unpredictable consequences for its future legitimacy and survival666. With hopes quickly fading, Clinton then turned his attention to the issue of territory. Sher and Ben-Ami did not offer anything new, as Albright concluded, they “had given all they could give”667. The Palestinians produced a map which they had shown earlier in the negotiations. The map conceded the annexation of 2.5 percent of the West Bank, which would allow the annexation of 30-35 percent of the settlers668located in the major settlement blocs. The Israelis however, were horrified that the settlements would only be connected to each other by virtual ‘ribbons’ and thereby left isolated and vulnerable669. To avoid this situation, the Israelis were pushing for annexation of entire blocs, including Palestinian villages which lay between the settlements. This would affect the lives of the 120,000 Palestinian residents currently residing in these villages. Not ready to extend these people Israeli citizenship, Barak was content for the villagers to “vote for the Palestinian state”, thereby annexing the land without providing any rights to its Palestinian inhabitants670. A further consequence of Israel’s demand to annex settlement blocs was that it would in effect divide the West Bank into four disconnected cantons, entirely surrounded and controlled by Israel. This would make an independent and viable Palestinian state impossible and solidify forever the hardships of the Oslo period671. While the Palestinians were willing to break with international law and allow a portion of settlers to remain in the Occupied Territories and live under Israeli sovereignty, they did not understand why this concession should impact so heavily upon their state and their citizenry. President Clinton found the Palestinian map insufficient to provide a basis for further talks and promptly brought the meeting to a close. Once again, it was only resolution
666 On this issue also, the Israelis were expecting the Palestinians to help them in finding a solution which would prove acceptable within Israel. The Palestinian rejection of this course caused great bitterness amongst the Israelis, see Ari Shavit, ‘The day peace died’, Ha’aretz, 14 September 2001 667 Albright 2003 p771 668 Enderlin 2004 p318 669 Gideon Sher gives his reaction to the 2.5 percent map in his memoir, Just Beyond Reach: The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations 1999-2001. Ch. 11, this translation was provided by Remba, no date 670 Tanya Reinhart 2002 p33 671 Eldar 29 July 2001
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of the question of Jerusalem which could break the back of the negotiations and allow movement on the other final status issues. After several discussions with the delegates, including Arafat, Clinton came up with a proposal for Jerusalem. For the first time, Barak had not given his prior approval and rather than take it to Barak, Clinton decided to deliver it first to Arafat. Clinton proposed that the Palestinians be awarded full sovereignty over the outer neighbourhoods; ‘limited sovereignty’ in the inner neighbourhoods, sovereignty in the Muslim and Christian Quarters of the walled city and ‘custodial sovereignty’ over the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount672. The terms ‘limited sovereignty’ and ‘custodial sovereignty’ were inventions of the US peace team. Crucially, ‘sovereignty’ in this sense was not to be used as a noun but as an adjective. The Palestinians dismissed the clever linguistic acrobats as robbing them of their legal rights including what they needed most, sovereignty over the inner suburbs of Jerusalem and even more importantly, the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount673. Clinton railed at the Palestinian leader, asserting that he had “been here fourteen days and said no to everything”. The President went on to inform Arafat that he would be blamed for the failure of the summit; that the US would freeze bilateral relations; and that Congress would freeze all aid674. However, once again Clinton’s sticks had little effect on Arafat, who reminded the President that Barak was merely being ‘generous’ with what the international community recognised as Palestinian land675. At 3.25am on 25 July Arafat gave his formal rejection to Clinton’s last offer676. The letter thanked the President and his team for their efforts and stated their desire and readiness for further negotiations677. The summit was over. News of the summit’s breakdown alarmed Secretary Albright, who quickly surmised it would be difficult to sell the US’ role as mediator when they had failed to bring the two leaders together for any substantive discussions678. In order to resurrect some credibility, President Clinton asked Arafat and Barak to join him to give their signatures to the Trilateral Statement which his aids had quickly drawn up as a show
672 Ross 2004 p707 673 See Akram Hanieh’s discussion of the Jerusalem issue in Hanieh 2001 pp83-84 674 Enderlin 2004 p326 675 Enderlin 2004 p327 676 The final proposal offered Palestinian sovereignty over the inner neighbourhoods and none in the old city or autonomy in the inner suburbs with sovereignty over the Christian and Muslim Quarters of the old city. Once again, Israel would retain sovereignty over the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount. 677 Enderlin 2004 p329 678 Ross 2004 p709
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of ongoing commitment to the peace process. The statement would be the only document to come out of the Camp David summit.
Post-summit final status talks – hitting the iceberg
Dennis Ross, a long-time supporter of Israel, was extremely concerned at how the news of the failed conference would affect Barak’s political standing when he returned home. News of concessions, both correct and incorrect, had been circulating in the Israeli media since the summit commenced. The reported concessions had caused uproar in circles to the right, provoking no-confidence votes in the Knesset and demonstrations opposing the talks. Without an agreement, the hawks could credibly accuse Barak “that he gave away the store and got nothing in return”679. Barak’s opposition was not confined to the Right, leaving him to battle criticisms on two fronts. Disappointed that their peace hopes remained in tatters, the Left would also likely turn on Barak and accuse him of responsibility for the summit’s failure. Since coming to office, Barak had slowly been losing credibility with the Left through his unchecked settlement construction and his refusal to implement the Oslo agreements. A failed summit might well have confirmed the Left’s fears that Barak was in fact an unreconstructed hawk. Ross decided that the best way to help Barak was to give American support for the strategy Barak had already devised – to blame the Palestinians680. Ross thereby convinced Clinton to read a statement which lavishly praised the Israeli Prime Minister while remaining deafeningly silent regarding the Palestinians, as Ross explains;
“It [the press statement] spoke of Barak’s courage and simply said that Arafat had come to Camp David to purse the peace process. I knew the contrast would be seen as implicit criticism of Arafat – something his performance at Camp David warranted.”681 Clinton, who was angry at Arafat and concerned about Barak’s political prospects, chose to breach his pre-summit promise to the Palestinian leader and blame him682. The lauding of Barak and omission of any praise for the Palestinians was quickly
679 Quote by Dan Meridor to Dennis Ross while asking for his ‘help’ after the collapse of the conference (Ross 2004 p709) 680 Barak’s intention to launch the blame game had already been witnessed through his impromptu letter to Clinton prior to his departure to Okinawa which accused Arafat of failing to negotiate in good faith. 681 Ross 2004 p710 682 Ross et al, 14 August 2001
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picked up by the press. When queried in the press conference, Clinton unconvincingly responded, “…I think you should look at it more as a positive toward him [Barak] than as a condemnation of the Palestinian side”683. However, at his own press conference a little later Barak was in no mood to even feign objectivity as he unequivocally laid the blame for the summit’s failure at the feet of Arafat;
“Arafat was afraid to make the historic decisions necessary at this time in order to bring about an end to the conflict. Arafat’s positions on Jerusalem are those which prevented the achievement of the agreement.”684 Barak was also careful to allay fears of the Right by reminding them that he had “fought for Israeli security” his entire life and continued to do so throughout the summit; “Israel was prepared to pay a painful price to bring about an end to the conflict, but not at any price”. Showing obvious collusion between Israel and the US, Clinton was also sure to reaffirm Barak’s security credentials, claiming that, “He [Barak] did nothing to compromise Israel's security, and he did everything he possibly could within the limits that he thought he had, all the kinds of constraints that operate on people in these circumstances to reach a just peace”685. The Palestinians watched Clinton’s statement on television while they were packing their bags. Furious, Saeb Erekat telephoned Ross to ask him what the President was doing. Ross responded that “Barak needs this so he can face his internal difficulties in Israel”686. The Palestinians then made a calamitous error by leaving the summit without a response or any form of statement. Their silence would be interpreted as confirmation of the Israeli and US accounts. Despite their fear of blame being ever- present “like a sixth sense” during the negotiations687, the Palestinians did nothing to circumvent the story by getting their version into the international media early. Later they would attempt to counter the story by asserting that the US had “proved its failure in being an honest and serious mediator. It has proposed ideas that are based on the strategic Zionist views of how the conflict should be settled”688. However it was all too late, the ‘myth’ had already gained resonance.
683 Clinton; 25 July 2000 684 Barak, 25 July 2000 685 Clinton; 25 July 2000 686 Enderlin, 2003, p260 687 This is the way ‘several Palestinians’ described their fear of blame to Clayton E Swisher (2004 p331) 688 Hassan Asfour, quoted in Herb Keinon, ‘Ben-Ami: Camp David is starting point for further negotiations’, The Jerusalem Post, 25 August 2000.
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Post-Camp David negotiations – the process limps on
Arafat did not return to Gaza as a defeated man, in fact, he was received by his people as a hero. Convinced that Camp David would be just another re-run of the Oslo negotiations where Arafat would balk but ultimately capitulate to Israel’s demands – the Palestinian people were surprised and relieved that this time the ‘old man’689 had held up. “This will produce full support for Mr Arafat and strengthen his credibility from the point of view of the Palestinians”, predicted Marwan Barghouti, a prominent West Bank leader within Fatah690. Indeed, Arafat’s refusal to buckle under the combined US-Israeli pressure was enough to unite the Palestinian street around him and provide him the political capital to continue the negotiations. And it was the continuation of negotiations which the Palestinians were keen to focus on. Rather than dwell too long on the failure of Camp David the Palestinians were anxious to build on the progress which had been made during the summit. In an interview with Palestine TV shortly after his return, Mahmoud Abbas was keen to portray the summit in a positive light in order to keep up the momentum of the talks:
“I consider the Camp David summit a success in that it brought about an understanding of the all the [sic] final status issues among the three sides. The Summit gave the Palestinian delegation a chance to explain the issues and their far-reaching effects in detail to the Israeli delegation and the American team. For the first time, all the issues were out on the table, nothing remained hidden.”691 The mood in Israel was mixed. The summit had prompted a shift in the Israeli public, who were for the first time considering the division of the ‘undivided and eternal city’. As noted by Mark Heller of the Jaffee Centre of Tel Aviv University, “All it takes is for someone to cast the first stone, and a lot of people who had been quietly thinking similar thoughts feel emboldened”692. However, Israeli polls were increasingly reflecting a shift away from support of the peace process, where according to one poll, 57 percent of those polled found Barak made too many concessions during Camp David, with only 30 percent approving693.
689 Term the Palestinians used to refer to Arafat. 690 Joel Greenberg, ‘Arafat’s allies say he stands taller at home for firmness at talks’, The New York Times, 26 July 2000. 691 Mazen 29 July 2000 692 Suzanne Goldenberg, ‘Barak rushes to blame unyielding Arafat’, The Guardian, 26 July 2000. 693 Enderlin 2004 p266.
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Following Camp David, Barak’s media campaign did little to rally his public behind him. Trying simultaneously to sell the messages of entrenched Palestinian intransigence and a continued search for peace proved untenable. Barak’s denunciation of Arafat as an uncompromising revolutionary unable to step to the peace ‘tango’ only acted to fuel peace protests from the Right, while prompting the support of the Left to melt away as they became disillusioned with their ‘partners’ in peace. Both consequences would impede Barak’s future peacemaking manoeuvrability. However, at the time the longer term implications of his blame game were only a secondary consideration to the saving of Barak’s political skin. Fortunately, Barak could count on the unwavering support of the American President to help boost his popularity back home. Keen to bolster Barak’s security record, Clinton appeared on Israeli television to announce the upgrading of US military assistance to Israel. More controversially, the President also promised that “in light of what has happened” he would review the decision to move the US embassy from Tel Aviv to West Jerusalem, a move which would mark a stark departure from US policy and international resolutions and effectively bring the peace process to an end694. But Clinton’s claims during the same interview that “Prime Minister Barak in no way ever compromised the vital interests of the security of the State of Israel” did little to stop Barak from becoming a victim of his own spin. For the story that Barak had held out his hand, broken taboos and made painful concessions while Arafat offered nothing in return, painted Barak in a rather foolish, irresponsible, and dangerous light, not just to the Israeli Right, but to his entire public. Despite Palestinian hopes, the Camp David Summit had taken the momentum out of the final status talks. Barak, convinced of his ‘iceberg theory’ (in which he saw Israel “moving toward an iceberg in the form of a collision with the Palestinians that will cause thousands of deaths on each side”), had two aims in mind. Firstly, the people of Israel had to be united behind the belief that there had been a genuine search for peace which had failed due to Palestinian intransigence. Secondly, this story had to be sold to the international community to provide Barak international legitimacy for the inevitable future conflict695. This story was therefore duly reported to world leaders
694 Clinton 27 July 2000 695 Barak would later describe his fear of Israeli disunity and the lack of international legitimacy when Israel did hit the ‘iceberg’ as his major cause for seeking place in the first place (Shavit 6 September 2002.
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by both Barak and his new Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami696, where it was generally well received697. Barak’s courting of foreign leaders, particularly within Europe, which had been the major base for Palestinian support, left Arafat increasingly isolated. Prospects of European countries recognising a unilaterally declared Palestinian state were severely diminished, causing the PLO to suspend their plans to declare statehood indefinitely on September 10. However, and despite all this, final status talks between Israelis and Palestinians did resume only days after the conclusion of the summit on 30 July698. Barak’s reasons for authorising the negotiations are somewhat ambiguous. He would later dismiss his decision as merely going through the motions to convince both Israeli citizens and the international community that he had done everything he could to achieve peace699. But Barak’s decision would seem to have been more complex than merely an effort to gain internal and international credence. By the end of August, Barak’s political survival looked increasingly precarious. On 31 July he had suffered a stunning loss when Likud member, Moshe Katsav, won the Israeli Presidential elections ahead of Labor Party veteran, Shimon Peres. The Likud leader, Ariel Sharon, was gaining traction through his denunciations of Barak for selling out Israel at Camp David. With Barak quickly losing ground, it was becoming obvious that only an end-of-conflict peace agreement could save him. However, the Israeli public had readily consumed Barak’s’ Camp David story and were losing interest in peace. The findings of the August 2000 Peace Index are insightful:
“The attention of the Jewish public in Israel is now focused mainly on domestic problems, while the peace process has been pushed to the sidelines where the national scale of priorities is concerned. This trend is presumably linked to increasing pessimism, since the Camp David summit, as to chances of peace with the Palestinians. This atmosphere has been reinforced by widespread opposition to the demands raised by them on the issue of Jerusalem, and the prevailing estimate that even if Israel were to agree to recognize east Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, the Palestinians would then present additional demands”700.
696 Shlomo Ben-Ami was appointed Foreign Minister after David Levy resigned in protest of the concessions Barak had made during the Camp David summit. 697 The Palestinians also launched a less successful campaign to court the support of international leaders during this period, often telephoning leaders or arriving for visits within days or hours of Israeli counterparts. 698 At the time Barak refused to refer to the talks as ‘negotiations’, claiming that they were merely ‘contacts’ (Herb Keinon and Lamia Lahoud, ‘Barak backtracks, renews peace talks. After suspending them for a day’, The Jerusalem Post, 20 September 2000) 699 Shavit 6 September 2002 700 Tami Steinmetz Centre for Peace Research, August 2000
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Within the territories, Arafat’s opponents, notably Hamas, were gaining greater credence with declarations that a return to the armed struggle was the only means through which to bring an end to the occupation701. Although Arafat’s personal popularity remained high, disillusionment with the peace process, which had been heightened by the subsequent actions of the American President, would invariably lead to violence and the ascendancy of organisations such as Hamas. With all this in mind, Arafat too, was aiming for an agreement. Arafat used his time after the summit consulting with Arab leaders. It was imperative that the Palestinian leader carry the support of the Arab world on the Jerusalem issue. The Americans had failed to seek a consensus on the issue before the summit and it had greatly impacted upon Arafat’s power to negotiate during the talks. Arafat was greeted with complete support for his stance on the Jerusalem issue, with Crown Prince Abdullah reminding him; “peace will not be possible until Jerusalem is under complete Arab sovereignty”702. However, the Arab world was also actively engaged in the search for creative solutions to the Jerusalem issue in the aftermath of the summit. President Mubarak of Egypt took the lead in this initiative, earning himself praise from the American peace team and patching up their differences after Camp David703. With the gaps between the sides now a matter of public knowledge, all focus was on the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount as the whole world scrambled for a solution. Many ideas were floated, such as horizontal sovereignty (entailing Palestinians sovereignty of what lies above the ground and Israel sovereignty over what lies beneath), ‘divine’ sovereignty and the placing of sovereignty with the Islamic Conference. Interestingly, the option to hand sovereignty over to the United Nations was also floated – a situation which would have closely mirrored the initial United Nations intention for the site in the Partition Resolution of 1947. As both leaders focused on a settlement and with the international community galvanized, prospects for peace were looking positive. For the first time since the failed summit, Barak was showing signs of public optimism towards the peace
701 Joel Greenberg, ‘Arafat’s allies say he stands taller at home for firmness at talks’, The New York Times, 26 July 2000. 702 Danna Harman, et al, ‘Barak: No yielding sovereignty on Temple Mount’, The Jerusalem Post, 31 July 2000. 703 Herb Keinon and Lamia Lahoud, ‘Clinton warns ‘time is short’. Barak, Arafat meeting in NY mooted’, The Jerusalem Post, 30 August 2000.
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process, while reminding the Palestinians that if no partner was found, “we will weigh the other alternatives”704. Barak’s re-engagement with peace talks was confirmed by his invitation to Arafat to visit him in his home in Kochav Yair on 25 September705. The two men walked together in close conversation for forty minutes, something which had not been achieved during the entire Camp David summit. The Israeli and Palestinian entourage were extremely heartened by what they observed, giving them cause for optimism that the appalling relationship between the leaders might be mended706. Hopes were further raised on the same day by the talks between negotiators in the US which had just concluded, with one American official commenting, “Both delegations got to thinking that there was more hope than at any point since Camp David”707. However, progress on the peace front was about to be overtaken by an excursion to the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount which Sharon was planning for the next day. With the fate of the compound at the centre of debate across the Middle East, Sharon planned the provocative act to “actualize Israel’s sovereignty over it”708. Despite protests from both Palestinian and US officials, who predicted the explosive repercussions of the move, Barak allowed Sharon to proceed and armed him with over 1,000 policemen for his protection. While demonstrations during the visit were limited, events exploded the following day as Palestinians spilled out of the Al Aqsa mosque following Friday prayers and rioted. Israeli policemen were waiting for them and fired into the demonstrators with live ammunition, killing four and injuring 200. Events quickly spun out of control, with demonstrations spreading across the territories and into Israel proper, leading to the death of 13 unarmed Israeli- Palestinians. The Al Aqsa Intifada had begun. By October, Barak and Arafat were locked in a furious dispute over which party was responsible for the start of the intifada and its violent continuation. Barak’s version of Camp David now found an addendum whereby Arafat had turned away from peace to unleash a wave of violence and pursue his ultimate goal of overthrowing the Israeli
704 Herb Keinon, ‘Ben-Ami heads to Egypt, Jordan’, The Jerusalem Post, 25 September 2000. 705 Yossi Beilin had been pushing Barak to meet with Arafat since the collapse of Camp David but Barak had resisted until this date to speak to Arafat until he accepted the Camp David proposals as the basis for discussion (Beilin 2004 p180) 706 Enderlin 2004 p284 707 John Lancaster, ‘Brokering peace or creating conflict; critics say US rushed into Camp David talks, miscalculated Mideast mood’, The Washington Post, 22 October 2000 708 Beilin 2004 p189
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state709. This message was quickly picked up and circulated by the US media, as exampled by Charles Krauthammer’s Op Ed in The Washington Post on 6 October titled “Arafat’s War”710:
“The plain fact is that Yasser Arafat, thrown on the diplomatic defensive by rejecting Barak’s offer (to the astonishment and dismay of the American mediators), has done what he has always done: resort to violence to regain the initiative and, most important, mint new underage martyrs – on world television – to regain the international sympathy he had forfeited by turning down peace at Camp David.”711 Meanwhile, the Palestinians saw the Barak Government’s connivance in Sharon’s provocative walk as a deliberate move aimed at igniting the combustible cauldron of Palestinian resentment, which was then escalated by a massively disproportionate response to the demonstrations it had intentionally provoked. The Palestinian version did find some sympathy in the international community, with French President Jacques Chirac commenting, “One does not fight against popular emotions with tanks”712. Disillusioned over the collapse of the summit, the Americans had initially downgraded their role in the final status negotiations, telling Arafat in response to his request for them to convene another summit; “We just shot our wad. There's nothing more we can do. If you want us to do something, you have to demonstrate to us that you're prepared to be serious and you're prepared to work these issues out”713. However, throughout September the US peace team had stepped up their engagement in talks, holding meetings with the protagonists and courting the Arab world for a consensus on Jerusalem. But any achievements this had wrought were quickly swept aside by the outbreak of violence, as the Clinton team found its time consumed in furiously trying to bring some calm to the situation and broker a ceasefire. The international community, including the UN and the Arab world, also scrambled to stem the violence, worried
709 Barak appeared on CNN to confirm this version of events on 15 October, claiming that Arafat had, “deliberately decided to prefer confrontation”. Barak 15 October 2000 710 Krauthammer’s piece was followed up by Thomas Friedman in an editorial with the same title the following week in The New York Times which similarly argued that Arafat had turned down peace and was now orchestrating the violence in order to ‘provoke the Israelis into brutalizing Palestinians again, and regain the moral high ground that way’. Thomas Friedman, 13 October 2000. 711 Charles Krauthammer, ‘Arafat’s war’, The Washington Post, 6 October 2000. 712 Brian Whitaker, ‘World blames hawk Sharon’, The Guardian, 3 October 2000. 713 Ross et al, 14 August 2001
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that it would extend beyond the territories and lead to all-out regional war714. Their efforts did little to contain the situation which left 100 dead in just 16 days, all but a handful of which were Palestinians. The bloody struggle which was rampaging across the occupied territories fuelled rejectionists from each side. Both Barak and Arafat were under pressure to cease all negotiations while the blood continued to spill. The ceasefire agreement, which Presidents Clinton and Mubarak managed to broker on 17 October, did nothing to solve the intensely acrimonious mood between the protagonists or alleviate pressure to abandon further negotiations. Barak was finding his policy of appeasing both the Left and the Right increasingly difficult. Needing to strengthen his coalition which had continued to exist without a majority, Barak was attempting to bring Likud into a national unity government. However, Sharon was demanding the total cessation of the peace track as a precondition for joining the government. Meanwhile, the ‘doves’ in Barak’s government, headed by Ben-Ami and Yossi Beilin, predicted that it would be a severe blow to Israel’s international standing to unilaterally end the peace process, and demanded that Barak continue the search for an agreement715. Barak continued to equivocate between the two factions, causing Sharon to charge him with “trying to travel simultaneously on two trains going in opposite directions”716. On 28 November Barak, who had been unable to negotiate a unity government deal with Likud, finally bowed to his coalition troubles and called an early election. With the Likud Party picking up the support of the groundswell of Israelis disillusioned with the peace process, it was predicted that only a peace agreement could save Barak from an ignominious end717.
The Clinton parameters and Taba – the end of hope
Barak’s newfound peace push coincided with Clinton’s agenda. The President was interested in making a last-ditch attempt to broker an agreement and secure his legacy before his presidency drew to a close. Following the US elections in early November,
714 Suzanne Goldenberg, ‘Clinton arrives for Israeli-Palestinian summit’, The Guardian, 16 October 2000 715 Herb Keinon and Nina Gilbert, ‘Beilin, Ben-Ami oppose ‘time-out plan’, The Jerusalem Post, 22 October 2000 716 Deborah Sontag, ‘Barak formally declares a timeout in the peace effort’, The New York Times, 23 October 2000 717 Lamia Lahoud, ‘Barghouti: Barak’s only chance is a deal’, The Jerusalem Post, 30 November 2000
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the President had become increasingly engaged with peace efforts, although his calls for Arafat to stem the violence while remaining mute on Israel’s excessive responses did little to ingratiate him with the Palestinians or rebuild the trust which was lost following the Camp David summit. However, with the two sides left polarised by the bloody struggle raging in the territories, the Palestinians were also aware that the only chance for an agreement lay in American intervention. Unable to enter formal negotiations with each other, the Palestinian and Israeli negotiators had been urging the US to submit their own proposals since August. However, President Clinton was initially reluctant, as Ross explains:
“We would be breaking new ground. The United States, even at Camp David, had never adopted a position on all the final status issues. To go on record with firm positions on all the core issues was a historic step. Once taken, it would be hard to take it back.”718 It was not until September that Clinton gave his assent to his team to draw up a document listing their ideas for a settlement of the dispute. This enterprise entailed much internal wrangling between Ross and his team, together with lengthy discussions with the respective negotiators. The proposals were nearing completion when Sharon took his fateful walk on the Al Aqsa plaza. The explosion of violence delayed further work on the proposals until Clinton met with Arafat on 9 November, two days after the US elections. Clinton outlined in vague terms the parameters he intended to propose, with Arafat responding positively719. However, rather than unveil the parameters at this time, the US team stalled, still unwilling to put an American document on the table. The Americans instead conducted further rounds of negotiations with the parties, hoping to bring them to agreement. It was not until the end of December that the US team finally understood that the only proposals the protagonists would be willing to consider were their own. On 23 December President Clinton invited the Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams to the White House to hear his ‘ideas’ on the resolution of the dispute. Clinton informed the teams that the ‘ideas’ could not be negotiated, but only accepted or rejected as a whole. The President also warned that the parameters he was outlining would disappear with him at the end of his presidency. To prevent Arafat ‘pocketing’ the ideas in the future, the President read out his proposals whilst the negotiators took notes. The ‘ideas’ Clinton conveyed were:
718 Ross 2004 p725 719 Ross 2004 p744
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• Territory. Between 4 – 6 percent annexed in the West Bank to accommodate 80 percent of settlers in three settlement blocs, with a range of 1 to 3 percent landswap and non-territorial concessions of safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
• Security. An international presence which could be withdrawn only by “mutual consent” and which would replace the IDF presence in the Jordan Valley only after six years. Israel would retain three early warning stations in the West Bank for as long as she deemed necessary. Palestinians would have sovereignty over their airspace but would have to accommodate Israel’s “training and operational needs”. The Palestinian state would be demilitarised and its borders would be controlled by an international force. The IDF would be able to redeploy to the Jordan River in the event it considered a “national state emergency”.
• Refugees. There would be no specific ‘right of return’ to Israel itself, however the parties would recognize the broad right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland. The Palestinians could chose to return to the state of Palestine; areas in Israel being transferred to Palestine, rehabilitation in a third country; and admission to Israel. Priority would be given to the refugee population in Lebanon. It would be agreed that the implementation of this approach constituted the fulfilment of Resolution 194.
• Jerusalem. The principle of what is Arab is Palestinian and what is Jewish is Israeli would apply to the outer neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, the inner neighborhoods and also the Old City, with special arrangements for governing the area. Regarding the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount, two either/or proposal were offered; 1) The Palestinians to gain sovereignty over the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount and the Israelis over the Western Wall and either the Holy of Holies of which it is part or the holy space of which it is part; or 2) the Palestinians would gain sovereignty over the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount and the Israelis sovereignty over the Western Wall and the two would share functional sovereignty over excavation.720 The President concluded by asking for a response in five days and left the teams to return to their leaders. Barak obtained cabinet approval for the parameters on 27
720 Ross 2004 p752-753.
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December. However, the approval came “with reservations”. Shlomo Ben-Ami dismissed the importance of the reservations as, “.…they were pretty minor and dealt mainly with security arrangements and deployment areas and control over the passages. There was also clarification concerning our sovereignty over the Temple Mount”721. The understanding, which has also been supported by the American team, that the Israeli reservations were unimportant in nature and constituted a ‘yes’, was later challenged by Barak. Barak maintains that the Israeli reservations were in fact contained within a weighty twenty page document722 and crucially, that they contested the transfer of sovereignty over the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount to the Palestinians723. As Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount was a core component of the Clinton parameters, it is difficult to see how this reservation could have been discarded as minor in nature by both the Israelis and the Americans. Having received the Israeli response, the Americans impatiently awaited a reply from the Palestinians, who had requested an extension of the deadline. The Palestinians were desperately seeking clarification on a number of points. Terms such as the ‘Holy of Holies’ had never been used before and it was unknown to what this referred724. The Clinton parameters had been constructed so as to be ambiguous. The Palestinians, free of constraints around electoral timetables, were determined to ascertain exactly what was being offered before they lay down the legitimacy afforded by international resolutions and accepted. However, Ross refused to discuss the ‘ideas’ with the Palestinians, concluding that Arafat was merely trying to manipulate changes and get a better deal725. After calls from leaders from all around the world, particularly within the region, Arafat visited President Clinton on 2 January, just seventeen days before his
721 Shavit 13 September 2001 722 Reports at the time suggest that the document was only 6 pages (John Lancaster, ‘Can Clinton reel in Mideast peace in two weeks?; There’s a feeling President won’t catch the pact for which he’s been casting for 18 months’, The Washington Post, 7 January 2001). 723 Shavit 6 September 2002. Barak also claimed at the time that he had not conceded sovereignty over the Temple Mount through his acceptance of the parameters, see John Lancaster, ‘Can Clinton reel in Mideast peace in two weeks?; There’s a feeling President won’t catch the pact for which he’s been casting for 18 months’, The Washington Post, 7 January 2001. 724 Ross claims to have invented this term himself for the parameters, just what Ross intended the term to apply to is unclear, his explanation merely stating that it is where the Ark of the Covenant was laid to rest in the Temple (Ross 2004 p753), however according to Dr Moshe Amirav of Haifa University, a former adviser to Barak on Jerusalem, the term was suggested by Barak, who applied it to the entire plaza (Swisher, 2004, p397). 725 Ross 2004 pp753-754
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presidency expired, and offered him his acceptance, which also came with reservations. Arafat’s letter containing the reservations has been reprinted in full in Clayton Swisher’s The Truth About Camp David. They ask for clarification on the location of the land that was to be annexed and swapped; the borders of the Wailing Wall and the effect of this on Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount; the modalities of allowing refugees to return to the Palestinian state and the compensation fund which would presumably be established. The only ‘idea’ to which the Palestinian leader explicitly objected was the timetable for Israeli withdrawal, which he complained was too long and thereby vulnerable to the “enemies of peace”726. With the Oslo experience of delayed and cancelled troop withdrawals still fresh in his mind, it was obvious why Arafat had misgivings on this point. Both the American and Israeli teams would later show great bitterness at the Palestinian response, claiming; “that, with its hundreds of objections, reservations, and qualifications, was tantamount to a resounding "No”727. As the story would go, it was just another piece of evidence that Arafat “was not up to ending the conflict”728. However, Arafat’s will was never in fact tested by the Clinton administration. Fast approaching its final days and with President-elect Bush packing his bags to take over the White House, the US team did not follow up on the parameters. Having insisted that the parameters not appear in writing due to their supreme fear of Arafat ‘pocketing’ concessions, the Americans were still no closer to a written agreement and time had run out. It was clear that Sharon was about to gain victory in the Israeli election and any agreement made with Barak would be null and void. Following Clinton’s departure, Barak authorised further negotiations to take place on 21 January, just days before his expected demise on 6 February. The reason for Barak’s authorisation of Taba is once again ambiguous. With Sharon’s popularity surging it was obvious that the only circumstance which might possibly have been able to save Barak from political oblivion was an agreement. However, Barak would later suggest that he authorised Taba only as a means to allow the doves within his coalition (who had been excluded from the negotiations) to understand that Arafat was incapable of making peace and that he was seeking the destruction of the Jewish
726 Swisher 2004 pp399-401 727 Morris 13 June 2002 728 Ross 2004 p756
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state729. However, Ben-Ami, who led the team at Taba disagrees with Barak’s claims:
“Political constraints and electoral concerns would later cause Barak to dismiss Taba as a meaningless exercise aimed to placate the Israeli Left. But the truth of the matter was that, in real time, he did his utmost to encourage the Israeli team to reach an agreement.”730 Six days of talks brought the sides to what was described as the closest they had ever come to an agreement731. Once again, no official document came out of Taba, however Miguel Moratinos, the European Union envoy who attended the talks in an unofficial capacity, later released his understandings of the conference. The Moratinos document (see Appendix III) demonstrates that the gaps which had plagued the final status talks persisted but that some progress was being made732. While Yossi Beilin, who had been left out of the final status negotiations until Taba, was extremely positive regarding the progress made during the talks733, the more experienced Ben- Ami was less forthcoming, ascribing the failure to reach agreement to persistent Palestinian intransigence734. Arafat concurred with the more upbeat assessment from Beilin, noting that, “at Taba we were very near to each other”735. But it was all too little too late. Sharon had signalled his intention to disavow any agreement Barak signed, giving the negotiators little reason to make the final necessary concessions. On 6 February, Ariel Sharon, the man reviled by Palestinians and Arabs around the world for his role in the 1982 Sabra and Shatilla massacres736, was voted Prime Minister of Israel in a landslide victory. The sound of guns and apache helicopters soon drowned out talk of peace. The Likud leader was assisted by the new Republican President who had little interest in following Clinton down the
729 Specifically, Barak maintained that Arafat did “not accept the moral and juridical right of the State of Israel to exist as a Jewish state”. Shavit 6 September 2002 730 Ben-Ami 2006 p274. However, this statement is in contradiction of statements Ben-Ami had given in an interview in 2002, where he claimed that Barak did not want to go to Taba, but that ‘there was a minister who told Ehud that if he didn't go to Taba they would denounce him in public for evading his duty to make peace’ (Shavit 13 September 2001) 731 The Taba Statement, Jewish Virtual Library, 27 January 2001 732 The Moratinos Non-Paper, MidEast Web, January 2001 733 Beilin 2004 p27 734 Ben-Ami 2006 pp276-276 735 Eldar 23 June 2002 736 The massacre was carried out by Phalangist militias over three days in the Sabra and Shatilla Palestinian refugee camps following Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon. The area was under overall control of the IDF, headed by Ariel Sharon in his position as Minister of Defense, at the time. The Israeli investigation into the massacre, the Kahan Report, found that Sharon ‘bears personal responsibility’ for the massacre.
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dead end of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. As Arafat had predicted prior to attending Camp David; it was the end of hope.
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Chapter 7
Camp David: Understanding the Protagonists
Please, Mr President, don’t let the summit fail. If you present it as a failure, the light will go out in the region, and I don’t know when it will come back on.
Yassir Arafat to President Clinton on the penultimate day of the Camp David summit737
The failure of the Camp David summit marked a cataclysm in the shared history of the Israeli and Palestinian people. The peace process born through a handshake on the White House lawn was dealt a mortal blow with the collapse of the conference. While the disappointments and miseries of Oslo had battered the two peoples and left them badly bruised, the vitriolic end to the talks was treated as irreducible proof of the implacability of the enemy and the futility of hope. Disappointment soon turned into bitterness, and thereafter into violence. Feeling that their outstretched hand had been spurned, the Israeli public reacted with calls for retribution, leading to the election of a man boasting an extensive history in the practice. The Palestinians meanwhile became convinced that their occupiers would never give them their freedom and resolved that they would have to seize it themselves through whatever means necessary.
While the events of the Camp David summit have become a subject of intense debate, they cannot by themselves explain how the peace process met its sad fate. For the Camp David summit was merely the culmination of a process which had begun seven years earlier in Norway. It was the Oslo documents which established the language of the dispute, the terms of the debate, the means for its resolution and the roles the parties would play. Nor did Camp David mark the closing chapter of the Oslo tragedy. The
737 Quoted in Enderlin 2003 p255
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final page of the peace process was not penned until the eve of the Israeli elections in February 2001. However, it was the failure of the Camp David summit which undermined the common assumption that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was reaching its end. For it was assumed by all, supporters and detractors alike, that the Oslo Accords had set the parties on an irreversible course towards some form of peace. Thus the acrimonious end to the summit produced deep shock worldwide when it was realised that there was to be no such happy denouement.
It was in this environment of shock and disillusionment that the Camp David ‘myth’ peddled by both Clinton and Barak became irresistible. The simplistic version of events provided an easily consumed explanation of the failure, and satisfied the widespread thirst for an easily identified ‘Hollywood-style’ victim and villain. Arafat presented an easy scapegoat, doubts about his revolutionary past lingered long after the signing of the Oslo Accord, and the Palestinians never fully managed to transcend their troublesome image. The synchronized sound bites which Clinton and Barak repeated after the conference were easily incorporated into daily headlines and faithfully parroted by the ‘experts’ saturating the network media.
This convenient myth surrounding the Camp David summit continues to pervade understanding of the final status negotiations across the world. Not only does it shape public opinion but the foreign policy of a number of states, including the US. It is symptomatic of the nature of myths that the Camp David narrative which the Israeli and US leaders had invented soon escaped their grasp, and, like the magic of the Sorcerer’s Apprentice, produced far reaching and dramatic effects that they had never foreseen.
Within Israel, the prolific ‘blame game’ which Barak launched in the wake of the Camp David summit generated a virtual revolution in Israeli thinking. Barak’s uncompromising verbal attack on the Palestinian leader, aided and abetted by his ally in the White House, led to the near total destruction of the peace movement within Israel. Questioning the GOI as it fought its ‘legitimate’ war against the Palestinian ‘terrorists’ came to be viewed within Israel as close to treason. Traditional leftist intellectuals such as Amos Oz and Benny Morris not just fell silent but huddled under the right’s umbrella. Barak had secured his ambition to unite Israel in its ‘inevitable’ struggle with the Palestinians but
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had failed to appreciate just how extreme the Israeli people’s reaction to his rhetoric would be. Ultimately, it would be the right-wing leader Sharon who would benefit from Barak’s political strategy, aided by a public which had lurched so far to the right in the wake of the Camp David summit as to make Barak’s Labour Party irrelevant for many years to come.
Barak’s efforts to secure international legitimacy for his ‘inevitable’ struggle had slightly more mixed results. While the GOI did not totally escape international condemnation for its disproportionate use of force in the early days of the intifada, it did enjoy the support and diplomatic backing of President Clinton738. The change of guard in both Jerusalem and Washington did not alter the close relationship the two countries shared. Eager to distance themselves from the mire of Palestinian-Israeli politics which had cost their predecessors considerable prestige, the myth provided a convenient alibi for the Bush administration’s efforts to disengage from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and leave Sharon to pursue his bellicose policies unimpeded. The Oslo peace process was dead, and nobody in the Sharon or Bush administrations were shedding any tears.
However, as conditions in the occupied territories deteriorated dramatically and casualty figures continued to spiral throughout 2001, it was increasingly obvious to those who had been involved in the peace process what the true consequences of the Camp David myth were. For a narrative which had been developed for short-term political gains was clearly having longer-term and bloody ramifications. By July 2001, this concern had prompted some to speak out with a more thoughtful understanding of the summit’s failure. Deborah Sontag was the first to do so in a piece in the New York Times on 26 July 2001739. Sontag utilised interviews with officials and diplomats to deconstruct the Camp David myth and assert that the parties failed to reach agreement not because of Palestinian malevolence but as a consequence of ‘missteps’ committed by all three participants. Robert Malley, a member of the Clinton peace team, together with the Palestinian academic Hussein Agha, followed up Sontag in early August with an analysis
738 After threats from the Clinton administration to veto Security Council Resolution 1322, which denounced Israel’s excessive use of violence against the Palestinians, the language was toned down so that Israel was not specifically mentioned in the clause which, ‘Condemns acts of violence, especially the excessive use of force against Palestinians, resulting in injury and loss of human life’. The resolution was finally passed 4-0, with the US abstaining on 7 October 2000. 739 Sontag, 26 July 2001
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of Camp David in the New York Review of Books740 which provoked a heated reaction from those in the ‘traditionalist’ camp and a caustic response from Ehud Barak through the new darling of the right, Benny Morris741.
The new analysis attempted to sift through the simplistic assumptions underpinning the mainstream understandings of Camp David to offer a more complete picture of the demise of the peace process. It assigns blame to all parties and shifts the focus from the two weeks of negotiations in Maryland to the entire peace process beginning in 1993. While the orthodox understanding of Camp David ignored this earlier period entirely, the ‘revisionist’ analysis pinpoints the disappointments and deficiencies of these years as a key factor in the failure of the final status negotiations.
The exposure of the Camp David myth by both players at the summit and experts close to the negotiations has led to a small shift from the major proponents of the ‘traditionalist’ doctrine, namely Shlomo Ben-Ami, Dennis Ross and Ehud Barak742. In response to the criticism which grew throughout 2001 and 2002, these men have attempted to shift the focus from the Camp David summit to the decidedly more ‘generous’ Clinton parameters in a belated admission of the paucity of the offerings at Camp David743. Ben-Ami and Ross charge that the Palestinians rejected the Clinton parameters due to their inherent intransigence, while in contrast Barak gave the proposals his full backing. The result has been the creation of another myth to reinforce the same message as the first; that Israel was both serious and generous in its quest for peace while the Palestinians demonstrated their inability to make peace and their preference for violence.
This chapter will not enter directly into the Camp David debate but will explore the many issues surrounding the Camp David summit in order to gain an understanding of the behaviour and positions of the protagonists during the final status talks.
740740 Malley and Agha, 9 August 2001 741 Morris, 13 June 2002. 742 In his interview with Benny Morris, Barak charges the revisionists with ignoring the Clinton proposals, which Morris notes to be ‘more generous’ than the Camp David proposals. Barak labels Arafat’s reply as being “tantamount to a resounding ‘No’”. Morris 13 June 2002. 743 After actively fuelling the Camp David ‘myth’ following the collapse of the summit, Shlomo Ben-Ami has subsequently admitted that he ‘would have rejected Camp David, as well’ (quoted in Norman Finkelstein and Shlomo Ben-Ami, February 2006).
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I. Israel: Peace-loving or aggressive expansionist?
“But I say that we have to be honest. We have to look at reality, cruel as it is, with eyes wide open. Because I say that the left cannot return to lead the country until it stands before the public and looks it in the eyes without blinking and without stuttering and tells the truth. The truth. The truth that every citizen now sees: that Arafat does not recognize our basic rights and that the Palestinian movement in its situation today is trying to undermine the State of Israel and not reach an agreement with it. Anyone who is incapable of seeing that truth and uttering it in a clear voice cannot ask for the authority to lead the nation.” Ehud Barak744
Throughout the period of the Oslo peace process the GOI was represented by four Prime Ministers representing both major parties in Israel – Labor and Likud. Due to the tactical necessities of Israeli politics, over the seven year span of the Oslo process, these four Prime Ministers represented not only their own parties, but coalitions which contained, at one time or another, most of the major parties represented in the Knesset745. However, all these vicissitudes within coalitions produced no discernable shift in the Israeli government’s policies towards the peace process. In fact, GOI handling of the process remained remarkably consistent throughout the seven years, a fact which failed to be appreciated by many within Israel and the United States at the time.
Yitzhak Rabin, the co-founder of the Oslo peace process, is widely revered as a statesman who would have steered his nation to peace with the Palestinians had he escaped his tragic fate746. Yet it is extremely unclear what sort of a peace this would have been. Certainly, Rabin never mentioned the possibility of Palestinian statehood, speaking only of a “Palestinian entity that would be less than a full-fledged state”. Rabin also committed himself to protecting eternal and undivided Jewish sovereignty over Jerusalem and considered that the Palestinian entity would receive no more than 70 percent of the
744 Shavit 6 September 2002. 745 None of the Arab parties within the Knesset were ever formally brought into the governing Coalitions, although both Rabin and Barak relied upon their support. 746 At the 2002 Memorial service for the late Prime Minister, Bill Clinton remarked, ‘I am convinced beyond a shadow of a doubt that if Rabin had not been killed we would have had a comprehensive agreement by 1998.’ (Clinton 5 November 2002), long-time Labor rival of Rabin, Shimon Peres agreed, stating ‘If not for the murder [of Rabin], we would have achieved peace’ (Peter Hirschberg, ‘Analysis/ Did peace die with Rabin?’, Ha’aretz, 21 October 2002).
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West Bank747. Crucially, Rabin also refused to confront the settler movement, speeding up settlement construction in a pattern which would come to define the Oslo years.
Shimon Peres, Rabin’s successor, began the cycle of delays and cancellations which came to characterise each Prime Minister’s treatment of the peace process. Allowing internal Israeli politics to intervene in his agenda, Peres delayed the Hebron redeployment to garner support from the Right for elections later that month. Peres’ plan failed to pay dividends and he was ousted by the Likud’s Binyamin Netanyahu.
Netanyahu shared a difficult relationship with the Clinton peace team, who viewed him as a hindrance to the peace process. Yet his negotiation of the Hebron Agreement in 1997 and the Wye Agreement in 1999, followed by his refusal to fully implement Wye, demonstrated that his dealing with the Oslo documents was no different to either Labor government which preceded and followed him.
Barak was as suspicious of Oslo as Netanyahu had been and actually followed a more hardline course than his predecessor. Like Netanyahu and Peres, he viewed the agreements as non-binding and subject to his own political considerations. Barak’s insistence on renegotiating the Wye Agreement, which had been signed by a Likud Prime Minister, demonstrates just how extensively Israeli Left and Right demarcations became blurred during the peace process.
It is therefore possible to view Barak’s actions during the last fateful year of the Oslo process not as an expression of his personal beliefs and idiosyncrasies, but as a reflection of completely mainstream political attitudes in Israel. Barak’s disdainful attitude towards the Oslo documents, his refusal to confront settler groups, and his failure to accord his partners in the peace process much respect were not the characteristics of one man but of Israeli mainstream politics as a whole.
The extent to which Barak’s negotiating stance at Camp David was entirely reflective of not only mainstream Israeli attitudes at the time, but of those held continuously since
747 Akiva Eldar, ‘On the same page, ten years on’, Ha’aretz, 4 November 2005. Jacques Neriah, an adviser to Rabin, commented in 1995 that, “The intention all along was for the interim agreement to be very near the final settlement’ (Naseer Aruri 2003 pxv)
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Israel’s birth, can be seen clearly if we examine the GOI’s positions towards the three main topics under discussion during the final status talks.
Territory
Israel’s unqualified victory in the 1967 war brought her territorial gains beyond her wildest expectations. Not only did she hold large tracts of land in Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, but she had also captured the remaining 22 percent of mandatory Palestine, in East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Israel’s regret at honouring the ceasefire agreement in 1948 before she had won these lands was wiped away as she surveyed her new booty. While Israel was pleased with her territorial conquests to the north and west, it was her gains in the east with which she was particularly consumed. For it was this area, which contained the ancient sites of ‘Judea’ and ‘Samaria’ that Jews shared a historic affinity The significance attached to these lands was felt by secular and religious Jews alike (as either part of their divine rights or historic inheritance) and accounted for the almost universal support within Israel for retaining them in perpetuity. However, the GOI’s decision to keep their war spoils in the east was not based on emotional ties alone, as the West Bank also offered many practical benefits. The aquifer system in the West Bank and the access to the waters of the Jordan River offered Israel crucial water resources she required for continued state-building. The new territory also offered Israel a deepened sense of security. Israel’s ‘narrow waist’ which had been a key concern to Israeli defence planners since the armistice lines were drawn was fattened and expanded. The capture of the mountainous Jordan Valley, with the Jordan River to its east, was also a prized security asset for the Jewish state, offering her natural defensible borders from her enemies to the east.
However, Israel’s occupation of the remaining Palestinian territories also presented her with unprecedented challenges. Unlike the less populated Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and West Bank held approximately one million Palestinian Arabs748. If Israel wanted to annex the land, legally or illegally, it would be forced to offer citizenship to these individuals. As the Jewish population within Israel was only 2.3
748 677,000 in the West Bank and 368,000 in the Gaza Strip. Note these are 1970 figures provided by Israeli Palestinian ProCon.org
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million at the time, the acquisition of one million Arabs, in addition to the nearly 400,000 Arabs already within her borders, presented an intolerable threat to Zionist aims749.
In light of these limitations, the Israeli Cabinet, headed by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, spent considerable time in the aftermath of the 1967 war grappling with methods through which Israel might attain permanent control of the land, but not the peoples, of the West Bank750. The first option which was discussed was the ‘Palestinian option’, whereby Israel would grant limited authority to a Palestinian ‘entity’ which might later become a state. Israel would however, maintain control over security matters throughout the entire region and would annex lands in the Jordan Valley in the north and Judean desert to the south for security purposes, in addition to lands connecting Jerusalem to the Dead Sea, a widened Jerusalem corridor west of Ramallah, and an expanded Jerusalem municipality. It was envisaged that the Palestinian entity would administer control over civil affairs in larger Arab population centres (such as Jenin, Jericho, Nablus and Talkarm), thereby ridding Israel of the burden of 95 percent of the West Bank’s Palestinian population. The residents of East Jerusalem however, would fall under the expanded Zionist state. Under the plan – which became known as the Allon Plan after its creator, the Israeli Defense Minister, Yigal Allon – the Palestinian entity would control a maximum of 60 percent of the West Bank751.
However, this ‘Palestinian option’ was quickly abandoned once it became clear that the Arabs of the West Bank would not accept its conditions. Determined that the Allon Plan nevertheless embodied the political solution to the West Bank’s future, the GOI turned to the ‘Jordanian option’. In this variant King Hussayn was offered control over the Palestinians, albeit with the same conditions attached752. While the King rejected the
749 1967 figures provided by provided by Israeli Palestinian ProCon.org 750 Prime Minister Eshkol likened Israel’s acquisition of the lands of the West Bank, which came with the drawback of the Arab residents, as liking ‘the dowry but not the bride’, quoted in Zaki Shalom 2005 p111 751 Yigal Allon publicly elucidated the Allon Plan in 1976 (Allon 1976). Yigal and the GOI have consistently maintained that the Allon Plan complies with international law as it allows Israel to maintain ‘defensible borders’, in line with Resolution 242’s demand that Israel withdraw to ‘secure borders’. 752 The ‘principles’ around which a political settlement would be reached, presented to King Hussayn by the GOI in September 1968, are worth noting. They included; territorial changes to the 1967 borders to accommodate Israel’s security requirements (including retaining troops in the Jordan Valley); the West Bank to be demilitarised; Jerusalem to remain under Israeli sovereignty with perhaps some special Muslim status for the Old City; and some alternative solution to the refugee issue to be later determined. Rueven Pedatzur 1995 p285.
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offer as “wholly unacceptable”753, the Jordanian option remained GOI policy until its signing of the DOP in September 1993754.
A central element in the Allon Plan was the role of Jewish settlements in the West Bank as a tool of Israeli control. The settlements were viewed as pivotal in establishing irreversible Israeli authority over territory which the Allon Plan deemed crucial to Israel’s future requirements. The settlement campaign, begun by Israel shortly after the 1967 victory, was in direct contravention of international law, which unambiguously prohibits the transfer of populations to occupied land. However, following the lessons learnt in 1949, Israel adhered to her policy of fait accomplis, trusting that the international community lacked the capacity or the will to impose its decisions on the Jewish state, particularly when she enjoyed the unparalleled diplomatic backing of the US.
Unable to achieve the acquiescence of the inhabitants of the West Bank or the King of Jordan to the Allon Plan, the GOI were forced to take the ‘do nothing’ approach which establishing a long-term de facto occupation of the territories, thus subjugating Palestinian national rights whilst gaining an ever firmer grip over the terrain. This approach allowed Israel to pursue her settlement policy while deferring the Palestinian problem indefinitely. It was only after the outbreak of the first intifada in 1987 (which succeeded in drawing the attention of the international community to the plight of the residents of the occupied territories), that the system of de facto occupation which Israel had established came to seem untenable, even to the Israeli leadership.
Rabin’s initial response to the intifada in his role as Defence Minister was to “break the bones”755 of protesting Palestinian youths. However, as Prime Minister, he came to embrace the project of legitimizing Israeli control over the West Bank through negotiations with a weak and internationally ostracized PLO. Rabin and his colleagues in the ‘peace camp’ – Shimon Peres and Yossi Beilin – therefore dusted off the Allon Plan
753 Rueven Pedatzur 1995 p285 754 This change in policy was contained within the ‘Letters establishing Mutual Israel-PLO Recognition’, signed by the parties on 9 September 1993, four days before the signing of the DOP. 755 Rabin gave this order to Israeli troops in a bid to bring the intifada to an end. The policy was faithfully followed by the IDF, with the Swedish branch of the Save the Children organization reporting that between 23,600 and 29,900 children required medical attention for their beating injuries in the first two years of the intifada (quoted in Mearsheimer and Walt 2007 p100)
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and negotiated with the PLO around its core elements. All that had really changed from the Israeli point of view was the existence of a Palestinian entity which would now agree to the terms of the plan. The Oslo period, which established Palestinian authority over large population centres while allowing Israel to retain control over most of the land and to continue her settlement building, thus represented little more than the realisation of the core provisions of the Allon Plan.
The signing of the Oslo Accords did not therefore mark a departure from longstanding Israeli policy, but simply a new means to its implementation. Though opposition to the Accord was launched from the Right, those within the Israeli mainstream had realised from 1967 that Israel’s interests were best served by granting some form of autonomy to the inhabitants of the West Bank. The DOP thereby marked an important victory by Israel in the realisation of its territorial ambitions.
When Barak approached the final status talks he considered that they would bring permanent recognition and legitimation to the Oslo model, which had in turn been derived almost entirely from the Allon Plan. Barak’s pledge of ‘no return to the 4 June 1967 borders’ was a direct echo of Yigal Allon’s commitment many years before. While Barak’s percentages may have varied slightly from the former Defense Minister’s, in all other respects his territorial ambitions were identical. Barak was indebted to Allon not just for his territorial claims, but for providing him the means in which to defend them. For while Allon had justified Israel’s territorial claims as necessary to ensure ‘defensible borders’, Barak could now claim that Israel’s territorial demands were necessary in order to accommodate settlements – which had been established by Allon for precisely this purpose.
Barak’s focus on the settlers was necessary in order to justify not just why Israel needed the land, but also how much land she needed. For all of Israel’s settlement construction since 1967, they constituted less than 2 percent of the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem756. The gap between settlements and Israel’s territorial ambitions was closed through her claim to settlement blocs, justified through the argument that isolated
756 While built-up settlements occupy only 1.7% of the West Bank, they control 41.9% of the territory through their expanded municipal borders (figures from B’tselem ‘Maps’)
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settlements within a Palestinian state would be impossible to defend, leaving their inhabitants insecure. Under this assumption, it was deemed necessary by the GOI to group the settlements together in larger, more defensible units. The fate of the 29 Palestinian villages, which would become isolated within the Israeli blocs and from the social fabric of Palestinian society, simply did not figure in the concerns of the GOI, even though Palestinians had been subjected to violent settler behaviour from the moment of their arrival.
When Barak and his team approached the final status negotiations, their understanding of the amount of land to be ceded to a future Palestinian state was not based upon international law, much less what the fledgling state would require to make it viable, but on Israel’s own ‘needs’. These in turn were shaped around Israel’s own concept of security, which Israeli historian Avi Shlaim has described as “so inflated and one-sided that it amounts to a denial of the legitimate security concerns of the other side”757. While the Israeli negotiating team were willing to show some flexibility with numbers, they never surrendered Israeli ‘needs’ to Palestinian demands for a contiguous and functional state.
The Israeli clash with the Palestinians over territory, during both the Oslo process and the final status talks, originated from their vastly different ‘jumping off’ points. The GOI viewed the lands of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as theirs – only to be ‘given’ to the Palestinians in return for good behaviour (during Oslo) or a full peace (during the final status negotiations). Ehud Barak became disillusioned with the Oslo process because he believed Israel was not getting anything worthwhile back, that it was doing all the giving while getting nothing in return. The final status talks were viewed in the same light. The very description of his territorial proposals as ‘generous’ suggests that Barak viewed himself as an “emperor dispensing gifts”758. Israel was not basing her claims on international law - which unequivocally viewed the land as Palestinian – but on possession. If the Palestinians wanted to be ‘given’ land, they would have to earn it, and
757 Shlaim 2004 p32 758 This term was used by Tony Klug to describe Barak’s negotiating methods. Klug 2001 p8
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even then it would only be ceded if it meshed with Israel’s own appreciation of her security needs759.
Refugees
Throughout the duration of the final status talks Israel’s position on refugees was both consistent and uncompromising. The two core principles underpinning the GOI’s position were; 1) No acceptance of any concept of a right of return, and 2) No acceptance of returning refugees as the implementation of such a right. On these, the Barak team did not budge one inch during the final status talks. Thus even the discussions which the Israeli team could hold with their Palestinian counterparts on this matter were severely limited. They would consider a return of ‘ten or fifteen thousand’ refugees on ‘humanitarian’ or a ‘family reunion’ basis but not one would be accepted on the principle of ‘right of return’. Israel showed little concern about where the refugees would be settled, suggesting three options; the future Palestinian state760, the Arab host countries or third-party countries such as Australia and Canada761. In light of humanitarian concerns, the Israeli team would also support an international fund for the compensation of refugees but would not contribute to it themselves762. As Yossi Beilin later stated, the Israeli attitude to the refugee issue during Camp David was; “that Israel was not responsible for the problem, doesn't have to pay for it and the number of refugees who will be admitted will be some hundreds every year and that's it”763.
Israel’s hostility towards allowing a significant return of refugees grew from her demographic concerns. As the GOI continues to assert, Israel was created to be both a democratic and a Jewish state. The arrival of large numbers of Arabs, be they Christian or Muslim, thereby represents a direct threat to the Jewish, democratic nature of the
759 Israel continues to harbour this mindset, with Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni informing the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in November 2008 that, “We must reach a basic understanding that the creation of a Palestinian state should occur only after Israel's security is established.” (Barak Ravid, ‘Livni, Rice meet in Jerusalem in bid to overcome impasse in peace talks’, Ha’aretz, 4 November 2008. 760 The discussions on the refugee issue never progressed to the point where it was determined if the Israeli team would restrict repatriation numbers to the Palestinian state through the planned Israeli monitoring of international border crossings. 761 Shavit 13 September 2001 762 Hanieh 2001 p82 763 Eldar 31 July 2002 p13
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Zionist state. The need to maintain a large Jewish majority has been an ongoing concern to successive Israeli governments since its inception. Following its establishment, the Israeli state saw a doubling of its Jewish population, primarily of Holocaust survivors from Europe and Jewish emigrants from Arab states. From then onwards however, Jewish immigration into Israel slowed, aside from periodic waves resulting from exceptional factors or events764. In addition to declining immigration, Israel also struggles with high levels of emigration due to the dual citizenship status of many of its citizens and the limitations that the Arab-Israeli dispute places on Israeli life765. Falling birth rates, declining levels of immigration and difficulties with emigration therefore combine to cast a long shadow over the viability of Israel’s continued existence as a Jewish and a democratic state.
Concerned by the existence of a 20 percent Palestinian minority within her current borders, the GOI is unequivocally opposed to accepting more, and thereby exacerbating the expected demographic crisis766. Whereas during the Lausanne Conference Israel defended her opposition to a return through its assertion that it would create an intolerable threat through the establishment of a large and hostile ‘fifth column’, in 2000 Barak would argue that the refugee threat to Zionist aims was of a more existential but equally destructive character.
Barak was strongly supported by the Israeli public in his rejection of the right of return. In the wake of the Camp David summit, news of Palestinian insistence on the right of return created enormous rage and indignation within Israel and the US, earning far more condemnation than the positions taken on the territorial, security and Jerusalem issues767. And yet, the Palestinian position on the refugee issue had been remarkably pragmatic;
764 The largest of these waves occurred in the early 1990s when 900,000 Soviet citizens settled in Israel following the breakup of the Soviet Union. 765 Martha Kruger July 2005 766 The current Israeli Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni, took this position one step further by suggesting that Israel’s Arab population renounce their Israeli citizenship and move to a Palestinian state once it is formed (see Barak Ravid and Yoav Stern, ‘Livni: Palestinian state will benefit Israeli Arabs’, Ha’aretz, 19 November 2007. 767 Incorrect reports of the Palestinian position caused traditional ‘dove’, Amos Oz, to write to the New York Times condemning Palestinian insistence on Israeli recognition of the ‘right of return’, ‘which’, he comments, ‘we all very well know is an Arab euphemism for the liquidation of Israel.’ (Amoz Oz, ‘The Specter of Saladin’, The New York Times, 28 July 2000.
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demanding only the acceptance of the ‘principle’ of the right of return, after which a practical implementation in line with Israeli demographic needs would be found. However, this Palestinian pragmatism went largely unreported, sparking Israeli existential fears that rather than accepting the two-state solution, the Palestinians were seeking to appropriate the Zionist state by stealth. Barak would later ferment these suspicions by claims that Arafat and his team were really seeking the destruction of Israel all along; “Arafat sees the Palestinian refugees of 1948 and their descendants, numbering close to four million, as the main demographic-political tool for subverting the Jewish state”768. Barak was of course, misrepresenting the Palestinian position, but his accusations were a powerful method through which to harness Israeli fears of the long- term intentions of their Palestinian neighbors.
The second principle underlying Israel’s position on the refugee issue concerned a less tangible but equally perilous threat to the Jewish state. Over fifty years after her establishment, Israel was intent on wiping from the national and international collective memory what her existence had meant for the indigenous inhabitants of the land. The dispossession of the Palestinians represented a stain on Israel’s past which she was anxious to forget. The sensitivity of this issue can be witnessed in Itamar Rabinovich, Israel’s former Ambassador to the US, lambasting of Barak for having implicitly accepted the mere term ‘right of return’ through his approval of the Clinton parameters. Such an acceptance, he argued, meant endorsing Arab claims of an ‘original sin’ and left the door open for future demands769.
However, during final status negotiations, Israeli negotiators were keen to slam the door on any suggestion of Israeli culpability in the refugee issue. Despite the emergence in the past three decades of historical research within Israel establishing the undisputable role of the GOI in the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem, the Israeli team continued to deny all responsibility throughout the final status talks770. At Camp David, an Israeli
768 Morris 13 June 2002. 769 Rabinovich 2004 p180 770 Of course, Palestinian and Arab writers have long-reported the Israeli expulsion of Palestine’s indigenous population, but the emergence of the ‘new historians’ research was particularly difficult to ignore within Israel and internationally as these historians were Israeli.
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negotiator commented that, “The most we can do…is to express our sorrow for the sufferings of the refugees, the way we would for any accident or natural disaster”771.
So sensitive were the Israeli team to any discussions of the 1948 file that they viewed the mere mention of it as both mendacious and subversive. As Shlomo Ben-Ami would later state:
“At the end of the process, it is impossible not to form the impression that the Palestinians don't want a solution as much as they want to place Israel in the dock of the accused. More than they want a state of their own, they want to denounce our state. That is why, contrary to the Zionist movement, they are incapable of compromising. Because they have no image of the future society that they want and for which it is worth compromising. Therefore, the process, from their point of view, is not one of conciliation but of vindication. Of righting a wrong. Of undermining our existence as a Jewish state.”772
Rather than facing history, Israel viewed its very mention a threat to the Jewish state. An end-of-conflict agreement was not designed to redress history but to expunge it; to wipe the slate clean. Palestinian attempts to put the issue on the table were viewed as proof that they were stuck in the past and unable to confront a future of peace and friendship with their Jewish neighbors.
While Clinton proposed that the two sides recognize the right of the refugees to return to historic Palestine or to return to their homeland, he explicitly stated that there would be no specific ‘right of return’773. Israel’s acceptance of this parameter may have appeared as a major concession to some but it did not in fact represent a deviation from Israel’s fundamental negotiating principles on this issue. During the Taba negotiations a new concept was introduced to overcome the impasse on the ‘right of return’; both the Israeli and Palestinian narratives would be included in an agreement, without formally accepting either774. That the Palestinians could insert their story into an agreement could perhaps be seen as a breakthrough, but without acceptance by Israel it merely meant that the war of words which had existed between the two sides since 1948 would become a war of
771 Hanieh 2001 p82 772 Shavit 13 September 2001 773 Shavit 13 September 2001 774 Eldar 31 July 2002 p13
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paper. The two narratives would stand unreconciled, side by side and separate – as would their people.
Jerusalem
The Israeli capture of East Jerusalem in 1967 saw jubilant celebrations with images and references of biblical redemption employed by secular and religious Jews alike. In contrast to the hesitant and uncertain policy the GOI exercised toward the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, its policy toward Jerusalem was both determined and unequivocal. Tearing down the barbed wire which had divided the city since 1948, the GOI effectively annexed the occupied eastern part of the city by immediately extending Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration to the East. Official annexation of East Jerusalem came 13 years later when the GOI amended the Basic Law which proclaimed united Jerusalem the capital of the Israeli state.
As in the occupied territories, the GOI set about establishing eternal Jewish rule over captured East Jerusalem through a policy of fait accomplis. A Jewish settlement enterprise was combined with policies aimed at restricting Palestinian numbers so as to ensure a Jewish majority throughout the entire city775. As noted by a UN special report, since its occupation, “Israel has expropriated more than 5,845 acres of mostly Palestinian-owned land — one third of East Jerusalem — for the construction of 10 major Israeli settlement neighbourhoods. These areas, with a population approaching 200,000, ring almost the entire northern, eastern and southern perimeter of the city”776. The placement of Jewish settlements in outer East Jerusalem was carefully planned to isolate it from the Palestinian West Bank and leave the Arab Jerusalemites detached and segregated from their peers in the occupied territories.
The Israeli annexation of Jerusalem has never been legitimated by international law. The UN, in addition to the US, has consistently regarded East Jerusalem as occupied, in line with both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. As in 1949, the international position
775 Policies which assist in restricting the Palestinian population include the confiscation of Palestinian land, the denial of new building permits and the demolition of Palestinian homes, and the denial of residency rights and the confiscation of ID cards (Palestine Monitor 2007). 776 United Nations Economic and Social Council, 14 June 2000
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towards the city did little to alter Israel’s determination to acquire Jerusalem as the eternal capital of the Israeli state, a position from which it has never wavered.
In the lead up to the Camp David summit there was minimal debate over the Jerusalem issue. It was widely accepted by commentators in the Israeli and international press that an agreement would include Palestinian recognition of Israeli control over East Jerusalem in return for a Palestinian capital just outside the borders of Greater Jerusalem, in Abu Dis777. The New York Times columnist, and reported ‘moderate’ Thomas L Friedman, in an open letter to Clinton prior to the Camp David summit, enlightened the President of what he thought the only fair and obvious solution to the Jerusalem issue;
Everyone knows the solution: Let the Palestinians also have a capital in Jerusalem, based outside the current municipal boundary of Abu Dis, and give them authority over the Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, while the Israelis retain authority over the Jewish neighborhoods, which become part of Israel.778
A Palestinian signature to such a deal would have allowed Barak to gain international legitimacy for Israel’s illegal annexation of East Jerusalem. In line with Friedman’s suggestions, Barak was willing to offer additional inducements for Palestinian quiescence in Israel’s takeover, including limited Palestinian autonomy over Arab neighbourhoods of the city (in effect allowing the PA to control sewerage and garbage collection). Authority over the crucial areas of security and planning, which had been continually employed to restrain and harass the Palestinian population since 1967, would be retained by the GOI.
The varying formulations which Barak offered the Palestinians throughout the Camp David summit conformed to the above approach. Israel would gain sovereignty over East Jerusalem with limited pockets of Palestinian autonomy designed to rid Israel of the burden of funnelling resources to the city’s Arab population.
Barred by Barak from discussing the sensitive Jerusalem issue with their Palestinian counterparts prior to the Camp David talks, the Israeli negotiators displayed genuine shock at Arafat’s refusal to entertain any of Barak’s proposals as a basis for discussion. Dismissing the consistent Palestinian statements regarding their demand to return to the
777 The possibility of Abu Dis becoming the capital of the Palestinian state first emerged during the Beilin- Abu Mazen talks in 1995. 778 Thomas L Friedman, ‘Just do it’, The New York Times, 4 July 2000.
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4 June 1967 lines, including those in East Jerusalem, as pre-summit bluster, the Israeli team were perplexed and embittered at the Palestinian response. It appears that Barak not only thought the Palestinians would accept his proposal on Jerusalem, but that it would be accepted gratefully. As noted by Shaul Arieli, Barak, “was convinced that Jerusalem was the winning card, and that once it was laid on the table, it would be possible to settle all the territorial, security and refugee issues that remained open”779.
When news that the issue of Jerusalem had led to the breakdown of the Camp David talks reached the world it thrust the fate of the city into the public arena. While Barak’s reported ‘concessions’ on Jerusalem during Camp David (which were wildly exaggerated in most accounts), were lambasted by the Right for ‘dividing the city’, they failed to generate the strong backlash within the Israeli public which Barak, and even some members in the American team780 had anticipated. The lack of outrage within Israel to the idea of dividing Jerusalem may have stemmed from the fact that in reality Jerusalem was already a divided city. As noted by Yossi Beilin;
There is more hypocrisy surrounding this issue [the unity of Jerusalem] than any other in Israeli politics. No government has managed to unite the city since 1967, when dozens of Arab villages covering seventy square kilometres were annexed to it following the Six-Day War. This move, which enlarged East Jerusalem ten-fold, made about two hundred thousand Palestinians holders of Israeli identity cards, without the character of the eastern city changing one iota. Any tourist visiting Jerusalem knows exactly where the Jewish city ends and the Arab city begins, a division reinforced by disparities in infrastructure, education, and even electricity.781
Fighting for an undivided Jerusalem was in fact fighting for a myth. The city’s Jewish and Arab inhabitants rarely crossed each other’s paths. Arab neighborhoods, which had been deprived of funding and resources since the Israeli occupation, bore little resemblance to their affluent Jewish neighbors. The GOI, unable to internalise the presence of a large Palestinian minority within the city, had actively pursued a policy of segregation rather than integration and under its tutelage Jerusalem had remained divided in all but name.
779 Eldar 2003 780 Denis Ross later commented that he was surprised at the ‘quiescence’ within Israel regarding Barak’s reported concessions in the months following the Camp David summit, leading the right to become ‘completely dispirited’. (Ross et al, 14 August 2001) 781 Beilin 2004 p163
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In later negotiations Barak came to accept that a formal division of Jerusalem would be needed in order to clinch a deal. Yet while the idea of dividing the outer parts of metropolitan Jerusalem, the city’s inner neighborhoods, and even the Old City, may have been tolerated by the Barak team, the issue of Jerusalem’s holy sites including the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount was a separate issue. While the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount, the Wailing Wall, and the Western Wall, in addition to the Holy Basin, were part of occupied East Jerusalem, Barak was not willing to consider anything other than Israeli sovereignty over these areas throughout the final status talks. To support his claims, Barak based his argument on purely religious terms. As noted by Shibley Telhami; “The Israeli government’s rationalisation for sovereignty over Haram al-Sharif was not based on Israeli security needs, legality, international legitimacy, or even use of property – but simply that it is important religiously to Jews”782.
In this way, Barak brought the issue of religion into the forefront of the political negotiations783. Basing Israeli claims on ‘religious ownership’ set Barak and his team on a collision course with their Palestinian counterparts, who had no choice but to enter into the religious debate Israel had introduced. The debate, of course, could neither be won nor lost, but it proved a rich source of acrimony for the Jewish, Christian and Muslim audiences following the talks784. The introduction of religion into the negotiations only acted to confuse the Jerusalem issue, blurring myths with facts; religious yearnings with present day realities. Above all, it simply obscured the matter as a political issue, the only basis on which it could, or can be, resolved.
The Israeli team appeared unaware that the injection of religious considerations into the peace talks would inevitably lead to the intractability of the Jerusalem issue. Shlomo Ben-Ami comments that peace with their Palestinian neighbors is immeasurably more difficult to resolve than peace with the Arab states as “peacemaking with the Palestinians
782 Telhami 2001 p14 783 To complicate the religious debate even further, Barak introduced an entirely new demand during negotiations that Jews be allowed to pray in the Haram al-Sharif, a practice which had been prohibited by Moshe Dayan personally since Israel occupied the site in 1967 and had never been permitted during the 33 years of Israeli rule. 784 Arafat’s foolish defence that the Temple had been in Nablus rather than Jerusalem was roundly leapt upon by his detractors following the summit as incontrovertible proof that he had never accepted the existence of the Jewish state. Morris 13 June 2002
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is an attempt to break the genetic code of the Arab-Israeli dispute, by touching religious and historical certificates of ownership”. Ben-Ami concludes; “Arafat clearly refused to be the first and only Arab leader to recognise the unique historical and religious roots of the bond of the Jews to their millenarian homeland and to their holy shrines”. However, Ben-Ami clearly fails to appreciate that through prioritising Jewish attachment to the city, he is himself negating Islamic affinity to the same space.
Israeli demands that the Palestinians put the yearnings of their own religion secondary to those of Judaism were deeply disrespectful and an anathema to the absolutist prescripts of both religions. Rather than lead to a practical solution to the fate of Jerusalem, it pitted Israel against the entire Muslim world.
In fact, the “religious and historical certificates of ownership” which Ben-Ami refers, is not, and never has been, a legal category of ownership in international or any other law. The term is purely an Israeli invention to couch political claims over the city of Jerusalem. Rather than embroiling the question of Jerusalem in an incontestable and insoluble religious debate, the issue could have been used by Israel as an important bridge to the Muslim world. As noted by The Jerusalem Post columnist Yosef Goell during the Camp David summit;
“WHY SHOULD [sic] we be ready to make any concessions on Jerusalem? Partly, because all of Jerusalem has never really been ours since June 1967. But primarily the issue of Jerusalem is the one that profoundly concerns the broader Arab and Moslem worlds, from whom we must win a declaration of the end to the conflict, or else there is no meaning to the entire diplomatic exercise.”785
Through accepting Palestinian sovereignty over parts of East Jerusalem Barak broke longstanding taboos surrounding the indivisibility of the city and opened a space within Israel where a more thoughtful discourse on the Jerusalem issue could take place. However, through basing Israeli claims to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount on the ascendency of Jewish religious claims he irresponsibly unleashed a debate between the monotheistic religions which could only act to provoke anger and hostilities between the
785 Yosef Goell, ‘The real red lines’, The Jerusalem Post, 24 July 2000.
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peoples. Rather than moving the protagonists closer towards peace, Israel’s claims on the city acted to leave them further apart.
Desire for a peace agreement
The outbreak of the first intifada in 1987 thrust the plight of the Palestinian people back into the international collective consciousness. No longer to be dismissed merely as refugees or terrorists, the Palestinians were clearly a national people deserving national rights, including the right to self-determination. Israel’s closest ally, the US, recognised that the ‘Palestinian problem’ could not be ignored indefinitely and that a solution would have to be found. Israel was not easy to awake from its slumber. Its policy of ‘do nothing’ had become an entrenched and fundamental aspect of Israeli life. The GOI was satisfied with the status quo which had emerged in the territories and reluctant to revisit the formula, which would invariably place restrictions on its territorial and/or demographic ambitions. Peace could only come at a price at a time Israel placed little value on the worth of an agreement.
The Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, was slow to appreciate the shift in zeitgeist which had permeated international affairs at the beginning of the 1990s. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the fall of the iron curtain generated political ramifications well beyond Eastern Europe. The world map, which had been frozen since the onset of the Cold War, became increasingly fluid with the emergence of new nation-states embodying the national interests of communities who had been living under Soviet rule. The US emerged as the world’s only superpower and showed great determination in using its hegemonic power to dictate a ‘new world order’. After defeating Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War, the US, under pressure from its Arab allies, determined that the dispute would have to be resolved. Unable to oppose the combined forces of newfound American interest in the dispute, the wave of national rights theory dominating current political thought and international condemnation at Israel’s oppression of the Palestinian people, Shamir agreed extremely reluctantly to attend the Madrid Conference. Shamir’s acquiescence could hardly be interpreted as a sudden desire for peace, but rather as a forced capitulation which his hardline stance during negotiations constantly strove to undermine.
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When Rabin took office there was little visible change in policies or positions from his Likud predecessor and the Madrid negotiations continued to make slow progress. Rabin, like Begin, was a supporter of the ‘capsule theory’, preferring peace with Syria before the Palestinians786. Peace with the Palestinians was therefore not high on Rabin’s agenda until he was advised by his Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, that a backchannel taking place in Oslo presented Israel with a unique opportunity to resolve her Palestinian dilemma.
As previously noted, the signing of the Oslo Accords represented an enormous strategic victory for the GOI. International denunciation of Israel melted away as talk of ‘occupation’ was replaced by the dialectic of the ‘peace process’, even while the document allowed Israel to expand its control over the territories. Unofficial estimates suggested that by 1998, 73 percent of the West Bank lands had been confiscated by the GOI787. East Jerusalem of course was omitted from the Oslo arrangements, allowing Israel to continue its de facto annexation over the city.
While Barak was “never part of the peace industry” like some members of the Labor Party, he had little choice other than to commit to final status talks when he first took office788. The five year timetable set by Oslo I had already expired. In addition, the Americans were growing impatient and were clearly expectant that a Labor Prime Minister would deliver. The ‘peace camp’ within Israel were highly mobilised and carried with them the support of the majority of the public. Israel could not defer the discussions on the final status issues any longer. Barak had little choice but to bring the Oslo process to its ‘moment of truth’.
Barak considered that the final status agreement would represent an extension of the Oslo process rather than a break with it. In line with Oslo, an agreement would be dictated by the Israelis to accommodate whatever the GOI determined to be within its ‘interests’, including Israel’s security interests, the requirements of settlers and respect for Jewish religious and historic attachments. These ‘interests’ were regarded as ‘sacred’, and breaking them was ‘taboo’. A Palestinian state would have to be formed around these
786 Ben-Ami 2006 p155 787 Amnesty International, 8 December 1999 788 Quote by Shlomo Ben-Ami when describing both Barak and himself (quoted in Avnery 2001.
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requirements. As commented by Ben-Ami, it was never intended to be a real state, but rather an ‘Andorra’ or a ‘Puerto Rico’ where the “borders and the degrees of sovereignty of the future Palestinian state would be open to discussion”789.
Israel’s vision of a Palestinian entity which was to be something “less than a full-fledged state” can best be appreciated by Israel’s security demands. Barak demanded an Israeli troop presence within the West Bank through ‘early warning stations’; five additional ‘emergency’ deployment areas, with the definition of an ‘emergency’ to be entirely in the hands of the GOI; Israeli troops monitoring all of the new state’s international crossings and the entire western border in the Jordan Valley; overriding control over Palestinian airspace for ‘military operations and training’; and control over the Palestinian electromagnetic sphere for ‘security purposes’790. The net result of Israel’s security demands would be a Palestinian state without any real semblance of sovereignty; a ‘state’; which was not a ‘state’ at all. In contravention of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter which sets out the principle that; “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members”, Israel was to be more sovereign than its Palestinian neighbour, and in fact more ‘equal’. This point was captured by Alain Gresh in Le Monde Diplomatique:
“The thinking behind Israel’s proposals at Camp David reflected its own particular conception of peace and of the Oslo accords. Both government and public opinion in Israel thought it normal that Palestinian rights (to dignity, freedom, security, independence) should come second to Israeli rights. The Oslo accords were never a marriage contract between two equal partners but an arrangement between occupier and occupied. And, at each stage, with the backing of the United States, the occupier tried to impose his own point of view.”791
It would appear that Barak was rather confident that the offer he had in mind would be acceptable to the Palestinians, despite the many pre-summit warnings given by Arafat and his team. When Barak discovered that Arafat would not accept his ‘generous’ offer, his mood turned dark792. However it appears that Barak’s real concern at the prospect of
789 Ben-Ami 2004 p247 790 These are in fact the demands made by the Israeli team during the Taba negotiations, which were a partial retreat from the maximal demands the Barak team made during the Camp David summit (Moratinos 2001). 791 Gresh 2001 792 Ross describes Barak’s ‘dark mood’ in Ross 2005 p678
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failure was due to the problems it would cause him politically rather than a genuine concern for reaching peace. Barak was well aware that his best chance to stay in power was to bring back a peace agreement. In fact, so central were Barak’s internal political troubles in the Camp David negotiations that the Palestinians often questioned if the summit was more about saving Barak’s coalition than achieving peace793.
Throughout the final status talks, Barak allowed the complexities within his coalition to dictate the course of the negotiations. Rather than trusting in his own resolve that he could sell an agreement to the Israeli public, he constantly kept one eye on the polls and another on the media, becoming a psychological victim of the constant political machinations which characterize the Israeli political system. Ultimately, Barak appeared unable to make up his mind if an agreement was worth the political risk, despite his political existence being almost certainly dependant upon it. The schizophrenic approach Barak took to the talks as a consequence left not only his interlocutors but his own public bewildered at just what his real intentions were and precluded him the opportunity to create an unstoppable momentum within Israel towards peace.
Barak’s pre-summit speeches did little to unify Israel around the concessions which would invariably be needed to reach agreement with the Palestinians. While Barak spoke at length about the concept of peace, there was very little mention of how this would be achieved. In repeating his ‘red lines’ publicly and often he failed to prepare his public for concessions on any of the key issues. Rather, Barak’s attempts to appear as both a man of peace and a tough, military-minded leader sent confused messages which disaffected both the Left and the Right. Barak continued this dual line following the collapse of the Camp David summit; claiming on one hand that he conceded nothing, while on the other that he had turned every stone. The paradoxes within Barak’s argument made it a difficult sell and ultimately resulted in his categorical defeat in the early election.
In giving his own reasons for entering into final status negotiations, Barak often refers to his ‘iceberg’ theory794. As described by Ben-Ami;
793 Sontag 2001 794 Shavit, 6 September 2002
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“He [Barak] knew of the assessment of the intelligence services that the Palestinians were like a volcano about to erupt in rage at the never-ending peace process. He used to warn his ministers that Israel was like the Titanic about to crash into an iceberg, and she urgently needed to change course by bringing an end to the conflict with the Palestinians before it became too late”.795
However, it is difficult to understand how Barak could perceive that Israel, the largest military power in the region, could hit an ‘iceberg’ through a conflict with the Palestinians, who lacked an army, navy or airforce. Barak later clarified what he really meant by his ‘iceberg’ theory; when justifying his decision to continue negotiations after the collapse of the Camp David summit;
“If Israel loses its moral superiority in the eyes of the world, it loses its ability to struggle. Therefore, we had to continue to the point at which all the world’s leaders and Israeli citizens across the whole spectrum understood that we really did do everything that could be done.
…Even if you think you have only a 20 percent chance of achieving peace, it is your duty to act; and all the more so when you know with 100 percent certainty that you are about to enter rivers of blood. You have a duty, you have to try to take the moral high ground. To ensure that if we confront violence we will have both internal unity and moral superiority. Without both of these elements, Israel is liable to slide into a disaster.”796
It would appear that it was not conflict with the Palestinians that was the ‘iceberg’ which Barak feared, but entering into the conflict without the support of the international community and the unity of the Israeli public. The GOI has constantly striven to garner international support for its ‘struggle’ against the Palestinians. While dismissing the Palestinians as wedded to their own ethos of ‘victimization’797, Israel laboriously cultivates her own image as ‘victim’ around the world. Barak viewed the peace negotiations as an additional method through which to convince the world of Israel’s ‘moral superiority’. If the Palestinians did not sign up to an agreement which in fact strengthened the occupation, then the world would know that Israel had ‘turned every stone’ for peace and support her in the inevitable post-Oslo struggle against the undeserving Palestinians.
795 Ben-Ami 2004 p255 796 Ari Shavit, 6 September 2002 797 See Shavit, 13 September 2001, for several references to Palestinian ‘victimization’.
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Barak’s ambivalence towards a peace agreement may be due to his limited view of peace itself. While the Israeli team were eager to obtain an end-of-conflict agreement they were not particularly interested in a ‘peace’ agreement. Peace between the two peoples would require reconciliation and the formulation of a shared narrative. Barak and his team were only interested in separation. Rather than viewing the nascent Palestinian state as any potential ally, the Israelis negotiated on the assumption that it would become a legally recognised entity from which the Zionist state would still need protection. Instead of negotiating for peace the Israelis were in fact negotiating for at best, a future of non- violent hostility. Peace with the Palestinians did not represent the opportunity for security but a continuing security threat. This mindset may be because the GOI’s desire for peace did not stem from a change in its perception or appreciation of the century-long struggle with its Palestinian neighbors but rather from short-term political expediency. Nor did the Israeli government’s interest in peace spring from the knowledge that peace was the only option, with Israel being extremely satisfied with the status quo which existed at the time.
Possibly one of the most destructive elements towards the peace talks was the Israeli Prime Minister himself. Barak is described by his own negotiator as “not a very pleasant person”798 and conceded by Dennis Ross to have “alienated everybody around him”799. There is no question that Barak’s underdeveloped social skills did little to help the talks. By refusing to meet with Arafat during Camp David he failed to build a personal rapport or degree of trust that might have built a platform of mutual understanding on which to base negotiations. By refusing to even address Arafat at the dinner table800, Barak chose to insult his interlocutor rather than show him the respect befitting of adversaries during negotiations. However, it was Barak’s personal views and opinions, rather than his social skills, which most adversely affected the talks and precluded him from ever really seeking a true peace with the Palestinians.
798 Shavit, 13 September 2001 799 Haberman 2001 p39 800 During the only dinner they shared during the Camp David summit, Barak refused to address Arafat, preferring to engage with the President’s daughter, Chelsea, who was sitting to his other side. Barak’s persistent refusal to meet with or speak to their leader throughout the summit led to the Palestinian team naming him the ‘runaway bride’. Swisher 2004 p282
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Barak’s views of the Palestinian people can best be gleaned from remarks made during his interview with Benny Morris in response to Malley and Agha:
“They [Palestinians] are products of a culture in which to tell a lie...creates no dissonance. They don't suffer from the problem of telling lies that exists in Judeo-Christian culture. Truth is seen as an irrelevant category. There is only that which serves your purpose and that which doesn't. They see themselves as emissaries of a national movement for whom everything is permissible. There is no such thing as "the truth."”801
This shameful description of Palestinian culture is an indication of the disdainful opinion which Barak holds of his’ partners’ in peace. As concluded by long-term Israeli peace campaigner, Uri Avnery:
“The stereotyping of a whole culture, people, society or race is despicable. It lies at the base of anti-Semitism. It is obnoxious coming from any politician, but when voiced by a politician trying to explain why he failed to make peace with these "products of a culture" it makes further study seem superfluous. It's all there, the whole rotten egg.”802
Barak’s prejudice is also indicative of his limited motivations for seeking an agreement. Barak’s search for peace was not built on any lofty ideals of justice and reconciliation, nor was it based on respect for peoples and cultures, but merely of political pragmatism based around short-term goals. Rather than outstretch both hands to the Palestinian people, Barak always kept one hand on the rifle. Looking through Barak’s confused statements regarding Camp David, it is difficult to ascertain if he ever wanted peace at all, or if the talks were just an avenue to garner internal and international support for what he assumed was Israel’s inescapable, timeless struggle against the Palestinian people. What is certain is that the agreement Barak sought would not have brought peace or an end to the conflict or even security, but just another chapter in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
801 Morris 13 June 2002 802 Avnery July 2002
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II. The Palestinians: Seeking peace or committed to Israel’s destruction?
For a true and lasting peace between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples, there must be two viable and independent states living as equal neighbors. Israel's Camp David proposal, which was never set forth in writing, denied the Palestinian state viability and independence by dividing Palestinian territory into four separate cantons entirely surrounded, and therefore controlled, by Israel. The Camp David proposal also denied Palestinians control over their own borders, airspace and water resources while legitimizing and expanding illegal Israeli colonies in Palestinian territory. Israel's Camp David proposal presented a `re-packaging' of military occupation, not an end to military occupation. The Official PLO explanation of why Israel’s Camp David offer was rejected803
Yassir Arafat and his PLO comrades were facing a bleak future at the time the Oslo ‘back channel’ was opened. The intifada had concentrated international attention on the occupied territories and produced a group of local leaders who presented a potential threat to the ascendency of the PLO as the sole representatives of the Palestinian people. The political and financial isolation which beset the PLO, especially following the gulf war, might well have spelt its end had Yossi Beilin and Shimon Peres not appreciated the opportunity the organisation’s weakness presented to Israeli interests. The PLO’s apparent capitulation (with its signing of the Oslo documents) would later be explained by members of Barak’s negotiating team in just these terms:
“That the PLO would accept 60 per cent of the Gaza Strip with all the agricultural land reserve remaining in the hands of 4,000 Israeli settlers, without getting guarantees that a Palestinian state would eventually be established, the settlements dismantled and the 1948 refugees would be promised a politically acceptable solution to their plight, was made possible only because of the circumstantial weakness of the PLO.”804
Through omitting references to human rights, national rights and the Fourth Geneva Convention the PLO signed away in the interim period the protections international law afforded their people. Rather than requiring Israel to abide by international covenants, the Oslo documents implied that their provisions could be negotiated. In more concrete
803 Eldar, 24 July 2001 804 Ben-Ami 2006 p204
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terms, the failure of the DOP to prohibit settlement construction, the expropriation of Palestinian land, or the demolition of Palestinian property, meant that the infrastructure of the occupation was permitted to persist and expand while being legitimated by the PLO. Combined, these acts would eventually ensure that by the time final status talks came around, a viable Palestinian state was an impossibility. In addition, the DOP said nothing about where the process was heading. Rather than stating definitively that the final agreement would bring Palestinians self-determination, human rights protections and an end to the occupation, the document remained silent, promising only that the final status issues would be ‘negotiated’ after a five year interim period. Reaction within the intellectual Palestinian community was captured by Palestinian academic and peace advocate, Hanan Ashrawi;
“It’s clear that the ones who initialled the agreement have never lived under occupation. You postponed the settlement issue and Jerusalem without even getting guarantees that Israel would not continue to create facts on the ground that will pre-empt and prejudge the final outcome. And what about human rights? There’s a constituency at home, a people in captivity, whose rights must be protected and whose suffering must be alleviated. What about all our red lines? Territorial jurisdiction and integrity are negated in substance and the transfer of authority is purely functional.”805
Through its signing of the DOP the PLO had irrevocably changed the language and contours of the dispute. Rather than a national movement fighting for the right to self- determination and statehood against an oppressive coloniser, the PLO was now understood to be ‘partners’ in the march towards peace with their Israeli ‘neighbors’. The immense asymmetry which existed between Israel and the Palestinian people was swept away in a dialogue which suggested equality and parity. Moreover, when Palestinians pointed to the way in which the instruments of occupation were expanded even further by Israel during the Oslo years, they were simply seen as whingers and spoilers of ‘the peace process’ (a catchphrase which increasingly became devoid of meaning). Edward Said recalled a presentation he made to the Columbia University School of Journalism in 1995 where he explained that under the Oslo agreements Palestinian life had “gotten worse, freedom less, and prospects diminished”806. Some
805 Ashrawi 1995 p260 806 Said 2002 p3
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audience members attacked Said on a personal basis, charging him with anti-Semitism and lack of integrity. Said surmised:
“Although all the other members of the audience soon tired of my opponents, and expressed agreement with my views, I realized that the nature of the encounter I had just had with proponents of the “peace process” was the main thing that was wrong with that process: its total obliviousness to the interests of the Palestinian people, as well as its enhancement of Israel’s position by propaganda and unstinting political pressure. Oslo gave Israelis and supporters of Israel a sense that the Palestinian problem had been solved, once and for all; it also gave liberals a sense of achievement, particularly as the “peace” came under attack by the Likud and settler movement. And this, in turn, made it unacceptable for Palestinians to express anything except appreciation for what had been done for them by Oslo, Clinton, Rabin, and Peres – even though unemployment in Gaza had risen at times to 60 percent, and closure of the West Bank and Gaza had demonstrated that Israeli occupation practices remained unchanged.”807
Once the ‘peace process’ train had got rolling it created a momentum which the Palestinians lacked the stature to resist. Jumping off the locomotive would have been perceived as incontrovertible proof of their persistent bad faith and hostility to peace. It meant little in the interim years that the peace process was hurtling towards an unknown destination with the likelihood of a crash extremely high. What was important was to be on the train, and to be grateful for the ticket.
Arafat’s agreement to sign away his people’s inalienable rights in 1993 was rewarded by Israel’s permission for the PLO to enter the occupied territories, where they could assert their rule over the Palestinian people. However, the “homeland of the free” which Arafat had promised Palestinians upon his return failed to materialise808. Not only did they face serious obstacles to freedom from Israel but also from their own leadership. Intent upon establishing their authority over the occupied territories, Arafat and his men instituted a huge security and police apparatus aimed at quashing opposition to the PLO and ‘the peace process’, to which it had become inextricably linked. Corruption quickly came to dominate the activities of the PA, as the vast sums of money pouring into the Occupied
807 Said 2002 p5 808 Yassir Arafat, ‘Arafat in Gaza; Arafat's Return: Unity Is 'the Shield of Our People', The New York Times, 2 July 1994.
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Palestinian Territories (OPT) from international donors were misused and abused to reward the men from Tunis and their long term supporters809.
Although Arafat attempted to present an image of strength to his people throughout the interim years, it was obvious that each new agreement brought new humiliations. When Arafat accepted a set of positions offered by the Americans prior to the Wye Summit, US Secretary of State Albright was forced to concede; “This reflected the weakness of his position, because our proposals were far closer to the original Israeli concepts than to his”810. The mutuality postulated in the Oslo documents was a world away from realities on the ground, where Arafat was forced to yield time after time to Israeli demands, which were almost always supported by the US ‘mediator’. Ironically, Arafat’s signature on the DOP which was designed to ensure his own grip on power, merely made him a servant of the occupier and their American allies.
Thus, when Yassir Arafat arrived at the final status talks he was an unpopular man on the Palestinian street. In November 1999, twenty prominent Palestinians had felt compelled to issue a scathing condemnation of Arafat’s PA “for its ‘corruption, humiliation and abuse’ of the people, its sell out in the ‘peace process’ and its supervision of the deterioration of the Palestinian commonweal”811. Arafat responded by arresting the majority of signatories to the document but could not dispel the ill-feeling an increasing number of Palestinians felt towards him and his inner circle. When riots broke out in the occupied territories on Nakba Day in May 2000 it was a mark of widespread Palestinian dissatisfaction with their leadership and its Oslo failures as much as with the Israeli occupation812.
The central problem for Arafat in controlling his increasingly disaffected population was his close identification with the ‘peace process’. For in effect this made its problems, his problems. In order to retain authority, Arafat was forced to ‘sell’ the peace process to his
809 The questionable activities of Arafat and his inner circle during the Oslo years have been well documented with Edward Said possibly being the most vocal voice of dissent within the Palestinian community. See Said 2002 810 Albright 2003 p470 811 Said 1999 p5 812 Itamar Rabinovich concludes that the Nakba Day riots were an indication, ‘that Arafat did not fully control the Palestinian “street”, and that the popular rage was directed in part at him and at the Palestinian Authority’. Rabinovich 2004 p146
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people, a difficult task as the misery of Palestinians increased813. By July 2000 it was perfectly obvious to Arafat and his team that if they returned from Camp David with a second-rate, Oslo-style document it would be received with hostile opposition and violence – aimed as much at them as the Israelis.
Territory
Since its inception in 1964, the raison d'être of the PLO had been the liberation of the whole of mandatory Palestine for the Palestinian people. The organisation was thereby fighting a protracted struggle against not only the 1949 armistice lines but the 1947 partition plan. When Israel occupied the remainder of former Palestine in 1967, the PLO adopted the Palestinian National Charter which included the newly overrun lands as part of its project of liberation814. Therefore, the PLO’s decision in 1988 to accept Resolution 242 and with it Zionist rule in 78 percent of mandatory Palestine, represented an enormous shift in longstanding PLO policy. The acceptance of Resolution 242 meant giving up most of the homes and lands which formed the childhood memories of many Palestinians still alive and the collective memory of the Palestinian nation.
Having undergone the traumatic and painful process of accepting the loss of the vast majority of their former lands, the Palestinians did not expect to be asked to accept even less. In fact, having accepted the international communities’ consensus and, thus, a severe curtailment to their territorial ambitions, the Palestinians assumed that these conceptions would underpin any subsequent peace agreement with the GOI. During Arafat’s speech to the UN General Assembly in 1988815 in which he explicitly accepted Resolution 242, the Palestinian leader clearly stated his assumption that the dispute would be resolved through the relevant international resolutions and human rights doctrines816.
813 Arafat later acknowledged this problem, asking ‘How do I convince my people that Israel is serious about peace while over the past decade Israel intensified the colonization of Palestinian land from which it was ostensibly negotiating a withdrawal?’ (Arafat, ‘The Palestinian Vision of Peace’, The New York Times, 3 February 2002. 814 The Charter was adopted in July 1968. 815 The UNGA voted to call an extraordinary session in Geneva to allow Arafat to address them after the US Government banned his entry into the United States, in contravention of UN neutrality. 816 Arafat, 13 December 1988
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In effect, the PLO understood that through following the land-for-peace formula prescribed by Resolution 242, they would get back all of the remaining 22 percent of historic Palestine, providing they offered Israel a full peace. The PLO’s understandings of the land-for-peace formula were enhanced by the important precedent set by the Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement. The agreement negotiated between Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat provided for the return of all of Egypt’s occupied lands and the dismantling of every illegal settlement established on Egyptian soil since 1967. The peace agreement forged between Israel and Jordan in 1994, which followed the signing of the Oslo Agreement, followed this same formula, where Jordan was returned all the lands Israel had conquered in the six day war (outside the West Bank)817.
During the Oslo years Arafat was under no illusion that the relentless Israeli encroachment on Palestinian lands was part of a deliberate strategy to preclude the possibility of a full return of land in return for a full peace. Rather than the Oslo process delivering him control over most of the occupied territories, Arafat possessed only fragments of land each encircled by Israeli-controlled roads, military zones, and settlements, which denied the Palestinians any chance of effective self-government. The Palestinians understood that the GOI was not embarking upon a construction boom within the occupied territories just to tear it all down again after an agreement. Aware that Israel was deliberately altering the ground rules of the final settlement with cement, Arafat and his colleagues appealed constantly throughout the Oslo period to the US to intervene and stop the Israeli construction. However the US lacked the will to confront Israel on its settlement policy, forcing the Palestinians to the point of desperation. Arafat even threatened to walk out of the peace process on a number of occasions, but was too powerless to even make good on this threat. Humiliatingly, Arafat had no choice but to stay in the macabre ‘peace’ dance.
Arafat’s cycle of threats and submissions gave rise to understandings within the GOI which would work against him when the final status negotiations were launched. Not only did it fuel the Israeli government’s belief that Arafat was weak, but that he would always back down in the face of US pressure. No matter how clearly and often Arafat
817 In an unusual arrangement, Israel retained effective control over the Baqura region, although it was returned to Jordanian sovereignty.
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reiterated his position that he expected a full return to the Green Line, Israel, and the US peace team simply assumed that he would capitulate when the crunch came.
The Israeli team’s incredulity at Arafat’s many pre-summit warnings over the positions the Palestinians would take during final status talks can be witnessed through Shlomo Ben-Ami’s bitter complaints after the collapse of the talks:
“But no one [in the Palestinian team] bothered to give us the heads up on this matter…why didn’t they tell us beforehand: ‘guys, its worthless to go for a summit since for us its either all or nothing’”818
However, Barak and his team had been told regularly and unambiguously what the Palestinians positions were – they just did not believe them. The failure of the Palestinians was not in failing to give a ‘heads up’ but in having allowed the Oslo process to deprive them of any credibility.
Israeli and US belief that Arafat would back down from his insistence on a full return to the Green Line were to some extent realised during Camp David. Despite their ostensive adherence to Resolution 242, the Palestinians did in fact make important concessions which eroded this position. They accepted Israeli annexation of the larger settlements, totalling around 2.5 percent of the West Bank. Rather than conceding settlement blocs which would swallow up Palestinian land and villages, the Palestinians produced a map conceding smaller Israeli enclaves, connected by ‘laces’ to accommodate 30-35 percent of Israeli settlers819. The Palestinians insisted upon a 1:1 swap of land of equal type and value to compensate for this loss.
However, the Palestinian counter offer was so far below what Israel was insisting upon that it was not recognised as an offer at all. When asked if the Palestinians made a counterproposal during Camp David in a later interview, Ben-Ami answered, ‘No. And that is the heart of the matter. Never, in the negotiations between us and the Palestinians, was there a Palestinian counterproposal. There never was and there never will be’820. However, the Palestinians’ counterproposal included difficult and unprecedented concessions, just as the Israeli proposals had. The Palestinian proposal on settlement
818 Ben-Ami 2001 819 Swisher 2004 p318 820 Shavit, 13 September 2001
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‘laces’ not only relinquished valuable land but more importantly accommodated the hated settlements and settlers. Arafat and his team were in effect legitimating an illegal and illegitimate Israeli practice which had been used to harass and dispossess the Palestinian population. While the Israelis and Americans were quick to dismiss this concession as no concession at all, it in fact represented a major compromise within the Palestinian camp821.
In private discussions with President Clinton during Camp David, Arafat went even further than his team and proposed that Clinton himself choose the amount of land the Palestinians would cede to Israel, intimating that he was ready to accept between 8 and 10 percent. Arafat explained to the President that he was ready to accept his judgement on this matter providing he extracted from Israel a similar compromise on the Jerusalem issue. Arafat’s surprising offer, which revealed his true priorities during the final status issues, failed to be met with a corresponding concession from Israel and was quickly eviscerated from official memory to accommodate the more convenient myth of Arafat’s determined intransigence. Barak would later deny that Arafat had ever voiced the proposal, commenting:
“He did not negotiate in good faith, indeed, he did not negotiate at all. He just kept saying 'no' to every offer, never making any counterproposals of his own,”822
Through his acceptance of the Clinton Parameters, Arafat later accepted the idea of settlement blocs, which were an anathema to the Palestinian people and threatened to divide their future state’s territory into three discontiguous and unviable zones in addition to leaving a host of Palestinian villages under Israeli control to face an unknown and precarious future. Once again, this concession represented a major compromise but one which has also been erased from the official Camp David narrative.
Barak’s initial anger at Arafat’s rejections at Camp David was directed towards the US team who he assumed were not doing enough to turn up the heat of the ‘pressure cooker’. In a note to the US President, Barak accused the US team of partiality in an obvious attempt to provoke them into becoming more forceful in their deliberations with the
821 Rob Malley was the first to explode the myth that the Palestinians did not make a counterproposal in the international press. Malley, 8 July 2001 822 Morris 13 June 2002
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Palestinian negotiators823. But Barak and his team had merely misread the mood in the Palestinian camp which had drawn a line under Oslo and looked at the final status talks as creating an entirely new status quo. Major concessions were to be a thing of the past, even in the face of American pressure. Rather than entering into bazaar-type negotiations with the US and Israeli teams where different percentages were to be bandied about in order to “meet somewhere in the middle”824, the Palestinians were concerned with preserving their future homeland. Percentages for them were not just figures to be negotiated away but homes, fields and wadis, which their future state would be built upon. If these foundations were compromised so too would be the future of the Palestinian state.
Refugees
The Oslo documents, which brought Arafat and his circle to the Palestinian Occupied Territories, forced upon them an enormously more complex and nuanced role in the Palestinian national movement than they had previously occupied. Arafat and his Fatah Party colleagues were compelled to hang up their revolutionary boots to slip into the invariably more conservative and compromising shoes of government. The journey the PLO made from Tunis to Gaza also represented a movement away from simplistic and absolutist sloganeering to the vagaries and quandaries of governance. Revolution quickly gave way to pragmatism as the PLO learned to navigate its way around local, regional and international political corridors. The journey made by the PLO not only changed its language but also its orientation and agenda. As a product of the refugee crisis, the PLO had always been firstly associated with this community and regarded itself as the central defender of its rights. However, the move to the occupied territories reorientated Arafat and his men towards issues confronting the occupants of the West Bank and Gaza and away from their exiled constituency. The deferral of the refugee issue in the Oslo documents allowed the PLO to avoid facing the possibly conflicting interests of the two communities, though only until the final status negotiations.
823 Ross suspected that the note was an attempt to manipulate the US team but also concluded it suggested something dark about Barak’s mood. Ross 2004 p676 824 Shlomo Ben-Ami later revealed that the Israeli team assumed that they teams would ‘meet in the middle’ of the Palestinian and Israeli team’s respective start-points of 2 percent and 10 percent. Shavit, 13 September 2001
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The 3.7 million refugees825 languishing in miserable conditions in refugee camps had little choice in the Oslo years but to wait patiently until their future was ‘negotiated’ during final status talks. Having waited for their internationally-sanctioned rights to be recognised by Israel since 1948, the refugees were resigned to waiting a little longer while hoping that the permanent settlement would finally free them from their limbo and give them control of their own destinies and the option to return to their former homes. Following the signing of Oslo the PLO continued to publicly uphold the right of return for the Palestinian refugees and reassure them that the defence of these rights remained a central tenet of the PLO’s agenda.
However, Arafat was aware that Israel would never accept Resolution 194 with the corresponding unlimited return of Palestinian refugees to Israel proper because of the demographic threat this would pose to the Jewish state. Arafat was also aware that he could not depend on support from the Clinton team, because the Clinton Administration had already withdrawn support for the resolution in the United Nations826. If Arafat was to negotiate an agreement with Israel under US mediation, it was obvious that the Palestinians would need to make a serious compromise on the refugee issue. Thus, in effect the Palestinian leader was faced with a stark choice between the two Palestinian communities. Insisting on the right of return and the implementation of Resolution 194 would almost certainly preclude the possibility of achieving self-rule and self- determination for the inhabitants of the OPT. However, compromising on Resolution 194 would entail sacrificing the refugees’ internationally recognised rights and ending their dreams of returning to their ancestral homes.
During final status talks there were some demands by Palestinians that any final agreement be put to a referendum which would be open to the entire Palestinian Diaspora as well as the residents of the occupied territories827. Having witnessed Arafat surrendering time after time to Israeli demands during the Oslo process, some Palestinians had as little faith in Arafat’s ‘red lines’ as did their Israeli counterparts. Arafat resisted calls for a referendum but was aware that a major compromise on the
825 Official UNRWA figure. 826 Neff 1995 p4, Bennis January 2001 827 For example, see Bishara 18 July 2000
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issue would provoke widespread condemnation on the Palestinian street and would fuel rejectionism from opposition groups including Hamas.
Faced with these dilemmas Arafat embarked upon a duplicitous course. While proclaiming at the commencement of talks that, “the right of refugees to return to their homeland is our conviction and one which we will never compromise”,828 Arafat and his team privately set about doing just that. According to Ben-Ami, during the Stockholm talks the Palestinians accepted a concept “based on a solution in Arab host-states, in the Palestinian state, in countries like Canada and Australia, and on family reunification in Israel”829. While Ben-Ami complains that there was a regression on the issue at Camp David, the Israelis understood that the Palestinians were looking for a creative solution to the refugee issue which would in fact represent a compromise but be able to be spun as something better. As commented by Shaul Arieli:
“They thought a solution would be found to the problem of the right of return by means of a trick that would remove its sting. From their point of view, any proposal that fell short of this would not enable them to make concessions on other issues,”830
Arafat viewed the concessions he would make on the refugee issue as his trump card, but one which would only be shown if Israel offered concessions on the other issues; notably Jerusalem831. Banking that he would be able to sell a compromise formula on the right of return if he was able to proclaim Jerusalem as the capital of the new Palestinian state, Arafat had in fact made a strategic decision to abandon Resolution 194.
Arafat’s acceptance of the Clinton Parameters represented a major compromise on Resolution 194 but achieved his goal of finding a creative solution on the right of return which would meet Israel’s demographic fears while being ambiguous enough to be sold to his public as something approaching a victory.
In public interviews, the Palestinian team insisted that they had demanded the implementation of the right of return throughout the final status negotiations832,
828 Danna Harman, ‘Israel, PA launch final-status talks tonight. Arafat: No compromise on refugees’, The Jerusalem Post, 13 September 1999 829 Shavit, 13 September 2001 830 Eldar, 11 March 2003 831 Eldar, 11 March 2003 832 See Yasir Arafat, interview on Frontline, Eldar, 24 July 2001 and Mahmoud Abbas 2001
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obviously aware of the hostility that any compromise on this issue would generate among their people in the absence of an agreement. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that by not insisting on the unrestricted implementation of Resolution 194, Arafat and his team were willing to make significant concessions on the issue833.
Given all this, it is ironic, to say the least, that it was the refugee question which provoked the biggest backlash for the Palestinians in the post-Camp David period, and even more ironic that this came, not from their own community, but from Israel. For it was the concessions the Palestinians offered on the refugee issue which signalled most clearly that they had internalised the existence of the Jewish state and were forging their negotiating positions around its continued survival. However, the myth that the Palestinian negotiators had steadfastly insisted upon the right of return throughout Camp David was perhaps the only myth which Arafat and his team were willing to let go unchallenged, as it vindicated their actions amongst their own people far more than the truth would have done.
Both the US and the Israelis failed to appreciate what the Palestinians had done in sacrificing their own internationally-mandated rights to accommodate Israel’s demographic concerns. Rather than destroying the Zionist state, Arafat had been willing to destroy the hopes and dreams of his people which had been kept alive for over fifty years. While this fact could easily be derided and overlooked by the Israeli and US teams, it would be not so easily forgotten by the millions of refugees still suffering in refugee camps, deprived of the most basic right to what Clinton referred to as “The quiet miracle of a normal life”834.
833 In an unreleased 2001 report by Gilad Sher summarising the progress of final status talks to outgoing Prime Minister Barak, it was noted that the Palestinians, “showed understanding of the sensitivity of the issue for Israel, and willingness to find a formulation that would balance these feelings with their national needs.” (quoted in Barak Ravid, ‘Document shows progress on core issues at Camp David summit’, Ha’aretz, 13 September 2007). 834 Clinton used this comment to refer to the hopes of both Palestinians and Israelis during his speech at the signing of the DOP (Foreign desk, ‘Mideast Accord; Statements by Leaders at the Signing of the Middle East Pact’, The New York Times, 14 September 1993).
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Jerusalem
The loss of the ancient city of Jerusalem was perhaps the hardest burden to bear for the Palestinian community following the six day war. The city had acted as the social, cultural and economic core of the Palestinian nation while also holding immense religious and historic significance to the wider Muslim world as the third holiest city in Islam. Just as Jews across the world celebrated the capture of the entire city in 1967, Muslims across the globe grieved its loss.
Having learned the lesson of 1948, the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem did not flee during the six day war, so that when Israel extended its authority over the entire city just over 25 percent of its residents were non-Jews835. After Israel annexed East Jerusalem, its residents became permanent residents and Israeli identity card holders. Rather than being treated as equals to the Jewish inhabitants of the city, the GOI and the Municipality of Jerusalem embarked upon policies designed to restrict Arab growth there while promoting the continuing expansion of the city’s Jewish population. Since 1967 one- third of the land Israel illegally annexed in the city has been expropriated for Jewish purposes, including settlement building. The construction of Jewish settlements in the midst of Arab East Jerusalem neighborhoods has been accompanied by severe restrictions on housing development for the Palestinian community. For example, by 2001 over 46,978 housing units for Jews had been built on the expropriated land but none for the Arab population, despite the fact that Palestinians now constitute one-third of the city’s population836. The dual planning policy exercised by the GOI has been complemented by severe disparities in funding which have denied resources to the Palestinian suburbs while ensuring that the Jewish neighborhoods enjoy all of the amenities and benefits of a highly developed state. In 1995, the GOI clandestinely embarked upon a policy of ‘quiet deportation’ of Palestinian Jerusalemites, cancelling their permanent residence status on highly dubious grounds and removing their ability to live and work in the city837. This
835 Of the 267,800 Jerusalem residents in 1967, 58,100 were Moslems and 12,900 were Christian. Israeli- Palestinian ProCon.org, ‘Population statistics’. 836 B’tselem, ‘East Jerusalem: Policy of discrimination in planning, building and land expropriation’ 837 For a full discussion of Israel ‘quiet deportation policy’, see B’tselem, April 1997
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policy is just one example of many employed by the GOI and the Municipality of Jerusalem since 1967 designed to empty the city of its Arab population.
When Arafat and his men signed up to the DOP they in effect acquiesced in Israel’s longstanding policy of treating East Jerusalem as a distinctly separate issue to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. While the GOI has generally managed these latter areas as one territorial unit and has been prepared to discuss different forms of self-government for them, including some ceding of land, the topic of Jerusalem has consistently been treated as a separate and unrelated issue and one in which no concessions could be made. Israel’s view on this matter is once again at variance with that of the international community, who hold that the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem all form the OPT.
Shortly after the signing of Oslo II in 1995, the peace process architect, Yossi Beilin, began secret preliminary final status talks with Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen). The product of these talks is referred to as the Beilin-Abu Mazen understandings. While the Palestinian leadership have been reticent to discuss the outcome of the preliminary talks, there is little doubt that Beilin and the Israeli team believed that Abbas had agreed to the concept of a Palestinian capital in Abu-Dis, which would become part of an expanded Greater-Jerusalem, while being firmly located outside the traditional boundaries of the city and removed from the old walled city, including the Islamic holy sites.
The Israelis’ casual belief that the Beilin-Abu Mazen understandings would underpin an agreement on Jerusalem were exploded when they arrived at Camp David and were faced with Arafat’s rejection of their Jerusalem proposals. As Gidi Grinstein, a member of the Israeli negotiating team would later complain:
The Palestinian side repeatedly retracted from understandings reached during the negotiations. The famous Beilin-Abu-Mazen understandings of 1995 became, for the Palestinians, the "Beilin-Abu- Beilin Understandings" (i.e., no Abu-Mazen).838
However, much had occurred since 1995 to influence Arafat’s positions on the final status issues. By 2000 Arafat was in a far weaker position within his own population than he had been in 1995 due in no small part to the detrimental effects of the Oslo
838 Grinstein 2001
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Accords on Palestinian life and his ineffective and corrupt rule over the occupied territories. If Arafat was to offer a major concession on the right of return and cede land to accommodate settlements, he would have to be able to achieve something better on the Jerusalem issue than the small village of Abu Dis as the capital of the Palestinian state. A victory on the issue of Jerusalem would in fact be the key to unlocking concessions on the other issues. The Israeli team were aware of Arafat’s position, but could not resist taking advantage of his relative weakness to extract more concessions. As commented by Shaul Arieli, ‘”But we thought that the concession on the right of return was already in our pocket and we wanted to get more”839.
Arafat’s decision to focus on getting a good deal on Jerusalem while offering up major concessions on the other issues had a very practical appeal. As the city was of great religious significance to the Muslim world, an agreement which recognised Palestinian sovereignty over its Muslim holy sites would be celebrated by Muslim communities across the globe. Muslim satisfaction with the Jerusalem arrangements within an agreement would then provide Arafat the cover he would need to sell the more difficult provisions of an agreement to his people. Essentially, if Arafat was able to carry the Muslim world with him, the Palestinian people would find it difficult to resist.
The expectations of the Arab and Muslim worlds no doubt complicated Arafat’s negotiating manoeuvres on the Jerusalem issue. While Israel expected that Arafat would be the first Arab figure in history to recognise its sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif, (something which had been consistently rejected by the United Nations, including the United States), they failed to appreciate the likely ramifications if they had been able to coerce the Palestinians into capitulating on this issue. An agreement which recognised Jewish sovereignty over Islamic holy sites would have made the agreement stillborn – it would have been rejected not just by the Palestinian street but the entire Muslim world. And Muslim wrath on the issue would not have been directed at Israel, but at the Palestinian team for accepting such a deal. Arafat and his negotiating team were well aware of this scenario, with Yasser Abed Rabbo commenting, “If we were to yield on this issue [sovereignty over East Jerusalem], we’d risk being accused of treason by the entire
839 Eldar, 11 March 2003.
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Muslim community”840, and Arafat more dramatically asking the US team if they wanted to come to his funeral841.
While religious considerations played a role in restricting Arafat’s ability to compromise on the Jerusalem issue, it did not form the basis of his claims on the city which strictly conformed to the provisions of international law. In fact, Jewish attempts at using religion as a basis for resolving the Jerusalem issue only confounded the Palestinian team who were trying to negotiate on the basis of present day practical realities rather than divine affinities, as noted by Saeb Erekat:
“I tell them [the Israeli negotiators]: “You can have the Jewish quarter, control it. Control over the Wailing Wall [also]. But what you haven’t done in all these years when you’ve had control of the Haram al-Sharif, don’t ask me to do it now… There’s no such thing as sovereignty over history or memory.”842
However, the Palestinians did in fact make serious concessions on the Jerusalem issue which were based, like their concessions on the refugee and territorial issues, around pragmatism and practicality. These included recognising Israeli sovereignty over Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem (which would form ‘bubbles’ attached to Israel proper through roads designed to not interfere with the contiguity of the Palestinian state, rather than the other way around which is what Barak was demanding)843. Arafat also accepted that the Jewish Quarter in the walled city be ceded to Israel in addition to sovereignty over the Wailing Wall.
While Arafat’s positions on the Jerusalem issue were denounced by the US team following the collapse of Camp David, it was his formulations which the American President eventually adopted in December. The vague formula proposed by Clinton that “what is Jewish is Israeli and what is Arab is Palestinian”, including Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif, reflected positions held by the Palestinians during the failed summit. Unfortunately it took another five months for the American team to
840 Enderlin 2003 p296 841 Enderlin 2003 p253 842 Enderlin 2003 p272 843 These positions were described in an unreleased report by Gilad Sher, quoted in Barak Ravid, ‘Document shows progress on core issues at Camp David summit’, Ha’aretz, 13 September 2007
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support this solution against Israeli rejectionism, ensuring that it was not developed before Sharon’s electoral victory.
Desire for an agreement
The PLO’s acceptance of Resolution 242 was not prompted by a change in relations with Israel or a newfound search for reconciliation, but a pragmatic appreciation of the realities on the ground and the acceptance that the PLO did not have the capability to change them. Dreams of revolution quietly gave way to the reality of the conflict which incorporated Israel as a permanent fixture on the regional and international landscape. Yearnings to reclaim all of mandatory Palestine’s former lands were replaced after many years of suffering by yearnings to live a normal life. As Ahmad Samih Khalidi, Palestinian writer and peace negotiator, concluded:
“do the Palestinians think that the loss of our homeland was fair? No, of course not. But this does not prevent us from looking forward to peace, not because we have learnt to love our enemies but because we cannot escape the need to get on with our lives and deliver a better future for our children.”844
Khalidi refers to Israel as the Palestinians “inevitable partner in peace”845 and it is this awareness which has driven Palestinian peace efforts. If the Palestinians are ever to achieve their freedom; freedom from closures and curfews; freedom of movement, freedom of self-government; freedom from Israeli imprisonment; and freedom from Israeli ‘incursions’; they know that they will have to make peace with Israel. The Palestinians have no will to live perennially under occupation; to have no control over their own lives and no certainty over their future or that of their children’s. Unlike the GOI, who are content with the status quo and therefore see peace as a double-edged sword, the Palestinians find the status quo wholly intolerable, making peace their only option. But the Palestinian conception of peace is entirely contradictory to that of their Israeli counterparts. The Palestinians do not want peace to preserve current conditions but to eradicate them completely by creating an entirely new reality.
844 Khalidi and Makovsky 2000 p20 845 Khalidi and Makovsky 2000 p17
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The Palestinians were aware that if they were to achieve peace and realise their right to self-determination they would have to make some unpleasant concessions. The first of these was recognising Israel’s control over 78 percent of what had been their historic homeland. This move was followed in 1993 by the ‘exchange of letters’ in which Arafat signed a missive to Prime Minister Rabin stating that, “The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security”846. These concessions, which were enormously difficult for the Palestinian community, were possible only as a result of their overriding desire for peace and normality. While the price of peace was high, it was worthwhile if it brought an end to their unbearable circumstances.
The Israeli team were aware of the asymmetry that these disparities in the desirability of peace between the two communities created. During tough negotiations at Camp David, Ben-Ami recalled, “I asked them [the Palestinian negotiators] which of the sides here wanted to establish a state – us or them”847. Clearly, it was the Palestinians who were viewed as the major recipients of the benefits of peace, allowing the Israelis to up the price. However, the Israelis misconstrued the sort of ‘peace’ their Palestinian interlocutors were willing to accept. Rather than offer major concessions to achieve a ‘peace’ and a ‘state’ in name only, the Palestinians were negotiating a peace which would provide them with real liberty, real freedom, real self-determination and real sovereignty. While more minor issues could be bartered over, these matters were unnegotiable. Having lived through seven years of the Oslo peace process, the Palestinians were well aware of the distinction between reaching an ‘agreement’ and achieving ‘peace’. While an agreement around the Oslo lines might allow the Palestinians some form of limited self-government, it would not end the occupation and it would most certainly not bring peace.
The most serious impediment to Arafat’s efforts to negotiate a just peace agreement at Camp David was his own signature on the first Oslo Agreement seven years earlier848. It was the DOP which established the rules of the game. Arafat’s agreement to the
846 The exchange of letters took place a few days before the signing of the DOP. The corresponding letter from Rabin to Arafat noted that, ‘the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people’. 847 Shavit, 13 September 2001 848 Edward Said constantly warned of this fact during the Oslo period and after. See Said 2002 and Said 2004
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document, for his own craven ends, affirmed the parameters of the process which could not later be changed. Arafat’s belief that a new set of rules could simply be applied once the final status talks commenced was seriously misguided (at best) and unsupported by anything he witnessed during the seven years of Oslo. For once the tracks had been set they could not be re-laid – and there was only one possible destination they were headed – and that was recognition of Israeli occupation. As Tony Judt concludes; the final status talks were the “bitter fruits of Oslo”, and it was the Palestinian leader who helped plant the seed849.
After the failure of the Camp David summit, and ultimately, the final status talks, Arafat was unequivocally blamed and his commitment to peace questioned while his participation throughout the seven years of Oslo was wiped away by the popular news networks. Arafat’s rejection of Barak’s ‘generous’ offer was reported to have stemmed from his inability to hang up his revolutionary garb and make peace. Rather than forge an agreement with Israel which would have led to Palestinian statehood, it is reported, Arafat chose to unleash a wave of terror. Arafat’s motives, beyond his being an unreconstructed terrorist, were never explained. But this myth cannot withstand analysis and those who accepted it unquestioningly did not even attempt to give it a basis in logic or rationality. Perhaps this is because Palestinians are often assumed to lack either850. But Arafat had very little to gain through the use of violence against one of the largest military powers in the world. Its only result could be to bring down the force of the IDF upon the Palestinian people and provoke the international community to abandon the Palestinian cause; both of which came to pass following the explosion of violence in October 2000.
In fact, Arafat demonstrated his commitment to peace by doing everything he could to stop violence from breaking out. Arafat’s attempt to delay the Camp David summit in the first place was due to his fear of the violent consequences of failure (which he rightly forecast). Having lost this battle (because his concerns were no match for the ticking
849 Judt 2008 p170 850 Perhaps the most deplorable demonstration of this tendency were accusations circulated in the Israeli press and US press by journalists including Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer and NYT columnist Thomas Friedman that Palestinians were deliberately sending their children out to be killed by the IDF in order to provoke international condemnation of Israel and sympathy towards the Palestinians. For analysis see Abunimah and Ibish 2001 pp233-258
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watches of the American and Israeli political systems), Arafat pleaded with Clinton at the close of the summit not to report it as a failure, as this would end all hope and lead to despair. Arafat also lost this battle; once again his justified fears could not trump Barak’s need of a public relations boost. Still persevering, Arafat then tried to stem the onset of violence by keeping hope alive through the immediate resumption of talks following the collapse of Camp David. However, Dennis Ross and the US team were too angry at Arafat at this point, and thought a bit of punishment would ‘do him good’ as well as give Barak time to mollify his coalition. So this attempt also failed. Yet, when violence eventually did break out all of this was forgotten. Arafat was roundly denounced for launching an inexplicable war which could only result in the further suffering of his people.
Levelling the entire blame for the collapse of the final status talks on Yassir Arafat provided an extremely simplistic and easy answer to what is a far more complex and multifaceted question. The negotiating errors made by the Palestinian leader, which have been discussed at length by commentators, certainly existed. But they do not detract from the fact that Arafat was negotiating in good faith and that his ambition was to achieve a peace accord. Accusations that he was precluded from doing so because he is “not an earthly leader” but a “mythological figure”851 who was “unwilling to confront history and mythology”852 are simply more myths. Even Arafat’s commitment to the interim agreements has been held up as an indisputable example of his inability to confront history853. Ironically, Arafat’s participation in the peace process, which for many years was held to be the sine qua non of the process succeeding, came to be sold as the principle reason for its failure.
In response to the growing scrutiny over Israel’s ‘generous offer’, Dennis Ross argues:
851 Shavit, 13 September 2001 852 Ross 2004 p758 853 Barak launched this campaign following his announcement of his intention to delay the implementation of the Wye Agreement counteract Arafat’s protestations, which were at the time finding sympathy within Washington – see Joel Greenberg, ‘Barak and Palestinians in first dispute over peace pact’, The New York Times, 3 August 1999. The spin has since been picked up Dennis Ross, who compares Arafat’s insistence that Barak honor the Oslo Agreements, unfavorably with Barak; who he feels ‘was thinking in historic terms and Arafat was thinking in interim terms’. Ross et al, 14 August 2001
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“Whether the Israelis put a generous offer on the table is not the issue. The issue is, did Yasser Arafat respond at any point—not only at Camp David—to possibilities to end this conflict when they presented themselves?”854
But the nature of the Israeli ‘offer’ was precisely the issue. Although Israel put forward some unprecedented proposals to the Palestinians, they did not come close to meeting their minimal aspirations and fell well short of meeting Israel’s international obligations. If Arafat had been prepared to take what he could and continue the struggle, in the spirit of ‘dunum by dunum’ (the approach employed by Zionists in their search for a state fifty years earlier) an agreement would have been achieved but without any genuine or lasting peace. Instead, Arafat saw the final status talks as the real end game which would determine the future of the Palestinian people. No amount of US promises or US recriminations could persuade Arafat from his ambition to reach an agreement that would bring a genuine end to the occupation and lay the foundations for a viable Palestinian state. Arafat’s attitude may have perplexed his interlocutors, but it was the least he owed his people.
854 Ross and Grinstein, 20 September 2001
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Chapter 8
The US and Camp David
"I have many doubts whether the United States could fill this role [of an honest broker] because of its behavior recently, but there is no better candidate”. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, 1991855
Since President Johnson concluded in 1967 that Israel represented a strategic asset in its fight against communist influence into the Middle East each US Administration has jealously guarded mediation efforts in the Arab-Israeli conflict as its own sole domain. While positive intervention by President Carter led to the Israeli-Egyptian peace accord, for the most part the US has actively worked against peace opportunities lest they weaken Israel’s military and technological regional supremacy. The end of superpower rivalry after the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc did nothing to diminish Washington’s view that the Arab-Israeli conflict was an appendage of American foreign policy. Rather than handing the issue over to the UN or other mediating bodies, President George Bush concluded that the Middle East was ready for re-shaping according to American interests and that the resolution of the Arab- Israeli dispute would form a core aspect of the American restructuring project856.
As it happened, the US, after many years of demanding exclusive rights over the dispute’s mediations efforts, played no role in the negotiation of the first Oslo agreement857. Possible American resentment at not being invited to the party was pacified through the large, flag-waving ceremony Clinton was able to host on the White House lawns which linked him indelibly with Arab-Israeli peacemaking.
855 Quoted in Indyk 1992 p85 856 The Madrid conference which the Bush Senior Administration organized as a result of its newfound interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict was also co-sponsored by the USSR but it was understood that theirs would be a largely ceremonial role. 857 The secret negotiations were hosted by the Norwegian government; however it was largely acknowledged that they played only a small role in negotiations, which were for the most part purely bilateral.
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However, the US President’s hosting of the signing ceremony was not merely an appeasement of American pride but a product of Israeli and Palestinian recognition that the involvement of the US as the world’s sole remaining superpower would be vital in ensuring that the agreement was successfully implemented. While the vast amounts of financial and economic assistance the US could contribute to the Oslo process was a central part of this thinking, the US was also seen to be indispensable diplomatically in adjudicating between the parties when disputes arose. As summed up by Martin Indyk (at the time the US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs); “there is the basic distrust [between the parties] that is born of decades of bloody conflict, and when you have that kind of distrust, it is important, even essential, that you have somebody who can act as the honest broker, who can interpret the positions of either side so as to clear up misunderstandings and find ways to build trust”858. The American President’s signature on the DOP signalled his intention that the US, under his guidance, would play such a role.
Hopes that America would faithfully fulfil its duty as an ‘honest broker’ when mediating between one of its closest and most enduring allies, and a group with which it had steadfastly refused to establish contacts, would seem always to have been somewhat misguided. Since the time of Truman the ‘special relationship’ between the US and Israel had grown, moving from mere emotional attachment to a strong strategic partnership. By the time Clinton took office, Israel was receiving economic and military aid from the US averaging US$3.0 billion-US$3.5 billion a year859, in addition to substantial loan guarantees and other assistance packages. Contrary to Israeli fears, US assistance measures had continued to pour into Israel following the end of the Cold War with Washington maintaining that close links with Israel enhanced its own presence in the Middle East860.
The close ties the US held with Israel theoretically placed it in a position of great leverage with the latter. In principle, the US could use its friendship with Israel, in addition to its large investment in the Zionist state, as a powerful means to extract concessions from the GOI. While this logic was apparently sound, it was not borne out by historical experience. Rather, the US has almost always remained so committed to preserving its close relationship with Israel that it has refused to assert
858 Indyk 1998 p81 859 Mark 2003 pp11-12 860 Mark 2003 pi
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any pressure on its partner state at all. While many predicted that this pattern would continue throughout Oslo, it was still felt that it was only the US that had any chance of dragging the GOI into permanent status talks and garnering the Middle East region into supporting their outcome.
Relations between the Palestinians and the US at the time of the launch of the Oslo peace process were far from close. Following Kissinger’s promise to the GOI that the US would refuse all contacts with the PLO, each American government had done just that. Contacts were finally established in 1988 following Arafat’s recognition of Israel and renouncing of terrorism, only to be terminated once again in 1990 at Israel’s urging861. Rabin’s revelation that his government had been holding secret negotiations with the PLO in Oslo therefore came as something of an embarrassment to the US, which had faithfully followed GOI official policy. White House officials were sent scrambling to ensure Congress passed a “sense of the Congress” resolution affirming support for the peace process and unravelling previous legislation outlawing contacts between the US and the PLO. In turn, Arafat was carefully reinvented in the US media from a terrorist figure into a peace-seeking international statesman.
The sudden turnaround in American policy gave rise to hopes that a new relationship with the PLO was in the making. Perhaps the peace process could sweep away the many years of frozen relations and produce a closer understanding of each others’ positions. After America’s blistering victory in the first Gulf War, the Palestinians understood that the road to peace would have to pass through Washington. For his part, Clinton was aware that his ability to develop good relations with the Palestinians would dramatically enhance the prospects for a final agreement. With so much to gain for each side, Clinton and Arafat set about the task of building a relationship.
The peace process and US foreign policy
President Clinton took office at a time of strained US/Israeli relations. While former President Bush had for the most part acted in support of Israeli interests, his deferral of US$10 billion worth of loan guarantees to Israel pending a freeze on settlement building placed an unprecedented wedge between the US and Israeli governments
861 Contacts with the PLO were terminated and the PLO office in Washington closed by the US after Arafat failed to denounce a terrorist attack.
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which ultimately assisted in the downfall of Prime Minister Shamir862. Israeli fears that the Bush settlement episode represented a shift in US foreign policy following the end of the Cold War was quickly alleviated by President-elect Clinton, who announced that “the one thing that would definitely never change was the unique bond that unites the United States and Israel”863.
Shortly after Clinton assumed office, Martin Indyk, Clinton’s Middle East special advisor in the National Security Council, outlined the new administration’s Middle East policy to the pro-Israel think tank, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP)864. In effect, Indyk’s speech was a display of unbridled American triumphalism and a celebration of American power. The breakup of the Eastern Bloc meant that the US no longer needed to make friends or procure allies in the Middle East. The US could now dictate the ‘new order’ in the region through its sheer power, which had been impressively demonstrated in its war against Iraq. Indyk was critical of the Bush (Senior) Administration for not having done enough to enforce its will on the region in the direct aftermath of the war865 and was determined his Administration would not be so neglectful.
With the US now able to flex its muscles unchallenged, Indyk identified the key interests of the Clinton Administration. Central to these was America’s commitment to promoting Israel’s ongoing security and survival in addition to its “wellbeing”, which he left undefined866. Indyk also identified ensuring free-flowing oil at reasonable prices as a further core element of US policy, signalling continuity in US foreign policy since the time of Truman. That these two central aspects of US Middle East policy often conflicted and undermined each other was an issue Indyk neglected to address.
Indyk went on to pinpoint US interest in the “promotion of a just, lasting, comprehensive and real settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict” as a further cornerstone of the administration’s Middle East policy. The promotion of a peaceful settlement of the conflict would enhance the position of moderates at the expense of
862 Shamir later claimed that his electoral defeat was partly caused by President’s Bush’ refusal to grant Israel the $10 billion in loan guarantees (David Makovsky, ‘Shamir not sorry to see Bush defeated’, The Jerusalem Post, 5 November 1992. 863 Clinton made this announcement at a joint press conference with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1992, quoted in Benson 1997 p2 864 Indyk 1993 865 This is Indyk’s central theme in Indyk 1993 866 Indyk 1993
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extremists wearing “religious garb” which were identified as the major threat to US regional interests at the time. Peace would drive moderate states within the US orb and isolate recalcitrant or ‘backlash’ states such as Iran and Iraq, who were to be put to a policy of ‘dual containment’, forcing them into a position of such weakness and isolation they could never dream of bothering the US or its allies again.
Indyk’s assessment of the new challenges to US interests originating from Islamic extremism were expanded by Samuel Huntington months later in his seminal piece, ‘The Clash of Civilizations’, which appeared in the Foreign Affairs journal. Huntington maintained that future international relations would no longer be shaped through ideological or economic fault-lines but through cultural divergence. The major challenge to ‘Western’ civilization was assumed to come from ‘Islamism’ to the East867. Huntington’s essay provoked strong debate globally but his assumptions commonly underpinned much of the Clinton administration’s foreign policy, particularly in regard to the Middle East. Under this paradigm, the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict came to be seen as a central arm in the new war against Islamic extremism and ‘Islamism’ in general. Through the ‘clash of civilizations’ prism, it was assumed that the settlement of the conflict would unleash moderating influences upon the peoples of the East and reorientate them towards Western influence. It was not just the peace process but also Israel which gained through the new ‘clash of civilizations’ theory dominating international relations writings at the time. As the only ‘Western’ country in a sea of Islamism, Israel once again became a strategic asset to the US as a vanguard in the war against the Islamic enemy868.
President Clinton and his team of peacemakers
Presidential candidate Bill Clinton’s courting of the Jewish community during his 1992 bid to unseat the incumbent Republican President was duly rewarded. Disaffected by the policies Bush had pursued towards Israel, the American Jewish community turned against the President and overwhelmingly supported Clinton. Winning an impressive swing, Clinton captured over 80 percent of Jewish votes, which were concentrated in the two key electoral states of New York and Florida. Within Israel, there were not too many people shedding tears at the departure of Bush
867 Huntington 1993 868 Aruri 2003 pxiv
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and many more welcomed Clinton’s accession to the Presidential throne869. In a poll taken in Israel shortly before the election, over 78 percent of respondents supported the new President870. Jewish communities within both the US and Israel now looked forward to Clinton honouring his electoral pledges, including his assurance that he would not waver from fulfilling US “financial, security and moral commitments to Israel”871.
Among Clinton’s first acts was the making of appointments which would shape his administration’s Middle East policy. These appointments would be crucial in determining the course of not just US/Middle East relations but of the future of the ‘peace process’ which was stuck at an impasse. The first of them was the appointment of Dennis Ross as the ‘US Coordinator’ of peace talks. The newly created role was designed to allow one person to act as the ‘point man’ on Arab- Israeli negotiations and coordinate policy from all areas of government. This appointment was surprising for two reasons. Firstly, Ross was the first non-Arabist to lead US Middle East negotiations. He had never lived in the Middle East although he was well acquainted with the Arab-Israeli conflict though his long experience in the Israel Lobby. Of Jewish origin, Ross had worked with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) the most powerful pro-Israel lobby group in the US, and also WINEP, a spin-off from AIPAC, both of which were aimed at influencing US policy towards a pro-Israel agenda.
Ross had also worked for the outgoing administration as Secretary of State James Baker’s deputy in the Policy Planning office and had held a position within the Reagan administration872. While it was highly unusual for high-ranking officials to be retained after a change of guard in Washington, Ross’ appointment signalled that there would be ‘continuity’ in American foreign policy towards the Middle East873.
869 The reaction of Israel’s Arab community was decidedly more mixed, with many seeing the former President as a friend to the Palestinians while others viewed his actions in the first Gulf War as placing him at odds with Arab interests (see David Rudge, ‘Israeli, Arabs, disagree over Bush defeat’, The Jerusalem Post, 5 November 1992. 870 Bill Hutman and David Rudge, ‘Clinton takes the lion's share in informal 'Jerusalem post' poll’, The Jerusalem Post, 4 November 1992. 871 From Clinton’s address to the B'nai B'rith annual convention on 9 September, entitled ‘My Commitment to Israel’ (recorded in The Jerusalem Post, 5 November 1992). 872 Ross worked for the Reagan administration as an NSC expert on the Middle East. 873 Allison Kaplan, ‘Bill Clinton to be sworn in as US president today’, The Jerusalem Post, 20 January 1993. Avi Shlaim notes that Ross’ tenure with both the Bush Senior Administration and the Clinton Administration have him the ‘unique distinction of having served in a prominent capacity both in the
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Working alongside Ross on the NSC would be Martin Indyk, an Australian-born Jew who had recently gained American citizenship through an expedited process overseen by the President. Indyk had also worked with AIPAC before founding WINEP and was seen as a trusted supporter of Israeli interests. Indyk’s appointment was received with “delight” by Israeli officials and he was to have two stints as US Ambassador to Israel during the Clinton tenure (1995-97 and 2000-June 2001)874.
It was anticipated that Ross and Indyk, in addition to former Ambassador Samuel Lewis, who was appointed as head of the Policy Planning Division, would exercise enormous influence on US Middle East policy, because the three other major foreign policymakers – Clinton himself, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and National Security Adviser Anthony Lake – had no experience with the Arab-Israel conflict875. The appointment of Madeleine Albright as Secretary of State during Clinton’s second term further increased the autonomy of Ross as she too had little Middle East experience and found her time monopolised by the US air campaign in Kosovo876.
Ross and Indyk shared the view with their President that “Israel must be strong and have a strong relationship with the US in order to make peace”877. Under this argument, it is the duty of the US to ensure that Israel feel as secure as possible in order to give her the confidence to make the bold steps necessary to achieve a peace agreement. Rather than exerting pressure on Israel to make concessions, Indyk and Ross saw their role as just the opposite. As explained by Indyk; “pressure is not in our lexicon”878.
The US team’s refusal during the Oslo years to influence Israel through anything other than friendly advice was most keenly felt on the issue of settlement construction. Although constantly implored by the Palestinians to use its influence with Israel to stop the illegal practice, the US team remained steadfast in their refusal to get involved. Later, Dennis Ross admitted that settlement building was “wrong and
most evenhanded American administration since the war and in one of the most ardently pro-Israel ones’ (Avi Shlaim 2004 p31). 874 Indyk was recalled to Washington during the Netanyahu premiership as he was regarded by the Israeli Prime Minister as too closely aligned to Israel’s Labor Party. 875 David Makovsky, ‘US appointee Lewis is no stranger to Israel’, The Jerusalem Post, 29 January 1993 876 Swisher 2004 p4 877 Haberman 2001 p39 878 Indyk 1998 p81
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misguided” but maintained that “Criticism [of Israel] was legitimate, but creating a breach in the relationship was not”879.
In his previously cited 1993 speech, Indyk signalled his government’s intention to become a “full partner” in the peace process, but stressed that this would only happen on the basis of its friendship and commitment to Israel, warning that, “those who seek real progress should understand that it won't come without this kind of special relationship between the United States and Israel”. At the outset therefore, it seemed clear that the Clinton Administration planned to be more a partner to Israel than to the other parties in the peace talks880.
The US teams’ often blatant pro-Israel proclivities frequently raised the ire of the Palestinians, whose relationship with Ross in particular had deteriorated throughout the Oslo years to the point of bare civility by the time the permanent status talks came around881. While Ross defended his impartiality, maintaining that “not often” did his religion get in the way of his negotiations with the Palestinians882, he failed to appreciate that it was not his religion which interfered with his claims to objectivity, but his pro-Israel ideology. As explained by Nabil Shaath, Palestinian negotiator:
“It’s not a question of their religion, because Aaron Miller is Jewish, and Ambassador Kurtzer is Jewish, and the two were never suspected by the Palestinians of being partial, whereas Ambassadors Ross and Indyk were viewed by everybody as partial, biased, pro-Israel, and they sometimes defended Israel much more than the Israeli delegates did. In fact, we always thought that anything good about the peace process we got out of the Israelis when Dennis Ross was looking the other way.”883
One of Ross’ own recollections in his memoirs illustrates just how true Shaath’s observation was. Late in the negotiations, in November 2000, Ross informed the Palestinians confidently that the lowest offer the Israelis would accept on territory would be seven percent annexation, only to be undercut by the Israelis a day later who offered five percent. Ross reflects that he was “furious” at the behaviour of the Israelis and questioned why he should take a “tough posture on issues” if he was only
879 Ross 2004 p7 880 Hudson 1994 p51. The popularity of Huntington’s theory motivated him to expand upon it further in 1996 by releasing a follow-up book entitled The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. 881 Avi Shlaim reports that, ‘Arafat saw Ross as an arrogant man who was too close to the Israelis’ and that in Arafat’s darker moments, he considered Ross ‘to be a real enemy’. Shlaim 2004 p32 882 Haberman 2001 p39 883 Quoted in Swisher 2004 p148
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to be undercut later884. Ross’ strict commitment to Israel precluded him from wielding any pressure on Barak and his team. Instead, he accepted each of their ‘red lines’ unquestioningly and subsequently adopted them as his own. Rather than move the Israeli position forward, Ross’ often over-inflated view of Israeli ‘bottom lines’ moved them further away from a potential agreement. This tactic also acted to place all of the pressure on the Palestinians, who were expected to make all the compromises.
The Palestinian charge that Ross was “more pro-Israeli than the Israelis”885 was not just damaging to the Palestinian negotiators, but was also of little help to the Israelis, who needed US pressure to legitimise difficult and unpopular concessions886. Shlomo Ben-Ami later spoke of the “suffocating patronage of the American broker”887 which hampered progress in negotiations and in a later article broke with conventional Israeli policy by calling for international, rather than US, mediation in any further negotiations888. Ben-Ami suggests that Presidents Carter and Bush (senior) were particularly effective in Middle East peacemaking because they were ready to confront Israel publicly and apply serious pressure when they deemed it necessary889. Clearly, Ben-Ami came to view the unconditional ‘special relationship’ between the US and Israel as part of the problem, rather than the solution, to achieving peace.
However, despite all this, Palestinian protests about Ross’ bias found little sympathy in the American camp at the time. While there was some division within the US team, those most influential during the negotiations were largely unified in their total commitment to Israel and uncritical allegiance to the Israeli leader and his negotiating positions. The replacement of Warren Christopher by Madeleine Albright as Secretary of State during the later years of the Oslo process made no difference to this. In fact Albright’s inexperience in the conflict allowed Ross to pursue his goals with even less impediment.
884 Ross 2004 p749 885 Swisher 2004 p32 886 For example, when the Americans relented under pressure from Barak to alter the proposals they had drafted on the third day of Camp David which caused the proposals to be abandoned, the Israeli negotiators later informed the US team that they should have stuck with the initial proposals after all (Albright 2003 p759) 887 Ben-Ami 2006 p213 888 Ben Ami 2007 889 Ben Ami 2006 p167
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While the Secretary of State played only a minor role in the permanent status negotiations, the President became actively involved. Clinton, an ardent supporter of Israel and the ‘special relationship’, took a deep and personal interest in the peace process. Solving the Arab-Israeli dispute offered the President not only the opportunity to strengthen America’s authority in the region, but also to establish a personal and enduring legacy of peacemaking. The long shadow which the Lewinsky Affair had cast over the Clinton presidency only acted to increase the importance he attached to restoring his tarnished reputation890. Yet rather than driving the peace process himself, Clinton allowed Barak to take the driver’s seat while he remained a mere passenger. Clinton, who made himself available to the Israeli leader whenever he called (which was often), rarely used his authority to question or alter Barak’s course, even when he or his team disagreed with it891.
Clinton’s uncritical enthusiasm for Barak continued into the final status talks, even when it was obvious that the latter’s actions and motives warranted some serious reflection. Rather than even questioning Barak’s continued pursuit of settlement construction, his demand to renegotiate the Wye Agreement, and his abandonment of the newly negotiated Sharm Agreement, Clinton simply accepted them all without argument.
During Camp David, there were moments when Clinton did run out of patience with Barak, notably his sudden outburst at Barak when the Prime Minister offered a retraction on his previous proposal on Day Seven of the talks. But Clinton’s angry words were not matched by any actions aimed at changing the GOI’s behaviour, regardless of the arsenal of economic and diplomatic sanctions the US had at its disposal. Instead, Clinton merely backed down, reinforcing Israeli convictions that whatever Israeli did, the President would never allow a breach in the ‘special relationship’.
Rather than acting as an ‘honest broker’ throughout Oslo and the final status negotiations, Clinton allowed himself and his staff to become an extension of the Israeli team. In a post Camp David synopsis, Ross’ Deputy, Aaron Miller,
890 Clinton denied that his pursuit of a peace agreement was at all to do with considerations over his legacy. Clinton, 27 July 2000 891 Aaron Miller later complained that his team was constantly undermined in their instructions to Clinton to dish out ‘tough love’ to Barak by the President who would take Barak’s regular calls in private and take a softer approach. Miller 2008 p311
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commented that “…far too often, we [the US team] functioned in this process, for want of a better word, as Israel's lawyer”892. This was perfectly demonstrated by Clinton’s capitulation to Barak’s demand to renegotiate the Wye Agreement – where he simply assumed the task of persuading the Palestinians to comply. The pattern was repeated during the Camp David summit, with Clinton placing enormous pressure on the Palestinians to accept Barak’s proposals, proposals which Miller concludes, were not viewed through the prism of fairness and workability but of Israeli generosity893. In contrast to Barak who was left largely free of the ‘pressure cooker’ by the American team, the Palestinians left feeling that they had been “in a prison”894.
The deep concern shown by the US team towards Israeli security and ‘wellbeing’ during the Oslo process and the permanent status talks was not matched by any parallel concern for the Palestinians. In fact, the Clinton team showed an absolute disregard for Palestinian security, even though they remained victims of daily attacks by Israeli security forces and settlers and their population was sliding into serious poverty. The discounting of Palestinian interests by the US team was no doubt motivated in part by the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ paradigm which viewed the Palestinians as ‘Islamists’, and therefore placed them on the wrong side of the civilizational divide.
After Clinton left office the Palestinian negotiating team immediately released a scathing attack on Clinton and his team’s performance throughout peace talks, singling out Ross for particular criticism. They said:
“US negotiators have accepted the Israeli worldview concerning the primacy of Israel’s security needs while ignoring the long-term development of the occupied Palestinian territories and the improvement of the Palestinian quality of life. The result has been that while Israel’s security, including the security of its occupation forces, have been the focus of each agreement, the quality of life of Palestinians has continued to decline. The dichotomy between the comfort of Israelis, including those occupying Palestinian land in settlements with green lawns and swimming pools, and the poverty and misery of Palestinians, has only further inflamed an already volatile situation.”895
892 Indyk et al 2005 893 Indyk et al 2005 894 Abbas, 1 August 2001 895 The report was released on the PLO website on 22 January 2001 (PLO Negotiating Team 2001 p160)
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Clinton’s final collusion with Barak in developing the Camp David myth, was ill- planned and ultimately counter-productive. Rather than assist Barak in his domestic political troubles, which was the intention, it actually helped consign him to political oblivion896. A famously astute politician, it is surprising that Clinton committed such a grave error. That Clinton was persuaded to follow this course rather than pursue a more thoughtful strategy, is testament not just to his extreme indifference to the Palestinian leadership, but also to the Israeli Prime Minister’s powerful influence over him, to the extent that Clinton subordinated his own judgement to that of Barak.
As Clinton was nearing the end of his second term when permanent status talks commenced, it might be assumed that he was free of election concerns and the influence of the Israel lobby. However, while Clinton was not himself facing the pressures of an upcoming election, Clayton Swisher suggests that he was still very interested in assisting the electoral prospects of those close to him; namely his wife, Hillary Clinton (who was running for the New York Senate seat) and Vice President, Al Gore, who was campaigning to replace him as President897. With the Lewinsky Affair damaging his relations with both, Clinton was apparently keen to give them us much assistance as possible in their respective electoral bids. Both Hillary and Gore were actively courting the pro-Israel vote898 and any friction between the President and the GOI, including Presidential endorsement of such concepts as Palestinian statehood, the division of Jerusalem or the right of return, could have been damaging to their campaigns899. Swisher’s conjecture is born out by events during the final status talks. It does not seem to be mere coincidence that Clinton, after stalling since the end of the Camp David summit, finally called Arafat into the Oval Office two days after the US Presidential elections to outline his parameters. It would appear that Clinton was unwilling to put any positions on the table while those close to him were still embroiled in their electoral challenges. Unfortunately, by delaying the release of the parameters, Clinton ensured that they were stillborn. While the
896 Following a long-history of Israeli political revivals, Barak returned to Israeli politics in 2007 after an absence of six years to lead the Israeli Labor Party once again. 897 Swisher’s account is corroborated by an article which appeared in The Jerusalem Post in September 2000, which reported that a ‘source close to the negotiations’ said that Clinton was wavering on endorsing a proposal on the fate of Jerusalem due to concern it might harm Hillary Clinton’s senatorial prospects (Herb Keinon et al, ‘Source: Hillary’s campaign delays US Jerusalem plan’, The Jerusalem Post, 22 September 2000. 898 For an example of both Hillary Clinton’s and Al Gore’s campaign to win votes through support of the GOI, see press coverage around the Barak visit to Washington in July 1999. 899 Swisher 2004 p20
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American team were fond of charging Arafat with always misreading the clock900, it would appear that it was the US President who had incorrectly set his watch by setting it to the US rather than the Middle East political calendar.
The US team’s assumption that Israel must be strong in order to make peace would appear to have been accompanied by a parallel assumption that the Palestinians on the other hand, must be weak. When explaining why America’s war against Iraq in 1991 had increased the chance for peace, Ross concludes it was because; “Radicals would be discredited, Arafat would be weak [emphasis mine], regional moderates would be ascendant, our standing and authority in the region would be unprecedented, and the Soviets would be on our side”901. Clearly, only a powerless and ineffectual Palestinian leader would open the door to peace. By Ross’ own logic, the goal of US strategists during the Oslo years was not to strengthen Arafat against the GOI, but to keep the ‘old man’ weak so that he would be ripe to sign a substandard agreement when the time came. However, Ross’ policy ultimately proved too successful – creating a Palestinian leader who was so weak he no longer possessed the credibility and authority to sign a document which cemented the Oslo arrangements.
By the time final status talks came around, Clinton and his team had spent many hours with the Palestinian leadership. Clinton invited Arafat to the White House more times than he did any other leader. Ross, and to a lesser extent Albright, spent many hours with the Palestinians on numerous ‘shuttle diplomacy’ missions during the Oslo years. During this time, they were constantly apprised of Palestinian history, present-day Palestinian conditions, and Palestinian aspirations for their future. However, the many shared hours did not appear to lead to a corresponding increase in understanding of, or empathy for, the Palestinian position amongst the Americans. An extraordinary example of this is once more contained within Ross’ memoirs. He describes his attempts to sell Abu Dis to Arafat as the Palestinian capital, leaving Israel with full sovereignty over the entire city of Jerusalem. Ross explains that he offered to build an American Embassy in Abu Dis, commenting; “That would be a big symbol for Arafat”902. That Ross could assume that Palestinians aspirations over
900 Ross repeats this reference and another that Arafat ‘only acts one minute to midnight’ on numerous occasions in his memoirs and interviews (for example, see Haberman 2001 p39, Ross et al 14 August 2001, Ross 2004 p5) and the phrase is repeated by Albright in her autobiography (2003 p766). 901 Ross 2004 p65 902 Ross 2004 p681
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Jerusalem could be assuaged through the construction of an American Embassy is testimony to his level of ignorance about Palestinian sensibilities. Albright also shared this ignorance. One example in her memoirs particularly stands out. When analysing why Arafat turned cold on Barak shortly after his election she does not attribute this to Barak’s refusal to implement the Wye Agreement, or his snub in pursuing the ‘Syrian track’ first, but rather because, “Barak, with his bold positions and ardent pursuit of peace, threatened to undermine Arafat’s status as professional victim”903.
The US teams’ ignorance of the Palestinian leadership’s aspirations was matched by its indifference towards the views of the Palestinian people, both locally and in the Diaspora. At no point during Oslo or the final status negotiations did they seek to apprise themselves of the will of the Palestinian people or take into account the restrictions this placed on Palestinian negotiators. Contrary to the acute sensitivity the US team displayed towards Israeli public opinion, the views of the Palestinian public were roundly ignored. The failure to take Palestinian popular opinion into account stemmed largely from a common view that, due to their undemocratic nature, Arab governments are entirely unanswerable and unresponsive to their publics904. There is no doubt that the Clinton team was aware of Arafat’s deteriorating popularity, but they simply assumed that it could be ignored. Using a perverse logic, the American team often encouraged Arafat to make decisions to assist Barak with his political problems even while they would further erode Arafat’s own internal position. While the US team assumed that they could ignore Palestinian popular opinion, Arafat was clearly deeply worried by his plummeting support. Arafat made several references to his possible assassination during the Camp David summit and these were not merely a theatrical device as some within the American team assumed905, but a very real concern given the history of the fate of Arab ‘peacemakers’906. Moreover, even if Arafat were to escape assassination after bringing home an unpopular peace
903 Albright 2003 p754 904 Shibley Telhami sums up the theory held by the US and Israel that, “the Arab world is made up of autocratic governments that are less sensitive to their public opinion than democracies, and have more control over shaping public opinion.”. Telhami 2001 p12 905 In her memoirs, Albright refers to Arafat’s suggestion that the concessions the US team were asking him to make would lead to his funeral as ‘theatrical’. Albright 2003 p764 906 King Abdullah of Jordan was assassinated in 1951 because of Palestinian fears he would make a separate peace with Israel and President Sadat of Egypt was assassinated in 1981 by rejectionist of his peace treaty with Israel.
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agreement, it could still lead to the overthrow of his Fatah party by opposition groups such as Hamas, potentially making any agreement moribund907.
The US team’s inability or unwillingness to take Palestinian popular opinion into account seriously impeded their ability to effectively brief their President in the leadup to Camp David. If Clinton had come to the summit better informed, he might not have wasted so much time chasing what were always going to be dead ends. A better understanding of their interlocutors would also have allowed the US team to recognise Palestinian concessions when they came, which could then have been built upon, rather than simply dismissed. But in any case Clinton’s own exclusive focus on Israel left him completely oblivious of the other side and their requirements. In the end, despite doing everything in the name of preserving Israel’s security, the US team succeeded in leaving the country without a peace agreement and without security for many years to come.
The US, Camp David and international law
The issues of Jerusalem, refugees, territory and settlements under discussion at Camp David were all the subject of international resolutions or conventions. The United Nations resolutions and conventions most relevant were Security Council Resolutions 242, 338 and General Assembly Resolution 194, and provisions within the Fourth Geneva Convention. Application of these resolutions would have seen the 4 June 1967 lines restored in full, with all settlements evacuated and their inhabitants returned to Israel. Jerusalem would be an international city under the governance of the UN. All of the Palestinians refugees would be given the choice to return home and would be compensated for their lost property.
Since 1967, the US had adopted a dual policy of formally recognising and endorsing these international resolutions, while in fact doing very little to realise their provisions. While this policy was of little practical help in resolving the Palestinian- Israeli dispute, it did keep the US in line with the international community in the diplomatic sphere and lent the resolutions the important backing of the superpower. The arrival of the Clinton Administration however, brought a fundamental change in
907 Of course, Hamas won the first general elections held after the failure of the peace process in early 2006 by a decisive majority. The overwhelming vote for Hamas and against Fatah was widely understood to be a rejection of the peace process policies the latter party had pursued.
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US policy in these regards. Rather than lending the tenets official diplomatic support, the US began to openly contest and even dismantle them. Perhaps the starkest example of this policy shift was Ambassador Albright’s renaming of the conquered Palestinian territories from ‘occupied’ to merely ‘disputed’ in 1994908. The Jerusalem issue suffered similar treatment as Washington allowed US money to be used in settlement construction in East Jerusalem and seemingly adopted the GOI’s claim that the city is Israel’s ‘united and eternal capital’. Settlement construction, which had been branded ‘illegal’ by President Carter, was downgraded first by President Reagan to ‘obstacles to peace’ and further by the Clinton Administration as merely ‘complicating factors’. As in the case of Jerusalem, the Clinton team altered its settlement funding policy, implicitly allowing US funds to be used for Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories909.
The greatest asset to the US team’s endeavour to dispense with international resolutions was the Oslo documents. Albright, Ross and their colleagues constantly cited these documents throughout the Oslo years to defend their abandonment of the international consensus pertaining to the solution of the conflict, claiming that as the crucial issues were to be ‘negotiated’ during final status talks; they were outside the reach of international legal prescriptions.
During the Camp David summit itself the Clinton administration clearly signalled its complete break with international law. Rather than adopting it’s provisions as the basis for negotiations, the US labelled any reference to it (by the Palestinians) as intransigence at best and belligerence at worst. Clinton’s outburst to Abu Ala, where he shouted at the Palestinian negotiator that “this is not the [UN] Security Council, this is not the General Assembly”910 was indicative of his view that international law simply did not matter. The US had not just moved the goal posts, they had reinvented the game. Nobody was more conscience of the long-term ramifications of America’s changed policy than the Israelis. Amazed and exuberant at what he had witnessed; Shlomo Ben-Ami wrote in his diary:
908 See Ambassador Albright’s 1994 speech to the UN which declares, ‘We simply do not support the description of the territories occupied by Israel in the 1967 war as occupied Palestinian territory’. Albright 1994 p151 909 Neff 1995 p4 and p165 910 Ben-Ami July 2001
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I told Barak that the American acceptance, for the first time, of the principle that 80% of the settlers would remain under Israel’s sovereignty, is an historic shift in its position, since the US always insisted that settlements are illegal and an obstacle to peace. I argued this summit would enter the pages of history as the event, which legitimated the settlements, and Jewish Jerusalem as the capital of the state of Israel.911
The Palestinians were understandably much less enthusiastic about American’s break with the international community. The Palestinian positions were wholly defined by international law to the degree that they came to Camp David simply to see them implemented. The far weaker party at the table, militarily, economically and diplomatically, international legal rights were their only protection against a far stronger and more powerful opponent. The US team’s consigning of the international resolutions to the dustbin thereby stripped the Palestinians of their only defence and left them fighting against a far superior and unified US/Israeli negotiating bloc. The Palestinians found the US “strangely touchy” whenever the international resolutions were even mentioned and gained no ground by demanding that they be implemented912. Curiously, the historic US refusal to deal with the PLO until they recognised Resolutions 242 and 338 was now turned around so that Arafat’s insistence upon the same resolutions became interpreted as a sign of obduracy.
As commented by Palestinian negotiator, Hassan Asfour following the collapse of Camp David:
“The United States has proved its failure in being an honest and serious mediator. It has proposed ideas that are based on the strategic Zionist views of how the conflict should be settled.”913
The Zionist position was based around the brute fact of Israel’s possession of the OPT through conquest. This viewpoint was completely contradictory to international law and for this reason the GOI has always resisted international involvement in the resolution of the dispute. Throughout the Oslo process, and particularly at Camp David, the US team completely subscribed to this approach, viewing Israel as doing all the giving while the Palestinians were doing nothing but holding out their hands.
911 Ben-Ami July 2001 912 Hanieh 2001 p86 913 Herb Keinon, ‘Ben-Ami: Camp David is starting point for further negotiations’, The Jerusalem Post, 25 August 2000.
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The US acceptance of Israel’s position proved a constant source of frustration to the Palestinians throughout the talks, with Arafat reminding Clinton during Camp David;
“You say the Israelis moved forward, but they are the occupiers. They are not being generous – they are not giving from their pockets but from our land. I am only asking that UN Resolution 242 be implemented. I am speaking only about 22 percent of Palestine, Mr President.”914
The US teams’ hostility to international law entirely echoed that of the Israelis, who felt that “endless UN resolutions had given the Palestinian claims a legitimacy they did not deserve”915. Rather than basing the settlement of the dispute on these resolutions, the Americans clearly presumed that the spoils should go to the victor. The final status agreement was not to be a negotiated agreement between equals but a document of surrender. The conflict between international law and this goal meant that the relevant resolutions simply had to be ignored. The policies of the US and Israel were now in complete accord; it was to be the might of the sword rather than the will of the international community which determined the resolution of the dispute.
Conclusions
While former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s credentials as a Middle East peacemaker are a matter of considerable debate, his conclusions regarding Middle East peacemaking present a powerful argument:
“…for 30 years it proved nearly impossible even to begin the process of negotiation. Every attempt to discuss a comprehensive solution failed – from the partition plan, to the Lausanne Conference [1949], to the Rogers Plan and the Four-Power talks of 1969 and 1970, to the UN Security Council deliberations. To discuss simultaneously issues of such complexity, between countries whose deep mutual mistrust rejected even the concept of compromise was futile until a minimum of confidence had been established.” [emphasis mine]916
To develop the ‘minimum of confidence’ necessary to achieve peace between the parties Kissinger devised the concept of incrementalism, which was adopted in Norway to underscore the Oslo peace process. The Clinton team were ardent
914 Swisher 2004 p327 915 Comment by Shlomo Ben-Ami, quoted in Marilyn Henry, ‘Palestinians call for 1967 borders in UN address’, The Jerusalem Post, 20 September 2000. 916 Quoted in Ben-Zvi 1989 pp12-13
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supporters of the step-by-step approach, which Ross claims responsibility for having created917. The problem however is that Oslo did not create trust between the parties, rather it eroded it out of existence. As the third party in the peace process, it was the responsibility of the US to ensure that this did not happen, to use its influence to ensure the process arrived safely at its final destination. Perhaps the greatest failure of the US team was its failure to act during the Oslo years when the process was seriously careening off course and out of control. Rather than acting as the honest broker, the Americans simply looked the other way in a bid to keep the process alive. Clinton and his team appeared to be content so long as the process was still in motion, regardless of the fact that trust was eroding rather than building and that the parties were as far away as ever from developing a mutual understanding of anything, much less the final status issues.
The document the Palestinians released after the departure of Clinton from office concluded that, “Under US supervision, the Palestinian-Israeli ‘peace process’ has become a goal in and of itself”918. Rather than pushing the parties towards a shared consensus, the Americans were willing to negotiate agreements around “constructive ambiguity” which allowed them to sign deals but brought them no closer to moving the parties towards peace. Ben-Ami described the situation established by the initial Oslo document as an “exercise in make-believe”919, because the DOP did nothing to address the divergent final status expectations of the two parties. Rather than arrest this situation and attempt to bring the parties closer, Ross and his team ensured that they remained far apart. The disastrous consequence of Ross’ ‘process over substance’ policy was that he effectively, and knowingly, allowed the parties to come to the permanent status talks with wholly different understandings of what could and would be achieved. The only possible result of this, and the one which transpired, was failure.
Clinton’s decision to stack his Middle East peace team with pro-Israel officials with no experience in the Arab world, rather than the usual spate of State Department Arabists, also contributed to failure. The inability of his team to reach even a modicum of understanding of the Palestinian position left them ignorant of what was
917 Ross 2004 p71 918 PLO Negotiating Team 2001 p159 919 Finkelstein and Ben-Ami, February 2006.
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needed to forge a deal. When analysing the Israeli team, respected Israeli commentator, Uri Avnery, describes how their lack of understanding of the Palestinians led to the collapse of the summit;
The ignorance worked against them as they did not understand the internal code of the Palestinians but were entirely imprisoned in that of ours. Hence they simply did not understand the other side. All its positions were incomprehensible and all its actions unanticipated.920
This criticism could also accurately be levelled at the US team. However, after the many hours they had spent with the Palestinians their inability to understand their positions was not so much born of ignorance, or entrapment in an ‘internal code’, so much as their inability to attach any worth to Palestinian aspirations.
The knee-jerk support Clinton and his team unfailingly provided Barak throughout the final status negotiations prevented them from being able to critically evaluate the Prime Minister’s actions and step in when needed to prevent him from pursuing actions harmful to Israel’s own long-term interests. The ‘special relationship’ which the US had worked strenuously to maintain throughout the Oslo years was never utilised to create the leverage with the GOI for which it was purportedly devised. When ‘the moment of truth’ came, Clinton and his staff abandoned any semblance of pressure on the Zionist state, supporting its policies in full, even when they were clearly leading to the breakdown of the peace process.
Perhaps the most tragic element of the failed permanent status negotiations was that everybody knew what would happen, but did it anyway. The Palestinians knew that the Camp David summit would fail, that they would be blamed, and that violence would be the probable outcome. Unfortunately, their powerless place in the peace trio meant that all they could do was issue warnings and go along anyway, preparing for the ‘worst case’ scenario. Barak too expected failure, but gambled that a failure would not necessarily be a bad thing – he could level the blame at Arafat and his search for peace would be enough to unify his population behind him and the international community around Israel – for the Israeli leader it represented a win-win
920 Avnery 2001
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situation921. However, it is the failure of the US team in their position as caretaker of the peace process which should be most condemned. They were warned many times that the Camp David summit would almost certainly fail and what the likely ramifications of this would be. But at each crucial step they always put their own internal political considerations, and Barak’s, above the welfare of each nation. The people of both Israel and Palestine deserved a lot more from the self-appointed guardians of the peace process than short-sighted decision-making for political gains. While the lot of the Palestinian community may not have been high on the Americans list of priorities, the ‘wellbeing’ of Israel certainly was. Yet by doing everything they could to help Barak, the US team robbed his constituency of the one thing they needed most to move on from a state of continual conflict to what the vast majority of Israelis and Palestinians yearned for; peace. Rather than launching a childish ‘blame game’, the Clinton Administration would have done well to accept their responsibility for not only the failure of Camp David but the catastrophe and loss of life that followed.
921 This situation was appreciated at the time by Ha’aretz writer Aluf Benn, see Aluf Benn, ‘Barak’s win-win plan’, Ha’aretz, 11 July 2000
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PART THREE
Comparison and Conclusions
Chapter Nine Lausanne and Camp David – The Changing Protagonists
Chapter 9
Lausanne and Camp David – The Changing Protagonists
Although the Lausanne conference and the Camp David summit can first appear as extremely different peace-making efforts, they share many important commonalities. While the core of the dispute is now recognised as essentially a conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, rather than a more general ‘Arab-Israeli’ affair, the central issues which separate the parties remain the same. These issues are fundamentally a struggle for the lands of Mandatory Palestine, including its most important city; Jerusalem. In 1948, the fight for these lands led to the creation of the Palestinian refugee crisis; which has become the third core issue framing the dispute.
The purpose of this chapter is to conduct a comparative analysis of the Lausanne negotiations and the Camp David summit in order to understand why the parties are still no closer to forging a peace agreement than they were fifty years ago. To reach this understanding it is necessary to investigate the actions and motivations of the protagonists themselves. The greatest change in peace-making efforts has been the replacement of the Arab states by the Palestinians as the key Arab players in the dispute. Denied a place at the peace table for many decades, the Palestinians are now internationally recognised as the legitimate interlocutors of the Zionist state. Israel’s place at the peace table has remained constant, with the generals of 1948 providing remarkable continuity to the GOI as they replaced Ben-Gurion and his colleagues at the head of the Israeli Government. The central role the US has played in Arab-Israeli peacemaking has been further enhanced throughout the years even while its peacemaking agenda has undergone a remarkable transformation.
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A comparative study of the 1949 and 2000 peace making efforts must also investigate how the dispute itself has changed over the intervening fifty years. The June 1967 war is viewed as a pivotal date in the transformation of the conflict from one of ‘border disputes’ to one of ‘occupation’. The change in focus from 1948 to 1967 produced a radical transformation in how the issues underpinning the dispute were understood by the international community and the protagonists themselves. This change however, did not provoke a meaningful shift in the positions taken by the protagonists, which largely remained constant. In this section I will examine this point in order to determine what it might tell us about the conflict.
In my final chapter I will attempt to draw some conclusions which may help future peace-making efforts. If the past is not fully understood it is simply repeated, and this is never truer than in Arab-Israeli peace-making. Before the parties embark upon another round of peace talks, which raises hopes and with them, the chances for more bloody conflict, the lessons of 1949 and 2000 must be appreciated so that their errors can be avoided. In trying to learn from the failures of the conferences it is necessary to focus on the larger, more pervasive issues separating the parties rather than looking at matters of procedure and protocol. For while negotiating formats can be easily amended, none will succeed if the fundamental issues dividing the protagonists remain unbridged.
The protagonists
From the Arab-Israeli conflict to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
The most pronounced difference between the Lausanne and Camp David peace efforts was the participants present at the negotiating table. While Israel represented one side at each conference, Arab representation underwent a marked change. In the years separating the two conferences, the primary place in peace talks with Israel was passed from the Arab states to the Palestinians, whose homes the Jewish state had been built upon. It is the purpose of this section to explore how this change occurred and its effect on peace efforts.
From its inception, the struggle over Palestine was a conflict between the indigenous Arab inhabitants of the land and the Zionist immigrants who were seeking to establish a
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Jewish homeland on those same lands. However, due to the colonial conceptions which dominated European thought at the time, the Arab inhabitants of the territory were largely eliminated from the Western perception of the issue. The first official endorsement of this position came from Britain, the future Mandate-holders of the region, in the Balfour Declaration which referred simply to the indigenous population of Palestine as ‘non- Jews’. The recently established UN followed this precedent when in 1947 they overwhelmingly voted to impose a solution on Palestine’s indigenous inhabitants who constituted 67 percent of the total population. Not only did the UN deem it appropriate to impose a solution on the majority Palestinian population, but they also handed over half of their land (52 percent) to the Zionists, who at the time owned only 6 percent of Mandatory Palestine.
In its decision to partition Palestine, the United Nations did acknowledge the presence of a local Palestinian population by calling for the creation of an independent ‘Arab’ state. However, when 26 percent of the proposed state was overrun by Jewish forces and up to 80 percent of Palestine’s indigenous inhabitants were expelled from the land falling under Israeli control, the UN failed to intervene. As Ilan Pappé concludes: “After 15 May, there was no excuse for the way the UN abandoned the people whose land they had divided and whose welfare and lives they had surrendered to the Jews who, since the late nineteenth century, wished to uproot them and take their place in the country they deemed as theirs.”922
In fact, rather than intervening, the UN merely gave the disastrous turn of events its seal of approval by totally dropping its demand for the creation of an independent Arab state and referring to the Palestinian people in Resolution 194 as simply ‘refugees’923. Although the UN continued to formally endorse the idea of partition, it did not act to enforce this decision and it was clear that the idea of Palestinian statehood had long been forgotten in preference for control over the Arab territories by one or more of the Arab states.
922 Pappé 2007 p126 923 In response to the activities of the PLO to achieve international recognition of the Palestinian people, in 1974 the General Assembly listed the Question of Palestine on its agenda, following an absence of over 20 years, and passed a resolution which ‘reaffirmed’ the Palestinian peoples’ inalienable right to self- determination, national independence and sovereignty.
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Throughout the Lausanne Conference, the PCC followed the new unofficial policy of the UN in resolutely ignoring its own decision to create an autonomous Arab state within Palestine. The PCC refused to issue a formal invitation to Haj Amin El-Husseini, leader of the AHC, or any other Palestinian group924. While Palestinian representatives attended the conference on an unofficial basis, their exclusion from the formal proceedings signalled the UN’s abandonment of its commitment to the establishment of an independent Arab state and to the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination.
The UN’s decision to withdraw its demand for the establishment of an independent Arab state west of the Jordan River was enthusiastically supported by Britain, which was in favour of the territory being annexed to its close ally, Jordan. The US also did not question the disappearance of the creation of a sovereign Arab state from the UN agenda, indicating that they had come around to Britain’s way of thinking. While the Truman administration had exerted a great deal of pressure on UN delegates to push the Partition Resolution through925, they quickly discarded half of its central premise. For the US officials in the White House, the State Department and their delegation in Lausanne, the Palestinians simply disappeared from the conflict as anything other than refugees and the matter became known as the ‘Arab-Israeli’ conflict and viewed as not much more than a series of border disputes with a complicating refugee factor.
As we have seen, the abandonment of the call for an independent Palestinian state was not seriously resisted by any of the states represented at Lausanne. Israel, like Egypt, toyed with the idea of demanding an independent Arab state only to antagonise Jordan.
924 In attendance at Lausanne were several groups representing factions within the Palestinian refugee community, including representatives of orange grove owners expelled to Lebanon, representatives of landowners, property owners and businesses, a delegation representing refugees expelled to Transjordan and what is now the West Bank, which was headed by Muhammad Nimer al-Hawari, and delegates representing Gaza-based refugees in the closing months of the conference. Gabbay 1959 p266 925 While there was a great deal of pressure from the White House applied to delegates representing smaller countries in the UN to support partition, it is unclear to what extent this pressure was directed from President Truman himself. In his oral interview, Loy Henderson describes a phone call he made to Herschel Johnson in the US UN delegation after received complaints over the heavy-handed pressure tactics from members of the US administration: “Loy, forgive me for breaking down like this, but Dave Niles called us up here a couple of days ago and said that the President had instructed him to tell us that, by God, he wanted us to get busy and get all the votes that we possibly could; that there would be hell if the voting went the wrong way. We are working, therefore, under terrific strain trying to carry out the President’s orders.” Loy Henderson, Oral History, 14 June 1973
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King Abdullah was adamantly against such a move and continually worked against it926, while the other Arab states remained largely silent on the issue.
Arab resistance to the establishment of an autonomous Palestinian state led to their silent endorsement of the UN’s efforts to deny Palestinians a significant role in peacemaking efforts in Lausanne. So hostile were the Arab delegations to the Palestinian representatives that the Ramallah-based refugee representative, Muhammad Nimer al- Hawari, came to favour a union with Israel rather than King Abdullah927. Through edging out the Palestinians and inserting themselves in the middle of negotiations, the Arab states eagerly anticipated the financial benefits this was expected to bring, courtesy of the US.
The exclusion of the Palestinians both as an independent entity in the conflict, and as an autonomous party at Lausanne, was a massive victory for the GOI. For the Zionist ideology the state was built upon implicitly negated the existence of a Palestinian identity. As Edward Said remarked, the Question of Palestine was a “contest between an affirmation and a denial”928. With the creation of the ‘Arab-Israeli conflict’, the denial clearly won the day. Israel now enjoyed international backing of its view that there was no such thing as a Palestinian people and therefore, nobody to whom to offer concessions through a peace treaty929.
However, by 2000 the Palestinians had finally been placed at the centre of the dispute as the term ‘Palestinian-Israeli’ conflict became common parlance. The emergence of the conflict as a Palestinian-Israeli affair was due to a number of factors. Firstly, the rise of the PLO into a highly visible international movement in the early 1970s placed the plight of the Palestinian people on the international agenda. Secondly, the outbreak of the first intifada in 1987 awakened the world to the fact that there were over 1.5 million930 Palestinians living under Israeli occupation deprived of both human and political rights.
926 See Shlaim 1988 for a complete analysis of King Abdullah’s collusion with the GOI to prevent the establishment of an independent Arab state in Mandatory Palestine. 927 Shlaim 1988 p495 928 Said 1980 p8 929 When Ben-Gurion received the Truman note he asked “And to whom was territorial compensation to be made?” (quoted in McDonald 1961 p166). 930 1989 statistics are 860,000 in the West Bank, 130,000 in East Jerusalem and 560,000 in the Gaza Strip, although the Gaza Strip figure, which was derived from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, is forecast to be 90,000 short of the actual population. See MacDowall 1989 p20
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These factors combined to make Israeli claims of the non-existence of the Palestinian people increasingly untenable. Finally, Israel’s attempt to isolate the Palestinian ‘problem’ by prioritizing peace agreements with her Arab neighbours was not bearing much fruit. Her peace agreement with Egypt did little to assuage the hostility of the Arab world towards the Zionist state, which was primarily motivated by the continued misery of Palestinians – both those living under its rule, and those living in the wretched refugee camps on its borders. While the GOI continued to resist attempts to broker a bilateral peace between itself and the Palestinians931, it was becoming more and more obvious to the rest of the world that Israel’s conflict with the Palestinian people was at the core of the Arab-Israeli dispute and as such it was only a peace agreement between the two which would finally draw the conflict to a close.
The emergent international consensus which located Israel’s conflict with the Palestinian people at the centre of the Arab-Israeli dispute took many years to be accepted by both the US and Israel. High profile terrorist attacks from some groups within the Palestinian national movement were used by the GOI and US to dismiss the PLO as a ‘terrorist’ organisation and reject any moves to engage with it or the substantive issues which it raised932. During this period both the US and Israel continued to insist that the issue of the West Bank was one to be negotiated between Israel and King Hussein of Jordan933 through a border settlement.
The rejectionism by the US and Israel continued, as we have seen, until the weakened status of the PLO presented them with a unique opportunity to gain Palestinian approval of the outcome Israel had desired for the OPT since 1967. While the PLO as representatives of the Palestinian people had come a long way in the intervening years in gaining international acceptance and support through the UN, it was not until the US and
931 The peace agreement between Sadat and Begin provided for ‘autonomy’ in the Occupied Territories, but as Ben-Ami explains, was based upon a Jabotinsky (Ze’ev Jabotinsky was the founder of the Zionist Right – referred to as the Revisionist Movement - during the early days of the Zionist project) principle of ‘to the Arabs as individuals, everything; to the Arabs as a people, nothing’, by proposing ‘autonomy’ for the occupants of the Occupied Territories but with no authority on the land and the space they inhabited (Ben- Ami 200 p165) 932 Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin labeled Arafat’s unprecedented address to the UN General Assembly in 1974, as “The speech of the leader of the terrorists”. Quoted in The Journal of Palestine Studies, ‘From the Hebrew Press: A day of trouble’ p135 933 In response to the widespread international acceptance of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, King Hussein finally relinquished all claims to the West Bank on 31 July 1988.
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Israel recognised their potential usefulness to their political agendas that they were finally able to secure their place at the peace table.
The sour conclusion of the Oslo peace process witnessed both Israel and the US attempting to marginalise the Palestinians by re-categorising Arafat as an unreformed terrorist; a charge carrying added weight in the post-911 environment934. However, while they succeeded in isolating the Palestinian leader and imprisoning him in the ruins of the Muqata935, they failed to convince most observers that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was not at the core of the many problems confronting the Middle East.
The internationally recognised centrality of the Palestinian problem to the Arab-Israeli conflict refocussed peacemaking efforts so that the issues under discussion during the Camp David summit were somewhat differently framed to those at Lausanne. The Lausanne conference had been a conference between states. While their differences were manifest, they were generally common to warring states and peacemaking efforts. By contrast, the presence of the Palestinians at Camp David meant that the major aim of the talks was to determine the ‘status’ of the Palestinian population living on Israeli-occupied land, which amounted to an attempt by a people to realise their right to self- determination. Rather than a negotiation between equal and independent states, Camp David represented a forum to deal with the manifold issues arising from a colonial enterprise.
The reinsertion of the Palestinian people into the Middle East conflict meant that the debate had in fact come full circle. The debate which occurred at Camp David was an attempt to reaffirm the Partition Resolution of 1947, even while the percentages of land potentially available to the Palestinian population had been greatly reduced. Camp David was therefore the discussion which the PCC, the US, Israel and the Arab states refused to engage in at Lausanne; the other half of the Partition Resolution. The Palestinian place at
934 Prime Minister Sharon was quick to draw a parallel between the September 11 attacks on the US and Palestinian attacks against Israel, declaring that ‘"One must understand that the terror that [Palestinian Authority chairman Yasser] Arafat conducts against Israel and Israeli citizens now for over 30 years is like the terror of bin Laden against the citizens of the United States,” (Melissa Radler, ‘Sharon: Terror is terror, murder is murder’, The Jerusalem Post, 16 September 2001). 935 The Muqata compound in Ramallah was built by the British for administrative purposes during the Mandate period and later served as the Palestinian Authority’s Headquarters. Israeli forces attacked the compound in 2002 and almost completely destroyed it save for one building which then acted as Arafat’s prison for over two years until his death by an unknown illness in Paris in 2004.
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the table meant that this issue could no longer be ignored as it was in 1949, and that it was in fact the prescient issue in the entire Arab-Israeli debate.
However, while the Palestinians had gained the right to be represented at peace talks, it is uncertain whether the discussions at Camp David exhibited any greater commitment to Palestinian self-determination than Lausanne. During discussions in 2000 the US was no more interested in Palestinian rights than the PCC had been fifty years earlier. As in 1949, the Palestinians were not expected to participate as equals in solving the dispute, but merely to accept whatever was imposed by higher powers. While at Lausanne these conditions were to be determined by the Arab States and Israel in conjunction with the UN, by 2000 the fate of the Palestinians was to be decided only by Israel and the US together. The Palestinian national movement had come far through demanding its place at peace talks, but its presence was not matched by any real power or influence. Perhaps the only power the Palestinians did possess at Camp David was the power to say ‘No’. Unlike at Lausanne, the Palestinians now had a voice, and they used it.
The framework for peace
The change of Arab representation in negotiations necessarily affected the method through which peace was pursued. As all the Arab states directly involved in the Arab- Israeli dispute were present at Lausanne, the PCC was interested in a comprehensive peace which would settle all issues outstanding between Arabs and Zionists. It was expected that Israeli, Egyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese and Syrian signatures on a peace document would have allowed the horrific events of 1948 to be forgotten and relations within the Middle East to normalise.
The comprehensive peace track had also been tried shortly before the onset of the Oslo peace process through the 1991 Madrid Negotiations, but these efforts became bogged down in an Arab position which was no longer prepared to offer serious compromises while Israel continued to ignore the needs of the Palestinians, who were denied an independent delegation and forced to join that of Jordan.
The failure of Madrid and the signing of the DOP convinced both Israel and the US that pursuing peace with the Palestinians might not just be possible, but that it was crucial if
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Israel was to achieve a comprehensive Middle East peace. Indeed, the DOP proved extremely fruitful for the Israelis in this regard, unlocking peace with Jordan, direct bilateral peace talks with Syria and the establishment of formal contacts with Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia936.
As a bilateral conference between a stateless people and their colonisers, the Camp David summit was conducted in an entirely different format from Lausanne and Madrid. Resolving the issues on the table would not remove the entire Arab-Israeli conflict but only the Palestinian component. However by 2000 it was generally accepted that the road to peace ran through the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Peace with the Palestinians was therefore a necessary first step to a comprehensive peace and the fruits of Camp David were accordingly not anticipated to end with the Palestinians. This approach was confirmed in 2002 with the Saudi Peace Initiative which offers Israel peace with the Arab League states in return for settling its dispute with the Palestinians by withdrawing to the 1967 lines.
The role of the mediator – from the United Nations to a strictly US affair
The presence of the Palestinian delegation was not the only change of personnel separating Lausanne from Camp David. The role of mediator also underwent a major change as the US assumed the central peacemaking role from the UN. In this section I will explore how the US overtook the UN in its role as the primary mediator in Middle East peacemaking and what impact this had on the substance and outcome of the Camp David summit.
In 1949, the resolution of the dispute was perceived as an international affair. As the formal conflict had begun as a consequence of the UN’s Partition Resolution, it was assumed to be that body’s task to resolve it. The decision to establish the PCC, rather than dealing with the issue in the Security Council, sent a clear signal however that the UN had abandoned its mission to impose its solution on the dispute in favour of allowing the protagonists to ‘sort it out’ amongst themselves, albeit under UN auspices. While the
936 Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia broke of diplomatic ties with Israel in September 2000 after the outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada.
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UN did pass resolutions in hope that they would form the basis of a negotiated solution, it did not make any attempt after 1947 to see that its will on the matter was implemented.
Mark Ethridge commented early in the PCC’s work that Palestine might become the burial ground of the UN937, and in fact he was not far wrong. Pablo Azcárate traced the demise of the UN in the Arab-Israeli conflict to its refusal to sanction Israel over her truce violations, which resulted in her capture of the Negev. As Azcárate points out, the UN’s inaction taught Israel a valuable lesson – that the UN would tolerate and even reward the use of the fait accomplis tactic938. Having learned this lesson, Israel drew the reasonable conclusion that the international body could simply be ignored. This point has continued to be appreciated by the GOI, which has remained wilfully defiant of UN resolutions, and with the backing of the UN’s most powerful member, has consigned the body to diplomatic irrelevance in Arab-Israeli peacemaking.
The high-profile and exclusive role the US played throughout the Oslo peace process is very different to the role the Truman Administration played during the Lausanne talks. In 1949 the US was only beginning to emerge out of the isolationism it had favoured during the interwar years. The US had strongly supported the creation of the UN and was keen to see issues like the Middle East conflict resolved through its authority. The US was therefore content to work under the umbrella of the UN in its efforts to mediate the dispute. This did not mean however, that the Truman Administration was prepared to handover peacemaking efforts entirely to the international body. The inclusion of the US on the PCC was an acknowledgement by the SC that only the weight of the US could bring the parties to agreement. This fact was not lost on officials in the State Department and the White House, who quickly dominated the PCC and effectively turned it into an extension of its own foreign policy.
However, while US officials often indirectly involved themselves in the proceedings at Lausanne, their involvement was strictly confined to background diplomacy, with the PCC as the ‘front-man’. The GOI was certainly aware of the US’ preference to remain ‘behind the scenes’ and used this as part of its fight against US pressure when Ben-
937 Ethridge to Acheson, 14 March 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/3-1449. FRUS pp825-826 938 Azcárate 1966 p110
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Gurion made public his anger at receiving the Presidential note939. The lack of response by the US to Ben-Gurion’s public denouncement was an unmistakable statement that it was not prepared to openly or officially become embroiled in the conflict.
The US was unwilling to have its background involvement in the events at Lausanne become public for a number of reasons. Most of these centre on the US’ reluctance to engage in an open battle with Israel, a position which was also evident in 2000. Perhaps the primary reason for this reluctance in 1949 was the recent events of the Shoah. Throughout 1949, Hitler’s atrocities against Europe’s Jewish population were still being brought to light. The global horror at the suffering of European Jewry became translated into sympathy and support for the Jewish state in the Middle East which effectively made direct conflict with Israel untenable for the US administration. While the US was willing to exert quiet pressure on the GOI to moderate its negotiating positions, it clearly had no stomach to enter into a battle with a country which was effectively born from the ashes of the Holocaust. The restrictions which the Holocaust placed on US policy clearly emboldened Ben-Gurion who did not hesitate to openly defy US wishes in a situation where most other countries would have been more circumspect. When criticism from the US became overbearing, the Israeli Prime Minister was therefore quick to evoke memories of the Holocaust in order to tighten the reigns on Washington, evidenced by his ominous reply to the Presidential note which warned that “We [Jews] can be crushed, but we will not commit suicide”940.
America’s reluctance to openly challenge Israel was also in part due to what Richard Nixon referred to as “US political considerations”, a euphemism for the Jewish vote941, or more appropriately, the ‘pro-Israel’ vote within the US. While Jews comprise less than three percent of the US population942, they wield a wholly disproportionate degree of political power through “their high concentration in key states, and their tendency to behave as a swing vote in ways that set them apart from virtually all other groups in
939 One of Ben-Gurion’s first moves upon receiving the note was the issuing of a press release condemning international intervention in the dispute. Forsythe 1972 p53 940 McDonald 1961 p166 941 Kissinger, 1982, p550. 942 In 1949 the Jewish population living in the US totalled 5.6 million (Snetsinger 1974 p12) out of a total of approximately 149 million (US Bureau of the Census) or 3.8%, today it is 6.4 million, or 2.2% of total population (see Jewish Virtual Library ‘Jewish Population of the United States by State’).
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American politics”943. These factors combine to make the Jewish vote a highly sought after commodity during Presidential campaigns. Candidates generally endeavour to win the Jewish vote by announcing staunchly pro-Israel policies, so that ‘Jewish’ and ‘pro- Israel’ are viewed as largely synonymous, quite often erroneously944. The struggle for the Jewish vote has remained an important aspect of US electoral campaigns, and was no less prevalent in 1992 than in 1948. Truman and Dewey openly competed to present the most pro-Israel credentials to American Jewry945, as did Clinton and Bush in 1992946. However, the need to put on a pro-Israel face does not end on Election Day, for there is a formidable pro-Israel lobby operating at the highest levels of American politics. While the lobby was certainly well-organised and influential during the Truman Administration, it had become much more powerful by the time of Camp David. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, in their recent study of the Israel lobby947 and its affect on US foreign policy, describe the Israel lobby as “one of the most powerful interest groups in the United States”948. The lobby’s primary concerns and objectives are described below: “The individuals and groups in the United States that make up the lobby care deeply about Israel, and they do not want American politicians to criticize it, even when criticism might be warranted and might even be in Israel’s own interest. Instead, these groups want U.S. leaders to treat Israel as if it were the fifty-first state. Democrats and Republicans alike fear the lobby’s clout. They all know that any politician who challenges its policies stand little chance of becoming president.”949
Mearsheimer and Walt are unequivocal in their assessment that the US has avoided asserting any effective pressure on Israel to reach a just peace with the Palestinians due to
943 Helmreich 2001 944 While the linking of American Jews with pro-Israel sympathies is generally accurate, there have always existed important exceptions within the Jewish population who do not automatically subscribe to the Zionist frame of reference and are ready to reject it entirely. For an interesting account of the treatment of anti-Zionist Jews in America, see Mike Marqusee, ‘Israel's Jewish critics’, The Guardian UK, 4 March 2008. 945 In the 1948 campaign, the topic of Israel was the only foreign policy topic on which the candidates openly went to battle following their agreement to ‘keep foreign policy out of politics’. Snetsinger 1974 pp130-132 946 See Thomas Friedman’s description of Clinton and Bush’s campaign strategies to win the pro-Israel vote in 1992 in Friedman, ‘The 1992 Campaign: Jewish Voters; Clinton Swipes at Bush For Lack of Jewish Aides’, The New York Times, 10 September 1992 947 The term ‘Israel lobby’ denotes what is more correctly described as the ‘pro-Israel lobby’. 948 Mearsheimer and Walt 2007 pp5-6 949 Mearsheimer and Walt 2007 p6
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the immense power and reach of the Israel lobby within the corridors of Washington which makes it “politically costly for any president to attempt it”950.
It is outside the scope of this thesis to offer a fuller analysis of the breadth and power of the Israel lobby within America. Suffice to state that it does exercise a considerable degree of influence over US Middle East policy, particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict. As Mearsheimer and Walt note, this influence has grown in strength throughout the years, and particularly since 1967, so that its power was much more keenly felt within the American political establishment in 2000 than in 1949. This analysis is certainly verified by the study of the Truman and Clinton Administrations. While Truman was subjected to relentless lobbying by pro-Israel supporters during his Presidency, they were not the political force they are today951 and their impact upon his decisions was largely restricted to their ability to recruit close Jewish friends and staff of the President’s to plead their case952. Although most commentators generally agree that Truman was persuaded to some extent by the efforts of the Zionist lobby, they generally find that this was just one factor in many which determined the policy of the President toward Israel953.
The decisive Israeli victory in the 1967 war acted to energise the American Jewish community and to transform the Israel lobby into the power it is today. Israel’s military strength allowed the lobby to present the Zionist state as a strategic ally to the US in its fight against Soviet expansion, calling for a closer US-Israel relationship based now on realpolitik necessities rather than mere sentimental attachment. The lobby’s message found a receptive audience in Washington where policymakers quickly chose to upgrade the Israel-US relationship into what has become the ‘special relationship’954. The ‘special relationship’ is best categorised by unconditional US support for Israel, where
950 Mearsheimer and Walt 2007 p9 951 By 1948 the Israel lobby had already gained considerable support from American Jewry, with membership to the American Zionist Organisation expanding from 50,000 in 1935 to 700,000 in 1948 (Zvi Ganin 1979 pxiii) 952 Truman’s close friend, Eddie Jacobsen was the key figure the Zionists were able to recruit to argue their case to Truman during their quest for statehood (Acheson 1969 p169). 953 The extent to which Truman was influenced by the Zionist lobby is still a subject of intense debate, see Snetsinger 1974, Bain 1979; Heald and Kaplan 1977, Ganin 1979; Wilson 1979, Cohen 1990, Benson 1997 954 Walt and Mearsheimer question the ‘article of faith’ that Israel did represent a ‘strategic asset’ to the US during the Cold War, arguing that Israel’s alliance with the US pushed Middle East states into the Soviet’s arms, impeded progress towards Middle East peace (a key policy objective of US Administrations) and contributed to the rise of anti-Americanism across the region. (Walt and Mearsheimer 2006 pp51-54)
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the purpose of US relations with Israel is to ensure that Israel retains its “qualitative edge”955 and thereby its regional dominance in all spheres.
By the time Clinton came to office, the ‘special relationship’ had become an “article of faith”956 within US political corridors, transcending the demise of the Cold War. During the final status talks, and in fact the entire Oslo process, Clinton demonstrated that his election commitments to the Israel lobby and his belief in the sanctity of the ‘special relationship’957 were not merely empty rhetoric but the nexus of his peace policy. Clinton never deviated from viewing Middle East peacemaking through the prism of the ‘special relationship’, which was seen as best served by prioritising Israeli ‘security’ as the primary objective of an agreement and refraining from open, or even private, criticism of the GOI. In fact, Clinton’s adherence to the ‘special relationship’ was so complete that he refused to “substitute his judgement for that of an Israeli prime minister so determined to make history”958 even when it appeared obvious to most that Barak was steering the process towards total failure.
William Quandt, who served as National Security Advisor in the Carter Administration during the Egyptian-Israeli peace talks, attributes Clinton’s reluctance to criticise the actions of the GOI, even at the end of his tenure, to the power of the Israel lobby and its influence over the electoral prospects of his wife and Vice President. Quandt finds that: “Clinton’s apparent resolution of these cross pressures was to limit himself to prodding and cajoling while giving Barak time to set his agenda.”959
Clinton’s reluctance to offer any criticism of the GOI’s decisions or to pose questions regarding its actions was a stark departure from the Truman administration, which was more than prepared to challenge Ben-Gurion and his colleagues on their policy choices,
955 The US Congress vet military aid to Middle East states, including key US ally Saudi Arabia, in order to ensure that Israel maintains its ‘qualitative edge’, a practice no other state enjoys (see Steven Erlanger, ‘Israel to Get $30 Billion In Military Aid From US’, The New York Times, 17 August 2007). 956 Walt and Mearsheimer 2006 p51 957 Clinton declared his fervent support of the ‘special relationship’ during his election campaign, remonstrating the George H W Bush Administration for tying loan guarantees to the issue of settlement construction and pledging that he would not use similar ‘strong-arm tactics’ during peace efforts (Tom Tugend, ‘Clinton: Bush will OK guarantees to win votes’, The Jerusalem Post, 4 June 1992) 958 This is how Madeleine Albright explains Clinton’s decision to hold the Camp David summit even while there was little belief in the US peace team that the parties were ready to reach an agreement (Albright 2003 p757) 959 Quandt 2001 p29
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albeit only in private. Truman’s actions resulted in the extraction of some serious concessions from the GOI in the form of the Lausanne Protocol, the Gaza Proposal and the 100,000 offer. While these were seen as insufficient at the time, they certainly represented significant concessions which the GOI had no intention of making when the talks commenced. In contrast, Clinton’s lack of pressure robbed him of the opportunity to test Barak’s negotiating positions and probe for potential concessions.
While both Truman and Clinton were committed to Zionist aims, Truman was more prepared to pressure Israel because Zionism threatened vital US interests during the time of his presidency. As we have seen, Cold War logic viewed Zionism as a direct threat to US interests. However, happily for Clinton, he was never forced to choose between his Zionist proclivities and his State Department’s advice because the paradigm had changed from Cold War to the (unofficial) Struggle Against Islam. Viewed in this way, support for Israel was a fundamental part of Clinton’s foreign policy, as it was Israel which was expected to act as the ‘West’s’ proxy in the Middle East.
A corollary of the US’ upgraded relationship with Israel following the 1967 war was its insistence upon retaining exclusive mediating rights in Arab-Israeli peacemaking. America’s newfound enthusiasm to occupy a central position in the Arab-Israeli conflict emerged from its desire to protect its ‘strategic asset’ from reaching a settlement which might weaken Israel’s (and therefore the US’) regional dominance and be sold to the Arab world as a Soviet victory. The US’ quest to protect its new ally meant that it first had to replace the UN in its mediating role as any agreement brokered under the UN would be based around the pertinent UN resolutions which each called for serious Israeli concessions. While the US had supported these resolutions during Lausanne, and therefore the involvement of the UN in resolving the dispute, changing Cold War considerations now caused them to privately withdraw this support and demand mediating exclusivity. The fact that the US inserted itself into the sole mediating role in the dispute, despite its open collaboration with Israel as its ‘chief diplomatic backer, financial donor, and military supplier’960, is as much a statement about the failure of the
960 Taken from Naseer Aruri’s excellent book regarding the role of the US in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, Dishonest Broker: The US Role in Israel and Palestine (2003).
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UN as it is the might of the US-Israeli partnership and the powerlessness of the Palestinians.
The US has always justified its unstinting financial, diplomatic and military support of Israel through asserting that only a strong Israel will make peace. The Clinton team, arguably more than any other administration, assiduously clung to this belief throughout Oslo. However this claim is wholly unsupported by historical experience, including the Lausanne example. After its unqualified victory in the 1948 war, the GOI became convinced of Israel’s military superiority in the region and therefore saw no reason to offer concessions to the enemy. Rather than offering major concessions throughout the Lausanne talks, the GOI’s sense of invincibility led them to make further territorial claims on the Arab states. The six day war similarly witnessed a victorious Israel which saw no reason to compromise with vanquished armies. In fact, it was only after the shock of a more successful campaign by Egypt and Syria in the 1973 war that the GOI began to appreciate the need for peace. This eventually led to its ceding of the Sinai Peninsula in 1978. Rather than learn from this history however, the Clinton team instead chose to adopt the entirely unsupported myth of the ‘peace-making’ qualities of a ‘secure’ Israel which unsurprisingly resulted in an uncompromising Israel during the Camp David summit.
The Clinton team’s repeated pronouncements of their commitment to Israel’s security were at no time matched by an equal commitment to the security of the Palestinian people. How the Palestinians would live in a discontiguous, demilitarised state, which was to be surrounded by an army which had brutally subjugated their people since its inception, was obviously not an issue any of the American team spent any time considering. Clearly, the Clinton team considered ‘security’ to be a one-way street.
During Lausanne, Truman Administration officials were genuinely concerned with preserving the friendship of Arabs961. This concern led the US to at least try to produce an outcome which would be acceptable to both sides. US officials’ search for a fair settlement resulted in their consistent pressuring of the GOI, as Israel’s demands were at far greater variance to US policy than those of the Arab states. In contrast to Camp
961 See Rusk 1990 p153
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David, at Lausanne it was Israel which was subjected to US bullying tactics, causing it to complain that the US was advancing more extreme positions than the Arabs962, a complaint only heard in reverse following Camp David963.
When Clinton took office the US was the unopposed hegemon of the world. The need for the US to procure allies had seemingly evaporated as its strength across the globe remained uncontested. Clinton and his team were quick to act upon America’s newfound dominance by producing a bold new Middle East policy based on the premise that the US could now do as it pleased in the region rather than having to curry favour with different factions as it had during the days of the Cold War964. While Truman officials felt it was beneficial to maintain Arab friendships to assist them in achieving their foreign policy goals, by 2000 the uncontested dominance of the US led Clinton and his team to believe that they could simply impose their policies on the peoples of the region.
The victorious mood within the Clinton camp had serious ramifications on its Middle East peacemaking. Released from the need to retain Arab friendship, Clinton was free to openly pursue a policy which guarded the ‘special relationship’ without even a cursory attempt to make it appear fair. The first signal of this course of action was Clinton’s appointment of pro-Israel officials to key State Department positions; keeping a promise he had made to the pro-Israel lobby during his election campaign965. The appointments of people such as Ross and Indyk to key peace positions within the Administration meant that the Arabists who had dominated the State Department during Truman’s time were completely marginalised in foreign policy development966.
The alignment of the US with Israel on almost every issue which arose during the Oslo peace process and final status talks was deeply resented, but as Clinton had predicted, could not be resisted by the defenceless Palestinians or their powerless (or indifferent)
962 Secretary of State to Embassy in Tel Aviv, 19 August 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/08-1949 963 See Palestinian comments in Swisher 2004 p32 964 In his analysis of key US policy objectives in the Middle East, of which ‘protecting Israel’ forms one of the three, Ross explicitly cites attaining Middle East allies as a historic objective particular to the Cold War. (Ross 2005 p61 965 Thomas Friedman, ‘The 1992 Campaign: Jewish Voters; Clinton Swipes at Bush For Lack of Jewish Aides’, The New York Times, 10 September 1992 966 Of the US officials who attended Camp David, only the interpreter Gemal Helal, had ever lived in the Middle East. Arabists such as Ned Walker and Ron Schlicher, who had spent their diplomatic careers in the Middle East, were entirely excluded. Swisher 2004 p257
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allies in the Arab world. The rage of the Clinton team at Arafat’s final rejection at Camp David was in part directed at the Palestinian leader’s refusal to accept the ‘reality’ of his own position (as they saw it) – a reality which they and Israel had mercilessly imposed throughout the Oslo period.
Unsurprisingly, the positions which the US took at Camp David were completely opposite to those they had adopted at Lausanne. Issues such as the inadmissibility of GOI fait accomplis tactics, the right of the refugees to return to their homes or be compensated; the illegality of Israel’s claims to Jerusalem; and the authority of UN resolutions, which the US had adopted alongside the Arabs at Lausanne, were actively opposed by the Clinton team at Camp David. Arafat’s adherence to the very same positions the US had held at Lausanne were now perceived as intransigent and belligerent. It was not the issues themselves which caused this change but the viewpoint of the US officials, who had committed themselves fully to Israel.
In their attempts to effectively impose an Israeli-dictated agreement on the Palestinians, the Clinton team forgot an important factor which had been fully appreciated by the State Department during Truman’s tenure; that an imposed and unfair agreement would destabilise the region, be rejected by the Arab world and only lead to further conflict967. The fact that the US was now the unopposed hegemon did not change this essential fact. As Aaron Miller noted, the US’s expectations that it could get peace ‘on the cheap’ was simply short-sighted and fatally flawed968. Regional peace and Israeli security, which are each foreign policy objectives of the US, require that a just agreement is reached so that the conflict can be drawn to a close. Unfortunately Clinton and his team’s close alliance with Israel precluded them from appreciating this simple truth, though it had been foremost in the minds of their predecessors over fifty years earlier.
967 In 1949, the US specifically advised King Abdullah of Jordan to not enter into direct bilateral discussions with the GOI as they suspected that it would result in an unjust agreement leading to an unstable peace and political unrest. The Secretary of State to Ethridge, 1 June 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/6- 149 968 Miller 2008 p305
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Chapter 10
Lausanne and Camp David – The Changing Issues
Between the Lausanne and Camp David summits the framework of the Arab-Israeli dispute had undergone a manifest change. The Lausanne Conference took place to resolve the many issues arising out of the 1948 war. Camp David on the other hand, was dealing with the ramifications of the 1967 war. While the issues under discussion at Lausanne had failed to be resolved, they were simply transcended by the events of 1967. The issues which were perceived to form the Arab-Israeli dispute thereby underwent a radical transformation so that the peacemaking agenda in 2000 was markedly different than that of the PCC’s in 1949. This section will examine how the issues transformed between Lausanne and Camp David and how this change effected the positions taken by the protagonists.
The 1948 war effectively removed the 1947 Partition Resolution entirely from the dispute. New UN Resolutions were accordingly enacted which were based around the circumstances which existed after the war. The peacemaking agenda was thereby formed around the prevailing international consensus which included; the division of territories between the combatants according to the Jessup Principle969; the internationalisation of the city of Jerusalem; the repatriation of the Palestinian refugees to their homes and/or the payment of compensation for lost homes. While the PCC was not able to bring the parties to agreement on these issues, it was clearly the will of most states within the UN, including the US, that these three principles be realised. Even though a meaningful search for peace was abandoned by the UN after the failure of Lausanne, it was never officially accepted by the organisation, or any other body, that Israel would remain in
969 The Jessup Principle was not formally recognized in UN Resolutions but formed the general international consensus for the resolution of the territorial issue at the time.
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possession of 78 percent of mandatory Palestine; that Jerusalem was to be anything other than an international city under the authority of the UN; or that the Palestinian refugees would not be permitted to return to their former homes or be compensated if they so chose.
On 4 June 1967 Israel remained in defiance of these principles. However, its occupation of the remainder of Mandatory Palestine, in addition to lands controlled by Egypt, Syria and Lebanon in 1967, led the fermenting 1948 issues to be forgotten by the international community in preference for the seemingly more pressing issues which the 1967 war gave rise. So consumed did the international community become with the events of 1967 that the date marking the beginning of the Arab-Israeli dispute was effectively set at Year Zero. While the issues under discussion at Lausanne continued to be guided by UN resolutions970, with the exception of the refugee issue they were essentially removed from the peacemaking agenda and would never again be addressed during peace talks.
At Camp David the Partition Resolution was a very distant memory as the armistice lines negotiated by Ralph Bunch had become what Israel had intended; the internationally accepted borders of the Zionist state. What was inside the Green Line was understood to denote inviolable Israeli territory and any questions as to Israel’s control over it attributed to extremist elements. What was under discussion was only the part of Palestine that Israel did not conquer in 1948. Rather than offering this up to neighbouring Arab states as in 1949, it was now understood by the international community that the indigenous Arab inhabitants of the land would gain some form of autonomy over the area. The international community, as reflected in UN resolutions, viewed these lands as occupied Arab territory. However, Israel’s appetite had grown since it had accepted the armistice lines in 1948 and the GOI now viewed its new lands as a part of its territory.
While the stakes might have changed as the area under negotiation grew smaller, the negotiating positions taken by Israel at each conference are strikingly consistent. The Palestinians, absent at the Lausanne Conference, also adopted very similar positions to those put forward by their Arab counterparts fifty years earlier. In fact, the only party
970 The UN decision recognising the ‘special status’ of Jerusalem was reiterated shortly after the six day war on 4 July 1967 by the General Assembly following Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem, however the Security Council refrained from passing a similar Resolution (Resolution 2253).
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which pointedly changed its positions in the intervening years was the US. As we have seen, after generally aligning with the Arab positions in 1949, the US almost completely embraced the Israeli positions in 2000. This section will examine the positions taken by the protagonists at each conference and examine how the passing of time affected these.
Territory
Israel
During Lausanne the GOI was unequivocal in its territorial position. It would not consider relinquishing any of the territory it held, including the slices it had acquired through truce violations. Rather than being satisfied with its control over large tracts of land outside the Partition boundaries, the GOI was still debating whether it should continue the conflict in order to acquire the remainder of Mandatory Palestine971.
Basing the Jewish homeland in the lands of all of historic Palestine (Eretz Israel, as it is known to Jews) had always been the Zionist dream. The separation of Jordan from the Palestinian Mandate came as an enormous disappointment to Zionists who viewed the lands of Jordan as part of their biblical inheritance972. The partition agreement, which curtailed the area of the Jewish homeland further, caused Zionists added frustration. Ben- Gurion was only able to garner the support he needed amongst the Zionist community to accept partition through his development of ‘practical Zionism’. According to ‘practical Zionism’, the Jewish state would be realised on a ‘dunum by dunum’ basis, so that the acceptance of the partition boundaries was not expected to denote the final borders of a Zionist state, but merely a building block which might be added to in the future. As Ben- Gurion stated in 1938; “I don’t regard a state in part of Palestine as the final aim of Zionism, but as a means towards that aim”973.
971 Shalom 2002 pp154-159 972 This development provoked a split within the Zionist camp between those willing to accept the curtailed Mandate who were led by Ben-Gurion and Chaim Weizmann and a faction which refused to accept the loss of Jordan as part of the future Zionist state, headed by Ze'ev Jabotinsky, now referred to as Revisionist Zionism. 973 Quoted in Morris 1990 p9
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The Lausanne Conference witnessed the ramifications of Ben-Gurion’s expansionist policy. The Israeli leader refused to entertain any suggestion of ceding territory and instead demanded to be awarded even more974. The GOI also rejected the idea that any entity other than itself possessed legitimate land claims by refusing to even acknowledge the presence of the indigenous population and citing the Arab armies’ invasion as proof of their unworthiness to control any piece of former Palestine975.
Israel’s argument for keeping the lands it had occupied outside the Partition Resolution was based on its policy of fait accomplis. The GOI would simply not consider any suggestion that it should give up any of the lands it controlled. To ensure that this occurrence became am impossibility, Israel was quickly razing the Palestinian villages which stood on the land in question, while encouraging recent Jewish immigrants from Europe and the Arab world to take possession of the land. This policy was carried out even while the Lausanne Conference was in session976.
While the land under discussion at Camp David may have differed from 1949, Israel’s territorial argument remained exactly the same. As Israel was in control of the entire area of land in question, she saw no reason why she should hand it back. Refusing to recognise any other right than that of possession, and biblical inheritance, the GOI viewed the territories as a legitimate part of Israel. The only reason why Israel was prepared to discuss the cession of a portion of the land at Camp David, unlike at Lausanne, was because it was inhabited by a highly concentrated population of Arabs which Israel had no intention of incorporating into its own state.
In its efforts to rid itself of responsibility for the one million Arabs living inside the OPT, the GOI was prepared to cede enough land to fulfil this purpose while keeping hold of the land it considered valuable; either for its water resources, its historic significance, or its usefulness to security. Like Ben-Gurion, Barak and all of his predecessors never
974 Israel demanded areas of both Egypt and Transjordan and also advised the PCC that she would submit future claims on Syria and Lebanon to accommodate her future development (The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State, 20 May 1949. USNA USNA 501.BB Pal/5-2049. Summary of Telegrams, 23 May 1949, Truman Library, SMOF: Naval Aide to the President Files, 1945-53, Box 23). 975 Upon receiving Truman’s Presidential note, Ben-Gurion questioned exactly ‘to whom’ Israel were supposed to make concessions. McDonald 1951 p157 976 Ben-Gurion established a special committee, which is referred to as the ‘Transfer Committee’ specifically to accomplish this task. Pappè 2006 pp213-215
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recognised the right of the Palestinians to any of the lands of former Palestine. Israel’s territorial demands throughout Camp David, as in Lausanne, were thereby based around Israeli expansionism rather than any ideas of justice and reconciliation.
The GOI had employed the policy of fait accomplis to establish her control over the occupied territories, just as it had done years earlier to secure her control over the lands outside the Partition boundaries. Since 1967, Jews had received large subsidies issued by the GOI to encourage them to move to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank977. The creation of facts on the ground worked well for the GOI in 1949 but even Ben-Gurion may not have been able to foresee the success of the policy in 2000. During the Camp David summit, the purpose of the settlements were never questioned by the US, much less the possibility of removing them altogether; despite the fact that they had been established in blatant contravention of UN Resolutions, were considered illegal by the entire international community, and that they had been constructed for precisely the purpose of preventing Israel from having to handover the territory on which they stood. The aim of Israel’s cynical policy was thereby fully realised.
Israel was remarkably consistent in each conference in its treatment of international resolutions pertaining to the division of land between her and her adversaries. Her mission in 1949 was to wipe away the Partition Resolution of 1947 in favour of her newly conquered borders. In 2000, Barak and his team were equally intent on eradicating Resolution 242, which called for her withdrawal from the OPT, arguing instead that any withdrawal she chose to make would be a concession on her part and that there was no possibility of a full withdrawal in return for a full peace. Israel’s contemptuous treatment of UN resolutions was founded in the knowledge she gained in 1949 that the organisation would not act against her to enforce its own resolutions, a lesson fifty-years of the dispute had only strengthened.
At both the Lausanne and Camp David conferences Israel’s interlocutors were confronted by an expansionist adversary. During Lausanne, the GOI was in a particularly expansionist frame of mind as she deliberated on whether she had allowed the war to end
977 The subsidies include cheap land, low-interest mortgages and lower income tax rates for individuals, as well as subsidies to local government councils. The subsidy system was created by the Likud Party but has also been adopted by Labor Governments.
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a little too soon978. While Israel’s aim at Lausanne had been to gain international acceptance of the armistice lines as her boundaries, there is considerable doubt whether she would have considered these to be her permanent borders. In 1967, Israel finished the job by conquering the remaining lands of Mandatory Palestine but her occupation of Lebanon in 1982 shows that this was not the limit of her territorial ambitions979. Israel’s expansionism at Camp David was demonstrated in her efforts to gain legitimacy for her effective control over the Occupied Territories, while devolving responsibility for the inhabitants to a Palestinian entity, which was to be less than a state. The system of control which Israel implemented throughout the Oslo period is a startling exhibition of Israel’s territorial ambitions. For the system of authority Israel established during these years which were devised to retain control of the land, but not the peoples, of the West Bank, clearly demonstrated that the GOI had not yet internalised the need to cede real sovereignty in order to gain security and peace for its people.
The Arabs
During Lausanne, each Arab government submitted land claims, and in the case of Transjordan it was these claims which preoccupied most of its time throughout 1949. The unspoken reason why each Government posted claims on the lands of former Palestine was that they were in quiet agreement that the provisions of the Partition Resolution calling for the establishment of an independent Arab state should not be implemented.
In their claims the Arab states shared a commonality with the Palestinian delegation in 2000. At each conference, the Arabs were seeking that the clock be turned back to one minute before hostilities began, in face of an opponent who wished to see the clock set at one minute after the hostilities had finished. In each case, the Arab party was trying to recreate a reality which they had previously rejected. This fact has not failed to be appreciated within Israel, as Abba Eban noted in 1978:
978 After Israel’s capture of the West Bank in 1967, Ben-Gurion noted in his diary that the ‘tears’ being spilt over each generation for the GOI’s decision in 1948 against moving its troops to capture the West Bank had been put to an end (see quote in Troen and Shalom 1999 p219). 979 Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon was ended in 2000 by Barak but her recent invasion of Lebanon in 2006 suggests that she still does not recognize the sovereignty of the Lebanese government on these lands and may reoccupy the area sometime in the future.
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“In the final resort, the Arab cause in the West Bank will stand or fall by the decision of the Palestinian Arabs. Their diplomatic history refutes any idea that nations usually act in their best interest. They have invariably rejected what has been available to them, only to look back nostalgically on the rejected proposal after its availability had expired. I should be less than frank if I were to deny that there are those in Israel who count, without excessive anguish, on the likelihood that this will happen again.”980
Much Arab energy, and particularly Palestinians energy, had been spent rejecting and indeed fighting the Partition Resolution. However, the military catastrophe which befell them following the passing of the resolution made it far more attractive ‘after the fact’. Likewise, Arab dissatisfaction with the status quo on 4 June 1967 whereby Israel controlled over three-quarters of former Palestine, became the sum total of Palestinian demands during Camp David981.
Against Israel’s policy of fait accomplis, the Arabs at each conference based their claims on international resolutions (Resolution 181 in 1949 and Resolution 242 in 2000). Having opposed both these documents at the time they were passed, the Arabs now saw them as their only protection against an opponent which was both militarily superior and which held the land in question. Clearly unable to resort to arms in either circumstance, the Arabs were reduced to cling to the very agreements they had previously despised. Each conference thereby witnessed an Arab delegation so weak that it was reduced to negotiating for an outcome which did not even meet its minimum requirements before its newly diminished circumstances.
The steady reduction in Palestinian territorial demands; from all of former Palestine, to only 22 percent, has not met with any appreciation from Israel or the US. Israel, seizing upon its opponents weakness, seeks to curtail its expectations even further, while the US now considers Palestinian demands for the 22 percent as a sign of entrenched Palestinian ‘extremism’. Perhaps after a few more years of checkpoints, closures, incursions, invasions and poverty the Palestinians will lower their demands once again in order to achieve some semblance of autonomy but even this may not be enough to satisfy Israel in her quest to control all of Palestine’s former lands.
980 Eban 1978 981 With the exception of the refugee issue.
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Refugees
Israel
The fifty years separating the Lausanne and Camp David conferences produced no alteration to Israel’s policy towards the refugee issue. Israel took an identical stance at each summit, declaring that it would not accept one refugee on a right of return basis and that any return would be limited to a small number through a ‘family reunification’ scheme only. The reason why Israel’s policy position on the issue had remained static is that the Zionist agenda had also remained unchanged. As Israel’s declaration of independence proclaimed, Israel was to be a ‘Jewish state’ [emphasis mine] so that the Jewish people could ‘be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State’. The attainment of a Jewish state was the realisation of the Zionist dream. In this dream there was very little room for the indigenous Arab inhabitants of the land, with Ben-Gurion committing himself very early to the idea of transfer; “Zionism is a transfer of the Jews. Regarding the transfer of the [Palestinian] Arabs this is much easier than any other transfer. There are Arab states in the vicinity… and it is clear that if the [Palestinian] Arabs are removed [to these states] this will improve their condition and not the contrary.”982 David Ben-Gurion, 1944
The purpose of Zionism was not to founder a state with a Jewish majority, but one which was almost exclusively Jewish. While numerically insignificant minorities could be tolerated, the purpose of the Zionist state was to accommodate the needs of its Jewish citizens.
By 2000 refugee numbers had increased substantially through both natural growth and the 1967 war. Numbering less than one million in 1949, there was close to four million refugees at the time the Camp David summit convened. During the final status talks there was great uncertainly about how many of these people would return to Israel if they were permitted to do so. A survey on the issue was not released until 2003 and found that only about 10 percent of refugees, or less than 400,000, would take up this option if
982 Quoted in Masalha 1992 p159
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it was provided to them983. Yet even if the GOI had known that a relatively small number of refugees would use their right of return, it is extremely doubtful that this knowledge would have changed Barak’s policy. This is because the Israeli leaders are as much concerned today as they were in 1949 about numbers. As explained in previous chapters, Israel is extremely sensitive about her demographics; if Israel loses its Jewish majority, and sizeable Jewish majority, the whole Zionist dream will collapse. Even without a new injection of Arab refugees, it has been projected that within twenty years Israel’s Jewish majority will be reduced from its current 81 percent to a mere 65 percent984. This figure would only decline further in future years so that the Jewish majority may one day be lost altogether. Rather than allowing the Palestinian refugees to return, the GOI has come to speak again of ‘transfer’985, just as its leaders did in the years prior to the Nakba.
The GOI’s policy regarding where the refugees should live also remained fundamentally consistent; that they should reside anywhere other than Israel. During 1949, the GOI suggested that the refugees should settle wherever it was they had ended up, or in other states in the Arab world, notably Iraq, as Chaim Weizmann had suggested to President Truman986. In 2000, Israel’s recommendations only changed slightly, this time also incorporating the Commonwealths of Australia and Canada987, without bothering to check with either Government whether this would be acceptable. At each conference the GOI was also willing to permit the refugees to reside in the parts of former Palestine not under its control. Though in the case of Camp David, where Barak was demanding control over the Palestinian state’s borders, it is unclear whether they would have allowed this in practice. At each conference, the fate of the refugees was not of terribly high concern to the GOI so long as they were kept out of Israel.
983Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research 984 Figure taken from Kimmerling 2003 p17, Kimmerling attributes the research to Arnon Sofer, a geographer at Haifa University. 985 Since the failure of Camp David, the concept of ‘transfer’, of both Palestinians living inside Israel and in the Occupied Territories, has been transformed from an idea only adopted by extremist elements to one which is now discussed in mainstream Israeli discourse. 986 President Weizmann to President Truman, 26 April 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/4-2649, FRUS p53 987 Shavit, 13 September 2001
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Israel’s policy stance at each conference was not just one of ‘no return’ but also of ‘no responsibility’. In each case Israel was assisted by the respective mediators, who never attempted to question how the refugees came to be refugees. This fact is particularly shocking in the case of Lausanne. The refugee crisis had only just occurred and there is no doubt that the Commissioners knew what the cause was. When Ben-Gurion and Comay denied responsibility for the problem, Mark Ethridge reported to his Secretary of State that: “I flatly told Ben Gurion and Comay [that] while [the] Commission was no tribunal to judge truth of contentions, I could not for [one] moment accept that statement in face of Jaffa, Deir Yassin, Haifa and all [the] reports that come to us from refugee organizations that new refugees are being created every day by repression and terrorism such as that being reported from Haifa… They are aware that world sentiment is being roused to some extent by plight of Arab refugees but they contend they are being subject to calumnies and vicious propaganda. I have answered that they are master propagandists of [the] world and that if Arabs had [one] tenth the geni us at it they would rouse public opinion to where it would engulf Israel in [a] wave of indignation, particularly in view of fact that [the] world has so greatly helped Israel to come into being.”988
Yet the PCC was also privy to far more information than mere “contention”. In fact the PCC held a special committee to investigate the massacre of 455 Arabs by Jewish forces in Dawaymek, a town three miles west of Hebron, releasing its report on 14 June 1949989. However, rather than using this knowledge to “rouse public opinion to where it would engulf Israel”, the US and the PCC merely ignored it in negotiations, depriving themselves of a valuable tool with which to force concessions from Israel.
The decision by the US and other members of the UN to refrain from widely publicising the dispossession of the Palestinian people was undoubtedly due in part to the role of the Holocaust in the creation of the Jewish state. Convinced that the establishment of a Zionist state was a “moral obligation”990, the US and other states were reticent to place the victims of Nazi Germany in the role of the aggressor. International horror at the
988 13 April 1949. Mr Mark F Ethridge to the Secretary of State, USNA 501.BB Pal/4-1349 989 The report can be found on the UN website – the report was brought to light by Ilan Pappè 2006 pp195- 198 990 In a 1948 report the NSC advised Truman that US support for the creation of a Jewish state was a ‘moral obligation’ (Benson 1997 p108)
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suffering endured by European Jewry simply eclipsed any potential sympathy for the victims of the Zionist enterprise.
Once the Israeli denial of responsibility for the creation of the refugees was allowed to evolve without challenge in 1949, it became an article of faith, not just within Israel but amongst the entire international community outside the Arab world. So ingrained has this myth become that Barak and his team adhered to it assiduously during Camp David, regardless of the fact that Israeli and Arab historians have proved beyond reasonable doubt the culpability of the GOI in this matter.
But there is almost certainly no amount of evidence that would be sufficient to change the GOI’s claim of ‘no responsibility’ due to the feared consequences of this acknowledgement. As Itamar Rabinovich predicted, any acceptance by Israel of ‘the right of return’ would suggest an ‘original sin’ which might lead to the posing of some very serious existential questions regarding Zionism’s essentially ethno-nationalist colonial foundations and therefore threaten to bring down the whole Zionist pack of cards. However, it is clear that Zionist ethics and understandings continues to underpin GOI behaviour today as much as it did at the State’s creation. For this reason the refugee issue is fundamentally irresolvable for the GOI. For Zionism simply cannot recognise the existence of a Palestinian people (whether they constitute a ‘nation’ or not) and will always search for a state which is ethnically ‘pure’, regardless of what that means for the lands indigenous inhabitants or other ethnic minorities.
The victims of Israel’s entrapment within Zionist ideology are the refugees. Rather than offer them any concern or sympathy, Zionism can only view them as an annoyance who constantly remind the world that there was a people living in Palestine before the Zionist enterprise and that these people still exist. Israel clearly needs to understand that the refugees will continue to exist as refugees until it is able to set aside its commitment to Zionism enough to work with them to find a solution which will end their misery.
The Arabs
The policy the Arabs pursued towards the refugee issue remained largely constant, but as in the case of the territorial issue, was diluted over the years to reflect the weakness of their relative position. At both Lausanne and Camp David, the Arab delegates based their
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negotiating position on GA Resolution 194. The resolution, which calls for the return of the refugees ‘at the earliest practicable date’, was no closer to being fulfilled in 2000 than it had been when it was passed in 1948. Nevertheless, the resolution remained the internationally-mandated solution to the refugee issue and the Palestinians therefore placed their faith in its authority.
At the beginning of the Lausanne Conference, the refugee issue possessed a sense of great urgency as the refugees faced the prospect of their first winter in the hastily constructed UN refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and what is now known as the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The PCC, including its most powerful member, the US, considered that the state of destitution in which the refugees were currently living should be ended as soon as possible with a significant amount being repatriated to their former homes within Israel. While the PCC and the US refrained from tabling an official proposal, the number of 250,000 was the number they considered to be acceptable991.
The Arab side never articulated a figure for repatriation at Lausanne because their first demand was that Israel accept the principle of return before they would be prepared to discuss practical arrangements. However, it is clear that the Arabs had something less than a full return in mind, with the Transjordanian delegate, Fawzi Mulki advising Ethridge that all the Arab delegations would agree to accept a portion of refugees, providing Israel first made a “satisfactory commitment”992. This procedural logic was echoed fifty years later by the Palestinian delegation at Camp David. Once again, the Palestinians insisted upon talking numbers only after Israel had accepted the principle of the right of return. However, once again the Palestinians made clear that they would accept a practical implementation of the right of return, in line with Israel’s demographic concerns993.
The major difference between the Arab position at Lausanne and Camp David regarding the refugee issue is that at Lausanne the Arab Governments were expecting Israel to accept a sizeable number of refugees while during the final status negotiations it was
991 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 16 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-1649. FRUS p1014 992 Fawzi Mulki also claimed that Iraq was also willing to accept some of the refugees. Mark F Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 28 May 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/5-2849, FRUS p2072 993 Ben-Ami 2001
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clear that the Palestinians were ready to accept an insignificant return of the refugee population. As in the territorial issue, the change in Arab position from Lausanne to Camp David was reflective of their weakened position. Whereas the Arab delegates at Lausanne represented sovereign states commanding large populations, trade and military forces, the Palestinians at Camp David represented a subjugated people who had fought for fifty years just for the right to be recognised.
The Palestinian position at Camp David was weakened further by the change in mood of the international community towards the refugee issue. After trying to bring about a change in the Israeli position throughout 1949, the international community largely gave up on the idea of repatriation to Israel and dropped it from its peacemaking agenda. As the months and years passed, the issue lost its urgency as the refugees passed from the world’s gaze into their miserable existences in the camps.
The passage of time also witnessed a complete turnaround in the US position. While at Lausanne the US actively supported Resolution 194 and exerted a great deal of pressure on Israel to implement it, Clinton and his team would not tolerate even a mention of it at Camp David. The US was now in complete agreement with the Zionist viewpoint and supported Israel in her claims that it was not feasible for her to repatriate any refugees other than on a small family-reunification basis. Sifting through the memoirs of the US delegates at Camp David it is impossible to find any demonstration of concern for the refugees comparable to that displayed by US officials in 1949; despite the fact that there are now four million of them and that a cursory visit to the camps would leave any visitor under no illusion regarding the squalor in which they are forced to live. The increasing disregard for their plight in the US political establishment was keenly felt at the negotiating table as the issue was transformed from a humanitarian problem to a political bargaining chip. In contrast to 1949, the world and its Superpower no longer cared about the refugees.
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Jerusalem
Israel
Similar to the territorial question, the issue of Jerusalem underwent a radical transformation between Lausanne and Camp David. Whereas at Lausanne the fate of the entire city of Jerusalem was under discussion, by 2000 it would only be the fate of Arab East Jerusalem which the ‘Question of Jerusalem’ was understood to denote. Israel’s opposition to the internationalisation of Jerusalem in 1949 had been allowed to prevail over time as she took continuous steps to place facts on the ground which would ‘justify’ her claim to the city. As in the case of Palestinian territory in general, only the part of Jerusalem that Israel had not conquered until 1967 was discussed in 2000. This fact is particularly striking, in that the international community – including the US – has never recognised Israel’s sovereignty over West Jerusalem and has actively opposed it through various UN resolutions and more concrete measures such as refusing to move Embassies to the disputed city. While the US has also refrained from moving its embassy to Jerusalem as a display of its ostensive commitment to the 1949 December resolution, it nevertheless conducted the Camp David talks on the presumption that Israel’s sovereignty over West Jerusalem was a given, as it did not form even an agenda item. Curiously, the US’ schizophrenic policy towards the question of Jerusalem in 2000 (and subsequently) was entirely overlooked (or ignored) by both of the interlocutors, their publics, and the entire international community.
Regardless of the geography of the issue changing, Israel’s position at each conference did not. In each she demanded full sovereignty over the area of Jerusalem she controlled994. In 1967 her attitude to East Jerusalem was identical to her previous attitude to the West of the city. She used the same policy of fait accomplis to establish her control there as she had done in the West. During the final status negotiations the GOI shifted its claims over the city by basing them around the need to recognise Israel’s
994 One of the myths circulated in the Israeli and US media following Camp David was that Barak had proposed to internationalize Jerusalem’s Holy Sites under the control of the UN Security Council (Charles Krauthammer, ‘Arafat’s war’, The Washington Post, 6 October 2000.
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authority over ‘the eternal and indivisible city of Jerusalem’. This was a particularly masterful piece of politicking on Israel’s behalf, as while she had never received international recognition of her control over West Jerusalem, she now based her claims on the assertion that East Jerusalem could not be ‘divided’ from its counterpart in the West. In other words, a notion of ‘reunification’ was used to retrospectively legitimise an entirely illegal land grab.
Israel was of course aided in this deception by the US, and even the Palestinians themselves. The Oslo document had allowed East Jerusalem to be treated separately from the issues of the occupied territories in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, when in fact it held exactly the same status in international law. This allowed the issues to also be treated separately during the permanent status talks. While even the US expected Israel to offer up something around 90 percent of the West Bank to a Palestinian state (not including the Jordan Valley which Israel would ‘lease’ indefinitely), it accepted that the Palestinians should not receive sovereignty over any part of East Jerusalem whatsoever. Even though the US and Israeli position moved slightly towards the end of final status talks through the Clinton Parameters, they were united in continuing to treat East Jerusalem as a completely separate issue from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, implying that the Palestinians possessed less rights to this area than they did to the other territories conquered in 1967.
Throughout Lausanne, Israel was unequivocal on the issue of Jerusalem. She would not accept anything other than full sovereignty of the area she controlled and even resisted a watered-down UN Resolution establishing international custodianship over the Holy Sites only, which the PCC and the US supported. Essentially, Israel would not tolerate any challenge to her sovereignty over the area of Jerusalem which she held and was willing to oppose the UN and the US to resist it.
During Camp David, Barak attempted to make an identical stance. While he would devolve some civil areas of authority to the Palestinians, he initially refused to consider the presence of a sovereign power in Jerusalem other than the State of Israel. That Barak was willing to consider devolving any authority at all was due to his determination to rid Israel of the burden of having to divert resources to Arab Jerusalemites. Once again,
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Barak was willing to transfer (limited) authority, but not sovereignty, to the Palestinians. Barak’s position did break down over the course of the final status talks and he was eventually willing to consider recognising Palestinian sovereignty over the Arab parts of East Jerusalem, though not the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount.
In both conferences, Israel based her position towards Jerusalem not only on the right of possession but on frankly mystical arguments. In 1949, the staunchly secular Ben-Gurion abstained from linking Jerusalem directly with religion but employed ethereal arguments to the effect that Jerusalem was the “heart of the Hebrew nation”995. Although also secular, Barak and his team did not hesitate to link their claims to the city with religious considerations. At each conference therefore, Israel attempted to lift the issue of Jerusalem out of a purely territorial debate to one over the historical yearnings and longings of the Jewish nation. The discussions were not therefore bound by the municipal borders of the ancient city but by over two thousand years of history.
At Lausanne Israel’s mystical claims were rejected, and the international community insisted that the city was of great importance to “the three world religions”996 and thus to a whole variety of the worlds’ citizens, and should thereby be placed under a special regime to be administered by the UN. The PCC and the US did not include this recommendation in its Draft Resolution only because the plan was unworkable in practice. They did however show their agreement with the international importance of Jerusalem through their continued support for the internationalisation of the city’s Holy Places.
By 2000 however, this claim had been dropped by Clinton and his staff, who were only interested in the importance of the city to the Christian and Jewish religions. Clinton and his team assumed that Christian interests in the city would best be served through the recognition of Jewish control over the entire city. This view had transformed radically from that taken fifty years earlier but those years had witnessed the proliferation of the concept of a ‘Judeo-Christian culture’ within the US. The concept was created to suggest a commonality of both history and values by the two religions, while completely ignoring
995 Quoted in Shalom 2002 p70 996 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194, 11 December 1948.
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the fact that Islam is an integral part of ‘Judeo-Christian’ culture and shares the same fundamental values997. Clinton speaks of his former pastor’s dying words to him that, “God will never forgive you if you don’t stand by Israel”; as he believed that “God intended the Jews to be at home in the Holy Land”998. Throughout his memoirs it is obvious that Clinton fully accepted the notion of Christian and Jewish interests opposed to the Muslim ‘other’. This allowed Israel’s claims to the city of Jerusalem to illicit the full support of the US, as they joined Israel in deriding Muslim interests in the city as inferior to that of the ‘Judeo-Christian’ world.
The Arabs
In 1949, with the exception of Jordan, the Arab delegates adopted the international consensus that Jerusalem should be accorded a special status and be administered by the international community. They did not insist on maintaining Muslim control over the city, despite its having been under continuous Muslim rule since 1260999. The Arab governments even went so far as to oppose control over the Eastern part of the city by the Jordanians for the same reason that they opposed Israeli control over the West. The Arab delegates, that is to say, did not employ arguments based on the centrality of Jerusalem to the Muslim people, but on the centrality of the city to all three world religions.
The Arab delegates attending Lausanne had of course never been in possession of Jerusalem and the fate of the city did not directly affect their citizens, so that their primary interest in the city was maintaining Muslim access to the Holy Sites for pilgrimage purposes. So long as Muslims around the world could come to Jerusalem to pray at the Al Aqsa Mosque, the Arab governments would be content.
By 2000 the option of internationalising the holy city was off the table as sovereignty became the only point of discussion1000. The Palestinians followed their counterparts in 1949 by aligning themselves with the international consensus. At the time this consensus
997 Barak perpetrated this view concept when he accused the Palestinians of being part of a [Muslim] culture in which ‘to tell a lie…creates no dissonance’ in comparison to the ‘Judeo-Christian’ where people suffer from the telling of lies (Morris, 13 June 2002. 998 Clinton 2004 p353 999 The Mamluks defeated the Mongols in 1260 to re-establish Muslim rule over the city. The Mamluks were eventually defeated by the Muslim Ottomans in 1517 1000 Ideas such as ‘no sovereignty’ over the Holy Sites floated by Egypt and ‘Divine sovereignty’ as floated by US were considered but ultimately not-embraced by either party.
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was that East Jerusalem was no different in status to the West Bank or Gaza Strip and that Israel was in illegal occupation of all three territories. However, unlike their counterparts at Lausanne, the Palestinian delegation at Camp David insisted that they be awarded full sovereignty over Arab East Jerusalem, in line with the effective sovereignty Israel had exercised over West Jerusalem since 1948.
The claims of the Arab delegates at Lausanne and Camp David had in fact changed radically as had the situation in Jerusalem. With Israel controlling the West and proclaiming it as their capital city, the Palestinians were given a powerful precedent to guide them in constructing their claim to the city. Rather than challenging Israel’s right to West Jerusalem, they chose instead at Camp David to use Israel’s control over the West to justify their claims to the East.
While the Jerusalem issue did not attract much attention from the Arab delegates at Lausanne, at Camp David it became the central issue. Although there were certainly practical aspects to their claims, such as providing Arab governance to the majority Arab population in East Jerusalem, it was also driven by deeply symbolic considerations, similar to those behind Israel’s claims to the city in 1949. Just as Ben-Gurion identified the need to control the ‘heart of the Hebrew nation’ in order to provide legitimacy to the creation of a Jewish state (both within and outside of the worldwide Jewish community), so too did Arafat fifty years later realise that the proclamation of a capital in Jerusalem would give the future Palestinian state a powerful identity which could galvanise strong national attachments and forge a new national consciousness. For Arafat in 2000, as much as Ben-Gurion in 1949, Jerusalem was the key to uniting his people around the embryonic state.
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Desire for a peace agreement
Israel
That Israel would have liked to broker a peace deal at both Lausanne and Camp David cannot be questioned. In 1949 an agreement would have brought Israel the peace it needed to pursue its state-building enterprise without worrying about the actions and intentions of hostile neighbours. An agreement at Camp David would have allowed Israel to divest itself of responsibility for the Palestinians residents living in the occupied territories, while legitimating the settlements it had built on these lands since 1967. The benefits of each agreement to Israel are self-evident, yet the question remains as to just how much Israel wanted the agreement and what price she was prepared to pay to achieve one.
At Lausanne Israel did not place a particularly high value on peace, believing that security would come first through immigration and only afterwards through peace with her neighbours1001. The GOI’s prioritizing of immigration meant that she was intent on retaining all the land she held and on resisting any sizeable return of refugees. But these requirements were diametrically opposed to the concessions Israel would have needed to make peace, forcing her very early on to conclude that an agreement on acceptable terms might be difficult or impossible. As Ben-Gurion noted in his diary during the conference; “there is no point chasing after peace as the price demanded would be too high”1002.
Even if the Arab delegates had capitulated, had accepted the armistice lines as the permanent borders and had agreed to resettle the refugees in their own countries, it is still not certain that Israel would have signed up to an agreement. For the armistice boundaries, while far exceeding what Israel had been granted in the Partition Resolution, still fell far short of Israel’s territorial ambitions. In fact, it is more likely that Israel would have placed more demands on the table, such as the right to make further territorial claims on Syria and Lebanon “at some point in the future” as she insisted at
1001 Burdett to Acheson, 28 February 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/2-2849. FRUS pp775-776 1002 Quoted in Segev 1986 p35
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Lausanne1003. What is certain is that Israel would only have considered signing a peace agreement if almost all of her demands were fulfilled.
Barak’s search for peace in 2000 was a little more earnest. Unlike Ben-Gurion who thought Israel could wait for peace, Barak was conscious that the clock was ticking on the Jewish state and that a final status agreement could potentially stop it. If Israel did not establish self-governance for its Arab population, it might lose its Jewish majority at sometime in the future, making its claim to be a ‘Jewish democracy’ impossible.
The second factor which prompted Barak’s interest in peace talks was his so-called ‘iceberg’ theory. Israel could no longer block peace talks whilst maintaining its painfully cultivated image as the peace-loving victim of Arab aggression and intransigence. In order to maintain the sympathy and support of the international community and to stop Israeli society from fragmenting around the peace issue, Barak believed that the world had to witness Israel making a highly visible effort to achieve peace. If peace was not found, at least the world would see that Israel had done its best and support her in her continued struggle against the Palestinian people1004.
However, while the GOI’s peace advances were c ert ainly more genuine in 2000, they were subject to the same restrictions as in 1949. It would not sign an agreement if it; 1) curtailed Israel’s territorial interests; and 2) involved a large return of refugees. As in 1949, these requirements, in addition to the GOI’s determination to keep hold of Jerusalem, formed Israel’s ‘red lines’ which she was not prepared to cross for the purpose of an agreement.
In his speech following the breakup of Camp David, Barak made an impassioned observation that: “there cannot be peace at any price, but also that there cannot be peace without paying a price – a painful, difficult and heartbreaking price”1005. However, the ‘heartbreaking’ price which Barak was willing to pay to forge an agreement was not much higher than Ben-Gurion‘s price fifty years earlier. Both Ben-Gurion and Barak offered minor concessions throughout negotiations, but never did they deviate from their
1003 Ethridge to the Secretary of State, 20 May 1949, USNA 501.BB Pal/5-2049. FRUS pp1036-1037 1004 See Shavit, 6 September 2002. Before Camp David, Barak made clear that a failure would lead to a new conflict, commenting that, ‘if it does not succeed we will be headed for a conflict with the Palestinians (Nina Gilbert, ‘Barak: Arafat not ready for peace’, The Jerusalem Post, 4 July 2000). 1005 Barak, 25 July 2000
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‘red lines’ which were underpinned by territorial expansionism and a steely resolve to deny the right of return for the Palestinian refugees.
The ambivalence of the GOI towards a peace agreement in 1949 was equally felt in 2000, with both leaders toying with the idea of peace but ultimately deciding it was not worth the necessary concessions. While time considerations were clearly more on Barak’s mind than they had been on Ben-Gurion’s, he was not overwhelmed by any real sense of urgency. After all, a few more years would help Israel to further consolidate her position by building more and more settlements and dispossessing more and more Palestinians of their land and homes. The building of the ‘separation barrier’ or ‘apartheid wall’ is a powerful example of how Israel has used its time since 2000 to do just this. Barak’s appreciation that every piece of Palestinian territory he grabbed now would only benefit Israel’s future negotiating position seriously immobilised his search for peace in that he could never entirely commit himself one way or the other.
What is striking when studying Lausanne and Camp David is the relentless consistency in the Israeli attitude towards the Palestinians. At each conference Israel refused to acknowledge that the Palestinians may have any legitimate claim to the lands of Mandatory Palestine and so in each case looked upon them as no more than beggars with their hands out. In each conference, Israel also refused to acknowledge, let alone demonstrate remorse, for the fact that its state-building enterprise had set forth the almost total destruction of Palestinian existence within their indigenous lands. The GOI’s contempt for Palestinian Arabs has echoed throughout the decades and has seemingly only strengthened, with Ben-Gurion never officially showing quite the same level of disdain towards Palestinians as Barak did fifty years later. Locked within Zionist ideology, which is arguably incapable of viewing Palestinians as equals, the GOI may never be able to forge a legitimate agreement with its ‘neighbours’.
The Arabs
The Arabs present at both Lausanne and Camp David were undoubtedly intent on reaching a peace accord. At each conference they were looking for an agreement around the same parameters; that of international law. In 1949, such an agreement would wipe away the catastrophe of 1948 while in 2000 it would allow the horrors of 1967 to be
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remedied. At each conference the Arab delegates held rather different ideas on how they would reach agreement. At Lausanne the Arab states were intent on extracting an imposed settlement, while during the final status talks Arafat’s interest was in a negotiated settlement, albeit one with strong US input.
The Arab governments of 1949 desired an agreement but they were not prepared to sign what would amount to a document of surrender to achieve it. While they were keen to bring peace to their borders in order to prevent future unrest within their own populations (and receive funding which they thought would be forthcoming from the US), they had to at least appear to have negotiated from a position of strength. Since they had no such strength, in reality an imposed solution represented their only way out. It would allow them to direct all popular discontent at the US or UN, while gaining what they assumed would be enormously favourable terms. For they were aware that any agreement which the Big Powers or the UN offered would be based around UN resolutions 181 and 194. Of course peace would come at a ‘price’ – the recognition of the Zionist state on their borders and the acceptance of ‘resettlement’ on their territories of a number of the Palestinian refugees. However, it was clear that the price which would be demanded of them in an imposed agreement would be far less than what Israel was insisting upon, and might even be able to be sold as a ‘victory’ over the GOI.
By 2000, Arab interest in an imposed settlement had waned. Aware that US positions had diametrically changed so that they almost completely mirrored Zionist claims, the Palestinians accepted the need for a negotiated solution. As opposed to Lausanne, the Palestinians could only hope to push a settlement based upon UN resolutions through negotiation rather than a Big Power imposed agreement. While the Arab ambition to see UN resolutions implemented had remained constant from Lausanne to Camp David, the change in position by the American superpower had caused them to change course. As the far less powerful interlocutor, the step to support a negotiated settlement could not have been an easy one for the Palestinians as they were aware that they did not possess the stature to negotiate Israel into what they considered a ‘just’ solution. However, the fact that they took the decision demonstrates how far Arab trust in the US had eroded between 1949 and 2000.
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Although the Arab governments would have liked to have concluded the conflict in 1949, they were aware that they could easily live without one as it would not affect their day-to- day lives (other than having to quickly rebuild their armed forces). The position of the Palestinians in 2000 was entirely different. They did not want to go back to their daily lives but to change them radically. The Palestinians did not just want peace; they needed peace. Negotiations were not just one option, but the only option the Palestinians had at their disposal if they were to recover lost lands and realise self-governance. This knowledge made the stakes for Arafat and his team far higher, as they could not just walk away without facing the prospect of an even worse future.
The Arab commitment to peace was questioned by the GOI after each conference. Israeli accusations of Arab intransigence failed to gain much currency after Lausanne because the claims were not substantiated by the UN (through the PCC) or the US, which both viewed Israel as the main obstacle to an agreement. However, in 2000 Clinton not only substantiated but openly backed Barak’s accusations that Arafat and his team did not really want peace. The unified US/Israeli position meant that this time the Arabs were viewed internationally as the cause of the failure, even though their position was not substantially different to 1949. It is especially interesting that the Arab commitment to peace was questioned far more in 2000 than in 1949 despite Arafat clearly being far more intent on achieving a peace agreement than had his counterparts at Lausanne.
The Palestinians need for peace induced them to make many concessions, the first of which was the forgoing of 78 percent of their former lands. During the final status talks the Palestinians went even further, accepting Israeli sovereignty over settlements, including those in East Jerusalem, the need for security arrangements which threatened to severely limit the future sovereignty of the Palestinian state, and the return of only an insignificant number of refugees into Israel.
But even Arafat’s (and the Palestinians’) desperate need for peace had its limits. For just as the Arab delegates were not interested in signing a document of surrender in 1949, neither was Arafat in 2000. In both cases this would most certainly have led to regime overthrow and an ‘unstable’ peace lacking both legitimacy and longevity. For the Palestinians the signing of a clearly ‘unjust’ peace agreement at Camp David was
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potentially far more calamitous than for their Arab counterparts at Lausanne, for it would have solidified the occupation and doomed the Palestinian people to live forever under the yoke of Israeli rule. This may have been an acceptable arrangement to the Americans, but for Arafat it was simply not an option.
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Chapter 11
Conclusions: The Lessons of History
In this section I will examine the lessons which the Lausanne and Camp David conferences can teach to assist future peacemaking efforts. The failure of each conference implies that it is possible only to learn negative lessons. Nonetheless, by viewing the peace efforts as two parts of the same story, albeit separated by fifty years, they may together teach us broader lessons which may be instructive for future peace attempts.
I will examine the lessons which may be drawn by all the protagonists; Israel, the Arabs and the mediator, as ultimately it will be the interaction and interplay between these three parties which will determine the future of the Middle East.
Israel
Arguably, the primary reason for the failure of both the Lausanne Conference and the Camp David Summit was Israel’s persistent refusal to attach a high value to peace. During the Lausanne Conference the value Israel placed on an agreement was extremely low, almost zero. By Camp David, the value had risen slightly due to Israel’s demographic fears, but it still fell exceedingly short of the price which was needed to reach an agreement. This prevented Israel from committing herself fully to negotiations as she was satisfied in each case with the status quo (and in fact preferred it) and was also comfortable with the prospect of a protracted conflict.
Perhaps the single most useful lesson to be learned about future peacemaking efforts is that Israel must first understand that she needs peace before talks commence, so that she will come to the table prepared to pay the price. Sadat realised this when he organised his attack on Israel in 1973 in order to pave the way for peace negotiations. This strategy proved enormously successful. However I would certainly not advocate
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another invasion of the Zionist state. In any case, threatening Israel’s security is unlikely to achieve much result, given that the US would intervene to defend her (in the extremely unlikely event that Israel’s formidable military could not adequately fend off an attack itself)1006. The Palestinians of course, lacking an army, do not have the option of an attack and have instead attempted to force Israel into submission through terrorist acts.
Yet instead of violence a more constructive approach is needed. This approach must change the Zeitgeist within Israel, so that the Israeli mainstream decides that though they may not necessarily need peace, they nevertheless want it. It is difficult to imagine what would produce such a change in Zeitgeist, which would indeed entail an enormous shift in the Israeli mainstream; other than an honest confrontation with Israel’s past. If the people of Israel were to sift through the many myths which permeate their history and conduct a truthful examination of the foundations of the State, the process would not just be cathartic to the nation but would inevitably produce a spirit of reconciliation towards their Palestinian neighbours. For only when Israel faces the victims of its state-building enterprise will it truly appreciate why it should cede land to the Palestinian people and allow them to exercise their right to self-determination.
However, most Israeli’s have been extremely reluctant to conduct such an exercise and the ‘new historians’ who have begun this task by documenting Israel’s history1007 have been attacked within Israel for their work1008. While the facts regarding Israel’s birth are now in the public domain, the GOI and most of its people simply refuse to
1006 The extent of this commitment was demonstrated during the Democrat Primaries Campaign, where Hilary Clinton promised that the US would “totally obliterate” Iran if it used nuclear weapons to attack Israel (Patrick Healy, ‘Clinton clearly outduels Obama in Pennsylvania), in The New York Times, 23 April 2008). 1007 For a brief overview of the main works which have been published by the ‘new historians’, see Benny Morris (1987) The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Benny Morris (1999) Righteous Victims: a History of the Arab/Israeli Conflict, 1881-1999, NewYork, Knopf; Ilan Pappé (1992) The Making of the Arab/Israeli Conflict, 1947-51, New York, St Martins Press; Ilan Pappé (1999) The Israel/Palestine Question, London and New York, Routledge; Ilan Pappé (2007) 2nd Ed. The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Oxford, Oneworld Publications; Michael Shalev (1992) Labour and the Political Economy in Israel, Oxford, Oxford University Press; Zeev Sternhell (1998) The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of Israel and the Arab World, New York, WW Norton; Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim (2001) The War for Palestine, Rewriting the History of 1948, with an afterword by Edward Said, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Avi Shlaim (1988) Collusion across the Jordan : King Abdullah, the Zionist movement, and the partition of Palestine, New York, Columbia University Press 1008 Ilan Pappé, the most courageous and therefore reviled of the new historians, has referred to himself as “the most hated Israeli in Israel”. Pappé 29 November 1999
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address them, so that the dispossession of the Palestinian Arabs has become the elephant in the corner of Israeli discourse.
The general reluctance in Israel to address the 1948 events has generally been shared by Israel’s peace movement. They view the otherwise high moral values of the Zionist state as corrupted by the occupation and the evil acts it forces on the GOI1009. The movement, like the broader Israeli Left, entirely separates the occupation from the events of 1948 and Zionism itself. Edward Said has referred to this tendency as a form of schizophrenia, where the Left aim for peace while asserting that there was nothing wrong with what happened in 19481010. Their denial is not just their refusal to acknowledge the ethnic-cleansing of Palestine, but that 1948, and the occupation which began in 1967, were both inherent products of Zionism.
It is the honest re-examination of Zionism which will be central to Israel’s exhumation of its past. For it is the Zionist ideology on which the state was foundered and continues to be governed which more than any other factor precludes a peace agreement. As an ethnic-national ideology, Zionism never did have room for the Arabs living on the lands it claimed for itself. Zionism was therefore always an ideology rooted in denial and dispossession – denial of the presence of an indigenous Palestinian population and the necessary dispossession of these peoples when they refused to simply melt away. The effect of this ideology on the conflict was as relevant in the 2000 peace talks as it was in 1949. Israel simply refused to see why it should ‘give’ land to a people whose existence it has systematically been trained to deny. While the solution to this dilemma in 1948 was expulsion, by 2000 the Israeli consensus had changed to penning Palestinians up in cantons, which would in effect serve as de facto prisons, exactly as Gaza has today. To move away from these ‘solutions’ and towards one which will recognise not just Palestinians but Palestinian rights, the very foundations of Zionism will need to be deconstructed and rebuilt in a far more enlightened manner.
Rather than viewing an honest discussion of Israel’s past as a potential harbinger to the end of the State of Israel, Israelis must see it as an opportunity to close the 1948 file and move on to a better future. While people such as Itamar Rabinovich quiver at the prospect of Israel’s ‘original sin’ being discussed at negotiations, it is only this
1009 See Tom Segev 2002 ppVII – XIII 1010 Said 2003 p200
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discussion which can lead to genuine peace, not just with the Palestinian people but with the Arab world in general.
Israel is extremely mindful of the need to confront the past when campaigning for European countries to take responsibility for their role in the Holocaust. While the process was a difficult one, the establishment of such institutions as Holocaust Museums were not just therapeutic for the victims of the murderous Nazi regime, but also for the states which collaborated in the slaughter of Europe’s Jews. In contrast however, the GOI does not allow its Arab citizens to erect Nakba Museums or Memorials, and even bans them from demonstrating on what has become Nakba Day (which falls on Israel’s Independence Day1011). As Palestinian author Nur Masalha notes, reconciliation in the Middle East rests on the acknowledgement of the Nakba by the GOI, including the establishment of institutions such as Nakba Memorials to honour the victims of Israel’s statehood. Only once such steps have been taken will the past no longer present an obstacle to peace1012.
Israel’s desire for peace should not just extend to the Palestinian people but the entire Arab world. Israel is located in the Middle East, surrounded on all sides by Arab nations. While the GOI prefers to locate itself culturally within Europe, it simply cannot continue to deny the truth and implications of its geographic location. Rather than pursuing extremely aggressive policies towards its Arab neighbours, Israel would do better to try to build bridges to the Arab world for mutual benefit. The GOI’s hostility to those she engaged with at Lausanne, such as Lebanon and Syria, has only increased since 1949, and has also extended to regimes not present in Lausanne such as Iran and Iraq1013. It is difficult to see how a peace agreement at Camp David would have led to a regional peace while Israel continues to behave in this manner. Rather than looking out and seeing only enemies, the GOI could at least try to stretch out its hands in peace to see if somebody responds.
A fundamental change in Israeli perceptions is needed not just to create a sense of reconciliation but also to curtail Israel’s territorial appetite and induce her to give up
1011 Israel banned Nakba Day demonstrations during its 60th Anniversary while encouraging its Jewish citizens to celebrate Israel’s birth on the same day, Gideon Levy, ‘You have to be sad, then happy’, Ha’aretz, 4 May 2008 1012 Masalha 2005 pp4-8 1013 The Israeli media and Government were extremely vociferous in their championing of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and are currently pursuing a similar course in the US’ confrontation with Iran over their nuclear program. Israel has also consistently advocated sanctions against Syria and has invaded Lebanon on several occasions, most recently in 2006.
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the dream of ‘Greater Israel’. The territorial issue was central to the failure of both Lausanne and Camp David. In each case, the GOI simply refused to give up sovereignty over territory it currently controlled in line with Israel’s historical dream of realising ‘Greater Israel’. Barak attended Camp David because he knew that Israel could not continue to rule over the millions of Palestinians inhabiting the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. However, his ‘offer’ demonstrated that he was little closer to internalising the need to give up the dream of ‘Greater Israel’ than Ben-Gurion had been in 1949. Resolution 242 drew a direct link between peace and territory, but it has failed to make Israel understand that she cannot have peace and exercise sovereignty over the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.
If the GOI does move towards a peace based upon reconciliation and territorial concessions it will encounter much opposition from Jewish extremists, particularly within the settler movement. Rather than allowing these elements to undermine negotiations or determine its negotiating positions, the GOI must be willing to openly confront these groups in order to bring the majority of Israelis with them on their journey towards peace. Allowing an open discussion of Israel’s past would undoubtedly aid them in this task, because these groups continuously invoke historic myths to mobilise widespread opposition. The struggle between the GOI and extremists would be a bitter one and to date the Israeli leadership have shown little appetite to enter into such a confrontation. In fact, they have encouraged violent settler behaviour since 1967 and have nurtured settlers to become the formidable force which they represent today. However, the IDF’s repression of Palestinian demonstrators shows that it is capable of controlling settlers, and this may be essential if Israel is to be able to achieve a peace accord.
The GOI’s task of creating a momentum towards peace within Israel would also be greatly aided if they were to lead their citizen’s out of what can be described as their collective ‘siege mentality’. This mentality, which is, to some degree, a consequence of the Holocaust, has often been manipulated by Israel throughout its existence to provoke support for its policies. As Norman Finkelstein has noted; “The Holocaust proved to be the perfect weapon for deflecting criticism of Israel”1014. By presenting itself as a small, embattled nation, constantly under siege by a murderous Arab world, the GOI has been enormously successful in winning international sympathy, even
1014 Finkelstein 2000 p30
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while dispossessing Arab lands and people. However, by continually reinforcing this mentality within its population the GOI makes more and more difficult any real move towards a peace based upon reconciliation. For the ‘siege mentality’ skews Israeli’s view of the conflict and precludes them from showing magnanimity or even fair- mindedness at the peace table. It would be much more beneficial to its Jewish citizenry if the GOI were to present Israel for what it is; a strong and successful nation which is now a permanent part of the Middle East. Rather than feeling under siege, Israel’s population should feel confident and proud of all she has achieved. A peace agreement will not compromise Israel’s future and is a natural step for a fully-fledged member of the international community.
The path Israel must take if it is ever to appreciate the value of peace will be a long one. It must accept not only the historical narrative of the Palestinian people, but also Israel’s place in the Middle East. The study of Lausanne and Camp David demonstrates that Israel had not even started on this path fifty years after the failure of the PCC. The historian Tony Judt has described Israel as “The country that wouldn’t grow up”. As he puts it; “Seen from the outside, Israel still comports itself like an adolescent: consumed by a brittle confidence in its own uniqueness; certain that no one “understands” it and everyone is “against” it; full of wounded self-esteem, quick to take offense and quick to give it. Like many adolescents Israel is convinced - and makes a point of aggressively and repeatedly asserting - that it can do as it wishes, that its actions carry no consequences and that it is immortal.”1015
The fifty years of stagnation which separate Camp David from Lausanne must be arrested. It is time for Israel to grow up and take her place both as a neighbour to the Palestinians and the Arab world and as a state in the wider international community. A truthful confrontation with Zionism and its past is the only option for Israel if she is to achieve peace and the security it will bring her. The elephant in the corner cannot be ignored indefinitely, and as Ilan Pappè has noted; “such a painful journey into the past is the only way forward if we want to create a better future for us all.”1016
The Arabs
One of Arafat’s greatest difficulties during Camp David was his incapacity to offer very much in return for peace. As a stateless, military-less, financially dependent, and
1015 Tony Judt, ‘The Country that wouldn’t grow up’, Ha’aretz, 5 May 2006. 1016 Pappè 2007 pXVII
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often friendless people, Israel felt very little real pressure to come to an agreement. The enormously asymmetrical relationship which exists between the Palestinians and Israel meant that Barak was very much aware that Israel’s existence would hardly be affected by the absence of peace. The only tangible advantage for Israel in relinquishing its claims over the occupied territories is the financial and diplomatic opportunities it would bring by opening up the Arab world. These opportunities were clear to Israel in 1949 and brought it to the peace table. However Ben-Gurion eventually concluded that a peace agreement would not assuage the Arab state’s desire for revenge, and was therefore worth very little1017. Similarly in 2000, the Palestinians, by not organising the Arab states into a coherent position prior to the conference (perhaps largely because they were not given time), failed to impress upon Israel that an agreement struck with them would forge the way to a comprehensive agreement with the rest of the Arab world.
The Palestinians need for broader Arab backing in order to induce Israel to make peace has now been resolved through the 2002 Saudi Peace Initiative (also called the Arab Peace Initiative). This proposal, which was reaffirmed in 2007, offers Israel recognition and permanent peace with all Arab countries in return for her withdrawal from lands captured in 1967. It also calls for the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital and a ‘just’ solution to the refugee problem1018. Yet even this proposal, which offers a genuine end to the conflict, has not been enough to encourage Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and her settlement drive continues unabated.
Unfortunately for the Palestinians, there is very little more than can do to reach an agreement and establish their state other than to patiently wait for Israel to change her positions. The Palestinian leadership, whether it is Hamas or Fatah, have very limited opportunity to bring pressure on Israel other than to lobby more powerful actors than themselves, namely the US, to force Israel into talks. The constant lobbying by Palestinian representatives has recently won some support within the Obama Administration and it is possible that this will bear some fruit, however it is very early days yet.
1017 Shalom 2002 p188 1018 The English translation of the Arab Peace Initiative can be found on the al-Bab website, ‘The Arab Peace Initiative, 2002’
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While stronger actors persuade Israel to enter into serious peace negotiations and re- think their intransigent positions, the Palestinians must continue to keep open a space which will allow for the peaceful coexistence of Israel and Palestine sometime in the future. Like every colonised people seeking an existence in a post-colonial future, the Palestinians must prepare themselves to move on from the injustices of the past. This task has not been aided by Israel’s continuing violence against their people, particularly in Gaza. Yet whenever the day does come when Israel extends the olive branch to the Palestinians, they have little choice but to be there to grasp it.
The Palestinians ability to keep open a space for peace would be greatly enhanced by an Israeli acknowledgement of its role in the creation of the refugee problem and the corresponding devastation and dispossession of the Palestinian people. For it is unlikely that the Palestinians will ever be able to fully close the Nakba file while they feel that Israel has not taken responsibility for the acts it perpetrated against their people at the time of its creation. In Australia recently the Federal Government finally apologised for its appalling treatment of the Aboriginal people at the time of White Australia’s birth. The process was cleansing for both white Australians and Aboriginals and is seen as a powerful tool in reconciling the two peoples so they may put the past behind them and face their future united. If Israel ever does embark on a similar process it is vital that the Palestinians also be prepared to work in a cooperative and constructive manner with the Zionist state. Finding a shared narrative of the Jewish and Arab experiences – not just in the period spanning 1947 to 1949 but the past one hundred years – would provide a powerful basis on which to forge a genuine peace agreement which would do far more than merely demarcate boundaries.
In order to fully contribute to this process, the Palestinians will also need to confront their own history and role in the tragedy which befell them. Rather than viewing themselves exclusively as victims, the Palestinians would do better to search for a fuller understanding of their part in the history of Palestine. This history is littered with Palestinian actions which have achieved nothing other than furthered Palestinian misery. It is a history in which Palestinians have often been slow to appreciate emerging realities and even slower to develop effective strategies to deal with them. It is a history of obstinacy, incompetency and failure. The recent slide into factionalism within the Palestinian community is an unfortunately development which
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only provides Israel with another excuse to avoid peace talks. Unity must somehow be found if Palestinians are to be able to reach peace with their neighbours and build an effective and viable state.
The Palestinian leadership will have a pivotal role to play on the road to peace. It must nurture a mood of forgiveness within its community so that statehood really will be seen as a new beginning. Essential to achieving this goal is that the Palestinian leadership unify around peace and resist any attempt to embroil a peace agreement in internal Palestinian politics. Hamas and Fatah must form a cohesive position and bring their followers with them. If not, it appears more than likely that the independence generations of Palestinians have dreamed of will be squandered in pointless internecine fighting which threatens to divide the future state, an outcome not unlike the occupation arrangements established through Oslo.
The mediator
As Israel is a far more powerful entity than the stateless Palestinian people it is difficult to imagine bilateral talks producing a ‘just’ agreement which would genuinely end the conflict. The Oslo Accord which was reached through bilateral negotiations certainly suggests this conclusion. The inclusion of a third party is therefore necessary, and as Avi Shlaim notes; The asymmetry in power between Israel and the Palestinians is such that a voluntary agreement between the parties is simply unattainable. A third party is needed to push Israel into a settlement, and that third party can only be the United States.1019
While the role the Clinton team played during the final status talks was far from that of an ‘honest broker’ and in fact had a largely destructive influence on the negotiations, it would appear that the involvement of the US in peace talks, as Israel’s closest and strongest ally, is necessary to extract meaningful concessions from the Zionist state. The central role the US played during the Lausanne Conference as the most powerful member of the PCC also points to this conclusion. The US’ superpower status, which fifty years did not alter, combined with its close relationship with Israel, mean that it is uncontested in its position of leverage and influence over each party. As this analysis has discovered, the positions of the parties were, and
1019 Shlaim 2004 p38
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remain, simply too far apart to be dragged together without a strong mediator to extract the necessary concessions.
However, the total alignment of the US with Israel means that the US is no longer capable of behaving as an impartial adjudicator. The period when the US even- handedly exerted pressure in order to reach a fair settlement (as it did during the Lausanne talks) is over. Rather than allowing the US to use the mediator function to act as “Israel’s lawyer”1020, other parties holding more impartial credentials must be permitted a genuine role in the mediation of the conflict. Shlomo Ben-Ami has called for international involvement in the dispute to replace the unilateralist US approach1021. The involvement of the international community, through such groups as the EU and the UN, would reinsert legitimacy to the role of mediator which the actions of the US have largely destroyed. If Ben-Ami’s calls are realised, the mediator role will have come full circle to Lausanne where the UN assumed the key mediating position.
Yet even with international mediation, the US would need to remain actively involved, as it did throughout the Lausanne talks. However, the policy of the US must change substantially if it is contribute positively to peace efforts. As former President Jimmy Carter has recently commented, if the US is to effectively perform its essential mediatory role in the dispute it must desist from appearing to be “in the pocket” of either side by offering unconditional knee-jerk support1022. Carter warns that if the US is ever to achieve the neutrality needed for successful mediation, Administration officials must resist the powerful influence of the pro-Israel lobby1023. In this analysis Carter is absolutely correct. The policies of AIPAC and other groups which comprise the pro-Israel lobby must be resolutely challenged and prevented from automatically dictating US Middle East policy. This will involve questioning the many assumptions on which AIPAC operates. These assumptions include; that Israel is constantly on the brink of annihilation; that Israel only ever acts in ‘defence’; that the Palestinians are out to destroy Israel; that all acts of Palestinian resistance
1020 This is the term Clinton peace team member, Aaron Miller used to describe the US role at Camp David, see Indyk et al 2005 1021 Ben-Ami 2007 1022 Carter 2007 p253. Carter’s advice appears to be supported by the vast majority of US citizens, with a recent poll finding that 71% of US respondents did not think that the US should take sides in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. WorldPublicOpinion.org, ‘International Poll: Most publics--including Americans - oppose taking sides in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’, 1 July 2008. 1023 Carter 2007 p253-254
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against occupation are acts of terrorism; and that these acts are inspired by Islamic fundamentalism or hostile third parties such as Iran and Syria, rather than the occupation itself.
Challenging these assumptions will necessarily entail treating Israel as the US would any other state. Rather than according the Zionist state ‘special’ status, whether it is due to Hitler’s crimes; a belief in scripture; or a conception of shared history and values, the US must base its treatment of Israel on the actions of the GOI. Crucially, the US must divorce the above considerations from its Middle East policy and no longer enable them to distort the search for peace in ways which are harmful to both the US and Israel. Clearly, the US has a long way to go to achieve this aim and necessary to its achievement will be an open debate within the US on the facts surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict. Just as both Palestinians and Israelis must confront the past honestly in order to slay the myths which continually frustrate peace attempts, so too must America. An open debate in the US would not only allow Americans to fully appreciate the contours of the conflict, and therefore the options for a just agreement, but would also allow them to appreciate their own role in the creation and prolongation of the dispute which might enable them to bring a great deal more depth and understanding to the negotiating table.
Ultimately, the US must desist from unilaterally trying to impose a solution based on its ‘special relationship’ with Israel, and accept the international consensus (which is essentially two peoples living side-by-side in peace within the 4 June 1967 borders). This will involve confronting Israel’s policy of fait accomplis and making it clear that the US does not accept Israel’s attempts to unilaterally dictate its own borders. If Israel does continue to preclude the possibility of a viable Palestinian state through the establishment of yet more ‘facts on the ground’, the US must keep open the concept of a bi-national state in all of the lands of Mandatory Palestine. This option was historically favoured by Palestinians and must be kept on the table if Israel is not capable of seriously accepting the existence of two states for two peoples.
However, even if the US defies the pro-Israel lobby by redefining the ‘special relationship’ and charts an impartial course through the conflict while also working alongside the international community to reach a just settlement, the example of Lausanne demonstrates that even this may not be enough to bring the parties to agreement. It is the yawning gap between the sides which remains unbridged. While
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most admit that the final status discussions throughout 2000 left the sides closer than they had ever been, there was still much more work to be done to achieve a formal settlement1024. The Lausanne experience teaches us that not only is a two-pronged US/UN attack needed, but that it must be a concerted attack which does not hesitate to exert pressure on each party in order to reach an agreement. During 1949 it was clear that the combined strength of the US and the international community can extract concessions, even resented concessions, from both the Arabs and the GOI, but that the moment this pressure is removed any progress is lost. The real lesson from Lausanne (and one which was never tested at Camp David) is that pressure must not be abandoned when resistance is encountered and that the parties must not be able to retreat to the status quo.
Ultimately, almost everybody now knows what a peace agreement should involve. The final status negotiations clearly defined what was needed for a deal. Even though the talks failed in 2000, their achievements have been built upon by other initiatives, notably the Arab Peace Initiative (2002) and the Geneva Accord (2003)1025, which are each based around the international consensus. The Arab Peace Initiative (also called the Saudi Peace Plan), launched in 2002 and reconfirmed in 2008, offers Israel full peace with the entire Arab world if she withdraws from all territory she occupied in 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights, and if she reaches a ‘just solution’ for the Palestinian refugees. The initiative thereby offers Israel a genuine en bloc peace agreement which was the hope of the PCC over fifty years earlier. However, knowing what the solution is and finalising it are two very different tasks. As more lives are lost every day it is essential that the US, in conjunction with the international community, take the lead and actively push to reach an agreement based around these initiatives. Performing the mediator role will not be easy, particularly for the US, but nevertheless, the future of the two peoples, and the Middle East generally, depend on the role being performed impartially, bravely and decidedly.
1024 Much of this work has subsequently been completely through unofficial bi-lateral talks which led to the Geneva Agreement, a document which is largely viewed as embodying the final settlement which will be realized between the peoples of Israel and Palestine. 1025 The Geneva Accord was an unofficial document negotiated between an Israeli group led by Yossi Beilin and a Palestinian delegation led by Yasir Abed Rabbo, a former Information Minister to Arafat. The document, which was based around the Clinton ideas, was rejected outright by the GOI but endorsed by the Palestinian leadership. See Beilin 2004, for a full description of the negotiations which led to the agreement.
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APPENDICES
Appendix I The Ex-Im Bank Loan
Appendix I
The Ex-Im Bank Loan
Previous analysis of the Lausanne Conference has often referred to the withholding of the allocation of the $100,000,000 Ex-Im Bank loan to Israel as a significant form of pressure exercised by the US during the conference1026. Yet research into the Ex-Im Bank loan points to a rather different and murkier conclusion. While there is no doubt that the idea of withholding the allocation of the loan to exert pressure upon Israel to change her negotiating position was discussed at great length within the State Department, what is less clear is the extent of support it received from the White House.
At the end of the 1948 war the fledgling Israeli economy was struggling under the costs of the war, the needs of a fledgling state, and the requirement to settle hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants. As the new Government of Israel saw the Jewish settlement of the state tantamount to its very survival, it would not allow a shortage of funds to become an obstacle to this overriding goal. To support its immigration drive in addition to the general needs of an emerging state, the Government of Israel was reliant on external aid. To respond to this need President Truman had promised in his 1948 electoral platform to give “appropriate aid to the State of Israel in developing its economy and resources”1027. The matter of the loan became further embroiled in domestic American politics after Republican candidate Dewey lashed out at Truman during the 1948 election campaign for failing to offer his full support to the Provisional GOI. Truman responded by issuing a statement in October 1948 which pledged: “With reference to the granting of a loan or loans to the State of Israel, I have directed the
1026 Pappé 1992 p221 1027 Johnson and Porter 1973 p432
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departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of our Government to work together in expediting the consideration of any applications for loans which may be submitted by the State of Israel”1028. In accordance with Truman’s electoral pledge, a loan of $100,000,000 was allocated to Israel by the US Ex-Im Bank shortly after his election victory.
Yet while the White House had fulfilled its election commitment to expedite the Ex-Im Bank loan, the State Department increasingly saw it as a source of leverage with the Israeli Government due to the nature of the loan itself. The loan could only be allocated according to specific projects submitted by the Israeli Government to the Bank for its approval. This piecemeal allocation process appeared to offer the State Department an opportunity to exert pressure on the policies of the GOI whilst the Lausanne Conference was in session.
The first occasion in which the withholding of an allocation was used as a strategic tool by the State Department against the GOI was in November 1948 when Secretary Marshall informed the Israeli Foreign Minister that if Israel openly defied the UN or the SC “it seemed clear it would be unable to gain admission to the United Nations, and that such matters as loans and de jure recognition would, of course, be affected”1029. The matter was subsequently taken up by George McGhee, who was at the time assigned to the task of finding of a solution to the Palestinian Refugee crisis. In May 1949, when the talks at Lausanne were stalling due to Israeli refusal to offer a concession on the refugee issue, McGhee drew up a memorandum for the President. McGhee argued that the only method through which Israel could be persuaded to repatriate a significant number of refugees (at least 200,000), was the exertion of US pressure. McGhee suggested that the withholding of the unallocated portion of the loan ($49,000,000) might be an effective instrument of this pressure1030.
1028 Statement by the President, 24 October 1948. USNA 501.BB Pal/10-2448 1029 Marshall to the Acting Secretary of State, 18 November 1948. USNA 501.BB Pal/11-1848 1030 Memorandum Prepared Presumably in the Office of the Coordinator on Palestine Refugee Matters (McGhee), 2 May 1949. FRUS p964
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The idea of withholding the loan was most fervently supported within the sub-department of Near Eastern and African Affairs but it gained support at all levels within the Department, including Under Secretary Dean Rusk and Acting Secretary Robert Lovett. When Lovett submitted to President Truman a draft of the document which was to become the 29 May note, Lovett explicitly warned the President that Israel’s refusal to comply with the requests contained within the note would necessitate firm action by the American Administration. Lovett suggested that one of these actions should be the withholding of an unallocated $49,000,000 of the Ex-Im loan. Lovett stressed to the President that the sending of the note should only be approved if the White House was prepared to take such firm action and that due to “strong opposition in American Jewish circles” it might prove unpopular domestically. Therefore Lovett suggested to the President that he consult his “advisers to give careful consideration to the possible implications of the above procedure”1031.
While Lovett’s message was clear, it seems to have been intentionally or unintentionally misinterpreted by the White House. Though approval was granted for the sending of the 29 May note, Israel’s subsequent refusal to concede to any of its demands was not met with any of the reprisals the State Department had suggested. The State Department viewed Israel’s rejection of the points made within the 29 May note as grounds to go to part two of their strategy and implement sanctions against Israel. A memorandum was drawn up for President Truman advising of the immediate course of action to be taken, which included the withholding of the remainder of the loan1032. Yet even though Truman had been warned by Lovett that if he gave his approval to the note he must be prepared to back it up, the White House failed to act on any of these recommendations.
Truman’s decision to send the note without accepting the whole of his State Department’s advice only acted to damage his country’s prestige in the eyes of the Arab world, the international community and Israel itself. The issuing of a threat without sanctions could not help but teach the world that the US would back down in event of a standoff with Israel. The result was a significant loss of face and a hardening of Israel’s
1031 Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President, 27 May 1949. FRUS pp1060-1063 1032 Memorandum by the Department of State to the President, 10 June 1949. FRUS p1110
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resolve to tough things out at Lausanne. As David Forsythe noted, the Truman letter was enormously detrimental to the Lausanne negotiations, as it only “antagonised Israel, impaired future US power, and had had the indirect effect of weakening the CCP since it discredited the Commission’s most powerful member”.1033
Truman’s failure to act upon the State Department’s recommendations during the note affair did not deter those within the Department from continuing to seek approval for the withholding of the loan. McGhee viewed the second session of the Lausanne Conference as a fresh opportunity for the US to extract concessions from the parties. McGhee recommended to Acheson that he strengthen Paul Porter’s hand by furnishing him with instructions authorising him to deal the loan “card” to Israel if it did not show a more conciliatory attitude1034. Porter was also keen to have the threat of the loan available to him as an instrument of coercion if the occasion warranted. It would seem that Porter received some form of support for this option. He reported to Acheson on 8 August that he had not mentioned the Ex-Im Bank loan to the Israeli delegation at Lausanne as he believed that the message would be taken more seriously by Israel if they were told by the Ex-Im Bank officials personally that full economic cooperation was not possible under existing circumstances1035.
Acheson’s response reveals that some linguistic creativity was needed to support the withholding of the loan. Whilst Acheson replied that he did not understand why the matter of the loan would be brought up at Lausanne, he did invoke a fresh interpretation of the terms of the loan which allowed its withholding to be not only reasonable, but mandatory also. Acheson explained that the State Department’s position had always been that the loan was premised on the achievement of peace in Palestine. Thereby, if Israel was not in a state of peace with her neighbours, the allocation of the loan could be denied due to the qualified conditions having not been met. Acheson assured Porter that future allocations of the loan would be reviewed with this in mind and that the Israeli Ambassador had been made aware of these considerations. Acheson was quick to add
1033 1972 p53 1034 Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs (McGhee) via Rusk to the Secretary of State, 19 July 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/7-1949. FRUS pp1235-1237 1035 Porter to the Secretary of State, 8 August 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/8-849
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however, that this was not a form of political pressure but a straightforward matter of the terms of the loan1036.
This argument by Acheson – which effectively created a means to exert pressure on Israel while by-passing normal diplomatic channels – was seized upon by McGhee who took the argument to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. McGhee asked him to approach the officials within the Ex-Im Bank and explain that allocation of the loan should be suspended pending a peace agreement1037. To help convince the Assistant Secretary, McGhee informed him that the President had already made the decision to postpone further allocation of the loan.
Clearly resentful of State Department intrusion into their affairs, the Ex-Im officials informed the Israeli Ambassador that, contrary to the Ex-Im Bank’s wishes and judgement, a decision to postpone allocation of the loan had been reached “as a result of a State Department ‘veto’ for purely political reasons”. This caused considerable consternation to the State Department who were not expecting to have their policy revealed so bluntly and were instead expecting to play a game of imaginative diplomacy. Now they were forced onto the defensive having to explain their actions both to the GOI1038 and their own President. Tel Aviv reacted swiftly by employing their contacts in the White House1039 to bring the matter to the President’s attention. When Truman brought the matter up in the Cabinet meeting the next day, Acheson assured him that the loan was going ahead and deflected the blame onto the Ex-Im Bank for “cross[ing] the signals” and giving the Jews the impression that the State Department had blocked the loan “which is not true”1040. That same day Israel was informed that they should
1036 The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Lausanne, 8 August 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/8-849 1037 Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 15 August 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/15-849. FRUS pp1312-1313 1038 See Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (Hare), 25 August 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/9-2549. FRUS pp1328-1331 1039 Tel Aviv apparently enlisted David Niles to address the matter with Truman. See Memorandum by William J McWilliams, Assistant to the Director of the Executive Secretariat, 26 August 1949. FRUS, 1332 1040 Papers of Matthew J Connelly, Cabinet Meeting Notes, 26 August 1949. In Notes on Cabinet Meetings II, 1946-53, Truman Library.
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consider the status quo ante restored in their relations with the Ex-Im Bank, and that there would be no further problems with the loan1041.
Although the White House failed to officially endorse the State Department’s tactics, it is difficult to believe that Truman had not given private approval to them. Acheson was renowned for his loyalty to the President and for his refusal to pursue policies which had not received explicit Presidential assent. McGhee certainly seemed to believe that this was so and referred to it in his memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Years later, McGhee recalled that he was advised by the Department that his 10 June memorandum to the President recommending the loan be withheld had been approved by Truman and that he was instructed to advise the Israeli Ambassador accordingly. When he spoke to Elath, McGhee remembered the reaction in his memoirs:
“The Ambassador looked me straight in the eye and said, in essence, that I wouldn’t get by with this move, that he would stop it. There was other conversation, but I had got the point. Within an hour of my return to my office I received a message from the White House that the President wished to dissociate himself from any withholding of the Ex-Im Bank loan. I knew of the President’s sympathy for Israel, but I had never before realized how swiftly the supporters of Israel could act if challenged.”1042
Clearly, McGhee attributed the withdrawal of White House support for the withholding of the loan to the formidable power of the Israel lobby within the US and its close ties with President Truman. While McGhee’s conclusions are speculative, there seems little doubt that the policy of withholding the loan did receive at least tentative support from the White House. In a meeting on 26 August, which was attended by the most powerful figures within the State Department including Acheson, McGhee, Rusk, Kennan and Nitze, Rusk states that the President’s policy had been to “drag our feet” rather than cancel the loan entirely1043. Whilst willing to follow his Department’s advice to an extent and exert pressure on Israel, President Truman was clearly reluctant to openly oppose the
1041 Elath to Sharett, 26 August 1949, State of Israel, p400 1042 McGhee 1983 p37 1043 Memorandum by William J McWilliams, Assistant to the Director of the Executive Secretariat, 26 August 1949. FRUS, 1332
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Zionist state. When directly challenged by the GOI, President Truman once again backed down as he did with his Presidential letter, and abandoned the matter entirely.
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Appendix II
The Economic Survey Mission
As the PCC embarked upon their work in the Middle East the US began to contemplate the long term implications of the refugee crisis. The US quickly realised that a resolution of the problem would necessarily entail both resettlement and repatriation. While the UN was funding and administering the refugees at the time, its aid had only been allocated on a temporary basis and was due to terminate by the end of that year. At this time it was hoped that a more general resettlement and repatriation project would take its place. The US thought Israel could repatriate 200,000 - 250,000 refugees and that the remaining 450,000 - 500,0001044 would be distributed among the surrounding Arab states. Whatever the final resolution of the problem, the Americans knew that its implementation would require a great deal of planning and funding. In order to prepare for this George McGhee was appointed as the United States Coordinator on Palestine refugee matters1045.
McGhee began his task by attending the Beirut meetings in an unofficial capacity. McGhee’s agenda was to “deal not only with immediate and interim phases [of the] refugee problem but, more particularly, long range measures designed for final settlement”1046. McGhee was specifically to look at long term development programs
1044 McGhee worked under the assumption that the maximum number of bonafide displaced peoples in need of repatriation and resettlement did not exceed 700,000. It was assumed that the remaining 250,000 refugees would settle in Arab Palestine. See Memorandum by the Coordinator on Palestine Refugee Matters to the Secretary of State, 22 April 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/4-2249, FRUS p935 1045 The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem, 9 March 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/3-949, FRUS p807 1046 The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem, 11 March 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/3- 1149, FRUS p818
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which would integrate the refugees into the economies of their host countries by creating jobs and increasing national productivity levels. The Refugee Coordinator was also to look at how these projects might be funded in order to ease the financial and economic burden on the effected countries. In May the Secretary of State estimated the total cost involved in the resettlement and repatriation of the refugees to be around $250-275 million over the next three years1047. While the US was ready to accept the bulk of the financial and technical burden1048 of the project they were anxious for it to be carried out under UN auspices rather than their own. As in the peace negotiations, the US was keen to involve itself heavily in the process but wary of becoming officially involved, preferring to work behind the scenes and under the guise of the UN.
In Beirut, McGhee formed a close working relationship with Mark Ethridge. Both McGhee and Ethridge believed that the key to the Palestinian refugee crisis was economic development1049. The assumption that a country’s internal difficulties, and/or a region’s inter-state conflict, could be resolved through a program of economic development was prevalent in Washington at the time. The post WW2 reconstruction plan for Europe had then been active for less than two years but was already showing remarkable signs of success in reviving the beleaguered European economies and promoting regional harmony. It was assumed that increased economic interdependence in the Middle East region would reduce the chance for conflict by increasing the economic costs.
McGhee had also been involved with the implementation of the Truman Doctrine through his position as Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey. In his memoirs, McGhee wrote:
“I had developed confidence in our country’s ability to help other nations recover from the ravages of war, overcome their inherited problems and protect themselves from what we perceived to be the threat of aggressive Soviet Communism.”1050
1047 Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, 9 May 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/3-949, FRUS p807 1048 The US did not want their contribution to the project to exceed 50%. See McGhee 1983 p42 1049 McGhee 1983 p32 1050 McGhee 1983 pxviii
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After meeting with Ethridge in Beirut, McGhee decided that a technical mission was needed to survey the area and assess the types of projects which could be developed in the area for funding. Under the December 12 Resolution the PCC had the mandate to form subsidiary bodies for such tasks and it was recommended that the PCC use these powers to establish the technical mission. After his visit to the Middle East, McGhee worked on a report with colleagues also involved in the Palestine issue; Dean Rusk (Deputy Under Secretary), Robert McClintock (Assistant Deputy Under Secretary), Joseph Satterthwaite (NEA), Raymond Hare (NEA), Frazer Wilkins (NE), Stuart W Rockwell (NE) and Samuel K C Kopper (NE). McGhee submitted his report to the Secretary of State on 22 April1051.
The April report stated that Israel must accept at least 200,000 refugees as a prerequisite of any satisfactory solution to the refugee problem. The remaining refugees would be repatriated to Transjordan, Syria and Iraq, and to a lesser extent, Lebanon, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. McGhee warned that the refugees should be assimilated on a self- supporting basis through a works program in order to cause limited disruption to their host economies and populations. This would be achieved through the creation of development projects which would increase the productivity of arable land, develop new industries and improve transport systems. The report recommended that pressure be exerted on Israel to accept at least 200,000 refugees and on the Arab states to accept and cooperate in the resettlement of those people unable to return to their former homes. McGhee then recommended that external relief be extended under UN auspices and that this relief be on a work relief rather than a direct relief basis. It was advised that funding for the project be sourced from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, from the US Ex-Im Bank, from other member states, and from UN agencies. It was also advised that funding be sourced through US Congressional appropriations with the strict proviso that this did not entail US acceptance of direct
1051 In his memoirs McGhee states the date of the report to be 27 April (p40) yet it is dated 22 April in the archives at NARA and in FRUS
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responsibility in the matter. It was further suggested that the plan be submitted to the UN for approval during the September session1052.
Though Acheson was supportive of McGhee’s report and endorsed it in full, he was worried about how to sell it to the Arab world without it appearing to be economic bribery. While the US looked upon the development schemes as imperative to the successful absorption of the refugees, they might easily be construed as inducements to accept the idea of resettlement. If the scheme was too actively promoted too soon it might convince both Israel and the Arabs that the US had taken responsibility for the resolution of the refugee problem and remove the pressure on them to make compromises and reach a settlement. Acheson warned his officials in the Middle East to stress to the parties involved their self-interest in resolving the issue and their responsibility to do so. At the time the Lausanne Conference was still in its early stages and Acheson was keen to exert as much pressure as possible for a successful conclusion. Officials were further instructed to make the governments aware that the “door is open” for financial aid, but to avoid making any direct financial offers of US assistance1053.
Meanwhile, the Israelis had received information regarding McGhee’s report and were interpreting it exactly as Acheson had feared. Having learned of Ethridge’s support for the economic approach and the McGhee plan, Eytan concluded that “Ethridge is clearly out to conquer the Middle East for America”1054. Yet as early as 9 May, Eytan’s attitude to the McGhee plan had changed completely. After further talks at Lausanne, the Israeli delegate’s hopes for a peace agreement had dwindled to the point where he despondently wrote; “I see no way out of this wood”. Direct and indirect meetings with the PCC and the Arabs had fed Eytan’s growing conviction that peace was impossible due to the enormous disparity in the parties’ positions. Seemingly resigned to this, he began to look upon the McGhee plan as the only credible hope for a solution. Eytan predicted that while the Arab states would; “put up a show of righteous recalcitrance, they will in the end make a great ‘concession’ by taking the refugees and the dollars that go with
1052 Memorandum by the Coordinator on Palestine Refugee Matters to the Secretary of State, 22 April 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/4-2249, FRUS pp934-943 1053 The Secretary of State to Keeley in Syria, 2 May 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/5-249, FRUS pp934-943 1054 Eytan to Sharett, 3 May 1949, State of Israel, p13
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them”1055. With the PCC only one month into its work at Lausanne, Israel had already reached the conclusion that an economic solution through the McGhee plan was the best that could be achieved. It appears that Acheson’s fears were well founded.
In order to overcome fears that the McGhee plan would be seen as a replacement for a negotiated settlement, the US stressed to the parties that financial and technical assistance would only be forthcoming if and when they accepted their responsibility to make peace and made concrete steps towards this. This strategy was a response not just to keep a momentum in the peace talks but to allay domestic misgivings also. To finance the McGhee plan, the President and State Department would have to obtain Congressional approval. The initial reaction to the plan by key Foreign Affairs Senators, Arthur Vandenberg and Tom Conally, was less than responsive as they felt that the Administration was underwriting Israel’s theft of Arab houses and land. The Senators made it clear that Congressional funding would only be forthcoming if Israel made an appropriate contribution to the resolution of the crisis1056. To respond to their concerns, the President agreed to request the funding for the program for the repatriation and resettlement of the refugees through the UN framework, with three conditions:
27. That a plan from the PCC or UN was forthcoming with a reasonable chance of success at reasonable cost
28. That both parties accepted their full responsibilities towards carrying out the plan
29. That there was appropriate assistance from international and other sources1057
Following his discussion with the Senators, McGhee was further convinced of Israel’s central role in resolving the refugee crisis, whether through political or economic means. McGhee battled fruitlessly with the President and his Secretary of State throughout the next few months to induce them to exert meaningful pressure on Israel through the withholding of the Ex-Im loan (see previous Appendix). Whilst these efforts foundered, along with the prospects for peace in Lausanne, time was running out for the refugees.
1055 Eytan to Sharett, 9 May 1949, State of Israel, p31 1056 McGhee 1983 p42 1057 The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland, 23 May 1949. FRUS p1048
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With UN funding due to expire by the end of that year, the situation was growing increasingly urgent. McGhee warned Acheson of the economic dislocation in the area and its potential to endanger security through Soviet affiliation1058.
McGhee’s warnings were enough to convince Acheson that urgent action was needed. With the talks at Lausanne stalling over the refugee issue and the belief that a deepening of the refugee crisis would impede US national interests, the Administration was persuaded to give their authorisation to the establishment of an Economic Survey Mission (ESM)1059. The ESM was to consist of an American Chief of Mission, with a French and British Deputy, and include experts in agriculture, finance, transportation and other important fields. The purpose of the ESM was to “go to the Near East, study existing economic conditions and data, which is quite complete regarding development projects, consult with the interested governments, and write a report with recommendations”1060. The PCC was to adjourn while the ESM carried out its work. It was hoped that the mission would finish its work by October and present its results to the General Assembly.
With the US fully committed to the ESM the other members of the PCC had little choice but to give it their full support1061. British support for the plan, which had been orchestrated by McGhee since the time he began his work, began to wane however. Increasingly, the UK thought that a shift in emphasis from a political to an economic approach would reduce the pressure for a settlement and grant Israel everything it had been seeking at no cost1062. A relaxation of the Lausanne formula would leave the political issues unresolved and the status quo in force. Israel would keep all territory it currently held and would continue to deny the principle of repatriation1063. Disappointed
1058 Memorandum by McGhee to the Secretary of State, 13 July 1949*. USNA 501.BB Pal, FRUS pp1218- 1219. While the file at NARA is undated the FRUS document is dated 13 July 1059 The Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland, 26 July 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/7-2649, FRUS pp1257 1060 Memorandum – Economic Survey Mission of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, 18 August 1949 (author unknown). USNA 501.BB Pal/8-1849 1061 Boisanger approved the plan so long as the adjournment of the PCC was handled in a manner to make clear that the machinery for negotiation was still available throughout this time. See Legation in New York to the Secretary of State, 22 August 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/8-2249 1062 Pappé contends that the British were unenthusiastic towards the ESM due to their territorial aspirations in the Negev. The British did not give up their desire for an Egyptian or Jordanian Negev, and thereby British access to the land, until early 1950. 1988 p143 1063 Ambassador in London to the Secretary of State, 23 August 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/8-2349
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by the UK’s reversal of position on the subject1064, the US nevertheless pressed on with the marketing of the ESM to the parties involved.
Israel was understandably “most pleased” with the announcement of the creation of the ESM1065, as was Jordan1066 which had been anxious to obtain the technical and financial assistance the scheme promised. Lebanon, which was eager to relieve herself of the refugees she was currently supporting, showed initial hostility to the ESM, fearing that it would spell an end to the Lausanne negotiations and warning that the economic aspect was only one dimension of the problem1067. Despite Arab fears, both they and Israel agreed to work with the ESM in their replies to the PCC 15 August questionnaire.
The ESM began its work on 8 September and submitted its final report on 28 December1068. The report was not enthusiastic about the possibility for large-scale development projects as had originally been envisaged. There was little infrastructure to support such schemes in the Middle East States and there was very limited possibility of cooperation amongst them to sustain regional projects. As a response to the report of the ESM the General Assembly established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. The Agency was initially envisaged to be a works agency but has primarily acted as an aid distribution body and continues to support over four million refugees today.
1064 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 21 September 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/0-2149, FRUS p1395 1065 Burdett to the Secretary of State, 31 August 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/8-3149 1066 Stabler to the Secretary of State, 22 August 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/8-2249 1067 Pinkerton to the Secretary of State, 31 August 1949. USNA 501.BB Pal/8-3149 1068 United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Economic Survey Mission, Report Part 1, 28 December 1949, A/AC.25/6/Part.1 and Report Part 2, 28 December 1949, A/AC.25/6/Part.2
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Appendix III
The Taba Negotiations: The Moratinos Non-Paper1069
Taba, January, 2001
Introduction
This EU non-paper has been prepared by the EU Special Representative to the Middle East Process, Ambassador Moratinos, and his team after consultations with the Israeli and Palestinian sides, present at Taba in January 2001. Although the paper has no official status, it has been acknowledged by the parties as being a relatively fair description of the outcome of the negotiations on the permanent status issues at Taba. It draws attention to the extensive work which has been undertaken on all permanent status issues like territory, Jerusalem, refugees and security in order to find ways to come to joint positions. At the same time it shows that there are serious gaps and differences between the two sides, which will have to be overcome in future negotiations. From that point of view, the paper reveals the challenging task ahead in terms of policy determination and legal work, but it also shows that both sides have traveled a long way to accommodate the views of the other side and that solutions are possible.
1. Territory
The two sides agreed that in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 242, the June 4 1967 lines would be the basis for the borders between Israel and the state of Palestine.
1069 Source: The Moratinos Non-Paper, MidEast Web, January 2001
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1.1 West Bank
For the first time both sides presented their own maps over the West Bank. The maps served as a basis for the discussion on territory and settlements. The Israeli side presented two maps, and the Palestinian side engaged on this basis. The Palestinian side presented some illustrative maps detailing its understanding of Israeli interests in the West Bank.
The negotiations tackled the various aspects of territory, which could include some of the settlements and how the needs of each party could be accommodated. The Clinton parameters served as a loose basis for the discussion, but differences of interpretations regarding the scope and meaning of the parameters emerged. The Palestinian side stated that it had accepted the Clinton proposals but with reservations.
The Israeli side stated that the Clinton proposals provide for annexation of settlement blocs. The Palestinian side did not agree that the parameters included blocs, and did not accept proposals to annex blocs. The Palestinian side stated that blocs would cause significant harm to the Palestinian interests and rights, particularly to the Palestinians residing in areas Israel seeks to annex.
The Israeli side maintained that it is entitled to contiguity between and among their settlements. The Palestinian side stated that Palestinian needs take priority over settlements. The Israeli maps included plans for future development of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The Palestinian side did not agree to the principle of allowing further development of settlements in the West Bank. Any growth must occur inside Israel.
The Palestinian side maintained that since Israel has needs in Palestinian territory, it is responsible for proposing the necessary border modifications. The Palestinian side reiterated that such proposals must not adversely affect the Palestinian needs and interests.
The Israeli side stated that it did not need to maintain settlements in the Jordan Valley for security purposes, and its proposed maps reflected this position.
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The Israeli maps were principally based on a demographic concept of settlements blocs that would incorporate approximately 80 percent on the settlers. The Israeli side sketched a map presenting a 6 percent annexation, the outer limit of the Clinton proposal. The Palestinian illustrative map presented 3.1 percent in the context of a land swap.
Both sides accepted the principle of land swap but the proportionality of the swap remained under discussion. Both sides agreed that Israeli and Palestinian sovereign areas will have respective sovereign contiguity. The Israeli side wished to count "assets" such as Israelis "safe passage/corridor" proposal as being part of the land swap, even though the proposal would not give Palestine sovereignty over these "assets". The Israeli side adhered to a maximum 3 percent land swap as per Clinton proposal.
The Palestinian maps had a similar conceptual point of reference stressing the importance of a non-annexation of any Palestinian villages and the contiguity of the West Bank and Jerusalem. They were predicated on the principle of a land swap that would be equitable in size and value and in areas adjacent to the border with Palestine, and in the same vicinity as the annexed by Israel. The Palestinian side further maintained that land not under Palestinian sovereignty such as the Israeli proposal regarding a "safe passage/corridor" as well as economic interests are not included in the calculation of the swap.
The Palestinian side maintained that the "No-Man's-Land" (Latrun area) is part of the West Bank. The Israelis did not agree.
The Israeli side requested and additional 2 percent of land under a lease arrangement to which the Palestinians responded that the subject of lease can only be discussed after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the transfer of land to Palestinian sovereignty.
1.2 Gaza Strip
Neither side presented any maps over the Gaza Strip. In was implied that the Gaza Strip will be under total Palestinian sovereignty, but details have still to be worked out. All settlements will be evacuated. The Palestinian side claimed it could be arranged in 6 months, a timetable not agreed by the Israeli side.
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1.3 Safe passage/corridor from Gaza to the West Bank
Both sides agreed that there is going to be a safe passage from the north of Gaza (Beit Hanun) to the Hebron district, and that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip must be territorially linked. The nature of the regime governing the territorial link and sovereignty over it was not agreed.
2. Jerusalem
2.1 Sovereignty
Both sides accepted in principle the Clinton suggestion of having a Palestinian sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods and an Israeli sovereignty over Jewish neighborhoods. The Palestinian side affirmed that it was ready to discuss Israeli request to have sovereignty over those Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem that were constructed after 1967, but not Jebal Abu Ghneim and Ras al-Amud. The Palestinian side rejected Israeli sovereignty over settlements in the Jerusalem Metropolitan Area, namely of Ma'ale Adumim and Givat Ze'ev.
The Palestinian side understood that Israel was ready to accept Palestinian sovereignty over the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, including part of Jerusalem's Old City. The Israeli side understood that the Palestinians were ready to accept Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish Quarter of the Old City and part of the American Quarter.
The Palestinian side understood that the Israeli side accepted to discuss Palestinian property claims in West Jerusalem.
2.2 Open City
Both sides favored the idea of an Open City. The Israeli side suggested the establishment of an open city whose geographical scope encompasses the Old City of Jerusalem plus an area defined as the Holy Basin or Historical Basin.
The Palestinian side was in favor of an open city provided that continuity and contiguity were preserved. The Palestinians rejected the Israeli proposal regarding the geographic
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scope of an open city and asserted that the open city is only acceptable if its geographical scope encompasses the full municipal borders of both East and West Jerusalem.
The Israeli side raised the idea of establishing a mechanism of daily coordination and different models were suggested for municipal coordination and cooperation (dealing with infrastructure, roads, electricity, sewage, waste removal etc). Such arrangements could be formulated in a future detailed agreement. It proposed a "soft border regime" within Jerusalem between Al-Quds and Yerushalaim that affords them "soft border" privileges. Furthermore the Israeli side proposed a number of special arrangements for Palestinian and Israeli residents of the Open City to guarantee that the Open City arrangement neither adversely affect their daily lives nor compromise each party sovereignty over its section of the Open City.
2.3 Capital for two states
The Israeli side accepted that the City of Jerusalem would be the capital of the two states: Yerushalaim, capital of Israel and Al-Quds, capital of the state of Palestine. The Palestinian side expressed its only concern, namely that East Jerusalem is the capital of the state of Palestine.
2.4 Holy/Historical Basin and the Old City
There was an attempt to develop an alternative concept that would relate to the Old City and its surroundings, and the Israeli side put forward several alternative models for discussion, for example, setting up a mechanism for close coordination and cooperation in the Old City. The idea of a special police force regime was discussed but not agreed upon.
The Israeli side expressed its interest and raised its concern regarding the area conceptualized as the Holy Basin (which includes the Jewish Cemetery on the Mount of Olives, the City of David and Kivron Valley). The Palestinian side confirmed that it was willing to take into account Israeli interests and concerns provided that these places remain under Palestinian sovereignty. Another option for the Holy Basin, suggested informally by the Israeli side, was to create a special regime or to suggest some form of
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internationalization for the entire area or a joint regime with special cooperation and coordination. The Palestinian side did not agree to pursue any of these ideas, although the discussion could continue.
2.5 Holy Sites: Western Wall and the Wailing Wall
Both parties have accepted the principle of respective control over each side's respective holy sites (religious control and management). According to this principle, Israel's sovereignty over the Western Wall would be recognized although there remained a dispute regarding the delineation of the area covered by the Western Wall and especially the link to what is referred to in Clinton's ideas as the space sacred to Judaism of which it is part.
The Palestinian side acknowledged that Israel has requested to establish an affiliation to the holy parts of the Western Wall, but maintained that the question of the Wailing Wall and/or Western Wall has not been resolved. It maintained the importance of distinguishing between the Western Wall and the Wailing Wall segment thereof, recognized in the Islamic faith as the Buraq Wall.
2.6 Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount
Both sides agreed that the question of Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount has not been resolved. However, both sides were close to accepting Clinton's ideas regarding Palestinian sovereignty over Haram al-Sharif notwithstanding Palestinian and Israeli reservations.
Both sides noted progress on practical arrangements regarding evacuations, building and public order in the area of the compound. An informal suggestion was raised that for an agreed period such as three years, Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount would be under international sovereignty of the P5 plus Morocco (or other Islamic presence), whereby the Palestinians would be the "Guardian/Custodians" during this period. At the end of this period, either the parties would agree on a new solution or agree to extend the existing arrangement. In the absence of an agreement, the parties would return to implement the Clinton formulation. Neither party accepted or rejected the suggestion.
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3. Refugees
Non-papers were exchanged, which were regarded as a good basis for the talks. Both sides stated that the issue of the Palestinian refugees is central to the Israeli-Palestinian relations and that a comprehensive and just solution is essential to creating a lasting and morally scrupulous peace. Both sides agreed to adopt the principles and references with could facilitate the adoption of an agreement.
Both sides suggested, as a basis, that the parties should agree that a just settlement of the refugee problem in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 242 must lead to the implementation of UN General Assembly Resolution 194.
3.1 Narrative
The Israeli side put forward a suggested joint narrative for the tragedy of the Palestinian refugees. The Palestinian side discussed the proposed narrative and there was much progress, although no agreement was reached in an attempt to develop and historical narrative in the general text.
3.2 Return, repatriation and relocation and rehabilitation
Both sides engaged in a discussion of the practicalities of resolving the refugee issue. The Palestinian side reiterated that the Palestinian refugees should have the right of return to their homes in accordance with the interpretation of UNGAR 194. The Israeli side expressed its understanding that the wish to return as per wording of UNGAR 194 shall be implemented within the framework of one of the following programs:
A. Return and repatriation
1. to Israel
2. to Israel swapped territory
3. to the Palestine state.
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B. Rehabilitation and relocation
1. Rehabilitation in host country.
2. Relocation to third country.
Preference in all these programs shall be accorded to the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon. The Palestinian side stressed that the above shall be subject to the individual free choice of the refugees, and shall not prejudice their right to their homes in accordance with its interpretation of UNGAR 194.
The Israeli side, informally, suggested a three-track 15-year absorption program, which was discussed but not agreed upon. The first track referred to the absorption to Israel. No numbers were agreed upon, but with a non-paper referring to 25,000 in the first three years of this program (40,000 in the first five years of this program did not appear in the non-paper but was raised verbally). The second track referred to the absorption of Palestinian refugees into the Israeli territory, that shall be transferred to Palestinian sovereignty, and the third track referring to the absorption of refugees in the context of family reunification scheme.
The Palestinian side did not present a number, but stated that the negotiations could not start without an Israeli opening position. It maintained that Israel's acceptance of the return of refugees should not prejudice existing programs within Israel such as family reunification.
3.3 Compensation
Both sides agreed to the establishment of an International Commission and an International Fund as a mechanism for dealing with compensation in all its aspects. Both sides agreed that "small-sum" compensation shall be paid to the refugees in the "fast- track" procedure, claims of compensation for property losses below certain amount shall be subject to "fast-track" procedures.
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There was also progress on Israeli compensation for material losses, land and assets expropriated, including agreement on a payment from an Israeli lump sum or proper amount to be agreed upon that would feed into the International Fund. According to the Israeli side the calculation of this payment would be based on a macro-economic survey to evaluate the assets in order to reach a fair value. The Palestinian side, however, said that this sum would be calculated on the records of the UNCCP, the Custodian for Absentee Property and other relevant data with a multiplier to reach a fair value.
3.4 UNRWA
Both sides agreed that UNRWA should be phased out in accordance with an agreed timetable of five years, as a targeted period. The Palestinian side added a possible adjustment of that period to make sure that this will be subject to the implementation of the other aspects of the agreement dealing with refugees, and with termination of Palestinian refugee status in the various locations.
3.5 Former Jewish refugees
The Israeli side requested that the issue of compensation to former Jewish refugees from Arab countries be recognized, while accepting that it was not a Palestinian responsibility or a bilateral issue. The Palestinian side maintained that this is not a subject for a bilateral Palestinian-Israeli agreement.
3.6 Restitution
The Palestinian side raised the issue of restitution of refugee property. The Israeli side rejected this.
3.7 End of claims
The issue of the end of claims was discussed, and it was suggested that the implementation of the agreement shall constitute a complete and final implementation of UNGAR 194 and therefore ends all claims.
4. Security
Kristen Blomeley 342 Appendix III The Taba Negotiations: The Moratinos Non-Paper
4.1 Early warning stations
The Israeli side requested to have 3 early warning stations on Palestinian territory. The Palestinian side was prepared to accept the continued operations of early warning stations but subject to certain conditions. The exact mechanism has therefore to be detailed in further negotiations.
4.2 Military capability of the state of Palestine
The Israeli side maintained that the state of Palestine would be non-militarized as per the Clinton proposals. The Palestinian side was prepared to accept limitation on its acquisition of arms, and be defined as a state with limited arms. The two sides have not yet agreed on the scope of arms limitations, but have begun exploring different options. Both sides agree that this issue has not been concluded.
4.3 Air space control
The two sides recognized that the state of Palestine would have sovereignty over its airspace. The Israeli side agreed to accept and honor all of Palestine civil aviation rights according to international regulations, but sought a unified air control system under overriding Israel control. In addition, Israel requested access to Palestinian airspace for military operations and training.
The Palestinian side was interested in exploring models for broad cooperation and coordination in the civil aviation sphere, but unwilling to cede overriding control to Israel. As for Israeli military operations and training in Palestinian airspace, the Palestinian side rejected this request as inconsistent with the neutrality of the state of Palestine, saying that it cannot grant Israel these privileges while denying them to its Arab neighbors.
4.4 Time table for withdrawal from the West Bank and Jordan Valley
Based on the Clinton proposal, the Israeli side agreed to a withdrawal from the West Bank over a 36-month period with an additional 36 months for the Jordan Valley in
Kristen Blomeley 343 Appendix III The Taba Negotiations: The Moratinos Non-Paper
conjunction with an international force, maintaining that a distinction should be made between withdrawal in the Jordan Valley and elsewhere.
The Palestinian side rejected a 36-month withdrawal process from the West Bank expressing concern that a lengthy process would exacerbate Palestinian-Israeli tensions. The Palestinian side proposed an 18 months withdrawal under the supervision of international forces. As to the Jordan Valley the Palestinian side was prepared to consider the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces for an additional 10-month period. Although the Palestinian side was ready to consider the presence of international forces in the West Bank for a longer period, it refused to accept the ongoing presence of Israeli forces.
4.5 Emergency deployment (or emergency locations)
The Israeli side requested to maintain and operate five emergency locations on Palestinian territory (in the Jordan Valley) with the Palestinian response allowing for maximum of two emergency locations conditional on a time limit for the dismantling. In addition, the Palestinian side considered that these two emergency locations be run by international presence and not by the Israelis. Informally, the Israeli side expressed willingness to explore ways that a multinational presence could provide a vehicle for addressing the parties' respective concerns.
The Palestinian side declined to agree to the deployment of Israeli armed forces on Palestinian territory during emergency situations, but was prepared to consider ways in which international forces might be used in that capacity, particularly within the context of regional security cooperation efforts.
4.6 Security cooperation and fighting terror
Both sides were prepared to commit themselves to promoting security cooperation and fighting terror.
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4.7 Borders and international crossings
The Palestinian side was confident that Palestinian sovereignty over borders and international crossing points would be recognized in the agreement. The two sides had, however, not yet resolved this issue including the question of monitoring and verification at Palestine's international borders (Israeli or international presence).
4.8 Electromagnetic sphere
The Israeli side recognized that the state of Palestine would have sovereignty over the electromagnetic sphere, and acknowledged that it would not seek to constrain Palestinian commercial use of the sphere, but sought control over it for security purposes.
The Palestinian side sought full sovereign rights over the electromagnetic sphere, but was prepared to accommodate reasonable Israeli needs within a cooperative framework in accordance with international rules and regulations.
Dispute over Ma'aleh Adumim
The importance of Israel's recognition of the June 4, 1967 border is that since 1967 (and even today), Israel's official position has been that UN Security Council Resolution 242 mandates withdrawal from "territories" conquered in the Six Day War. The Arab position, in contrast, is that the resolution requires withdrawal from "the territories." Israel's official refusal to recognize the June 4, 1967 borders is currently an obstacle to Foreign Minister Shimon Peres in his efforts to reach an agreement with the chairman of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Ahmed Qureia (Abu Ala). There is no Palestinian confirmation of Peres' claim that the Palestinians have accepted the formulation that a final-status agreement will be based on Resolution 242.
Israel agreed to recognize the June 4, 1967 border as the basis for the border between Israel and Palestine after the Palestinians agreed in principle to discuss territorial swaps in the West Bank, as proposed by Clinton, that would enable Israel to annex parts of the West Bank adjacent to the Green Line (but not parts of Gaza). The maps presented by the Palestinians at Taba gave Israel 3.1 percent of the West Bank. That is less than the lower
Kristen Blomeley 345 Appendix III The Taba Negotiations: The Moratinos Non-Paper
limit proposed in the Clinton plan (under which the Palestinians would receive 94 to 96 percent of the West Bank). Israel demanded 6 percent - the upper boundary of the Clinton plan - plus an additional 2 percent in the context of a leasing agreement. The Palestinians also rejected Israel's demand that the "no man's land" around Latrun not be considered part of the West Bank.
According to the document, Israel gave up all the Jordan Valley settlements, focusing instead on its security interests in that area. The dispute centered around the large stretch of territory between Ma'aleh Adumim and Givat Ze'ev, which contains both a fairly large Palestinian population and East Jerusalem's most important land reserves. The Palestinians retracted their earlier readiness to include these two settlements in the settlement blocs to be annexed to Israel after realizing that Israel also insisted on annexing the large tract that joins them - which would mean that Palestinian citizens would suddenly find themselves in sovereign Israeli territory. Barak instructed his chief negotiator, Gilad Sher, to tell the Palestinians that the map presented by then foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, which reduced the area of the settlement bloc (including the Ma'aleh Adumim-Givat Ze'ev tract) to only 5 percent of the West Bank, had no validity.
Another dispute that remained unresolved stemmed from Israel's refusal to accept the Palestinian demand for a 1:1 ratio between the area of the West Bank annexed to Israel and the parts of Israel that would be given to the Palestinians in exchange. Israel proposed a ratio of 1:2, in its favor. In addition, the Palestinians rejected Israel's proposal that the Halutza Dunes in the Negev, the area of the "safe passage" between the West Bank and Gaza, and the part of Ashdod Port that would be set aside for Palestinian use all be considered part of the land swap. They insisted that the land they received be contiguous with either the West Bank or Gaza, and that it not include any land that was merely set aside for their use, over which they would not have sovereignty. (Akiva Eldar)
How long is the Western Wall?
The Clinton proposal paved the way for understandings in Jerusalem, but it also created the principal dispute between the two parties.
Kristen Blomeley 346 Appendix III The Taba Negotiations: The Moratinos Non-Paper
An agreement was reached that East Jerusalem, which would be called Al-Quds, would be the capital of Palestine. Understandings were also reached regarding a division of East Jerusalem's neighborhoods such that Jewish neighborhoods would remain under Israeli sovereignty (other than Har Homa, which the first Jewish families are just moving into now, and Ras al-Amud), while Arab neighborhoods would be transferred to Palestinian sovereignty. In addition, it was agreed that parts of the Old City - the Muslim Quarter, the Christian Quarter and part of the Armenian Quarter - would be to the Palestinians.
But the Clinton proposal did not help the parties to draw mutually accepted borders between the Open City - to which both sides agreed - and the surrounding Palestinian areas, on one side, and Israeli areas, on the other. The Open City is territory that citizens of both countries can enter without passing through any checkpoints. The Palestinians wanted it to encompass all of Jerusalem, while the Israelis wanted it limited to the Old City only.
And the Clinton proposal complicated negotiations on the most sensitive issue: the Western Wall. Clinton had referred to "the holy parts" of the Wall, thereby creating an opening for the Palestinian claim that only the exposed part of the Wall (the Wailing Wall) is considered holy to the Jews, and therefore only this part should be left under Israeli sovereignty. Palestinians claimed the Western Wall tunnels were part of Haram al- Sharif (the Temple Mount).
Since the Taba talks ended, many meetings and seminars have taken place in an effort to close the gaps, attended by politicians and experts from both sides and from other countries as well.
Symbols of sovereignty
Israel insisted that it retain sovereignty over the "safe passage" between Gaza and the West Bank, with the Palestinians receiving only usage rights to the land. With respect to air space, however, Israel adopted a more generous approach to the sovereignty issue. Nevertheless, it demanded rights to the use of Palestinian air space, including for air force training exercises.
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The document reveals that the Palestinians expressed a willingness to accept the principle of limitations on their armaments and even took Israel's security needs into account (they agreed to three early warning stations and two "emergency locations," compared to the five "emergency locations" Israel had sought in addition to the early warning stations).
But in all matters relating to the symbols of sovereignty, the Palestinians took a harder line. They therefore insisted that an international force man the "emergency locations," rather than an Israeli one. And the issue of control over Palestine's international border remained unresolved for the same reason: the question of who would man the border control posts.
Kristen Blomeley 348
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