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Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico, 1999-2002
ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN MEXICO, 1999-2002 A Report Prepared by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress under an Interagency Agreement with the United States Government February 2003 Researcher: Ramón J. Miró Project Manager: Glenn E. Curtis Federal Research Division Library of Congress Washington, D.C. 20540−4840 Tel: 202−707−3900 Fax: 202−707−3920 E-Mail: [email protected] Homepage: http://loc.gov/rr/frd/ Library of Congress – Federal Research Division Criminal and Terrorist Activity in Mexico PREFACE This study is based on open source research into the scope of organized crime and terrorist activity in the Republic of Mexico during the period 1999 to 2002, and the extent of cooperation and possible overlap between criminal and terrorist activity in that country. The analyst examined those organized crime syndicates that direct their criminal activities at the United States, namely Mexican narcotics trafficking and human smuggling networks, as well as a range of smaller organizations that specialize in trans-border crime. The presence in Mexico of transnational criminal organizations, such as Russian and Asian organized crime, was also examined. In order to assess the extent of terrorist activity in Mexico, several of the country’s domestic guerrilla groups, as well as foreign terrorist organizations believed to have a presence in Mexico, are described. The report extensively cites from Spanish-language print media sources that contain coverage of criminal and terrorist organizations and their activities in Mexico. -
Exploring the Relationship Between Militarization in the United States
Exploring the Relationship Between Militarization in the United States and Crime Syndicates in Mexico: A Look at the Legislative Impact on the Pace of Cartel Militarization by Tracy Lynn Maish A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science (Criminology and Criminal Justice) in the University of Michigan-Dearborn 2021 Master Thesis Committee: Assistant Professor Maya P. Barak, Chair Associate Professor Kevin E. Early Associate Professor Donald E. Shelton Tracy Maish [email protected] ORCID iD: 0000-0001-8834-4323 © Tracy L. Maish 2021 Acknowledgments The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of their committee and the impact that their guidance had on the process. Without the valuable feedback and enormous patience, this project would not the where it is today. Thank you to Dr. Maya Barak, Dr. Kevin Early, and Dr. Donald Shelton. Your academic mentorship will not be forgotten. ii Table of Contents 1. Acknowledgments ii 2. List of Tables iv 3. List of Figures v 4. Abstract vi 5. Chapter 1 Introduction 1 6. Chapter 2 The Militarization of Law Enforcement Within the United States 8 7. Chapter 3 Cartel Militarization 54 8. Chapter 4 The Look into a Mindset 73 9. Chapter 5 Research Findings 93 10. Chapter 6 Conclusion 108 11. References 112 iii List of Tables Table 1 .......................................................................................................................................... 80 Table 2 ......................................................................................................................................... -
Ciudad Juarez: Mapping the Violence
Table of Contents How Juarez's Police, Politicians Picked Winners of Gang War ............................... 3 Sinaloa versus Juarez ................................................................................................................... 3 The 'Guarantors' ............................................................................................................................ 4 First Fissures, then a Rupture.................................................................................................... 4 Towards a New Equilibrium? ..................................................................................................... 6 Barrio Azteca Gang Poised for Leap into International Drug Trade ..................... 7 Flying 'Kites' and Expanding to the 'Free World' ................................................................. 7 Barrio Azteca’s Juarez Operation ............................................................................................. 8 The New Barrio Azteca ................................................................................................................ 9 Barrio Azteca’s Modus Operandi .............................................................................................. 9 Becoming International Distributors? ................................................................................. 10 Police Use Brute Force to Break Crime’s Hold on Juarez ........................................ 12 Case Study: Victor Ramon Longoria Carrillo ..................................................................... -
Fiscal Year 2019 Activities and Funds Report for the Motor Vehicle Crime Prevention Authority
Fiscal Year 2019 Activities and Funds Report for the Motor Vehicle Crime Prevention Authority Prepared for the Texas Legislature April 1, 2020 Texas Motor Vehicle Crime Prevention Authority Lieutenant Tommy Hansen – Presiding Officer Law Enforcement Representative Ms. Ashley Hunter Mr. Armin Mizani Insurance Representative Insurance Consumer Representative Assistant Chief Mike Rodriguez Mr. Steven C. McCraw Law Enforcement Representative Ex-Officio, Department of Public Safety Designee: Major Justin Owen Mr. Shay Gause Ms. Kit Whitehill Insurance Representative Insurance Consumer Representative MVCPA Director Bryan Wilson 512-465-4012 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................................................4 MVCPA at a Glance ................................................................................................................................................5 Losses to Texans from Motor Vehicle Burglary & Theft in CY 2018 .......................................................................5 Sunset Legislation (SB 604) .........................................................................................................................................6 Fee and Name Change Activities ................................................................................................................................6 FY 2019 MVCPA Activities .....................................................................................................................................7 -
Pandillas Y Cárteles: La Gran Alianza
Pandillas y cárteles: La gran alianza Publicado en junio de 2010 Los cárteles mexicanos son organizaciones dinámicas con una alta capacidad de adaptación a nuevas condiciones. La lógica de la guerra que libran hoy los cárteles contra otras organizaciones criminales y contra el gobierno federal, y la lógica empresarial de expansión de mercados y elevación de ganancias, han empujado a los cárteles a dar pasos decisivos hacia su profesionalización. Uno de estos pasos es la práctica del outsourcing o subcontratación de los servicios especializados que prestan las pandillas, con las que han establecido una relación de conveniencia mutua. Alianza por conveniencia mutua Las pandillas ofrecen diversos servicios a los cárteles en el rubro de narcotráfico: transporte de mercancías, distribución y venta. De la mano con los cárteles, las pandillas también están incursionando activamente en el secuestro, la extorsión, la trata de personas, el lavado de dinero, el robo de vehículos y el tráfico de armas —delitos típicos del crimen organizado. Hay al menos cinco factores que contribuyen a que la relación intermitente entre pandillas y cárteles se convierta en una alianza duradera. El primero es la protección o reducción de riesgos de los propios cárteles. Al operar con células semiautónomas (es decir, con pandillas separadas del cártel), las dirigencias de los cárteles reducen la probabilidad de que sus organizaciones sean penetradas por informantes gubernamentales o de otros grupos criminales. Asimismo, cuando los pandilleros son arrestados por las autoridades o reclutados por cárteles adversarios, no pueden proporcionarles información sobre el modus operandi del cártel al que apoyaban porque simplemente no la poseen: han trabajado para el cártel pero fuera de él. -
Honor-Crime in North America
MOTORCYCLE HIT TEAM • HRT MANHUNT • LOS AZTECAS • RUSSIAN WEAPONS Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals The CounterAPRIL/MAY 2013 VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 2 HONOR-CRIME IN NORTH AMERICA INTERNATIONAL EDITION An SSI ® Publication APRIL/MAY 2013 www.thecounterterroristmag.com USA/CANADA $5.99 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2013 1 Circle 2372 on The Reader Counter Service Terrorist Card ~ April/May 2013 13 Circle on Reader Service Card ~ April/May 2013 3 The Counter Terrorist340 CircleCircle 13 on onReader Reader Service Service Card Card WE’VE CREATED A MONSTER. MRAD™ 4 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2013 Circle 121 on Reader Service Card The Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals APRIL/MAY 2013 Counter VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 2 COVER STORY: HONOR-CRIME IN NORTH AMERICA 32 By M. Zuhdi Jasser and Raquel Evita Saraswati FEATURES: 32 Firsthand: 8 HRT MANHUNT By James A. McGee Case Study: 20 THE MOTORCYCLE HIT TEAM: A GLOBAL TACTIC By Glenn McGovern MODERN RUSSIAN SPECIAL WEAPons 48 By Eeben Barlow 8 THE BARRIO AZTECA, LOS AZTECAS NETWORK 60 By John P. Sullivan DEPARTMENTS: 6 From the Editor Leadership 20 46 Book Review Shariah Law and American Courts: An Assessment of State Appellate Court Cases 69 Innovative Products Mini-Caliber Robot, Reconyx Camera, CQB-11 72 Training Review CDG Advanced Handgun Skills 48 Cover Photo: Muslim woman. Photo: Steve Evans CONTENTS The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2013 5 FROM THE EDITOR: CounterThe Leadership By Chris Graham Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 2 APRIL/MAY 2013 n November 5, 2009 Nidal Hasan murdered 13 soldiers and wounded 29 Editor at Ft. -
La Linea and Los Linces Author: Matthew Pacilla Review: Phil Williams
Organization Attributes Sheet: La Linea and Los Linces Author: Matthew Pacilla Review: Phil Williams A. When the organization was formed + brief history La Linea is the armed wing of the Juarez Cartel that serves an enforcer role, murdering and kidnapping enemies of the Juarez cartel while also contributing to drug trafficking efforts.1 The group is comprised of former and current Mexican state police officers as well as drug traffickers who take part in assassinations, kidnappings, and the only Mexican gang to have performed a car bombing against federal authorities. The infamous car bombing took place in Juarez City, killing four people including a police officer. It was intended to kill federal police and was detonated by cell phone.2 Established by Amado Carrillo Fuentes, the former leader of the Juarez cartel, to specialize in enforcement. Los Linces, a special detachment of La Linea, was established in response to the need for even more assistance against Mexican authorities and associates of the Sinaloa cartel. Infamous for killing a group of teenagers at a birthday party which resulted in 16 deaths and many other injuries. The group thought that one of the teenagers was an informant for the police.3 Los Linces (The Bobcats) are a special unit within La Linea whose sole purpose is to carry out assassinations on important targets. They are comprised of ex-special forces members from the Mexican Army, and are considered the more militaristic of the two enforcement groups that work for the Juarez cartel. Los Linces are comparable to Los Zetas in terms ofmilitary experience and have been known to operate in small groups of no larger than 5 individuals. -
IDL-53331.Pdf
CIUDADES EN LA ENCRUCIJADA: Violencia y poder criminal en Río de Janeiro, Medellín, Bogotá y Ciudad Juárez Medellín, octubre de 2014 CIUDADES EN LA ENCRUCIJADA: Violencia y poder criminal en Río de Janeiro, Medellín, Bogotá y Ciudad Juárez. Corporación Región Carrera 49 Nº. 60-50 Teléfono: (574) 2542424 e-mail: [email protected] Medellín - Colombia Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales Universidad Nacional de Colombia Carrera 5A Nº. 34A - 09 Bogotá - Colombia PBX (57-1) 7430700 Diseño e impresión Pregón S.A.S. Medellín, 2014 Corrección de Estilo: Sol Astrid Giraldo ISBN: 978-958-8134-66-6 Contenido Presentación .................................................................. 5 Introducción ................................................................. 9 La paradoja latinoamericana. Las ciudades en perspectiva comparada. ................................ 9 I. Cocaína y conflicto .......................................................... 14 II. Contenido del poder: “consenso” y violencia ................. 25 III. Forma y alcance del poder: la estructura ..................... 37 Bibliografía .......................................................................... 48 Río de Janeiro: sufrir la violencia, decir la paz ................ 49 I. La criminalidad y la violencia en su contexto histórico y social ............................................. 50 II. Actores colectivos de la violencia en Río de Janeiro .......... 81 III. Las políticas de seguridad pública y las UPP ..................... 109 Bibliografía -
Monica Cruz Rosas a Juarez Drug Lord Saved My Life Confessions Of
Monica Cruz Rosas Master’s Project UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism Monica Cruz Rosas A Juarez drug lord saved my life Confessions of an accidental narco. When the Mexican security forces arrest someone involved in drug trafficking, they make sure everyone knows. A news release isn’t enough. The press officers hold a special kind of photo-op. All the elements of a good crime story are conveniently placed in one room: the agents, their detainees and the evidence of their crime. One of these press events took place at midnight in the military headquarters of Ciudad Juarez. It was 2009, one of the most violent years of the Mexican drug war. Five armed soldiers guard two men on top of a platform. The men stand still, handcuffed, squinting at the constant flickering of camera flashes. Dozens of small packets wrapped in brown tape and plastic are lined up in front of them. Below, about 20 reporters await to hear details of the arrest. Minutes later, a military official greets them and reads a news release at loud: Personnel of the Mexican Army arrested two men in Ciudad Juarez, after finding 99 packets of marijuana inside their vehicle, 52 kilos in total, valued at 1.3 million pesos or $100,000 in the black market. The arrested individuals are Americans Shohn Erich Huckabee, age 22, and Carlos Guillermo Quijas Ruiz, age 36. It was one more story about drugs in Mexico. By 2009, the military and federal police had apprehended nearly 80,000 people linked to organized crime, mainly drug trafficking. -
Propaganda in Mexico's Drug
Journal of Strategic Security Volume 6 Number 5 Volume 6, No. 3, Fall 2013 Supplement: Ninth Annual IAFIE Article 17 Conference: Expanding the Frontiers of Intelligence Education Propaganda in Mexico’s Drug War America Y. Guevara ManTech International Corporation Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss pp. 131-151 Recommended Citation Guevara, America Y. "Propaganda in Mexico’s Drug War." Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 3 Suppl. (2013): 131-151. This Papers is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Propaganda in Mexico’s Drug War This papers is available in Journal of Strategic Security: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss5/ 17 Guevara: Propaganda in Mexico’s Drug War Propaganda in Mexico’s Drug War America Y. Guevara Introduction Propaganda has an extensive history of invisibly infiltrating society through influence and manipulation in order to satisfy the originator’s intent. It has the potential long-term power to alter values, beliefs, behavior, and group norms by presenting a biased ideology and reinforcing this idea through repetition: over time discrediting all other incongruent ideologies. The originator uses this form of biased communication to influence the target audience through emotion. Propaganda is neutrally defined as a systematic form of purposeful persuasion that attempts to influence the emotions, attitudes, opinions, and actions of specified target audiences for ideological, political or commercial purposes through the controlled transmission of one-sided messages (which may or may not be factual) via mass and direct media channels.1 The most used mediums of propaganda are leaflets, television, and posters. -
Southern New Mexico/ Texas Gang Update 2012 Edited by Robert J
BUSINESS NAME Southern New Mexico/ Texas Gang Update 2012 Edited by Robert J. Durán, Jason A. Campos, and Maria Bordt Volume 1, Issue 1 Newsletter Date Overview of Project—Robert J. Durán, Ph.D. During the Spring semester of 2012, I taught my final applied gang research class at New Mexico State Universi- ty. This was the third participatory Inside this action research course for undergrad- uate students I taught. The students issue: selected the communities of Anthony, Chaparral and Sunland Park (near Las Anthony, New 2-7 Cruzes) in New Mexico, and El Paso Mexico and Horizon City in Texas. Similar to previous years, the students evaluated the data obtained and ranked the level Chaparral, 8- of seriousness of gangs. These con- New Mexico 10 clusions were reached after reviewing the national gang literature. Please be aware that everything included is not Las Cruces, 11 related to or involved with gangs but New Mexico -18 is more of a reflection of the art and style of a particular geographic re- gion. The conclusions reached by my Sunland Park, 19- New Mexico 25 students were definitely influenced by whom they spoke to and what they were observing. Many of the students El Paso, Texas 26- were from these same communities 30 but most did not have any prior asso- every sentence to bring greater clarity ciation with gangs. Some of the com- ments provided read more as opinion to these responses. Although it has been eight years since the data for this Horizon City, 31- than based upon actual data whereas gang update was acquired, I hope it Texas 34 other points were very insightful and can serve as a model for highlighting established through teamwork. -
Mexico's Out-Of-Control Criminal Market
SECURITY, STRATEGY, AND ORDER MARCH 2019 MEXICO’S OUT-OF-CONTROL CRIMINAL MARKET VANDA FELBAB-BROWN MEXICO’S OUT-OF-CONTROL CRIMINAL MARKET VANDA FELBAB-BROWN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY • This paper explores the trends, characteristics, and changes in the Mexican criminal market, in response to internal changes, government policies, and external factors. It explores the nature of violence and criminality, the behavior of criminal groups, and the effects of government responses. • Over the past two decades, criminal violence in Mexico has become highly intense, diversified, and popularized, while the deterrence capacity of Mexican law enforcement remains critically low. The outcome is an ever more complex, multipolar, and out-of-control criminal market that generates deleterious effects on Mexican society and makes it highly challenging for the Mexican state to respond effectively. • Successive Mexican administrations have failed to sustainably reduce homicides and other violent crimes. Critically, the Mexican government has failed to rebalance power in the triangular relationship between the state, criminal groups, and society, while the Mexican population has soured on the anti-cartel project. • Since 2000, Mexico has experienced extraordinarily high drug- and crime-related violence, with the murder rate in 2017 and again in 2018 breaking previous records. • The fragmentation of Mexican criminal groups is both a purposeful and inadvertent effect of high-value targeting, which is a problematic strategy because criminal groups can replace fallen leaders more easily than insurgent or terrorist groups. The policy also disrupts leadership succession, giving rise to intense internal competition and increasingly younger leaders who lack leadership skills and feel the need to prove themselves through violence.