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The EU's “Rhetorical Entrapment” in Enlargement Reconsidered

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The EU's “Rhetorical Entrapment” in Enlargement Reconsidered THE EU’S “RHETORICAL ENTRAPMENT” IN ENLARGEMENT RECONSIDERED The EU’s “Rhetorical Entrapment” in Enlargement Reconsidered: Why Hasn’t It Worked for Turkey? BEKEN SAATÇİOĞLU* ABSTRACT he EU’s December 2004 Brus- This article analyzes the EU’s sels decision to open member- December 2004 Brussels decision Tship talks with Turkey followed regarding membership talks with Turkey’s efforts to “rhetorically entrap” Turkey. While the Brussels Council the EU. Prior to the Brussels Council launched accession negotiations meeting (16-17 December 2004), Turk- with Turkey, the adopted ish politicians engaged in “rhetorical Framework for Negotiations action” understood as “the strategic use formulated exceptionally stringent of norm-based arguments.”1 They ar- membership terms. This is a puzzle for normative institutionalism IWGFVJCV6WTMG[UWHſEKGPVN[EQORNKGF because prior to Brussels, Turkey with the EU democratic accession cri- had su!ciently complied with the VGTKC Ō CU EQPſTOGF D[ VJG 'WTQRGCP EU’s liberal democratic membership Commission – and thus the EU could criteria and systematically engaged not legitimately reject Turkish demands in “rhetorical action” to “entrap” for the start of accession negotiations. the EU in its liberal, inclusionary More broadly, this rhetorical strategy enlargement discourse. It is argued aimed at “entrapping” the EU within the that the puzzle is explained by how framework of its own liberal democratic the EU member states’ enlargement norms in order to have gained a favor- preferences played out in an able bargaining position at the summit. intergovernmental bargaining context when it came to the It has been argued that the Brussels inclusion of Turkey. decision is the outcome of successful rhetorical argumentation on the part of * Assistant Professor of International Relations, Istanbul Kemerburgaz University, [email protected] Insight Turkey Vol. 14 / No. 3 / 2012 pp. 159-176 SUMMER 2012 159 BEKEN SAATÇİOĞLU Turkey and EU member-states’ subsequent “rhetorical entrapment.” As Frank 5EJKOOGNHGPPKIENCKOUQPEG6WTMG[UWHſEKGPVN[FGOQPUVTCVGFKVUEQOOKVOGPV to the EU’s constitutive liberal democratic norms by reforming, and called, on this basis, for the opening of member- Turkish actors systematically ship talks, “member states opposed used “rhetorical arguments” to Turkish membership for economic in order to “entrap” the EU or cultural reasons could not legiti- mately block the path to accession into acquiescing to their but were rhetorically entrapped.”2 demands regarding the start This article takes issue with this of membership talks as well as claim and reconsiders the validity of preferred EU accession terms the rhetorical entrapment thesis as applied to the Brussels decision. The CPCN[UKUJCUIGPGTCVGFVJTGGMG[ſPFKPIU(KTUVVJGFGEKUKQPECPPQVDGCVVTKDWVGF to EU member-states’ rhetorical entrapment within Turkish arguments couched in the Union’s non-discriminatory, liberal enlargement norms. Rather, it is the result of intergovernmental bargaining based on member-states’ utilitarian con- siderations regarding Turkey’s EU accession. This is evident in the content of the Framework for Negotiations adopted in Brussels.3 Although the Frame- work launched negotiations with Turkey, on the whole, it did not accommodate 6WTMG[ŏURTGHGTGPEGU+PFGGFKVUVGTOUTGƀGEVVJG'7ŏUGZENWUKQPCT[CRRTQCEJ towards Turkey rather than a preference for inclusion based on commitment to EU norms, which was Turkey’s preferred outcome and hence, the target of its pre-Brussels “rhetorical entrapment efforts.” On the one hand, the Framework shook Turkey’s full membership aspirations by implicitly suggesting alternatives to membership as a result of “open-ended” membership talks. On the other, it tied membership to uniquely strict terms, which seemed to focus more on mak- KPI6WTMKUJCEEGUUKQPFKHſEWNVVJCPKPVGITCVKPI6WTMG[CUCHWNNOGODGT 6JGUGEQPFCPFRCTCNNGNſPFKPIEQPEGTPUVJGHCEVQTUDGJKPFVJGHCKNWTGQH rhetorical entrapment. Given the systematic use of rhetorical argumentation by 6WTMKUJCEVQTUCPFVJG'WTQRGCP%QOOKUUKQPŏU1EVQDGTEQPſTOCVKQPQH Turkey’s compliance with the EU’s liberal democratic criteria, it is indeed puz- zling that the EU was still not “rhetorically entrapped.” According to the nor- mative “institutionalist” account on enlargement and the rhetorical entrapment thesis, which is derived from it, compliance with EU criteria and rhetorical CTIWOGPVCVKQPDCUGFQPKVCTGVJGPGEGUUCT[CPFUWHſEKGPVEQPFKVKQPUHQTVJGQE- currence of rhetorical entrapment.4 Hence, the fact that entrapment did still not QEEWTKP$TWUUGNUFGOCPFUGZRNCPCVKQP +VKUCTIWGFJGTGVJCVVJGHCKNWTGQHVJGUVTCVGI[QHGPVTCROGPVKUGZRNCKPGFD[ the prohibitively high costs of Turkish accession to the EU. Given that Turkey 160 INSIGHT TURKEY THE EU’S “RHETORICAL ENTRAPMENT” IN ENLARGEMENT RECONSIDERED is the “costliest” and most controversial EU candidate, its arguments on acces- sion negotiations necessitated stronger support within the EU than had formerly been the case for the Central and Eastern European EU applicants. Hence, Tur- MG[ŏU'7CEEGUUKQPECWUGCPFURGEKſEFGOCPFUTGICTFKPIPGIQVKCVKQPUPGGFGF to be taken up by powerful EU member-states as well as EU institutions capable QHKPƀWGPEKPIVJG'7ŏUſPCNFGEKUKQPU;GVVJKUYCUPQVVJGECUGCUPGKVJGT OGODGTUVCVGUPQTVJG'WTQRGCP%QOOKUUKQPPQTVJG'WTQRGCP2CTNKCOGPVGZ- RTGUUGF WPKſGF UWRRQTV HQT 6WTMKUJ demands before Brussels. Thus, Tur- Turkey was the principal agent key was the principal agent seeking seeking to rhetorically entrap to rhetorically entrap the “Turkey- skeptic” members of the EU, which the “Turkey-skeptic” members RTQXGF KPUWHſEKGPV HQT GPVTCROGPV of the EU, which proved Consequently, the Brussels Council insu!cient for entrapment remained divided on the issue of Tur- key and member-states could readily pursue their political agendas vis-à-vis Tur- key’s EU path. These agendas were ultimately shaped by what the EU member states considered the multiple, “costly” dimensions of Turkey’s membership. Last and more generally, the analysis proves the limits of the normative in- UVKVWVKQPCNKUVGZRNCPCVKQPQP'7GPNCTIGOGPV6WTMG[TGRTGUGPVUCőJCTFECUGŒ VQGZRNCKPYKVJKPVJKUCPCN[VKECNHTCOGYQTM(QT$TWUUGNUVQJCXGHQNNQYGFVJG logic of rhetorical entrapment, Turkish democratization and rhetorical argu- ments should have been enough. However, in this case, there was additional need for intergovernmental bargaining and in the end, the Brussels decision was shaped by member-states’ political agendas as opposed to purely norm-driven őGPVTCROGPVŒ'ZKUVKPICEEQWPVUQHVJG'7ŏUFGEKUKQPQPOGODGTUJKRVCNMUYKVJ Turkey overlook this evidence and readily argue for the presence of rhetorical entrapment.5 6JG CTVKENG ſTUV NC[U QWV VJG PQTOCVKXG DCUKU QH VJG '7ŏU EQOOKVOGPV VQ Turkey’s membership. It then analyzes Turkish politicians’ rhetorical arguments constructed upon the EU’s enlargement norms. Last, the article analyzes the controversial aspects of potential Turkish membership, which was behind the Brussels decision. The EU’s Rhetorical Commitment to Turkey The normative basis of the EU’s commitment to Turkey’s membership (and en- largement, broadly put) lies in its liberal values: The EU is a community of states bound together by liberal democratic ideals and any “European” state sharing this identity is, in principle, entitled to join the Union. This common democratic SUMMER 2012 161 BEKEN SAATÇİOĞLU ethos is incorporated in the EU’s membership criteria established in Copenhagen in 1993. Subsequently, the requirement to democratize has been prioritized over the two other membership conditions. Indeed, as decided by the December 1997 .WZGODQWTI%QWPEKNDGHQTGGCTPKPIVJGTKIJVVQPGIQVKCVGOGODGTUJKRKPVQVJG 7PKQPCP[EQWPVT[UJQWNFUWHſEKGPVN[HWNſNNVJGFGOQETCE[ETKVGTKQP Following this cosmopolitan, liberal democratic orientation, the member- ship requirement of being a European state6 has been loosely conceptualized. #UENCTKſGFKPVJG6TGCV[QHVJG'WTQRGCP7PKQPYJCVUGGOUVQOCVVGTHQTCP[ “European” state’s membership application is adherence to liberal democratic values.7 Clearly, the EU has developed an inclusionary community approach to en- largement. The principal conditions of membership are normative (rather than political, ethnic/religious or geo-strategic), which, from a broader theoretical RGTURGEVKXG ſVU UQEKQNQIKECNPQTOCVKXG KPUVKVWVKQPCNKUO 6JKU CRRTQCEJ XKGYU the EU as an international organiza- As a liberal democratic tion, which is “strongly determined community of states, the EU by the standards of legitimacy and appropriateness of the international de$ned its accession criteria community to which [it belongs].”8 based on principles constitutive Since these standards principally of this collective identity. consist of liberal democratic norms, Consequently, this liberal states that share these values are also entitled to join the Union regardless identity emerged as the basis of of how costly their admission would rhetorical arguments used by be for the EU. The EU then will Turkish politicians have to legitimately acquiesce to the admission of any state that democra- VK\GUCPFQTWUGUTJGVQTKECNCTIWOGPVUQPVJKUDCUKU6JWUHWNſNNKPIVJG'7ŏU EQPUVKVWVKXGPQTOUKUDQVJPGEGUUCT[CPFUWHſEKGPVHQT'7CFOKUUKQP+PUJQTV sociological institutionalism argues: EU enlargement hinges on “the degree to which the actors inside and outside the [Union] share a collective identity and fundamental beliefs,” as opposed to being shaped by the “material, distribu- tional consequences of enlargement for individual actors.”9 In line with this approach, the EU formally committed itself to Turkey’s OGODGTUJKR EQPVKPIGPV
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