Artworks As Shifting Speech Acts
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Alterpieces: Artworks as Shifting Speech Acts Daisy Louise Dixon Peterhouse, University of Cambridge This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy July 2018 ii Alterpieces: artworks as shifting speech acts Daisy Louise Dixon Abstract Art viewers and critics talk as if visual artworks say things, express messages, or have meanings. For instance, Picasso’s Guernica has been described as a “generic plea against the barbarity and terror of war”, forming a “powerful anti-war statement”. One way of understanding meaning in art is to draw analogies with language. My thesis explores how the notion of a speech act – an utterance with a performative aspect – can illuminate art’s power to ‘speak’. In recent years, philosophers of art have explored speech act theory in relation to literary art, though barely at all in relation to visual art. Given the way we talk about painting, sculpture, installation, film, and photography, and given that artists have investigated performativity through their art, this neglect is surprising. My thesis develops two main arguments. First, artwork meaning is active. I argue that visual artworks, under certain conditions, are speech acts. They have propositional content, and they have a certain force: they can do things such as assert, protest, and criticise – things we would normally do with words. I defend these contested claims against several dissenters, and explore some consequences: in particular, I explore how art can lie, a hitherto neglected question. Second, artwork meaning is flexible. I argue that what an artwork says and does is affected by the context in which it’s displayed, and in particular, by its curation. As a result, an artwork’s content and force can vary from context to context. This goes against a dominant view in the philosophy of art – what I call ‘Originalism’ – that the meaning of an artwork is fixed by factors which held at the time of the work’s creation, and so cannot change across time. I argue that this is mistaken: artworks can change in meaning. Curatorial factors can affect an artwork’s content and force, and consequently its social effects. It is known that our verbal speech has the power to oppress and liberate people in a society. My thesis aims to show that art also has this power to shape society; through what it says, and through what it does. iii iv Declaration This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the Faculty of Philosophy’s Degree Committee. v vi Acknowledgements First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors Rae Langton and Louise Hanson, who have both been inspiring mentors, and revered role models for women in philosophy. I am indebted to the University of Cambridge School of Arts and Humanities Doctoral Award, the Peterhouse Gunn Fund, and the University of Cambridge Philosophy Faculty for their financial assistance throughout my PhD. Many thanks go to Peterhouse for being my home these past few years, and to the Addenbrookes Pain Clinic team for their excellent treatment and support. Warm thanks also go to: Mat Simpson and Hugh Mellor, for their philosophical guidance and good-humoured chats; Alex Wortham, May Wallis, and Lauren Galloway for their unwavering support; the Famous Five for keeping my imagination vivacious; and to Emma Greensmith and Hannah Rose Woods for their tireless moral support and impassioned late-night discussions. Special thanks go to James Kirkpatrick for his love, care, and patience, and to my darling brother Will for the constant laughter and emotional support. Finally, I would like to thank my Mum and Dad. Without your unconditional love, pride, and faith in me, I wouldn’t have made it this far. This thesis is dedicated to you. vii Contents Introduction ............................................................................................................1 1. Art as speech ............................................................................................................................... 1 2. The Puzzle .................................................................................................................................. 2 3. Thesis plan ................................................................................................................................ 13 4. Implications for the Intentionalist Debate ................................................................................ 16 1. The Illocutionary Force of Artworks ............................................................. 21 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 22 2. The force of art ......................................................................................................................... 24 3. How to do things with words .................................................................................................... 27 4. How to do things with art ......................................................................................................... 32 4.1. Internal Convention .................................................................................................................... 32 4.2. External Convention ................................................................................................................... 36 4.3. Intention in art ............................................................................................................................ 39 4.4. Uptake in art ............................................................................................................................... 45 5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 47 2. Can Art Lie? .................................................................................................. 49 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 50 2. Preliminaries ............................................................................................................................. 54 3. Lying requires ‘quality’ ............................................................................................................ 56 4. Can art lie? ................................................................................................................................ 59 4.1. Conditions (BF) and (BQ): Whose beliefs? ............................................................................... 61 4.2. Condition (Q): The artworld is not by default a quality context ................................................ 63 4.3. Condition (Q): The artworld can contain local quality contexts ................................................ 67 5. Lies and fine-grained quality contexts ...................................................................................... 69 6. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 73 3. Artworks Express Propositions: A Soamesian Picture ................................... 77 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 78 2. The proposition theory of art .................................................................................................... 79 3. Three problems ......................................................................................................................... 83 3.1. The disanalogy problem ............................................................................................................. 83 3.2. The (in)determinacy problem ..................................................................................................... 85 3.3. The expression problem ............................................................................................................. 86 4. What are propositions? ............................................................................................................. 87 4.1. Traditional approach................................................................................................................... 88 4.2. Propositions as cognitive event-types ........................................................................................ 89 5. A sketched Soamesian proposition theory of art ...................................................................... 92 5.1. Artworks and cognitive events ................................................................................................... 92 5.2. Shallow