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Violence in Ciudad Juárez

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Violence in Ciudad Juárez MAY/JUNE 2011 report: mexico No End in Sight: Violence in Ciudad Juárez Mexican troops on patrol in Ciudad Juárez in April 2008. Intense violence followed the drug-trafficking arrest of a cartel leader (and high-ranking police official), prompting President Felipe Calderón to dispatch thousands of soldiers and federal police into the city’s streets. By Howard Campbell IUDAD JUÁREZ , IN THE MEXICAN STATE OF of migrants for its fine weather, vibrant nightlife, Chihuahua, is known as a city of death.1 and relatively high standard of living. CPerhaps the most violent place on the In the mid-1980s two powerful drug traf- planet, it is home to the world’s highest homi- fickers, Rafael Aguilar Guajardo, a federal Howard Campbell cide rate—officially there were 3,111 total mur- police commander, and Rafael Muñoz Talavera, is a professor of ders in 2010, but since many deaths go unre- a businessman, ran the Juárez Cartel, but the anthropology at the ported, the real number is likely significantly city’s yearly homicides remained below 100 University of Texas– El Paso. He is the O higher. Like many other Mexican border cities, until 1993. That year, Amado Carrillo Fuentes author of Drug War ER Juárez has had relatively high levels of crime, muscled out his competitors and took control Zone: Frontline 2 vice, and corruption for decades. But it was not of the Juárez trafficking market and assumed Dispatches From Y ROM R 3 N always as brutally violent as it is today. Not long the mantle of the Juárez Cartel. From 1993 the Streets of El E ago the city was renowned by its own inhab- onward, Amado Carrillo Fuentes, an innovator Paso and Juárez itants (Juarenses); visitors from its “sister city” in jet-transporting cocaine from South America (University of Texas Press, 2009). REUTERS/H across the border, El Paso, Texas; and millions to northern Mexico, substantially increased 19 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS report: mexico the volume of cross-border drug trafficking. Homicides, In the first month of the “surge,” the homicide rate including a substantial number of killings of women that dipped, but it quickly returned to high levels that have were labeled “femicides,” increased correspondingly. In only since increased. In 2008 there were about 1,600 1993 Juárez homicide totals surpassed 100 for the first homicides, more than 2,700 in 2009, more than 3,100 in time in recent history, and from 1994 on, total homicides 2010, and rates continue apace as of June. (While precise surpassed the 200 mark and remained there for the rest figures are often unobtainable or open to interpretation in of the decade (with the single exception of 1999, when many cases, the magnitude of the tragedy is beyond ques- they declined in the aftermath of Carrillo Fuentes’s death tion.) Social critics, activists, and victims’ relatives assert and the violent shake-up within the cartel that occurred that much of the violence is in fact perpetrated by these immediately after it). same soldiers and policemen, who also engage in fratricidal By 2000, Vicente Carrillo Fuentes, Amado’s brother, violence within their own ranks—with municipal cops regained control of the trafficking market, and the homi- killing other municipal cops, and city and federal police cide rates leveled off at about 200 to 300 a year as busi- engaging in shoot-outs with each other. Throughout, the ness returned to “normal.” Drug trafficking continued federal and local government claimed to be reforming the to produce needed revenue for thousands of Juarenses police forces. The municipal police were purged several and El Pasoans, locally known as Paseños. Many border times, police captains were replaced, and federal police people considered the violence inevitably produced by were rotated back and forth. The military was reinforced, the drug trade to be undesirable but not “out of control,” then partially withdrawn, then brought back. The federal although activists, relatives, and friends protested the dis- police took over from the military, and military forces were appearances and murders of their loved ones.4 Indeed, reduced substantially. The federal police proved to be so despite the increase in killings and disappearances that abusive, however, that many Juarenses now call for the began in the 1990s, Juárez remained a bustling, 24/7 city complete withdrawal of both it and the army. that was much livelier than El Paso.5 Violence and criminality—particularly the booming The ultra-violence that Juárez now endures began in extortion and kidnapping businesses—actually grew January 2008 with the drug-trafficking arrest in El Paso with the arrival of the soldiers and federal police. At the of a high-ranking Juárez police official, Saulo Reyes Gam- same time the Aztecas and other lesser or rival criminal boa, who reputedly cooperated with U.S. law enforce- gangs multiplied as the city devolved into a totally law- ment. Then a series of high-profile killings occurred in less nightmare—a war-ravaged landscape of burned-out rapid succession in Juárez. Knowledgeable local observers and abandoned buildings by day, a ghost town by night. attributed these deaths to attempts by the Juárez Cartel to Reportedly, more than 100,000 homes lie vacant, aban- kill disloyal members as well as to internal power struggles doned or destroyed. Perhaps as many as 20% of Juárez’s within the organization after the downfall of a once power- previous inhabitants have fled the violence for El Paso or ful leader. This internal battle was exploited by the cartel’s other destinations in the United States and Mexico.6 Since bitter rival, the Sinaloa Cartel, led by Chapo Guzmán, in 2008 there have been only a few days in which there an attempt to take over the Juárez drug-trafficking market. were no killings in Juárez. These few relatively peaceful As the violence continued, experts compared the Juárez days were primarily the result of extremely cold winter drug war to the 2004–2006 inter-cartel squabble between weather, which forced residents to stay in their homes. the Gulf Cartel/Zetas and the Sinaloa Cartel for control of Many of the victims of recent violence are not big- Nuevo Laredo and surrounding areas. time cartel members. They are street-level drug deal- By March 2008, the spike in Juárez violence attracted ers, small-time gangsters, small business people of all the attention of Mexican president Felipe Calderón, who sorts who refuse to pay extortive “protection” fees, sent thousands of soldiers and federal police into the city’s bystanders, municipal police men and women, hap- streets to stop the bloodshed. Military and police check- less smugglers who lost their drug loads, snitches or points, heavily loaded troop transport trucks filled with reputed snitches, and even drug addicts and homeless green-uniformed soldiers, and blue police trucks filled street people. Elderly people, small children, people in with federal cops in heavy body armor and ski masks, wheelchairs, and women of all ages have all fallen to the with their fingers on the trigger of automatic weapons, assassin’s bullet as crime organizations—in particular became ubiquitous sights in the border town. Juárez was La Linea, the dominant wing of the Juárez Cartel—have in a state of siege, essentially controlled by the military. expanded from drug trafficking into all manner of crimi- 20 MAY/JUNE 2011 report: mexico nal activity. Young people have been the most victim- factory workers, in recycled yellow U.S. school buses, to ized social group. The degree of extreme violence and the manufacturing and assembly plants.7 torture—including decapitations and mutilations—defy Second, the global economic crisis closed many Juárez the imagination. Some of the most extreme examples maquilas and exported low-wage jobs to China. The laid- since 2008 include the following: off border workers were left with nothing to fall back on as the U.S. militarized its southern border with fences, • Eighteen recovering drug addicts massacred by a death walls, more Border Patrol agents, and a general crack- squad at a drug rehabilitation center in the Colonia down on undocumented immigrants.8 Crossing into the Bellavista; United States to find work was no longer an option for • Fifteen teenagers, mistaken for gang members, were most poor Juarenses. Crime became the main economic gunned down in Colonia Villas de Salvárcar; opportunity for unemployed youth. • Several Juárez journalists murdered, including legend- Third, ongoing political problems in Mexico after a ary crime reporter Armando Rodríguez; flawed transition to democracy brought the consolidation • Three people associated with the U.S. Consulate assas- of free trade and neoliberal policies begun in the 1980s. sinated; These policies abandoned the working class and poor, • Thousands of quartered, duct-taped, beheaded, burned, who represent the vast majority of the Mexican popula- sexually mutilated, or otherwise desecrated cadavers tion, in a time of reduced employment and wages.9 The dumped in the streets; corrupt corporate state controlled for 71 years by the • A car bomb, killing a Juárez policeman and a respected Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), despite its myriad paramedic; flaws, had at least provided a modicum of jobs, social • One hundred and forty-nine policemen murdered in safety-net programs, and patronage. Moreover, the PRI’s Juárez in 2010; heavy-handed and corrupt rule limited the growth of • Three hundred and four women murdered in 2010; drug cartels to a degree. • Dozens of mass killings in bars, homes, drug rehab In contrast, the neoliberal model championed by the centers, private parties, shopping centers, restaurants, since discredited President Carlos Salinas and continued used car lots, junk yards, car repair shops, and other by the new National Action Party (PAN) administrations businesses; and from 2000 onward removed much of the social safety net • An estimated 20% of the homicides during the Mexican and broke down the old patronage networks that kept “drug war” have occurred in Juárez.
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