History of the U.S. Marine Corps in WWII Vol V

PART IV

Occupation of Japan

CHAPTER 1 Initial Planning and Operations

The war was over, but the victory was to an airfield outside of Tokyo . Admiral not yet secure . Foremost among the Nimitz ordered the Third Fleet, cruis- multitude of new and pressing problems ing the waters off Japan, to form a land- confronting Allied planners was the ing force from ships' complements to question of how the Japanese military supplement the force that was to seiz e would react to the sudden peace . On by- Yokosuka Naval Base in Tokyo Bay . To passed islands throughout the Pacific, augment this naval force, FMFPac wa s on the mainland of Asia, and in Japa n directed to provide a regimental combat itself, over four million fighting men team for immediate occupation duty . were still armed and organized for com- These Marines, and others who followed bat. Would all of these men, who had them, were destined to play an im- proven themselves to be bitter-end , portant role in the occupation of Japan. fanatical enemies even when faced with THE YOKOSUKA OPERATION 1 certain destruction, accept the Em- Months before the fighting ended , peror's order to lay down their weapons ? preliminary plans and concepts for the Or would some of them fight on, refus - ing to accept or believe in the decision 1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s of their government? Would the tradi- section is derived from : Eighth U . S. Army in Japan Occupational Monograph, v. I, tion of fealty to the wishes of the Em- Aug45-Jan46, n .d., hereafter Eighth Army peror overbalance years of conditioning Monograph I (Army Sec, WWII RecDiv, NA) ; that held surrender to be a crushin g CinCPac WarDs, Aug-Sep45 ; CinCPac Sur- personal and national disgrace ? render and Occupation Rpt ; CTF 31 AR, Occu- Logically, the focal point of Japanes e pation and Securing of the Yokosuka Naval physical and moral strength was th e Base and Airfield, 18Aug-8Sep45, dtd 8Sep45, hereafter Yokosuka Occupation Force AR ; seat of Imperial rule. If Tokyo could be CTG 31 .3 AR, Initial Occupation of Yokosuka occupied without incident, the chance s Naval Base Area, Japan dtd 7Sep45, hereafte r for a successful and bloodless occupation Fleet Landing Force AR (OAB, NHD) ; CT U of Japan and the peaceful surrender o f 31 .3 .2 Record of Events, dtd 6Sep45 ; CT U outlying garrisons would be greatly en- 31 .3 .3 AR, Initial Landings Incident to th e f Occupation of Tokyo, 20Aug-4Sep45, dtd hanced. Plans for seizure of ports o 5Sep45 ; MAG-31 WarDs, Sep-Dec45 ; 3/ 4 entry in the Tokyo Bay area by occupa- WarD, Jan46 ; 2d SepGdBn (Prov) WarDs, tion forces received top priority . Speed Feb-Jun46 ; Kenneth W . Condit and Edwin T . was essential and the spearhead troop s Turnbladh, Hold High The Torch : A History of the occupying forces were selecte d of the 4th Marines (Washington : HistBr, G- 3 from those units with the highest stat e Div, HQMC, 1960) ; Henry I . Shaw, Jr., The f of combat readiness. United States Marines in the Occupation o Japan—Marine Corps Historical Reference From General MacArthur's com- Series No. 24 (Washington : HistBr, G-3 Div, mand, the 11th Airborne Division was HQMC, 1961), hereafter Shaw, Marine Occupa- to stage from Luzon through Okinawa tion of Japan. 475

476 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

occupation of Japan had been formu- short notice and enforce the Allies' wil l lated at the headquarters of Mac- until occupation troops arrived" 4 was Arthur and Nimitz . Staff studies, based Admiral William F. Halsey's Third on the possibility of swift collapse of Fleet, at sea off the enemy coast . Ad- enemy resistance, were prepared an d vance copies of Halsey's Operation Pla n distributed at army and fleet level for 10–45 for the occupation of Japan, planning purposes . In the early summer which set up Task Force 31, the Yoko- of 1945, as fighting raged on Okinaw a suka Occupation Force, were distributed and in the Philippines, dual plannin g on 8 August. Two days later, Rear Ad- went forward for both the assault on miral Oscar C. Badger (Commander, Japan (OLYMPIC and CORONET ) Battleship Division 7) was designate d and the occupation operation (BLACK- the commander of TF 31, and all com- LIST) . (See Map 26.) manders of carriers, battleships, and Many essential elements of the tw o cruisers in the Third Fleet were alerted plans were similar, and the Sixth Army , to organize and equip bluejacket and which had been slated to make the at- Marine landing forces from amongst tack on Kyushu under OLYMPIC, was their crews. At the same time, FMFPac given the contingent task of occupyin g directed the 6th Marine Division t o furnish one RCT to the Third Fleet fo r southern Japan under BLACKLIST .2 In like manner, the Eighth Army , possible early occupation duty in Japan.5 utilizing the wealth of information it had accumulated regarding Honshu i n General Shepherd, the division com- planning CORONET, was designated mander, without hesitation selected th e the occupying force for northern Japan . 4th Marines. This was a symbolic gesture on his part, as the old 4th Marine Regi- The Tenth Army, also scheduled for th e ment had participated in the Philippin e Honshu assault by CORONET, was Campaign in 1942 and had been capture d given the mission of occupying Korea with other U . S. forces in the Philippines. in BLACKLIST plans .3 Now the new 4th Marines would be th e main combat formation taking part in th e When, in the wake of atomic bomb- initial landing and occupation of Japan .6 ings and Russian entry into the war, th e , Japanese government made its momen- Brigadier General William T . Clement Assistant Division Commander, was tous decision to surrender, the "onl y named to head the Fleet Landing Force. military unit at hand with sufficient On 11 August, IIIAC prepared pre- power to take Japan into custody at liminary plans for the activation of Task Force Able, which consisted of a 2 Sixth Army Rpt of the Occupation of Japan, 22Sep–30Nov45, n .d ., p . 10, hereafter skeletal headquarters detachment, the Sixth Army Rpt (Army Sec, WWII RecDiv , NA) . Halsey and Bryan, Halsey's Story, p . 247 . 3 On 13 August 1945, MacArthur's head- IIIAC WarD, Aug45, p. 3. quarters substituted XXIV Corps for Tenth s BGen Louis Metzger ltr to Hd, HistBr , Army as the Korean Occupation Force . Ibid., G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 6Jan66, hereafter Metzger p. 11. ltr.

INITIAL PLANNING AND OPERATIONS 477

OPERATIONS BLACKLIST AND CAMPUS- BELEAGUER Io o IOU 20 0 00 000 9o 0 INITIAL OCCUPATION OF CHINA , STATUTE NILF 9 KOREA,AND JAPAN ;AUG-OCT 1945

MAP 26 T. L . RUSSELL

478 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

4th Marines, Reinforced, 7 an amphibia n Transport Division 60 assigned to lift tractor company, and a medical com- Task Force Able . The mounting-out pany. Concurrently, officers designate d process was considerably aided by th e to form General Clement's staff wer e announcement that all ships would alerted and immediately began planning arrive in port on 13 August, 24 hour s to load out the task force. Warning later than they were originally sched- orders, directing that the RCT with uled. On the evening of the 14th, how- attached units be ready to embark ever, "all loading plans for supplie s within 48 hours, were passed to th e were thrown into chaos" 8 by news of staff. the substitution of a smaller type of The curtain of secrecy surroundin g transport for one of those of the origi- the proposed operation was lifted at nal group . The resultant reduction o f 0900 on 12 August so that task forc e shipping space was partially made u p units could deal directly with the neces- by the assignment of an LST to th e sary service and supply agencies with - transport force . Later, after the task out processing their requests through force had departed Guam, a second LS T the corps staff . All elements of the tas k was allotted to lift most of the remain- force were completely reoutfitted, and ing supplies, including the tractors of the 5th Field Service Depot and receiv- Company A, 4th Amphibian Tracto r ing units went on a 24-hour day to com- Battalion. plete the resupply task. The 4th Marines Loading began at 1600, 14 August, joined 600 replacements from th e and continued throughout the night. FMFPac Transient Center, Marianas, The troops boarded ship between 1000 to fill the gaps in its ranks left by com- and 1200 the following day, and that bat attrition and stateside rotation . evening, the transport division saile d Dump areas and dock space wer e for its rendezvous at sea with the Thir d allotted by the Island Commander , Fleet. "In a period of approximately 96 Guam, to accommodate the five trans- hours the Fourth Regimental Comba t ports, a cargo ship, and an LSD o f Team, Reinforced, had been completel y re-outfitted, all equipment deficiencie s ' The 4th Marines was reinforced by th e corrected, all elements provided a n following units : 1st Battalion, 15th Marines ; initial allowance to bring them up to Company G, 6th Tank Battalion ; Tank Main- T/O and T/A [Table of Allowance] tenance Section, 6th Service Battalion ; Com- pany A, 6th Engineer Battalion ; Company A , levels, and a thirty-day re-supply pro - 6th Pioneer Battalion ; Company A, 6th Medi- cured for shipment." 9 cal Battalion ; Truck Company, 6th Motor Two days prior to the departure of Transport Battalion ; 1st Platoon, Ordnanc e the main body of Task Force Able, Gen- Company, 6th Service Battalion ; Service Pla- eral Clement and a nucleus of his head- toon, 6th Service Battalion ; Supply Platoon , 6th Service Battalion ; Band Section, 6th quarters personnel left Guam on th e Marine Division Band ; and a Shore Party LSV (landing ship, vehicle) USS Ozark Communication Team, Ships Fire Contro l to join the Third Fleet . There had been Party, and Air-Ground Liaison Team of th e 6th Assault Signal Company. Fleet Landing ' Fleet Landing Force AR, p . 6. Force AR, p . 2 . ' Ibid.

INITIAL PLANNING AND OPERATIONS 479

no opportunity for preliminary planning , Marines . In less than three days, the and no definite mission had been re- task of transferring at sea some 3,50 0 ceived, so the time en route to th e men and hundreds of tons of weapons, rendezvous was spent studying intelli- equipment, and ammunition was ac- gence summaries of the Tokyo Bay area. complished . The newly formed units, as Halsey's ships were sighted and joine d soon as they reported on board thei r on 18 August . The next morning, transports, began an intensive progra m Clement and key members of his staff of training for ground combat opera- transferred to the battleship Missouri tions and occupation duties . for the first of a round of conferences o n On 20 August, the ships carrying th e the coming operation.1 ° 4th RCT arrived and joined the Admiral Badger formed TF 31 on 1 9 burgeoning task force. General Clem- August from the ships assigned to him ent's command now included the from the Third Fleet . The transfer o f 5,400 men of the reinforced 4th Ma- men and equipment to designated trans - rines, a three-battalion regiment o f ports by means of breeches buoys an d approximately 2,000 Marines taken cargo slings began immediately . Car- from 33 ships' detachments, 12 a naval riers, battleships, or cruisers wer e regiment of 956 men organized from the brought along both sides of a transport crews of 10 ships into a regimental to expedite the operation. 11 In addition headquarters, landing battalions, and 8 to the landing battalions of bluejackets nucleus crew units to handle capture d and Marines, Third Fleet units forme d shipping, 13 and a British battalion o f base maintenance companies, a naval 250 seamen and 200 Royal Marines . To air activities organization to operate a act as a floating reserve for the landin g Yokosuka airfield, and nucleus crews t o force, five additional battalions of blue - take over captured Japanese vessels . jackets were organized and appropri- Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings ' ately equipped from within the carrie r British Carrier Task Force contribute d groups. a landing force of seamen and Royal 12 This regiment, commanded by Lieutenant 10 Upon arrival at Tokyo Bay, "General Colonel William T . Lantz, came from th e Clement and his small staff were assigned a Marine Detachments of the following Thir d destroyer escort for several days" to be use d Fleet ships : USS Alabama, Indiana, Massa- as a "taxicab" for visiting and holding con- chusetts, Missouri, North Carolina, South ferences on the flagships of the key command- Dakota, Wisconsin, Bataan, Belleau Wood, Ben- ers involved in the landing. "Transfers of the nington, Bon Homme Richard, Cow pens, Han - General and staff were made in breeches buoys cock, Independence, Lexington, Monterey, ranging in quality from mail pouches to Ad- Randolph, San Jacinto, Ticonderoga, Wasp , miral Halsey's fancy fringed model ." Col Yorktown, Amsterdam, Atlanta, Boston, Chi- Orville V. Bergren ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div , cago, Dayton, Duluth, Oklahoma City, Pasa- HQMC, dtd 14May66, hereafter Bergren ltr . dena, Quincy, Springfield, Topeka, and Wilke s .2 Rec of Events, dtd 6Sep45 , 11 "It was quite a sight to see a transpor t Barre . CTU 31 .3 ship under way in open sea with an aircraft passim . 13 carrier on one side and a battleship or cruise r CTU 31 .3 .3 AR—Initial Landings Incident on the other transferring their Marine detach- to the Occupation of Tokyo—Period 2OAug– ments or bluejackets to the transport." Ibid. 4Sep45, dtd 5Sep45, pp . 3, 6 (OAB, NHD) .

480 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

FLEET LANDING FORCE personnel are transferred from USS Missouri to USS Iowa somewhere at sea off the coast of Japan prior to the initial occupation landings. (USN 80-G-332826)

INITIAL PLANNING AND OPERATIONS 481

Halsey had assigned TF 31 a primar y sibility of Japanese treachery." 14 The mission of seizing and occupying th e weight of evidence, however, was Yokosuka Naval Base and its airfield . rapidly swinging in support of the (See Map 27 .) Initial collateral mis- theory that the enemy was going to co - sions included the demilitarization of operate fully with the occupying force s the entire Miura Peninsula, whic h and that some of the precautions formed the western arm of the head- originally thought necessary could no w lands enclosing Tokyo Bay, and the be held in abeyance . But the primary seizure of the Zushi area, tentativ e reason for the selection of Yokosuk a headquarters for MacArthur, on the rather than Zushi for the landing are a southwest coast of the peninsula . To was the problems that would arise i n accomplish these missions two alter- moving the landing force overland from native schemes of maneuver were con- Zushi to Yokosuka . "This overland sidered. The first contemplated a land- movement would have exposed the ing by assault troops on beaches near landing force to possible enemy attack the town of Zushi, followed by an over - while its movement was restricted over land drive east across the peninsula to narrow roads and through a series o f secure the naval base for the landing of tunnels which were easily susceptible to supplies and reinforcements. The sec- sabotage. Further, it would have de- ond plan involved a direct landing fro m layed the early seizure of the majo r within Tokyo Bay on the beaches an d Japanese naval base ." 1 5 docks of Yokosuka Naval Base and Ai r Eichelberger's directive also include d Station, followed on order by the oc- the information that the 11th Airborne cupation of Zushi and the demilitariza- Division was to establish its own air- tion of the entire peninsula. All plan- head at Atsugi airfield a few miles ning by TF 31 was coordinated with northwest of the north end of the Miura that of the Eighth Army, whose com- Peninsula . The original plans of the mander, Lieutenant General Robert L . Fleet Landing Force, which had been Eichelberger, had been appointed by made on the assumption that Genera l MacArthur to command the force s Clement's men would seize Yokosuk a ashore in the occupation of northern Air Station for the airborne operation , Japan. had to be changed to provide for a simultaneous Army-Navy landing. A , On 21 August, General Eichelberger tentative area of responsibility includ- who had been informed of the alter- ing the cities of Uraga, Kubiri, Yoko- native plans formulated by TF 31, suka, and Funakoshi was assigned to directed that the landing be made at Clement's force, and the rest of the the naval base rather than in the Zush i peninsula became the responsibility o f area. Admiral Halsey had recommende d the 11th Airborne Division . the adoption of the Zushi landing plan To ensure the safety of Allied war - since it did not involve bringing ship - ships entering Tokyo Bay, Clement' s ping into restricted Tokyo Bay until " Halsey and Bryan, Halsey's Story, p . 275 . assault troops had dealt with "the pos- ' Metzger ltr .

482 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

LANDINGS OF THE 4th MARINE S 30-31 AUGUST 194 5

S A G A M I B A Y

MAP 27 T. L . RUSSELL

INITIAL PLANNING AND OPERATIONS 483

operation plan detailed the British threatening typhoon forced Admiral Landing Force to land on and demili- Halsey to postpone the landing date to tarize four small island forts in th e the 28th. Ships were to enter Sagami Uraga Strait at the entrance to Tokyo Wan, the vast outer bay, on L minus 2 . Bay. To erase the threat of shore bat- On 25 August, word was received fro m teries and coastal forts, the reserv e MacArthur that the anticipated ty- battalion of the 4th Marines (2/4) wa s phoon would delay Army air operation s given the mission of landing on Futts u for 48 hours, and L-Day was conse- Saki, a narrow point of land jutting quently set for 30 August and the entr y into the eastern side of Uraga Strait. of the Sagami Wan ordered for th e After completing its mission, 2/4 was 28th. to reembark in its landing craft and re- The Japanese had been warned as join its regiment . Nucleus crews fro m early as 15 August to begin minesweep- the Fleet Naval Landing Force were t o ing in the waters off Tokyo to facilitate enter the inner Yokosuka Harbor prio r the operations of the Third Fleet . On to the designated H-Hour and take ove r the morning of the day stipulated fo r the damaged battleship Nagato, whose American entry into Sagami Wan, Japa- guns commanded the landing beaches . nese emissaries and pilots were to mee t The 4th Marines, with 1/4 and 3/4 with Rear Admiral Robert B . Carney, in assault, were scheduled to make th e Halsey's Chief of Staff, and Admira l initial landing at Yokosuka on L-Day . Badger on board the Missouri to receive The battalions of the Fleet Marine and instructions relative to the surrender o f Naval Landing Forces were to land i n the Yokosuka Naval Base and to guid e reserve and take control of specifi c the first Allied ships into anchorages. areas of the naval base and air station, Halsey was not anxious to keep hi s while the 4th Marines pushed inland t o ships, many of them small vessels link up with elements of the 11th Air - crowded with troops, at sea in typhoo n borne Division landing at Atsugi air- weather, and he asked and received per- field. The cruiser San Diego, Admiral mission from MacArthur to put int o Badger's flagship, 4 destroyers, and 12 Sagami Wan one day early ." gunboats were to be prepared to furnish The Japanese emissaries reported o n naval gunfire support on call. Although board the Missouri early on 27 August . no direct support planes were assigned , They said a lack of suitable mine - approximately 1,000 fully armed air - sweepers had prevented them from craft would be airborne and available clearing Sagami Wan and Tokyo Bay, if needed . Despite the hope that the but the movement of Allied shipping to Yokosuka landing would be uneventful , safe berths in Sagami Wan under th e TF 31 was prepared to deal with either guidance of Japanese pilots was accom- organized resistance or individual act s plished nonetheless without incident. of fanaticism on the part of the Japa- By late afternoon, the Third Fleet wa s nese. anchored at the entrance of Tokyo Bay . L-Day had been originally schedule d American minesweepers checked the for 26 August, but on 20 August, a "Halsey and Bryan, Halsey 's Story, p . 275.

310-224 0 - 69 - 32

484 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

channel leading into the bay and re- picture of the Japanese as meek and ported it clear . harmless. On 28 August, the first American task On the evening of 27 August ap- force, consisting of combat ships of peared a reminder of another aspect of Task Force 31, entered Tokyo Bay and the war. At that time, two Britis h dropped anchor off Yokosuka at 1300 . prisoners of war hailed one of the Thir d Vice Admiral Totsuka, Commandant of Fleet picket boats in Tokyo Bay an d the First Naval District and the Yoko- were taken on board the San Juan, com- suka Naval Base, and his staff reporte d mand ship of a specially constitute d to Admiral Badger in the San Diego for Allied Prisoner of War Rescue Group. further instructions regarding the sur- Their harrowing tales of life in the render of his command. Only the ab- prison camps and of the extremely poo r solute minimum of maintenance person- physical condition of many of th e nel, interpreters, guides, and guard s prisoners prompted Halsey to order the were to remain in the naval base area ; rescue group to stand by for action o n the guns of the forts, ships, and coastal short notice . On 29 August, the Mis- batteries commanding the bay were t o souri and the San Juan task grou p be rendered inoperative ; the breech- entered Tokyo Bay. At 1420, Admira l blocks were to be removed from all Nimitz arrived by seaplane and author- antiaircraft and dual-purpose guns. ized Halsey to begin rescue operation s Additionally, the Japanese were told t o immediately .18 Special teams, guided fly a white flag over every gun position and guarded by carrier planes overhead, and to station at each warehouse an d immediately started the enormous tas k building an individual who had a com- of bringing in the prisoners from th e plete inventory of the building and keys many large camps in the Tokyo-Yoko- to all the spaces. "Both of the above hama area . By 1910 that evening, th e were meticulously carried out ." 17 first RAMPs (Recovered Allied Mili- As the naval commanders mad e tary Personnel) arrived on board th e arrangements for the Yokosuka landing, hospital ship Benevolence, and at mid- a reconnaissance party of Army troop s night 739 men had been brought out .1° landed at Atsugi airfield to prepare th e Long before dawn on L-Day, the first way for the airborne operation o n group of transports of TF 31 carrying L-Day. Radio contact was establishe d 2/4 began moving into Tokyo Bay . All with Okinawa, where the 11th Division was waiting to execute its part in 18 General MacArthur had directed that th e BLACKLIST. The attitude of the Japa- Navy role in the POW rescue operations b e nese officials, both at Yokosuka and held up until it could be coordinated with the Atsugi, was uniformly one of docilit y work of specially constituted Eighth Arm y rescue teams . Admiral Nimitz, however, real- and cooperation, but bitter experienc e ized that MacArthur would understand the caused the Allied commanders an d urgency of the situation, and gave the go-ahead troops to view with a jaundiced eye th e signal to Halsey. Halsey and Bryan, Halsey's Story, p . 278. 17 Metzger ltr . 19 Ibid. INITIAL PLANNING AND OPERATION S 485 the plans of the Yokosuka Occupation the story was much the same—the Force had been based on an H-Hour of coastal guns had been rendered ineffec- 1000 for the main landing, but last- tive, and the few Japanese remainin g minute word was received from Mac- as guides and interpreters amazed th e Arthur on 29 August that the firs t British with their cooperativeness . serials of the 11th Airborne Divisio n The Japanese had not only cleared th e would be landing at Atsugi airfield at naval yard and the airfield areas as di- 0600. Consequently, to preserve th e rected, but had removed from the immedi- value and impact of simultaneous Army- ate area all Japanese whom they consid- Navy operations, TF 31 plans were ered `hot-headed ' or whom they believe d changed to allow for the earlier landing would not abide by the Emperor's decree . Additionally, uniformed police from Tokyo time. had been brought down and were statione d The first landing craft carrying Ma- outside of the Initial Occupation Line rines of 2/4 touched the south shore of which effectively cordoned the occupatio n Futtsu Saki at 0558 ; two minutes later, forces from the Japanese population . I t was obvious that the Japanese fully in - the first transport plane rolled to a sto p tended to carry out the terms of the sur- on the runway at Atsugi, and the occu- render .2 0 pation of Japan was underway . In both areas, the Japanese had followed thei r The main landing of the 4th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Fre d instructions to the letter. On Futtsu D. Beans, was almost anticlimacti c Saki the coastal guns and mortars ha d f been rendered useless, and only the bar e Exactly on schedule, the first waves o 1/4 and 3/4 crossed the line of de- minimum of maintenance personnel, 2 2 e men, remained to make a peaceful turn- parture and headed for their respectiv . At 0930, men of the 1st Bat- over of the forts and batteries . By 0845, beaches f the battalion had accomplished its mis- talion landed on Red Beach southeast o sion and was reembarking for the Yoko- Yokosuka airfield and those of the 3 d Battalion on Green Beach in the heart of suka landing, now scheduled for 0930 . the Navy yard. There was no resistance. With first light came dramatic evi- The Marines moved forward rapidly, dence that the Japanese would compl y noting that the few unarmed Japanese with the surrender terms . On every present wore white armbands, accord- e hand, lookouts on TF 31 ships could se ing to instructions, to signify that they white flags flying over abandoned and were essential maintenance troops, offi- inoperative gun positions. Nucleus cials, or interpreters . Leaving guards at g crews from the Fleet Naval Landin warehouses, primary installations, and Force boarded the battleship Nagato at gun positions, the 4th Marines pushed 0805 and received the surrender from a on to reach the designated Initial Occu- skeleton force of officers and tech- pation Line. s nicians ; the firing locks of the ship' General Clement and his staff lande d main battery had been removed and all at 1000 on Green Beach and were met secondary and AA guns had been dis- by a party of Japanese officers, wh o mounted. On the island forts, occupied by the British Landing Force at 0900, "Metzger ltr. 486 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

MEMBERS of the Yokosuka Occupation Force inspect a Japanese fortification on Futtsu Saki . (USMC 1347.41)

GENERAL CLEMENT looks over Yokosuka Naval Base after its surrender by the former commander (r.). (USMC 133863)

INITIAL PLANNING AND OPERATIONS 487

formally surrendered the naval base came ashore at Yokosuka at 1330 to area. "They were informed that non - make an inspection of the naval base. cooperation or opposition of any kind Reserves and reinforcements lande d would be severely dealt with ." 2 1 at Yokosuka during the morning an d Clement then proceeded to the Japanese early afternoon according to schedule . headquarters building, where an Amer- The Fleet Naval Landing Force took ican flag presented by the 6th Marine over the area that had been secured b y Division was officially raised .22 3/4, and the Fleet Marine Landing Force occupied the airfield installation s Vice Admiral Totsuka had been seized earlier by 1/4. The British Land- ordered to be present on the docks of ing Force, after evacuating all Japa- the naval base to surrender the entire nese personnel from the island forts , First Naval District to Admiral Carney, landed at the navigation school in the acting for Admiral Halsey, and Ad- naval base and took over the area be- miral Badger . The San Diego, with tween the sectors occupied by the Fleet Carney and Badger on board, tied up a t Naval and Marine Landing Forces . the dock at Yokosuka at 1030 . The sur- Azuma, a large island hill mass, whic h render took place shortly thereafter had been extensively tunnelled for us e with appropriate ceremony, and Bad- as a small boat supply base, was part of ger, accompanied by Clement, departe d the British occupation area. It was investigated by a force of Royal Marines for the Japanese Naval Headquarters and found deserted. building to set up the headquarters of TF 31. The 4th Marines, relieved by the other elements of the landing force , With operations proceeding satisfac- moved out to the Initial Occupation Lin e torily at Yokosuka and in the occupatio n and set up a perimeter defense for th e zone of the 11th Airborne Division , naval base and airfield . Patrol contact General Eichelberger took over oper- was made with the 11th Airborne Divi- ational control of the Fleet Landing sion, which had landed 4,200 men dur- Force from Halsey at 1200 . Both of the ing the day . top American commanders in the Allied drive across the Pacific set foot on Japa- The first night ashore was uneventful, marked only by routine guard duty . nese soil on L-Day ; General MacArthur General MacArthur's orders to disar m landed at Atsugi airfield at 1419 t o begin de facto rule of Japan, which was and demobilize had been carried ou t to last more than five years, and Ad- with amazing speed . There was no evi- miral Nimitz, accompanied by Halsey, dence that the Japanese would do any - thing but cooperate with the occupyin g =1 Fleet Landing Force AR, p. 18 . troops. The Yokosuka area, for example , " This was the same flag that had bee n which had formerly been garrisoned b y raised by the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade at Guam and the 6th Marine Division at Oki- about 50,000 men, now held less than a nawa . Cass, 6th MarDiv Hist, p. 203. tenth of that number in skeletal head-

488 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

quarters, processing, maintenance , While a large part of the strength police, and minesweeping units. It was of the Fleet Landing Force was return- clear that, militarily at least, the occu- ing to normal duties, a considerabl e pation was slated for success . augmentation to Marine strength i n On 31 August, the Fleet Landing northern Honshu was being made. On 23 Force continued to consolidate its hold August, AirFMFPac had designated on the naval base area. Company L of Marine Aircraft Group 31, then at 3/4 sailed in two destroyer transport s Chimu airfield on Okinawa, to move to to Tateyama Naval Air Station on th e Japan as a supporting air group for th e northeastern shores of Sagami Wan to northern occupation. Colonel John C . reconnoiter the beach approaches an d Munn, its commanding officer, had re- to cover the 3 September landing of th e connoitered Yokosuka airfield soon after 112th Cavalry RCT. Here again, th e the initial landing, and on 7 September Japanese were waiting peacefully t o the first echelon of his headquarters and carry out their surrender instructions . the planes of Marine Fighter Squadro n Occupation operations continued to 441 flew in from Okinawa . Surveillance run smoothly as preparations were mad e flights over the Tokyo Bay area bega n to accept the surrender of Japan on the following day as additional squad- board the Missouri. Even as the sur- rons of the group continued to arrive. render ceremony was taking place, ad- Initially, Munn's planes served unde r vance elements of the main body of th e Third Fleet command, but on 16 Sep- tember, MAG–31 came under opera- Eighth Army occupation force wer e tional control of Fifth Air Force . entering Tokyo harbor . Ships carrying Admiral Badger's TF 31 had been the headquarters of the XI Corps and dissolved on 8 September when the Com- the 1st Cavalry Division docked at Yoko- mander, Fleet Activities, Yokosuka , hama. Transports with the 112th assumed responsibility to SCAP for the Cavalry RCT on board moved to Tate- naval occupation area. General Clem- yama, and on 3 September, the trooper s ent's command continued to function fo r landed and relieved Company L of 3/4 , a short time thereafter while most o f which then returned to Yokosuka . the reinforcing units of the 4th Marines As the occupation operation pro- loaded out for return to Guam. On 20 ceeded without the discovery of any September, Lieutenant Colonel Beans notable obstacles, plans were laid to dis- relieved General Clement of his respon- solve the Fleet Landing Force and TF 31 . sibilities at Yokosuka, and the general and his Task Force Able staff flew back The 4th Marines was selected to tak e to Guam to rejoin the 6th Division . over responsibility for the entire naval Before he left, however, Clement was base area. By 6 September, ships' de- able to take part in a ceremony in which tachments of bluejackets and Marine s 120 RAMPs of the "old" 4th Marines had returned to parent vessels and th e captured at Corregidor, received the provisional landing units were dis- colors of the "new" 4th from the hand s banded. of the men who had carried on the regi-

INITIAL PLANNING AND OPERATIONS 489

mental tradition in the Pacific war .23 directly under FMFPac. Orders were After the initial major contribution received directing that preparations be of naval land forces to the occupation of made for 3/4 to relieve the regiment of northern Japan, the operation becam e its duties in Japan, effective 31 Decem- more and more an Army task . As addi- ber. In common with the rest of th e tional troops arrived, the Eighth Arm y Armed Forces, the Marine Corps faced area of effective control was enlarged great public and Congressional pressure to include all of northern Japan. In Oc- to send its men home for discharge as tober, the occupation zone of the 4th rapidly as possible. Its world-wide com- Marines was reduced to include only th e mitments had to be examined with this naval base, airfield, and town of Yoko- in mind. The Japanese attitude of co- suka. In effect, the regiment becam e operation with occupation authorities a naval base guard detachment, and o n fortunately permitted considerable re- 1 November, control of the 4th Marine s duction of troop strength . passed from Eighth Army to the Com- In Yokosuka, Marines who did no t mander, U. S. Fleet Activities, Yoko- meet the age, service, or dependency suka.24 point total necessary for discharge in In addition to routine security and December or January were transferred military police patrols, the Marines also to the 3d Battalion, and men with th e carried out Eighth Army demilitariza- requisite number of points were con- tion directives, and collected and dis- centrated in the 1st and 2d Battalions. posed of Japanese military and naval On 1 December, 1/4 completed loading material. Detachments from the regi- out and sailed for the States to be dis- ment supervised the unloading at Uraga banded. The 3d Battalion, reinforced by of Japanese garrison troops returning the regimental units and a casual com- from bypassed Pacific outposts . pany formed to provide replacements for ships' Marine detachments, relieved On 20 November, the 4th Marines wa s 2/4 of all guard responsibilities on 24 - detached from the administrative con December. The 2d Battalion, with th e trol of the 6th Division and placed garrison at New Georgia Island and ha d 23 Ibid., p. 205. This was an occasion of deep headed the SNLP [Special Naval Landin g personal significance to General Clement, wh o Party] that was occupied, among other things , had been present in Manila as Marine officer o n in trying to locate and capture the Marin e the staff of the Commander, Asiatic Fleet, a t Coast-Watcher who had been providing intel- the outbreak of the war . He had volunteered t o ligence from New Georgia Island for som e serve with the 4th Marines on Corregidor whe n time. The Coast-Watcher happened to be Majo r fleet headquarters withdrew from the area, bu t Clay Boyd, who was present at the party. It he was ordered to leave the island fortress by was interesting to hear these two forme r submarine just before the American surrender. enemies describing their experiences and ex- 24 Shortly after the 4th Marines occupied th e changing questions regarding their New Yokosuka naval base, the small Japanese naval Georgia activities . It provided an interestin g garrison there entertained a group of officer s [situation] whereby two officers of differen t from the regiment. During the course of the countries could exchange such friendly con- gathering, "it developed that a Japanese Lieu - versation after having been such deadly ene- tenant Commander present had been in the mies only months before ." Bergren ltr.

490 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

Regimental Weapons and the Headquar- diminished, and early in May, MAG—3 1 ters and Service Companies, loaded ou t received orders to return to the United between 27—30 December and sailed for States. By 20 June, all serviceable air - the United States on New Year's Day. craft had been shipped out and on that The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, as- date, all group personnel were flown sumed the duties of the regiment at mid - out of Japan. The departure of MAG—3 1 night on 31 December, although a token marked the end of Marine occupation regimental headquarters remained i n activities in northern Japan and closed Yokosuka to carry on in the name o f the final chapter of the Yokosuka opera- the 4th Marines. On FMFPac order, thi s tion. headquarters detachment left Japan on 6 January to join the 6th Marine Divi- SASEBO-NAGASAKI LANDINGS 2 5 sion at Tsingtao, in North China . On 15 February 1946, 3/4 was reor- The favorable reports of Japanes e ganized and redesignated the 2d Sepa- compliance with surrender terms in rate Guard Battalion (Provisional) , northern Japan allowed a considerabl e FMFPac. Its military police and security number of changes to be made in th e duties in the naval base area remaine d operation plans of Sixth Army an d the same. Most of the occupation tasks Fifth Fleet. Prisoner of war evacuation of demilitarization in the limited are a groups could be sent into ports of south - of the naval base had been completed , ern Honshu and Kyushu prior to the and the battalion settled into a routine o f arrival of occupation troops, and the guard, ceremonies, and training that main landings could be made adminis- was little different from that of an y tratively without the show of force orig- Navy yard barracks detachment in the inally thought necessary. In fact, before United States . the first troop echelon of Sixth Army The continued cooperation of the arrived in Japan, almost all of the Japanese with SCAP occupation direc- RAMPs and civilian internees had bee n tives and the lack of any overt signs of resistance considerably lessened the '' Unless otherwise rioted, the material i n need for the fighter squadrons of MAG this section is derived from : CinCPac WarDs, — Sep-Oct45 ; CinCPac Surrender and Occupa- 31. On 7 October, Fifth Air Force re- tion Rpt ; ComFifthFlt AR—The Occupation turned control of the group to the Navy. of Japan, 15Aug–8Nov45, n .d., hereafter Com- Regular reconnaissance flights in the Fif thFlt AR ; Sixth Army Rpt ; ComPhibGru Tokyo area were discontinued on 1 5 4 Rpt of Occupation of Sasebo and Nagasak i October, and the operations of MAG—3 1 and of Fukuoka-Shimonseki Areas, dtd 11Nov - 45 ; VAC OpRpt, Occupation of Japan, dt d were confined largely to mail, courier , 30Nov45, hereafter VAC OpRpt ; VAC WarD , transport, and training flights . Person- Sep45 ; 2d MarDiv OpRpt, Occupation of nel and unit reductions similar to thos e Japan, dtd 1Dec45, hereafter 2d MarDiv imposed on the 4th Marines also oc- OpRpt ; 5th MarDiv OpRpt, Occupation of curred in the air units. By the spring Japan, dtd 5Dec45, hereafter 5th MarDiv OpRpt ; 5th MarDiv WarD, Sep45 ; MAG–22 of 1946, the need for Marine participa- WarD, Sep45 ; Shaw, Marine Occupation o f tion in the occupation of Japan had Japan. INITIAL PLANNING AND OPERATIONS 491

THE "NEW" 4TH MARINES passes in review for members of the "old" 4th, recently liberated from prison camps . (USMC 135287)

26TH MARINES moves into Sasebo . (USMC 139128)

492 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

released from their prisons and proc- the total Japanese population, including essed for evacuation by sea or air . half of the presurrender home garrisons , Japanese authorities received orders three of the four major naval bases i n from SCAP to bring Allied prisoners Japan, all but two of its principal ports, into designated processing centers o n four of its six largest cities, and three of Honshu and Kyushu . In the Eight h its four main transportation centers . Army occupation zone, Yokohama wa s Kyushu, which was destined to b e the center of recovery activities, an d largely a Marine occupation responsi- by 21 September, 17,531 RAMPs an d bility, supported a population of 10 mil - internees (including over 7,500 from th e lion in 15,000 square miles of precipi- Sixth Army area) had been examine d tous terrain. Like all of Japan, every there and hospitalized or evacuated.2 " On possible foot of the island was inten- 12 September, after Fifth Fleet mine - sively cultivated, and enough rice an d sweepers had cleared the way, a prisoner sweet potatoes were produced to allow recovery group put into Wakayama i n inter-island export . The main value o f western Honshu and began processin g Kyushu to the Japanese economy, how- RAMPs. In less than three days, th e ever, was its industries . The northwest remainder of the prisoners in the Sixt h half of the island contains extensive coa l Army area on Honshu and those fro m fields, the greatest pig iron and stee l Shikoku—in all 2,575 men—had bee n producing district in Japan, and most embarked in evacuation ships. important shipyards, plus a host o f Atom-bombed Nagasaki, which ha s smaller industrial facilities . one of the finest natural harbors in The V Amphibious Corps, initiall y Japan, was chosen as the evacuation composed of the 2d, 3d, and 5th Marin e port for men imprisoned in Kyushu . Divisions, had been given the task o f Minesweeping of the approaches to the occupying Kyushu and adjacent areas of port began on 8 Septembel-, and the western Honshu and Shikoku in Sixth RAMP evacuation group was able t o Army plans, at the same time that th e enter on the 11th . The operation was I and X Corps of the Eighth Army took essentially completed by the time occu- control of the rest of western Honsh pation troops began landing in Naga- u saki ; over 9,000 prisoners were re- and Shikoku. The Fifth Fleet, under Ad- covered. miral Raymond A . Spruance, was responsible for collecting, transporting, At the time that the Eighth Army was extending its hold over northern Japan , and landing the scattered elements of and the recovery teams and evacuation General Walter Krueger's army.27 Be- groups were clearing the fetid prison cause of a lack of adequate shipping, th e compounds, preparations for the Sixth Marine amphibious corps was not able to Army occupation of western Honshu, `7 On 19 September, Admiral Spruance a Shikoku, and Kyushu continued. Th s e Commander, Fifth Fleet, relieved Admiral occupation area contained 55 percent of Halsey of his responsibilities in the occupatio n of Japan and assumed command of all naval 29 Eighth Army Monograph I, pp. 23-28. operations in the Empire .

INITIAL PLANNING AND OPERATIONS 493

move its major units to the target simul- the entire island of Kyushu and acros s taneously.28 Therefore, it was necessar y the Shimonoseki straits to the Yama- that the transport squadron that lifted guchi Prefecture of Honshu to complete the 5th Marine Division and VAC Head - the occupation tasks assigned by quarters from the Hawaiian Islands be SCAP.30 sent to the Philippines to load out the Major General Harry Schmidt, VA C 32d Infantry Division, which was sub- commander, opened his command post stituted on 6 September for the 3 d on board the Mt. McKinley off Maui in 29 Marine Division in the occupation force. the Hawaiian Islands on 1 September The first objective to be secured in the and sailed to join the 5th Division con- VAC zone under Sixth Army plans was voy., already en route to Saipan . LST and the naval base at Sasebo in northwest- LSM groups left the Hawaiian area o n ern Kyushu. (See Map 28 .) Its occupa- 3 September with corps troops and th e tion by the 5th Marine Division was t o numerous Army augmentation units be followed by the seizure of Nagasak i necessary to make the combat units a n 30 air miles to the south by the 2 d effective occupation force . At Saipan, Marine Division . When the turn-around the various transport groups rendez- shipping arrived, the 32d Infantry Divi- voused and units of the 2d Marine Divi- sion was to occupy the Fukuoka- sion embarked. Conferences were hel d Shimonoseki area, either by an overland to clarify plans for the operations, an d move from Sasebo or a direct landing, two advance reconnaissance parties if the mined waters of Fukuoka harbo r were dispatched to Japan. One, led b y permitted. Once effective control ha d Colonel Walter W . Wensinger, VAC been established over the entry por t Operations Officer, and consisting of ke y area, the subordinate units of VAC divi- staff officers of both the corps and th e sions would gradually spread out over 2d Division, flew to Nagasaki, where it arrived on 16 September. The second 28 Had there been sufficient shipping, othe r party of similar composition, but with problems would have arisen, for unloadin g beachmaster representatives and 5th facilities were either primitive or badly dam - aged by bombing . At Sasebo, there were onl y Division personnel included, left fo r two or three docks available, no unloadin g Sasebo by high speed transport (APD) equipment, and inefficient loading crews . on 15 September. The mission of the MajGen William W . Rogers ltr to Hd, HistBr , parties was : G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 12Jan66, hereafte r Rogers ltr. . . . to facilitate smooth and orderl y 29 In order to guard against any possibl e entry of U . S. forces into the Corps zon e treachery on the part of the thousands o f of responsibility by making contact with Japanese troops on bypassed Central Pacifi c islands, the Navy "requested that one full 30 There are seven prefectures or kens on Marine Division remain in the Marianas pre - Kyushu : Fukuoka, Oita, Miyazaki, Kagoshima , pared for any eventuality ." Aurthur and Kumamoto, Nagasaki, and Saga . The prefec- Cohlmia, 3d MarDiv Hist, p. 331. The 3 d ture very much resembles the American count y Marine Division was given the stand-by job , in political form. Each of the seven takes it s and consequently the 32d Infantry Divisio n name from the largest city in the ken, the loca- was attached to VAC as a replacement unit . tion of the prefectural headquarters .

494 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

MAXIMUM DEPLOYMENT OF VAC O N KYUSHU AS OF 14 OCTOBER 194 5 10 5 0 10 20 50 90 50 60 TO .• 90 100 STATUTE MILE S

ISUS HI MP

3t128(—) 9M0 FOF ♦ mmo9~u1 MO _XX.

26(-) MsII0 1500 sHIMA

(F) om...

Kum9AAl o

~lT H srylRI ISLAND S NOTE ' PREFECTURAL BOUNDARIES--- - 12 (A) FUKUOK A (B) 0IT A (C) MITAZAK I (D) KUMAMOT O (E) KAGOSHIM A (F) NAGASAKI (G) SAG A (H) YAMAGUCHI

MAP 28 T. L . RUSSELL

INITIAL PLANNING AND OPERATIONS 495

key Japanese civil and military author- The rest of the 28th Marines, i n ities ; to execute advance spot checks o n division reserve, remained on board shi p compliance with demilitarization orders ; on A-Day . The 1st Battalion of the 27th and to ascertain such facilities for reception of our forces as condition and Marines landed on the docks in late af- suitability of docks and harbors, adequacy ternoon and moved out to occupy th e of sites selected by map reconnaissance fo r zone of responsibility assigned its regi- Corps installations, condition of airfields , ment. Before troop unloading was sus- 3 1 roads, and communications . pended at dusk, two artillery battalion s After issuing instructions to Japanese of the 13th Marines and regimenta l officials at Nagasaki, Colonel Wensinger headquarters had landed on beaches i n and the corps staff members proceeded the aircraft factory area, and the 5th by destroyer to Sasebo where prelim- Tank Battalion had disembarked at th e inary arrangements were made for th e air station . All units ashore established arrival of the 5th Division . On 20 Sep- guard posts and security patrols, but the tember, the second reconnaissance party first night of the division in Japan arrived at Sasebo, contacted Wensinger , passed without any noticeable event . and completed preparations for the land - On 23 September, as most of the re- ing. maining elements of the 5th Division At dawn on 22 September (A-Day) , landed and General Bourke set up hi s the transport squadron carrying Majo r command post ashore, patrols started General Thomas E. Bourke's 5th Marine probing the immediate countryside . Division and corps headquarters troop s Company C (reinforced) of the 27th arrived off Sasebo. Members of the ad- Marines was sent to Omura, about 22 vance party transferred from an APD miles southeast of Sasebo, to establish which had met the convoy, and reported a security guard over the naval air to their respective unit command ships . training station there. Omura airfiel d At 0859, after Japanese pilots had di- had been selected as the base of Marin e rected the transports to safe berths in air operations in southern Japan . the inner harbor of Sasebo, the 26t h A reconnaissance party, led by Colonel Marines (less 3/26) began landing on Daniel W. Torrey, Jr., commanding offi- beaches at the naval air station. As the cer of MAG—22, had landed and in- men advanced rapidly inland, relievin g spected the field on 14 September, and Japanese guards on naval base installa- the advance flight echelon of his ai r tions and stores, ships carrying othe r group had flown in from Okinawa six elements of the division moved to th e . Corsairs of VMF–11 3 Sasebo docks to begin general unloading. days later reached Omura on 23 September, and The shore party, reinforced by the 2 d n Battalion, 28th Marines, was completel y the rest of the group flight echelo e ashore by 1500 and started cargo un- arrived before the month was over. Th loading operations which continued primary mission of MAG–22 was simi- through the night. lar to that of MAG–31 at Yokosuka : surveillance flights in support of occu- "VAC OpRpt, p . 7. pation operations .

496 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

As flight operations commenced at ernmost part of the island, was trans- Omura and the 5th Division consolidate d ferred to General Schmidt 's comman d its hold on Sasebo, the second major from the Far East Air Forces on 1 element of VAC landed in Japan . The October. This unit, which was built early arrival at Saipan of the transports around a reinforced battalion (1/127 ) assigned to lift the 2d Division, couple d of the 32d Infantry Division, had bee n with efficient staging and loading, ha d flown into Kanoya on 3 September t o enabled planners to move the division secure an emergency field on the aeria l landing date ahead two days . When re - route to Tokyo from Okinawa and th e ports were received that the approache s Philippines. to the originally selected landing beache s General Krueger, well satisfied with were mined but that the harbor at Naga - the progress of the occupation in th e saki was clear, the decision was made VAC zone, assumed command of all to land directly in the harbor area . At forces ashore at 1000 on 24 September . 1300 on 23 September, the 2d and 6th The first major elements of the othe r Marines landed simultaneously on th e corps of the Sixth Army began landing east and west sides of the harbor . at Wakayama the next day. On every The two regiments moved out swiftl y hand, there was ample evidence that the to occupy the city and curtain off the occupation of southern Japan would b e atom-bomb-devastated area . The Marine bloodless. detachments from the cruisers Biloxi Among the VAC troops, whose previ- and Wichita were relieved by 3/2, which ous experience with the Japanese i n took up the duty of providing securit y surrender had been "necessaril y guards in Nagasaki for RAMP opera- meager," considerable speculation de- tions. Ships were brought alongside of veloped regarding : wharfs and docks to facilitate cargo handling, and unloading operations wer e . . . to what extent and how, if at all, th e well underway by nightfall . A quiet calm Japanese nation would comply with th e ruled the city to augur a peaceful occu- terms of surrender imposed . . . . The onl y e pation. thing which could be predicted from th past was that the Japanese reaction woul d On 24 September, as the rest of Major be unpredictable .32 General LeRoy P . Hunt's 2d Division began landing, the corps commander ar- And it was. In fact, the eventual key rived from Sasebo by destroyer to in- to the pattern and sequence of VAC oc- spect the Nagasaki area . General cupation operations was "the single out- Schmidt had established his CP ashore standing fact that Japanese compliance at Sasebo the previous day and taken with the terms was as nearly correct as command of the two Marine divisions. could be humanly expected ." 3 3 The only other major Allied unit ashore in Kyushu, an Army task force that wa s "= Ibid., pp . 11-12 . " occupying Kanoya airfield in the south- Ibid . CHAPTER 2

Kyushu Deployment to December 1945

KYUSHU OCCUPATION 1 the Emperor and the Japanese Govern- ment would be under the absolute au- Original plans for the occupation o f thority of SCAP. The Japanese militar y Japan had contemplated military gov- forces were to disarm and demobiliz e ernment of the surrendered nation , under their own supervision, and th e coupled with close operational contro l Allied forces were to occupy assigne d over the disarmament and demobiliza- areas at the same time that Japanese tion of the Japanese armed forces. Dur- demobilization was underway . ing the course of conferences with enemy The infantry regiment (and divi- surrender emissaries at Manila, radica l sional artillery operating as infantry ) modifications of these plans were made, was to be "the chief instrument of de- however, "based on the full cooperatio n militarization and control . The entir e of the Japanese and [including] meas- plan for the imposition of the terms of ures designed to avoid incidents which surrender was based upon the presenc e might result in renewed conflict ." 2 of infantry regiments in all the pre- Instead of instituting direct militar y fectures within the Japanese home - rule, the responsible occupation forc e land." 4 In achieving this aim, a fairly commanders were to supervise the ex- standard pattern of occupational dutie s ecution of SCAP directives to the Japa- was established with the division of re- nese government, keeping in mind sponsibilities based on the boundaries MacArthur's policy of using, but not of the prefectures so that the existing supporting, that Bove-nment.3 An im- Japanese government structure coul d portant element of the surrender was be utilized. In some instances, especi- the clear statement by the Allied power s ally in the 5th Marine Division zone, that from the moment of capitulation, the vast size of certain prefectures, th e density of civilian population, and the 1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in this tactical necessities of troop deploymen t section is derived from : CinCPac WarDs, Sep– combined to force modifications of th e Nov45 ; Sixth Army Rpt ; VAC OpRpt ; VAC general scheme of regimental respon- WarDs, Sep–Nov45 ; 2d MarDiv OpRpt ; 5th sibility for a single prefecture . MarDiv OpRpt ; 5th MarDiv WarDs, Sep– Nov45 ; Fukuoka Base Comd OpRpt, Occupa- Generally speaking, the method of tion of Japan, dtd 25Nov45 ; Conner, 5th carrying out the regimental missio n MarDiv Hist ; Shaw, Marine Occupation o f varied little between zones and units , Japan. whether Army or Marine. After selected 'Eighth Army Monograph I, p. 12 . advance parties of staff officers from SCAP, Summation No . 1 of Non-Military higher headquarters and the unit con - Activities in Japan and Korea, Sep–Oct45, p . 3 (Army Sec, WWII RecDiv, NA) . Sixth Army Rpt, p . 35. 497

498 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

cerned had established initial liaiso n The dangerous job of explosiv e with local Japanese authorities, th e ordnance disposal was handled by th e regiment moved into a bivouac area i n Japanese with a bare minimum o f or near the zone of responsibility. Re- American supervision . Some explosive s connaissance patrols were sent out to were either dumped at sea or burned in verify the location of military instal- approved areas, some were exploded i n lations and check inventories of wa r underground sites ; and because it was material submitted by the Japanese . too dangerous to enter certain explo- With this information, the regimenta l sives storage tunnels, these were seale d commander was able to divide his zon e and the contents left buried.° Weapons into battalion areas, and the battalio n and equipment declared surplus to th e commanders could, in turn, assign thei r needs of occupation troops were con- companies specific sectors of responsi- verted into scrap, mainly by Japanes e bility. Billeting and sanitation detail s labor, and then turned over to the Hom e preceded the troops into these areas t o Ministry for use in essential civilian in- oversee the preparation of barracks an d dustries. Foodstuffs and other nonmili- similar quarters, since many of these tary stocks were returned to the Japa- buildings were in a deplorable state of nese for distribution . repair and rather filthy. Although prefectural police main- The infantry company or artillery tained civil law and order and enforce d battery then became the working unit democratization decrees issued at th e instance of SCAP, constant surveillanc that actually accomplished the occupa- e was maintained over Japanese methods tion duties. Company commanders were of government . American intelligence empowered to seize any military instal- and military government personnel , lations in their zone and to use Japa- working with the occupying troops , nese military personnel not yet demo- acted quickly to stamp out any sugges- bilized or laborers furnished by Hom e tion of a return to militarism or evasion Ministry representatives to dispose of of the surrender terms. Regarding the all material within the installations . handling of war criminals, the JCS, o n SCAP directives governed dispositio n 14 September, had directed MacArthu r procedures and divided all material into to "proceed without avoidable delay the following categories : with the trial before appropriate mili- 1 . That to b e destroyed or scrapped tary courts or tribunals and the punish- (explosives and armaments no t ment of Japanese war criminals as have needed for souvenirs or training been or may be apprehended, in accord- purposes) . ance with the desire of the President ." 7 2 . That to be used for our operation s (telephones, radios, and vehicles) . Known or suspected war criminals were 3 . That to be returned to the Japanes e therefore apprehended and sent to Home Ministry (fuel, lumber, etc .) . Tokyo for processing and possible ar- 4 . That to be issued as trophies . raignment before an Allied tribunal . 5 . That to be shipped to the U . S. as trophies or training gear .5 ° Col Saville T . Clark It- to Hd, HistBr, G— 3 Div, HQMC, dtd 8Dec65 . 6 Ibid. 7 CinCPac WarD, Sep45 .

KYUSHU DEPLOYMENT TO DECEMBER 1945 499

In addition to the apprehension of wa r up a repatriation center at Uragashira , criminals and the exercise of super- which shortly after 26 September was visory control of Japanese demobiliza- receiving and processing nearly 3,000 tion of the home garrison, occupatio n repatriated and demobilized Japanese troops were responsible for ensuring troops a day. Soon after, Hakata and it s the smooth processing of hundreds o f receiving area were operating under thousands of military personnel an d occupation supervision . The ports o f civilians returning from the outposts o f Moji and Shimonoseki were closed the now defunct Empire. At the sam e down and not authorized for purpose s time, thousands of Korean, Formosan, of repatriation because the harbor ap- and Chinese prisoners and "voluntary" proaches were still heavily mined an d laborers had to be collected, pacified at had not yet been cleared . times,8 housed and fed, and returned to According to reliable information their homelands. In all repatriation available to the occupation authorities, operations, Japanese vessels and crew s there were well over a million Korean s were used to the fullest extent possibl e to be repatriated from Japan, and addi- in order to conserve Allied manpowe r tional ports and receiving centers were and allow for an accelerated program o f set up immediately . Following thei r postwar demobilization . inspection, Senzaki, Hakata, Sasebo, Soon after the initial VAC landings and Kagoshima were authorized a s on Kyushu, investigation disclosed that VAC zone ports of embarkation and the the Japanese had begun repatriation of Japanese were instructed to improve their own people from Korea and wer e and expand facilities there . Available returning Koreans home from Japan . Japanese shipping, however, fell far The port of Hakata, a short distance up short of port capacity. the coast from Fukuoka, was being In addition to the Koreans discovered utilized as an embarkation point, an d in the zone, the Americans found that Moji and Shimonoseki were employe d some 40,000 Chinese had to be re- as receiving and holding areas. The patriated ; 6,000 of these were in the Japanese used small craft for the re- VAC zone of responsibility along with patriation program, "and processin g approximately 7,000 Formosans and centers, records, sanitation, etc ., were 15,000 Ryukyu Islanders . Higher head- conspicuous by their absence." 9 Con- quarters advised VAC that th e fronted by the first groups of incomin g Ryukyuans and Formosans—half of Japanese, the 5th Marine Division set whom were demobilized soldiers—coul d a Deep-rooted feelings of antipathy towards not be repatriated yet, but the Chines e the Japanese among the Koreans and Chinese, could. The return home of the Chines e coupled with delays in the repatriation pro - on Japanese shipping began early in gram caused by lack of shipping, sometime s October from Hakata, and it was foun d led to riots and disturbances . Most of these necessary to place U . S. guard detach- were handled by Japanese police, but America n troops occasionally had to intervene to preven t ments on many ships to prevent dis- serious trouble. order because the Japanese crews coul d VAC OpRpt, Anx D, App 3, pp. 1-2. not control the returnees. The Koreans,

310-224 0 - 69 - 33

500 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

on the other hand, were relatively the city. Containing the third largest docile. naval base in Japan, Sasebo was a cit y With "their constant drift out o f whose normal population was approxi- nowhere" 10 into repatriation centers, mately 300,000 until 29 June 1945 . On the Koreans soon clogged these point s that day, Sasebo suffered its only B–29 beyond the capacity of available ship - raid of the war which destroyed a large ping. SCAP authorized the use of 80 portion of the city, but left the Navy LSTs for a China-to-Sasebo run for th e yard area relatively undamaged . This repatriation of Japanese, and a Sasebo- raid made over 60,000 Japanese home - to-Korea or -China run for others . After less and killed 1,000. 30 November, the port of Kagoshima On 27 September, four days after he was used as a repatriation center. The had first landed at Sasebo, General first Chinese repatriates, a total o f Bourke moved his CP to the naval re- 2,800, left Sasebo on 24 Novembe r cruit training center at Ainoura, seve n under this system. miles to the west of Sasebo.13 The 5th The pattern of progressive occupa- Pioneer Battalion, with military polic e tion called for in SCAP plans wa s and motor transport units attached , quickly established by VAC : garrisoned Sasebo. This reinforced battalion furnished working parties for th e After the 2d and 5th Marine Divisions had landed, VAC's general plan was for 5th Division quartermaster, unloade d the 2d Marine Division to expand south o f ships, provided guards for supply Nagasaki to assume control of the Naga - dumps and water points, and established saki, Kumamoto, Miyazaki, and Kago- military police patrols for the city. shima Prefectures . The 5th Marine Divi- sion in the meantime was to extend east As the 5th Marine Division estab- to the prefectures of Saga, Fukuoka, Oita , lished order in the Sasebo area, it bega n and Yamaguchi . The latter division wa s preparations to extend the occupation to be relieved in the Fukuoka, Oita, an d throughout the northern area o f Yamaguchi areas upon the arrival of sufficient elements of the 32d Division .11 Kyushu and onto nearby islands, including southern Honshu. A reinforced Troops occupying Sasebo found a company of the division was establishe d serious breakdown in those sanitary an d at Omura almost immediately afte r public services 12 ordinarily rendered by landing, and motorized patrols recon- 1° VAC OpRpt, Anx D, App 3, p . 4 . noitered the approaches to Sasebo . Very 11 Sixth Army Rpt, p. 26 . poor road conditions existing along the 12 For example, the telephone service i n route from Sasebo to Omura were par- Sasebo, and western Japan as well, wa s ticularly bad on the outskirts of the atrocious. "A telephone call to a point 50 mile s away often took many hours for a connectio n unsung triumph of the communicators," thi s and then [one was able to get] only an unin- system was used throughout the VAC area an d telligible response." To improve these condi- was "finally extended to Tokyo" with excellent tions, VAC established a line of sight system results. Rogers ltr. similar to that used in Hawaii, where there 12 It was later discovered that the defender s was a scrambler unit at the origin and a n of Tarawa had trained at Ainoura . BGe n automatic unscrambler at the receiver . "An Clarence R . Wallace ltr to CMC, dtd 4Jan66 .

KYUSHU DEPLOYMENT TO DECEMBER 1945 501

former city. The many narrow bridges tive center of the northwestern coal an d encountered were often in poor repair steel region, was made almost immedi- or entirely impassable . Japanese males ately after the initial landings . Because met by the patrols were usually friendly, the waters of Fukuoka harbor wer e but the woman and children appeare d liberally sown with mines, the move- frightened . As the Japanese populac e ment to the city was made by rail an d grew more accustomed to the presenc e road from Sasebo . An advance party, of the Marines and became assured that consisting of officers from VAC and th e the occupation forces would not harm 5th Division, reached Fukuoka on 2 7 them, their shyness and fear disap- September and began making prelimi- peared. nary arrangements for the entry of the During the latter part of the first troops. Meetings were held with Japa- week of occupation, VAC continued t o nese military and civilian authoritie s extend its zone of occupation operations, regarding the conduct of the occupation. guarded Japanese military installation s Leading elements of the occupatio n and arms and supply dumps, and began force began arriving on 30 September . to inventory and dispose of the materia l Brigadier General Ray A. Robinson , in these dumps in line with prescribe d Assistant Division Commander of the regulations . The 2d Marine Division 5th Marine Division, was given com- established detachments at Isahay a mand of the Fukuoka force which (northeast of Nagasaki) and Kawatan a consisted of the 28th Marines (Rein- at the same time that patrols exercise d forced) and Army augmentation de- surveillance over all roads and strategi c tachments. areas. The Fukuoka Occupation Force One week after the initial landings, (FOF), which was placed directly the 5th Division zone of responsibility under VAC command, began sending (Z/R) was extended to include Yagi- reconnaissance parties followed by hara, Miyazaki, Arita, Takeo, Sechi- company- and battalion-sized occupa- bara, and other small towns to the nort h tion forces to the major cities of north- and west of Sasebo . The normal occu- ern Kyushu and across the Straits o f pation missions of the division con- Shimonoseki to Yamaguchi Prefectur e tinued to proceed in a satisfactor y in southwestern Honshu . Because of the manner. Japanese equipment was inven- limited number of troops available to toried rapidly and Japanese guards FOF, Japanese guards were left i n were relieved by Marine sentries a s charge of most military installations, soon as the inventories were completed . and effective control of the zone was On 29 September, VAC published an maintained through the use of motor- operation order for the occupation o f ized surveillance patrols . Fukuoka. (See Map 28. ) In order to prevent possible outbreak s - FUKUOKA OCCUPATIO N of mob violence, Marine guard detach ments were set up to administer the The decision to occupy Fukuoka, Chinese labor camps found in the area , largest city in Kyushu and administra- and Japanese Army supplies were

502 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

requisitioned to feed and clothe the Moji Occupation Group was formed . A former POWs and laborers . Some of detachment was sent from Shimonosek i the supplies were also used to sustain to Yamaguchi the next day, and eight the swarms of Koreans who gathered in days later, occupation forces were set temporary camps near the principal re- up at Senzaki. patriation ports of Fukuoka and Sen- As General Robinson's force took zaki (Yamaguchi Prefecture) while control of Fukuoka and Yamaguch i they awaited shipping to return to thei r Prefectures, the 5th Marine Divisio n homeland . The Marines supervised the expanded its hold on the area east of loading out of the Koreans and mad e Sasebo. On 5 October, the division Z/ R continuous checks on the processing and was extended to include Saga Prefec- discharge procedures used to handle th e ture and the city of Kurume in the cen- Japanese troops who returned with eac h ter of the island. The 2d Battalion, 27th incoming vessel . In addition to its re- Marines, moved to Saga city, operating patriation activities, the FOF located for a short time as an independen t and inventoried vast quantities of Japa- occupation group . On 24 October, the nese military material for later disposi- regiment (less 1/27) established its tion by the 32d Infantry Division. headquarters in Kurume and assume d On 1 October, General Robinson con- responsibility for the central portion of ferred with ranking Japanese officer s the division zone, which now extende d concerning orders and instructions per- to the east coast (Oita Prefecture) . taining to the occupation . At the direc- Through all of these troop movements , tion of higher authority, the FOF com- the maintenance of roads and bridge s mander ordered sentries posted at the was a constant problem since the inade- more important buildings and dock quate road net quickly disintegrated facilities, and in a swift move to crush when punished by the combination of a suspected black market operation i n heavy rains and extensive military traf- foreign exchange, he immediately closed fic. The burden of supplying and trans- the branches of the Bank of Chose n porting the scattered elements of VA C throughout the FOF zone, posted guards was borne by the Japanese rail sys- at these branches, sealed their safes tem.1 4 and vaults, and impounded the records After it had moved to Saga, 2/27 dis- of the bank. covered on the airfield there 178 Japa- Further establishment of occupation nese fighter planes, all but 8 of whic h forces throughout the zone began on 4 October with the movement of a rein - 14 The state of the Kyushu road net, much of which would not support even medium-sized forced company from 3/28 into Shi- vehicles, and the extensive rice paddy areas monoseki as the Shimonoseki Occupa- contiguous to these roads would have consti- tion Group. On 6 October, another tuted extremely serious obstacles to the prose- reinforced company of the battalion wa s cution of OLYMPIC, the projected invasio n sent into the Moji area . The rest of the of Kyushu . Fortunately, the extensive Japanes e rail network was capable of handling most o f battalion moved into Moji on 1 0 the supply requirements of the occupation October, the day that the Shimonoseki- forces .

KYUSHU DEPLOYMENT TO DECEMBER 1945 503

had been damaged by typhoons . The ministration received evidence of Zillig's battalion also uncovered a vast "am - existence, it began sending him a check munition dump where the Japanese had again. Veterans legislation that ha d stored approximately one-fifth of the been passed in Congress during the war country's ammunition for home de- years had increased Zillig's pension t o fense." 15 A battalion patrol located an $75 a month. Unfortunately, he did no t internment camp at Shimizu, where live long enough to cash more than a fe w Dutch, British, Italian, Portuguese , checks, for he committed suicide o n Swiss, and Belgian nationals had been 9 March 1946. confined during the war . Upon entering the camp, the Marines found that : FURTHER EXPANSION

The only remaining internee was an 82-year old Swiss who amazed everyone When it was decided to occupy Oita by proving that he was an ex-U . S . Marine . Prefecture, the entire 180-mile trip fro m Edward Zillig had enlisted in the Marin e Sasebo to Oita city was made by rail . Corps in 1888 in Philadelphia, had bee n The occupation force, Company A (Re- discharged in 1893, and then had reen- inforced) of the 5th Tank Battalion , listed during the Spanish-American War. He produced a letter from the Veterans operating as infantry,19 set up in the Administration showing that he had re- city on 15 October and conducted a received a pension . From 1936 until his connaissance of the military installa- house was blown to bits, he had lived in tions in the coastal prefecture by means Nagasaki with his Japanese wife . Zillig y turned over two items to the patrol : (1 ) of motorized patrols . The compan a statement of the kind treatment he had served as an advance party for 32 d received from a Japanese police sergeant, Infantry Division troops, and because and (2) a request for renewal of his $60- of its small size, was forced to rely a-month pension.1 6 on Japanese labor for most of its mate- Zillig also had a request for the "one rial inventory work. more thing I want to see in life," a full - The Marines found that the naval air dress Marine Corps parade .17 The old station at Oita had been almost comman received his wish shortly there - pletely destroyed by American bombs, after, when he stood beside Lieutenant although nearly 100 dispersed Japanese Colonel John W. A. Antonelli 2/27 com- planes remained in semi-operable condi- mander, and "watched the modern tion. Despite the fact that Oita had never Leathernecks swing by—and he remem- been singled out as a primary target for bered to salute at the right time." 1 8 AAF raids, approximately 40 percent o f The former Marine's pension was re- the city had been razed because B–29s newed, for as soon as the Veterans Ad- ""Tanks were never used even for show purposes because the soft roads would not bea r 1G Conner, 5th MarDiv Hist, p. 153 . their weight . The Iwo-scarred Shermans had 19 Ibid. been landed and parked at the Sasebo nava l 1T Washington Star, 3Dec45 . air station, and there they stayed." Conner , 18 Ibid. 5th MarDiv Hist, p . 155 . 504 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

BATTERED BUDDHIST FIGURES symbolize the atomic destruction suffered at Nagasaki. (USMC 136176)

MORE THAN 200 Japanese planes are destroyed at Omura as part of the Allied disarmament program. (USMC 139991)

KYUSHU DEPLOYMENT TO DECEMBER 1945 505

had been diverted there when their pri- preparations to move to Peleliu an d mary target could not be hit or when th e supervise the repatriation of Japanes e a bomb load left over from those dropped troops from the Western Carolines,21 the on the initial target . From Oita, the oc- first elements of the 32d Division began cupation spread northwest along the landing at Sasebo . An advance party of east coast of Kyushu to Beppu, where the division had arrived in Fukuoka - the most famous beaches and shore re earlier, on 3 October. The 128th Infan- sorts of Japan are located . try, followed by the 126th Infantry and The 13th Marines, occupying the are a to the south and east of Sasebo in Naga - division troops, moved straight on saki and Saga Prefectures, supervise d through the port and entrained for the processing of Japanese repatriate s Fukuoka, where the Army units came returning from China and Korea, and temporarily under the control of FOF. handled the disposition of the weapons , The V Amphibious Corps placed the equipment, and ammunition that wer e 127th Infantry (less 1/127), which stored in naval depots near Sasebo an d landed on 18–19 October, under the op- Kawatana. The 1st Battalion, 27th erational control of the 5th Division t o Marines, which was detached from its take over the zone of responsibility o f regiment, was stationed in Sasebo under the 26th Marines . division control, and furnished a portion The Fukuoka Occupation Force was of the garrison for the city as well a s dissolved on 24 October when it was re- detachments that investigated the island lieved by the 32d Division, which opened groups offshore. The division reconnais- its command post in Fukuoka on th e sance company was sent in DUKWs to same day.22 At this time, the Fukuoka Hirado Shima, north of Sasebo, on Base Command, composed of the service 2 October. Finding everything in order , elements that had been assigned to Gen - the company returned to Sasebo on the eral Robinson's force, was set up to 4th. support the operations in northern The 26th Marines, whose patrol s Kyushu and continued to function until ranged the hinterland north and east of 25 November, when the Army division Sasebo, had a very short tour of duty took over its duties. The 28th Marines in Japan. On 13 October, the regimen t -` See pt III, chap 3, "Return to the Islands, " was alerted for transfer to the Palau above. Islands.20 While the 26th was making " "The movement of the 32d Army Divisio n to the Fukuoka area created a problem. It wa s 2 ° The 6th Marines of the 2d Marine Division unsafe to send [it] by sea because of the re- was originally scheduled to answer this cal l maining harbor mines. Overland was almost from CinCPac, and when its Palau alert wa s impossible because of the narrow bridges an d cancelled, it was directed to stand by to mov e turns" facing the division's heavy equipment, to Sasebo to replace the 26th Marines . On 1 7 and surmounting all of this was the impossibl e October, this second alert was cancelled whe n loading situation in Sasebo . The 32d "finally VAC attached the 127th Infantry Regiment to went overland in what was a really remarkable the 5th Marine Division . logistic feat." Rogers ltr .

506 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

and the 5th Tank Battalion occupation 2d and 6th Marines moved into billets i n forces were relieved by Army units : the the vicinity of Nagasaki, with the mis- 128th RCT 23 took over Yamaguch i sions of surveillance in their assigned Prefecture, the 126th patrolled Fukuok a areas and of disposition of enemy mili- and Oita Prefectures, and the 127th , tary material in the nearby countryside after it was relieved by the 28th Ma- and on the many small islands in the vi- rines in the zone formerly occupied b y the 26th Marines, occupied Fukuok a cinity of the coast. The 8th and 10th Ma- and the zone to the north. rines went directly from their transports The 26th Marines began boarding to barracks at Isahaya, where they began ship on 18 October and 127th Infantry patrolling the peninsula to the south an d units moved into the vacated billets . On the rest of Nagasaki Prefecture in th e 19 October, the Marine regiment was 2d Division zone . detached from the division and returne d On 4 October, VAC changed th e to FMFPac control as loading con- boundary between divisions to include tinued. Before the transports departed Omura in General Hunt's zone . The 5th on 21 October, orders were receive d Division security detachment at the Ma- from FMFPac designating 2/26 for dis- rine air base was relieved by 3/10 and bandment, and the battalion returned to returned to parent control. Shortly the Marine Camp, Ainoura—the 5th Di- thereafter, the 10th Marines took ove r vision headquarters outside of Sasebo . the whole of the 8th Marines area in On 31 October, 2/26, the first of many Nagasaki Prefecture. war-born Marine infantry battalions t o The corps expanded the 2d Division end its Pacific service passed out of ex- zone on 5 October to include all of highly istence and its men were transferred to industrialized Kumamoto Prefecture . other units. An advance billeting, sanitation, and re- While Brigadier General Robert B . connaissance party of the 8th Marine s McBride, Jr.'s 32d Infantry Division travelled to Kumamoto city in the south- moved north to take over the area occu- western part of the island to make con- pied by the Fukuoka and Oita Occupa- tact with the Japanese authorities and tion Forces, the 2d Marine Divisio n pave the way for regimental assumptio n gradually expanded its hold on souther n of control. By 18 October, all units of th e Kyushu . Immediately after landing, th e 8th Marines established themselves i n =' The infantry units of the 32d Infantr y and around Kumamoto and began th e Division were organized as RCTs comprising by-now familiar process of inventor y an infantry regiment, an artillery battalion , and disposition. In line with SCAP di- and other attached division and corps troop s to perform occupation duties . In the Marin e rectives outlining measures to restore divisions, where the artillery regiment was a n the civilian economy to a self-supporting organic unit, it was reinforced and used as an occupation force in the same manner as th e level, the Marines assisted the local gov- infantry regiments . ernment wherever necessary to speed the

KYUSHU DEPLOYMENT TO DECEMBER 1945 507

conversion of war plants to essentia l south and southwest respectively of peacetime production .24 Kyushu. The remaining unoccupied portion of On 29 October, a motor convoy carry- Kyushu was taken over by the 2d Divi- ing the major part of 1/8 moved from sion within the next month. Advance Kumamoto to Kagoshima city to assum e parties headed by senior field grade of- control of western Kagoshima . The bat- ficers contacted civil and military offi- talion had to start anew the routine o f cials in Kagoshima and Miyazaki reconnaissance, inspection, inventory, Prefectures to ensure compliance with and disposition that had occupied i t surrender terms and adequate prepara- twice before . The 2d Battalion, 2d Ma- tions for the reception of division rines, assigned to the eastern half of troops.25 Miyazaki Prefecture and the Kagoshima, found much of its prelimi- half of Kagoshima east of Kagoshim a nary occupation spadework already Wan were assigned to the 2d Marines. done. The Army task force at Kanoya The remaining half of Kagoshima Pre- had been actively patrolling the are a fecture was added to the zone of the 8th since it had come under VAC command . Marines ; later, the regiment was also When 2/2, loaded in four LSTs, arrive d given responsibility for conducting oc- from Nagasaki on 27 October, it wa s cupation operations in the Osumi and relatively easy to effect a relief. The Koshiki island groups, which lay to th e Marines landed at Takasu, port fo r Kanoya, and moved by rail and road to Z' A military government team, compose d the airfield. On 30 October, 2/2 assumed primarily of Army and Navy officers, wa s from 1/127 operational control of the assigned to each regimental headquarters an d Army Air Force detachment mannin g performed a valuable liaison function betwee n the Marine commanders and local government the emergency field, and the 32d Divi- agencies. LtCol Duncan H . Jewell ltr to Hd , sion battalion prepared to return to HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 3Jan66 . Sasebo to rejoin its regiment. 25 Colonel Samuel G . Taxis, the G—3 of th e The remainder of the 2d Marines als o o division, headed up the team which went t moved by sea from Sasebo to Takasu an d southern Kyushu to meet with the commanders of the Forty-seventh and Fiftieth Armies and thence by rail to Miyazaki Prefecture the head of the Naval Base Force at Kagoshima in early November. Regimental head- to explain the provisions of the surrender . quarters and 3/2 set up their bases of f When Colonel Taxis compared the strength o t the Japanese forces with that of the occupation operations at Miyakonojo, and the 1s forces, he came to the conclusion that "a boy Battalion moved into billets in the city was sent to do a man's job." BGen Samuel G . of Miyazaki .26 By 14 November, with Taxis comments to HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, the occupation of . Miyazaki complete, dtd 28Dec65. General Taxis also recalled tha t his team was purposely composed of only a Subsequently, one reinforced company was few Marines in the belief that if a show o f deployed to a small coastal town half-way be- force had been made in the south, the Japanese tween Miyazaki and Oita, and remained there armed forces there would react. Ibid. until the entire regiment was withdrawn . Ibid.

508 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

VAC had established effective contro l centers under corps control . The tide over its entire zone of responsibility .27 of humanity had not all flowed from one At the end of November, VAC coul d direction, since 273,276 Koreans, Chi- nese, and Okinawans had been sent back report substantial progress in its major to their homelands . On 1 December, only occupation tasks . Over 700,000 Japanes e about 20,000 Japanese Army and Navy returning from overseas had been proc- personnel remained on duty, all em- essed through ports and separatio n ployed in demobilization, repatriation, minesweeping, and similar activities . " In late November, in order to determin e On that date, in accordance with SCA P whether the VAC plan for OLYMPIC wa s directives, these men were transferred valid and feasible, Brigadier General Willia m W. Rogers, VAC chief of staff, called int o to civilian status under newly create d Sasebo for a three-day war games session the government ministries and bureaus . The commanders, chiefs of staff, and principal staff destruction or other disposition of war officers of the Japanese forces which wer e material in the Corps area proceeded to have defended Kyushu. In the course of these satisfactorily with surprisingly fe w sessions, the play of the games was based o n the VAC plan and the defense orders and plan s mishaps,28 considering the enormous which the Japanese participants brought wit h quantity of old and faulty munitions them, after some initial reluctance to do so o n that had to be handled . their part. Questions were asked at random , The need for large numbers of combat capabilities and reaction times were measured , and all conceivable factors were taken into con- troops in Japan steadily lessened as th e sideration. The Japanese were asked how long occupation wore on, and it became in- it would have taken them to move one division . creasingly obvious that the Japanes e Instead of the 36 hours that the Marines had intended to offer no resistance . Report- expected, the answer was 9 days . The reason ing to Washington in September, Gen- was that the former enemy commanders coul d l only move their troops at night, and by foot, eral MacArthur told General Marshal because of the complete American air supe- that he had inspected the occupied area s riority over the target by day. At the com- about Tokyo Bay, and that he believe d pletion of the war games, it was decisivel y that Japan was very near to economi c proven that U . S. air superiority had in fac t and industrial collapse. MacArthur went guaranteed success to the VAC plan. In addi- e tion, although the strength of Japanese forces on to say : "It appears the fire raids hav in the south of Kyushu was great, many so destroyed the integrity of the indus- soldiers were armed with spears only . The trial establishment as to prevent con - more than 2,000 aircraft on Kyushu posed a threat to the American landing, but these 43 In November, several accidents in the VA C planes were held back to be employed in a zone occurred during the munitions disposition mass Kamikaze attack which was never program . At Kanoya, a dump of parachute ordered. The entire three days of sessions were flares was accidentally ignited and the result- conducted on a thoroughly professional basis ing fire touched off a major explosion. A t with attention paid to mutual courtesy an d Soida, in the 32d Infantry Division zone, a cave respect. In the end, General Rogers was satis- full of propellant charges and powder explode d fied that the VAC plan would have been valid, in a devastating blast, which spread death if OLYMPIC had been consummated. Co l and destruction among nearby Japanese . No Robert D . Heinl, Jr ., comments to HistBr, American personnel were injured in either G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 19Aug66. accident.

KYUSHU DEPLOYMENT TO DECEMBER 1945 509

tinuance of modern war." 29 MacArthur ship, and in less than a wee k continued : AirFMFPac directed that the unit return to the United States . Its planes Manpower alone is the only warlike re - source available or potential . The Japanes e were flown to an aircraft replacemen t Imperial Government and the Japanes e pool on Okinawa, and low-point me n Imperial General Staff are fully cognizant were transferred to MAG–31 as re- of these conditions and as near as can b e placements for men eligible for rotatio n judged are completely through with thi s or discharge. On 20 November, afte r war . Their attitude encourages the stron g belief that these agencies are striving to picking up MAG–31 returnees at Yoko- their utmost to effect rapid disarmamen t suka and similar Army troops at and demobilization . They are submissive Yokohama, MAG–22 left for home . The and apparently sincere. . . . I feel confident Marine Air Base, Omura, remained i n that the strength of occupation forces ma y operation, but its aircraft strength s be cut and retrograde movement of unit d to the United States well under-way by th e consisted mainly of light liaison an 1st of the year or shortly thereafter .30 observation planes of the observatio n squadrons assigned to VAC divisions .3 1 The first major Marine unit to ful- The redeployment of MAG–22 wa s fill its mission in southern Japan and only a small part of the general patter n return to the United States was MAG– for withdrawing excess occupatio n 22. On 14 October, Admiral Spruance , forces. On 12 November, VAC informed acting for CinCPac, had queried the the Sixth Army that the 5th Marine Fifth Air Force if the Marine fighter Division would be released from its group was still considered necessary t o duties on 1 December for return to the the Sasebo area garrison . On 25 Octo- United States. By the turn of the year, ber, the Army replied that MAG–22 wa s the 2d Marine Division would be the no longer needed, and it was returned only major Marine unit remaining on to the operational control of the Navy . occupation duty in southern Japan . Both the group service squadron an d '1 MAG–22 WarDs, Oct–Nov45. A thir d its heavy equipment, which had just ar- Marine air base at Iwakuni to support opera- rived from Okinawa, remained on boar d tions in the Kure area had been a part o f original occupation plans . It was not estab- zB CinCAFPac Adv 041207Z of Sep45 to lished, however, and the transport squadron s WARCOS in CinCPac WarD, Sep45 (OAB, of MAG–21 intended for it were reassigned, NHD) . VMR–353 to Guam and VMR–952 to Yokosuka. '° Ibid. ComFifthFlt AR, pt VI, sec L, p . 2. CHAPTER 3

Last Months in Japan

Americans, uncertain of how the Jap- Although fraternization with the Jap- anese people would accept the occupa- anese was not permitted at first, thes e tion, had their doubts allayed within a restrictions were soon eased and it di d short time after the troops had lande d not take too long for the Marines to learn more than they had known pre- and begun fulfilling their missions . Original Japanese qualms about associ- viously of the Japanese way of life an d to appreciate Japanese customs an d ating with their conquerors were quickl y culture. At the same time, the Japanese dispelled after the children : were often awestruck by the manner . . . were the first to lose their fear. and means by which the Americans These doll-like small fry, most of the m could accomplish tasks which the Japa- wearing uniforms and thoroughly accus- nese considered difficult but which the tomed to saluting, soon began to line th e Marines considered normal routine . Jap- streets and gaze with wide eyes at th e anese standards of living and efficiency Marines and their vehicles . The children' s curiosity was soon shared by their elders . were woefully below those of the West- Old and young alike seemed especiall y ern world, and the former enemy natio n amazed at the American jeeps and truck s sadly lacked transportation and con- which, regardless of heavy rains and ba d struction equipment and tools. Most roads had the power to travel where their Japanese primary and secondary indus- drivers took them . Bulldozers and othe r earthmoving equipment brought even more try had been devastated in the air raids. amazement. And not the least of the Besides, Japanese industrial facilitie s startling sights were the Marines them - had long been geared to the production selves. Men with blue eyes and light hai r of war materiel rather than consumer were astonishing enough, but red-haire d goods, or housing, or any of the othe r Marines were beyond imagination .) products that the civilian population o f Japanese cordiality and hospitality the Allies was able to obtain, even i n became evident as the Marine occupa- wartime. tion forces spread out over the island Japanese men and women alike la - of Kyushu. Other signs of the presence bored days to accomplish what th e of American troops were the Englis h Americans with their heavy equipment language safeguard markers placed on and know-how could do in minutes . The churches, religious shrines, and schools , backward conditions of the Japanes e warning occupation troops away and could be blamed partially on the war, exempting these places from search and but even more so on a way of life and a trespass. social structure that had remained largely unchanged for centuries . Al- 'Conner, 5th MarDiv Hist, p. 138. though the opening of Japan by the Wes t 510

LAST MONTHS IN JAPAN 511

in the mid-19th Century caused a sever e MARINE WITHDRAWAL 3 jolt to Japanese attitudes and sensibili- ties, it was nothing compared to th e By 30 November, only about 10 per- changes wrought by the American occu- cent of the Marines in VAC had bee n pation. returned to the States, although dis- There had indeed been many change s charge and rotation directives had made and much accomplished by the end of more than 15,000 men eligible . Marine the first few months of occupation, dur- divisions were under orders to maintai n ing which time the occupation forces their strength at 90 percent of T/0, an d enforced the surrender terms . The Jap- these restrictions severely curtailed th e anese armed forces had been almost com - number of men that could be released . pletely demobilized, 90 percent of the Replacements were almost nonexistent military facilities in the Home Islands in this period of postwar reduction . had been razed, and approximately 2 0 Still, the 2d Division, which was to re - percent of the ammunition and ex - main in Japan, had 7,653 officers and plosives stored in bunkers all over Japa n men who were entitled to return home .4 had been destroyed. Eighty percent of To meet this problem, VAC ordered a n the war materiels and equipment still interchange of personnel between the 2 d in usable condition had been turned ove r and 5th Marine Divisions . to the Japanese Home Ministry for con - High-point men of the 2d Divisio n version to peacetime use. would be transferred to the 5th Division , and men not yet eligible for discharge In the 5th Division area, the 13th o Marines alone had supervised the scut- or rotation would move from the 5th t tling at sea or the destruction by othe r the 2d in exchange. Almost half of th e means of 188,000 rounds of artillery an d 2d Division and 80 percent of the 5th mortar ammunition, 25,000 aerial Division, in all about 18,000 Marine s bombs, 1,800 machine guns, 270 tor- and corpsmen, were slated for transfer. pedoes, 4,500 mines and depth charges , At the same time that the personnel 83 large guns, 400 tons of aircraft parts , exchanges took place, elements of the 2d 30 tons of signal equipment, 650 tons o f and 32d Divisions occupied the 5th Divi- torpedo parts, and 161 miscellaneou s sion zone of responsibility so that the types of machines that were geared for occupation mission of surveillance, dis- the manufacture of war materiel . Other Unless otherwise noted, the material in this VAC units completed similar demolition section is derived from : Eighth Army Mono- missions. Even while they enjoyed thei r graph I; Occupational Monograph of the stay in Japan and carried out their oc- Eighth U . S . Army in Japan, v . II, Jan—Aug46, cupation duties, " `Home, when do w e n.d . ; I Corps Hist of the Occupation of Japan , go there?' " was the single most impor- Dec45—Jun46 ; VAC OpRpt ; VAC WarDs , Nov45—Jan46 ; 2d MarDiv Occupational Hist - tant topic of conversation among the Rpts, 1Mar—15Jun46 ; 5th MarDiv OpRpt ; 5th Marines in Kyushu.2 MarDiv WarDs, Nov—Dec45 ; Shaw, Marin e Occupation of Japan. 2 Ibid., p . 173 . 4 2d MarDiv OpRpt, Anx B, p. 4.

512 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

position of materiel, and repatriation On the same date that the 2d Marin e could continue without interruption. Division took over the duties of th e On 24 November, control of Saga an d 5th, VAC received a dispatch directiv e Fukuoka Prefectures passed to the 2 d from the Sixth Army stating that th e and 32d Divisions respectively . (See corps would be relieved of occupa- Map 29.) In the first of a series of tion responsibilities on 31 December, comparable troop movements, 2/6 en - when the Eighth Army was to assum e trained for Saga to take over the dutie s command of all Allied occupatio n and absorb the low-point men of 2/27 . troops in Japan, and plans were laid to The 6th and the 10th Marines occupied reduce American strength to the point the 5th Division zone, relieved units o f where only those units considered a the 13th, 27th, and 28th Marines, and part of the peacetime Armed Force s effected the necessary personnel trans- would remain . I Corps, with head - fers. The 2d and 8th Marines sent their quarters at Osaka (later Kyoto), woul d returnees to Sasebo, the 5th Divisio n take over the area and troops of VAC. port of embarkation, and joined new The VAC spent most of its remaining men from the infantry regiments of th e time in Japan completing its current 5th. Separate battalions and headquar- occupation missions, supervising the ters troops of both divisions exchange d transfer of low-point men to the units men with their opposite numbers . of the 2d Division, and preparing to The 5th Division began loading ou t turn over the area to I Corps . As had as soon as ships were available at Sasebo , been ordered, the changeover took place and the first transports, carrying men of on 31 December 1945, and VAC troops the 27th Marines, left for the States on began loading out the following day, 5 December. The 2d Division assume d some units for return to the United all of the remaining occupation dutie s States and others for duty with Marine of the 5th on 8 December, and the last supply activities on Guam . On 8 Jan- elements of the 5th Division departe d uary, the last elements of VAC, includ- Sasebo 11 days later . ing General Schmidt's headquarters , Beginning on 20 December, with the left Sasebo for San Diego where on 1 5 arrival Stateside of the first troopship s February 1946, it was disbanded .6 of the 27th Marines, a steady stream of Not long after the departure of VAC officers and enlisted men passed through from Japan, the 2d Marine Division be reassignment and discharge centers a t - came responsible for the whole of wha Camp Pendleton . During January, mos t t had been the corps zone of the organic elements of the divisio n . The 32d In- fantry Division, a former Michigan were skeletonized and then disbanded. - On 5 February 1946, the Headquarter s Marines, arrived at San Diego from Peleliu . Battalion followed suit "and the 5t h Disbandment came quickly for these units . Th e Marine Division passed into history ." 5 1st Battalion completed its mission on Peleli u in March and moved to Guam where it, too , 5 Conner, 5th MarDiv Hist, p. 176 . "Exactly died an honorable death ." Ibid. one year after the Division had landed on Iwo Muster Rolls, H&S Bn, VAC, Feb46 (Diary Jima, Headquarters and the 3d Battalion, 26th Unit, Files Sec, Pers Dept, HQMG) .

LAST MONTHS IN JAPAN 513

VAC DEPLOYMENT O N 8 DECEMBER 194 5 10 5 0 10 E0 30 40 50 80 TO 00 00 100

STATUTE MILE S

KIAAU0 sMuA

S(REin)(-) YE .

NOTE: PREFECTURAL BOUNDARIES —•- - (A) FUKUOK A (B) OIT A (C) MIYAZAKI (D) KUMAMOTO (E) KAGOSHIM A AKa (F) NAGASAKI (B) SAG A (N) YAMAGUCHI

T. L . RUSSELL MAP 29

514 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Wisconsin National Guard outfit, wa s largely the same until the entire divi- one of the Army units slated for deacti- sion departed Japan. vation early in 1946 . In preparation for When Major General Roscoe B. Wood- taking over the duties of the 32d Divi- ruff, commander of I Corps, returned to sion in Yamaguchi, Fukuoka, and Oit a the United States on temporary assign- Prefectures, the 2d Division began mov- ment on 8 February, Major General ing units of the 6th Marines north to LeRoy P. Hunt, Jr., the commander o f the Army zone and increasing the size the 2d Marine Division and senior divi- of the areas assigned to the other regi- sion commander in the corps, flew to ments. On 31 January, when the 2d Kyoto and assumed command of th e Division formally relieved the 32d, the corps, a position he retained until Gen- prefectural responsibilities of the majo r eral Woodruff's return on 5 April. The Marine units were : 2d Marines, Oita corps zone of responsibility underwent and Miyazaki ; 6th Marines, Yamaguchi , one more change during this period . Fukuoka, and Saga ; 8th Marines, Kuma- Advance elements of the British Com- moto and Kagoshima ; 10th Marines, monwealth Occupation Force (BCOF ) Nagasaki . (See Map 30 .) began moving into Hiroshima Pre- At this time, the 2d Division com- fecture on 4 February and formall y mand post was in Sasebo, and the CPs took control from the 24th Infantry of the regiments were located as fol- Division on 7 March . On the 23d, the lows : 2d Marines, Miyazaki ; 6th Ma- BCOF formally relieved the 6th Ma- rines, Fukuoka ; 8th Marines, Kuma- rines in Yamaguchi Prefecture, reduc- moto ; and the 10th Marines, Nagasaki . ing the 2d Marine Division zone to th e An increase in the size and number of island of Kyushu. areas assigned to the 2d Division meant By April, it seemed that the constant that Marine occupation responsibilitie s shifting of units was largely over an d were similarly enlarged. The routine o f that the divisions of I Corps could con- guard, patrol, repatriation, and disposi- centrate mainly on reinstituting regula r tion duties grew apace with the areas i n training schedules. The 2d Marine Divi- which they were accomplished . sion had been pared down to peacetime A typical regimental disposition i n strength by 11 February, when th e this phase of the Marine occupation may third battalion of each infantry regi- be seen in the deployment of the 6t h ment and the last lettered battery o f Marines on 31 January., (See Map 31.) each artillery battalion were relieved The regimental headquarters and 1/6 of occupation duties, assembled at CP were at Fukuoka ; the CP of 2/6 wa s Sasebo, and then sent home for dis- at Saga. The battalion headquarter s bandment. Insofar as possible, the re- company and Companies K and L o f maining units were assembled in bat- 3/6 were located at Kokura ; Compan y talion-sized camp areas, which serve d I was at Senzaki in Yamaguchi Ken . as centers from which surveillance of From these widely separated localities, the local zone of responsibility was units of the 6th Marines maintained a maintained. When not undertakin g daily occupation routine that remained occupation missions, the Marines at-

LAST MONTHS IN JAPAN 51 5

DEPLOYMENT OF 2D MARDIV, 31 JANUARY 194 6 10 5 0 20 50 40 50 80

STATUTE YILE 8

400 SAUN A

NOTE , PREFECTURAL GOUNDA RIES--- - (A) FUKUOKA (B) OITA (C) MIYAZAK I D) KUMAMOT O (E) KAGOSHIM A (F) NAGASAK I (G) SAG A (H) YAMAGUCHI

MAP 3 0 T.L . RUSSELL

310-224 0 - 69 - 34

516 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

tended classes in basic military sub- June bound for Norfolk, and the 8t h jects, fired individual and crew-served Marines followed soon after . General infantry weapons, and carried out fiel d Hunt turned over his zone to the 24th exercises in combat tactics . An efficien t Division on 15 June, and Marine re- air courier service of liaison planes an d sponsibility for the occupation of occasionally transports, operating out Kyushu ended .'' Division headquarters of the Marine air base at Omura, con- left on 24 June, and with the exception nected the scattered battalions and en- of service troops and rear unit echelons , abled the division and regimental com- which remained to load out heavy equip - manders to maintain effective contro l ment, the major elements of the 2 d of their units. The Marines had dis- Marine Division all had departed by 2 posed of most of the Japanese war July.8 General Woodruff attested to the materiel and the tremendous repatriatio n accomplishments of the 2d Marine Divi - flow of the first months of the occupa- sion in the following farewell messag e tion had slowed. The Japanese, as well to General Hunt : as their conquerors, had settled int o a routine of mutual tolerance, and often Today the 2d Marine Division comes t o the end of its long trail from Guadalcanal a relation much closer and stronger to Japan . Its achievement in battle and i n than that. occupation : `Well Done .' The cooperatio n Soon after General Hunt had re- and assistance of your splendid Divisio n turned from Kyoto, he received word will be greatly missed . I Corps wishes yo u bon voyage and continued success in you r from Eighth Army that the 2d Division next assignment . Woodruff .9 would be returned to a permanent bas e in the United States . The 24th Infantry As a result of the acceptance of de- Division would move to Kyushu an d feat by the Japanese, it was never neces- take over the Marine zone. Preparations sary to institute complete military rule . for the movement got underway befor e General MacArthur's directives outlin- the end of April, when reconnaissanc e ing a program of demilitarization an d parties of the relieving Army regiments democratization were put into effect b y arrived to check their future billeting a Japanese Government that disarme d areas. and demobilized its own military force s General Hunt planned to relieve hi s and revamped its political structure outlying units first and then gradually without serious incident. to draw in his men upon Sasebo until the last unit had shipped out from the port . ' On the same date, Marine Air Base, Omura , Oita and Miyazaki were the first pre- was deactivated . ' Before the 2d Marine Division left Japan , fectures to be handed over to the Army, it transferred 2,349 of its men into a Chin a and their former garrison, the 2d draft, which furnished replacements for th e Marines—whose CP had been move d last major-Marine unit remaining in the Fa r from Miyazaki to Oita on 18 March— East, the 1st Marine Division. 'Cited in LtCol Michael S . Currin, "Occupa- was the first unit to complete loadin g tion of Kyushu," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 30, out. The regiment left Sasebo on 13 no. 10 (Oct46), p . 21 .

SEA OF JAPAN

YADSAGUCHI

Yamaguchi Im o

/ H/B/Kt SEA L Irakunl

Fukugara

hlmonose Moil

Kokura

Fukuoka

1 FUKUOKA f-' TYPICAL DEPLOYMENT O F A MARINE REGIMEN T 31 JANUARY 194 6

AR/AKENO LEGEND

~- - PREFECTURAL BOUNDARIE S -k—I—HF RAILROA D ROADS lit CLAS S c PREFECTURAL CAPITALS

MAP 31 T. L . RUSSELL

518 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

As MacArthur recalled in hi s thousands of foreign civilians and memoirs : prisoners of war and handled the floo d

From the moment of my appointment as of Japanese returning from the defunct supreme commander, I had formulated th e overseas empire. Using local labor, the policies I intended to follow, implementin g Marines collected, inventoried, and dis- them through the Emperor and the ma- posed of the vast stockpile of munition s chinery of the imperial government . . . and other military materiel that the the reforms I contemplated were thos e which would bring Japan abreast of mod - Japanese had accumulated on Kyush u ern progressive thought and action . First in anticipation of Allied invasion . destroy the military power . Punish wa r Where necessary, they used their ow n criminals . Build the structure of repre- men and equipment to effect emergency sentative government. Modernize the constitution. Hold free elections . Enfranchis e repairs of war damage and to help re- the women . Release the political prisoners. establish the Japanese civilian economy . Liberate the farmers . Establish a free Within three months after its land- labor movement. Encourage a free economy. Abolish police oppression . Develop ing on Kyushu, the V Amphibious Corp s a free and responsible press. Liberalize had established effective surveillanc e education. Decentralize the political power . over the entire island and its ten mil- Separate church from state . lion people and had set up smoothl y These tasks were to occupy me for the next five years and more. All were even- functioning repatriation and disposition tually accomplished, some easily, some with procedures. The task was so well alon g difficulty . . . I cautioned our troops from by the end of 1945 that responsibilit y the start that by their conduct our own for the whole island could be turned country would be judged in world opinio n over to one division . Perhaps the most . . . Their general conduct was beyon d criticism . . . They were truly ambassadors significant benefit to accrue to the of good will .lo Marine Corps in the Japanese occupa- The Marines in Kyushu stood by a s tion was the variegated experience observers and policemen during many gained by the small unit leaders i n phases of the occupation operation, bu t fields widely separated from their nor- were directly concerned with others. mal peacetime routine of training and They supervised the repatriation of guard duty. Facing heavy responsibil-

1° ities, the Marines' ability to adap t MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp . 282-283. themselves to new situations and lear n A peace treaty with Japan was signed in Sa n Francisco on 8 September 1951 by the U. S . an d as they went along made the occupation 48 other countries . of Kyushu a success. PART V

North China Marines

CHAPTER 1

Background for Military Assistance

China is a troubled land. In the 20th most favored nation clause which gave century its people have known little o f to the United States any right give n peace and much of war and interna l another power by the Chinese Govern- strife. By the date of Japan's surrender, ment. The intent of this agreement an d China needed a breather—time to re- others like it negotiated by Wester n cover its strength, to rebuild its econ- nations was to ensure equality of com- omy, and to stabilize its government. mercial opportunity ; the practica l Instead, a smoldering civil war flared effect was to saddle China with a legac y up with increased intensity . of foreign extraterritorial rights . The The mutual distrust and hatred of fact that the Manchu Emperor of the Chinese Communists and National- China did not share the enthusiasm of ists had its foundation in two decade s occidentals for opening his country t o of vicious infighting and campaigns o f trade, or their penchant for seeking suppression. In retrospect, it seems that converts to Christianity, really made there was no real chance of bringing little difference. The major European the two sides together in peace . Yet the powers, sparked by Great Britain and United States attempted the impossibl e France, forced the establishment of role of mediator—impossible because it foreign concessions ruled by foreign was not the equal friend of both sides . law and police in China's major cities . The presence of American forces in Although the United States popularly China, particularly North China, can b e is supposed to have been blameless i n explained only in terms of the peculia r this period of unbridled expansion, it situation created by the National Gov- nevertheless got a share of many con - ernment's concurrent fight against th e cessions and was not unwilling to us e Communists and the Japanese. force whenever it appeared necessary. The first Marines to serve ashore i n HISTORICAL SITUATION China, the ship's detachment of th e REPORT ' sloop of war St. Louis, landed at Canto n The first treaty signed by the Unite d in 1844 with bluejacket support to pro- e States with China in 1844 contained a tect the American trade station ther

1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s Tangle ; F. F. Liu, A Military History of Mod - section is derived from : John King Fairbank , ern China 1924–1949 (Princeton : Princeto n The United States and China (Cambridge : University Press, 1956), hereafter Liu, Mil- Harvard University Press, 1958, rev . ed .) , itary History of China ; U . S. Department of hereafter Fairbank, U. S. and China ; Herber t State, United States Relations with China Feis, The China Tangle (Princeton : Princeton (Washington, 1949), hereafter U. S. Relations University Press, 1953), hereafter Feis, China with China . 521

522 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

from mob violence .' (See Map 32.) In following the end of the Sino-Japanes e the years immediately following, ships ' War. landing parties were often in action at In North China, Russia acquired th e trouble spots along the China coast right to build a railroad across Man- when American businessmen or mis- churia to its port of Vladivostok, and, sionaries required protection . Armed after forcing Japan to withdraw its intervention to enforce the terms of claim, leased the Kwantung Peninsul a treaties and to protect lives and prop- with its all-weather harbors of Port erty was the order of the day for every Arthur and Talienwan (Dairen) . To nation strong enough to maintain a counter the Russian move, Britain de- share of the Chinese market . Small wars veloped a naval station at Weihaiwe i with limited objectives were fought i n on Shantung Peninsula directly acros s which the Imperial troops were soundl y the Gulf of Chihli from Kwantung . thrashed by British and French ex- Germany, moving in all haste to joi n peditionary forces ; and each Western the land grab, forced the lease of a success diminished China's sovereignty holding centered on Tsingtao with ex- as the victors demanded further conces- ploitation rights in Shantung Province. sions to enhance their already privilege d Britain pressured an acknowledgemen t positions. of its extensive investments and inter- Japan bought into the favored natio n ests in the Yangtze River Valley by ob- category by an easy victory in war with taining an agreement giving it para- China in 1894, and acquired Formos a mount rights in this area. In South and the Pescadores as part of its booty. China, the Imperial Government signed a promise to Japan that no other natio n The appalling weakness of the Manch u would exploit Fukien Province opposite dynasty, its inability to hold onto it s Formosa ; Britain acquired Kowloon territory or to resist foreign pressures , Peninsula to guard its colony of Hong- encouraged the more rapacious power s kong ; and France added substantiall y to improve their own positions by forc- to the area under its thumb along th e ing the grant of leaseholds and exclusive borders of its Tongking-Annam protec- spheres of economic influence . To the torate. Chinese, it appeared that "the rest of By 1899, the United States faced th e mankind is the carving knife and dish, possibility that it might be squeeze d while we are the fish and meat ." 3 The out of an influential position in Chin a aptness of this characterization was and moved to prevent this happening . amply demonstrated in the five year s The American Secretary of State, Joh n Hay, obtained agreement of the othe r Clyde H . Metcalf, A History of the United powers to the "Open Door" principle— States Marine Corps (New York : G . P . Put- that in their spheres of influence they nam's Sons, 1939), pp . 91-92 . 3 would maintain the equality of rights Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I—The Thre e Principles of the People (Chungking : Ministry of other foreign nationals. The follow- of Information of the Republic of China, 1943) , ing year an anti-foreign uprising with p. 12 . open Imperial support, the Boxer Re-

'SZECHUAN ---,L`.HUPEI ~'~ Z Y . ..t• hanyhai }4ankow • Hangchow Chungking . - -•-- • -fCHEKIA N iKIANOSI 1 J \HUNAN ~PUKIEN

MAP 32 T. L. RUSSELL

524 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

bellion, broke out in North China. By immediate experience . Significant geo- dint of hard fighting, an internationa l graphical barriers had helped foster th e relief force which included several bat- development of a number of semi- talions of American Marines broke autonomous regions, each with its ow n through to the besieged foreign legation s speech, dress, and customs . China was at Peking. Secretary Hay acted quickl y in fact a nation of separate states, bu t to forestall a further parceling of one with no federal tradition . A strong China's territory by the victoriou s central government was needed to weld powers, and circulated a statement of together the varying elements, but th e policy which said that the United State s Manchu Dynasty had long since cease d would : to fill that need. The Manchus hel d power, such as it was, by default . . . . seek a solution that would bring about permanent safety and peace in The opposition to Peking's rule was China, preserve Chinese territorial and widespread but ineffectual until the administrative entity, protect all rights decade following the Boxer uprisin g guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard fo r when Imperial officials belatedly at- the world the principle of equal and im- tempted to institute government re- partial trade with all parts of the Chines e forms. The sands had run out for the Empire .4 Manchus, however, and the try at mod- The stand of the United States, aide d ernizing the Imperial structure merel y in large part by the wary regard of the gave impetus to those who advocated its interested governments in maintainin g overthrow. One man became the symbo l a balance of power, won China a respite of the diverse forces which sought to wi n from dismemberment . Consistently control of China—Sun Yat-sen . Under maintained through the 20th century, Sun's inspirational leadership, a revo- the American advocacy of China's in- lutionary party dedicated to republica n tegrity also won the United States a principles was formed which drew its deserved reputation as a "friend of strength primarily from the merchants, China." This title came to signify a students, and factory workers of th e moral and emotional commitment far cities of South China where Western in- more powerful than the original ac- fluence had been greatest. Associated knowledgement of enlightened self- with Sun's following were a number of interest. groups whose primary aim was to By Western standards, the China of achieve provincial self-rule, men who di d the era of foreign intervention was a not want a strong government i n backward country, a land with littl e Peking. After a series of abortive at- national spirit whose people wer e tempts, the Chinese Revolution was suc - wholly concerned with a hand-to-mout h cessfully launched at Hankow on struggle to exist. Most Chinese wer e 10 October 1911. The revolt spread provincial in outlook, caring and know- quickly and with little bloodshed ; by the ing little of those things outside thei r year's end the Manchu regent ha d ' U. S. Relations with China, p. 417 . resigned.

BACKGROUND FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE 525

Sun Yat-sen was installed as Pro- work through the warlords to achieve visional President of the Republic of national unity. Turning from this fruit - China on 1 January 1912 and an at- less effort, he devoted himself to the tempt was made to set up a parliamen- Kuomintang which became the vehicle tary democracy. It was soon obvious tha t by which he spread his political philoso- a strong man, backed by military power, phy for the new China . Essentially, he was needed to force the provinces t o wanted to ensure the people an adequate adhere to the new government. Sun livelihood, to develop nationalism, and to stepped aside for such a man, Yua n institute a guided democracy compatible Shih-k'ai, a northern military leader with Chinese tradition which in "four who tried by increasingly undemocrati c thousand years, through periods of order methods to rule China. When Yuan died and disorder, [had] been nothing but in 1916, the Peking government retaine d autocracy." 5 The mission of the Kuo- only nominal strength. Regional war- mintang was to achieve Sun's goal s lords, relying on conscript coolie armies through a revolutionary process—first for their power, seized control through- would come the unification of China by out the country. The experiment i n military power, then a period of politica l Western-style democracy had failed . tutelage, and finally a consitutional de- The system of government which finally mocracy shaped to Chinese needs . evolved after a decade of turmoil was A disciplined political structure and tailored closer to China's tradition of an efficient and powerful army were ele- one-man rule. ments essential to Kuomintang success . During World War I, Japan, taking Soviet Russia, realizing the potential advantage of the deep involvement of for its own ends in Sun's party, began the Western powers in Europe to force to provide needed organizational and compliance with its demands for the military advisors . Members of the infant privileged foreign position, tried to se t Chinese Communist Party, organized in up a protectorate over China. Although 1921, were encouraged to join th e the United States was instrumental i n Kuomintang and lend their zeal to th e partially blocking this power grab, the revolutionary movement. A trusted lieu - Japanese were able to improve their tenant of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek , political and economic hold on Man- was sent to Russia to secure extensiv e churia, a presence which stemmed from aid and to observe Russian military or- their defeat of Russia in 1904-1905. ganization. Early in 1924, at Whampo a Japan's blatant attempt to subjugate outside Canton, a military academy was their country aroused in many Chines e organized in the Russian pattern with a long-dormant spirit of nationalism . Chiang as superintendent to train and The principal beneficiary of this new indoctrinate officers for the Revolution- awareness was the Kuomintang (Na- ary Army. The Whampoa graduates an d tional People's Party) whose leader wa s cadets, fiercely loyal to China; to the Sun Yat-sen. Disillusioned in his at- Kuomintang, and to Chiang, were the tempt to establish a republic in th e Western pattern, Sun had next tried to Sun Yat-sen, op. cit ., p . 169 .

526 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

men who were to lead the Nationalist knowledged the rule of Nanking, th e forces for the next quarter century. Japanese had their own ambitious plans In 1925 Sun Yat-sen died, leaving tw o for that rich territory. Altogether th e claimants to his political estate, the Com- situation called for strong measures an d munist-dominated faction in the Kuo- an authoritative leader not afraid to mintang and the anti-leftist majorit y apply them. Chiang Kai-shek was that who looked to Chiang for leadership. man. The rift between the two faction s Under a variety of titles, Chiang hel d widened steadily while Chiang led th e the real power in the Chinese Govern- Revolutionary Army in a successful ment in the 1930s and '40s. He controlled campaign against the northern warlord s the Kuomintang, and in short order the in 1926-27 . Finally in April 1927, an party apparatus became almost indis- open break occurred and Chiang began tinguishable from the government itself . to root the Communists out of the Kuo- The deep animosity between the Com- mintang and the army . His purge wa s munists and the Kuomintang festered , bloody and bitterly contested, but suc- erupting repeatedly as Chiang strove t o cessful . By the year's end the militan t wipe out the Kiangsi stronghold . In remnants of the Communist Party had 1934, under pressure of an annihilatio n fled for refuge to the mountains of drive against them, the Communist s Kiangsi Province . (See Map 32 . ) abandoned their mountain fastness and The northern campaign ended in 1928 set out on a 6,000-mile trek to a new after the fall of Peking, renamed Pei- home at Yenan in north central China . ping (Northern Peace) to celebrate th e Only the most dedicated Communists victory. The new National Governmen t survived the hardships and runnin g of the Republic of China was establishe d battles of this legendary "Long March, " at Nanking, and the various foreig n and these veteran troops formed th e powers, including the U.S.S.R., recog- hard core around which Mao began to nized its legitimacy . Although the gov- organize a new base of operations. He ernment was the strongest that ha d needed time to develop his position an d held sway in China during a century o f the Japanese gave it to him . disorder, the unification of the country Japan's steady encroachment on Chi- was far from complete. Warlord armie s nese territory had first call on Chiang' had been incorporated in the Nationalist s forces for expediency's sake, but thei r attention . In 1931 Japan established a leaders still held tremendous local power protectorate over Manchuria and set up and their men were unreliable when a puppet regime despite the protests o f compared with the Whampoa-led troops the United States and the League o f of South China . The Communists hole d Nations. Undisturbed by vocal opposi- up in Kiangsi under the leadership of tion, Japan in the next year used it s Mao Tse-tung posed a cancerous threat troops to drive the Shanghai garriso n that could not be ignored . And eve n from the city after a boycott of Japanes e though the warlords of Manchuria ac- goods led to furious fighting . When the

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Japanese withdrew from Shanghai after war with Japan, Nationalist troops bor e capturing it, they transferred their at- the brunt of the heavy fighting and suf- tentions to North China and increase d fered by far the greatest proportional economic and military pressure on the casualties as they were committed to border regions. Chiang, who was re - defend the prize cities and rice bow l modeling the National Army with Ger- farmlands of South and Central China. man assistance and advice, held off from In North China, the Communists use d full-scale conflict as long as possible t o the war as a means to increase thei r give his troops training and equipment strength and expand the area under con - that would make them a better matc h trol of Yenan, the Red capital . for the Japanese. During 1936 an inter- In effect, the Communists gained a mittent series of clashes between Chi- standoff by not contesting possessio n nese Government forces and invading of the important strategic objective s Manchurian puppet troops of Japan' s that Japan wanted. Rather than dissi- Kwantung Army were handily won b y pate his strength in set-piece battles fo r the Chinese. A Government spokesman cities, mines, and railroads that he di d in Nanking promptly warned that "the not need, Mao concentrated on develop- time has ended when foreign nation s ing his followers into an effective guer- could safely nibble away at Chines e rilla force which eventually controlled territorial fringes." 6 the countryside around the Japanese The stage was set for the full-blow n positions. The Communists' most effec- war which broke out on 7 July 1937 tive recruiting aid was their policy o f when Japanese troops attacked the de- forced land redistribution in favor of the fenders of Peiping. Almost immediately, peasantry. The hundreds of thousand s leaders of all Chinese military factions , of peasants who directly benefited, o r whether Government, warlord, or Com- who saw at least the possibility of bet- munist, aligned themselves behind tering an ageless cycle of impoverishe d Chiang Kai-shek's leadership as Gen- and debt-ridden tenantry, were willin g eralissimo and pledged resistance to th e and militant converts to Communism . Japanese invasion. Mao's troops wer e This ability of Mao's party to effect designated the Eighth Route Army o f long-sought economic reforms by fiat the Central Government's forces an d was perhaps the greatest factor supposedly came under Chiang's control . in its favor in the contest with the Actually, the Communists played their Kuomintang . own game, as Chiang had been sure they Reform proposals were sidetracked o r would when he was forced into a re- given little attention by Chiang's gov- luctant alliance with them by public and ernment which was wholly concerned private pressure. During eight years of with a desperate struggle to maintain China's identity as a nation . Chinese 'The Central Daily News (Nanking), dtd troops were driven slowly from the im- 28Nov36, quoted in Liu, Military History o f China, p . 114 . portant coastal cities and the major

528 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

communication centers of the interior. At this juncture, the United State s The national capital was moved deep sent a veteran of service in China, Lieu- inland to Chungking, in the mountain s tenant General Joseph W . Stilwell, to of Szechwan Province on the upper command American troops in the newl y reaches of the Yangtze. A wearying an d created China-Burma-India Theater . He costly war of attrition was fought dur- had a parallel duty as Chief of Staff to ing which dogged Chinese resistance and Chiang Kai-shek for a projected join t the vast and rugged expanse of China Allied staff that never materialized an itself combined to limit but not hal t d Japanese expansion . a mission of training and building the Chinese Army into a more effectiv e During the early years of its figh t fighting force with the aid of America n China received trickles of aid from vari- equipment and instruction. Stilwell was ous foreign powers, notably German y also made responsible for the effort to and the U.S.S .R., until the outbreak o f reopen overland supply routes to Chin a war in Europe shut off help. After 1939 , and to step up the pace of aerial supply. the United States became the principal The tasks given the American general supporter of China's war effort . Men, were bewildering in their complexity , trucks, and materiel from the State s but he had a single-minded tenacity o f were furnished to keep open the Burma purpose which drove him to carry out Road, the sole supply route to NationaI- his orders despite any obstacles. This ist China after Japan blockaded the very drive was his undoing, as he was coastline. American fighter pilots and unable to appreciate Chiang's positio n ground crewmen, some of them volun- as head of state in many military mat- teers from the armed forces, were al- ters. Since Stilwell's actions were char- lowed to serve in the Chinese Air Forc e acterized by what one Chinese office r against Japan. Military and economi c called "a monumental lack of tact," 8 missions were sent to Chungking to ini- friction between the two strong-wille d tiate aid programs, and President Roose- men was inevitable. The Generalissimo velt made China eligible for Lend-Lease forced Stilwell's recall in September supplies by declaring that "the defense 1944.9 The largest rock on which their of China was vital to the defense of the stormy relationship foundered was the United States ."' All this effort was jus t difference in attitude toward the Chi- getting into full swing when Japan at- nese Communists whom Stilwell wanted tacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 . One of the priority targets of ' Liu, Military History of China, p . 178. Japanese troops in Asia was the Burma A lucid and detailed examination of the Road, and with the fall of its southern complex situation which led to Stilwell's recal l can be found in the official Army history b y terminus, China was cut off from all Charles F . Romanus and Riley Sutherland, supplies except those brought in by air . Stilwell's Command Problems—China-Burma- India Theater—United States Army in World ' U. S. Relations with China, p . 26 . War II (Washington : OCMH, DA, 1956) .

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to arm, train, and equip to fight agains t smoothed the way for a restoration o f Japan ." cordial relations in Chungking. At To replace Stilwell in China, and t o Chiang's invitation, and with JCS ap- harvest the ripe fruits of his labors i n proval, Wedemeyer served as his Chie f training and logistical fields, President of Staff in directing operations agains t Roosevelt sent Major General Albert C . the Japanese and in coordinating the Wedemeyer to become commandin g organization, equipment, and training general of what was now to be th e of Chinese forces during the closing China Theater . In addition to a far- months of the war.12 Japan's fortune s reaching and able military training an d were on the downgrade in China as wel l advisory organization, Wedemeyer a s as in the Pacific, and the prospect i n theater commander had control of th e spring and early summer of 1945 was principal American combat unit in for mounting Chinese military success . China, the Fourteenth Air Force. The Fourteenth was the full-grown child of WAR'S END IN CHINA 1 3 the early American Volunteer Group o f 1941-1942 raised by Major Genera l In late May 1945, Japanese Imperial Claire Chennault, who was still its com- General Headquarters issued orders to mander . Where Stilwell had strongl y its area commander in China, Genera l questioned the practicality of Chen- Yasuji Okamura, to contract his battl e nault's concept of air war against the lines in the southwest and withdraw th e Japanese home islands, a concept that main body of his troops to the centra l found favor with Chiang Kai-shek an d and northern provinces . At the same President Roosevelt, Wedemeyer had a time, Okamura's China Expeditionary firm directive to carry out air operations Army was directed to concert its move- from China .11 In this respect, as well a s ments with the Kwantung Army in others, the personable American leade r was armed with instructions that 13 Wedemeyer ltr, op . cit . 13 Unless otherwise noted, the material in this 10 The commander of the Marine occupation section is derived from : MilHistSec, HqAFFE , forces in China recalled that at a meeting in Japanese Monograph No . 129, ChinaArOpsRec September 1945, General Stilwell describe d Comd of the China ExpeditionaryA, dtd the Chinese Communists as being primarily 13Feb52 (OCMH 8-5.1 AC 121), Japanese "agrarian reformers ." LtGen Keller E . Rocke y Monograph No . 154, Rec of Ops Against Sovie t interviews by HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMG, dt d Russia, Eastern Front (Aug45), dtd 6Apr5 4 14–15Apr59, 29Apr59, and 9Ju159, hereafte r (OCMH 8-5 .1 AC 179), and Japanese Mono- Rockey interview with appropriate date. Gen- graph No . 155, Rec of Ops Against Sovie t eral Wedemeyer commented that the Gener- Russia on Northern and Western fronts of alissimo "was confident the Communists woul d Manchuria and in Northern Korea (Aug45) , not fight the Japanese but would simply pre - dtd Sep54 (OCMH 8-5 .1 AC 180) ; Senate pare for postwar takeover." Gen Albert C . Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Wedemeyer ltr to ACofS, G-3, HQMC, dt d Relations, Hearings on the Military Situation 26Aug61 . in the Far East, 3 May—17 August 195 1 11 Gen Albert C . Wedemeyer, Wedemeye r (Washington, 1951), hereafter Military Sit- Reports! (New York : Henry Holt & Company , uation in the Far East ; U . S. Relations with 1958), p . 271, hereafter Wedemeyer, Reports . China.

530 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Manchuria and the Seventeenth Area churia had been skeletonized to obtain Army in Korea. Japanese intelligence heavy weapons for more active fronts . predicted that a large-scale America n Significantly, the Japanese themselve s amphibious assault was probable in the rated the effective strength of the ten Shanghai-Hangchow area, with other divisions and one brigade which hel d possible landings on the Shantung Eastern Manchuria at just 23/4 first-line Peninsula and in South Korea. Looming divisions. The combat efficiency of othe r even larger in Japanese defense plans major Kwantung units was equally low. was the clear and ominous threat that When the Soviet Far East General the U.S.S.R. would at last enter the Army struck, its tanks and motorize d war against their country . infantry poured over the border on three The enemy prediction of U . S. land- widely separated fronts . Japanese out- ings in China was now incorrect, al - post resistance was brushed aside an d though such operations had once been stronger defenses were contained o r planned ; the Japanese estimate, how- overwhelmed as the multi-pronged at - ever, was based on logical assumption s tacks converged on the Changchun- of American intentions. In the case of Mukden area . Although the Kwantung Soviet moves, the Japanese were able Army reeled back from Soviet blows , to read the signs without difficulty an d most of its units were still intact and i t all too correctly . Even before the end of was hardly ready to be counted out of the war in Europe, a buildup of troops in the fight. The Japanese Emperor's Im- Siberia was evident . Within weeks o f perial Rescript which ordered his troop s Germany's surrender, the border area to lay down their arms was the only fairly bristled with Soviet soldiers an d thing which prevented a protracted and their weapons and equipment . Early costly battle. September was the expected date fo r Before the end of August the Kwan- an attack, but Soviet armor-led column s tung Army was no more, and Soviet cracked the Japanese defenses on 9 troops controlled most of Manchuria and August, three days after the dropping of North Korea. Dispensing with formal the first atomic bomb . Within a week the surrender ceremonies, the Soviets war was over. swiftly disarmed the Japanese, broke up The Kwantung Army which met the existing military formations, separate d Soviet attack was only a shadow of wha t officers from enlisted men, and organ- once was Japan's military showpiec e ized hundreds of labor battalions. In unit. Its first-line divisions had bee n short order, a complex military organi- committed to bolster defenses in Burma, zation was reduced to pieces, its only China, and especially in the Pacific visible remnants columns of weaponles s islands. In their place, much weake r soldiers trudging north and east to garrison divisions, largely composed of Siberian labor camps . new conscripts, had been raised . Strong The asking price of the U .S.S.R.'s border defenses which barred the ave- entry into the Pacific War was high. At nues of approach from Siberia to th e Yalta in February 1945, Marshal Stali n industrial heartland of Eastern Man- agreed to attack Japan in two to three

BACKGROUND FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE 53 1

month's time after the surrender of Ger- ruary or even in the first days of August many. In return for this promise, Stalin that the war with Japan would end as wanted all former rights of Imperial suddenly as it did, and that the expecte d Russia in Manchuria, rights which ha d heavy toll of Allied lives would not hav e been lost in the Russo-Japanese War of .to be paid. 1904-05 . In addition to the virtual con- The Generalissimo accepted the prof- trol of Manchurian railroads and th e fered treaty, despite its unfavorable Kwantung Peninsula that this deman d bent, in hope that the Soviet Union meant, Stalin insisted that China write would honor its written guarantee o f off its claim to Outer Mongolia by rec- China's "sovereignty and territorial ognizing the status quo in that Soviet - integrity" and its recognition of "the dominated country. All of Sakhalin an d National Government as the central the Kuril Islands were to be turned ove r government of China ." 15 Chiang wa s to the U.S.S.R. as war booty. President too much of a realist not to appreciat e Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchil l the fact that Stalin might take all that both agreed "that these claims of th e he wanted without Chinese sanction . If Soviet Union shall be unquestionably the Soviet Union violated the letter o r fulfilled after Japan is defeated ." " spirit of its treaty, however, world Despite its deep concern, China was no t moral condemnation would become a a participant in the Yalta Conferenc e practical asset to Nationalist China in nor a signatory power to the Yalt a soliciting aid. Agreement, because it was believed that The Chungking Government was sorel y the secret of Soviet entry into the wa r in need of any support that it coul d against Japan could not be kept in th e muster at home or abroad at the war' s lax security situation then prevailin g end. The Kuomintang had been unable to in Chungking . effect significant political or economi c President Roosevelt undertook th e reforms during eight years of fighting. task of persuading Generalissimo Stripped of the shield and purpose of a Chiang to accept the Yalta terms b y popular anti-foreign war, it drew the signing a treaty of friendship and al- blame for continued poverty, rampan t liance with the Soviet Union . As the one inflation, and corruption . The majorit y nation, next to China, most deeply in- of the Chinese people were war-wear y volved in fighting Japan, the Unite d and eager for a better chance in life ; as States was extremely anxious that th e events were to prove, they would not U.S.S.R. add its power to the final bat- continue to support a government tha t tles. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had postponed or was unable to effect neces- advised the President before he left fo r sary reforms. Yalta to insure "Russia's entry at as early a date as possible consistent with 1f Quoted in Military Situation in the Fa r her ability to engage in offensive oper- East, p. 3332 . 16 . ations." 15 No Allied leader knew in Feb- Quoted in U. S. Relations with China, pp 586, 587 ; Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in " Quoted in U. S. Relations with China, China (New York : Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, p. 114 . 1957), p. 227, hereafter Chiang, Soviet Russia .

310-224 0 - 69 - 35

532 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

The Chinese Communists, who ha d calculable effect on United States for- none of the obligations and few of th e eign policy for the next decade. problems of an internationally recognized government emerging from a dis- U. S. COMMITMENT 18 astrous war, were able to pursue thei r After the publication of the Japanes e end of dominating China with fanatica l Imperial Rescript, the China Expedi- singleness of purpose . While Chungking tionary Army reversed its wartime rol e had devoted most of its resources to and became a quasi-ally of the Nationa l the defeat of Japan, Yenan had ex- Government. In North China, the Japa- panded its hold on North China and nese garrison was the only force that Western Manchuria. The Communists could prevent the Communists fro m concentrated on economic reforms whic h seizing the major cities and the com- would expand their base of popular sup- munication routes that linked them . The port. . In the summer of 1945, American North China Area Army, with head- military intelligence agents could truth - quarters in Peiping, complied with a fully report : Chungking directive that its troops surrender only to properly designate d . . . since the Chinese Communists pro - representatives of Chiang Kai-shek. Al- vide individuals, especially laborers an d peasants, with greater economic oppor- though Mao Tse-tung's men were abl e tunity than the Kuomintang Nationalists to pick off outlying Japanese detach- provide, the Communists enjoy wider pop- ments and force the defection of large ular support in the area held by their ow n numbers of puppet troops, the bulk o f armies than do the Nationalists in thei r Japanese soldiers held their discipline areas of control . This is the Communists ' greatest source of strength in China .17 and complied with the orders passed t o them from above. They continued t o Chiang Kai-shek had no intention o f mount guard as they had in years past letting a rival government exist i n and to fend off Communist attacks, while China, and Mao Tse-tung showed n o they waited for relief by Nationalis t signs of turning over the territory h e troops. controlled to Chungking. Into this situa- The decision to use the Japanese to tion of a nation divided, of a civil wa r hold North China was seconded in Wash - ready to flame anew, the United State s ington where President Truman approved plans to use American troops, committed its troops to help repatriate ships, and planes to aid the Nationalis t the Japanese and, in a limited manner , recovery of the area.1° Chiang Kai- to aid the Nationalists in regaining pos - session of North China . The resultant ' F Unless otherwise noted, the material i n this section is derived from : CinCPac-CinC- entanglement with the cause of the Na- POA JStfStudy BELEAGUER, dtd 13Aug45 ; tional Government was to have an in - CinCPac WarD, Aug45 (OAB, NHD) ; Mil- itary Situation in the Far East ; Wedemeyer , 1R MIS, WD, "The Chinese Communist Move- Reports . 1° ment," ca. Ju145, in Congressional Record, 81s t Harry S . Truman, Years of Trial and Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1949), v . Hope—Memoirs, v. II (Garden City : Double- 95, pt 15, p. A5501 . day and Company, 1956), p . 62 . BACKGROUND FOR MILITARY ASSISTANC E 533

shek's armies had no organic transpor- the use of Marine divisions to occup y tation capable of moving large bodies o f Shanghai and gain control of the men for long distances, and the coun- Yangtze's mouth, but the revised Cin - try's road, rail, and shipping facilitie s CPac plan for occupation operations, were totally inadequate for the job at published on 14 August, covered landing s hand. Following a JCS directive of 1 0 in the Taku-Tientsin and Tsingtao areas August 1945, General Wedemeyer issue d instead.21 (See Map 33.) China Theater orders to the American units under his had advised that Nationalist troop s command to assist the National Govern- would be airlifted to Shanghai and Nan- ment in occupying key areas, in receiv- king by American planes ; the Marines ing the enemy surrender and repatri- would not be needed there . A consider- ating Japanese troops, and in liberatin g able time gap would occur, however, be- and rehabilitating Allied internees an d fore National Government forces i n prisoners of war. While furnishing thi s strength could reach North China, an d assistance, theater forces were admon- the presence of American occupation ished to make every effort "to avoi d forces as stand-ins for the Nationalists participation in any fratricidal conflict would help to stabilize the situation . in China ." 20 This warning to steer clea r On 19 August, at Manila, representa- of involvement in civil strife followe d tives of CinCPac, Seventh Fleet, an d the consistent pattern of American China Theater met to coordinate plans policy instructions carried through from for China operations. The assignment the earliest days of the Stilwell mission . of IIIAC to General Wedemeyer's com- Alarmed by the possibility of U.S.S.R. mand was confirmed and 30 September encroachment in North China and Man- set as the earliest practical date for churia, General Wedemeyer asked that landing the Marines without undu e seven American divisions be sent to his interference with the occupation o f command to create a barrier force which Japan and Korea. would discourage further Soviet expansion. In reply, the JCS indicated that IIIAC PLANS 2 2 the absolute priority of occupation op- In order to keep abreast of the erations in the Japanese home islands rapidly changing situation in the would use up all immediately available troops and shipping. In furtherance of '' CinCPac-CinCPOA OPlan 12-45 (Re- plans then being laid at Admiral Nimitz' vised), CAMPUS-BELEAGUER, dtd 14Aug4 5 headquarters, however, General Wede- (OAB, NHD) . meyer was offered the Marine III Am- == Unless otherwise noted, the material i n this section is derived from : CinCPac WarD, phibious Corps to assist the National Aug45 ; ComSeventhFlt OPlan No. 13—45, dtd Government in reoccupying North Chin a 26Aug45, corrected through Change 10, dt d and repatriating the Japanese. 18Sep45 ; ComVllPhibFor OPlan No. A1703— The preliminary concept of opera- 45, dtd 19Sep45, hereafter VIIPhibFor OPlan tions involving IIIAC units called for 1703—45 ; IIIAC WarD, Aug45 ; IIIAC OPla n No . 26—45, dtd 1Sep45, corrected through '0 USForChinaThtr OpDirective No . 25, dtd Change 4, dtd 27Sep45, hereafter IIIAC OPlan 20Aug45 (Wedemeyer File, TAGO, KCRC) . 26-45.

534 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Pacific and to have a planning edge fo r time the North China objectives were future operations, III Amphibiou s confirmed, with Shanghai as an alter- Corps monitored the radio traffic o f native operation, the coordination of higher headquarters. As a result, the naval plans with those of the landin g corps commander, Major General Kel- force at the corps level was well under - ler E . Rockey, and his staff were aware way. A formal warning order was of the impending China commitment o f issued by CinCPac on 21 August ; IIIAC IIIAC several days before any word alerted its subordinate units the follow- was received from CinCPac .23 Even ing day. prior to this alert, however, the majo r The Seventh Fleet, under Admira l units of the corps were readying them- Thomas C . Kinkaid, was assigned th e selves for occupation duty . The swift mission of conducting naval operation s mounting out of Task Group Able for off the coast of China and wester n the occupation of Japan was sufficien t Korea in Admiral Nimitz' operation warning of a probable role for other plan of 14 August . On the 26th, Kinkai d Marine units .24 published his own plan which covere d The presence of CinCPac and FMF- the landings of the Army XXIV Corp s Pac Advance Headquarters on Gua m in South Korea and the III Amphibiou s helped speed preparations for the com- Corps in North China. ing operations and allowed changes in Kinkaid's concept of operations calle d plans to be made with a minimum of for a Fast Carrier Force (TF 72) and disruption. Before the switch of targets a task grouping of cruisers, destroyers, for IIIAC to the Tsingtao and Tientsin minesweepers, and close fire suppor t areas was effected, Rear Admiral For - landing craft, North China Force (T F rest P. Sherman, the operations office r 71), to arrive in the Yellow Sea prio r for CinCPac, held a briefing on the pro - to Japan's surrender . By means of exposed landing at Shanghai for General s tensive air and sea sweeps, the U . S. Geiger and Moore of FMFPac an d ships and planes would exercise control Rockey and his chief of staff, Brigadie r of the Yellow Sea and the Gulf of General William A . Worton.25 By the Chihli. Simultaneously, other task forces of the fleet would move in on th e =' MajGen William A . Worton ltr to Hd , South and Central China coasts, and, a s HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 12Jan59 and Nationalist troops advanced to take th e interview by HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dt d ports, set up patrol bases at Canton and 10Feb59, hereafter Worton ltr and Worto n interview, respectively. General Rockey re- Shanghai. called that Marine officers on the CinCPa c Amphibious operations were to be con - staff also had passed the word of the Chin a ducted by Task Force 78, led by Vice commitment of IIIAC before the official notifi- Admiral Daniel E . Barbey, Commander, cation was received . LtGen Keller E . Rocke y VII Amphibious Force. Barbey's tas k comments on draft ms, dtd 6Feb62, hereafter Rockey comments . was to land and establish the XXIV 2' See pt IV, "The Occupation of Japan, " Corps ashore in the Seoul area of Korea , supra. and then to lift and land IIIAC at 26 Worton interview . Tsingtao and at Tientsin's ports, Taku-

BACKGROUND FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE 535

Tangku and Chinwangtao . After the were released from operational contro l initial III Corps landings, some turn - of MacArthur's Far East Air Forces o n around shipping was scheduled to brin g 27 August, shortly after the wing com- on the follow-up echelons of the corps mand post had shifted from Bougain- while other transports moved to South ville to Zamboanga on Mindanao .28 The China to pick up Nationalist forces wing's transport group, MAG-25, re- scheduled to relieve the Marines . mained based at Bougainville tem- In order to facilitate joint planning porarily, although its planes were con- 2 9 for the operation, Admiral Barbey sen t tinually in the forward area. a liaison party from the VII Amphibiou s In all, with the normal reinforcements Force to Guam to live and work directl y for a major amphibious operation , with IIIAC staff officers. The men he the initial troop list of Genera l picked were empowered to make major Rockey's command included approxi- decisions without constant referral t o mately 65,000 men. Many of the units the admiral. 2 " Although Barbey's oper- attached for planning were those tha t ation plan was not issued until 1 9 would have been needed if extensiv e September, its essential elements were combat or base construction activitie s well known to IIIAC as they developed . were expected . But, in North China it The corps itself was able to send out a appeared that there would be little nee d tentative schedule of operations on 2 9 for additional Seabee battalions or hos- August and follow it up three days late r pitals. Once General Rockey had a with its basic plan. chance to confer with Admiral Kinkai d General Rockey, as Commander, and with General George C . Strate- Naval Occupation Forces (TF 79), wa s meyer, General Wedemeyer's deputy, assigned his own corps as the China IIIAC strength was reduced by the de- landing force . In addition, the 3d Ma- letion of a number of supporting units . " rine Division on Guam and the 4th The paring process went on as the oper- Marine Division on Maui reported for ation developed, and the peak strength planning purposes as CinCPac are a of III Corps in China stayed close to reserve. III Corps Artillery was give n 50,000 men. the role of corps reserve, and was t o As it first evolved, the IIIAC concept move from Okinawa to China when an d of operations included landings about if needed. The heavy artillerymen were ten days apart at two widely separated ordered to be prepared to operate as objectives . Rockey 's headquarters an d infantry.27 To augment IIIAC ground corps troops would mount out at Guam , forces and to give it a substantial air move to Okinawa, be joined there by the capability, CinCPac added the 1st reinforced 1st Marine Division, and Marine Aircraft Wing to Rockey's com- then sail for Tientsin . The 6th Marin e mand. The fighter groups of the win g Division (less the 4th Marines, whic h

"Rockey interview, 14—15Apr59 . "1st MAW WarD, Aug45 . "7 III CorpsArty OPlan No. 11—45 (Tenta- "9 MAG—25 WarD, Sep45 . tive), dtd 4Sep45, p . 2 . 30 Rockey comments .

536 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

had been committed in the occupation until General Rockey had landed an d of Japan) would follow from Guam o n established his headquarters . Once th e later shipping and make Tsingtao its IIIAC commander was ready to assum e destination . Elements of 1st MAW , control of his forces, he would report to loading at Mindanao and Bougainville , the China Theater commander for would move to China as soon as air - operational control . fields at Tientsin and Tsingtao wer e The nature of the proposed opera- ready. tions at each objective varied so sharply In the main, command relationship s as a result of differing geographical , for this operation were similar to thos e political, and military factors that in for combat landings in the later stages many respects the further history of th e of the war . The transport squadron Marines in North China became tw o commanders who moved and landed th e different accounts . One, told at Tsingtao , two assault echelons were charged wit h has an aura of routine garrison duty the responsibility for the success of through all but the last days of its tell- operations ashore until the respective ing. The other, based on activities along division commanders notified them tha t the rail line and roads connecting Pei - they were ready to take over . Admiral ping, Tientsin, and Chinwangtao, bristle s Barbey was to continue in command o f with the constant threat and sometime amphibious forces afloat and ashore reality of Communist attacks . CHAPTER 2 Ashore in North China

TARGET ANALYSIS ' are particularly cold, owing to biting winds which whip in from the sea an d The North China plain encompasses out of the mountains. Rainfall is light, most of Hopeh Province and extends averaging 20—25 inches the year round , two broad valleys through Shantung, but in North China almost half of that one touching the sea near Tsingtao and usually falls during two months, Jul y the other reaching toward Centra l and August. During this rainy season , China. (See Map 33.) Irregular foot- the many rivers, streams, and canals hills rising into rugged mountai n that lace the plain habitually overflo w ranges border the plain, infringing o n their banks and flood the countryside . Hopeh's boundaries to the north and Roads become virtually impassable to west and interrupting the lowland i n any heavy traffic until the end of the Shantung in the south and east. The rains returns them to their usual dust y plain has long been the invasion route state. The frequent dust storms from for armies bent on China's conquest ; October through May are a particularly the Great Wall which separates Hopeh unpleasant feature of the colder from Manchuria and Mongolia was weather. There is relatively little sno w built to check such incursions . Where in winter months. the wall touches the sea, a narrow cor- Any fertile land in the Hopeh- ridor begins which skirts the moun- Shantung region is intensely cultivated ; tains shadowing the coast until it opens fields are terraced high on the hillsides into the Manchurian plain . and edge the salt marshes and mud flat s In some ways the climate of North that line a good part of the low-lyin g China is similar to that in the nort h coast. The staple crops are cereal grains , central part of the United States . There principally rice and kaoliang,2 aug- is a significant range of temperature mented by family garden plots . Thou- between the seasons, and the winters sands of farm villages dot the orderly maze of small fields which give a ' Unless otherwise noted, the material i n monotonous sameness to the hinterland . section is derived from : MID, OfcCofEngrs , Most of the seventy million people liv- USA, Strategic Engineering Survey No . 150 , ing in the two provinces in 1945 wer e Hopeh—Shantung Region (China) (Summary ) indebted to absentee landlords and , Terrain—Intel, dtd May45 ; CinCPac—CinCPO A Bul No . 48—45, "The Coast of North China," tied to the land, eked out a marginal 2 vols., dtd 1Mar45 ; VIIPhibFor OPlan 1703— 45 ; IIIAC IntelStudy ThtrofOps North China , Kaoliang is a grain sorghum which form s dtd 29Aug45, hereafter IIIAC IntelStudy ; much of the diet of eastern Asia . The dry an d IIIAC G—2 PeriodicRpt No . 1—M, Oct45, dtd pithy stalks, which often grow higher than a 3Nov45 in IIIAC WarD, Oct45 . man's head, serve as fuel and thatch. 537

MAP 33 T.L . RUSSELL

ASHORE IN NORTH CHINA 539

existence . Many townsmen and city nearby village . Seven miles upriver on dwellers made their living servicin g the north bank was Tangku, a tow n and exploiting rural market areas . Trade which served as Tientsin's gateway to with other parts of China and with the sea and as its railhead for transship- foreign lands was funnelled almost en- ment of cargo . River traffic to Tientsin tirely through a few large cities whic h was extensive but confined to craft less lay along the principal communication than 300 feet in length which could routes. negotiate the restricted turning basin From an economic viewpoint th e at the city's wharves . most important city in North China at Tientsin's airport was about seven the war's end was its commercial hub , miles east of its outskirts near the vil- Tientsin. Second only to Peiping in size , lage of Changkeichuang. The field, with a population swollen by refugee s which was circular in outline, had three to an estimated million and a half, the intersecting runways only one of which city dominated an extensive network o f was paved. The comparatively short railroads and waterways . Since it had landing strips, just a bit over 4,000 fee t grown to importance only during th e long, and the poor drainage of the sur- past half century, Tientsin was quit e rounding terrain often faced pilots with modern in many respects. Broad, paved the prospect of coming down on a short streets and substantial masonry build- runway that began in mud and ended in ings of foreign styling characterized the mud. Other air facilities at Chang- area of the former international conces- keichuang Field were comparabl y sions which gave the city its pronounced limited, and the prospects for heavy us e Western cast. Even the predominantly were poor without extensive construc- Chinese quarters shared this appearance tion. of openness, especially when contrasted In contrast to Tientsin's one poo r t with the jumbled and warren-like aspec airfield, Peiping had two first class mili- of most older cities. tary airdromes, each with considerable Although it was 36 miles from the hangar, repair, and storage facilities . s Gulf of Chihli, Tientsin was still China' Lantienchang Field, nine miles north- most important port north of Shanghai . west of the ancient city, had five run - The Hai Ho (River) and the railroa d n which paralleled its course from the se a ways, all shorter than those at Tientsi but in better operating condition . Eight were the means by which a constant n flow of goods had reached and gone ou t miles south of the city was Nan Yua a from Tientsin in times of peace . An Field which the Japanese had used as , open roadstead off the entrance to th e training base . Most of its installations river gave anchorage over good holdin g including four runways and a grass in - ground to ocean-going vessels . Only field suitable for takeoffs and landings, lighters and coastal shipping drawin g were located within a walled oval nearl y 14 feet or less were able to negotiate th e two miles long and over a mile wide . Taku Bar, a barrier of silt across th e Located just outside the enclosure was river mouth that took its name from a an airstrip a mile and a quarter long

540 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

that could accommodate the heavies t pletely surrounded the former palace transports and bombers. area of the Manchus—the Forbidde n The excellent air facilities at Peipin g City. Within high palace walls wer e were an indication of its strategic im- dozens of buildings and courtyard s portance. The ancient city, China's which offered impressive testimony to capital for nearly 700 years, had a the richness of a bygone era. The walls measureless value as a symbol of na- of the Imperial City had been razed to tional power . It was the cultural and make way for roads but its confines educational center of North China as were still clearly discernible . In the well as its administrative headquarters southeast part of the Tartar City was under both Nationalists and Japanese. the walled Legation Quarter, the hom e More than 1,650,000 people dwelt and commercial center for a sizeable within its moated walls. foreign community . Scattered through- The massive walls of Peiping were out Peiping were many colorful temple s the city's most distinctive feature an d and buildings of the Imperial age which gave definition to sections within their helped make the city an irresistible goal bounds. The outer walls made of earth for tourists in peacetime . and cement faced with brick were 4 0 Some 475 miles southeast of Peipin g feet high, 62 feet broad at the base, an d was the port of Tsingtao, the smallest 32 feet across the top. A deep moat , of the three North China cities whic h water-filled in most places, extended al l had populations of over a million. Situ- around the city. In general outline Pei - ated on Kiaochow Bay at the tip of a ping resembled a square set beside a stout finger of land jutting out from rectangle, the square being the Tarta r the south shore of Shantung Peninsula City, the rectangle the Chinese City . , Tsingtao had the best harbor north o The Tartar City was roughly four mile s f along each side, while the Chinese City Shanghai. Foreign warships, including was five miles long and two wide. elements of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet, use d Towering gates in the outer walls an d its port facilities frequently in prewar in the interior wall between the tw o years, and American naval officers were cities opened into broad and straight impressed with its suitability as a for- thoroughfares . Sharp contrast to these ward area base . Tsingtao was built up main avenues was offered by the man y around several harbors with most of the patternless, twisting side streets an d large scale commercial activity centered alleys which led off them . Most of Pei- on the mile-square Great Harbor in the ping's residents lived in family or com- northern part of the city where deep munal compounds which lined the draft vessels could dock. Extensive rai l narrow streets. yards and an industrial area dominate d Centered in the Tartar City to th e by textile mills were close to Grea t east of an extensive system of artificia l Harbor's wharves . Ringing the wid e lakes was the Imperial City . Once th e semicircle of shoreline of the Oute r home of court officials and China's lead- Harbor to the south were most of the ing scholars, the Imperial City corn - city's public buildings.

ASHORE IN NORTH CHINA 541

As befitted its origin as a Germa n Chinese civil war . Chefoo was 150 miles leasehold, Tsingtao was laid out i n due south of Dairen and its possessio n orderly fashion with many Teutoni c gave the holder easy access to Man- touches. Indeed, to some observers it churia across the mouth of the Gulf of "looked like a fragment of the Friesland Chihli or the capability of choking off or Westphalia rather than a Chinese such communication. The city had a port city." 3 Its streets were wide and war-swollen population of about 200,00 0 paved, and its buildings, most of them whose main concern was the agricul- two- and three-stories high, were mod - tural life in the surrounding country - ern and Western in appearance. From side. Chefoo had no rail connection with an incoming ship or plane, the most the interior and only a way-station air - striking aspect of the city was the field, but the rural roads leading into it almost universal color scheme of re d were adequate to service a guerrill a tile roofs and white buildings. army in all months but the rainy season . Tsingtao was built on the foothil l The railroad network that traced it s reaches of an isolated cluster of moun- way across the North China plain was of tains standing to the east of the city . paramount importance in determining To the north, well drained flatland pro- the course of events in North China. The vided ample room for airfield construc- key line was the Peiping-Mukden Rail- tion. The Japanese had established tw o road ; connecting and subsidiary line s military airdromes in the area and, in reached south into Central China and addition, had expanded the facilities o f north into Siberia from the termina l the existing commercial airfield . This cities. At Tientsin the Peiping-Mukden field near Tsangkou village about seven connected with a railroad which led t o miles from the outskirts of the city was Tsinan, Shantung's capital, and thence perhaps the best in North China . It had eventually to Nanking and Shanghai . two main concrete runways with exten- Tsinan was linked directly to Tsingta o sive paved taxiways and aprons and re- and the sea by rail . pair shops, storage sheds, and barracks The prize section of the Peiping- adequate to handle a large volume of ai r Mukden Railroad ran between Tangku traffic. The terrain in the vicinity pro- and a small coastal town 150 miles t o vided almost unlimited opportunity fo r the north, Chinwangtao. The Kailin expansion. Mining Administration (KMA), a No other coastal city in Shantung or British-controlled company, had de- g Hopeh could rival Tsingtao's natura l veloped Chinwangtao as a shippin point for its coal mines near Tangshan . advantages as a port, but Chefoo, whic h Coal was the basic fuel for many public had the best protected anchorage o n utilities and factories throughout Chin a Shantung Peninsula's north shore, ha d and the output of the KMA mines fig- comparable strategic significance in the ured strongly in any plans for economi c recovery. Like the KMA, the Nationalist lstLt Alan T . Shilin, "Occupation at Tsin g Tao," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no. 1 (Jan- Government was attracted to Chinwang- 45), p. 36. tao by the fact that its wharves and

542 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

anchorages were never icebound, an d There was a marked absence of heav y it had rerouted the Peiping-Mukde n supporting weapons in the Japanes e tracks to go through the town. During a Army organizations, which were com- hard winter when the Hai River wa s posed largely of second-line troop s frozen over, Chinwangtao served i n formed from service units turned in- Tangku's stead as Tientsin's port . fantry and filled out with recent con - The Nationalists, the Communists, scripts. The North China Pacificatio n and the Japanese were agreed upon th e Army puppet units were even less wel l strategic value—and the vulnerability— trained and equipped and the poorl y of the railroads . The Japanese were abl e armed local defense troops were of littl e to keep in operation only those portion s military consequence except as man- of the rail system that their troops held power reserves . in strength. Communist guerrillas laid In the areas where Marines of IIIA C waste unguarded stretches and attacked were scheduled to land, approximatel y weak outposts in a ceaseless program of 116,000 Japanese regulars were present. harassment which caused extensiv e In Peiping and its immediate environ s damage to tracks, roadbeds, and rollin g were General Nemoto's area army head - stock. The Nationalists moving into quarters troops as well as similar ele- North China faced the same problem an d ments of the Mongolian Garrison Army . planned the same solution as the Japa- At Tientsin, Lieutenant General Gin- nese. Chiang Kai-shek's forces would be nosuke Uchida, Commanding General o f able to use only as much track as they the 118th Division, had charge of 50,000 could keep tightly guarded . Japanese who defended the city and guarded the rail lines halfway to Pei- Most Japanese troops in North Chin a ping, two thirds the distince to Tsinan , at the war's end were concentrated i n and as far north on the Peiping-Mukde n rail junction cities and extended along as Chinwangtao. The area commande r the tracks between . There were 326,00 0 at Tsingtao, Major General Eiji Nagano , regular troops in Hopeh and Shantun g had 15,000 troops, including his ow n and in the provinces immediately inland , 5th Independent Mixed Brigade . Honan and Shansi, all under command Communist regular forces in Hopeh of the North China Area Army of Lieu- and Shantung totaled 170,000 troop s tenant General Hiroshi Nemoto. Four with at least that number in addition t o armies, the First in Shansi, the Twelfth partially trained rural militia. Most of in Honan, Forty-third in Shantung, and the regular units were disposed near the the Mongolian Garrison in Hopeh had big cities garrisoned by the Japanese, charge of area defense . In addition to close enough to be troublesome, but far the Japanese units, there were 140,00 0 enough out of reach to avoid punitive Chinese in the puppet North China Paci- expeditions. Nationalist strength in the fication Army and an additional 340,000 two provinces was negligible, but th e village and county local defense troops influence of Chiang Kai-shek was latent, under Japanese charge . not absent. Opportunists among local

ASHORE IN NORTH CHINA 543

government officials appointed by the ADVANCE PARTY 6 Japanese puppet regime, as well as man y puppet troop commanders, saw a mor e While accurate order of battle infor- rewarding future in the pay of the mation on the former enemy forces in Central Government than they di d North China was available from Japa- within the austere Communist setup. nese sources, details regarding Commu - The attitude of the puppet soldier s nist dispositions and intentions were was typical of a traditional and prag- meager. The political situation was un- matic approach to warfare in China : stable, and Chungking was unable to "one army is pretty much the same a s supply reliable intelligence which would another!" The introduction by the give American planners a firm picture Communists, and to a lesser extent by of what they might find upon landing. the Kuomintang, of political indoctrina- This handicap, however, did not hinde r tion of the coolie and peasant soldier y the III Amphibious Corps in compiling a brought about a radical change in thi s considerable body of geographic infor- feeling. Political propaganda made a mation on target areas . potent reinforcement to military power , Many officers and senior enlisted me n and its skillful use by the Communist s in the IIIAC had served in China in th e was a significant factor in the course of years of disorder between the worl d the civil war. Intelligence officers of III wars.? Veterans of the Embassy Guard Amphibious Corps, in assessing the diffi - in Peiping and Tientsin, of the 4th Ma- culties of the task assigned the Marine s rines in Shanghai, and of the two expedi - in North China, concluded that the Com - tionary brigades and numerous ships ' munist system : detachments landed to protect America n lives and property were widely dis - . . . permits a policy of expansion and contraction according to need . Thei r closely-woven network needs neither high- Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s ways nor railroads owing to Communis t section is derived from : CinCPac WarD, Sep45 independence of the major transportatio n (OAB, NHD) ; VIIPhibFor OPlan 1703–45 ; lines. The process of consolidation in th e IIIAC OPlan 26–45 ; IIIAC WarD, Sep45 ; interim following Japanese capitulatio n IIIAC IntelStudy ; Rockey interview, 14– and the arrival of Chungking forces would 15Apr59 ; Worton ltr ; Worton interview ; seem to strengthen their ability to resis t MajGen William A . Worton ltr to Hd, HistBr , the entry of a force to take over from th e G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 2Jan58 . Japanese . If frustrated in the immediate The III Corps was fortunate in having a achievement of their objectives the Com- number of Chinese interpreters available t o munists (unless in the meantime thei r assist it in the initial months ashore in China . differences with Chungking are resolved ) These men, some of whom were Chinese stu- are prepared to combine political with dents in the U . S. and others Americans with military warfare for a protracted struggl e considerable facility with the language, wer e against any internal or external opponent.5 recruited by the Marine Corps in 1944 when a landing in South China by the V Amphibiou s Capt Edward Klein, "Situation in North Corps was contemplated. LtCol Sherwood F . China," Marine Corps Gazette, v . 30, no. 4 Moran ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd (Apr46), p . 14 . 14JuI59 (Plans & Policies—Interpreters File , IIIAC IntelStudy, p . 3 . HistBr, HQMC) .

544 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

tributed throughout both air and groun d to CinCPac that the III Corps send an elements. Of the eight general officers advance party to China to sound out th e in the corps' new task organization , situation and smooth the way for the seven had served at least one tour i n projected landings . There was little China.8 Although the corps commander , question that the logical person to lea d General Rockey, had never been as- this party was General Worton, and fol- signed China duty, he was fortunate in lowing Admiral Nimitz' approval of the having a chief of staff, General Worton , proposal, General Rockey made a forma l who had over 12 years experience in th e request to that effect to General Wede- Orient, most of it spent in North China. meyer. The response was favorable, and Worton and the Corps G–2, Colone l a tentative date of arrival in China wa s Charles C. Brown, were both qualifie d set for 20 September, 10 days before Chinese language interpreters an d the Tientsin operation was to get translators. During 1931–1935 the tw o underway. officers were assigned to the America n General Worton named Colonel Brow n Embassy at Peiping as language stu- as his executive in the advance party an d dents. Colonel Brown, moreover, ha d added senior representatives of other just returned from duty as Assistant corps staff sections . The officers chosen Naval Attache in Chungking before he continued to take a prominent part i n joined the IIIAC staff. The experience the intricate planning for the Marin e of Worton and Brown was of consider - landings, becoming familiar with the able value in processing intelligence dat a problems arising from the amount an d supplied by CinCPac, and in the plan- type of forces and materiel committed . ning for the landing, movement whe n As a necessary precaution, these plans ashore, and billeting of troops . called for the first men ashore to be as- An up-to-date political-military brief- sault troops, but on the whole the opera- ing, even one which was scanty on par- tion contemplated was noncombat in ticulars of the situation in Hopeh an d nature. IIIAC units, standing in for Shantung, was needed . On 22 August Nationalist troops to arrive later, were a representative of General Wede- to take over garrison duties from th e meyer's theater staff, Brigadier Gen- Japanese and get the repatriation proc- eral Haydon L. Boatner, arrived o n ess started. Under these circumstances , Guam for conferences with Admira l the basic mission of the corps advanc e Nimitz. The Army general had known party was to contact Japanese com- Worton as a fellow language student in manders and Chinese officials to arrange Peiping during the '30s, and he was able barracks and storage facilities in area s to brief the Marine officer on the possibl e where the Americans were to operate . courses of action and the leaders an d The actual territory to be occupied forces involved in the threatening civi l by Marine forces expanded considerably strife. Boatner made a recommendatio n as plans evolved. In the initial assign-

'General Officer Biographies (SubjFile , ment of objectives to IIIAC by Sevent h HistBr, HQMC) . Fleet, landings at Tsingtao and Tientsin

ASHORE IN NORTH CHINA 545

(including the Taku-Tangku area) were cussions after the advance party arrived ordered and the possibility of a landing in Shanghai on 20 September ." at Chinwangtao was considered .9 By On the recommendation of Genera l 7 September the attraction of Chin- Geiger, Colonel Karl S . Day, Command- wangtao's all-weather port status had ing Officer of MAG—21 at Guam, was brought about its addition to northern assigned as command pilot for the ad- sector objectives. Peiping was a proba- vance party. As finally constituted , ble target in Marine plans from thei r Worton's group included a field office r earliest stages despite its lack of forma l from each of the general staff section s assignment by higher authorities. Both and the corps surgeon as well as several Generals Rockey and Worton strongl y junior officers and a dozen enlisted me n believed that IIIAC would have to oc- from the corps staff . No representatives cupy the walled city's airfields in orde r of the divisions or the wing were in- to ensure the arrival of the Nationalist cluded since corps was prepared to forces which were to relieve th e handle all arrangements for receptio n Marines. of troops and supplies. As a parting Corps planners were well aware of th e promise to the IIIAC commander, threat to peace in North China posed b y Worton stated that he would mee t Communist possession of Chefoo . Gen- Rockey's command ship off Taku Bar o n eral Rockey wanted to land a regimental 30 September in a KMA tug ; if all signs combat team of the 6th Division at the indicated an unopposed landing the tu g strategically located port to take it over would be flying a large American flag from the Japanese . He proposed thi s from its foremast. move to General Wedemeyer in mid - Near midnight on 19 September th e September through staff representative s advance party took off from Guam i n of the China Theater who had visite d three transports, one primarily a fue l carrier. After a stop at Okinawa, th e Guam. On the 16th, theater headquar- planes flew on to Shanghai, arriving i n ters radioed that Chiang Kai-shek an d midafternoon. Worton commandeered a Wedemeyer had both approved IIIA C Japanese truck to move the whole party operation plans to include landing an into the city where they put up at hotels. RCT at Chefoo ; the new objective wa s Few American or Nationalist troops published the following day. In the same were in Shanghai as yet, and the Ma- message Rockey was given a tentativ e rines were on their own for the thre e schedule of arrival of Chinese National- days they spent there while arrange- ist Armies (CNA) in Hopeh and Shan- ments were made for the trip north . tung. He was also informed that all On the day after his arrival Genera l questions relative to the corps move into Worton reported to the China Theate r North China would be covered in dis - representative, Major General Dougla s

0 ComSeventh Flt OPlan No . 13-45, dtd 26- 10 ComGenChina msg to CinCPOA AdvHq , Aug45, corrected through Change 10, dt d dtd 16Sep45, in CinCPac WarD, Sep45, en d 18Sep45, p. 14 . (B), p . 4 .

546 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

L. Weart, for orders, and saw Ambas- landing signal officer to bring in the sador Patrick J . Hurley who was on his other planes. This first taste of what had way back to Washington for a round of been considered a major airdrome mad e conferences. Neither man could giv e the possession of Peiping's airfields eve n Worton a clear picture of the current more attractive . situation in North China, since th e The Japanese were waiting for th e Nationalists had just begun to take hol d Marines when they arrived and Genera l in the cities under Japanese control. Worton was soon set up in temporar y They did, however, confirm his freedom headquarters at the Astor House, th e of action within the broad bounds of th e city's principal hotel . After a conference corps mission . The Marine general fully with the North China Area Army's chief intended to stretch his permissive au- of staff that evening, which indicate d thority to arrange for the seizure of that the Japanese were quite ready to "areas necessary to facilitate the move- comply with any instructions give n ment of the troops and supplies in orde r them, the IIIAC staff officers turned to to support further operations " 11 to in- on the various tasks falling within thei r clude the occupation of Peiping. Even areas of responsibility. Arrangements while this discussion was going on, were made with Chinese Nationalist of- Chungking was approving a revise d ficers to take over Japanese barracks, directive to General Rockey which gave warehouses, school buildings, and head - the corps a firmer basis for the Peiping quarters within the city . Some houses move while still not naming the city a s and buildings owned by members of th e an objective. In the new wording, Rockey German community were also requisi- could, "for the security of his ow n tioned by the Chinese for American use. forces" and of the major targets as - Negotiations through consular repre- signed to IIIAC, "occupy such inter - sentatives were made to occupy publi c mediate and adjacent areas as he deem s buildings in the former foreign conces- necessary ." 1 2 sion areas. As a general rule, propert y An Army liaison officer and a Stat e of enemy nationals was taken without Department advisor had been added t o ceremony, while leases were execute d the advance party when it took off fo r for holdings which were owned by Al - Tientsin on 24 September . Colonel Day lied residents or governments . Most of led his flight up the coast to Shantung the property selected in the latter cate- Peninsula, across its mountains and o n gory had also been used by the Japanese to the mouth of the Hai River, following military forces or civilian community . its course to Changkeichuang Field out- General Worton set aside the French side Tientsin . Almost half of the runway Municipal Building, Tientsin's most im- was under water, forcing Day to make a posing structure, as IIIAC headquar- very difficult landing and then act as a ters. He also laid claim to the French Arsenal, an extensive barracks and 11 IIIAC OPlan 26-45, p. 3 . storage compound located on the road 12 ComGenChina msg to ComSeventhFlt, dt d 25Sep45 in CinCPac WarD, Sep45, end (B) , to the airfield, for wing headquarters . A p. 13. reluctance to lease the arsenal on the

ASHORE IN NORTH CHINA 547

part of local French officials was swiftl y not very profitable . Marine billeting offi- overcome when the general used the cers could promise that property would Japanese radio to contact Chungking be adequately repaired and maintained , and get pressure brought to bear by the and in many cases improved upon .1 4 senior French representative in the Japanese cooperation with the ad- Chinese capital . The Italian Consulate , vance party was exemplary. Sullenness close to East Station of the Peiping - and foot-dragging tactics, which could Mukden line, was chosen as the 1st well have been expected, were absent.1 5 Marine Division headquarters . General Worton flew to Tsingtao, Tang- As soon as the billeting and storage shan, and Chinwangtao to confer with program was well underway at Tien- local Japanese commanders . Arrange- tsin, General Worton flew on to Peiping ments were made in each place in keep- where he arranged to take over many o f ing with the procedures used in Tientsi n Nan Yuan Field's facilities and to house and Peiping for reception and housin g most of the Marine units within the of planned IIIAC garrisons . In Tsingtao confines of the Legation Quarter . His the general left Colonel William D . State Department advisor was able to Crawford, an Army officer who was serv- smooth the way within the diplomati c ing in the Corps G–1 Section, to lay th e corps when any resistance arose to meet - groundwork for the 6th Marine Divisio n ing the considerable space requirements arrival. Worton also flew to Weihsien i n of the proposed Marine garrison. As in Shantung, the site of Japanese POW an d Tientsin, the property taken over wa s civilian internment camps, to expedite mainly that seized by the Chinese from the release and return to Tientsin of Japanese and Germans, or leased from foreign railroad and KMA executives . friendly sources in continuation of usage He was convinced that the economic wel - made of it by the enemy. In both cities fare of a large part of China depended there were sizeable barracks once use d upon the KMA mines getting back int o to house troops protecting diplomati c full production. missions following the Boxer Rebellion ; Shortly after General Worton visited these were naturally set aside for troop Peiping and indicated by his actions that 13 use. the Marines intended to move troops Few private owners were reluctant to there, he received a message that "the have the Marines hold their property , people opposed to Chiang Kai-shek" 1 6 even though the leases negotiated wer e would like to talk to him . A meeting wa s 's quarters 13 These barracks included the famou s set up that night at Worton Marine Barracks at Peiping, which had been with the full knowledge of Nationalist occupied from 1905 to 1941 by a crack detach- authorities . The caller who arrived wa s ment. When the Marines returned to Peiping , General Chou En-lai, the top Commu - "the traditional spit-and-polish main gate sentry post at the entrance to the old America n 14 Rockey interview, 9Ju159 . compound was immediately restored, at the instance of old-timers who remembered th e 1' Col William K . Enright interview b y . days before the war." Col Robert D . Heinl, Jr., HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 10Mar58, p . 2 Itr to CMC, dtd 31Aug61 . 16 Worton interview .

310-224 0 - 69 - 36

548 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

nist representative in wartime truce ne- Major General DeWitt Peck's 1st Ma- gotiations between Yenan and Chung - rine Division . (See Map 34 .) Although king. The substance of Chou's remarks Corps planners recognized that th e was that Communist forces would figh t landing would be primarily a logistical to prevent the Marines from moving int o problem, provision had to be made fo r Peiping . General Worton in reply told overcoming resistance. The division des- the Communist leader that the Marines ignated the 7th Marines, organized a most certainly would move in, that the y s would come by rail and road, and just CT–7, as its assault troops. The 2d Bat- how they intended to do so. Further, th e talion followed by 3/7 was to make the Marine officer pointed out that III Corp s initial landing at Tangku and secure the was combat experienced and ready, that town for use as the IIIAC main port o f it would have overwhelming aerial sup - entry for Hopeh operations . The 1st port, and that it was quite capable of Battalion of the 7th was detailed to driving straight on through any force take Chinwangtao in a separate landing. that the Communists mustered in it s Scheduled to follow the assault troop s path. The stormy hour-long interview ashore at Tangku was the Assistant ended inconclusively with Chou vowin g Division Commander, Brigadier General that he would get the Marines' order s Louis R . Jones, and his command group changed ; it was a grim warning of the clashes to come . plus detachments of the 1st Pioneer By the end of the week, the advance Battalion to perform shore party tasks. party had made all the most urgen t One battalion of CT–7 would guard th e arrangements for the reception of the lines of communication between Tangku incoming corps. They had deliberatel y and Tientsin while the other secured th e established a pattern of direct handling port area. The regiment was to be pre- of all local logistic support problem s pared to place a garrison in Tangshan which was to hold throughout the Ma- on order and assume responsibility fo r rines' stay in North China . There was security of the railroad south to Tangku . to be little opportunity for the traditional At the same time, 1/7 at Chinwangtao Chinese "squeeze" that invariably woul d would take charge of the Peiping-Muk- have marked such operations had they been turned over to middlemen . In this den line north of Tangshan . as well as many other respects, the ex- 1703—45 ; VIIPhibFor WarD, 15Aug—310ct4 5 perience of the old China Marines was (OAB, NHD) ; ComTransRon 17 AR—Tien- of incalculable but obvious benefit . tsin, China, dtd 1Nov45 (OAB, NHD) ; IIIAC OPlan 26—45 ; IIIAC WarDs, Sep—Oct45 ; IIIA C ShoreBrig OPlan No . 1—45, dtd 9Sep45 ; 1st HOPEH LANDINGS 17 MarDiv OPlan No . 3—45, dtd 10Sep45 ; 1st MarDiv WarDs, Sep—Oct45 ; 1st MAW WarDs , The responsibility for seizing and Sep—Oct45 ; MajGen Keller E . Rockey ltr to holding the Tientsin area rested with Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift, dtd 130ct4 5 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, " Unless otherwise noted, the material in HistBr, HQMC), hereafter Rockey—Vandegrif t this section is derived from : VIIPhibFor OPlan ltr, 130ct45.

C . GNf ICNU>NG TIENTSIN 11= 7

HOPEH DEPLOYMENT TAT" U >^ 1Q

GULF OF CH/HL/

550 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

The 1st Marines Combat Team wa s cific 13 (GroPac-13), which was even- assigned the mission of occupying th e tually to operate the port of Tangku, als o city of Tientsin and Changkeichuang came under Salzman . As soon as suffi- Field. The 5th Marines Combat Team , cient components of the GroPac arrive d moving to the target in a transport divi- in North China, the Shore Brigad e sion arriving a few days after the main would be disbanded . For the first coupl e convoy, was slated to secure Peiping of weeks of the operation, however, and its airfields. Tientsin was the pro- General Rockey emphasized that th e jected base for those units of the 11th brigade "must have full authority ove r Marines and division separate battalion s all unloading activities and must co - that were not attached to infantry regi- ordinate all movement of troops, equip- ments. The greatest part of Corps ment and supplies in the landing Troops was also scheduled for garrison area." is duty at Tientsin in support of the 1st Much of the concern with the logisti c Division and 1st Wing. aspects of the Tientsin area operation s One corps unit, the 7th Service Regi- was generated by the fact that all traffi c ment, was given far-reaching responsi- from ship to shore would have to funnel bilities that tended to increase an d through the narrow seaward channel o f expand as the occupation wore on . Des- the Hai, across the tide-altered depth o f ignated as the functional supply agency the Taku Bar, and up river to th e for all IIIAC ground and air element s Tangku piers . Although extensive use of in Hopeh, the regiment's organization ships' boats for unloading was planned , was such that it would adapt to rapidly the strong possibility was recognize d changing conditions of service . Its lo- that only landing craft as large as LCT s gistic support companies formed the would be practical for the long run from backbone of the Shore Brigade that transport to pier . Since the condition corps organized to cope with the for- of the river channel and the cargo midable problems presented by Tien- handling facilities at Tangku was un- tsin's geographic situation . certain, plans for landing procedures The brigade, which was strictly a were flexible enough to be adapte d temporary organization, operated with a rapidly to the situation existing on 3 0 tiny headquarters of seven officers an d September. men under Colonel Elmer H . Salzman . The responsibility for embarking and Two FMF units attached to IIIAC, th e moving the forward echelons of unit s 1st Military Police and 11th Moto r headed for the Tientsin area, and for Transport Battalions, together wit h all follow-up echelons regardless of des- medical and signal detachments fro m tination rested with Rear Admiral Ingol f Corps Troops augmented the element s N. Kiland, Commander, Amphibious of 7th Service Regiment which were to Group 7. Under him, the commander of process all personnel and cargo comin g ashore. The first echelon of the Nav y t` IIIAC SO No . 119-45, dtd 23Sep45, i n advanced base organization, Group Pa- IIIAC WarD, Sep45, App I, p . 1 .

ASHORE IN NORTH CHINA 551

Transport Squadron 17 (Transron-17) , radio contact was maintained to spee d Commodore Thomas B . Brittain, was or- cargo handling . Landing craft were use d dered to load, lift, and land the 1st to move light loads on all tides and Division and Corps Troops and to act heavier gear with high water ; the am- as Senior Officer Present Afloat (SOPA ) phibious vehicles of 3d DUKW Com- at the objective. General Peck woul d pany, which were not hampered by shoal move to the target in Commodore Brit- water, were in use all around the clock . tain's flagship, while General Rocke y Much division heavy equipment, partic- sailed with Admiral Barbey in the com- ularly that of the engineer and pioneer mand ship Catoctin. Barbey intended to battalions, was loaded directly into take the Catoctin to the Tientsin land- beached LSMs which could move u p ing and thereafter to whatever point the river without unloading at Tangku . The progress of the operation demanded . rail and road bridges between Tangku and Tientsin were none too sturdy, in- Corps Troops on Guam began load- telligence indicated, and the possibility ing supplies and equipment on vessels o f that they could not be used by bulldozers, their assigned transport division on 11 tanks, and similar vehicles had to be September. Three APAs and an AK A considered . of the division, plus 15 LSMs for the heaviest vehicles and gear, were neede d All units were loaded for minor com- to move the first echelon ; the remaining bat employment after the movement to two transports, a cargo ship, and addi- North China, but in practice there was tional LSMs reported to Okinawa to a significant difference from wartime load out the 7th Service Regiment. On 20 combat loading procedures . There wa s September, the day after the IIIAC ad- little inclination to leave anything be - vance party took off for China, the corp s hind on Okinawa that might be useful convoy sailed for Okinawa to rendezvou s in China . The very uncertainty of what with ships carrying the 1st Marine Divi- lay ahead prompted unit commanders to sion and Headquarters Squadron of th e fill all available spaces, cutting down on 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. the hold room needed to work combat Three of the four transport division s cargo properly, and leading in some in - of Commodore Brittain's squadron as- stances to lack of clear understanding signed to lift the 1st Marine Divisio n of unloading priorities.19 The hurried had returned to Okinawa from Korea acquisition of clothing and materiel to and begun loading by 18 September . cope with North China's rugged winte r Bulk cargo of rations and fuel was taken continued right up to the time of sailin g on board off the Hagushi Beaches in the and further complicated the loading sit- center of the island before the ship s uation. Winter gear, particularly suit- moved north to Motobu Peninsula and .12 and 78.1 .5 ) began loading unit equipment and sup- is ComTransDiv 59 (CTU 78 .1 AR—Occupation of Taku, Tangku and Tien- plies. Separate dumps were set up fo r tsin, China, 3OSep—50ct45, dtd 11Oct45 (OAB , each vessel's load, and ship-to-dump NHD), p . E—4 .

552 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

able clothing, was in short supply fo r Larkin intended to observe the airfield some units until late in 1945.20 situation at Tientsin first-hand befor e In the original concept of the opera- calling in planes of his groups . The tion, the movement of a battalion landing ground echelons of some wing units wer e team to Chinwangtao was deferre d already at sea by 25 September, an d until after the main body of troops left most of the squadrons were packed an d for Tientsin . On 19 September, however, ready to sail . Flight echelons were pre- planning for concurrent movement be- pared to stage through Okinawa and gan and an APA was detailed to load Shanghai as soon as the wing declared out 1/7. An LSM carrying a shore party North China airfields operational. detachment of the 1st Pioneer Battalio n On the 26th the III Amphibiou s and a destroyer escort were scheduled Corps, less the 6th Marine Division, left to join the Chinwangtao landing force Okinawa bound for the Taku Bar . On off Taku.71 Loading of the landing team board the convoy's ships were nearly was finished by 25 September, the sam e 25,000 men, the vanguard of a planned date that all elements of IIIAC at Oki- strength of 37,638 scheduled for Hope h nawa completed embarkation . garrisons. Heavy seas and leaden skies Both the corps convoy from Guam and attended an otherwise uneventful trip .2 2 three LSTs from Zamboanga with th e On 30 September, most ships reached ground echelon of 1st MAW headquar- their assigned anchorage off the Ha i ters on board joined Transron–17 on th e River's mouth slightly behind the time 24th. The flight echelon of wing head - forecast and Admiral Barbey delaye d quarters had flown in on the 22d to H-Hour, originally 0900, to 1030 . Wor- establish a temporary command post o n ried by the rough water and delay in th e Okinawa. While the Assistant Wing landing as scheduled, General Rocke y Commander, Brigadier General Byron considered putting off the landing until F. Johnson, stayed with the CP, the the next day, but the arrival of General wing commander, Major General Claud e Worton at the Catoctin prompted him A. Larkin, planned to board the 1s t to carry through with the original land- 2 Marine Division command ship . General ing plan . 3 The corps chief of staff had sent out -0 The former commanding general of the several encouraging situation reports 1st MAW recalled that "aviation personnel, at least, stood guard until about the 1st of Jan- after he arrived in North China, and h e uary in khaki when temperatures were below was able to keep his promise and mee t freezing." He credits an inspection trip b y Rockey in a KMA tug flying an Ameri- Major General James T . Moore, Commandin g General, AirFMFPac, with the expediting o f can flag that signified that all was well delivery of "a great amount of heavy cloth- ashore. Worton brought with him the ing," for use of the division and wing. LtGe n Louis E . Woods ltr to CMC, dtd 260ct61, here- 22 General Rockey recalled that en route t o after Woods ltr, 1961 . China, the convoy encountered a number of 21 ComTransDiv 50 AR—The Chinwangta o floating Japanese mines that were the target s Landing—19 Sep-40ct45, dtd 40ct45 (OAB , of interested gunners . Rockey comments . NHD) . 22 Rockey interview, 14-15Apr59 .

ASHORE IN NORTH CHINA 553

mayor of Tientsin who requested that of the 7th Marines, 2/7, reached land af- at least a token force of Marines reach ter transferring to' LCIs from its APA . the city that day . When he and Worto n The 2d Battalion spread out through th e had started down river very early tha t port town to establish security for th e morning people were already gathering incoming troops and supplies . The 3d for a welcoming ceremony ; a tumultu- Battalion, 7th, with the regimental ous reception was planned . Rockey ac - headquarters attached, landed next an d ceded to the Chinese official's request , immediately boarded a train at the dock which was seconded by Worton, and railyard for Tientsin. In late afternoon directed that one battalion of the 7th 3/7, which had been greeted by cheering, Marines go straight on through t o flag-waving Chinese all the way up the Tientsin as soon as it landed. Hai River to Tangku and all along th e The Navy's river control organizatio n rail line to Tientsin, stepped off its car s was getting into operation while Gen- into the thick of an unbelievably noisy eral Worton was briefing General and happy crowd of thousands o f 25 Rockey. The long run in from the an- people. chorage to Tangku's docks—15 miles The corps advance party had arrange d minimum—combined with rough wate r for Japanese trucks to carry the men t o over Taku Bar to rule out the use of their billet, the commandeered race- ships' landing craft to land troops and course buildings on the western out - supplies. The unloading task was shifted skirts of the city, 26 but progress through entirely to LSMs, LCIs, such LCTs a s the packed streets of the former conces- could be made available from Korea and sions was kept to a snail's pace . The Japan, and locally hired Chinese light- utility-clad Marines with full ammuni- ers. Control officers in patrol craft were tion belts and mammoth transport packs stationed in the rendezvous area off must have looked little like the Marine s Taku Bar, in the river mouth just over of prewar years to the Chinese, bu t the bar, and at the docks where liaison their welcome was as fervid as that for was maintained with the shore brigade. a long-lost friend . Loaded craft reported to the rendezvous Each man in 3/7 had only one day' s control, were dispatched to the bar on ration in his pack when he went ashore , the approval of the river control at th e docks, and assigned to specific docks or Rocket' comments . beaches by the river mouth control .24 "e A Chronological Hist of 3/7, 1st MarDiv Activities in China, 30Sep45-15Apr46, n .d . p. 1. General Jones, the ADC of the 1st General Worton, who belonged to the Tientsi n Division, with some of his staff, arrive d Race Club, had the unique experience of votin g at Tangku via a patrol craft at 1030 ; approval of his action in taking over its prop- the two hours it took him to travel fro m erty. When a sufficient number of member s transport to dock was typical of the time returned from internment camp, a meetin g . . It was was held and a lease to IIIAC was authorized lapse involved in reaching shore Race Club members were accorded the privi- 1315 before the initial assault battalion leges of the Corps Officers' Club which was established at the racecourse . Worton inter- " ComTransDiv 59 AR, op . cit. view. 554 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

1ST MARINE DIVISION troops landing at Taku on 30 September 1945 . (USN 80-G- 417486)

TIENTSIN CITIZENS welcome first Marines to return to city since end of war. (USMC 225072)

ASHORE IN NORTH CHINA 555

since his unit, like all others in th e a pontoon causeway was towed up to corps, had loaded the remainder of th e Tientsin and put into use for unloading required five days' rations in organi- the LSMs.29 zational vehicles .27 The trucks that Corps planners had allowed for the should have stayed with the 3d Bat- near-certainty that there would be vex- talion according to original plans wer e ing logistical problems in making the left in Tangku when the battalion mad e landing at Tangku . After the assaul t its unexpected trip to Tientsin . The battalions had established themselve s lack of food was acutely felt, but mem- ashore, the Shore Brigade was given th e bers of the advance party were soon time to get itself set up and in efficien t able to arrange for locally procured operation before calling in additiona l rations.28 forces. More troops and supplies coul d The mix-up regarding rations wa s have been landed on 30 September, bu t not uncommon during the first three to no particular useful purpose . As it days of the operation while Tangku was, more than 5,400 men and 442 ton s port facilities were being adapted t o of equipment (including 115 vehicles) handle the flood of heavy military came ashore the first day. The total of equipment and bulk supplies directed unloadings increased rapidly as Tang- to shore. One of the greatest problem s ku's piers, its warehouses and dum p was getting loaded vehicles off landin g areas, and its freight yard maintaine d craft and onto dry land . The mud bank the driving pace dictated by the need t o near the pier selected as a vehicle land- clear Transron-17 ships for furthe r ing would not support the Marine tasks. trucks until hundreds of loads of stone Shortly after the first troops ha d d ballast and layers of logs had provide reached the docks, a flying boat carry- a firm ramp . The high gasoline con- ing Admiral Kinkaid and Lieutenan t t sumption rate of trucks hauling ballas General George E . Stratemeyer, wh o e and struggling through mud to shor was commanding the China Theater resulted in unexpected priority request s while General Wedemeyer was in from Shore Brigade that complicated Washington with Ambassador Hurley , . By 2 October, unloading procedures set down near the Catoctin. The two o LSMs were proceeding upriver t officers immediately were apprised o f Tientsin with the heaviest equipmen t the favorable situation ashore . In an and unloading ramp-to-ramp into LCM s ensuing conference, the future action s . Later, that ferried the cargo to shore of IIIAC were discussed with Admira l ' MAC AdminO No . 8—45, dtd 4Sep45 . Barbey and General Rockey . A decision "8 MajGen DeWitt Peck interview by HistBr , made by the Marine commander earlie r G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 8Jun59, hereafter Peck that day—to proceed immediately with interview . Concerned by the sudden change i n the Chinwangtao landing—was ap- IIIAC orders which "had upset the planne d ; LT 2/7 was underway for its d proved schedule of procedure," Generals Peck an d Worton had accompanied 3/7 to Tientsin . target that evening . The long-planne MajGen DeWitt Peck ltr to ACofS, G—3 , HQMC, dtd 3Sep61, hereafter Peck ltr . "e ComTransDiv 59 AR, op . cit .

556 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

movement of Marines to Peiping was a t The detached 1st Battalion of the last approved officially. In a joint re- 7th Marines, commanded by Lieutenan t appraisal of the corps mission, a deci- Colonel John J . Gormley, began landing sion was made to cancel some of th e at Chinwangtao at 1010 on 1 October. reinforcing naval units assigned to its The troops went ashore in four waves of task organization. Three of six naval landing craft but found no opposition ; construction battalions, a fleet hospital , instead, cheering townsmen met them and some GroPac units were dropped at the beaches. Gormley took command from follow-up echelons of IIIAC . This ashore with the landing of his last wave . reduction, though minor in nature, wa s At 1140 the battalion's transport move d merely the first whittling down of corps to dockside and began unloading ; its strength ; the demobilization rush still holds were cleared by the evening of th e to come would pare it to the marrow and next day.30 eventually force it out of existence . The situation in Chinwangtao wa s The sea was too rough for Admira l tense. Closely investing the town were Kinkaid's seaplane to take off durin g regular and guerrilla forces of the Com- the first few days of October, and h e munist Eighth Route Army ; exchanges and General Stratemeyer finally left b y of small arms fire were frequent. About land plane from Tientsin on the 3d . By 1,600 Japanese and puppet troops wer e the time of their departure, the oper- in Chinwangtao and another 2,000 wer e ation was progressing smoothly ; the at Peitaiho, a one-time summer resor t reception of the Marines by the Chinese 10 miles south down the coast.31 The continued to be vocal and enthusiastic . Japanese regulars were ready to leav e Most of the unloading problems impose d for Tangshan as soon as 1/7 took over , by the lack of adequate facilities a t expecting to surrender there with th e Tangku had been solved . General Peck main area command . Gormley, however , disarmed the Japanese, pulled the pup had landed with his headquarters group - and set up the division CP in the ex - pet troops off the perimeter defense s where they were constantly harassed by Italian Concession of Tientsin. The 1st the Communists and replaced them with Marines, charged with the security o f Marines,32 and arranged to take the the city, had established headquarter s surrender of the garrison . Most of the at the British Barracks, and sent guard Japanese troops and civilians were dis- detachments to the French Arsenal an d patched to Tangshan by rail on 3 Changkeichuang Field . On 5 October, the 11th Marines took over the arsena l M10 ComTransDiv 50 AR, op. cit . guard when the artillery regiment's C P " A large Japanese hospital at Peitaiho was opened there. The 7th Marines con- offered barracks space for a considerable num- tinued to keep its headquarters and on e ber of Marines and the town was therefore soo n battalion in Tientsin, but moved fro m secured by 1/7 and later used as a regimental command post and billeting area by the 7t h the racecourse to billets in the Japanes e Marines . School in the ex-Russian Concession o n '= Col John J . Gormley comments on draft the west side of the Hai River. MS, dtd 3Aug61 .

ASHORE IN NORTH CHINA 557

October, and the formal surrender too k the area, who were also to be repatri- place on the 4th . The Communist leader s ated with their military brethren unde r in the area sent word that they woul d the terms of the surrender, followe d be happy to cooperate with the Marines, suit and ran their own community in a an attitude of friendliness that had a disciplined manner which created few very short life. problems for the Marines . The surrender of all the Japanes e The surrender ceremony itself, con - forces in the Tientsin area, some 50,00 0 ducted with considerable formality , men, was arranged to take place on the took place in the plaza in front of the morning of 6 October . The Japanese French Municipal Building, now offi- were directed to turn in their arms , cially IIIAC Headquarters . General equipment, and ammunition and to keep Rockey had assumed command ashore , only such supplies as were needed fo r reporting to China Theater for orders , health and subsistence . Japanese units on 5 October. An honor guard of com- were to continue their guard dutie s pany strength, the band, and the color s until relieved by Marines, and those tha t of the 1st Marine Division formed a did surrender were allowed to keep on e background to the actual signing. rifle with five rounds of ammunition fo r Lieutenant General Ginnosuke Uchida, each ten men to safeguard persons and accompanied by a small representativ e supplies until these could be placed i n staff, signed for the Japanese ; symboli- physical custody of Marine units . The cally, these officers laid down their 1st Marine Division was given the re- treasured swords . General Rockey act- sponsibility of collecting the Japanes e ing in the name of Chiang Kai-shek materiel and controlling the sur- signed for the Allies . Looking on as offi- rendered troops . The attitude of the cial guests were the senior officers of Japanese officers and men was so uni- the Marine units in China and repre- versally cooperative that most of the sentatives of the countries and othe r administrative and logistical arrange- armed services who had contributed t o ments for care of former enemy force s the victory. Unofficial American ob- were left in the hands of the Japanes e servers lined the windows and roof of themselves.33 The Japanese civilians i n the corps headquarters, and the adjoin- " The former 1st Division Quartermaste r ing streets were filled with the citizen s noted that the Japanese "furnished us with of Tientsin. Most appropriately, the what appeared to be a complete and hones t Japanese surrender party filed off the n inventory of all their stores and the locatio plaza to the strains of "The Marine's of each . They even had records of all furniture removed from private houses and where it wa s Hymn." located . As a matter of fact, they were a sor t Chinese Nationalist officers, who wer e . Many times when of secondary supply depot beginning to arrive by air in increasing we needed items which were not available in regular supply channels we merely consulte d numbers, were quite interested in tak- the Jap list, called them on the phone, tol d ing the prestige-laden surrender of th e r them what was wanted, and where to delive North China Area Army. General it ." Col John Kaluf ltr to Head, HistBr, G— 3 Div, HQMC, dtd 25Aug61 . Rockey, who felt that the Tientsin cere-

558 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

mony was a necessary and appropriate The 5th Marines transport division tribute to his own men, agreed to sup - had arrived off Taku on the 2d and be- port this plan for the surrender at Pei - gun discharging cargo on the 5th an d ping. The first elements of the 92d CN A troops on the 6th.3" By this time almost to be airlifted to the old capital by all corps and division troops in the for- American transports arrived on 6 ward echelon., except the unit ship October, and on the following day, a platoons left on board to unload cargo , 95-vehicle convoy of the 5th Marine s were ashore . The LSTs of the 1st MAW reached the city. Headquarters Squadron laid alongsid e the docks at Tangku on the 7th and be- The violent Communist reaction to gan unloading. the Marine move, promised by Genera l Chou En-lai to General Worton, had When the CP of the wing shifte d already made itself evident . Marine re- from Okinawa to Tientsin at midnigh t on 6 October, following the arrival o connaissance parties that went to Pei- f the first planes from wing and MAG–24 ping in 5 October found a series of road- and -25 at Changkeichuang Field, 36 all blocks on the Tientsin-Peiping road but one of the major unit headquarters that narrowed passage room to jeep of Expeditionary Troops were ashore an d width. On the 6th, an engineer grou p in operation. The convoy carrying th e guarded by a rifle platoon of the 1s t 6th Marine Division was at sea proceed- Marines attempted to remove the road - ing to its objectives, but the Chinese blocks . They were fired upon by an esti- Communists had already beaten them to mated 40–50 troops at a point 22 mile s one. Rear Admiral Thomas G. W. Settle, northwest of Tientsin and withdrew to commanding a cruiser force which ha d the city after a short firefight . Three put into Chefoo harbor, reported tha t Marines were hit and at least one of th e the Japanese had evacuated the city an d attackers was struck by return fire . The the Communists had seized it and were engineers returned to their task th e ill-disposed to any suggestions that they following day escorted by a platoon o f hand over control to anybody else. tanks, a rifle company of the 1st Ma- Admiral Kinkaid requested General rines, and a covering flight of carrier Rockey to proceed to Chefoo with Ad- planes.34 The roadblocks were removed miral Barbey and investigate the ad- without incident, allowing the 5th visability of landing Marines there in Marines' vehicles to reach Peiping light of the altered situation . Immedi- safely before nightfall. ately following the surrender ceremony in Tientsin, the two commanders boarded " An interesting sidelight to this incident the Catoctin and headed for Chefoo . comes from a notebook General Peck kept at (See Map 33. ) the time . He wrote : "7 Oct. Convoy to repair road to Peiping left at 0700. Japs fear yester- 'Corn TU 78 .1 .14 (ComTransDiv 36) AR of day firing on us may have been by Jap troops , (PhibLanOp) in Tientsin—Chinwangtao Area so gave Jap officer permission to precede con- of China, dtd 230ct45 (OAB, NHD) . voy by 1/2 hour in jeep with 2 America n '° MAG—24 WarD, Oct45, and MAG—2 5 officers . (Did not go) ." Peck ltr. WarD, Oct45 .

ASHORE IN NORTH CHINA 559

SHANTUNG LANDING 37 in the internal affairs of China ; that i t would be bitterly resented by the Com- munists and that there would probably be The Catoctin dropped anchor in serious repercussions . Although the oppo- Chefoo city harbor in midmorning of 7 sition would not have been very serious , October under the protective guns o f there was apt to be some fighting, sabotag e Admiral Settle's flagship, the cruiser and guerrilla warfare. Upon our recommendation, the landing was cancelled .3 9 Louisville . Two days of conferences on ship and ashore took place between the After he received a dispatch recom- local Communist military and politica l mendation from General Rockey on 8 officials and the senior American offi- October, General Stratemeyer conferre d cers. Barbey and Rockey saw numerou s with Chiang Kai-shek and then radioe d Communist troops in the port and were approval.40 The China Theater deputy told by their leaders that any attempt commander also suggested that th e by the Nationalists to land with or after Chefoo landing force be sent ashore at the Marines would be opposed . 38 The Tsingtao.41 Word of the change in implication was clear that a Marin e operation orders was passed to the 6th landing at Chefoo would not mean th e Marine Division on the 9th when it s liberation of a Japanese-held city but convoy was two days out of Tsingtao. rather a partisan act for the National- The cancellation of the Chefoo opera- ists in the civil war. Under these cir- tion was not much of a surprise to Majo r cumstances, as the corps commande r General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., the wrote shortly afterwards to the Com- 6th Division commander . General mandant of the Marine Corps : Rockey had warned him as early as 4 October that the presence of Com- Admiral Barbey and I both felt that an y munist troops might make it inadvisa- landing there would be an interference ble to land Marines there . The division " Unless otherwise noted, the material i n billeting plan issued the next day mad e this section is derived from : ComSeventhFlt tentative provision for the accommoda- WarD, Oct45 (OAB, NHD) ; VIIPhibFo r tion of the Chefoo landing force, the WarDs, Aug–Oct45 ; ComTransRon 24 (CT G 29th Marines, in buildings in Tsingtao . 78 .6) AR, Landing of 6th MarDiv at Tsingtao , China, 23Sep–170ct45, dtd 270ct45 (OAB , 30 Rockey-Vandegrift ltr, 130ct45 . Admira l NHD) ; IIIAC WarD, Oct45 ; 6th MarDi v Barbey made the recommendation not to lan d OPlan No . 108–45, dtd 18Sep45 ; 6th MarDi v the Marines in a dispatch to Admiral Kinkaid ; WarDs, Sep–Oct45 ; 1st MAW WarD, Oct45 ; General Rockey was present during the draft- MAG–32 WarD, Oct45 ; Rockey-Vandegrift ing of the dispatch and concurred in its recom- ltr, 130ct45 ; Gen Lemuel C . Shepherd, Jr . mendations . Barbey ltr. interview by HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMG, dtd 40 General R'ockey recalled that when he saw 14Ju159, hereafter Shepherd interview . Chiang Kai-shek in November, the generalis- " Admiral Barbey recalled that the "Com- simo was very upset about the elimination o f munist commander at Chefoo made it unmis- the Chefoo landing and pointed out the prox- takably clear that any landing of the Marines , imity of Dairen to the Communist-controlled with or without Chinese Nationalist troops , port . Rockey comments . would be opposed ." VAdm Daniel E . Barbey 4I CGUSForChinaThtr disp to WDCOS, dtd ltr to ACofS, G–3, HQMC, dtd 8Nov61, here - 80ct45 (Missionary Incoming Book No . 2, after Barbey ltr . Wedemeyer File, TAGO, KCRC) .

560 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Before Chefoo was written off as an Division. Best was directed to proceed to objective, the planned Tsingtao ground Tsingtao and to "take all possible step s garrison consisted of the 6th Marine to insure orderly and efficient arrival, Division, less two of its rifle regiments , discharge, and billeting of the divi- with sufficient supporting units t o sion." 42 On 7 October, General Shepher d enable General Shepherd to perform his followed up his advance party and transmission of securing the city and Tsang- ferred with a small staff to the destroyer kou Field. Tsangkou, which was pro- escort Newman in order to reach jected as the aerial port of entry fo r Tsingtao a day ahead of Transron 24. North China, was designated the home The general wanted to check the situa- base of MAG–32 and of Marine Wing tion ashore and explore the possibility of Service Squadron 1, which was to oper- cancelling the planned assault phase of ate a processing center for all aviation the operation and proceeding withou t personnel entering or leaving the area . delay to general cargo discharge over Operational control of Tsangkou-base d Tsingtao docks . squadrons rested with General Larki n A typhoon which struck the Okinawa as wing commander rather than General area on 8 October caught the ships of Shepherd as area commander. Transron 24 in its lashing edge . Rough The 6th Marine Division's mountin g seas slowed the convoy to such an extent out for China was an orderly and un- that Commodore Short had to delay the eventful procedure as befitted the vet- landing date 24 hours. Toward th e eran status of the troops and naval ele- center of the furious storm, waves a s ments involved. Transport Squadron 24 high as 40 feet and winds that reache d under Commodore Edwin T . Short above 100 knots tore at the LSTs carry- assembled at Guam after its transpor t ing the ground echelons of wing unit s divisions had helped move occupation to Tsingtao and Tangku . The turbu- forces to Japan. Loading began on lence was so great that the main deck 23 September when the IIIAC convo y of one landing ship split and it had t o had cleared the island, and on the 29th return to Okinawa for repairs. the transports carrying the 29th Ma- The havoc wrought by the typhoon at rines sailed to Saipan to relieve conges- Okinawa was even greater than it wa s tion in the loading area . The transron at sea. Winds with gusts that destroye d reassembled at sea on 3 October an d measuring instruments swept across sailed on past Okinawa for Shantung. Chimu Field where planes and gear of On board the ships were 12,834 men of 1st MAW squadrons were parked wait- the landing force and 17,038 tons of ing on clearance for the move to China . supplies, including 1,333 vehicles . The extent of the material damage wa s Taking advantage of the delay in the hard to believe ; every plane in VMSB– Tsingtao operation caused by the short - 244 and VMTB–134 was unflyable when age of shipping, General Shepherd ha d the high winds abated on the 10th . Re- sent an advance party led by Colonel 4= CG, 6th MarDiv ltr of instruction to Co l William N . Best, the Division Quarter- William N . Best, dtd 20Sep45, in 6th MarDiv master, to China with the 1st Marine WarD, Sep45, encl (L) .

ASHORE IN NORTH CHINA 56 1

supply stores, personal baggage, and forces while avoiding any collaboratio n unit equipment were scattered and tor n with the Communists . The schedules for apart. The flight echelons of MAG–3 2 arrival of the rear echelon of IIIA C squadrons, working around the clock , units and for the initiation of repatria- performed a miracle of reconstructio n tion of Japanese soldiers and civilian s on their battered ships . Searching ou t came under consideration. Since the JCS needed tools and materiel in dumps an d had stated that it was U . S . policy to storeships throughout the island and assist the Chinese Government in estab- its anchorages, improvising and eve n lishing its troops in the liberated areas , improving as they made repairs, the particularly Manchuria, as rapidly a s pilots, gunners, and ground crews ha d possible,45 both the movement of fol- their planes airborne within a week .43 low-up echelons and the progress of re- Weather is no respecter of person, an d patriation hinged upon the extent to the typhoon that struck Okinawa gave which American vessels were used to General Shepherd, on board the New- move Nationalist armies . Ships of man, "his roughest experience at sea ." 4 4 Transron 17 were assigned to transport All hands were thankful to see the hills the 13th CNA from Kowloon to Hulutao of Tsingtao come up on the horizon o n and the 8th CNA from Kowloon to the morning of the 10th, and enjoy the Tsingtao ; and as soon as Transron–2 4 prospect of setting foot on the ground cleared its holds, it was to pick up th e again. Alerted by Colonel Best, th e 52d CNA at Haiphong and take it to mayor of the city and a delegation of Dairen. local officials met the general when h e Commodore Short brought the 6th Di - landed. Billeting preparations were well vision convoy into Kiaochow Bay on the in hand, and the cooperation of the Japa - 11th under a continuous cover of carrier nese garrison was exemplary . Shepherd air launched from ships of TF 72 which decided that there was no need to lan d were keeping station at sea just off th e assault battalions to secure the wharve s Shantung coast . The standby air and prior to the main landing . naval gunfire support programmed for Admiral Kinkaid flew in from Shang- both the northern and southern secto r hai on the 10th, shortly after th e landings had not been used, but both Catoctin arrived from Chefoo, an d objective areas were well accustomed t o broke his flag on board the comman d flights of Navy planes overhead by the ship. Generals Rockey and Shepherd and time the troops came ashore . The aerial Admiral Barbey discussed the China show of force over Tsingtao was but on e situation with the Seventh Fleet com- of a progression that had begun when mander, and reviewed the difficulties the Fast Carrier Task Force first sailed inherent in their instructions to coop- into the Yellow Sea in August. Every erate with the Central Government city and town on the Marine occupation schedule and the countryside for man y 43 VMSB—244 WarD, Oct45 ; Maj Gerald Fink interview by HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC , "JCS msg to CinCPacAdvHq, dtd 19Sep4 5 dtd 8Mar60 . in CinCPac WarD, Sep45, end (B), p . 9. "Shepherd interview . (OAB, NHD) . 562 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

NAVY CARRIER PLANES in a "show of force" flight over Peking with the For- bidden City in the background. (USN 80-G-417426)

REPATRIATED JAPANESE SOLDIERS salute American flag upon boarding LSTs returning them home to Japan. (USN 80-G-702992)

ASHORE IN NORTH CHINA 563

miles around had been made aware that be an act of arson by the school's care - the American combat aircraft supporte d taker without the sanction or encourage - the occupation . A good part of the task ment of Japanese authorities. The Ma- of 1st MAW squadrons would be to con- rine artillerymen moved instead into tinue the surveillance and show of forc e an old set of barracks built by the Ger- flights started by the Navy carrie r mans and into another school. Most of planes, which were calculated to impres s the remainder of the division was bil- the Japanese and cause the Communists leted in Japanese schools also ; the tank to take heed. battalion occupied Japanese barrack s After he had received the latest hydro- near the tank and vehicle park which graphic information and arranged a was established on open ground near docking schedule that suited the altere d the racecourse. The 6th Marine Division 6th Division landing priorities, Commo- CP opened at the former Japanese Naval dore Short brought his first transport s Headquarters Building on the shore o f into Great Harbor and authorized un- the Outer Harbor on the 12th ; General loading to begin. The first unit over th e Shepherd took command ashore report- side was the 6th Reconnaissance Com- ing to IIIAC for orders on the 13th . All pany which landed at 1430 and boarded troops were off their ships by the 16th Japanese trucks provided by the advanc e and the transron sailed the followin g party. These men got the initial taste of day. Tsingtao's welcome to the division, an d Admiral Kinkaid had stayed at Tsing- found it to be fully as loud, enthusiastic, and memorable as that which had tao just long enough to see that the op- greeted the first Marines to enter Tien- eration was proceeding smoothly an d tsin. The reconnaissance outfit threaded then had flown out. On the 12th, the its way through the crowded streets and Catoctin followed suit and upped anchor out past the city outskirts to Tsangko u for Chinwangtao with General Rocke y Field where the Japanese guard was still on board . The IIIAC commander relieved. and Admiral Barbey wanted to investi- Other elements of the division disem- gate the situation at the KMA port town , barked and moved to their billets on particularly with regard to the potential schedule, with the 22d Marines, whic h danger posed by the strong Communis t had been detailed as assault troops i n forces in the vicinity. Seemingly, afte r the original scheme of maneuver, lead- the decision not to land at Chefoo was ing the way. The 22d moved into announced, the Communist leaders Shantung University Compound, a con- ordered a temporary respite in thei r siderable collection of buildings which harassment of the Marines. A Commu- was also to house part of the 29th nist general in civilian clothes even Marines and the 6th Medical Battalion. called at corps headquarters in Tientsin The Japanese girls' high school set asid e to apologize for the attack on the roa d as the barracks of the 15th Marines was patrol.46 But the lull was only fleeting gutted by fire on the night of the 10th . Subsequent investigation showed this to 4e Rockey-Vandegrift ltr, 130ct45 .

310-224 0 - 69 - 37

564 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

while attempts were made to sound out it was in early October 1945 . This Marine commanders on their attitudes . chance, however slim, was soon throw n General Shepherd was approached by away with the outbreak of a series of an emissary of the Communist com- harassing attacks against the 1st Marin e mander in Shantung on 13 October with Division units guarding the communica- a letter that offered to assist the Marine s tion routes in Hopeh. In the 6th Marine in destroying the Japanese and puppet Division zone, the more usual form forces and in policing Tsingtao. It called of harassment became small arms fire attention to the fact that the Nationalist against low-flying reconnaissance air- Army was going to land at the city craft. under the protection of the Marines i n The first Marine squadron to establish a move that was sure to bring open wa r itself at Tsingtao was VMO–6. On in Shantung ; despite this, the Commu- 12 October, its 16 light observation air- nist general hoped that his force an d craft (OYs) flew into Tsangkou Field the Marines could still cooperate . Gen- from the escort carrier Bougainville eral Shepherd carefully prepared a point which had transported the squadron by point reply and dispatched it by th e from Guam . Although the 1st Wing same emissary on the 16th. The Marine had administrative responsibility for commander pointed out that the mission VMO-6, operational control was as- of his division was a peaceful one and signed by corps to the 6th Division ; a that it could not and would not cooperat e similar setup involving the 1st Divisio n in any way to destroy Japanese or Chi- and VMO–3 applied in the Tientsi n nese forces . The city of Tsingtao was area. While the OYs' principal tasks also peaceful, he noted ; and should any would be liaison and surveillance flight s disorders arise, "my Division of well- for ground units, their ability to land trained combat veterans will be entirel y and take off from makeshift airstrips capable of coping with the situation ." 4 7 also ensured their use for retrieving Shepherd then stated that the movement downed airmen. of Nationalist troops into Tsingtao was The flight echelon of MAG–32 arrived a factor beyond his control, but that he at Tsangkou Airfield on 21 Octobe r could promise that the 6th Divisio n would not take the part of either side amidst the preparations of the groun d in armed conflict . In the face of the crewmen to get set up for extensiv e Marine general's determination to carr y aerial operations. General Shepherd wa s out his orders to cooperate with the Na- anxious that regular reconnaissanc e tional Government and to avoid assist- flights over the interior of Shantung be ance to Yenan's forces, the Communist made to report on the activities of th e commander could make no headway . Japanese and of the Communists . He If there ever was a time when the made an oral request to that effect ; Communist Eighth Route Army and the and on 26 October, the torpedo an d Marines could have coexisted peacefully, scout bombers of the group began flyin g over Chefoo and Weihaiwei, the moun- " 6th MarDiv WarD, Oct45, encl (B) . tains of the Shantung Peninsula, and the

ASHORE IN NORTH CHINA 565

railroad leading into Tsinan, headquar- tary police escorted the former enemies ters city for the Japanese Forty-thir d from the field to close the proceedings .4 8 Army garrison. The Japanese troops that were in the CONSOLIDATION PHASE 4 9 immediate Tsingtao vicinity, those controlled by the 5th Independent Mixed The 6th Marine Division settled int o Brigade, were fortunate since their re- a garrison routine with relative ease. patriation was assured . Before the othe r The potential for trouble was strong i n units of the Forty-third Army, strung view of the impoverished thousands of out along the rail line and quartered in jobless refugees who jammed the poore r the provincial capital, could count on sections of the city and overflowed into heading home, they would have to wait a miserable collection of shacks and cav e relief by Nationalist units. Most intelli- hovels on its outskirts . A rash of thiev- gance sources indicated that the relie f ery and mob action broke out from these could well be a bloody one. Communist slums. Directed against German an d troop dispositions along the vital rail - Japanese households, it occurred withi n road promised a battle to CNA forces a week of the Marine landing . The local attempting to reach Tsinan . police seemed powerless to prevent the Major General Eiji Nagano, the loca l outrages, but squad-sized patrols of the Japanese commander in Tsingtao, was 22d and 29th Marines soon restore d directed to surrender his troops to Gen- order. While the mob violence abruptl y eral Shepherd on 25 October . Admiral ceased with the advent of Marine street Barbey, General Rockey, and a gather- patrols, the threat of its renewal re- ing of distinguished official guests wer e mained. General Shepherd's prompt invited to witness the ceremony ; Gen- action in bolstering civil authority had eral Shepherd asked Lieutenant Gen- its desired effect, however . It dispelle d eral Chen Pao-tsang, Deputy Com- any idea that may have existed in th e mander of the Nationalist Eleventh War minds of the people of Tsingtao, or of Area, to sign as Chiang Kai-shek's per- the watching Communists, that the 6th sonal representative. The entire 6th Marine Division was just a show force . Marine Division, less the 4th Marine s The division's rear echelon arrive d still in Japan, was also a witness . On the from Guam on 28 October . On the same morning of the 25th, more than 12,00 0 date naval units needed to operate men marched on to the oval infield o f Tsingtao's port as an advance fuel an d the Tsingtao racecourse and formed in supply base for the Seventh Fleet began company and battalion mass columns . To their front, on a raised platform 48 Cass, 6th MarDiv Hist, pp . 206—219 . erected for the occasion, General Nagan o "Unless otherwise noted, the material in and the Allied commanders signed th e this section is derived from : ComSeventhFl t surrender documents . The Japanese gen- WarD, Oct45; VIIPhibFor WarDs, Aug Oct45 IIIAC WarD, Oct45 ; 1st MarDiv eral and his staff then laid down thei r ; WarD, Oct45 ; 6th MarDiv WarD, Oct45 ; 1st swords, a gesture of defeat of tremen- MAW WarD, Oct45 ; 7th ServRegt WarD , dous significance to them. Division mili- Oct45.

566 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

unloading . By the month's end, th e The rest of Peiping's complement o f ground portion of the city's America n Marine planes, the Corsairs of MAG–12, garrison was firmly established . staged through Tsangkou to Lantien- At Tsangkou, aerial activity wa s chang Field on 25 October. Since the greatly increased over that originally group's ground elements were still at se a planned by the decision to base MAG–25 at the end of the month, effective opera- as well as MAG–32 at the field . The de- tions of its fighter squadrons, VMF–115, ficiencies of Changkeichuang Field a t -211, and -218, waited upon their land- Tientsin for extensive use by eithe r ing. For the most part, however, the 1st fighter or transport aircraft persuaded Marine Aircraft Wing was ashore an d General Larkin to switch the transpor t in service by 30 October . On that date, group's home station. The group servic e General Larkin, whose failing health squadron was diverted to Tsingtao whil e would not allow him to remain in China , it was still at sea en route from Bougain- was detached to return to the States . ville, and the flight echelon began ferry- The new wing commander, Major ing men and equipment to Tsangkou on General Louis E. Woods, who had led the the 22d. From the moment the group' s 2d Wing at Okinawa, arrived at Tientsi n two transport squadrons, VMR–152 and on the 30th and assumed command the -153, arrived in China they were heav- following day . o1 By this time, his plane s ily committed to support the III Corps . had relieved the carrier aircraft of T F Regular passenger and cargo runs to 72 of all supporting missions flown fo r Shanghai, to Peiping, and to Tientsi n IIIAC. The reconnaissance and surveil- were scheduled. In addition, special mis- lance flights requested by ground com- sions were flown as the situation re- manders were now all the responsibility quired ; in mid-October Marine trans - of 1st Wing squadrons . The Marin e ports were used to evacuate the Allied pilots also inherited the dubious privi- internees at Weihsien after Communist lege of being fired upon by Communist troops cut the railroad south to Tsingtao . riflemen and machine gunners who too k The two night fighter squadrons of exception to their presence overhead . MAG–24, VMF (N)–533 and -541, set No return fire was authorized withou t up at Nan Yuan Field outside Peiping permission of higher headquarters, an d without incident . The group's groun d the sporadic shots went without the re - echelon, which moved to the target i n payment that the flyers dearly wished t o company with that of MAG–32, had bee n " General Woods, recalling his introductio n battered by the typhoon off Okinawa bu t to Changkeichuang Field, commented that it came out of the storm with no cripplin g had good approaches and that any good pilot damage.50 MAG–24's first regular flight should be able to land there without too muc h trouble, but that he would have to use all th operations began on 17 October as the e runway. The general remembered a sign had ground echelon was unloading at been erected reading : "This is a small field , Tangku. use all of it." LtGen Louis E . Woods intervie w by HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 22Jun59 , °° MAG—24 WarD, Oct45 . hereafter Woods interview .

ASHORE IN NORTH CHINA 567

make.5 Instead, minimum altitudes a t A subordinate command of the 1s t which scouting flights were made were Division, Peiping Group, under th e steadily raised to lessen the risk to plane ADC, General Jones, was established t o and crew. control Marine activities in the capital . The Communist troops who fired at Only two battalions of the 5th Marines, Marine planes seemed equally attracte d the 2d and 3d, were part of the Peipin g by Marine-guarded trains. Regularly Group. The 1st Battalion was attached throughout October, pot shots wer e to the 11th Marines which had security taken at trains on the Peiping-Mukden responsibility for the stretch of road, line as they rattled by, and the Marine s rail, and river between Tientsin an d returned fire if any targets could b e Tangku. The infantry battalion was as- seen. On 18 October, six Communis t signed to Tangku, guarding the enor- soldiers were killed in the act of firing mous dumps of ammunition and sup - on a train running between Langfan g plies that were building in the area. and Peiping, but for the most part th e Although Tientsin was the supply shooting on both sides was without center for IIIAC units in the norther n visible result. Jeep patrols in the vicin- sector, Tangku was developed as the ity of Marine positions were also fire d major storage area to prevent unneces- upon by concealed riflemen and three sary transshipment of materiel un- men were wounded in such incidents loaded at the docks along the river . On through 30 October. 15 October, the Corps Shore Brigad e The Tientsin-Peiping road, site of th e was disbanded and the 7th Servic e first clash in China between Communist Regiment took over its duties ; GroPac— troops and Marines, broke out in a fres h 13 and the 1st Pioneer Battalion were rash of roadblocks on 15 October an d placed under its operational control . At succeeding nights . This activity soon Tsingtao, a provisional detachment o f ended, however, when word was passe d 7th Service was activated with th e to farmers along the route that the next landing of the 6th Division to suppor t ditch dug across the road would be fille d Marine activities in the south . The serv- in from the nearest field.53 Patrols of ice regiment was officially designate d the 5th Marines roamed the road as fa r the responsible and accountable supply south as Ho-Hsi-Wu, the halfway tow n agency for all organized and attached below which the 1st Marines zone of military and naval units of III Corps in responsibility began . Along the rail line North China on 21 October . between the two cities, Langfang wa s The dispositions of 1st Marine Divi- the limiting point and a small detach- sion troops in the Tientsin area re- ment of the 5th occupied the station mained throughout October much a s there. they were just after the landing. Most of the division's strength was concen- 52 At this time, or shortly thereafter, Genera l trated in cities and major towns where Woods issued orders that "planes on reconnaissance would no longer be authorized to their presence acted as a strong deter - carry ammunition." Woods ltr 1961 . rent to mob action. When raging crowds u' Peck interview . of Chinese attacked Japanese civilians

568 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

in Tientsin on 13 October, riot squads The use of Japanese troops to hol d of the 1st Marines waded into the fight- communication routes vital to the ing to rescue the Japanese and quickly Nationalist scheme of control in North quelled the disturbances before serious China was supposedly a temporary ex- damage was done. Here, as in Tsingtao, pedient. The airlift of the two National- the city's unruly element was given a ist armies that China Theater Head- sharp warning that the Marines would quarters had scheduled to relieve th e act strongly to prevent disorder when- Marines and assume responsibility fo r ever local authorities failed to do so . Japanese repatriation was complete d . The 30,000-man 92d General Peck was in no hurry to ex- on 29 October pose his men in small and vulnerable CNA remained in Peiping as the capi- guard detachments along the Peiping- tal's main garrison, while the 94th CNA, with a strength of 26,000 men , Mukden line.J4 As a consequence, the 55 Japanese continued to outpost the set up its headquarters in Tientsin . bridges and isolated stretches of track The 43d Division of the 94th was dis- between Chinwangtao and Peiping dur- patched to Chinwangtao, and singl e ing October. Disarmament of Japanese regiments of the army were sent to troops within the garrison cities oc- Tangku and the mines near Tangshan cupied by the Marines was effected for guard duty. The immediate goal of smoothly with minimum supervision b y the Nationalist commanders seemed to American forces. The concentratio n be the recruitment and reorganizatio n point for the Japanese in the 1st Divi- of 60,000 former puppet troops in the sion zone was their North China Fiel d area ; there was no visible disposition t o Warehouse five miles southeast of Tient- relieve the Japanese of their rail secur- sin on the Tangku road ; the details of ity task. These Chinese officers wer e feeding, housing, and processing thou - particularly interested in acquiring the sands of soldier and civilian repatriates Japanese weapons and equipment tha t were all handled by Japanese officials had been turned in to the Marines . acting under the direction of a handfu l Based on his belief that the National- of Marines. The extent of the repatri- ist forces would relieve the Marines, ation problem facing the 6th Divisio n and that no American troops should re- at Tsingtao and the 1st at Tientsin wa s main in an area of probable civil war , revealed by North China Area Army officers who estimated that there were General Peck has noted : "On arrival of the 94th CNA, I received orders to cooperat 326,375 military and 312,774 civilians e with the Chinese in the defense [of Tientsin] . in North China who would have to b e General Mou Ting Fang bore the titles of C G sent home. The first reduction from 94th Army and CG Tientsin Garrison Force . this vast total was made on 22 October, In conference between Mou and myself it wa s when 2,924 civilians and 436 militar y agreed that the Chinese would be responsible patients boarded a Japanese ship at for the static defense of the city while the Marines would operate as a mobile reserve . Tangku and left for Japan. This understanding seemed the best answer to the ticklish problems of command which Ibid. could arise ." Peck ltr.

ASHORE IN NORTH CHINA 569

General Stratemeyer recommended t o the central government of China ." 58 Washington that the IIIAC begin pull- The vast store of captured Japanese ing out of China on 15 November . munitions collected by the Soviet occu- Admiral Kinkaid agreed with this pro- pation troops found its way into the posal in an information copy he sent to hands of the Communist forces that CinCPac on 27 October. Both American poured into Manchuria with the arriva l commanders said that their recom- of the Soviet armies . Hulutao, which th e mendation held true only if there wer e Nationalists planned as their principa l no change in the mission of the Chin a port of entry to the Manchurian plain, Theater or of the Marines .56 Although was seized by the Communists. At the IIIAC commander was not an ad- Dairen, the local Soviet commander re- dressee of Stratemeyer's message, fused to let Nationalist troops land, thu s routine monitoring of the communica- closing the sea gate to the Liaotun g tion traffic of higher headquarters soon Peninsula and eastern Manchuria . At made him aware of its content . Word Yingkow, another proposed landing sit e of the possible 15 November departur e in Manchuria, the Soviet commande r date circulated rapidly through corps turned over the area to Chinese Com- headquarters, and for a few days there munists after Admiral Barbey in th e was a noticeable letdown in the pace of Cactoctin arrived to arrange for the planning for winter operations . Since landing of Nationalist troops.69 In all General Rockey felt that no credence instances where the Communists held should be given to speculation about a n sway, they threatened to fight to pre - early withdrawal, and in fact that suc h vent the landing of CNA troops . a move was very unlikely, he activel y As soon as it became evident that the discouraged any tendency on the part of proposed landings might encounter re- his staff or unit commanders to let sistance, Admiral Kinkaid and General things ride .57 Stratemeyer informed Chiang Kai-shek Evidence that supported General that American ships could not be used Rockey's estimate of a long China tou r to transport Nationalist forces to any area where opposition was expected for IIIAC accumulated rapidly durin g . Loading of the 52d CNA for Dairen wa the latter part of October. Soviet foot- s suspended on 27 October, and the 13th dragging tactics in Manchuria made a CNA, which was at sea en route t o farce of the Russian treaty promise to Hulutao, was diverted to Chinwangtao. recognize Chungking's "full sover- This action was in keeping with the eignty" over the area and to give "moral principles contained in a Seventh Fleet . . . support and aid in military supplies policy guide which Kinkaid published s entirely to the National Government a on 21 October. The guide called attention to the U . S. recognition of th e fie CGUSForChina Thtr disp to WDCOS in CincPac WarD, Oct45, encl (B), pp . 19—22 Central Government and its strict (OAB, NHD) . 'Rockey interview, 9Ju159 ; Rockey com- Ge Quoted in U. S. and China, p . 587 . ments . se Barbey ltr.

570 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

neutrality in dealing with Communis t line and sent word to the commander o f forces and cautioned : 1/7 that no armed Americans would b e allowed to pass through the area with - (B) All operations shall be carefull y planned and executed so as to offer the out permission . This bit of bravado wa s minimum risk of clashes with Communist s reported to the Nationalist Eleventh or entanglement in possible civil strife i n War Area commander, and on hi s China. orders the 43d Division of the 94th CN A In landing or supporting Centra l (C) conducted a sweep which drove off th e Government troops, areas are chosen where Communist resistance is unlikely . Communists . Should a clash or resistance occur between The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, was Communist and Central Governmen t undoubtedly capable of tangling with .so forces, fleet units will not take part these Communists and coming out on The loss of direct American sealif t top, but it could not do so without con- radically changed Chiang's plans fo r travening its orders not to take offen- occupying Manchuria. (See Map 33.) A sive action . General Rockey felt that it time-consuming overland advance, prob- was "difficult but essential" to compl y ably against Communist opposition, was with the directive not to get involved in scheduled to free Hulutao . Hopeh Prov- the Chinese civil strife and that it ac- ince was looked upon as a base for oper- curately reflected majority American ations in Manchuria and the Peiping- opinion at the time ." The Commandant Mukden Railroad as the main suppl y of the Marine Corps in discussing th e route. The area between Chinwangtao threatening situation facing the Ma- and Shanhaikuan was selected as th e rines, commended General Rockey for assembly and jump-off point . his "action at Chefoo and subsequent Since Communist guerrilla force s action at other places [which] has cer- abounded in the Chinwangtao area, the tainly given us every reason to believ e danger of Marines becoming involved i n that if we do get mixed up [in the fight - the fighting was acute . A sample of the ing] it will have been forced upo n trouble that could brew occurred on 3 0 us." 6 2 October, when Communist troops nea r 91 Peitaiho blew two bridges on the rail Rockey interview, 14-15Apr59 . 92 Gen Alexander A . Vandegrift ltr t o B0 ComSeventhFlt msg to SeventhFlt, dtd MajGen Keller E . Rockey, dtd 310ct45 . (Van- 210ct45 (Missionary Incoming Book No . 5 , degrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr , Wedemeyer File, TAGO, KCRC) . HQMC) . CHAPTER 3 An Extended Stay

EXPANDED MISSION 1 to move into Manchuria with either th e speed or the limited forces that ha d When General Wedemeyer returne d once been planned. Instead, the first-lin e from Washington he quickly confirme d troops which had been scheduled to re- General Rockey's judgment that there lieve the Marines of repatriation an d would be no early withdrawal of the guard duties were committed to an over - IIIAC. In a conference held on 7 Novem- land advance through Shanhaikuan. ber, Wedemeyer told the corps com- In his capacity of chief of staff to mander it was imperative that substan- Generalissimo Chiang, a wartime rol e tial numbers of Marines remain in Nort h that was dropped before the year's end , China, and that reductions in strength General Wedemeyer was sharply awar e made necessary by the world-wide demo - of the low military potential of the Na- bilization rush of American forces be tionalists, He recommended against the phased over a period of months . Rockey move in strength into Manchuria after immediately radioed this informatio n Communist opposition developed. In- to FMFPac in order to maintain the stead, the American commander tol d continuity of resupply shipping and to Chiang that he should first consolidat e assist General Geiger's staff in the in- his political and military hold on North volved planning necessary to provid e China as a base of operations. Although replacements for the veterans in IIIAC . the Central Government's armies pos- The continued requirement for Ma- sessed a three to one superiority in man - rines in North China stemmed from two power over the Communists, and a complementary causes . One was the considerable edge in weapons and equipment as well, Wedemeyer believed that U. S. commitment to assist the National the Nationalist forces would becom e Government in eliminating all Japanes e overextended and increasingly vulner- influence from China, and the other wa s able if they attempted to occupy and hold the overriding determination of Chiang Manchuria. Kai-shek to recover control of Manchu- Despite General Wedemeyer's advice , ria. As a direct result of the obstruc- the recovery of Manchuria became th e tionist tactics of Soviet occupation focus of Chungking's military effort . forces, the Nationalist Army was unabl e The Japanese-created industrial complex and the rich agricultural resources ' Unless otherwise noted, the material i n of the area made its position seem essen- this section is derived from : Eyes Alone tial to the economic well-being of post- , Radios Folder (Wedemeyer File, TAGO war China. This argument lost much of KCRC) ; Rockey interviews, 14—15Apr59 an d 9Ju159 ; Worton interview ; U . S. Relations wit h its force, however, as a result of th e China ; Wedemeyer, Reports . action of the Soviet occupation army 571

572 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

during the fall and winter of 1945 . Strip- of suggesting that we withdraw all of ou r ping the best of machinery and equip- American forces including the Marine s from China ment from Manchurian factories an d . It is impossible to avoid involvement in political strife or fratricida l power plants under the guise of wa r warfare under present circumstances, yet reparations, and immobilizing the re- I am admonished to do so by my direc- mainder by this selective robbery, th e tive. The presence of American troops in Soviets effectively converted Manchuri a the Far East as I view it, is for the ex - from an economic asset to a liability . Its pressed purpose of insuring continue d peace and accomplishing world order . gutted factory cities added nothing to Under the provisions of the lofty aims o f Nationalist strength when they were the United Nations Charter, however, I taken over, and Communist military ac- doubt that the American people are pre - tion made certain there was no oppor- pared to accept the role inherent in world tunity to rebuild what had been lost. leadership. We can justifiably be accused , by removing our forces at this critica l As the pattern of events in Manchu- time, of deserting an Ally . It is readil y ria began to take shape, the United discernible that China is incapable o f States anxiously strove to appraise it s solving her political and economic prob- position in Chinese affairs . Genera l lems and also repatriating the millions of Wedemeyer returned to Chungking enemy troops and civilians within he r from the States with instructions to sur- borders." vey the current situation regardin g President Truman and the Join t American forces and future prospects Chiefs asked the theater commander to for his country's interests . After visiting suggest several alternative lines of ac- Shanghai, Peiping, and Mukden an d tions for consideration by policy makers talking to top American, Chinese, an d in Washington . Accordingly, Wedemeyer Soviet commanders, he submitted a de- recommended that either all U. S. forces tailed report on 20 November . In it he be removed from China as soon as pos- analyzed the relationship of the II I sible, or that American policies unde r Amphibious Corps to the Central Gov- which they were being employed b e ernment and its plans, saying : clarified to justify their use in a situa- The Generalissimo is determined to re- tion of imminent danger . He also sug- tain in their present areas the Marines i n gested that American troops might b e North China . As a matter of fact he de - withdrawn and that economic aid to th e sires the Marines to expose long lines o f Central Government be stepped up, or , communications in their occupational area . in lieu of this course, that a straightfor- He visualizes utilizing the Marines as a base of maneuver . The Gimo [Generalis- ward policy declaration be made affirm- simo] would like to concentrate plans ing U. S. support of the Central Govern- based on conducting a campaign against ment until it had solved its interna l the Chinese Communists instead of re- problems and repatriated the Japanese . patriating the Japanese . Such a campaign In an attempt to discover a solutio n may require several months or years . . . in the interim the Marines are subject to to the ominous Manchurian situation , unavoidable incidents which may involve the general proposed that a four- the United States in very serious com- nation trusteeship (U .S., Great Britain , mitments and difficulties. Careful consideration has been given to the implications 2 Quoted in Wedemeyer, Reports, p . 452.

AN EXTENDED STAY 573

U.S.S .R ., and China) be established to split existing throughout the directin g control the territory until Chiang's bodies of the U. S. Government .4 Re- government could demonstrate that i t gardless of their personal feelings, how- was able to take over. He further sag- ever, the Marine generals conscien- gested that planning already underway tiously tried to comply with their infor the creation of a Military Advisor y structions. Group to handle American aid to th e The dominant consideration in deter - Nationalist army be continued, but that mining U. S. policy toward China wa s consummation be withheld until militar y a sincere desire for the restoration o f and political stabilization was accom- peace. Ambassador Hurley had directe d plished to U. S. satisfaction . a good part of his efforts in Chungking Following his report directive, Gen- toward ending the civil war and achiev- eral Wedemeyer did not point out what ing collaboration of both sides in a he considered was the only workabl e practical coalition government and solution to the China problem . In later army. When he left China in late Sep- years he wrote : tember, Hurley was convinced that h e I could do no more than make my view s had made substantial progress toward of the situation clear, while refrainin g that goal ; some agreements on genera l from stating definitely that only one course principles of settlement had bee n in China would preserve American inter- reached and the ambassador had engi- ests and those of the free world ; namely , neered the convening of a Political unequivocable assistance to our ally, the Chinese Nationalist Government .3 Consultative Conference which woul d consider details of implementation . The senior Marine officers most con- Then, on 26 November, Hurley an- cerned shared Wedemeyer's belief that nounced his resignation as ambassador, the directives under which they had to on grounds of his lack of confidence i n operate were ill-considered and ambigu - certain officials within the Department ous in meaning. The American forces i n of State . China, particularly the IIIAC, were Immediately following Ambassado r placed in an untenable position by in- Hurley's unexpected resignation, th e structions that made them at once neu- President asked General of the Arm y tral and partisan in China's civil strife . George C . Marshall to become his special Some officers felt, as did General Rockey, representative in China. Marshall who that U. S. Forces were committed to the had just stepped down as Army Chie f extent that American public suppor t of Staff, a position that he held with would permit. Other officers on the distinction throughout World War II , scene, whose view was shared by General returned to duty at the request of hi s Worton, felt that more active backing of the Nationalists could be undertaken ' In November seven different joint resolu- without undue risk. The split in opinion tions calling for the withdrawal of the Marine s between the III Corps commander an d from China were introduced in Congress . 79th his chief of staff was indicative of the Congress, 2d Session, Congressional Recor d (Washington, 1945), v . 91, pt 8, pp . 11007 , Ibid., p . 359. 11156.

574 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

commander in chief . The stage was set his obvious determination to carry out for a renewed effort on the part of the his directive and see an end to th e American Government to restore peace fighting. in China . While General Marshall was still i n On 15 December, President Truma n Washington preparing for his Chin a made a public statement of U. S. policy assignment, he helped draft a set o f toward China which was substantially instructions to General Wedemeye r the same as that in his instructions to which would cover American support o f Marshall. The President believed it es- Nationalist forces . The theater com- sential that a ceasefire be arranged be- mander was authorized to step up th e tween the Nationalist and Communis t program for the evacuation of Japanese armies for the purpose of completin g repatriates, and to arrange for the trans- the return of all China to effective gov- portation of CNA units to Manchurian ernmental control . He stated that a ports uncovered by the Nationalist national conference of representative s overland advance . He was informed that of major political elements should be ar- "further transportation of Chinese ranged to develop an early solution to troops to north China, except as north the civil strife, one which would brin g China ports may be necessary for the about a unified country and army. At movement of troops and supplies into the international level the U . S. would Manchuria, will be held in abeyance ." 6 continue to support the Central Govern- Provisional plans for Nationalist troop ment, and within China would concen- lifts to North China might be made but trate on assisting the Nationalists to would not be put into effect unless Gen- disarm and repatriate Japanese forces . eral Marshall determined that carryin g The sense of the President's directive them out would be consistent with hi s to General Marshall was that the Ameri- negotiations. can representative should act as medi- The temporary halt to the movemen t ator to bring the two sides together , of Nationalist soldiers into Hopeh an d using as his most powerful goad the Shantung emphasized the fact that re- dispensing or withholding of American lief for the Marines was yet to come . In economic and military aid . When late October the 1st Marine Division ha d Marshall arrived in China shortly afte r been forced to extend its hold on the the President's statement was released , Peiping-Mukden line because of the re- he immediately began a round of con- luctance of Nationalist commanders to ferences with the Communist emissarie s outpost the vital railroad in effective and Nationalist officials in Chungking . strength. A directive from China The- General Wedemeyer and Admiral Bar - ater to General Rockey, which ordere d bey, who had taken over Seventh Fleet this further exposure of the America n from Admiral Kinkaid on 19 November , troops, declared : briefed Marshall on the American mili- It is a military necessity that at leas t tary situation .5 All were impressed with 100,000 tons of coal reach Shanghai each

6 ComSeventhFlt WarDs, Nov—Dec45 (OAB , Quoted in U. S. Relations with China, p . NHD) . 607.

AN EXTENDED STAY 575

month. The mines in the Tangshan-Kuyeh combat units that remained in relativ e area are the only immediately availabl e comfort in Tientsin, Peiping, and Tsing- sources of coal for Shanghai . Action has tao were a stand-by reserve that was been initiated to dispatch to Chinwangta o sufficient shipping to move at least 100,00 0 never called upon although always ready . tons of coal per month to Shanghai . It i s understood that the Chinese railway com- TSINGTAO STAND-BY 9 pany will endeavor to operate 4 daily coa l trains to Chinwangtao by the end of th e China duty for the ground elements month provided the III Phib Corps wil l of III Corps at Tsingtao often seemed to furnish train guards. It is desired that be divorced from the main current of you take the necessary action to protect the port of Chinwangtao and the rail line Marine activities in North China. In and rail traffic to Chinwangtao to the ex- contrast to the extended deployment o f tent necessary to permit the movement to the 1st Division in Hopeh, the 6th Divi- and outloading from Chinwangtao of a t sion had no security responsibility fo r least 100,000 tons of coal per month des - communication routes in the interior o f tined for Shanghai .? Shantung. With the exception of the rifle In short order, Marine rail and bridge company regularly on guard at Tsang- guard detachments, most of them take n kou Field, no unit of General Shepherd' s from the 7th Marines, were spread ou t command held a position exposed t o along the length of the Peiping-Mukden Communist harassing attacks . The Jap- line from Tangku to Chinwangtao. In anese disposition to cooperate in re- many instances the outpost units were patriation matters kept the requiremen t little more than squad size and the duty for Marine supervisory and guard per- they drew was lonely and dangerous. sonnel low. Once it was well established Their quarters, their clothing, and eve n ashore, the 6th Division met demands their rations were often not suited, a t that hardly taxed its strength and i t first, for the North China winter. Those could operate at little more than idling Marines whose spell of China duty con- speed. sisted of rail, coal, and train guard dur- The 6th Marine Division was thu s ing the winter of 1945—1946 have a far better able than the thinly spread 1st to different story to tell than the fortunat e meet a requirement for reinforcements majority who were stationed in the along the Peiping-Mukden line . On 30 cities.8 The headquarters, support, and October, the corps ordered General Shep - herd to ready a reinforced rifle battalio n 'Corps SO No . 226-45, dtd 6Dec45, in IIIA C for transfer to Chinwangtao. The 1st WarD, Dec45 . Battalion, 29th Marines, was picked fo r ' The 1st Division commander considered the task and the division attached t o rotating troops in outlying positions with thos e in Tientsin and Peiping, but found the mem- ° Unless otherwise noted, the material i n bers of his own staff and the unit commander s this section is derived from : IIIAC WarDs , "were almost all opposed to the rotation idea. Nov—Dec45 ; 6th MarDiv WarDs, Nov—Dec45 ; Instead, we worked out a liberal recreatio n 1st MAW WarDs, Nov—Dec45 ; MAG—3 2 schedule which allowed troops on outlyin g WarDs, Nov—Dec45 ; Rockey interview, 14 — duties to frequently visit Tientsin and Pei - 15Apr59 ; Shepherd interview ; Woods inter - ping ." Peck ltr. view .

576 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

it Battery E of 2/15, platoons from th e rectly connected with operations . By the tank and motor transport battalions, and end of October, Tsangkou had develope d detachments of engineers and ordnanc e into the wing's busiest and most impor- men. The new rail guard unit left Tsing- tant base in China . Command of the field tao on 6 November and arrived at th e and its complement rested with Genera l coal port the following day, reporting Johnson, the assistant wing commander, to the 1st Division for orders . On the who reported to General Woods at Tien- 9th, when all its supplies and equipmen t tsin for orders except where the defens e were unloaded, 1/29 moved to Peitaiho of Tsingtao was concerned . General to set up its command post . Operation- Rockey had altered the original com- ally attached to the 7th Marines, the mand setup to give General Shepherd battalion from Tsingtao was soo n operational control of both ground an d deeply involved in the mettlesome rou- air units in a defensive situation . tine of guarding the Chinese railway . As a result of the wide separation General Shepherd realized that one of of major elements of III Corps in North his major problems in Tsingtao wa s China, Marine transports flew an exten- keeping his men usefully occupied. So sive schedule of personnel and carg o long as the Communists posed no serious flights connecting Tsingtao, Tientsin, threat to the city and the repatriatio n Peiping, and Shanghai . In order to make process ran smoothly, there was a goo d maximum use of the planes available , chance that combat troops might lose MAG–25 operated VMR–152 and -15 3 efficiency. Idleness, even that of a rela- as one squadron .10 The transport pilots tive nature, can be a curse to a military and crewmen frequently returned to Pa- organization geared to operate at ful l cific island bases, particularly Okinawa , capacity. In order to maintain uni t to pick up cargo from the vast suppl y standards of discipline, appearance, and dumps assembled to support the invasio n performance, Shepherd instituted a six- of Japan. The demand for cold weathe r week training program on 12 Novembe r gear was constant and pressing, an d which laid emphasis on a review of basi c most of that which found its way to th e military subjects. The division com- men manning rail outposts and wind - mander also directed that each unit swept flight lines arrived at Tsingtao schedule at least ten classroom hours a and points north in the transports of week of studying academic and voca- Marine Aircraft Group 25. tional subjects, to be held concurrentl y While most transport flights kept wel l with the military training schedule . above the range of Communist small Among the officers and men in the arms, the scout and torpedo bombers of wing squadrons at Tsangkou Field there MAG–32 frequently landed with bullet was equal emphasis and interest in a n holes in their fuselages . Chance alone educational improvement program . prevented some riflemen or machine Work schedules were arranged to en- gunner from bringing down one of th e courage study, but heavy flight commit- planes ; the near misses were frequent . ments of MAG–25 and MAG–32 ate into the time available for training not di- 10 VMR-152 WarD, Nov45 .

AN EXTENDED STAY 577

The search and reconnaissance missions aerial show of strength on the anniver- requested by General Shepherd in Octo- sary of Pearl Harbor . The show went off ber evolved into a daily patrol routin e without a hitch, but on the return flight that gave the Marines at Tsingtao a n to Tsingtao the planes ran into one of excellent picture of Communist activit y the season's first snow storms over Shan- in eastern Shantung and kept them in- tung Peninsula . Each squadron wa s formed of the progress of Japanes e proceeding independently, and th e units moving toward the repatriation planes of VMTB–134 and VMSB–24 4 port. One search pattern was flown over climbed above the storm to come in. The the mountains of Shantung Peninsula to scout-bombers of VMSB–343, attempt- Chefoo with a return leg that paralleled ing to go under the tempest, were the northern coast and turned south at caught up in its blinding snow swirls . Yehhsien to follow the main cross - Only six pilots managed to bring thei r peninsula road into Tsingtao . (See Map planes home safely ; six others crashed 33.) A second route took the plane s into the mountain slopes near Pingtu i n up the railroad as far as Changtien be- the center of the peninsula ." fore turning south and west through As soon as it became evident that th e mountain valleys to the road and rai l VMSB–343 craft were down, intensiv e junction at Taian ; from Taian pilots efforts were made to locate them. Virtu- followed the tracks through Tsinan an d ally every plane in MAG–32 and VMO– 6 all the way home to Tsangkou . The third had a turn at the search, but it was route covered by regular aerial patro l three days before Chinese civilian s ran south to the mountain chain that brought word of the location of the bordered the coast before turning north crash and pilots confirmed the fact . through tortuous defiles to Weihsien and Communist villagers had rescued the the favorite railroad return route . only two survivors, one of whom was The importance of the railroads in- injured. The Communists of Shantung dicated by the attention given them i n Peninsula also held two other Marine the MAG–32 patrol schedule was em- airmen at this time, the crew of a photo phasized on 2 November when a semi - reconnaissance plane which crash - weekly rail reconnaissance over th e landed on 11 December on the shor e whole length of the Tsingtao-Tsinan - near Penglai . Leaflets were dropped in Tientsin rail net was directed . The two- both wreck areas offering rewards fo r seater bombers returned to Tsangkou the return of the living and the dead . Field across the Gulf of Chihli reporting on junk traffic that passed beneath The photo plane at Penglai was par t them. of a flight of three from VMD–254 on Okinawa which had tried to fly around The hazardous nature of winter fly- a heavy weather front and reach Tsang- ing over mountainous terrain wa s kou Field. All three planes were forced vividly emphasized by an accident that down, one by propeller and engine occurred on 8 December . A major por- trouble and the other two by empty fue tion of each MAG–32 squadron flew to l Tientsin that day to take part in an "VMSB-343 WarD, Nov45.

578 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

tanks.12 Both crew members of the sec- reason, the Communist harassment of ond plane died in a water landing nea r the Marines in Shantung faded a bi t Weihaiwei, but the crewmen of th e after the crashes of December . The re- third craft, which went down on th e spite unfortunately proved to be tem- beach near Jungchen, escaped un- porary. scratched and were picked up by OY s The sporadic ground fire that me t of VMO–6 on 13 December . On the 15th, American air patrols was a sever e the VMD–254 plane crew from th e trial to pilots who had to stand the snip- Penglai crash and the uninjured sur- ing. General Rockey attempted to estab- vivor of the mass accident at Pingt u lish a set of conditions under which thi s were released by the Communists. Re- antiaircraft fire could be returned, and covery parties of the 6th Division on 6 December he issued combat in- picked up these men, and also drov e structions. The flyers could shoot bac k north on 24 December to accept the re - if the source was unmistakable, if th e mains of the VMSB–343 flyers killed on fire from the ground was in some vol- 8 December. The injured survivor o f ume, if the target was in the open an d this crash was returned to Tsingtao on easily defined, and if innocent peopl e Christmas Day . Though all the negoti- were not endangered . With permission ations attending the recovery of these to fire hedged by these qualifications , Marines, the Communist villagers had and the possibility of open warfare been most cooperative, refusing the always resting on their decision, the proffered rewards, and treating well the Marine pilots remained discreet but men they rescued . frustrated . While in General Wood's By prior arrangement with the Com- opinion the individual pilot should have munists, an attempt was made to re- been given considerably more freedom cover the photo plane down near Jung- of action, no Marine in China, regard - chen. The 6th Division organized a task less of his position, had anything re- force built around Company F of th e sembling a free hand in conductin g 29th Marines with appropriate air an d operations . The orders from Genera l ground attachments to handle the jo b Rockey were an accurate reflection of of getting the plane airborne again . the policy directives that reached hi m Travelling to Jungchen on the 17th on from higher headquarters . board an LST, the recovery force foun d Certainly, the directive most difficul t the plane could not take off because o f to comply with was the admonition t o soft ground . The aircraft was strippe d avoid support of the Nationalist armie s of usable parts and the carcass burned. in the civil war. The very presence of The same fate met the wreck of the the Marines in North China holdin g plane down at Penglai . In both in- open the major ports of entry, the coa l stances, the cooperation of the local mines, and the railroads was an in - villagers was exemplary . For whatever calculably strong military asset to th e Central Government 1 : Aircraft Accident Cards of F7F—3Ps Nos . . And the fact that 80381, 80419, and 80423, dtd 11Dec45 (Uni t the U. S. had provided a good part o f HistReptFile, HistBr, HQMC) . the arms of the troops scheduled to take

AN EXTENDED STAY 579

over North China and Manchuria mad e munition he needed . Shepherd for- the situation even more explosive . The warded the request to Rockey, who in a supply of ammunition and replacemen t meeting with Wedemeyer at Peiping o n parts for these weapons, even though the 23d received permission to make the they were now used to fight the Com- transfer. The III Corps commander sent munists rather than the Japanese, wa s an order to Shepherd authorizing him a charge upon the American govern- to turn over to the 8th CNA one unit o f ment. On at least one occasion, the fire 13 for the infantry weapons of a Marines at Tsingtao wound up provid- Marine division . A hurry-up request to ing this ammunition directly to a Na- FMFPac asked for immediate replace- tionalist force hotly engaged with th e ment of this ammunition . Communists . The majority of Japanese troops to The 8th Chinese Nationalist Army be repatriated through Tsingtao wer e began landing at Tsingtao on 14 Novem- intended to be released from guar d ber, its mission to accept the surrende r duties by the action of the 8th CNA . of the Japanese Forty-third Army at Once the Nationalist army had reache d Tsinan. The Nationalist commander Tsinan and disarmed the Japanes e moved his troops through the city an d there, it was to turn these arms over to encamped between it and Tsangko u puppet troops in the area which had de- while he regrouped for the drive north. clared for Chiang Kai-shek. The 8th The Communist reaction to the landing was then to return along the railroad was immediate and violent. On the taking over the guard assignment fro m night of the 14th, the railroad was effec- the Japanese who held it . This plan tively knocked out for a distance of 3 7 failed of accomplishment in many re- miles above Tsangkou by a spread of spects, but principally because th e destructive raids . General Shepherd Nationalist unit, with a strength of les s immediately moved 2/22 reinforced by than 30,000 men, just could not handl e tanks to the airfield to back up the rifl e the job assigned it. At the end of a company already there, withdrawing month of fighting, the 8th CNA had the battalion as soon as the Nationalist s reached a point just below Weihsie n began their advance. and could go no farther . Nationalist authorities changed its mission to on e The forward units of the 8th CN A of rail security and pinned their hope s tangled with the Communists soon after for relief of Tsinan on armies approach- clearing Tsangkou's outskirts on 1 9 ing overland from central China. The November. The prospect of a continuous former puppet troops at Tsinan dug i n series of fire fights was most disturbin g for a protracted defense of the city, to the Nationalist commander whos e 33 The unit of fire was a measure of ammu- army was quite low on ammunition at nition supply. It represented a specific numbe r the time it debarked from the America n of rounds of ammunition per weapon whic h transports which carried it to Tsingtao . varied with its type and caliber. The IIIA C took three units of fire to China to cover th e On 20 November, he made a formal re- possible requirements for ammunition of it s quest to General Shepherd for the am - ground components .

310-224 0 - 69 - 38

580 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

while the Japanese Forty-third Arm y shared by the Nationalist police and th e set its own schedule for troop movement Marines. In like manner, the inspection to Tsingtao. of repatriates' baggage for contraban d The actual mechanics of repatriation was a joint procedure ; the Japanes e through Tsingtao were deceptively were allowed to carry away little mor e simple. They represented, however, a than a handbag full of personal effects , wealth of preliminary work at the a small amount of cash, and a five days ' theater level, principally logistical supply of food for the voyage. arrangements, 14 and the ironing out of Initially, 15 American LSTs were as - details at the port of embarkatio n signed to shuttle between Tsingtao and among Nationalist representatives, Jap- Japan carrying military repatriates, anese military and civilian leaders, an d while the civilians had to wait on Japa- operations and civil affairs officers of nese merchant vessels to carry them the 6th Marine Division. When the home. Seventh Fleet, in an effort to routine of repatriation was settled, onl y speed up the repatriation process, firs t one company of the 29th Marines plus authorized the use of LSTs by mal e a relatively few liaison officers and in- civilians and later opened their deck s terpreters from division headquarters and holds to family groups also . Regular were needed to supervise and control repatriation runs from Tsingtao bega n the program . on 19 November when three landin g Basically, the repatriation system at ships sailed with 2,873 naval base troop s Tsingtao worked in this way . All Japa- and nine civilians on board . Similar nese civilians and those military units shipments of approximately 3,000 men which had not surrendered to th e were made on the 21st and 23d . On Marines came under control of National- board each LST, in addition to the re- ist authorities. When the Nationalist patriates, were six Marine guards an d 11th War Area representative release d a Japanese interpreter. The first sub- the military from guard duties or cer- stantial shipment of civilians departed tified the civilians for return they on 5 December when 4,152 left on a assembled at a coke factory just nort h Japanese vessel which had brought in of Tsangkou which was designated as 1,961 Chinese from Japan . On ships the processing and staging center . carrying civilian repatriates, Japanes e Within the center the Japanese handle d guards and medical personnel wer e all the administrative work necessary t o added to the operating complement . set up embarkation rosters within By the year's end, 33,500 Japanes e priorities established by the Marines . military and civilians had cleare d The housekeeping details of the variou s Tsingtao . The figure could have been billeting areas were also managed by much larger but Nationalist reluctanc e the Japanese. Security details at the to release rail guards or vital civilian coke factory, along the train route t o technicians kept the total down . Com- Great Harbor, and at the docks were munist destruction of the tracks, bridges, and roadbed slowed the move- 1` Wedemeyer, Reports, pp. 351-352 . ment of Japanese from Tsinan, and the AN EXTENDED STAY 581

43d Army advance units which alter- with a priceless Samurai sword "on be- nately marched and rode down the rail- half of all Japanese soldiers under my road had to fight off harassing attacks . command who are moved by your open There were still 125,000 Japanes e and honorable conduct toward them . " scheduled to move home through Tsing- The Japanese officer continued : tao on 31 December, and most of thes e Exemplary conduct and actions on the people had not as yet begun to move part of your soldiers inspired our mind s toward the port city . with respect and wonder. Personally I The main interest of the Nationalist like plain speaking. Indeed, it may soun d military authorities in the Japanese strange for us Japanese soldiers to spea k forces was their weapons, equipment, of American soldiers in this strain, but let the fact speak for itself. I feel it is m y and ammunition. The considerable pleasant duty to report to you that ever y stores of munitions that III Corps units Japanese in Tsingtao City feels gratefu l had collected in disarming the Japanese to you for your fair and square dealings. were a prize that the Nationalists This is the last thing that we expected o f wanted badly. During October and your Marines of the Okinawa Battle fame.15 November, the Marine division commanders had a seldom-exercised author- The occasion for this presentation wa s ity to make emergency issues from General Shepherd's departure fro m these stocks to Nationalist units . The China ; at the same time an heirloo m American feeling was that control o f suit of Samurai armor was given him i n the surrendered military supplie s behalf of the Japanese civilian repatri- should pass to the Central Government ates who praised his Marines for thei r only when full responsibility for the impartiality and "strict maintenance of Japanese and their repatriation wa s military discipline ." 16 On 24 December , assumed . On 13 December, in a move General Shepherd, who was return- calculated to prod Nationalist author- ing to the States to organize the ities, corps withdrew even the limite d Troop Training Command, Amphibiou s authorization that had existed to turn Forces, Atlantic Fleet, relinquished over Japanese weapons and ammuni- command of the division which he had tion. organized and led throughout the Oki- In keeping with this decision, Gen- nawa fighting. In a formal ceremony eral Shepherd turned down a request before the division staff and the regi- made by the 8th CNA that it be give n mental and battalion commanders and the materiel taken from the 5th Inde- executive officers, Shepherd turned ove r pendent Mixed Brigade . The Marine his command to Major General Archie general in reply pointed out that these F. Howard, who had been Inspecto r surrendered Japanese troops were the General, FMFPac. particular responsibility of the 6th Division. This fact was evident in the 15 MajGen Eiji Nagano, IJA, ltr to MajGen voluntary tribute that the 5th Brigade Lemuel C . Shepherd, Jr ., dtd 15Dec45 file d commander, General Nagano, paid Gen- with Shepherd interview . eral Shepherd in presenting the Marine le Ibid .

582 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

General Howard's assumption of com- eluded payment of Americans in any- mand coincided with the arrival at thing but American money. Even the Tsingtao of a merchant ship loaded with many Chinese employees of the Marine s 9,500 tons of coal . Had the vessel come had their wages set in terms of Ameri- a few days later, only the Marines can money with payment at the goin g would have had fuel for heat and light rate of exchange . since the stockpile for public purposes The fact that most Marine enlisted was exhausted . In peacetime, coal mine s men could have afforded a personal serv- in the Poshan region of Shantung had ant in China, and in fact did share th e supplied Tsingtao, but Communist activ- services of one with his fellows in a ity had shut off this source . The city ratio set by his commanders, was an had to limp along on a dole reluctantly attractive feature of China duty. In the taken from the supplies intended fo r city garrisons, each platoon had severa l Shanghai. houseboys who made up beds, shined Despite the fact that Tsingtao re- shoes, cleaned the quarters, ran errands , ceived only the fuel necessary to powe r and generally made themselves useful . essential public utilities, enough coa l Naturally, the fact that someone els e somehow found its way into privat e was doing many of the necessary but hands to keep a thriving souvenir in- irksome jobs which fall to the lot of dustry heated during the winter of 1945 - lower ranks in any military organiza- 1946. The souvenir shops, like the in- tion was universally appreciated by the evitable honky-tonk district that sprang men who held those ranks . up almost in the footsteps of the first While only a small portion of the Marines to land, were attracted by th e Marines in North China were steadily American dollar. The free-spending engaged by occupation tasks, the pres- habits of the Marines, and of the sailor s ence of the remainder as a necessary re- of Seventh Fleet who often came ashor e serve lent emphasis to the actions of th e with several months pay in thei r pilots, the rail guards, and the repatria- pockets, gave Tsingtao a superficial tion details. Unit commanders were par- aspect of prosperity that extended onl y ticularly concerned that the off-dut y as far as the customary haunts of hours of men used to having their tim e American servicemen . and abilities fully occupied be filled in a Inflation of the local puppet currenc y manner that would maintain morale an d was an ill common to all North China discipline. Since the majority of the vet- when the III Corps arrived . Since the erans in III Corps had been in the Pa- Marines were not an occupying forc e cific islands for a year or more when the in the sense that the Allies were in North China landings were made, the Japan, the steadying influence of a con - chance at liberty in Chinese cities wa s trolled economy in such unsettled con- eagerly taken up . The novelty soon wor e ditions was absent . The Nationalist s off, however, as few pocketbooks coul d were not strong enough to impose thei r stand the strain of constant spending at economic will, and the almost daily up - inflated prices. To meet the problem , ward spiral of the exchange rate pre- General Rockey took steps to set up an

AN EXTENDED STAY 583

extensive recreational program which The Central Government, through it s would offer the most service at the least War Area Service Corps (WASC) , pro- cost to his men. vided a wealth of educational and cul- Rockey invited the Red Cross to ex - tural opportunities to the Marines . tend its service club operations to the. Hostels run by WASC were the principa l III Corps area and sent planes of MAG – quarters for transient servicemen from 25 to Shanghai and Kunming to pick the fleet and from outlying posts wh o up personnel and equipment. The facili - visited the principal cities garrisoned by ties that these people opened in Octobe r the corps. Peiping in particular was a in Tsingtao, Peiping, and Tientsin wer e mecca for tourists in uniform who fle w elaborate and luxurious beyond any ex- in or came by rail from all over North perience of Marines overseas.17 To sup- China as part of a systematic effort to plement the Red Cross support, Rocke y grant liberty in the ancient city to thos e encouraged the formation of unit clubs, not fortunate enough to be stationed particularly at remote stations, to offe r there. By the end of December 1945, con- varied and inexpensive recreation . sistent command effort, ably seconde d The breakup of Army commands in by the work of the Red Cross an d southwestern China provided the Ma- WASC, brought into being a corps-wid e rines with a radio network. Three sur- recreational program that significantl y plus 50-watt transmitters with enough eased the tension of waiting inherent i n broadcasting equipment to set up radio the Marines' situation. stations at each of the three major IIIAC bases were obtained . The Army - LINE OF COMMUNICATION run newspaper at Shanghai, a theater TROOPS " edition of The Stars and Stripes, was In the northern sector of III Corps distributed in North China, but it wa s responsibility, the processing machiner y overwhelmingly concerned with unit s at the focal point of repatriation ran as and experience of little interest to th e smoothly as it did in the south . (See y Marines. General Rockey felt strongl Map 34.) Essentially the process wa s that the corps should have its own news - the same at the Tientsin-Tangku por t a paper, and as a result, The North Chin of embarkation as it was at Tsingtao . Marine began weekly publication o n The 1st Marine Division had full charge . The paper, which took its 10 November of the program, and the 1st Marines sup- e title from a predecessor put out by th plied the necessary guards, including 39 prewar embassy guard, was printed i n six-man details to ride the LSTs carry- Tientsin at a local press and distributed free by rail and air to all IIIAC 18 Unless otherwise noted, the material i n installations. this section is derived from : IIIAC WarDs , Nov–Dec45 ; 1st MarDiv WarDs, Nov–Dec45 ; 17 General Rockey was very complimentar y 1st MAW WarDs, Nov–Dec45 ; LtCol James to the Red Cross for its services to IIIAC , D. Hittle, "On the Peiping-Mukden Line, " citing in particular its club in Peiping, whic h Marine Corps Gazette, v. 31, no . 6 (Jun47) ; had luxurious quarters in the rented Italian Rockey interviews, 14–15Apr59, 29Apr59, and Embassy. Rockey comments . 9Ju159 ; Peck interview ; Woods interview.

584 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

ing military repatriates . The Japanese northern sailings stood at 112,022 o n through their military command and a 31 December. civilian liaison committee handled most The major factor controlling repatria- of the administrative and logistical re- tion totals was the relief of Japanes e quirements of selecting, feeding, hous- troops from rail security duties . In ing, and moving the thousands wh o Shantung the Central Governmen t arrived at the assembly area nea r forces assigned to this task were un- Changkeichuang Field. The Nationalists equal to it ; in Hopeh there was ver y provided police protection along the lin e little disposition on the part of the Na- of march to the railroad station at Tien- tionalists to make the relief at all . Of tsin and inspectors for the search of necessity, the 1st Marine Division did baggage at the docks. the job for Chiang Kai-shek's forces b y Three Japanese merchant ships were securing the lines of communication be- available for civilian repatriation durin g tween cities where Marines were sta- November, and the 1st Division was able tioned. Repeated American polic y to send home 8,651 people during th e statements pointing to repatriation as- month. Five times that number left in sistance as the principal reason for th e December as more ships became avail - presence of Marines in China made the able and LST transportation was au- relief of the Japanese mandatory after thorized for nonmilitary repatriates . 19 the 1st Division extended its hold on the The feeling of the Japanese civilian s Peiping-Mukden Railroad . toward the Marines of the 1st Division The Nationalist headquarters whic h paralleled remarkably the sentiment s was assigned the job of taking over Man- expressed to General Shepherd regard- churia, the Northeast China Comman d ing the men of the 6th Division. The of Lieutenant General Tu Li Ming, di d spokesman for the civilian repatriate s not start its troops in motion up th e wrote to General Peck commending the Shanhaikuan corridor until 17 Novem- attitude of the Marines and pointing ou t ber. In ten days the advance guard ha d that the first repatriates had "kept re- reached Chinchow at the foot of th e questing that the profound gratitude Manchurian plain without encountering they felt for the kind and understanding much Communist opposition. Generalis- treatment accorded them by your men simo Chiang then ordered the National- be given expression ." 20 ist force to hold up and not press on for After LSTs became available for mili- Mukden and Changchun ; by not pro- tary repatriation on 13 November, the ceeding farther, he intended to emphasize 1st Division was able to process and shi p the lack of cooperation of the Soviets . out 33,583 men from Tangku by the 30th The American decision to provide him and an additional 20,450 the following with troop lift which would expedite his month. The cumulative total for the take-over program caused him to revis e his strategy. At this point, the Sovie t 10 IIIAC G—5 PeriodicRpt No . 2, Nov45, dtd 1Dec45 and No . 3, Dec45, dtd 1Jan46. occupation command became much mor e 2° Mr . H . Imura ltr to MajGen DeWitt Peck, amenable to Nationalist requests, but th e dtd 12Nov45, filed with Peck interview . damage both to Manchuria's industrial

AN EXTENDED STAY 585

capacity and to its chances for a peace- 37,000 tons were sent to Tientsin. In ful future had already been done .2 ' December the situation improved tre- The movement of Nationalist armie s mendously, 94,000 tons were shipped t o north into Manchuria interfered with Chinwangtao and 98,000 to Tientsin . A the execution of the mission given III good part of the increase could be trace d Corps to keep coal flowing from th e to a definite slackening of Communist KMA mines near Tangshan and Kuyeh pressure against the rail line after the for Shanghai, and, quite naturally, fo r first part of the month . In Hopeh, as i n Peiping and Tientsin, too. Before the Shantung where the same thing was advance began, Marine civil affairs of- happening, the widely publicized peace ficers got word that Northeast Chin a efforts of General Marshall were the Command intended to take a great deal most probable cause of the temporary of rolling stock beyond the Great Wall lull. to support its operations . General Wede- The destruction wrought by Commu- meyer was asked to take steps to pre- nist raiding parties in the first weeks of vent this and he, in turn, passed the November was often enough to halt al l request on to Chiang Kai-shek. On traffic on the Peiping-Mukden line for a 30 November, the III Corps was tol d day or more . Chinese track repair gangs , that only 2 locomotives and 60 car s however, profited from the wealth of would be taken permanently . A board experience provided them by these at- was set up with Marine representation tacks and made continuous improvemen t to control the allocation of stock on each on the time necessary to restore service . side of the wall. Before this agreement Damage to rolling stock was handled i n was made, however, Marine sources esti - the large railroad shops at Tangsha n mated that 25 locomotives and 500 coal whose Japanese technicians were de- cars disappeared into Manchuria in the clared essential by the Nationalists and initial stages of the Nationalist ad- withheld from repatriation . vance. In order to prevent this confis- The OYs of VMO–3 frequently flew cation, Marine guards riding coal trains along the line to check for damage, since to Chinwangtao stayed on board during the railroad signal system was almos t the turn-around period and kept th e non-existent. Often the first news tha t Nationalists from seizing the engine s engineers had of a break in the track s and cars.2 2 would be their own sighting of twiste d or broken rails . Under the circumstances One result of the severe loss to carry- a ride on a train which traveled the well - ing capacity involved in the appropria- patched stretch of tracks betwee n tion of coal cars for troop transports Tangku and Chinwangtao was a memo- was a disappointingly low total of coa l rable experience. moved from the KMA mines durin g , November. Only 22,000 tons reache d Just before noon on 14 November Chinwangtao for transshipment, while Communist troops firing from the protection of a village six miles north o f `1 Chiang, Soviet Russia, pp. 146—147 . Kuyeh stopped a train carrying the 1st 22 IIIAC G—5 PeriodicRpt No . 2, op . cit. Marine Division commander . General

586 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

Peck, who was inspecting 7th Marine s so General Peck returned to Tangshan positions along the railroad, ordered hi s and flew up to Chinwangtao. escort platoon to return fire . Using a In the exchange of messages between radio jeep mounted on a flatcar to con - Generals Rockey and Wedemeyer which tact the nearest Marine garrison a t resulted from this incident, the IIIAC Linsi, he directed that reinforcement be commander indicated that he was ready dispatched immediately ; at the same to authorize a strafing mission if fir e time, he radioed General Rockey re - continued from the offending village . questing air support and permission to The reply from Wedemeyer is interest- call down a strike on the village if it ing since it vividly demonstrates th e 23 should prove necessary. The Commu- difficulties attending Marine combat op- nists faded away as soon as Company L erations in China : from Linsi arrived, set up a mortar, an d dropped a few rounds in the area fro m If American lives are endangered b y which the firing had come .24 small-arms fire received from village abou t 600 yards north of Loanshien as indicate d General Peck returned to Tangshan in your radio CAC 0368, it is desired tha t for the night and on the next day started you inform the military leader or respon- again for Chinwangtao . Just beyond the sible authority in that village in writing , that fire from that particular village i point at which he had been fired upo s n endangering American lives and that suc h the previous day, Peck found the track firing must be stopped . After insurin g torn up for several hundred yards. A that your warning to said military leade r track gang which was traveling on the or responsible authority has been receive d train began making repairs while Ma- and understood, should firing that jeop- ardizes American lives continue, you ar rines beat down scattered sniper fire e authorized to take appropriate action fo r which was covering the break. The area their protection . Your warning and actio n proved to be mined and several of the should include necessary measures to in - Chinese repair gang were killed or insure safety of innocent persons .25 jured when a mine exploded . The extent General Peck, on his arrival at Chin- of the repairs necessary indicated tha t wangtao, was authorized to deal directly no trains could get through for two days , with General Tu Li Ming, in order to ge t the Nationalists to take offensive action 2S General Woods recalled that he receive d against the Communists along the rail- an order specifing that planes loaded wit h ammunition only be sent to the scene . He pro- road. On the 16th, the generals agree d tested that bombs should also be carried, bu t that if the Marines would mount guar d directed that the planes be made ready. Shortly on all railroad bridges over 100 meters after this, "the original order was cancelled b y in length between Tangku and Chin- telephone and no planes were sent ." Woods wangtao, the Nationalists, using th e ltr . General Peck noted, however, in his con - temporary notebook, that some planes did troops thus relieved, would conduct an eventually fly over at 1500, but that the pilots offensive sweep driving away the Com- reported they did not sight any hostile force . munists. Ten days later, after Marin e Peck ltr. detachments had taken control of th e =' A Chronological Hist of 3/7, 1st MarDiv Activities in China, 3OSep-15Apr46, n .d ., p . 3 . 25 Quoted in IIIAC WarD, Nov45, pp . 4-5 . AN EXTENDED STAY 587

ARROW, made of blankets and clothing, directs Corsairs to village from which Chinese Communists fired upon a Marine patrol . (USMC 226788)

COMMUNIST MINE damages roadbed of Tientsin-Chinwangtao railroad . Standing figure at left is 1st Division commander, Major General DeWitt Peck . (USMC 226782)

588 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

bridges, Northeast China Comman d 80 miles south of Peiping while on a informed the 1st Division that it did no t routine flight to Tientsin . The pilot an d have enough troops available to mee t five passengers were held by the loca l its offensive commitment. Then in earl y Communists, and the plane was camou- December, as if to clinch the situation , flaged in an attempt to conceal it from the commanding officer of the 7th Ma- aerial observation . On 15 November, rines was told by the Nationalist 43d however, a pilot of VMF(N)—54 1 Division commander that he had no in- spotted the aircraft, 29 and negotiation s structions to relieve the Marines o f were immediately undertaken to have bridge guard, nor did he have enough the men returned. Civilian emissarie s men to make the relief if it was ordered . who contacted the Communists reporte d It is undoubtedly fortunate that the that all the Marines were well and bein g Communist forces harassing the Pei- fairly treated. On 17 December, 38 days ping-Mukden Railroad in Hopeh wer e after the plane had gone down, Commu- unaware of the hedging restrictions on nist troops brought the men to a Na- combat use of Marine air in North tionalist outpost near Tientsin and fro m China. A steady procession of fighte r there they proceeded to 1st Wing head- planes was kept aloft over the railroad , quarters. The reason for the delay in re- seemingly ready at any time to suppor t leasing the men was not explained . The ground action . Beginning on 1 Novem- Marines reported that the Communists ber, the squadrons of MAG—12 alter- questioned them repeatedly about nated the duty of flying two show-of- American aid to the Nationalists, a sor e strength flights daily to Chinwangtao point that was obviously being empha- and return ; in December the Corsair sized by Yenan's propagandists . units were also assigned a 25-mile radiu s Not all the incidents involving attacks daily search of the Peiping area .2° The on Marines could be laid clearly at the night fighters of MAG—24 also made a door of the Communists . Intelligence daily flight to Chinwangtao, moving officers were often forced to put an "un- cross country to the coal port from Nan identified Chinese" label on the assail - Yuan Field and returning over the rail- ants. One such case, involving the road.27 The group's two squadrons fle w murder of one Marine and the severe a daily search pattern in the Tientsi n wounding of another, achieved consider- area in December with orders to report able publicity in the States as the resul t any unusual incidents to an air-ground of an inaccurate report of its cir- liaison jeep.28 cumstances. On 10 November, a torpedo bomber o f On 4 December two Marines of 1/29, MAG—24's Headquarters Squadron wa s hunting near their railroad outpost two forced down by mechanical failure about miles west of Anshan, were shot with - out warning by two Chinese civilians 20 VMF-115 WarD, Nov45 ; VMF-211 War- who approached them . One Marine Ds, Nov-Dec45 ; VMF-218 WarD, Nov45 . escaped by feigning death, although =' MAG-24 WarD, Nov45 . 28 VMF(N)-533 WarD, Dec45 . 29 Ibid.

AN EXTENDED STAY 589

each man was shot again after he ha d been wiped out if all the 60-mm morta r fallen. The survivor watched the Chi- shells scored direct hits." 3 1 nese disappear into a nearby village an d Building upon the incorrect report o f then made his way back to his post . firing into the village and imaginary Near dusk, the executive officer of 1/2 9 casualties, some American newspapers led a small party to the area, set up a blasted the Marines in China . One edi- 60mm mortar close to the village, and torial writer compared the alleged firin g then entered it with an American in- on defenseless Chinese villagers to th e terpreter . The Marine told the village atrocities committed by the Nazis i n headman, who acknowledged the en - Europe and the Japanese in Asia.32 A trance of the gunmen, to surrender the board of inquiry which General Rocke y murderers within a half hour . If he immediately convened made a detaile d failed to do so, the officer promised to investigation of the events at Ansha n shell the village. When the time set and recommended that no disciplinar y elapsed without the terms being met, 2 4 action be taken against the officer in- rounds of high explosive and one o f volved, a finding which Rockey strongl y white phosphorus were fired toward the approved .33 As might be expected, th e village. The impact area was deliber- correct version of what happened neve r ately kept outside the village walls, and received the currency of the original sen - there was little property damage and n o sational story . injury to any of the inhabitants . 30 The The wide circulation given the fals e murderers were never apprehended . report of the Anshan incident empha- The story of the punitive action take n sized the heavy responsibility which la y to force the disclosure of the guilty Chi- on the shoulders of the Marines who le d nese was garbled in its transmission to the men keeping open the Peiping- 1st Division headquarters . The report Mukden line. Should even a bridg e received stated that the mortars fire d guard commander prove too aggressiv e into the village . This was the initial re- and exceed his orders to maintain a n port that General Rockey received from essentially defensive attitude, the chain the division, and which he released i n reaction to his rashness might well b e response to a directive from theater all-out guerrilla warfare against Ma- headquarters. The wire service reporter s rines throughout North China . On the already had an incorrect version an d other hand, the same commander b y were prepared to send it out whether o r being too circumspect might encourag e not it was officially released . One re - Communist incursions . It was largely porter in building his highly speculative " New York Times, 9Dec45, p . 23 . narrative wrote that "combat men 33 "Semper Fidelis," The Washington Post , estimated that the village could have 12Dec45, p . 10, filed with Gen Alexander A . Vandegrift ltr to Mr . Eugene Meyer, dtd 3° MajGen Keller E. Rockey ltr to Gen Alex- 13Dec45, published in The Washington Post , ander A. Vandegrift, dtd 29Dec45 (Vande- 15Dec45, p. 16 (Vandegrift Personal Corre- grift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, spondence File, HistBr, HQMC) . HQMC) . 33 Rockey ltr to Vandegrift, 29Dec45, op . cit.

590 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

due to the discretion required, expected , bridge across the Luan River at Luan- and obtained from the "junior officer s hsien. Seven bridge guard detachments and senior NCOs who commanded the and four station details were mounted , track detachments along the Peiping - each with a strength based upon the Mukden that the very delicate . . . inter- importance of the installation, the ca- nationally explosive phase of U . S. pacity of the quarters at hand, the prox- foreign policy requiring the protection imity of adjacent detachments, and per- of the Peiping-Mukden railroad fro m sonnel available. The detachments Tientsin to the Manchurian mountain s ranged in size from 1 officer and 1 8 was accomplished successfully ." 3 4 enlisted men, who held a small bridg e The KMA mines and the tracks from only a half mile from the track command Tangshan to Chinwangtao were the post, to a skeleton company of 4 officer s focus of Communist harassment. Marine and 85-100 men who guarded the bridg e defensive arrangements in this area over the Luan River . The destruction of were kept fluid and changed as the situa- this half-mile-long bridge would have tion required. The regimental headquar- effectively cut the railroad to Manchuria ters of the 7th Marines moved t o for a lengthy period . To supplement in- Peitaiho in November in order to facili- dividual weapons, the Marine guard at tate control. Three of the four battalions Luanhsien was equipped with two 81m m assigned to the 7th's command at thi s and two 60mm mortars plus four light time held the key area, while 3/7 and four heavy machine guns. secured the long stretch of track be- This concentration of supportin g tween Tangshan and Tangku. Even weapons was characteristic of the track though many men were necessarily tie d outposts where firepower was calle d down at fixed posts, bridges and rail - upon to make up for manpower short- road stations, strong mobile reserve s ages. As demobilization had its effect were maintained in each battalion sector in early 1946, the battalion for a tim e of responsibility for emergency call . had to concentrate its training on pro- Common sense on the part of the me n viding operators to replace fully quali- concerned and the requirements of their fied weapons men on these crew-serve d mission helped develop a workable op- pieces. At least one mortar was made a erating procedure for the track guard . part of detachment armament for night A brief consideration of the defensiv e illumination and support . Frequently , organization of the 30 miles of track as - unit commanders, who had orders no t signed to the center battalion, 2/7, can to "interfere in any engagement or conserve as an example of the genera l flict between Communists, Puppets, Na- deployment at the turn of the year . (See tionalists, or any other troops, except as Map 34. ) necessary to protect yourself, your ow n The 2d Battalion's sector reached troops, and the installations with whic h from the walled city of Changli to the you are charged," 35 shot up flare shells

" Hittle, "On the Peiping-Mukden Line," " 1st MarDiv OPlan No . 5-45, dtd 220ct4 5 op . cit., p . 20. in 1st MarDiv WarD, Oct45.

AN EXTENDED STAY 59 1

when close-lying CNA outposts were watchfulness of the duties they per- attacked. The incidental protection an d formed . Regular liberty parties were assistance provided the Nationalists b y flown to Peiping from Tangshan with this natural Marine precaution was un- priority of place going to men who ha d doubtedly interpreted as active support stood the lonely vigil at the bridges of by the Communists. the Peiping-Mukden Railroad . Through- When the men of the 7th Marine s out a period of frequent disruptive per- first moved out on bridge guard, the y sonnel changes brought about by de- took over existing Japanese troop quar- mobilization, the morale of the men ters. Few of these buildings, which were charged with rail security was excellent . often peasant huts in poor repair, were They had a tangible and important jo b acceptable billets. As fast as they could to do, and they did it well . be shipped from Okinawa, quonset hut s were set out along the railroad to pro - DEMOBILIZATION AND vide suitable accommodations that could REPLACEMENT 3 7 be adequately winterized .3" Although each detachment had a considerable The Marine Corps demobilization pro- store of rations at its post in case it wa s gram for its reservists was based on a cut off, daily hot meals were distribute d point discharge system developed by th e by track galleys . In 2/7's sector, six o f Army for its non-regular veterans . these galley cars were used to service th e Those few reservists who were ove r outposts. All other supplies reaching the the upper draft age limit of 36 wer e men, including mail and special service s also eligible for release regardless of th e kits of recreational and educational gear, points they had accumulated . came by rail also. Marine regulars who had complete d Both wire and radio contact with sec- their terms of enlistment and thos e tor headquarters was maintained by eac h who had served two years or more detachment, but the Communist pro- overseas were also scheduled for re - clivity for cutting the phone lines place d turn home for discharge or reassign- primary reliance on radio . Frequent in- ment. Naval personnel serving wit h spection trips by battalion and company the Marines were eligible for discharge commanders were an established part of under a different schedule of point the routine of rail guard to ensure that accumulation which generally paralleled standards of discipline and performance the Army-Marine system . The actual remained high . Marines on outpost were point total for discharge was deter - rotated frequently to compensate for mined by the service concerned, an d the monotony and constant strain o f most men in the States were separated a s

" General Woods recalled that many of these Unless otherwise noted the material i n quonset huts were Navy ones being sent to this section is derived from : 6th MarDi v house aviation personnel ; he gave orders to WarDs, Nov—Dec45 ; CMC Ur to Hon Franci s turn some over to IIIAC to provide suitable Case, dtd 11Feb46 in 79th Congress, 2d Ses- accommodations for Marines on bridge guard. sion, Congressional Record (Washington , Woods ltr . 1946), v . 92, pt 9, p . A653 .

592 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

soon as their personal score was reached . Tangku in December and early January, Similarly men serving overseas were re - enough Marines to enable all the 50 - turned home as their point total neared point men to be home and discharge d the discharge level and transportation by the end of February. was available . Within two months' time, the III Am- Although the Marine Corps had a phibious Corps lost one quarter of . its well organized schedule for demobiliza- veterans, and received in their place a n tion before the end of the war, one whic h equal number of Marines who were was realistic in terms of occupatio n short on service and military experience . e commitments, the public pressure to In the transportation pipeline from th have veterans released from service did U. S. were even more young Marines, not allow its efficient execution .38 The many of them fresh from boot camp, point score for discharge dropped rap - who were scheduled to replace the men idly in the final months of 1945 with with point scores in the 40s and 30s . The most 50-point men in the States sepa- problems which arose in assimilating rated by the end of the year ; 48,000 these new men into units disrupted b y more Marines were discharged by 1 1 the loss of key officers and NCOs were January 1946 than had been originally formidable . The most characteristic ac- planned. On that date, the occasion of a tivity of Marine commands during th e report by the Commandant to Congress, spring of 1946 was the implementation Marine Corps strength stood at 301,070 . of a repeated cycle of basic trainin g Of this total 45,981 Marines were serv- which enabled them to maintain a satis- ing in North China, a figure quite close factory level of performance . to the original Marine Corps landing In view of the rapidly shrinking siz e strength of III Corps. of the Marine Corps overall, a reduction in the strength of Marine forces i n Through December, no significant re- North China was inevitable. The chang e duction in the size of IIIAC had been in official views regarding the earl y effected although changes were in the withdrawal of the IIIAC from China offing. High-point Marines in China had did not alter the plans for the peacetim e to be replaced rather than withdrawn as strength of the FMF to be reached b y had once been the plan, 39 and low-poin t the summer of 1946 .4° Four of the si x men from the States and from other Marine divisions activated during the units of the FMF were sent to North war were scheduled for reduction an d China to release those eligible for sepa- disbandment. Plans for the first majo r ration and rotation . More than 11,00 0 step in this program to concern III replacements arrived at Tsingtao and Corps were issued in December to tak e " CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 130ct49, Subj : De- effect on order . mobilization Planning (2515–35 File, NavSec , The 6th Marine Division was to b e FRC, Alex) . reduced to brigade strength with on e '° Gen Alexander A . Vandegrift ltr to LtGe n Holland M. Smith, dtd 30Nov45 (Vandegrift 4° CominCh disp to CinCPac, dtd 30Sep4 5 Persona l Correspondence File, HistBr, HQ in CinCPac WarD, Sep45, end (B), p . 7 MC) . (OAB, NHD) .

AN EXTENDED STAY 593

infantry regiment, the 4th Marines . At The news of the first major reduction an appropriate time, after necessary of Marine strength in North China em- reductions and detachments had been phasized the many such changes pend- made in Japan, a skeleton headquarters ing in 1946 . In the coming year, the group, incorporating the name, the principal task set IIIAC when it wa s colors, and the traditions of the regi- dispatched to Hopeh and Shantung—the ment, would sail for Tsingtao . Once the repatriation of the Japanese— was suc- Chinese base was reached, the regiment cessfully accomplished . A new mission o f would be newly constituted from dis- support of General Marshall's attempt banded infantry units of the division . to bring about peace in China made the Supporting elements of the brigade year chiefly memorable, however, fo r would be activated from units perform- its wasted effort and endless frustra- ing similar functions within the division . tions. CHAPTER 4

Abortive Peace Mission

EXECUTIVE HEADQUARTERS 1 and the formation of an Executiv e Headquarters to police the truce . When General Marshall arrived i n The agreement was issued on 10 Janu- China on 20 December, he immediatel y ary over the signatures of the two began a series of informal conferences Chinese members of the Committee with Nationalist and Communist lead- of Three and was addressed to "all units , ers. Both sides appeared anxious t o regular, militia, irregular and guerilla, bring an end to the fighting and to have of the National Armies of the Republic Marshall act as the mediator in thei r of China and of Communist-led troop s discussions. Consequently, the American of the Republic of China ." 2 In modifi- was asked to be the presiding membe r cation of the ban on troop movement , of a three-man committee whose task both forces were allowed to make es- was the development of a workable truc e sential administrative and logistica l plan. The Nationalist representative wa s moves of a local nature. The National- General Chang Chun ; speaking for th e ists, in addition, won agreement fo r Communists was General Chou En-lai . their continued advance within Manchu- The Committee of Three, as it soon ria to restore Chinese sovereignty, an d came to be known, first met on 7 Janu- acknowledgement of their right to con- ary at the American Ambassador's resi- tinue troop shifts necessary to complet e dence in Chungking . The result of six army reorganization in the area sout h long meetings spaced over the next three of the Yangtze River. days was an agreement which ordered The Executive Headquarters provided the cessation of all hostilities by 13 for in the truce agreement was to be January, an end to destruction and inter- established in Peiping with its action s governed by three commissioners, a Na- ference with lines of communication, a tionalist, a Communist, and an Ameri- partial suspension of troop movement , can, with the latter the chairman of the ' Unless otherwise noted, the material in organization. General Marshall ap- this section is derived from : HistRec of th e pointed U. S. Charge d'Affaires Walter ExecHq, PeipingGruHq, Peiping, China, 10- S. Robertson as the American commis- Jan-31Mar46, n .d . (OCMH), hereafter Exec- sioner. His opposite numbers wer e HqHist with the appropriate quarter ; SCA P Major General Cheng Kai Ming of th ltr AG 370 .05, dtd 17Jan46, Subj : Conf on e Repatriation, 15-17Jan46, Tokyo, Japan (Sev- Nationalist Ministry of Operations an d enth Flt & ComNavWesPac File, FRC, Mech) ; General Yeh-Chien-Ying, the Commu- IIIAC G—5 PeriodicRpts No. 4, Jan46, dtd nist Chief of Staff. Three independent 1Feb46, No. 5, Feb46, dtd 1Mar46, and No . 6 , Mar46, dtd lApr46 ; U. S. Relations wit h 2 Quoted in U. S. Relations with China, p . China. 609. 594 ABORTIVE PEACE MISSIO N 595

signal systems were authorized to en - tion set up operations in the building s able the commissioners to keep in con- of the Peiping Union Medical College on stant and secret contact with their 14 January and immediately made prep - superiors. The commissioners had the arations to send its first teams into th e authority to vote and negotiate amon g field to check reports of cease-fire vio- themselves, but all orders issued had t o lations. have unanimous agreement . The agency Support of the Executive Headquar- through which these orders would reac h ters made heavy demands upon the air- the field was the Executive Headquar- craft availability of the Army's Ai r ters Operations Section. Transport Command at Shanghai . On 15 The Committee of Three determine d January, a detachment of transports that an American officer should be the from MAG–25 was temporarily assigne d Director of the Operations Section and to Peiping to increase the number o f that he should have equal numbers of planes available to fly truce teams to Nationalist and Communist representa- trouble spots and keep them supplie d tives on his staff, as well as enough on a regular schedule . The Marine planes Americans to carry out the tripartite were also used to drop leaflets incorpo- concept in negotiations . The U. S. rating the cease-fire message in areas Military Attache at Chungking, Briga- where fighting continued . Fighters of dier General Henry A . Byroade, was MAG–12 and -24 flew special reconnais- selected for the post of director . General sance missions over Jehol Province i n Byroade's main concern with the im- Manchuria to report on Communis t mediate problems involved in maintain- troop movement for the Executiv e ing the cease-fire . Field teams, each one Headquarters.3 a miniature Executive Headquarters i n The fighting subsided in the first organization, were to be dispatched t o weeks after the publication of the truc e areas where fighting continued or brok e agreement. The field teams sent out fro m out anew. The teams were expected t o Peiping were able to localize clashes supervise the carrying out of the term s between the two sides and to get a star t of the truce and to fix responsibility for on restoration of normal railroad com- failure to comply with them . munications. One result of the opera- The initial contingent of officers and tions of Executive Headquarters was a n enlisted men assigned to Executive immediate step up in the tempo of Japa- Headquarters arrived by air at Peiping nese repatriation. The former enemy on 11 January. A steady procession of soldiers and civilians isolated by Com- Army Air Forces transports, shuttling munist action in the interior of North from fields at Shanghai and Chungking , China were at last able to march and brought in additional personnel and ride out to the embarkation ports. The supplies. Priority in the airlift was given continued presence of large numbers of to communications equipment. On the Japanese in the disputed area was a 12th and those days immediately succeeding, radio operators repeatedly sent '1st MAW WarD, Jan46 ; MAG-25 WarD , out the cease-fire order. Byroade's sec- Jan46 ; VMR-152 WarD, Jan46 .

310-224 0 - 69 - 39

596 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

factor which seriously affected th e shipping allocations and scheduling fo r chances for peace, and the truce teams the overall program . The burden of the were directed to take an active part i n transportation task involved in return- arranging their withdrawal . In coordi- ing the more than 3,000,000 Japanes e nation with the Central Government and still overseas had to fall on Japanese- China Theater, Executive Headquarters manned ships operated by SCAJA P determined the priority and method of (Shipping Control Administration, movement of repatriation groups an d Japan) . The requirements of naval de- arranged to feed, house, and transport mobilization had already made seriou s them. inroads in the number of American- With the advent of the truce, Gen- manned vessels available, and in im- erals Marshall and Wedemeyer were mediate prospect was the end to the use able to prod the Central Government of American crews . Several hundred into taking over complete responsibilit y Liberty ships and LSTs were to b e for Japanese repatriation from China . turned over to SCAJAP and sailed by This decision was in keeping with a Japanese seamen to supplement the cap- directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff tured merchant vessels already in use . which limited future participation in the The conference decided that Chin a program by China Theater forces to ad- Theater should have the use of 30 per- visory and liaison duties . All Japanese cent of this merchant shipping, and that personnel, supplies, and equipment were 100 SCAJAP Libertys and 85 LSTs to be released to Nationalist control . would be made available in February Word of the impending change was cir- and March for the China run. By utiliz- culated by IIIAC on 3 January, and the ing the crew space in the LSTs for pas- 1st and 6th Marine Divisions were di- sengers, SCAJAP planned to carry rected to work out turnover procedures 1,200 repatriates in each vessel rather with officials of the Eleventh War Area . than the 1,000 lifted in similar Ameri- The switch began in Shantung on th e can-manned ships . The use of such 14th and in Hopeh on the 18th . Responsi- measures, added to the fact that SCA- bility for the Japanese themselves was JAP shipping could not be diverted t o assumed immediately and the trans- transporting Nationalist troops to Man- fer of property was completed b y churia, enabled General Wedemeyer t o 9 February .4 predict that Japanese repatriation from In the absence of Communist obstruc- China would be completed by the end o f June. tion, an important factor influencing repatriation progress was the avail - The scheduling of Korean repatri- ability of shipping. In mid-January, a ation, a necessary consideration in thos e conference of the Pacific command s areas where the Japanese had held con- most concerned with the repatriatio n trol, was also taken up at the Toky o problem was held at Tokyo to determin e conference . The economic competitio n of the Koreans overseas, who were 'MAC WarDs, Jan—Feb46 ; 1st MarDiv mainly laborers and artisans, made them WarD, Jan46 ; 6th MarDiv WarD, Jan46 . unwelcome to native populations . Most

ABORTIVE PEACE MISSION 597

Koreans clamored to return home, and these outrages, theater headquarter s their agitation posed a particularly determined that American supervision difficult problem in Japan proper where of Chinese repatriation procedures wa s their number ran into the hundreds of necessary . On 15 February, III Corp s thousands. Priority of shipping space was directed to extend supervisory as- was assigned to the movement of sistance to Nationalist repatriation Koreans from Japan, but enough ves- agencies during staging, movement, and sels were diverted to Shanghai, Tsing- loading of the Japanese. The imposition tao, and Tangku to allow 10,000 of the of partial control by the Marines ha d most destitute Koreans in China to the desired effect of stemming furthe r leave during late January and early disorder in IIIAC sectors of responsi- February. bility.5 In January, the last month in which any substantial lift by American vessel s REDUCTION OF FORCES 6 was available, 57,719 Japanese and 1,838 Koreans left North China. In the Hard on the heels of the assumptio n following month, 4,000 more Korean s of responsibility for repatriation by th e and 43,635 Japanese were repatriated , Nationalists came a decision by General most of the latter on SCAJAP LSTs . Marshall to authorize a 20 percent re- March saw a significant change, how- duction in strength of all Marine units ever, when the SCAJAP program go t in China .7 The presidential representa- into full swing, and 142,235 Japanese tive's mission and authority were suc h repatriates cleared Tsingtao and Tang- that he effectively controlled American ku. The encouraging progress confirmed forces, although he ordinarily confine d General Wedemeyer's estimate for a his directives to the policy level and did June end to the entire program . not interfere with operational routine.8 During most of the period of Na- His decision was welcomed by Head- tionalist responsibility for repatriatio n quarters Marine Corps, since the tas k in North China, American participation of maintaining a strength level of in the process went beyond the advic e 45,000 officers and men in IIIAC seri- and liaison stage contemplated by the ously threatened the planned demobil- JCS. As soon as the Marines turned ' ExecHgHist, lMay–30Jun46, sec VII, pp . o over security and inspection duties t 17–18 ; IIIAC WarD, Feb46 . n Chinese forces, a distinct slackening i 'Unless otherwise noted, the material i n the standards of treatment of the Japa- this section is derived from : Eyes Alone In - nese was apparent. China Theate r activation Folder (Wedemeyer File, TAGO , headquarters was deeply concerned by KCRC) ; IIIAC WarDs, Jan–Mar46 ; IIIAC a rash of incidents of unchecked mob OPlan No. 1–46, dtd 14Feb46 ; 1st MarDiv – g WarDs, Jan–Apr46 ; 6th MarDiv WarDs, Jan violence against the repatriates movin Mar46 ; 1st MAW WarDs, Jan–Mar46 . r to the coast and of the looting of thei 'Marshall disp to CGChina, dtd. 22Jan4 6 meager belongings during the process- (Eyes Alone Personal Radio Folder, Wede- ing at ports of embarkation . After an meyer File, TAGO, KCRC) . investigation of the circumstances of e Rockey interview, 9Ju159.

598 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

ization schedule for the whole Marin e much paring of its personnel strength, Corps.9 but it was directed to reorganize alon g The strength cut sanctioned by Gen- lines established by the Service Com- eral Marshall gave the Marine Corps an mand, FMFPac . Support functions wer e opportunity to revamp its forces in consolidated in a smaller and less spe- North China in the planned postwa r cialized number of service companies . pattern of FMFPac. On 14 February, In a move separate from but compli- IIIAC issued its operation plan for th e mentary to the corps reorganization reduction, directing that its major com- plan, the regiment's detachment a t ponents reorganize according to ne w Tsingtao was replaced on 19 April by peacetime (G-series) tables of organi- the 12th Service Battalion . The bat- zation. Missions were redefined and talion, which came north from Okinawa , provision was made for the redeploy- reported to 7th Service Regiment for ment necessary to give effect to the plan. operational control for a short whil e Subordinate units had prepared thei r and then became an integral part of th e own plans by the end of February to fi t Marine command at the Shantung port. within the framework of action outlined Stock control remained with the servic e by corps. March was slated to be th e regiment.10 period of greatest activity since ship - The conversion of the 6th Marin e ping to take home 12,000 Marines was Division to a brigade, anticipated well due to arrive at Tangku and Tsingta o before the issuance of the corps oper- during the month. ation plan, was directed to take effect Two of the supporting FMF bat- by 1 April. The reduced regimental talions which landed with III Corp s headquarters of the 4th Marines which were dropped from the troop list under arrived in Tsingtao from Japan on 1 7 the reduction plan, with the companies January formed the core of the new of the 1st Military Police to be dis- unit. A new regimental Headquarter s banded in Tientsin and those of the and Service Company was organize d 11th Motor Transport to be returned to and the Weapons Company of the 22 d the States. The 1st Separate Engineer Marines was redesignated the Weapon s Battalion lost one of its three enginee r Company of the 4th. By the same order , companies but remained in China. 2/29 became 1/4, 2/22 changed to 2/4 , Corps Troops was reorganized as a and 3/22 was redesignated 3/4. The Headquarters and Service Battalio n artillery battalion of the brigade was (Provisional) with companies replacing formed from the 4th Battalion, 15th the former signal, medical, and head - Marines. The brigade's headquarters quarters battalions . battalion was organized from signal , The widespread logistics activities of tank, assault signal, medical, and head - 7th Service Regiment did not permi t quarters companies drawn from comparable division units . The service bat- CMC memo to CNO, dtd 10Jan46, Subj : talion drew its companies from th e Reduction of Marine Forces in China (HQM C S&C File, FRC, Alex) . "7th ServRegt WarDs, Apr-May46 .

ABORTIVE PEACE MISSION 599

division engineer, pioneer, motor trans- The new dispositions of the Marine port, and service battalions. The 32d forces in Hopeh placed a reduced garri- and 96th Naval Construction Battalion s son in Peiping under General Jones . which had been attached to the division The 2d Battalions of the 1st and 11th now became a part of the brigade Marines with supporting division medi- organization. On 26 March all remain- cal and motor transport companies an d ing units of the 6th Marine Division a small headquarters comprised Peipin g were disbanded, and on 1 April the 3d Group. A company from 2/1 provide d Marine Brigade came officially into security for MAG–24 installations at being. South Field, and a battery of 2/11 per - The changes ordered for the 1st formed the same function for th e Marine Aircraft Wing were far les s Army's 13th Troop Carrier Group at sweeping. Flight activities in the Pei- West Field . A radio relay station at ping area were consolidated at South Langfang on the boundary of the Pei - Field (Nan Yuan), leaving West Fiel d ping Group's sector of responsibility (Lantienchang) to U . S. Army Air was guarded by an artillery platoon Forces transports supporting Executive from 2/11. Headquarters . The Headquarters and The 1st Marines was charged wit h the Service Squadrons of MAG–12 were the security of the area between Lang- ordered to the States and with them fang and Tientsin's East Station which went VMTB–134 and VMF(N)–541 . included most of the international con- The fighter squadrons of MAG–12 wer e cession where corps and division serv- transferred to MAG-24. Air unit with- ice and support troops were head - drawals were completed by earl y quartered. The 11th Marines watched 11 April. the stretch of road, rail, and river be- The reduction in strength of the 1st tween Tientsin and Tangku with a bat- Marine Division was accomplished pri- tery of 1/11 furnishing a guard for the marily by disbanding the third bat- 1st Wing facilities at Changkeichuan g talions of each of its infantry regiment s Field. Tangku and the railroad north t o and one firing battery from each of the Lei-chuang near the Luan River wa s four battalions of the 11th Marines . To . facilitate its disbandment, the 1st Bat- the responsibility of the 5th Marines talion, 29th Marines, was formally Regimental headquarters of the 5th transferred from the 6th to the 1st Divi- was established at Tangshan with 1/ 5 sion on 15 February and went out o f in Tangku and 2/5 at Linsi . The 1st existence at Peitaiho at midnight on 3 1 Battalion's sector extended north abou t March. The other three infantry bat- two-thirds of the way to Tangshan ; talions scheduled for disbandment rifle sections guarded vital bridges and stayed in being until 15 April when th e a radio relay at Lutai . A company of the 1st Division had completed its rede- 2/5 was stationed at each of the tw o ployment. major KMA mines in the Kuyeh vicin- 31 1st MAW WarD, Apr46. ity with the remainder of the battalion

600 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

mounting bridge guard and providin g quested retirement after serving ove r security for the mining area powe r 30 years as a Marine officer, relinquishe d plant at Linsi . command of the Marines in Tsingtao to The dispositions of the 7th Marines General Clement.13 For three weeks remained much as they had been sinc e during February and March, whil e November, with 2/7 units manning the General Rockey was on temporary duty important bridges and stations fro m in Pearl Harbor at FMFPac head - Lei-chuang to Chang-li and 1/7 guard- quarters, General Peck commanded II I ing the remainder of the railroad to an d Corps as senior Marine officer in China . including Chinwangtao . Both the regi- Despite the handicap of constant ment and the 2d Battalion maintained personnel changes and shifting of units their headquarters in Peitaiho, while in the first months of 1946, the mission s the 1st Battalion, reinforced by Battery assigned to the Marines were efficientl y G of the 11th Marines, garrisoned Chin- executed. The repatriation of the Japa- wangtao. nese kept pace with the shipping as - The effect of the reorganization an d signed. The output of coal from th e the resultant departure of officers an d KMA mines in the Kuyeh area shipped men eligible for discharge or rotation from Chinwangtao climbed well abov e was apparent in the steady fall of II I the 100,000-ton minimum set by Chin a Corps troop strength . At the end of January 1946, the total number o f Theater and stayed there . And the lines Marines and Navy men in the corps of communication between Peiping and stood at 46,553 ; three months later the Chinwangtao were kept open. figure was 30,379 . The deactivation of An additional mission not formally the 6th Marine Division dropped the laid down in operation orders was give n ground strength of the Tsingtao garri- IIIAC in January. General Marshal l son by over 6,000, while the 1st Divi- suggested that the Marines at Tsingta o sion lost nearly 4,000 men, and the 1s t take an active part in arranging th e Wing dipped from 6,175 to 4,200 .12 distribution of UNRRA (United Several important command change s Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Ad- took place in this period of reorganiza- ministration) supplies in Communis t tion and reduction of Marine forces . On areas of Shantung . The general felt 17 February, Brigadier General Walter that such action might improve the re- G. Farrell from the staff of AirFMFPac lations between the Communists and replaced General Johnson as Assistant the Marines . Since the United States Wing Commander at Tsangkou Field. was by, far the heaviest contributor t o Farrell, like Johnson, was a veteran o f UNRRA, any help to the United prewar China expeditionary duty . On 1 Nations agency's humanitarian and eco- April, General Howard, who had re- nomic relief efforts could be considere d

"IIIAC G—1 Monthly PeriodicRpts, Jan46 , l3 Muster Rolls, 3d MarBrig, Apr46 (Diar y dtd 8Feb46 and Apr46, dtd 6May46 . Unit, Files Sec, RecBr, PersDept, HQMC) .

ABORTIVE PEACE MISSION 601

a furtherance of U. S. policy aims.14 MARINE TRUCE TEAMS 1 5 Using light planes of VMO-6, Marine officers and UNRRA officials flew t o General Marshall believed that Ma- Chefoo and Lini in January to coordi- rine participation in the conflict control nate plans for the delivery of food , activities of Executive Headquarter s clothing, and agricultural supplies . Both should be restricted. He appeared Generals Howard and Clement mad e anxious to avoid any possible misunder- visits to the Communist-controlled standing arising from their ambiguou s cities to assist liaison efforts. role in support of the Nationalist re- The incidence of firing on Marines, entry into North China." By earl y both those on outpost duty and on aeria l March, however, it became apparen t patrol, fell off appreciably during the that there were not enough qualifie d months immediately following the sign- U. S. Army personnel available to form ing of the truce. Assistance provided the American contingents of all th e UNRRA in carrying out its relief pro - needed truce teams . Under the cir- gram in Communist territory seeme d cumstances, General Marshall directe d to have the good effect desired by Gen- the assignment of a select group of eral Marshall. The atmosphere wa s Marines to temporary duty with th e hopeful and the signs at this junctur e Executive Headquarters . The under- of Marine activity in North Chin a standing was that they were to be re- pointed toward an early withdrawal o f lieved as soon as suitable Army replace- American troops . ments arrived from the States . In Chungking, the Political Consul- On 11 March, III Corps issued a spe- tive Conference which met during Jan- cial order directing the formation of si x uary arrived at a basis for organization liaison teams for Executive Head - d of a coalition government that seeme quarters, each to be headed by a colo- . The Committee of to satisfy both sides nel or lieutenant colonel, with a lieu - Three was then able to agree upon a , plan for integrating the Communist and tenant signal officer, a radio mechanic Nationalist armies into a single force. two radio operators, and a mechanic - The success of this latter scheme, and driver as team members . The six senio r of the political solution, depended en- officers chosen were Colonels Theodor e tirely upon the ability of the Executive Headquarters to bring an absolute en d 15 Unless otherwise noted, the material in , to the fighting. The experience of the this section is derived from : ExecHqHist — e lOJan—31Mar46, lApr—30Jun46, and 1Jul truce teams proved, however, that th 30Sep46 ; IIIAC WarDs, Mar—Apr46 ; 1st Mar - end of the fighting was as far off as it Div Intel-Memo No . 48, dtd 13Aug46, Subj : had ever been . Compromise agreement s Evac of Communist Trps from Bias Bay, South achieved by prolonged negotiation wer e China, in 1st MarDiv WarD, Aug46 ; Activities violated by either side whenever th e of Team 8 in South China in North China situation shifted to favor one over the Marine (Tientsin), 27Ju146, pp . 1, 8 . 19 other. MajGen Keller E . Rockey ltr to Gen Alex- ander A . Vandegrift, dtd 9Apr46 (Vandegrif t 14 U. S. Relations with China, pp . 225—226. Personal Correspondence File, HQMC) .

602 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

A. Holdahl and Orin K . Pressley and the operation of the team than either of the Chinese representatives .17 Lieutenant Colonels Gavin C . Hum- phrey, Jack F. Warner, Maxwell H. For more than three months, th e Mizell, and LeRoy P . Hunt, Jr. The need Marines with the field teams and a fe w for the Marines was pressing, and the radio and supply men at Peiping, a team commanders reported to Peipin g group which never exceeded 60 officers n on 13 March for briefing from thei r and men, played an important part i the American attempt to make the truc e former posts at Tangshan, Tientsin , work. Life in the field was not easy ; the and Tsingtao. On the 18th, after joining place of duty was usually deep i n their Nationalist and Communist mem- China's interior, and the only contact bers and interpreters assigned by th e with home base was the radio and a headquarters, the first Marine-directe d weekly Army or Marine transport teams were sent into the field . plane carrying supplies and mail . Being Two of the teams, those led by Mizel l shot at was not at all an unusual ex- and Warner, acted as watchdogs on th e perience for men who tried to step railroad lines of communication. The between two fighting forces . Still, the other teams drew assignments in areas reaction of the responsible American s on the teams to their problems wa s of actual or probable conflict wher e much the same as General Marshall's . their duties required them to try to keep When he visited North China and Man- the peace through negotiation with the churia in early March, the general contending sides. The effort was taxing , pointed out that "it is not in huma n and the round of conferences among th e nature to expect individuals to forget three principals members as well as th e the events of the past, but there isn't discussions with local military leaders time to cogitate on that now. The were endless. One Marine observer who rights and wrongs of the past 18 year s visited Pressley's team at Chihfeng in will probably be debated for 18 years Jehol Province commented that thi s to come. But we have something now method of operation placed a tre- that demands that we look entirely in is mendous burden on the American mem- the future." He noted further an atti- ber : tude toward his task that was shared b y many American team members in say- Neither the Nationalist nor the Com- ing, "I am deeply involved in this mat- munist representative take the initiativ e ter and I don't like to have anything t o in solving problems which come befor e is the team . Indeed, long hours are spent i n do with failure." discussion of minor points while action o n 17 lstLt Robert E . McKay Rpt of trip to major points is delayed for weeks at a , 2-8Apr46, in IIIA time. Even after action is taken and re - Chihfeng, Jehol Province C ports forwarded to Executive Headquar- IntelMemo No . 37, dt d 15Apr46, in IIIA C ters one member or the other will attemp t WarD, Apr46. to void the decision by a new vote . The 18 Quoted in ExecHqHist, 10Jan-31Mar46, American representative has displaye d p. 67 . more concern and taken more interest in "Ibid., p. 60.

ABORTIVE PEACE MISSION 603

This determination to get the job don e late afternoon of the 29th, the last da y successfully was graphically demon- of the local truce . strated by the work of the few Marine s The job done by Nelson's sub-team s who operated in South China as part of was unique in concept and execution, bu t the truce team headquartered at Canton. it shared the atmosphere of tensio n In the mountains north and east of th e characteristic of most truce team efforts . city, some 3,000 Communist guerrillas Although for a time in the first half of posed a constant threat to lines of com- 1946 it appeared that the truce migh t munication, and the Nationalists, after become more than a paper agreement, trying unsuccessfully to root them out , fighting continued . Because Communis t agreed to allow their evacuation by sea and Nationalist commanders did not to Chefoo. Six Marines, two officers an d enjoy having publicity given to thei r three sergeants led by Captain Albi n cease-fire violations, the arena of battl e F. Nelson, were assigned by Executive often shifted to areas not policed by Headquarters to shepherd the evacu- Executive Headquarters. The blame for ation. eventual failure of the truce can not be On 23 April, Nelson's group flew fro m laid solely at the door of either side i n Peiping to Canton and, after a month the civil war ; but as events proved, the of preparation, went up into the moun- Communists benefited from truce nego- tains to contact the Communist forces. tiations and regarded them strictly a s Three sub-teams, each composed of a devices to gain time.2 ° Marine officer and an NCO, a Nationalis t and a Communist officer, an interpreter, THE END OF THE ILIAC 2 1 and a small police escort, arranged assembly points and safeguarded the In February, Generals Marshall and Communists in their travels through Wedemeyer recommended that China Nationalist lines . The tension was high Theater be deactivated on 1 May . The between the bitter enemies and an open move was made in an effort t o fight was never more than a hair' s strengthen Chiang Kai-shek's pressur e breadth away. Team members handle d on Soviet Russia for the removal of it s all arrangements for feeding and hous- "0 LtCol Robert B . Rigg, USA, Red China's ing the evacuees, inoculated them Fighting Hordes (Harrisburg : Military Serv- against communicable diseases, an d ice Publishing Company, 1951), p . 229, here- even mustered out those Communists after Rigg, Red China's Hordes . '1 who did not want to make the move . The Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from : Eyes Alone In- three columns collected by the sub- activation and Withdrawal of Marines Folder s teams, which included women and chil- (Wedemeyer File, TAGO, KCRC) ; IIIAC dren as well as soldiers, assembled o n WarDs, May—Jun46 ; 1st MarDiv WarDs , the beach of Bias Bay 40 miles north- May—Ju146 ; 1st MAW WarDs, May—Ju146 ; ; 4th Mar s 3d MarBrig WarDs, Apr—May46 west of Hongkong on 23 June . Typhoon WarDs, Jun—Ju146 ; Rockey ltr to Vandegrift , delayed the arrival of LSTs which took dtd 9Apr46, op. cit. ; Liu, Military History of the Communists north to Chefoo until China; U . S. Relations with China .

604 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

occupation troops from Manchuria. The used. He felt that truce teams judi- residual functions of the theater com- ciously placed in areas of potentia l mand were to pass to U . S. Army Forces, trouble might prevent Communist depre- China, an administrative and servic e dations. It appears that both Wedemeyer command, and Seventh Fleet. Opera- and Marshall believed that the National- tional control of the III Amphibiou s ists would make no move to provide ade- Corps would be exercised by Com- quate security forces in North Chin a mander, Seventh Fleet, Admiral Charle s until it was clear to them that the Ma- M. Cooke, who had replaced Admiral rines were going to be pulled out . A Barbey. tentative target date for the start of the General Marshall was anxious to re - withdrawal of the Marines was set for duce Marine forces in China to air trans - 15 April, but this, as well as everything port, housekeeping, and security detail s else in the concept, depended upon the whose main purpose would be logistical outcome of truce negotiations. support of Executive Headquarters . He General Marshall returned to Wash- stated frequently in conversations with ington on 12 March for a month of con- General Wedemeyer that the continued ferences bearing on the China situation . presence of the Marines in Nationalis t His absence coincided with the step- territory was a source of considerabl e ping-up of the Nationalist drive agains t embarrassment to him in his peace ne- the Communists in Manchuria, an op- gotiations. The crux of the matter la y eration which made Chungking eve n in Marshall's inability to persuade the less willing than usual to divert goo d Generalissimo to make the long-prom- troops to rail and mine security. The ised relief of the Marines and to obtain Communists, naturally enough, wer e the agreement of the Committee o f dead set against any movement of CN A Three to the movement of Nationalist troops into North China which might troops to North China for this purpose . strengthen the Nationalists hand in General Rockey, in conversations with Manchuria. Adding further complica- General Wedemeyer on 18–19 March , tions to the issue was the belief of recommended strongly that the Marines theater intelligence officers that the not be relieved until first-line CN A "Marines in China are the anchor o n troops were firmly established in their which the Generalissimo's whole Man- place. The IIIAC commander believe d churian position is swinging." 22 The that the Communists were strong effect of the altered situation was to enough to disrupt communications com- slow the reduction of Marine force s pletely between Peiping and Chin- considerably. wangtao, to stop production at the KM A The pressure for the relief of-the Ma- mines, and even to capture Tsingtao in rines was not all directed at th e the absence of effective opposition . Nationalists or prompted by Genera l Wedemeyer agreed to the risk involve d Marshall's desire to get American coin- in making the relief, but pointed out that " ComSeventhFlt disp to CNO, dtd 3May4 the relief must be made even if onl y 6 (Withdrawal of Marines Folder, Wedemeyer Nationalist forces locally available were File, TAGO, KCRC) .

ABORTIVE PEACE MISSION 605

bat troops out of China . In the postwar In order to determine how Marine budget of the Navy Department ex- ground forces in IIIAC could be re- penditures for the Marine Corps were organized, General Geiger and repre- calculated on the basis of peacetime sentatives of his FMFPac staff visited strength and organization, and the Com- China between 12 and 22 May . Before mandant was vitally interested in with- leaving Pearl Harbor, the FMF staff drawing or deactivating any units i n officers drew up a plan which elimi- the field that were not necessary to the nated III Corps Headquarters and Corp s accomplishment of the missions assigne d Troops and 3d Brigade Headquarter s IIIAC. He was insistent that change s and Brigade Troops, leaving only the should be fitted into the organizational 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) in framework of the FMF and that the North China. Personnel equal to those divisional structure be retained .23 eliminated, 391 officers and 5,700 en- Before any firm commitment wa s listed men, were to be returned to the made to reduce the ground element o f U. S. This plan formed a working basis IIIAC, a substantial cut in its air for talks with Admiral Cooke and Gen- strength was ordered . Qualified flying eral Rockey. Once Geiger was on th e personnel and plane mechanics were i n scene in North China, the IIIAC an d short supply throughout the Marine FMFPac staffs worked out changes that Corps, and it was no longer possible to better fitted the situation . maintain all the squadrons in North Rockey had no substantial objection China in efficient operating status with to the reductions outlined, but he be- the replacements available . In early lieved that the 1st Division would need April, plans were laid for the return of a headquarters augmentation in order MAG–32 to the States during the fol- to control its scattered components . Sim- lowing month, and the Commandin g ilarly, the reduction agreed upon for General, AirFMFPac proposed tha t Tsingtao was much lighter than that MAG–25 also be sent home. General originally proposed in view of the sepa- Rockey recommended strongly that at rate nature of the command there. At least one transport squadron be retaine d the end of several days of conferences , to support Marine activities and to as- Geiger and Rockey approved a reorgani- sist Executive Headquarters in main- zation that eliminated a number of bil- taining its truce teams in the field. The lets and reduced Marine strength by 12 5 recommendation was adopted quickly, officers and 1,417 enlisted men . Cooke concurred in this proposal and recom- and VMR–153 was selected as the unit mended its acceptance to Marshall, who to stay while its parent group an d gave his approval on 24 May .24 VMR–152 returned to the west coast of the United States. 2' LtGen Roy S . Geiger ltr to Gen Alexande r A. Vandegrift, ca . 25May46 (Vandegrift Per- =' Gen Alexander A . Vandegrift ltr to Maj - sonal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC) ; Gen Keller E . Rockey, dtd 24Apr46 (Vande- ComSeventhFlt disp to CinCPac and CGFMF- grift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, Pac, dtd 24May46, in CinCPac WarD, May 46 , HQMC) . dtd 6Jun46, end (B), (OAB, NHD) .

606 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

When the reorganization order wa s to port operating, construction, an d published on 4 June, to take effect on medical units. the 10th, General Rockey was name d As part of the reorganization of Ma- Commanding General, 1st Marine Divi- rine forces, the number of general office r sion (Reinforced) and Marine Forces , billets in China was cut. In view of the China, the latter a task force designa- sharply reduced strength of the wing, tion for the division . General Worton the rank of the commander was set as went from chief of staff of the corps to brigadier general and the position of assistant commander of the division ; assistant wing commander was deleted in general, corps staff officers were as - from the T/O. General Woods was assigned the senior positions on the aug- signed new duties as Commanding Gen- mented staff. Some 600 officers and men eral, Marine Air., West Coast and Gen- from IIIAC Headquarters and Service eral Farrell returned to AirFMFPac . Battalion were added to division troops , The new wing commander, Brigadier and the battalion itself was transferred General Lawson H. M. Sanderson, re - to the division for subsequent return to ported from AirFMFPac and relieved the U. S. The 1st MAW, consisting o f Woods on 25 June. General Peck, who MAG–24 and the squadrons, includin g had requested retirement in April after VMR–153, assigned to wing headquar- completing more than 30 years of active ters, came under operational control o f duty, remained in command of the 1s t the division. The 7th Service Regiment Division at the Commandant's request 2 5 and one company of the 1st Separate until the reorganization was completed . Engineer Battalion also became part o f To round out the picture of major com- the reinforced division ; the remainder mand changes, General Jones moved of the engineer unit was returned to the from his Peiping command to duties as States. President of the Marine Corps Equip- At Tsingtao, the 3d Marine Brigade ment Board at Quantico .2 5 ended its short existence with most o f During the many changes in composi- its units becoming part of the 4th Ma- tion of Marine forces in China that took rines (Reinforced) or Marine Forces , place in the spring of 1946, there was Tsingtao. General Clement was give n little basic change in assigned missions . both commands in keeping with the Whether the operation orders originate d wishes of General Marshall and Admira l from China Theater or Seventh Fleet , Cooke that a general officer continue to the Marines still were charged with re- represent the Marines in the port city . sponsibility for seeing that the vital coa l Aside from the regiment and its at- supplies from the KMA mines were tached units, the task force include d shipped without interruption and tha t VMO–6, the 12th Service Battalion, an d 96th Naval Construction Battalion. The "Gen Alexander A . Vandegrift ltr to Maj - Gen DeWitt Peck, dtd 8May46 (Vandegrif t total authorized strength of the 1st Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQ - Marine Division (Reinforced) was set MC) . at 25,252 officers and men with 2,51 7 "e General Officer Biographies (SubjFile , of that number naval personnel assigned HistBr, HQMC) .

ABORTIVE PEACE MISSION 607

the line of communication betwee n repatriation. In April, SCAJAP in- Tientsin and Chinwangtao was kept creased its allotment of LSTs to th e open. They were directed to provid e North China run and 125,872 Japanes e logistical support to Executive Head - were sent home from Tsingtao and quarters until the Army was able t o Tangku.29 By the end of May, repatria- relieve them . In furtherance of thes e tion was completed except for those per - tasks, principal garrisons were con- sons detained by the Chinese, serving on tinued at Peiping, Tientsin, Tangku , repatriation staffs, or too ill to be Peitaiho, and Chinwangtao with orders moved ; only 15,855 people remained t o to secure only the "actual ground occu- be returned to Japan .30 With the sailing pied by U. S. installations, property , of the last scheduled repatriation ship materiel, personnel, and intervening or from Tangku on 15 July, even thi s surrounding ground necessary for wire rearguard was gone ; more than and road traffic communications so that 540,000 Japanese had been repatriate d the elements of the command are no t from North China under Marin e isolated." 2 7 supervision .3 1 In the south, the same garrison order When the last SCAJAP LST cleare d applied to the Marine force at Tsingtao . Tangku, it also marked the end of th e The U. S. installations to be guarde d entire repatriation program from Chin a were almost exclusively naval in char- proper which saw the return of over acter as the city had become Seventh 2,200,000 Japanese to their home island s Fleet headquarters and base of opera- in nine months of dedicated effort . The tions by June . A growing shore estab- significance of the American contribu- lishment provided administrative and tion to this remarkable undertaking wa s logistic support to the ships of Admira l summed up well by General Nagano, the Cooke's command. In addition, a n former Japanese commander at Tsing- American naval training group had bee n tao, on the occasion of his leaving China . operating at the port since December The Japanese officer, who had been with a mission of teaching Nationalist charged by General Shepherd with the crews how to sail and fight the U . S. responsibility for seeing the last of hi s ships that were transferred to the Cen- countrymen home from Shantung, wrot e tral Government under military aid in an unofficial report to the Marin e general : laws. 28 The most significant change in th e I cannot but be grateful to you an d . This may sound rathe r tasks set the Marines was the ending of your country strange from my lips . I like plain speak- supervisory responsibility for Japanese ing . Please do not think that I am makin g

20 . 7, Apr46, dtd "MAC OPlan No. 2-46, dtd 1May46, in IIIAG G-5 PeriodicRpt No IIIAC WarD, Apr46 . 1May46. G-5 PeriodicRpt No . 8, May46, dtd 2a Corn Tsingtao Unit Final Rpt to Chief , "MAC NavAdDiv, JUSMAG, China, dtd 23Jan49, p . 1Jun46, p . 1 . 1 (ComNavWesPac A9 File, FRC, Mech) , 31 Ibid. ; ExecHqHist, 1Ju1-30Sep46, sec I, hereafter Tsingtao NavAdDivRpt . p. 50.

608 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

compliments . If anyone ever tells you that June to back up the defenses of the 4th I [am] please tell him to go to Tsingtao Marines, which held a main line of re- and stand in front of the America n sistance well inside the positions of th e L. S. T. and see the Japanese soldier as he passes on the ramp salute the Stars and Nationalist garrison . The Communis t Stripes ; no Chinese flag, no Russian flag , drive slackened after 15 June while ne- no English flag, but the Stars and Stripes , gotiations were being made to bring to under which they will be able to sail to an end even more serious fighting i n Japan. Happy they! Just think of thos e Manchuria. Japanese soldiers and civilians in Man- churia and Siberia . We cannot be to o In many respects, the organized ha- grateful to you.32 rassment of lines of communication i n Hopeh and the bitter struggle in Shan- The early months of 1946, when the tung seemed to have been initiated b y mass of Japanese soldiers and civilians the Communists to relieve pressure o n moved from the interior of North Chin a their troops north of the Great Wall. to the repatriation ports, was the perio d The armies of the Central Government of greatest success of the truce . The won a series of heady victories in Man- Communists, by permitting the peace- churia during an all-out spring offen- ful withdrawal of the troublesome Japa- sive, but the defeated Communist forces nese, apparently were clearing the deck avoided entrapment. The magnitude of for action. The number of incidents i n the battles was so great that it threat- which Marine outposts were involved i n ened the end of all peace efforts . Since clashes with Communist troops in- both sides claimed at times that the 1 0 creased steadily as summer came on . January truce had no effect beyond Most of these sudden flare-ups were of China proper, General Marshall had to a minor nature and American casualtie s negotiate a separate truce for Manchu- were few. Only one man was killed in the ria. A temporary halt to the fightin g first six months of 1946 in such an affair. was ordered by the Committee of Thre e He died on 21 May when a small recon- on 6 June and a more permanent truc e naissance patrol of the 1st Marines were was signed on the 28th . In short order, fired upon by 50—75 armed Chinese near this agreement too came to be mor e a village south of Tientsin. The attack- honored in the breach than the observing force slipped away unpunished. ance. The renewed Communist effort to re- At the end of June, General Rocke y tain control of North China was partic- was able to make a realistic appraisal o f ularly marked in Shantung where the the Marine situation in the comin g pressure on the CNA got so bad in early months. He reported to the Commandant June that General Clement believed tha t that in his opinion : Tsingtao might be attacked . Twelve . . . conditions will operate to keep Corsairs from VMF—115 at Peiping were Marines in North China for a considerabl e stationed at Tsangkou Field from 12—15 period, at least during the remainder o f this calendar year. Our departure woul d 3= MajGen Eiji Nagano ltr to MajGe n very materially influence the whole sit- Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., dtd 18May46, filed uation in China and General Marshall with Shepherd interview . has apparently reversed his former ideas

ABORTIVE PEACE MISSION 609

about our early withdrawal. The CNA i s earned lessons of guerrilla warfare wer e spread thin in Manchuria . They do no t primers in Communist military schools. appear to have the necessary troops to In regard to planning, he said : relieve us . If the Central Governmen t loses the key cities in North China or if Without planning it is impossible to wi n the coal fails to move from the KM A victory in a guerrilla war . The idea o f mines to Shanghai, Hongkong, Nanking, fighting a guerrilla war at haphazar d and elsewhere, the show is over as far as means nothing but making a game of it— present plans for the unification of China the idea of an ignoramus in guerrilla war - 3 3 are concerned. fare. The operations in a guerrilla are a as a whole or the operations of a single 3 4 CAPTURE AND AMBUSH guerrilla detachment or guerrilla corp s must be preceded by the most compre- In July, the Communists reorganized hensive planning possible . . . .3 5 their armies, naming the whole, "People' s This dictum provides a revealing Liberation Army," which agreed with background for two Communist actions their title for the territory they held a s against the Marines which took place i n the "liberated areas." In the Communis t July. One was the first occasion on which view, the "liberated area" in Hopeh ex - Marines other than downed airmen wer e tended right up to the perimeter de- held prisoner, and the other was a de - fenses of the Marine and Nationalis t liberate and well planned ambush. outposts along the Peiping-Mukden Yenan had evidently decided that th e Railroad. Despite its nominal colorin g time had come for a major incident in- as Nationalist, the countryside over the volving the Marines, one that could b e entire range of land between Chinwang- worked for its full propaganda value . tao and Peiping was alive with Commu- Such an incident would increase pres- nist guerrilla forces . In their actions they sure in the U. S. for the withdrawal of took their cue from Mao Tse-tung, the Marines because of the danger i n whose pamphlets incorporating hard - which they stood . " CG 1st MarDiv(Reinf) ltr to CMC, dtd On 13 July, the summer afternoon' s 26Jun46 (HQMC S&C File, FRC, Alex) . heat prompted eight men from th e " Unless otherwise noted, the material i n bridge guard at Lin-Shou-Ying to head this section is derived from : ComPhibGru 3 for a nearby village to get ice. This ltr to ComNavWesPac, dtd 30Apr48, Subj : action violated a division directive tha t Info and comment concerning incidents in- y volving U . S. persons taken into custody by guard detachment members would sta Chinese Communists (ComNavWesPac A– 8 within the barbed wire defenses of thei r File, FRC, Mech), hereafter Capture com- posts. Communist soldiers, about 80 ments ; 1st MarDiv WarD, Ju146 ; CO 1/11 ltr strong, surprised and surrounded the to CMC, dtd 1Aug46, Subj : SAR of Inciden t Marines at the icehouse. One man es- h Between CCF and a MarPat on 29Ju146, wit k five endorsements (HQMC S&C File, FRC , caped unnoticed in the gathering dus Alex) ; Col Wilburt S . Brown ltr to CMC, dt d to alert the bridge outpost which radioed 20Aug46 (HQMC S&C File, FRC, Alex) ; LtCol Henry Aplington, II, "North Chin a a' Mao Tse-tung, Strategic Problems of the Patrol, " Marine Corps Gazette, v . 33, no. 6 Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War (Peiping : For- (Jun49) ; U . S. Relations with China . eign Language Press, 1954), p. 21 .

610 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

the news to 7th Marines headquarter s begin negotiations, they required tha t at Peitaiho, 15 miles to the north . That all Marine units return to the positions evening all available men of the 1st held on the 13th. A series of discussion s Battalion boarded a special train at were held after this was done . The Com- Chinwangtao and rode to the captur e munists demanded that the U . S . recog- site to begin a dogged pursuit that con- nize the "unlawful" act of entering the tinued all through a rainy night and on "liberated area" and apologize ; that into the next day. No contact was made there be no repetition of the incidents ; and it soon became apparent that a long and that the Marines captured eac h search was in prospect. The Communist make a written statement of their goo d troops, armed with a sure knowledge o f treatment. The upshot of this was tha t the countryside and protected by a the seven men each wrote a letter at- friendly populace, was able to stay wel l testing to their good treatment at th e away from the Marines . hands of the Communists, and U. S. The regimental commander decided negotiators assured the Communist s to relieve the 1st with the 2d Battalio n that additional orders restricting th e and withdraw 1/7 to prepare for ex- movement of Marines in the Chinwang- tensive field operations. A 200-man com- tao area would be issued . The men were bat patrol of 2/7 moved out from returned unharmed on 24 July . Changli to continue pursuit on the 16th. No one but the Communists could be Fields of kaoliang higher than a man' s pleased by the distasteful but necessar y head bordered the roads, blocking off solution to the problem posed by the all view. The villages along the route captured Marines . During all the talk s were deserted when the Marines firs t leading to the men's release, Communis t entered and then reoccupied only by officials hammered away at one them e women, oldsters, and children ; no young —the Marines were actively aiding the men were ever seen. The patrol could Chinese Nationalist Army . This line of easily have been ambushed despite its propaganda was to be sounded again an d own precautions and the overhead cover again as long as the Marines were in of OYs, as virtually nothing could be China, but nowhere in so outrageous an d seen through the dense cover of ripening lying a fashion as in the Communist ex- crops . When a circuit of the 2/7 secto r planation of their ambush at Anping o n had been made without result, the pa- 29 July. (See Map 35 .) According to trol returned on 18 July to Changli , Yenan, the positions of its Eighth Route secured its base camp, and went back Army near Anping on the Peiping-Tien- to Peitaiho . tsin road were suddenly attacked on the Because none of the Marines taken morning of the 29th and in the battle near Lin-Shou-Ying or their captors "more than sixty U. S. soldiers were dis- could be located by patrols, Executiv e covered fighting shoulder to shoulder Headquarters was asked to take a han d with eighty-odd Koumintang troops. . . . in obtaining the release of the men . Be- In the afternoon an American force fore the Communists would permit a came as reinforcements from Tientsin . truce team to enter their territory to With a view to make the American

ABORTIVE PEACE MISSION 611

4Q 0 . . % § CQaN 7- ? {~2=\\!OS k~ . 2R

NOT TO SCALE - SCHEMATIC

MAP 35 T.L . RUSSEL L

310-224 0 -e-e

612 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

troops conscious of what they were do- keep in contact all the way to Peiping , ing, units of the Eighth Route Army lef t so there was a considerable gap between the battle at once." 3 6 the time the patrol lost touch with 1/1 1 In truth, the Communists laid an am- and the time it was picked up by 2/11' s bush at Anping, knowing full well tha t set at South Field . Within that stretch their prize would be a routine Marine lay the village of Anping . supply convoy. As a matter of policy, The convoy started out at 0915 with no CNA troops accompanied America n the patrol protection divided equally be- trucks so there could be no claim of tween forward and rear points ; all ve- mutual interest or protection . On 29 hicles proceeded at 50-yard interval s July, the only Chinese vehicle in the with 100 yards between elements . Radio convoy was a truck bearing UNRRA contact with 1/11 faded by 1105 and the supplies. The presence of Communist patrol proceeded normally until abou t troops in strength anywhere along th e noon when it had reached a point 4 4 road to Peiping was completely unex- miles from Tientsin . A line of rocks pected, although sniping at individua l across the road slowed the lead jeep s trucks and jeeps had occurred several and as they were threading their way times in June . It was as a result of thi s through these obstacles, a new roadbloc k occasional firing that there was a guard of ox carts was spotted just ahead . The and convoy ; the patrols which had point stopped and dismounted cau- searched the road regularly from Oc- tiously. At that moment, about a doze n tober 1945 until March 1946 had been grenades were thrown from a clump of discontinued because there seemed to be trees 15 yards to the left of the road no need for them . block. Lieutenant Corwin was killed im- On the morning of 29 July, the convoy mediately and most of the men with him assembled at the 1st Marines compoun d were either killed or wounded in thi s in Tientsin. The patrol escort, com- initial attack . The survivors took cover manded by Second Lieutenant Dougla s and returned the Communist fire . A. Corwin, consisted of 31 men fro m The body of the convoy halte d 1/11 and a 10-man 60mm mortar section quickly when it in turn came under of the 1st Marines . In addition to nin e steady and well-directed rifle fire whic h supply trucks for the Peiping Marine originated in a line of trees about 10 0 garrison and the UNRRA vehicle, there yards to the right of the road. Very few were two Army staff cars with American of those men riding the supply trucks personnel from Executive Headquarters and passenger vehicles were armed an d and three jeeps carrying Marines boun d they took cover as best they could i n for Peiping . The patrol itself rode i n the ditch to the left of the road . The four reconnaissance trucks and fou r ambush was complete when the rea r jeeps, two of the latter carrying TCS point, stalled by the convoy, was radios. The TCSs lacked the range t o sprayed with fire from positions to th e

3e right and left rear. The second in com- Statement released by New China New s Agency, Yenan, quoted in The Peiping Chron- mand of the patrol, Platoon Sergeant icle, 3Aug46, p . 1 . Cecil J. Flanagan, then ranged up and

ABORTIVE PEACE MISSION 613

down the long column of vehicles direct- mediately ordered to get ready. Air sup- ing return fire . The mortar and machine port was requested of the wing, while gun with the rear point were instru- the regimental executive officer took off mental in stopping Communist attempt s in an OY of VMO–3 to scout the scen e to rush. About 1315, during a lull in the of action . Flying low over Anping at attack, three Marines turned one of th e 1730, he counted 15 bodies in Com- jeeps around and made a successfu l munist uniform, but saw no sign of th e break for help. attackers. Five Corsairs of MAG–2 4 The Communists, responding to bugl e which reached the ambush site at 191 7 signals, finally ceased fire about 153 0 also failed to spot the Communists, 3 7 and began withdrawing. The attacking nor was there any longer a sign of th e force, which had an estimated strength bodies. of 300 men well armed with rifles an d The 11th Marines relief force, 400 - automatic weapons, seemed content to strong and backed by two 105mm call it a draw with the smaller an d howitzers, cleared the French Arsenal weaker defending force . On order of th e at 1830 driving "at reckless speed, an d senior officer in the convoy, an Army still only reached the scene of comba t major in special services at Executive at 2045." 38 The Communist force had Headquarters, the American group then vanished, taking its dead and wounded gathered up its wounded, and covered with it, and the Marines could only to w by a rear guard of Flanagan's men , in the shot-up trucks that marked th e continued on for Peiping. Only a few ambush site. scattered shots greeted the lead vehicles In the wake of the attack, orders as they left the ambush area ; three were issued that substantially increase d damaged trucks were abandoned . The the strength of patrols on the Peiping- convoy and patrol reached the old capi- Tientsin road. Aerial surveillance of the tol at about 1745 . The Marine casualty road increased, and fighter aircraft list of the afternoon's action reported 3 alert time was cut from 2 hours to 1 5 killed and 1 died of wounds and 1 0 minutes. More powerful field radios wounded, all of whom were from 1/11 . were used to bridge the communication The first news of the ambush to reac h gap between the two cities . No further Tientsin was brought by the Marine s attack of similar nature occurred dur- who had escaped from the trap early i n ing the remaining months the 1s t Marine Division was in China . the fire fight . Their wildly racing jeep overturned on the outskirts of the city , General Rockey launched a carefu l injuring two of the occupants, and de- investigation of the circumstances of th e laying their report until a passing ve- ambush and the nature of the attackin g hicle could be commandeered for the force. The findings were that a deliber- rest of the passage to the nearest Ma- ate and unprovoked attack had bee n made by strong elements of one or more rine post. The 11th Marines got word of what had happened at 1630 and a " MAG—24 WarD, Ju146, n .d . heavily armed combat patrol was im- 38 Brown ltr to CMC, op . cit.

614 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

regular Communist regiments . A simi- ing in attitude on the part of the Com- lar inquiry of the events at Anping con- munists. The American representative ducted by a special team of Executive commented later that prior to 29 July Headquarters foundered on Communis t 1946 "there had not been a deliberate obstructions.39 On General Marshall's break which struck at us specifically, order, the American members withdre w which means that they were takin g from the team and submitted their own measures against the Nationalist Gov- report which agreed entirely with tha t ernment and ourselves all included, of the 1st Marine Division. which is a very definite departure fro m To Marshall, the most disturbin g what had been the status before ." 4° aspect of what he called a deliberatel y After the Anping incident, the element planned and executed stroke at th e of risk involved in stationing th e Marines, was its indication of a harden - Marines on outpost guard increase d substantially. As a result, the latter part 's The Seventh Fleet commander at the time , Admiral Cooke, in reviewing this portion o f of 1946 saw a considerable concentra- the manuscript, drew particular attention t o tion of Marine positions and the fore - the fact that "Communist authorities refuse d shadowing of their complete withdrawal to allow any of their attack commanders to b e from Hopeh . brought before the investigating body ." Adm Charles M . Cooke ltr to ACofS, G-3, dt d "Quoted in Military Situation in the Fa r 310ct61, hereafter Cooke ltr . East, p . 543 . CHAPTER 5 Withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division

CONSOLIDATION OF MARINE mobilization . An extensive schoolin g POSITIONS ' program begun by IIIAC to keep abreast of the loss of specialists was By the summer of 1946, the combat continued and expanded. Ranges were efficiency of the 1st Marine Divisio n opened near Peiping, Tientsin, Chin- and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had wangtao, and Tsingtao to maintain dropped far below wartime standards. weapons proficiency and to qualify thos e Neither organization was considered i n replacements who had missed range in- satisfactory shape to perform its nor- struction in boot camp. Squads and mal function in an amphibious oper- platoons practiced tactics to the extent ation. The two units had become, in that maneuver room was available i n effect, garrison forces with capabilities the immediate vicinity of Marine posts , geared to the missions which had bee n but field training by larger formations theirs since the war's end. was not possible . By September, 1st The wing's troubles stemmed fro m Division units were reporting military wholesale personnel turnover brought efficiency levels of 25–35 percent,3 on by rapid demobilization. Genera l barely adequate to do the job at han d Sanderson reported on 15 July : "Only and certainly far below acceptable 35% of the present enlisted strength o f standards for amphibious troops . the entire Wing can be considered to Part of the solution to the combat have any qualifications other tha n readiness problems of the division and basic. . . ." He pointed out further that wing lay in a return to more normal MAG–24 had less than one experience d rates of personnel attrition . At the mechanic for every four planes, and direction of the Secretary of the Navy , that it was forced to operate at onl y a target date of 1 October was set for 20 percent of aircraft availability. Prog- the discharge of all reserves and ress in correcting training deficiencie s draftees in the naval establishment, a was hampered by a lack of experienced decision prompted by the limited post - instructors.2 war funds available to operating The division shared with the wing the forces.4 From North China, all but a personnel problems brought on by de- CG, 1st MarDiv (R'einf) SpecRpt of Mil - 1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s Efficiency to CG, FMFPac, dtd 24Sep46 (Corn - section is derived from : Aug—Oct46 WarDs o f SeventhFlt A—9 File, FRC, Mech) . 1st MarDiv and 1st MAW . ' Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr to Adm CG 1st MAW ltr serial 0052 to CG Air - John H. Towers, dtd 9Aug46 ; Gen Alexande r FMFPac, dtd 15Ju146, Subj : Reduced statu s A. Vandegrift Itr to LtGen Roy S . Geiger, dtd of 1st MAW AvnUnits (ComSeventhFlt S — 22Aug46 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondenc e A4—1 File, FRC, Mech) . File, HistBr, HQMC) . 615

616 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

handful of these men were on their way States. In August, 3/12, the 3d Medica l home by mid-September . Replacements Battalion, and headquaters, signal, an d scheduled to arrive during the fall service companies of the regimental months, together with the regulars re- reinforcing elements sailed for the west maining, promised stability in unit coast to form part of a new 3d Marin e rosters and therefore greater benefit Brigade organizing at Camp Pendleton. from training programs . On 3 September, the 4th Marines, less Substantial cuts in the strength of 3/4, embarked and sailed for Norfol k Marine Forces, China, continued dur- to become a component of the 2d Marin e ing the summer, easing the replace- Division at Camp Lejeune. On the de- ment problem appreciably . As a result parture of the regiment, the command of the Communist threat to Tsingtao in Marine Forces, Tsingtao, ceased to June, the Nationalist garrison had been exist, and Colonel Griffith reported t o strengthened, and there seemed little the Commander, Naval Facilities, reason to station there any more Ma- Tsingtao, for operational control. At the rines than were necessary for the im- same time, the Marine air base a t mediate security and support of Sevent h Tsangkou came under the naval com- Fleet shore installations . On 1 August, mander. The division and wing retaine d the 1st Division issued an operatio n administrative control of their respec- order directing the reduction of Marin e tive units. Forces, Tsingtao, to the strength of a The narrowing of the 1st Division's reinforced infantry battalion . The 3d operational responsibility to Hopeh wa s Battalion, 4th Marines, augmented by made even more significant by a long- detachments from the regiment's sup - sought change in Marine dispositions . porting units and with operational con- Sometime near the beginning of July, trol of VMO-6, was selected to remain. General Marshall informed the Centra l Colonel Samuel B. Griffith, II, was as- Government that he was going to order signed duty as lcs commander . The 12th the Marines off coal and rail guard duty Service Battalion was directed to con- and bring an end to their exposure to tinue supply functions for Navy and Communist attack. His decision forced Marine units in the Tsingtao area unde r the Nationalists to begin relieving the operational control of 7th Service Regi- Marines without further delay .5 In July, ment. The air units at Tsangkou Field, eight Marine bridge detachments wer e except VMO-6, remained under th e replaced by troops of the 94th CNA , wing's command. which included four first-line division s All regulars in Tsingtao over th e equipped with American arms . number needed for the reinforced 3/4 , On 7 August, as the pace of relief s the 12th Service Battalion, and 1st was accelerated, General Rockey re- Wing detachments were transferred t o ported to Admiral Cooke the extent of 1st Division units in Hopeh . The re- the Marine commitment along the rail- serves and draftees eligible for dis- road. Over 4,700 officers and men, a charge, over 2,200 men, were trans - ferred to units returning to the United Rockey interview, 14-15Apr59 .

WITHDRAWAL OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION 617

third of the actual strength of the 1st number of such incidents declined Division,6 were stationed from Tangku steadily as the division's units became to Chinwangtao. Of that number, 87 3 less vulnerable. The Communists showed Marines were on outpost duty, an as- no disposition toward attacks on the signment that included the security o f main Marine positions, but such costly 20 bridges. Sixty men a day were de - attacks were unnecessary . The same tailed to bridge guard on the coal trains purpose of speeding the decision to originating at Kuyeh ; between 120 and withdraw the Marines was accomplished 180 men were constantly employed in by harrassing actions, and without the this task. The close-in protection of the risk of all-out retaliation. KMA mines near Linsi was the respon- In effecting a reorganization of its sibility of three companies of the 5th positions, the division returned the bat- Marines. Intelligence indicated that talions of the 1st and 11th Marines in 25,000 Communist troops, both regulars Peiping to their parent units in Tien- and militia, were located within 1 5 tsin. The 5th Marines (less 1/5) was miles of either side of the railroad i n reassigned to Peiping and the command , the 1st Division zone of responsibility . Peiping Marine Group, was dissolved . Nationalist forces in the same area, all The 1st Battalion, 5th, continued its under the 94th CNA with headquarter s year-long association with Tangku an d in Tientsin, totaled 35,898, but many of remained responsible for the security these soldiers were former puppet of the port and its warehouses and sup- troops of dubious military worth .? ply dumps . In like manner, after pullin g The Communists did not relax their in its outposts, the 7th Marines con- program of harassment while the Ma- tinued to hold the American installa- rines were withdrawing from the rail- tions in Peitaiho and Chinwangtao, a road. On 4 August, a coal train heade d job that had occupied the regiment for Tientsin was ambushed and de - since the initial landings in China. railed near Lutai. The four Marin e The last relief of Marine rail guards guards riding the caboose and Chinese by Nationalist troops took place on 3 0 railroad police fought off the 50-man September . The event also marked th e ambush party ; a relief train from completion of moves which saw the con - Tangku rescued the men . Sentries on centration of division units in thre e bridge and station outposts were often main areas—Peiping, Tientsin-Tangku , sniped at, and occasionally a night-long and Peitaiho-Chinwangtao . With the exchange of fire would occupy the Ma- ending of its responsibility for ensurin g rines and their elusive attackers . coal delivery to Chinwangtao for ship- Through August and September th e ment, Marine Forces, China, had only four residual missions : (1) to protect ° 1st MarDiv G—1 Rpt, Ju146, dtd 5Aug46 i n U. S. property, installations, and per- 1st MarDiv WarD, Ju146 . sonnel ; (2) to maintain such detach- ' CG, 1st MarDiv ltr to ComSeventhFlt, dtd ments in port areas as were necessary : Defense of the RR Line from 7Aug46, Subj ; (3) to guard only Tientsin to Chinwangtao (HQMC S&C Files , for its own support FRC, Alex) . those routes and means of communica-

618 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

tion necessary for its own support ; and Chinese that a change of comman d (4) to assist and provide logistical sup - meant a change in Marine purpose . In a port for U . S. Army activities of Execu- public statement addressed to the peopl e tive Headquarters . of North China, he stated : While the ground elements of th e The U . S . Government's announced division were regrouping, the wing mad e policy is the promotion of peace and har- two changes that reflected the altere d mony in China. General George C . Mar - nature of Marine operations in China. shall and the members of his Executiv e On 22 September, the wing service Headquarters are working toward that end. squadron, which had acted as a person- The U . S. Marines have no part in th e nel clearing center at Tsangkou Fiel d establishment of our nation's policy . We for almost a year., moved to Chang- are an organization whose traditional dut y keichuang Field outside Tientsin to is to support and uphold that policy and relieve headquarters squadron of main- to protect American lives and property in any part of the globe tenance, housekeeping, and transporta- . We are in China to carry out the directives of our Stat e tion details. On 15 October, VMO– 6 Department or those of General Marshall . was detached from 3/4's command and This we propose to do .9 moved to Tientsin to provide additiona l reconnaissance aircraft to cover supply The Communist attitude toward the trains bridging the gaps betwee n Marines did not soften in any way wit h Marine garrisons and to scout the im- the withdrawal of the Americans from mediate vicinity of American defensiv e railroad and mine outposts . General positions. Both transfers were mad e Howard's assumption of command was entirely by air. greeted with an incident as serious as that at Anping in what it portended—a During this period of change, the last well planned raid on the Division Am - two general officers who had made the munition Supply Point at Hsin Ho six original landing completed their Chin a miles northwest of Tangku . The supply duty. On 26 August, General Worton point was laid out along the edge of a was relieved as ADC by Brigadier Gen- large oval almost two miles across o n eral Alfred H. Noble, and on 18 Septem- its long axis and just over a mile wid e ber, Major General Samuel L . Howard on the short ; the area enclosed was relieved General Rockey in command o f marshy ground. A barbed wire fence, a the division . Rockey's new post wa s motor road, and eight sentry tower s Commanding General, Department o f ringed the oval ; the ammunition was the Pacific, and Worton took command disposed in tented piles between the of Marine Garrison Forces, Pacific, i n towers . During the summer of 1946, succession to Noble .8 Howard, a China- this ammunition supply seemed an duty veteran who had commanded the irresistible lure to many individuals and 4th Marines in Shanghai in 1941, acte d small groups which attempted to stea l quickly to forestall any thought by th e from it. Sentries were frequently fire d

' General Officer Biographies (SubjFile, 'North China Marine (Tientsin), 28Sep46 , HistBr, HQMC) . p. 1 .

WITHDRAWAL OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION 619

upon and their return fire drove off sev- cases of rifle ammunition and grenades eral raiding parties bent on getting at were recovered . An inventory showe d the contents of the tents inside the 32 cases of pistol, carbine, and rifle am- barbed wire. The last such incident munition were missing. Papers on the happened on 4 September and then a dead man and interrogation of th e lull occurred which set the stage for a prisoner identified the raiding group a s determined effort by the Communists to a 200-man company from the Road Pro- make a sizeable haul . tecting Battalion of the 53d Communis t At about 2200 on 3 October, a sentry Regiment ; the unit had come from an at the ammunition point's Post 3, which area about 35 miles north of Tangku in was nearly a quarter of a mile from the a day's hard marching . guard house, discovered a large group The Communists withdrew as rapidly of Chinese just outside the perimete r and as secretly as they had come . Aerial wire. When he approached to investi- reconnaissance did not spot them or th e gate, he was fired upon and, after a n donkey carts they had brought with exchange of shots, ran to the sentr y them to carry away the ammunition. tower to call in an alarm . While he was The raid was well planned, well exe- phoning, a raiding group cut throug h cuted, and but for the prompt reactio n the wire, entered one of the tents, and of the Marine guards might have been began carrying off ammunition boxes. even more successful. The strengthene d The sentry's rifle fire failed to stop th e security precautions taken at Hsin H o thieves. as a natural result of the raid did not A strong covering party of th e discourage the Communists from at- raiders, from positions in the fields ad - tempting further attacks, but the y joining the ammunition point, opened a helped delay a return engagement unti l heavy fire on a truck carrying men o f spring. the guard to the aid of the sentry. Be- fore the Marines could reach Post 3, WITHDRAWAL FROM HOPEH 10 they were forced to dismount, tak e cover, and build up a firing line, while Almost as the last shots were dyin g the remainder of the guard, 52 men in away at Hsin Ho, General Marshall was all, came up and joined the fight. Grad- reporting to President Truman that he ually the firing from the fields die d felt he could no longer be useful in China away and when a reinforcement of 10 0 as a mediator. Neither side was willin g men of 1/5 from Tangku arrived at t° Unless otherwise noted, the material in 2300 the Chinese had disappeared . this section is derived from 1st MarDiv WarDs , Machine guns and mortars were set u p Oct46-Jun47 ; 1st MAW WarDs, Oct46-Jun47 ; and searching fire by flare light wa s Raid on DivAmmoPt at Hsin Ho, 5Apr47, enc l delivered for several hours to discour- A to 1st MarDiv G-2 PeriodicRpt No . 52, dtd age any repetition of the raid . At dawn 8Apr47 ; U. S. Relations with China ; Military Situation in the Far East ; Harry S . Truman, the nearby fields were thoroughl y Years of Trial and Hope—Memoirs, v . II searched ; one dead and one wounde d (Garden City, N . Y. : Doubleday and Company, Communist soldier were found and 11 Inc ., 1956) .

620 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

to honor its truce agreement nor to China which outlined his views on th e make any concessions which would ma- reason for failure of the negotiation s terially weaken its position . The fires of leading toward peace and coalition gov- hatred fanned by years of bitter civil ernment. On the Nationalist side he lai d strife could not be quenched by nego- most of the blame on a "dominant grou p tiations. An American reporter cate- of reactionaries" in the Kuomintang gorizing the attitude of the Communist s who believed "that cooperation by th e and the Nationalists at this time aptl y Chinese Communist Party in the govern- summed up the situation : "Each side is ment was inconceivable and that only convinced of the insincerity of the other . a policy of force could definitely settl e Each side is convinced that the enemy the issue." 13 While he recognized the aims only at its destruction . And each existence of an even more powerful and side is right ." 1 1 doctrinaire group among the Communis t Unwilling to admit failure wheneve r leaders who would not compromise thei r the barest glimmer of hope for peace views, Marshall stated that he con- remained, Marshall continued to try to sidered that there was "a definite libera l bring the two sides together during th e group among the Communists, especially remainder of the year . His efforts were of young men who have turned to th e fruitless. Finally, on 3 January 1947, Communists in disgust at the corruptio n President Truman directed Marshall's evident in the local governments—me n recall for consultation and on the 7th, as who could put the interests of the Chi- the general was preparing to leave nese people above ruthless measures to China, announced Marshall's nominatio n establish a Communist idealogy in th e as the next Secretary of State . In evalu- immediate future ." 1 4 ating the Marshall mission, the Presi- The American representative recog- dent commented : nized, however, that many knowledge - able people disagreed entirely with hi s . . . it is important to bear in mind that even before he left for China there alread y thesis, holding that Communist party existed a formal agreement in writing be- discipline was so rigid that it could not tween the Central Government and the condone the existence of divergent view - Communists to work toward nationa l unity . This is the agreement that wa s points. Marshall advocated as a solution brought about previously with the assist- to the China crisis the assumption of ance of Ambassador Hurley when he leadership by liberals in the Central headed our diplomatic mission to China , Government and in independent minor- and had this not already been in existence I would not have sent Marshall to China.12 ity parties . In the context of his re - marks, it is apparent that he had fe w General Marshall issued a strongl y illusions that what he recommende d worded personal statement as he lef t would occur. 11 Harold J . Noble, "Should We Pull Out of China," The Saturday Evening Post, v . 205, 13 Quoted in U. S. Relations with China, p . no. 13 (28 Sep46) , p . 19. 687 . " Truman, op. cit., p. 92. 14 Ibid.

WITHDRAWAL OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION 621

While American efforts to bring about to units remaining in China. Two artil- peace in China were reaching a final lery battalions, 3/11 and 4/11, and peak of frustration and disappointment , VMO—6 were attached to the regiment the role of the Marines was undergoing for the return voyage. A small rear a sharp reappraisal . The mission of as- echelon was charged with the responsi- sistance and support to American-spon- bility for disposing of all U . S. property sored activities of Executive Headquar- in the Chinwangtao-Peitaiho area . To ters was the prime reason for the provide security while American troops continued presence of the 1st Marine and supplies were being shipped fro m Division in North China . As it became Chinwangtao, a guard detachment of increasingly apparent that a complete two companies from 1/1 was sent to th e collapse of truce negotiations was in KMA port town on 28 December . The 7th the offing, plans were laid for the with- Marines embarked and sailed on 5 Janu - drawal of all Marine units from Hopeh . ary, reporting to FMFPac for opera- Guam, which was being developed as the tional and administrative control . principal forward base of FMFPac, wa s Sailing with the regiment but bound originally designated the redeploymen t for Ewa on Oahu was the ground eche- point for the entire division, but late r lon of VMF(N)—533 . In December, the plans provided for gradual reduction flight echelon of the squadron had flown of forces with some outfits slated fo r its night fighters to Guam via Shanghai , Guam, others for the west coast, and a Okinawa, and Iwo Jima ; from Guam the few aviation units headed for Hawaii . planes were shipped the rest of the way The first major move was ordered fro m to Ewa. Eleven days after the VMF - Washington and called for the retur n (N)—533 aircraft staged through Oki- of the 7th Marines (Reinforced) di- nawa, the Corsairs of VMF—115 wer e 15 rectly to the States . flown to the island to pick up the carrier A division operation plan incorporat- Tarawa as a transport to Ewa. This cut ing this decision was issued on 2 Decem - in MAG—24 strength was ordered on 2 3 ber. All troops were scheduled to shi p December as a part of a further reduc- out from Chinwangtao. Before the tion of Marine Forces, China, which sa w month's end, the 7th Marines was the departure of the remaining units o f directed to disband the reinforcing com- the 11th Marines for Guam. panies of the division service and sup - r port battalions which had been attache d Heavy icing conditions at Taku Ba to it during most of the China tour o f and in the Hai River made it necessary g duty. Those men eligible for return on to use Chinwangtao as the shippin the basis of their time overseas wer e point for troops ordered out on 23 De- incorporated in the regiment's ranks ; cember also. The 1st Tank Battalion , recent replacements were transferre d less Company B which remained attached to the 1st Marines and Company 15 Gen Alexander A . Vandegrift ltr to Maj - C which had been disbanded by the 7t h . Howard, dtd 29Nov46 (Vande- Gen Samuel L Marines, left for Guam with the division grift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr , HQMC) . artillery regiment on 18 January . The

622 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

ground echelon of VMF–115 sailed at diseases.17 Before he left China, how - the same time for Ewa . ever, Rockey endorsed the idea of send- For a short while in December, Ma- ing Marine dependents to Tsingtao sinc e rine combat units were leaving Chin a its geographic situation permitted quick as Army dependents arrived. General evacuation and close-in naval support, Marshall had approved the sending out while the health and housing picture was of the wives and children of personnel considerably better than it was in Tien- attached to Executive Headquarters be- tsin and Peiping."S On 29 November, the fore the truce reached its final stage s Commandant wrote to General Howar d of disintegration . As a result, depend- that he was ready to recommend to th e ents began arriving at Tangku in Au- Secretary of the Navy that dependents gust and were escorted to Peiping by be sent out to China as soon as the Marine train guards and covering flight s troop list was firm .19 Marine familie s of OYs. A sizeable shipload arrived on actually began arriving at Tsingtao i n 14 November, but the situation was suc h late fall, following by several months that many of these people were sent the arrival of the first dependents o f home on 23 December when another de - Navy men stationed at the port. pendent ship arrived . Thereafter th e The Department of State made its civilian traffic was all one way—home- formal announcement of the end of bound. Many dependents bound for Pei - American participation in the activities ping never got off the ships they ar- of Executive Headquarters on 29 Janu- rived in . ary. The stay of the 1st Division units in Hopeh was tied to the evacuation of Some Marine officers and senior NCOs American personnel and property from who were normally entitled to have their Peiping. In a new operation order issue d dependents with them at peacetim e on 3 February, the division was directe d overseas stations were quite anxious to to provide tactical and logistical support have their families join them in China . to the Army's Peiping-based forces un- When the matter was first seriously con- til their withdrawal was completed an d e sidered in the summer of 1946 after th at the same time to finish preparations Navy had approved the idea in prin- for its own departure from China . The ciple,l" General Rockey recommended 1st Marines in Tientsin and the 5th in s strongly against its adoption for force Peiping and Tangku were ordered to in Hopeh. Aside from the obvious dan- provide train guards, rescue parties, an d ger from Communist action, he felt tha t motor convoys as needed in addition to the personnel and military situation wa s routine security detachments . One bat- too fluid, that suitable housing was no t talion of the 1st Marines was to be ready available, and that there was a signifi- to fly to Shanghai on six hour's notice , cant danger to the health of women and a requirement which reflected the fact children exposed to a wealth of strange 11 Rockey comments . 16 CNO disp to CinCPac, dtd 1Jun45 i n 18 Rockey interview, 14-15Apr59 . CinCPac WarD, Jun46, encl (B) (OAB , 19 Vandegrift ltr to Howard, dtd 29Nov46 , NHD) . op . cit.

WITHDRAWAL OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION 623

that the few Army and Navy units left operations that they had met since the in the central Chinese city were no t transport planes first reached Nort h organized or equipped to protect Ameri- China. In late February, at Seventh can lives and property. Fleet order, the squadron began drop- Training was the keynote of China ping UNRRA supplies, mainly clothin g duty for the ground elements of Gen- and medical items, in Communist terri- eral Howard's command during the tory in western Hopeh .21 By 27 March waning months of the Marines' stay i n when this mission ended, three-quarter s Hopeh. Between the fall of 1946 and the of a million pounds of relief supplie s spring of 1947, there was a steady but had been air dropped . slow rise in the reported combat effi- Marine transports were sent to ciency of the various elements of the Tsinan on 3 March to evacuate 1 7 division, but the lack of opportunity for American and foreign civilians threat- large unit maneuvers and amphibiou s ened by fighting between CNA and Com- practice put an effective ceiling on effi- munist troops . This particular type o f ciency ratings . By April only the rescue mission was to become more and medical and motor transport battalions , more a part of the VMR–153 routine a s whose duties were roughly the same in its stay in China continued and the civi l war and in peace, reported percentage s war situation grew less and less favor - of combat efficiency as high as 75 per - able to the Nationalists. The decision a s cent ; the remainder of the division hov- to what aviation units were to remain ered around the 50 percent mark an d in China after the withdrawal of the the infantry regiments hung at 40 per- 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) ha d cent.20 been made in Washington by March an d The situation in the 1st Wing wa s the ubiquitous transport squadron somewhat better since the pilots wer e headed the slim list of units scheduled to able to maintain flying proficiency. The base at Tsangkou where a new com- requirements for patrol flights were mand, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, sharply curtailed, however, by the fold - Western Pacific (AirFMFWesPac), was up of Executive Headquarters and the to be organized. consolidation of Marine positions . In Colonel John N. Hart, the chief of December, VMF–211 got in three week s staff of the wing, was assigned duties of gunnery practice over the sea off as commanding officer of the new or- Tsingtao while it was temporarily based ganization which was to be a part of at Tsangkou Field, but in general 21 t r The Seventh Fleet commander noted tha fighter pilots had little opportunity fo these supplies were arranged for by nego- combat training . As far as the crews of tiations at Nanking between Communist, Na- VMR–153 were concerned, there was no tionalist, and U . S . representatives . They wer e discernible letup in the heavy schedule o f intended for "relieving nonmilitary inhabitants, non-Communist inhabitants in dire straits ." 20 CG, 1st MarDiv serial 01Al2647 to CG , Admiral Cooke stated that "it was later found FMFPac, dtd 5May47, Subj : ReadinessRpt o f that the Chinese Communist Army appropri- FMF, (Ground) Units (Unit HistRpt File , ated and put to its own use all the medical HistBr, HQMC) . supplies . . . ." Cooke ltr.

624 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

the over-all Marine command to be ac- for the 1st Brigade which was slate d tivated at Tsingtao—FMFWesPac . The to be based on the island. Brigadier Gen - wing issued the operation order for th e eral Edward A. Craig, who had re- withdrawal of its units on 25 Marc h lieved General Noble as ADC at the tur n as a preliminary part of the 1st Divi- of the year, was the commander desig- sion's similar inclusive plan which was nate of the new unit.22 On the 17th, published on 1 April . In addition to VMR– Company E of 2/1 was ordered t o 153, one fighter squadron (VMF–211) , Tsingtao to augment 3/4 so that th e a headquarters squadron (formed from reinforced battalion could relieve all sea- the wing service squadron), and the air men guards at naval installations . At base detachment already at Tsangkou the same time the 1st Reconnaissanc e were included in Hart's command. The Company was sent to Chinwangtao to pilots of VMF–218 began flying thei r relieve the one 1st Marines company stil l ships to Shanghai via Tsingtao on 2 6 on duty with the guard detachment at March and completed a further move t o the port. Okinawa by the 30th . From Okinawa the Essentially, the division's withdrawal Corsairs picked up a carrier for trans- plan, which was to take effect on the de- port to Guam. parture of the last elements of the Guam was to be the next base fo r Army's headquarters group from Pei- the wing and for MAG–24, and the ping, divided the division into four de- planes and men of the headquarters an d tachments. The Marine ground units service squadrons moved to the Mari- detailed to FMFWesPac included the 1st anas in April . The advance CPs of the Marines, less its Weapons Company an d wing and group opened on Guam on the 1/1, and company-sized attachment s 24th. The rear echelon of MAG–24 from the division's headquarters, serv- closed out all Marine facilities at Sout h ice, engineer, medical, and motor trans- Field by 9 May and headed for Guam ; port battalions. Similar attachments of with its departure all scheduled flights division supporting troops were added t o to Peiping ceased . While the 1st Marine the 5th Marines which was schedule d Division remained in China, a few trans- for Guam as the infantry component of ports of VMR–153 and six fighters o f the 1st Brigade. The headquarters com- VMF–211 remained at Changkeichuang panies of FMFWesPac and of the 1st Field, which was serviced by an air bas e Brigade were to be formed by redesig- detachment. Regular flight operations nating the Headquarters and Service from the field did not end until 19 June . Companies of the 1st and 5th Marines. A The final plan for the withdrawal of rear echelon consisting of the 7th Serv- the 1st Marine Division ground ele- ice Regiment and 1/1 was directed t o ments was preceded by several minor dispose of all U. S. property in the area moves which anticipated the deployment occupied by Marines before withdraw- ordered on 1 April as had the 1st MAW ing. All remaining elements of the divi- plan. On 10 March, Company B of th e 22 Gen Alexander A . Vandegrift ltr to LtGen 1st Pioneer Battalion was sent to Gua m Allen H . Turnage, dtd 12Feb47 (Vandegrif t to assist In camp construction activities Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC) .

WITHDRAWAL OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION 625

sion were ordered to Camp Pendleton to security system was adequate to dis- join units then stationed there and to courage thievery and to hold off the at- rebuild others to form a new 1st Marin e tacks of small raiding groups unti l Division. reinforcements could arrive from During this period when the division Tangku, but it was not designed to cope withdrawal plan was just getting under - with an attack by a force estimated at way, the Communists made their most 350 well-armed men . punishing attack against the Marines . At about 0115 on 5 April, a bugle call Again the ammunition point at Hsin Ho sounded from the fields adjacent to the was the target, and by all indications the northernmost sentry post and a fusilad e raiding force was the same one that ha d of rifle and machine gun fire burst out o f hit the point in October. (See Map 36 .) the night directed at the Marines . The Ironically, the Marine guards were close two sentries returned the Communist to the end of their task when the Com- fire for about 10 minutes before the y munists struck. The 7th Service Regi- were killed . Two separate bodies of raid- ment had nearly finished the process o f ers then penetrated the northern dump , separating the serviceable ammunition their action evidently a diversion fo r from the stocks and shipping it out of a stronger and heavier attack which China. Much of what remained was took place farther down the eastern sid e useable but unstable or in poor condi- of the ammunition point . The target o f tion. Although no decision had been this attack was a dump area containin g made as yet to turn over this ammuni- artillery and mortar ammunition and tion residue to the Nationalists, 23 the fuzes. The Communist fire emptied a prospect that this might be done was patrol jeep, killing all three occupants , obvious and may have triggered the and drove back the other sentries as attack. well as the men from the main guar d Following the October raid, the layou t coming to their rescue . Eight more Ma- of the supply point had been altered rines were wounded in the exchange of from an oval to a more regular triangu- shots. lar shape, with the long axis toward th e As soon as word was received i n north. The ammunition was grouped in Tangku that the Hsin Ho point was eight dump areas along the triangle' s under attack Company C of 1/5 was legs, a pair two miles in length and a dispatched to the scene . The Communists shorter side a little over a mile long . At were ready for them. At 0200, as the the northern apex, the point most self-propelled 105mm howitzer leading distant from the guardhouse, was a two - the relief column reached a narrow poin t man sentry post. Several other fixe d in the road near Hsin Ho, it was dis- posts were placed at strategic point s abled by a land mine and blocked the along the perimeter and jeep patrols way. Immediately, the Marine vehicles checked the open stretches between . The following, a jeep and two trucks crowde d with men, were subjected to an intens e MajGen Samuel L . Howard statement o f 2S fire coming from an irrigation ditch onl y 30Apr47, in North China Marine (Tientsin) , 3May47, p. 1 . 40 yards east of the road . Under cover of

626 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

ATTACK ON HSIN HO AMMUNITION SUPPLY POIN T 5 APRIL 194 7 • FIRST GROUP-APPROXIMATELY 100 ME N • SECOND GROUP-APPROXIMATELY 75 ME N THIRD GROUP-APPROXIMATELY 150 ME N C RELIEF • AMBUSH-GROUP-APPROXIMATELY 30-40 MEN COLUMN NOT TO SCALE- SCHEMATIC

MAP 36 T. L. RUSSELL

WITHDRAWAL OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION 627

this fire, two waves of Communist sol- attacked when and where they pleased , diers rushed forward and threw gre- secure in the knowledge that once they nades at the Marines who had taken struck and ran they were safe fro m cover behind the trucks and were firin g effective reprisal hidden among th e back. The Communists, a group of 35–40 thousands of villagers within a short men, then pulled back to the ditch and distance of any Marine post. kept up a brisk exchange for another 1 5 As a matter of expediency, before th e minutes before they were driven off. month of April was out the ammunitio n Eight more Marines were wounded in point was being guarded by Nationalis t this well-planned ambush . troops. The transfer had little element By this time the main body of th e of formality ; "it was more a walking raiders was withdrawing, leaving be- away from the ammunition than a turn - hind six dead and taking an estimate d over." 24 Only a small detachment from 20–30 wounded with them . Tracks 7th Service Regiment which was clean- showed that six to eight carts and a ing up the last stocks of serviceable am - number of pack animals carried full munition remained at Hsin Ho and these loads of ammunition out of the dum p men were withdrawn to Tientsin on 1 5 but no accurate count of what was los t May.25 At virtually the same time i n could be taken since the Communist s Tsingtao, the Nationalists began acquir- blew up the remnants of the piles the y ing similar stocks of American ammu- had stolen from . A rear guard compose d nition declared unserviceable by boards of the raiders who had hit the northern of survey. The ammunition was dumped dump area furnished covering fire unti l in small quantities in revetments near 0300 when the last of the Communist s Tsangkou Field after the local CN A drew off. Again, as in the first Hsin Ho commander was informed of the inten- attack, the Communists got away un- tion to do so. Naturally enough, the am - detected. munition quickly disappeared.26 Heavy punitive columns from 1/5 and Marine activities in Hopeh graduall y planes from VMO–3 and VMF–211 wer e shut down and centered in Tientsin a s on the trail at dawn but the only Com- the division withdrew on schedule. The munists sighted were those who had die d last motor convoy carrying 5th Marine s in the attack . The raiders and thei r gear cleared Peiping on 12 May, and o n booty, ammunition and fuzes whic h 24 Ibid. could be made into mines, were able t o 25 7th ServRgt WarD, May47 . reach a ferry across the Chin Chun g 29 River eight miles north of Hsin Ho an d ComNavWesPac ltr serial 0002640—07 to CNO, dtd 16Sep47, Subj : Rpt of Ammo dumped lisappear on the other side into a maz e by FMFWesPac at Tsingtao, China 19May — of farming villages and fields . 13Sep47 (ComNavWesPac File, FRC, Mech) . The unsatisfactory ending of the sec- The decision to dump the ammunition in this ond Hsin Ho attack was a grim reminde r fashion was recommended by Admiral Cooke, and approved in Washington during a con- of the handicaps under which the Ma- ference in early February 1947, which wa s rines operated in North China. The ini- attended by Admiral Cooke and Secretary o f tiative rested with the Communists, wh o State Marshall . Cooke ltr.

310-224 0 - 69 - 41

628 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

the same date the regiment (less 1/5 ) Tientsin to reinforce 1/1. The threa t sailed for Guam. On the 20th, the 1st Ma- failed to materialize and the divisio n rines departed for Tsingtao, leaving 1/ 1 headquarters battalion and attached as the guard force for the rear echelon . units sailed for San Diego on 20 June. The port of Tangku's garrison was se- At midnight on the 19th, Lieutenan t cured when 7th Service Regiment with- Colonel Frederick L. Wieseman, com- drew its naval detachment, the successo r manding the division rear echelon, re- to GroPac-13, to Tientsin, and 1/5 fol- ported by dispatch to the Commandin g lowed the rest of its regiment to Guam General, FMFWesPac, for operational on the 24th. For a few days, the onl y control. Marines in Hopeh stationed outside o f Tientsin were at Chinwangtao, but Com- FLEET SUPPORT 88 munist attacks on the railroad at that port soon prompted their withdrawal . The troop strength of Fleet Marine The Communist drive on Chinwang- Force, Western Pacific, was settled earl y tao was in sufficient strength to threaten in 1947 at an interdepartmental confer- the CNA perimeter positions, and Na- ence in Washington in line with th e tionalist gunboats fired over the Marine State Department view "that the num- camp on one occasion to beat back at- ber of United States armed forces ashore tacks on the railroad .27 Between 22–24 in China should be maintained at the May, 79 U . S. and European civilians minimum compatible with United State s were evacuated from Peitaiho by Marin e interests." 29 The command drew it s OYs and Navy landing craft . On the name from the altered title of Sevent h 26th, the Marine guard detachment, th e Fleet which had been redesignate d 1st Pioneer Battalion which had taken Naval Forces, Western Pacific in Janu- post in late April to relieve the recon- ary. Named to head FMFWesPac, which naissance company, boarded LSMs and was activated on 1 May, was Brigadie r left for Tientsin. The Communist attack General Omar T. Pfeiffer, who ha d proved to be only the most serious of a served under Admiral Cooke as Fleet long series of attempts to disrupt rai l Marine and Planning Officer since Janu- 3 ° traffic in the vital corridor to Manchu- ary 1946. ria, and the Nationalists were able to The basic organization of General retain their hold on Chinwangtao . Pfeiffer's command included a force The remainder of the division shippe d headquarters and service battalion, tw o out for the States and Guam during th e infantry battalions, the 12th Servic e first weeks of June. The only threat to 28 Unless otherwise noted, the material i n the orderly withdrawal procedure wa s this section is derived from : FMFWesPa c a report received on the 18th that th e WarDs, May–Aug47 ; AirFMFWesPac WarDs, Communists intended to attack Tangku. May–Aug47 ; 7th ServRgt WarDs, May–Sep47 ; To counter this action, a rifle company 12th ServBn WarDs, May–Aug47 . 26 SecState ltr to SecNav, dtd 23Ju147 (Com - at Tsingtao was alerted for airlift to NavWesPac S–A–14 File, FRC, Mech) . 2i 1st MarDiv G–2 PeriodicRpt No . 59, dtd 2° MajGen Omar T . Pfeiffer ltr to CMC, dtd 27May47 . 19Oct61 .

WITHDRAWAL OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION 629

Battalion, and AirFMFWesPac . Its eral months at a time . The force's lone strength at the end of May after all it s tank platoon was permanently stationed elements had joined was 279 officer s at the field as part of its defenses . and 3,747 enlisted men. Administra- In addition to its guard duties, tively, the air elements remained a part FMFWesPac had a mission of providing of 1st MAW with operational contro l emergency protection for American resting with General Pfeiffer. In the lives and property in Tientsin, Nanking , case of the service battalion, the sam e and Shanghai . The three cities containe d situation applied although the phrasin g the majority of Americans in China on vested "military command and coordina- government business, aside from the tion control" in FMFWesPac and re- sizeable contingent at Tsingtao. The pro- tained "management and technical con- tective requirement was temporary i n trol" in Service Command, FMFPac.31 nature as far as the 1,900-man divisio n In the absence of a regular artiller y rear echelon at Tientsin was concerned ; unit, FMFWesPac was reinforced b y its planned departure date was set for enough officers and men to form the nu- the end of August. At the Chines e cleus of a provisional artillery organiza- capitol of Nanking, there were 1,24 0 tion with two six-gun 105mm howitze r military and diplomatic personnel an d batteries. Five officers and 16 men were their dependents and at Shanghai wer e added to the force as a tactical head - another 1,700 . Besides these official rep - quarters, and one rifle company in eac h resentatives, more than 4,500 American infantry battalion was augmented by 3 nationals were in China on private busi - officers and 22 artillerymen . These rein - ness and the number was steadily inforced companies were commanded by creasing. artillery majors with infantry captain s Airlift was the means of accomplish- as executive officers. The battalions were ing the quick reinforcement intended commanded by colonels with lieutenant by FMFWesPac orders. The infantry 32 colonels as executives . company at Tsangkou had to have a FMFWesPac was ordered to continu e rifle platoon ready at all times for lift the principal mission executed by 3/4 on an hour's notice . One of VMR—153' s and its predecessors of furnishing se- R5C transports stood by on the sam e curity for American naval installations. alert. On six hour's warning, all of 2/ 1 In alternate months, each of the tw o had to be prepared to lift from Tsang- infantry battalions was to furnish all kou in the squadron's transports. In sur- the guard details needed for wharfs an d prise practice alerts undertaken during warehouses, barracks and headquarters , the summer, the ready platoon was aloft and ammunition dumps and motor pools . in half an hour and seven plane loads One company, initially E of 2/1, was of infantrymen were airborne in les s assigned to the air base guard for sev- than an hour. On the departure of 2/1, 3/4 was to undertake all security com- 31 12th ServBn WarD, May47 . 32 mitments, including those at the air- End (A) to CMC serial 03A5947, ca. 15Apr47 (ComNavWesPac A—1 File, FRC , field, assisted by bluejackets trained i n Mech) . interior guard duty by the Marines .

630 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

The addition of a second infantry sea off the port of Tsingtao was availabl e battalion to the units at Tsingtao was as a firing range, and in mid-August made in part so that a realistic progra m VMF—211 was able to practice strafing of amphibious training could be sched- and dive and glide bombing in attack s uled. By alternating months of guard on a Japanese destroyer sailed to the and training, both battalions were able area as a target . Later in the month, th e to increase combat efficiency appreci- squadron flew combat air patrol for flee t ably. All summer long, small unit prac- units maneuvering off Tsingtao . tice for amphibious exercises planned Heavy weather dogging these exer- for the fall was the daily routine of th e cises was responsible for the loss o f battalion in training . An important ad- three Corsairs . The pilots of two wer e junct of this improved program was th e recovered quickly, one from the sea an d instruction given ships' landing force s another from a friendly sector of the in the tactics and techniques of land Tsingtao countryside ; the third pilot combat. One or two ships of Admiral was taken by the Communists when he Cooke's forces were detailed each mont h landed out of gas on the south shore o f for this training which was conducted Shantung Peninsula . His plane wa s as a regular activity of FMFWesPac . sighted on 28 August, and a landin g No amount of planning or training, party sent ashore to destroy it and find however, could overcome Tsingtao' s the flyer exchanged fire with local Com- most serious deficiency as a site for am- munists as it withdrew. Fifteen days phibious exercises. There was no safe later the pilot was returned unharmed , impact area for live firing in support but only after lengthy negotiations, th e and execution of a landing, and no roo m submission of a letter explaining the infor maneuver ashore in the heavily cul- cident from Admiral Cooke, and th e tivated countryside. Fields used by the payment of $1,000 plus medical supplies Marines in cold weather for extended as compensation for damages suppos- order training were denied them as soon edly sustained by the Communists.33 as the spring thaws allowed crops to be The status of VMR—153 as the odd- planted. The city's food supply was to o job and workhorse squadron of Marin e critical as a result of the Communist air in China was not in any way change d economic blockade to permit the leasing by its assignment to AirFMFWesPac. of arable land for troop use . Courier flights to Tientsin were mad e The problem of a suitable area for twice weekly after 20 June to expedite training did not plague the fighter the withdrawal of the division rear squadron at Tsangkou as much as it di d echelon ; Changkeichuang Field wa s the ground units it was to support . In manned by a liaison detail from 7th June, 17 pilots of VMF—211 went t o Service Regiment during landing and Guam for ten days training in naval takeoff. Nanking and Shanghai were gunfire spotting techniques . While these men were gone, a like number of VMF— 33 Capture comments, p . 6 . Admiral Cook e commented that he directed that "there woul d 218 pilots from Guam took their plac e be no ransom and no apologies" in the nego- to maintain the state of readiness . The tiations for the release of the flyer . Cooke ltr.

WITHDRAWAL OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION 631

stopping points in a regular schedule port continued to have a different aspect of transport and cargo flights which than that which prevailed in the north . maintained physical contact between th e In many senses, during the remainder major American bases in China . The of its existence FMFWesPac repeate d squadron continued to perform chores Marine history. Its actions paralleled outside the common military pattern , those performed by the expeditionary and on 28–29 August it flew 218 Ger- and garrison forces in the China of the mans from Tsingtao, Canton, and Tien- prewar era. As an arm of the fleet tsin to Shanghai where they boarded a ashore, it provided security for Ameri- repatriation ship. The former enemy can nationals in danger when the civil nationals were not wanted in China by war's tide turned overwhelmingl y the Central Government, and the U. S. against the Nationalists . State Department cooperated in arranging their transport . A LOSING CAUSE 3e August was the time of departure. General Pfeiffer completed his tour o f By the summer of 1947, the Com- overseas duty, having establishe d munists had their Nationalist opponent s FMFWesPac as a flourishing command. dead in their sights . A mounting serie s Brigadier General Gerald C . Thomas, the of offensives in Manchuria cut off an d former Director of Plans and Policies , annihilated or captured CNA outpost Headquarters Marine Corps, relieved garrisons. Lines of communication be- him.34 At the same time, Colonel Hart tween major cities were severed and relinquished command of AirFMFWes - permanently blocked . In less than si x Pac to Colonel Frank H. Lamson-Scrib- months the Nationalists were effectively ner. The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, at isolated in several large garrison areas. Tientsin mounted out for the States on In order to shake loose from Communis t 27 August, its destination Camp Pendle- nooses which were slowly tightening , ton and the 1st Marine Division . The the Nationalists had either to reinforc e remainder of the rear echelon, its task their armies strongly and take the offen- completed, boarded ship by 30 Augus t sive or to consolidate positions quickl y and sailed for Guam. On 12 September, to conserve men . They did neither. Lieutenant Colonel Wieseman reported The weak reinforcements sent wer e with 7th Service Regiment to the 1s t dissipated ineffectually, and hundred s Brigade and at the end of the mont h of thousands of men were tied to th e the regiment was officially disbanded. defenses of cities whose retention adde d The withdrawal of these Marine units little or nothing to Nationalist military from Hopeh marked the end of 2 5 or economic strength . It was eviden t months of difficult, sometimes hecti c that few leaders in Nanking appreci - service. Tsingtao now became the focus of attention, but duty in the Shantung '' Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s section is derived from : U. S. Relations wit h '' General Officer Biographies (Subj File, China ; Liu, Military History of China ; Wede- HistBr, HQMC) . meyer, Reports ; Rigg, Red China's Hordes .

632 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

ated the truth of the Communist battle an incredibly inept supply system ofte n philosophy espoused by one of Mao Tse- left him on short rations, with ailin g tung's commanders : "When you keep equipment, and too little ammunition. men and lose land, the land can be re - To top the dismal picture, the military taken ; If you keep land and lose hierarchy in Nanking kept changing soldiers, you lose both." 3 6 senior field commanders ; the rate of Vividly illustrative of the Communis t turnover was high early in 1947 and viewpoint was their reaction to a CNA soared higher as reverses mounted. In drive to capture the Red capital a t all save a few cases, proven comba t Yenan. Rather than tie themselves t o leadership was subordinated to politica l position defenses, Mao Tse-tung's forces considerations in making appointments . faded before the advance and let the The situation was so black that Amer- Nationalists take the remote Shensi city . ican leaders were in a quandary as to The victors then were exposed at the just what their future policy toward end of a long and vulnerable supply line China should be . In May 1946, General and became besieged instead of be- Marshall had determined that the Com- siegers. Similarly, Nationalist advances munists and Nationalists were not coin Hopeh and Shantung, which included operating to establish peace and a coali- the capture of Chefoo in October, were tion government as they had promised, hollow successes . The attack objectives and he had been instrumental in im- were cities, not soldiers, and the attack- posing an embargo on U . S. arms ship- ing forces soon settled into a sit-tight ments to the Central Government. This defensive pattern to protect their prize s cut-off of munitions supply to th e and withered as fighting units. Nationalists lasted a year and the re- The deterioration of Nationalist sults were felt sharply in the fightin g morale was compounded of many fac- in the latter part of 1947. The 6,500 tors. American military observers note d tons of ammunition turned over to the a significant loss of popular support fo r CNA by the Marines at Hsin Ho an d the Nationalists among the war-wearied Tsingtao between April and Septembe r people, and Chiang's soldiers in return was a helpful measure, but little mor e evidenced little regard for the natives than a stopgap. The Communists, aide d of Manchuria and North China. Many by the huge quantities of Japanes e of the men in the CNA ranks were munitions handed over to them by th e from southern and central province s Soviets and by their own increasin g and had not seen their homes or fam- captures of Nationalist weapons an d ilies for years ; there was no rotation ammunition, fared better on the arms plan for veterans . Inflation robbed th e supply front than their adversaries. soldier's meager pay of any value, an d In July, at the request of President Truman and Secretary Marshall, Gen- '° Gen Liu Po-cheng, CG, Second Communist F1dA, quoted in Rigg, Red China's Hordes, p. eral Wedemeyer headed a special mis- 31. sion to China to investigate and report

WITHDRAWAL OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION 633

on the situation as he found it .37 He was can be revitalized is through the presentl y asked to advise on what aid measure s corrupt, reactionary and inefficient Chines e might be taken to bolster the Central National Government . The National Government is incapabl Government and what would be the con e - of supporting an army of the size it no w sequences if no assistance was given. has in the field . For a month members of the missio n In order to preclude defeat by Com- visited China's major cities and talke d munist forces, it is necessary to give th e with many prominent persons both in National Government sufficient and promp t military assistance under the supervision and out of Government. The report of of American advisors in specified military the detailed survey and its conclusions fields. were presented to the President on 1 9 American military aid to China should September. be moral, material, and advisory. It shoul d In his report, General Wedemeye r be an integrated part of our world wid e policy of military assistance to certai n severely criticized the Central Govern- nations .3 8 ment and its conduct of political, economic, and military affairs . He pointed The Wedemeyer report was not mad e out, however, that the U . S. had little public after its presentation and the tone choice but to support the Nationalists, of urgency its recommendations con- since the Chinese Communists wer e tained was not translated into immedi- furthering the aims of the Soviet Unio n ate action. Although Congress subse- in the Far East, and these aims wer e quently increased American economi c diametrically opposed to those of th e and military aid and the military ad- United States and jeapordized its stra- visory groups in China were strength- tegic security . Although Wedemeyer ened, the pace of this support did no t made a number of specific recommen- match that at which the Nationalis t dations designed to remedy the situ- fortunes declined . ation, including increased American The confused military picture at this economic assistance and the institution critical point in the civil war was bes t of a United Nations-sponsored trustee - explained by the man most responsibl e ship of Manchuria, the crux of his feel- for its being—Mao Tse-tung . In a ings was summed up in an extract from speech to his principal subordinates o n the report's conclusions : 25 December 1947, the Communist The only working basis on which na- leader laid out a ten-point path of con - tional Chinese resistance to Soviet aim s quest, a primer for the warfare that had gone before and the battles to come : a' When he was in Washington in Februar y 1947, Admiral Cooke, in a meeting with Presi- (1). First strike scattered and isolated dent Truman, had proposed that "a commission groups of the enemy, and later strike con- composed of emminent members of high pres- centrated, powerful groups . tige, in the political field, the economic field , (2). First take the small and middle - and the military field, be sent to China in the sized towns and cities and the broad immediate future, and thoroughly explore the countryside, and later take big cities . situation and make recommendation to the U. S. Government of what should be done ." 'B Quoted in U. S. Relations with China, pP. Cooke ltr . 813-814.

634 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

(3). The major objective is the annihi- the tactics of attacking positions, wrestlin g lation of the enemy fighting strength, and strong points and bases from the enemy. not the holding or taking of cities an d (8). With regard to assaults on cities, places . The holding or taking of cities and resolutely wrest from the enemy all stron g places is the result of the annihilation o f points and cities which are weakly de - the enemies fighting strength, which often fended . At favorable opportunities, wrest has to be repeated many times before they all enemy strong points and cities whic h can be finally held or taken . are defended to a medium degree and (4). In every battle, concentrate abso- where the circumstances permit . Wait lutely superior forces—double, triple, until the conditions mature, and then wrest quadruple, and sometimes even five and all enemy strong points and cities that ar e six times those of the enemy—to encircle powerfully defended . the enemy on all sides, and strive for his (9). Replenish ourselves by the capture annihilation, with none escaping from th e of all enemy arms and most of his per- net . Under specific conditions, adopt the sonnel . The sources of men and material method of dealing the enemy smashing for our army is mainly at the front. blows, that is, the concentration of al l (10). Skillfully utilize the intervals be- forces to strike the enemy 's center and one tween two campaigns for resting, regroup- or both of the enemy's flanks, aiming a t ing and training troops. The period of the destruction of a part of the enem y rest and regrouping should be in genera l and the routing of another part so that not too long. As far as possible do not le t our troops can swiftly transfer forces to the enemy have breathing space .3 9 smash another enemy group . Avoid battle of attrition in which gains are not suffi- The complete Nationalist defeat pre- cient to make up for the losses, or in which saged by Mao's pronouncement was the gains merely balance the losses . Thu s more than a year and a half in the mak- we are inferior taken as a whole—numer- ing. During that time, the America n ically speaking—but our absolute superi- private and public stake in mainland ority in every section and in every specifi c campaign guarantees the victory of eac h China was wiped out, and the principa l campaign. As time goes by we will becom e concern of U . S. officials became the superior, taken as a whole, until the enem y safety of American nationals. The is totally destroyed . primary mission of Naval Forces , (5). Fight no unprepared engagements ; Western Pacific in support of nationa l fight no engagements in which there is no assurance of victory . Strive for victory policy eventually became the evacuation in every engagement ; be sure of the rel- and protection during evacuation of ative conditions of our forces and thos e Americans ordered from China . of the enemy . (6). Promote and exemplify valor i n as Mao Tse-tung, Turning Point in China combat ; fear no sacrifice or fatigue or con- (New York : New Century, 1948), p . 3, quoted tinuous action—that is, fighting several in Liu, Military History of China ; Quoted engagements in succession within a shor t from the original press release of 1Jan48 i n period without respite . Rigg, Red China's Hordes, pp . 180-181 . The (7). Strive to destroy the enemy while two translations vary but not significantly ; in movement . At the same time emphasize that in Liu has been used . CHAPTER 6

Withdrawal

STATE OF READINESS 1 and assigned the regimental titles t o battalion-sized units . At the same time, For FMFWesPac, autumn of 194 7 the battalion level was done away with brought the harvest of a summer's hard in division artillery regiments and bat- training. On 30 September, BLT 2/1 teries were grouped under regiment. made a full-scale landing near Tsingtao The intent of the new setup was to pro- with simulated naval gunfire support vide the larger FMF commands with a and the overhead cover and dry-run flexible number of hard-hitting unit s bombing and strafing of VMF-211 . In patterned on the battalion landing October, a battalion landing team built teams of World War II. The new organ- around 3/4 (newly redesignated the izational theory found its principal 3d Marines) completed a month-long impetus in the attempts of the Marine course of ashore and afloat amphibiou s Corps to field the most fighting men i t exercises with a similar landing. After could garner despite severe budgetary this final phase of training for 194 7 pruning of its strength .2 was completed, the Marine garrison Within FMFWesPac the number of settled down to a winter routine o f changes made were relatively few . The guard duty and a renewal of the familia r artillery augmentation of both the 1s t e pattern of training by progressiv and 3d Marines was withdrawn to par e stages to maintain the amphibious com- those organizations to the T/Os com- petence of veterans and replacements. mon to all FMF infantry battalions . A The new 3d Marines, and its com- skeleton artillery headquarters was re- panion, the 1st Marines formed from tained within the force headquarters 2/1, reflected the reorganization of and service battalion primarily fo r FMFWesPac under new Marine Corps - training purposes . In emergencies, the wide ground tables of organization gunners needed to man the 105mm which eliminated the infantry regi- howitzers which were kept in Tsingta o mental level in brigade and division would have to be flown or shipped in . Most reinforcing units of General 1 Unless other wise noted, the material in this Thomas' command were redesignate d section is derived from : ComNavWesPac Semi - as elements of parent organizations i n annual Summary of NavForWesPac, lApr– the 1st Marine Division, although ad- 30Sep48, dtd 22Oct48 (ComNavWesPac A– 9 ministrative and operational control re- File, FRC, Mech) ; FMFWesPac WarDs , Sep47–Feb48 ; FMFWesPac G–1, G–2, G–3 , mained with FMFWesPac. The 12th G–4, and Air S–3 Rpts, Mar48 (S&C Files , Service Battalion was reorganized ac - HQMC), hereafter FMFWesPac StfRpts- and following appropriate months, Apn–Jun48 ; 2 "The New FMF," Marine Corps Gazette , Capture comments . v. 31, no . 5 (May47), pp . 10–15 . 635

636 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

cording to a new logistical concept that of Kiaochow Bay . Communist troop s gave units of Service Command, FMF- immediately hustled the crew out o f Pac, with headquarters in Hawaii, the sight, and the first Marine search plane direct support role once assigned organi c which scouted the wreck was fired upon . service battalions which were droppe d For a month the Communists denie d from division and brigade organiza- knowledge of the whereabouts of the tions.3 Marines while planes of AirFMFWes - Emplaced behind a cordon of Na- Pac dropped clothing, food, and medical tionalist defenses, the Marines i n supplies in Communist territory in - Tsingtao had few contacts with th e tended for the captives. When the Com- Communists who held the Shantung munists finally admitted that they held countryside. Those that did occur were the flyers, they stalled negotiations for uniformly unpleasant. Continuing the their release interminably, and the me n practice begun in 1945 of holding the were not returned to Tsingtao until 1 men who unwittingly fell into the their July. hands, the Communists seized five The seizure of the hunting party re- Marines of a hunting party whic h sulted in a firm check on Marine excur- had blundered through Nationalist lines sions beyond the limits of Tsingtao and on Christmas Day in 1947 . One Marine the American installations at Tsangko u died of wounds received in the unpro- Field. There was no way, however, of voked outburst of fire which preceded lessening the exposure of Marine flyers the capture. For three months the Com- to capture so long as there were mis- munists kept moving and interrogatin g sions to be flown over Communist ter- the men, feeding them English lan- ritory with the chance of operationa l guage propaganda, and trying unsuc- failures. The need for such missions cessfully to convince them of American continued in 1948, and the land ove r responsibility for the civil war. The which the Marine pilots flew increas- Communists finally released the Marine s ingly showed the red banners of Mao on 1 April, having failed also in their Tse-tung's armies . In early February, purpose of getting the men to mouth th e as a result of the imminent capture of lie that "high ranking officers sent the m Changchun in Manchuria by Com- into `liberated areas' to make an in- munist forces, VMR–153 transports cident." 4 evacuated American and British con- Only four days after these Marines sular officials, missionaries, and foreig n were returned, the four-man crew of a n nationals from the city. Later in the R5D of VMR–153 was taken. The month, the Marine planes flew in sup- plane's engines failed as it was circling plies for the U . S. Consulate in besieged to land at Tsangkou, and it crashed on Mukden. This supply lift was repeate d the mud flats lining the western shor e in April as a skeleton U . S. consular staff kept a death watch within the 3 Ibid .; 12th ServBn WarD, Oct47 . Nationalist stronghold . Interrogation of four Marines, dtd 1Apr48 , end A to CG, FMFWesPac ltr to CNO, dtd In view of the worsening civil war 28May48 (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC, Alex) . situation, the new Commander, Naval

WITHDRAWAL 637

Forces, Western Pacific, Vice Admiral new cycle of combat training in Jul y Oscar C . Badger (who had relieved Ad- and stood by ready to move as the situ- miral Cooke in February) ordered ation required. General Thomas to have his comman d ready to mount out on 30 days' notice. STATE DEPARTMEN T Initially, in a plan published on 3 April , WARNINGS 7 FMFWesPac contemplated leaving a small service contingent to secure and Admiral Badger assigned General maintain the supplies not loaded in th e Thomas the responsibility for evacu- allotted time. By June, an Inspector ation of Americans from North China . General's review of this decision noted The FMFWesPac staff prepared plan s that the economic situation of Tsingtao' s to cover the withdrawal of their fellow beleaguered populace was so desperate countrymen from Tientsin and Peiping that "hungry Chinese hordes woul d as well as Tsingtao . In the latter city, sweep over any such remaining force Thomas was given military command as this. Supplies and installations woul d and coordination control of all Navy melt away instantly ." 5 FMFPac added and Marine shore activities . When the a comment that if redeployment order s expected official warning to American were given, the evacuation of men and civilians to get out was issued, the materiel would be complete, and General Marines, working closely with local Thomas noted that with 30 days' warn- U. S . consulates, were prepared to mov e ing, adequate shipping, and Chinese swiftly to facilitate the withdrawal . labor, he could clear all Marine supplies The amount of water lift and naval and equipment from Tsingtao.6 support necessary to accomplish the While the alert for possible evacu- evacuation was determined by FMF- ation existed and plans were made fo r WesPac and the plans were kept cur - that eventuality, the Marine garriso n rent to match the shifting political an d life in Tsingtao went on much as usual . military situation.$ To complete the winter's training, al l In the Yangtze Valley, the only other companies of the 1st and 3d Marine s area of China where large numbers o f were air lifted in practice deploymen t Americans were present, the overall problems, and in June the battalion s responsibility for evacuation rested each made two landings in conjunctio n with Rear Admiral Frederick I . with Admiral Badger's amphibiou s s forces. As Communist troops moved in Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi section is derived from : U. S. Dept of State strength into northern and central record groups on China, Lot F79—830 U . S. provinces in the summer of 1948 the Marines 1948 and Lot 55F174, Box 2—30 0 danger to Americans in China increased Evacuation, General (Dept of State RecCen) ; gravely. The Marines embarked on a FMFWesPac StaffRpts, Jul—Dec48 ; U . S. De- partment of State Bulletin No . 496, v. 20, no. 6 IG memo to CMC, dtd 13JuI48, Subj : Abil- 1 (2Jan49), pp . 28—29, hereafter State Bu l ity of FMFWesPac to carry out assigned mis- 496. sion (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC, Alex), p. 4 . IG memo to CMC, dtd 13Ju148, op. cit., 5 Ibid. pp. 4—5.

638 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

Entwistle, Commander, Amphibiou s In order to meet FMFWesPac's mos t Forces, Western Pacific. Under En- pressing need for combat support, th e twistle, the Director, Ground Division , personnel to man an artillery battery Army Advisory Group, Nanking, and were requested from the 1st Provisiona l the Commander, Naval Port Facilities, Marine Brigade on Guam . Initially, the Shanghai, were charged with planning artillerymen were held ready for air- and directing evacuation procedures in lift, 10 but in October, Battery D of the their respective regions . Missionaries , 11th Marines shipped out from th e teachers, and businessmen in outlying island, landed at Tsingtao on the 17th , sectors who wished to leave would b e and moved directly to positions at collected by air or whatever means pos- Tsangkou Field to bolster Marine de- sible and funnelled through the two fenses. The arrival of the battery cities toward ships bound for safe ports . marked the first increase in the strength Principal reliance for security force s of FMFWesPac above the ceiling im- under this plan was placed on Marine posed at its formation by the State De- combat units detailed from Tsingtao o r partment . Further minor increases i n Guam with reinforcements provided by troop strength were authorized bu t ships' landing parties, many of them never effected, for the swift march o f trained by FMFWesPac.9 events caught up with and passed this Naval authorities realized that the decision.1 1 ground forces available to them were Preparations were made to dispatc h not strong enough to protect the wide- a battalion landing team to Tsingta o spread properties of Americans during from Guam in mid-October, either by the rioting and disorder that might ac- air if an emergency warranted such a company Communist attacks on major move, or by sea if it did not. Actually, cities. The decision was made early i n the time in transit of the BLT would be the summer, and was implicit in all less by sea than by air, since with the plans prepared after July, that securit y land transport planes then available the forces would concentrate on safeguard- total airlift time would be 15 1/2 days to ing the lives of U. S . nationals during f evacuation. The possible demands on move the 1,350 Marines and their hal FMFWesPac to provide troops to assis t million pounds of equipment .12 A simi- simultaneous operations in North Chin a 10 PlansOff, NavForWesPac Itr to G—3, 1st and the Yangtze Valley made the rein- ProvMarBrig, dtd 5Ju148, Subj : FMFWesPa c forcement of General Thomas' com- OPlans (ComNavWesPac S—A16 File, FRC , mand a wise and necessary move. Mech) . 11 CG, FMFPac speedltr to CG, FMFWesPac, e ComWesPacPhibFor OPlan No. 783, dtd dtd 220ct48 (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC, Alex) . 6Aug48 (OAB, NHD), Anxs A and B . Prior "Ends (A) and (B) to CinCPac seria l to the commencement of the evacuation, Ad- 000138 to CNO and ComNavForWesPac, dt d miral Entwistle was relieved on 1 Decembe r 210ct48, Subj : Reinforcement of FMFWesPac , 1948 by Rear Admiral George C . Crawford . Tsingtao with forces presently available to 1s t Gen Gerald C . Thomas ltr to Hd, HistBr, G—3 ProvMarBrig, FMF (ComNavForWesPac T S Div, HQMC, dtd 23Aug61. File, FRC, Mech) .

WITHDRAWAL 639

lar estimate of lift time made by Flee t once by United States Naval vessel fro m Air Wing One on 15 November indi- Tientsin .15 cated that use of 24 large seaplanes By this time, all Marines had been stationed in the Marianas would only transferred from Tientsin and Peiping , cut the span of time needed by two but a few returned to help process days.13 Unless the need for men was im- evacuees. A Marine officer with a rifle perative enough to warrant piecemeal squad and five communications me n reinforcement, the best method of mov- flew to Tientsin from Tsingtao on th e ing the BLT to China would be by ship . 14th ; another officer and a communica- The reason for the rush of preparation detail reported to Peiping. These tions to bolster FMFWesPac was found Marines assisted consulate personnel in in the successes of the Chinese Com- loading out a landing ship and staye d munists. On 24 September Mao's forces until the 18th when the ship sailed. A captured Tsinan, Shantung's capitol , similar detachment was sent to Tientsi n and on 15 October the Red armies too k for two days on the 25th to help evacu- Chinchow, the supply center for al l ate other Americans who availed them- CNA forces in Manchuria . In both in - selves of the naval lift. stances, Nationalist relief columns made The emergency condition activatin g feeble attempts to rescue the besieged plans to evacuate all U . S. nationals wh o garrisons and were easily turned back wanted to leave China was set by Ad- by the triumphant Communists . Under miral Badger on 16 November as Am- the circumstances, the chance of the bassador John Leighton Stuart warned Nationalists holding their positions i n them to "plan at once to move to place s Manchuria or in North China seemed of safety." 16 Concurrently, the 1st slim, and Americans in China were ad- Brigade on Guam ordered the 9th vised to "consider the desirability o f Marines, suitably reinforced as a BLT , evacuation while normal transportation to embark on the APA Bay field for facilities were available ." 1 4 movement to Tsingtao and temporar y Between the 1st and 15th of Novem- duty with FMFWesPac . The battalio n ber, the American Consulates and the was directed to be prepared to remai n Embassy issued this precautionary on board ship for an indefinite perio d warning in all areas of China, and o n in readiness for combat operations the 11th, the Consul Generals at Pei - ashore.17 On 28 November., BLT—9 ping and Tientsin followed up with a sailed from Guam and reported by dis- statement : patch to Admiral Badger and Genera l Thomas for orders . In as much as later evacuation on a n While the Guam reinforcements wer e emergency basis may be impossible, Amer- en route, the Marines at Tsingta o ican citizens who do not desire to remai n in North China should plan to leave a t " Ibid., p. 29. 16 Ibid. la ComFAirWing One OPlan No . 4-48, dtd 1' 1st ProvMarBrig (Reinf), FMF OpO No . 15Nov48 (OAB, NHD) . 8-48, dtd 16Nov 48 (ComNavWesPac TS File, 14 State Bul 496, p . 28 . FRC, Mech) .

640 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

moved swiftly to prepare for their ow n Shanghai, where approximately 2,500 eventual withdrawal . The 2d Provi- American civilians remained, becam e sional Combat Service Group (Light) , the focal point of evacuation efforts . as 12th Service Battalion had been re - Once the exodus from Nanking go t designated in July, began loading out underway, with most people leaving by supplies to reduce all force stocks to a air while a shuttle of Navy landing 90-day level. Large working parties craft carried away military supplies and from the infantry battalion not on household goods, the city was nearl y guard duty were furnished to expedite clear of potential evacuees by 1 7 this process . Most Navy and Marin e November. 18 On that date, at the re- dependents left Tsingtao in Novembe r quest of Ambassador Stuart, a rifl e in advance of their bulky household platoon of the 3d Marines was sent effects which were crated for shipment from Tsingtao to the Nationalist capi- on following cargo vessels . The remain- tal to provide security for the American ing dependents left in the first days o f Embassy. The platoon travelled by December. While other American APD, and the high-speed transport civilians in China could choose to re - stayed at anchor in the Yangtze off main or go despite their government's Nanking as added insurance for the warning, military families had no possible emergency evacuation of the option ; they were ordered to places o f Embassy staff . Stuart believed that the safety. In like manner, American presence of the Marines would preven t women employees of the Embassy an d lawless mobs from attempting to pillage the dependents of diplomatic personnel the Embassy in the interim betwee n were directed to leave. Nationalist collapse and Communis t The evacuation plans long in prepara- takeover. The latter act seemed in- tion worked smoothly . Some few foreig n evitable by November's end, and the nationals, mainly dependents of diplo- ambassador felt that Chinese polic e matic officials, were evacuated alon g could not be relied upon for adequate with the Americans who were leaving . protection. Between 1 November and 5 December , On the arrival of the 9th Marines at 1,316 persons left China, 751 by plane, Tsingtao, one rifle company (A) and mainly from Shanghai, and 560 by Nav y some of the landing team's reinforcing and Army transports . By 20 Decembe r elements went ashore as a reserve whil e the figure had risen to 3,944, of which the remainder of the unit stayed on more than 1,500 were military de- board the Bayfield ready for immediat e pendents. In the process, North Chin a use. On 5 December, Admiral Badger had been virtually cleared of American reported to the Chief of Naval Oper- civilians, with only a few businessmen ations that the 9th was ready to move to and missionaries remaining as the re- Shanghai on order . After a discussion sponsibility of skeleton consulate staffs . Nanking was emptied of its many 18 CTF 78 ltr to ComNavWesPac, dtd 6Dec- 48, Subj : Movement of Evacuees in Yangtz e American military and economic ad- by U. S. Forces (ComNavWesPac A16—3 File , visory groups by early December, and FRC, Mech) .

WITHDRAWAL 641

of the situation with the American ficiencies were taken, some American Consul General, and with Ambassado r officials felt that the event did letha l Stuart's approval, Badger reported : damage to the fighting spirit of the already reeling CNA troops .2 1 Considerable conjecture and talk ha s already taken place regarding Marines in Regardless of the truth of this sup - Shanghai. Their appearance now woul d position, the end result of the civil war cause little additional excitement inasmuch was already evident when the shipment as they are needed to augment naval force s arrived. On 15 December, the Director already there . Am ordering Bay field with of the Joint U. S. Military Advisory BLT—9 embarked, minus reserve units , proceed Shanghai ETA 16 Dec . . . .19 Group, Major General David Barr, USA, reported to Washington :

SHANGHAI STAND BY 20 Only a policy of unlimited United States aid including the immediate employment e The last few weeks of 1948 witnesse d of United States armed forces to block th southern advance of the Communists , the end of effective Nationalist re- which I emphatically do not recommend , sistance in Hopeh, and in January both would enable the Nationalist Governmen t Tientsin and Peiping fell easily int o to maintain a foothold in southern Chin a Communist hands. The precipitating against a determined Communist advance. . . . The complete defeat of the National- factor in this defeat was attributed i n ist Army . . . is inevitable.22 later years to the arrival of a badl y needed but defective shipment of With a puzzling disregard for the weapons and equipment at Tangku o n facts of past performance, the official s 29 November. The military gear, of a number of major U. S . firms in American surplus from depots in Japan , Shanghai felt that they could do busi- had been shipped in unopened crates ness with the Communists . They feare d just as it had been packed at the war' s a probable period of lawlessness at the end ; at its destination much of the ma- time of changeover of governments , teriel was found to be in poor conditio n however, and wanted the Marines t o or useless for lack of vital parts . guard their properties, such as the city' s 23 Although immediate steps to correct de- power company, from mob damage . The official American policy of using 'B ComNavWesPac disp to CNO, dtd 2ODec - Marines to protect lives only was re- 48 (S&C Files, HQMC, FR'C, Alex) . iterated, but a consulate spokesman '° Unless otherwise noted, the material i n pointed out that the concept was broad this section is derived from : U . S. Dept of State record group Tsingtao ConGenlntelRpts enough "so that emergency or tem- 1949 (Dept of State RecCen) ; ComNavWesPac zi Testimony of VAdm Oscar C . Badger an d OpO No . 1—49, dtd 24Jan49 (OAB, NHD) ; MajGen David Barr in Military Situation in FMFWesPac StaffRpts Dec48—Jan49 ; 3d Mar the Far East, pp . 2694, 2745—2749 . S—1 and S—3 PeriodicRpts, Feb49, dtd 1Mar4 9 (S&C Files, HQMC), hereafter 3d Mar StfRpts 2' Quoted in U. S. Relations with China, p . with appropriate following months ; Muster 336. Rolls of the units concerned (Unit Diary Sec , 23 "American Business Request for Marines, " PersDept, HQMC) ; U. S. Relations wit h The North China News (Shanghai), 8Dec48 , China. p. 1 .

642 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

porary protection might be given to ational facilities for fleet liberty property if necessary to guard Ameri- parties and a Marine shore patrol de- cans living here ." 2 4 tachment. The ground elements of FMF- On the arrival of the Bay field in the WesPac, less a reduced 3d Marines BLT Whangpoo River off Shanghai, the an- and the 9th Marines on stand-by at nouncement was made that the 9th Shanghai, were to load out for Camp Marines would land only if America n Pendleton and the 1st Marine Division . lives and property were threatened . If AirFMFWesPac, less MGCIS–7 which the need for emergency evacuation pro- would report to MAG–24 on Guam to cedures arose, the evacuees would as- continue air control duties, was ordered semble at four major collecting points to move to Cherry Point. The escort convenient to the American community carrier Rendova would join VMF– where the Marines would furnish neces- 211,26 whose pilots had qualified t o sary protection and cover withdrawa l operate from its decks in August prac- to the U. S. Navy's dock and warehous e tice flights .27 area. From the docks, Navy amphibiou s Part of the movements and transfers craft would transfer the evacuees t o directed from Washington were alread y ships located downriver in the Whang- underway or accomplished by the tim e 2 5 poo anchorage. the formal directive arrived . The The departure of the 9th Marines fo r platoon of the 3d Marines on duty at Shanghai lent impetus to the with- Nanking was relieved in late December drawal preparations at Tsingtao. Com- by a similar unit of the 9th . On 6 munist successes had the effect of com- January, Admiral Badger returned th e pletely isolating the city, making it th e reserve units of the 9th Marines to only Nationalist stronghold left north Guam, and on the 10th, Battery D of of the Yangtze . The Central Govern- the 11th Marines also left Tsingtao for ment, with a target date of 1 February, the 1st Brigade . Loading operations t o began withdrawing the men and mate- complete the withdrawal of all U.S. riel that made up the thriving naval supplies and equipment were continued training center which had grown up a t by 2d Combat Service Group and th e the port following the arrival of th e units concerned. Americans. The fold-up of U. S. naval By 21 January, all VMF–211 pilot s shore-based facilities kept pace. On 21 had requalified as carrier pilots and th e January, the Chief of Naval Operations squadron moved on board its new home . directed Admiral Badger to embark all The R5Ds of VMR–153 flew out in sev- shore-based units, except for a mini - eral echelons before the 29th when th e mum staff needed to operate recre- ground personnel and heavy equipment 2' United Press disp of 9Dec48 in North left for the States. Two days later , China Marine (Tsingtao), 11Dec48, p. 1 . 2e AmerConGen Shanghai disp No . 55 to CNO disp to ComNavWesPac, dtd 21Jan49 Dept, dtd 3Feb49, Subj : Protection and Evac- (S&C Files, HQMC) . uation of American Nationals (Lot F79, Bo x 27 AirFMFWesPac S—3 PeriodicRpt No . 16 , 45, File 300—Evacuation—Emergency Plan , Aug48, dtd 7Sep48 (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC , Dept of State RecCen) . Alex) .

WITHDRAWAL 643

Tsangkou Field was closed to all Amer- continued to flow through the be- ican planes and flight operations leaguered port, but most American s ceased as AirFMFWesPac Head- who wanted to leave North China ha d quarters Squadron secured and mounte d gotten out by February and those few out. On the departure of the last shore- people who left later were generally based Marine planes, air transport an d foreigners or stateless persons certified liaison for ComNavWesPac was fur- for evacuation by the consulate . nished by a seaplane detachment of Fleet Tsingtao was kept alive mainly by Air Wing 1 based on a tender anchore d infusions of American economic ai d in Tsingtao's harbor . Combat air sup- which provided raw cotton for the city' s port, if needed, would be the respon- textile mills and coal, flour, and rice fo r sibility of the Rendova's air group. the refugee population. The role was By 3 February, all elements of FMF- hardly enough to keep Tsingtao in ro- WesPac were on board ship excep t bust or even passable health, and th e Company C, 3d Marines, which wa s days of the port under Nationalist con- assigned duties as shore patrol to polic e trol were obviously numbered . Its the limited liberty area kept open for capture was easily within the capabil- fleet recreation . Another 3d Marines ities of Mao Tse-tung's armies, but the company (B) was transferred to the drive to cross the Yangtze and destroy 1st Marines in keeping with Badger's the main Nationalist forces had priority orders to reduce the strength of the in Communist military efforts . The battalion remaining at Tsingtao. The people of Tsingtao no longer considered sole reinforcing elements added to the U. S. naval forces to be an effective 3d Marines were an engineer platoo n shield against the Communists and , and a small detachment, mostly motor according to the American Consul Gen- transport of 2d Combat Service Group , eral, were convinced that the Marines left to support the final wind up o f and Navy combat ships would take n o logistic activities. steps to prevent a Communist entry int o On 8 February, when General Thoma s the city. and the major portion of his comman d sailed from Tsingtao, the end of FMF- WINDUP ACTIVITIES 28 WesPac waited only the disbandment o f its Headquarters and Service Battalion By March the Communist armies had in Camp Pendleton and the rejoining of reached the Yangtze River on a broad its task force elements to the 1st Marin e =a Unless otherwise noted, the material i n Division during the following month . this section is derived from : Tsingtao ComGe n For Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. IntelRpts, op . cit.; 3d Mar StfRpts, Feb–Apr - Colley and the officers and men of the 49 ; 3d Mar S–2 PeriodicRpt, Apr49, dtd 1May- 3d Marines that he commanded, the re- 49 (ComNavWesPac A–9 File, FR'C, Mech) ; t mainder of their time at Tsingtao was Muster Rolls of the units concerned (Uni Diary Sec, PersDept, HQMC) ; Military Sit- to be a period of watchful waiting, com- uation in the Far East ; C. E. Lucas Philips, paratively uneventful and yet poten- Escape of the Amethyst (New York : Coward- tially trouble-filled. A trickle of evacuee s McCann, Inc ., 1957) .

310-224 0 - 69 - 42

644 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

front and were poised to invade South most of the new Company B was China. While his forces regrouped fo r already ashore in Shanghai guardin g the attack, Mao Tse-tung put pressure American naval facilities in the doc k on the Nationalist government to ceas e area and the remaining platoon fur- fighting or else be annihilated . Several nished the embassy guard at Nanking. weeks of negotiations proved futile fo r In addition to these units, the 3d Ma- there was no ground for compromise ; rines set up a small shore patrol detach- both sides knew that despite the sur- ment which was quartered on th e face appearance of an agreement, its Shanghai Bund and provided a ship's practical effect was absolute Corn- guard to Admiral Badger's flagship , munist victory. the AGC Eldorado. Under the circumstances, Tsingta o The stay of the 3d Marines a t was more than ever a doomed city and Shanghai was a short one . Less than a held its status as an American nava l month after the battalion arrived at the base on a day-to-day basis. By mid- city, an outrageous Communist attack o n March, Admiral Badger had decided to British naval forces gravely increased move his flagship from the port and t o the risk of the deep involvement of cut further the number of service ships American ships and men in a similar remaining. What was left of the one- incident. Admiral Badger made the de- time thriving base was either operating cision to withdraw on strong evidence from shipboard or was ready to mount that the Communists would no longer out on short notice . There was no recognize the neutrality of America n longer any need for the 3d Marines t o ships in Chinese waters . stay at Tsingtao, and Badger ordere d So confident were the Communists of the battalion south to relieve the 9th their success that they openly an- Marines. On 17 March, BLT–3 (less its nounced the date when their ultimatum shore patrol company) sailed for to the Nationalists would expire and Shanghai in its transport, the AP A the advance across the Yangtze would Chilton, and dropped anchor in the begin. In an effort to beat this deadline, Whangpoo the following day. the British attempted to relieve the sta- After a period of familiarization with tion ship which had been maintained at the evacuation plan and with the city Nanking for emergency evacuation of itself, the 3d Marines was ready to take Commonwealth nationals . On 20 April, over the watch . In order to reach the in the narrow reaches of the Yangtz e strength required for the evacuation below the capital city, the relief ship, procedures which had been worked out , HMS Amethyst, was shelled by Com- the battalion needed to gain back the munist artillery, forced aground on a n rifle company it had lost when FMF- island, and raked unmercifully by rifle WesPac left Tsingtao . Before its de- and machine gun fire . parture on 30 March, the 9th Marine s The Communists' immediate and transferred its Company C to the 3 d demonstrably false claim was that the which redesignated the unit Company British frigate was operating in con- B. The selection was a natural one since junction with Nationalist warships .

WITHDRAWAL 645

The Red artillerymen also delivere d Repose which sailed for Hong Kong o n their fire against HMS Consort, the 25 April . erstwhile station ship which attempte d The Communist action against the unsuccessfully to rescue the Amethys t British was followed by threats that and she was barely able to limp down - similar punitive measures would b e river with heavy structural damage and taken against any foreign warshi p a long casualty list . A relief force which attempted to sail on the river. headed by the cruiser London, steaming Since all plans for the evacuation of up from Shanghai, was unable to break American civilians had been predicated through the deadly barrier of artillery on free use of the Whangpoo River, fire and sustained in its turn consider- Shanghai's access route to the broa d able casualties and materiel damage. mouth of the Yangtze, the altered situ- The Communist gunners firing at point - ation called for a reappraisal of Ameri- blank range at large targets in re- can objectives . If Badger ordered his stricted waters could hardly miss in this ships to remain where they could be at- unequal engagement and were able t o tacked, he would undoubtedly be force d keep up their attack despite murderou s to use all means at his command, includ- return fire by the British . After these ing carrier air and naval gunfire, to rescue attempts were beaten off, th e retaliate. The Admiral considered that Amethyst stayed stranded in the rive r such action would have an adverse effor more than three months while th e fect on the safety of the Americans wh o Communists tried to gain maximu m desired to stay in China and would cer- propaganda value for their "capture. " tainly involve the U . S. more deeply i n Finally, in an incredible feat of seaman- the morass of civil war. Consequently, ship and courage, the frigate's crew he recommended and had approved a brought their ship out to safety in a decision to make one last call fo r night-long dash through the gantlet of Americans to leave and then to with- artillery. draw his forces.29 Admiral Badger was quick to offe r The State Department was convinced assistance to the British ships damaged that most Americans who still remained in the first few days of the Amethyst in China were prepared to stay regard- incident and to provide the means fo r less of the risk . Under the circumstances, the platoon of Marines at Nan- more effective care of their casualties . king was no longer needed to assist i n The grim lesson of the destructiv e evacuation, and on 21 April the me n effect of field artillery fire on naval ves- flew back to Shanghai leaving behind sels unable to maneuver freely or repl y five NCOs who were transferred to effectively was a costly one. More than State Department guard duty as a regu- 40 men were killed and 78 wounde d lar detachment. The arrival of the aboard three ships . With the help of Nanking Marines was followed very 3d Marines' corpsmen and stretcher 29 ComNavWesPac disp to CNO and ConGe n bearers, the wounded men were trans- Shanghai, dtd 22Apr49 (S&C Files, HQMC , ferred to the American hospital ship FRC, Alex) . 646 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

CHINESE NATIONALIST SENTRIES relieve Marine bridge guards at Chinwangtao in October 1946. (USMC 228263)

A PORTION of the Marines remaining in Tsingtao debark from USS Chilton, on which they are billeted, to relieve guard posts throughout the city in March 1949 . (USN 80-G-706944)

WITHDRAWAL 647

shortly by the assembly on board the lar Marine ships' detachment on tw o Chilton of the whole BLT-3 . Company A cruisers, plus a headquarters and a thir d remained temporarily on Shanghai's platoon to be stationed on the Eldo- docks to shepherd out the last 119 rado. 31 Company C of the 7th Marines American civilians who heeded the con- was detached for this task at Pearl Har- sul general's final warning to leave . On bor on 1 May, and the remainder of th e 28 April, their task finished, the rear battalion returned to California withi n echelon of the battalion rode an LS M a week, completing what was certainl y downstream to their transport, and on the shortest tour of overseas duty in its the 29th the 3d Marines sailed fo r history. Tsingtao. The replacement Company C on The purpose of the trip north to the board the Manchester and St. Paul ar- Shantung port was to readjust some o f rived at Tsingtao on 14 May ; two days the cargo hastily loaded out at Shangha i later the cruisers which had been re- and to redistribute naval personne l lieved on station departed with Compan y e evacuated from the port facilities ther C of the 3d Marines . The stay of ne w to various fleet units .30 The Chilton arrivals at Tsingtao was fleeting ; almost sailed for the States on 6 May, leaving as soon as the Marines he had asked for behind Company C of the 3d as the sol e had transshipped to the Eldorado, Ad- remnant of an FMF task force that ha d miral Badger left for Hong Kong and once topped 50,000 men . The company, which had long had most of its gear the two cruisers followed in a few days loaded on board a cruiser for ready em- time. The St. Paul visited Shanghai just ployment as an emergency landing force , ahead of the Communist forces which shifted its station to shipboard on 3 captured the city on 25 May, and the May, but continued to furnish shore pa- Manchester left Tsingtao on the 26th trol detachments. when it was clear that the Communists Relief for Company C was enroute to were at last ready to take the city . These Tsingtao when the rest of the 3d Ma- two events, the fall of Shanghai and th e rines sailed for home . Early in April , imminent loss of Tsingtao, had the ef- the 7th Marines at Camp Pendleton ha d fect of cancelling the requirement fo r been alerted for movement to join Ad- Marine ship-based reinforcements. miral Badger's command and replace There was no longer any opportunity the 3d, and on the 21st the battalion to land in the portions of China held embarked on two cruisers at San Pedro . by the Communists without incurrin g By the time the ships arrived at Pearl casualties, and the Americans who had Harbor, the swift march of events in unwisely remained to do business as China had caught up with original re- usual could expect no succor from the placement plans and Badger no longe r Navy. wanted a battalion . Instead he aske d for a rifle platoon to reinforce the regu - 31 CG, FMFPac msg to CG, 1st MarDiv, dtd 10Apr49 ; ComNavWesPac disp to CNO, dtd '° ComNavWesPac disp to CNO, dtd 30Apr4 9 29Apr49 ; CNO disp to ComNavWesPac, dtd (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC, Alex) . 29Apr49 (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC, Alex) .

648 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

The cruisers with the platoons o f against their attackers, to hunt the m Company C on board rendezvoused a t down relentlessly, to shell and strafe the Okinawa with the Eldorado after leav- villages and farms that hid them—but ing China. There the company reassem- instead they gave the disciplined re- bled on the command ship and left with sponse expected of Marines . The great- it for the U. S., arriving and disembark- est tribute that can be paid these men ing at San Diego on 16 May . The retur n is that they maintained whatever posi- home of the last element of the FMF to tion their government assigned them an d be assigned to Naval Forces, Western did so in the spirit as well as the letter Pacific, brought an end to a long and of the orders under which they served. colorful era of Marine History. The The wisdom inspired by hindsigh t swarming Red tide which engulfed can provide many solutions to the prob- mainland China wrought a change tha t lems that faced the U. S. in China . In- erased forever the way of life which had teresting though these theories may be, once made China duty a coveted goal and they are academic arguments now . One the China Marine an envied person i n practical lesson learned, and a costly the Corps . one, was never to underestimate th e strength of Communism or the determi- CONCLUSION nation of its adherents . Promises, agreements, and negotiations were al l In the considerable volume of litera- regarded as means to an end by the ture that has been written in castigation, Chinese Communists, and the Marines explanation, or defense of United State s ambushed at Anping and those wh o policy in China during the postwa r fought at Hsin Ho received the brunt of years, there is only passing mention o f this practical education for their fellow the part played by the Marines in carry- Americans . ing out this policy. Virtually all memoirs It was not the Communists but th e and records concede the enormous diffi- Japanese who were the expected source culty of being at one time an active ally of trouble when IIIAC first landed i n of Nationalist China and at the sam e North China, and one of the marvels of time neutral in the civil war it was the postwar period is the open cooper- fighting. Too little recognition is give n ation that was received from forme r to the controlled reaction of Americans bitter enemies. The Marines steppe d who were exposed to Communist harass- into a complicated repatriation setu p ment and attack and who meted out and with the help of the Japanese made a frustrated limited punishment in re- its solution seem easy. Where opposition turn, a retaliatory attitude at odds with might have been expected, none was re- all Marine training and conditioning . ceived, and a few hundred Marine ad- The men of III Amphibious Corps and ministrators and guards were able to do its successor commands had it in thei r a job that could have required thousands power as individuals and small groups of men. Techniques of repatriatio n to go beyond the restriction of thei r worked out at theater level were trans- orders—to lash back with full fury lated into practice virtually without a

WITHDRAWAL 649

hitch. The impartial justice exercised b y by their very presence were a force the Marines in North China and by all for stability in China, not because of the services throughout the Pacific in their own strength, for that was soon seeing defeated soldiers and uprooted whittled away, but because they stoo d civilians home was an incalculable bu t for the power of their country . In effect, evident asset in the later relations of American action secured for the Na- the U. S. with Japan. tionalists a base of operations from The mutual trust of the Japanese and which they launched their drive to re - the Marines extended to the point where cover Manchuria and North China . they mounted guard over the railroads Thereafter, the American position wa s of Hopeh together . And the Marines re- entangled irretrievably with the for- lieved the Japanese when the National- tunes of the Central Government's ists were unable to do so in order that armies. the American pledge to facilitate re- During the year and a half that a patriation could be honored . The mission large portion of the FMF was statione d of keeping open the lines of communica- in North China, the Marine Corps under - tion between Peiping and Chinwang- went a drastic reduction in strength . tao and the responsibility for seeing that The men who served so well along th e KMA coal reached its destination gave rail lines, at the coal mines, and in th e the IIIAC tasks that savored much o f headquarters cities were often fres h the duties which fell to the Marine ex- from boot camp. There was constant peditionary forces in the Caribbean drain of experienced men from corps , islands in the '20s and '30s . The eco- division, and wing units that matche d nomic well-being of a large and impor- or exceeded the ravages of combat, bu t tant part of Nationalist China depended withal the job set out was done. A during the winter of 1945–46 on th e determined and continuous effort wa s security measures taken by Genera l made to maintain high standards of Rockey's command. discipline and to continue training by Important though the humanitaria n whatever means possible . Again, as has aspects of Marine missions were, their been the case many times in the Marine political repercussions were far greate r Corps past, commanders were able to and longer lasting . The support of th e count on the fact that their veterans an d Central Government involved in the ac t inexperienced men would coalesce a s of securing ports of entry into Red- units because of the tangible pride the y dominated territory ensured the endur- had in themselves as Marines. To those ing enmity of the Communists. The who have not experienced this feeling or decision not to follow up this initia l seen its results, it may seem question- support by using all the force necessary able, but it exists and was in large part to restore order in North China gave im- responsible for the cohesiveness of Ma- measurable but certain strength to the rine units in China at a time when de- Communists, but it was a decision i n mobilization and demanding commit- keeping with the temper of the Ameri- ments might have caused a different can people at the time . The Marines result.

650 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Not until the 1st Marine Divisio n Their readiness to land and ability t o pulled out of China and the mission o f handle a difficult assignment with dis- the remaining units was narrowed to patch was sufficient insurance that more security of American installations at a normal measures could be used. r naval advanced base was there time o When the whole of Marine activitie s opportunity to turn to amphibious trainin North China in the postwar years i ing. At Tsingtao in 1947-48, the bat- s considered, the variety of missions ac- talion landing teams of FMFWesPa c were able to renew their skills in the complished is considerable and the com- complicated business which is the Ma- mon factor that threads them all is the rine Corps primary mission . When the adaptability of Marines to the job at State Department was convinced that hand. Perhaps the most valuable legacy Americans should leave China, thes e of this tour of China duty is one often ready battalions were a logical on-the- taken for granted—the fund of com- scene choice to handle the job of emer- mand experience in a variety of situ- gency evacuation and to provide protec- ations which was garnered by young tion if need be. As it happened, emergency officers and NCOs. This reservoir of employment of the ship-based Marine s responsibility well earned has bee n was unnecessary, but this fact was in drawn on repeatedly since in peace an d keeping with their selection for the task. war. PART VI

Conclusion

CHAPTER 1

Amphibious Doctrine in World War II 1

THE GENESIS Marine Corps interest in what i s termed amphibious warfare may be sai d One would not exaggerate by sayin g to have begun as early as 1898, when , that amphibious warfare was the pri- in the Spanish-American War, Lieuten- mary offensive tactic in the American ant Colonel Robert W . Huntington's conduct of the Pacific War. Simply de- battalion of Marines landed at Guan- fined, an amphibious assault is "a n tanamo, Cuba, to seize a major naval operation involving the coordinated em- base for fleet operations in the block- ployment of military and naval forces ade of Santiago.4 In the years followin g dispatched by sea for an assault on a this landing, the advanced base concept hostile shore." 2 In his final report of the envisioned the establishment on a per- war to the Secretary of the Navy, Ad- manent basis of a force capable of seiz- miral King stated : ing and defending advanced bases t The outstanding development of this which a fleet could employ to suppor war, in the field of joint undertakings, was its prosecution of naval war in distant the perfection of amphibious operations , waters. According to the theory of ho w the most difficult of all operations in mod- advanced base operations were to b e ern warfare . Our success in all such oper- conducted, primary emphasis was on the ations, from Normandy to Okinawa, involved huge quantities of specialize d defense of the base . There was appar- equipment, exhaustive study and planning, ently no consideration in the pre-Worl d and thorough training as well as complet e War I period of the feasibility of large integration of all forces, under unifie d scale landings against heavily defended command.3 islands, which, of course, was the nature 1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s of much of the amphibious warfare in chapter is derived from : Hough, Ludwig, an d the Pacific in World War II . Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal ; Isely an d As the international commitments an d Crowl, Marines and Amphibious War ; LtGe n influence of the United States increase d . Smith, "The Development of Am- Holland M during the early years of the 20th cen- phibious Tactics in the U. S. Navy ." in 10 parts, Marine Corps Gazette, v . 30, no . 6 tury, the requirements for military an d (Jun46) through v. 31, no . 3 (Mar47), here- strategic planning grew apace . Ameri- after Smith, "Amphibious Tactics," Marine can interest in Latin America and U. S. Corps Gazette, with issue and page numbers ; participation in World War I accelerated Maj Robert D . Heinl, Jr., "The U . S. Marine Corps : Author of Modern Amphibious War, " 4 For a thorough treatment of Marine par- USNI Proceedings, v. 73, no . 11 (N9v47), here - ticipation in the evolution of amphibious war - after Heinl, The USMC . fare, see Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Smith, "Amphibious Tactics," Marine Corp s Harbor to Guadalcanal, pt I, and Isely and Gazette, v . 30, no. 6 (Jun46), p .14 . Crowl, Marines and Amphibious War, chaps 'War Reports, p . 658. 1-2 . 653

654 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

the need for the preparation of long- The Marine Corps did little in the range programs, and the Marine Corp s area of amphibious planning and train- was not exempted from having to look t o ing during the late 1920s and early the future. Although expeditionary serv- 1930s because in those years it wa s ice in revolt-torn Latin America consti- busily engaged in the pacification of tuted a heavy and continuing drain o n Nicaragua, Haiti, and Santo Domingo , the services of the Marine Corps an d and in protecting American lives and forced it to focus attention on that area, interests in the midst of the unrest in a few farsighted military strategists , China. It was thus precluded from en - such as the brilliant Major Earl H. Ellis, gaging in large-scale amphibious exer- directed their thoughts to the Pacific an d cises during these years . None could be to the prospect of war between the held in any case because military appro- United States and Japan . priations were slim . Additionally, the In the general distribution of the Navy was more interested in preparin g spoils following World War I, Japan for traditional fleet surface actions . was given the mandate over former Nevertheless, much thought and study German possessions in the Central Pa- was given to amphibious logistic cific. Thus, the strategic balance in that supply in the Navy-Marine Corps ma- area was changed drastically in favor neuvers at Culebra in 1924 and durin g of Japan, which now had authority over the joint Army-Navy-Marine Corps ma- a deep zone of island outposts guardin g neuvers at Hawaii in 1925 . Out of these its Empire. Once they were fortified and meager efforts, the genesis of presen t supported by the Japanese fleet, they amphibious doctrine appeared early in would provide a formidable threat t o the academic year 1930-1931, when the the advance of the United States flee t Commandant of the Marine Corps across the Pacific if a war broke out . Schools directed a committee of four Ellis was one of the first to recogniz e officer—Majors Charles D . Barrett, the danger posed by the strategic shift Pedro A. del Valle, and Lyle H. Miller, in the Pacific . This awareness influence d and Lieutenant Walter C . Ansel, USN— him to modify his earlier ideas about the to prepare a manual embodying existing nature of a war with Japan and in 192 1 knowledge concerning landing opera- he submitted his new thoughts in th e tions . Although never published, Marine form of Operation Plan 712, "Advanced Corps Landing Operations, as it was en- Base Operations in Micronesia ." He titled, comprised the first formal effort foresaw operations for the seizure of to assimilate current amphibious doc- specific islands in the Marshall, Caroline, trine. As General del Valle recalled : and Palau groups, some of which Ma- . . . the boss man in that show wa s rines actually assaulted in World War II . Charlie Barrett, who was a brilliant offi- His views were generally shared by th e cer, and the rest of us were `makee- Commandant, Major General John A. learnee' and all that we did was study th e meager historic records . . . and semi - Lejeune, and other high ranking Marin e historic records that existed . I remembe r officers. that I had read about the Mesopotamian

AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE IN WORLD WAR II 655

campaign of Sir Charles Townshend, and ately following the activation of th e he gave me some of the principles of a FMF, it became necessary to prepare a landing attack that we incorporated into textbook which would incorporate the this original study. . . .5 theory and practice of landing opera- After Major Barrett, as general tions for the use of the infant tactical or- chairman of the committee, had blocke d ganization. Work on this text began at out the general form the manual was t o the Marine Corps Schools in November take, he was transferred to Headquar- 1933, when all classes were suspende d ters Marine Corps and his place wa s and both faculty and students were as- taken by Major DeWitt Peck, who, in signed the duty of writing a manual tha t addition, was head of the Tactical Sec- would present in published form a de - tion of the Marine Corps Schools . Major tailed account of the doctrine and tech- Peck : niques to be employed in training fo r and conducting amphibious assaul t . . . wrote the basic chapter . . . an d parcelled out the other chapters to the operations . appropriate school instructors, artillery t o The final result of this crash program the art[illery] instructor, etc. As the appeared in January 1934 under the titl e chapters were finished [Peck] as editor, Tentative Manual for Landing Opera- coordinated the whole. . . . Upon approval of the CO of the Schools, tions. The contents and title of the man- the manual was sent to HQMC where i t ual were revised several times in the was reviewed, I believe, by Barrett an d following years, and the Navy accepted [Major Alfred H .] Noble . The only im- it as official doctrine in 1938, when, portant change they made was in the entitled Tentative Landing Operations handling of beach and shore parties, re- - versing the school concept .6 Manual, the book was reprinted and dis tributed as Fleet Training Publicatio n The groundwork prepared by thes e 167 (FTP-167) . Three years later, th e officers at the Marine Corps Schools re- War Department recognized the wort h sulted in further study of the subject at and potential of amphibious tactics an d Quantico and elsewhere . Meanwhile , published the substance of the work a s the Fleet Marine Force was establishe d Field Manual 31-5 . in September 1933, and became increas- Army interest in amphibious assaul t ingly important in Marine Corps train- tactics had resulted earlier in the parti- ing, planning, and thinking.' Immedi- cipation of the 2d Provisional Army LtGen Pedro A . del Valle interview b y Brigade (18th Infantry and two battal- HistBr, dtd 17Nov66 (Oral History Collection , ions of the 7th Field Artillery) in Fleet HistBr, HQMC) . Landing Exercise Number (FLEX) 4 i n e MajGen DeWitt Peck ltr to Hd, HistBr , 1938. Not until 1941 did the Army agai n G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 9May66, hereafter Peck take part in a FLEX or evince any overt ltr 1966 . ' An example of Marine Corps attitudes con- Little : "I have selected General Little for the cerning the establishment of the Fleet Marin e most important command in the Marine Corp s Force may be found in the following comment —the FMF ." Officer's Personnel Jacket, Loui s of the Commandant, Major General Thoma s McC. Little (0562) (GSA, MilPersRecCenter, Holcomb, regarding Major General Louis McC . St. Louis, Mo.) .

656 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

interest in amphibious warfare. It was tested them against the enemy and foun d in this year that joint amphibious train- that they worked .8 ing of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps The two key words in General Hollan d organizations was first conducted on th e Smith's definition of amphibious tactic s east coast. Under the experienced guid- noted above are "coordinated" an d ance of Major General Holland M . "assault." In the formal body of am- Smith, commander of the Amphibiou s phibious doctrine presented in early Corps, Atlantic Fleet, and his staff com- 1934, the Marine authors had recognized posed of officers from the three services , that an amphibious operation was a the 1st Joint Training Force (1st Ma- joint undertaking of great complexity rine Division and 1st Infantry Division ) and that the landing of troops on a hos- conducted maneuvers at Culebra an d tile shore had to be accomplished as a later at Onslow Beach, North Carolina . tactical movement . The steps leading t o Following in 1942, the 9th Infantry a successful landing operation include d Division joined the 1st Marine Divisio n an approach, deployment, and assault b y in landing exercises on the east coast . the landing force following an adequate Meanwhile, other Army divisions were preparatory bombardment and accom- similarly involved in the west coas t panied by the effective supporting fires training together with FMF units an d of surface and air forces. Basically, thi s learning the fundamentals of amphibi- is how Allied amphibious operation s ous warfare . The results of this train- were conducted in World War II an d ing were thoroughly demonstrate d since. throughout the war wherever Army di - Also basic to the conduct of an am- visions made amphibious assaults . phibious assault was the organization , Lessons learned and gradual advance s founded on well-established concepts, of made in the period 1934-1940, and the the amphibious task force and its majo r refinements that appeared in the fleet elements. Generally, such a force was landing exercises conducted during the comprised of the following : a transport group, a fire support group, an ai prewar years, placed at the disposal of r group, a mine group, a salvage group , United States forces at the beginning of and a screening group, all naval units ; World War II a body of tactical princi- and a landing force, composed of Ma- ples forming a basic amphibious doc- rine units for the most part. The latter trine. At Guadalcanal, Marines were the was conceived as a mobile striking force first to put to the test of war this doc- containing self-sufficient combat ele- trine, and found it practicable . General ments that could be employed with a Vandegrift, who commanded the Gua- maximum degree of flexibility. dalcanal assault troops, later wrote : The nucleus of the landing force was usually the Marine division, which was We were as well trained and as wel l armed as time and our peacetime expe- ' Gen Alexander A . Vandegrift ltr, dtd 5 Dec- rience allowed us to be. We needed comba t 47, in Maj John L. Zimmerman, The Guadal- to tell us how effective our training, our canal Campaign (Washington : HistDiv, HQ - doctrine, and our weapons had been. We MC, 1949), p . v.

AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE IN WORLD WAR II 657

often reinforced by corps troops, and tactics and techniques, which had also been sometimes Army units. In the divisio n developed, in war.9 were three infantry regiments, an artil- Faced with the imminence of war, lery regiment, and division, special, an d Congress made adequate funds available service troops, the composition, organi- for a speedup of defense preparations. zation, and strength of which underwent Some of this money was allotted to th e several changes in the course of the war . Navy and Marine Corps, which then be- According to established doctrine, the gan to eliminate personnel and materie l assignment to the Marine landing forc e shortages as rapidly as possible . The of troops and equipment for an amphibi- most important task facing the Marin e ous operation was based on the impend- Corps as it prepared for the world con- ing mission and the lift capability o f flict certain to erupt was to train troop s the assault transports carrying th e in amphibious tactics utilizing the doc- troops to the target . trine, equipment, and materiel then Not all phases of amphibious opera- available. tions were emphasized during the fleet landing exercises before 1940 . Basic As General Vandegrift commented , logistic planning was relatively simple Guadalcanal proved Marine tactics were in this period because there was little sound. The subsequent development o f equipment to embark and hardly any amphibious tactics following later land- assault shipping worthy of the name ings and combat ashore in the Pacific to embark it in, especially when com- did little to change basic doctrine, but pared to conditions in the war years . did serve to teach Americans how t o One logistics shortcoming which wa s land more troops and materiel on the brought to light following the early as- beach in a shorter period of time and at sault operations in the Pacific concerned less cost. In the course of the war, exist- the over-the-beach handling of supplies. ing techniques were perfected and re- While not completely resolved, thi s fined at the same time that new solution s problem was considerably eased with (JASCO, air support control, and under - each succeeding operation as the plan- water demolition teams) and the em- ners attempted to correct the mistake s ployment of new equipment (radar , of previous landings . landing ships and craft, amphibiou s In reviewing the development of am- command ships, and escort carriers ) phibious tactics, General Holland M . were developed and integrated with the Smith, who has been called the "Father basic amphibious warfare doctrine to of Amphibious Warfare," stated : eliminate old problems .10 It was readily Amphibious preparedness in the tw o apparent that, no matter how sound Ma- years prior to Guadalcanal consisted o n rine tactics were, they were ineffective the one hand of full-scale production of th e unless dynamic, intelligent, and well-in - materials which had been found suitabl e for landing operations in the experimental period before 1940 and on the other of ° Smith, "Amphibious Tactics," Marine Corps training military and naval personnel t o Gazette, v . 30, no. 10 (Oct46), p . 45 . use that materiel in accordance with the 10 Ibid., v. 30, no . 11 (Nov46), p. 47 .

658 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

formed commanders and highly trained of coordination." ' _ For the Marin e and disciplined troops employed them Corps, the delineation of command re- aggressively, vigorously, and resource - sponsibilities between the amphibiou s fully. The Navy and Marine Corp s force commander and the landing forc e learned lessons in every assault opera- commander was an important factor i n tion that they conducted during the war ; the success of the advance across the in the final analysis, the experiences Pacific. gained in one landing helped to achieve The chain of command in a force the successes in each following one . established to conduct an amphibious as - The Pacific War may be roughly di- sault was relatively simple, at least i n vided into three periods, 11 during which theory, and Guadalcanal was the testing amphibious tactics were developed and ground for this facet of amphibious doc- gained optimum results . The first or de- trine. According to FTP–167 :

fensive period began with the attack o n d . The attack force commander wil l Pearl Harbor and lasted until the land- usually be the senior naval commander o f ings on Guadalcanal and Tulagi . The sec- the units of the fleet comprising the attack ond, a period of limited offensives , force. . . . Provision must be made in advance for continuity of command within began with the Guadalcanal operation ; the landing area during the course of the the third was an offensive perio d operation.1 3 heralded by the Tarawa invasion in No- And this was all that FTP–167 said vember 1943 . In the opening year of about command relations. Essentially, American offensive operations, United the naval amphibious force commande r States commanders learned that close would have the primary authority for cooperation between landing force an d decisions affecting either the landin g naval staffs through the planning an d force or the various support groups, training phases for a landing and during each of which would have co-equal com- its execution was vital to its success . mand status and parallel command functions under his direction . The pattern COMMAND RELATIONS was thus set in the Guadalcanal landin g for the concept of command relations — In World War II "joint forces fought worked out in peacetime—to be em- in assault on a scale never before ployed in a combat situation for the firs t dreamed of . So much combined effort time. called for the highest possible degree At Guadalcanal, Major General Alex- ander A. Vandegrift, Commanding Gen- " Admiral Spruance set up this arbitrar y but practical division in a lecture presented t o "Adm William H . P. Blandy, "Comman d the Royal United Service Institution in Londo n Relationships in Amphibious Warfare," USNI on 30 October 1946. Adm Raymond A . Spru- Proceedings, v. 77, no. 66 (Jun51) , p . 572, here- ance, "The Victory in the Pacific," Journa l after Blandy, "Command Relationships ." of the Royal United Service Institution, v . " CNO, ND, Landing Operations Doctrine , XCI, no. 564 (Nov46), p. 540, hereafte r U. S. Navy, 1938 (FTP–167) (Washington , Spruance, "Lecture ." 1938), p. 29 .

AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE IN WORLD WAR II 659

eral, 1st Marine Division, and th e Japan in the South Pacific and South - landing force commander for the opera- west Pacific areas, and which stated : tion, was subordinate to Rear Admira l Richmond K . Turner, Commander, Am- Direct command of the tactical operations of the amphibious forces will remai n phibious Force, South Pacific (Phib- with the Naval Task Force Commande r ForSoPac), and amphibious force com- throughout the conduct of all three tasks .15 mander for the same operation . A major source of disagreement which rose be- In the planning for and actual con - tween Turner and Vandegrift was base d duct of operations at Guadalcanal , on their differing concepts of Vande- Turner's forceful personality and char- grift's command functions and responsi- acter had an effect on each decision bilities once the general had landed and made. General Vandegrift maintaine d assumed responsibility for the conduc t that the commander trained for groun d of operations ashore . operations should not be subordinate to Even before the order for the Guadal- the local naval amphibious force com- canal operation had been distributed , mander with respect to the conduct o f the command relationship between thes e the land battle and the disposition o f two leaders derived from the following the main force and reserves given th e paragraph of the order which estab- responsibility to fight it .1 6 l lished Turner's command in Apri Concerning these differences of 1942 : opinion, Major General DeWitt Peck, IX. Coordination of Comman d who was War Plans Officer for the (a) Under the Commander, South Commander, South Pacific Force (Corn - Pacific Force, Commander of SoPac) , wrote : "It might be noted that the South Pacific Amphibious in questions of command relationship , Force will be in command of the naval, ground and air units General Vandegrift's position was sup - assigned to the amphibious ported by ComSoPac . I believe, however, forces in the South Pacific that a definite directive should hav e area.14 been issued when the question firs t Further augmenting this relationship was a clause in the JCS Directive of 2 JCS 00581, dtd 2Ju142, cited in Samuel Eliot Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Sub - July 1942, setting forth the militar y marine Actions May 1942–August 1942—His- aims of the moment for the war against tory of United States Naval Operations in World War II, v. IV (Boston : Little, Brow n " CominCh ltr to DistrList, Subj : Basic Plan and Company, 1949), p. 261 . The three tasks for the establishment of the South Pacific referred to concerned the seizure of : (1 ) Amphibious Force (Short title–LONE WOLF) , Santa Cruz Islands, Tulagi, and adjacen t e FFL/A3–1/A16–3 (5), Ser 00322, dtd 29Apr4 2 enemy positions ; (2) The remainder of th f (OAB, NHD), quoted in VAdm George C . Solomon Islands and the northeast coast o Dyer, "The Amphibians Came to Conquer, " New Guinea ; and (3) Rabaul, and enemy-held MS, p . 6–27, hereafter Dyer, "The Amphib- New Guinea and New Ireland . 16 ians." Currently in preparation, this book is a Vandegrift and Asprey, Once A Marine , biography of Admiral Turner . p. 119 .

310-224 0 - 69 - 43

660 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

arose." 17 Continuing, General Peck re - October 1942 and questioned Vandegrift called : about the local situation, the 1st Marine Division commander related his prob- . . . two points of difference between lems and said "the quicker we get th e Vandegrift and Turner in particular . After the successful landing at Guadal- Navy and particularly Kelly Turne r canal and the consolidation, Turner wanted back to the basic principles of FTP—16 7 Vandegrift to station marine detachment s . . . the better off we are going to be ." 1 9 at several points along the NE and N W At the request of Admiral Halse y shores of the island which were likely landing places for Japanese reinforce- (ComSoPac) on 23 October, Vandegrift ments . Vandegrift refused to make thi s accompanied the Commandant and hi s dispersion of his force. At another time party in a flight to Noumea, New Cale- Turner wanted Vandegrift to form anothe r donia, for a conference with Halsey and Raider Battalion, composed of selecte d his major commanders concerning personnel from the Division . Vandegrift refused. It would weaken the Division both Guadalcanal. During this conference in personnel and morale to form an `elite' Holcomb raised the question of com- organization. In fact there was consid- mand relationships in the amphibious erable question in SoPac as to the efficacy force and made certain recommenda- 18 and wisdom of having raider battalions . tions concerning organizational and When the Commandant of the Marine command relationship changes i n Corps, Lieutenant General Thomas Hol- Turner's force . After his retirement, Admiral Turner later told his biog- comb visited Guadalcanal in lat e rapher that he had not been adverse to these changes.2 0 17 Peck ltr 1966 . 18 Ibid. Commenting on this situation, Majo r After approval had been given b y General Omar T . Pfeiffer, Fleet Marine Office r Halsey, Nimitz, and King, the comman d and Assistant War Plans Officer at CinCPa c structure in Amphibious Force, South during this period, stated : "I had persona l Pacific, was changed as follows on 1 6 knowledge of the differences between Ge n Vandegrift and Adm Turner, as told to me by November 1942 : Gen Vandegrift in Oct '42, when I was a t a. All Marine units were detache d Guadalcanal with Adm Nimitz. I advised Adm from PhibForSoPac . Nimitz of these differences ." MajGen Omar T . b. All Marine Corps organizations i n Pfeiffer ltr to CMC, dtd 19Apr66, hereafte r the South Pacific Area, except Marine Pfeiffer ltr. Attempting to put the Vandegrift- Turner command relationship in perspective , Corps aviation, regular ships' detach- General Pfeiffer continued : "It was my priv- ments, and units in the Ellice Island s ilege to serve intimately with Admirals Nimit z and the Samoan Defense Group, were and King and to have almost daily persona l assigned to I Marine Amphibious contact with Commandants Holcomb and Van- Corps. degrift. My experiences, therefore, were wit h c. For coordination of operations, the high command and I have restricted m y comments to what I learned on that level . . . . joint planning would be conducted by Although command relations with Admira l Turner were not satisfactory, I consider hi m '9 Vandegrift and Asprey, Once A Marine, p. the exception rather than an example of normal 183 . relations ." Ibid. 99 Dyer, "The Amphibians," p. 6-30.

AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE IN WORLD WAR II 661

CG, IMAC, and ComPhibForSoPac to include in our order a definite statemen t under the control of ComSoPac.21 of the transfer of responsibility, not only to satisfy the two commanders but so tha t In addition, it was determined that in the entire force would understand . the future, after the landing force com- I continued to draft proposed paragraph mander had landed, control of th e 5s [pertaining to command] of our operations plan until I finally reached a word- troops ashore would revert to him in hi s ing that was satisfactory to both Turner capacity as commander of a task forc e and Smith . established in the operation order to I have not got the plan before me but conduct the shore phase of the oper- my notes indicate that para . 5 read in part ation. An alternative to this was that like this : o Marine Corps units would revert t `The Commander Joint Expeditionar y Marine Corps command when and a s Force commands all task organization s directed by ComSoPac or, as the Allies employed in the amphibious operations at tightened the ring around Japan, by th e all objectives through inter-related attac k force commanders . The Commanding Gen- area commander . eral Expeditionary Troops will be em - Although the pattern embodied in barked in the flagship of the Commande r this directive was the one followe d Joint Expeditionary Force or statione d ashore when the situation requires, an d throughout the war in the Pacific with will command all landing and garrison but few modifications, it took a littl e forces that are ashore. while before the concept of separate Landing Forces, after their respective functions prevailed . As Admiral commanders have assumed command o n Spruance's former chief of staff re - shore, will be under the overall comman d of the Commanding General Expeditionary called : Troops. The problem of the transfer of respon- Commander Joint Expeditionary Force sibility from the Commander Joint Ex- is designated as second in command of this peditionary Force to the Commande r operation.' Expeditionary Troops continued to plagu e Admiral Turner and General [Holland ] There seemed to be no difficulty in ac- Smith until an agreement was reached cepting the provision that the landing during the planning for `Galvanic .' [The force commanders would inform their re- invasion of Tarawa in November 1943] . spective task group commanders when the y I was not a witness to any argument s assumed command on shore . the two commanders may have had, bu t Although Turner and Smith disagree d each came to me privately and complaine d with much ill humor during the plannin g about the other. . . . My job was to reassure stages of Galvanic, Flintlock [the Mar- them, quiet them down, and try to solv e shalls landings], and Forager [the their differences . I could get no help from Marianas campaign], the minute the y Admiral Spruance. His attitude was `The y were embarked together in the flagship o f both know what I want and they will do it . the Comdr . Joint Expeditionary Force, There is no need of prescribing definitel y friction disappeared and cooperation and a solution .' I insisted that it was essential collaboration was excellent. d " ComSoPac msg to TF Commanders SoPac , The command arrangements establishe dtd 16Nov42 (OAB, NHD) . for Galvanic set the pattern for Flintlock

662 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

and Forager, and no further problem s in logistics and familiar with the schem e 2 2 arose . of maneuver for the assault phase o f the operation. LOGISTICS Trained to cope with the specialize d nature of amphibious logistics and Another important lesson learne d versed in all of its myriad details wa s during the first year of the American the Transport Quartermaster (TQM) , offensive in the Pacific was that the lo- a Marine officer assigned to duty aboar d gistical aspect of an amphibious opera- each amphibious assault ship . He was tion was as vital to the success of a required to be familiar with not only th e landing as were the assault tactics em- weight and dimension of each item of ployed to reach and stay on the shore . Marine issue that might conceivably b e Like the negative influence of the Galli- taken into combat, but also every char- poli debacle on the evolution of so many acteristic of the particular ship to which other facets of amphibious doctrine, the he was assigned . The TQM therefore failure of basic logistics planning dur- had to become familiar with the exact ing this World War I campaign spurred location of all holds and storage spaces Marine planners on to develop sound and their dimensions in cubic and squar e logistical theory and techniques . De- feet. Because modifications, not shown spite all efforts to the contrary, however, in ships' plans, had often been made i n most if not all logistical problems that troop cargo space of the vessel, the conceivably could occur during an am- TQM was required to obtain an accurat e phibious operation cropped up in the remeasurement of holds, their hatches , preparations for and later at Guadal- and loading spaces . canal. The Marine Corps had acquired some , The key to amphibious logistics plan- but not enough, practical experience i n ning developed by the Marine Corps in combat loading during fleet landing ex- the prewar period was the "combat unit ercises held between 1935 and 1941 . loading" of transports. This practical The lack of suitable transports and th e process involved the sequential loading uncertainty at times as to ports of em- of supplies and equipment in order to barkation and dates of availability of support the anticipated tactical scheme ships limited the full application of ashore. Combat loading was finally re - these doctrines in practice and prevente d fined to the point where, if possible, al l the Marines from gaining a real ap- material belonging to a single organiza- preciation of what combat loading tion was stowed in the same part of a would be like under wartime conditions . ship. Because the tactical requirement s This lack was evident during the for each amphibious assault were differ- preparations for Guadalcanal . When ent, however, combat loading could not the 1st Marine Division left the United be standardized, and each load had to States, it was headed for New Zealand, be planned by someone knowledgeabl e the staging area rather than the target , 22 RAdm Charles J . Moore ltr to Hd, HistBr , and most of the ships transporting di - G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 2May66 . vision units were loaded organization-

AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE IN WORLD WAR II 663

ally. 23 The reason for this was because forces had to be drawn from the tac- General Vandegrift and his planner s tical units for this purpose . The mission had been told that the division was t o of the latter was thus affected adversely . "be the nucleus for the buildup of a In the prewar years, when a simulate d force which would be trained for opera- enemy was introduced to add realism tions which might come late in 1942." 2 4 to a fleet landing exercise, it prove d When 7 August was announced as the difficult to achieve the requisite order date for the invasion of Guadalcanal , and control of the beaches. In recogni- a D-Day that was much earlier than ha d tion of this problem, early amphibious been expected, the division had to un- warfare doctrine provided for the es- load its ships at Wellington and im- tablishment of a beach party, com- mediately reload them for combat. manded by a naval officer entitled a Reloading was expedited and went Beachmaster, and a shore party—a spe- relatively well for all groups except one , cial task organization—commanded b y which found the 11-day period require d an officer from the landing force . Such to accomplish this task something akin primarily naval functions as reconnais- to a nightmare.2 5 sance and marking of beaches, marking At the objective, the inability of the hazards to navigation, control of boats , landing force to relieve the congestion evacuation of casualties from the beach , on the beaches, as men and supplies and the unloading of landing force ma- poured ashore, was as great and insolu- teriel from the boats were assigned t o ble a problem during the war as it ha d the beach party. The duties of the shore been in the prewar landing exercises . party encompassed such functions a s Before World War II, no separate shor e control of stragglers and prisoners, se- party organization had been established lection and marking of routes inland , within the T/0 for a Marine infantry movement of supplies and equipment division, with the result that labo r off the beaches, and assignment o f storage and bivouac areas in the vicin- r 23 "I think that this tends to paint a bette ity of the beach. The Tentative Landing picture than actually existed . It is my recol- lection as the logistic staff Marine on Halsey's Operations Manual did not stipulate the staff group (Vice Admiral Robert L . Ghormley , strength and composition of the shor e ComSoPac at the outset), that we had unti l party, but only stated that it woul d about November 1942 for build-up and train- contain detachments from some or al l ing in New Zealand and therefore there was no of the following landing force units : combat loading for the 1st Division. All carg o was unloaded at Wellington and reloade d medical, supply, engineer, military po- (combat load) . The material for which there lice, working details, 26 communications, was no space remained in Wellington for sub- and chemical warfare. Although the sequent displacement forward ." BGen Joseph beach and shore parties operated in - H. Fellows ltr to Hd, HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC , dependently, the manual called for thei r dtd 25Apr66 . 24 Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor 29 It is interesting to note that, although to Guadalcanal, p . 249 . incongruous, "working details" is the exact 2' See ibid ., pp. 249—250, for the trials an d term appearing in the Tentative Manual fo r tribulations of this unit . Landing Operations .

664 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

commanders and personnel to observ e war, the number of ships available fo r the fullest degree of cooperation . the operation was limited, necessitating The solution to these deficiencies was a careful screening of the landing forc e found in 1941, when, based on the rec- equipment that was to be carried to th e ommendations of Major General Hol- target. No gear that was in excess of land M. Smith, a joint board consisting tactical requirements could be loaded i n of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and assault shipping, nor was there enough Coast Guard officers recommended to hold space for all of the division organic Rear Admiral Ernest J. King, Com- motor transport. Most of the quarter- mander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, that : and one-ton trucks were loaded aboar d (1) as a component of the landing force ships, but 75 percent of the heavier roll- the beach and shore parties be joined ing stock was left behind with the rear together under the title Shore Party ; echelon. When finally embarked, th e (2) the beach party commander be des- Marines carried supplies for 60 days, ignated both as the assistant to the 10 units of fire for all weapons, onl y shore party commander and as his ad - enough individual gear to live and fight, visor on naval matters ; and (3) the and less than half of the vehicles of th e responsibility for unloading boats at division . the beach be transferred from the naval The Guadalcanal operation also dem- element to the landing force element onstrated that an increased number of of the shore party.27 TQMs was needed to supervise all These changes were officially adopted phases of loading and embarkation . In on 1 August 1942 as Change 2 to Fleet addition, events showed that boat crew s Training Publication 167 . Earlier that well trained in seamanship and small- year, the size of the Marine division had craft handling were required for the been increased by adding a pionee r rapid unloading of ships, movement t o (shore party) battalion of 34 officer s the beach, and the return to the ships and 669 enlisted Marines . The T/O for other loads of cargo . Although this change was made on 10 January 1942 , phase of assault landings was improved a date too late for the personnel con- somewhat during the course of the war , cerned to acquire practical experienc e comments concerning the operations of in large-scale exercises, where the tech- boat crews at Okinawa give rise to the niques of handling vast quantities of observation that even at the end of the supplies and the adequacy and strengt h Pacific fighting there was still consider - of the new organization could have been able room for improvement.28 tested. A primary source of concern at At Guadalcanal, where logistical doc- Guadalcanal on D-Day and after wa s trine was put into practice, some glar- e ing deficiencies were uncovered . To the slowness with which supplies wer moved from the landing craft to the begin with, at that critical point in th e beaches and then to supply dumps in - uT CG, LantPhibFor PrelimRpt to CinCLan t land. Quite simply, General Vandegrift on New River Exercise 4-12Aug41, dtd 27 - Aug41 . `e See pt II, chap 5, p . 159, supra.

AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE IN WORLD WAR II 665

was faced at this critical point of th e war in the Pacific . "So limited was it operation with a manpower shortag e at first, that all of our efforts for several that had been predicted during the plan- months were exerted primarily to hol d ning phases. In view of the uncertainty what we had taken at Guadalcanal ." 3 0 of the situation on a hostile beach, he Operations in this second period were believed that he could not spare me n conducted chiefly in the Solomons-New from combat units to augment the 50 0 Britain—Eastern New Guinea area an d Marines in the 1st Pioneer Battalion . may be said to have lasted until Novem- The mounting stack of supplies on the ber 1943. As one student of militar y beaches offered a lucrative target to history has written, the primary lesson Rabaul-based Japanese aircraft, but of Guadalcanal "was that without th e fortunately for the American force s FMF, the operation could never hav e ashore, the enemy concentrated on ship - happened." 3 1 ping in the transport area rather than The United States entered the offen- materiel on the beaches . " `Had the sive period in November 1943 when th e Japanese set fire to the supplies tower- Central Pacific campaign opened wit h ing high on the Guadalcanal beachhead, ' the Gilberts operation . This phase of to quote Vandegrift, `the consequence s the war was marked by growing Ameri- might well have been incalculable an d can strength as new ships joined th e ruinous.' " 2 9 fleet and additional troops became avail- Although enemy threats to the beach- able. In November 1942, there wer e head became negligible as the war pro- 69,320 Marine ground troops in the Pa- gressed—that is, with the exception of cific ; this number increased to 100,845 the period of the Kamikazes—the logis- a year later.32 Marine aviation strength tical problems inherent in an amphib- increased proportionately . In this third ious assault landing never completel y war period, vast forward area bases disappeared. Even under optimum con- were constructed from which these ditions, such as those that existed o n growing forces could mount and stage L-Day at Okinawa where there was n o for future operations. opposition to the landing, logistics Although the war in the South Pacifi c problems continued to crop up from the was primarily a holding action, whic h very inception of an operation and were in the end became fully offensive i n among the most difficult that the in- character, the Central Pacific campaign vasion force commanders had to solve . was a true offensive from the outset . Quick and easy solutions were seldom if ever within grasp, for amphibious The terrain of the targets here was en- logistics has always been an immens e tirely different from that experienced and complex factor. in the South Pacific, and the targets "a The Guadalcanal landings began th e themselves were not only a series of second or limited offensive period of th e '° Spruance, "Lecture," p . 541 . 31 Quoted in Isely and Crowl, Marines an d Heinl, "The USMC," p . 1320 . Amphibious War, p . 132. FMF Grd Status Rpts, Nov42, Nov43 .

666 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

tiny, isolated, completely and densely the reassessment and transformation o f fortified atolls or small islands" 33 but the following essentials of an amphib- also larger islands such as those foun d ious operation : in the Marianas . In the conduct of th e 1. fighting in the Central Pacific and in Preliminary preparation of the tar - get [by air and naval gunfire] . the selection of targets, many of Ellis ' 2. [Air bombardment and naval gun - prophecies of the 1920s became reality . fire] in close support of the landing . It has been accurately stated that : 3. Logistic support of the landing. 4. Landing craft. If the battles of the South Pacific prove d 5. Landing force communications. that the Fleet Marine Force was ready fo r 6. Assault techniques and tactics.3 5 war, those of the Central Pacific demonstrated its grasp and virtuosity in amphib- Amphibious assaults were uniformly ious assault . Except for Okinawa—whic h successful throughout the course of op- was really not a part of either South o r erations in the Pacific because two o f Central Pacific campaigns—the entir e the principles of war—surprise and roll of Central Pacific battles, from Tar- awa to Iwo Jima, was by necessity a serie s concentration of forces—were gener- of sea-borne assaults against position s ally followed . In the final period of th e fortified and organized with every refine- war, it became not only practicable bu t ment that Japanese laboriousness and in- possible to subordinate the former to genuity could provide . To reduce such strongholds was truly amphibious war- the latter because American naval an d fare a l'outrance [to the utmost]—the air forces had gained control of a vas t assaults which the Marine Corps had fore- area above and surrounding the targets. seen and planned for during the decades Consequently, objectives were sealed off of peace.3 4 and the enemy could not reinforce a Between the invasions of Guadalcanal garrison in the face of an impending on 7 August 1942 and of Tarawa on 2 0 American amphibious assault. There- November 1943, Marine forces had bee n fore, U. S . forces could and did sacrifice involved in assault operations in th e surprise without endangering any land- Central and Northern Solomons . Dur- ings. ing the first year of offensive operations, and indeed until the end of the Pacific LANDING CRAFT War, amphibious warfare doctrine was modified without seriously affecting Increased production at home and the basic principles. Two primary factors resultant flow of new types of weapons generated these modifications—in- and equipment overseas did not materi- creased American production and really affect the basic pattern of amphib- finement of existing techniques in am- ious operations. The debarkation of phibious operations . Each of these Marines into landing craft from amphib- factors had far-reaching influence on ious transports, the formation of as -

a3 Heinl, "The USMC," p . 1319 . " These six arbitrary categories are thos e "Ibid., p. 1320. noted in ibid., p. 1322 .

AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE IN WORLD WAR II 667

sault waves, and the trip to the beach in the role of prime movers . "Once in itself all remained essentially un- position, however, the gunners foun d changed. New and improved amphib- the amphibian was a creature of mixe d ious vessels and vehicles, however , virtues ; tracked vehicles tore up comm permitted American forces to conduc t wire, creating early the pattern of com- landings in a more expeditious manner . bat events that became too familiar to The Fleet Marine Force pioneered i n plagued wiremen ." 37 The amtrac began the 1930s the development and testin g its career on Guadalcanal in a modest of landing craft, most notably the shal- manner, and its "usefulness exceeded al l low-draft Eureka, designed by Andrew expectations" ; 38 nobody, however, en- J. Higgins, a shipbuilder in New visioned using the weird vehicle in much Orleans. Despite the fact that the Navy more than a cargo-carrying capacity . had developed an experimental type of After Tarawa, however, "Never again its own, the Higgins boat "gave the in the Pacific War were assault troops greatest promise, for it could push it - to be handicapped by serious shortages self aground on the beach and then re - of this vital piece of equipment." 39 Am- tract. In fact this boat was the ancesto r phibian tractors were later armored and of the LCVP (Landing Craft Vehicle an d armed with guns, howitzers, and flame - Personnel) that played an importan t throwers, and utilized to carry the as- part in the amphibious operations of sault wave into the beachhead . World War II ." 36 Because of its rathe r fragile hull, however, the Higgins boat Also making its first appearance in a could not negotiate the reefs offshore Central Pacific campaign was th e of many of the island targets in the DUKW. Developed for the Army to Pacific, whereupon another Marine serve as ship-to-shore cargo and troo p Corps-sponsored and -developed item , transfer vehicles where harbor facilities the amphibian tractor, orginally con- were inadequate, the value of this am- ceived for employment in logistical phibian truck was initially exhibited at l support, was fully utilized as a tactica Kwajalein, where it transported sup- weapon. plies and equipment—mainly artillery The importance and capabilities o f and ammunition—to the beaches . When the versatile amtrac as a landing vehicle ashore, the DUKWs also supplemented as well as an assault weapon were fully the organic motor transport of the land - demonstrated at Tarawa, although they had been employed earlier in the war in Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbo r the Solomons . On Guadalcanal, the am - to Guadalcanal, p . 256 . phibian tractors were used to carr y 38 Ibid., p . 256n. Not everybody was enthused about the amtrac, for, according to General cargo from ship to shore, and once on Pfeiffer, Admiral Turner " . . . recommended the island, the artillery employed them no further amtracs because they rusted on th e beach at Guadalcanal . . . ." Pfeiffer Ur. 38 King and Whitehill, King's Naval Record, 39 Isely and Crowl, Marines and Amphibious p. 320. War, p. 583 .

668 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

ing force in support of the operation .40 dure became commonplace in later Worl d In all Marine operations in the Pacific War II amphibious assaults in this area. after Kwajalein, Army DUKW com- Depending on how and for what pur- panies, and Marine DUKW companies i n pose they had been modified, LSTs wer e the later stages, were attached to the employed as offshore radar stations, re- divisions involved. pair ships, and hospital ships . They were British developmental experiments also used as floating platforms from with seagoing landing ships furnishe d which small spotter planes were the United States with an insight to launched and recovered by Brodie Gear , solving the problem of getting amphib- which may very roughly be compared ious forces and all of their combat gea r to a giant slingshot. ashore in as complete a package as pos- American adoption and further modi- sible. The most important of the large r fication of yet another type of landing landing vessels developed in the war craft, the LCI, also resulted from earlier was the LST, which quickly attained a British experimentation . Initially em- reputation for being "the workhorse of ployed with ramps on either side of the 4 1 the amphibious fleet." bow for the rapid offloading of infantry Although hydrographic conditions in troops at or close to the beach, coral the Central Pacific often prevented LST s outcroppings fringing the island objec- from reaching the shore to load or un- tives in the Central Pacific prohibited load their cargoes, these vessels were their employment as originally con- ideally suited as sea-going transport s ceived. The LCIs were then converted t o for DUKWs and amtracs, which could gunboats and rocket and mortar boats , easily offload into the water from the and were assigned to the gunfire sup - huge LST bow ramp. At the staging are a port group of the amphibious landin g for the Marianas invasions, assaul t force for the purpose of providing troops and amphibian vehicles were car- close-in fire support of the landing . ried to the target on LSTs for the first They first appeared in this role durin g time in the Central Pacific. This proce- the invasion of the Treasury Islands . Both tactical and logistical require- '° The DUKW "was valuable only to th e ments gave impetus to the developmen t extent that nothing else was available to th e artillery . It was rated at 5,000 pounds capacity of a family of various types of landin g in moderate surf. The 105mm howitzer weighed craft and to the modification and im- 5,000 pounds all by itself . Consequently, we provement of those already in produc- had to overload to get a skeleton crew, a lim- tion and service . The considerations of ited amount of ammunition, howitzer, and section gear in one DUKW . Until DUKW s basic amphibious doctrine were constant were modified to transport the 105, we had to factors when the configuration and fu- beat out the sides to get the piece aboard . Th e ture uses of new types of landing craft only reason that artillery used this vehicle wa s were being determined . Fundamentally, because the amphibian tractors were alway s e assigned to the infantry." LtCol Robert C . these craft had to give the ship-to-shor Hilliard comments on draft ms, dtd 9Dec65 . movement greater power and flexibility 61 Isely and Crowl, op. cit ., p . 583 . and expedite the landing of the supplies

AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE IN WORLD WAR II 669

and equipment belonging to and in sup - necessary to staff amphibious force head - port of the landing force . quarters so numerous, that no ordinar y combatant or auxiliary ship could hol d them.4 2 COMMUNICATIONS Along with the improved control of Other technical innovations, which operations overall provided by the equip- modified but left unchanged amphibiou s ment and facilities of the AGC was an doctrine and helped to improve the con- attempt to ensure that no communica- trol of ship-to-shore movement and op- tions gap would again occur in amphibi- erations ashore, appeared in the field of ous assault. To gain this assurance communications . Improved communica- control craft bristling with the most tions procedure and the development o f modern communications equipmen t highly sophisticated radio equipment , available were stationed at the line o f which was better suited for employmen t departure. Not only did these craft orin amphibious operations than that ganize, control, and shepherd to the which had been available at the begin- beachhead the vessels and amphibiou s ning of the war, soon emerged as a re- vehicles comprising the initial assault sult of the lessons learned in battle . wave, but they also coordinated the landing of subsequent waves The most critical period of all in an . amphibious assault is immediately be- Technical refinements and modern , fore and during the ship-to-shore move- up-to-date equipment served together to ment. It is at this time that effective make an amphibious assault a smoothly command control over scattered subordi- functioning and relatively simple type nate units is difficult to maintain, of operation. At the end of the war most especially without an optimum com- if not all kinks had been ironed out. By munications performance. Many factors 1945, testing and practice under combat led to a communications breakdown at conditions had given American com- various times at Tarawa . The inter- manders improved and coordinated sup - rupted contact between the attack force porting arms, close air support, an d commander's flagship and the force s naval gunfire support systems . ashore was one that was fraught with the most dangerous consequences . After SUPPORTING ARMS Tarawa, few such breakdowns recurred because of the introduction into the Pa- Because coordination and control fig- cific of the amphibious force flagshi p n (AGC, which stands for Auxiliary Gen- ure so importantly in the conduct of a eral Communications) . amphibious operation, every effort wa s

That new type of naval auxiliary . . . 42 Samuel Eliot Morison, Aleutians, Gilbert s had been improvised for Admiral Hewitt and Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944—Histor y in the Salerno operation because the net- of United States Naval Operations in Worl d work of communications in modern am- War II, v. VII (Boston : Little, Brown an d phibious warfare had become so vast and Company, 1960), p . 207, hereafter Morison, complicated, and the officers and men Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls .

670 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

bent in developing all of the tools an d time in the war at Iwo Jima.43 The techniques that would make each ven- establishment of the coordination cen- ture a complete success. Coordination of ters ashore simply was an extension to all three elements of the amphibiou s a point closer to the scene of action o f force and especially the three supportin g the control exercised aboard the AGC by arms—air, artillery, and naval gunfire the task force commander, and per- —was vital. The communications failure mitted a more rapid response to the at Tarawa provided the medium i n requests of the infantry unit command- which the Joint Assault Signal Com- ers, although it did not always work out pany was nurtured . The nucleus of that way . At Okinawa, final authorit y Army, Marine, and Navy communica- for the allocation and selection of sup - tions personnel around which the porting fires was vested in the artiller y JASCO was formed came from fire sup - representative in the Target Informa- port ships, air liaison parties, and shore tion Center, who generally made his de- fire control parties . The JASCO, em- cision in accordance with the advice an d ployed only in the course of amphibious recommendations of the representatives operations, served as a single adminis- of air and naval gunfire . trative and housekeeping unit for th e From the Marine Corps point of view , naval gunfire teams, air liaison parties , air support of ground troops by Marine and shore party communication teams pilots flying Marine aircraft never required by a division during an assaul t reached a satisfactory level during the landing. Just prior to and in the cours e Pacific War. In fact, many World War I I of operations, all of these teams were Marine aviation commanders considere d parcelled out by attachment to the rifle that their squadrons, groups, and wing s regiments and battalions of the division . were never employed to maximum capa- The establishment of the JASCOs re- bility with respect to their tactical func- sulted in a reduction in personnel and tions from a time immediately afte r operational requirements of their for- Guadalcanal until the Philippines an d mer parent organizations, because the Okinawa campaigns . In late 1943 an d JASCO required fewer skilled communi- the early months of 1944, tedium an d cators who, by employing uniform tech- boredom were the order for Marin e niques and radio procedures, reduced the pilots who, day after day, flew the so - amount of unnecessary traffic and thus called "Bougainville Milk Run," o r unclogged previously overworked radi o bombed and rebombed oft-attacked circuits. 'a According to Colonel Robert D . Heinl, Jr., Complementing the JASCOs and also former 3d Marine Division Naval Gunfir e Officer, "What we had on Iwo was just a providing an additional measure of co - single small-size blackout tent where we kept ordination and control to the conduct of a modest situation map, a few radio remotes , the amphibious operation were land - and our whiskey . The 3d Division was th e only unit that did this ; neither of the othe r based fire support coordination center s divisions was that institutionalized." Col Robert (FSCCs), which appeared for the first D. Heinl, Jr., ltr to CMC, dtd 27May66.

AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE IN WORLD WAR II 671

atolls and islets that were in the back- manders noted that Navy control pro- wash of the war. It may have been good cedure was relatively inflexible an d experience for young Marine aviators , caused long, needless delays between th e but it wasn't the type of combat fo r request for a mission and its final execu- which they had been trained . tion. Another cause for aggravation was The situation improved with the as- that these missions were controlled by signment of Marine squadrons to the naval officers on board ship and out of Philippines and Okinawa operations . realistic touch with the situation ashore . Attached to MacArthur's forces, the Ma- In the Guam campaign, the most criti- rines amassed an outstanding record of cal area of air support operations wa s successful and fruitful close air suppor t communications . Requests for air missions, and proselytized a number of strikes originated with air liaiso n Army commanders who had not previ- parties assigned to each infantry bat- ously been aware of the capabilities o f talion and regiment, and had to be ap- this supporting arm. During Okinawa, proved up the chain of command and by close air support was flown for the most both division headquarters and the Com- part by carrier-based Navy flyers, whil e mander, Support Aircraft, Attack Force . Marine pilots of TAF flew combat ai r Only one radio circuit, the Support Air patrols and provided the air defense o f Direction net, was made available fo r the island. Although these TAF aviator s these requests, and it was crowded at al l did the most to blunt the Kamikaze times. Additionally, "very few close sup - threat and downed a creditable if no t port strikes were carried out on time or entirely confirmed number of enemy within limits set by requesting agencies " planes, they still did not fulfill what ha s for "the time consumed in request, proc- come to be recognized as the primary essing, approval, and final execution wa s mission of Marine aviation, close ai r generally 45 minutes to an hour or support of Marine ground troops. more." 44 Despite the belief of the Com- The request that Marines support Ma- mander, Support Aircraft at Guam that rines was not based on pride of service "the time spent [was] justified by the suc- alone, as some have suggested—Marine cess of the missions, ground units gen- ground commanders were happy to re- erally asked for more immediate contro l ceive air support from any source, proof planes by air liaison officers and for a vided it came in immediate response to method of operations and system o f the initial request and did the job fo r communications that would ensure a which it had been requested . A less-than- faster response to the needs of assaul t completely satisfactory performance i n troops." 4 6 these two aspects of air support served Concluding that air liaison partie s as the crux of Marine dissatisfaction should have more direct contact with with the type of support they received supporting planes, the Commander , until late in the war. This disconten t Support Aircraft, Pacific Fleet, backe d was very strongly voiced in the opera- Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central tions and action reports following th e Pacific Drive, p . 574. Marianas campaign, where Marine com- Ibid.

672 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

the Marines in his comments on air op- fended island. Although this should have erations in the Marianas.46 He also been apparent, American commander s called attention to the need for greate r learned that in order to soften up the understanding "on the one hand by the target for a landing, the preliminary Ground Forces of the capabilities and bombardment had to be heavier and sus- limitations of aircraft, and on the othe r tained for a longer period than had bee n hand by the pilots of what they are sup- the case in previous operations . More posed to accomplish." 47 The problem importantly, task force commander s of control was eased somewhat at Iw o learned that : and Okinawa, where Marine LFASCU s . . . the Japanese shore battery coul d and the ALPs were given greater au- be attacked at short range with reasonabl e thority and provided a quicker response impunity ; ships could `fight forts,' at least to the requests of infantry commanders, Japanese forts ; and no longer would the but full control remained with the concept of gunfire support in the Centra l command ship-based Navy CASCUs fo r Pacific require that ships maneuver a t high speeds while firing at long range ; in- the greater portion of these tw o deed the opposite was recommended b y operations . Admiral Hill when he suggested that One Marine demand that was never destroyers operate close enough to the completely answered was to have Ma- beach to use their 40mm.4 8 rine squadrons in support of the infan- What this meant was that in order to try from the outset of an amphibious reduce casualties—especially during th e assault. At the end of the war, and then assault phase—enemy emplacements too late for their full employment, some would have to be destroyed rather than Marine escort carriers appeared in the just neutralized. This concept was a Pacific . Marine close air support tech- complete reversal of naval gunfire doc- niques and operations never reached ful l trine to that time . Another significant fruition during the war . Not until lesson learned about naval gunfire sup - Korea, where the experience gained i n port at Tarawa was "the vital necessit y World War II and in postwar landin g of reducing the time lag between the lift- exercises was tested in the crucible of ing of fires and the touchdown of th e combat, did Marines fly close support leading wave in order to reduce the op- missions for other Marines for any con- portunity of the defender to recover siderable period . from the shock of the bombardment . The operations leading to the capture ." 49 All in all, "the lessons of Taraw a of Tarawa provided the source of man y showed the `doubting Thomas' that effec - lessons learned, not the least of which tive gunfire support required a thoroug h was the importance of the role of naval knowledge of the gunnery problem . gunfire in an assault on a strongly de - . . ." 99 Essentially, in view of the nature

4B ComSptAirPacRpt of Ops in Spt of the de Col Donald M . Weller, "Salvo—Splash! " Capture of the Marianas, dtd 11Sep44, p . 3 0 USNI Proceedings, v. 80, no . 8 (Aug54), p. 839. (0AB, NHD) . " Ibid., p. 849 . " Ibid., p. 9 . Ibid.

AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE IN WORLD WAR II 673

of Japanese island redoubts in the Cen- commanders were amply supported tral Pacific scheduled for future attack , were the Marshalls, Guam, and Okinawa. the performance of naval gunfire sup - The amount of naval gunfire availabl e port had to improve greatly . for other operations was limited, how- One step taken along these lines was ever, by certain considerations . For ex- the establishment of a shore bombard- ample, during the early stages of th e ment training program at Pearl Harbor war at Guadalcanal, the threat to th e in September–October 1943 . Kahoola- landing by the Japanese fleet forced the wee Island in the Hawaiian group wa s U. S. task force commander to reduc e utilized as a bombardment range at the strength of the support force b y which both fire support ships and their diverting some ships to stem that threat. crews and shore fire control partie s At Iwo, a portion of the fleet was as- practiced naval gunfire support tech- signed to cover the carrier strikes o n niques that were to prove successful i n Tokyo in order to reduce the Kamikaz e subsequent operations . According to one menace. These, among others, were th e observer, the Commander, Cruiser - reasons given for the fact that the Destroyer Forces, Pacific Fleet : landing forces could not get all of th e NGF support that they wanted and . . . took quite a hard-boiled attitude towar d an unsatisfactory performance over this needed. course—and no destroyer went into the Finally, naval gunfire preparation of forward area without demonstrating pro- an objective prior to a designated D-Da y ficiency at Kahoolawee .61 was necessarily limited early in the war Marine commanders never disputed in order to maintain the principle of sur- the importance of naval gunfire in sup - prise. American naval superiority in the port of a landing, and acknowledged it s latter stages of the fighting permitte d dominant position in comparison with the sacrifice of surprise without en- the other supporting arms available t o dangering an assault landing . It was not ground forces. "This dominance can be only superior strength that allowed tac- measured by various yardsticks such tical and even strategical surprise to b e as weight of fire, rapidity of response, subordinated to ensure the capture of all-weather capability, economy, unin- the beachhead . Improvement in the tech - terrupted availability, and peak power niques of employment and delivery o f during the beach assault itself." 52 Once naval gunfire did much to guarantee the artillery is ashore, however, it become s success of an operation . the dominant arm . In general, landing Following Tarawa, naval gunfire doc- force commanders wanted all of the trine was thoroughly reappraised. As naval gunfire support they could get ; pointed out earlier, one conclusion three notable occasions when ground reached was that while area fire could be employed for neutralization in the pre - 61 Weller, op. cit., USNI Proceedings, v . 80 , landing period on the morning of a no. 9 (Sep54), p . 1017. D-Day, it could not effectively destro y " Col Robert D . Heinl, Jr., "The Gun Gap and How to Close It," USNI Proceedings, v. enemy gun positions and well-con- 91, no. 9 (Sep65), p . 28 . structed defenses . In order for NGF to

674 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

perform its primary task, it was vital "enterprises . . . that . . . become models that support ships "deliver prolonge d of their kind . . . . If such a tactical deliberate destructive pinpoint fire superlative can be used to describe a against known or suspected difficult military maneuver, where the resul t targets." 53 Accordingly, gunfire support brilliantly consummated the planning vessels, including battleships, woul d and performance, Tinian was the perfect have to move in close to the beaches . At amphibious operation in the Pacifi c Kwajalein, NGF was delivered at con- war." 5 6 stantly closing ranges, down to 1,80 0 Close on the heels of the end of th e yards. Samuel Eliot Morison quotes a Marianas campaign came the bitterly conversation that allegedly occurred on fought battles in the Philippines and o n the task force flagship bridge after Ad- Iwo Jima and Okinawa. The successful miral Turner had given orders for the amphibious assault at each of thes e fire support ships to close the range : targets was a logical culmination of al l " C.O. of a battleship : `I can't take my lessons learned since Guadalcanal and ship in that close .' demonstrated a determination not to re- Turner : `What's your armor for? Get peat earlier mistakes and shortcomings . in there!" 5 4 Viewing the Pacific War, 67 Admiral A direct result of the lessons learne d Spruance speculated on three factors at Tarawa was the successful and rapid that stand out in the development o f capture of Kwajalein with significantl y naval warfare . These were the great smaller losses. Subsequent amphibious growth of carrier strength, the improved operations in the Pacific benefitted simi- ability to make amphibious landing s larly. The conduct of amphibious as- against heavy resistance, and the in- saults in the period following the Gil- creased capacity for logistical suppor t berts campaign was so vastly improve d of the fleet at ever-increasing distance s and the techniques of amphibious war- from Pearl Harbor. One can charge the fare refined to such a degree that, in les s Marines' success in the conduct of am- than a year after Tarawa was secured , phibious warfare to the same three Marines landed on Tinian on 24 July factors. Vital to all this, however, was 1944 in what Admiral Spruance con- the development of new techniques an d sidered "was, perhaps, the most bril- refinement of the old which neither liantly conceived and executed amphibi- blindly adhered to basic amphibiou s ous operation of the War." 55 General warfare doctrine nor completely dis- Holland M . Smith, commander of th e regarded it either. This thesis best de- Expeditionary Troops for both Saipan scribes the foundations of the strateg y and Tinian, called the latter one of those leading to victory.

" Isely and Crowl, Marines and Amphibious "Gen Holland M . Smith and Percy Finch , War, p . 587 . Coral and Brass (New York : Charles Scrib- " Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Mar- ner's Sons, 1949), p . 181, hereafter Smith and shalls, p . 260n . Finch, Coral and Brass. 6s Spruance, "Lecture," p . 550. 54 Spruance, "Lecture," pp . 554-555 .

AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE IN WORLD WAR II 675

THE JAPANESE combat engineers and tanks to assum e the cruelly expensive task of litera l But what of the enemy? In the Pacific , extermination of all resistance, lon g the Allies faced a fantastically impla- after any hope of vital victory remained cable, determined, and aggressive foe , to the Japanese ." 58 This conclusion is who had a strong capability for organ- particularly valid in relation to Peleliu , izing the ground and constructing de- Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, and certainl y fensive works of great strength . the latter, where General Ushijima's As individual soldiers and small unit Thirty-second Army "extracted th e fighters, the Japanese were probably un- maximum cost for our victory ." 5 9 surpassed in courage and tenacity, but In an attempt to salvage something i n these attributes were not complemented the face of impending defeat, the Jap- by effective tactical direction . Although anese finally resorted to the program the Japanese Army had good field ar- of Kamikaze attacks in the hope that tillery, the support of a flexible artiller y resulting American losses would force organization was lacking . After the loss the United States to tire of the wa r of Guadalcanal, the Japanese groun d and end it. Although U . S. casualties troops were denied anything that even mounted as a direct result of these at - resembled effective air support and for tacks, the war effort was not deterred. all practical purposes, the Japanese wer e The myth of enemy invincibility, an d unable to maintain an air offensive that his reputation for cunning and ruth- was even worthy of the name. By the lessness emerged from the record of the end of the Gilberts operation, and cer- Japanese Army in China in the 1930s , tainly by the time that Saipan was in- the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, an d vaded, the island outposts defending th e the relative ease of initial Japanese con- Empire had been completely isolate d quests in Southeast Asia . Marine Corps and beyond any hope of reinforcement . attitudes towards the enemy were first American amphibious assaults in th e formed in Shanghai and later tempered Central Pacific rapidly took on a pattern in combat at Guadalcanal. The Marine which seldom varied throughout the res t estimate of the opponent basically took of the war . This program was set by the two forms. The first was that the Japa- generally small size of the objective nese could be defeated by employing thei r combined with the high density an d own tactics against them, and by be- great strength of the defense, particu- coming as adept as the enemy in jungle larly at the beachhead . The classic ex- warfare. The Marines were not novice s ample of this, perhaps, is Peleliu. Once in fighting in the tropics, for many o f American and Japanese forces were i n the regulars had received their baptism contact, the determination of the enem y of fire in the Banana Wars. The second to fight until death and the impregna- attitude, one of deep mistrust, was bility of his defenses tended to neutral- " Col Donald M . Weller, "Firepower an d ize the overwhelming fire superiority the Amphibious Assault," Marine Corp s of the Americans. "This forced our Gazette, v. 36, no . 3 (Mar52), p . 56 . riflemen, with some assistance fro m 5D Ibid.

310-224 0 - 69 - 44

676 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

based on a number of incidents which the Japanese military system were ex- had occurred in the early days of the posed and exploited. The step-by-step war in the Philippines and at Guadal- process by which the enemy was de- canal. feated cost the Americans dearly, but i n One specific episode at the root of thi s the end, Japanese attrition was the mistrust which strongly affected the Ma- heavier. Perhaps no fighting men in the rine temper when it became known was war suffered so much as those who com- the unfortunate Goettge Patrol o n prised the pitiful remnants of the once - Guadalcanal.60 As soon as the partic- proud Japanese units that retreated ulars of what had happened to the patrol from Guadalcanal, those that withdrew reached the rest of the division : from Cape Gloucester to Rabaul, an d others that withered on the vine on th e . . . hatred for the Japanese seared th e heart of the Marine Corps. This episod e bypassed islands of the Pacific . Once . . . followed by devious trickery, such a s Japanese fortunes waned and th e playing dead before tossing a grenade, American offensive began to roll, these made it difficult to indoctrinate Marines forces were neither reinforced, replen- on Guadalcanal and later with the neces- ished, nor succored . Collectively, the y sity of taking prisoners of war for th e purpose of gaining information . Such an were indeed a forlorn hope in the mos t attitude, combined with the adamant re- descriptive sense of this term. fusal of most Japanese to surrender under Other factors in addition to the ef- any circumstances, hobbled intelligence fective application of the doctrine of work in the field .61 amphibious warfare and subsequent re- Repercussions stemming from the finements strongly influenced the Ma- knowledge of this event continued as rine Corps role in the Pacific War . Such long as the Pacific War lasted . considerations as the strength and or- With each succeeding Pacific amphib- ganization of Marine divisions and air- ious assault, more chinks and defects in craft wings, combat developments and tactical innovations, and improved an d Pearl Har- 80 See Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, new weaponry together provided the bor to Guadalcanal, p. 281, for the story of thi s patrol . bases leading to a successful conclusion e1 Isely and Crowl, Marines and Amphibious of each campaign to which Marine War, p . 138. Corps units were committed. CHAPTER 2 A Final Accounting '

The intent of the five-volume History ations with the fleet, as the force was to of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in be part of the fleet for "tactical employ- World War II—of which this is the final ment." The Commandant also was to volume in the series—is the compre- designate the units comprising the FM F hensive presentation of Marine Corp s and which were to be under his command participation in the Pacific War . Be- except when embarked with the fleet o r cause of the emphasis on operations, th e when engaged in fleet exercises. At the administrative aspect of the wartime onset of World War II, therefore, the growth and development of the FM F Commandant did control the FMF, or has received less than full treatmen t parts of it. The outbreak of the war heretofore . It would be difficult and in - changed this command relationship fo r appropriate to attempt in this one chap - all practical purposes, primarily becaus e ter either to depict the many change s most of the FMF was operating essen- in the nature, composition, and mission tially under the tactical direction of fleet of Marine Corps units in the war, to commanders. Thereafter, the CMC wa s describe fully unit activations, deac- responsible only for Marine Corps ad - tivations, and consolidations, or to eval- ministration and planning, and had no uate the causes and effects of changes in operational control over FMF units . amphibious doctrine mentioned briefl y But the manner in which he provided in the previous chapter . the FMF with fully trained an d These five volumes would be less than equipped Marines and the most modern complete, however, without some ac - tools available cannot be overempha- counting of the role of the Commandant sized. and Headquarters Marine Corps It is possible that many Marines in (HQMC) in the war effort. Under the the islands thought that HQMC oper- provisions of General Order 241—the ated in a vacuum because Washington charter for the Fleet Marine Force—th e was so far away from the combat zone . Commandant of the Marine Corps This view was sometimes believed jus- (CMC) was to maintain the Marine ex- tified because it seemed to take so long peditionary force in readiness for oper- for HQMC to respond to a request o r inquiry from the field. The truth is, Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s chapter is derived from : CMC Rpts, 1940— however, that both Generals Holcomb 1945 ; USMC Admin Hist ; Condit, Diamond, and Vandegrift kept fully abreast o f and Turnbladh, Marine Corps Training ; all developments that concerned their Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Marines and, depending upon what wa s Guadalcanal; Isely and Crowl, Marines and Amphibious War ; Shaw and Kane, Isolation required by field units, they responde d of Rabaul. to those requirements with appropriat e 677

678 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

and decisive action . CMC decisions coul d formed on 1 April 1943 . In July, it wa s and did involve such varied yet allie d redesignated as the 1st Headquarters matters as personnel, training, an d Battalion, and a 2d Headquarter s logistics . Battalion was activated . These two Assisting the Commandant was a units functioned to administer the grea t Headquarters staff, which, like the res t number of additional military person- of the Corps, expanded throughout th e nel who had been assigned to HQM C war. Headquarters Marine Corps ha d staffs. been located in the "New Navy Build- Perhaps the most important staff ing," on Constitution Avenue, Wash- section at HQMC throughout the wa r ington, D . C., until November 1941 , was the Division of Plans and Policies , when it moved to the Navy Department which came into being as a result of th e Annex in Arlington, Virginia . Built redesignation of the Division of Oper- before World War II as an archive s ations and Training on 21 April 1939 . storage building and later taken over This move was made in preparation fo r by the Navy, the Navy Annex overlook s a possible war in view of the deteriora- Arlington National Cemetery and com- tion of international relations at this mands a fine panoramic view of the time. To dwell on the importance of thi s skyline of the nation's capital . division is not to derogate the equall y At the beginning of the war, th e important role played by other head - Commandant had a planning staff in quarters staff agencies . A brief narra- the Division of Plans and Policie s tion will show how its functions vitally (irreverently known as "Pots and affected almost every facet of other Pans") and its subordinate sections, HQMC staff activities and responsi- and an administrative, technical, sup- bilities. ply, and operating staff in the following The Division of Plans and Policie s HQMC staff agencies : Adjutant an d formulated Marine Corps policy an d Inspector's Department, Quartermaste r developed plans for personnel, intelli- Department, Paymaster Department , gence, operations, supply, equipment , Division of Reserve, Division of Publi c and training, and maintained liaison Relations, Division of Personnel, an d regarding these and other Marine Corp s Division of Aviation . matters with various government agen- Following the outbreak of World War cies. To facilitate the operations of th e II, the overall growth of Headquarter s division, it had four staff sections of it s Marine Corps, together with the initi- own : M-1, personnel ; M-2, intelligence ; ation of the Women's Reserve program M-3, operations ; and M-4, supply .'- A and general wartime requirements , fifth section, M-5, was established on 2 7 made it necessary to revamp the head - March 1944 to provide more active quarters structure and bring the Ma- supervision and coordination of al l rine personnel under some sort o f phases of basic and advanced Marine centralized administrative control . To On 24 February 1945, the designations this end, a Headquarters Battalion , M-1, M-2, etc ., were changed to the more com- Headquarters Marine Corps, was mon G-1, G-2, etc .

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 679

Corps training, except that conducted salient points published and sent to field by aviation organizations—which came units for their information and use . In under the Division of Aviation—and these and other ways, Headquarter s that conducted by combat organization s Marine Corps played a most vital rol e —which remained the exclusive pur- in supporting the FMF . view of the M–3 Section. Until its disbandment on 6 May 1945, the M–5 Sec- PERSONNEL AND TRAINING tion continued to supervise all Marin e Corps training activity within the Even before it appeared that a wa r United States. was imminent, the Marine Corps was Understandably the most important fulfilling its mission in national defense . section in "Pots and Pans" was the M–3 The 1930s saw the development of th e Section, which had cognizance over th e doctrine of amphibious warfare and o f following matters : war plans, tactica l the tools and techniques to be employe d doctrine, FMF organization, aviatio n in amphibious assaults . The outbreak planning (with the Division of Avi- of war created an undeniable demand ation), equipment (with M–4 and for troops in ever-increasing numbers , M–5), FMF personnel allowances an d an expansion of existing organizations priorities, troop movements, maneuver s and facilities and the activation of a (with M–5), chemical warfare doctrine , variety of new ones, and the develop- statistical reporting on location and ment of modern weaponry to be em- strength of units, security and passiv e ployed by Marines in combat. The defense, signal security, assignment of Marine Corps was as sensitive and re- radio frequencies and call signs, codes sponsive as the other Services to these and ciphers, training of combat organ- demands, and it was incumbent upon th e izations, and maintenance of liaiso n Commandant to meet them as far as th e with major agencies of Headquarters Corps was concerned. Marine Corps and the other Services . With the publication of the Presi- As the war progressed, the ranks o f dential declaration of a limited nationa l this and other HQMC staffs expanded emergency on 8 September 1939, and o f in pace with the expansion in the num- an unlimited national emergency nearl y ber and diversity of FMF units in th e two years later on 27 May 1941, Marine field. Many if not most of the staff Corps strength was expanded dramati- billets were filled with combat veteran s cally. The July 1941 strength of th e who provided the Commandant and hi s Corps was 53,886 ; a year later, after assistants with valuable knowledg e the Pearl Harbor attack impelled a based on their actual experiences in th e flock of volunteers to rush to recruitin g Pacific. Following each amphibious as- stations to enlist, Marine Corp s sault landing in which Marine Corp s strength had increased to 143,388 . units participated, a raft of specia l In the months prior to the Pearl action reports flowed in to Head- Harbor attack, the Marine Corps proc- quarters Marine Corps to be reviewed, essed approximately 2,000 recruits a analyzed, and their most important and month ; following that date, 20,000 men

680 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

were joined each month . By 1 March later, as this load was increased 1942, recruit depot housing as well a s further, the camp was expanded and de- facilities at other major Marine base s veloped to many times its original size were filled to overflowing. At this time, to meet ballooning needs . From the time the Marine Corps was forced to reduce the 2d Marine Division was activated t o its manpower input to approximatel y the date of its departure to the Pacific, 8,000 men monthly until additiona l it called Elliott's 29,000 acres home . It land could be acquired and housing also became the base for the first Ma- built.3 rine Corps tank training center and th e To meet training requirements and infantry training center for numerou s house the burgeoning ranks of the Pacific-bound replacement drafts . Marine Corps, the Commandant took On the east coast, Quantico had as- steps to purchase additional land o n sumed an important position in th e both the east and west coasts of th e development of Marine amphibiou s United States . A divisional training site doctrine and techniques, and in th e of 113,000 acres, later to be calle d training of Marine officers and tech- Camp Pendleton, was purchased a t nicians during the period between wars . Oceanside, California . The Marine The advent of the national emergency Corps bought 150,000 acres in the sam e soon made it apparent that Quantico state at Niland for an artillery firin g could not expand physically to continu e range, and land for a parachute train- these activities, all of which were ing site at Santee, near San Diego . rapidly growing and intensifying i n In addition, in mid-1940, Camp Elliot t scope, and at the same time serve a s —near San Diego—was activated , home base for east coast FMF activities. ". . . and in operation for a considerabl e This was especially true in view of th e time prior to the acquisition of Cam p fact that operational forces were to Pendleton."' The following year, thi s reach division size . Parris Island was new base housed west coast FMF ele- hard put to maintain its own recruit ments and also serviced as an advanced training program and could do littl e training base . Until that time, the re- to relieve the pressure . The only answer cruit depot at San Diego had provided to this problem was to construct an en- room for all of these services besides tirely new and extensive base for FM F fulfilling its basic mission of trainin g activities on the eastern seaboard . Marine recruits . Because of the ac- Congressional approval on 15 February celerated Marine Corps expansion, San 1941 led to the selection of a site in the Diego became too crowded and th e New River-Neuse River area of North opening of Elliott fortunately relieve d Carolina. the pressure . Initially, this camp was Shortly after its maneuvers in the able to handle the vastly increased ad- Caribbean in the summer of 1941, the vanced training load on the west coast ; understrength 1st Marine Divisio n CMC Rpts, 1941, 1942 . moved into Tent Camp #1, Marine ' Gen O . P. Smith ltr to Hd, HistBr, G—3 Barracks, New River, N .C. From this Div, HQMC, dtd 3May66 . base, which was redesignated Camp

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 681

Lejeune on 20 December 1942, 5 the facilities thereon was the attempt to division participated in a series of am- meet the demand for trained commis- phibious exercises, one with the Army sioned and enlisted personnel for bot h 1st Infantry Division, the first of fou r general and specialist duties . With th e Army divisions to receive such training expansion of Marine Corps strength , jointly with Marine units or under the there was a comparable development i n direction of Marine officers . the training program . Like the division, the 1st Marin e By the time that the United State s Aircraft Wing soon outgrew its quarter s had entered the war, the main pattern s at Quantico, even before it gained full of Marine Corps recruit training to be strength. At the same time that the bas e employed for the duration had evolved . at New River was being developed, th e The basic principles underlying recrui t Marine Corps obtained authorization to training in 1939 changed little in the construct a new air base nearby. Cun- war years, except for the amount of ningham Field, Cherry Point, North time allotted to the training cycle. Be- Carolina, was designated a Marin e fore the national emergency was de- Corps Air Station for development pur- clared in September 1939, boot camp poses on 1 December 1941 . When it was lasted eight weeks. Following that time, commissioned on 20 May 1942, it had and until the authorized strength figure become a vast new base that was cap - of 25,000 enlisted Marines had been able of handling the greatest part of a reached at the end of January 1940, the completely built-up Marine aircraft training period was accelerated an d wing. new Marines entering service fro m Similarly on the west coast, burgeon- September 1939–January 1940 received ing Marine Corps aviation strength re- only four weeks of recruit training . quired the facilities to handle the new Beginning in February 1940, with th e squadrons and training organizations . attainment of the manning level, it was Accordingly, the following Marine possible to lengthen the training cycl e Corps Air Stations—all in California— first to six and then to seven weeks. In were commissioned : Santa Barbara, 4 1944, the Marine Corps reverted to December 1942 ; Mojave, 1 January an eight-week schedule . The program 1943 ; El Toro, 17 March 1943 ; and El promulgated by Headquarters Marine Centro, 23 July 1943 . In addition, a Corps provided that each recruit spen d number of satellite air facilities were his first three weeks in the Corps train- built on both coasts to handle the over - ing at the main station of either Parri s flow as well as to conduct specialized Island or San Diego, the fourth to sixt h training of squadrons permanently or weeks on the rifle range, and the last two temporarily based on the larger sta- weeks of boot camp back at the main tions. station. This schedule represented 42 1 Paralleling the acquisition of ne w hours of training, broken down as fol- training sites and the construction of lows : 195 devoted to weapons instruction, 39 to physical training, 89 to gar- ' G-3 OpD, Dec42, p . 36 . rison subjects, and 98 to field subjects .

682 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

In July 1944, the final wartime chang e obviate the necessity of withdrawin g was made in training recruits ; 36 addi- from combat a unit that had suffered tional hours of weapons training were heavy losses . Replacement battalions included in the eight-week cycle with - were also the source of men to fill gaps out lengthening it. in deployed units caused by rotation of From Pearl Harbor to V-J Day, th e veterans to the States . Marine Corps Recruit Depots at Parris On 22 May 1942, after the 1st and 2d Island and San Diego trained approxi- Marine Divisions had been trained an d mately 450,000 new Marines . This is prepared for movement overseas, th e only an approximation because, whil e Commandant directed that trainin g there is no actual recruit depot output centers be activated at New River an d figure available, all recruits had to g o San Diego. Infantry training of re - through boot camp before they could be placements began first on the west sent to the FMF or other Marine Corp s coast at Camp Elliott, where the 2 d activities, and this number is close t o Replacement Battalion was formed on 1 the enlisted strength of the Corps near September 1942 . This battalion's train- the end of the war . At the recruit depots, ing was limited to two weeks of physi- training in the nomenclature, function- cal conditioning only. It should be note d ing, and handling of weapons, physical that, from the very beginning of the re - conditioning, and instruction in comba t placement battalion program to the end field subjects were emphasized . The of the war, replacement battalions wer e primary effort of the recruit depots purely administrative organization s was to transform raw civilians into formed to train and expedite the move- basically trained Marines, and pass the m ment of replacements overseas. on to the FMF or to replacement train- Basically, the function of the training centers for intensive combat training centers was to prepare both spe- ing, or send them to schools for special- cialist and infantry replacements to take . ized training their places in combat organizations . Accordingly, the training programs at TRAINING REPLACEMENTS these centers stressed conditioning marches and field exercises, and such Marine Corps policy in World War II was to replace combat losses on an indi- subjects as techniques of individual vidual basis. That is, rather than allo w combat, cover and concealment, fiel d committed units to become reduced in fortification, sniper and infiltration size and combat effectiveness because of tactics and countermeasures, individual casualties, it was determined to sen d and crew-served infantry weapons , replacement battalions of trained Ma- jungle warfare, small unit tactics, and rines to the combat area. Once there , amphibious training. In short, the these battalions would be disbanded an d training centers taught FMF-boun d individual Marines fed into the units Marines all that they should know to that had been hit hard in the fighting . enable them to take their places in tac- It was believed that this system would tical units in the field.

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 683

Although the syllabi of the infantry fighting. Specifically, after the plans fo r training centers were designed to reflec t the invasion of Saipan had been com- the needs of the FMF, and while the pleted and the invasion was underway, programs should have provided th e the G—1 annex was reconsidered an d FMF with well-trained infantry re - provisions for the immediate acquisi- placements, this often was not the case . tion of replacements inserted.? As late in the war as the Iwo Jim a The heavy losses sustained by the 1s t operation, reports from the field in- Marines during the first week of the as- dicated that in too many instances , sault on Peleliu served to confirm th e replacements failed to measure up t o necessity for planning for the replace- expected standards in combat . Com- ment of casualty losses during a comba t menting on the inadequacies of replace- situation. Beginning with the Iwo Jima ments during the battle for Iwo Jima , operation, each division was provide d the commander of the 27th Marine s initially with two replacement drafts , pointed out that "replacements were the personnel of which were to be use d certainly unsatisfactory. . . . Having first to augment the shore party an d had little or no previous combat train- then to be released as individual combat ing, they were more or less bewildere d replacements when needed. These sam e and in many cases were slow in leaving provisions were made for the Marine their foxholes ." 6 divisions assigned to the invasion o f Replacements failed to meet combat Okinawa. requirements for several reasons . In Had replacements in the States com- one instance, the replacement training pleted the full cycle of the revised train- program was not originally designed to ing program set forth in a July 194 4 train a man so thoroughly that he coul d directive, it is possible that they migh t join a strange FMF unit while it was have performed more satisfactorily in in combat . It had been anticipated that combat. So great was the demand from replacements would join combat unit s the field for replacements that, by mid - in rest and rehabilitation areas during 1944, only a few drafts had been abl e the interval between operations . Then . they could be integrated under optimu m to complete the 12-week cycle Other factors diminished the impact conditions, a prerequisite for reasons of of whatever training the replacements training, morale building, and to imbue did receive . During the early years, the them with unit spirit . It was important long periods between the departure o f that replacements and combat veteran s replacements from training centers an d alike became acquainted and learned their assignment to combat units often what to expect of each other . caused them to forget much of what Anticipated heavy losses during th e they had learned in training . Intensive Marianas operations raised the need t o schooling in numerous unfamiliar sub- replace casualties while units were still jects compressed into a short time wa s ° 5th MarDiv SAR, Iwo Jima Operation , 19Feb-26Mar45, dtd 28Apr45, Anx R (27th CTF 56 Rpt on FORAGER, dtd 2Oct44 , Mar) . encl F (G-1) .

684 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

quickly forgotten during the long voy- Formal schooling was required fo r age on transports and longer period s some of the specialties, while on-the-jo b during which these Marines were per- training sufficed for others . Courses i n forming non-tactical duties in various certain basic occupational fields, such as camps overseas . No adequate training administration, band, and tank and LVT program was provided to keep up thei r had been underway before Decembe r knowledge during this period .8 1941. By the following April, formal Through no fault of either the per- Marine Corps schooling had been ex- sonnel or the programs of the trainin g panded to include courses in the follow- centers, the infantry replacement pro- ing fields : barrage balloon, parachute , gram overall was less than satisfactory. chemical warfare, landing boats, and th e Replacement training was probably a s Japanese language. Some Marines were good as it could have been considerin g assigned to courses conducted by the the time limitations. Pressing person- Marine Corps ; others attended school s nel requirements in the combat zon e established by the other Services ; and caused trainees to be shipped out be- still others were trained by civilian facil- fore completion of the training cycle. ities, either industrial or academic . The training centers were responsible Specialist training at all times re- neither for this nor for the training an d flected the current needs of the Marine integration programs established by the Corps. New courses were adopted, other s receiving organizations. The inherent changed, and still others dropped when - shortcomings of the replacement system ever it was required that such action be could be cured only by adopting a dif- taken. Parachute and barrage balloo n ferent method for replacing combat training, for example, was dropped losses, and none had appeared, even by when those units were deactivated. the end of the war. INTELLIGENCE MATTERS SPECIALIST TRAINING In an authoritative summary of Because amphibious warfare became American participation in the Pacifi c so exactingly complex, to make a suc- War, the United States Strategic Bomb- cessful assault on a heavily defende d ing Survey stated : shore and to support the operations o f At the start . . . our strategic intelli- the attack force demanded a high orde r gence was highly inadequate, and our over- of technical skill in a variety of special- all war plans, insofar as they were base d ties. By 1945, Marine Corps personnel on faulty information and faulty interpre- classification employed no fewer than 2 1 tation of accurate information, were un- realistic . . . . different occupational fields, each field In the field of operational intelligence containing a number of individua l considerable forward strides were mad e specialties. during the Pacific War . . . s

MajGen Oscar R. Cauldwell ltr to CMC, USSBS, Summary Report (Pacific War) dtd 27Feb56 . (GPO, 1946), p . 31 .

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 685

This is true when comparing the very often assigned to work in the G–2 status of American intelligence opera- or S–2 sections, and those who were, tions at the beginning of the war wit h produced intelligence which command- those at the end. But judging by the ers usually disregarded .1' An additional numerous gaps in our knowledge of the liability accruing from all of this wa s enemy existing as late as the time of that intelligence training and an aware- the planning periods for ICEBERG and ness of its importance suffered through - OLYMPIC, a great deal had yet to be out most commands . In this respect, the accomplished in the intelligence pro - Marine Corps was as guilty as the othe r gram before it could be considered to b e Services. operating at an optimum level. At Guadalcanal, the division intelli- Much has been written in the earlie r gence section was the weakest compo- volumes of this series about poor aerial nent of the 1st Division staff throughou t photographic coverage and subsequen t the planning period and into the first mapping of targets from Guadalcana l weeks of combat . Compounding thi s on. During the discussion in this wor k weakness, regimental and battalion in- of the planning for Okinawa, it was ob- telligence teams were not well integrated served that the same problems existed. with either one another or with division . Also, American knowledge of Japanes e As the campaign progressed, signs ap- strength and defenses on Okinawa ". . . peared that both commanders and sub- was minimal, and . . . as late as L minus ordinates were becoming conscious of 1," the G–3 of the 6th Marine Division the importance of complete, up-to-dat e "was told that the Hagushi beaches wer e information of the enemy and how to held in great strength ." 10 This was, of acquire it. It was a slow and tedious course, proved incorrect by the uncon- process, however, to indoctrinate al l tested landing on 1 April 1945. hands with the importance of saving an d Intelligence problems existed on the " A division level and below, or perhaps thi s General Omar Bradley spoke of this in Soldier's Story (New York : Henry Holt and - should be reversed since intelligence pro Company, 1951), p. 33, when he related the duction by the G–2 depended upon the intelligence gap to his experiences as an Army timeliness and wealth or paucity of in- officer and said "The American army's long formation provided by lower echelons . neglect of intelligence training was soon re- Throughout the 1930s and well into flected by the ineptness of our initial under - takings . . . Misfits frequently found themselve s World War II, American commander s assigned to intelligence duties. And in some of all Services generally did not under - stations G—2 became a dumping ground_ for stand or appreciate how important it officers ill suited to line command . . . Had it was to staff their intelligence section s not been for the uniquely qualified reservist s properly. Because of this attitude, the who so capably filled so many of our intelligence jobs throughout the war, the army people most experienced or knowledge- would have found itself badly pressed fo r able in intelligence matters were no t competent intelligence personnel ." In this context, it should be noted that Lieutenant Colonel 10 LtGen Victor H . Krulak ltr to ACofS, G—3 , Edmond J . Buckley, mentioned on page 686 , HQMC, dtd 4Dec65 . was a Marine Corps reserve officer.

686 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

turning in every scrap of material per- For the invasion of Cape Gloucester, taining to the enemy. 1st Division intelligence officers worked On 8 September, the 1st Raider Bat- hard to assemble information on the ob- talion landed east of Tasimboko on Gua- jective and the enemy in order to brief dalcanal, the site of a suspected enemy assault troops. In addition, they devote d base. Following this raid, Lieutenant as much attention to the very real prob- Colonel Edmond J . Buckley, division in- lem of acquiring information after th e telligence officer who had replaced Lieu - landing. Part of the preinvasion trainin g tenant Colonel Frank B . Goettge afte r deliberately and repeatedly stressed th e the latter's death, remarked : importance of immediately passin g along to intelligence agencies any en- It did not occur to any of the intelligence emy papers or material that were found . personnel present to collect any of the large amount of documentary material Members of the 1st Marine Divisio n that was lying among the rest of th e were shown through repeated demon- [enemy] supplies . . . a newspaper cor- strations and a review of combat experi- respondent on his own initiative, collected ence that a seemingly insignifican t a poncho full of maps, diaries, and order s enemy document or item of equipmen t and brought them to me personally .12 might provide the key that woul d The intelligence gap existing at the shorten the battle and save lives . In 1st Division level was not solely a resul t order to overcome the indifference tha t of its own deficiencies, but occurred als o most Marines showed toward the takin g because higher headquarters did not of prisoners, intelligence staff personne l supply General Vandegrift with impor- reminded the New Britain-bound Ma- tant information made available to other rines that the ordinary Japanese soldie r commanders. Until mid-October, the di - was willing to cooperate with his cap - vision was not on the distribution lis t tors and provide military informatio n for the daily intelligence report pub- once he had surrendered. lished by Commander, South Pacific, Following these two operations, the headquarters in Noumea. Vandegrift' s attitude of Marines respecting battle- G–2 learned of the existence of this re - field intelligence and how to acquire it port only after the 164th Infantry had generally improved . This was apparen t landed on Guadalcanal and the regi- not only in the 1st Marine Division but mental intelligence officer informed hi m " also in the Marine divisions which subse- of this particular publication . quently arrived in the Pacific . Intelli- "= Col Edmond J. Buckley interview by Hist— gence training paid off at Bougainville , Div, HQMC, dtd 3Ju147 . (Guadalcanal Com- for instance, when a patrol from the 3 d ment File) . Battalion, 3d Marines, turned in a sketch " Ibid. According to Lieutenant Genera l Louis E . Woods, Cactus Air Force commande r about the big Japanese invasion force directly after 7 November 1942, Marine aviation o n from General Vandegrift in time to have some Guadalcanal also suffered an intelligence gap, fighter planes flown in prior to the [enemy ] for "I received very little pertinent intelligence November 13—15th landing ." LtGen Louis E . information from the 1st Division Headquar- Woods ltr to Hd, HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd ters . However, I did receive the information 18May66, hereafter Woods ltr 1966.

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 687

of enemy positions found in the ma p given to intelligence matters in the Ma- case of a dead Japanese officer . Based rine Corps. on this intelligence, the battalion was able to attack the next day to kee p UNIT FORMATIONS : CHANGES the enemy off balance. This incident of AND DEVELOPMENTS intelligence awareness was not an isolated one, for similar instances appeare d With the creation of the FMF, the in succeeding operations . Marine Corps acquired the tactical Because of Stateside training base d structure necessary to carry out its pri- on lessons learned in combat, most Ma- mary wartime mission ; namely, to serve rines sent to the Pacific after the cam- the fleet by seizing advance bases fo r paign for Guadalcanal received a fairl y naval operations, and, once captured, to thorough indoctrination in the impor- occupy and defend these bases. Accord- tance of battlefield intelligence . Other ingly, a tactical organization had to be aspects of intelligence besides basic com- developed to perform these functions . Although authorization had bee n bat intelligence interested the Marin e granted to form a brigade for the FMF , Corps. These ancillary fields encom- other Marine Corps commitments pre- passed Chinese and Japanese languag e vented the Commandant from assignin g study and the training of aerial pho- the personnel and equipment initiall y tography interpreters . required to bring the FMF up t o By the end of 1944, the Marine Corps strength. had 242 trained Japanese language per- In pace with the ever-changing de- sonnel and 63 enrolled in a study pro- velopment of amphibious warfare doc- gram. At the same time, some 38 Chi- trine and techniques were changes in th e nese interpreters were available to the tactical formations of the units slated to Corps. 14 To provide the FMF with of- employ these techniques . Additional men ficers trained in Order of Battle tech- and material were needed to beef up the niques, commissioned personnel wer e FMF, but the isolationist attitude of the sent to a course in that subject conducted American people was well reflected in by the War Department at the Penta- congressional reluctance to appropriat e gon.16 Other Marines received special- any money to any of the Services for any ized training at the Combat Intelligence purpose which seemed offensive in char- School, Camp Lejeune, and the Army acter. To obtain the approval of Con- Military Intelligence Training Center , gress for an increase in Marine Corp s Camp Ritchie, Maryland . This training, strength, following a discussion with in addition to that conducted in the field , Admiral Leahy, the CNO, General Hol- pointed up the increased importance comb hit upon the stratagem of making it appear that an increase in Marin e " G—2 Sec, Div P&P, OpD, 7Dec4l—31Dec44 , p. 3. Corps manpower would actually consti- 16 Ibid., p. 4 . tute an increase in the defensive poten-

688 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

tial of the United States ." In keeping purpose of providing efficient and readil y with the defensive aspects of the ad- available organizations for the defense o f vance base force, Headquarters Marine bases . These battalions are heavily armed and are relatively immobile . The overhead, Corps planners developed a new uni t administration, supply, etc ., has been re- admirably suited and entitled for thi s duced to the minimum . A battle statio n purpose—the defense battalion . Credit has been assigned to every man. The de- for the creation and development of the fensive fire power of these battalions i s defense battalion has been attributed to very large . (2) The organization of two additional Colonel Charles D . Barrett, the head defense battalions has recently been au- of the War Plans Section, Division of thorized . The use of all six of these defense Plans and Policy, and his artillery as- battalions can be foreseen in existing sistant, Lieutenant Colonel Robert H . plans. In addition, inquiries, preliminar y Pepper. to requesting the service of defense battalions in areas not contemplated in pres- As it transpired, the defense bat- ent plans, have recently been made. talion program, commencing with the (3) These defense battalions and those activation of the 3d Defense Battalion on to be organized will be under the com- r mand of the Commanding General, Flee t 10 October 1939, was one of the majo Marine Force, and therefore at the dis- activities of the Marine Corps in th e posal of the Commander in Chief of the first two years of the war. In that time, U. S. Fleet.1 7 the Corps activated a total of 18 de- The complete development of the defense battalions—numbered in sequence fense battalion provided the Marine —and two composite defense battalions , Corps with a balanced force designed t o the 51st and 52d . These last two units accomplish the seizure and securing o f were comprised almost entirely of Negro bases for the Fleet. The advent of the Marines. defense battalion liberated infantry and Concerning defense battalions, in his artillery units of the FMF from any annual report for 1940 to the Secretar y inherent responsibility for the protec- of the Navy, General Holcomb said : tion of bases . As originally conceived and organized, defense battalions con- (1) During the fiscal year ending 3 0 June 1940, the Marine Corps organize d sisted of seacoast and antiaircraft and trained four defense battalions for th e artillery batteries, searchlight and sound locator units, and antiaircraft and beac h 18 Concerning this particular matter, Gen- eral Thomas recalled that in 1941 General defense machine gun units . Holcomb told him : "If you said, 'I want an On 2 October 1941, the Commandan t offensive outfit,' the politicians would say, 'N o approved Defense Battalion Tables of sir, you want to fight a war.' But if you said, Organization D—155a through D—155d, 'I want a defensive outfit and I want to defend each T/O representing a defense bat- this country,' you could get men and we got talion that was organized differentl y men for defense battalions and we got them just that way because they were going to a from the other three . Common to each defensive outfit and we were going to defend defense battalion under this T/O were a this area." Gen Gerald C . Thomas interview Headquarters and Service Battery an d by HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 26Sep66 (Ora l History Collection, HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC) . 1' CMC Rpt, 1940 .

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 689 a 90mm or 3-inch AA Group . The addi- in North Carolina.19 The strength of this tion of two of the following other com- unit was 1,085 Marines, and it consisted ponents would then complete the organi - of a Headquarters and Service Batter y zation of the battalion : 155mm Artillery (Reinforced), a Machine Gun Group, a Group ; Special Weapons Group ; 5-inch 90mm or 3-inch Antiaircraft Group, a Artillery Group ; Machine Gun Group ; 155-mm Artillery Battery, a 75mm Pack or a 7-inch Artillery Group. At this Howitzer Battery, and a reinforced Rifle time it was stated that "The particular Company . table which will govern the organization Officers assigned to defense battalion s of a defense battalion will depend upon usually were graduates of the Base De- the type of equipment furnished and will fense Weapons Course, a component of be prescribed by the Commandant from the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico . time to time." 18 This course was designed to train com- Approximately seven months later , pany grade officers in the techniques an d the defense battalions were reorganized , employment of light field artillery and this time with an increase of strength weapons utilized in the defense of ad- and the addition of a fifth type of bat- vanced bases. Prior to the outbreak of talion formation, but all still using th e World War II, the 10-month course was components mentioned above . Under thi s fairly evenly balanced between instruc- T/0, dated 25 May 1942, the D–155a for- tion in field artillery and base defense .2 0 mation, for instance, consisted of a Mobilization of Marine reservists and Headquarters and Service Battery, a general expansion of the Corps necessi- 155mm Artillery Group, a 90mm or tated in turn an expansion of the train- 3-inch Antiaircraft Group, and a Spe- ing program and general reduction i n cial Weapons Group . The total strengt h the length of most courses. In 1940 the of this groupment was 1,146 Marines ; Base Defense Weapons Course was re- the D–155d unit was even larger–1,196 duced to a period of 16 weeks . Marines. The naval medical component Under the pressures of the short-of- of 25 doctors, dentists, and corpsme n war period, the Base Defense Weapon s was the same for each groupment . As a Class, as it had been retitled, was split matter of comparison, it is interesting into Field Artillery and Base Defens e to note that the strength of the D-Serie s Sections (antiaircraft and coast artil- T/O infantry battalion was 933, an d lery) . Further reductions in the length never during World War II did th e of the course ensued under the pressur e strength of the various T/O infantr y of wartime needs . In January 1943, the o battalions exceed 996 men. Base Defense Section was transferred t Camp Lejeune and redesignated the Of - d On 13 May 1942, the CMC approve ficers Base Defense School, which be - a recommendation to organize, equip , came a part of the Base Artillery Bat- and train a "colored composite Defense Battalion, the 51st, at Montford Point," 19 G-3 OpD, May42. 20 Condit, Diamond, and Turnbladh, Marine 18 G-3 OpD, Dec41 . Corps Training, p . 88 .

690 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

talion, which, in turn, was an elemen t appearance of intermittent enemy ai r of the Training Center, Camp Lejeune. raids to relieve their boredom. Beginning in March 1944, two separate This was the case in late summe r courses were set up—one designated 1943, when General Vandegrift—wh o the Antiaircraft Course dealing with had recently been appointed as the com - 90mm guns, and the other, which mander of I Marine Amphibious Corps actually began in May, titled the when General Barrett died suddenly — Special Weapons Course to instruct made an inspection trip in the Solomon s in the employment of 20mm and 40m m in company with his chief of staff, Colo- guns and .50 caliber machine guns. Be- nel Gerald C . Thomas . "What intereste d ginning in June that year, the emphasi s Vandegrift most were these defens e in training began to shift towards in- battalions . . . in the Guadalcanal area . struction in field artillery at the Camp . . . The war had gone on beyond them ." 2 1 Lejeune school. This change reflected the It was found that each battalion had an progress of the Pacific War, for as the excess of five or six majors, "and her e offensives in the South and Central Pa- these kids were pleading just to get int o cific went into high gear, the need for the war." 22 IMAC then made arrange- base defense artillery began to pale and ments with Headquarters Marine Corp s the attacks on the strongly fortifie d to send approximately 35 of these officers Japanese-held islands in the Gilberts , back to the States assigned to th e Marshalls, Marianas, and Palaus demon - Command and Staff Course at Quantico, strated the requirement for more an d and then back to the Pacific, "becaus e heavier field artillery. our crying need at the division and corp s It was intended that defense bat- level [was] for junior staff officers." 2 3 talions would land on an objective afte r The problem concerning the futur e the-assault troops had landed, and then of the defense battalions, however, was assist in the defense of that objective not solved until 1944, when all of them , either while the fighting was still going with the exception of the 6th Defens e on or after the target had been secured . Battalion and the two composite units , In practice it did not work out that way, were first redesignated antiaircraft bat- for in many instances, defense battal- talions, and shortly thereafter desig- ions landed immediately after the initia l nated antiaircraft artillery battalions. assault and began operations soon after . On 1 November 1944, for the Okinaw a In the case of the defense battalions—or operation, four of these AAA battalion s detachments thereof—on Wake, Mid- —the 2d, 5th, 8th, and 16th—wer e way, and certain other Pacific islands, formed into the 1st Provisional Antiair- the enemy came to them . At any rate, craft Artillery Group, which was later once the Central Pacific campaign be- placed under the operational control o f gan, the defense battalions in the South " Gen Gerald C . Thomas interview by Hist- Pacific area found themselves in the Br, G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 26Sep66 (Oral His- backwash of the war and, like the avia- tory Collection, HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC) . tion activities based in these islands , -= Ibid . became beset by doldrums with only the Ibid.

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 691 the Army 53d AAA Brigade of the the Head of the Division of Plans an d Tenth Army . Policies came to the then Colonel del Although the defense battalion s Valle and asked to see the prototype di - loomed large in the Marine Corps over- visions that Harris and del Valle ha d all, it appears that "almost until the drawn up ; ". . . we produced our crud e disaster at Pearl Harbor, there existe d products, one of which was selected a s in the G–3 [Division of Plans and Poli- the basis for the division which we took 2 8 cies at HQMC] a divided opinion as to to Guadalcanal ." the relative value of `Defense Battalions ' THE MARINE DIVISION and `Divisions.' " 2 4 According to General del Valle, in During the course of World War II , 1939 Executive Officer of the Division of the organization of the Marine divisio n Plans and Policies : underwent numerous changes to reflect revisions and new developments i n A study of the problem we might en - counter in the Pacific, especially the Elli s the conduct of amphibious assaults . Al- estimate, inspired me to work with th e though the unit designation was the then Lt. Col . H . D . Harris, our G–2, t o same, there was considerable difference make available rough T .Os of variou s in the strength and organization of the types of divisions . This was done on ou r 1st Marine Division which landed o n own. . . .25 Guadalcanal in 1942 and the 1st Divisio n Both del Valle and Harris : which landed on Okinawa three year s later. All other Marine divisions acti- . . . made a study of all the divisions i n vated during the war years were simi- the civilized world, the composition of th e divisions we went into war with, the first larly affected by various organizational World War. . . . And we decided that som e changes. time that the Marines may get a division . General Vandegrift's Guadalcanal di- . . . So, I did it all with Harris . He did the vision was organized in accordance with research and I did the pictures, and we Marine Corps T/O D–100, which ha d made up a division, in fact we made up three type divisions for the Marine Corps. been approved on 1 July 1942 . The total One of them had a battalion of tanks .26 strength of the D-Series Marine divisio n was 19,514, which was broken down int o One of the protagonists for the defens e 865 commissioned and 16,987 enlisted battalions then told del Valle : "That's Marines, and 115 commissioned an d all the Marine Corps is going to need, 1,547 enlisted Navy personnel, who wer e defense battalions." 27 Soon after this, members of the Medical, Dental, Chap - 2' LtGen Pedro A . del Valle ltr to Hd, Hist - lain, and Civil Engineer Corps . Br, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 13Apr66, hereafte r The organization of this division wa s del Valle ltr 1966 . as follows : 25 Ibid. Special Troops 3,031 20 LtGen Pedro A . del Valle interview by Headquarters Battalion HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 17Nov66 (Oral Headquarters Company History Collection, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC) . " Ibid. 28 del Valle ltr 1966.

310-224 0 - 69 - 45

692 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Signal Compan y Naval Construction Battalio n Military Police Company Headquarters Company Special Weapons Battalio n 3 Construction Companies 3 2 Headquarters and Service Battery Artillery Regiment 2,581 40mm Antiaircraft Battery Headquarters and Service Battery 90mm Antiaircraft Battery 105mm Howitzer Battalio n 3 Antitank Batterie s Headquarters and Service Battery Parachute Battalio n 3 105mm Howitzer Batterie s Headquarters Compan y 3 75mm Pack Howitzer Battalions Headquarters and Service Batter 3 Parachute Companie s y 3 75mm Pack Howitzer Batterie s Tank Battalion (Light ) Headquarters and Service Company 3 Infantry Regiments 9,504 Scout Company Headquarters and Service Company 3 3 3 Tank Companie s Weapons Company 3 Infantry Battalions Service Troops 1,946 Headquarters Compan y Service Battalion Weapons Company3 4 Headquarters Compan y 3 Rifle Companies 3 5 29 Service and Supply Company Throughout the series of wartim e Ordnance Compan y T/Os, the Marine division was organ- Division Transport Compan y ized on a triangular basis . This tri- 3 Regimental Transport Companie s Medical Battalion angular formation was reflected pri- Headquarters and Service Company 3= The versatility of the Seabees is reflecte d 5 Medical Companie s by the composition of each construction com- Amphibian Tractor Battalion pany, which had : a maintenance and operation s Headquarters and Service Compan y platoon, two construction platoons, a roa d 3 Amphibian Tractor Companie s blasting and excavation platoon, a waterfront platoon, and a tanks, steel, and pipe platoon . Engineer Regiment 2,452 33 The regimental weapons company con- Headquarters and Service Compan y sisted of a company headquarters, a 75mm gu n Engineer Battalion platoon, and an antiaircraft and antitan k Headquarters and Service Company platoon . 3o 3 Engineer Companies 34 The battalion weapons company consiste d Pioneer Battalion of a company headquarters, a 20mm antiair- Headquarters Compan y craft and antitank platoon, an 81mm mortar 3 Pioneer Companies 3 l platoon, and three machine gun platoons . Th e D—Series Tables of Equipment (T/E) specifie d The Service and Supply Company con- that when the 20mm dual-purpose gun wa s sisted of a company headquarters and a serv- not available, the 37mm gun was to be substi- ice platoon. The latter was comprised of a tuted, which was fortunate, for the Marine s platoon headquarters and service and supply , employed this weapon with good effect through- bakery, commissary, post exchange, chemica l out the war . services, salvage, and bath sections . 3a Each rifle company had a company head- 30 Each company consisted of a compan y quarters, a weapons platoon (consisting of a headquarters and an assault and an , engineer 60mm mortar section and a light machine gu n platoon . section), and three rifle platoons . The rifl e 31 There were a company headquarters an d platoon was broken down into a platoon head - three pioneer platoons in each company. quarters, a BAR' squad, and three rifle squads .

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 693

marily in the organization of the thre e were : service troops, which was en- infantry regiments in each division. larged slightly when the division trans- Within the infantry regiment, groups port company and the three regimenta l of three formed the whole : three squads transport companies were taken from (under the F- and G-Series T/Os, the the service battalion and formed into a lowest component was the fire team ) division motor transport battalion ; the comprised a rifle platoon, three platoon s engineer and infantry regiments, which a rifle company, three companies an in- were given nearly 100 more men ; and fantry battalion, and three battalion s the artillery regiment, which was ex- an infantry regiment. Some of the sup - panded with the addition of a secon d port units organic to the division wer e 105mm howitzer battalion . Along with likewise triangularly organized in orde r the formation of the motor transport to give maximum assistance to the in- battalion, which gave the division an fantry elements . increase of 84 personnel in this field , Slightly less than a year after th e 130 more vehicles were assigned to th e D-Series T/0 for a Marine division ha d division.37 been approved and published, on 1 5 The F-Series tables for a Marine April 1943 the E-Series T/0 appeared .36 division, approved on 5 May 1944, had There were certain marked changes i n 2,500 less men than its predecessor. In the composition and strength of th e the 1944 organization, special troops— new T/0 division. Some units wer e in essence a command headquarters taken away from the division, some wer e groupment—was abolished and in it s added, and others completely or slightly stead a division headquarters battalion , revamped. The aim of the reorganiza- which became a separate battalion tion was to make the Marine division a within the division, took control of the more effective and flexible fightin g units formerly under special troop s machine. cognizance . The headquarters battalio n The E-Series Marine division wa s troop listing was changed somewhat a t stronger than the D-Series by 45 1 this time, for the special weapons bat- sailors and Marines . Although unde r talion was disbanded, and the light tank the new T/0, the strength of special battalion became an independent bat- troops was decreased by 714 men, pri- talion. It was given a numerical desig- marily because of the transfer of the nation which reflected the number of parachute battalion to corps troops, an d the division to which it belonged, e .g., a reduction in the size of the specia l the 1st Tank Battalion was organic t o weapons, light tank, and service bat- the 1st Marine Division, etc. Division talions, these losses were overbalance d service troops was reduced in strengt h by the strengthening of certain othe r at this time with the transfer of th e division organizations . Among thes e amphibian tractor battalion to corp s 3e See App I, "Comparison of Organization , troops. Marine Division," for a tabular representation of the composition of the four World War I I a' See App J, "Comparison of Equipment , T/Os for a Marine infantry division . Marine Division."

694 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Along with its redesignation, th e needed elsewhere in the Pacific for air- composition of the tank battalion was field construction and it would hav e also changed. The reduction in battalion been uneconomic to have them remai n strength to 594 men was primarily inactive with their Marine divisions be- caused by the loss of the scout company , tween operations . Despite this T/ O which was redesignated as the divisio n change, the Seabees were attached t o reconnaissance company (1st Recon- Marine divisions as a component of th e naissance Company, 1st Marine Divi- landing force in assault landings . sion, etc.) and placed in the divisio n The only specific change in the artil- headquarters battalion. Here, the com- lery regiment in the F-Series tables was pany became the instrument of the divi- that the number of 75mm pack howitzer sion commander . The duties of this battalions was reduced from three t o company more nearly reflected the am- two. The Marine artillery regiment phibious mission of the division, for now had two 75mm pack howitze r reconnaissance personnel more ofte n battalions and two 105mm howitze r travelled by jeep or on foot on land and battalions. In deference to the am- in rubber boats over water wheneve r phibious character of the Marine divi- they were on a reconnaissance mission . sion, it contained lighter organic artillery The ancestry of the reconnaissanc e than its Army counterpart, which ha d company can be traced to the concept three 105mm howitzer battalions and a and the needs underlying the formatio n battalion of 155mm howitzers . During of Colonel William J. Whaling's scout- combat operations, however, Marin e sniper group on Guadalcanal.38 Quite a divisional artillery was usually sup- few Marines who were assigned to th e ported by the 105mm and 155m m new unit came from the parachute an d howitzers and 155mm guns of corps raider battalions, which were disbanded artillery. in 1944. Although the G-Series T/O was no t The engineer regiment, as such, was published until 4 September 1945, afte r disbanded when the F-Series T/O was the Pacific War had ended, the tables of published, and like the headquarters an d some division units had been published tank battalions, the engineer and earlier. For example, the T/O for a n pioneer battalions became separate infantry regiment is dated 1 May 1945, entities in the division . They, too, were but this is misleading because many of given the numerical designation of thei r the changes inherent in the G-Series division . The engineer battalion wa s had been made before this time . A case enlarged somewhat, while the pionee r in point is the fact that the Marine in- battalion remained relatively unchanged fantry regiments which landed on Oki- in size. The naval construction bat- nawa just a month before the T/O talions (Seabees) were detached at this publication date were organized in ac- time because they were continuously cordance with these tables. Each division of IIIAC was up to or close to T/O 38 See Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Har- strength, 19,176 men—a considerabl e bor to Guadalcanal, p. 319n. increase over the previous T/0—plus

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 695 an overage which reflected the norma l T/O changes, the types and numbers of reinforcement given a combat-boun d the different weapons with which it division. fought similarly underwent change . In the 1945 version of the tables of Conversely, the development and assign- organization, the division had bee n ment of new weapons and the augmen- given an assault signal company, a tation of existing tables of equipmen t rocket platoon, and a war dog platoon . strongly influenced each succeeding in- Other division units that had bee n fantry regiment T/O change. augmented were the service troops , The most outstanding changes in th e whose motor transport battalion wa s infantry regiment took place on bat- enlarged from 539 to 906 men (overal l talion and company levels . Within the transportation in the division was in - regimental headquarters complex, th e creased from a previous total of 1,54 8 only element significantly modified dur- pieces of rolling stock to 1,918), and a ing the war was the regimental weapon s slight expansion of the artillery an d company, which lost its three antiair- infantry regiments. Further indicatin g craft/antitank platoons in the E-Series that the 1st and 6th Marine Division s T/O and instead picked up three 37m m were organized on Okinawa in accord- gun platoons. These were reduced by ance with the G-Series tables is the fact one in the G-Series tables . At the same that the 75mm self-propelled gun pla- time, the 75mm gun platoon was re- toon had been replaced by the 105mm placed by a platoon of 105mm self - self-propelled howitzer platoon in th e propelled howitzers . This larger-caliber infantry regimental weapons compan y weapon proved to be of inestimable prior to the landing. value in the cave warfare of Okinawa . With the inception of the F-Serie s THE MARINE INFANTRY T/0, the battalion weapons company REGIMENT was abolished . Its 81mm mortar platoon was placed in the battalion head- At first glance, it would appear as quarters company, where it became th e though the various wartime T/O regi- infantry battalion commander's artil- ments differed only slightly in size fro m lery, and its three machine gun platoons one another, and that there had been were parcelled out on the basis of one to but few changes in their compositions .3" each rifle company . The weapons pla- Appearances are deceiving, however , toon of the rifle company was also dis- for the Marine infantry regiment an d banded at this time . The 60mm mortar its components experienced perhaps the platoon was incorporated with the com- most dramatic revolution of all of th e pany headquarters and the light ma - types of Marine Corps units each tim e chine gun section became part of the new tables of organizations were pub- newly established company machine lished. Not only was the composition of gun platoon . the infantry regiment affected by thes e The size of the rifle company grew with the appearance of each succeedin g '0 See App K, pt 1, "World War II Develop- ment of the Marine Infantry Regiment ." table of organization. In the D-Series

696 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

tables of 1942 company strength wa s only 456 '03s,41 this was not, in fact, th e 183 ; 196 in the E-Series ; 235 in the case for the 1st Marine Division o n F-Series ; and 242 in the G-Series . This Guadalcanal was not so armed. The growth rate was caused in part by th e M–1 rifle was issued to the 1st Divisio n fact that the machine gun platoon (44 in April 1943, after it had left Guadal- men in 1944, 56 in 1945) was added to canal, and was in Australia training fo r the rifle company and offset the loss of the impending New Britain operation . the weapons platoon, which was only "Nostalgia for the reliable '03 was wide - a paper loss. Actually, when the 60m m spread, but the increased firepower o f mortar section was transferred to th e the M–1 would not be denied." 42 This company headquarters, it gained fou r is not to say that no Marines had M–1 s men, and despite the fact that the ligh t on the 'canal, for some acquired the m machine gun section was abolished, th e through a "moonlight requisition" afte r loss of its 19 Marines was more tha n Army units arrived on the island . made up for by the addition to the rifl e Others obtained the new rifle by pickin g company of the 44-man machine gun up the dropped weapons of soldiers who platoon. had been wounded and evacuated. This Another element of the rifle company last occurred in October 1942, durin g increased during the war was the rifl e the time that the 164th Infantry fough t platoon, or more importantly, th e alongside of the 7th Marines in stemming Japanese attacks on the perim- squads of that platoon . The D-Serie s 43 rifle platoon had 42 Marines in a pla- eter. toon headquarters of 7 men, an 8-man Returning to the D-Series rifle squad, automatic rifle (BAR) squad, and thre e it was not particularly suited for oper- 9-man rifle squads. The BAR squad ating other than as a whole and, unlik e consisted of a squad leader armed with the rifle squads of later T/Os, it was the r a submachine gun, two BAR-men, an d lowest component of the triangula five riflemen . Although assistant BAR - organization and could not be broken down into a smaller tactical unit . At this men were designated as such in subse- point in the development of Marine as- quent T/Os, they did not appear in th e sault tactics, the chain of command ex - D-Series tables . The rifle squad in thi s tended down only as far as the squa d T/O consisted of a squad leader, a BAR - man, six riflemen, and a rifle grenadier , 41 Apparently only the rifle grenadiers wer e who was armed with the trusty Spring - to be armed with the '03 since the division was equipped with an equal number of grenad e field M1903 .30 caliber rifle and a gre- launchers in this T/E . nade launcher. 43 Shaw and Kane, Isolation of Rabaul, p . At this juncture, it must be pointed 307 . out that, although the D-Series table o f 43 Mr . George C . MacGillivray comments to equipment for a Marine division 4 0 HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 7Feb66, hereafte r MacGillivray Comments . Mr. MacGillivray was listed 5,285 carbines, 7,406 M–1s, an d a crewman of a 37mm gun team with weapon s Company, 7th Marines, in the operations on 90 See App J . Guadalcanal and Cape Gloucester.

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 697

level. This was the lowest echelon on composed of six fighting teams of fou r which control was maintained and fir e men each. supervised. The problem of control i n combat has always plagued com- Each team was led by a senior private or junior NCO, and could be employed manders ; and the more difficult the ter - flexibly in independent action as well as rain over which a battle was bein g in performing its primary mission as a n fought, the more difficult it was t o integral part of the riot company as a maintain control. whole. The equipment of each man in the 1st Marine Corps units committed to th e and 3d Platoons was a rifle, bayonet , jungle war and antibandit activities in cartridge belt with 100 rounds of ammuni- Central America during the early 1900 s tion, gas mask, and steel helmet. Two men found it necessary to devise methods of the 1st and 6th Teams in the 2d Platoon carried BARs ; the other two men in each for achieving better infantry contro l of these teams were armed with Thompson and accuracy under fire. In face of th e sub-machine guns . hit-and-run tactics and ambuscades o f Marines in the 2d and 5th Teams carrie d such bandit leaders as Augusto Sandin o rifles with bayonets fixed, and they to o in Nicaragua, and in areas where mo- had 100 rounds of ammunition in their bility was curtailed by the jungle, fire - cartridge belts. Rifle grenadiers comprise d the strength of the 3d and 4th Teams, an d power became the key to success . Addi- they each wore a grenade carrier holdin g tional firepower came from reliance on eight tear gas grenades .4 5 the assignment of an additional number of automatic weapons to each The four-man fighting team was th e squad. solid foundation on which the riot company was based, for although : The practical experience gained from using automatic weapons in Nicaragu a . . . the company commander and th e influenced greatly the development of th e platoon leaders would retain control fo r fire team . The ratio of automatic weapon s as long as the situation warranted, th e in the squad was increased by most leader s fighting team could have been quickly de- from one for every eight men to one fo r tached on independent assignments such every three or four. Most important wa s as search missions or the establishment the growth of the automatic rifle as a bas e of a strong point at a street intersection . of fire and as the nucleus of a small fir e In any case, the team could be detache d group 4 4 without destroying the basic riot formation or the unit integrity of the company. A further development leading to a The success of the riot company would more responsive infantry unit occurred result from its simple line formations and in China in 1938, with the developmen t signals, and more importantly, from th e d emphasis on the decentralized control of of a rifle company specially organize the four-man fighting team . to quell street riots. At the heart of . . . The decentralization of comman d this organization were three platoon s and independent coordinated action by small units were as necessary in the " 2dLt Lee M . Holmes, "The Birth of th e Fire Team," Marine Corps Gazette, v . 36, no . 45 Gen Wallace M . Greene, Jr., "Shangha i 11 (Nov52), p . 21, hereafter Holmes, "The Fir e 1937," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 49, no. 11 Team." (Nov65), p . 63 .

698 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

crowded streets of the International Settle- fire team organization over the squad were ment [of Shanghai] as they were in th e soon noted.4 7 jungles of Nicaragua and the Pacific islands . . . .4 6 The mission of the Marine raider battalion and the organization of a An answer to some of the problems squad of raiders was described by the of rifle squad control appeared in the commander of the 2d Raider Battalion, E-Series T/O . The BAR squad wa s Major Evans F. Carlson, in a letter to dropped and replaced by a third rifl e President Roosevelt, who was told that : squad. The rifle squad was increased in size to 12 men : a squad leader, an as- I designed the organization and equipment with a view to providing a battalio n sistant squad leader, six riflemen, an d capable of high mobility and possessin g two assistant BAR-men, all armed with the maximum fire power compatible wit h M-1s, and two BAR-men . Now the squa d such mobility . . . The emphasis is on spee d could be broken down into two six-man of movement on foot, endurance, self- sufficiency and great fire power . . . The units, each containing a total of one squad, consisting of a corporal and nine automatic and five semiautomatic rifles. others, is armed with five Thompson sub - While meeting some of the requirement s machine guns, four Garand rifles and one for better control and heavier firepower Browning automatic rifle . These nine men in jungle fighting, this formation pro- operate in three fire groups of three men each . Each group, led by a scout arme d vided only a partial solution. Prior to with a Garand, is supported by two auto- the adoption of the E-Series T/0, some matic riflemen . . . The three fire groups , Marine units, especially the 1st Para- of course, are mutually supporting. A chute Battalion—then in training a t group so armed and so trained can cover Camp Lejeune—experimented on thei r a front of from 100 to 300 yards, as own. Based on the recommendations o f against the 50 yard front covered by th e orthodox infantry squad of eight men, - the battalion operations officer and be armed with the 1903 rifle and one BAR.4 6 cause some extra BARs were availabl e to the battalion at the time (1941) , th e At Camp Pendleton in July 1943 , parachutists trained with their rifle Company L, 24th Marines, conducted squads organized into three three-ma n experiments in the problems of control - teams in which one man was arme d ling infantry units in combat. The basis with the BAR. Soon other Marine for this training were the lesson s Corps organizations were adopting thi s learned by veteran FMF units in th e formation, if the extra weapons were a t Pacific. The company was organized ac- hand. cording to the E-Series tables with

Liaison between the Parachute an d " Col Robert T . Vance ltr to 2dLt Lee M . Raider units was very close and ideas o n Holmes, n.d., cited in Holmes, "The Fire Team, " tactics, technique, organization, and equip- p. 22 . It should be noted that the term "fir e ment were freely exchanged . Both Raider team" did not officially appear until the F - and Parachute units operated with th e Series T/O was published in 1944 . 3d Marine Division during the Bougain- 48 Maj Evans F . Carlson ltr to President ville campaign and the advantages of the Franklin D . Roosevelt, dtd 2Mar42 (NARS , Franklin D . Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park , 9e Ibid. N. Y .), hereafter Carlson ltr .

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 699

12-man rifle squads . Heralding the The troops provided the board for future, an additional man and an extr a these experiments consisted of a rifl e BAR were added to each squad, which platoon furnished by the Training Bat- then conducted training with this for- talion, Marine Corps Schools . Each mation. The results of field tests prove d squad was organized into four group s the practicality and ease of control o f of three men each. The platoon was such an organization, and the officer s oriented on the purpose of the experi- observing the tests recommended "that ments at a two-hour lecture and black- the rifle companies of the 24th Marine s board talk conducted by Colone l be organized on the group basis for ex- Griffith's board, and on the followin g haustive tests of this method with a day a number of formations and "plays " view to its possible adoption by th e were described to the members of the Marine Corps." 49 Major General Harry platoon, who then practiced them in the Schmidt, commander of the 4th Marine field under the board's observation . Division, forwarded this report to the Although the board generally con- Commandant by way of Major General curred in the findings following the ex- Clayton B. Vogel, Commanding Gen- periment conducted by the 24th Ma- eral, Fleet Marine Force, San Diego rines, it believed that instead of the Area, who further recommended tha t four three-man teams recommended b y "experiments be carried out with a that regiment's board for the rifle company and a battalion organized squad, the new formation should consist along these lines, possibly in the schoo l of three groups of four men each . 5 0 organization at Quantico . . . ." Griffith's board reasoned that in a three - On 14 October 1943, the Com- group squad, battle casualties could be mandant, Marine Corps Schools, wa s absorbed more easily, control would be asked to conduct experiments along the easier, and the principle of the Marin e lines indicated in the reports which infantry triangular formation would be General Holcomb had received from preserved. One further point that the California . A board was convened on 1 5 board made was that "From the psy- December at Quantico ; the senior mem- chological point of view the use of th e ber was Lieutenant Colonel Samuel B . word `team' infers a unit of effort and Griffith, II, a former Marine Raider , a spiritual cohesiveness that the ter m and Majors Thomas J . Meyers an d 51 `group' does not." 52 Reinforcing th e Lyman D. Spurlock. recommendations of the board, Colonel '0 LtCols John J . Cosgrove, Aquilla J. Dyess , Griffith included as an enclosure ex- and Homer L . Litzenberg, Jr ., ltr to CO, 24th tracts of a letter he had written in Mar, dtd 2Aug43 . September 1943, as 1st Raider Battalio n 60 CG, 4th MarDiv ltr to CMC, dtd 23Sep43 , commander, relating the organizatio n and CG, FMF, San Diego Area, 1st End t o of the raider companies to the experi - same, dtd 30Sep43 . 61 CMC ltr to CMCS, dtd 140ct43, Subj : u2 LtCol Samuel B . Griffith, II, ltr to CMCS , Employment of the Rifle Squad ; CMCS ltr t o dtd 7Jan44, Subj : Report of Board of officers LtCol Samuel B . Griffith, II, dtd 15Dec43 , relative to experiments conducted with a rifl e Subj : Board of Officers. squad organized into groups .

700 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

ences of his battalion in the New Lieutenant Colonel Victor H. Krulak- Georgia operation. now head of the G–4 Section—noted : In preparation for this campaign, in The squad organization recommende d March 1943, the 10-man rifle squads of by the Marine Corps Schools is believed t o the 1st Raider Battalion were reorgan- be fundamentally sound . All squads in th e ized into "three groups of three men Battalion which I commanded were organized on a three group system—each each, with a corporal squad leader. Each group being built around an automatic group was designated as a `fire team' weapon (in this case the Johnson light and the senior man was appointed machine gun) . The organization stood up leader of the fire team . Each fire tea m well in combat .J6 was equipped with one BAR, one car- The reports from the FMF field units bine, and one M1 ." 53 Colonel Griffith indicated that the new formation wa s continued, "As a result of this combat satisfactory, and it was adopted and training experience, the officers and en- appeared in the new rifle squad T/ O listed men of this battalion were of th e published in March 1944 . opinion that the fire team organizatio n The F-Series rifle squad was a great was superior to normal organization, " improvement over its predecessors and and "Our experience in the Ne w its organization seemed to give th e commander the requisite control and Georgia operation confirmed" thi s opinion.54 additional firepower found to be s o necessary in both jungle and islan d The findings of the Griffith Boar d fighting. The 1944 squad was improve d were then sent to Headquarters Marin e in several ways—it had 13 instead of Corps, where the Division of Plans an d 12 men, it was armed with a third BAR , Policies noted that a similar plan fo r and was susceptible to greater contro l the reorganization of the rifle squad ha d over its Marines. Whereas in previous been submitted to FMF field units fo r T/Os, the responsibility and authority 55 comment. Upon receipt of the Griffith of command was vested in only on e Board report at Headquarters, it wa s man—the squad leader—four men wer e routed through the various sections o f given command authority in the F- "Pots and Pans" for comment . Based on Series squad . These were the squad his experiences as the commanding offi- leader and his subordinates, three fire cer of the 2d Parachute Battalion, whic h team leaders . The new squad consiste d had conducted the diversionary raid on of a squad leader armed with a carbine, Choiseul nearly three months earlier , three fire team leaders and three rifle - men armed with M–1s and M–7 grenade °' Extracts of CO, 1st Raider Bn ltr to CO , launchers, three assistant BAR-men 1st Mar, dtd 17Sep43, Subj : Organization of armed with carbines and M–8 grenade Marine Raider Companies, end (A) to Ibid. launchers, and three BAR-men .67 The 54 Ibid. " CMCS ltr to CMC, dtd 10Jan44, Subj : G8 LtCol Victor H . Krulak memo AO—644—gg Employment of the Rifle Squad ; CMC ltr t o for M—3, dtd 13Jan44 . CMCS, dtd 17Jan44, Subj : Employment of " MCTrngBul No. 101, dtd 29Mar44, Subj : the Rifle Squad . Rifle Squad, T/O F—1, approved 27Mar44.

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 701

composition, concept of employment, control ; decentralization of command ; and combat principles underlying th e mobility ; flexibility ; rapid absorption of organization of the fire team were a replacements during reorganizatio n culmination of Marine Corps tactical under combat conditions ; and adapta- experience to that time. By the dele- bility to special training and the ac- gation of command authority to th e complishment of missions involving the squad and fire team leaders, it was be- employment of special equipment.68 lieved that the principle of military Regarding this last factor, the F - leadership would be more widely dis- Series T/E gave the Marine division a seminated and that the rifle squad would sufficient number of flamethrowers an d become more aggressive and efficient . demolition kits to permit the distribu- Under the fire team concept, th e tion of one of each per squad when the squad leader was responsible for the employment of this equipment was re- training, control, and general conduc t quired. The flamethrowers and demoli- of his squad . He was to coordinate th e tions were kept in the infantry battalion employment of his fire teams in a man- supply section, and were available whe n ner that would accomplish the missio n the battalion commander called for assigned by his platoon commander . He them. was also responsible for the fire control, In 1st Marine Division preparations fire discipline, and maneuver of his fir e for the Peleliu operation, however, there teams as units. The fire team leader s was a shortage of flamethrowers and re - were similarly responsible for their fir e placements were late in arriving . Nine- teams . teen of these, together with three ba- As it evolved, the fire team was or- zookas and some demolitions, were ganized primarily around the base of fire placed directly under battalion control. provided by the automatic rifle . Reflect- To employ these special assault weapons, ing the uniform organization and bal- a battalion weapons platoon composed anced equipment of the team, it wa s of 60 men drawn from the rifle com- capable of operating independently a s panies was, in some cases, organized. a reconnaissance, observation, security, These Marines were evidently drawn or outpost group. Maintenance of the from the company headquarters, for the principle of triangular organization i n 58 Ibid. Apparently the matter of control of the Marine division beginning at th e troops in a combat situation was uppermos t rifle squad level was apparent with th e in the minds of Marine planners when they advent of the fire team . In addition, the adopted the fire team concept . Regarding this , General Gerald C . Thomas, Director of Plan s establishment of this unit meant tha t and Policies at that time, has written : "Th e control and coordination of effort unde r fire team leader should not take his place in battle conditions in general and in am- the firing line, but stay in [the] rear to con- phibious operations in particular could trol his fire team . We went to this squad be- be sustained. Other benefits accruing cause a leader could not control seven men in combat, so, we certainly would not expect hi m from the employment of the fire team to control twelve." Gen Gerald C . Thomas were : maintenance of mutual support in memo to Hd, HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, dt d the defense ; decentralization of fire 26Apr66 .

702 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

rifle platoons generally were maintained tive and deadliest amphibious assaul t at full strength ." unit in history to that time . To forestall the necessity of denuding the rifle companies of men in order to WEAPONS AND EQUIPMEN T form special assault units, the G-Serie s T/O provided the infantry battalion Some note has been made in precedin g with a 55-man assault platoon. This paragraphs of the weapons and equip- organization was composed of a platoo n ment organic to the Marine division. headquarters and three assault section s The point has been emphasized that a di - of two seven-man squads each . Com- vision did not always possess the types prising the squad was a squad leader, a and amount of equipment specified in a flamethrower operator and his assistant , particular T/E . The comments regard- a bazooka operator and his assistant, ing the number of M–1 rifles in th e and two demolitions men. In 1942, the hands of Guadalcanal Marines bear this Marine division had 24 not-too-satis- out. Although the D-Series T/O called factory flamethrowers, which were car- for the antiaircraft and antitank platoon ried and employed by the combat engi- of the regimental weapons company t o neers. Each infantry battalion supply be armed with 20mm guns, they were section in the F-Series T/O had 2 7 not in fact so equipped . Organized at flamethrowers to be put into action on Parris Island, the Weapons Company, the battalion commander's order. In the 7th Marines trained at New River with G-Series tables, there were only 1 2 the old wooden-wheeled, 88-pound, flamethrowers per battalion, but the on e 37mm gun before the division left for advantage in this case was that a traine d the Pacific . The company later received unit had been established to make opti- a wholly different 37mm gun, which mum use of the weapon . proved most effective in combat .80 From 1942 on, many changes wer e Another notable difference betwee n made in the composition of the divisio n what the D-Series T/E indicated the —some transitory, some long-lasting , Marine division should have and what i t and all reflecting combat lessons learne d actually possessed relates to the 75m m as well as immediate or future refine- self-propelled gun platoon of the regiments. Many T/O changes resulted from mental weapons company . Officially, the experimentation of individual units ; each platoon was equipped with tw o a new tactical formation or an improve d half-track 75s, but in reality, until near combat tactic often proved successfu l the end of the Guadalcanal campaign , and was adopted throughout the Marine the platoon fired 75mm guns which had Corps after official approval had been a modified recoil system on a wholly ne w given. In retrospect, each successive carriage with a new sighting, elevating, T/O change served to make the Worl d and training system. The special weap- War II Marine division the most effec - ons battalion also had some half-tracks , which were employed in defense of th e " Garand and Strobridge, "Western Pacific Operations," MS, pt III, chap 8, p. 61 . 80 MacGillivray comments.

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 703

1st Division perimeter on the beaches o f medium tank were employed on Iwo Guadalcanal. " Jima and Okinawa.6 3 Marine equipment was continuousl y Soon after improved tank models be- repaired (until no longer serviceable) , gan appearing in the Pacific, armored replaced, and replenished throughout th e flamethrowers became available . Much war. Some gear could be refurbished b y of the successful introduction and em- service units in the division, but mor e ployment of this infantry weapon i n often, combat organizations would have combat depended upon the rapid devel- to send damaged items to maintenanc e opment of the portable flamethrower and repair facilities in rear areas. Nor- earlier. At the beginning of the war , mally, the replacement and replenish- American troops had only the Ml flame - ment system functioned as well as coul d thrower, which had a range of a mer e be expected under conditions of war , 10-15 yards and frequently misfired . with combat units receiving the supplie s Despite the knowledge that the enem y - they had requisitioned or those which had no better weapon, it "did not over were automatically replenished . As soon come the dislike and distrust the Ameri- can troops felt for the M1 ." 64 as modified or new weapons and vehicles were received, they were sent to the Although this model was graduall y , units which would use them. improved, the basic problem remained the too-rapid burning of the flame- In May 1943, for instance, the light thrower fuel, which in the beginnin g tanks (M3A1, mounting 37mm guns) o f was gasoline alone . The development of Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, wer e napalm (a three to eight percent mix- replaced by 33-ton General Sherman ture of aluminum soap with gasoline ) medium tanks (M4A1, mounting 75mm came later after much experimentation . guns) . This event is noteworthy becaus e When the correct formula for napalm the first 24 mediums to arrive in th e was achieved, its use as a fuel almost SWPA were received by the Army an d turned over to the Marine company .62 e' The 1st Marine Division's tank battalion on Okinawa, however, retained its M4A2 tanks , When subsequent models of the Sher- which had welded hulls and were equipped with man (M4A2, M4A3) , which wer e diesel motors. "LtCol [Arthur J .] `Jeb' Stuart' s heavier and more fully armored, wer e fight to keep these instead of accepting th e e shipped to the Pacific, other Marine gasoline driven ones was carried by me all th way back to Pearl Harbor before the Okinaw a g division tank battalions began usin landing . In my opinion, considering all factors , them also. The two later versions of th e this feature helped keep casualties [among tank battalion personnel] to a minimum. The 81 LtCol George Janiszewski comments t o [tanks] were not so easily set on fire and blown HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 8Feb66 . LtCol up under enemy fire . We salvaged many using Janiszewski served as an enlisted Marine in a 4.2 mortar smoke barrage and a tow tan k the 75mm Gun Platoon, Weapons Company, under fire." del Valle ltr 1966 . 7th Marines, on Guadalcanal . e ° lstLt Lewis Meyers, "Tactical Use o f °= LtCol Frank O . Hough and Maj John A . Flame," Marine Corps Gazette, v . 29, no . 11 Crown, The Campaign on New Britain (Wash- (Nov45), p . 20, hereafter Meyers, "Tactical ington : HistBr, HQMC, 1952), p . 22 . Use of Flame ."

704 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

doubled the range of the flamethrower in support of a combat operation at and gave greater adhesion of the liqui d Tinian, where Army pilots used it on a n on the target, it burned for a longer pe- experimental basis . Various gasoline/ riod than earlier fuels, and was muc h napalm mixtures, types of fuses and fuse safer for the flamethrower operator to settings, and methods of delivery wer e handle. The Ml was modified for us e attempted to ascertain what the poten- with napalm, and when fully loaded, it tials and limitations of the napalm bomb weighed 68 pounds—a heavy burden for were. On the basis of reports received an infantryman to carry, especially in from his Navy and Marine Corps ob- combat when he was being shot at . 85 servers, the commander of Amphibious The M2–2 flamethrower was intro- Group 2, Rear Admiral Harry W . Hill, duced into combat in late 1943 (th e concluded that "the bomb gave grea t E-Series division had 24, the F-Serie s promise of success as an amphibiou s had 243, and the G-Series had 108) , weapon in future assaults against and although it had an improved igni- densely covered islands ." 66 This con- tion system and could be maintaine d clusion was verified in later operation s better in combat, it had the same 4-gal- as air delivery of napalm was perfected lon capacity and 40-yard range of the as an offensive weapon. earlier model. Fitting LVTs and tanks with flame - By the end of the war, the portable throwers gave the infantry a better flamethrower had become an importan t weapon for the destruction of enemy - addition to the arsenal of Marine in- held caves, cliffs, and canefields . Appear- fantry weapons. But in face of the Japa- ing in the Pacific in early 1944 was th e nese defenses encountered in the Centra l "Ronson," a Canadian Army-developed , Pacific operations, it was found that it heavy-duty, long-range flamethrower could not provide flame in sufficient which had a 150-gallon tank. It was ini- quantity and that flamethrower opera - tially mounted on an LVT and experi- tors could not advance through coordi- mented with in the Hawaiian Islands nated enemy fires to apply it without tre- and later used at Peleliu . In the spring mendous loss of American lives . The two of 1944, the Marines in the Pacifi c solutions most likely to succeed were t o created "Satan," an M3 light tank which drop some sort of fire bomb on a target had been converted to carry the Ronso n and to develop an armored vehicle capa- and 170 gallons of fuel, and had a range ble of delivering large amounts of flame of 60–80 yards . VAC took 24 Satans for greater periods than heretofore. into the Marianas campaign, where they The napalm bomb was first employed 86 VAdm Harry W. Hill ltr to Dr. Jeter A . eu Casualties among flamethrower operators Isely, dtd 15Jun49, cited in Isely and Crowl , were especially high in proportion to thei r Marines and Amphibious War, p. 364. Com- numbers because of the nature of the tactic s menting on this matter, General Woods ha s in which they and their weapons were employe d written : "Marine aviation did much experi- in the assault of fortified positions. Also, the menting with napalm, mixes, etc., in the Mar- weight of the loaded flamethrower, and it s shall Islands prior to Tinian, and much of i t high silhouette combined to make the operato r was dropped on Japs in bypassed islands ." particularly vulnerable to enemy fire. Woods ltr 1966 .

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 705

were employed with spectacular re- chute and the raider battalions . There sults.67 The Satan was improved upon were, however, other specialist-typ e with the appearance of the Army H1 groups of brief life and briefer memory , Flamethrowing Tank, which mounted and still others which were develope d a newer model Ronson on the M4 Sher- and activated late in the war . Although man. It carried 290 gallons of fuel, had some of the units to be mentioned in thi s the same range as the Satan, and a firing section were short-lived, the lesson s time of 2½ minutes . This was the learned from their training and combat weapon employed by Tenth Army troops experience in many cases proved valu- on Okinawa. able to other FMF organizations . A new type of tracked vehicle makin g Marine parachutists, or Paramarine s its Marine Corps appearance in comba t as they were often called, appeared on on Iwo Jima was the "Weasel," a ligh t the scene in the fall of 1940, when the cargo carrier (M29C) that was capabl e Commandant solicited requests from of hauling a half-ton load . VAC, whic h Marine volunteers to undergo parachut e received these vehicles in Novembe r training. The first group began training 1944, distributed them to the 3d, 4th, at the Naval Air Station, Lakehurst, and 5th Marine Divisions the same New Jersey, on 26 October of that year . month. While not seaworthy, the Wease l As this and succeeding classes became proved of inestimable value on land , qualified parachutists, they formed the where it was fast, maneuverable, and nucleus of the first parachute battalion could pull trailers and light artillery organized. Company A, 1st Parachute pieces over terrain untrafficable fo r Battalion, was activated at Quantico o n wheeled vehicles.68 28 May 1941, and the battalion itsel f A recital of the numerous items of some two months later on 15 August. At new and modified equipment—aviation, the same time that this battalion wa s ordnance, communications, transporta- organizing on the east coast, the 2d tion, armor, etc.—assigned to Marine Parachute Battalion was being forme d Corps organizations would require more at Camp Elliott on the west coast. On space than is available here. An account- 3 September, the 2d Battalion was at ing of their employment is found in the full strength . five volumes of this series . From Quantico, the 1st Battalion moved to New River for further train- SPECIAL UNITS ing. Many World War II Marines will recall seeing the parachute towers at Hadnot Point when they reported to f Whenever there is a discussion o Camp Lejeune for duty . In order to ap- what special units the Marine Corps ha d ply Marine Corps concepts of parachute in World War II, the two organization s training, parachute training school s most readily thought of are the para - were established at Camp Gillespie, San e' Meyers, "Tactical Use of Flame," p . 21 . Diego, on 6 May, and at New River o n es VAC G—4 SAR, Iwo Jima, dtd 30Apr45 , 15 June 1942 . In July 1943, the New p. 45. River complex was closed, and Camp

706 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

Gillespie became the center of Marine to cadre the newly forming 5th Marine Corps parachute training activities . Division. The air delivery section wa s The 1st Parachute Battalion departe d divided equally, and its elements wer e the United States for New Zealand i n redesignated as corps air delivery sec- June 1942. It landed on Gavutu, British tions for I Marine Amphibious Corps Solomon Islands, on the same day that and V Amphibious Corps. The 1st Para- other elements of the 1st Marine Divi- chute Regiment was formally disbande d sion landed on Guadalcanal and Tulagi. on 29 February 1944 . Following its commitment in the heavy In retrospect, the Marine parachute fighting on Tulagi and later on Guadal- program proved of little value to th e canal, the battalion was withdrawn fro m Corps in the sense that no Marine com- action and sent to Noumea, New Cale- bat paradrops were made during th e donia, where it was joined by the 2d and war, although some had been considered . 3d Parachute Battalions in 1943. On Militating against such action were sev- 1 April 1943, the 1st Parachute Regi- eral cogent factors . First, the Marine ment was formed of these three battal- Corps did not have an adequate lift capa- ions. A fourth battalion was activated bility. At no one time could existin g the next day at San Diego, but never wa s Marine aviation organizations muste r sent overseas and was disbanded the fol- more than six transport squadrons for a lowing January. single operation, which meant that only Meanwhile, after a lengthy training one reinforced battalion could be lifte d period, the regiment left Noumea to re- to an objective . Moreover, there were n o turn to Guadalcanal, arriving there i n shore-based staging areas within a September 1943. At the end of the reasonable distance of proposed targets. month, the entire regiment was trans- Further, the long distances between ob- ferred to Vella Lavella, New Georgia jectives were prohibitive . Finally, the Group, where it participated in opera- objectives assigned to the FMF were tions against the Japanese . The 2d Para - generally small, densely defended areas , chute Battalion, Reinforced, landed on and therefore unsuitable for mass para- Choiseul on 27 October in a raid in - chute landings. For these reasons, th e tended to divert Japanese forces from Marine parachute program passed into the area of the 1 November target of history. the 3d Marine Division, Bougainville . Although the Paramarines never The diversionary group withdrew on made a combat jump, they did fight a s the 3d. ground troops in several actions and Before the Bougainville operation wa s fought exceptionally well before the over, most of the 1st Regiment had parachute battalions were disbanded . been committed to action . In December Marine parachute troops had outstand- 1943, however, a decision was reached in ing spirit and, because of the emphasis Washington to disband Marine para- on physical conditioning and small-unit chute units. The 1st Regiment, less it s tactics in their training program, they air delivery section, was ordered to San excelled in these areas. Their combat Diego, where the Paramarines were used knowhow and aggressiveness were fully

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 707

demonstrated at Iwo Jima, where a and [Joseph C .] Fegan are sold on the ide a large proportion of 5th Division person- and are giving their full support .7 1 nel who were awarded Medals of Hono r One recent critic of special units, wh o and Navy Crosses had been Parama- believes that any good organization ca n rines.°° be trained for special operations, has Another group of Marines whose written that "Most of the pressure fo r this organization came from th e members, like the Paramarines, con- Navy." 72 This might be rebutted by a sidered theirs an elite organization, wer e comment Admiral Nimitz made in 195 7 the Raiders . One reason for the forma- concerning the assignment of Carlson's tion of several Marine raider battalion s 2d Raider Battalion to CinCPac i n was the apparent need for specially 1942 : "Here I was presented with a trained hit-and-run troops who could unit which I had not requested and harass the enemy based on the long which I had not prepared for ." 73 A chain of Japanese-captured islands in partial explanation for the high level of the Pacific. Presumably, Marine raider interest evinced in the Marine raide r battalions were formed because of the battalions can possibly be inferred fro m notable success of British commando - the following excerpt of President Roosevelt's reply to Carlson's letter : type organizations at a time when every - thing else was going badly for the Allies . I am delighted to have your letter an d Although unsubstantiated and undocu- to know that all goes so well with you . What you tell me about the new outfit mented, it has been rumored that not all is most interesting and surely there wil l Marine Corps officers were particularly be a chance to use it .7 4 enthusiastic about the raider concept.70 Regardless of the quarter from whic h In writing to President Roosevelt about the impetus to organize Marine raide r his 2d Raider Battalion, Major Carlson battalions came and despite Marine said : Corps attitudes pro and con regardin g their formation, a program of specia l The whole thing is unorthodox, in the raider training began on 6 Januar y military sense, but it will do the job . . . Of course, we are meeting with opposition 71 Carlson ltr . from the orthodox brass hats. However , 72 General Vogel, the Force commander, an d LtCol Don P . Wyckoff, "Super Soldiers, " Marine Corps Gazette, v . 47, no . 11 (Nov63) , [Major] Generals [Charles F . B.] Price p. 24 . 00 Col Frank C. Caldwell comments to Hist - " FAdm Chester W . Nimitz ltr to ACofS , Br, dtd 15Feb66 . Colonel Caldwell, a forme r G-3, dtd 10Mar57 . On 28 May 1942, however , Paramarine, was the commander of Compan y Admiral Nimitz proposed to General Mac- F, 26th Marines, on Iwo Jima . Arthur that the 1st Raider Battalion, then a t '0 "Any such organization, as was the Britis h Tutuila, be employed to raid Tulagi, which th e Commandos, is suitable only for minimal Japanese had captured on 3 May. counter-offensive [action] pending the tim e " President Franklin D . Roosevelt ltr t o when the offensive is resumed . Their opera- Maj Evans F . Carlson, dtd 12Mar42 (NARS , tional use was limited by their organizatio n Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park , and equipment." del Valle ltr 1966 . N. Y .) .

310-224 0 - 69 - 46

708 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

1942. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines , American business policy, and the rol e was redesignated the 1st Separate Bat- of the British and French in China ." 7 6 talion and transferred from the 1st Ma- Edson's 1st Separate Battalion was rine Division to Amphibious Forces , redesignated the 1st Raider Battalion on Atlantic Fleet . Shortly thereafter, Lieu - 16 February 1942. The battalion execu- tenant Colonel Merritt A . Edson and tive officer, Major Samuel B . Griffith, Major Evans F . Carlson were directed II, joined it after observing commando to organize, train, and command the training in England . On 29 March, the first two Marine raider battalions acti- 1st Raiders and 3/7 were sent to th e vated. Both officers had the requisite west coast for transfer overseas to experience necessary to guide the forma- Samoa. Arriving at Tutuila on 28 April , tion and training for this type of special- Edson's outfit moved once again, thi s ized organization. Edson had been a time in July, to Noumea, New Cale- company commander with experience i n donia, where it prepared for the Guadal- fighting bandits in Nicaragua, and Carl - canal operation . son had been a military observer wit h The 1st Battalion landed on Tulagi on General Chu Teh's Eighth Route Army 7 August together with the 2d Battalion , in North China during the Sino-Japa- 5th Marines as part of the 1st Marine nese War. Carlson's raider concept was Division invasion force, whose other ele- based, at least in part, on his analysi s ments landed on Guadalcanal, Gavutu , and admiration of Mao Tse-tung's guer- Tanambogo, and Florida Islands . Al- rilla tactics and operations, about which though the initial operations on Tulag i he wrote in two books published i n were unopposed by the enemy, durin g 1940.7 5 the night 7–8 August the raiders re - A reason for President Roosevelt' s pulsed four separately launched Japa- interest in the raiders and Carlson ma y nese attacks . Organized enemy resist- stem from the fact that before the Ma- ance was eliminated by nightfall of th e rine officer had begun a tour as ob- 8th, and the battalion remained o n 77 server in China (1937–1938), he wa s Tulagi until the end of August . the commander of the guard at the At this stage in the Guadalcanal cam- "Little White House," Warm Springs, paign, a growing need for more troops Georgia. Also, while still a company led to the move of the battalion across grade officer, Carlson had a number o f to the bigger island on 31 August to personal appointments with the Presi- strengthen the 1st Division perimeter . dent, and "during his tour . . . , he sent Two raider companies patrolled Savo the President, at his request, a number Island, on 2 September, but found n o of reports dealing with politics, politi- enemy. Following this, the 1st Raide r cal, diplomatic and military figures , and 1st Parachute Battalions were consolidated into a provisional battalion and 7' Evans F . Carlson, The Chinese Army : Its Organization and Military Efficiency (New 7e Dr. Elizabeth B . Drewry, Dir, Franklin D . York : Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940) ; Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N . Y., ltr to Hd , same author, Twin Stars of China (New York : HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 8Mar66 . Dodd, Mead and Company, 1940) . " 2/5 moved to Guadalcanal on 21 August .

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 709

moved into defensive positions on th e permanent patrol base on the coast of southern rim of the division perimeter , Guadalcanal at Kokumbona. Meanwhile , inland from the airfield . at the mouth of the Matanikau River, Here, Edson and his staff planned fo r 1/7 and 2/5 had become involved in a an amphibious raid around to the east i n heavy fire fight with a strongly en - the Tasimboko area, where an enem y trenched enemy force and had become buildup was reported . The raid was pinned down. Griffith's raiders were launched on 8 September with a landing ordered to join the two battalions and just before dawn. Although light at first, to prepare for a renewal of the attack enemy resistance became heavier . Upon the next day. It began early on the the arrival of the Paramarines, Edso n 27th and the raiders were stopped shor t pushed the attack into the village, where when they ran into a Japanese force he found that the Japanese had with - which had crossed the river during the drawn, leaving some guns, ammunition, night to set up strong positions on high and food. ground some 1,500 yards south of the Despite the disappearance of the en- beach. The raiders as well as the other emy forces, intelligence sources indi- two Marine battalions were hit hard and cated that the Japanese were massing finally were forced to evacuate fro m for another attack on the Marine de - Point Cruz. fenders. To forestall enemy incursions The final action on Guadalcanal in and to protect the airstrip, General which the understrength 1st Raider Bat- Vandegrift ordered the raiders and talion participated was the Matanika u parachutists to prepare positions on a offensive on 7–9 October. Because of long, low ridge extending south of losses suffered in this fighting, the bat- Henderson Field and paralleling th e talion was no longer an effective unit, Lunga River . Following sporadic prob- and it was withdrawn soon after fro m ing attempts on the night 12–13 Septem- Guadalcanal. It was detached from the ber, the Japanese launched a full-scal e 1st Marine Division and attached t o attack the following night and lastin g Corps Troops, I Marine Amphibious until early the next day. The defenders Corps . The battalion embarked for of Bloody Ridge, or Edson 's Ridge as it Noumea, arriving there on 17 October . also became known, turned back a seri- At San Diego, on 19 February the 2 d ous threat to their precarious foothol d Separate Battalion (formed on the 5th ) on Guadalcanal in a violent and blood y under the command of Major Carlson fight that was crucial to the defense of was redesignated the 2d Raider Battal- the perimeter. Edson took over the com- ion. Carlson's executive officer was mand of the 5th Marines on 21 Septem- Major James Roosevelt. The 2d Bat- ber, at which time Griffith, now a lieu - talion (less Companies D and E, whic h tenant colonel, relieved him as were sent to reinforce the Marine de- commander of the raider battalion . tachment on Midway) departed the The next action in which the 1s t west coast for the Hawaiian Islands for Raider Battalion took part occurred o n training in landing from submarine s 26 September, when it was to establish a and rubber boat handling. On the day

710 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

after the Guadalcanal landings, Carlso n the enemy at a loss to themselves of 1 6 and the remainder of his battalion killed and 18 wounded . The battalio n boarded submarines and sailed fro m left Guadalcanal for Espiritu Santo o n Pearl Harbor for a raid on Makin in the 17 December 1942, and moved from Gilbert Islands, landing there o n there to Wellington, New Zealand the 17 August. following 4 February for a brief rest The purposes of this raid were to de- period, and then back to Espiritu Santo , stroy enemy installations, gather intel- where it remained awaiting orders for ligence data, test raiding tactics, boos t commitment to further action . morale in America, and perhaps diver t A third raider battalion was formed some Japanese attention from Guadal- in the Samoan area on 20 Septembe r canal. Although the greatest asset of 1942 of volunteers from various 3d Ma- this operation was in relation to its rine Brigade infantry and defense bat- effect on home-front morale, it als o talion units. The commanding officer gained a modicum of success in its other was Lieutenant Colonel Harry B. objectives. The raiders lost 30 of their Liversedge . The 3d Raider Battalion de- force in the course of which the battalio n parted Samoa on 15 January 1943 an d destroyed the 85-man Japanese garrison , joined the 2d Battalion at Espirit u and the accompanying radio stations, Santo. Liversedge's battalion spear- fuel and supply dumps, and other instal- headed the unopposed Army landing in lations before reboarding the subma- the Russell Islands on 20–21 Februar y rines for the return to Pearl .78 1943, and remained there until it was committed to combat later in the year . Carlson's battalion next moved to Espiritu Santo, arriving there on 2 0 Major James Roosevelt organized th e 4th Raider Battalion on the west coast September. On 4 November, the 2 d on 23 October 1942 . It left the Unite d Raider Battalion landed at Aola Bay , States in February 1943 and went into about 40 miles east of the Lunga River . From this point, Carlson marched hi s camp at Espiritu Santo. On 15 March , the 1st Marine Raider Regiment was ac- command through the jungle west to Lunga Point to clear the region of th e tivated here and consisted of the fou r raider battalions organized to date . Liv- enemy. For 30 days, until 4 December, the 2d Raider Battalion conducted a ersedge, promoted to colonel earlier, was . At this 150-mile combat and reconnaissanc e the first regimental commander - patrol through some of the most difficul t time, the raiders were scattered through terrain on Guadalcanal . In the course o f out the South Pacific with the regi- this patrol, the raiders fought more than mental headquarters and the 2d an d e a dozen actions and killed nearly 500 o f 4th Battalions at Espiritu Santo, th 1st at Noumea, and the 3d in the Rus- ?8 Nine of the Marine casualties were raider s sells. who had been tragically left behind and late r Upon its assignment to the New captured when the rest of the Carlson force Georgia operation, the regiment, les s withdrew under most difficult circumstances . See Appendix A, "Marine POWs," infra ., for the 2d and 3d Battalions, moved to an account of the fate of these men. Guadalcanal, arriving there the first

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 71 1

week in June, when it became part o f the Marine Corps as a whole and a the New Georgia Occupation Force . The luxury which it could not afford . Four first element of the regiment committe d Marine divisions (three overseas an d in this operation was the 4th Raider one Stateside) were then in existenc e Battalion (-) , now commanded b y and the activation of a fifth one was i n Lieutenant Colonel Michael S . Currin , the offing . The American war effor t which landed at Segi Point on New was in full gear at this time and addi- Georgia Island, on 21 June 1943. Before tional manpower was needed for regu- the New Georgia campaign ended fou r lar Marine Corps ground formations . months later, the regimental headquar- The center of the argument here is tha t ters, the 1st Battalion, and the remain - the weapons and tactics with which the y der of the 4th Battalion, together with fought were no. different from thos e Army units, took part in the hard - employed by regular Marine groun d fought operations leading to the con - troops. As a matter of fact, a certain quest of the New Georgia group . On cycle is apparent when applied to th e 29 August, the regiment left Enogai history of the formation and disband- for Guadalcanal, and on 4 Septembe r ment of the raider and parachute bat- left the Solomons for Noumea . talions : special unit, to groups of spe- Here, on 12 September, the 2d Raide r cial units, and a return to regula r Regiment (Provisional), was activated. infantry formations . Consisting of a regimental headquarter s The raiders were too small in organi- and service company, and the 2d and 3d zation, too lightly armed (initially, thei r Raider Battalions, Lieutenant Colonel heaviest weapon was the 60mm mortar) , Alan Shapley's new organization wa s and too specialized in T/O and T/E . slated as a reinforcing element of th e Unlike the Paramarines, the raiders di d 3d Marine Division for the Bougainvill e conduct at least one operation of a typ e operation. Prior to the assault landing , for which they had been trained—th e the division attached the regimental raid on Makin. But there was insuffi- headquarters and the 2d Battalion t o cient justification by 1944 for the Marine the 3d Marines and the 3d Battalion to Corps to maintain special units organ- the 9th Marines for the campaign . ized solely to conduct hit-and-run raids . Both the 1st Raider Regiment on New On 26 January, the 2d Raider Regimen t Georgia and the 2d Regiment on Bou- (Provisional) was disbanded at Guadal- gainville fought well during their rela- canal, and the 2d and 3d Raider Bat- tively short spans of life . The same ma y talions were assigned to the 1st Raide r be said about their battalions whic h Regiment. This unit, in turn, was dis- fought as independent units before the banded on 1 February, when the Head- regiments were formed . But, by the quarters and Service Company and the summer of 1943, the siphoning off of 1st, 3d, and 4th Battalions were desig- trained men both individually and in nated the regimental headquarters com- battalion-sized organizations, as raide r pany and the 1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions and paramarine battalions were acti- of the 4th Marines. The 2d Raider Bat- vated, proved to be a severe drain on talion became the regimental weapons

712 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

company. The new regiment was or- Unfortunately for the time, expense, ganized to bear the name and honor s and effort put into the program, bar- of the "old 4th," which fought so gal- rage balloons proved to be of little valu e lantly in the Philippines in 1942, and and hindered rather than supporte d was employed first in the Emirau land- friendly air operations . In addition , ing and subsequently as a component 90mm antiaircraft artillery fire was far of the 1st Marine Brigade in the in- more effective in the defense of Ameri- vasion of Guam . Later, at Okinawa, as can installations . On 15 June 1943, i n an element of the 6th Marine Division , a memorandum to General Marshall , the regiment was in the foremost of th e Admiral King stated that a separate fighting. Marine Corps barrage balloon program Two other World War II Marin e was "an uneconomical use of men and Corps organizations of passing interest materiel," 79 and recommended that th e which were abandoned because of gen- Army take over the program in orde r eral unsuitability were the barrage that existing Marine Corps squadrons balloon and glider squadrons . Late in could be disbanded. General Marshal l 1941, the Navy had undertaken a bar - concurred with the CominCh recom- rage balloon program, which was turned mendation, whereupon Admiral Kin g over to the Marine Corps for develop- advised the Commandant on 1 July of ment because those naval bases no t the decision and directed that all bal- defended by the Army came under the loon materiel and equipment was to b e cognizance of the FMF . One of the turned over to the Army .80 final steps leading to implementation o f By the end of 1943, all of the Marin e the Marine program was the recall t o squadrons had been disbanded, their . Smith active duty of Major Bernard L materiel transferred to the Army, an d as officer-in-charge of barrage balloo n their personnel absorbed by Marine de- development. Major Smith, a reservist, fense battalions. An interesting side was a pioneer Marine aviator who had - light to the story of the barrage balloo served in World War I. On 18 Octobe r n 1918, he had made the first successfu l program is the fact that one of the three long-distance dirigible flight in th e original officers in the program at United States, from Akron, Ohio, t o Quantico was Captain Aquilla J. Dyess, Rockaway, New York. who was later posthumously awarde d A barrage balloon school was organ- the Medal of Honor for heroism whil e ized at Quantico in April 1941, and later transferred to Parris Island . The long- 7 ° CominCh memo for CofS, USA, dtd 15Jun - range goal envisioned a total of 20 43, FF/IA16-3, Ser : 001187, Subj : Assign- balloon squadrons, but in fact by 1943, ment of Barrage Balloon Defense Activitie s only five had been organized and sent in the Pacific Areas to War Department an d Liquidation of the Marine Corps Barrag e into the field . The 1st, 3d, 5th, and 6th Balloon Program (OAB, NHD) . Barrage Balloon Squadrons were em- "Gen George C . Marshall memo for Ad m ployed at Noumea under the operationa l King, dtd 26Jun43, end A to CominCh Itr to control of the Army ; the 2d Squadro n CMC, dtd 1Ju143, FF1/A16-3, Ser : 001318, was at Samoa. Subj : Barrage Balloons (OAB, NHD) .

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 713

leading his infantry battalion at Roi - Shortly after the program had begun, Namur. the impracticality of Marine Corps em- Close upon the heels of the beginning ployment of gliders was realized. Quite of the balloon program came the incep- simply, transport-type aircraft were re- tion of the naval aviation troop-carrying quired to haul gliders and the glider- glider program, which similarly was t o transport combination could not fly in be executed by the Marine Corps . In bad weather over long distances, both o f 1941, President Roosevelt initiated a re - which were common in the Pacific . Ad- vision of existing war plans and goals , ditionally, as in the case of the Para- which, in essence, increased the size o f marine program, the Marine Corps di d Marine Corps aviation, among other not have enough transport planes t o things, and envisioned four glide r support the glider program . These rea- groups with a lift capacity of 10,000 sons, combined with the island-hoppin g Marines.8 1 mission of the Marine Corps in the vast expanses of the Pacific, caused the ter- The responsibility for developing th e mination of the glider program after glider program was given to the Divi- it had reached a strength of 282 Marines sion of Aviation, Headquarters Ma- and 21 gliders .8 3 rine Corps, and called for extensive planning in the development of gliders , Another Marine Corps program, be - personnel, and training. On 9 July gun in response to a real wartime need, 1942, CominCh approved a CMC lette r was the training of dogs for use in com- which recommended that certain Marin e bat. On 26 November 1942, the Com- battalions, designated as air infantry, mandant directed the establishment o f be transported by gliders . The es- "a training program for dogs for mili- tablishment of three glider bases wa s tary employment when personnel an d authorized : Eagle Mountain Lake , materiel become available ." S4 At that Texas ; Edenton, North Carolina ; and time, 20 Marines were being trained b y Shawnee, Oklahoma . Personnel to man the Army at Fort Robinson, Nebraska , these bases came from Marine Glide r and 4 other Marines were training a t Group 71, consisting of Headquarter s Fort Washington, Maryland . Squadron 71, Service Squadron 71, and Soon after the War Dog Trainin g Marine Glider Squadron 711, which was Company was organized at New River, stationed at Parris Island until 15 No- the Marine Corps determined that there vember 1942 . At that time, the grou p was little use in tying up the manpowe r moved to its permanent station, MCAS , and effort necessary to support the pro - Eagle Mountain Lake ; the other two a3 Maj John H . Johnstone, United States bases were never utilized for glider op- Marine Corps Parachute Units—Marine Corps erations. Glider program training ended Historical Reference Series No . 32 (Washing- in March 1943 and the group was dis- ton : HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, 1962), p . 8. banded the following June .82 84 CMC ltr to CG, TC, FMF, MarBks, Ne w River, N . C ., dtd 26Nov42, cited in "War Dogs 81 DivAvn OpD, Supplement dtd 1Jun45, p . 4 . in the U. S . Marine Corps," n .d ., p. 2 (War Dog Ibid., p. 5 . Subject File, HistBr, HQMC) .

714 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

gram unless the use of the dogs con- The last special unit which deserve s tributed directly to killing the enem y a brief mention here is a rocket platoon , and keeping down casualties in units for which became organic to the Marine which the dogs were helping to supply division in the G–Series T/O and wa s security. Therefore, although at the placed in headquarters battalion. Early beginning of the program a certain in the war, purely because the United number of the dogs were trained for States was late in beginning the devel- guard or sentry duty, as soon as the opment of the weapon, employment of program was in full operation, the rocket organizations was strictly on a Marine Corps trained only scout and hit-and-miss basis . An IMAC experi- messenger dogs. A 14-week training mental rocket detachment participated period was established at Camp Lejeune in the Bougainville operation, but its for both dogs and handlers. Following projectiles were highly inaccurate the completion of each training period, against small area targets and whe n a platoon of 1 officer, 64 Marines, and fired, the rocket launchers reveale d 36 dogs (18 scout and 18 messenger ) Marine positions. was formed . One man was assigned to Four provisional rocket platoons wer e handle each of the 18 scout dogs, an d organized by FMFPac during the war . two handlers were assigned to each o f Each detachment had 12 one-ton truck s the messenger dogs . Although it wa s mounting M7 rocket launchers which anticipated that a war dog platoon wa s fired the Navy 4 .5-inch finned barrage to be attached to each infantry regi- rocket. Lighter installations sometime s ment, in the G–Series T/O the platoo n supplemented this basic armament. The was organic to the division headquarter s detachments' capabilities were admira- battalion, from which the dogs and their bly suited for situations where con- handlers were to be assigned to front - ventional supporting arms could not d o line units . the job, and Marine rocket personnel , The first of its kind to see action i n dubbed "Buck Rogers Men," S5 were the Marine Corps was the 1st War Dog often called upon . The sudden and in- Platoon, which departed San Diego on tense concentration of fire from this 23 June 1943, and landed with the 2d weapon was ideal for last-minute prep- Marine Raider Regiment (Provisional ) aration of an objective, also, and wa s on Bougainville. War dogs participate d often used as a signal for the attack in the Guam, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, an d to jump off.86 Ground-fire barrag e Okinawa assaults, and they were em- rockets were effectively employed in ployed in mopping up operations on this fashion from the invasion of Guam on. Their fires wrought havoc amon Saipan and in the occupation of Japan . g the enemy both as a destructive and a Until 11 August 1945, the Marine Corp s morale-breaking agent . The appearance procured dogs or accepted offers of do- nations of dogs for combat training . 8" Sgt George Doying, "The Buck Roger s Approximately six days later, the pro- Men," Leatherneck, v . 23, no . 4 (Apr45), p . 27 . gram ended . so Bartley, Iwo Jima, p . 141n.

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 71 5

of rocket launchers at the frontlines missile first went into use in July 1944 .88 generally evoked a hail of Japanese fire, Marine pilots also employed the "Tiny but Marines quickly learned to dig in Tim," the 11 .75-inch rocket that was when the rockets were called up, and by 12 feet long, weighed approximately the end of the war, the employment of 1,200 pounds, and carried a punch that this weapon in difficult situations wa s equalled the projectile of a 12-inch naval rifle . These were employed with commonplace. some success by planes from the carrier In connection with this discussion of Intrepid at Okinawa, but the results rocketry, their use by Marine aircraft could not be completely assessed be - is of interest here. A Marine squadron , cause "so many things were bein g VMTB-134, flying TBFs claimed th e thrown at the Japs on Okinawa that it distinction of having fired the first Nav y was impossible to distinguish the wreck - aircraft rocket at the Japanese : age caused by `Tiny Tim' from the general destruction ." 89 That this squadron carried off the pioneering honors was due to their own enterprise and the ingenuity of a serv- MARINE CORPS AVIATION ice squadron in locating and installing launchers and securing rockets . The Perhaps no other arm of the Services rockets reached the squadron on 8 Febru- was so profoundly affected by techno- ary 1944 . On 15 February, with only 3 logical advances during the war as days training, the squadron took part i n aviation, and the air organization of a strike on Rabaul . Despite their lack of experience, they used their rockets with the Marine Corps was no exception. considerable success .87 Merely viewing a procession of the types of planes employed by Marin e One of the rockets developed for ai r pilots from 7 December to V-E Day delivery and used extensively by Marin e supports this statement . The staff aviation was the 5-inch HVAR (High agency at Headquarters Marine Corp s Velocity Aircraft Rocket), which was 6 responsible for supervising the expan- feet long, weighed 140 pounds, and had sion of and supporting the Marine ai r a velocity of 1,375 feet per second . This program throughout World War II was the Division of Aviation . 8' Joint Board on Scientific Information Pol- Previous volumes in this series, es- icy, U. S. Rocket Ordnance, Development an d Use in World War II (Washington : GPO , pecially Volumes II and IV have dealt 1946), p . 29 . The VMTB–134 Hist, dtd Feb4 4 extensively with Marine Corps air op- (OAB, NHD), states that the date of the erations in the Pacific fighting. The attack was 17 February 1944 . The fact that sections of combat narrative in each of claims of "firsts" are tenuous is proved b y the other three volumes describe i n USS Manila Bay (CVE–61) AR, ser 014, dt d 18Feb44 (OAB, NHD), which indicates that detail the tremendous strides Marine TBFs of VC–7 employed "air-to-ground rockets Corps aviation made during the war , in attacking Japanese shore and ship target s in the Kwajalein Atoll area on 31 January an d 88 Joint Board on Scientific Informatio n 1 February 1944 ." Dir, NHD, ltr to Hd , Policy, op. cit . HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 3Jun66 . 88 Ibid., p . 28 .

716 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

and the valuable support it provided i n ing from the north . A post-Guadalcana l most of the operations in the Pacific . analysis of its operations states, "The Although the 1st and 2d Marine Air - Cactus Air Force performed beyond all craft Wings had been established nearl y proportion to its facilities and equip- six months before the outbreak of the ment. . . ," 9 0 war, only one group in each wing— By 8 February 1943, when Guadal- MAG–11 at Quantico and MAG–21 a t canal was secured, Marine aviation Ewa—were operational . The Japanese strength on the island had been buil t attack on Pearl Harbor destroyed al l up dramatically . No longer were Allied but one of the planes at Ewa . Just planes content to play a strictly defen- prior to 7 December, half of the com- sive role ; they were carrying the battle bat strength of MAG–21 had been sen t to enemy air bases elsewhere in th e westward. Eighteen dive bombers of Solomons, and indeed to the heart of VMSB–231 being ferried on the carrier Japanese air operations at Rabaul o n Lexington to garrison Midway were re- New Britain. The plane which was to routed to Pearl Harbor, arriving ther e become the basic weapon of Marin e on 10 December after having bee n fighter pilots in the war appeared over launched from the flattop on the sam e Guadalcanal on 12 February, when day. A week later, 17 of the planes VMF–124 flew its gull-winged F4U–1 made a long over-water flight to thei r Vought-Sikorsky "Corsairs" up from original destination . On Christmas Day , Espiritu Santo. This plane not onl y the aircraft complement on Midway wa s could fly faster than any aircraft th e augmented when VMF–221 pilots flew Japanese possessed, but it could also in 14 fighter planes . Throughout th e climb nearly 3,000 feet a minute and following months, and until the 1st had twice the range of the Grumman Marine Division landed on Guadal- Wildcats, the Marine fighter plane s canal on 7 August 1942, a greater num- flown heretofore . With these and othe r ber of Marine pilots and planes entere d modern aircraft, Marine squadron s the Pacific. But at first, the number s claimed a total of more than 2,34 4 were all too few . Japanese planes downed in air combat . The importance of the relation of There were 120 Marine aces in the aviation to Marine ground tactics was war—that is, pilots who had shot down graphically demonstrated at Guadal- five or more enemy aircraft . Lieutenant canal, where, despite a severe shortage Colonel Gregory Boyington, a Medal o f of planes, fuel, and spare parts, th e Honor winner, was the leading Marine Cactus Air Force—as the first squad- ace with 28 planes to his credit ; six of rons to be based on Henderson Fiel d these were downed while he was with were collectively called—devastated th e the Flying Tigers in China before the myth of Japanese superiority in the air . United States entered the war . Not Guadalcanal-based pilots flew cover for available for the record is the amoun t Allied shipping coming into and an- 00 Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor t o chored off of the island, and they als o Guadalcanal, p. 294. CACTUS was the cod e went up to intercept Japanese raids corn- name for Guadalcanal .

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 717

of damage accomplished by Flyin g of the Marine division and regiment wa s Leathernecks during their support of traced earlier in this . chapter. For one ground operations . reason, throughout the Pacific War pe- It was in this area, Marine air sup- riod there was constant development in port of Marine ground troops, that clos e and manufacture of different types o f coordination between the Marine air tactical aircraft, which formed the basi s and ground components worked so wel l of new tactical squadrons . Therefore, and laid the basis for the postwar de- the character and makeup of the wing s velopment of the balanced air-ground and groups changed constantly from task force . Close air support technique s 1941-1945. The wartime wings were in were pioneered during World War I I reality task organizations whose com- as a result of the close working relation - position depended primarily upon th e ship and cooperation between Marine mission which they had been assigned . aviation and ground commanders, and a In early 1942, the D-Series T/ O knowledge of what the requirements of for a Marine aircraft wing consisted of each were. Beginning in the Bougain- a headquarters squadron, an air regu- ville campaign, and improved upon con- lating squadron, an observation-utilit y stantly in each succeeding operation , group (headquarters squadron, observa- close air support of ground forces cam e tion squadron, and two utility squad- to be as important as artillery and naval rons), two scout bombing groups (head- gunfire support, and in many cases wa s quarters squadron, service squadron , more effective . and four scout bombing squadrons) , an d The strength and numbers of Marine two fighter groups (headquarters squad- air organizations, like the ground forces , ron, service squadron, and four fighter grew apace with the expanding Ameri- squadrons) . A year later, the 1st MAW can war effort. With the capture and —with squadrons based on Espiritu occupation of Pacific islands formerly Santo, New Caledonia, Guadalcanal, and held by the Japanese, Marine squad- Efate—consisted of a headquarter s rons were based on newly built or pre- squadron, an air depot squadron, an air viously established fields on these island s repair and salvage squadron, an air and became available for a vast number base squadron, an observation squadron , of missions against the enemy. By the and four composite aircraft groups in war's end, the Marine Corps had acti- which were fighter, scout bombing, an d vated four aircraft wings in the Pacific, transport squadrons, as well as the usua l one in the States, a number of training headquarters and service squadrons for commands, 128 tactical squadrons, an d each of the groups . The makeup of each had an aviation strength of 116,62 8 group was different. And so, throughou t Marines—of whom 10,049 were pilots. the war, the composition and, in fact, th e Because of the nature of Marine Corp s strength of the wings changed in keep- aviation activities in the course of th e ing primarily with assigned tactica l war, it is not possible to trace the de- missions. velopment of wing and group T/Os in Marine air operations in the Pacifi c the same manner that the organization War can be divided roughly into sev-

718 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

eral phases . Encompassed in the first beat off enemy attacks . It would not be are the operations following Pearl enough to patrol the island aggressivel y Harbor and leading to Guadalcanal . in search-and-kill missions . In the fina l Included in the second phase is the ad- analysis, these were the tactics em- vance up the Solomons chain and the ployed to seize and hold Guadalcanal , complete reduction of enemy air power but there were other islands to be taken , centered in Rabaul, the story of which other Japanese positions to be overcome , is found in Volume II, Part V, "Marin e and other tactics to be developed . Air Against Rabaul ." In a third phase , Japanese bunker defenses encoun- the role played by Marine pilots durin g tered on Munda during the New Georgi a the Central Pacific drive and in th e campaign gave impetus to the develop- Philippines campaign forms Parts IV ment of a new set of ground tactic s and V, "Marines in the Philippines" and which emphasized close tank-infantry "Marine Aviation in the Central coordination. In this operation, the Pacific," of Volume IV . Finally, "Ma- Marines provided the tanks, the Army rine Carrier Air," leads off Part III of supplied the infantry . At the conclu- this volume. In these many pages are sion of the fighting, Marine and Arm y found the outstanding record of achieve- commanders submitted a number of ment of Marine Corps aviation in Worl d recommendations which were aimed a t War II. improving tactics, communications, and fire coordination. The experience of TACTICAL INNOVATIONS New Georgia pointed up the need fo r the infantry to be supported by heavie r Paralleling the changes in the com- tanks and tank-mounted flamethrowers . position of the Marine rifle squad wa s The light tanks used at that time wer e the development of Marine infantr y not capable of destroying the well - tactics. Some of the senior officers an d constructed Japanese bunkers. noncoms landing in the Solomons with Training in small-unit tactics agains t the 1st Marine Division had been a fortified position paid dividends t o schooled in jungle fighting during tour s the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, on D-Day of duty in the Caribbean in the 1920s at Bougainville. The assault wave of th e and early 1930s. Most of the rest of th e battalion was hit hard by effective fir e division had participated in one or mor e from an undamaged Japanese 75m m of the numerous fleet landing exercises artillery piece, and Marine element s of the prewar era. Prewar concepts an d which landed were thoroughly dis- tactics had to be changed, however , persed. Only one infantry compan y when subjected to test in combat. landed on its assigned beach . Rifle The combined training and experi- groups soon began forming under rank- ence of division personnel was soun d ing men, however, and as the fight t o and proved successful in the initia l extend the beachhead ensued, the phases of the Guadalcanal campaign, Marines became oriented to their loca- but more was required of Marines tha n tion and tactical integrity was restored . to defend the division perimeter or to The pace of the assault then intensified.

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 719

While in New Zealand preparing for of visual or physical contact . The for- Bougainville, 3d Division training ha d mation was spearheaded by a securit y consisted first of small-unit tactics, an d patrol and avoided all trails . Control then progressed to battalion and regi- was maintained by means of telephon e mental combat team rehearsals. On the wire which was unrolled at the head of lower level, all Marines had been thor- the column and reeled in again at th e oughly briefed on the mission of each tail. Upon stopping or at the time of assaulting element, and each squad, contact with the enemy, unit and sup- platoon, and company was mad e porting arms commanders clipped thei r familiar with the mission of adjacen t hand-carried sound-powered telephones organizations. Additionally, each Ma- into the lines and were in instant com- rine was given a sketch map of the Cap e munication with the formation com- Torokina shoreline. Because of thi s mander. The officer at the head of th e sound preinvasion indoctrination, an d main body controlled the speed and despite the confused situation on th e direction of the column. beach on D-Day, control was regaine d Experience at Bougainville demon- and "bunker after bunker began to fall strated that a command employing th e to the coordinated and well-execute d "contact imminent" formation could attacks" of the reformed infantr y expect to move at a rate of 500 yards groups." per hour through swamps—and Bou- As the Bougainville campaign pro- gainville had swamps aplenty inland of gressed and after three major engage- the beachhead. It was also discovered ments with the enemy, 3d Division that a unit in this formation could fen d Marines became as adept at jungle fight- off small enemy attacks without a dela y ing as the veterans of Guadalcanal. The in forward movement. At the same Marines on the Northern Solomons time, the formation was flexible enough island learned to take cover quickly an d to permit the commander to deploy hi s quietly when attacked and learned t o troops for immediate combat on the employ their supporting arms effec- flanks, in the front, or at the rear . tively. By the end of the Bougainville cam- The 3d Division developed a forma- paign, 3d Division Marines had amasse d tion it called "contact imminent," whic h a bookful of lessons learned in combat was employed for an approach march which, together with the experience s through the jungle to enemy positions. gained by others in previous operations , This formation, ensuring a steady and would profit Marines assigned to th e controlled advance, had several vari- Pacific area when they entered combat. l ations. Basically, it consisted of a Bougainville proved, as did Guadalcana march column of units which had flank and New Georgia earlier, that with few d guards deployed to cover the widest exceptions, jungle tactics were base o possible front under existing condition s simply on common sense applied t standard tactical principles and methods 91 Shaw and Kane, Isolation of Rabaul, p. generally employed in tropical terrain 213. and vegetation. Although it was diffi-

720 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

cult to maintain troop control in th e New Britain, Marines opened the jungle, the "contact imminent" forma- Central Pacific campaign with the in- tion proved eminently sound . Another vasion of Tarawa, where Marines met a lesson of Bougainville was that, like in determined enemy well ensconced i n the "Banana Wars" of Central America , heavily fortified defenses. An overall rapid-fire weapons were most suitable evaluation of the Tarawa operatio n for jungle fighting ; the light machin e called this "a battle where perseverance gun was particularly favored because dominated over adversity, where indi- of its rapid rate of fire, mobility, and vidual courage and collective knowho w low silhouette . defeated a strong Japanese garrison o n Less than two months after th e its own ground and in its own posi- Bougainville D-Day, Major General tions." 9 3 William H . Rupertus' 1st Marine Divi- A post-operation analysis determined sion landed on New Britain at Cape what factors militated for success o n Gloucester, which was the last major Tarawa. In this context, both 2d Divi- Marine ground operation in the South - sion engineers and tankmen praised the west Pacific area. The terrain on New preinvasion training they had receive d Britain for the most part was very in coordinating their employment o f similar to that found on Bougainville . demolitions, flamethrowers, and fire- Jungle, swamps, and unknown and un- power in knocking out the coconut palm foreseen heights abounded . The tactics log, coral, and concrete bunkers and the Marines employed here, therefore, pillboxes . were the "book" tactics for jungle war - Tarawa served as a bloody testing fare, with basic techniques refined b y ground where valuable lessons were these now combat-wise veterans . Gen- learned for storming a heavily defended eral Rupertus' men maintained excel - beach. It was found that in their train- lent night fire discipline and patrolle d ing for future combat commitments, the aggressively throughout the campaign . Marine divisions had to emphasize more In essence, they successfully employe d thorough coordination of tanks, artil- tactics which had once been the exclu- lery, flamethrowers, demolitions, and sive province of the enemy in the riflemen in isolating and overrunnin g Pacific ; the tables had been turned . strong Japanese defenses. A further Marines captured enemy weapons and conclusion based on the Tarawa experi- used them expertly against their forme r ence was that all Marines, regardless o f owners. Again, as before, small-uni t their specialties, had to be taught some- leaders were capable of independen t thing about the use of demolitions . Up action in "brush-choked terrain, wher e to that point, explosives had been em- the bitterest fighting was often done a t ployed almost exclusively by combat 92 close range with an unseen enemy ." engineers. While fighting on Bougainville was underway and before it had started in 0' Capt James R . Stockman, The Battle Fo r Tarawa (Washington : HistSec, DivPubinfo , "Ibid., p . 438. HQMC, 1947), p . 65 .

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 721

The lessons of Tarawa were absorbed in searching out the real strongpoints an d at Camp Pendleton by the 4th Marin e thereby avoiding holding up the attack Division, which was forming and train- by weak and scattered resistance . Whe n a strongpoint is encountered, the infantry- ing for its impending assault of the tank team and demolition-flame throwe r islands of Kwajalein Atoll . Great stres s team become integrated and operate to- in the training phase was placed on the gether until the strong point is reduced . destruction of pillboxes. To achieve this, In reducing a strong point, emphasis the infantry regiments organized tw o must be also placed upon the value of supporting fires from air, naval gunfire an d types of assault demolition teams — artillery. Field artillery continues to be each numbering about 20 men—for us e the most reliable and effective weapon for against these and other fortified posi- neutralization purposes in close suppor t tions. Both teams contained demolitions , of infantry. Proper use of supporting fires bazooka, and BAR groups, but the in reducing strong points calls for the artillery-infantry-tank team to be closely nucleus of the first was a flamethrower , coordinated . The greatest neutralization and the second was built around a ligh t value is gained by the infantry and tank s machine gun. The 4th Division selecte d moving quickly into the neutralized are a infantrymen from all of the assault as artillery fires lift. The closer the ad- units for special demolitions training vance behind our own neutralization fire s the more the benefit derived from the and to act as demolition men in the neutralization . Team work, involving above-mentioned teams. They were, in firing, must be practiced in trainin g fact, to take the place of combat engi- periods to develop thoroughly the use o f neers in this formation and elsewhere , combined arms . 9 4 whenever necessary. In a personal letter to the Comman- The success of this training was em- dant, General Smith more vividly de- phasized at Roi-Namur and the other scribed the Kwajalein battle : islets of Kwajalein . At the end of this operation, the VAC commander, Gen- The fighting on Namur was fierce. Heavy eral Holland Smith, made the followin g underbrush filled with Japs throughout the entire back area . The [enemy] had comments, which could have applie d concrete tunnels connecting their pill equally to subsequent campaigns : boxes, and in addition trenches dug at th e base of trees running zigzag across th e The technique of the infantry-tan k entire island . The 24th [Marines] had t o teams pushing rapidly forward, closel y dig them out with hand grenades, flame followed by demolition and flame throwe r throwers, and bayonets 9 5 teams is concurred in by this Headquarter s as sound . However, emphasis is placed o n The refinement of existing tactics the fact that it must be a continuous move- w ment in which light enemy resistance is rather than the development of ne neutralized and bypassed by the forwar d ones marked the Saipan operation, elements of the infantry-tank teams, the n the supporting elements of the infantry °' CG, VAC, comments, n .d., in CominCh , equipped with demolitions and flame Amphibious Operations, The Marshall Islands , throwers reduced these isolated enem y Jan-Feb44, dtd 20May44 . positions before they can recover and fire ° u MajGen Holland M . Smith ltr to CMC , on the rear of our troops moving forward. dtd 4Feb44 (Vandegrift Personal Correspond- This technique is particularly effective ence File HistBr, HQMC) .

722 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

where the technique of tank-infantry tank from suicide-inclined Japanese coordination was improved . Although who threatened to blow up both tank s artillery served admirably as a support- and themselves. As the eyes and ears o f ing arm, the fighting in the Pacifi c the tank, the infantry was also respon- demonstrated the "need for a weapon sible for designating suitable target s which could operate closer to the infor the guns of the armored vehicle an d fantry, a weapon which the infantr y directing its fire . could direct and control, and from thi s The tank-infantry concept reached came the tank-infantry team." 9 ° full maturity at Saipan. Not only be- Standard infantry arm and hand sig- cause of earlier experiments but be- nals and radio communication were em- cause the terrain here was more suite d ployed whenever infantry and armo r for armored operations . Infantry-tan k worked together . Neither was a satis- coordination was excellent at Tinian . factory link, however, and at Arawe , "Indeed, much of the operation took o n 1st Tank Battalion personnel installe d the properties of a tank-infantr y field telephones at the rear of their ligh t sweep." 98 There were few tank losses tanks through which the riflemen could here primarily because enemy antitank contact the tank commanders . "The im- fire was ineffective, and also because the provement in tank-infantry cooperatio n most dangerous antitank weapon, the was immediate, and the innovatio n magnetic mine, was offset by a Marine proved to be sound enough to have a technique used first at Roi-Namur, later permanent part in armored support employed in the Marianas, and nearl y tactics." 9 7 perfected at Iwo and Okinawa . This Tank-infantry cooperation was base d simple field expedient merely consiste d on a mutuality of needs. The tanks ha d of covering the flat areas of the mos t the crushing ability and firepower vulnerable surfaces of the tank wit h which, under optimum conditions, pro- oak planking.99 vided excellent support to the infantry . Each infantry regiment on Tinia n On the other hand, in the midst of was assigned one reinforced company o f battle, the tank, a large lumberin g 18 medium tanks plus a platoon of four vehicle, was a target which the enem y flamethrower tanks and two light tanks . could hardly expect to miss, and, in Throughout this operation, these tank fact, often hit . Under most combat con- companies supported the same infantr y ditions, the tanks were tightly buttone d units to which they had originally been up and vulnerable because the vision o f assigned . This led to constantly improv- the tankers inside was restricted to a ing tank-infantry tactics . very great degree. The infantry, there- As at Tarawa, the only infantry fore, was responsible for protecting th e tactics feasible at Peleliu were thos e

°e Capt Leonard G . Lawton, "Tank-Infantr y °8 Maj Carl W . Hoffman, The Seizure of Team," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no . 1 1 Tinian (Washington : HistDiv, HQMC, 1951) , (Nov45), p. 30 . p. 131 . °' Shaw and Kane, Isolation of Rabaul, p. °° LtCol Richard K. Schmidt ltr to CMC, dt d 394. 5Dec49, cited in Ibid.

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 723 employed by determined flamethrower , a part of the tank, you would have one demolition, and infantry assault teams . of the finest weapons possible for thi s The Japanese had fully utilized the ter - mopping up of caves, pillboxes and block - houses that you could devise.lol rain on the island to their advantage. It has been said of enemy defenses on For the invasions of Iwo Jima and Oki- Peleliu that "never before in the Pacifi c nawa, the Marine divisions had dozer War had the Japanese displayed greater and flamethrower tanks . resourcefulness or exploited their capa- But these tools of war were not avail - bilities more successfully ." 10 0 able to Captain George P . Hunt's Com- To overcome these nearly impreg- pany K, 3/1, at Peleliu on D-Day, when nable defenses, 1st Marine Division it landed on White Beach, the extreme troops employed their bazookas, portable left of the 1st Marine Division beach- flamethrowers, and demolitions with head. Hunt's Marines encountered here savage expertise. When afforded profit- a classic Japanese defense, set in : able targets, artillery supported the in- . . . solid, jagged coral, a rocky mass of fantry. Tank-infantry tactics proved sharp pinnacles, deep crevasses, tremen- satisfactory, but only on level ground dous boulders . Pillboxes, reinforced with where the tanks could maneuver . steel and concrete, had been dug or blaste d in the base of the perpendicular drop to the f General Rupertus, the commander o beach. Others, with coral and concrete the 1st Marine Division, noted after piled six feet on top were constructe d Peleliu that portable flamethrower s above, and spider holes were blaste d were not at first employed satisfactoril y around them for protecting infantry . It because the infantry did not receiv e surpassed by far anything we had conceived of when we studied the aeria l them until immediately before embark- photographs .102 ing for the target area. The 1st Division commander commented favorably on th e It was such a narrow thing that at one results achieved by the Ronson flame- stage during the first night, Hunt wa s thrower, but added that he believed i t holding the point with 18 men and de - should not be mounted on the LVT . pending heavily on a captured Japanese Instead Rupertus thought that the Gen- machine gun to stave off annihilation . eral Grant tank would prove a more Later it proved possible to send in re- suitable platform . The Grant mounted a inforcements and needed supplies by 75mm gun on its right side and in a LVTs, and Hunt was able to attack an d power turret on top, a 37mm gun and a overcome the enemy position . .30 caliber machine gun. General After the Peleliu operation, Hunt was Rupertus recommended that : returned to Quantico to instruct a course in the rifle company in the attack . d The 37mm gun . . . could be remove s and the Navy flame-thrower installe d With the cooperation of Colonel Lewi ; you would still have the 75m m therein 101 MajGen William H . Rupertus ltr to CMC , h gun available. . . . If in addition to suc dtd 180ct44 (Vandegrift Personal Corre- e installation a bulldozer blade were mad spondence File) . 1°1 10° Isely and Crowl, Marines and Amphibiou s George P. Hunt, Coral Comes High (New War, p. 412 . York : Harper and Brothers, 1946), p. 58.

310-224 0-69 - 47

724 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

W. Walt, "in charge of the attack divi- jetted to this base of fire, the demoli- sion" at the Marine Corps Schools, a tion teams would move in for the kill . problem was designed and entitled One such team might be armed with "Assault of a Fortified Position," based several sections of bangalore torpedoes , on the experiences of Company K o n and such other explosives as pole , White Beach, for use in the course of satchel, and shaped charges.104 The instruction at the Schools . The exac t other team would have two flame- layout and construction of Japanese de- throwers and their operators, which in fenses were reconstituted for this prob- turn were protected by two riflemen . lem. "Later Colonel Walt added the lak e In the end, the application of these and amphibious craft," which gave tactics, which were graphically bu t additional realism to students and visi- aptly described at Okinawa as th e tors alike whenever this particula r "corkscrew and blowtorch" method by problem was demonstrated.1o3 For a General Buckner, was enough to destro y number of years thereafter, "Assaul t of a Fortified Position" was a highligh t 104 A bangalore torpedo is a long iron pipe and necessary ingredient in the educa- filled with an explosive, and fitted with a tion of young lieutenants at the Basi c detonating cap and a long fuse. Several School. bangalore sections could be fitted together, an d Iwo Jima confronted invading Ma- after a rounded cap was fastened to the hea d end, these sections could be pushed forwar rines with defenses and an enemy op - d over most types of terrain and exploded to position which were in many ways very destroy barbed wire entanglements or to deto- much like those encountered in the Gil- nate buried mines. The pole charge was simpl y berts, Marshalls, and Palau Islands . about 15 pounds of block TNT tied together, The objective was relatively small i n capped, fuzed, and mounted at the end of a comparison with those in the Marianas . long pole, ready to be fired . The beauty of the pole charge was that it could be placed in At Iwo, defensive weapons and instal- position out of hand-reach . Satchel charges also lations were mutually supporting and consisted of about 15 pounds of explosive s thoroughly fortified . Their destruction either taped to a board fitted with a rope or depended upon closely coordinated wire loop for carrying, or placed in a haver- teamwork by Marine infantry and sup- sack for the same purpose . Once the fuze wa s lit, the satchel could be flung at an enem y porting arms. fortification or position . A shaped charge wa s The hard-working infantry, as usual , as the name suggests, a charge composed o f was called on to perform this mission in cast TNT shaped like a cone so that the ex - the face of murderous enemy fire . Ma- plosive energy was focused and concentrated to rine tactics generally employed upon move in one direction . Fastened to a pole an d emplaced against a concrete blockhouse, when meeting a strongpoint were these : a exploded the shaped charge would blow a smal l "pin up" team consisting of a bazooka , hole on the outside of the position, but onc e two BARs, and an M–1 rifle would having penetrated the wall, the concentrate d direct a heavy volume of fire on the energy fanned out with tremendous force , target. When the Japanese were sub- carrying with it concrete and steel fragments and a concussive blast, which in itself wa s 109 Mr . George P . Hunt ltr to author dtd capable of killing all the defenders within th e 17Jun66 . fortification.

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 725

even the most steadfastly held Japanes e Okinawa. In the first instance, follow- defensive position . ing the neutralization of an objective It was tactics such as these which by supporting fires, the ground troop s moved Secretary of the Navy James V . —preceded by Shermans—advanced to Forrestal, who was present and an ob- secure the area. This type of attack server at Iwo Jima, to express great proved successful only against groun d admiration "for the guy who walks up lightly defended by the enemy . In cases beaches and take enemy positions with where there were heavy and well dug-in a rifle and grenades or his bare Japanese positions, the pre-attack prep- hands." 105 Mr. Forrestal gave an exag- aration had a temporary effect only, an d gerated description, of course, of how when American forces were on or nea r Marine infantry overcame General the objective, the enemy would leve l Kuribayashi's island fortress, but th e furious fire on the attackers, pinnin g Secretary of the Navy was not far off them down and prohibiting their move- the mark . ment forwards or backwards. Okinawa was the ultimate amphibi- A second method was widely em- ous assault landing in the Pacific War , ployed in southern Okinawa. Prior to a and the ultimate weapon here was th e general tank-infantry advance, th e infantryman and his supporting arms . Shermans—protected by fire teams — The most complete employment of tank- delivered close-range direct fire on infantry tactics perhaps best character- caves, bunkers, and tomb emplacement s izes the nature of the fighting on Oki- in the path of the assault . Tanks and nawa. In the rapid drive north which armored flamethrowers ranged out led to the decisive and successful battl e ahead of the front lines to distances u p for Motobu Peninsula, 6th Divisio n to 800 yards, systematically destroyin g Marines rode the tanks which later pro- enemy positions on forward and revers e vided fire support in the heavy fighting slopes by putting point-blank 75mm to rid northern Okinawa of the Japa- fire and flame right into cave mouths nese. But it was in the southern portio n and embrasures . In the fighting fo r of the island, both on level ground and Sugar Loaf, tanks were emplaced i n in cave-studded draws that the develop- hull defilade firing positions at the fron t ment of the tank-infantry team reache d to deliver flat trajectory fire into enemy a climax. lines opposite. Of proven worth in th e In both the 1st and 6th Marine Divi- tank-infantry attacks were the M–7s sions, tanks functioned as a major with their 105mm guns . These vehicles direct-fire, close-support weapon . At all served admirably as siege guns and times, IIIAC tanks operated within th e were the most powerful organic weapon limit of observation and control of the in the infantry regiment . Like the infantry. Generally depending upon the tanks, the M–7s could and did roll right tactical situation, tank-infantry teams up to the face of Japanese emplacement s were employed in one of two ways on to deliver their fire. Peculiar to the terrain of Okinawa i s 105 Quoted in New York Times, 26Feb45 , p. 1, column 6 . a series of sharp, rocky coral ridges

726 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

which the enemy defended with skill the valley walls . Closely following thi s and ferocity against all attackers. fire, the tank-infantry teams started These ridges form the precipitous wall s into the pocket, working both sides of of valleys, upon the floors of which the valley simultaneously to prevent th e were emplaced mutually supported numerous enemy positions from sup - weapons, concealed in caves, and sited porting each other. "Each cave position for murderous crossfire . The entrances is attacked by fire until neutralized , to the valleys were very often mined to then burned out with flamethrowers, discourage tank operations . Usually, the and eventually sealed by demoli- cave positions enfiladed any advance in tions." 107 the open space leading to the valleys . It may be clearly seen from this brief In most cases, the caves were so high exposition on the evolution of Marin e on the cliff faces that the infantry was infantry tactics in the war that the wa y unable to close to assault them . of the Marine infantryman in no way As demonstrated by the fighting fo r became safer, although his path wa s the Awacha Pocket, and later at both made easier as new methods and Dakeshi and Wana Ridges, the maneuve r deadlier weapons became his . This in of Marine forces was restricted by th e no way mitigates the fact that under funnelling influence of the ever-narrow- any condition infantry combat simply ing cliffs. This, in effect, forced the in- is a dirty and hard business, where fantry to mount what generally becam e training, discipline, and courage earn a frontal attack, "a slugging match wit h dividends. but temporary and limited opportunit y to maneuver ." 10 6 SPIRITUAL AND MEDICA L Born of the necessity for reducin g SERVICES Japanese emplacements in the area s just named, the Marines devised a suit- The most important thing that can able tactic employing all arms organi c be said about chaplains, doctors, and and available to the infantry . According corpsmen in any war is that they were to this solution, it was important for "there," and that they were there with attack elements first to take the high the troops when they were needed . The ground, from where they could support services performed by these naval per- a methodical cleaning out of the draw s sonnel in Marine Corps uniforms have and valleys below by tank-infantry- been praised by generals and privates flamethrower-demolitions teams . Once alike. The members of the Navy Corps a ridge position had been secured, com- of Chaplains and Medical and Dental bat engineers cleared mines from the Corps ministered to the spiritual and entrances of the valleys. From the ridge - physical needs of all ranks and religion s tops, all supporting arms were called under all conditions. Although un- upon to place as much fire as possible on armed, they were subjected to the same rigors and discomforts in combat a s 10° MajGen Pedro A . del Valle, "Cave War - Marine assault troops. fare," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no. 7 (Ju145), p . 58. 107 Ibid., p . 59.

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 727

Early in World War II, the Nav y was heaviest. But by 'Yom Kippur, th e Chaplains Division established th e Day of Atonement, which is the holiest policy of assigning a Protestant and a of all Jewish religious observances, Catholic chaplain to each Marine regi- conditions were fairly secure at the ment, and six other chaplains to serv e beach area. Of this holiday on Peleliu, the other units in the division . This Rabbi Edgar E . Siskin, the Jewish chap- complement of chaplains in each divi- lain of the 1st Marine Division, wrote sion came to a total of 16 with the addi- afterwards : tion of a Division Chaplain and his as- We held services in the morning in the sistant, a Jewish chaplain who min- Division CP area. Word had got aroun d istered to the Marines of his faith somehow and the boys drifted in from all throughout the division .los parts of the island . Some had come from Like the Marines to whom they ha d lines where fighting was still going on . They straggled in—bearded, dirty, carry- been assigned, Navy chaplains ofte n ing their weapons . The altar rigged b y landed with the assault waves . In the Chaplain Murphy, Division Chaplain, wa s midst of the fighting, they would go improvised out of ammunition boxes, an d from man to man, giving aid and com- was covered over by a length of capture d fort as best they could, and assistin g Japanese silk. Over this we draped ou r the doctors and corpsmen in treatin g Ten Commandments Banner . The sym- bolism of this act was not lost to ou r the wounded. It made no difference small congregation. what faith a chaplain represented, fo r And there we were—72 men—praying , he had learned a cardinal rule when chanting the old Yom Kippur mode, sum- first entering the Chaplain's School : moned by a call heard above the tumult "Cooperation with Compromise."los of battle. There we were not 200 yard s from a ridge still held by the Japs, withi n Therefore, it was not unusual for a range of sniper and mortar fire. And Protestant chaplain to counsel or com- throughout the service the artillery kep t fort a serviceman of another religion , up a shattering fire overhead . . . . This or for a fellow chaplain of another per - Yom Kippur no service anywhere, I dare , suasion to do the same for a Protestant , say, surpassed in the significance ours for all its makeshift appointments an d a Catholic, or a Jew. As soon as the bedraggled worshippers .110 combat situation permitted, chaplain s held divine services, very often withi n It was commonplace in the experience the range of enemy guns . Several times of all chaplains who served with Ma- during the war, a major religious holi- rines to have held religious services i n day occurred after a combat operatio n a combat area while the guns were stil l had begun. Such was the case at firing. Innumerable Catholic masses Peleliu, where the Jewish New Year , and Protestant observances were held Rosh Hashonah, fell when the fighting on the hood of a jeep, which served a s an altar, and many confessions could 108 Capt Clifford M. Drury (ChC), USN , not be heard over the sound of firing , The History of the Chaplain Corps, United States Navy, 1939-1949, v. 2 (Washington : 110 Lt Edgar E . Siskin (ChC), USN, "Yom BuPers, ND, 1950), p . 110 . Kippur on Peleliu," Hebrew Union Colleg e 108 Ibid., p. 214 . Bulletin, Apr45, pp. 7—8 .

728 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

although they were being whispere d collecting station group landed as soo n directly into the ears of confessors . as possible after the shore party com- Naval Medical Corps personnel playe d mand group. Whenever the tactical situ- no less an important role in their sup - ation permitted, the hospital section, port of Marine Corps assault units than medical battalion, and malaria control the chaplains. Unless one has been i n unit were sent ashore. The normal chain combat and has heard the anguished cry of evacuation of a casualty was throug h of "Corpsman ! Corpsman !" above the the battalion aid station via the regi- din of battle, much of what Navy doctors mental aid station to the beach, and and hospital corpsmen do in combat is from here to an attack transport, a hos- diminished greatly in telling . And unless pital ship, or the division or corps one has himself been wounded in com- hospital. "The first link in the elaborate bat, treated where he has fallen, an d chain of care established by the Medica l evacuated under fire, it is even mor e Department" was formed by the infan- difficult to convey the feeling of blesse d try company aid men who landed wit h relief experienced by a casualty who and closely followed the assault wave."' knows the tender care and expert treat- The respectful disposition of the re- ment he is soon to receive. It was im- mains of both friendly and enemy dea d portant for combat troops to know that , was an important element in this chai n if they were unfortunate enough to be - of care. come wounded in action, they would no t Battalion aid stations were set up be - have to wait long before they receive d hind the units they supported at a dis- medical assistance . tance in relation to the size of the beach - With but few variations, the opera- head and the depth to which it had bee n tions of medical units in amphibious as- extended. Here, they could give more sault landings generally remained the complete treatment than that available same throughout the war . At the time in the midst of the fighting . These aid that a division operation plan was pre- stations moved forward progressively i n pared, the medical annex to the admin- pace with the rate of the advance. istrative plan was written and published . The advance element of the medica l In this document were the basic instruc- company, the collecting party, landed tions for the employment of medical soon after the aid station was set up an d units in the impending assault . In the in operation. With its ambulance jeeps , ship-to-shore movement, medical per- the collecting parties went forward to sonnel landed in approximately the same the company aid areas to evacuate the wave as the headquarters of the unit to wounded to either the battalion aid sta- which they were attached . Company tions or the beach, where landing craft corpsmen sometimes were assigned t o carried the casualties to transports and individual rifle platoons . Medical officers were never assigned below the bat- ' Capts Bennett F . Avery, Louis H . Roddis , talion level and remained at their re- and Joseph L . Schwartz (MC), USN, eds ., The History of the Medical Department of th e spective aid stations during combat . United States Navy in World War II, v. 1 Shore party medical personnel and the (Washington : BuMed, ND, 1953), p . 67 .

A FINAL ACCOUNTING 729

hospital ships offshore. As soon as the These gallant efforts resulted in a airfield on an objective had been seize d high casualty rate amongst hospita l and put into operation, transport planes corpsmen.. Iwo Jima, like other Marine flew in to evacuate casualties to hos- assault operations, was no less costly pitals in the rear areas or to the Unite d in the loss of medical personnel. In the States. On Okinawa, the artillery spot- 4th Division alone, the casualty rate ting planes were pressed into service to among corpsmen was 38 percent .113 fly Marine casualties to field hospital s On all combat operations, the work north of the fighting. of dental officers and technicians wa s The use of LSTs for casualty handlin g invaluable . In addition to carrying out and evacuation was developed early in their regular duties, dental officers als o the South Pacific campaigns . Desig- assisted in the sick bays and operating nated LST (H) s and staffed with surgi- rooms. They often relieved the medica l cal teams from rear echelons for eac h officers of routine functions, gave operation, these vessels became an im- anesthesia, and aided in identifying the portant link in the chain of evacuation . dead. Dental surgeons were also trained In the Central Pacific fighting and until "to work as a team with otorhino- the Iwo Jima and Okinawa operations, laryngologists in treating gunsho t there was a shortage of LSTs for this wounds of the jaws and face ." 11 4 purpose, but their availability at thes e Proof of the devotion to duty and pro- later landings proved ideal for givin g fessionalism of Navy Medical Corps per- early care when further evacuation wa s sonnel is exhibited by the numerous lives impossible. they saved, the high proportion of casualties they sustained, and the number o f The heroism of medical personne l l under fire in combat has been well decorations they were awarded. Al seven Medals of Honor given to mem- chronicled in almost every action repor t bers of the Medical Corps went to com- submitted during the Pacific fighting . pany aid men serving with the FMF. In During the early phases of the Saipa n addition, 69 Navy Crosses and 486 assault, for instance, the beach was Silver Stars, plus numerous lesser com- shelled continuously and had become a bat decorations, were awarded the scene best described as one of extrem e doctors, dentists, hospital corpsmen, and confusion . Into this inferno landed the 11 5 medical section of the beach parties . dental technicians . "Working for as long as 48 hours at a TAPS time without rest . . . , they gave emergency medical treatment and set u p In the final analysis, battles are not casualty evacuation stations in the sand . won by machines, but by men filled with . . . From these stations, the company ai d the zest of life and imbued with a sense men went out to administer first ai d of discipline and a willingness to sacri - exposing themselves to enemy fire i n 113 order to reach the wounded ." 11 2 Ibid., p. 95 . "' Ibid., p. 161. 112 Ibid., p . 83. 116 Ibid ., v . 2, pp. 88-111. 730 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

flee self for others . The Marine Corps Non-battle casualties in a campaigns of the Pacific War came t o combat zone 4,778 symbolize the courage and offensiv e Wounded in action 67,207 spirit that brought victory to this nation in World War II. In these battles, 80 Total 91,71811 6 Marines won the Medal of Honor "For The Tomb of the Unknowns at Arling- conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity" ton Cemetery exemplifies the sacrifice o f at the risk of their lives "above an d every American who gave his life in bat- beyond the call of duty" ; 48 of these tle for his country. Perhaps no word s men were given posthumous awards . A that have been said here in eulogy to ou r total of 957 Navy Crosses were pre- fallen heroes are as meaningful to the sented other Marines for heroism in the living as those lines written many year same actions. That these decorations an d s American victory were not won easily i s ago by the English author John Donn e evident by the following World War I I in "For Whom the Bell Tolls" : Marine casualty statistics : Any man's death diminishes me, Killed in action 15,161 because I am involve d Died of wounds 3,259 in mankind . . . . Captured and died 26 8 "e Missing, presumed dead 79 5 These figures were collated by the Report s Prisoner of war, and Statistical Unit, Personnel Services Br , presumed dead 250 Data Systems Div (APB/5), HQMC, n .d . APPENDIX A

Marine POWs 1

CAPTURE otherwise unaccounted for, are presumed to have died . A total of 1,756 cap- All but four of the 2,274 Marines who tured Marines returned to the juris- became prisoners of war in World Wa r diction of the United States ; a very II were taken by the Japanese. The small number of these were escapees , known exceptions were Marines as- and the rest were liberated at the end o f signed to the Office of Strategic Services , the war.2 The majority of the Marine better known as the OSS, who wer e POWs had been captured early in the captured in 1944 by German forces war. The rest, mostly aviation person- while engaged in covert activities i n nel, fell captive to the Japanese afte r company with the French underground . the beginning of Marine air operation s Of the remainder of the Marines who in the Allied South Pacific drive. were captured, 268 died en route to o r On 8 December 1941 (Manila Time) , in prison camp, and 250 men, who were Japanese forces took their first Marin e known to have been captured but are prisoners of war—the officers and men of the American Embassy Guard, Pei- 1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi s ping, and of the Marine Legation Guard , : 4th Mar Unit Hist , appendix is derived from Tientsin. A detail of 22 men from the Philippine AreaOp, and POW, WWII Files , all in HistBr, HQMC ; Col Gregory Boyington , Tientsin detachment was captured while USMC (Ret), Baa Baa Black Sheep (Ne w stockpiling supplies at the Chingwang- York : G . P . Putnam's Sons, 1958), hereafte r tao docks in anticipation of an immedi- Boyington, Black Sheep ; Martin Boyle, Yank s ate evacuation . The North China Ma- Don't Cry (New York : Bernard Geis and rines were scheduled to depart Ching- Associates, 1963) hereafter Boyle, Yank s Don't Cry, excerpts reprinted with the permis- wangtao on 10 December 1941 in the sion of Bernard Geis Associates from Yanks President Harrison, which had evacu- Don't Cry by Martin Boyle . ©1963 by Martin ated the 4th Marines from Shanghai Boyle ; Kenneth W . Condit and Edwin T . during the last week of November . Turnbladh, Hold High the Torch : A History of the 4th Marines (Washington : HistBr, G–3 At approximately 0800 on the 8th, Div, HQMC, 1960), hereafter Condit and Turn- however, about 1,000 Japanese troop s bladh, Hold High the Torch ; James P . S . surrounded the Tientsin barracks, while Devereux, The Story of Wake Island (Phila- three enemy planes circled overhead . delphia : J . B. Lippincott Company, 1947), hereafter Devereux, Wake Island ; Col Jack The Marine gate sentry phoned his com- Hawkins, Never Say Die (Philadelphia : Dor- manding officer, Major Luther A . Brown, rance & Company, Inc ., 1961), hereafte r and stated that a Japanese officer wante d Hawkins, Never Say Die ; Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal ; Lodge, 2 Casualty figures provided by Reports an d The Recapture of Guam ; Shaw, Nalty, an d Statistical Unit, Personnel Services Branch , Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive. Data Systems Division (APB/5) HQMC, n.d . 731

732 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

to speak to him.3 The officer, a Majo r thought that if they offered no resist- Omura who was well known to Brown , ance, they would be considered part o f brought a written proposal that all of- the diplomatic entourage and therefor e ficers and men be assembled in one place would be repatriated . Unfortunately, in the barracks compound, and all o f the basis for this belief was nonexistent . their weapons and equipment in another , Because their initial treatment was rel- while the Japanese took over . The al- atively mild, and because they receive d ternative to surrender was "that the repeated informal Japanese assurance s Japanese would enforce their proposa l that they would be repatriated, the with the troops at hand ." 4 Marines made no attempt to escape .? Brown told the major that he would Following the establishment of com- sign the proposal only if the Japanes e munications with the Japanese Govern- accorded his men the privileges due ment through Swiss diplomatic channel s them under the Boxer Protocol to which for the purpose of setting up the ex - Japan and the United States had been change of Japanese and American con- signatories. Following a telephone consular officials, the United States at - versation with the local Japanese com- tempted to get Japan to recognize the mander, Lieutenant General Kyoj i diplomatic status of the North Chin a Tominaga, with whom Brown had bee n Marines. In a telegram on 26 Decembe r friendly in prewar days, Major Omura 1941, the Swiss Government was re- stated that Tominaga agreed to the stip- quested to inform Japan that "The ulation and that Japan would honor it i f United States Government consider s valid. Brown believed that this stipula- that its official personnel subject to thi s tion should have guaranteed the repatri- exchange includes . . . the marine guard s ation of his men .5 remaining in China and there unde r General Tominaga arranged fo r the protection of international agree- Brown to telephone Colonel William W. ment. . . ." 8 Ashurst, senior Marine officer in Nort h In reply, Japan stated that "it i s China and commander of the America n unable to agree to include United States Embassy Guard in Peiping . Ashurst told Marine Guards remaining in China a s 8 Brown that he was accepting a simila r they constitute a military unit ." The Japanese proposal and advised the United States was busy at this time set- Tientsin Marine commander to do the ting up the exchange program overall , same.° The embassy and legation guards ' MIS, G—2, WD, Escape Rpt Nos. 665, Cap t Richard M . Huizenga, and 666, Capt James D . 'Col Luther A . Brown ltr to Hd, HistBr , McBrayer, Jr ., both dtd 12Ju145 (NARS, FRC , G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 50ct66, hereafter Brown Alexandria, Va .), hereafter Escape Rpt, with ltr. number and name of individual concerned . 'Col Luther A . Brown interview wit h ' U . S. Department of State, Foreign Rela- HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 29May58, here - tions of the United States, Diplomatic Papers , after Brown interview . 1942, v. 1 (Washington : GPO, 1960), p . 382 , Brown ltr . hereafter U. S. Diplomatic Papers, 1942. Ibid. Ibid., p . 389.

MARINE POWS 733

and informed the Imperial Government be repatriated ." 13 Until the exchange through Swiss channels that it woul d ships left without the Marines, the men revert to this point at a later date . Japan believed that they would be repatriated . inferred from this statement that "th e Brown said after the war that they United States Government do not insis t were convinced that they were at least in inclusion of the Marine Guards in the slated to be returned to the United present exchange." 10 This inferenc e States, but that the excuse the Japanes e was incorrect because on 13 March, gave for failing to send them back wa s when it provided a list of the Americans that there was not enough room fo r to be repatriated, the Department of them on board the exchange ships . 14 State referred to what it had said previ- This may have been a valid excuse, for ously regarding the return of the Marine many grave problems concerning ship- guards and stated that it expected the board accommodations arose whic h Japanese Government "to take cogni- threatened the whole repatriation proc- zance of their true status as diplomatic ess. 1 5 1 1 guards." On 2 February 1942, the North Chin a Neither Major Brown nor Colonel Marines arrived at Woosung prison Ashurst, who had surrendered the Pei- camp, at the mouth of the Whangpo o ping guard at 1100 on 8 December, knew River near Shanghai, where they joined of this diplomatic interchange . On 3 the Marine survivors of Wake Islan d January 1942, the Peiping Marines who had arrived on 24 January . Also at were brought to Tientsin and quartere d Woosung were a handful of Marines, with Brown's troops . At Major Brown' s who, unlike the others, received diplo- intercession, Major Edwin P. McCaul- matic immunity and were to be repatri- ley, who had retired and was living i n ated later in 1942 . These men were Peiping but was recalled to active dut y Quartermaster Clerk Paul G . Chandler, as the Quartermaster for the Peiping First Sergeant Nathan A. Smith, Sup- Guard, was relocated by the Japanese ply Sergeant Henry Kijak, and Staff to a Tientsin hotel, and later returne d Sergeant Loren O. Schneider, all mem- to the United States on the first ex - bers of the 4th Marines who had been change ship.1 2 left at Shanghai to settle governmen t On the 27th, the entire group o f accounts after their regiment had saile d Marines was moved, together with al l for the Philippines .16 For some unknown personal effects, by train to Shanghai , reason, unless they had been gulled into where a Japanese officer told them in 13 Brown interview . English as they entered the prison camp , 14 Ibid. that "they were not prisoners of war 1" U. S. Diplomatic Papers, 1942, pp . 427f. although they would be treated as suc h 10 LtCol William T . Clement (Fleet Marine and that North China Marines woul d Officer, U. S. Asiatic Fleet) ltr to CMC, dtd 6Apr42, Subj : Dispositions and employment 10 Ibid., p. 402 . of U . S . Marines on the Asiatic Station durin g 11 Ibid ., p. 404 . the initial stages of the War (MiscRpts File , 12 Brown ltr . Philippine Area Ops Files, HistBr, HQMC) .

734 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

believing so, the Japanese thought that Sumay, Guam, including the 28 Marine s these last four were part of the U . S. assigned to the Insular Patrol (Police) . consular staff at Shanghai and there- Saipan-based Japanese bombers hit th e fore entitled to diplomatic immunity. island of Guam on 8 December (Manil a Chandler and the other three Marines Time) and again on the 9th . The Guam became prisoners on 8 December, and Marines took up positions in the butts o f were transferred several times to other the rifle range on Grote Peninsula and , prisons in the Shanghai area before after making all possible preparation s they, too, arrived at Woosung. This was for a stiff defense, awaited the antici- a former Japanese Army camp, approxi- pated Japanese assault. mately 20 acres overall, and completel y It was not long in coming, for early enclosed with two electrified fences . The on the 10th, two separate enemy force s buildings were all frame structure and landed, one above Agana, and the mai n unheated. Most of the prisoners were group below Agat. Aware of the over- not dressed warmly enough to with- whelming superiority of the enemy an d stand the biting Chinese . winter, and in order to safeguard the lives o f all were insufficiently fed. ' Guamanian citizens, Captain George J . McMillin, USN, Governor of Guam, sur- The second group of Marines to be- rendered the island to the Japanese come captives of the Japanese were th e . Scattered fighting 153 members of Lieutenant Colonel Wil- shortly after 0600 liam K . MacNulty's Marine Barracks , continued throughout the day as the enemy spread out over the island and " Capt Paul G . Chandler interview in Colum- met isolated pockets of opposition . bus, Ohio, Citizen, 16Sep42. A thorough chec k Nonetheless, the defenders could offer of known available sources does not indicate only token resistance to the well-arme d that any other Marine besides McCaulley an d f the quartet from the 4th Marines was repatri- Japanese, who quickly had control o ated . This group was taken from Woosung on the entire island . 9 June ; and together with other diplomati c On 10 January 1942, the America n personnel being exchanged they boarded eithe r members of the Guam garrison were the Japanese Asama Maru or the Italian Conte . Verde, which departed Japan on 25 June 1942 . evacuated to prison camps in Japan On 22 July, these liners arrived at the Portu- After a five-day sea voyage, the pris- guese Southeast African port of Lourenco oners arrived at the island of Shikoku Marques. Here, the Swedish liner S . S . and were imprisoned at Zentsuji, 1S Gripsholm had arrived a short time before with where they remained until they wer e Japanese officials to be returned to thei r transferred in June 1942 to Osaka on country. On 24 July, with the repatriates on board, the Gripsholm steamed for the Unite d States and arrived there on 25 August after 18 Of interest is the fact that Zentsuji Priso n having stopped at Rio de Janeiro to drop of f Camp was built to house German prisoners of South American diplomats and their families. the Japanese in World War I . Upon the re- Because discussions for a second exchange o f lease of the Germans, the camp was inactivated this type were then underway, the returnees until it was reopened to hold Guam Marines i n were requested to keep their statements to th e 1942 . CWO Earl B . Ercanbrack ltr to Hd , press regarding their conditions of imprison- HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 210ct66, here - ment while in Japan to a minimum . after Ercanbrack ltr 1966 . MARINE POWS 735

NORTH CHINA MARINES, en route to prison camp in Shanghai, are paraded through the streets of Nanking by their captors on 10 January 1942 . (Photograph courtesy of Colonel Luther A. Brown)

POW QUARTERS at Fengt'ai, where the Woosung prisoners were held for a short time before being transferred to camps in Japan . (Photograph courtesy of Colonel Luther A . Brown)

736 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Honshu. First Sergeant Earl B. Ercan- punishment without opportunity to offer brack, as senior Marine noncommis- protest or seek justice ." 20 sioned officer of the Guam men, became Some of the Guam prisoners believed camp leader at Osaka from the date o f that it was not entirely proper to wor k their capture until October, when Japa- so hard for the enemy, and a numbe r nese Army authorities turned the POW s of the POWs at Osaka "formed a some- over to the tender mercies of civilia n what informal, loose group or faction guards and work supervisors . Until that who felt that it was our duty to slow down time, the Marines were treated fairly . the National (Jap) War Effort. We Although the Marines were assigned t o never seemed to properly understan d heavy manual labor both at Osaka and the Jap guards, we stumbled, spille d Zentsuji, none of the men felt that th e bags, caused minor damage and bettere d "work was unfair or the treatment othe r our own morale but did little real dam- 21 than just and honorable ." 19 This situa- age to their war effort ." In October tion changed after the middle of October 1942, 80 men of the Osaka camp wer e t when the POWs were treated "as crim- called out of formation, advised tha they had been observed by prison au- inals, subjected to ridicule and humilia- thorities, who had decided that th e tion, and . . . suffered cruel and unjus t Americans were non-cooperative an d therefore to be transferred to a more '0 Marine Gunner Earl B . Ercanbrack ltr to International Red Cross Representatives, dtd severe camp . "So this group, half 30Aug45, Subj : Report of Treatment whil e USMC and half USN (known thereafte r held as Prisoners of War, hereafter Ercan- as the `Eighty Eight Balls') were sent to brack ltr I . To explain the discrepancy betwee n Hirohata to work as stevedores shovel- Ercanbrack's rank noted in the text and tha t ing coal and iron ore at Seitetsu Stee l given in this citation, he stated in a report t o 2 2 the Commandant that he assumed the warrant Mills ." rank of Marine Gunner in February 1945. He Perhaps some insight into the reason s took this action because "Realizing the re- underlying Japanese treatment of pris- sponsibility resting on me [as Camp Leader ] should I act in taking over the camp . . . and oners may be found in the followin g further realizing that the situation of the war statement made by a senior enemy offi- was developing where American invasio n cer to Ercanbrack's group on the da y seemed possible and imminent," he believed that it was transferred to Hirohata that this rank would give him the fuller authority of a commanding officer . lstSgt Earl B . camp, west of Osaka . The Japanese Ercanbrack ltr to CMC, dtd 12Nov45, Subj : colonel told the Americans that : General Report of Commanding Officer, Inde- pendent Detachment of American Forces Held We were cowards, else we would hav e as Prisoners of War, Osaka Prisoner of Wa r killed ourselves as brave Japanese soldier s Camp, Hirohata Sub-Camp, for the period would have done, that he could not forget 60ct43-2Sep45, hereafter Ercanbrack ltr II . that our comrades in arms were killin g Ercanbrack vacated the warrant rank whe n Japanese brothers and husbands, that w e he was liberated but upon his return to th e 2 United States, he was officially promoted to th e ° Ercanbrack ltr I . rank of Warrant Officer, with the appointment =' Ercanbrack ltr 1966 . backdated to 31 January 1943 . == Ibid.

MARINE POWS 737

chose the disgrace of a cowardly surrende r Wake, and eight others were confined i n 23 and that we must suffer. a one-room cottage. Most men of th e As Japanese war reverses mounted an d Marine detachment had been taken a t Allied planes began bombing the Home their defense positions, but not before Islands, the lot of the POWs grew worse . they had dismantled and destroyed thei r After a heroic stand against tremend- personal weapons and had damaged be- ous odds, on 23 December the defender s yond any further use their crew-served of Wake Island surrendered to become pieces. Those wounded prior to 23 De- the third group of Marines to be cap- cember and those who had been hos- tured by the enemy. The Wake prisoner s pitalized for other reasons had bee n were comprised of the survivors of the placed in an underground ammunitio n 1st Defense Battalion detachment an d magazine for protection from Japanes e VMF–211 .24 Also taken at the same bombs. time with these Marines and a fe w Both the wounded and others cap- Army Air Corps and Navy personnel tured after the enemy landings wer e were some 1,100 civilian contract em- held under guard at the VMF–211 air - ployees who were actively engaged in craft parking area until dusk on 2 5 constructing new and extensive defense s December, when they were marche d on the island when war struck. around the island to the vacated civilian Immediately following the capitula- barracks . At this time, the wounded wh o tion of the Wake Island garrison,25 the were completely unable to walk were men were subjected to numerous indig- taken to the improvised hospital men- nities regardless of rank . By sunset of tioned above. "During this period o f 23 December, all of the Americans o n approximately 54 hours, there was n o the island had been rounded up. Com- medical attention of any kind, no form mander Winfield S . Cunningham, the of protection from the sun by day and island commander, Major James P . S. cold rain by night, no food, and almos t Devereux, the senior Marine officer o n no water." 2 6 "' Ibid. On 11 January 1942, the American s "° Actually, "VMF—211 was represented o n were alerted that they would be evac- Wake Island by only 12 aircraft, 13 pilots, and , uated to prison camps shortly . A group if I remember correctly, 13 of its own enliste d of regulations, violation of any one of men plus 27 Marines from the other squadron s of the parent Group, and 1 hospital corpsman ; which could result in the death penalty , in short, 50% of its aircraft, approx . 40% o f was read to the prisoners . Amongst the its pilots and about 10% of its own enliste d heinous crimes for which they could b e personnel . It was `the squadron' only in th e executed were such things as : "talking sense that its CO was present ." BGen Paul A . without permission and raising lou d Putnam ltr to Hd, HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC , carrying unnecessary baggage dtd 170ct66, hereafter Putnam ltr . voices, " " "6 For the events leading up to and includin g in embarking," and "using more tha n the surrender, see Devereux, Wake Island, and two blankets." 27 Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, pt III, "The Defense of Wake," Putnam ltr . pp. 95—149 . Devereux, Wake Island, p . 211 .

738 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Early on the morning of 12 January, men were removed and taken to camp s the prisoners were herded aboard th e in Japan. Six days later, the Wake Nitta Maru, a relatively new Japanes e prisoners arrived at Shanghai . Here passenger liner ; enlisted Marines, they were told that they would be sailors, and civilians were placed in th e paraded through the city and marche d holds, while the officers and the senio r out to the Woosung camp . Somehow th e civilian supervisor were locked in th e parade did not materialize .30 Major mail room. Left on the island wer e Devereux particularly remembered th e approximately 300 civilian constructio n bitter cold the prisoners felt at Yoko- workers, who were to rebuild installa- hama and Shanghai, for they were onl y tions there, and another 100 or s o partially clad in khaki uniforms and civilians and servicemen who were to o not acclimated to the change from th e ill to be moved . Most of those who re- tropical weather of Wake .3 ' Once the mained were later evacuated to prison Americans arrived at Woosung, th e camps in either China or Japan . Tragi- Japanese Navy relinquished its respon- cally, nearly 100 of the civilians were sibility for the POWs to the Army. lined up on a beach on Wake the nigh t Most of the Wake prisoners remaine d of 7 October 1943 and executed by a at Woosung until they were transferred machine gun firing squad. For this in December to Kiangwang, five miles crime, Rear Admiral Shigematsu Sakai- away. In May 1945, they began a journey that was, for most of them, to end bara—the Japanese commander o f 32 Wake—and a number of his officer s eventually in Japan . were tried, found guilty, and hanged '0 Escape Rpt No . 667, lstLt John F . Kinney, after the war's end .28 dtd 12Ju145 . Dressed in whatever tattered tropi- Sl Because of the extreme cold and their lac k cal clothing they could find 29 and carry- of proper clothing, the Wake prisoners made a practice of wrapping blankets over thei r ing only the barest minimum of per- shoulders when they were marched into th e sonal possessions allowed by their cap - camp compound for exercise . Ishihara, one o f tors, the Americans spent 12 days on the civilian interpreter-guards soon put a sto p board the ship under very difficult con- to this . According to one of the former pris- ditions. They were systematically de- oners, the conversation went as follows : "Ishi : (Infuriated, waving his saber) `Why you take prived of their valuables, fed only blankets from bed, you stupid individualists? ' sporadically, not permitted to talk t o (His supreme insult) . Marine : `We're cold! ' one another, and given no room fo r Ishi : `It's wintertime, you 're supposed to b e exercise . On 18 January, the ship cold! No more blankets!'" SgtMaj Robert R . arrived at Yokohama, where the squad- Winslow ltr to Hd, HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC , dtd 190ct66, hereafter Winslow ltr . ron commander of VMF-211, Major a= A number of the Wake Marines and civil- Paul A. Putnam, and a number of othe r ians had been shipped to Japan previously . One detail was sent in the spring of 1943, an d 28 See pt III, chap 3, supra. "If I remember correctly, my detail was ""Most of the POWs had been stripped o f shipped to Osaka in August 1943. We were all clothing during the capture." BGen Joh n placed in barracks located in the shipyard are a F. Kinney ltr to Hd, HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC , and worked as stevedores and longshoreme n dtd 20ct66 . until early spring of 1945 ." Ibid.

MARINE POWS 739

Chronologically, the next group of men had neither clothes nor shoes an d Marines captured belonged to the Ma- were covered from head to toe with fuel rine detachment of the USS Houston. oil from the ships that had been sunk. This heavy cruiser, together with the These men became badly sunburned, an d Australian light cruiser HMAS Perth to aggravate matters, they were given and two other Allied naval vessels, had little or no medical attention or food been ordered to block the Japanese in- and "no water . . . as the Japs didn' t vasion of Java and to destroy the enemy have any themselves . There were a fe w attack force headed for Banten Bay o n cases of beating to hurry up the work— the northwest corner of the Dutch this was the main Japanese landing an d colonial possession. Shortly after mid- the invaders were obviously pressed fo r night of 28 February, Perth and time." 3 4 Houston, outnumbered in a punishing The captives were fed rice and meat engagement with Japanese warships balls late that night and the followin g guarding the landing force, were sunk morning, when the officers were sepa- within 40 minutes of each other . Of the rated from the enlisted prisoners and more than 1,000 men on the Houston, trucked to the town of Serang . On 2 only 368 survived ; 24 of this number were Marines from the 74-man detach- Other Powers, 1923-1937, v. IV (Washington, 1938), p . 5234, hereafter Geneva Conventio n ment. with article number . Even before their capture, the lot of The Geneva Convention of 1929 was ratified the survivors was not an easy one . Oil- by the United States on 16 January 1932, and by other countries before and after this date . soaked and half-drowned—many o f Although not one of the states which had them wounded—they remained in the ratified this code before the war, Japan in - water or on life rafts for eight hours o r formed the Swiss Government in February more. Some of the men were picked up 1942 that it "is strictly observing Red Cross by Japanese landing craft between Convention as a signatory state" and whil e it didn't consider itself bound by the Conven- dawn and 0800 on 1 March . They were tion relative to the treatment of prisoners o f taken to the beach on St. Nicholas war, it would apply "provisions of that Con- Point, Banten Bay, where they wer e vention to American prisoners of war in it s pressed into unloading enemy transports power." U. S. Diplomatic Papers, 1942, p. 382 . and hauling supplies .33 Many of th e A review of the depositions taken for, th e testimony given at, and findings of the court of s as Article 31 of the Geneva "Convention o f numerous trials of the Far East War Crime n July 27, 1929 Relative to the Treatment o f Tribunal indicate that Japanese officials i Prisoners of War" states in part : "Labo r charge of prisoner of war activities observe d neither the spirit nor the letter of any of th e furnished by prisoners of war shall have n o direct relations with war operations . It is articles of this treaty . especially prohibited to use prisoners for a.' 1st Lt Edward M . Barrett POW Rpt, n .d . manufacturing and transporting arms or muni- (POW WWII (USS Houston) File, HistBr , tions of any kind, or for transporting mate- G–3 Div, HQMC) . One of the four officers o f rial intended for combatant units ." S . Doc. No . the ship's Marine detachment, Lieutenant Bar- 134, 75th Cong ., 3d sess, Treaties, Conventions , rett presumably made this report shortly afte r International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements his liberation from prison camp on 7 Septembe r Between the United States of America an d 1945.

310-224 0 - 69 - 48

740 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

March, in a temperature of 100 degrees, no interference from the Japanese the enlisted sailors and Marines, bare- guards.36 footed and lightly clad, were marche d Before the end of the week following the nearly 30 miles to Serang over a the loss of the Houston and Perth, all concrete highway, pushing Japanes e Allied survivors of the naval engage- ammunition and supply carts all of th e ment had been captured and detained i n way. Serang. Conditions here were very bad ; Some Houston survivors were picke d dysentery and malaria broke out among up by a Japanese transport ship, which the prisoners, who were afforded little medical relief took them on board, searched them, an d . The captives went almos t then returned them to their life rafts . completely without food, and by the end One of the Americans put on a lif e of March, they began succumbing to beriberi and other diseases caused by jacket, swam to shore, and spent three malnutrition. days in the coastal hills trying to joi n Allied forces on Java . Unfortunatel y Between 12 and 15 April, the POW s for this Marine, natives found him an d were removed from Serang to Batavia , turned him over to Japanese troops . where they were interned in a former Dutch military cantonment known be - Another life raft, with four Marine s fore the war as the Bicycle Camp, for and two sailors aboard, drifted fo r some unknown reason. Under vastly three days around the northwest coas t improved conditions, the prisoners re- of Java and through the Sunda Strait . mained here until October, when after a On the afternoon of 3 March, it was transfer first to Shanghai, they were beached at Laboehan (Labuan), and th e again transferred, this time to Burma six Americans took to the jungles . where their real ordeal began . After two days of thrashing about, the y met Javanese natives who promised to When they were captured, member s of the 4th Marines experienced some- guide them to Dutch forces, but instea d what different circumstances than ha led them right to a Japanese machine d the Houston Marines. Following its gun position.35 withdrawal from Shanghai, the 4th Ma- It was believed that many of the men rines landed on 30 November and who survived the sinking of the Hous- 1 December 1941 at the U . S. Naval Sta- ton reached the beaches of Java, only to tion, Olongapo, on Subic Bay, Luzon , be killed outright by natives armed wit h Philippine Islands . Immediately afte r knives. On the march from Serang to the Japanese attack on the Philippines , Batavia, the natives stoned the POWs the regiment was committed to actio n and otherwise abused them with little o r along with other forces which had bee n stationed in the islands. After an epic , 3v PFC Bert E . Page, Jr., POW Rpt, dtd four-month-long stubborn resistance , 24Aug45. Hereafter, all like reports by Marin e the American and Filipino defenders of survivors of the Houston will be cited Housto n Bataan were forced to surrender o n POW rpt and name of individual makin g statement . ae Houston POW rpt, Cpl Howard R . Charles .

MARINE POWS 741

9 April 1942, and the men on Corregidor , dered in a massacre at the Puert o nearly a month later on 6 May. 37 Col- Princesa prison camp. lectively, the number of Marines take n One of the most difficult and tryin g prisoner in the Philippines formed the periods experienced by American POW s largest Marine contingent the Corps is better known as the Bataan Death lost at any one time . March, which followed the fall of tha t Included in the ranks of the 4th Ma- peninsula. Much has been written of th e rines captured in the Philippines wer e suffering, indignities, and atrocities men from Marine organizations which which constituted the common fate of had been stationed in the islands when the Americans and Filipinos who sur- the 4th arrived from China. These units rendered to Lieutenant General Masa- —Marine Barracks, Olongapo, and 1st haru Homma's forces. Primarily becaus e Separate Marine Battalion, Cavite — of his responsibility for the insensat e were absorbed by the regiment in De- and uncontrolled brutality of his soldier s cember 1941 and January 1942. As the during this infamous event, Homma wa s fighting progressed, the 4th detached tried, found guilty, and executed after some of its units for commitment where the end of the war . It would serve n o fighting was heaviest and they were purpose to recount, step by step, the needed—and where they were finally bloody and tragic evacuation of th e captured . POWs from Bataan to Camp O'Donnell , a trek that was approximately 85 mile s At the end of the war, after Marin e of hell. Corps authorities had checked all pos- Corregidor held out a month longer sible sources, official Marine record s than Bataan—to 6 May 1942, when at listed 105 Marines captured on Bataa n 1200, the white flag of surrender wa s and 1,283 on Corregidor . Of this num- hoisted over this and the other fortified ber, 490 men never survived for a num- islands in Manila Bay . Despite these ber of reasons. Some succumbed t o obvious signs of capitulation, the Japa- wounds received during the fighting , nese on Bataan continued to pour others died because of malnutrition, artillery fire on Corregidor and enem y beatings, and various diseases . Finally, aircraft flew sortie after sortie over the a number of men were executed for il- island, dropping bombs that day and legal or real violations of Japanese night. Early the next morning it wa s prison regulations, some were killed quiet ; the fighting had ended for the when American aircraft bombed enemy embattled inhabitants of Corregidor, but ships transporting prisoners to Japan, not the war—and the Japanese were to and still others were outrageously mur- remind them constantly of this fact i n " See Condit and Turnbladh, Hold High th e both word and deed until the American s Torch, pp. 195—240 ; Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw , were liberated over three years later. Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, pp. 155—202 ; Late on the afternoon of the 7th, the and Hanson W. Baldwin, "The Fourth Marines Japanese began collecting and concen- Marine Corps Gazette, vols . at Corregidor," h 30—31, nos . 11—12 and 1—2 (Nov—Dec46, Jan- trating their prisoners in a small beac Feb47 .) area near a large galvanized iron build-

742 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

ing which had been the garage of an apparently as a form of punishment. Army coast artillery unit. Enroute to Particularly aggravating the sufferin g this place of confinement, which eventu- of the prisoners was the weather, for ally was to hold nearly 13,000 American s May is the hot season in Luzon . and Filipinos, the prisoners were This in itself created serious health seached many times by Japanese soldiers problems, because many bodies on th e who took "watches, fountain pens , island remained unburied until approxi- money, clothing, canteens, mess gear, mately 10 days after the surrender . A etc., in fact anything we had that the y Navy chaplain, who remained on Cor- wanted." 38 This unmitigated thievery, regidor for two months after the Japa- in which Japanese officers also took part , nese took over, told another prisoner was a commonplace experience of nearl y that some bodies were not found and every American prisoner, no matte r buried until the first or second week of where or when he had been captured . June. Initially, there was neither food no r In addition to the hardships impose d water for the Corregidor prisoners ex- upon the prisoners by the enemy and cept for the meager amount they ma y their difficulty in adjusting to thei r have been able to keep with them, and status as captives, all POWs—regardles s "for one well near a partially destroye d of rank—were required to salute or garage. The water was of doubtful qual- bow to every Japanese soldier—from ity and the amount of water in the wel l private to general—whose paths they crossed was very small." 39 The POWs' thirst . Non-observance of this regu- was so great that they drained the radi- lation resulted in a beating of various degrees of severity . As a matter of fact, ators of wrecked automobiles, trucks, prisoners could be and very often were and tractors and drank the rusty fluid . beaten on the slightest pretext or for n o A water pipeline was finally installed , reason at all. This was one aspect of ". . . one spigot of one-half inch pipe fo r the character and personality of the the Americans and one spigot of the sam e Japanese which American POWs were size for the Filipinos," 40 who had been unable to fathom for the entire period segregated from the others . It was fre- of their captivity.41 quently necessary for an individual t o Prisoners were fed sporadically dur- stand in line for 24 hours before h e ing their first few days of captivity on could fill his canteen, and often a guar d Corregidor, and only those who wer e would walk up and turn off the spigot , "1 As noted later in this appendix, one reaso n for the beatings may have been the fact tha '8 Capt Austin C. Shofner Rpt of Experi- t such treatment was a common form of punish- ences and Observations, dtd 3Dec43, hereafte r ment in the Japanese Army Shofner rpt . . The languag e barrier that very often existed between captiv e '° BGen Curtis T . Beecher ltr to Hd, HistBr , and captor may be another possible reason for G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 70ct66, hereafter Beeche r these beatings, because the guards may have ltr . felt that a stick was more effective in gettin g 40 Shofner rpt . results than an unintelligible order.

MARINE POWS 743

lucky or energetic ate during this time .42 paucity of food and water, and the lac k At the first Japanese ration issue, the of even minimal sanitary facilities, con- food was distributed inequitably . After ditions improved considerably once th e this, some form of discipline and order full weight and effect of the MP com- appeared in the ranks of the POWs, an d pany were asserted. the Americans took charge of the ration On the night of 22 May, a heavy, col d issue. rain fell on Corregidor, worsening th e The Japanese numbered each prisoner miserable lot of the prisoners. At dawn and divided the entire group of POW s the next day, they were told to pack thei r into divisions of 1,000. These divisions belongings and prepare to leave th e were then sub-divided into groups o f island bastion . After considerable con- 100. Rations were allotted according to fusion and milling about, the POWs the strength of each division, which is - were marched to the docks, and loaded sued the food to the 100-man groups. aboard several vessels in the bay, wher e In some cases, group kitchens had al - they spent the night under absurdl y ready been established . In other in- crowded conditions . Early on the morn- stances, three or four cooking group s ing of 24 May, the men were herded were formed which took the entire ra- into landing barges, put ashore at th e tion, cooked it, and then apportioned southern end of Dewey Boulevard in it to their members on an equitable Manila, and marched through the city basis. In this manner, every prisoner to Bilibid Prison in the infamous Japa- was fed and nourished on the same sort nese "Victory Parade ." The Japanese, of starvation diet as his fellows . in the words of one of the prisoners :

Because the Japanese authorities were . . . compelled the Filipino civilians to not unduly concerned with enforcing attend the parade, many of whom crie d sanitary regulations and establishing while others tried to slip us food . The some sort of discipline and order withi n Filipinos . . . caught giving food to the Americans were brutally punished by the the ranks of the POWs, the prisoner s Japs. We had only one short water stop took it upon themselves to organize a during the hike. Many people dropped ou t military police company of approxi- because of the terrific heat, heavy packs, mately 100 men, nearly half of whom almost no sleep for three days. . . . Every- were Marines. Physical and moral one had to keep hiking until they passe d out, then a truck picked up the unconsciou s persuasion were employed by the MP s and brought them in .4 3 since the company had no real authority to enforce its orders . In spite of the The prisoners were herded into ol d boiling sun, the swarms of flies, the Bilibid Prison, where all remained unti l the morning of the 25th. Early that day, " Prior to this ration issue, "the Japanese the first of several groups to be trans- did permit some parties to go foraging for rations. I personally led one group to the Navy ferred was moved by train to prison supply tunnel where we found various dry camps located in the vicinity of Cabana- stores and brought them back to the beach. We tuan, approximately 75 miles north of also foraged for wood for fuel for cooking fires." Beecher ltr. " Shofner rpt.

744 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Manila. The rail trip was a trying ordeal mosa, leaving behind American soldiers , for the already ill-treated prisoners . At sailors, Marines, and civilians, and Fil- some stops on this trip, "the Filipino s ipino servicemen . All were to endur e tried to give the prisoners food an d months of hard labor, starvation, mis- candy and sometimes succeeded." " treatment, and numerous indignities at Groups of 100 were crowded into box- the hands of the Japanese before Gen- cars in which there was just enough eral MacArthur's forces liberated the room for each man to stand up during Philippines . the six-hour trip . A total of 1,500 men in Tragically, the last Marines captured four groups left Bilibid and were sent t o in a group in the Pacific War were nin e Cabanatuan Camp 3, a march of 2 0 members of Lieutenant Colonel Evans kilometers from the town . The re- F. Carlson's 2d Raider Battalion, which mainder of the Corregidor prisoners raided Makin Island in the Gilberts on were sent to Camps 1 and 2, not too fa r 17—18 August 1942 . Although this raid from 3. Because of a severe water short- was successful within the limits imposed age at Camp 2, it was evacuated after on the overall operation, serious conse- the POWs had been there two days and quences resulted from its aftermath . the men were sent to one of the other Following their surprise landing, the two camps. Marine raiders had killed every enemy While at Bilibid Prison, all America n soldier on the island and destroyed man y officers in the grade of colonel and abov e of the Japanese supply dumps and facili - were segregated from the rest of th e ties there. When the battalion had com- prisoners for transfer to camps other pleted its mission and attempted to than those set aside for lesser ranked return to the submarines which had POWs.45 One of the officers transferred carried it to Makin, the Marines foun d was Colonel Samuel Howard, the com- that the surf was heavier than had bee n mander of the 4th Marines . His grou p expected and were unable to maneuver was moved on 3 June to a prison cam p their rubber craft through the breakers outside of Tarlac, Luzon, where it re- to clear water. The submarines remaine d mained until 12 August. Among thes e submerged through most of the 18th, officers was Lieutenant General Jona- but moved into the mouth of the island than M. Wainwright, the former com- lagoon at approximately 1930 that eve- mander of American forces in the ning. There they met and took aboar d Philippines and the senior American tattered raiders, who had managed to officer present in camp. On 12 August, jury-rig their rubber boats to a native the officers were entrained for Manila, outrigger canoe, in which they were abl e and placed on board the Nagara Maru, to negotiate the tossing surf. Both sub- which sailed the following day for For- marines then immediately departed fo r Pearl Harbor . " Beecher ltr . Nobody knew it at the time, but nin e " The exceptions were "two Army colonel s Marines had been left behind . They were who arrived in Camp 3 . They were later (in September, I believe) taken to join othe r captured later by Japanese reinforce- colonels and general officers ." Ibid. ments which mounted out of a nearby

MARINE POWS 745

island garrison on 18 and 20 August . Japanese hands were individual pilot s Thirty-three Japanese flew in to th e and aircraft crewmen whose planes were atoll on 20 August, and a larger group shot down over or near enemy territory . arrived at Makin on a ship the followin g The story of Major Gregory Boyington , day. These Japanese reported that they VMF–214 commander and recipient of found 21 Marine bodies, 5 rubber boats , the Medal of Honor, who was shot down 15 machine guns, 3 rifles, 24 automati c over Rabaul on 3 January 1944, in gen- rifles, 350 grenades, "and a few othe r eral reflects the experiences of othe r things." 4 6 Marine aviators who were downed an d The captured Marines received satis- survived, only to become prisoners. factory care at the hands of their cap- After Boyington's plane was hit an d tors on Makin, and humane treatmen t set afire, he parachuted and landed i n continued for nearly a month after they the water. He spent eight hours in hi s had been moved to Kwajalein . Early in life raft before being picked up and October, Vice Admiral Koso Abe, taken to Rabaul by a Japanese subma- Marshall Islands commander, was ad- rine. In the middle of February 1944, vised that he need not send these prison - Boyington and five other POWs were ers to Tokyo. A staff officer from a flown from Rabaul to an airport on th e higher headquarters told Abe that a re- outskirts of Yokohama by way of Truk, cently established policy permitted the Saipan, and Iwo Jima. Upon settin g admiral to dispose of these men on Kwa- down on Japanese soil, the six prison- jalein as he saw fit . Abe then ordere d ers were walked from the airport to a the Marines beheaded . A native wit- point outside of Yokohama and trucke d nessed the executions, and based on hi s a distance to a streetcar terminal. Here and other testimony in war crimes trials they boarded a trolley which took the m after the war, Abe was convicted o f to a Japanese Navy-run POW camp at atrocities and hanged at Guam. Captain Ofuna, the prewar Hollywood of Japan. Yoshio Obara, Kwajalein commander Processed through or at Ofuna wer e who had been ordered to arrange the captured Allied submariners, pilots, an d executions, was sentenced to 10 years technicians whom the enemy believe d imprisonment, and Lieutenant Hisaki- could provide special information of chi Naiki, also involved in the affair, value. Holding Boyington and som e was sentenced to 5 years in prison .47 others as captives rather than POWs, - After the capture of the men left o n the Japanese never reported their where abouts or existence to the Internationa l Makin, the only Marines to fall int o Red Cross and these men were therefore 48 WDC Japanese Docs Nos . 161,013, 161,110 , listed as missing or killed in action . and NAl2053, "Records of Various Base Boyington remained at Camp Ofuna un - Forces" and "Base Force Guard Units and De- til the last months of the war, when h e fense Unit Records," 17—22Aug42 (OAB , was transferred to Camp Omori nea r NHD) . Tokyo, and there he was liberated. 4T ComMarianas, "Recordings of Proceedings of a Military Commission, 1946," Files 149234— With the exception of those aviators 150837 (JAG, ND) . who were downed near Chichi Jima in

746 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

the Bonin Islands and executed there , the Rhone Valley and Savoy regions that most pilots and crewmen underwent to " `organization for guerilla activity es- a greater or lesser degree the same in- pecially on or after D-Day is now their cessant round of beatings and interro- most important duty .' " 49 Although the gations as had Major Boyington . The agents on this mission were dropped i n severity of their initial period of cap- plain clothes, they took their uniforms tivity depended on where they had bee n with them, and the leader of the group captured and who their captors were as well as how long it took before they claimed that they were "the first allie d were transported to POW camps i n liaison officers to appear in uniform i n Japan. France since 1940 ." 50 "Ortiz, who knew not fear, did not hesitate to wear hi s OSS MARINES US Marine captain's uniform in town and country alike ; this cheered the The circumstances of the capture and French but alerted the Germans, and the subsequent imprisonment of the four mission was constantly on the move ." 5 1 Marines captured by the Germans in Their task completed, the UNION group Europe were considerably different than was withdrawn from France and re- the experiences of the men taken in the turned to England in late May 1944 . Pacific. Interestingly enough, the Ma- The Marine officer returned to th e rines in Europe were captured withi n Haute Savoie region of France again on a few days of each other, although they 1 August 1944 with a mission entitled were on different missions . Major Peter J. Ortiz, and Sergeants John P . Bodnar 9e A maquis was a French resistance or guer- and Jack R. Risler went into captivity rilla unit. There were a number of thes e throughout France during the latter period o on 16 August 1944, and Second Lieu- f the German occupation, and Americans wer e tenant Walter W . Taylor on the 21st. attached to some of them as advisors and in- Ortiz was a veteran OSS-man who, be - structors. fore entering the Marine Corps in 1941 , 48 Undated ordre de mission [operation had served with the French Foreign order] in an SOE file, cited in M .R.D . Foot, SOE in France : An Account of the Britis Legion and risen through the ranks o f h Special Operations Executive in France 1940— that organization . He was an office r 1944 (London : Her Majesty's Stationery Office , at the time of the fall of France whe n 1966), p . 367, hereafter Foot, SOE in France . captured by the Germans for the firs t The SOE was, loosely speaking and for wan t time. He escaped from a POW camp i n of a better definition, analogous to the Amer- ican OSS . When the OSS was formed, its per- Austria and made his way to the Unite d sonnel were introduced into many sections o f States by way of Lisbon, Portugal. He the SOE and received their initial trainin g returned to France as a member of a under the British . three-man interallied mission called SOE, History, v. XXIVA, 1944, p. 8, cite d in Ibid. UNION, which was dropped in southeast 51 Ibid. While in France, Ortiz had been pro- France on the night of 6–7 January moted to major, a rank which he assumed upo n 1944 to impress maquis 48 leaders in his return to England in May .

MARINE POWS 747

UNION II. This was an all-American Brunner, however, managed to escape group of seven men headed by an OSS the trap, swam a swiftly flowing rive r Army major and containing Ortiz, Ser- to the other side of the village, and trav- geants Bodnar and Risler, a third Ma- eled across 15 miles of enemy-held ter- rine sergeant, Frederick J . Brunner, ritory to reach the relative safety of and several other men. Dropped with another resistance group .53 these agents were numerous containers Upon their capture, Ortiz and the of supplies for the maquis in the region. others passed through a series of Ger- The quickening pace of French guerrill a man POW camps before they finally activities here as well as elsewhere i n arrived at Marlag-Milag Nord . This France made these units the objects of was a group of POW camps for Allie d German search parties, and particularl y naval and merchant marine personnel in this area for it was still under th e in Westertimke (Tarmstadt Oest) , control of strong enemy forces . For the which was located in a flat, sandy plai n Haute Savoie, Allied liberation was still between the Weser and Elbe Rivers, 1 6 in the future . miles northeast of Bremen . On 16 August, Ortiz and his group Lieutenant Taylor, the other Marine were surrounded by a Gestapo party in captured in Europe, was the operation s the vicinity of Centron, a small village in officer of the OSS intelligence team as - the Haute Savoie region just south of signed to the 36th Infantry Division , Lake Geneva, the local headquarters o f Seventh Army, for the invasion of the OSS team. Ortiz surrendered be- Southern France in the Cannes-Nice cause he believed that if he and his men area. On D plus 5 (20 August 1944) , shot their way out of the entrapment , surrounded during a special mission designed local villagers would undoubtedly suffe r to immobilize enemy reinforcements statione d reprisals for German deaths which a in that area, he disregarded the possibility of fire fight surely would have produced .52 escape and, in an effort to spare villager s severe reprisals by the Gestapo, surrendere d 52 Ortiz had ample evidence on which to base to this sadistic Geheim[e] Staats Polizei ." I n his estimate of what the Gestapo might do. grateful recognition of his services leading t o The destruction of the population and town of the liberation of France, the French Govern- Lidice in Czechoslovakia following the assas- ment made Ortiz a Chevalier of the Legio n sination of Reinhard Heydrich, the Gestapo d'Honneur and awarded him the Croix de overlord of the country, and the mass murde r Guerre with Palm . Great Britain honored him of 700 inhabitants of the French village o f by making him an Officer of the Most Excellent Oradour-sur-Vayres in retaliation for th e Order of the British Empire . killing of a German officer was all too-well- " During the balance of his stay in France , known to Ortiz and he did not want to subjec t Brunner actively participated in the liberatio n the population of Centron to the same fate. of Albertville, and elsewhere in the Haute Ortiz was awarded a Navy Cross for heroi c Savoie region . In recognition of his services , accomplishments during his first mission int o the French Government awarded him the France in early 1944. He was awarded a Gold Croix de Guerre with Silver Star . Unfor- Star in lieu of a second Navy Cross for hi s tunately, this was a posthumous award becaus e activities during UNION II, and a portion o f Brunner was killed in a plane crash in Ger- the citation accompanying this award reads : many on 19 March 1945 while on another OS S "When he and his team were attacked and mission .

748 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

Taylor, his section chief, and a Marin e conscious on the road . When I came to , sergeant attached to the team went be- I was surrounded. n t It might be interesting to note that whe hind German lines to determine wha I have thought about the incident of my German intentions were—retreat or capture I have always pictured us as fight. Taylor and an agent recruite d coming down a long hill and seeing, across from a local resistance group were t o a wooded stream valley, the site of th e reconnoiter Grasse—15 miles inland road-block with men in uniform scurryin g about and climbing the cliff-embankment . and directly west of Nice . Recalling this I have always blamed myself for thinkin g mission, Taylor said : them to be Resistance and not recognizin g them as Germans . . . and thus causin g I was to stay behind with the agent an d our trouble and the death of the agent . the Citroen [a car the two had "liber- However, after years of trying, in 196 3 ated"], accomplish the mission of taking I returned to the scene and found that the him in and waiting and then taking him reality was quite different from my image , out ; and then we were to get to the 36th that the road did not go down the opposit e as fast as we could. The agent had been side of the valley, that there were n o leading the Resistance fight against the trees, that the actual site of the road-block Germans ever since the landing and wa s is completely invisible from any part of th e absolutely exhausted, falling asleep time road until one is within about 20 yards, i n and time again while we were briefin g other words that I could not possibly hav e him . . . . At dawn the next morning, the seen men . . . scurrying or been aware of agent and I headed for the town of St . the block .54 Cezaire, which was declared to be in th e hands of the Resistance and where I wa s The Nazis took Taylor to Grasse for to let the agent down and wait for hi s treatment and interrogation . The hand return from Grasse. However, during the night, due to Allied pressure on Draguig- grenade had shredded his left thumb nan and Fayence, what evidently was a and there were approximately 12 shell company of Germans had taken up posi- fragments embedded in his left leg, "6 tions in St. Cezaire . On approaching th e of which at last count remain." 55 On dead-still town by the steep and winding the ride to Grasse, being strafed by road, we ran into a roadblock of lan d mines ; we both thought it was Resistance, Allied aircraft all the way, Taylor man- and the agent took my carbine and jumpe d aged to get rid of an incriminating out of the car to walk toward the line of document by stuffing it behind the seat mines. He lasted just about 10 feet beyon d cushion of the vehicle in which he wa s the car and died with a bullet through his riding . In Grasse he was subjected to head . I still thought it was the trigger- happy Resistance but started to get ou t intensive interrogation, which ended of there . . . even faster when I finall y when he vomited all over the uniform saw a German forage cap behind som e of his inquisitor . From 21 August to 1 0 bushes above the road . But the car jammed September, he was passed through and against the outer coping, and a Germa n treated at six different Italian and Ger- jumped down on the road in front of m e and threw a grenade under the car, I tried man hospitals in Italy . On the 10th, he to get out of the right door and luckil y was sent to a POW hospital at Freising , did not, because I would have been completely exposed to the rifle fire from th e " Mr . Walter W . Taylor ltr to Hd, HistBr , high cliff on that side above the car. Th e HQMC, dtd 31May66, hereafter Taylor ltr . grenade exploded and I was splashed un - " Ibid.

MARINE POWS 749

Oberbayern, some 20 miles north of not make contact with the British, th e Munich and approximately 17 mile s escaped POWs returned to the vicinit y northeast of infamous Dachau . of the camp from which they had bee n Six weeks later, Taylor was trans- moved. Their food soon gave out an d ferred to a hospital 15 miles furthe r two of the party became sick fro m east at Moosburg, where he remaine d drinking swamp water, whereupon they until the end of November, when he wa s returned to the camp to find it, to al l well enough to be placed in a transient intents and purposes, in the hands of officers' compound nearby. At the end the Allied prisoners . Merchant seamen of January, Taylor was sent to the sam e and ailing military personnel had re - camp in which Ortiz was imprisoned. placed the nominal guard left behind b y On 9 April 1945, the prisoners at the the Germans.. In fact, on the night that Westertimke camp were given three the runaways returned, the British hours to move out of camp because o f prisoners took over the actual guarding the imminent approach of British and administration of the camp. On 29 forces. The suddenness of this move April, British forces liberated th e disrupted the escape plans of Taylor , prisoners, and on the next day the y who had prepared and laid aside fals e were trucked out of the area for return identity cards, maps, compass, civilian to their respective countries. clothes, food, and other items necessar y for an escape between 15 and 20 April. PRISON CAMPS: LOCATIONS, By the 10th, the Germans had move d CONDITIONS, AND ROUTINE the prisoners out and onto the road toward Luebeck, northeast of Hamburg . Article 77 of the Geneva Protocol Taylor, Ortiz, and another man planned states that, on the outbreak of war , to leave that night. During the after - each of the belligerents was to estab- noon, however, continuous Allied straf- lish an information bureau, which ing of the area created such confusion would prepare POW lists and forward that the three Americans were able to them to a central information agency , break from the column in which the y ostensibly to be organized by the Inter - were marching and make for the nearby national Red Cross . By this means, in- woods, where they were joined by a formation about POWs could be sent t o sergeant major of the Royal Marines— their families. The Protocol, in addition , another escapee . stipulated that each of the belligerents For eight days, the men hid in the was bound to notify the others withi n woods by day and moved at night, intent the shortest possible time of the names on evading German troops and civilians . and official addresses of prisoners unde r The escapees waited to be overrun by its jurisdiction. British forces and made some attempt to find Allied front lines, whose posi- For nearly a year after the attack on tions were uncertain and, from the Pearl Harbor, it was virtually impos- sound of the gunfire they heard, were sible for the United States to obtain re - constantly changing . When they could liable information concerning Ameri-

750 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

cans imprisoned by the Japanese ." It Philippines was learned until a consider- was not until the war had ended and th e able time after their imprisonment. The POWs were liberated that the families Japanese were quite slow in reporting of a number of them found out that they the names of prisoners or of Allied per- were still alive. The special prisone r sonnel who had died in prison camp . category into which Major Boyingto n The enemy also had an irresponsible fell is an example of this. Another wa s attitude about forwarding mail fro m that of the survivors of the Houston POWs to their families or deliverin g whose existence was not known unti l mail to the prisoners despite majo r very near the end of the fighting . attempts to open lines of communicatio n The Casualty Division at Head - through neutral powers for this pur- quarters Marine Corps maintained th e pose. records of Marines reported to hav e In the summer of 1943, the Japanese been taken prisoner . Information con- restricted the number of words on in- cerning Marine POWs came from such coming letters to 25 per message, and sources as the Provost Marshal Gen- mail sent by POWs was limited to onl y eral of the Army, the Department of a few words on a form with a printe d State, the International Red Cross, as message supplied by their captors . well as from reports of escape d Marine POWs were imprisoned i n prisoners. As soon as the Casualty Divi- some 33 camps located in Burma, China , sion definitely learned that a Marine Formosa, Japan, Java, Malaya, Man- was a POW, his next of kin was notifie d churia, the Philippines, and Thailand. and asked to keep in touch with th e Very often they were transferred HQMC Prisoner of War Information through a series of camps before they Bureau. As long as the individual Ma- were liberated. The North China and rine continued in a POW status, his Wake Island Marines were imprisoned allotments were paid and his pay an d initially at Woosung camp, outside o f allowances accrued to his benefit. If Shanghai . The prisoners' quarters con- authoritative word was received that a sisted of seven ramshackle barracks , Marine had died in a prison camp or each of which was "a long, narrow, one- that he had been killed in action, his story shanty into which the Jap s account was closed out and all benefits crowded two hundred men ." 57 Adjacent paid to his beneficiaries. to the end of the buildings were toilets Soon after the North China, Wake , and a wash rack. Facing the toilets., and Guam Marines had been captured , much too close for normal standards of the Casualty Division was able to list sanitation, was the galley where th e them as POWs. Little of what had hap- POWs' food was prepared. Administra- pened to the Marines captured in the tive offices, quarters for the guards, an d E0 lstLt Clifford P . Morehouse, "Prisoners storerooms comprised the rest of th e of the Enemy," Marine Corps Gazette, v . 28 , camp area. Surrounding Woosung was no. 1 (Jan44), p. 23 . Lieutenant Morehouse an electrified fence, and inside that was a member of the War Prisoner's Aid Committee, YMCA . 5? Devereux, Wake Island, p . 217 .

MARINE POWS 751

IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY . I am still in a P . O . W. Camp near Moulmein, Burma, There are 20,000 Prisoners, being Australian, Dutch, English , and American. There are several camps of 2/3000 prisoners wh o work at settled labour daily . We are quartered in very plain huts. The climate is good . Our life is now easier with regard to food, medicine and clothes . The Japanese Commander sincerely endeavours to treat prisoners kindly. Officers' salary is based on salary of Japanese Officers of the same rank and every prisoner who performs labour or duty is given daily wages from 25 cents ( minimum ) to 45 cents, according to rank and work. Canteens are established where we can buy some extr a foods and smokes. By courtesy of the Japanese Commander we conduct concerts in the camps, and a limited number go to a picture show about once per month #1_fi/ i 4 ~astesa--!_--

another electrified fence was erected for his bedding, but the Japanese cover s around the barracks and the toilets . In were so skimpy, they were : t the time that the prisoners remained a . . . not half as warm as one ordinar y this camp, two of them were electro- American blanket . The jerry-built bar - cuted when they accidentally touched racks gave little protection against th e the wire barrier. According to Colonel intense cold, and during the bitter winte r we were soon pooling our blankets an d Luther A . Brown, who was in thi s sleeping four in a bunk to keep from camp, "one Marine POW was murdere d freezing to death.59 by a Japanese sentry with rifle fire at t close range. Colonel Ashurst demanded Living conditions at Woosung were no that the sentry be tried and punished, particularly good, nor was Japanese however, the Japanese transferred th e treatment of the prisoners gentle . Each sentry." 5 8 morning and evening, the POWs fell out Each prisoner was given a mattress in sections of approximately 36 men fo r filled with straw and two cotton blankets a roll call. Invariably one or more o f " Brown ltr. 5 . Devereux, op . cit.

752 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

the men would be slapped or beaten fo r twisted the sword out of Ishihara's such minor offenses as not standing at hands and made him back off . Brown attention or appearing to be inatten- suffered no punishment for this darin g tive. 6o act. Immediately after this episode, Cap- According to Major Devereux : tain Endo, the Japanese camp executiv e The guards were brutal, stupid, or both . officer, beat Ishihara with a 2x4 board , They seemed to delight in every form o f and the interpreter was forbidden there - abuse, from petty harassment to sadisti c after to wear a sword . 64 torture, and if the camp authority did no t Other incidents in the camp reflected actively foster this type of treatment, the y did nothing to stop it .61 what appeared to be the Japanese respect of force, firm action, or courage . One former Marine POW has writte n At one evening check, Ishihara struck in retrospect : a Marine platoon sergeant. The sergeant Possibly their actions reflected thei r returned the blow knocking the Japa- basic training. On the first night in nese to the ground . On rising, the latter Woosung, Major Brown heard a rumpu s approached the sergeant, placed hi s in the guard-room nearby . On going to the door he saw the Japanese sergeant o f hand on the Marine's shoulder, and said , the guard strike a private in the face , "You are a good soldier." 85 Later, on th e then the private bowed to the sergeant , event of the Emperor's Birthday, th e and the same routine [was] repeate d Marine sergeant was given a reward for several times until the private's nose wa s being a "model POW ." bloody.6 2 One of the most brutal guards at Woo - One of those who experienced Ishi- sung was a civilian interpreter by th e hara has written : name of Isamu Ishihara, who ha d The following anecdote may well b e learned English in Honolulu where h e apocryphal, but I have heard it from sev- had been educated and later worked a s eral sources. Ishihara . . . tried to turn a taxi driver. This man was dubbed the himself in as a war criminal when the "Beast of the East" by the prisoners h e trials were being conducted in Japan. At "flogged, kicked, and abused "63 first the investigators brushed him off a s the Japanese version of the compulsive One day in Woosung, for no apparen t confessor who harasses our police with reason, Ishihara became infuriated wit h confessions to all the crimes he reads abou t Sir Mark Young, the former Governo r in the newspapers . But he was persistent , General of Hong Kong, and whipped out and finally his story was confirmed by his sword to strike the elderly Briton . statements made by the survivors of hi s lunatic fits of rage . . . . At his trial, th e Major Brown of the Tientsin Marine s prosecutor asked Ishihara why his hand was bandaged . Ishihara replied, `If I were 00 Sworn statement of Cpl Jerold Story, dt d Japanese soldier, I commit harakiri whe n 9Apr45, hereafter Story. After several unsuc- Japan surrenders ; but since I am onl y cessful attempts, Story finally escaped from a civilian working for Army, I only cut off jail in Shanghai on 6 October 1944 . little finger, that's enough .' Anyway . . . 01 Devereux, Wake Island, p. 218. 02 Brown ltr . 01 Brown ltr. 03 Devereux, op . cit. 05 Ibid.

MARINE POWS 753

all of us who knew `Ishi' believe it fits hi m The protests of Colonel Ashurst and to a `T.'" the continued visits of members of th e The Japanese attitude toward thei r Swiss Consulate as representatives of prisoners was expressed many times in the International Red Cross finally bor e various ways . One Christmas, a prison fruit, for in December 1942, the pris- camp commander left no doubt in th e oners were moved to Kiangwan, fiv e minds of his charges about their statu s miles distant from Woosung . Here con- when he told them : ditions were just slightly improved . At Kiangwan, Colonel Ashurst agreed to From now on, you have no property . have the officers work on a prison farm . You gave up everything when you sur- The officers labored for approximatel y rendered . You do not even own the air that is in your bodies. From now on, you 8 to 10 hours daily, from 0730 until 120 0 will work for the building of Greater Asia . and then from 1300 to 1730 in the sum- You are the slaves of the Japanese. 67 mer. Enlisted prisoners worked abou t the same hours, but their duties wer e Colonel Ashurst, the senior office r more onerous. The six-acre farm pro- prisoner, continually protested the treat- duced vegetables intended for the pris- ment the POWs were receiving and at - oners, but the produce was occasionall y tempted to get the Japanese authoritie s confiscated by the guards. to recognize the Geneva Protocol as th e Following a Japanese raid on the basis on which Woosung should be run, POW farm, Major Brown and several but to no avail. A representative of the other officers in turn conducted a night International Red Cross visited Woo- raid on the small Japanese garden . sung after the POWs had been there Colonel Otera, the camp commander , for eight or nine months, and managed sent for Brown and permitted him to to arrange for a few shipments of food speak after a long heated tirade durin g and supplies to the prisoners. The gen- which he brandished his sword in a eral attitude of the Japanese captive s menacing manner . Brown pointed ou t was that without these Red Cross foo d that many difficult situations had and medical parcels, many more pris- arisen : oners would not have survived the war. The food at Woosung consisted of a . . . because of misunderstandings and cup of rice and a bowl of watery vege- differences between the Occidental and Oriental philosophies and that therefor e table soup for breakfast and dinner, an d the POWs never knew what to do and no t a loaf of bread weighing approximatel y do, even though specific rules governing 150—160 grams (less than half a pound ) POWs had been requested, but refuse d and vegetable soup again for supper . since they were `part of Japanese Arm y These rations were supplemented with Regulations and therefore secret .' Henc e the solution to a dangerous situation— whatever else the prisoners could obtain watch the Japanese and follow their ex - from the guards by paying exorbitant ample . Otera received this remark wit h prices on the black market . great mirth and replied, `Don't ever tak e Japanese vegetables again and the Jap- ea Winslow ltr. anese will not take yours .' Thereafter all e' Devereux, op. cit., p . 220 . POW farm produce went to [their] galley

754 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

except two shipments Colonel Ashurst On 17 March 1942, after the pris- agreed to send to the American Civilia n oners at Woosung had been forced to Internment Center in Shanghai .68 sign a paper promising not to escape , In another encounter with the Japa- Corporals Jerold Story, Connie Gen e nese over the POW truck farm, whe n Battles, and Charles Brimmer, and Pri- camp authorities ordered the officers t o vate First Class Charles Stewart, Jr ., spread "night soil" on the garden , escaped from the prison camp . They Colonel Ashurst told them, " `No, they headed for the Jessfield Road area out - will not do it. You will have to kill me side of Shanghai, where they made con - first.' The Japanese cancelled the tact with a British woman who hi d order." 69 them. The Japanese learned of thei r The enlisted POWs at Kiangwan presence in the woman's house, sur- worked on a rifle range north of the rounded it on 16 April, and the Ma- local military airport from about the rines gave themselves up. The four men beginning of January 1943 to Septem- were imprisoned in the Jessfield Roa d ber 1944. This work consisted of ver y Jail in separate cells, interrogated, an d heavy labor, and this, added to their beaten. The next day, they were removed poor diet, resulted in many cases o f to the infamous Bridge House Jail i n malnutrition and tuberculosis. In Sep- Shanghai, and questioned for long hour s tember 1944, the enlisted men were pu t at a stretch over a period of nine days . on other details, such as digging ditche s During the time that he spent at the and building emplacements and gasolin e Bridge House, Story was beaten on an storage dumps. average of once every three days, an d For these labors, the prisoners wer e on 29 June 1942, he and his companions paid, but in such small amounts tha t were transferred to Kiangwan . Here little was left after ever-increasing de- they were tried by court-martial . The ductions were made for such items as Marines were not told what the charges food, clothing, heat, electricity, rent, an d were, were not given counsel of any sort , anything else the Japanese authorities and were not even allowed to make a could assess them for . The POWs pooled plea. It would not have done any goo d their last few payrolls at Kiangwan to anyway, because the trial was conducte d buy a few pounds of powdered eggs fo r in Japanese . After the trial was over, the sick.70 The POWs began a recreation the men learned that Battles, Stewart, program, using "recreational equipment and Story had been sentenced to four donated by the people in Shanghai an d years in prison, and Brimmer, seve n delivered . . . by the International Red years. It appeared that the latter had 7 1 Cross." been given the longer sentence because "Brown ltr. the Japanese believed him to be the rin g °B Col James D . McBrayer, Jr., ltr to Hd , leader. Story recalled that Brimmer ha d HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 140ct66, here- admitted this, even though it was no t after McBrayer ltr . true, to stop the Japanese from beatin g 70 Brown ltr. him. 71 BGen James P . S. Devereux ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 50ct66 . When they told Brimmer he got seven

MARINE POWS 755

years, we all started to laugh and told hi m prisoners war, their chief in this case he would be an old man before he left th e Commander Cunningham liable death pen- prison . As we started to walk out of the alty according this law. Nevertheless , courtroom the Japs called us back and Japanese authorities showed clemency and raised Brimmer's sentence to nine years , condemned them to punishment which con- evidently because we had laughed.7 2 sidered very light compared gravity accu- sations. As consequence Japanese govern- For about 10 days after their trial , ment does not see itself in position the Marines were kept at Kiangwan, bu t entertain protest of American Govern- on 9 July 1942, they were removed t o ment.73 Ward Road Gaol in Shanghai . This was Commander Cunningham was sen- a completely modern prison used only tenced to 10 years' close confinement i n for those POWs convicted and sentence d prison for the crime of desertion fro m by Japanese courts for "criminal of- the Japanese Army, and jailed wit h fenses." On 9 October 1944, Story, to- Story and the other Marines at War d gether with a British and an American Road Gaol in mid-1942 . Through vari- naval officer, sawed the bars out of thei r ous channels of information, the Unite d cells, climbed down ropes which they States Government was able to obtai n had manufactured from blankets, an d accurate and documented accounts of escaped over the prison wall into Shang- alleged Japanese violations of th e hai. The three eventually made their Geneva Protocol occurring in prison way to Chungking and freedom . camps near large cities which were vis- On the night of their escape, they met ited, when permitted, by the represen- other prisoner-escapees from the jail . tatives of the International Red Cros s These men were Commander Winfield and neutral observers . S. Cunningham, Brimmer, Stewart, d another Marine, and a Navy pharma- In response to the information it ha cist's mate. These men were recaptured. received about the trials of Cunningha m e In March 1942, Cunningham and th e and the others, on 12 December 1942, th head of the construction gang on Wake, United States drew up a well-documented list of complaints, containing Nathan Dan Teeters, had escaped fro m d Woosung, only to be recaptured almost the names of the individuals concerne immediately . Apparently in response to and the incidents in which they were in- continuous American complaints abou t volved, and indicted the Japanese Gov- n the treatment of U. S . prisoners, on 11 ernment for its treatment of civilia December 1942 Japan notified th e and military POWs . The Department of l United States by cable through Swis s State vehemently protested the illega e channels of the attempted escape in sentences imposed on the escapees by th March of Cunningham and the Marines Japanese military court, and emphatically denied the legality of the courts- and said : martial themselves . The United States Plan escape made by persons in question demanded that the sentences be can- constitutes grave violation (Japanese Law celled, the punishments for the at- of 1915) regarding punishments inflicte d 72 Story. R3 U. S. Diplomatic Papers, 1942, p . 832 .

310-224 0 - 69 - 49

756 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

tempted escapes be given in accordance To retain their self-respect and main- with the provisions of the Protocol, and tain a form of unit integrity, even i n that the prisoners be treated with the prison, the POWs established their ow n respect due given to the prisoner's grade internal organization. Such principles or rank and position . The Japanese di d of military discipline as respect fo r not respond to these demands .74 seniors and saluting continued despit e At Kiangwan as at Woosung earlier, the situation. The prisoners were generally under continuous pressure fro m the POWs continued the dull, uneventful their fellow Americans to remain clea n routine of prison camp life . Evening roll and neat, even under the most difficul t call was held at 2030, and dependin g circumstances . A recreation program upon the season, between 2100 and 2300, was begun, but was limited in scop e t when taps was sounded, the lights wen because some forms of athletics wer e out in the barracks . "Then the hungry, too strenuous for the POWs' weakene d weary prisoners lay in the dark, trying condition . Some attempt was made to to forget the thoughts a man cannot institute an education program, and in forget, hoping to sleep until the bugl e 1942 the men organized classes in math- called them out to slave again." 7 5 ematics, history, and other subjects of Of these days, Major Devereux re- interest. No more than 10 men wer e called : allowed to meet at any one time, fo r any group larger than that was immedi- That was our routine, our way of life ately suspected of planning an escape. for almost four years—except when it After the movement to Kiangwan, th e was worse . But . . . that is only part of the story of our captivity, the easiest part . education project was abandoned be- 77 Hidden behind the routine, under the sur- cause the work load became too heavy . face of life in prison camp, was fought American prisoners at all camps soo n a war of wills for moral supremacy—a n endless struggle, as bitter as it was un- discovered that no matter how badl y spoken, between the captors and the cap- they were treated, they had one defen- tives . The stakes seemed to me simpl y sive weapon they could employ to preven t this : the main objective of the whol e the Japanese from breaking their prid e Japanese prison program was to brea k r our spirit, and on our side was a stubbor n entirely, and that weapon was thei determination to keep our self-respec t universal observance of military dis- whatever else they took from us . It seem s cipline and continued existence as a to me that struggle was almost as muc h military organization . Without this de- a part of the war as the battle we fough t on Wake Island .76 Major Brown made good use of the time he spent in prison, for he learned Russian so " p. 838. One reason for the trials b y well that a handbook on Russian verbs he pre - court-martial of the escapees was that al l pared while a prisoner was suitable for us e POWs were under the Japanese military reg- by advanced students of the language . Brown ulations normally imposed on recruits in th e interview . "Major Brown . . . was known as Japanese Army . `Guidebook Brown' due to his authorship o f Devereux, Wake Island, p. 222. the forerunner of the present `Guidebook for 7B Ibid. Marines .' " Winslow ltr.

MARINE POWS 757

fense, at isolated times the POWs be- based on the fact,that the supplies (medi- came only a mob of craven creature s cal and individual boxes) were not unde r his control upon whom the enemy prison guard s . The Japanese tried in man y ways, over a considerable time, to ge t could and did visit all forms of crue l Colonel Ashurst to sign the invoices, bu t and unusual punishment. By maintain- he was adamant . There were some prising military discipline even while i n oners who wished Colonel Ashurst to sign , prison, the officers were able to repre- evidently hoping to receive some part of the shipment sent their men properly in dealings wit h . Apparently under order s from higher authority the camp Japanes e the Japanese and very often prevented finally turned the supplies over to Colone l the men from suffering heavier beat- Ashurst, and he signed for them . A s ings than those which were meted out . against the strong possibility that littl e By acting as a buffer, the officers at benefit to the POW's would have bee n times received the punishment due to derived from the supplies, if signed for be given to someone else. And most im- without control, Colonel Ashurst's superb handling of the issue provided us with a portant, the realization that they wer e significant amount of essential food an d still part of a military organization wa s medical supplies.'8 a very vital factor in maintaining PO W morale at as high a level as possible . The Marines at Kiangwan were kep t Although the health of the prisoner s fairly well abreast of the progress of at Kiangwan could not by any stretch the war, as : of the imagination be categorized as . . . Sgt Balthazar Moore, USMC, an d good, it was not critical and the death Lt John Kinney, USMC, and [I] manu- rate was very low . A primary reaso n factured a short wave radio out of stole n for this condition was that the POW s parts and listened fairly regularly t o were not in a tropical climate and the KWID in San Francisco, and BBC from weather, by and large, was not too bad. New Delhi . Unfortunately the true reports Overwork and malnutrition, however , had to be mixed with spurious informatio n because of the tendency of a lot of peopl e contributed to the high incidence of to talk too loud, too long, and in the wron g diarrhea, dysentery, tuberculosis, ma- place at the wrong time . Col Ashurst, laria, influenza, and pellagra. During Major Brown and Major Devereux were their more than three years at Woosun g regularly informed of the true contex t and Kiangwan, the prisoners receive d [of the news] . Additionally, small crystal from the United States three shipment s sets were manufactured ; lead and sulphu r for the crystal ; and wire and a `Nescafe ' of Red Cross food parcels and medica l can for the earphone. The shortwave radi o supplies which undoubtedly sustained set was hidden in various places but per- the men, although Japanese soldier s haps the best place was in the forty t o pilfered from these shipments and sol d fifty gallon `ordure crocks' in the toilets , the stolen items in Shanghai . or buried under the barracks . The infor- Of these three shipments, the onl y mation provided by the short wave radi o large one : and the crystal sets (which obtained

. . . was held by the Japanese while the y '8 MajGen Frank C . Tharin ltr to Hd , put pressure on Colonel Ashurst to sign HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, dtd 19Oct66, here- a receipt for the lot . This he refused to do, after Tharin ltr.

758 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Russian newscasts from Shanghai) serve d by removing doors from a nearby Japa- to stabilize the morale of the prisoners .7° nese barracks and installing these in th e corner of the boxcar, thus enclosing not By March 1945, the POWs bega n only the toilet but the window. The barbe d hearing numerous rumors to the effect wire was carefully put on the window s o that they were to be moved from Kiang- that it would be easily unhooked . Directl y wan. Although the prison guards in- outside of the windows were metal rung s that would provide a ladder to descen d sisted that nothing like that was to tak e prior to jumping to the ground . With this place, the POWs began preparing for a arrangement, it appeared that certainl y journey by discarding possessions they one person could make an escape, and i f no longer needed and hoarding food and the guards were not alert it was possible the like for what might turn out to be a that several might escape before the de - creased numbers would be noticed .$ ° difficult trip. Still other prisoners began preparations for an escape during th e The main party of 901 prisoners left move. One of the Wake prisoners re - on 9 May ; remaining behind in Shang- called : hai were 25 seriously ill and wounded men. The first leg of the trip, Shanghai On 8 May 1945 the Japanese organize d a working party to go into Shanghai to to Nanking, approximately 100 miles , prepare railroad cars for a move of the took 24 hours. Upon arrival at Nanking , prisoners . Two Marine Officers volunteere d the POWs were taken from the train, to accompany the working party in the marched through the city, and boated to hope that something could be done tha t the other side of the Yangtze River , would assist in an escape during the trip . It was well known from information where they reboarded their trains, gained from recently captured aviator s which had crossed the river empty . On that the 100 mile stretch of the railroa d the night of 10—11 May 1945, First north of Nanking was virtually in th e Lieutenants John F . Kinney and John hands of the Chinese . On arrival at the railroad yard in Shanghai, it was foun d A. McAlister, taken prisoner at Wak e that the cars to be used were standar d Island, First Lieutenants Richard M . Chinese boxcars with sliding doors in the Huizenga and James D . McBrayer , center and windows on either side of the captured in North China, and Mr . Lewis ends. The Japanese instructions were that S. Bishop, a former pilot with the Fly- barbed wire was to be nailed over the windows and barbed wire put up to enclose ing Tigers, escaped from the train. the ends of the boxcars leaving a spac e The following is McBrayer's account between the doors free for the guards . I t of the escape : was obvious that the only means of escap e would be through the windows and that These four Marine officers had long this would be impossible if within ful l planned for an escape, slowly accumulating view of the guards . Also provided by the tools necessary to cut through a fence, Japanese for each end of. the car was a etc. Once they learned of the planned move five gallon can to be used as a toilet during of the prisoners by train, they laid plan s the trip. After considerable discussion wit h to cut a hole in the bottom of the boxcars the Japanese, they finally agreed that the and escape via the `rods' while the train Officer's car should provide some privacy was moving. Fortunately the boxcar in for the toilet . This was to be accomplishe d 80 Col William W . Lewis memo to Hd, HistBr, SB McBrayer ltr . G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 10Nov66 .

MARINE POWS 759

which they were placed had a small win- escape plans, but when he saw the hole dow in the corner which was covered with he followed . Each officer was quite battere d barbed wire and small iron bars, which by the jump from a fast moving train . they could cut with their stolen tools. Each one also had . . . [a] harrowing The boxcars had contained forty to fifty experience prior to establishing contact officers, about twenty to twenty-five bein g with friendly Chinese guerrillas . The latte r wired in by barbed wire in each end . Fou r brought the five escaped officers together in Japanese guards were in the wired-off about five days ; it was only then that th e middle section between the sliding door s four Marines knew Bishop had jumped of the boxcars . Blankets and blackout from the train . equipment was placed over all openings i n The five . . . stayed with the Chines e the car because of U . S. aircraft strikes. guerrillas and made a long swing to th e Huizenga, Kinney, McAlister, and Mc - east and joined elements of the Chines e Brayer placed the `five gallon gasoline ca n Communist New Fourth Army. They toilet' near the window in their end of traveled with the Chinese Communist the car so as to give a reasonable excus e troops until they reached the boundar y to be near the blacked out window. between the Chinese Communist an d The POW train left Nanking traveling Chinese Nationalist Armies . An apparen t north toward Tientsin about midnight, the armistice was declared between the two four Marine officers took turns going to Chinese forces, and the escapees were the `head,' and cutting the wires and bars transferred to the Nationalist troops . At when it appeared the Japanese guards this point the escape seemed in doubt as were not looking or alert, particularly both the . . . Communists and the National- while the guards were eating supper. ists told [the Americans], `the other side The four Marine officers planned to jum p will kill you and blame it on us to cause off the train about midnight near th e trouble with your government.' Fortu- Shantung border because of the Commu - nately, the treatment of the escapees by nist 8th Route Army operations in that the guerrillas, the Communists and th e ,area . They planned to jump in pairs as Nationalists, was excellent, and the fHuizenga and McBrayer each spoke som e former POWs gained strength and weight . !Chinese, but Kinney and McAlister di d During their tour of the Anwhei-Shan- not . However, each had a small `pointee- tung provincial areas the escapees attended talkee,' which a Chinese-American ha d many patriotic rallies, and always they prepared for them in camp in the event were requested to sing the American Na- the officers became separated . When th e tional Anthem . As they could not really time came to escape—about midnight—th e sing the `Star Spangled Banner' and do it officers discovered there were no hand hold s justice, they invariably responded wit h on the side of the car, consequently the y the Marine Corps Hymn . So if part o f could not hang on and jump in pairs . China today thinks `From the Halls o f [Therefore,] it was out of the window an d Montezuma' is the U. S . National Anthem , out into the black night. you know who to blame : Huizenga, Kinney , The prison train was making abou t McAlister, and McBrayer, Marines, an d forty miles per hour when each jumpe d Bishop, a Marine `by adoption .'8 1 into the black unknown . Each officer ha d to time his approach to the window when Aided by the Chinese forces, the fiv e the four Japanese guards were not look- Americans finally reached an emergenc y ing, and slide up under the blanket cover- airstrip at Li Huang on 16 June, an d ing the window and jump . Consequently subsequently returned to the United the individual officers were strung out u p States. The night after these fiv e and down the track for many miles . Lewis Bishop . . . had not been included in the 81 McBrayer ltr .

760 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

escaped, two civilian prisoners also left regrouped in various camps in the mining the train ; one made a successful get - area . The officers were separated from the enlisted men and put in a small compound , away, but the other was recapture d meeting there a group of Australian offi- and badly beaten . cers. The men were sent to a number of On 14 May, the prison caravan camps where they found Australian, Indo- reached Fengt'ai, slightly west of Pei- nesian and other prisoners.8 3 ping, where there were fewer facilities , They remained on Hokkaido unti l less food, and more miserable condi- liberated. tions than at either Woosung or Kiang - e wan. At Fengt'ai : In the southern part of Japan, th Guam Marines were put to work i n All prisoners were put in a large ware- earnest at Zentsuji in early March 1942 , house. Instead of rice, flour was announced two months after their arrival . For thei r as the staple food. Claiming that flour , per se, was an impossible diet the PO W first major task, they had to construc t mess officer demanded that the Japanes e rice paddies on the side of a mountain provide some means to process this int o near the prison camp. As one Marin e bread . An oven was finally located (it had recalled : belonged to the N . China Marines i n Peiping) and bread production started . The axes that were used to knock dow n Later, the Japanese ordered the mess the trees were the most modern equipmen t officer to make hardtack `for the Japanes e I saw on the entire project. The rest of Army' and hundreds of pounds of hard- the equipment was even more basic—hoes , tack poured out of the oven, put into sack s rakes, a shovel or two, and hands .8 4 and stored. Much thought went into th e manufacture of this hardtack, unfortu- Groups of prisoners were continually nately. When the prisoners later arrived i n transferred to other camps from Zentsuji Hokkaido the hardtack was there, to be in the months following their arrival . a part of our ration . It was completely spoiled and inedible . Our sabotage of the In May 1942, one such group was sent Japanese war effort had boomeranged .82 to Osaka Prisoner of War Camp 1 , which was actually a warehouse not far Approximately a month later—on 19 from the docks of this port city . As a June—the POWs began another trip by matter of fact, most of the POW camp s boxcar, this time to the port of Pusan situated in such metropolitan areas o f in Korea, which had an infinitely wors e ., Osaka, Kobe, an d camp than the previous ones the pris- the country as Tokyo Yokohama were in warehouses or build- oners had been in . After three days here , ings of the same type . In violation of they were packed into the crowded lowe r other articles of the Geneva Protocol , deck of a ferry steamer, which trans - many of these city camps were directl y ported them to Honshu. When unloaded, in the center of strategic areas, and th e the POWs : men imprisoned there were forced to . . again were crowded into trains an d work as stevedores, loading and unload- sent around the island of Honshu vi a ing war material from military trans- Osaka and Tokyo by train and ferry to the island of Hokkaido, where they wer e " Ibid. e ' Tharin ltr. 84 Boyle, Yanks. Don't Cry, p . 42 .

MARINE POWS 761

ports. The majority of the camps i n istered right down the chain of com- Japan, however, were situated in rura l mand, from officer to NCO, from ser- or suburban locales. The stockades con- geant to private. One prisoner noted sisted of several areas of fenced-in that these Japanese beatings took "plac e grounds and one- and two-story woode n daily in their own army and Jap civilians barracks of the kind generally used b y suffered the same indignities and brutal , the Japanese Army . savage treatment from the Jap Army Some Guam Marines were trans- as we did ." 86 ferred in October 1942 to Hirohata Sub - Although Japanese authorities con- Camp, which was within the Osak a stantly told the prisoners that the camp groupment . Hirohata was admin- rations they were issued were equal i n istered by enlisted Japanese Army per- amount and quality to those issued t o sonnel, and by hanchos, or civilian labor the Japanese Army, S7 the physical con- supervisors who wore a red armband t o dition of the POWs proved otherwise . mark their authority, and who had the Hirohata prisoners lost on the average power of life and death over their hap - 45 pounds per man during the period of less captives . Although otherwise un- their imprisonment . Their daily ration armed, the hanchos carried clubs o r usually consisted of 600 grams (2 1 bamboo sticks of some sort which the y ounces) dry weight of either rice, wielded with relish on all ranks whethe r wheat, beans, corn, or flour . This ration provoked by the prisoners or not.85 was increased to 680 grams per day fo r Most of these civilians and many of th e a short while, and then reduced to 54 0 soldiers at the camp conducted black grams in the winter of 1943-1944. Dur- market activities, selling at exorbitan t ing the growing season, the men's diet prices to the prisoners Red Cross sup- was supplemented to a limited degree plies, food, and other items that the men by green vegetables which were used t o were entitled to . make a watery soup. Even though the As far as the beatings were con- Hirohata men were engaged in the cerned, the Marines soon noticed that i t heaviest types of manual labor, such as was commonplace for senior Japanese shoveling iron ore, coal, and slag an d Army personnel to beat their junior s required a more nourishing diet than for some major or minor provocation , that which they were given, they re- real or imagined . Beatings were admin- ceived very small amounts of fish o r meat once a month, if they were lucky . " Although under no compulsion to say s o On their rest days, "men were per- at the time, some of the liberated POWs re - mitted to make hikes through the ric e ported during initial interrogations after the y had been freed that they had been beaten for paddies," where they obtained suc h some infraction of a petty but strict prison supplements to their diet as ". . . snakes, rule. Undoubtedly, the prisoners very often di d all that they could to try the patience of thei r 8e Ercanbrack ltr II. captors . They expected quick punishment whe n " It is possible that the considerable heigh t caught for violating a camp law, and were no t and weight differences between Japanese an d often disappointed . CinCPac Surrender an d Americans may have resulted in what the latter Evacuation Rpt, p . 51 . believed to be a starvation ration.

762 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

grasshoppers, small frogs, turtles, and or any action which would affect the edible roots." ss general welfare of the prisoners overall, The Hirohata prisoners alleviated the was a matter which had to be and wa s food problem somewhat by pooling all handled by the POWs' own leaders . foodstuffs, tobacco, and relief supplie s They took a very serious view of any they received . Thereafter, an equal misconduct and for the common sur- ration was given to each man. Men who vival of all, harsh but just punishmen t had been weakened by hunger an d was given. Although it might seem some - disease and were dying were give n what humorous to read at this late date, double rations by common agreement . the senior POW was undoubtedly quite First Sergeant Ercanbrack of the serious when he made the followin g Guam Marines was made the senio r comment alongside the names of severa l commander of the Hirohata prisoners, men in the report he submitted upon his liberation : "Not recommended fo r and in turn organized the men im- 89 prisoned with him into platoons . To reenlistment." Their offenses : "profi- lessen the punishment which the priso n teering and theft of food during star- authorities might want to mete out, h e vation times" ; their victims, fellow maintained tight control over his com- prisoners. mand. All matters pertaining to in- The basic drive for self-preservatio n ternal discipline, cases of theft, or an y and an innate belief in the fact that, i n disputes that arose amongst the othe r the end, the United States would win th e POWs were referred to him for action . war did more than anything else to Ercanbrack managed to keep detaile d bolster the morale and instinct for sur- records of what transpired during hi s vival of the POWs. If they were caught imprisonment, including deaths, treat- talking to Japanese natives, the pris- ment of POWs, and the conduct of th e oners were beaten severely, and so were POWs—good or bad. Since any action of the civilians . Nonetheless, the captives an individual prisoner might result i n were able to keep somewhat abreast o f mass punishment for the entire camp, the general trend of the war through the maintenance of stringent internal the good intentions of these civilians , discipline by the prisoners themselve s who were pro-American, but surrepti- was a necessity. Theft of Japanese sup- tiously so for obvious reasons . One of plies was not only condoned, but wa s these was the interpreter at the Hiro- actually necessary for survival . To be hata camp, of whom more shall be sai d uncooperative with the guards or t o later. show them disrespect generally woul d A Guam Marine who was at the result in a beating or worse, but thi s Osaka Prisoner of War Camp remem- was something the individual brough t bered that : upon himself. . . . the last three or four months of 1943 were about the best months we ha d On the other hand, the theft of a as prisoners of war, or anyway the leas t fellow prisoner's rations or possessions , bad. We had a lot of reasons for feeling

88 Ercanbrack ltr II. "End (D) to Ercanbrack ltr II.

MARINE POWS 763

pretty good in late 1943 . For one thing, clothing and supplies into the priso n the Japanese civilians were keeping us with them. These items they shared fairly well posted on how the war was going, and we had every reason to expec t with the Marines. The soldiers had bee n it to end soon . After all, we knew that the able also to retain battalion funds Japanese were finally getting their lump s amounting to several thousand guilders . . . because the civilians told us about the with which they purchased food in beating their Navy took in the Coral Se a Batavia. These rations, too, they shared and at Midway, and we knew that th e with the Houston men, who, in addi- Marines had pushed the Japs out of th e Solomons and that the Japanese had made tion, were each given 10 guilders for similar `strategic withdrawals' out of Ne w purchasing tobacco and a little extr a Guinea and Attu Island in Alaska . All in food at a canteen operated by Austral- all it looked like we were doing all right. 90 ian POWs . In post-liberation interroga- If nothing else, most of the prisoners tions, Houston Marines universall y still had hope. praised the officers and enlisted men o f the 131st Field Artillery for their un- There were some, however, wh o stinting generosity during their difficult almost wished death would come to re- times together. lieve them of their misery, so terrible In addition to the Americans and the were the conditions of their imprison- Australians, Bicycle Camp held British ment. Among this forlorn group were and Dutch POWs, all of whom worke d the Marines and sailors captured when at a local oil refinery, handling barrels the Houston went down. Again, as in the and loading trucks and trains . The case of other groups, it is difficult to prisoners found that the guards wer e trace the travels of each man from the Koreans for the most part, and very Houston. Most of the Marines from th e brutal . Most prisoners thought that the ship's detachment had very much th e reason for the general cruelty was the same experiences, however . While at pressure applied to the guards by the the Bicycle Camp prison in Batavia, Japanese authorities . Java, these men were joined by othe r The most serious incident occurrin g Americans, survivors of the 2d Bat- at this camp took place on 3 July 1942 , talion, 131st Field Artillery. 9 1 when the Japanese produced a paper for Japanese rations at Bicycle Cam p all American prisoners to sign . It was were no better than they had been a t an affidavit requiring them to pledg e Serang, but, fortunately, the U . S . artil- allegiance to the Japanese Army and to lerymen had been able to bring thei r promise to neither escape nor attempt

°° Boyle, Yanks Don't Cry, p . 137 . an escape . The POWs protested th e - ° L This battalion was originally scheduled t o order and sent it back to the camp com join the 148th Field Artillery on Luzon, but th e mandant. It was returned with a de- ships transporting it could not break th e mand that the Americans sign it , Japanese blockade of the Philippines . Instead , whereupon they said they would obey the artillerymen were landed at Soerabaja , only those orders that did not conflic t and thrown into the Banten Bay defenses at St. Nicholas Point, where they were overru n with the oath they had taken to thei r and captured in the Japanese invasion . own government . When the Japanese

764 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

camp commander received this answer, At Changi, the Americans were pu t he took away all privileges the Ameri- to work clearing a rubber plantation so cans had, closed down their kitchen, con - that vegetable gardens could be started . fined them to their barracks, and caused There was continuous bickering betwee n many of them to be beaten . On 4 July, the English and the American POWs , with some sort of twisted logic, the because each side had its own concept of camp commander marched the entir e how much cooperation the Japanes e group of American POWs to his head- should receive. In general, the British quarters, where he forced them to sig n favored a more ordered relationship the document. 9 2 which was based on an established pat - Bicycle Camp POWs could purchas e tern of conduct between the prisoners food and other items from the native s and their captors. Few Americans wer e when they were on working parties out- disposed to accept either the Britis h side of the camp, but the Japanese woul d disciplinary system or the limited de- allow nothing to be brought back into gree of cooperation with the Japanes e the prison compound . Guards beat al l which was the basis of this workin g violators, and in addition, forced them relationship.93 either to kneel in the sun for an entire Although they were in POW status , day without water or stand at attention most Americans believed that the y for 12 to 72 hours at a stretch. should and could sabotage the Japanes e In the first week of September 1942 , war effort. This they did in every pos- a large group of prisoners, including th e sible way whenever disruptive acts Americans, was transported to Singa- could be accomplished surreptitiously pore on the Dai Naichi Maru. With or made to look like accidents . 1,400 POWs and a number of Japanese Generally, the work of POWs was very troops on board, the ship was bulging a t closely supervised . Nevertheless, the the seams. After a five-day voyage, th e prisoners were able to commit acts o f prisoners debarked at Singapore an d sabotage which were not very often dis- were immediately taken to Changi, a n covered. Some Marines were assigned to English Army barracks before the fal l an oil refinery at Saigon . Here they of the crown colony . Here, British drained gasoline drums and then added troops were also imprisoned. water to fill the drums again . Their work Although housing conditions were not was not inspected and the drums were too bad at Changi, the place had bee n immediately loaded on barges and take n stripped clean by the Japanese . Shortly to the local military airport . Word came after their arrival, the Marines wer e back from the field that four or fiv e given a Red Cross food supply issue , planes cracked up daily because of the containing corned beef, cocoa, milk, an d contaminated fuel. At the refinery there a meat and vegetable ration . This was was a large dynamo which was out of manna to men who had been on an all - order and an American sailor was di- rice diet for eight long months . rected to repair it. Instead he threw san d

"Houston POW rpt, Sgt Charley L. Pryor . "Ibid., p . 8 .

MARINE POWS 765

into the moving parts, but unfortunatel y marines a day or so after clearing th e was caught and severely beaten by th e Inland Sea .95 Japanese ; he could have been executed. Another gambit successfully attempte d A group of the men from the 4th Ma- was to overload cargo nets so that the y rines, after transfer from the Philip - would burst and drop their loads, often pines to Japan, was assigned to buil d over the side of the ship into the water . a dam on Honshu, at Mitsushima on th e At one time, the Guam Marines managed Tenryu River . The POWs were put to to sabotage the major winch on one of work building the dam under the super- the ships on which they were working, vision of a Japanese construction com- and to hold up its unloading for many pany. After the end of the war, Master hours. When the POWs were fortunate, Sergeant Fred Stolley visited the scene they found that the ship's cargo con- of his labors as a POW. Here he met tained food supplies and other valuabl e the president of the construction com- items which they pilfered and smuggle d pany who took him on a tour of the da m back to camp. Very often the guards which had been completed in the post - would look the other way until the POWs war era. The Japanese told Stolley : had their fill, and then the Japanese would take what remained to their 'I never would have finished it if I ha d families or to the black market. On other to depend on your work alone. You people were very bad at times . . . what did you occasions the prisoners were discovered do with my machine tools? ' with these stolen items on their person s I winced . We had taken two cases of by the camp guards, who then severely valuable machine tools and used them for punished the Americans or withdrew reinforcing in the cofferdam . It was one their limited privileges . of the few ways we had of fighting back at the time .94 Once, the Guam men were unloading a pig-iron cargo from a freighter into Other Marines had other ways of barges alongside . The man on the cargo fighting back. The Guam men, working winch purposely set an overloaded net as stevedores on the Osaka docks, be- down on a barge which obviously coul d came quite adept at unloading ships as not carry the four-ton load. The barg e slowly as possible. They found that thei r sank slowly, followed by the bars o f military or civilian guards didn't care pig-iron. A Marine who observed all of how much work was accomplished as this philosophically commented : "There long as they made some headway, wasn't anything heroic about sending a big barge load of pig-iron to the bottom . . . and we took advantage of this laxit y of Osaka Harbor, but it made a gang of and got away with a lot of gold-bricking. horios [prisoners] a little bit happie r We were never in a rush to get a shi p unloaded until later on in the war whe n as we trudged back to our barracks ." 96 it was a lead-pipe cinch that the shi p Actually, while their acts of defiance would be sent to the bottom by our sub - did not seem very heroic to the POW s

55 D1 Fred Stolley, "Return to Mitsushima," Boyle, Yanks Don't Cry, p . 98 . Leatherneck, v. XLV, no . 3 (Mar62), p. 83 . "Ibid., p . 108.

766 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

who committed them, they were heroe s come to Burma, the POWs were marched in a real sense. If they were caught, as to the 40 Kilometer Camp and immedi- a number were at various times, they ately put to work excavating rail beds . could be beaten, tortured, or executed . The extremely difficult labor lasted fro m Despite the knowledge of what coul d dawn to dark and under living conditions happen to them if discovered, the POWs that ranged from poor to hardly bear- determinedly continued committing able. Each man was given a daily work minor and major acts of sabotage . It was quota to fulfill . If soil conditions wer e their way of fighting the war . good, the work day lasted 14 hours , Less than a week after their arriva l which was considered a relatively short at Changi in 1942, some of the Houston day. At other times, the work assigne d Marines were again put aboard a shi p required 20 hours to complete . bound for Burma, and were taken ashor e This group remained at 40 Kilomete r and imprisoned in Moulmein . From this Camp until the end of November 1943, city, located across the Bay of Chaung- when it marched back to 26 Kilo - zon from Rangoon, the POWs were meter Camp, remaining there throug h marched five miles to a train which car- Christmas . At this time, they began or- ried them to Thanbyuzayat . This was ganizing for an escape, for they ha d a base camp for the railroad to Bangkok , received word from fellow prisoners a t which the Japanese were building Thanbyuzayat base—where a clandes- wholly with prisoner labor . Thanbyu- tine radio receiver was located—tha t zayat housed the hospital and suppl y British forces were making a drive i n dumps servicing the subsidiary wor k their direction . Under the leadership of camps built temporarily along the rail - two officers from the 131st Field Ar- road right of way . The sub-camps were tillery, the POWs formed squads an d titled 5 Kilometer Camp, 25 Kilometer managed to steal four or five machine Camp, 40 Kilometer Camp, etc ., each guns and a dozen or more hand grenades deriving its name according to the dis- from their Japanese guards . Unfortu- tance they were located from Thanbyu- nately, nothing developed from the ru- zayat. mor of the English advance, although On their first day at the main camp, planning for the uprising "did wonders the Japanese officer in charge tried t o for the men's spirits ." 97 impress on the POWs the futility of es - The 25 or 26 Kilometer Camp, as it cape because of the isolation of the was variously called, was a cholera - locale. He called the prisoners the rabbl e infested area in which at least 60 native of a defeated army and reminded them laborers had died of the disease before that they were under Japanese control . the POWs had arrived . Some unburie d The enemy officer added that he had bodies were still in evidence when th e orders to build a railroad to Bangkok prisoners marched in. In addition t o and assured them that he was going to the malnutrition, dysentery, and other do it, even if it meant the burial of a n diseases common to the POWs, many Allied soldier under every rail tie along the way. Two days after this jolly wel - " Houston POW rpt, Cpl Howard R . Charles .

MARINE POWS 767

men were suffering from skin ulcers . In a day. Just after Christmas, they arrive d the work that they were doing, it wa s in Thailand, where the men were sepa- very easy for the prisoners' legs to b e rated into several different groups an d bruised or cut, and every cut or bruise sent to a number of camps throughout meant an ulcer . Once a prisoner's limb s the country. In April 1944, some of the became ulcerated, they were difficult to prisoners were sent out of Thailand t o heal. Sometimes it was impossible for Saigon, where they worked as steve- the men with ulcers even to stand u p dores in the dock area . Allied bombin g to work, but nevertheless, they wer e raids were by that time on the increase , taken out on stretchers and given a ham - and without shelters of their own, th e mer to break rocks . Not only did the POWs "took a beating from th e oppressive jungle heat and humidit y planes." 98 When the war ended, a num- prevent healing, there were few medi- ber of the prisoners were liberated i n cines available with which POW doctors Saigon. An interesting sidelight of thi s could treat the men. period was that just after V-E Day, na- Throughout the following months , tive Annamites began an uprisin g whenever the work in the vicinity o f against French authorities who had re- one camp was completed, the men woul d turned to power and street fighting be moved to another, only to begin the erupted. Fortunately, none of the POW s same cycle of construction all over was hurt. again. Work at the 30 Kilometer Cam p Some prisoners remained in Thailand progressed under the most difficult con- following their departure from the ditions, because the rainy season began jungles of Burma. These men were while the prisoners were here . Heavy taken to Kanchanburi, which was th e rains caused the road beds to wash ou t largest city they had been in to that and cave in. The POWs were often time, excluding their brief stay in Singa- forced to work day and night, and some - pore. The Thai people with whom the times did not get to bed until 0200, onl y POWs came in contact treated them to be called out again to begin thei r decently and did what they could to ease labors again at daybreak. During th e their suffering . After approximately a heavy rains, many of the prisoners con- year in this area, these men were move d tracted malaria and were unable to wor k to various places in the country, at all. wherever the Japanese had work for In December 1943, the railroad wa s them. Conditions depended upon th e finally completed, and the men were attitude of the guards, which ranged given a three-day rest at Thanbyuzayat , from complete indifference to thorough- the first such break they had experience d going brutality. Most of this group were since they began working in Burma . liberated from a number of differen t Late in the month, the POWs were camps in Thailand at war's end . loaded 35 to 40 men each into 6 x 20-foot Those Houston Marines who had boxcars and transported out of the remained in Singapore at Changi whe n jungle into Thailand . In the three-day trip, they were fed fish and rice once °° Ibid. 768 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION the first group left in December 1942, ords show that one Marine from the were moved several weeks later, in Houston detachment remained i n January 1943. Some followed in the Batavia until April 1943, when he an d tracks of the first, and ended up work- other POWs were transferred first to ing on the railroad. They too were one camp and then another within a forced into the hard labor that became period of several months . In June, the the lot of all Allied POWs in this area. group to which this Marine belonge d One Marine told about work at 100 was transferred to Singapore, where i t Kilometer Camp, where there wer e remained approximately a month load- many sick prisoners, most of the m ing Japanese transports. In July 1943, suffering from fever and tropical ulcers . it was taken across the Straits of This camp was located at the foot of a Malacca to the South Siak River and u p mountain in a low place on the Burma it to the vicinity of Pakanbaru, approx- side of the Burma-Thailand border . imately in the center of Malaya . Here Rain was a constant factor in the lives the POWs were employed in construc- of the POWs who lived here in almos t tion of a railroad from the time the y knee-deep mud all of the time . The route arrived until they were liberated . of the railroad in this area was laid ove r Like the Houston Marines, the Ma- ground that consisted of a very har d rines captured in the Philippines foun d lava formation . The prisoners had t o their captors neither compassionate no r break up the volcanic rock with ham- gentle and their future existence a mat - mers, and each time the hammer fell , ter of doubt. It was questionabl e showers of stone splinters flew off, som e whether the American POWs woul d piercing uncovered portions of the men's succumb first from malnutrition and bodies and embedding themselves like disease, brutal and inhumane treatment , shell fragments in the POWs' flesh. or death by execution. Initially, it ap- Scratches developed into ulcers, and th e peared that any one or all of these fac- ulcerations soon began suppurating . tors would have an equal opportunity of Very often, because of inadequate treat- depleting the ranks of the prisoners ment and the lack of drugs, blood poison- which General Homma's forces held . ing set in. Those afflicted were so ru n Upon his removal from Manila to- down to begin with that their bodie s gether with other senior America n could not throw off the effects of the POWs, Colonel Howard of the 4th Ma - blood poisoning and their systems were rines was taken to Formosa, arriving unable to develop antibodies . As a result, there at Karenko prison camp on 1 6 they died." August 1942 . Up to this time, Howard , General Wainwright, and the others had This second group of Houston POWs, been accorded satisfactory treatment , like the first to leave Singapore, als o except for an insufficient diet. Things worked on the railroad until it was com- quickly changed at Karenko, however , pleted and was transferred first to Thai - for they were all placed on a starvatio n land and later to Saigon . Existing rec - diet here, forced to perform coolie labor , on Houston POW rpt, Sgt Charley L . Pryor . and suffered many personal indignities .

MARINE POWS 769

In late October 1943, the group was "Not so much due to my complaints, " moved to Japan, and moved again i n wrote General Beecher, "but due to a November, this time to Manchuria via change of policy . We also received bulk Korea. Howard's group finally was sent Red Cross supplies, which were issue d to Mukden, where it remained unti l to the messes ; medicine, food, etc. They liberated on 20 August 1945 first by a n saved our lives." 10 2 OSS team and then by a party of Rus- On the morning of 26 October 1942 , sian soldiers. 1,000 POWs hiked from the Cabanatuan At Camp O'Donnell on Luzon, th e Camp 1 to a rail loading point at Corregidor prisoners learned the hor- Cabanatuan, were loaded into boxcars — rible details of the Bataan Death Marc h 80 men to each car—and transferred from the survivors of that infamou s to Bilibid prison . episode. Approximately 2,000 Bataa n At one of the frequent train halts, a men died before the POWs were shifte d town about 30 miles from Manila, all th e to Cabanatuan . American prisoners received quite a surprise. A group of Filipino children tested Here, conditions were slightly im- the Jap guards on our boxcar and found proved. The death rate of Americans a t out that they did not understand English . Cabanatuan continued at 40 to 50 daily . The children then sang, `God Bless 3 This situation prevailed until 16 Jan- America .'10 uary 1943, which was the first day i n After one night in Bilibid, the POW s the history of the camp without a death . were crowded aboard a coal-burning Colonel Beecher constantly complained transport which carried them to Davao , to the Japanese about the ration .'°° on Mindanao, making stops at several Causing these deaths was a combinatio n other Philippine island ports along th e of malnutrition, disease, exposure, and way. Disembarking at Davao on the the constant mistreatment by Japanes e morning of 7 November, the prisoner s guards who found every POW fair gam e began an 18–mile march to the Davao for their excesses.10 ' The Japanese made Penal colony. Formerly a civil prison , no effort to furnish medical supplies, t o the Japanese had converted it into a establish a hospital, or even to alleviate POW camp. Conditions here were a the suffering of either Americans o r distinct improvement over those experi- Filipinos. Army and Navy medical per- enced previously. sonnel captured with the rest did thei r The Davao Penal Colony actually wa s best under the circumstances, but i n a plantation of many thousands of acres . view of the limited resources availabl e Before the war, it had produced all of to them, their best was not good enough . the food required for the 2,000 inmate s Sometime in December 1943 the ra- imprisoned there, and in fact shippe d tion issue was materially increased , the surplus production to other Philip - pine prisons. Approximately 75 acres loo Beecher ltr. were devoted to banana trees, and a 101 lstLt Jack Hawkins Rpt of Experience s and Observations, dtd 3Dec43, hereafte r "'Beecher ltr. Hawkins rpt . loa Shofner rpt.

770 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

large orchard contained papaya, citrus , outside of the prison camp. One aspect avocado, and other tropical fruit trees . of the method of escape was solved by There were several hundred cows an d getting all members of the escape grou p water buffalo roaming about . The farm on one or the other of two labor detail s also had about 10,000 egg-producing which worked outside of the camp i n poultry. In fact, there was plenty o f close proximity to each other . On 14 food, but not for the POWs . Nonethe- March 1943, these men made a success- less, the prisoners found that their foo d ful dummy escape run . here was better than that which ha d On 4 April, the day set for the actual been received elsewhere in captivity , escape, everything went according to and they were issued rations of meat an d schedule . At 0800, the work parties left fish once or twice a week. Rice, however , the camp, headed for the direction of remained the staple item in their diet . their work areas, and then doubled back All officers and enlisted POWs wer e to the rendezvous point, evading Japa- forced to work at Davao . Some of the nese sentries. When they met at 0830 , projects to which they were assigned they uncovered their previously hidden consisted of hauling gravel from a cree k supplies, and waited two suspense-fille d bed to a railroad siding, cutting logs in hours within 300 yards of the Japanes e the jungle, building Japanese defensiv e barracks for their Filipino guides t o positions, different farming chores, an d arrive. These two men had been delaye d prison housekeeping duties . Depending for some minor reason by the enem y upon the work detail involved, the work- guards. day began between the hours of 060 0 At 1030, the escapees quickly left th e and 0800 and ended at 1700, with two camp area. "It was a great feeling to be hours for lunch. free again, and when we finally got Before Christmas 1942, a group of started we literally flew through th e Davao POWs, consisting of Captain jungle for the first hour," recalled Cap- Austin C . Shofner and First Lieutenants tain Shofner.105 In their hurry and th e Jack Hawkins and Michiel Dobervic h guides' nervousness, the men missed th e of the 4th Marines and seven othe r trail they were heading for . Fortu- American servicemen, began formulat- nately, a heavy rain began falling and ing plans to escape . Their primary ai m lasted all day, washing away the tracks was to reach Allied territory (Aus- they may have left. After three rainy tralia) to report the inhumane Japanes e days and two sleepless nights in a treatment of POWs.lo4 The escape party swamp, all the while plagued by vora- was increased to 12 men with the addi- cious mosquitos, the men became in- tion of two Filipino prisoners who wer e creasingly exhausted. At 1730 of the to guide the rest to safety. third day, they heard some rifle, machine The would-be escapees spent two gun, and mortar fire and observed what months accumulating necessary supplie s appeared to be huts burning in the dis- and rations, which they cached at a spot tance. They changed the direction o f

109 Ibid. 1°° Ibid.

MARINE POWS 771

their march away from this area. Shofner, Hawkins, Dobervich, and th e On the fourth day, 7 April, the escape others discussed the relative merits of party headed in the direction of th e adhering to their original plan or haz- previous night's firing, and upon arriv- arding a hike to the north over hundred s ing found evidence of a fight . Heading of miles of mountainous terrain, unin- north away from the camp, about 1 0 habited except for tribes of savage head - kilometers beyond the scene of the fire hunters, who "killed for the sake o f 1°6 fight, they arrived at an occupied house , killing." Laureta offered to send with whose inhabitants conducted the party the group an armed escort and two to a guerrilla outpost at Longaog . guides who had just recently returne d from the north . The 12 fugitives remained here sev- After they had agreed on this new eral days, resting up and being treated course of action and all preparations fo r to the hospitality and generosity of thei r the trek had been made, the escaped . At the outpost, they were give n hosts prisoners and their escort left the guer- some interesting information ; the rilla encampment on 21 April . They swamp that they had just crossed wa s reached Medina, a town on the north- infested with crocodiles. When the west coast of Mindanao, following a former prisoners told the local guerrill a long, tiring, and dangerous journey. e commander of their plans to reach th Here they were greeted by Lieutenant east coast of Mindanao and to sail t o Colonel Ernest E . McLish, USA, wh o Australia, he said that they would have had been serving with a Philippine to contact his superior, who was in con- Army regiment when Corregidor fell , trol of the whole area and whose assist- and had hidden in the mountains of ance was required to obtain the neces- Mindanao rather than surrender . After sary equipment and guides for the trip . a period of hiding, he began organizin g A guide from this man, Captain Claro a resistance movement, which, whe n Laureta of the Philippine Constabulary , formed, became the 110th Division an d soon arrived to conduct the escapees on subordinate to the 10th Military Dis- a two-day journey to Laureta's head - trict, the senior command responsibl e quarters, where they met the guerrill a for coordinating all guerrilla activity chieftain and detailed their plans an d on Mindanao. Its commander wa s requirements . Laureta told them of som e Colonel Wendell W . Fertig, a U. S . Army of the difficulties they might encounte r reservist, who "had over 33,000 men on in the long sea voyage and then in- his rolls in February 1945, some 16,50 0 formed them that a large guerrilla of them armed ."1o' organization officered by Americans While waiting to be evacuated from existed in the northwest portion of th e the Philippines by submarine, th e island and that it had radio communi- 108 Hawkins, Never Say Die, p. 135 . cation with Australia . Furthermore, he "'Robert R . Smith, Triumph in .the Philip- had learned that an American sub - pines—The War in the Pacific—United States marine recently landed and supplied th e Army in World War II (Washington : OCMH , guerrillas. DA, 1963), p . 586 .

310-224 0-69 - 50

772 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

former prisoners were asked to join the fruit and decided to punish them him - 110th Division to assist in directing self . He broke the left arm of each ma n guerrilla activities . On 11 May, Shofner with an iron bar and then beat the m was appointed a major and Hawkins and about the buttocks with it . At anothe r Dobervich made captains in the Army time, upon being told by a prisoner that of the United States . Shofner became the food was no good, this same cook deputy chief of staff and assistant opera- threw a dipper-full of boiling tea on th e tions officer of the division, Hawkins man's feet. Although the prisone r became the division intelligence officer, jumped away, the liquid reached hi s and Dobervich, the supply officer . For ankles. Suffering third-degree burn s nearly six months, they held these posi- and lacking adequate medical attention , tions while, at the same time, taking his foot, as a result, healed slowly an d part in the raids on Japanese garrisons became heavily scarred . on Mindanao . Finally, on 15 November In January 1944, the Puerto Princes a 1943, the three Marines boarded an prisoners received some Red Cross sup - American submarine at Nasipit, Bu- plies, but the Japanese took out an d tuan Bay, Mindanao, which took them kept all drugs and medicines, leavin g to Australia, and they reported for duty only adhesive tape, gauze, and sulf a with United States forces eight days powder . It was presumed that this last later. item was left in the boxes because enem y Of the American prisoners remaining medical personnel were ignorant of in the Philippine Islands, a group of either its presence or use . approximately 350 was transferred at During one of the Allied air raids o n the end of July 1942, from Cabanatuan the Palawan field, one POW had a larg e Camp 3 to Puerto Princesa, Palawan gash opened in his head by a flying roc k Island, where it was put to work con- which hit him. His side became para- structing a Japanese airfield . The treat- lyzed, his eyes crossed, and he appeare d ment of the POWs here was as brutal to have suffered a bad concussion . All as that received by the men on the that the Japanese offered in the way of Death March. One of the three Japanese medical aid was a supply of cotton . One interpreters at Puerto Princesa was a of the doctors amongst the prisoner s small man who constantly carried brass made some instruments for operatin g knuckles and delighted in punching the on the injured man to ease his suffer - prisoners in the mouth with them.'°8 ing. Despite these ministrations, the Another instance of Japanese cruelty man did not improve and remained a to prisoners occurred when two Ma- stretcher case, helpless and incoherent . rives were caught eating a papaya they Later, Japanese guards shot him whil e . he was still on the stretcher. had picked in violation of a camp order A Japanese cook saw them eating the As bad as conditions were at Puerto Princesa, they became increasingl y worse after the American air raids, 10e Sworn statement of Sgt Douglas W . Bogue and PFC Glen W . McDole, signed and dtd beginning in October 1944, seemed to 17Feb45. indicate that friendly forces were un-

MARINE POWS 773

doubtedly going to return to the Philip- There was a roof of some type overhead pines soon. During the previous month , and a small entrance at each end of the all Japanese guards at the camp were shelter. Some men had constructed in- replaced by veteran combat troops, th e dividual shelters of a similar type clos e POW food ration was cut, and 159 of to the barbed wire fence enclosing the the surviving Americans were returne d compound and near the edge of a cliff to Manila. Once Allied bombings bega n which dropped to a beach some 60 fee t in earnest, camp authorities took out below. their frustrations on the Americans b y After the prisoners had been sittin g beating and starving them . In some near their shelters for approximately 30 cases, but not until after a few of th e minutes, two American P–38 aircraft POWs were wounded in the first ai r appeared overhead, whereupon the raids, they were allowed to build shelters Japanese guards forced the American s for themselves. into their shelters . Immediately, som e In anticipation of early liberation , 50 or 60 Japanese soldiers rushed for- the Americans at Puerto Princes a ward carrying light machine guns, attempted to maintain a high degree of rifles, and buckets of gasoline . They morale and to take whatever maltreat- surrounded all of the shelters, and into ment came their way as best the y the first one tossed a lighted torch fol- could.109 The climax of the whole situ- lowed by a bucket of gasoline ; they re- ation on Palawan came on 14 December peated this in the other two . As soon 1944, when Japanese seaplanes operat- as the burning and screaming prisoner s ing from Puerto Princesa sighted a n ran out of the shelters, they were American invasion convoy in the Sul u mowed down by the machine guns and Sea headed for Mindoro . Upon receiv- rifles. Several wounded Americans, ing this sighting report and believing flames shooting from their clothes an d that Puerto Princesa was the target fo r bodies, rushed the Japanese and fough t the landing, the Japanese camp com- them hand to hand. mander prepared to carry out his order s e to kill the prisoners remaining in his Prisoners in the shelters near th barbed wire fence without hesitation custody. tore through the wire and scramble d At approximately 1400 on the 14th, down the cliff to the beach . Some 30 to all of the POW working parties wer e e returned to the prison compound an d 40 managed to reach the water's edg forced to remain in the immediat e and began swimming across Honda Bay, - vicinity of their air raid shelters . These towards the northern section of Pala shelters were nothing more than wan. Most of these men were shot b y trenches, each about five feet deep, an d riflemen standing at the edge of th e long enough to hold about 50 men . cliff overlooking the beach . Meanwhile, in the camp, the Japanese began throw- CinCPac-CinCPOA Escape and Evasion ing dynamite into the shelters to kill t Rpt No . 23, dtd 15Feb45, interrogations of Sg those prisoners whom the guards be- Douglas W . Bogue, PFC Glenn W . McDole, and RM1 Fern J . Barta, USN . lieved were still alive.

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One Marine managed to escape and often [asked] that if and when Japan lost hid in the rocks immediately below th e the war [would I] give him a letter o f n bluff, where he remained all the while some kind to prove that he had not, as a individual, been cruel to POWs . He aide d the butchery above him was in progress . us to the best of his ability, often helpe d After dark, and before enemy soldier s us to deceive the . . . authorities to pre- began patrolling the beaches, this man clude punishment and, in general, trie d and four other survivors of the shoot- to help us . ing and burning swam to the opposite In 1944 . . . Tahara came to me and advised `I am very sorry—we must all die .' shore. Reaching it, the five immediately Tahara told me that orders had bee n plunged into the Palawan jungles , issued by Tokyo which would require, th e through which they wandered for five moment the first American set foot o n days and nights without food and water . Japanese soil, that all POWs be killed an d that the camp authorities then commit The escapees finally reached the suicide . Iwahig Penal Colony, where a thriving Shortly afterwards, the Japs began dail y Filipino underground organization took drills . A platoon of Japs would arrive at them in, fed and clothed them, and the n our camp from Himeji barracks (the y evacuated them to a point where a n were required to move on the double for the 11 kilometers), hastily set up thei American submarine could pick them r machine guns to completely encircle th e up. camp and execute other maneuvers clearl y Approximately 140 men died in th e indicating a plan they wished to execut e Puerto Princesa Massacre . Those who without mistake . Their arrival, their escaped learned later that, after all of maneuver, their critique, and their departure took place two or three times each the remaining POWs had been killed, week. The . . . authorities made mention the Japanese authorities had let it be that the soldiers were being trained to known to Filipinos in the area of the protect us from irate civilians who migh t camp that the Americans had all been wish to harm us if U. S . troops started t o killed in bombing raids by American invade . On one occasion, I made a poin t planes. To ensure that this story woul d blank statement to the [Japanese second i n command], Sgt . Fukada, that it was re- be the only one told, the Japanese camp grettable that we should have to die after authorities executed all of the Filipino s so long a term in prison camp—he agree d working at Puerto Princesa at the and stated he would have liked to hav e time.110 Altogether, 23 Marines perished lived after the war was over, perhaps th e in the massacre. country would some day be a good countr y again . Luckier, it appears, were the Hiro- I believed that orders directing mas- hata prisoners, who were destined for a sacre of the prisoners had been issued an d similar end . According to Ercanbrack : am still of that opinion . I confided in only my senior Staff NCO s Our Camp Interpreter, Mr . Tahara, wa s and drew up `Plan A ' for escape. The plan . . . elderly (about 65) . . . educated in the contemplated cutting the wires to Himej i U. S. and professing to be a Christian. d For the last 2 years of the war, he was (their phone line was buried and connecte increasingly friendly with me . . . an d with Himeji barracks as a `hot line'— Tahara had pointed out where the line "° Ibid., and sworn statement of Sgt Douglas could be cut), heading for the hills i n W . Rogue, dtd 17Feb45 . squad units (our squads numbered about

MARINE POWS 775

60 men) and hiding out until we coul d thought the Jap guards weren't watch- contact friendly forces . I am quite sur e ing them." 11 2 we could have taken over the camp an d When the prisoners arrived at the l made a break-out—but am very doubtfu s that we could have survived for long du e docks, they saw that Manila Bay wa to the proximity of Himeji where abou t glutted with the hulks of Japanese ships 35,000 [Japanese troops] were garrisoned . sunk in American air raids . A total of Tahara obtained some maps of the sur- 1,619 POWs were herded aboard th e rounding country (rather melodramatic Oryoku Maru, a relatively new passen- at this time—but I had the control ma p sewn into my shoes by Cpl Ward USM C ger vessel of approximately 10,00 0 113 who was camp cobbler) and, with the tons. Also boarding the ship were NCOs we held 'command post exercises ' 2,000 Japanese sailors whose ships had frequently to perfect our break-out plan . been sunk, and about 3,000 Japanes e .11 1 Tahara, of course, was to go with us women and children. By 1800, all of the Fortunately, the Japanese plan wa s prisoners and the rest of the passenger s never implemented . had been crowded into all available Another shocking incident involving space ; the POWs, jammed into th e 11 4 Marine POWs as well as prisoners from holds "at bayonet point ." the other services occurred in late 1944 . After the POWs boarded the ship, Early that year, the Japanese high com- Japanese guards attempted to lowe r mand apparently realized that it woul d food and water to the men in the holds, be unable to retain its hold on the but owing to the confusion and the Philippines, and it gave orders for the crowded conditions, few men got ration s evacuation of Japanese nationals an d that night . The holds were stifling, hot , the remaining POWs in the islands to crowded, and lacking in sanitary facil- n Japan. Some of these POWs had been ities, except for a number of two-gallo brought back to Manila in mid-194 4 wooden buckets, which were inaccessible from the Davao Penal Colony. Early in to most of the prisoners. As a result of October 1944, the Japanese authoritie s the cumulative effect of these condi- began bringing in the prisoners fro m tions, several men went berserk tha t other outlying areas, collecting them all night, and killed a number of their fel- at Bilibid Prison. low POWs. Other prisoners suffocated . Among this number was Lieutenan t r A majority of the men were in fai Colonel John P . Adams, the former physical condition when they arrived i n commander of the 3d Battalion, 4th Manila, but after a 60-day starvatio n Marines . Some of the men became so diet, they were all in very poor health for an impending sea voyage. On 13 112 Personal Diary of LtCol Roy L . Bodine , December, they were formed up into a Jr ., DC, USA, p. 7. A copy of this handwritten column of 100-man groups and marche d diary was introduced into evidence in the wa r to the Manila docks . Along the way , crimes trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashit a "People lined the streets to see us pas s in Manila following the war. 113 and many gave us 'V' signs when they "I know the exact figure because the roster was turned over to me ." Beecher ltr. 111 Ercanbrack ltr 1966. 1" Ibid.

776 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

crazed by thirst, they even drank their beach because all of the remaining life own urine and cut their wrists to drin k rafts and boats had been riddled in th e their own blood. About 15 prisoners air attacks. failed to survive the first night .115 The POWs were not evacuated unti l Colonel Beecher asked Toshino, th e the morning of the 15th and at the guard commander, to evacuate the pris- exact time that Navy planes resume d oners that night, but "an attempt to g o the attack on the ship. One bomb up a ladder to go . . . on deck resulted in dropped directly into a hold, killin g a guard shooting into the hold ." many of the trapped prisoners. The men Beecher "pointed out to the interprete r who attempted to climb up the ladder s who was the go-between to Toshino tha t to the deck during the attack were shot we would surely be bombed in th e to death by the Japanese guards . morning ." 11 6 Finally, at 0900, the prisoners receive d Early the next morning, in compan y word to evacuate the ship as best the y with six or seven cargo vessels, a could . This they did, leaving behind all cruiser, and a destroyer, the Oryoku of their meager belongings, includin g Maru steamed out of the harbor and u p clothes and shoes, on the ship. the coast of Luzon. At approximately Just after the POWs evacuated th e 0800, U. S. Navy aircraft spotted th e ship, "a flight of four planes came in on convoy sneaking up the coast, and san k a bombing run . The leader apparentl y all ships except the cruiser, which high - recognized the fact that we were Ameri- tailed it back to Manila, and the Oryoku can prisoners . He waggled his wing s Maru. The prisoners in the holds hugge d and the planes did not drop their bombs . the bulkheads in an attempt to escap e Thus, we were spared many mor e the shell fragments and bullets which casualties ." 11 7 ricocheted through the open cargo Many of the POWs drowned while hatch, but a number of the POWs be - swimming ashore, as the two days an d came casualties. The attack continued the night aboard the ship had drained throughout most of the day . At 2200 them of what slight physical strength the POW-laden vessel limped into Subic they might have had. On the beach, th e Bay. The Japanese then removed the Japanese guards had set up and fire d women and children and landed them machine guns to mark the boundarie s at Olongapo. Next, the sailors left, of the zone in which the prisoners wer e swimming the 500—800 yards to th e to come ashore ; anyone carried outsid e 11" Summary of the evidence in the case of of that zone by the tide or current wa s US v Toshino et al (POW, WWII, Philippine s shot at. Only 1,200 of the original grou p File) . Toshino was the commander of th e of 1,619 survived the ill-fated trip. A guards charged with escorting the prisoners total of 21 Marines was killed to Japan . He and another guard were sentenced . to be hanged for what later happened to thei r Once ashore and rounded up, the remaining charges ; the rest of his men were POWs were marched to the tennis sentenced to imprisonment for periods varyin g court of the old Marine base at Olon- from 10 to 25 years . "'Beecher ltr. "7 Ibid.

MARINE POWS 777

gapo, and it seemed to many of the Lingayen Gulf. Ten men did not survive Marines in the group who had been sta- the journey. , The others remained here tioned here in prewar days that their for two days before they were crammed lives had now gone full circle. The aboard two ships on 27 December, a t POWs sat in the wire-enclosed cour t which time they began what can only be from 15 to 21 December without pro- described as a hell voyage . In the four tection against the elements . For two day period en route to the port of Takao days they received no food whatsoever, on Formosa, they were furnished an ex- and at no time did the Japanese giv e tremely inadequate supply of food and them either medical supplies or treat- water. The conditions in the holds of th e ment. Toshino told Colonel Beeche r two ships, the Brazil Maru and the "that there was no rice available ." But Enoura Maru, both indescribably filthy , Beecher noted that although this "wa s were such that the POWs were reduce d true during the first day but not there- to living an animal-like existence in a after, I could not prevail upon him to dank, dark, and fetid atmosphere that feed us." us On the 21st and 22d the men beggars the imagination. As the vessel s were loaded on trucks and taken to Sa n approached Formosa, the weather grew Fernando, Pampanga, approximatel y colder, and the suffering of the POWs 22 miles away. Half of the group wa s increased apace. put in a schoolhouse, and the other half When the ships arrived at Takao, all in a theater. Here they were permitte d of the prisoners were crowded aboard to cook an issue of rice and given an the Enoura Maru. If, as the records indi - adequate supply of water. cate, there were only 350 POWs on th e On the 21st, Colonel Beecher and the other ship, and discounting the approxi - POW doctors were ordered by the Japa- mate number of men who may have die d nese to pick out 15 men who were in the prior to and immediately following th e worst physical condition . These indi- second departure from the Philippines , viduals were to be sent back to Manil a it would appear that the Enoura Maru where they could be treated properly . then was loaded with more than 1,30 0 At 1900 on the 21st, the 15 men—one o f prisoners. They were crowded into two whom was Lieutenant Colonel Samue l large holds of the ship, and forced to re - W. Freeny, Beecher's former executive main there for the entire 11 days it la y officer—were put on a truck, drive n in the port of Takao. two miles to a nearby cemetery, and be- Over 400 prisoners were killed on their headed. ninth day in the Formosan harbor when American aircraft bombed the area and The prisoners were moved once again, hit the unmarked ship . Colonel Beecher , this time by train in crowded boxcars asked that doctors and medical supplie s d in a 17-hour journey with neither foo to aid the wounded be sent aboard . For nor water. This trip was to San Fer- two days the Japanese authorities left nando, La Union, a port city on the west the POWs in the after hold—which wa s coast of Luzon and slightly north of the worst hit—with no attention what- 118 Ibid. soever. Eventually, the dead were taken

778 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

out in cargo nets, and a doctor boarde d can aircraft and submarines with a the ship, "but did not even go into the resultingly high loss of life amongst after hold." 119 In addition to those the prisoners. Existing records indicate killed, many others were wounded . A that 184 survivors of the 4th Marines number of men succumbed en route t o died under these circumstances. Attack- the port of Moji, on the island of ing pilots had no way of knowing wha t Kyushu, when the trip to Japan re- cargo the Japanese ships were carrying . sumed. After the bombing raid, the On the other hand, submariners very healthy, the sick, the wounded, and the often attempted to pick up survivors o f dying were again transferred to the ships they sank . It is not difficult to Brazil Maru for the voyage north. To imagine the horror and the heartbreak evade Allied planes and submarines, th e of the subs' crews when they discovered ship headed for the China coast, follow- that the men they had rescued were ing it until nearing Shanghai . The ci- emaciated and dying American POWs . vilian master of the vessel wanted to pu t The American invasion occurred be - in there to obtain food and clothes fo r fore the Japanese were able to evacuate the POWs, but he was overruled by the all of the prisoners they held in the Japanese guard commander. Approxi- Philippines . General MacArthur, ex- mately 30 to 40 prisoners died dail y tremely anxious about the fate of th e from the cold, starvation, and lack of American civilians and military person- water during this part of the voyage . nel imprisoned in jails and camps i n The other POWs stripped the corpse s Manila and elsewhere in the islands , of their clothes before the bodies were directed his commanders to bend ever y hoisted from the holds and thrown over- effort to liberate these people. As a result board without even the pretence of a of this order, Army units mounted spe- burial service. cial operations keyed to retrieve th e Moji harbor was reached on 29 Janu- prisoners from the enemy. On 3 Febru- ary 1945 ; only 470 prisoners had sur- ary 1945, troopers of the 1st Cavalr y vived the trip, and within 30 days after Division crashed through the gate o f their arrival in Japan, nearly 300 more Santo Tomas prison in Manila, where died in the various camps and hospitals some 3,700 Americans had been in- to which they had been sent. Between 2 5 terned. Later that evening, anothe r and 29 April 1945, the hapless remnants 3,767 prisoners were freed from Bilibid of the original group of 1,619 prisoners Prison. Marines were among the POWs were sent to prison camps in Korea , liberated in both groups ; in addition, where they were liberated at the end of some of the men recovered at Cabana- the war. tuan were also survivors of the 4th Ma- Japanese ships carrying American rines. The remainder of the surviving POWs were sent from the Philippines i n members of the regiment as well as othe r increasing numbers in the last half o f Marines who had been captured else- 1944, and like the ships mentioned where were still suffering and starving above, these too were attacked by Ameri - in prison camps in Japan, China, Korea , 116 Ibid. Formosa, and other isolated areas in

MARINE POWS 779

Southeast Asia, and waiting for thei r day after the death of President Roose- day of liberation . velt. The primary target in this raid was the dock area, where the Gua m RECOVERY prisoners worked daily. When the bombs began falling, the Marines were herde d Through the various diplomatic chan- into a brick and wood warehouse at th e nels discussed earlier and based on the edge of the harbor, and once they wer e reports of men who had escaped fro m in this building, the steel doors wer e prison camp, the Allied powers had slammed shut and barred from the out - amassed a fairly accurate, if not alto- side. Soon some incendiary bombs lande d gether complete, picture of where and on the roof of the fire trap and set the under what conditions their national s building ablaze . Climbing up a wall o f were being held captive. The anxiety of human bodies to reach a small ledge at American officials and their determina- the base of the rafters, one Marine man - tion to liberate the POWs as soon as pos - aged to break a window and drop the 20 sible was heightened by their knowledge . feet to the street outside . He the n Accordingly, they prepared contingency grabbed an iron bar that was close by, plans for the recovery of Allied military and pried the warehouse door open . At personnel, who were dubbed Recovere d the end of an hour, when the raid wa s Allied Military Personnel (RAMPs) i n over, the POWs marched back to Osak a these plans. Prisoner of War Camp 1, and all that Meanwhile, as the intensity of Ameri- they found of their former barracks was 12 can air raids over the Home Islands the cinder foundation . ° stepped up in 1945, and carrier planes Two hundred of the prisoners from and bombers zoomed over the priso n this camp were moved approximately camps in increasing numbers, th e 50–60 miles northwest of Osaka t o morale of the POWs rose accordingly . Notogawa, a small village on the western Now and then in little ways, the Japa- banks of Biwa-ko, the largest lake i n nese guards indicated to the prisoner s Japan. Other men from the Osaka cam p that they knew Japan had lost the wa r were moved elsewhere to makeshift and that the end was not too far in the camps away from the city . The work at future. The appearance of Allied air - Notogawa was hard and did not provid e craft over Japan did not always wor k the kinds of opportunities for lootin g to the favor of the prisoners, for in some and easing the lot of the POWs as their cases when areas near the camps were jobs in unloading cargo ships in Osak a bombed, the guards took out their re- harbor had. g sentment and frustration by beatin The only bright spot in the monoto- W their captives . In a few cases, PO nous and tiring days at Notogawa was camps, which never were marked a s the large formations of B–29s and car- such by the Japanese, were bombe d rier planes which, with increasing fre- by American planes . quency, appeared overhead . Despite th e On one of these attacks, in April 1945, Osaka was raided by B–29s the 120 Boyle, Yanks Don't Cry, pp. 196-199.

780 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

threat of frenzied beatings and deadlie r Finally, one of the men in the barracks punishment, the POWs cheered on th e got up from the table, opened the door , American planes as though they were at and went out to see what had happened . a football game and the aircraft wer e The rest of the prisoners followed him , the players on the field. and saw the POWs in the other barracks Following the dropping of the atomic looking out of their windows. Those wh o bomb on Hiroshima, Allied prisoner s had gone out discovered that : became aware of the fact that something The big, heavy inner gate that separate d spectacular had taken place. One day us from the guard shack and the outside a Japanese noncommissioned officer gate was locked, but the soldiers wh o tried to question Major Boyington abou t usually manned the sentry boxes over- the bomb. It was beyond the ability of looking the inner compound were not a t their posts. the Japanese to explain what had hap- Then, slowly, it dawned on us . The wa r pened and beyond the comprehension o f was over . Somehow, somewhere, it must the American to accept that just one have ended . 12 2 bomb could have caused all of the dam - The men at the Hirohata camp wer e age and deaths about which he was told. told on 15 August that because ther e For most of the prisoners in Japanes e was a lack of raw materials at the mil l camps, the end came suddenly and within which they had been working, the y out warning. One day they were unde r were not required to report there . In- close guard and subjected to all form s formally, the pro-American interpreter of harassment, and the next, all wa s said that the war was over. On the 27th, quiet, and they were given food an d the POWs painted the letters "P . W." medicine, which up to that time had bee n on all of the roofs of the camp build- withheld from them. ings, 123 and later that same day fou r A Guam Marine remembered : carrier planes flew over with a supply The August sunlight slowly brightened drop. Three days later, B–29s dropped the room and one by one the men awoke , food and clothing to the men . Sergeant grumbling to themselves as they went out - Ercanbrack, the senior man at Hirohata, side to the wash rack . The mess cooks cam e arranged for a flag-raising ceremony on back, lugging the buckets, and ladled out 2 September, and using parachute sil k the rice and soup . We ate in silence . I t was unusually quiet ; it seemed as if the and the red lining from the barrack s last spark of our energy had been burne d black-out curtains, devised American out during the excitement of seeing ou r and British flags . The Japanese colors Navy planes so close to us. were struck that day, the Nationa l We finished eating and waited for th e work whistle to blow . A half hour passe d 1=' Ibid., p . 214 . and still we waited. Slowly, the time crept 1_' When the Japanese received instruction s by, and the odd silence gripped the bar - to paint these letters on the roofs, the men at racks, a silence so heavy I felt I coul d Hirohata had a problem, " . . . there was n o reach out and grab a handful of it . Stil l yellow paint . . . 121 . Marine/Japanese ingenuity no whistle, no shouting guards . solved that—we used white paint and tinte d it with every can of curry powder on hand. Di d 1 .1 Boyle, Yanks Don't Cry, p. 213 . not look bad, either." Ercanbrack ltr 1966 .

MARINE POWS 78 1

Colors and the Union Jack were raised , evacuation proceedings were not to be- and the camp superintendent surren- gin until after the surrender document dered his command . 124 had been signed, Admiral Halsey or- In northern Hokkaido, where Majo r dered the commander of Task Group Devereux and other Woosung prisoners 30.6, the organization assigned the mis - had been taken to join some Australian sion of liberating, evacuating, and giv- officers captured at Rabaul, it was not ing medical assistance to POWs in th e known that an atomic bomb had been Third Fleet area of responsibility, t o dropped. Also at this camp were som e begin emergency evacuation of prisoner s .12s British soldiers, one of whom cryptically in the area of Tokyo Bay told Devereux that "We're having a In the period between the inceptio n bowl of caviar tonight," and anothe r of this task group on 15 August and th e officer was told, "Sir, Joe is in." 125 In beginning of actual evacuation opera- this manner, it was learned that Russi a tions on the 29th, Commodore Rodge r had entered the war against Japan . Fol- W. Simpson, Commander, Task Grou p lowing this news, the guards bega n 30.6, had organized and trained specia l treating the prisoners with kid gloves . medical and communications units and On 14 August, all of the Japanese in th e small landing forces. Prior to this time, camp gathered at the main office to liste n in preparing his plans, Commodore to a radio broadcast, which appeared t o Simpson had made extensive use of th e have been an official announcement of detailed information of POW camps ac- some kind. When it was over, all of th e quired from carrier plane visual and Japanese appeared stunned ; they had photographic reconnaissance and ma- just heard that their country had sue d terial derived from other intelligence for peace. None of the prisoners wer e sources. told, but they were informed that there The plan developed for evacuation ac- would be no need for working partie s tivities had two phases. One, "Opera- the following day . All rations were in- tion Spring-Em," was to cover the evac- creased and little by little the restric- uation of prisoners in and around th e tions were relaxed . Tokyo Bay Region . Included in each of Even before the surrender ceremon y the forces to be employed in this phas e on the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay, th e was a company of Marines which wa s Allied forces began implementing the set to act as the security element . This plans they had prepared for the libera- unit was to spearhead the landing and tion of the POWs. The Allies were face d to act as military police to ensure th e with the difficult task of supplying th e orderly and unopposed activities of the prisoners in widely scattered camps with evacuation party. The second phase of food, clothing, and medical supplies un- the operation plan, called "Jail Break, " til the men could be evacuated. Although provided for the evacuation of POWs in areas east of the 135th meridian, an d "+ Ercanbrack ltr II. There were also Com- those parts of Japan not easily acces- monwealth prisoners at Hirohata. '=C Devereux, Wake Island, p. 237. '=° See pt IV, chap 1, p . 484, above .

782 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

sible from the initial areas of occupation. with the entire prison population at On the 29th, the task group proceede d Omori had been evacuated. Each PO W up Tokyo Bay and anchored off Omori. was taken on board the hospital ship The task group commander with medical USS Benevolence and put through a and evacuation parties loaded in LCVPs , clearing and examination process . This and with the assistance of an air spotte r procedure, which most of the prisoner s overhead in a TBM from the carrie r liberated from Japan experienced be - USS Cow pens, headed towards the beach fore their trip home, involved a bath , and Omori Camp 8. As the evacuation medical examination, and an issue o f team neared the shore : clean clothes . They were then fed and The appearance of the landing craft i n afterwards filled out a mimeographed the channel off the prisoner of war camp form which requested information abou t caused an indescribable scene of jubilation camp conditions and instances of bru- and emotion on the part of hundreds o f tality. Following this, the RAMPs wer e prisoners of war who streamed out of th e assigned to a bed in the hospital ship , camp and climbed up over the piling . Som e began to swim out to meet the landin g or, if ambulatory, transferred to billets craft. After some difficulty in being heard, on an APD alongside of the AH . During the prisoners of war were assured that the night of the 30th, the CTG 30.6 staff more boats would be coming and that the y evaluated the mass of information i t should stand steady for an orderly evac- had received from the RAMPs abou uation, and that the liberation part y t wanted to go immediately to those wh o the location of other POW camps . As a were ill and extend medical assistance an d result of this intelligence, the evacuatio n evacuate them first .127 unit was divided into two separate Commodore Simpson learned from the groups in order to expand overall opera- senior POW officer that there were man y tions. seriously ill prisoners at the Shinagaw a A conference was held at the Yoko- hospital camp. The party that went to hama headquarters of the commander this place later reported that "it was an of the Eighth Army on 1 September, indescribable hell hole of filth, disease , when Admiral Halsey agreed to coordi- and death." 12 8 nate Third Fleet evacuation operations By the early morning of 30 August, with those of the Eighth Army Recov- all of the men at Shinagawa together ered Personnel Officer. Once this joint program had begun, and both ships an d '-' CTG 30 .6 AR, dtd 22Sep45, Subj : Cover- personnel were assigned to various area s ing Evacuation of POW during period 29Aug- coming under the cognizance of the tw 19Sep45 (OAB, NHD) . o major commands, all means of transpor- 1" CinCPac Surrender and Occupation Rpt , p. 20. It is interesting to note that two members tation—both Japanese and American — of the Swiss Legation in Tokyo visited th e were to be employed to evacuate th e camp on 19 February 1945 and gave it a fairl y POWs. favorable report. MID, WD, Extracts of PO W Without the outstanding assistance o f Camp Information Rpt No . A–P 85, dtd members of the Swedish Legation, th e 17May45, in USAF Japanese Prison Camp s 1943–45 File No . 142 .7511 (ASI (HA), Max- Swiss Legation, and the International well AFB, Ala.) . Red Cross, in arranging train schedules

MARINE POWS 783

and in furnishing information on th e plans was a document entitled the location of POW camps, the compositio n "Black List," which had been issued by of the occupants, and their general con- the Headquarters, United States Army dition, the success of this joint ventur e Forces, Pacific, and a similar CinCPac - would have been less than it was. The CinCPOA publication . Not only were United States assumed the responsibilit y these lists incomplete, they were inac- for the evacuation of all liberated pris- curate as well because, during the whole - oners and civilians from Japan to either sale bombing of Japanese coastal area s Manila or Guam, and from Guam to the in the last months of the war, the POW s States, using both surface and air trans- had been removed from many of th e portation. Commonwealth POWs, with camps listed. the exception of Canadian servicemen, One of the surrender conditions im- were to be transported from Manila to posed upon the Japanese was the re- their destination in British vessels . Ca- quirement that it furnish General Mac - nadian ships carried their own national s Arthur a complete list of the names , home. locations, and populations of all PO W At the same time that Allied prison- camps in existence under Japanese con- ers were being liberated in the Tokyo - trol, and that all such camps be clearly Yokohama area, steps were being take n marked. On 27 August, the first such to evacuate the men from camps located list, the "Yellow List," was made avail - in Manchuria, Korea, North and Central able and it contained a total of 7 3 China, Formosa, and the outlying sec- camps. Before the supply drops could tions of the Home Islands. The author- take place, however, the camp location s ities responsible for taking steps to had to be verified. Two days later, the recover these other POWs estimated 314th Bombardment Wing on Guam be- that it would take 30 days to get them gan the first of a series of reconnaissance all, and further recognized that to save flights, which took its planes over the many of the critically ill, prompt and islands of Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu . adequate supply of these camps by air Planes of the same wing flew over Hai- drops was essential . The air supply task nan, Peiping, Hong Kong, Shanghai , was shared by Marianas-based B-29 s and Mukden on 31 August. These flight s and FEAF aircraft located on Okinawa . verified the existence and location o f After the program had begun, th e 57 additional camps . Twentieth Air Force became responsibl e From 27 August to 20 September, for its functioning. AAF aircraft flew 900 effective sorties In planning these activities, the mos t over 158 POW and civilian internment difficult problem that arose was deter- camps, dropping supplies. After the first mining the exact locations of the camps three days of operations, the planned to be supplied. Although some lists ha d altitude of 500 to 1,000 feet for droppin g been compiled, there was little assuranc e the supplies was found to be too low fo r of their accuracy . At first and until 2 7 efficient operation of the cargo para- August, the only basis on which th e chutes. As a result, the air crews wer e Twentieth Air Force could prepare its directed to release the paradrops at alti- 784 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

SHADOW of a B-29 on a supply-drop mission passes over the POW camp at Nagasaki . (USAF 58504)

AMERICAN AND BRITISH POWs (r.) raise their nations' colors over the camp at Hirohata. (Photograph courtesy of CWO Earl B . Ercanbrack)

MARINE POWS 785

tudes above 1,000 feet in order that th e Some of the air drops also brough t chutes could function more effectively , death as the heavily loaded pallets avoid casualties among the prisoner per- hurtled from the sky . The parachutes sonnel, and prevent the destruction of were not always big enough to hold the the bundles of supplies.12 9 heavy loads, and as they collapsed, the Various other factors reduced the ef- food pallets and steel drums rained dow n fectiveness of the B–29 supply drops to and exploded like bombs when they hi t the POWs. The B–29 crews had no pre- the ground. Major Boyington remem- vious experience in this work and ther e bered heading for the nearest air raid was no time for them to test supply dro p shelter when the drops began . In his techniques before the missions began . camp, three or four prisoners were hi t Because there was such a short supply and killed by the parcels dropping fro m of cargo parachutes, they were used only the sky. Many of the loads went righ t for dropping food and medicine con- through ramshackle roofs of the POW tainers ; the other bundles were dropped barracks . free. One such instance was recalled by The B–29s had accurately located th e Sergeant Major Robert R . Winslow, a warehouse in Osaka where the POWs Wake Marine, who was in a camp at from Guam and elsewhere had been Naoetsu—on the northwest coast of Ky- imprisoned. The men soon had plenty of ushu—on V-J Day . Upon receiving news food and medicine and wore the ne w of the end of the war, Winslow reported : clothes included in the supply drops . These prisoners found the food drop s . . . we took over the camp, set up a n MP force, and actually ran liberty details exciting and it seemed to them that the into town. Some of our hale and hearty plane crews in each of the aircraft were survivors spent some time futilely search- trying to outdo the others in seeing ho w ing the vicinity for our former guards and close to the ground they could come. One Camp Commander, who had mysteriousl y group of POWs saw "a big Superfor- disappeared . . . . After about two week s we commandeered a train and traveled to tress dip in for an air drop and watched Tokyo where we were met by the occupa- it level off not over 50 feet from th e tion forces.13 1 ground, dipping even lower as it roare d straight for the building we were stand- At the Hokkaido camp : ing on." And then to their amazement, A day or two after the Japanese sur- the B–29 approached "with breathtak- rendered, the officers were informed . Im- ing speed, then, at the last second, i t mediate steps were taken to send officer s lurched upward, swooping to within te n to the other camps, locate Marines an d feet of the roof's edge, and the thunder- see that discipline was maintained . Radios were provided and food brought in . An ing noise almost shook the warehouse announcement was made over the radi o 13o apart" as the men fell flat. directing POWs to identify POW camps in such a manner as to be seen from the ai r '20 Twentieth AF TacMissionRpt, Subj : and to remain there until U . S . teams POW Supply Missions, 27Aug-20Sep45, n .d. arrived to evacuate the ex-POWs . About (ASI(HA), Maxwell AFB, Ala .) . 130 Boyle, Yanks Don't Cry, p. 232. 'Winslow ltr.

786 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

three weeks after the surrender a team weak they required hospitalization . The arrived in the area, a trainload of ex- remainder were ambulatory troop pas- prisoners was transported to Chitose an d sengers, who, after arriving at Okinawa , flown out (to Atsugi) . 13 2 were flown to Manila in C–46s fo r At the same time that these activitie s further transfer to the United States. were under way and after the surrende r By 22 September, the evacuation o f instrument had been signed, a Fift h POWs from Nagasaki was completed . Fleet delegation conferred with SCA P Operations at Wakayama began on authorities regarding the evacuation of 14 September. Because of the excellen t RAMPs from southern Japan . The pla n port facilities in this city and the fac t agreed upon called for the Eighth Arm y that it was a rail center, all RAM P to extend its evacuation operations wes t processing was completed here by th e and to evacuate POWs through Osaka next day. A total of 2,575 men wa s to Tokyo until relieved by Fifth Flee t handled this quickly . Only a handful o f and Sixth Army units. Similar to the the prisoners were civilians ; the rest joint program established by the Third were military personnel from camp s Fleet and the Eighth Army, the othe r in the Hiroshima area . These POWs ha d two major commands organized two been captured on Guam, Wake, Corregi- evacuation groups comprised of landin g dor and Bataan . There were also Aus- craft, truck companies, hospital ships , tralians taken in Java, Dutch from Army contact teams, and Navy medical Sumatra, and British from Singapor e units. The ports of Wakayama and Nag- and Hong Kong. asaki were to be employed as evacuatio n At all the stopping-off places of the centers for all of western Japan . Though homeward-bound RAMPs, everything the responsibility of delivering RAMP s possible was done for the comfort an d to these two ports belonged to the Army, well-being of the returning forme r the mission of medical examinations an d POWs. On Okinawa, the 2d MAW com- processing became a Fifth Fleet func- mander recalled : tion. General `Vinegar Joe' Stilwell . . . took Repatriation began at Nagasaki o n a personal interest in them and made man y 11 September . A medical examination inspections to ensure that their every want was taken care of . and processing station was set up in a For example, I had a request from him large dockside warehouse, and the hos- one day to send planes of different type s pital ship Haven was tied up at th e over their barracks to perform maneuvers, dock to serve as a screening hospital. etc., for such an exhibition had been re - It also provided the processing statio n quested by the POWs . Shortly after I ha d complied with the request, he called me and with steam, hot water, general utilities , asked me to tell my pilots not to do quite and food. such a good job, for one had just hit the A total of 9,061 RAMPs was evac- flagpole . Luckily, no one was killed, an d the plane was damaged but slightly! 13 3 uated from Nagasaki ; of this numbe r 685 were stretcher cases or patients so 133 LtGen Louis E . Woods Ur to Hd, HistBr , G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 190ct66, hereafter Woods 133 Tharin ltr. ltr II 1966 .

MARINE POWS 787

It is difficult in the extreme to describ e prison camps the life of the prisoners or to plumb the depths of the emotion s was not a continuous hell on earth . As and the attitudes of the former POWs the former commander of VMF–21 1 at the moment of and following thei r has written : liberation. Considerable literature concerning prisoners of war and priso True, there were some tough times an d n rough times and hungry times for all of camps has been published since the en d us. But there were also times, at leas t of World War II . Despite the close at- in some camps, when a man could laugh tention to detail in the almost day-to - heartily at a truly humorous incident o r day accounts appearing in these works , situation . And there were even times— they could not provide the essentia l short times, I grant—when a man coul d almost enjoy life if only he would try. spirit or the feelings of the men whe n Too . . . broader recognition [should be they had learned that the war was ove r given] to the really surprising number of and that they were to go home, becaus e Japanese who went far out of their way , most were published long after th e and even risked their own safety, to make things a little better for the prisoners. 135 actual date of liberation . For the most part, news of the end of the war was Yet, there are few indications that anticlimactic and to many of the pris- the Japanese guards and camp comman - oners, it seemed that they were emerg- ders were punished other than as a re- ing from a bad dream that had lasted sult of sentences handed down after th e much too long. Others, concerned abou t war crimes trials . Although the POW s their homes and families, could hardl y could have resorted to mob violence and wait to send messages to their love d killed their brutal captors, they did not . ones, stating that they were safe and Summed up, the general attitude of the well. For still other former prisoners, former prisoners was that if they them - liberation was a moment of triumph, a selves punished the Japanese in a man- time for which they had waited so long, ner similar to their treatment in prison , when they could inflict just retribution then they would have descended to thei r on the men who had kept them in such former guards' level of inhumanity . abject captivity. This reaction was enough to deter the One former prisoner stated : most bitter POW from venting his pent - It's not pleasant to recall the humili- up hatred on the men who had forced ation, degradation and endless days o f him to live under conditions that very monotonous drudgery, and looking back o n often were not fit even for the lowest it now the whole experience has an unreal aspect as though it may have happened to forms of animal life . someone else and I read about it some - Some prisoners encountered kindly where . I suppose it's human nature t o guards, men who would keep them in - suppress unpleasant memories and there r are very few bright spots to remembe r formed of the true course of the wa from 44 months in prison camp .134 and relate how Japan was being de- On the other hand, there is consid- feated on all fronts . Other Japanese erable evidence to indicate that in som e would slip the POWs extra rations or

'3' Winslow ltr. 'ac Putnam ltr.

310-224 0 - 69 - 51

788 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

cigarettes or medicine. These individual code of Bushido—the "way of the war- acts of charity and mercy shone like rior." rays of hope in a dark sea of despair , For centuries this rigid code had and often sustained the lagging moral e affected every aspect of Japanese life of prisoner groups . and all classes were bound to respect it s A question that remains for the mos t dictates. Although Bushido supposedl y part unresolved to this date is why the governed the conduct and mores of the Japanese treated prisoners of war as warrior and aristocratic classes alone , they did in World War II . A partial ex- actually this philosophy permeated dow n planation for the initial treatment of to the lowest stratum of Japanese so- Americans taken in the Philippines may ciety. It is for this reason, perhaps, tha t rest in the fact that the Japanese force s even the lowest-ranking Japanese sol- were woefully unprepared to handle the dier emulated his superiors in the beliefs unexpectedly large number of men they that to become a prisoner was the ulti- had captured . This may in some smal l mate disgrace, and those who becam e way answer the question of why there prisoners should be treated severely. was a Bataan Death March . But what A vital concept in the warrior's code of the treatment meted out to POW s was that suicide was preferable to cap- after this period, after the enemy had ture. The general inability of American consolidated his hold on the islands an d forces in the Pacific to take Japanes e he could establish some sort of priso n prisoners indicates to a degree that th e camp administration? Why were the average Japanese soldier firmly believed prisoners so brutally and miserabl y in this code. Furthermore, he was tol d handled? There seems to be neithe r that it was a criminal act, punishable rhyme nor reason for the treatment o f by death, for him to fall captive. "The POWs in camps in the Home Island s disgrace of becoming a prisoner was so and elsewhere or for the subhuman con- great that Japanese troops considered i t ditions in which some of them wer e a duty to kill their own wounded rather forced to live. than to permit them to be captured ." 13 6 It was noted earlier in this appendi x This uniquely Japanese attitude became that all Allied POWs were subject to part and parcel of the treatment accorded Allied POWs. If the Americans were military regulations normally impose d on Japanese Army recruits . In essence , not ashamed of having surrendered— a fact which the enemy found difficulty the regulations were harsh, restrictive , in comprehending—then it was the duty and demanding of immediate obedience. of the Japanese Army to forcibly remind Viewed in this light, the Japanese treat- the Americans of their disgrace, thei r ment of POWs is somewhat more com- dishonor, and their lowly status . prehensible, for life in the Japanese It is difficult to assess what the effect Army reflected the authoritarian an d of prolonged imprisonment was on the strict society from which it was derived. The basic philosophy underlyin g 'Stanley L. Falk, Bataan : The March o f the way of the military was the Samurai Death (New York : Norton, 1962), p . 231 .

MARINE POWS 789

Marine prisoners . Some of them were possible. The only requests I ever had broken in body and spirit at the tim e were for Marine Corps ornaments for al l and some small American flags .13 7 of their liberation, and a number o f them died shortly after from the results Amplifying this, General Woods late r of the treatment they had received . wrote : Other men, in much better condition , When I received word that the POW s were either discharged from the Marin e wanted ornaments, I tried to get them fro m Corps or returned to duty in an activ e our source of supply on Okinawa . Imagine my surprise when I was told I status. Perhaps the best indication of could not have 500 of them . When I asked the frame of mind of most Marine re- why not, I was told by the Quartermaste r turnees was found in the reminiscence s that if he gave me 500, he would have non e left on his shelves. (You see Quarter - of Lieutenant General Louis E . Woods , masters haven't changed much since 1776) . who, in August 1945, was the senior So I went back to my Headquarters and Marine officer on Okinawa, where man y took all the Marine ornaments from the personnel of one of the Aviation Groups 13 of those being evacuated by air stopped . 8 for a brief time. General Woods re- It was in this spirit that Marin e called : RAMPs returned to the Corps and were

Inasmuch as the Army authorities wer e welcomed back by other Marines of all handling all arrangements, I did not bothe r ranks. them [the former Marine POWs] unles s they especially asked to see me . I did hav e 13' LtGen Louis E . Woods ltr to Col William a goodly number of officers and men de - P. McCahill, dtd 29Aug65 . tailed to be with them and help in any way 118 Woods ltr II 1966 . APPENDIX B

Bibliographical Notes

This history is based principally upon official Books Marine Corps records, i.e., the reports, diaries , Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate , journals, orders, plans, etc ., of the units an d eds . The Pacific : Matterhorn to Nagasaki— commands involved in the operations described . The Army Air Forces in World War II, v . 5 . Records of the other Services have been con- Chicago : The University of Chicago Press , sulted and used when they pertained to th e 1953 . The Air Force official history details th e n actions with which this book is concerned . O final year of the Pacific War . Well documented , matters pertaining to activities and decision s the book is a reliable source for the actions o f at high strategic levels, the authors consulted Air Force commands in the Pacific and th e the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff o r part they played in the defeat of Japan . official publications which had made consider - FAdm William F . Halsey and LCdr J . able use of JCS records . Bryan, III . Admiral Halsey's Story . New York : To cover the inevitable gaps and inadequacie s Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Publishin g that occur in the sources consulted, extensiv e Company, Inc., 1947 . This popular treatment use was made of the knowledge of key partici- of one of the most spectacular figures in th e pants in the actions herein described . These Pacific War presents a fascinating and useful men, representing all Services, have been gen- picture of the final naval operations of th e erous with their time in making themselve s war in the waters of the western Pacific an d available for interviews, and in commentin g surrounding Japan . critically on draft manuscripts, not only of Jeter A . Isely and Philip A . Crowl . The this volume, but also of preliminary mono- U. S. Marines and Amphibious War. Princeton : graphs. The historical offices of the Army, Princeton University Press, 1951 . An essential Navy, and Air Force have made detailed re- book and important source for the study o f views of draft chapters and furnished much the development of amphibious tactics and valuable material to the history . The War techniques and their application in the Pacifi c History Office of the Defense Agency of Japa n during World War II. Additionally, the authors has read and commented upon the passage s have commented on each major Marine amphib - dealing with the Okinawa operation and pro- ious assault landing of the war and present a vided worthwhile information that has been number of pertinent conclusions relative t o incorporated into the narrative. each campaign . Because this volume deals with so man y FAdm Ernest H . King and Cdr Walter M . disparate, and yet related, subjects, many dif- Whitehill. Fleet Admiral King : A Naval Rec- ferent sources were consulted in its prepara- ord. New York : W. W . Norton & Company, tion. Such sources have been fully cited in the Inc ., 1952 . Admiral King's autobiograph y text and are discussed here in relation to th e covers his entire naval career and provides particular operation or event for which they revealing insights into the character of th e have the greatest pertinency . Unless otherwis e man and his contributions to American strat- noted, all records cited are obtainable through egy as well as an overview of the conduct of the Archives of the Historical Branch, G– 3 that strategy in the war. Division, Headquarters, U . S. Marine Corps . FAdm William D . Leahy . I Was There. New A number of published works of genera l York : Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Pub- interest have been consulted frequently in th e lishing Company, 1950 . Another autobiograph y writing of this volume . The more important of by a high-ranking naval officer who served a s these are listed below . the wartime Chief of Staff to Presidents Roose- 790

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 79 1

velt and Truman . This account is based on the of Marine ground training in World War II, contemporary notes and diaries of the author . prepared by the Historical Branch, and a his- Robert Sherrod . History of Marine Corps tory of FMFPac prepared at Pearl Harbor i n Aviation in World War II. Washington : Com- 1951, present an excellent picture of the postur e bat Forces Press, 1952 . Although this is an of the six Marine divisions at the beginning o f unofficial history, it was written with substan- 1945. tial Marine Corps research support and con- Other valuable official sources utilized in th e tains valuable aviation unit historical data writing of this part are : "History of Unite d unavailable elsewhere . Much of the very read- States Army Forces Middle Pacific and Pred- able text is based upon interviews and eye - ecessor Commands During World War II, 7 witness accounts that were not retained fo r December–2 September 1945, History of th e later study . G–5 Section," n.d ., held by OCMH ; "Depart- The War Reports of General of the Army ment of the Army Estimate of Japanese George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, General o f Strength and Disposition of Forces," October the Army H. H. Arnold, Commanding General, 1945, File No . 320 .2, Geographic V–Japan, also Army Air Forces, Fleet Admiral Ernest J . held by OCMH ; and Military Intelligence Divi- King, Commander in Chief, United State s sion, United States Army, War Department , Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations . Phila- "Disposition and Movement of Japanese delphia and New York : J . B . Lippincott Com- Ground Forces, 1941–1945," 10 December 1945 , pany, 1947 . A convenient compilation of th e held by the Operational Archives Branch , official reports of the chiefs of the armed serv- Naval History Division . ices issued during and just after the war , Japanese Sources which provides an excellent overall review of U . S. operations in World War II. In the years immediately following the en d of the war, former Japanese officials workin g PART I under the auspices of General MacArthur's headquarters prepared a series of monograph s PROLOGUE TO THE EN D detailing Japanese actions in many Pacific and Asian campaigns and at the various head- Official Documents quarters in the Home Islands . In the middle The minutes of the CominCh–CinCPa c 50s, a number of these original studies wer e Pacific Conferences of mid–1944 were particu- revised and expanded, again by knowledgeabl e larly helpful in developing the course that Japanese . The monographs vary considerably American strategy and tactics were to take in in their value, but, on the whole, they ar e late–1944 and 1945. Added to these are the honestly presented and useful in gaining a n records of the JCS and CCS as cited in previ- insight into Japanese actions . The Office of ously published official histories, which aide d the Chief of Military History, Department of in tracing how the decision to invade the the Army, which has a complete file of thes e Ryukyus was determined. Intelligence survey s studies, has prepared an annotated guide and by higher headquarters were used extensivel y index, Guide to Japanese Monographs and to build a picture of enemy troop strength an d Japanese Studies on Manchuria 1945–196 0 dispositions, and the nature of the terrain that (Washington, 1961), which is an excellent ai d the Japanese held . in evaluating the individual items . The main sources for the status report on Among the several Japanese monograph s the FMF were the Annual Reports of the that were used with this part, No . 45, the 382– Commandant to the Secretary of the Navy an d page history of the Imperial General Head - the operational diaries prepared at HQMC b y quarters, Army Section, was particularly help- the G–1 and G–3 Sections of the Division o f ful. It provides an overall view of the progres s Plans and Policies and by the Division of of the war as seen from Tokyo and contains Aviation. An additionally valuable source were appendices of Army orders. The operational the monthly FMF air and ground status re- record of the Thirty-second Army and its sub - ports also prepared by the G–3 Section . A study ordinate commands is embodied in Okinawa

792 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Operations Record (No. 135 of the series) , Howard M. Conner . The Spearhead : Th e which is extremely valuable in developing ho w World War II History of the 5th Marine Divi- that command prepared for the inevitable in- sion. Washington : Infantry Journal Press , vasion of Okinawa and how it fought the 1950 . Although this unit history is primaril y battle . concerned with the Iwo Jima operation, th e only campaign of the 5th Division in World Books War II, it contains some interesting back- The first three volumes of this series, Pearl ground material, particularly concerning th e Harbor to Guadalcanal, Isolation of Rabaul, status of the division at the beginning of 1945 . and Central Pacific Drive, as well as the draft Richard W . Johnston. Follow Me! The Story manuscript of the fourth, "Operations in the of the Second Division in World War II . New g Western Pacific," were useful in reviewin York : Random House, 1948 . This work contain s how the Marine Corps fared in the first three considerable information on the organizatio n years of the war and how it developed an d of the division and its role as a diversionar y employed amphibious warfare doctrine in that force for the Okinawa campaign . period . Among a number of other books con- Toshikasu Kase . Journey to the Missouri. cerning emerging American strategy in the David N . Rowe, ed. New Haven : Yale Uni- last year of the war, the problems facing versity Press, 1950 . A first-hand account by a Japan, and the status of the FMF in the former Japanese official of the factors and con- Pacific, the following were of great value . siderations influencing Japan's surrender an d Lt Robert A . Aurthur and Lt Kenneth of the fateful day on which that country signed Cohlmia. The Third Marine Division . Wash- the instruments of capitulation . ington : Infantry Journal Press, 1948 . A com- pact division history, this book is a good source George McMillan . The Old Breed : A Histor y of the First Marine Division in World War II . for unit background . Robert J . C . .Butow. Japan's Decision to Sur- Washington : Infantry Journal Press, 1949 . render. Stanford : Stanford University Press, This unit history, which concerns itself mor e 1954. A scholarly dissertation to the steps lead- with the spirit of the 1st Division than with a ing from the Cairo Declaration to the Imperia l recital of details of its combat actions, is gen- Rescript and to the capitulation of Japan , erally accorded to be one of the finest book s and an excellent source for the diplomati c of its type written after the war. history of the Pacific War . Samuel Eliot Morison . History of Unite d Bevan G . Cass, ed . History of the Sixt h States Naval Operations in World War II, v . Marine Division . Washington : Infantry Jour- VIII, XII, and XIII . Boston : Little, Brown an d nal Press, 1948 . As the last of the wartime Company, 1958, 1959, and 1960. These three Marine divisions to be formed, the 6th—an d volumes by Rear Admiral Morison, New Guine a its predecessor unit, the 1st Provisional Marin e and the Marianas, Leyte, June 1944–Janucve y Brigade—were involved in only the Guam an d 1945, and The Liberation of the Philippines— Okinawa campaigns and the occupation o f Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas : 1944–1945, North China. By its very nature, the Ryukyu s comprise a highly readable account of Nav y operation receives the fullest coverage in thi s operations in the final stages of World War II . work . Written with considerable assistance and Ray S . Cline, Washington Command Post : cooperation from the Navy, the histories are, The Operations Division—The War Depart- however, very much the personalized work of ment—United States Army in World War II . the author and are most effective in thei r Washington : Office of the Chief of Militar y description of American naval actions and per- History, Department of the Army, 1951 . An sonalities and of Japanese operations . official Army history relating the story o f Carl W . Proehl, ed . The Fourth Marine Divi- high-level war planning in the Operation s sion in World War II. Washington : Infantry Division of the War Department. An excellen t Journal Press, 1946 . Of interest in a review background study based on the importan t of the status of the 4th Division at the be - primary sources in the subject area . ginning of 1945 .

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 793

United States Army, War Department. sent copies of their preliminary draft to vari- Handbook on Japanese Military Forces . TM— E ous individuals who had major roles in the 30—480 . Washington, lOct44 . A basic source operations . Many of these men replied and their on the organization and equipment of Japanes e comments have been cited throughout thi s land forces with useful detail on weapon s part. Similarly, the draft manuscript of thi s characteristics and textbook tactics. volume was sent to key participants and to th e historical agencies of the other Services, and PART II the resultant replies have been used when OKINAWA applicable in revising the narrative . All suc h Official Documents comments are retained in the files of th e As the largest amphibious assault of th e Marine Corps Historical Archives . Pacific War, Okinawa resulted in the partici- With the establishment of the Marine Corps pants generating much paperwork which too k Oral History Program, a new dimension wa s the form of operation plans and orders, actio n added to the techniques employed by Marin e reports, message files, unit journals, and th e Corps historians. As a result, some of the first like, much of which has been preserved and i s interviews conducted with retired prominent held in the archives of the individual Service s Marines by the author of this part of the book or has been retired to a Federal Records Cen- dwelled on matters concerning the Okinawa ter. Because ICEBERG was to be the prologue operation, and pertinent comments were in- to the invasion of Japan, all the tactical inno- corporated into the body of the text with the vations developed in the Pacific to that time permission of the individual interviewees . Par- were employed together with whatever ne w ticularly helpful were the comments of Gen- military hardware was made available t o erals Lemuel C . Shepherd, Jr ., and Gerald C . Tenth Army units. It was a matter of the Thomas, Lieutenant General Pedro A . del highest interest, therefore, that each majo r Valle, and Major Generals Wilburt S . Brown unit prepare a detailed evaluation of the way and Ford O . Rogers . it had fought the campaign, and these evalu- Several other unofficial documents exist . ations are found in the action reports of th e Through the generosity of General Vandegrift , Tenth Army, III Amphibious Corps, and XXI V his personal correspondence for the period o f Corps . Division action reports, and, in the his tour as Commandant was made availabl e case of the Marines, regimental and battalion for Historical Branch use. The letters he re- special action reports, provide a useful insight ceived from Lieutenant Generals Holland M . into the conduct of the battle on battalion and Smith and Roy S . Geiger are invaluable for a n regimental level . overview of the Okinawa operation . Extract s From the naval point of view, the action re- from this correspondence together with copie s ports of the Fifth Fleet and subordinate tas k of some of the letters are available in the force and group commanders are an invaluabl e Marine Corps Historical Archives for use b y source of information concerning naval sup - qualified researchers . port of the land campaign as well as som e Another source is a personal narrative pre - stark facts and figures which in no way tell th e pared immediately after the war by General whole story of the Navy's desperate and mag- Oliver P. Smith, who, as a brigadier general , nificent fight against the Kamikaze menace. was the Marine Deputy Chief of Staff of th e Additionally, the report of the British Com- Tenth Army. This document is particularl y bined Operations observers assigned to th e important because of the insight that Genera l Okinawa campaign provides an interesting Smith gives to the operations of as large a insight into how our Allies viewed America n joint command as the Tenth Army and the conduct of a joint amphibious operation . role of Marine officers on the joint staff . The Unofficial Documents resulting 152—page typescript goes far towar d While writing the monograph used exten- giving the reader a feeling of Marine partici- sively in preparing this account of the battl e pation in high-level staff operations on wha t for Okinawa, Major Nichols and Mr . Shaw was predominantly an Army command .

794 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

A third unpublished document of value in Japanese defensive doctrine and more than a the study of ICEBERG is "A History of the hint of how Okinawa would be defended . A 7th Marines on Okinawa Shima," which wa s considerable volume of documents and pris- an ambitious project prepared at the behest oners—Okinawans primarily—were captured of Colonel Edward W . Snedeker by his staff on the island itself. As noted in the narrativ e officers and battalion commanders . This work of this part, little fruitful information wa s has some outstanding sketch maps whic h gained, however, as a result of POW interro- meld excellently with accounts of small uni t gation and translation of the documents, an d actions in the regiment. the Japanese situation was very often not In no way has all of the material uncovere d uncovered until after it had been met head-o n by draft comments or during the course of by Tenth Army troops. interviews been used in this book or in the Nichols-Shaw monograph which preceded it . Books and Periodicals The files contain much unpublished informatio n Once again Craven and Cate, Matterhorn to that is of value to the student of the operation , Nagasaki, Isely and Crowl, Marines and Am- particularly in regard to details of small uni t phibious War, and Sherrod, History of Marine action and the assessment of the accomplish- Aviation and the Hattori manuscript are ments and character of individuals. invaluable sources . Among other works which shed considerable light on the Okinawa cam- Japanese Sources paign are : In addition to the previously mentioned Roy E . Appleman, et al. Okinawa :The Las t Japanese monographs held by the Office of th e Battle—The War in the Pacific—U. S. Arm y Chief of Military History, two others wer e in World War H. Washington : History Divi- used : No . 86, History of the Fifth Air Fleet , sion, Department of the Army, 1948 . Although which provided some data on the developmen t generally concerned with the operations of th e of the Kamikaze as an offensive/defensiv e Tenth Army as a whole in the Okinawa cam- weapon, and No. 123, Homeland Defense Naval paign, this official Army history focuses pri- Operations, which related to confused and ofte n marily on the actions of XXIV Corps divisions. thwarted Japanese preparations for the de- At the same time, it gives a balanced treatmen t fense of the Home Islands, and Honshu, i n to the role of III Amphibious Corps units i n particular . the fighting. A major Japanese source is : Takushiro Maj Orville V . Bergren . "School Solution s Hattori . Dai Toa Senso Zenshi, v . IV [Th e on Motobu," Marine Corps Gazette, v . 29, no. Complete History of the Greater East Asi a 12 (Dec45) . Written by the Operations Officer War] . Tokyo : Matsu Publishing Company , of the 4th Marines, this article gives a concise 1955. A A . manuscript translation of this excel - and clear account of the maneuvers and fight- lent study is available at the Office of the ing involved in seizing Motobu Peninsula an d Chief of Military History, Department of th e Mount Yae Take . Army. The author, a ranking staff officer RAdm Worrall R . Carter. Beans, Bullets, during the war and an historian afterwards , and Black Oil. Washington : Government Print- has written a comprehensive history whic h ing 'Office, 1953 . An official Navy history of contains enough detail to provide a usefu l the massive logistic support of the fleet in th e strategic review from the Japanese viewpoin t Pacific campaigns, with some emphasis on th e of every major campaign of the war . Okinawa operation. In terms of pertinent captured documents , Chief of Naval Operations. Amphibiou s by the time that ICEBERG became a reality, Operations—Capture of Okinawa, 27Mar– the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocea n 21Jun45 (OpNav 34–P-07000) . Washington : Area, and other Allied intelligence agencie s Government Printing Office, 22Jan46 . A com- had amassed a mountain of data concerning pilation of pertinent excerpts of action reports the enemy . While much of this was not directl y by the major unit commanders at Okinawa con- concerned with Okinawa, the material concerning American surface, ground, and ai r tained a wealth of information relating to operations in the campaign .

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 795

Orlando R . Davidson, et al. The Deadeyes : Okinawa campaigns as well as naval operation s The Story of the 96th Infantry Division . Wash- in the last year of the war . An especially ington : Infantry Journal Press, 1947. This interesting account of the Navy's war wit h history is an interesting account of an Army the Kamikazes . division which made a fine record for itsel f LtCol Max Myers, ed . Ours to Hold It High. both in the Philippines and on Okinawa . Washington : Infantry Journal Press, 1947 . MajGen Pedro A. del Valle. "Old Glory on The story of the 77th Infantry Division pro- Shuri," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no . 8 vides a good overall view of the fighting o n (Aug45) . The commander of the 1st Marin e Okinawa and helpful information on its train- Division relates the story of the Marine battl e ing and personnel . for Shuri and how a member of the division Maj Charles S . Nichols, Jr. and Henry I . placed the American flag over the ancien t Shaw, Jr . Okinawa : Victory in the Pacific . castle . Washington : Historical Branch, G–3 Division , MajGen Pedro A . del Valle. "Southward HQMC, 1955 . This official monograph, the last from Shuri," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no . of 15 written concerning Marine Corp s 10 (Oct45) . In this article, the author relates operations in World War II, covers the fightin g the breakout of his division following the fal l in good style and considerable detail, and give s of Shuri and the pursuit of the withdrawing adequate coverage to Navy and Army partici- Japanese forces . pation in the Okinawa campaign . Capt James R' . Stockman. "Night Operations Saburo Hayashi and Alvin D . Coox, K5gun . Marine Corps Gazette, v. 30, no . Quantico : Marine Corps Association, 1959 . on Okinawa," Originally published in Japan, this English 9 (Sep46) . A well-researched article concerning the many night operations conducted language account of the Japanese Army High y Command's actions during the war in th e during the course of the Okinawa battle b Army as well as Marine Corps units . Pacific was written by a former member o f Alexander A . Vandegrift and Robert B . the Imperial General Headquarters . Asprey . Once A Marine . New York : W . W . Capt Rikihei Inoguchi and Cdr Tadash i Norton and Company, Inc., 1964. The auto- Nakajima, former IJN, with Roger Pineau . biography of the 18th Commandant of the The Divine Wind : Japan 's Kamikaze Forc e Marine Corps written with the assistance of a in World War II. Annapolis : United State s former Marine officer. It contains particularl y Naval Institute, 1958 . The Japanese coauthors interesting details regarding the discussion o f of this work were intimately concerned with a second amphibious assault on the southeast - the formation of the Kamikaze corps and the . concepts which led to its origin, and therefor e ern beaches of Okinawa shed much light on the operations of th e PART III suicide units . Capt Edmund G . Love . The 27th Infantry THE END OF THE WA R Division in World War II . Washington : In- fantry Journal Press, 1949 . Written by an Official Document s official Army historian who observed the divi- Although Operation OLYMPIC was never sion in combat, this is a work which narrate s launched, Allied forces were ready. Joint staff the operations of the division on Okinawa as studies, plans, orders, and other paperwor k well as on Saipan and in the Gilberts and had been prepared and published, and the Marshalls. assault forces, in most cases, had alread y Samuel Eliot Morison . Victory in the Pacific, staged and were ready to mount for the in- 1945—History of United States Naval Opera- vasion . Considerable documentation, therefore , tions in World War II, v . XIV . Boston : Little, exists to assist the researcher in following th e Brown and Company, 1960 . This last-but-one step-by-step, day-to-day preparation for th e volume of the highly readable unofficial account assault on Kyushu. The researcher is not so of Navy operations in World War II tells o f successful in determining what the final plan s naval support activities in the Iwo Jima and were for Operation CORONET, the invasion

796 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

of Honshu. When Japan capitulated, all assaul t of Japan, dated 11 February 1946 . This report , planning became moot. held in the Operational Archives Branch of Because they are so well-documented, Cline' s the Naval History Division, is a tremendou s Washington Command Post and Craven and source of information in relating how eac h Cate 's Matterhorn to Nagasaki were utilize d island garrison was surrendered to America n extensively to determine CCS and JSC activ- forces, what the condition of Japanese troop s ities and decisions. The historical archives of and civilians was in each case, and how th e the Service historical agencies maintain i n former enemy were repatriated home . There is good order all of the pertinent documents pub- some information about the search for war lished at all levels of the proposed invasio n criminals in this document, but more on thi s force. subject is found in Historic Narrative o f Concerning the advent of Marine carrie r Special War Crimes Duties Performed by Per- aviation, considerably more searching wa s sonnel of the Marine Barracks, Guam. For th e required to develop the attempts of senior purposes of this section, the CinCPac report Marine officers to make fuller use of Marin e noted above is also a valuable source of infor- pilots and planes in the war. Because th e mation concerning surrender ceremonies a t commissioning of Marine escort carriers wa s Tokyo Bay and the activities preceding thi s primarily a Navy decision on the highest levels , event—especially those relating to fleet activ- the minutes of the CominCh–CinCPac Pacifi c ities. Conferences and the items for the agenda Similarly, the Marine Corps Historica l thereof provided considerable information . Archives holds considerable material relatin g Additionally, the war diaries of the first escort to demobilization and the subsequent postwa r carriers and carrier squadrons commissioned development of the Marine Corps . Orders , are also quite important. bulletins, directives, and pertinent memorand a Of invaluable assistance in tracing th e exist to enable researchers to trace the solution reduction of the Fleet Marine Force followin g of personnel problems facing the Corps in thi s the Japanese surrender, and then its postwa r period. development, are the Annual Reports of th e Unofficial Documents Commandant to the Secretary of the Navy , Again, the files containing General Vande- the Administrative History of the United grift's personal correspondence served as a States Marine Corps in the Postwar Period , fruitful source in determining the backgroun d and the Administrative Activities of the Fleet of the problems facing the Commandant an d Marine Force, Pacific . In addition, the report s his subsequent decisions in this difficult perio d of the Department of the Pacific, Marine Gar- for the Marine Corps . In addition, comments rison Forces, Pacific, and the various Marine received on the draft manuscript of this section barracks activities in the Pacific provide con- from senior commanders and staff officers fille d siderable data regarding the many change s in the gaps which exist in the documentation . that took place in the composition and mission s Of great importance was certain information of Marine forces in the Pacific. concerning the Marine carrier program devel- Tracing the activities of Marine organiza- oped in the course of several interviews with tions involved in accepting the surrender of General Thomas for the Marine Corps Oral Japanese Pacific garrisons is simplified to a History Program . great degree by the existence of reports submitted by the senior Marine officers of eac h Books and Periodicals surrender group . The reports of the nava l Used to great advantage in this section were commands responsible for supervising th e Aurthur and Cohlmia, The Third Marine Divi- surrender are also available. sion, Cass, History of the Sixth Marine Divi- Perhaps the most important document util- sion, Conner, The Spearhead, Johnston, Follow ized in writing the story of the surrender o f Me!, King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King : former Japanese holdings in the Pacific i s A Naval Record, Leahy, I Was There, CinCPac Report of Surrender and Occupation McMillan, The Old Breed, Morison, Liberation

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 797

of the Philippines, and Proehl, The Fourth accounts covering the period he remained i n Marine Division in World War H. In addition, Japan. Also, the Eighth Army published mono - the following books and articles proved fruitfu l graphs relating its mission and responsibilitie s for research . and how they were carried out . Equally im- LtCol Walter L . J. Baylor, Last Man Off portant are the reports of the naval command s Wake Island . New York : Bobbs-Merrill, 1943 . involved in the occupations of Yokosuka an d An autobiographical account by the Marin e Tokyo initially, and later of Sasebo and Naga - officer who was the last man to leave Wake saki. Pertinent information concerning th e Island before it fell to the Japanese . The conduct of Marine occupation duties is foun d author was also the first American to set foo t in VAC Operation Report, Occupation of on Wake at the time of the Japanese surrender . Japan, and the war diaries of the corps cover- K. Jack Bauer and Alvin D . Coox . "Olympic ing the period it remained in Japan . The vs Ketsu-Go," Marine Corps Gazette, v . 49 , operation reports and war diaries of the 2 d no. 8 (Aug65) . This is the combined effort of and 5th Marine Divisions and their subordinate Dr. Bauer, who presents the Allied plan fo r commands are also valuable sources for thi s the invasion of Kyushu, and Dr. Coox, wh o interesting period of the Corps' history. From outlines the Japanese defensive plans. the historian's point of view, documentary Kenneth W . Condit, Gerald Diamond, and evidence of the last months of Marine occupa- Edwin T . Turnbladh . Marine Corps Ground tion duties is not as ample as the materia l Training in World War II . Washington : His- reflecting the first months in Japan, but it is torical Branch, G–3 Division, HQMC, 1956. A sufficient to permit a full enough view of th e valuable study of the training of commissione d period. and enlisted Marines in the prewar and Worl d War II periods . Contains detailed information Unofficial Documents concerning infantry and specialist training . Copies of the draft manuscript of this sec- LtCol Henry G . Morgan, Jr . "Planning th e tion were sent out for comment to the forme r Defeat of Japan : A Study of Total Wa r commanders and staff officers of the Marin e Strategy ." This unpublished manuscript hel d occupation force in Japan . With the adven t in the Office of the Chief of Military History , of the end of the war, it was possible once Department of the Army, is an important more for individual Marines to maintain diarie s source which depends to a great degree on CC S and other personal records . From these docu- and JCS documents relating to the subject . ments and subsequent replies commenting o n Harry S . Truman . Year of Decision— the draft, certain items of information not Memoirs, v. I. New York : Doubleday & Com- otherwise appearing in official reports were pany, inc., 1955 . In this, the first volume of made available to the author . Because of th e his memoirs, President Truman relates the very real human interest stories which com e circumstances under which he first became out of an operation such as this, the occupation aware of the American development of the of a defeated nation, a vast mass of newspape r atomic bomb, and the agonizing decision s and magazine articles was written . Many suc h facing him concerning its employment . items relating to the Marines in Japan ca n be found in issues of Leatherneck for th e PART IV period.

OCCUPATION OF JAPA N Books and Periodicals Kenneth W . Condit and Edwin T . Turnbladh . Official Documents Hold High The Torch : A History of the 4th A wealth of material concerning the initia l Marines . Washington : Historical Branch, G–3 period of the occupation of Japan is available Division, HQMC, 1960 . An official history of in the archives of the various Service historica l one of the oldest infantry regiments in th e offices, as well as in the National Archives . Marine Corps, this work is particularly val- General MacArthur's SCAP headquarters quite uable for an accounting of the occupation of assiduously prepared and published detailed Yokosuka as well as other highlights in the

798 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

history of the unit. records that were submitted were destroyed ; LtCol Michael S . Currin . "Occupation o f in a number of instances, the reports that Kyushu," Marine Corps Gazette, v . 30, no . 1 0 survive provide a bare minimum of informa- (Oct46) . This article, written by the forme r tion. One exception to this observation is th e Operations Officer of the 2d Marine Division , multi-volumed report of General Marshall's relates some of the problems his organizatio n Executive Headquarters, held by the Office o f faced while occupying and disarming Japan . the Chief of Military History, which provides a Henry I . Shaw, Jr. The United State s detailed picture of the unsuccessful peac e Marines in the Occupation of Japan, Marin e mission 's activities . Corps Historical Reference Series No . 24 . Washington : Historical Branch, G–3 Division , Unofficial Documents HQMC, 1961 . In reality a brief history of the Without the active cooperation of a number subject, this well-researched booklet served a s of senior officers involved in Marine operation s the foundation on which this part was written . in North China, it would have been impossibl e to reconstruct a picture of the policy direction PART V to commanders and to develop the rational e NORTH CHINA MARINE S behind a number of deployments and decisions . In particular, General Worton 's account of hi s Official Documents trip to North China in advance of the actua l The plans, orders, and war diaries of III occupation and the several interviews with Amphibious Corps units provide the basis for General Rockey and his letters concerning th e the accounting of the movement to and landin g whole span of his command were invaluable in of the Marines in North China . The genera l filling gaps in the official records . The com- Chinese situation at that time is developed i n ments on the draft manuscript by the man y the Wedemeyer papers and in dispatch traffic. participants in the China action, interview s Once the Marines were established ashore, the with Generals Shepherd, Rockey, Woods, Peck , G–2 sections of the IIIAC and 1st Marin e and Worton, Admiral Barbey, and others, com- Division war diaries provide the most interest- prise a unique source file on this period . Sev- ing reading and give the background on th e eral letters from General Rockey to Genera l civil war action . In general, the scope an d Vandegrift reporting on the first days of IIIA C quality of reports on Marine activity droppe d involvement provide a useful contemporar y in direct ratio to the reduction of Marine picture of the landings and movements once strength . By February 1947, the requirement ashore. for submission of war diaries was dropped an d the records of Marines in China after that Japanese Sources point (and for some months prior to that For a reconstruction of the Japanese situa- time) are scant . Extensive research in retire d tion in China and Manchuria at the end of the classified correspondence files of Marine Corp s war, three of the monographs prepared for Headquarters, in classified records of Com- the Office of the Chief of Military History , mander, Naval Forces, Western Pacific, an d . 129, 154, and 155, which deal with th e in State Department records of evacuation o f Nos China Expeditionary Army American civilians from China was necessar y situation of the to establish a meaningful narrative of th e and the operations against Soviet Russia, ar e 1947–1949 period . useful. The story of Japanese repatriation i s The researcher on this period of America n developed mainly from American official rec- involvement in North China will find th e ords. Highly complimentary letters from Japa- records of all Services excellent in 1945, an d nese repatriates to Generals Shepherd an d good in the first months of 1946 . After that Peck, commenting on the attitude and behavio r period, the experience will be frustrating , of the Marines supervising repatriation activ- highlighted by an occasional and sometime s ities, are filed with the interviews of these unexpected find of pertinent information . Many officers .

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 799

Books and Periodicals Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 196 8 While many secondary sources touch on th e ed. A preliminary study to this part which out- situation in North China during the 1945-1949 lines the Marine participation . period, there is a surprising lack of comment Mao Tse-tung. Strategic Problems of th e or recognition of the presence of Marines . Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War. Peiping : Foreign Useful in developing the public attitude toward Language Press, 1954 . A primer for Chines e this unusual occupation duty are a number o f Communist guerrilla actions which provide s inserts and speeches in the volumes of Con- insight into the activities of the units in North gressional Record for the period. The publica- China. tions of most direct use in this section were : U . S. Department of State . United State s LtCol Henry Aplington, II . "North China Relations with China . Washington, 1949 . Th e Patrol," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 33, no . 6 China "White Paper," which is replete with (Jun49) . An interesting account of the frus- contemporary documents, some of which appl y trating search for Marines captured nea r to the Marines . A necessary source work, bu t Chinwangtao by the Communists in July 1946 . one which shows the strains of its hasty John King Fairbank . The United States and preparation. China. Cambridge : Harvard University Press , U . S. Senate . Committees on Armed Services 1958, rev. ed. A scholarly, but highly readabl e and Foreign Relations. Hearings on the Mil- history of Sino-American relations . itary Situation in the Far East, 3 May-1 7 Herbert Feis . The China Tangle . Princeton : August 1951 . Washington, 1951 . The "Mac- Princeton University Press, 1953. A largel y Arthur Hearings" contains many interesting successful attempt to present a coherent pic- and revealing references to the situation in ture of the involved Chinese situation with China prior to the American withdrawal . emphasis on the last years of the Nationalis t Gen Albert C . Wedemeyer. Wedemeyer Re- hegemony. ports! New York : Henry Holt and Company , LtCol James D. Hittle . "On the Peiping- 1958. A highly personalized and opinionate d Mukden Line," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 31 , account of an officer deeply involved in the no. 6 (Jun47) . A detailed accounting of th e American actions in China at the highest levels . activities of 2/7 on rail and bridge guard PART VI during the winter of 1945-1946. Chiang Kai-shek . Soviet Russia in China . CONCLUSIO N New York : Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957 . The Generalissimo's own views of the role of Official Document s the Soviets in the defeat of his forces an d Many primary sources exist to enable th e their forced retreat from mainland China . researcher to trace the Marine Corps and Navy F. F . Liu . A Military History of Modern development of amphibious warfare doctrine . China. Princeton : Princeton University Press, These documents are to be found, for the mos t 1956. Very helpful book on the organization , part, in the Marine Corps Historical Archive s leaders, and actions of both Nationalist and and the Operational Archives Branch, Nava l Communist forces . History Division . The most valuable informa- Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sutherland . tion on this subject, as well as for studies on Stilwell's Command Problems—China-Burma- the role of Marine Corps Headquarters i n India Theater—United States Army in Worl d World War II and the development of tactica l War H . Washington : Office of the Chief of innovations and changes in tactical organiza- Military History, Department of the Army , tion, etc., was developed from the Annual 1956. The most pertinent of three Army his- Reports of the Commandant of the Marine tories on the China operations, this provides an Corps, Marine Corps orders and bulletins , excellent account of the final months of th e Fleet Marine Force ground and air status re - war. ports, the World War II operational diarie s Henry I . Shaw, Jr. The United States Ma- of the Division of Plans and Policies (and of rines in North China, 1945-1949. Washington : the G-2 and G-3 Sections therein) and the

800 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Division of Aviation . In addition, the followin g and Joseph L . Schwartz (MC), USN, eds . The files in the Historical Archives of the Marin e History of the Medical Department of th e Corps were used with great profit : subject , United States Navy in World War II, v . I. exercise reports, and tables of organization . Washington : Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Personnel statistics were derived from a stud y Navy Department, 1953 . This official Navy of contemporary muster rolls. History is an extremely valuable source primarily for the statistics that it offers . Unofficial Documents Adm William H . P . Blandy . "Command Re- Interesting and valuable comments pertain- lationships in Amphibious Warfare," USNI ing to the prewar and World War II opera- Proceedings, v. 77, no . 66 (Jun51) . An expert tions of Headquarters Marine Corps and th e in amphibious warfare, especially in the are a Division of Plans and Policies, and the majo r of naval gunfire support of the landing force, policy decisions emanating therefrom, were writes tellingly of the real problems of com- developed in the course of Oral History Pro - mand relationships which existed in the Pacifi c gram interviews with Generals Thomas, del and how they were solved . Valle, and Peck . Other outstanding source MajGen Pedro A . del Valle. "Cave Warfare, " material derived from first-hand knowledge is Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no . 7 (Ju145) . found in the letters of comment on the draf t The then-commander of the 1st Marine Divi- manuscript. Generals del Valle and Peck were sion details the tank-infantry tactics employe d again most cooperative, as were General s by his Marines in reducing Japanese position s Woods, Pfeiffer, and Fellows, among others. in the areas of Dakeshi and Wana Ridges on Admiral Moore, who was chief of staff t o Okinawa. Admiral Spruance, contributed a useful in - Sgt George Doying. "The Buck Rogers Men, " sight into the problem of command relation - Leatherneck, v. ships in the Pacific during the early part o f 23, no. 4 (Apr45) . An informa- the war and how it was subsequently solve d tive article concerning the men and operations of Marine Corps provisional rocket platoons. to a degree . Dr. Elizabeth B. Drewry, Director of the Franklin D . Roosevelt Library at Hyde Capt Clifford M . Drury (ChC), USN . The Park, New York, was most cooperative in pro- History of the Chaplain Corps, United State s viding copies of the correspondence betwee n Navy, 1939-1949, v. II . Washington : Bureau of President Roosevelt and Major (later Lieu- Naval Personnel, Department of the Navy , tenant Colonel) Evans F . Carlson concerning 1950 . This official Navy history provides a the establishment of the Marine raider pro - good insight into the way the naval service gram. Not the least important of the documen- ministers to the religious needs of sailors an d tation utilized in this part are the pertinent Marines in combat . letters which exist in the Vandegrift Personal VAdm George C . Dyer. "The Amphibian s Correspondence File . Came to Conquer." MS . n .d . This is a preliminary draft of a partially completed biog- Books and Periodicals raphy of Admiral Richmond K . Turner, which To provide the basis for many of the con- is being prepared by Admiral Dyer under th e clusions drawn in this section, the first thre e auspices of the Naval History Division fo r volumes of this series and the draft manuscrip t publication by the Government Printing Office . of the fourth were invaluable because of the Gen Wallace M . Greene, Jr . "Shanghai , considerable research that went into thei r 1937," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 49, no. 1 1 writing. Also used once again with grea t (Nov65) . The 23d Commandant of the Marin e profit were Condit, Diamond, and Turnbladh , Corps recalls his days as a company grad e Marine Corps Ground Training in World War officer with the 4th Marines in Shanghai an d II, Isely and Crowl, Marines and Amphibious the development of a tactical formation for th e War, King and Whitehill, King 's Naval Rec- controls of riots which possibly served as the ord, Vandegrift and Asprey, Once A Marine , forerunner of the World War II fire team . and War Reports. Additional sources were : Col Robert D . Heinl, Jr . "The Gun Gap and Capts Bennett F. Avery, Louis H . Roddis, How to Close It," USNI Proceedings, v . 91,

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 801

no. 9 (Sep65) A recognized historian an d with the development and employment of tank- writer, who served as a naval gunfire officer i n infantry teams in combat. World War II, utilizes his knowledge an d Lt Lewis Meyers . "Tactical Use of Flame, " experiences to make a plea for fuller use o f Marine Corps Gazette, v . 29, no . 11 (Nov45) . larger gunfire support ships in the Vietnam A very interesting and fruitful study con- war. cerning the research and development of flam e Maj Robert D . Heinl, Jr. "The U . S. Marin e as a tactical weapon with emphasis on the Corps : Author of Modern Amphibious War, " Marine Corps role in this area . USNI Proceedings, v. 73, no . 11 (Nov47) . A Office of the Chief of Naval Operations . soundly written, article tracing the role played Department of the Navy. Landing Operation s by the Marine Corps in the development of Doctrine, U. S. Navy, 1938 (FTP–167) . Wash- amphibious warfare doctrine and techniques . ington, 1938 . The basic document which gov- Maj Carl W . Hoffman . The Seizure o f erned Navy and Marine Corps conduct of Tinian . Washington : Historical Division , amphibious operations in World War II . HQMC, 1951 . An official Marine Corps history Gen Holland M . Smith and Percy Finch . which is particularly good in describing th e Coral and Brass. New York : Charles Scribner's development of tank-infantry tactics . Sons, 1949. Reliable for the personal opinion s and actions of General Smith, and not to o Lt Lee W. Holmes. "The Birth of the Fir e accurate concerning details of small uni t Team," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 36, no. 1 1 actions. (Nov52) . Lieutenant Holmes conducted con- LtGen Holland M . Smith . "The Developmen t siderable research in attempting to develop the genesis of the fire team concept adopte d of Amphibious Tactics in the U . S . Navy, " Marine Corps Gazette, v . 30, no . 6 (Jun46 ) by the Marine Corps, and this article goes fa r through v . 31, no . 3 (Mar47) . General Smith in answering many questions . contributed considerably to the developments LtCol Frank O . Hough and Maj John A . which he discusses in this authoritative five- Crown. The Campaign on New Britain. Wash- part article. The last five parts of this study— ington : Historical Branch, G–3 Division, 1952. which was scheduled to be written in ten This official Marine Corps monograph con- parts—were never completed ; and General cerning the Cape Gloucester operation describes Smith's conclusions unfortunately do not the many changes in tactics and weapons that appear in what was published . took place in the 1st Division following th e Adm Raymond A . Spruance. "The Victory Guadalcanal campaign . in the Pacific," Journal of the Royal Unite d Maj John H . Johnstone. United States Service Institution, v. XCI, no. 564 (Nov46) . Marine Corps Parachute Units—Marine Corps An interesting but brief survey of the Pacific Historical Reference Series No . 32 . Washing- War with emphasis on planning and strategy. ton : Historical Branch, G–3 Division, HQMC , Capt James R . Stockman . The Battle for 1962 . In addition to the detailed information Tarawa . Washington : Historical Section . Divi- about the formation, training, operations, an d sion of Public Information, HQMC, 1947 . On e disbandment of the Paramarines, this useful of the early official Marine Corps monograph s booklet contains a brief history of the Marine which is valuable for a study of the develop- Corps glider program. ment of assault team tactics . Joint Board on Scientific Information Policy , Col Donald M . Weller. "Firepower and th e U. S. Rocket Ordnance, Development and Us e Amphibious Assault," Marine Corps Gazette , in World War II. Washington, 1946 . This littl e v. 36, nos. 3–4 (Mar–Apr52) . A recognized study is valuable for the information it give s Marine Corps naval gunfire expert writes on the employment of rockets by Marine Corp s about the employment of this supporting ar m aviation in the late stages of the war. in combat. Capt Leonard G . Lawton, "Tank-Infantr y Col Donald M . Weller. "Salvo—Splash!, " Team," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no. 1 1 USNI Proceedings, v . 80, nos 8–9 (Aug– (Nov45) . A profitable article dealing further Sep54) . A valuable survey of the historical

802 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

development of naval gunfire training an d at Wake Island and in North China, and their operations in World War II with emphasis o n subsequent adventures . Pacific operations . Conditions at the various prison camps ar e LtCol Don P . Wyckoff . "Super Soldiers, " detailed in full in these escape reports and ar e Marine Corps Gazette, v. 47, no . 11 (Nov63) . also found in the sworn statements of Sergeant The thesis of this author is that regular infan- Douglas W . Bogue and Private First Class try organizations are as well or better equipped Glenn W. McDole, which shed light on th e to conduct the type of operations for which events leading to the Puerto Princesa mas- such special organizations as the Commandos sacre and its aftermath . All of these escap e and Marine Raiders and paratroops were reports are held in the Marine Corps Historical established . Archives. For postwar events, most notably the drop- APPENDIX A ping of supplies to the prisoners and thei r eventual recovery, fuller documentation exists . MARINE POWS The Twentieth Air Force tactical mission report of its POW supply-dropping mission is i n Ofcial Documents the archives of the Aerospace Studies Institute It is completely understandable that th e at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama . Among so-called "fog of war" veils from view th e the Navy documents relating to this period ar e condition, location, unit integrity, and well - the CinCPac Surrender and Occupation Report being of combat organizations and individual s noted earlier, and the report of Task Grou p once they have been captured . It is a matter 30 .6 concerning the evacuation of prisoner s of record that the Services received informa- during the period 29 August–19 September tion concerning hapless American prisoner s 1945 . only long after the fact of their capture . Thi s Although not used in the preparation of thi s information was acquired generally from th e appendix, certain classified documents were International Red Cross, as a result of escap e made available to the Historical Branch castin g reports, or, as most often was the case, at th e new light on the activities of Marines who end of the war when the POWs were recovere d were assigned to the OSS in Europe and subse- and interrogated . To a large extent, the mate- quently captured there . rial in this appendix is derived from th e following files in the Marine Corps Historica l Unofficial Documents Archives : POW, World War II; POW, World Without doubt, this appendix could not hav e War II, Philippines ; POW, World War I I been as extensive as it is without the outstand- (USS Houston) ; Philippines Area Operations ; ing cooperation and full accounts given b y and 4th Marines Unit History . Of great valu e individuals to whom the draft manuscript was to the researcher investigating the last day s sent for comment. In addition to their accounts , of Corregidor is the report of Lieutenant photographs and documents hitherto unpub- Colonel William T . Clement, who was the Fleet lished were provided by Brigadier General s Marine Officer in the Asiatic Fleet (Miscel- Curtis T . Beecher and John F . Kinney, Colonel s laneous Reports File, Philippines Area Opera- Luther A . Brown and James D . McBrayer, Jr ., tions File) . The reports filed by Captain Austi n Chief Warrant Officer Earl B . Ercanbrack , C. Shofner and Lieutenant Jack Hawkin s and Mr . Walter W . Taylor, whose assistance following their escape from the Philippines is gratefully acknowledged by the author . proved valuable in developing the events tha t Unfortunately, not all accounts or documentar y transpired in the fall of Corregidor and thei r and pictorial material could be included in experiences following that time. Similarly, the this book, but they are filed appropriately in escape reports of Captains Richard M. the Historical Archives of the Marine Corps as Huizenga and James D . McBrayer, Jr . an d testimony to the very real heroism and courag e Lieutenant John F . Kinney were helpful in exhibited by all Marines who became prisoner s filling out the story of the Marines captured of war .

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 803

Books and Periodicals Col Jack Hawkins. Never Say Die . Phila- In researching the fall of Wake Island and delphia : Dorrance & Company, Inc., 1961 . A the Philippines and the capture of the Nort h personalized autobiography by one of th e China Marines, the first volume of this serie s Marines who escaped from a Japanese prison was used to good advantage . Condit and Turn- camp in the Philippines. bladh, Hold High the Torch provided addi- Maj Orlan R . Lodge . The Recapture of tional material on the 4th Marines on Correg- Guam. Washington : Historical Branch, G– 3 idor and Bataan . Other published source s Division, HQMC, 1954 . The official Marine utilized for this appendix are : Corps monograph concerning the Guam opera- Hanson W . Baldwin, "The Fourth Marine s tion with some material on the loss of the at Corregidor," Marine Corps Gazette, v . 30 , island at the beginning of the war. nos . 11–12 (Nov–Dec46) and v . 31, nos. 1– 2 Lt Clifford P . Morehouse . "Prisoners of the (Jan–Feb47) . A journalistic account based on Enemy," Marine Corps Gazette, v . 28, no . 1 official documents and interviews concernin g (Jan44) . A factual article written during th e the role of the 4th Marines in the defense o f war by the Marine Corps member of th e the Philippines . YMCA War Prisoner's Aid Committee . O f Col Gregory Boyington . Baa Baa Blac k interest in that the author provides consid- Sheep. New York : G. P . Putnam's Sons, 1958 . erable information on the wartime activitie s An interesting autobiography by a colorfu l of the Casualty Reporting Division at Head- personality who was in addition a Marine quarters Marine Corps . Corps ace awarded the Medal of Honor . What Robert R. Smith . Triumph in the Philippine s he has written about his capture and treatmen t —The War in the Pacific—United State s later at the hands of the enemy is perhap s Army in World War II . Washington : Office o f typical of what was experienced by othe r the Chief of Military History, Department o f Marine pilots. the Army, 1963 . In this official Army history , Martin Boyle . Yanks Don't Cry . New York : full treatment is given to the activities o f Bernard Geis and Associates, 1963 . Anothe r those Americans who remained in the Philip - autobiography by a former prisoner, in thi s pines after they had fallen and participated in case an enlisted Marine who was captured at guerrilla activities . It was with one of thes e Guam . underground units that Captain Shofner an d James P . S. Devereux . The Story of Wak e Lieutenants Hawkins and Dobervich served Island. Philadephia : J.B . Lippincott Company , until evacuated to Australia by submarine. 1947. General Devereux relates in this book Fred Stolley . "R'eturn to Mitsushima, " the particulars of the fall of Wake Island and Leatherneck, v . XLV, no. 3 (Mar62) . A former his later experiences in Japanese prison camps . Marine prisoner of war relates his return to M . R. D . Foot. SOE in France : An Accoun t the place in Japan where he had been hel d of the British Special Operations Executiv e for most of the war . in France, 1940–1944 . London : Her Majesty' s U. S. Department of State . Foreign Rela- Stationery Office, 1966. The official British tions of the United States Diplomatic Papers , account of Allied covert activities in occupie d 1942, v. I. Washington : 1960. In this collection France . The story of Peter J . Ortiz, a Marine of diplomatic documents are a number of in- officer assigned to the OSS and a member of a teresting and important letters concernin g joint Anglo-American undercover team, i s Marine prisoners and North China Marines i n covered in this work . particular .

310-224 0-69 - 52

APPENDIX C

Guide to Abbreviations

AA Antiaircraft , Armored Amphibia n AAA Antiaircraft Artiller y Artiller y AAF Army Air Forces Assault Signal Compan y AAFPOA Army Air Forces, Pacifi c Aerospace Institut e Ocean Area s Assault AAR After-action repor t Assistant Acft Aircraft AT ...... Antitan k ACofS Assistant Chief of Staff AutoRpr Automotive repair ADC Assistant Division Comman- AvGas Aviation gas der Avn Aviation ADCC Air Defense Control Cente r A W Automatic Weapon s Addees Addressee s AWS Air Warning Squadron Adm Admiral B–24 Army four-engine bomber , Admin ...... Administrative the Consolidated Liberato r Adv Advance B–29 Army four-engine bomber, AF Air Force the Boeing Super-Fortres s AFB Air Force Bas e Bar Barrack s AFPOA Army Forces, Pacific Ocea n BAR Browning Automatic Rifl e Areas Btry Battery AG Adjutant Genera l BB : Battleship AGC Amphibious command shi p BBC British Broadcasting Corpo- AH Hospital ship ration AirDel Air Delivery B C O F British Commonwealth Occu- AirFMFPac Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force , pation Forc e Pacific BENT Beginning evening nautical AKA Cargo ship, attack twiligh t Alex Alexandri a BGen Brigadier General ALMAR All Marine Corps (Bulletin ) BLT Battalion Landing Tea m ALP Air Liaison Party Bn Battalion Ammo Ammunitio n Br Branc h Amphib Amphibian (-ous ) Brig Brigade Amtrac Amphibian tractor Bu Burea u Ann Annual Bul Bulletin AN/VRC Army-Navy Vehicle, Radio , BuMed Bureau of Medicine and Sur- Communication gery Anx Annex Bureau of Naval Personne l AP Armor-piercin g Calibe r APA Transport, attack Combat Air Patrol APB Barracks ship, self-propelle d Captain APD Transport, high speed Close Air Support APH Transport for wounded Commander, Air Suppor t App Appendix Control Unit Ar Arm y CASD Carrier Air Service Detach- AR Action Report men t 804

GUIDE TO ABBREVIATIONS 805

CCF Chinese Communist Force s Ed Editor, edited CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff EENT End of evening nautical twi- Cdr Commander light CG Commanding Genera l End Enclosure Chap Chapte r Engr Enginee r ChC Chaplain Corp s Evac Evacuation CinCAFPac Commander in Chief, Arm y Exec Executive Forces in the Pacifi c FAdm Fleet Admiral Commander in Chief, Pacifi c FAirWest Fleet Air, West Coast Flee t FAirWing Fleet Air Win g Commander in Chief, Pacifi c FDC Fire direction cente r Ocean Area s FEAF Far East Air Force s Commander in Chief, United F E C Far East Command States Fleet F4U Navy - Marine single - engine Centimete r fighter, the Chance-Vough t Commandant of the Marin e Corsair Corps F6F Navy - Marine single - engin e Commandant, Marine Corp s fighter, the Grumman Hell - School s cat CNA Chinese Nationalist Arm y F6F–5N Navy - Marine single - engin e CNO Chief of Naval Operations night fighter, the Grum- CO Commanding Officer man Hellcat Co Company Fld Field Cof S Chief of Staff FLEX Fleet Landing Exercise Col Colone l Flt Flee t Corn Commander (Units ) FMF Fleet Marine Force Comd Comman d FOF Fukuoka Occupation Forc e CominCh Commander in Chief, U . S. FRC Federal Records Cente r Flee t F S C C Fire Support Coordination Conf Conference Cente r Const Construction FTP Fleet Training Publication CP Command Pos t G–1 Division (or larger unit) Per- Cpl Corpora l sonnel Office (r) CT Combat Team G—2 Division (or larger unit) In- CV Aircraft Carrie r telligence Office(r ) CVE Escort Carrie r G—3 Division (or larger unit) Op- C W 0 Chief Warrant Office r erations and Training Of- D Diary fice (r) DA Department of the Arm y G—4 Division (or larger unit ) DC Dental Corp s Logistics Office (r) DE Destroyer Escort GarFor Garrison Forces DepNavOps Deputy Chief of Naval Oper- Gd Guard ations Gen General Dir Directo r GHQ General Headquarter s Det Detachmen t GP General purpose Disp Dispatc h GPO Government Printing Offic e Dist Distribution Grd Ground Div Division GroPac Group Pacifi c DOW Died of Wound s Gru Group Dtd Dated GSA General Services Administra- DUKW Amphibian truck tion

806 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Hd Hea d LCVP Landing Craft, Vehicle and HE High Explosiv e Personnel H&I Harassing and Interdictio n LD Line of Departure Hist History ; historica l LFASCU Landing Force Air Suppor t HMAS His Majesty 's Australian Control Uni t Ship Light Machine Gun HMS His Majesty's Ship Locate d Hosp Hospital Landing Ship, Dock How Howitze r Landing Ship, Mediu m Hq Headquarter s Landing Ship, Tank HQMC Headquarters Marine Corp s Landing Ship, Tank (Hos- HRS Historical Reference Section pital) H&S Headquarters and Servic e LSV Landing Ship, Vehicl e H V A R High Velocity Aircraf t Lt Lieutenant Rocket LtCol Lieutenant Colone l IG Inspector General LtGen Lieutenant General IGHQ Imperial General Headquar- Ltr Letter ters LVT Landing Vehicle, Tracke d IIB Independent Infantry Battal- LVT(A) Landing Vehicle, Tracked ion (Armored ) IIIAC III Amphibious Corp s Marine Aircraft Group IJA Imperial Japanese Arm y Majo r IJN Imperial Japanese Navy Major Genera l IMAC I Marine Amphibious Corp s Marine (s) IMB Independent Mixed Brigad e Marine Fleet Air, West Coast IMR Independent Mixed Regiment Department of the Pacific , Inf Infantry U . S . Marine Corp s Intel Intelligenc e MASG Marine Air Support Grou p Inter Interrogation MAW Marine Aircraft Win g IsCom Island Comman d MB Marine Barracks JAG Judge Advocate General MBDAG Marine Base Defense Air - Jnl Journa l craft Group JANAC Joint Army-Navy Assessment MCAS Marine Corps Air Statio n Committee MCASD Marine Carrier Air Suppor t JASCO Joint Assault Signal Com- Detachment pany M C V G Marine Carrier Aircraf t JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff Group JICPOA Joint Intelligence Center, Pa- Marine Detachmen t cific Ocean Are a JLC Joint Logistic Comman d Medica l JOB Japanese Order of Battle Memorandu m JUSMAG Joint U . S . Military Advisory Marine Gunner Group Marine Ground Control Inter- JWPC Joint War Plans Committee cept Squadro n KCRC Kansas City Records Cente r MIA Missing in Action KIA Killed in Actio n MID Military Intelligence Division KMA Kailin Mining Administration MilGovt Military Government Lant Atlanti c Min Minute s LCdr Lieutenant Commander MIS Military Intelligence Sectio n LCI Landing Craft, Infantry Misc Miscellaneous LCS Landing Craft, Support Mm Millimeter

GUIDE TO ABBREVIATIONS 807

MOTG Marine Operational Trainin g Per Personne l Group PFC Private First Clas s MP Military Polic e Ph Phas e MS Manuscript Phib Amphibious ; Amphibiou s Msg Message Forces MT Motor Transport PhibsPac Amphibious Forces, Pacific N Note Fleet NA National Archive s Pion Pionee r NABS Naval Air Base s Pit Platoon NAD Naval Ammunition Depot POA Pacific Ocean Area s NARS National Archives and Rec- POW Prisoner of War ords Service P&P Division of Plans and Policie s NAS Naval Air Statio n Prelim Preliminar y Nav Navy ; Naval Prov Provisiona l NavWesPac Naval Forces, Western Pa- Pt Part(s) ; Point cific Pubinfo Public Information NCB Naval Construction Battalion Pvt Privat e NCO Noncommissioned Officer PW Prisoner of War N.d No date RAdm Rear Admiral ND Navy Departmen t RAMP Recovered Allied Military NGF Naval gunfire Personnel NHD Naval History Divisio n RCT Regimental Combat Tea m No Numbe r R'5D Navy - Marine four - engine NOB Naval Operating Base transport, the Douglas 0 Officer Skymaster OAB Operational Archives Branc h Rec Reception OCMH Office of the Chief of Militar y Recon Reconnaissance History Reinf Reinforce d Ofc Office Ret Retired OIC Officer in Charge Rev Revise d Radioman, 1st class OP Observation Pos t R M 1 RN Royal Nav y Op Operation(s ) Rpt Report Operation (s ) Oper RR Railroa d OPlan Operation Plan SAD Support Air Directio n OpNav Office of the Chief of Naval SAR Special Action Repor t Operation s SC Submarine Chaser OpOrd Operation Orde r S&C Secret and Confidentia l Ord Ordnanc e SCAJAP Shipping Control Administra- OSS Office of Strategic Services tion, Japa n OY Navy - Marine single - engine SCAP Supreme Commander Allie d observation plane, the Con - Power s solidated-Vultee Sentinel SCAT South Pacific Combat Air Transport Comman d P, pp Page, page s Signal Corps Radio P—47 Army single-engine fighter , SCR n the Republic Thunderbol t Sec Sectio y PackHow Pack Howitze r SecNav Secretary of the Nav SecState Secretary of Stat e PBY—5A Navy-Marine two-engine patrol bomber with amphib- Sep Separate ian boat hull, the Consoli- Sery Servic e dated Catalina Sgt Sergeant

808 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

SgtMaj Sergeant Major Training Shpg Shipping Troops Sig Signa l Top Secret SMS Supply a n d Maintenanc e Task Uni t Squadro n Underwater Demolition s SNLF Special Naval Landing Forc e Team SO Special Order UNRRA United Nations Relief an d SOE Special Operations Executiv e Rehabilitation Administra- SOPA Senior Officer Present Afloa t tion SoPac South Pacifi c USA United States Arm y SP Shore Party USAF United States Air Force Spd Speed USAFFE United States Army Forces , Spec Special Far East Spt Support USAFMidPac United States Army Forces , Sqd Squad Middle Pacifi c Sqn Squadron USAFPOA United States Army Forces , Stf ...... Staff Pacific Ocean Areas Subj Subject USASTAF United States Army Stra- Sum Summary tegic Air Forces in the Pa- Suppl Supplement cifi c Sup Support UsForChina- SWPA Southwest Pacific Are a Thtr United States Forces, China T/A Table of Allowance s Theate r Tac Tactica l United States Marine Corps TAF Tactical Air Forc e United States Navy TAGO The Adjutant General's Offic e United States Naval Bas e TBF Navy - Marine single - engine United States Naval Institute torpedo bomber, the Grum - United States Naval Reserve man Avenger United States Ship TBM Navy - Marine single - engin e United States Strategi c torpedo bomber, the Gen- Bombing Surve y eral Motors Avenger USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Re - TCS Vehicle mounted, high fre- public s quency radi o Volume T/E Table of Equipmen t V Amphibious Corp s TF Task Force Vice Admira l TG Task Group Very Long Rang e T.H Territory of Hawaii Marine Bomber Squadro n TIC Target Information .Center Marine Photographic Squad- TIO Target Information Officer ron Tk Tan k VMF Marine Fighter Squadron TM Technical Manual VMF(CVS) Marine Carrier Fighte r Tntv Tentative Squadron T/O Table of Organizatio n VMF(N) Marine Night Fighter Squad- TOT Time on Targe t ron TQM Transport Quartermaster VMO Marine Observation Squadron Tr Translator(ed ) VMR Marine Transport Squadron Trans Transport V M SB Marine Scout Bomber Squad- Transdiv Transport Division ron Transron Transport Squadron VMTB Marine Torpedo Bombe r Trk Truck Squadron

GUIDE TO ABBREVIATIONS 809

Marine Carrier Torped o W D C O S Chief of Staff, War Depart- Bomber Squadron ment Chief of Staff, War Depart- Wounded in Action ment Western Pacific s War Diary White Phosphorou Weapon s War Area Services Com- World Wa r mittee Young Mens Christian Asso- War Departmen t ciation Washington Documents Cen - Z/A Zone of Actio n ter ZofA Zone of Action

APPENDIX D

Military Map Symbols

SIZE SYMBOL S UNIT SYMBOL S

Platoon/Detachmen t Engineer

Company/Batter y Infantr y

I I Battalion/Squadro n Naval Base Forc e

I I I Regiment/Grou p ® Recon Reconnaissance

X Brigade Servic e

XX Division/Wing Tank

XXX Corps EXAMPLE S

XXXX Arm y Tank Platoon,lst Tank Battalion

Company A, F M F Reconnaissanc e UNIT SYMBOL S Ai::Recon Battalio n

Basic Unit IJVMO-2 Marine Observation Squadron 2 lol Enemy Unit 8 8th Service Regimen t 11 Marine Unit (Serving wit h 23d Shipping Enginee r units of other services) 123 USMC Regiment (Japanese ) Proposed Unit Locatio n Naval Base Force (Japanese )

0 Artiller y Amcl Americol Divisio n

00 Aviation Amphibious Corp s XXX X 23 Cavalry (EIGHT H Eighth Army

810 APPENDIX E

Chronology

The following listing of events is limited t o 2Jan U. S. Army troops land at those coming within the scope of this book , Saidor, New Guinea. and those events treated in previous volumes 31Jan—7Feb U . S . forces assault an d applying equally to the matters discussed i n capture Kwajalein and Ma- this work . juro Atolls in the Mar- shalls . 1941 16—17Feb Task Force 58 strikes Truk , 8Dec Personnel of American Em- revealing weakness of tha t bassy Guard, Peiping, and base . of Marine Legation Guard , 17–22Feb U . S. forces assault and cap- Tientsin, become first Ma- ture Eniwetok Atoll in th e rine POWs in World Wa r Marshalls . II . 20Feb–28Mar U . S . forces assault and cap- lODec Guam surrenders to Japanes e ture the main islands of landing force . the Admiralties. 23Dec Wake Island falls to enemy . 6Mar 1st Marine Division land s near Talasea on New Brit- 1942 ain in the Bismarcks . 6Feb U. S. and Great Britain es- 12Mar JCS issue directives to CinC- tablish Combined Chiefs of POA and CinCSWPA re- Staff (CCS) . garding future operation s 9Mar Java surrenders to Japanese , in their respective areas . ending conquest of Nether- 22Apr U . S. Army troops land at lands East Indies . Aitape and Hollandia i n 30Mar Pacific Ocean divided into Pa- northern New Guinea, be - cific Ocean Areas under ginning drive up the coast . Adm Nimitz and Southwest 6Jun Allied forces invade the con- Pacific Area under Ge n tinent of Europe at Nor - MacArthur . mandy. e 9Apr Bataan falls to the Japanese . Joint War Plans Committe g 6May Corregidor and Manila Bay issues study establishin forts surrender. 1945 Pacific invasion schedule for planning purposes. 1943 15Jun—9Jul U . S . forces assault and cap- 2—6Dec At Second SEXTANT Con- ture Saipan in the Mari- ference in Cairo, Allied anas . leaders agree upon stra- 19—20Jun Battle of the Philippine Sea . tegic concept for prosecu- Japanese naval air arm suf- tion of Pacific War. fers decisive defeat. 18Jul Premier Hideki Tojo resigns . 1944 21Jul—10Aug U. S. forces assault and cap- 1Jan LtGen Alexander A . Vande- ture Guam in the Marianas . grift becomes 18th Com- 24Jul—lAug VAC troops assault and cap- mandant of the Marin e ture Tinian in the Mari- Corps . anas . 811

812 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

26—29Jul Adm Nimitz and Gen Mac - the Japanese capital b y Arthur meet with Presiden t land-based planes . Roosevelt at Pearl Harbo r 25Nov CinCPOA issues operatio n to determine future Pacifi c plan for invasion of Iwo strategy . Jima ; tentative date is set 11—16Sep At OCTAGON Conference i n for 3Feb45 . Quebec, CCS establish a 15Dec U . S . Army troops invad e new schedule of Pacific op- Mindoro in the Philippines. erations. Kyushu to be in- 25Dec Leyte declared secure . vaded in October and Hon- shu in December 1945 . 1945 U . S. Army troops assaul t 2Jan U. S . Army landings on east and capture Morotai in th e and west coasts of Min- Netherlands East Indies. doro. U . S. forces assault and cap- 3Jan ComFifthFlt issues OPIn 1— ture Peleliu and Angaur in 45 for Okinawa operation . the Palaus. 6Jan Tenth Army Tentative OPln U . S . Army troops seiz e 1—45 for ICEBERG issued . Ulithi Atoll in the Western 9Jan Sixth Army lands in Linga- Carolines. yen Gulf area of Luzon . JCS direct Adm Nimitz t o 15—16Jan TF 38 carrier aircraft rai d invade Ryukyus (Operation Formosa, Hong Kong, Hai- ICEBERG) two months nan, and Swatow . following Iwo Jima opera- 24Jan Combined air-sea bombard- tion. ment of Iwo Jima . 90ct CinCPOA issues warning or - 25Jan First support mission flow n der for ICEBERG . by Marine dive bombers i n 100ct First U . S. carrier raid on the Philippines . Okinawa . 29Jan U . S. Army forces land o n 140ct VAC directed to prepar e Luzon at Subic Bay . plans for Iwo Jima opera- 16Feb Final operation plan for Oki- tion. nawa issued by Tent h 200ct U . S. Army . troops land on Army. Leyte in the Philippines . 16—17Feb TF 38 aircraft raid Tokyo 210ct Marine Carrier Groups, Air- area. FMFPac, activated at MC - 17Feb Joint Expeditionary Forc e AS, Santa Barbara, Cali- for Okinawa assembles an d fornia. begins rehearsals . 23—250ct Battle of Leyte Gulf . U. S. 19Feb—16Mar ... VAC assaults and capture s naval forces eliminate Jap- Iwo Jima in the Volcan o anese surface fleet as a Islands . major threat . 1Mar B—29s and carrier - base d 250ct CinCPOA issues Joint Staff planes begin preliminar y Study outlining plans fo r air bombardments of Oki- Okinawa operation . nawa . 280ct CNO directs the formation of 10Mar U . S. Army troops land o n the Marine Air Support Mindanao . Division . 11Mar Gen Buckner places Tent h 24Nov Saipan-based B—29s bomb Army OPIn 1—45 into effec t Tokyo in the first attack on by dispatch .

CHRONOLOGY 813

18—19Mar TF 58 strikes Kyushu, Kure , 6Apr XXIV Corps divisions firs t and Inland Sea areas . encounter strong enemy re- 19Mar USS Block Island, first Ma- sistance on the southern rine escort carrier com- front. missioned, departs Sa n 6—7Apr First of ten major Kamikaze Diego for war duty in the attacks mounted on Allie d Pacific with MCVG—1 em - shipping in waters off Oki- barked. nawa . 21Mar Western Islands Attac k 7Apr TAF aircraft begin opera- Group carrying assault tions from Okinawa fields . troops of 77th Infantry Di - TF 58 planes sink Yamato , vision sorties from Leyt e Yahagi, and four Japanes e Gulf for the opening phas e destroyers in the Battle of of ICEBERG . the East China Sea . 23Mar Carrier strikes, intensive sur- 8Apr Gen Mulcahy, commandin g face bombardment, under - TAF, assumes control of water demolition, and mine- aircraft ashore . sweeping operations begin 9—10Apr 3/105 of the 27th Infantry preinvasion preparation s Division assaults and cap- against Okinawa. tures Tsugen Shima, th e 24Mar Preassault staging of ICE - only defended island in the BERG force begins. Eastern Islands group . 26—31Mar 77th Infantry Divisio n lOApr 27th Infantry Division (les s assaults and captures Ke- 3/105) lands on Okinaw a rema Retto and Keise to reinforce XXIV Corps. Shims . 2d Marine Division return s 26Mar TF 57 begins first of 10 attacks between this date an d to Saipan . 20Apr against Sakashim a llApr Heavy Kamikaze attack s Gunto. mounted against TF 58 . 27Mar Transport and covering force s 12Apr President Roosevelt dies, i s of the Joint Expeditionar y succeeded by Vice Presi- Force sortie from Leyt e dent Truman. Gulf and Ulithi for ICE - 15—16Apr TF 58 aircraft raid Kyushu . BERG . 16Apr 77th Infantry Division in- Demonstration Group, carry- vades Ie Shima . ing troops of 2d Marine Di - Gen Buckner establishes his vision, leaves Saipan . 18Apr CP on Okinawa . 81st In- Tenth Army, comprised of lApr fantry Division released a s IIIAC and XXIV Corps Area Reserve by CinCPOA. makes unopposed landing on Okinawa; Yontan an d 19Apr XXIV Corps begins major Kadena airfields secured . assault against outer ring of Shuri defenses . 2Apr Forward elements of the 7th Infantry Division reach the 20Apr 6th Marine Division troop s eastern coast of Okinawa, capture Motobu Peninsula . severing the island . 22Apr Phase II of ICEBERG com- 3Apr 1st Marine Division troop s pleted with end of all or- reach the east coast . ganized major resistance i n 5Apr Reconnaissance of the East- northern Okinawa and l e ern Islands begins . Shima . Phase I continues.

814 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

29Apr German and Italian troops in 24—25May 6th Marine Division move s northern Italy surrender t o to outskirts of Naha . Allied troops . 7th Infantry Division ad- 30Apr 1st Marine Division begins vances on Yonabaru. relief of 27th Infantry Di- 25May JCS direct the invasion o f vision on right (west) o f Japan, Operation OLYM- Tenth Army line. PIC, with a target date of 77th Infantry Division re- 1Nov45 . lieves the 96th Infantr y 26May Enemy movement south of Division in XXIV Corps Shuri observed by spotte r zone . planes . 3—4May Attempted Thirty - second 27May Third Fleet relieves Fift h Army counterlanding on Fleet . Gen Buckner now west coast of Okinaw a directly responsible t o blunted . CinCPOA for operations of 4May 27th Infantry Division re- the Tenth Army . lieves 6th Marine Division 30May 5th Marines captures Shur i in northern Okinawa . Castle. 7May IIIAC takes over the western 2Jun VAC reports by dispatch t o zone of the Tenth Arm y Sixth Army for purposes o f front in southern Okinawa. planning for OLYMPIC . Nazi Germany surrender s 3—4Jun RCT—8 secures Iheya Shima . unconditionally. 4Jun 6th Marine Division assaults

8May First elements of the 6th Oroku Peninsula. Marine Division enter III- 9Jun RCT—8 secures Aguni Shima . AC lines . 11May Tenth Army launches coordi- 11—12Jun Organized resistance ends o n Oroku Peninsula. nated attack across entire front. 14Jun JCS order commanders in Pa- 12May Tori Shima occupied . cific to prepare plans fo r 13—14May Task Force 58 strike s immediate occupation of launched against Kyushu . Japan . 17May Adm Hill relieves Adm Tur- 18Jun Gen Buckner killed in action; ner as control of .all forces Gen Geiger assumes com- ashore passes to Gen Buck- mand of Tenth Army . ner, who assumes respon- 21Jun Organized resistance ends o n sibility to ComFifthFlt for Okinawa . defense and developmen t 22Jun Official flag-raising ceremon y of captured positions. at Tenth Army headquar- 20May—4Jun Bulk of Japanese Thirty-sec- ters marking capture o f ond Army withdraws under Okinawa . cover of rain from th e 23Jun Gen Stilwell assumes com- Shuri bastion to new posi- mand of Tenth Army. tions in Kiyamu Peninsula . 30Jun Completion of the mop-up o f 21May 7th Infantry Division recom- southern Okinawa . Genera l mitted on the east coast t o Rockey relieves Gen Geige r encircle Shuri . as commander of IIIAC . 24May Japanese airborne suicid e FMFPac Reconnaissanc e group lands on Yontan air - Battalion secures Kum e field ; all enemy destroyed . Shima .

CHRONOLOGY 81 5

1Jul Marine escort carriers sup - 28Aug Task Force 31 enters Tokyo port Allied landings on Bay. Balikpapan . First advance units of occu- TF 51 dissolved by CinCPOA : pation force land at Atsug i Gen Stilwell assumes re- Airfield . sponsibility for defense an d 30Aug L—Day for the occupation o f development of Okinaw a Yokosuka . Marines of 2/ 4 Gunto. land on Futtsu Saki at 3Jul Gen Geiger relieves Gen 0558 . General Clement ac- Smith as commander o f cepts surrender of Yoko- FMFPac . suka Naval Base. 5Jul Philippines campaign de- Army airborne units land at clared ended . Atsugi to occupy Yoko- 10Jul TF 58 aircraft mount strike hama area . against Tokyo. Gen MacArthur lands in 15Jul IIIAC detached from Tent h Japan. Army and placed under op- 1Sep VAC headquarters departs erational control of FMF- Hawaiian Islands for occu- Pac . pation of Kyushu. 16Jul Atomic bomb successfull y 2Sep Japanese Empire formally tested at Los Alamos, New surrenders to Allies in cere- Mexico . monies on board USS Mis- 26Jul Allies issue Potsdam Decla - souri in Tokyo Bay. ration . 6Sep Disbandment of Fleet Land- lAug Heaviest B—29 raid in wa r ing Force . Marine com- on Japan . ponent returns to duty a s 4Aug 27th Infantry Divisio n ships' detachments . reaches Hedo Misaki, end- 7Sep Gen Stilwell accepts the sur- ing three and a half-month render of the Japanes e mopping up action i n Ryukyus garrisons signify- northern Okinawa . ing the beginning of Amer- 6Aug Tinian - based B—29 drop s ican political hegemony in atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Okinawa. 8Aug ComThirdFlt OPIn 10—45 fo r 19Sep Led by Gen Worton, IIIA C the occupation of Japan i s advance party depart s distributed . Guam for North China . 9Aug Tinian - based B—29 drop s 22Sep 5th Marine Division arrives atomic bomb on Nagasaki . and lands at Sasebo . Russia invades Manchuria . 23Sep First elements of 2d Marin e lOAug Japan sues for peace . Division (2d and 6th Ma- 14Aug 4th Marines (Reinforced) , rines) land at Nagasaki . comprising the Yokosuk a 6th Marine Division (less 4th Landing Force, departs Marines) begins loading Guam for Japan . operations at Guam for de- 15Aug Hostilities against Japan of- ployment to China . ficially suspended . 24Sep Gen Krueger, commander o f 21Aug CinCPac issues warning order the Sixth Army, assume s to IIIAC for occupation of command of all occupatio n North China . forces ashore on Kyushu . 27Aug Ships of the Third Fleet Gen Worton and his part y enter Sagami Wan . arrive in Tientsin.

816 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

26Sep IIIAC, less the 6th Division , 4th Marines detached from departs Okinawa for China . administrative control of 29Sep VAC publishes the operation 6th Division and placed order for occupation of directly under FMFPac . Fukuoka . MAG — 22 redeployed fro m 3OSep IIIAC, including the 1st Ma- Japan to the United States . rine Division and attached Control of former 5th Marine units, arrives at Taku Bar Division zone of responsi- and begin unloading for bility in Japan passes to occupation duties . 2d Marine and 32d Infantr y Leading elements of Fukuoka Divisions as the 5th pre- Occupation Force unde r pares for redeployment command of Gen Robinson home . arrive in Fukuoka . 4th Marine Division dis- 10ct 1/7 lands at Chinwangtao. banded at Camp Pendleton. 60ct In Tientsin, Gen Rockey ac- 5Dec First ships carrying 5th Divi- sion troops leave Japan . cepts the surrender of th e Gen Shepherd relieved b 50,000 Japanese troops in y Gen Howard as commande r the Tientsin, Tangku, and of the 6th Marine Division Chinwangtao areas . . First major armed clash be- 3d Marine Division (less 1/ 3 in the Bonins and 2/21 on tween Marines and Chines e Communists in North China Truk) disbanded on Guam. VAC relieved of all occupa- takes place on Tientsin- Peiping road . tion duties . Eighth Army assumes command of al l 1st Marine Aircraft Win g headquarters established at occupation troops in Japan. the French Arsenal near 3d Marine Aircraft Wing disbanded at Ewa, T .H. the airfield east of Tientsin . 110ct 6th Marine Division begins 1946 landing at Tsingtao . 8Jan VAC departs Sasebo for San 150ct IIIAC Corps Shore Brigade Diego . disbanded and its dutie s 21Jan 2d Marine Division relieves taken over by 7th Service 32d Infantry Division of Regiment, FMFPac . occupation duties on Kyu- shu . 220ct First group of Japanese repatriates leave Tientsin for 5Feb 5th Marine Division disbanded at Camp Pendleton . home. 11Feb 2d Marine Division reduced 24Oct Fukuoka Occupation Force to peacetime strength when dissolved when it is relieve d third battalion of each in- by 32d Infantry Division. fantry regiment and las t 25Oct Gen Shepherd and LtGen lettered battery of eac h Chen Pao-Tsang, CNA, act- artillery battalion relieved ing for the Nationalist gov- of occupation duties and ernment, accept the formal sent home for disbandment . surrender of the Japanese 14Feb IIIAC issues operation pla n garrison in Tsingtao and on for the reduction of it s the Shantung Peninsula. forces to conform to new 19Nov Repatriation runs begin from Marine Corps peacetim e Tsingtao . tables of organization .

CHRONOLOGY 817

15Feb VAC disbanded at San Diego . 29Jul Chinese Communists ambush 11Mar IIIAC directs the formatio n a Peiping-bound Marin e of six liaison teams fo r supply convoy at Anping . assignment to Executiv e 3Sep 4th Marines, less 3/4, em - Headquarters to supervis e barks for Norfolk to be - the truce in China. come a component of th e 26Mar 6th Marine Division dis- 2d Marine Division . banded at Tsingtao . Marine Forces, Tsingtao, disbanded, and 3/4 (Rein - 31Mar 4th Marine Aircraft Win g forced) comes under opera- disbanded at San Diego . tional control of Com- 9th Marine Aircraft Win g mander, Naval Facilities , disbanded at Cherry Point. Tsingtao . lApr 3d Marine Brigade activated 18Sep Gen Howard relieves Gen at Tsingtao . Rockey as commander of 15Apr 1st Marine Division complete s 1st Marine Division. redeployment in Hopeh . 30Sep Last relief of Marine rail 17Apr Gen Howard relinquishes guards by Nationalis t command of 3d Brigade t o troops takes place . Gen Clement. 300ct Chinese Communists stag e 10Jun IIIAC Corps Headquarters raid on 1st Marine Division and Corps Troops dis- ammunition supply poin t banded. at Hsin Ho . Gen Rockey becomes CG, 1s t 16Dec Activation of FMFLant at Marine Division (Rein- Camp Lejeune, with th e forced) and Marine Forces, commander of the 2d Ma- k China, the latter a tas rine Division assigned addi- force designation for th e tional duties as CG, FMF- division and 1st Wing. Lant . 3d Marine Brigade disbande d at Tsingtao . Most of it s 1947 organic units now comprise 5Jan 7th Marines embarks an d 4th Marines (Reinforced ) sails from Chinwangta o or Marine Forces, Tsing- for the United States, re - tao, with Gen Clemen t porting to FMFPac for commanding. operational and adminis- 15Jun 2d Marine Division relieve d trative control . of occupation duties in 18Jan 11th Marines, in company Japan by 24th Infantry Di- with the 1st Tank Battalio n vision . (—), sails from Chinwang- 24Jun 2d Marine Division headquar- tao for Guam . ters departs Sasebo for it s 5Apr Marine ammunition suppl y new home at Camp Le- point at Hsin Ho struck jeune, North Carolina . again by Chinese Commu- nists in even greater force . 15Jul With departure of last repatriation ship from Tangku , 1May FMFWesPac activated a t more than 540,000 Japanes e Tsingtao with Gen Pfeiffer have been repatriated from in command . AirFMFWes- North China under Marin e Pac activated the same date supervision . with Col Hart commanding.

818 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

12May Marine activities in Hopeh lSep 1st Marine Division rea r reduced and center in echelon departs China . Tientsin as last motor con- 194 9 voy carrying 5th Marines gear clears Peiping and th e 23Jan AirFMFWesPac ceases fligh t regiment sails from China operations at Tsangkou for Guam. Field, as last shore-based Marine planes fly out of 20May 1st Marines depart Tientsin China. for Tsingtao . 8Feb Major portion of FMFWes- 20Jun 1st Marine Division head - Pac departs Tsingtao fo r quarters and detached units United States . depart China for San 26May Last Marines leave China, a s Diego, leaving behind th e elements of Company C , division rear echelon, which 7th Marines, depart Tsing- reports to FMFWesPac fo r tao on board USS Man- operational control . chester.

APPENDIX F

Fleet Marine Force Status-30 April 1945

Strength

Units and Locations USMC USN

Off Enl Off En t

Outside U .S.A.

Hawaiian Area

Oahu

Headquarters and Service Battalion, FMFPac 244 1,265 42 2 9 Signal Battalion, FMFPac 72 415 49 0 Tactical and Gunfire-Air Observation Training Center (Pro- visional), FMFPac 35 12 0 0 Transient Center, FMFPac 260 8,106 40 284 45th Replacement Draft, FMFPac 36 1,012 0 0 62d Replacement Draft, FMFPac 47 1,050 0 0 Headquarters Company, Supply Service, FMFPac 103 352 0 3 6th Base Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac 134 2,865 9 6 2 41st Depot Company, Supply Service, FMFPac 4 160 0 0 Marine Air Support Control Units, Amphibious Forces , Pacific Fleet 95 272 0 4 Headquarters Squadron, AirFMFPac 87 232 7 0 Air Warning Squadron–11, 3d MAW 26 312 0 7 Headquarters Squadron–3, 3d MAW 102 797 10 3 0 Marine Observation Squadron–4, 3d MAW 11 34 0 0 Marine Observation Squadron–5, 3d MAW 11 27 0 0 Service Squadron–14, 3d MAW 15 379 0 0 Marine Transport Squadron–953, 3d MAW 91 451 1 8 Marine Utility Squadron–1, 3d MAW 18 86 0 0 Marine Utility Squadron–3, 3d MAW 19 70 0 0 Headquarters Squadron–44, MASG–44 22 141 5 1 5 Service Squadron–44, MASG–44 18 461 0 0 Marine Fighter Squadron–215, MASG–44 93 301 1 4 Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron–332, MASG–44 22 326 1 4 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron–333, MASG–44 48 290 1 7

Area Sub-Total 1,613 19,416 166 457

See footnote at end of table .

310-224 0 - 69 - 53 81 9

820 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Strengt h

Units and Locations USMC US N

Off Enl Off En t

Hawaii

5th Marine Division 847 14,855 129 938 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac 27 508 2 8 5th Amphibian Truck Company, FMFPac 7 187 0 0 5th Joint Assault Signal Company, FMFPac 33 404 14 0 2d Marine Detachment (Provisional), FMFPac 11 254 0 4 3d Rocket Detachment (Provisional), FMFPac 3 52 0 0 Corps Evacuation Hospital I, FMFPac 0 1 27 22 5 6th Separate Laundry Platoon, FMFPac 1 57 0 0 8th Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac 99 1,580 5 3 1 1st Service and Supply Battalion, Supply Service, FMFPac 30 639 2 1 3 27th Replacement Draft, FMFPac 27 213 2 1 2 31st Replacement Draft, FMFPac 3 28 1 1

Area Sub-Total 1,088 18,778 182 1,23 2

Kaui

1st Marine Detachment (Provisional), FMFPac 14 276 3 1 1 3d Service and Supply Battalion, Supply Service, FMFPac 27 563 0 9

Area Sub-Total 41 839 3 20

Maui

Headquarters and Service Battalion, VAC 107 699 11 60 Medical Battalion, VAC 1 97 29 23 0 Motor Transport Battalion, VAC 6 110 0 0 Signal Battalion, VAC 65 738 3 1 4 2d Bomb Disposal Company, VAC 12 71 0 0 Air Delivery Section, Headquarters and Service Battalion , VAC 3 83 0 0 4th Marine Division 836 15,317 126 1,04 3 1st FMFPac Amphibian Tractor Group Headquarter s (Provisional) 4 4 0 0 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion FMFPac 47 551 2 1 1 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac 31 511 3 2 8 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac 33 523 3 2 9 2d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac 37 812 4 3 4 3d Military Police Battalion (Provisional), FMFPac 19 336 0 0 12th Motor Transport Battalion (Provisional), FMFPac 28 518 1 1 4th Amphibian Truck Company (Provisional), FMFPac 6 181 0 0 1st Joint Assault Signal Company, FMFPac 33 395 13 0 2d Separate Topographical Company, FMFPac 6 78 0 0 2d Separate Laundry Platoon, FMFPac 1 64 0 0 8th Separate Laundry Platoon, FMFPac 1 62 0 0

FLEET MARINE FORCE STATUS—30 APRIL 1945 821

Strength

Units and Locations USMC US N

Off Enl Off En t

1st Separate Radio Intelligence Platoon, FMFPac 1 4 9 0 5th Separate Radio Intelligence Platoon, FMFPac 1 4 9 0 3d Marine Detachment (Provisional), FMFPac 1 0 272 3 1st Rocket Detachment (Provisional), FMFPac 1 5 7 0 2d Service and Supply Battalion, Supply Service, FMFPac 3 4 1,03 1 10 55th Replacement Draft, FMFPac 3 6 1,25 6 0 59th Replacement Draft, FMFPac 35 1,251 0

Area Sub-Total 1,394 25,115 197 1,470

Midway

6th Defense Battalion 2 9 71 0 2 1 Headquarters Squadron 23, MAG-23 2 5 17 3 14 Service Squadron 23, MAG-23 2 2 60 2 0 Marine Fighter Squadron 324, MAG-23 55 22 5 8 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 343, MAG-23 31 291 8

Area Sub-Total 162 2,001 11 5 1

Southwest Pacific

Lingaye n

Headquarters Squadron 24, MAG-24 3 6 11 9 22 Service Squadron 24, MAG-24 1 9 48 1 0 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 133, MAG-24 4 8 28 5 8 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 241, MAG-24 55 281 8

Area Sub-Total 15 8 1,166 10 3 8

Luzo n

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 244, MAG-24 4 7 298 1 8

Mindanao

Air Warning Squadron 3, 1st MAW 1 8 24 9 6 Air Warning Squadron 4, 1st MAW 1 7 24 3 6 Headquarters Squadron 12, MAG-12 27 14 8 24 Service Squadron 12, MAG-12 23 469 0 Marine Fighter Squadron 115, MAG-12 54 229 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 211, MAG-12 52 21 6 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 218, MAG-12 64 188 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 313, MAG-12 5 0 247 8 Headquarters Squadron 32, MAG-32 28 134 20

822 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

Strengt h

Units and Locations USMC US N

Off Enl Off En t

Service Squadron_ 32, MAG–32 2 4 51 3 Marine Bombing Squadron 611, MAG–32 7 0 47 1 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 142, MAG–32 6 2 29 2 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 236, MAG–32 5 3 27 8 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 243, MAG–32 4 9 28 4 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 341, MAG–32 5 0 27 2

Area Sub-Total 64 1 4,233 32 12 8

Samar

Headquarters Squadron 14, MAG–14 3 1 12 9 19 Service Squadron 14, MAG–14 2 3 508 0 Marine Fighter Squadron 221, MAG–14 5 2 204 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 222, MAG–14 53 19 6 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 223, MAG–14 53 19 4 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 251, MAG–14 53 21 0

Area Sub-Total 265 1,441 1 3 5 1 Auckland, New Zealan d

3d Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac 1 5 92 0 0

Banika, Russell Islands

4th Base Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac 98 2,818 6 4 2

Emirau

Headquarters Squadron 61, MAG–61 3 0 158 1 8 Service Squadron 61, MAG–61 2 6 42 9 1 5 Marine Bombing Squadron 413, MAG–61 6 5 39 2 9 Marine Bombing Squadron 433, MAG–61 : 68 41 0 8 Marine Bombing Squadron 443, MAG–61 69 436 8

Area Sub-Total 258 1,825 13 5 8

Green Island

Marine Bombing Squadron 423, MAG–61 7 0 437 1 8 Guadalcana l

South Pacific Echelon (Provisional), FMFPac 1 4 7 4 1 3 4th Casual Company (Provisional), FMFPac 13 104 2 28

FLEET MARINE FORCE STATUS —30 APRIL 1945 82 3

Strength

Units and Locations USMC US N

Off Ent Off En t

2d Field Service Command, Supply Service, FMFPac 1 2 3 4 0 0 4th Service and Supply Battalion, Supply Service, FMFPac 34 818 3 1 4

Area Sub-Total 73 1,03 0 6 4 5

Los Negro s

Marine Air Detachment 1, 1st MAW 58 47 7 4 1 5 Marine Service Squadron 25, MAG–25 2 0 38 5 0 0

Area Sub-Total 78 86 2 4 1 5

Munda, New Georgia

Marine Air Base Squadron 1, 4th MAW 1 2 35 7 2 1 5

Torokina, Bougainville

Headquarters Squadron 1, 1st MAW 2 3 19 6 1 8 Headquarters Squadron 25, MAG–25 2 3 19 6 18 Marine Transport Squadron 152, MAG–25 55 32 2 8 Marine Transport Squadron 153, MAG–25 58 31 7 8

Area Sub-Total 159 1,031 12 52

Central Pacific

Okinawa

Headquarters and Service Battalion, IIIAC 134 95 5 1 0 3 1 Medical Battalion, IIIAC 1 9 9 30 233 Signal Battalion, IIIAC 81 88 3 4 10 Headquarters Battery, Corps Artillery, IIIAC 33 22 7 3 8 1st Bomb Disposal Company, IIIAC 12 7 3 0 0 Air Delivery Section, Headquarters and Service Battalion , IIIAC 2 150 0 2 1st Marine Division 882 16,99 4 14 1 1,05 9 6th Marine Division 929 16,578 123 99 8 Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, FMFPac 20 279 0 1 3 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac 34 54 0 3 2 8 1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac 42 83 1 4 3 6 1st Military Police Battalion, FMFPac 32 452 0 0 1st 155mm Howitzer Battalion, FMFPac 34 587 2 1 0 1st Separate Engineer Battalion, FMFPac 4 6 82 7 3 2 0 2d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac 54 1,270 4 32

824 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

Strengt h

Units and Locations USMC USN

Off Ent Off En t

3d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Provisional) , FMFPac 78 9 3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion, FMFPac 59 1 4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac 46 8 5th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac 1,25 9 6th 155mm Howitzer Battalion, FMFPac 59 1 7th 155mm Howitzer Battalion, FMFPac 64 4 8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac 53 1 8th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac 1,27 6 8th 155mm Howitzer Battalion, FMFPac 64 4 9th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac 49 2 9th 155mm Howitzer Battalion, FMFPac 63 8 11th Motor Transport Battalion, FMFPac 55 8 16th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac 1,28 3 Headquarters Battery, 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Group , FMFPac 2 2 144 0 2 Headquarters Battery, 2d Field Artillery Group (Provisional) , FMFPac 77 1st Separate Topographical Company, FMFPac 12 1 3d Amphibian Truck Company (Provisional), FMFPac 19 2 4th Joint Assault Signal Company, FMFPac 34 4 6th Amphibian Truck Company (Provisional), FMFPac 18 8 6th Joint Assault Signal Company, FMFPac 42 2 1st War Dog Platoon, FMFPac 7 9 3d Separate Laundry Platoon, FMFPac 5 5 3d Separate Radio Intelligence Platoon, FMFPac 4 6 4th War Dog Platoon, FMFPac 79 5th Separate Laundry Platoon, FMFPac 57 7th Separate Laundry Platoon, FMFPac 62 4th Rocket Detachment (Provisional), FMFPac 5 8 5th Rocket Detachment (Provisional), FMFPac 5 5 Corps Evacuation Hospital II, FMFPac 0 Corps Evacuation Hospital III, FMFPac 0 7th Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac 3,45 6 26th Replacement Draft, FMFPac 96 1 29th Replacement Draft, FMFPac 1,169 32d Replacement Draft, FMFPac 1,169 33d Replacement Draft, FMFPac 952 Headquarters Squadron 2, 2d MAW* 38 6 Marine Observation Squadron 6, 2d MAW 2 8 Marine Observation Squadron 7, 2d MAW 2 8 Marine Observation Squadron 3, 4th MAW 2 9 Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 131, MAG–21 394 Headquarters Squadron 31, MAG–31 100 Service Squadron 31, MAG–31 522 See footnote at end of table .

FLEET MARINE FORCE STATUS—30 APRIL 1945 82 5

Strength

Units and Locations USMC USN

Off Enl Off En t

Marine Fighter Squadron 224, MAG-31 22 4 Marine Fighter Squadron 311, MAG-31 22 4 Marine Fighter Squadron 441, MAG-31 22 4 Marine Night Fighter Squadron 542, MAG-31 21 8 Headquarters Squadron 33, MAG-33 13 0 Service Squadron 33, MAG-33 54 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 312, MAG-33 21 3 Marine Fighter Squadron 322, MAG-33 21 4 Marine Fighter Squadron 323, MAG-33 22 3 Marine Night Fighter Squadron 543, MAG-33 21 8 Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 232, MAG-33 30 7 Headquarters Squadron 43, MAG-43 21 3 Air Warning Squadron 6, MAG-43 25 8 Air Warning Squadron 7, MAG-43 27 2 Air Warning Squadron 8, MAG-43 29 5

Area Sub-Total 4,241 65,931 516 3,555

Marine Carrier-based Aviation

On board USS Bennington (CV-20)

Marine Fighter Squadron 112, MAG-42 34 168 2 3 Marine Fighter Squadron 123, MAG-42 34 131 0 5

On board USS Block Island (CVE-106 )

Carrier Air Support Detachment 1, MCVG-1 10 227 0 2 Marine Carrier Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 233, MCVG-1 20 45 .0 1 Marine Carrier Fighter Squadron 511, MCVG-1 29 9 1 0

On board USS Bunker Hill (CV-17 )

Marine Fighter Squadron 221, MAG-42 39 137 0 4 Marine Fighter Squadron 451, MAG-42 36 169 1 3

On board USS Gilbert Islands (CVE-107)

Carrier Air Support Detachment 2, MCVG-2 11 228 0 2 Marine Carrier Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 143, MCVG-2 20 45 0 0 Marine Carrier Fighter Squadron 512, MCVG-2 30 8 1 0

826 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

Strengt h

Units and Locations SM C USN

Off Ent Off En,

On board USS Vella Gulf (CVE—111 )

Carrier Air Support Detachment 3, MCVG—3 11 226 0 2 Marine Carrier Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 234, MCVG—3 20 45 0 0 Marine Carrier Fighter Squadron 513, MCVG—3 30 8 1 0

Area Sub-Total 386 1,723 7 2 4

Angau r

7th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac 54 1,239 4 2 9

Engebi

Headquarters Squadron 22, MAG—22 26 112 8 1 9 Service Squadron 22, MAG—22 23 510 0 0 Air Warning Squadron 1, MAG—22 19 228 0 6 Marine Fighter Squadron 113, MAG—22 55 224 1 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 422, MAG—22 52 224 1 8 Headquarters Squadron 94, MAG—94 32 225 8 1 9 Service Squadron 94, MAG—94 19 601 0 0 Marine Night Fighter Squadron 533, INS AG—94 44 269 1 9 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 151, MAG—94 38 310 1 8

Area Sub-Total 308 2,703 20 7 7

Eniwetok

51st Defense Battalion, FMFPac 63 1,317 6 32 Marine Fighter Squadron 111, MAG—94 41 257 1 8

Area Sub-Total 104 1,574 7 4 0

Gua m

Forward Echelon, Headquarters, FMFPac 21 78 0 0 Headquarters Battery, Corps Artillery, VAC 25 218 5 9 3d Marine Division 934 15,469 127 1,04 6 Transient Center, Forward, FMFPac 126 1,408 22 11 9 War Dog Training and Administrative Headquarters (Pro - visional), FMFPac 2 35 0 0 1st Base Headquarters Battalion, FMFPac 73 548 104 44 7 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac 4 154 0 0 9th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac 58 1,239 4 3 0 14th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac 56 1,234 4 2 8 52d Defense Battalion, FMFPac 67 1,252 7 33

FLEET MARINE FORCE STATUS—30 APRIL 1945 827

Strength

Units and Locations USMC US N

Off Ent Off En l

2d Military Police Battalion, FMFPac 3 2 41 8 1 5th 155mm Howitzer Battalion, FMFPac 3 2 66 1 1 0 10th 155mm Howitzer Battalion, FMFPac 3 2 68 4 1 2 11th 155mm Howitzer Battalion, FMFPac 3 5 66 4 1 4 12th 155mm Howitzer Battalion, FMFPac 3 3 65 3 1 3 2d Separate Engineer Battalion, FMFPac 67 84 4 2 0 Headquarters Battery, 2d Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Pro- visional), FMFPac 13 8 3d Joint Assault Signal Company, FMFPac 35 5 1st Separate Laundry Platoon, FMFPac 6 0 4th Separate Radio Intelligence Platoon, FMFPac 4 8 3d War Dog Platoon, FMFPac 6 6 6th War Dog Platoon, FMFPac 60 7th War Dog Platoon, FMFPac 58 1st Field Service Command, Supply Service, FMFPac 8 2 5th Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac 3,00 1 46th Replacement Draft, FMFPac 1,20 1 54th Replacement Draft, FMFPac 1,21 8 56th Replacement Draft, FMFPac 1,25 0 57th Replacement Draft, FMFPac 57 0 63d Replacement Draft, FMFPac 1,25 0 64th Replacement Draft, FMFPac 1,24 3 Marine Photographic Squadron 354, 4th MAW* 28 8 Headquarters Squadron 21, MAG–21 23 9 Service Squadron 21, MAG–21 48 5 Air Warning Squadron 2, MAG–21 24 3 Marine Fighter Squadron 225, MAG–21 20 8 Marine Night Fighter Squadron 534, MAG–21 21 7 Marine Observation Squadron 1, MAG–21 4 4 Marine Observation Squadron 8, MAG–21 2 8 Marine Transport Squadron 252, MAG–21 34 4 Marine Transport Squadron 253, MAG–21 31 3 Marine Transport Squadron 952, MAG–21 323 Marine Utility Squadron 2, MAG–21 11 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 314, MAG–22 22 5 Area Sub-Total 2,031 28,107 290 1,83 8 Kwajalein Headquarters Squadron 4, 4th MAW 10 6 69 8 1 5 Headquarters Squadron 15, MAG–15 1 7 11 6 15 Marine Bombing Squadron 613, MAG–94 6 7 452 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 155, MAG–94 39 341 7 Area Sub-Total 229 1,607 14 45

See footnote at end of table.

828 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

Strengt h

Units and Locations USMC USN

Off Enl Off En l

Majuro

Headquarters Squadron 13, MAG—13 23 130 5 1 9 Service Squadron 13, MAG—13 19 478 0 0 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 231, MAG—13 45 317 1 8 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 331, MAG—13 67 315 1 8

Area Sub-Total 154 1,240 7 3 5

Peleliu

4th Antiaircraft Battalion, FMFPac 38 900 4 3 8 12th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac 53 1,248 4 3 0 3d Base Headquarters Battalion, FMFPac 30 233 29 9 10th Service Battalion (Provisional), Supply Service , FMFPac 16 331 0 5 Headquarters Squadron 11, MAG—11 35 131 2 0 Service Squadron 11, MAG—11 36 736 8 1 9 Marine Fighter Squadron 114, MAG—11 44 256 1 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 121, MAG—11 42 221 1 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 122, MAG—11 44 222 0 8 Marine Night Fighter Squadron 541, MAG—11 31 219 1 8 Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 134, MAG—11 59 367 1 8

Area Sub-Total 428 4,864 51 14 1

Saipa n

2d Marine Division 905 16,553 129 1,05 3 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac 31 515 2 9 11th Service Battalion (Provisional), Supply Service, FMFPac 38 1,198 4 4 4 2d Amphibian Truck Company, FMFPac 6 165 0 0 2d Joint Assault Signal Company, FMFPac 36 362 15 0 4th Separate Laundry Platoon, FMFPac 1 58 0 0 2d War Dog Platoon, FMFPac 2 36 0 0 2d Rocket Detachment (Provisional), FMFPac 3 53 0 0 35th Replacement Draft, FMFPac 63 1,208 1 1 1 41st Replacement Draft, FMFPac 62 1,176 1 1 0 Marine Bombing Squadron 612, MAG—21 75 518 1 8 Marine Observation Squadron 2, MAG—21 11 33 0 0 Marine Transport Squadron 353, MAG—21 75 365 0 0

Area Sub-Total 1,308 22,240 153 1,135

FLEET MARINE FORCE STATUS—30 APRIL 1945 829

Strengt h

Units and Locations USMC US N

Off Enl Off En l

Tinian

17th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac 55 1,302 4 2 9 18th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac 53 1,264 4 2 8 Marine Torpedo Bomber Squadron 242, MAG-21 51 308 1 8

Area Sub-Total 159 2,874 9 6 5

Ulithi

Headquarters Squadron 45, MAG-45 28 122 1 0 Service Squadron 45, MAG-45 29 504 9 1 8 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 245, MAG-45 47 281 1 8

Area Sub-Total 104 907 11 2 6

Miscellaneous

Aviation personnel attached to Marine divisions, amphibiou s

corps, and JASCOs 41 55 ......

West Coast, U.S.A .

San Diego

Headquarters Company, Marine Training and Replacement Command, San Diego Area 49 137 2 5 Headquarters Squadron, Marine Fleet Air, West Coast 91 566 2 3 Marine Photographic Squadron 354, Marine Fleet Air, Wes t Coast 46 274 1 4

Area Sub-Total 186 977 5 1 2

Camp Elliott

Base Depot, Marine Training and Replacement Command , SDA 90 563 2 2 0

Camp Gillespie

Headquarters and Service Squadron, 2d AWG 17 159 0 1 Air Warning Squadron 9, 2d AWG 18 220 0 6

Area Sub-Total 35 379 0 7

830 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Strength

Units and Locations USMC US N

Off Ent off Ent

Camp Pendleton

Headquarters Battalion, Marine Training Command, SDA 86 976 2 0 74 Schools Regiment, Marine Training Command, SDA 640 1,004 0 0 Specialist Training Regiment, Marine Training Command , SDA 297 2,071 4 9 868 2d Infantry Training Regiment (8 battalions), Marine Training Command, SDA 164 1,793 0 0 62d Replacement Draft (Rear Echelon) 4 281 0 0

Area Sub-Total 1,191 6,125 6 9 94 2

El Centro

Headquarters Squadron 35, MAG-35 291 749 4 1 9 Service Squadron 35, MAG-35 27 749 0 0 Service Squadron 43, MAG-35 16 335 2 15 Marine Transport Squadron 352, MAG-35 49 241 1 7 Headquarters Squadron 42, MAG-42 55 609 4 2 7 Service Squadron 42, MAG-42 34 673 0 0 Marine Fighter Squadron 214, MAG-42 32 141 0 3 Marine Fighter Squadron 452, MAG-42 35 155 1 5

Area Sub-Total 539 3,652 1 2 7 6

El Toro

Headquarters Squadron 41, MAG-41 54 447 5 Service Squadron 41, MAG-41 19 433 0 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 141, MAG-41 1 1 0 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 464, MAG-41 49 277 1 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 474, MAG-41 52 263 1 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 484, MAG-41 16 248 1 Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 943, MAG-41 58 332 1 Headquarters Squadron 46, MAG-46 76 332 7 Service Squadron 46, MAG-46 27 751 0 Marine Fighter Squadron 461, MAG-46 90 333 1 Marine Fighter Squadron 462, MAG-46 88 304 1 Marine Fighter Squadron 471, MAG-46 119 340 0

Area Sub-Total 649 4,061 1 8 108

Miramar

Supply Squadron 5, Marine Fleet Air, West Coast 15 258 0 0 Marine Fighter Squadron 217, Marine Fleet Air, West Coas t 10 12 0 0

FLEET MARINE FORCE STATUS—30 APRIL 1945 83 1

Strength

Units and Locations USMC US N

Off Ent Off En l

Marine Fighter Squadron 217, Marine Fleet Air, West Coast 5 2 9 0 Headquarters Squadron, Personnel Group 907 23 9 0 Marine Wing Service Squadron 1, Personnel Group 0 3 0 Marine Wing Service Squadron 2, Personnel Group 0 2 0 Marine Wing Service Squadron 3, Personnel Group 0 2 0 Marine Wing Service Squadron 4, Personnel Group 0 2 0 Marine Air Control Squadron 1, Personnel Group 12 1,19 8 0 Marine Air Control Squadron 2, Personnel Group 9 1,49 5 201 Marine Air Control Squadron 3, Personnel Group 5 36 3 0 Marine Air Control Squadron 4, Personnel Group 5 1,58 8 0 Marine Air Control Squadron 5, Personnel Group 5 2,269 0

Area Sub-Total 97 3 7,460 65 20 1

Mojave

Headquarters Squadron 51, MASG-51, 2d Div, Marin e Carrier Groups, AirFMFPac 2 0 40 0 0 Service Squadron 51, MASG-51, 2d Div, Marine Carrie r Groups, AirFMFPac 83 0 Carrier Air Support Detachment 5, MASG-51 14 7 Carrier Air Support Detachment 6, MASG-51 15 8 Carrier Air Support Detachment 8, MASG-51 38 Marine Fighter Squadron 124, MASG-51 5 Marine Fighter Squadron 321, MASG-51 3 0 Marine Carrier Fighter Squadron 514, MASG-51 3 8 Marine Carrier Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 144, MASG-51 7 3 Marine Carrier Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 454, MASG-51 6 3 Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 621, MASG-51 7 5 Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 622, MASG-51 : 4 6 Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 624, MASG-51 91

Area Sub-Total 270 1,634 1 3 3 8

Port Huenem e

Headquarters Squadron 62, MAG-62 1 1 169 1 4

Santa Barbara

Air Warning Squadron 12, 2d AWG 2 0 23 1 6 Headquarters Squadron 48, MASG-48 1 8 4 9 0 Service Squadron 48, MASG-48 6 5 74 7 32 Carrier Air Support Detachment 7, MASG-51 1 10 6 2 Marine Fighter Squadron 213, MASG-51 8 9 0

832 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Strength

Units and Locations USMC USN

Off Enl Off Enl

Marine Fighter Squadron 472, MASG-51 3 5 5 0 0 Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 623, MASG-51 22 92 0 0

Area Sub-Total 169 1,239 6 4 0

Eagle Mountain Lake, Texas

Headquarters Squadron 53, MNFG-53 4 6 16 7 0 Service Squadron 53, MNFG-53 2 1 580 27 Marine Night Fighter Squadron 531, MNFG-53 9 4 219 0 Marine Night Fighter Squadron 532, MNFG-53 1 5 18 5 0 Marine Night Fighter Squadron 544, MNFG-53 35 191 5

Area Sub -Total 201 1,342 8 3 2

East Coast, U .S.A.

Camp Lejeune

Headquarters Battalion, Marine Training Command 34 1,59 2 Range Battalion, Marine Training Command 6 25 1 Quartermaster Battalion, Marine Training Command 4 3 45 8 Schools Regiment, Marine Training Command 64 5 1,756 Specialist Training Regiment, Marine Training Command 37 0 3,327 Infantry Training Regiment (10 battalions), Marine Training Command 304 7,57 2 0 7th Separate Infantry Battalion 22 62 0 23 65th Replacement Draft 3 6 59 1 0 66th Replacement Draft : 7 4 1 0

Area Sub-Total 1,467 16,20 8 0 2 3

Norfolk

Marine Base Depot 19 346 1 9

Quantico

Infantry Training Battalion, MCS 3 5 1,040 2 4 0 Field Artillery Training Battalion, MCS 70 657 0 9

Area Sub -Total 105 1,697 2 4 9

Bogu e

Air Warning Squadron 18, 1st AWG 1 3 0 6 Headquarters Squadron 93, MAG-93 27 4 5

FLEET MARINE FORCE STATUS—30 APRIL 1945 83 3

Strength

Units and Locations USMC USN

O8 Ent Off En t

Service Squadron 93, MAG-93 2 4 48 5 2 1 4 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 933, MAG-93 4 5 25 2 1 4 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 934, MAG-93 43 248 0 4

Area Sub-Total 152 1,246 7 3 3

Cherry Poin t

Marine Wing Service Squadron 9, 9th MAW 31 2 2,80 1 Headquarters Squadron 9, 9th MAW 12 6 89 1 Headquarters and Service Squadron 1, 1st AWG 4 8 45 7 Air Warning Squadron 16, 1st AWG 2 1 18 6 Headquarters Squadron 81, MOTG-81 5 0 66 8 Service Squadron 81, MOTG-81 2 5 67 9 Marine Operational Training Squadron 811, MOTG-81 3 7 412 Marine Operational Training Squadron 812, MOTG-81 3 0 37 0 Marine Operational Training Squadron 813, MOTG-81 2 4 50 4 Marine Operational Training Squadron 814, MOTG-81 172 552 Headquarters Squadron 91, MAG-91 42 12 5 Service Squadron 91, MAG-91 1 9 52 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 911, MAG-91 4 8 22 5 Marine Fighter Squadron 912, MAG-91 4 8 19 0 Marine Fighter Squadron 913, MAG-91 4 9 19 1 Marine Fighter Squadron 914, MAG-91 47 191

Area Sub-Total 1,098 8,970 4 0 12 4

Congaree

Air Warning Squadron 14, 1st AWG 1 7 18 0 6 Headquarters Squadron 52, MAG-52 2 9 114 5 Service Squadron 52, MAG-52 2 2 56 3 1 5 Marine Fighter Squadron 521, MAG-52 5 8 19 1 4 Marine Fighter Squadron 522, MAG-52 3 0 16 5 3 Marine Fighter Squadron 523, MAG-52 37 173 3

Area Sub-Total 193 1,386 8 3 6

Greenville

Marine Photographic Squadron 254, 9th MAW 37 317 1 12

834 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Strength

Units and Locations USMC USN

Off Ent Off En l

Kinston

Marine Photographic Squadron 154, 9th MAW 28 211 2 8 Marine Photographic Squadron 954, 9th MAW 19 256 1 4

Area Sub-Total 47 467 3 1 2

Newport

Service Squadron 62, 9th MAW 15 380 5 1 6 Marine Bombing Squadron 614, 9th MAW 67 433 1 4

Area Sub-Total 82 813 6 20

Oak Grove

Air Warning Squadron 17, 1st AWG 14 171 0 6 Headquarters Squadron 34, MAG–34 26 124 1 5 Service Squadron 34, MAG–34 21 464 4 1 6 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 931, MAG–34 45 215 0 3 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 932, MAG–34 43 223 1 4

Area Sub-Total 149 1,197 6 3 3

Parris Island

Marine Fighter Squadron 524, MAG–52 30 224 1 4

Vero Beach

Air Warning Squadron 13, 1st AWG 13 224 0 5

Total FMF (Ground) Overseas 10 , 562 188 , 627 1, 499 9 , 72 2 Total FMF (Air) Overseas 5 , 704 30 , 399 286 1,11 9 Total FMF (Ground) in U .S.A 2,921 25,076 76 1,,04 8 Total FMF (Air) in U .S.A 4,774 35,451 197 788 Total FMF Overseas 16 , 266 219 , 026 1, 785 10 , 84 1 Total FMF in U .S.A 7,695 60,527 273 1,83 6 Total FMF 23,961 279,553 2,058 12,677

Strength figures and unit designations were abstracted from the FMF Status Reports, Ground and Air, for April 1945 held in th e Archives of the Historical Branch, G—3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps . Units en route or ordered to the indicated areas (indicated by an asterisk *) are listed under those areas regardless of their temporary locations .

APPENDIX G Fleet Marine Force Status-31 October 1946 1

Strength

Units and Locations USMC USN

Off Enl Off Enl

Outside U.S.A . Hawaiian Area

Oahu Headquarters and Service Battalion, FMFPac (less Topo - graphic Company) 7 9 54 0 8 1 6 Headquarters Battalion, Service Command, FMFPac 2 6 14 3 0 4 6th Service Depot 51 1,188 4 2 3

Area Sub-Total 156 1,871 12 4 3

Maui

18th Service Battalion 5 9 4 1 3

Ew a Headquarters Squadron, AirFMFPac 4 9 29 0 Headquarters Squadron 15, MAG—15 1 6 6 4 Service Squadron 15, MAG—15 1 4 29 5 Marine Transport Squadron 352, MAG—15 3 7 30 2 Marine Transport Squadron 953, MAG—15 4 2 299

Area Sub-Total 158 1,25 0 3 1 7

Midway Marine Fighter Squadron 322, MAG—15 20 73 0 0

Central Pacific Area Gua m Heavy Antiaircraft Group, 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion 14 33 3 0 0 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 1st MarDiv 7 6 7 0 0 5th Service Depot 59 1,25 4 6 2 2

Area Sub-Total 80 1,65 4 6 2 2

See footnote at end of table .

310-224 0 - 69 - 54 835

836 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Strength

Units and Locations USMC US N

Off Enl Off En t

Kwajalein

Marine Detachment (Provisional) 5 108 0 0

Eniwetok

Marine Detachment (Provisional) 2 65 0 0

China Area

Tientsin

1st Marine Division, Reinforced (less 1st Amphibian Tracto r Battalion) 353 9,295 119 420 7th Service Regiment 28 707 4 1 8 7th Casual Officer Detachment 50 0 0 0 109th Replacement Draft 6 1,001 0 0 Headquarters Squadron 1, 1st MAW 81 326 4 1 1 Marine Wing Service Squadron 1, 1st MAW 8 40 1 0 Marine Observation Squadron 3, 1st MAW 9 26 0 0

Area Sub-Total 535 11,395 128 44 9

Tsingtao

3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Reinforced) 43 1,240 9 3 8 12th Service Battalion 23 415 4 6 Marine Observation Squadron 6, 1st MAW 8 19 0 0 Marine Transport Squadron 153, 1st MAW 53 514 2 1 2

Area Sub-Total 126 2,188 15 5 6

Peiping

Headquarters Squadron 24, MAG—24 29 123 2 2 Service Squadron 24, MAG—24 20 468 3 7 Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 7, MAG—24 11 90 0 5 Marine Fighter Squadron 115, MAG—24 35 136 0 3 Marine Fighter Squadron 211, MAG—24 29 129 0 2 Marine Fighter Squadron 218, MAG—24 30 129 1 3 Marine Night Fighter Squadron 533, MAG—24 32 176 1 2

Area Sub-Total 186 1,251 7 24

FLEET MARINE FORCE STATUS—31 OCTOBER 1945 83 7

Strengt h

Units and Locations USMC USN

Off Enl Off Ent

East Coast U .S.A.

Camp Lejeune

2d Marine Division 231 3,373 13 10 4 2d Air Delivery Platoon 1 2 0 0 Transport Company, FMF 1 6 0 0 Signal Company (Provisional), FMF 2 9 0 0 8th Service Regiment 20 283 0 3 Topographic Company, Headquarters and Service Battalion, FM FP ac 0 4 0 0 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (less Heavy Antiaircraft Group) 10 65 0 1 2d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Composite) 8 79 0 0 3d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Composite) 9 229 0 0

Area Sub-Total 282 4,050 13 10 8

Marine Carrier-based Aviation

On board USS Salerno Bay (CVE-110 )

Marine Fighter Squadron 114, MAG-ll 29 176 0 2

On board USS Mindoro (CVE-120)

Marine Fighter Squadron 225, MAG-11 26 174 0 2

On board USS Palau (CVE-122)

Marine Fighter Squadron 461, MAG-ll 27 180 0 2

Area Sub-Total 82 530 0 6

Cherry Point

Headquarters Squadron 2, 2d MAW 60 268 4 9 Marine Wing Service Squadron 2, 2d MAW 2 2 0 0 Headquarters Squadron, MACG-1 21 240 2 2 Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 5, MACG-1 8 6 0 2 Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 6, MACG-1 2 1 0 2 Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 8, MACG-1 3 3 0 1 Headquarters Squadron 11, MAG-ll 13 143 2 3 Service Squadron 11, MAG-ll 14 332 0 5 Headquarters Squadron 14, MAG-14 16 44 2 2 Service Squadron 14, MAG-14 11 354 1 7

838 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Strength

Units and Locations USMC USN

Off Enl Off Ent

Marine Fighter Squadron 122, MAG-14 4 7 Marine Fighter Squadron 212, MAG-14 3 1 Marine Fighter Squadron 222, MAG-14 3 1 Headquarters Squadron 21, MAG-21 9 4 Service Squadron 21, MAG-21 36 2 Marine Transport Squadron 252, MAG-21 24 9 Marine Transport Squadron 952, MAG-21 240 Headquarters Squadron 22, MAG-22 5 Service Squadron 22, MAG-22 89 5 Marine Fighter Squadron 113, MAG-22 0 Marine Fighter Squadron 314, MAG-22 0 Marine Fighter Squadron 422, MAG-22 0 Marine Observation Squadron 1, MAG-22 0 Headquarters Squadron 53, MAG-53 573 Service Squadron 53, MAG-53 1 Marine Night Fighter Squadron 531, MAG-53 1 Marine Night Fighter Squadron 532, MAG-53 1 Marine Photographic Squadron 354, MAG-53 7

Area Sub-Total 324 3,93 0 17 5 8

West Coast U .S.A.

Camp Pendleton

3d Marine Brigade (less 3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Rein- forced) at Tsingtao) 7 6 212 2 4 1 10th Casual Officer Detachment 45 0 0 0

Area Sub-Total 121 21 2 2 4 1

Marine Carrier-based Aviation

On board USS Rendova (CVE-114)

Marine Fighter Squadron 214, MarFAirWest 2 6 152 1 2

On board USS Badoeng Straits (CVE-116) Marine Fighter Squadron 452, MarFAirWest 2 9 17 9 1 2

On board USS Saidor (CVE-117) Marine Fighter Squadron 513, MarFAirWest 31 179 1 2

Area Sub-Total 86 510 3 6

FLEET MARINE FORCE STATUS—31 OCTOBER 1945 839

Strength

Units and Locations USMC US N

Off Ent Off En t

El Toro

Headquarters Squadron, MarFAirWest 141 437 6 1 5 Headquarters Squadron, MACG-2 16 42 0 0 Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 3, MACG-2 1 1 0 0 Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 4, MACG-2 2 1 0 0 Headquarters Squadron 12, MAG-12 13 27 0 4 Service Squadron 12, MAG-12 15 196 0 2 Headquarters Squadron 25, MAG-25 13 71 1 2 Service Squadron 25, MAG-25 11 227 0 4 Marine Transport Squadron 152, MAG-25 22 213 0 3 Marine Fighter Squadron 224, MAG-32 5 40 0 1 Marine Fighter Squadron 311, MAG-32 3 0 0 1 Headquarters Squadron 33, MAG-33 28 69 0 3 Service Squadron 33, MAG-33 13 77 3 9 Marine Fighter Squadron 223, MAG-33 37 174 0 0 Marine Fighter Squadron 312, MAG-33 34 174 0 0 Marine Fighter Squadron 323, MAG-33 34 174 0 1 Marine Photographic Squadron 254, MAG-33 14 137 0 0

Area Sub-Total 402 2,060 10 4 5

Miramar Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1, MACG-2 15 256 0 0 Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 2, MACG-2 2 1 0 0 Marine Transport Squadron 253, MAG-25 29 162 0 2 Headquarters Squadron 31, MAG-31 22 65 2 4 Service Squadron 31, MAG-31 13 269 0 8 Marine Night Fighter Squadron 534, MAG-31 19 161 0 2 Marine Night Fighter Squadron 542, MAG-31 12 133 0 3 Headquarters Squadron 32, MAG-32 10 166 0 3 Service Squadron 32, MAG-32 6 136 0 3

Area Sub-Total 128 1,349 2 2 5

Total Ground (Overseas) 751 16,450 155 55 0 Total Air (Overseas) 522 3,500 17 64 Total Ground (In U .S.A.) 403 4,262 15 14 9 Total Air (In U .S.A.) 1,022 8,411 32 14 0 Total FMF (Overseas) 1,273 19,950 172 614 Total FMF (In U.S.A.) 1,425 12,673 47 28 9 Total FMF 2,698 32,623 219 903

Strength figures and unit designations were abstracted from the FMF Status Reports, Ground and Air, for October 1946 held i n the Archives of the Historical Branch, G—3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps . Units en route or ordered to the indicated area s (indicated by an asterisk *) are listed under those areas regardless of their temporary locations. APPENDIX H

Table of Organization G-100 Marine Divisio n

4 September 1945 1

USMC USN TOTALS Unit Off Enl Off Enl Off En t

Division Headquarters (84) (276) (4) (5) (88) (281 ) Headquarters Battalion 161 1,,601 19 13 180 1,,61 4 Headquarters Company (95) (539) (6) (9) (101) (548 ) Signal Company (17) (331) ...... (17) (331 ) Military Police Company (6) (93) ...... (6) (93 ) Reconnaissance Company (5) (104) ...... (4) (5) (108 ) Assault Signal Company (34) (418) (13) ...... (47) (418 ) War Dog Platoon 2 : (1) (63) ...... (1) (63 ) Rocket Platoon (3) (53) ...... (3) (53) Tank Battalion 27 586 1 9 28 59 5 Headquarters and Service Company (12) (91) (1) (9) (13) (100 ) 3 Tank Companies (5) (165) ...... (5) (165 ) Service Troops 86 1,673 71 417 157 2,09 0 Service Battalion (37) (681) (5) (9) (42) (690 ) Headquarters Company (7) (36) (5) (9) (12) (45) Supply Company (8) (149) ...... (8) (149 ) Service Company (9) (267) ...... (9) (267 ) Ordnance Company (13) (229) ...... (13) (229 ) Motor Transport Battalion (48) (848) (1) (9) (49) (857 ) Headquarters and Service Company (8) (58) (1) (9) (9) (67) Automotive Repair Company (19) (330) ...... (19) (330 ) Amphibian Truck Company (5) (140) ...... (5) (140 ) 4 Truck Companies (4) (80) ...... (4) (80) Medical Battalion (1) (144) (65) (399) (66) (543 ) Headquarters and Service Company (1) (24) (30) (49) (31) (73) 5 Medical Companies (24) (7) (70) (7) (94 ) Engineer Battalion 40 814 1 20 41 83 4 Headquarters and Service Company (22) (232) (1) (20) (23) (252 ) 3 Engineer Companies (6) (194) ...... (6) (194 ) Pioneer Battalion 40 665 3 32 43 69 7 Headquarters and Service Company (13) (86) (3) (32) (16) (118 ) 3 Pioneer Companies (9) (193) ...... (9) (193 ) Artillery Regiment 177 2,421 8 55 185 2,476 Headquarters and Service Battery (26) (210) (4) (9) (30) (219 ) 155mm Howitzer Battalion (37) (588) (1) (10) (38) (598 ) Headquarters and Service Battery (16) (135) (1) (10) (17) (145 ) 3 155mm Howitzer Batteries (7) (151) ...... (7) (151 ) 3 105mm Howitzer Battalions (38) (541) (1) (12) (39) (553 ) Headquarters and Service Battery (17) (136) (1) (12) (18) (148 ) 3 105mm Howitzer Batteries (7) (135) ...... (7) (135) 840

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION G-400—MARINE DIVISION 841

USMC USN TOTAL S Unit Off Ent Off Enl Off Ent

3 Infantry Regiments 137 3,130 11 134 148 3,264 Headquarters and Service Company (23) (207) (5) (14) (28) (221 ) Weapons Company (6) (169) ...... (6) (169 ) 3 Infantry Battalions (36) (918) (2) (40) (38) (958 ) Headquarters and Service Company (15) (213) (2) (40) (17) (253 ) 3 Rifle Companies (7) (235) ...... (7) (235 )

Division Totals 942 17,150 136 948 1,078 18,098

1 All unit strength figures enclosed in parentheses are included in strength totals of parent units . 2 These strength figures do not include the 36 dogs assigned to each platoon . Two Marines were assigned to handle each messenger dog, and one Marine for each scout dog.

MAJOR WEAPONS AND TRANSPORTATION—MARINE DIVISIO N

Weapons Number Transportation Number

Carbine, .30 Cal ., Ml or M2 10,371 Ambulance : Carrier, personnel : 4 -ton, 4 x 4 5 3 Half-track, M3, radio-equipped -ton, 4 x 4 12 (MAQ) 1 Car, 5-passenger 3 Half-track, M3, radio-equipped Station wagon, 4 x 4 2 (SCR-528) 4 Tractor : Flamethrower : Miscellaneous 9 1 Mechanized, M3-4-3 18 Trailer : Portable, M2-2 108 -ton, cargo 21 9 Gun, 37mm, M3, antitank 24 -ton, dump 1 9 Gun, machine : 1-ton, cargo 17 2 .30 Cal., Browning, M1917A1 162 1-ton, water, 300 gallon capacity 11 8 .30 Cal., Browning, M1919A4 356 Miscellaneous 13 6 .50 Cal ., Browning, heavy barrel , Truck : flexible 162 -ton, 4 x 4 41 1 Gun, submachine, .45 Cal . , -ton, 4 x 4, with radio 124 Thompson, M1A1...... 49 1-ton, 4 x 4, cargo 21 0 Howitzer : 2 %-ton, 6 x 6, cargo 177 105mm, M2A1, w/carriage M2A2 36 2 %-ton, 6 x 6, prime mover 84 105mm, M7 or M7B1, motor car- 2 %-ton, 6 x 5, dump 6 1 riage, w/armament, radio- Miscellaneous 2 6 equipped (TCS) 12 155mm, Ml, w/carriage Ml o r M 1A1 12 Launcher, rocket, 2 .36-inch, M9A1 or M18 153 Mortar : 60mm, M2 or M19 117 81mm, M1 36 Pistol, automatic, .45 Cal ., M1911 1,707

842 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Weapons Number Transportation Numbe r

Rifle, Automatic, Browning, .30 Ca l , A2 867 Rifle, U .S., .30 Cal ., M1 6,261 Shotgun, Winchester, riot type, 1 2 gauge, M1912 or M1897 30 6 Tank : Flamethrower, primary armament, w/tank, medium, radio-equippe d (SCR-528 and AN/VRC-3) 9 Medium, M4A2, or M4A3, radio- equipped (AN/VRC–3 and SCR- 508) 1 6 Medium, M4A2 or M4A3, radio- equipped (AN/VRC–3 and SCR- 528) 30 Vehicle, tank recovery, M32B2 or M32B3, radio-equipped (SCR- 528) 4

APPENDIX I Comparison of Organization, Marine Division'

D E F G Unit Series Series Series Series Note s

Marine Division 19,514 19,965 17,465 19,17 6

Special Troops 3,031 2,317 ......

HgBn (697) (851) 1,004 1, ,794

HgCo (334) (420) (483) (649 )

SigCo (267) (340) (292) (348 )

MPCo (96) (101) (102) (99 )

ReconCo * (127) (113) *Prior to F-Series T/0, Recon - Co was ScoutCo of Tank Bn

AssltSigCo (465)* *In May 1945, JASCO reorganized when J(oint) droppe d and unit became organic to Marine division .

RocketPlt (56 )

WarpogPlt (64)* *Not including the 36 dogs assigned to each platoon .

SpecWpnsBn (856) (757) ......

H&SBtry (99) (102) ......

40mmAAABtry (307) (307) ......

90mmAAABtry (126) ......

3 AT Btrys (100) (116) ......

Parachute Bn (583)* ...... *Became Corps Troops uni t 15Apr43 .

See footnote at end of table . 84 3

844 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

D E F G Unit Series Series Series Series Notes

Lt TankBn (895) (707) 630 623 *Became 1st, 2d, etc . TankBn w/F-Series .

H&S Co (80) (85) (123) (113 )

Scout Co (175) (139) * ...... *Redesignated to Div ReconCo w/F-Series .

4 Tank Cos (160) (161)* (169) (170) *Reduced to 3 cos. w/E-Series .

Service Troops 1,946 2,200 1,889 2,24 7

Service Bn (959) (661) (751) (732 )

HgCo (55) (62) (68) (57 )

Serv&SupCo (352) (455) (502) ......

Service Co (276 )

Supply Co (157 )

OrdCo (109) (144) (178) (242 )

DivTransCo (116) ......

3 RegtlTransCos (109) ......

MT Bn (527) (539) (906 )

H&S Co (188) (194) (76)

3 TransCos (113) (115) ......

AutoRprCo (349 )

AmphibTrkCo (145 )

4 Trk Cos (84 )

MedBn (506) (526) (599) (609)

H&SCo (16) (21) (89) (104 )

5 MedCos (98) (101) (102) (101 )

AmTracBn (481) (486) * ...... *Became Corps Troops uni t 5May44 .

COMPARISON OF ORGANIZATION—MARINE DIVISION 845

D E F G Unit Series Series Series Series Note s

EngrRegt 2,452 2,513 * ...... *EngrRegt as such broken up into an EngrBn and a PionBn on 5May44 ; Seabee s taken away from divisions, to be assigned/attached for specific operations .

H&SCo (273) (290) ......

Engr Bn (614) (645) 904 87 5

HgCo (29) (60) (307) (275)

3 Engr Cos (195) (195) (199) (200 )

Pioneer Bn (743) (744) 745 74 0

HgCo (119) (120) (127) (134 )

3 PionCos (208) (208) (206) (202 )

Naval ConstBn (822) (838) ......

Artillery Regiment 2,581 3,207 2,639 2,66 1

H&S Btry (159) (204) (229) (249 )

105mm HowBn (607) (594)* (602) (592)** *Increased to 2 per regt . **Increased to 3 per regt .

H&S Btry (154) (150) (161) (166 )

3 105mm HowBtrys (151) (148) (147) (142 )

3 75mm PackHowBn (605) (605) (603)* ...... *Reduced to 2 per regt.

155mm HowBn (636)

H&S Btry (162 )

3 155mm HowBtrys (158 )

3 Infantry Regiments 3,168 3,242 3,218 3,41 2

H&S Co (173) (186) (261) (249 )

Wpns Co (196) (197) (203) (175 )

3 Infantry Bns (933) (953) (918) (996)

846 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

D E F G Unit Series Series Series Series Notes

HgCo (89) (137) (213) (270 )

Wpns Co (273) (228) ......

3 Rifle Cos (183) (196) (235) (242)

All unit strength figures enclosed in parentheses are included in the strength totals of parent units . For a more complete breakdown of each of the four T/O series noted in this table, see Appendix H, supra ., and the appropriate appendices in al previous books in this series with the exception of Volume I . The material in this appendix is derived from the Tables of Organization Sub_ ject File (HRS, HistBr, HQMC) . The various T/Os were approved on the following dates : D-Series, 1Jul42 ; E-Series, 15Apr43 ; F-Series, 5May44 ; and G-Series, 4Sep45 .

APPENDIX J Comparison of Equipment, Marine Division'

D E F G Item Series Series Series Series Notes

Weapons Carbine, .30 caliber, M–1 5,285 11,074 10,95 3 10,37 1 Flamethrower : Mechanized, E4–5 24 ...... Mechanized, M3–4–3 1 8 Portable, M2–2 24 24 3 10 8 Gun : 20mm, AA and AT 54 ...... 37mm, M3, AT 54 36 2 4 37mm, AT, SP 20 ...... 40mm, AA and AT 16 16 ...... 75mm, AT, SP 12 12 12* ...... *Dropped in favor of 105mm howitzer, M7, SP Gun, machine : .30 caliber, M1917A1 544 108 162 16 2 .30 caliber, M1919A4 656 682 302 35 6 .30 caliber, Johnson, light 87 ...... 50 caliber, Browning, heavy barrel, flexible 360 343 161 16 2 .50 caliber, Browning, water- cooled, flexible 32 ...... Gun, submachine : Reising, caliber .45 , w/folding stock 4,208 ...... Thompson, caliber .45, M 1A1 78 49 4 9 Howitzer : 75mm pack 36 36 24 ...... 105mm 12 24 24 3 6 105mm, M7, SP 1 2 155mm 1 2 Launcher : Grenade, Ml 456* ...... *These are for the 456 M190 3 rifles in D-Series division . Rocket, 2 .36-inch, AT, Ml 132 243 ...... Rocket, M1A1 172 ...... Rocket, M9A1 or A18 : 153 Mortar : 60mm 63 81 117 11 7 81mm 36 36 36 36 Pistol, automatic, .45 cal 798 299 399 1,707

See footnote at end of table. 847

848 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

D E F G Item Series Series Series Series Notes

Rifle: .30 caliber, M1903 456 ...... 30 caliber, Ml 7,406 8,030 5,436 6,26 1 .30 caliber, automatic, Browning, M1918M2 513 558 853 867 Shotgun, Winchester, riot type, 12-gauge, M1912 or M1897 306 306 306 Tank : Army, light, with 37mm gun 72 54 ...... Flamethrower-armed , medium, radio equipped ...... 9 Medium, M4A2 or M4A3 46 46 Light, recovery 3 ...... Medium, recovery 3 1 4

TRANSPORTATION Ambulance : -ton, 4 x 4 • 21 48 52 53 -ton, 4 x 4 11 12 1 2 Car, 5-passenger 3 3 3 3 Car, Scout, M3A1 14 ...... Station wagon, 4 x 4 11 12 3 2 Tractor : Amphibian 100 100 ...... Miscellaneous 59 73 71 9 1 Trailer : -ton, cargo 92 135 21 9 3-ton, dump 20 19 1 9 1-ton, cargo 142 125 155 17 2 1-ton, water, 300 gallo n capacity 62 81 73 11 8 Miscellaneous 97 123 110 13 6 Truck: -ton, 4 x 4 427 375 323 41 1 -ton, 4 x 4, with radio 134 85 124 1-ton, 4 x 4, cargo 238 268 224 21 0 1-ton, 4 x 4, with radio 22 ...... 1-ton, 4 x 4, reconnaissance 30 ...... 11 ...... 2 %-ton, 4 x 4, cargo 24 48 ...... 2 %-ton, 6 x 6, cargo 229 198 150 17 7 2 %-ton, 6 x 6, dump 33 51 53 6 1 2 %-ton, 6 x 6, prime mover ...... 8 4 Miscellaneous 36 51 68 2 6

Total transportation 1,494 1,838 1,548 1,918

The material in this appendix is derived from the D-, E-, F-, and G-Series Marine Division Tables of Organization (Tables o f Organization Subject Files, HRS, HistBr, HQMC) .

APPENDIX K World War II Development of the Marine Infantry Regiment'

PART 1—INFANTRY REGIMENT T/O s

D E F G Unit Series Series Series Series Note s

Infantry Regiment 3,168 3,242 3,218 3,41 2 H&S Company (173) (186) (261)* (249) *Company supply section became a service platoon . Weapons Company (196) (197) (203) (175) Company Hq (48) (69) (71) (51) 75mm SP Gun Platoon (34) (26) (36)* ** *Increase of two 75mm gun s (total of four) in each platoon. **75mm gun platoon replaced by a 105mm howitzer (self- propelled) platoon . 3 AA and AT Platoons.... (38) ...... 3 37mm Gun Platoons ...... (34) (32) (40)* *Reduced to two platoon s without reduction in number of guns . 105mm SP Howitzer Platoon (44) 3 Infantry Battalions (933) (953) (918) (996) Headquarters Company (111) (137) (213) (270) Battalion Hq (75) (123) (138) (131) Company Hq (36) (14) (17) (26) 81mm Mortar Platoon ...... (58) (58) Assault Platoon (55 ) Platoon Hq (10 ) 3 Asslt Secs (15 ) SecHq (1 ) 2 Asslt Sgds (7) Weapons Company (273) (228) ...... Company Hq (29) (41) ...... 20mm AA & AT Pit (24) ...... 81mm Mortar Plt (76) (58)* ** ...... *Platoon strength reduced without reduction of mortar s **Mortar platoon placed in battalion headquarters company . 3 Machine Gun Pits (48) (43) * ...... *Machine gun platoon placed in rifle company.

See footnote at end of table . 849

850 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

D E F G Unit Series Series Series Series Notes

3 Rifle Companies (183) (196) (235) (242 ) Company Headquarters (29) (28) (53) (51 ) Hq Sec (33) (31 ) 60mm Mort Sec (20) (20 ) Weapons Platoon (28) (39) ...... Pit Sec (4) (4) ...... 60mm Mort Sec (11) (16)* ...... *An additional mortar and machine gun added to pia - Lt MG Sec (13) (19)* ...... toon ; which now consisted of3 mortars and 3 machine guns. Machine Gun Plt (44)* (56)** *F-Series platoon had 12 machine guns ; 6 air-cooled, an d 6 water-cooled . **G-Series T/O platoon given an additional two guns. 3 Rifle Platoons (42) (43) (46) (45) Platoon Hq (7) (7) (7) (6) BAR Squad (8) ...... 3 Rifle Sqds (9) (12)* (13) (13) *BAR Sqd dropped ; platoon now consists of three rifle squads.

PART 2—INFANTRY REGIMENT EQUIPMEN T

D E F G Unit Series Series Series Series Note s

WEAPON S Carbine, .30 caliber, Ml 943 1,,405 1,794 1,38 3 Flamethrower, portable, M2-2 81 3 6 Gun : 20mm, AA & AT 18 ...... 37mm, AT 12 12 8 75mm, SP 2 2 4 ...... Gun, Machine : .30 caliber, M1917A1 72 36 54 5 4 .30 caliber, M1919A4 36 69 65 6 6 .50 caliber, heavy-barrel , flexible 8 16 12 1 0 Gun, submachine, .45 caliber , with folding stock 507 ...... Howitzer, M7, self-propelled 4 Launcher : AT 47 ...... grenade, AT, Ml 97 ......

WORLD WAR II DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARINE INFANTRY REGIMENT 851

D E F G Unit Series Series Series Series Notes

rocket, AT, Ml 53 43 ...... rocket, 2.36-inch, M9A1 o r A18 3 5 Mortar : 60mm 18 27 39 3 9 81mm 12 12 12 1 2 Pistol, automatic, .45 caliber 17 * * 408 *Carbines replaced Pistols in the infantry and artillery regiments in E– and F–Ser- ies T/Os . Rifle: .30 caliber, Ml 1,385 1,673 1,179 1,39 3 .30 caliber, M1903 97 ...... 30 caliber, automatic , Browning, M1918M2 162 162 243 243 Shotgun, 12-gauge 100 100 100

TRANSPORTATIO N Ambulance, %-ton, 4 x 4 5 5 5 Station wagon, 4 x 4 2 2 ...... Truck: -ton, 4 x 4 55 48 36 3 4 -ton, 4 x 4, radio-equipped ...... 11 8 1 2 1-ton, 4 x 4, cargo 8 8 23 2 0 1-ton, 4 x 4, light repair 1 1 2 ......

1 The material in this appendix is derived from the D-, E-, F-, and G-Series Tables of Organization for each of the above unit s (Tables of Organization Subject File, HRS, HistBr, HQMC) .

310-224 0 - 69 - 55 APPENDIX L Marine Task Organization

and Command List 1

A. ASSAULT AND OCCUPATION OF G–5 Col Elmer H . Salzman OKINAWA GUNT O III Amphibious Corps Troop s CO Col Edward G. Hagen (CO, Rea r (24 March–30 June 1945 ) Echelon ) Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion , III Amphibious Corps Headquarters an FMFPac d Service Battalion (27Mar–30Jun45 ) CO Maj James L. Jone s CO LtCol Harry A. Traffert, Jr. III Amphibious Corps Headquarters III Amphibious Corps Medica l CG LtGen Roy S . Geiger (to 3OJun - Battalio n 45 ) CO LCdr Maurice A. Diehr (MC ) MajGen Keller E . Rockey (from (to 29Apr45 ) 30Jun45 ) LCdr Donovan C. Blanchar d CofS BGen Merwin H. Silverthorn (to (MC) (29Apr–18Jun45 ) 30Jun45 ) Cdr Robert Mazet, Jr . (MC ) BGen William A. Worton (fro m (from 19Jun45 ) 30Jun45 ) G–1 Col Gale T . Cumming s III Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion G–2 Col Charles C. Brow n CO Col Robert L. Peterso n G–3 Col Walter A . Wachtler G–4 Col Francis B. Loomis, Jr. 1st Military Police Battalion CO LtCol Alfred H . Marks 1 Unless otherwise noted, names, positions held, organization titles, and periods of service were take n from the muster rolls of the units concerned, held in th e 1st Separate Engineer Battalion Diary Unit, Files Section, Records Branch, Personne l CO LtCol Alonzo D . Gorham Department, Headquarters Marine Corps. Units are listed only for those periods, indicated by the dates below parent unit designation, for which they are entitled to 11th Motor Transport Battalion campaign participation credit. This information is de- CO LtCol Franklin A. Hayner (to rived from muster rolls and the U . S . Bureau of Naval 28Jun45 ) Personnel, Navy and Marine Corps Awards Manual— NAVPERS 15,790 (Rev . 1953) with changes (Washing- LtCol James M. Ranck, Jr. (fro m ton, 1953–1958) . The muster rolls have been the final 28Jun45 ) authority when there is a conflict in dates of unit entitlement within the overall campaign period as cite d 7th Service Regiment by the Awards Manual . In the case of Marine air units, many of which participated in the campaigns as fligh t CO Col Harold E. Rosecran s or advance echelons only, the unit commander who wa s ExO LtCol Edwin D . Partridge actually in the combat area is shown where muster roll s reveal this information . In order to conserve space, only S–3 None shown units of battalion and squadron size, or larger, an d sizeable separate detachments are listed for each opera- Headquarters Battalion, 7th Service Regimen t tion, although smaller organizations may have participated also . CO LtCol Kenneth L. Moses c Unless otherwise indicated, the campaign period for Marine units on Okinawa was 1 April–30 June 1945. 3 Additional duty, CO, Corps Service Group. 852

MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 853

III Corps Artillery 1st 155mm Howitzer Battalion CG BGen David R . Nimmer CO LtCol George H. Ford CofS Col John A. Bemi s 3d 155mm Howitzer Battalio n G-3 LtCol ' Frederick P. Henderson (to 16May45 ) CO LtCol Robert C. Hiat t LtCol Ernest P. Foley (from 6th 155mm Howitzer Battalio n 16May45 ) CO LtCol Lewis A. Jones 1st Provisional Antiaircraft Artillery Grou p 7th 155mm Gun Battalion (2Apr-30Jun45 ) CO LtCol Guido F . Verbeck, Jr. CO Col Kenneth W. Benner ExO LtCol Willard C. Fiske 8th 155mm Gun Battalion S-3 LtCol John F . Dunlap (to 11 - CO LtCol George V . Hanna, Jr . Jun45 ) LtCol Jack H . Brown (from 11 - 9th 155mm Gun Battalio n Jun45 ) CO LtCol Merritt Adelman

2d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion Headquarters, 1st Marine Division (3Apr-30Jun45 ) CG MajGen Pedro A. del Vall e CO LtCol Max C. Chapma n ADC BGen Louis R. Jones CofS Col Robert 0 . Bare 5th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalio n G-1 LtCol Harold O . Deaki n (3May-30Jun45 ) G-2 LtCol John W . Scott, Jr . LtCol Harry O . Smith, Jr. CO G-3 LtCol Russell E . Honsowet z 8th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion G-4 LtCol Harvey C. Tschirg i (17Apr-30Jun45 ) Division Headquarters Battalio n CO LtCol James S. O'Halloran CO LtCol Jame s S. Monahan (to 16th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion 20May45 ) (4Apr-30Jun45 ) (None shown 20-23May45 ) CO LtCol August F . Penzold, Jr . (to Col Kenneth B. Chappell (24- 19Jun45 ) 31May45 ) LtCol Charles T. Tingle (from (None shown 1-23Jun45 ) 19Jun45 ) LtCol John D . Muncie (from 24Jun45 ) 2d Provisional Field Artillery Group 1st Engineer Battalion CO LtCol Custis Burton, Jr . CO Maj Theodore E . Drummond ExO LtCol John S . Twitchell (t o 11May45 ) 1st Medical Battalion Maj Alfred L . Owens (11May- CO LCdr Francis Giuffrida (MC ) 20Jun45 ) LtCol John S . Twitchell (fro m 1st Motor Transport Battalion 21Jun45 ) CO LtCol Marion A. Fawcett (to S-3 LtCol Ernest P . Foley (to 15Apr45 ) 21Apr45 ) (None shown 15-17Apr45 ) LtCol John S . Twitchell (21Apr- LtCol Calvin C. Gaines (from 7May45 ) 18Apr45 ) Maj Alfred L . Owens (8May- 29Jun45 ) 1st Pioneer Battalion (None shown for 30Jun45) CO LtCol Robert G. Ballance

854 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

1st Service Battalion 3d Battalion, 1st Marines CO LtCol Calvin C . Gaines (to CO LtCol • Stephen V. Sabol (to 18Apr45 ) 21May45 ) Col John Kaluf (WIA 6Apr45, 4 LtCol Richard P . Ross, Jr . (fro m from 18Apr45 ) 21May45 )

1st Tank Battalio n 5th Marines CO LtCol Arthur J . Stuart (WI A CO Col John H . Griebel (to 25Jun45 ) 13Jun45 ) Col Julian N. Frisbie (fro m 25Jun45 ) 3d Armored Amphibian Battalion ExO LtCol John D . Muncie (to (Provisional) 26Jun45 ) CO LtCol John I . Williamson, Jr. LtCol Robert E . Hill (fro m 26Jun45 ) 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalio n S—3 Maj James H . Flagg CO LtCol Maynard M . Nohrde n 1st Battalion, 5th Marine s 8th Amphibian Tractor Battalio n CO LtCol Charles W . Shelburn e CO LtCol Charles B. Nerren (to 14Apr45 ) 2d Battalion, 5th Marines Maj Bedford Williams (14—17- CO : LtCol William E . Benedict (to Apr45) 21Jun45 ) LtCol Charles B. Nerren (from Maj Richard T . Washburn (fro m 18Apr45 ) 21Jun45 )

1st Marines 3d Battalion, 5th Marines CO Col Kenneth B . Chappell (to CO Maj John H . Gustafson (WI A 6May45 ) lApr45 ) Col Arthur T . Mason (from LtCol John C . Miller, Jr . (4Apr— 6May45 ) 16May45 ) ExO LtCol Richard P . Ross, Jr. (to Maj Frank W. Poland, Jr. (17 - 21May45 ) May—8Jun45 ) LtCol James S . Monahan (from LtCol Robert E . Hill (9—24Jun45 ) 21May45 ) LtCol Joseph L. Winecoff (fro m S—3 Maj Bernard T . Kelly (WIA 25Jun45 ) 5Apr45, 6 to 22Apr45 ) 7th Marines Maj Jonas M. Platt (from 22 - . Snedeke r Apr45) CO Col Edward W ExO LtCol James M . Masters, Sr . 1st Battalion, 1st Marine s S—3 Maj Walter Holomon (to 23 - CO LtCol James C . Murray, Jr . May45 ) (WIA 9May45 ) LtCol Stephen V. Sabol (23May— LtCol Richard P . Ross, Jr. (10— 19Jun45 ) 13May45 ) (None shown 20—25Jun45 ) LtCol Austin C. Shofner (from lstLt Charles E . Crow (from 26 - 13May45 ) Jun45 )

2d Battalion, 1st Marines 1st Battalion, 7th Marines CO LtCol James C . Magee, Jr . CO LtCol John J . Gormley -

° WIA ; records show returned to duty . 2d Battalion, 7th Marines 5 Not evacuated . CO LtCol Spencer S . Berger

MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 85 5

3d Battalion, 7th Marines G-1 Maj Addison B . Overstreet CO LtCol Edward H . Hurst (WIA , G-2 LtCol Thomas E . Williams 19Jun45 ) G-3 LtCol Victor H . Krulak LtCol Stephen V . Sabol (from G-4 LtCol August Larson (to 17May - 19Jun45 ) 45 ) LtCol Wayne H. Adams (from 11th Marine s 17May45 ) CO Col Wilburt S . Brown ExO LtCol Edson L . Lyman Division Headquarters Battalio n S-3 Maj Charles D. Harri s CO LtCol Floyd A. Stephenso n 1st Battalion, 11th Marine s 6th Engineer Battalion CO LtCol Richard W . Wallace CO Maj Paul F . Sacket t

2d Battalion, 11th Marines 6th Medical Battalion CO LtCol James H . Moffatt, Jr. CO Cdr John S . Cowan (MC )

3d Battalion, 11th Marine s 6th Motor Transport Battalio n CO LtCol Thomas G . Ro e CO LtCol Ernest H. Goul d

4th Battalion, 11th Marine s 6th Pioneer Battalion CO LtCol Leonard F . Chapman, Jr. CO LtCol Samuel R . Shaw (to 11 - May45 ) 8th Marines (Reinforced), 2d Marine Divisio n Maj John G . Dibble (Acting, 11 - (1-30Jun45) May-8Jun45 ) CO Col Clarence R . Wallace (to LtCol Samuel R . Shaw (9-18Jun - 29Jun45 ) 45 ) Col James F . Shaw, Jr. (from Maj John G. Dibble (19-24Jun- 29Jun45 ) 45 ) ExO LtCol Martin S . Rahiser LtCol Samuel R. Shaw (from 25- S-3 Maj William C . Chamberlin Jun45 ) (WIA, 18Jun45 ) 6th Service Battalion 1st Battalion, 8th Marines CO LtCol George B . Bell (to 26Apr - CO LtCol Richard W . Hayward 45 ) 2d Battalion, 8th Marine s LtCol Alexander N . Entringe r (from 26Apr45 ) CO LtCol Harry A. Waldorf

3d Battalion, 8th Marines 6th Tarok Battalio n LtCol Robert L. Denig, Jr . CO LtCol Paul E . Wallac e CO 2d Battalion, 10th Marines 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion - CO LtCol Richard G . Weede CO Lt Col Louis Metzger (to 22Jun 45 ) 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion Maj Richard G . Warga (from 22- CO Maj Fenlon A. Duran d Jun45 )

Headquarters, 6th Marine Division 4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion CG MajGen Lemuel C . Shepherd, Jr . CO LtCol Clovis C . Coffma n (WIA, 16May45 ) n ADC BGen William T . Clemen t 9th Amphibian Tractor Battalio CofS Col John C . McQueen CO Maj Theodore E . Watson

856 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

4th Marines 1st Battalion, 22d Marines CO Col Alan Shapley CO Maj Thomas J . Myers (KIA 15 - ExO LtCol Fred D . Beans (to 14Apr - May45 ) 45) Maj Earl J . Cook (from 15May45 , (None shown 14–30Apr45 ) WIA 17 Jun45 ) LtCol Fred D . Beans (from 1 - LtCol Gavin C. Humphrey (fro m May45 ) 17Jun45 ) S—3 Maj Orville V. Bergren 2d Battalion, 22 Marines 1st Battalion, 4th Marine s CO LtCol Horatio C . Woodhouse, Jr . CO Maj Bernard W . Green (KIA, 15 - (KIA 30May45 ) Apr45) LtCol John G. Johnson (from 31- LtCol Fred D . Beans (15Apr—1 - May45 ) May45 ) LtCol George B . Bell (from 1 - 3d Battalion, 22d Marine s May45, WIA 4Jun45 ) CO LtCol Malcolm "0" Donohoo (WIA 16May45 ) 2d Battalion, 4th Marine s Maj George B . Kantner (16—19 - CO LtCol Reynolds H. Hayden (to 27 - May45 ) May45 ) LtCol Clair W . Shisler (from 20- Maj Edgar F . Carney, Jr. (fro m May45 ) 27May45 ) 29th Marine s 3d Battalion, 4th Marine s CO Col Victor F . Bleasdale (to 15- CO LtCol Bruno A . Hochmuth Apr45) Col William J . Whaling (fro 22d Marines m 15Apr45 ) CO Col Merlin F . Schneider (to 17- ExO LtCol Orin K . Pressley May45 ) S—3 LtCol Angus M . Fraser (to 14- Col Harold C . Roberts (from 17 - Jun45 ) May45, KIA 18June45 ) LtCol George W . Killen (from LtCol August Larson (18—23Jun- 14Jun45 ) 45) Col John D . Blanchard (from 24- 1st Battalion, 29th Marines Jun45 ) CO LtCol Jean W . Moreau (WIA 16 - ExO Col Karl K . Louther (to 17May - May45 ) 45 ) Maj Robert P. Neuffer (16—25- LtCol August Larson (17May— May45 ) 17Jun45 ) LtCol Samuel S. Yeaton (26May— LtCol John B . Baker (18—20Jun- 14June65 ) 45 ) LtCol LeRoy P . Hunt, Jr. (fro m LtCol Samuel R . Shaw (21—23 - 15Jun45 ) Jun45 ) LtCol August Larson (from 24- 2d Battalion, 29th Marine s Jun45 ) CO LtCol William G . Robb (WIA 19 - S—3 LtCol John B . Baker (to 18Jun45 ) Apr45 ) LtCol Walter H . Stephens (18— 20Jun45 ) 3d Battalion, 29th Marine s LtCol John B . Baker (21—27Jun - CO LtCol Erma A . Wright (to 15 - 45 ) Jun45) LtCol Walter H . Stephens (from LtCol Angus M . Fraser (from 28Jun45) 15Jun45)

MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 857

15th Marines Marine Aircraft Group 2 2 CO Col Robert B . Luckey (12 May—30Jun45 ) Ex0 LtCol James H . Brower CO Col Daniel W. Torrey, Jr . S—3 Maj William H . Hirst Ex0 LtCol Elmer A. Wrenn (to 23- Jun45 ) 1st Battalion, 15th Marine s LtCol Curtis E. Smith (from 23 - CO Maj Robert H . Armstron g Jun45 ) 2d Battalion, 15th Marines Gru0ps0 .. . Maj Thomas C. Colt, Jr . (to 26- Jun45 ) CO Maj Nat M . Pace LtCol Nathan T . Post (from 26 - 3d Battalion, 15th Marine s Jun45 ) CO LtCol Joe C . McHaney CO, Hq- 4th Battalion, 15th Marines Sqn—22 ... Capt Lindsay K. Dicke y CO , CO LtCol Bruce T . Hemphil l SMS—22 ... Maj Bruce Prosse r 2d Marine Aircraft Win g Marine Aircraft Group 31 (Tactical Air Force, Tenth Army) CO Col John C. Munn CG MajGen Francis P . Mulcahy (to Ex0 LtCol Gordon E . Hendricks (to 11Jun45 ) 21Jun45 ) MajGen Louis E. Woods (from LtCol Kirk Armistead (from 22 - 11Jun45 ) Jun45 ) CofS Col Hayne D . Boyde n GruOpsO ... LtCol Kirk Armistead (to 22Jun- G—1 Capt Robert E . Coddington 45 ) G—2 Maj David B . Decker Maj Charles M. Kunz (from 22 - G—3 Col Perry O . Parmelee Jun45 ) G—4 LtCol Charles T . Young, III CO, Hq- (WIA 20Apr45 ) Sqn—31 ... Maj Leon A . Danco (to 14May45 ) Capt William L . Woodruff (from lstLt Frederick L . Donnell y 11Jun45 ) (from 14May45 ) CO, Hq- CO, Sqn-2 Capt Richard F . Hylan d SMS—31 .. . Maj Archibald M . Smith (to 29 - Air Defense Command Apr45 ) . Johnston (29Apr— CG BGen William J . Wallace Maj Paul T CofS Col Ford 0 . Roger s 1Jun45) Maj Joseph A . Gray (from 2Jun - G—3 Col Boeker C . Batterto n 45 ) Marine Aircraft Group 1 4 Marine Aircraft Group 33 (29 May—30Jun45 ) CO Col Ward E. Dickey . Montgomery CO Col Edward A Ex0 LtCol James L. Beam . Smith, Jr . (t o Ex0 LtCol Curtis E GruOpsO LtCol Eschol M . Mallor y 25Jun45 ) CO, Hq - m 25 - LtCol Carl W . Nelson (fro Sqn—33 Capt Richard Kilbourn e Jun45 ) CO , Gru0ps0 ... LtCol Robert H . Richar d SMS—33 . Maj Hugh B . Calaha n CO, Hq - Sqn—14 ... Capt Robert M . Crooks Marine Aircraft Group 4 3 CO, CO LtCol Robert 0 . Bisson SMS—14 . Maj Francis H. Smythe (to 8Jun - Ex0 (Not shown ) 45 ) GruOpsO .. . LtCol Radford C . Wes t Maj Julius W. Ireland (from 8 - CO, Hq- Jun45) Sqn—43 ... Maj William F. Feasley

858 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Marine Air Warning Squadron 1 Maj Robert C . Hammond, Jr . (31 - (18Apr—30Jun45 ) May—14Jun45 ) CO Capt Edward R . Stainbac k Maj Allen T . Barnum (from 15 - Jun45) Marine Observation Squadron 2 (1—15Apr45 ) Marine Torpedo Bomber Squadron 232 CO Capt John A. Amble r (lMay—30Jun45 ) CO Maj Allan L . Feldmeie r Marine Observation Squadron 3 CO Capt Wallace J . Slappey, Jr. Marine Fighter Squadron 31 1 (lMay—30Jun45 ) Marine Air Warning Squadron 6 CO Maj Perry L . Shuman (to 15Jun - (17Apr—30Jun45 ) 45 ) CO Capt Clarence C . Gordo n Maj Michael R. Yunck (from 15 - Marine Observation Squadron 6 Jun45 ) CO Capt Donald R . Garret t Fight Echelon, Marine Fighter Squadron 31 2 Marine Air Warning Squadron 7 (9Apr—30Jun45 ) CO Maj Richard M . Day (MIA, 14 - CO Capt Paul E . Bardet May45 ) Marine Observation Squadron 7 Maj Hugh I . Russell (14—24May- (6May—30Jun45 ) 45 ) CO Capt William A. Sewar d Maj "J" Frank Cole (from 25 - May45 ) Marine Air Warning Squadron 8 Marine Fighter Squadron 31 4 CO Maj Frank B . Frees e (24May—30Jun45 ) Marine Air Warning Squadron 1 1 CO Maj Robert C . Cameron CO Capt John L . Carnegie Flight Echelon, Marine Fighter Squadron 322 Marine Fighter Squadron 11 3 (9Apr—30Jun45 ) (21 May—30Jun45 ) CO Maj Frederick M . Rauschenbac h CO Maj Hensley Williams (to 31May45 ) Maj Walter E . Lischeid (from Marine Torpedo Bomber Squadron 131 31May45 ) (29May—30Jun45 ) Flight Echelon, Marine Fighter Squadron 32 3 CO Maj Douglas H. Banger t (9Apr—30Jun45 ) Marine Fighter Squadron 21 2 CO Maj George C . Axtell, Jr. (to 15 - (29May—30Jun45 ) Jun45 ) CO Maj John P . McMahon (None shown 15Jun45 ) Maj Martin E . W. Oelrich (fro m Marine Fighter Squadron 222 16Jun45 ) (10—30Jun45 ) CO Maj Harold A . Harwoo d Marine Fighter Squadron 422 (23May—30Jun45 ) Marine Fighter Squadron 22 3 CO Maj Elkin S. Dew (24—30Jun45) Flight Echelon, Marine Fighter Squadron 1 CO Maj Howard E . King 44 (7Apr—30Jun45 ) Marine Fighter Squadron 22 4 CO Maj Robert 0 . White (to 2OJun- (lMay—30Jun45) 45 ) CO Maj James W. Poindexter (to 31 - Maj Paul T . Johnston (from 20 - May45) Jun45)

MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 859

Marine Night Fighter Squadron 533 4th Marines RC T (lOMay-30Jun45 ) (2Sep-31Dec45 ) CO LtCol Marion M . Magrude r CO LtCol Fred D . Beans ExO LtCol Bruno A. Hochmuth Flight Echelon, Marine Night Fighte r S-3 LtCol Robert W . Rickert (to 13 - Squadron 54 2 Sep45 ) (7Apr-30Jun45 ) Maj Orville V. Bergren (13Sep- CO Maj William C . Kellum (to 22 - 10Nov45 ) May45 ) LtCol George B . Bell (11Nov- (None shown 23May45 ) 1Dec45 ) Maj Robert B . Porter (from 24 - 2dLt David M. Mixter (from 2 - May45 ) Dec45 ) Flight Echelon, Marine Night Fighte r 1st Battalion, 4th Marine s Squadron 543 (2Sep-31Dec45 ) (6Apr-30Jun45 ) CO LtCol George B . Bell (to 11Nov - CO Maj Clair "C" Chamberlain (t o 45 ) 18Jun45 ) Maj Orville V. Bergren (from 11 - Maj James B . Maguire, Jr . (from Nov45 ) 18Jun45 ) 2d Battalion, 4th Marines Landing Force Air Support Control Unit 1 (2Sep-31Dec45 ) CO Col Kenneth H . Weir (to 16May- CO Maj Edgar F . Carney, Jr. 45) 3d Battalion, 4th Marine s Col Avery R . Kier (from 16- (2Sep45-14Feb46 ) May45 ) CO Maj Wilson E . Hun t Landing Force Air Support Control Unit 2 1st Battalion, 15th Marine s CO LtCol Kenneth D. Kerby (to 21 - (2-15Sep45) May45 ) CO LtCol Walter S . Osipoff LtCol Etheridge C . Best (from Third Fleet Marine Landing Forc e 21May45 ) (2-6Sep45 ) Landing Force Air Support Control Unit 3 CO LtCol William F . Lantz (to 4Sep - CO Col Avery R. Kier (to 16May45 ) 45 ) Col Kenneth H . Weir (from 16 - LtCol Harvey B . Atkins (from 4 - May4 5 Sep45 ) ExO Maj Gerald L. Eagleburger S-3 Capt Steve J . Cibik B. OCCUPATION OF JAPA N g (2Sep45-27Apr52 ) 1st Battalion, Third Fleet Marine Landin Force Yokosuka Landing and Occupatio n CO Cdr Charles H . Becker, USN Fleet Landing Force (Task Force Alpha) 2d Battalion, Third Fleet Marine Landin g (2-6Sep45 ) Force CG BGen William T . Clement . Atkins (to 4Sep - CofS LtCol Louis Metzger CO LtCol Harvey B S-1 Capt John R . Thek 45 ) Capt Thomas H. Barry (from 4 - S-3 Maj Orville V . Bergren Sep45 ) S-4 LtCol Theodore F. Beeman 3d Battalion, Third Fleet Marine Landin g ° Unless otherwise indicated, the period of occupatio n Forc e for Marine units in Japan was 2 September 1945—2 7 April 1952. CO Maj Norman A. Miller, Jr .

860 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

2d Separate Guard Battalion (Provisional) CofS Col George F . Good (to 6Nov45 ) (15Feb—14Jun45 ) Col Gregon A . Williams (from 6 - CO LtCol Bruno A . Hochmuth Nov45 ) G—1 LtCol Glenn R . Lon g Marine Detachment, U . S . Fleet Activities, G—2 Col Jack P. Juhan (to 310ct45 ) Yokosuka, Japan LtCol Harry 0 . Smith, Jr. (from (15Jun45—30Apr47 ) 310ct45 ) CO LtCol Bruno A . Hochmut h G—3 LtCol Samuel G . Taxis (to 13- Apr46) Marine Barracks, Yokosuka, Japan LtCol Michael S. Currin (from (1May47—26Jun50 ) 13Apr46 ) CO LtCol Bruno A . Hochmuth (to G—4 LtCol Jacob G . Goldberg (to 28- 31May47 ) Jan46 ) Col William S . Fellers (31May47— (None shown 28Jan46 ) 23May48 ) Col James O . Brauer (from 29 - LtCol John B . Heles (24May— Jan46 ) 14Ju148 ) Division Headquarters Battalio n Col Alva B . Lasswell (15Jul48— 23Jun50 ) (16Sep45—7Ju146 ) LtCol Robert C . Burns (from 23 - CO LtCol Bennett J . Clarke (to 15 - Jun50 ) Oct45) LtCol Clarence J . O'Donnell (15 — Kyushu Landing and Occupation 240ct45 ) V Amphibious Corp s LtCol Francis J . McQuillen (25 - (2Sep45—7Jan46 ) Oct45—7Jan46 ) CG MajGen Harry Schmidt LtCol Francis C . Claggett (8 — CofS BGen William W . Rogers (to 21 - 26Jan46 ) Dec45 ) LtCol Bennet G . Powers (27Jan— Col Dudley S . Brown (from 21 - 2May46 ) Dec45 ) LtCol William P . Spencer (fro m 3May46 ) G—1 Col David A. Stafford G—2 (None shown to 24Oct45 ) 2d Engineer Battalio n LtCol Gooderham L . McCormic k (23Sep45—25Jun46 ) (from 24Oct45 ) CO Maj Richardson D . Kirkpatrick G—3 Col Walter W . Wensinger (to 21 - (to 60ct45 ) Dec45 ) LtCol John H. Partridge (60ct- (None shown after 21Dec45 ) 45—17Apr46 ) G—4 Col Matthew C . Horner (to 18- (None shown 18—24Apr46 ) Dec45 ) LtCol Kenneth P . Corson (25Apr— LtCol John M . Davis (from 18 - 24Jun46 ) Dec45 ) Maj Harry D . Clarke (from 25 - Jun46 ) V Amphibious Corps Troops CO Col Alton A. Gladde n 2d Medical Battalio n (23Sep45—23Jun46 ) 2d Marine Divisio n CO Cdr George Donabedian (MC ) (16Sep45—7Ju146 ) (to 220ct45 ) CG MajGen LeRoy P . Hunt Cdr Joseph A . Clinton (MC ) ADC BGen John T. Walker (to 29Apr - (220ct—29Nov45 ) 46) LCdr Robert F . Sterner (MC ) (None shown after 29Apr46) (30Nov45—26Jan46)

MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 861

Cdr John J . Tordoff (MC) (from 1st Battalion, 2d Marines 26Jan46 ) (23Sep45—12Jun46 ) CO LtCol Clayton O . Totman (to 22- 2d Motor Transport Battalion Nov45) (23Sep45—7Ju146 ) LtCol John A . Anderson (25Nov- CO Maj Joseph A . Meyer (to 31Jan - 45—8Apr46 ) 46 ) LtCol William M. Barba (9Apr— LtCol Alan T. Hunt (31Jan— 31May46 ) 12Apr46 ) LtCol Robert C . McDonough LtCol George N . Carroll (fro m (from 1Jun46 ) 13Apr46 ) 2d Battalion, 2d Marine s 2d Pioneer Battalio n (23Sep45—12Jun46 ) . Rovetta (to 15 - (23Sep45—7Ju146 ) CO LtCol Carlo A Feb46 ) CO Maj Victor J . Simpson (to 50ct- LtCol Clarke J . Bennett (from 45 ) 15Feb46 ) LtCol Tom C . Loomis (50ct— 14Nov45 ) 3d Battalion, 2d Marine s LtCol William I . Phipps (15Nov- (23Sep45—26Feb46 ) 45—25Jan46 ) CO LtCol Walter F . Layer (to 23 - LtCol Donn "C" Hart (from 26- Oct45 ) Jan46) LtCol Clarke J . Bennett (fro m 230ct45 ) 2d Service Battalion (23Sep45—7Ju146 ) 6th Marines CO Col Cyril A. Martyr (to 1Nov45 ) (23Sep45—30Jun46 ) LtCol Donald C. Merker (1—30 - CO Col Gregon A . Williams (to 6Nov- Nov45 ) 45 ) Col Lewis A. Horn (from iDec - Col Jack P . Juhan (6Nov45—24- 45 ) Jan46 ) Col James P. Berkeley (25Jan — 2d Tank Battalion 26Mar46 ) - (23Sep45—23Jun46 ) Col John F . Hough (from 27Mar 46 ) CO LtCol John I . Williamson, Jr . Ex0 LtCol Edmund B . Games (to 23 - 2d Marine s Oct45) . Fuller (230ct- ) LtCol Donald W (23Sep45—12Jun46 45—26Apr46 ) CO Col Richard M . Cutts, Jr . (to 25 - LtCol William R. Collins (from Oct45 ) 27Apr46 ) LtCol Clarence J . O'Donnell (25 - S—3 Maj William S. McLaughlin (to Oct45—17Apr46 ) 30ct45 ) LtCol Ronald B . Wilde (from 18 - LtCol Donald W. Fulle r (3—22- Apr46) Oct45 ) ExO LtCol Francis J . McQuillen (t o (None shown 23—280ct45 ) 250ct45 ) Maj Frederick R. Smit h (from LtCol Ronald B. Wilde (250ct- 290ct45 ) 45—9Apr46 ) LtCol John A . Anderson (fro m Apparently in the phase-outs of the 3d battalions o f the infantry regiments, when the 3d battalion com- 10Apr46 ) mander was assigned as commander of the 2d battalion, S—3 Maj Duncan H . Jewell as in this case, the officer wore two hats for a while .

862 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

1st Battalion, 6th Marines 3d Battalion, 8th Marine s (23Sep45—30Jun46 ) (24Sep45—26Feb46 ) CO LtCol Richard D. Strickler (to CO LtCol Paul E . Wallac e 25Apr46 ) 10th Marines LtCol Wade M . Jackson (25Mar— (24Sep45—25Jun46 ) 15Jun46 ) CO Col Saville T . Clark Maj James R. Blackwell (from Ex0 LtCol Edward H. Forney 16Jun46 ) S—3 LtCol William C . Capehart (to 2d Battalion, 6th Marine s 16Mar46 ) LtCol Claude S . Sanders, Jr . (23Sep45—29Ju146 ) (from 16Mar46 ) CO LtCol James R . Clarke (to 28 - Apr46 ) 1st Battalion, 10th Marines LtCol Donald W . Fuller (from 28 - (24Sep45—25Jun46 ) Apr46 ) CO Maj Joe B. Russell (to 200ct45 ) LtCol Charles 0 . Rogers (fro m 3d Battalion, 6th Marine s 200ct45 ) ) (23Sep45—29Ju146 2d Battalion, 10th Marine s CO LtCol George D. Rich (24Sep45—25Jun46 ) 8th Marines CO LtCol John P . Leonard, Jr . (24Sep45—14Jun46 ) 3d Battalion, 10th Marines CO Col Thomas G. McFarland (24Sep45—25Jun46 ) Ex0 LtCol Martin S . Rahiser (to 8- CO LtCol Loren S . Fraser (to 15Apr- Dec45 ) 46 ) (None shown 8—11Dec45 ) LtCol Noah P . Wood, Jr . (from LtCol Alan T. Hunt (12Dec45— 15Apr46 ) 15Jan46 ) 4th Battalion, 10th Marine s LtCol Richard W . Hayward (from 16Jan46 ) (24Sep45—25Jun46 ) S—3 Maj John I . Warner, Jr . (to 14- CO Maj Marshall J. Hooper (to 1 - Dec45 ) Apr46 ) (None shown 14—29Dec45 ) LtCol Henry E . W. Barnes (from Maj Donald R . Kennedy (fro m 1Apr46 ) 30Dec45 ) 5th Marine Divisio n (22Sep—15Dec45 ) 1st Battalion, 8th Marines CG MajGen Thomas E . Bourke (24Sep45—14Jun46 ) ADC BGen Ray A. Robinson CO LtCol Richard W . Hayward (to CofS Col Clarence R. Wallac e 10Jan46 ) G—1 LtCol Warner T. Bigge r LtCol Robert S. Howell (from 10 - G—2 LtCol George A. Roll (to 29Nov- Jan46) 45 ) (None shown after 29Nov45 ) 2d Battalion, 8th Marine s G—3 LtCol Frederick R . Dowsett (to (24Sep45—14Jun46 ) 29Nov45 ) CO LtCol Herbert R . Nussbaum (to Maj Virgil W . Banning (fro m 28Jan46 ) 29Nov45 ) Maj William H . Junghans, Jr . G—4 LtCol Russell Duncan (to lNov (28Jan—12Feb46 ) 45 ) LtCol Paul E . Wallace (from 27 - LtCol Frank C . DeSantis (fro m Feb46) 1Nov45 )

MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 863

Division Headquarters Battalio n 3d Battalion, 26th Marine s (22Sep-15Dec45 ) (22Sep-190ct45 ) CO LtCol Charles E . Shepard, Jr . CO LtCol William K . Davenport, Jr. 27th Marine s 5th Engineer Battalion (22Sep-5Dec45 ) (22Sep-15Dec45) CO Col Thomas A. Wornham (to 24 - CO Maj William S . Kelley, Jr . (to Nov45 ) 310ct45 ) Col Robert H . Williams (from (None shown 1-13Nov ) 24Nov45 ) LtCol- Michael C. Sodano (fro m ExO LtCol Donn J . Robertson 14Nov45 ) S-3 Capt Franklin L. Smith (to 29- Nov45 ) 5th Motor Transport Battalio n (None shown after 29Nov45 ) (22Sep-15Dec45 ) CO Maj Arthur F . Torgler, Jr. (to 1st Battalion, 27th Marine s 12Nov45 ) (22Sep-5Dec45 ) Maj George Moore (from 12Nov- CO Maj Gerald F . Russell 45 ) 2d Battalion, 27th Marine s 5th Medical Battalion (22Sep-5Dec45 ) (22Sep-15Dec45 ) CO LtCol John W . Antonell i CO Cdr John E . Gorman (MC) (t o 240ct45 ) 3d Battalion, 27th Marines LCdr Thomas C . Butt (MC ) (22Sep-5Dec45 ) (from 240ct45 ) CO LtCol George R . Stallings 28th Marines 5th Pioneer Battalion (22Sep-5Dec45 ) (22Sep-15Dec45 ) CO Col Harry P. Liversedge CO LtCol Robert S . Riddell ExO Col Robert H . Williams (to 23 - Nov45 ) 5th Service Battalio n (None shown after 23Nov45 ) (22Sep-15Dec45 ) S-3 Maj Henry R. Rolph (to 230ct45 ) CO Col Bernard Dubel Capt Fred E . Haynes, Jr. (23- Oct-29Nov45 ) 5th Tank Battalion (None shown after 29Nov45 ) (22Sep-15Dec45 ) CO LtCol William R. Collins 1st Battalion, 28th. Marine s (22Sep-5Dec45 ) 26th Marines CO LtCol Jackson B . Butterfield (t o (22Sep-190ct45 ) 9Nov45 ) CO Col Chester B. Graha m (None shown 9-11Nov45 ) ExO LtCol Joseph P . Sayer s Maj William A . Wood (from 1 2 S-3 Maj Albert V. K. Gar y Nov45 )

1st Battalion, 26th Marines 2d Battalion, 28th Marines (22Sep-190ct45 ) (22Sep-5Dec45 ) CO LtCol Daniel C . Pollock CO LtCol Robert C . McDonoug h

2d Battalion, 26th Marine s 3d Battalion, 28th Marine s (22Sep-310ct45 ) (22Sep-5Dec45 ) CO Maj Amadeo Rea CO Maj Tolson A . Smoak

864 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

13th Marine s Ex0 LtCol Jack R . Cram (to 6Nov45 ) (22Sep—18Dec45 ) LtCol Clyde P . Mattison (8Nov- CO Col James D . Waller (to 180ct - 45—4Feb46 ) 45 ) LtCol John P . Condon (from 5 - LtCol Edwin C. Ferguson (acting Feb46 ) 18–230ct45 ) Gru0ps0 .... LtCol Kirk Armistead (to 14Dec - Col John A . Bemis (from 240ct - 45 ) 45 ) LtCol Nathan T . Post (from 14- Ex0 LtCol Edwin C . Ferguso n Dec45 ) S–3 LtCol Jack Tabor (to 190ct45 ) CO, Hq- Maj James R . Crockett (from 19- Sqn–31 ... Capt Thomas D . Stockwell, Jr . Oct45 ) (to 8Jan46 ) Capt Rudolph L . Bittman (from 1st Battalion, 13th Marine s 8Jan46 ) (22Sep–18Dec45 ) CO, CO Maj James F . Coady SMS–31 Maj Joseph A . Gray (to 1Dec45 ) LtCol Wayne M. Cargill (1Dec- 2d Battalion, 13th Marines 45–30Jan46 ) (22Sep–18Dec45) LtCol William A. Cloman, Jr . CO Maj Carl W . Hjerpe (to 60ct45) (31Jan—9Jun46 ) Maj William W . Mitchell (from Maj Frank M. Maerz (from 10 - 60ct45) Jun46 )

3d Battalion, 13th Marine s Marine Air Base Squadron (Provisional) , (22Sep–18Dec45) Omura, Japan CO Maj William M . Miller (13Nov45–15Jan46 ) CO Col Bernard L . Smith 4th Battalion, 13th Marines (22Sep–18Dec45) Marine Observation Group 1 CO LtCol John S . Oldfield (23Sep45–7Jan46 ) CO Maj John W . Ryland (to 6Nov- Marine Aircraft Group 22 45 ) (20Sep–19Nov45 ) Capt Richard T . Smith (acting , CO Col Daniel W . Torrey, Jr . (to 21 - 6–30Nov45 ) Oct45) (None shown 1–10Dec45 ) Col Elliott E . Bard (210ct–10 - Capt Richard T . Smith (from 11- Nov45 ) Dec45 ) LtCol Jack R . Cram (from 11Nov- Ex0 Capt Richard T . Smith (to 6Nov- 45 ) 45 ) Ex0 LtCol Nathan T . Post (to 9Nov- (None shown after 6Nov45 ) 45) GruOpsO ... lstLt Eugene "A " Wailes (to 6 - (None shown after 9Nov45) Nov45 ) GruOpsO ... LtCol Elkin S . Dew 1st Lt Cloyd E . Waters (6–30Nov- CO, Hq- 45 ) Sqn–22 ... lstLt Paul M . Ruffner (None shown after 30Nov45 ) CO , SMS–22 . Maj Bruce Prosser Marine Observation Squadron 2 (25Sep45–20Jun46) Maurine Aircraft Group 31 CO Capt John E . Lepke (to 310ct- (7Sep45–20Jun46 ) 45 ) CO Col John C . Munn (to 7Apr46 ) lstLt Willis B . Anderson (310ct– Col John N. Hart (from 7Apr46) 5Nov45 )

MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 86 5

lstLt Eugene "A" Wailes (7Nov - Detachment, Marine Transpor t 45—lJan46) Squadron 253 Capt Joseph J. Callis (2—28Jan - (20Feb—15Jun46 ) 46 ) CO LtCol William A . Rygg (to 24- Maj Frank L . Maerz (29Jan—4 - Mar46 ) Jun46 ) LtCol William K. Lanman, Jr . Capt Eugene "A" Wailes (from (25Mar—15Apr46 ) 5Jun46) Maj Robert V . Reilly (16Apr— 31May46 ) Marine Observation Squadron 5 LtCol Harry H. Bullock (from 1 - (22Sep45—7Jan46 ) Jun46 ) CO Capt Gordon Walker (to 310ct - Marine Fighter Squadron 31 1 45) Capt Joseph J . Callis (310ct45 — (9Sep45—20Jun46 ) 1Jan46 ) CO Maj Michael R. Yunck (to 26 - (None shown after 1Jan46 ) May46 ) Maj James C . Otis (26May—11 - Marine Air Warning Squadron 9 Jun46 ) (18Oct—lONov45 ) Capt James W . Baker (from 12 - Jun46 ) CO Maj William A . McCluskey, Jr. Marine Fighter Squadron 31 4 Marine Air Warning Squadron 1 2 (25Sep—19Nov45 ) (8Oct—19Nov45 ) CO Maj Christian C . Lee (to lOct45 ) CO Maj Emil H . Heintz Maj William H . Whitaker (from lOct45 ) Marine Fighter Squadron 11 3 Detachment, Marine Transport (21Sep—19Nov45) Squadron 353 CO Maj Hensley Williams (7Sep—5Nov45 ) Detachment, Marine Torpedo-Bombe r CO LtCol Charles W . Somer s Squadron 131 Marine Fighter Squadron 42 2 (17Sep—31Oct45 ) (26 Sep—19Nov45 ) CO Maj Wilbert H . Fuller, Jr . (to CO Maj Elton Mueller 12Oct45 ) Marine Fighter Squadron (None shown 12—25Oct45 ) 44 1 Maj John P . McMahon (from 26- (7Sep45—20Jun46 ) Oct45 ) CO Maj William C . Voss (to 1Feb46 ) Marine Night Fighter Squadron 542 Marine Fighter Squadron 224 (lOSep45—20Jun46 ) (8Sep45—20Jun46 ) CO Maj William C. Kellum (to 25 - CO Maj Allen T . Barnum (to 6Nov- Dec45) 45 ) Maj Samuel B . Folsom, Jr . (25 - Maj James K . Dill (6Nov45—19- Dec45—1 Feb46 ) Jun46 ) Maj Roscoe M. Nelson (2Feb—19 - Capt Roy S . Bachstein (from 20- Apr46) Jun46 ) Capt Robert P. Wray (acting, 20- Apr—3May46 ) Detachment, Marine Transpor t Maj David C . McDowell (4May— Squadron 25 2 9Jun46 ) (13Oct45—16Jan46 ) Capt Robert P . Wray (from 10- CO LtCol Glenn L . Todd Jun46)

866 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

Marine Night Fighter Squadron 54 3 Col Homer C. Murray (28Feb46— (28Sep-16Nov45 ) 23Mar47 ) CO Maj James B . Maguire, Jr . LtCol Frederick L . Wieseman (24M ar-29Aug47 ) Detachment, Marine Bomber Squadron 61 2 LtCol William H . Barba (from (7Sep-16Oct45) 30Aug47 ) x CO LtCol Lawrence F . Fo ExO LtCol Edwin D . Partridge (to Marine Transport Squadron 952 1Jan46 ) . Murray (1Jan - (7Sep45-lMar46 ) Col Homer C CO LtCol Stanley W . Trachta (to 31 - 27Feb46 ) (None shown 28Feb-19Apr46 ) Oct45 ) LtCol Paul A . Tyler (20Apr- LtCol Lowell S . Reeve (from 31 - 18Dec46 ) Oct45 ) LtCol Frederick L . Wieseman Marine Landing Force Air Support Contro l (19Dec46-24Mar47 ) Unit 4 LtCol Paul A . Tyler (25Mar - (20Sep-19Nov45 ) 29Apr47 ) CO Col Robert M . Hayne s LtCol William H . Barba (30Apr- 29Aug47 ) C . OCCUPATION OF NORTH CHINA e (None shown after 29Aug47 ) (2Sep45-26May49 ) S-3 (None shown to 20Apr46 ) Maj John J. Bukowy (20Apr- 1st Military Police Battalion, FMFPac 28May46 ) (30Sep45-2Mar46 ) (None shown 29May-9Jun46 ) CO LtCol Alfred H . Marks LtCol Marvin K . Stewart (lOJun- 15Sep46) 11th Motor Transport Battalion, FMFPac LtCol William H. Barba (16Sep- (30Sep46-5Apr46 ) 46-21Feb47 ) CO LtCol James M. Ranck, Jr . Capt Robert S . Hudson (22Feb- 1st Separate Engineer Battalion, FMFPa c 19Aug47 ) ) (30Sep45-16Jul46 ) (None shown after 19Aug47 CO LtCol Alonzo D . Gorham (to 1 - Dec45) Headquarters and Service Battalion, Maj Frank W . Poland, Jr . (1Dec- 7th Service Regiment, Service Command, 45-31Mar46 ) FMFPa c LtCol John C. Brewer (lApr- CO LtCol Charles W . Kelly, Jr. (t o 9Jun46 ) 6Feb46 ) Maj Wallace H . Robinson, Jr . (None shown 7Feb-13Mar46 ) (from 10Jun46 ) Maj Ralph E . Boulton (14Mar- 7th Service Regiment, Service Command, 19Apr46 ) FMFPac Maj John J. Bukowy (20Apr- 29May46 ) (30Sep45-lSep47 ) Capt Jack M . Daly (30May- CO Col Harold E . Rosecrans (to28 - 10Jun46 ) Feb46 ) LtCol Marvin C . Stewart (11 - 8 Unless otherwise indicated, the inclusive period o f Jun-16Sep 46 ) the occupation of North China by Marine units is 2 Maj Victor R'. Bisceglia (17Sep- September 1945—26 May 1949 . For the purposes of thi s 6Nov46 ) listing, however, the end date of the occupation perio d for major units is 8 February 1949, when FMFWesPa c LtCol Marvin C. Stewart (7Nov- departed Tsingtao . 46-3Jan47)

MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 867

Maj Victor R . Bisceglia (4Jan– III Amphibious Corps Headquarters 5May47 ) (30Sep45—9Jun46 ) . Fitzgerald (6May— LtCol Paul A CG MajGen Keller E . Rockey 29Aug47 ) CofS BGen William A . Worton Maj Victor R . Bisceglia (from G—1 Col Harry E . Dunkelberger (t o 30Aug47 ) 4Feb46 ) LtCol Cornelius P . Van Ness Motor Transport Battalion, 7th Servic e (from 4Feb46 ) Regiment, Service Command, FMFPa c G—2 Col Charles C . Brown (30Sep45—20Apr46 ) G—3 Col Manly L. Curry (to 16Jan46 ) CO Maj John J . Bukow y LtCol William K . Enright (fro m 16Jan46 ) Supply and Maintenance Battalion, G—4 Col Earl S . Piper 7th Service Regiment, Service Command , G—5 Col Benjamin W . Gally FMFPac CO Maj George C . Pafford (to III Amphibious Corps, Corps Troops 4Feb46 ) (30Sep45—9Jun46 ) (None shown 5—13Feb46 ) CO Col Edward G. Hagen (to 30ct- Maj Glen C. Taylor (14Feb— 45 ) 15Mar46 ) CO LtCol Cornelius P. Van Ness (3- (None shown 16Mar—19Apr46 ) Oct—17Dec45) Maj Franklin J . Weeman (20— LtCol James M . Ranck, Jr. (18— 26Apr46 ) 31Dec45) i o Capt Nathan Siegal (27Apr— 19May46 ) III Amphibious Corps , Capt Foy E . Jordan (20May— Headquarters and Service Battalion 4Jun46 ) (30Sep45—31Jul46 ) Capt Richard P. Brezinski (5— CO LtCol Cornelius P. Van Ness (t o 16Jun46 ) 30ct45 ) Capt Jack M. Daly (17—20Jun46 ) LtCol Harry A. Traffert, Jr. (3- LtCol William H . Barba (21Jun - Oct—31Dec45 ) 46—17Mar47 ) LtCol Reynolds H . Hayden (1Jan— Maj Louis G . Monville (fro m 26Apr46 ) 18Mar47 ) LtCol Allen B . Geiger (from 27- Apr46) 12th Service Battalion, Service Command , FMFPac e III Amphibious Corps, Medical Battalio n (17Apr46—31Jan49 ) (30Sep45—15Mar46 ) LtCol Paul W CO . Russell (to 28Sep- CO LCdr Donovan C . Blanchard 46) (MC) (to 290ct45 ) LtCol Ralph L . Houser (28Sep46— LCdr William H. Hanan (MC ) 30Sep47 ) (290ct—1Nov45 ) LtCol Frederick L . Wieseman Cdr Nicholas Palma (MC) (2 - (10ct—8Dec47 ) Nov45—9Jan'.3 ) LtCol Noah P. Wood, Jr. (9Dec- Cdr Francis X . McGill (MC) 47—17Jun48 ) (from 10Jan46 ) LtCol Forest C . Thompson (from 18Jun48 ) 10 On 1 January 1946, the billet of commander of Corp s Troops was merged with that of commander of the 9 Redesignated 2d Provisional Service Group (Light), Corps Headquarters and Service Battalion as an addi- Service Command, FMFPac, on 1 July 1948. tional duty.

310-224 0 - 69 - 56

868 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

III Amphibious Corps, Shore Brigade Col George W . McHenry (20Jan— (30Sep—150ct45 ) 29Apr47 ) LtCol Charles W. Harrison (fro m Col Elmer H. Salzman CO 30Apr47 ) III Amphibious Corps, Signal Battalion G—3 LtCol William K. Enright (to 21 - Aug46 ) (30Sep45—15Mar46 ) Col Jaime Sabater (21Aug46— CO LtCol Benjamin F . Kaiser, Jr. 1 May47 ) (None shown 2May47 ) Marine Forces, China " LtCol Elliot E . Bard (from 3May- (10Jun46—19Jun47 ) 47 ) CG MajGen Keller E . Rockey (to 17 - G—4 Col Earl S . Piper (to 24Ju146 ) Sep46 ) LtCol George A. Roll (24Jul— MajGen Samuel L . Howard (18 - 24Aug46 ) Sep46—17Jun47 ) Col James M . Smith (from 25 - Col Alva B . Lasswell (from 18- Aug46 ) Jun47 ) G—5 Col Benjamin W . Gally (to 24 - CofS BGen William A . Worton (to 26- Jun46 ) Aug46 ) LtCol Herbert A. Vernet, Jr . (25- BGen Alfred H . Noble (26Aug— Jun—2Aug46 ) 16Dec46 ) LtCol Chester A . Henry, Jr . (3- (None shown 17—19Dec46 ) Aug46—13Mar47 ) Col Alva B. Lasswell (20Dec46— (None shown after 13Mar47 ) 17Jun47 ) Headquarters and Service Battalion, (None shown after 17Jun47 ) Marine Forces, China G—1 LtCol Cornelius P . Van Ness (to (lOJun46—19Jun47 ) 23Aug46 ) LtCol Robert W . Rickert (24Aug— CO LtCol Allen B. Geiger (to 18Jun- 10Sep46) 46 ) Col Alva B . Lasswell (11Sep — Maj Maurice L . Appleton, Jr. 19Dec46 ) (from 18Jun46 ) LtCol Robert W . Rickert (20Dec- Headquarters, 1st Marine Division 46—23Jan47 ) (30Sep45—19Jun47 ) LtCol Thomas B . Hughes (24Jan — - 26Feb47 ) CG MajGen DeWitt Peck (to 13Jun 46 ) LtCol Robert W . Rickert (from MajGen Keller E . Rockey (13- 27Feb47 ) Jun—17Sep46 ) G—2 Col Charles C. Brown (to 14Nov- MajGen Samuel L . Howard (18- 46) Sep46—17Jun47 ) LtCol Charles W. Harrison (14- Col Alva B . Lasswell (from 18- Nov46—19Jan47 ) Jun47 )

11 On 10 June 1946, III Amphibious Corps was redes- ADC BGen Louis R . Jones (to 10Jun- ignated Marine Forces, China, which was a task force 46 ) designation for the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) . BGen William A . Worton (10Jun— As indicated, General Rockey became the division com- 25Aug46 ) mander and General Worton became the assistant division commander. Generally, corps staff officers wer e BGen Alfred H . Noble (26Aug— assigned the senior positions on the augmented Marin e 16Dec46 ) Forces/1st Division staff. In such cases, the muster roll s (None shown 17Dec46—30Jan47 ) may indicate two individuals occupying a single staff BGen Edward A . Craig (31Jan— billet for a brief period, or one individual occupying tw o staff billets on two command levels . This listing wil l 17May47 ) therefore reflect the situation as it was. (None shown after 17May47)

MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 869

CofS Col Robert 0 . Bare (to 17Oct45 ) LtCol Elliot E . Bard (from 3May - Col Julian N. Frisbie (180ct45- 47 ) 9Jun46 ) G-4 LtCol Harvey C . Tschirgi (to 24- BGen William A . Worton (10- Jun46 ) Jun-25Aug46 ) Col Earl S . Piper (25Jun-23Ju1 - (None shown 26-31Aug46 ) 46 ) Col Harry E . Dunkelberger (1 - LtCol George A . Roll (24Jul - Sep-18Dec46 ) 24Aug46 ) (None shown 19Dec46 ) Col James M. Smith (from 25 - Col Alva B . Lasswell (20Dec46- Aug46 ) 17Jun47 ) (None shown after 17Jun47 ) Division Headquarters Battalio n G-1 LtCol Clarence R . Schwenke (t o (30Sep45-19Jun47 ) 30Jun46 ) LtCol Cornelius P. Van Ness (1 - CO LtCol John D . Muncie (to 5Nov- Jul-23Aug46 ) 45 ) LtCol Robert W . Rickert (24Aug- LtCol David W . Silvey (5Nov- lOSep46 ) 22Dec45 ) Col Alva B. Lasswell (11Sep-19 - LtCol Richard T . McNown (23 - Dec46 ) Dec45-17Feb46 ) LtCol Robert W. Rickert (20Dec- Maj Alexander W. Chilton, Jr . 46-23Jan47 ) (18Feb-30Mar46 ) LtCol Thomas B . Hughes (24Jan- LtCol Glenn C. Funk (31Mar- 26Feb47 ) 5Jun46) LtCol Robert W. Rickert (fro m LtCol Gallais "E" Matheny (6 - 27Feb47 ) Jun-29Ju146 ) G-2 LtCol John W . Scott, Jr . (to 28- Col Augustus W . Cockrell (30 - Oct45) Jul-4Nov46 ) LtCol James M . Masters, Sr . (28- LtCol Marvin T. Starr (5Nov46 - Oct45-3Mar46 ) 9May47 ) Maj Bernard W . McLean (4Mar- (None shown 10-25May47 ) 9Jun46) Maj Henry Aplington, II (from Col Charles C. Brown (10Jun- 26May47 ) 14Nov46 ) LtCol Charles W . Harrison (14- 1st Engineer Battalio n Nov46-19Jan47 ) (30Sep45-19Jun47 ) Col George W . McHenry (20Jan - CO LtCol Theodore E . Drummond (to 29Apr47 ) 5Apr46 ) LtCol Charles W . Harrison (fro m LtCol Edmund M . Williams (5 - 30Apr47 ) Apr-9Jun46 ) G-3 LtCol Russell N . Honsowetz (to (None shown 10-22Jun46 ) 31Jan46 ) LtCol Clifford H . Shuey (23Jun- LtCol Robert T . Vance (lFeb- 14Oct46 ) 30Mar46 ) . Brewer (from 15 - LtCol Henry Aplington, II (31 - LtCol John C Mar-30Jun46 ) Oct46 ) LtCol William K . Enright (lJul- 1st Medical Battalion 20Aug46 ) Col Jaime Sabater (21Aug46 - (250ct45-2May47 ) 1May47 ) CO LCdr Francis Giuffrida (MC ) (None shown 2May47) (to 6Nov45)

870 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Cdr Harold H . Hill (MC) (6 - 1st Marines 1 2 Nov45-27Jun46 ) (30Sep45-20May47 ) Cdr Louis R. Gens (MC) (from CO Col Arthur T . Mason (to 2OSep - 28Jun46 ) 46 ) LtCol James M . Ranck, Jr. (21 - 1st Motor Transport Battalio n Sep-70ct46 ) (30Sep45-20Jun47 ) Col John E . Curry (80ct46-20 - CO LtCol Calvin C. Gaines (to 9Jan- May47 ) 46) Maj Edwin B . Wheeler (18Feb- Capt Eero Nori (9Jan-1Ju146 ) 8Mar48 ) Capt Lloyd F . Barker (2Jul-11 - Col George W . McHenry (9Mar- Aug46 ) 27Apr48 ) Col Miles S. Newton (from 28 - LtCol Robert E . Hommel (12 - Apr48) Aug46-8May47 ) LtCol Francis T . Eagan (from ExO (None shown to 5Nov45 ) LtCol Max C . Chapman (5Nov45- 9May47 ) 14Feb46 ) 1st Pioneer Battalio n (None shown 15Feb-5Apr46 ) LtCol James M . Ranck, Jr . (6- (30Sep45-11Jun47 ) Apr-19Sep46 ) CO Maj Austin S. Igleheart, Jr . (to (None shown 2OSep-70ct46 ) 310ct45 ) Col James M . Ranck, Jr . (80ct- Maj Robert H . C. Johnston (31 - 46-10Mar47 ) Oct-10Nov45 ) LtCol Edward L. Hutchinso n LtCol Lloyd G . Coutts (11Nov45 - (from 11Mar47 ) 30Sep46) S-3 Maj John V. Kelsey (to 31Mar46 ) LtCol Edmund M . Williams (1 - Maj Noel C . Gregory (31Mar- Oct46-17Apr47 ) 5Sep46 ) Maj James P . Jacobson (18Apr - LtCol Gallais "E" Matheny (fro m 19May47 ) 6Sep46 ) LtCol Edmund M . Williams (fro m 20May47 ) 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (30Sep45-27Aug47 ) 1st Service Battalion CO LtCol Austin C . Shofner (to 4 - (30Sep45-15Jun47 ) Feb46 ) LtCol Wilbur F . Meyerhoff (4 - CO LtCol William E . Benedict (to 8 - Feb-280ct46) Jan46 ) LtCol Edward L. Hutchinson (29 - LtCol Edward H . Drake (8Jan- Oct46-6Mar47 ) 14Sep46 ) (None shown 7-12Mar47 ) Maj Fraser E . West (15Sep-31 - LtCol Francis T . Eagan (13Mar- Oct46 ) 30Apr47 ) LtCol Earl E . Sneeringer (1Nov- LtCol John A . Burns (from 1 - 46-8May47 ) May47 ) LtCol Gallais "E" Matheny (fro m 9May47 ) 12 On 20May 1947, as part of the overall strength reduction of Marine units in North China, the 1s t Marines was reorganized into two battalions without a 1st Tank Battalion regimental headquarters. The 2d Battalion was assigned (40ct45-24Jan47 ) that date to Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific, an d was redesignated 1st Marines, Fleet Marine Force , CO LtCol Alexander B . Swenceski Western Pacific, on 1 October 1947.

MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 871

2d Battalion, 1st Marines 13 LtCol John H . Masters (from (3OSep45-3OSep47 ) 40ct46 ) Maj James H CO LtCol James C . Magee, Jr . (to S-3 . Flagg (to 8Feb46 ) 24Jun46 ) (None shown 8Feb-31Mar46 ) LtCol Allen B . Geiger (1-20Apr - LtCol Glenn C . Funk (24Jun46- 46 ) 14Jan47 ) (None shown 21-30Apr46 ) LtCol Harold Granger (15Jan- Maj Wallace E . Tow (1-24May - 2OMay47) ) Col John E . Curry (21May-22 - 46 (None shown 25May-26Jun46 ) Aug47 ) LtCol Carlo A. Rovetta (27Jun- LtCol Harold Granger (23-26 - 17Dec46 ) Aug47 ) LtCol Ralph A . Collins, Jr . (18 - Col George W . McHenry (from Dec46-6Feb47 ) 27Aug47 ) Maj Maxie R . Williams (from 7 - 3d Battalion, 1st Marine s Feb47 ) (3OSep45-15Apr46 ) 1st Battalion, 5th Marine s CO LtCol Hector R. Migneault (to (3OSep45-25May47 ) 16Jan46 ) CO LtCol John H . Masters (to 20ct- LtCol Bowers C . G . Davis (from 46 ) 16Jan46 ) Maj Jeff P . Overstreet (3-80ct- 46 ) 5th Marine s LtCol Richard T . McNown (90ct- (3OSep45-14May47 ) 15Dec46 ) CO Col Julian N . Frisbie (to 160ct - LtCol Theodore M . Sheffield 45 ) (from 16Dec46 ) LtCol Robert E . Hill (16Oct- 2d Battalion, 5th Marines 8Nov45 ) Col Theodore A . Holdahl (9Nov- (30Sep45-14May47 ) 45-31Mar46 ) CO LtCol John B . Baker (to 150ct45 ) LtCol August Larson (1Apr-15 - Maj Robert T . Washburn (15- Ju146 ) 310ct45 ) Col Julian N. Frisbie (from 16 - LtCol Edwin C . Godbold (lNov- Ju147 ) 45-19Ju146 ) Ex0 LtCol Robert E . Hill (to 160ct- LtCol George D . Rich (from 20- 45 ) Ju146 ) (None shown 170ct-8Nov45 ) 3d Battalion, 5th Marine s LtCol Robert E . Hill (9Nov45- (3OSep45-15Apr46 ) 27Jan46 ) (None shown 27Jan-14Mar46 ) CO LtCol Joseph L. Winecoff LtCol August Larson (15-31Mar- 7th Marines 46 ) (30Sep45-11Jan47 ) (None shown 1-14Apr46 ) CO Col Richard P . Ross (to 28Jan46 ) LtCol Joseph L . Winecoff (15- Col Paul Drake (from 28Jan46 ) Apr-11Ju146 ) ExO LtCol James M . Masters, Sr . (to LtCol John A . Anderson (12Jul- 270ct45 ) 3OSep46 ) LtCol Willard C . Fiske (270ct- (None shown 1-30ct46 ) 29Dec45 )

13 Redesignated 1st Marines, Fleet Marine Force, Maj Walter Holomon (30Dec45 - Western Pacific, on 1 October 1947. 4Jan46)

872 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

LtCol Charles E . Shepard, Jr. LtCol William F . Kramer (1–21 - (from 5Jan46 ) Jul46 ) S–3 Maj Walter Holomon (to 31Mar- LtCol Noah P. Wood, Jr. (22Jul— 46 ) 1 Dec46 ) Maj Wallace G. Fleissner (lApr– LtCol Thomas B. Hughes (from 13Aug46 ) 2Dec46 ) LtCol Thomas C . Kerrigan (from S–3 (None shown to 310ct45 ) 14Aug46 ) LtCol Roger S . Bruford (lNov– 20Dec45 ) 1st Battalion, 7th Marines LtCol Thomas G . Roe (21Dec45 – (30Sep45–5Jan47 ) 6Jan46 ) CO LtCol John J . Gormley (to 9Feb - Maj William P . Oliver, Jr . (7– 46) 31Jan46 ) LtCol Russell N . Honsowetz (9- LtCol Harry N. Shea (lFeb–30- Feb-5Ju146 ) Jun46 ) LtCol Norman E . Sparling (6Jul– LtCol Henry E . W . Barnes (fro m 22Dec46 ) 1Ju146) LtCol Carlo A . Rovetta (from 23 - 1st Battalion, 11th Marines Dec46 ) (30Sep45–24Jan47 ) 2d Battalion, 7th Marines CO LtCol Richard W . Wallace (to 3 - (30Sep45–5Jan47 ) Apr46) CO LtCol Charles T . Hodges (to 25 - LtCol Thomas R. Belzer (3Apr– Feb46 ) 12Dec46 ) LtCol James D . Hittle (25Feb– LtCol Fred T. Bishopp (from 13 - 25Jun46 ) Dec46 ) Maj Louis G. Ditta (26Jun–lJul - 2d Battalion, 11th Marine s 46 ) (30Sep45–24Jan47 ) LtCol Henry Aplington, II (2Jul– 17Dec46 ) CO LtCol Samuel S . Wooster (to 1 - LtCol Edward H . Drake (from Jan46 ) 18Dec46 ) LtCol David W . Silvey (1Jan– 3Mar46 ) 3d . Battalion, 7th Marines Maj Maurice L . Appleton, Jr . (4– (30Sep45–15Apr46 ) 31Mar46 ) LtCol Edward L . Peoples (lApr– CO LtCol Stephen V . Sabol 26Jun46 ) 11th Marines LtCol Noah P . Wood, Jr . (27Jun– 21Ju146 ) (30Sep45–24Jan47 ) LtCol Edward L. Peoples (22Jul— CO Col Wilburt S . Brown (to 22Dec - 18Aug46 ) 45 ) LtCol Warren P . Baker (from LtCol Edson L . Lyman (acting , 19Aug46 ) 22Dec45–11Jan46 ) Col Wilburt S. Brown (12Jan– 3d Battalion, 11th Marines 30Sep46) (30Sep45–5Jan47 ) Col Eugene F. C . Collier (fro m CO LtCol Thomas G . Roe (to 19Dec- l Oct46) 45 ) ExO LtCol Roger S . Bruford (to 1- Maj John P. McAlinn (19Dec45 – Nov45 ) 7Jan46 ) LtCol Edson L . Lyman (1Nov45 – LtCol Roger S . Bruford (8Jan– 30Jun46) 29Dec46)

MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 873

Maj David S . Randall (from 30 - 6th Medical Battalion Dec46 ) (140ct45–26Mar46) 4th Battalion, 11th Marines CO Cdr John S. Cowan (MC) (t o (30Sep45–5Jan47 ) 28Jan46 ) CO Maj Andre D. Gomez (to 15Jan - LCdr Rich H . Pembroke (MC ) 46 ) (from 28Jan46 ) LtCol William J . Van Ryzi n (15 - Jan—9Ju146) 6th Motor Transport Battalion LtCol Claude S . Sanders, Jr . (10 - (140ct45–26Mar46 ) Jul–19Nov46) CO LtCol Robert E . McCook Maj Lewis E . Poggemeyer (20- Nov–12Dec46 ) 6th Pioneer Battalio n LtCol Thomas R . Belzer (fro m (140ct45–23Mar46 ) 13Dec46 ) CO LtCol Samuel R . Shaw (to 150ct- 45) 6th Marine Division Maj John G. Dibble (15–210ct45 ) (110ct45–31 Mar46 ) LtCol Harry A. Schmitz (220ct- CG MajGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr . 45–19Mar46 ) (to 24Dec45 ) (None shown after 19Mar46 ) MajGen Archie F . Howard (fro m 24Dec45 ) 6th Service Battalio n ADC BGen William T . Clemen t (140ct45–22Mar46) CofS Col John C . McQueen (to 10Feb - CO Col William W . Orr (to 3Dec45 ) 46 ) LtCol Alexander N . Entringer (3 - Col Harry E . Dunkelberger (fro m Dec45–19Mar46) 10Feb46 ) LtCol Harry A . Schmitz (fro m G–1 Col Karl K. Louther (to 17Nov - 20Mar46 ) 45 ) LtCol Frederick Belton (from 17 - 6th Tank Battalion Nov45 ) (130ct45–26Mar46 ) G–2 LtCol Thomas E . Williams (to 16Feb46 ) CO LtCol Robert L. Denig, Jr . LtCol Carl V . Larson (from 16 - 4th Marines 1 4 Feb46 ) G–3 LtCol Victor H . Krulak (to 150ct - (17Jan–2Sep46 ) 45 ) CO LtCol Fred D . Beans (to 27Jan - LtCol Wayne H . Adams (150ct 46 ) 31Dec45 ) 2dLt Paul V . Stone (27Jan–7Feb- LtCol George W. Kille n (from 1 - 46 ) Jan46) 2dLt Lawrence H . Guthart, Jr . G–4 LtCol Wayne H . Adams (to 15 - (8Feb–6Mar46 ) Oct45) Col William J . Whaling (7–25 - LtCol Samuel R . Shaw (from 15 - Mar46 ) Oct45 ) Col John D . Blanchard (26Mar– 30Jun46 ) Division Headquarters Battalio n (120ct45–31Mar46 ) 14 On 1 April 1946, the 3d Marine Brigade was acti- CO LtCol Floyd A. Stephenso n vated, at which time the 4th Marines became a component unit of that command . When the 3d Brigade was deactivated with the formation of Marine Forces , 6th Engineer Battalio n Tsingtao, on 10 June, the regiment became the 4th (130ct45–26Mar46 ) Marines (Reinforced), the reinforcing elements repre- CO LtCol Orin C. Bjornsrud senting support units formerly under the brigade .

874 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

BGen William T . Clement (1Jul - 22d Marine s 24Aug46 ) (110ct45-22M ar46 ) LtCol Robert L. Denig, Jr. (from CO Col John D . Blanchard (to 26 - 25Aug46 ) Mar46) Ex0 (None shown to 9Mar46 ) Maj George B . Kantner (fro m LtCol August Larson (9-14Mar - 26Mar46 ) 46 ) Ex0 LtCol August Larson (to 8Mar- LtCol John E . Weber (15Mar - 46 ) 22Apr46 ) (None shown 9-14Mar46 ) LtCol William N . McGill (from Maj George B . Kantner (15-25- 22Apr46 ) Mar46) S-3 (None shown to 8Mar46 ) (None shown 26Mar46 ) LtCol Jack F. Warner (8-18Mar- S-3 LtCol Walter H . Stephens (t o 46 ) 1Dec45 ) Maj Norris E . Lineweaver (19 - Maj George B . Kantner (2Dec45- Mar-3Apr46 ) 6Mar46 ) LtCol Richard I . Moss (4Apr- (None shown after 6Mar46 ) 9Jun46) (None shown after 10Jun46 ) 1st Battalion, 22d Marines (110ct45-26Mar46 ) 1st Battalion, 4th Marine s CO LtCol Gavin C. Humphrey (8Mar-3Sep46 ) 2d Battalion, 22d Marines 1B CO LtCol Joseph P . Sayers (to 22Jul- (110ct45-8Mar46 ) 46 ) CO LtCol John G. Johnso n LtCol Warren P . Baker (23Jul - 7Aug46 ) 3d Battalion, 22d Marines " LtCol Walter H . Stephens (fro m (110ct45-8Mar46 ) 8Aug46 ) CO LtCol Clair W . Shisler (to 9Nov - 2d Battalion, 4th Marine s 45 ) (8Mar-3Sep46 ) Maj George B . Kantner (9-13 - CO LtCol John G . Johnson (to 12Apr- Nov45 ) 46 ) LtCol Clair W . Shisler (14-26 - Maj Jeff P . Overstreet (13-21 - Nov45 ) Apr46) Maj George B . Kantner (26-30 - LtCol John E . Weber (21Apr- Nov45 ) 5Aug46 ) LtCol Walter H . Stephens (fro m LtCol Edwin C . Godbold (6-15 - 1Dec45 ) Aug46 ) 29th Marine s LtCol Theodore F . Beeman (from 16Aug46 ) (110ct45-26Mar46 ) CO Col William A . Whaling (to 6 - 3d Battalion, 4th Marines 1 6 Mar46) (8Mar46-2Sep46 ) (None shown after 6Mar46 ) CO LtCol Walter H . Stephens (to 5 - Ex0 LtCol George W . Killen (to 12 - Aug46 ) Oct45) Col Samuel B . Griffith, II (from Col Orin K . Pressley (12-310ct - 5Aug46 ) 45 )

15 On 3 September 1946, 3/4 (Reinforced) became th e le Redesignated 2d Battalion, 4th Marines on 8 March major element of the Marine forces in Tsingtao, and o n 1946 . the 12th was attached to the 1st Marine Division, Marin e 14 Redesignated 3d Battalion, 4th Marines on 8 Marc h Forces, China, for operational control . 1946 .

MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 875

LtCol John E . Weber (1Nov45— 1st Battalion, 15th Marines 10Mar46 ) (110ct45—23Nov45) * (None shown after 10Mar46 ) CO LtCol Walter S . Osipoff S—3 LtCol George W . Killen (to 31- Dec45) 2d Battalion, 15th Marine s (None shown 1—9Jan46 ) (110ct45—26Mar46 ) LtCol Jack F . Warner (lOJan— CO Maj Nat M . Pace 7Mar46 ) (None shown after 7Mar46 ) 3d Battalion, 15th Marine s 1st Battalion, 29th Marines 18 (110ct45—26Mar46 ) CO LtCol Joe C . McHaney (to 8Jan- (110ct45—26Mar46 ) 46 ) CO LtCol LeRoy P . Hunt, Jr. (to 11- LtCol Walter S . Osipoff (8—14 - Mar46) Jan46 ) Maj Wallace G . Fleissner (from Maj George F . Vaughan (from 11Mar46 ) 15Jan46 )

2d Battalion, 29th Marines 10 4th Battalion, 15th Marines 8 0 (100ct45—8Mar46 ) (110ct45—17Mar46 ) CO LtCol William G. Robb (to 8Feb- CO Maj William H. Hirst (to 250ct - 46 ) 45 ) Maj Thomas J . Gross (from 8Feb- Maj Francis F . Parry (250ct45 — 46) 8Jan46 ) Maj John S. Hartz (9Jan—24Feb - 3d Battalion, 29th Marine s 46 ) (110ct45—26Mar46 ) Maj Marshall R . Pilcher (25 — CO LtCol Angus M . Fraser (to 8Feb- 28Feb46 ) 46) LtCol Louis A . Ennis (from 1- (None shown 8—19Feb46 ) Mar46 ) LtCol Joseph P . Sayers (from 19- Feb46 ) 3d Marine Brigade 2 1 (lApr—9Jun46 ) 15th Marine s (110ct45—26Mar46 ) Marine Forces, Tsingtao CO Col Robert B . Luckey (10Jun—3Sep46 ) ExO LtCol James H . Brower (to 13- CG BGen William T . Clement Jan46) CofS Col Harry E . Dunkelberger (None shown 13Jan—11Feb46 ) G—1 LtCol Frederick Belton LtCol Louis A . Ennis (from 12 - G—2 LtCol Carl V . Larsen Feb46 ) G—3 LtCol George W . Killen S—3 Capt William W. Curtis (to 10- - G—4 LtCol Samuel R. Shaw Dec45 ) 3d Marine Brigade Headquarters Battalion R2 LtCol Walter S . Osipoff (10Dec - 45—7Jan46 ) (lApr—9Jun46 ) Capt William W. Curtis (8Jan — 1Mar46 ) * Disbanded 23 November 1945 . (None shown after 1Mar46 ) 20 On 17 March, the 4th Battalion, 15th Marines, wa s redesignated Artillery, 3d Marine Brigade. 19 Attached to 1st Marine Division on 14 February 21 On 10 June 1946, the brigade was' redesignate d 1946 . Marine Forces, Tsingtao . 10 Redesignated 1st Battalion, 4th Marines on 8 March 22 Redesignated Headquarters Battalion, Marine Forces . 1946. Tsingtao, on 10 June 1946 .

876 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Headquarters Battalion, Marine Forces, Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific Y7 Tsingtao (20May47—8Feb49 ) (lOJun—3Sep46 ) CG BGen Omar T . Pfeiffer (to 15 - CO Maj Floyd A. Stephenson Aug47 ) Artillery Battalion, 3d Marine Brigade Y3 BGen Gerald C. Thomas (fro m 15Aug47 ) (17Mar—24Aug46 ) CofS Col George W . McHenry (to 27 - CO LtCol Louis A . Ennis Aug47 ) Medical Battalion, 3d Marine Brigade " Col William J . Scheyer (from 27 - (lApr—l0Aug46 ) Aug47 ) CO LCdr Rich H. Pembroke (MC ) G—1 LtCol Warren P . Baker (to 25- (to 26Apr46 ) May48 ) LCdr Douglas J . Giorgio (MC ) Maj Drew J. Barrett, Jr . (25May— (26Apr—7May46 ) 9Aug48 ) LCdr Henry R . Ennis (MC ) Maj John R . Chaisson (from 10- (from 8May46 ) Aug48 ) . Larsen (to 14Sep47 Service Battalion, 3d Marine Brigade " G—2 Maj Carl V ) Capt John B . Bristow (14Sep— (lApr—230ct46) 8Dec47 ) CO LtCol Harry N . Schmitz (to 5- LtCol William A. Kengla (9Dec- Ju146 ) 47—26Jan49 ) LtCol Kenneth P . Corson (6Jul — Capt John B. Bristow (from 27- 24Aug46 ) Jan49 ) LtCol Robert E . McCook (from G—3 Maj John P . Wilbern (to 5Jun47 ) 25Aug46 ) LtCol Edward L . Hutchinson (6- 3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Reinforced) 2B Jun—lOSep47 ) (3Sep46—30Sep47 ) LtCol Thomas J . Colley (11Sep47— 220ct48 ) CO Col Samuel B . Griffith, II (to 22- LtCol Floyd H . Moore (230ct48— May47 ) 26Jan49 ) LtCol Edward L . Hutchinson (22- LtCol William A . Kengla (fro m May,5Jun47 ) 27Jan49 ) Col Jaime Sabater (from 6Jun47 ) G—4 LtCol John E . Weber (to lOSep - 23 On 17 March 1946, the 4th Battalion, 15th Marines , 47 ) was redesignated the Artillery Battalion, 3d Marin e LtCol Edward L . Hutchinson (11 - Brigade . This unit designation was again changed o n Sep47—20Jan48 ) 22 May 1946, when the battalion became 3/12 (Rein- forced) . LtCol Frederick L . Wieseman (21Jan—31Mar48 ) 24 Redesignated 3d Medical Battalion, 3d Marin e Brigade, on 22 May 1946. On 10 June 1946, designated LtCol Paul A . Fitzgerald (lApr— 3d Medical Battalion, 4th Marines (Reinforced) . 31Ju148 ) 25 Redesignated 3d Service Battalion, 3d Marin e Maj Stephen C . Munson, Jr. (1 - Brigade on 22 May 1946. On 10 June 1946, redesignated Aug—20Sep48 ) 3d Service Battalion, 4th Marines (Reinforced) . Maj Edwin B . Wheeler (from 18 - Ye With the disestablishment of Marine Forces , Tsingtao, 3/4 became the major Marine unit in that Sep48) 2 8 city. The support units formerly under Marine Forces, Tsingtao, were generally reduced to company-sized or- 27 With the withdrawal of all Marine units fro m ganizations and represented the battalion's reinforcement . Hopeh, the center of Marine activities and FMFWesPac , On 12 September 1946, the reinforced battalion cam e the major Marine command in China, were located a t under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division , Tsingtao . Marine Forces, China. On 1 October 1947, 3/4 was re- 2s No apparent reason is indicated for this discrepanc y designated 3d Marines, Fleet Marine Force, Wester n in dates in the Muster Rolls, FMFWesPac, Sep48 (Diar y Pacific. Unit, Files Sec, PersDept, HQMC) .

MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 877

Headquarters Battalion, FMFWesPa c LtCol Frederick L . Wieseman (1 - (20May47—8Feb49 ) Apr—17Aug48) 3 1 CO LtCol Marvin T . Starr (to 21Sep - Col Walfried M . Fromhold (18- 47 ) Aug—240ct48 ) Maj John A . Burns (22—29Sep47 ) LtCol Thomas J . Colley (from 25 - LtCol Marvin T . Starr (30Sep47— Oct48) 5Jan48 ) ExO LtCol Thomas W . Brundage, Jr. LtCol Paul A . Fitzgerald (6Jan - (to 31Mar48 ) 31 Mar48 ) LtCol John A . Burns (lApr—6Jul - LtCol Thomas W. Brundage, Jr. 48 ) (from 1Apr48 ) Maj William T . Bray (7Jul—12 - Aug48 ) 1st Marines =0 Maj James G . Juett (13Aug— (10ct47—8Feb49 ) 2Sep48 ) (None shown 3—30Sep48 ) CO Col George W . McHenry (to 17- LtCol William T . McKenna n Feb48 ) (from lOct48 ) Maj Edwin B . Wheeler (18Feb — S—3 Maj William T . Bray (to 6Ju148 ) 8Mar48 ) Maj James G . Juett (7Jul—12Aug- Col George W . McHenry (9Mar — 48 ) 27Apr48 ) (None shown 13Aug—2Sep48 ) Col Miles S. Newton (from 28 - Maj James G . Juett (3—20Sep48 ) Apr48) Maj William T . McKennan (21 - ExO LtCol Harold Granger (to 8Jul 30Sep48 ) 48) (None shown 1—310ct48 ) . Wheeler (9—19Jul - Maj Edwin B Maj Meryl F . Kurr (from lNov - 48) 48 ) Maj John P . Wilbern (20Jul—12- Aug48 ) 2d Provisional Artillery Battalion , LtCol Floyd H . Moore (13Aug— 11th Marine s 190ct48 ) (10ct47—3Feb49 ) Maj John P . Wilbern (20—290ct - CO Maj Elliott Wilson 48) Maj Charles H . Brush, Jr. (30 - 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (70ct45—17Apr47 ) Oct48—27Jan49 ) . Larkin (to Maj John P . Wilbern (from 28 - CG MajGen Claude A 310ct45 ) Jan49 ) MajGen Louis E . Woods (310ct - . Wheeler (to 19 - S—3 Maj Edwin B 45—23Jun46 ) JuI48 ) (None shown 24Jun46 ) Capt Emil J . Radics (20Jul—12 - BGen Lawson H . M . Sanderson Aug48 ) (from 25Jun46 ) Maj John P . Wilbern (from 13 - AWC BGen Byron F . Johnson (to 17 - Aug48 ) Feb46 ) — 3d Marines 3 0 BGen Walter G . Farrell (17Feb 14Jun46 ) ) (10ct47—3Feb49 (None shown 15—21Jun46 ) CO Col Jaime Sabater (to 31Mar48 ) Col John N . Hart (22Jun—3Ju146 ) (None shown after 3Ju146 ) -U The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, was redesignated 1s t Marines, Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific, on 1 CofS Col Clarence J . Chappell, Jr . (to October 1947 . 25Jan46 ) 30 On 1 October 1947, 3/4 (Reinforced) redesignated 3d Marines, Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific . 31 Promoted to Colonel 1 July 1948 .

878 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

Col Vernon M . Guymon (25Jan— Col Frank E . Lamson-Scribner 3Ju146) (from 18Aug47 ) Col John N. Hart (4Ju146—16Apr- Ex0 LtCol Edward B . Carney ' 2 47 ) S–3 LtCol Benjamin S . Hargrave, Jr . Col Joe A . Smoak (17Apr47) (to 9Feb48 ) G—1 LtCol Etheridge C . Best (to 13 - LtCol George W . Herring (9Feb— Feb46 ) 90ct48 ) (None shown 14—21Feb46 ) LtCol Birney B . Truitt (100ct48— Col William B . Steiner (from 22 - 30Jan49 ) Feb46 ) (None shown after 30Jan49 ) G—2 Maj Manual Brilliant (to 1Feb- CO, HqSqn, 46) AirFMF- Col Roger T . Carleson (1Feb— WesPac Col John N . Hart (to 12May47 ) 26Mar46 ) Maj James N . Cupp (12May— (None shown 27Mar—15Apr46 ) 30Jun47 ) LtCol John F. Carey (from 16 - Maj Walter J . Carr, Jr . (1Jul47 — Apr46 ) 28Feb48 ) G—3 Col Carson A . Roberts (to 12Nov - LtCol Lee C . Merrell, Jr. (1Mar— 45 ) 29Jun48 ) LtCol Leonard K . Davis (12Nov- Maj Walter J . Carr, Jr. (30Jun— 45—25Jan46 ) 14Nov48 ) Col Charles J. Schlapkohl (26 - LtCol George W . Nevils (from Jan—10Aug46 ) 15Nov48 ) (None shown 10Aug—2Sep46 ) Marine Aircraft Group 1 2 Col Joe A . Smoak (3Sep46—16 - Apr47) (250ct45—26Apr46 ) Maj Frank E . Hollar (acting , CO Col Verne J. McCaul (to 14Jan46 ) 17Apr47 ) Col Marion L. Dawson (14Jan— G—4 LtCol Milo G. Haines (to 24Jan - 3Apr46 ) 46 ) (None shown 4—5Apr46 ) Col Elliot E . Bard (25Jan46— Col Edward L . Pugh (from 6 - 17Mar47 ) •Apr46 ) LtCol Zane Thompson, Jr. (fro m Ex0 LtCol Robert D . Moser (to 14 - 18Mar47 ) Jan46 ) — CO, Hq - LtCol Joseph N . Renner (14Jan 1Apr46 ) Sqn—1 Maj Robert W . Baile (to 24 - m Oct45) LtCol Elmore W . Seeds (fro Maj Finley T. Clarke, Jr . (24 - 2Apr46 ) GruOpsO . .. Maj John S . Payne (to 30Nov45 ) Oct45—13May46 ) (None shown 14May46 ) (None shown 1—9Dec45 ) . Moore (10Dec45 — Maj Kenneth D . Frazier (15May- LtCol James B 14Jan46 ) 46—24Jan47 ) (None shown 25Jan47 ) LtCol William A . Houston, Jr . Maj James N . Cupp (26Jan—31 - (15Jan—5Apr46 ) (None shown after 5Apr46 ) Mar47) - Capt Robert M . Keim (from 1 - CO, Hq . Maj Philip "L" Crawford (to 13 - Apr47) Sqn—12 .. Dec45 ) Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacifi c Maj Eugene A . Trowbridge (13 - Dec45—5Apr46 ) (lMay47—8Feb49 ) CO Col John N . Hart (to 18Aug47) 32 Promoted to colonel 10 July 1948 .

MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 879

lstLt Joseph B . Harrison (from Capt Charles F . Hughes (28May— 6Apr46 ) 17Jun46 ) CO , Capt Harold E . Smith (from 18 - SMS—12 . LtCol Richard E . Figley (to 13 - Jun46 ) Dec45 ) CO , Maj Philip "L" Crawford (13- SMS—24 . LtCol Benjamin B . Manchester , Dec45—31Mar46 ) III (to 25Jan46 ) LtCol Harlan Rogers (from 1 - LtCol John F . Carey (25Jan– Apr46 ) 6Apr46 ) LtCol William A . Houston, Jr . Marine Aircraft Group 2 4 (7Apr—27May46 ) Maj Charles S . Manning (28May— (180ct45—17Apr47 ) 15Sep46) CO Col Edward A . Montgomery (t o LtCol William A . Cloman, Jr . 29Jan46 ) (16Sep46—11Apr47 ) Col Edward L. Pugh (29Jan— Maj Joseph H . Elliott, Jr . (from 5Apr46 ) 12Apr47 ) Col Marion L . Dawson (from 6 - Apr46) Marine Aircraft Group 2 5 Ex0 LtCol Martin A. Severson (to 2 - (70ct45—7Jun46 ) Mar46 ) CO Col Herbert P. Becker (to 6Jun - LtCol John D . Harshberger (2 - 46 ) Mar—2Apr46 ) LtCol Gregory J . Weissenberger LtCol Joseph E . Renner (3—17 - (from 6Jun46 ) Apr46) Ex0 LtCol Elmore W . Seeds (to lApr - LtCol John D . Harshberger (18- 46 ) Apr—19Jun46 ) LtCol Edwin P . Pennebaker, Jr . LtCol Edwin P. Pennebaker, Jr. (1—5Apr46 ) (from 20Jun46 ) (None shown after 5Apr46 ) Gru0ps0 ... LtCol Guy M . Morrow (to 26Jan - Gru0ps0 .. .. LtCol John G . Walsh, Jr. (to 25 - 46 ) Jan46 ) LtCol John D . Harshberger (26 - (None shown 26Jan—16Feb46 ) Jan—10Mar46 ) LtCol Gregory J. Weissenberge r Maj Billie K . Shaw (11Mar— (17Apr—5Jun46 ) 4Apr46 ) (None shown after 5Jun46 ) LtCol John D . Harshberger (5 — CO, Hq - 17Apr46 ) Sqn—25 ... Capt Lawrence N . Laugen (t o (None shown 18—30Apr46 ) 14Feb46) Maj Philip "L" Crawford (1 — Maj William P . Dukes (from 14 - 28May46 ) Feb46 ) Maj William P. Addington (29 - CO , May—19Jun46 ) SMS—25 Maj Philip E . Sweeny (to 12Nov- LtCol John D . Harshberger (20 - 45 ) Jun—26Nov46 ) Capt Stanley Roszek (12Nov45— LtCol Lee C . Merrell, Jr . (27Nov- 10Jan46 ) 46—11Apr47 ) Maj Jack A . Church (11Jan — (None shown after 11Apr47 ) 31Mar46 ) CO, Hq- LtCol James R. Christensen (1- Sqn—24 ... Capt John S . Court (to 8Apr46 ) Apr—30May46 ) Capt William J . Suhr (8Apr— Maj Jack A . Church (from 1 - 27May46) Jun46 )

880 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

Marine Aircraft Group 32 lstLt Edward S . John (15Dec45— (160ct45—26May46 ) 25May46 ) . Cropley (26May— CO Col Thomas G . Ennis (to 29Jan - Capt Richard B 46 ) 21Aug46 ) (None shown 29Jan—4Feb46 ) Maj James N . Cupp (22Aug—23- Col Frank D . Weir (from 5Feb - Sep46 ) 46 ) Capt Richard B . Cropley (24Sep— Ex0 LtCol Wallace T . Scott (to 11Dec - 12Dec46 ) 45) Capt Harold F . Brown (from 13 - (None shown 12—17Dec45 ) Dec46 ) LtCol William M . Frash (18Dec - 45—4Apr46 ) Marine Air Warning Squadron 7 " LtCol Charles N . Endwess (5Apr— (270ct45—31Ju147 ) 17May46 ) CO Maj Thomas Turner (to 3ONov- (None shown after 17May46 ) 45) Gru0ps0 .... LtCol James B . Moore (to 6Dec- Capt Lawrence W . Canon (30 - 45 ) Nov45—19Jan46 ) (None shown 7Dec45 ) Capt Frank M . Richard (20Jan— LtCol William M . Frash (8—17- 12Mar46 ) Dec45 ) Maj Nelson B . Palmer (13Mar— . Anderson (from LtCol James R 14Jun46 ) 18Dec45 ) Maj Albert L . Jones (from 14Jun - CO, Hq - 46 ) Sqn—32 ... Capt Ernesto Giusti (to 18May - 46 ) Marine Air Warning Squadron 1 1 Capt LaVerne Gonnerman (from (280ct45—20May46) 18May46 ) CO , CO Capt Craig W. Parris (to 24Nov- SMS—32 . Maj Sherman A . Smith (to 200ct - 45 ) 45) Maj Daniel H . Davis (24Nov45— (None shown 21—220ct45 ) 28Feb46 ) LtCol Wyatt B . Carneal, Jr . lstLt Wesley "W" Carscaren (1 - (from 230ct45 ) Mar—4May46 ) lstLt Dwight O . Deay (from 5 - Marine Observation Squadron 3 May46 ) (100ct45—22Jun47 ) CO lstLt Daniels F . Nickols, Jr . (t o Marine Fighter Squadron 11 5 18Nov45 ) (14Nov45—17Jan47 ) lstLt Victor E . Reeves (18Nov45 — CO Maj Thomas W . Coles (to 9Mar- 12Jan46 ) 46 ) lstLt Thomas R . Riley (13Jan — Capt Fred J . Gilhuly (9Mar— 11Mar46 ) 30Apr46 ) Capt Billie C. Marks (12Mar— Maj John E . Reynolds (1May— 3Nov46 ) 16Aug46 ) Capt Jesse V. Booker (from 4 - Maj Harry B . Hooper, Jr. (17- Nov46 ) Aug—6Nov46 ) Marine Observation Squadron 6 LtCol Gordon H . Knott (from (110ct45—5Jan47 ) 7Nov46 ) CO Capt Joe W . Fitts, Jr. (to 15Dec - 33 Redesignated Marine Ground Control Intercept 45) Squadron 7 on 1 August 1946 .

MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 881

Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 134 LtCol Lee C . Merrell, Jr . (iMay- (210ct45—26Apr46 ) 47—28Feb48 ) Maj James T . McDaniel (1Mar— CO Maj Gruger L. Bright (acting, to 5Dec45 ) 8Oct48 ) Maj Walter F . Cornnell (5Dec45 — Maj Ernest R . Hemingway (9 - 28Feb46 ) Oct—iNov48 ) Maj Daniel H . Davis (1Mar— LtCol George W. Herring (2— 3Apr46 ) 23Nov48 ) LtCol William M . Frash (from Maj Walter J . Carr (24—29Nov - 48 ) 4Apr46 ) Maj Allan L . Feldmeier (30Nov— Marine Transport Squadron 152 10Dec48 ) (10Nov45—7Jun46 ) LtCol George W . Herring (fro m 11Dec48 ) CO LtCol William M . Frash (to 8 - Dec45 ) Marine Fighter Squadron 21 8 Maj Roscoe C . Cline, Jr . (8Dec45 – (14Nov45—7Apr47 ) 18Jan46 ) CO Maj Richard R . Amerine (to 10 - LtCol Gregory J . Weissenberger Mar46 ) (19Jan—15Feb46 ) Capt Paul H . Hackstadt (lOMay— LtCol Frank H. Collins (from 16- 7Apr46 ) Feb46 ) Maj Charles Kimak (8Apr—31 - Marine Transport Squadron 15 3 Aug46 ) LtCol Robert J. Johnson (fro m (5Nov45—29Jan49 ) 1Sep46 ) CO LtCol Louis L . Frank (to 15Apr- 46) Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 24 4 LtCol Neil R. McIntyre (15Apr - (18Oct45—21 May46 ) 46—12Mar47) CO Maj John E . Sperzel (to 24Nov— LtCol Benjamin S . Hargrave, Jr. 45 ) (acting, 13Mar—17Apr47 ) Maj Taylor R . Roberts (24Nov - LtCol Neil R. McIntyre (18Apr— 45—14Mar46 ) 30Sep47 ) lstLt James D . Freeze (15Mar— LtCol James R . Christensen (1- 4Apr46 ) Oct47—7Feb48 ) Maj Daniel H . Davis (5—9Apr46 ) Maj Ernest C . Fusan (8Feb— Maj Robert L. Anderson (10Apr— 15Nov48 ) 16May46 ) Maj Richard "F" Ofstad (from Maj Daniel H . Davis (from 17 - 16Nov48 ) May46 ) Marine Fighter Squadron 21 1 Detachment , Marine Transport Squadron 252 (14Nov45—4Apr49 ) (18Sep45—31Jan46 ) CO Maj Angus F . Davis (to 10Mar - CO LtCol Glenn T . Todd 46) Detachment, Marine Transport Squadron 253 Capt Reinhardt Leu (10Mar— 7Apr46 ) (lDec45—28Feb46 ) Maj Billie K . Shaw (8Apr—30Jun - CO LtCol Desmond E . Canavan 46) Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 343 Maj Joseph H . Elliott, Jr. (iJul— 31Aug46 ) (20Oct45—20May46 ) LtCol John D . Howard (1Sep46— CO Maj Jack Cosley (to 10Jan46 ) 30Apr47) (None shown 11—12Jan46 )

882 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

Maj Louis R. Babb (13Jan-17- Marine Carrier Fighter Group 1 May46 ) (USS Block Island ) Maj Walter F . Cornnell (fro m (D—lOMay-16Jun45 ) 18May46 ) (E—15Jun-2OJu145 ) CO LtCol John F . Dobbin s Detachment, Marine Transport Squadron 352 (1O0ct45-31Jan46 ) Marine Carrier Fighter Group 2 CO LtCol John W . Burkhard t (USS Gilbert Islands ) (D—21May-16Jun45 ) Detachment, Marine Bombing Squadron 41 3 (E—26Jun-6Ju145 ) (21-310ct45 ) (F—31Jul-15Aug45 ) CO Maj Edward J . Doyl e CO LtCol William R. Campbell

Marine Night Fighter Squadron 53 3 Marine Carrier Fighter Group 4 (USS Cape Gloucester ) (70ct45-7Jan47 ) (F—1OJul-7Aug45 ) CO Maj Robert P . Keller (to 27May - CO LtCol Donald K. Yost 46 ) Maj Jack C . Scott (27May-4Sep - Marine Fighter Squadron 11 2 46 ) (USS Bennington ) LtCol Alfred N . Gordon (5Sep- (B—15Feb-4Mar45 ) 19Dec46 ) (C—17Mar-11Jun45 ) Maj John N . Burnett (acting, 20 - CO Maj Herman Hansen, Jr. Dec46-22Jan47 ) LtCol Alfred N . Gordon (fro m Marine Fighter Squadron 12 3 23Jan47 ) (USS Bennington ) (B—15Feb-4Mar45 ) Marine Night Fighter Squadron 54 1 (C—17Mar-11Jun45 ) (60ct45-12Apr46 ) CO Maj Everett V . Alward (to 25 - CO Maj Reynolds A . Moody (to 27 - Feb45 ) Nov45 ) Maj Thomas E . Mobley, Jr. (from Capt George U . Smith (from 27 - 25Feb45) Nov45 ) Marine Fighter Squadron 12 4 Detachment, Marine Bombing Squadron 61 1 (USS Essex ) (21-290ct45 ) (A—3-22Jan45 ) CO LtCol Winston H. Mille r (B—15Feb-4Mar45 ) (C—17-24Mar45 ) Landing Force Air Support Control Unit 3 CO Maj William A . Millingto n (120ct45-6Mar46 ) CO LtCol John T . L. D . Gabbert Marine Carrier Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 13 2 (USS Cape Gloucester ) (F—1OJul-7Aug45 ) D. MARINE CARRIER-BASE D CO Capt Henry W . His e AIR UNITS " B. Assault and occupation of Iwo Jima ; Fifth Fleet as Under each unit listed there will appear a lette r raids against Japan, 15Feb—16Mar45 . designation for each operation in which the unit par- C. Third and Fifth Fleet raids in support of Okinawa ticipated, and dates of involvement . Following are the operation, 17Mar—11Jun45 . campaigns and dates of entitlement : D. Assault and occupation of Okinawa, 24Mar— A. Third Fleet supporting operations : Luzon attacks , 30Jun45 . 6—7Jan45 ; Formosa attacks, 3—4, 9, 15, and 21Jan45 ; E. Balikpapan operations, 15Jun—20Ju145 . China coast attacks, 12, 16Jan45 ; and Nansei Shoto F. Third Fleet operations against Japan, 10Jul— attacks, 22Jan45. 15Aug45 .

MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST 883

Marine Carrier Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 14 3 Marine Carrier Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 233 (USS Gilbert Islands ) (USS Block Island ) (D—21May-16Jun45 ) (D—3May-16Jun45 ) (E—26Jun-6Ju145 ) (E—26Jun-6Ju145 ) (F—31Jul-15Aug45 ) CO Capt Edmund W . Berr y CO Capt John E . Worlund Marine Carrier Fighter Squadron 35 Marine Fighter Squadron 213 (USS Essex ) 1 (USS Cape Gloucester ) (A—3-22Jan45 ) (B—15Feb-4Mar45 ) (F—10Jul-7Aug45 ) (C—17-24Mar45 ) CO . Maj Armond H . Delalio (to 5Jun - CO Maj Donald P. Frame (to 29Jan- 45 ) 45 ) Maj Charles E . McLean, Jr. Maj Louis R. Smunk (29Jan- (from 5Jun45 ) 4Feb45 ) Maj David E . Marshall (from 5 - Marine Fighter Squadron 45 1 Feb45 ) (USS Bunker Hill ) (B—15Feb-4Mar45 ) Marine Fighter Squadron 214 (C—17Mar-13May45 ) (USS Franklin ) CO Maj Henry A . Ellis, Jr. (C—17-22Mar45 ) CO Maj Stanley R . Bailey Marine Fighter Squadron 45 2 Marine Fighter Squadron 21 6 (USS Franklin ) (USS Wasp ) (C—17-19Mar45 ) (B—15Feb-4Mar45 ) CO Maj Charles P . Weiland (C—17-22Mar45 ) CO Maj George E . Dooley Marine Carrier Night Fighter Squadron 51 1 (USS Block Island ) Marine Fighter Squadron 21 7 (D—3May-16Jun45 ) (USS Wasp ) (E—26Jun-6Ju145 ) (B—15Feb-4Mar45 ) CO Maj Robert C. Maze (to 27May (C—17-22Mar45 ) - 46 ) CO Maj Jack R . Amende, Jr . (to 16 - Capt James L . Secrest (from 27- Feb45 ) May45 ) Maj George S . Buck (from 16 - Feb45 ) Marine Carrier Fighter Squadron 51 2 Marine Fighter Squadron 221 (USS Gilbert Island ) (USS Bunker Hill ) (D—21May-16Jun45 ) (B—15Feb-4Mar45 ) (E—26Jun-6Ju145 ) (C—17Mar-13May45 ) (F—31Jul-15Aug45 ) CO Maj Edwin S . Roberts, Jr . CO Maj Blaine H . Baesler

310-224 0 - 69 - 57

APPENDIX M Marine Casualties '

KIA DOW WIA MIAPD TOTA L Okinaw a (lApr–22Jun45) Offi- En- Offi- En- 015- En - Offi- En- Offi- En - cer sted cer listed cer listed cer listed cer listed

ReconBn, FMFPac 0 3 0 0 3 10 0 0 2 1 3

IIIAC Troops 0 18 1 4 14 148 0 0 15 170

IIIAC Artillery 1 10 1 11 11 458 1 1 14 48 0

1st Marine Division 56 1,036 13 149 311 6,094 0 6 380 7,28 5

RCT—8 1 36 0 11 11 317 0 0 12 36 4

6th Marine Division 27 1,337 18 274 388 7,041 1 10 434 8,662

2d Marine Aircraft Wing 24 21 0 9 51 162 28 3 103 19 5

Replacement Drafts2 1 157 1 28 9 735 0 1 11 921

Miscellaneous Air3 4 0 1 0 9 11 4 0 18 1 1

Miscellaneous Ground4 0 16 0 8 0 117 0 0 0 14 1

Total Casualties 114 2,634 35 494 806 15,093 34 21 989 18,24 2

Marine Ships Detachments.. 1 47 0 1 8 97 0 10 9 15 5

Marine Carrier Ai r Detachments 10 . 40 0 0 7 6 2 0 19 4 6

Grand Total Marine Casualties 125 2,721 35 495 821 15,196 36 31 1,017 18,443

Naval Medical Personnels Organic to Marine Units .. 1 108 0 9 12 430 0 0 13 54 7

Grand Total 126 2,829 35 504 833 15,626 36 31 1,030 18,990

1 These final Marine casualty figures were compiled from records furnished by Statistics Unit, Personnel Accounting Section , Records Branch, Personnel Department, HQMC . They are audited to include 26 August 1952 . The key to the abbreviations used at the head of columns in the table follows : KIA, Killed in Action ; DOW, Died of Wounds ; WIA, Wounded in Action ; MIAPD , Missing in Action, Presumed dead . Because of the casualty reporting method used during World War II, a substantial number o f DOW figures are also included in the WIA column . 2 Most members of replacement drafts who became casualties did so as member of regular combat units . In many instances , these men were hit before official notice of their transfer reached Headquarters Marine Corps, and therefore, they are carried on th e casualty rolls as members of the various drafts . 8 Included in the miscellaneous categories are those men whose personnel records still showed them as members of units no t part of Tenth Army when the report of their becoming a casualty reached Headquarters Marine Corps . E This category includes the casualties suffered by the 2d Marine Division while it was in the Okinawa area . 2 Compiled from NavMed P-5021, The History of the Medical Department of the Navy in Wnrld War II, 2 vols (Washington : Government Printing Office, 1953), II, pp. 1–84. 884 APPENDIX N

Unit Commendation s

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY , Washington .

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIA L UNIT CITATION to th e

FIRST MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED , consisting of The FIRST Marine Division ; Fourth Marine War Dog Platoon ; Fourth Provisiona l Rocket Detachment ; Fourth Joint Assault Signal Company ; Third Amphibian Truc k Company ; Third Provisional Armored Amphibian Battalion ; First Amphibian Trac- tor Battalion ; Eighth Amphibian Tractor Battalion ; Detachment, First Platoon, First Bomb Disposal Company ; Second Platoon, First Bomb Disposal Company (less First Section) ; Battery "B", 88th Independent Chemical Mortar Battalion, U . S. Army ; Company "B" (less First Platoon), 713th Armored Flame Thrower Battalion, U . S. Army, for service as set forth in the followin g

CITATION : "For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces during the invasion and capture of Okinawa Shima, Ryukyu Islands, from April 1 to June 21 , 1945. Securing its assigned area in the north of Okinawa by a series of lightnin g advances against stiffening resistance, the FIRST Marine Division, Reinforced, turne d southward to drive steadily forward through a formidable system of natural and man - made defenses protecting the main enemy bastion at Shuri Castle . Laying bitter siege to the enemy until the defending garrison was reduced and the elaborate fortification s at Shuri destroyed, these intrepid Marines continued to wage fierce battle as they advanced relentlessly, cutting off the Japanese on Oroku Peninsula and smashing through a series of heavily fortified, mutually supporting ridges extending to the southern - most tip of the island to split the remaining hostile force into two pockets where the y annihilated the trapped and savagely resisting enemy . By their valor and tenacity, the officers and men of the FIRST Marine Division, Reinforced, contributed materiall y to the conquest of Okinawa, and their gallantry in overcoming a fanatic enemy in th e face of extraordinary danger and difficulty adds new luster to Marine Corps Histor y and to the traditions of the United States Naval Service ." For the President.

JOHN L. SULLIVAN , Secretary of the Navy .

885

886 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY , Washington .

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIA L UNIT CITATION to the

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCE D

consisting of The Sixth Marine Division ; First Marine War Dog Platoon ; Fifth Provisional Rocke t Detachment ; Third Platoon, First Bomb Disposal Company ; Marine Observation Squad- ron Six ; Sixth Joint Assault Signal Company ; First Armored Amphibian Battalion ; Fourth Amphibian Tractor Battalion ; Ninth Amphibian Tractor Battalion ; Firs t Section, Second Platoon, First Bomb Disposal Company ; 708th Amphibian Tank Bat- talion, U. S . Army ; Third Armored Amphibian Battalion (less 4 platoons) ; 91s t Chemical Mortar Company (Separate), U . S . Army ; First Platoon, Company B, 713th Armored Flame-Thrower Battalion, U . S. Army , for service as set forth in the following

CITATION : "For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces during th e assault and capture of Okinawa, April 1 to June 21, 1945 . Seizing Yontan Airfield i n its initial operation, the SIXTH Marine Division, Reinforced, smashed through organized resistance to capture Ishikawa Isthmus, the town of Nago and heavily fortifie d Motobu Peninsula in 13 days . Later committed to the southern front, units of th e Division withstood overwhelming artillery and mortar barrages, repulsed furiou s counterattacks and staunchly pushed over the rocky terrain to reduce almost impreg- nable defenses and capture Sugar Loaf Hill . Turning southeast, they took the capital city of Naha and executed surprise shore-to-shore landings on Oroku Peninsula, securing the area with its prized Naha Airfield and Harbor after nine days of fierce fighting. Reentering the lines in the south, SIXTH Division Marines sought out enem y forces entrenched in a series of rocky ridges extending to the southern tip of th e island, advancing relentlessly and rendering decisive support until the last remnant s of enemy opposition were exterminated and the island secured . By their valor and tenacity, the officers and men of the SIXTH Marine Division, Reinforced contributed materially to the conquest of Okinawa, and their gallantry in overcoming a fanati c enemy in the face of extraordinary danger and difficulty adds new luster to Marin e Corps history, and to the traditions of the United States Naval Service ." For the President .

JAMES FORRESTAL , Secretary of the Navy .

UNIT CITATIONS 887

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY , Washington.

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIA L UNIT CITATION to the

SECOND MARINE AIRCRAFT WIN G

for service as set forth in the followin g

CITATION : "For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces during th e Okinawa Campaign, from April 4 to July 14, 1945 . Bearing the entire burden of land - based aircraft support during the early part of the Okinawa Campaign, the Secon d Marine Aircraft Wing established facilities and operated its aircraft under the mos t hazardous field conditions with a minimum of equipment and personnel. Undeterred by either the constant rain during April and May or by heavy enemy artillery shellin g and repeated day and night aerial bombing of the air strips, the unit succeeded in carrying out highly effective aerial operations against the enemy from Kyushu to th e southernmost islands of the Ryukyu Group, flying picket-ship and anti-submarine patrols, fighter sweeps, day and night fighter and bomber strikes, reconnaissance an d search missions, escort missions, and minesweeper and photographic plane cover, in addition to paradrop missions to move essential supplies to our forces . Blasting night and day at the enemy's dug-in infantry and artillery positions and executing some o f the most successful night fighter operations of the Pacific War, the unit furnished clos e air support for our ground forces, shooting down 495 Japanese planes during thi s period . A gallant, fighting unit, complemented by skilled officers and men, the Secon d Marine Aircraft Wing played a major role in achieving the air superiority essentia l to our success in the Okinawa operation ." For the President .

JAMES FORRESTAL , Secretary of the Navy.

888 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY , Washington .

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIA L UNIT CITATION to th e

MARINE OBSERVATION SQUADRON THRE E

for service as set forth in the followin g

CITATION : "For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces during th e invasion of Okinawa, April 2 to June 21, 1945 . The first aviation squadron to land o n and operate from Yontan Airfield, Marine Observation Squadron THREE assisted i n preparing a landing strip on the field while under enemy fire and, during the first nin e days of the operation, provided that field with the only available fire, crash and ambulance service. Despite inclement weather, intense enemy antiaircraft fire and constan t bombing of its operational field, this squadron rendered invaluable service for mor e than two months, conducting extremely low-altitude searches, spotting and photo - graphic missions over organized enemy positions to furnish thorough observation for all the Marine artillery units on Okinawa, serving as many as fourteen battalion s during some periods . Though reduced in number by enemy action and operationa l losses, Marine Observation Squadron THREE effectively pursued its mission through - out a hazardous campaign and, by the indomitable courage and excellent teamwork o f its officers and men, contributed immeasurably to the destruction of the Japanese o n Okinawa ." For the President.

JAMES FORRESTAL , Secretary of the Navy .

UNIT CITATIONS 889

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY , Washington .

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

AMPHIBIOUS RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIO N FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFI C

for service as follows : "For outstanding heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces in the Gilber t Islands, from November 19 to 26, 1943 ; the Marshall Islands, from January 30 t o February 23, 1944 ; Mariana Islands, from June 15 to August 4, 1944 ; and Ryukyu Islands, from March 26 to July 24, 1945 . The only unit of its kind in the Fleet Marin e Force, Pacific, the Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion rendered unique service i n executing secret reconnaissance missions on enemy-held islands. Frequently landing at night from submarines and other vessels prior to the assault, the small unit entere d areas where friendly aircraft, Naval gunfire and other forms of support were unavailable and, under cover of darkness, moved about in hostile territory virtually in th e presence of enemy troops . Despite hazards incident to passage through dark and unfamiliar hostile waters, often through heavy surf onto rocky shores, the Battalion persevered in its mission to reconnoiter enemy islands and obtain information vital t o our assault forces and, on several occasions, succeeded in overcoming all enemy resistance without the aid of regular troops. Carrying out its difficult tasks with courage and determination, the Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion contributed materiall y to the success of our offensive operations throughout four major campaigns an d achieved a gallant record of service which reflects the highest credit upon its officers and men and the United States Naval Service ."

All personnel attached to and serving with the Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion durin g one or more of the above-mentioned periods are authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COM- MENDATION Ribbon.

JAMES FORRESTAL, Secretary of the Navy .

890 VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, Washington.

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending th e

FIRST SEPARATE ENGINEER BATTALIO N

for service as follows : "For exceptionally meritorious service in support of military operations on Guadal- canal, December 10, 1942, to February 27, 1943 ; Tinian from August 20, 1944, to March 24, 1945 ; and Okinawa from April 14 to September 2, 1945 . Faced with numerous and difficult problems in engineering throughout two major campaigns, the Firs t Separate Engineer Battalion initiated new techniques and procedures in construction , repair and maintenance, executing its missions under adverse conditions of weathe r and terrain and in spite of Japanese shellings, artillery fire, bombing raids, sicknes s and tropical storms . Technically skilled, aggressive and unmindful of great persona l danger, the officers and men of this gallant Battalion constructed, developed and maintained vital routes of communication, airfields and camp facilities ; they served a s combat engineer units in performing demolitions, mine detection and disposal an d bomb disposal tasks in support of various units of the Fleet Marine Force ; and the y built bridges and repaired air-bombed air strips toward the uninterrupted operations of Allied ground and aerial forces . Undeterred by both mechanical and natural limitations, the First Separate Engineer Battalion completed with dispatch and effectiveness assigned and unanticipated duties which contributed immeasurably to the ultimate defeat of Japan and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

All personnel attached to the First Separate Engineer Battalion during any of the abov e mentioned periods are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATIO N Ribbon .

JAMES FORRESTAL , Secretary of the Navy .

UNIT CITATIONS 891

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, Washington .

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending th e

III AMPHIBIOUS CORPS SIGNAL BATTALIO N

for service as set forth in the followin g

CITATION : "For extremely meritorious service in support of military operations, whil e attached to the I Marine Amphibious Corps during the amphibious assault on Bougain- ville, and attached to the III Amphibious Corps during operations at Guam, Palau and Okinawa, during the period from November 1, 1943 to June 21, 1945 . The firs t American Signal Battalion to engage in amphibious landings in the Pacific Ocean Areas, the III Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion pioneered and developed technique s and procedures without benefit of established precedent, operating with limited an d inadequate equipment, particularly in the earlier phase of these offensive actions, an d providing its own security while participating in jungle fighting, atoll invasions an d occupation of large island masses. Becoming rapidly experienced in guerrilla warfar e and the handling of swiftly changing situations, this valiant group of men successfull y surmounted the most difficult conditions of terrain and weather as well as unfamilia r technical problems and, working tirelessly without consideration for safety, comfort o r convenience, provided the Corps with uninterrupted ship-shore and bivouac communication service continuously throughout this period . This splendid record of achievement, made possible only by the combined efforts, loyalty and courageous devotion to duty o f each individual, was a decisive factor in the success of the hazardous Bougainville , Guam, Palau and Okinawa Campaigns and reflects the highest credit upon the III Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion and the United States Naval Service."

All personnel attached to the III Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion who actually participate d in one or more of the Bougainville, Guam, Palau and Okinawa operations are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon .

JAMES FORRESTAL , Secretary of the Navy .

Index

Abe, VAdm Koso, 745 Air activities-Continued Acorn, 456, 456n . See also Navy Units. American-Continued Adams, LtCol John P ., 775 176, 188, 193, 202, 213, 216-217, 231 , Adjutant & Inspector's Dept, HQMC, 67 8 245, 259-260, 265, 275, 284-286, 311 , Admiralties, 4 344-345, 352, 369, 371, 430, 433, 461, 500 , Advanced Naval Bases, 4, 94, 103, 406, 467 , 503, 635, 767, 772-775, 77 9 550, 650, 653-654, 687-689 . See also Bases. carrier strikes, 12, 60, 78-79, 96, 98, 106 , Aerial photography . See Air activities. 259, 393, 426, 67 3 Aerial photography interpreters, 61, 68 7 close support, 13, 57, 60-61, 90-91, 111 , Agana, 73 4 136, 138n, 180-182, 193, 202, 230, 305 , Agat, 734 348, 375n, 376-377, 380, 383, 390, 410 - Agina, 12 8 411, 417, 421, 424-425, 427, 561, 586, Aguijan, 46 2 613, 669-672, 71 7 Aguni Shima, 34, 347-348, 38 1 combat air patrols, 69, 99, 138, 177, 181 , Aid stations . See Medical activities . 186, 224-226, 370, 372, 374, 383, 415 , Aihara, RAdm Aritaka, 45 5 577, 601, 62 3 Ainoura, 500, 500n losses, 208n, 36 9 Air activitie s reconnaissance, 77, 337, 377, 564, 566, 577 , American 595, 613, 783 Air attacks, 11, 18, 32, 40, 57, 61n, 63, 67 , search and rescue, 103 60, 104, 134-135, 152, 164, 186, 190, 192- strafing, 97, 111, 154-155, 167, 417, 586 , 193, 209, 211, 220, 343, 352, 371, 495, 529 63 5 air control, 177, 182, 184, 226, 65 7 Japanes e air defense, 26, 69, 177, 183-184, 242, 274, air attacks, 81, 97, 99-100, 102, 109, 116 , 373, 381, 410, 46 5 177-179, 183-184, 186, 209, 224, 241n , air drop, 25, 130, 234, 271, 293, 295, 297, 274-275, 69 0 304, 328-329, 329n, 330-331, 331n, 340, airborne raids, 227-229 342, 361n, 374, 383, 707, 783, 785 air personnel, 98, 100, 107, 178, 186, 224 , air evacuation . See Medical Activities . 370 air liaison parties, 182, 259, 344, 374-375 , air photography, 22 5 382-383, 386, 670-67 1 air support, 67 5 air observers, 90, 102, 132, 162, 186n, 37 7 air tactics, 177, 223-22 4 air personnel, 16, 22, 69, 75, 95, 102, 177n , bombing, 177, 179 180, 185-186, 208, 208n, 209, 223-224, combat air patrols, 21 226-227, 227n, 228-230, 278, 331, 370- losses, 15-16, 100, 178, 180, 180n, 184-186 , 371, 373-374, 377, 409-412, 418, 424-426, 186n, 209, 227, 229, 242, 251, 27 4 461, 470, 528, 552n, 561, 566, 576-578 , reconnaissance, 177, 189 582, 591n, 621, 623, 636, 670-671, 704 , suicide attacks, 22, 53, 81, 100, 166, 177 - 712, 715-716, 731, 745-746, 783 180, 185, 190, 208, 223, 227-228, 236, air photography, 61, 78-80, 102, 185, 252n , 264, 421 . See also Kamikazes ; Kikusui. 377, 460, 577, 68 5 Aircraft air raid warning services, 177, 182-18 3 American, 21, 32, 41, 60, 75, 97, 103n, 104 , air tactics, 26, 85, 226, 230, 42 5 177, 179, 182, 185-186, 192, 193, 211, 271 , artillery spotters, 376-37 7 277, 307, 364n, 375, 379, 382-383, 411 , bombing, 5, 8, 13, 15, 17, 20, 39, 55, 63, 67 , 414, 483, 532-534, 561, 566-567, 595, 643 , 97-98, 103, 111, 138, 144-145, 148, 155, 670, 715-717, 741, 748, 774, 776-778, 78 3

89 3

894 INDEX

Aircraft—Continued Aircraft—Continue d American—Continued American—Continue d type s types—Continued B–24s (Liberators), 373, 453n transports, 25, 123, 180n, 225, 243, 437 , B–25s (Mitchells), 37 3 485, 566, 576, 595, 599, 602, 604, 623 , B–29s (Superfortresses), 13, 78, 98 , 629, 638, 643, 713, 729 373n, 379, 401, 430, 433, 436, 503, 779 – Germa n 780, 783, 78 5 Messerschmitt ME–109, 227 n bombers, 8, 25, 98, 167, 373, 438, 577, Japanese 77 9 aircraft, 21–22, 57–58, 69, 76, 100, 109 , carrier aircraft, 16, 61, 78, 98–99, 102 , 166, 177, 179, 224–225, 293, 307–308 , 104, 109, 111, 111n, 115, 129, 179, 181 , 370–371, 503, 665, 731, 74 1 193, 243, 329, 329n, 374-375, 383, 407 , types 409-410, 431, 436, 484, 538, 561, 566, Bettys (light bombers), 41 5 645, 776, 779–780 bombers, 21, 100, 179–180, 208, 227–228 , C–46s (Commandos), 78 6 53 4 dive bombers, 71 6 carrier planes, 1 6 F4Us (Corsairs), 95, 154, 177n, 186, 225 , fighters, 21, 179-180, 50 2 371, 373, 413, 415, 417–418, 424–428 , Franks (fighters), 227, 371, 371 n 431, 495, 566, 588, 608, 613, 621, 624 , Jacks (fighters), 22 7 71 6 reconnaissance planes, 21, 179, 208, 22 5 F6Fs (Hellcats), 91, 128, 225–226, 413 , seaplanes, 773 415, 417, 424–426 suicide planes, 94, 104, 175, 419 . See FM–2s (Wildcats), 428, 71 6 also Kamikazes ; Kikusui . fighter bombers, 2 6 Tonys (fighters), 227n fighters, 8, 13, 25–26, 129, 152, 154, 166 – training planes, 2 1 167, 370, 431, 438, 566, 585, 613, 627 , ), 227, 371 , 71 6 Zekes (fighters) ("Zeros " 371 n gliders, 71 3 night fighters, 25, 181, 208, 225, 374, 58 8 Airfields observation planes, 25, 117, 120, 219, American, 4, 11–12, 25–26, 32, 55, 60–61, 69 , 277–278, 335, 337, 601, 668, 72 9 73, 75, 78, 90, 98, 120, 181, 208, 224, 228– OYs (Sentinels) ("grasshoppers"), 128 , 229, 251, 299–300, 302, 309, 311, 314 , 376, 564, 578, 585, 610, 613, 622, 62 8 370, 372, 376, 378–379, 408, 460, 487– patrol bombers, 97, 103 488, 538–539, 541, 545–546, 550, 552 , P–38s (Lightnings), 77 3 556, 566, 566n, 584, 599, 618, 624, 630 , P–47s (Thunderbolts), 226–227, 371-372 709, 729 PBJs (Mitchells), 373n development, 72, 74–74, 123, 166, 226 , PBY–5As (Catalinas), 84n 242n, 335, 379, 69 4 photo-reconnaissance planes, 29, 417 , Japanese, 21, 32, 46, 66–67, 98, 100, 102–103 , 577–578 183, 226, 372, 406, 417, 455, 716, 772 reconnaissance planes, 564, 61 8 Aitape, 4 R5Cs (Commandos), 629 Aka Shima, 45 2 R5Ds (Skymasters), 636, 642 Akron, Ohio, 71 2 scout bombers, 25, 564, 576–57 7 Alabama, 479n seaplanes, 107, 185n, 484, 555–556, 63 6 Alamogordo, N . Mex., 43 2 TBFs (Avengers), 71 5 Alaska, 763 TBMs (Avengers), 91, 226, 293, 304 , Albertville, 747 n 329n, 374, 383, 424, 428n, 431, 78 1 Allied forces, 3, 5, 15–17, 19–21, 31–32, 57, 63 , torpedo bombers, 25–26, 61, 226, 417 , 436–437, 439, 462, 497, 528, 557, 582, 675 , 423, 564, 576, 588 707, 740, 749, 779, 781

INDEX 895

Allied POW Rescue Group, 484 . See als o Ammunition-Continue d Prisoners of War. Japanese-Continue d Alward, Maj Everett V ., 416 Types-Continue d Amami 0-Shima, 11, 34, 39, 39n, 43, 97, 179 , mortar, 211, 262, 51 1 370, 42 7 parachute flares, 508 n Amamiya, LtGen Tatsumi, 43, 212, 268, 289 , 320mm mortar, 45, 30 8 363 white phosphorous shells, 252, 25 4 Amend, Maj Jack R., Jr ., 416 Amoy, 11, 40 2 American Civilian Internment Center (Shang - Amphibious assault operations, 4-5, 11, 12n, hai), 754 . See also Prisoner of War Camps . 40, 60, 66-67, 76, 86n, 109, 166, 177, 196 , American Embassy Guards, 543, 583, 73 2 205, 242, 299, 303, 324, 348, 376, 394, 403 , Peiping, 73 1 410-411, 413, 429, 447, 460, 467, 481, 485 , American flag, 295, 545, 552, 780-78 1 534-535, 615, 653, 655-658, 661-662, 664 - Amethyst, 644, 64 5 667, 669-670, 674-676, 679, 684, 691, 694 , 701, 710-711, 725, 728, 77 8 Amike, 30 3 Amphibious doctrine, tactics, 382, 429, 654 - Ammunition 658, 663, 669, 677, 680, 68 7 American, 65, 103, 144, 149n, 151, 173, 180n , Amphibious exercises, 468, 630, 635 . See also 196, 234, 304, 225, 237, 240, 262, 275, Fleet Landing Exercises . 331, 339, 342, 344, 479, 579, 625, 627, Amphibious forces, 637, 659-660, 668, 670 . See 668n, 697 See also 667, . Supplies and also Navy Units. Equipment. Amsterdam, 479n Type s Anchorage s armor piercing, 316n American, 4, 7-8, 22, 94, 103, 184, 208, 455 , artillery, 192, 192n, 211, 217, 241, 338 , 539, 542, 552-553, 56 1 459 Japanese, 3 1 , bombs, 148, 152, 154, 192, 211, 249, 277 Andaman Islands, 178n 352, 373-374, 382, 419, 426-427, 459 , Angaur, 4, 240n, 45 0 50 3 Annam, Annamites, 522, 767 n 81mm mortar, 180 Anping, 610, 612-614, 648 .50 caliber, 192, 374, 41 7 Ansel, Lt Walter C., 654 5-inch shells, 38 5 Anshan, 588-589 flares, 209, 254, 299, 341, 338, 590 Antiaircraft Artillery . See also Army Units ; 14-inch, 30 5 Marine Units ; Weapons . high explosive shells, 305, 316n, 58 9 American, 75, 106, 109, 166, 177, 179, 181 - machine gun, 21 1 184, 185n, 208, 228-229, 274, 279, 369 - mortar, 326, 62 5 370, 380n, 384, 453, 464, 688-690, 692 , 155mm, 24 0 692n, 695, 70 7 105mm, 189n, 262 Japanese, 41, 45, 47, 115, 194, 350, 484 rockets, 211, 373n, 374, 385, 417, 71 4 Antonelli, LtCol John W . A ., 50 3 75mm, 189n, 218n, 260, 262, 30 5 Anwhei Province, 75 9 smoke, 37 4 Aola Bay, 71 0 star shells, 190, 254 Aoyangai, LtCol Tokio, 108, 12 1 .30 caliber, 26 0 Aragachi, 344, 357, 363, 368 tracers, 20 9 Aragusuku, 29 8 20mm, 142, 37 4 Arakabesan, 45 3 Japanese, 154, 289, 455, 70 9 2 Type s Ara Saki, 351, 361-36 artillery, 22 2 Arawe, 72 2 bombs, 208, 419, 73 7 Ariake Wan, 40 8 8-inch, 32 0 Arita, 501 47mm, 353 Arlington, Virginia, 678

896 INDE X

Armor . See also Army units ; Marine Units ; Army Units—Continue d Weapons . Sixth Army, 399, 404, 408-409, 476, 490 , American, 84n, 126, 142, 194, 201, 201n, 203 , 492-493, 496, 509, 512, 78 6 206, 219, 222, 231, 247, 249-250, 260, 262 , Seventh Army, 74 7 264, 266-267, 273, 284, 306, 310-312 , Eighth Army, 408, 438, 476, 481, 484n, 488- 315-316, 335, 339, 344, 346, 351, 363 , 489, 492, 512, 517, 781, 786 386-387, 390, 467, 563, 576, 598, 629 , Tenth Army, 350, 353, 354n, 356-357, 363 , 684, 691-694, 7G'8, 720, 722, 72 6 365, 365n, 368-369, 372, 374-375, 378- Japanese, 20, 44, 80, 20 6 385, 385n, 386, 388-350, 392, 397, 408 , Army Air Forces, 13, 60-61, 75, 4Q1, 41 4 410, 452, 476, 476n, 691, 70 5 Unit s Island Command, 58, 71, 75-77, 84, 92-93 , Far East Air Forces, 373, 407-409, 430 , 122, 160, 191, 241-242, 348, 365, 378-381 438, 496, 535, 78 3 Tactical Air Force, 25, 61, 69, 74-75, 92 - Fifth Air Force, 407, 430, 438, 488, 490 , 93, 95-96, 136, 152, 176-177, 181, 183 , 50 9 185-186, 192, 228-230, 243, 278n, 329n, Seventh Air Force, 407, 430-43 1 371-372, 372n, 373-374, 430, 67 1 Eighth Air Force, 430 Air Defense Command, 61, 61n, 69, 98 , Thirteenth Air Force, 407, 43 0 176-177, 182, 184-185, 226, 229, 243, 372 , Fourteenth Air Force, 52 9 372n, 43 1 Twentieth Air Force, 401n, 430, 78 3 Air Defense Control Center (ADCC), 176 , Air Transport Command, 59 5 182-184, 223, 38 1 Fighter Command, 373 n Bomber Command, 6 1 XX Bomber Command, 43 0 I Corps, 404, 408, 492, 512, 514, 51 7 XXI Bomber Command, 43 0 314th Bombardment Wing, 78 3 IX Corps, 399, 404, 40 8 301st Fighter Wing, 372n X Corps, 11n, 49 2 413th Fighter Wing, 372n XI Corps, 404, 408, 48 8 507th Fighter Wing, 372n XXIV Corps, 60, 66, 68, 72, 80-81, 83-84 , 11th Bombardment Group, 372n 84n, 85, 91-93, 96, 112, 117, 125, 128, 131 , 136n, 138, 158, 160, 164n, 166, 169, 176 , 41st Bombardment Group, 372, 372 n 181, 183, 188-198, 202, 204, 206-207, 209 , 319th Bombardment Group, 372 n 211, 213n, 214, 216-217, 233, 236, 240-241 , 494th Bombardment Group, 372 n 266, 268-269, 274, 281, 293, 297-298, 300 , 318th Fighter Group, 229-230, 372 n 303-304, 344, 351, 351n, 352, 354, 356, 362 , 13th Troop Carrier Group, 59 9 364, 374-375, 387, 389, 476n, 53 4 19th Fighter Squadron, 230 n Artillery, 68, 103, 106, 189, 195, 216, 216 n 73d Fighter Squadron, 230n Americal Division, 408 333d Fighter Squadron, 230n 1st Cavalry Division, 408, 488, 77 8 28th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron, 18 5 1st Infantry Division 656, 68 1 Army of the United States . -See also U . S. 7th Infantry Division, 60, 68, 92, 112, 112n, Army, 77 2 117, 120, 125, 128, 131, 188-190, 194, 196, Army Units 199, 199n, 206-207, 210-211, 213, 270-272, Army Advisory Group, Nanking, 63 8 274, 276, 280-281, 287, 290, 292-293, 293n, Army Counterintelligence Corps, 12 2 297-298, 300, 303, 351-352, 356-357, 362 , Army Military Intelligence Training Center, 36 8 68 7 9th Infantry Division, 65 6 Army Service Command OLYMPIC, 40 4 11th Airborne Division, 404, 408, 438, 475 , Leyte Base Command, 85, 85 n 481, 483-485, 48 7 10th Military District, 77 1 24th Infantry Division, 514, 51 7 First Army, 409 25th Infantry Division, 408

INDEX 897

Army Units—Continue d Army Units—Continued 27th Infantry Division, 49, 62, 65, 86, 90 , Infantry Regiments—Continue d 164, 164n, 189, 192—199, 199n, 216, 380 , 126th, 505—50 6 412n 127th, 505, 505n, 50 6 32d Infantry Division, 493, 493n, 496, 500, 128th, 505—50 6 502—503, 505, 506n, 508n, 511, 51 2 158th, 404, 40 7 33d Infantry Division, 408 164th, 686, 69 6 36th Infantry Division, 747 165th, 348 40th Infantry Division, 404, 40 7 184th, 211, 270, 272, 278, 280—281, 303, 35 7 41st Infantry Division, 40 8 305th, 167, 169, 233, 263, 267, 269, 293n, 43d Infantry Division, 408 303, 36 4 '77th Infantry Division, 62, 65, 67, 91, 96, 98 , 306th, 212, 269, 282, 29 5 103—104, 106, 142n, 166-167, 169, 196-199 , 307th, 91, 202, 204, 216, 267—269, 368 206, 209, 212-213, 233, 244, 256, 263, 265— 381st, 398, 35 7 269, 272, 274, 281-283, 286, 293, 293n , 382d, 267—26 9 297—298, 368, 40 8 383d, 131, 233, 266, 269, 298, 326, 328, 33 1 81st Infantry Division, 65, 40 8 708th Amphibious Tank Battalion, 30 5 93d Infantry Division, 45 2 870th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Bat- 96th Infantry Division, 60, 68, 85, 92, 96 , talion, 308n 125, 128, 131, 188—189, 189n, 190, 193—194 , 713th Armored Flamethrower Battalion , 196—199, 199n, 206n, 220, 233, 236, 244 , 201n, 386, 386n 256, 266—270, 272, 274, 277, 281, 293, 293n , Infantry Battalion s 297—298, 300, 303, 325, 326n, 327, 333, 335 , 1/127, 496, 507 351, 353—354, 356-357, 363, 36 8 1/184, 362 98th Infantry Division, 40 8 1/305, 16 9 1/307, 282 110th Division, 771—772 1/383, 269 , 53d Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, 183, 274 2/184, 270 69 1 2/305, 29 8 1st Engineer Special Brigade, 16 0 2/306, 106, 269 2d Provisional Army Brigade, 65 5 2/307, 104, 204 Artiller y 2/383, 267-270, 304, 32 8 17th Field Artillery, 655 3/105, 16 4 131st Field Artillery, 763, 76 6 3/305, 267 419th Field Artillery Group, 188 3/306, 281—28 2 420th Field Artillery Group, 106, 111, 18 9 3/307, 267 Battalion s 3/381, 268, 27 0 104th, 216, 216 n 3/383, 297, 331 105th, 21 6 91st Chemical Mortar Company, 25 3 106th, 21 6 Arnold, MajGen Archibald V ., 6 0 145th, 216, 216 n Arnold, Gen H . H ., 303, 351, 401n, 403n, 43 0 148th, 763n Artillery . See also Army units ; Marine Units ; 249th, 199n Weapons. 149th, 189 American, 63, 79, 86n, 88-89, 91, 93, 103n , Infantry Regiments 114, 116-117, 117n, 130, 135—136, 144- 17th, 293, 30 3 145, 148, 172, 175, 183, 185, 189—190 , 18th, 65 5 192—194, 209, 211—212, 216, 218, 221, 240 , 32d, 272, 298, 303, 36 7 245, 249, 254, 262, 264, 268-269, 277— 105th, 164, 193, 19 9 278, 298, 305, 352, 376—377, 384, 409 , 106th, 19 9 467, 598, 621, 625, 629, 635, 638, 657 , 111th, 453—45 4 667—668, 670, 673, 688—690, 692-695, 705 , 112th, 488 720—723

898 INDEX

Artillery—Continued Awards and decorations, 72 9 American—Continue d Aware Saki, 106, 388n operations, techniques, 86, 89—90, 90n, 118 , Aware Shima, 6 7 144—146, 150—151, 155, 188, 190, 198, 202 , Awase, 37 2 213, 216—217, 218n, 220, 222, 231, 235 , Awashi Peninsula, 12 8 248—249, 253, 254n, 259, 265, 275, 280 , Axis, 1 8 286, 289, 296, 305, 311, 320, 326, 333 , Axtell, Maj George C ., Jr., 374n 339, 341, 343, 345, 351, 358, 369, 374 , Azuma, 48 7 380, 382—383, 385, 390, 645, 717 . See als o Tactics . Babelthuap, 45 3 Japanese, 45, 55, 111, 139, 142, 145, 146n, Badger, RAdm Oscar C ., 476, 479n, 483—484 , 151—152, 185, 185n, 201, 214, 253, 271 , 487—488 ; VAdm, 637, 639—640, 642—645, 64 7 275, 363, 485, 511, 675, 709 Bailey, Maj Stanley R., 41 9 operations, techniques, 111, 126, 131, 140 , Bailey bridge, 223, 223n, 231, 275, 307 . See als o 144, 148, 193—194, 197—198, 201—202, 204 , Bridges . 207, 212, 221, 230—234, 237, 245, 248 , Baird, Capt Robert, 226 251—252, 259—260, 270, 275, 295, 393, 74 1 Balikpapan, Borneo, 427, 42 9 Asa, 202—20 3 Ballance, Col Robert G ., 112n, 158n ; BGen , Asa Kawa River, 199, 201, 203, 205, 212, 214 , 116n 216, 219—220, 222—223, 223n, 230, 234—235 , Banana Wars, 675, 72 0 257, 302, 388 n Bangkok, 76 6 Asama Maru, 734 n Banika, 70, 74, 93, 39 1 Asato, 282 Bank of Chosen, 50 2 Asato Gawa River, 233—236, 247, 251, 254, 256, Banten Bay, 763 n 271, 273, 275—276, 280, 30 1 Barbey, VAdm Daniel E ., 358, 408, 534, 536 , Ashurst, Col William W ., 732—733, 751, 753— 551—552, 555, 559, 559n, 561, 563, 565, 569 , 754, 757 574, 60 4 Asia, 60, 475, 528, 589 Barr, MajGen David, 64 1 Assault signal companies, 598, 695 . See also Barrett, Maj Charles D . 654—655 ; Col, 688 ; Army Units ; Marine Units . MajGen, 690 Assembly areas , Barrett, lstLt Edward M ., 739n American, 111, 132, 145, 197, 214, 218n, 270 , Barry, 370, 370 n 275, 293n, 307, 338, 34 2 Base s Japanese, 193 American, 7, 65, 75, 98, 103, 146, 424, 680 , Astor House, 546 709, 77 6 Atlanta, 479n Japanese, 39, 57—58, 139, 406, 45 5 Atlee, Clement, 434 Basic School, Quantico, 72 4 Atoll Commander, Eniwetok, 444 n Basset, RAdm Melvin H ., 452n Atolls, 666, 671, 74 5 Bataan, 45, 439, 740—741, 78 6 Atomic Bomb, 192, 399—400, 428, 432, 433, 436 , Bataan, 479 n 452n, 459, 476, 536, 780—78 1 Bataan Death March, 769, 772, 78 8 Atrocities, 741, 74 5 Batavia, 740, 763, 76 5 Atsugi Airfield, 438, 481, 483—485, 487, 786 Battles, Cpl Connie Gene, 75 4 Atsutabaru, 13 2 Bayfield, 639—640, 64 2 Attu, 76 3 Bay of Chaungzon, 76 6 Australia, 87, 696, 760, 770—772, 781, 78 6 Bayler, Col Walter L . J., 459 Austria, 74 6 Beaches, 34, 63—66, 76, 79, 91, 93, 96, 100, 102 , Awa, 135, 136n, 140, 142, 144, 149, 15 2 104, 106, 109, 112, 114—115, 125, 136, 160 , Awacha, 199, 204, 217, 220n, 25 9 162, 167, 272, 306, 323, 330, 332, 379, 48 5 Awacha Draw, 220—22 1 Black, 11 8 Awacha Pocket, 203, 216, 218, 220, 232, 726 Green, 485

INDEX 899

Beaches—Continue d Black market, 502, 753, 76 1 Green 1, 11 5 Blake, BGen Robert, 450, 455, 45 7 Green 2, 11 2 Blakelock, BGen David H ., 65n, 72n, 123n , Orange, 158, 16 4 158n, 162n, 166n, 180n, 240n, 242n, 272n , Purple 1, 15 8 392n Red, 305, 485 Blandy, RAdm William H . P., 60, 99n, 100 , Red 1, 42, 158, 30 5 102–10 3 Red 2, 30 5 Bleasdale, Col Victor F., 129, 142, 14 6 White, 723–724 Block Island, 424, 426, 427n, 42 9 Yellow 2, 160 Bloody Nose Ridge, 23 2 Yellow 3, 15 8 Bloody Ridge, 167, 169, 20 9 Beachheads, 70, 117n, 118, 222, 273, 375, 719 , Boatner, BGen Haydon L., 54 4 729 . See also Beaches. Boats . See Landing Craft. Beachmaster, 66 3 Bodnar, Sgt John P., 746–747 Beach party, 663–664 . See also Beachmaster ; Bombardments, 65, 99, 102, 111, 348 . See also Shore Party Activities. Naval gunfire . Beans, LtCol Fred D., 145, 149, 151, 174, 256n , Bomb disposal activities, 2 5 476, 485, 48 8 Bon Homme Richard, 479 n "Beast of the East," 75 2 Bonins, 7–9, 11, lln, 12, 21, 40, 43, 159, 449 – Beecher, Col Curtis T ., 769, 776–777 ; BGen , 450, 452, 460–461, 468, 74 6 769 Bonins Occupation Forces, 450, 460–461 Bell, LtCol George B ., 254, 31 0 Boston, 479n Belleau Wood, 479 n Bougainville, 4, 25, 27, 88, 372n, 410, 412, 535 – Benedict, LtCol W . E ., 128n, 303, 342, 345 , 536, 566, 686, 698, 711, 714, 717–720 358, 364, 364 n Bougainville, 56 4 Benevolence, 484, 78 1 Bougainville Milk Run, 67 0 Benner, Col Kenneth W ., 183–18 4 Bouker, LtCol John G., 103n Bennington, 180, 185, 416, 421, 479n Boundaries, 67, 112, 115, 117–118, 125, 173 , Beppu, 50 5 202–204, 214, 233–234, 248, 273, 282, 293n , Berger, Lt Col Spencer S ., 116, 171–172, 210 , 297–298, 303, 305, 312, 314, 318, 329, 338 , 330, 33 2 350, 356, 360, 36 2 Bergren, Maj Orville V ., 144n, 145n, 320n ; Col , Bourke, MajGen Thomas E ., 397n, 409, 495, 50 0 479n, 489n Boxer Protocol, 732 Beriberi, 453, 74 0 Boxer Rebellion, 522, 524, 54 7 Berlin, 43 2 Boyd, Maj Clay, 489 n Besena Misaki, 13 6 Boyington, Maj Gregory, 745, 750, 785 ; LtCol, Best, Col William N ., 560–56 1 716 Biak, 4 8 Bradford, BGen William B ., 21 6 Bias Bay, 603 Bradley, MajGen James L., 60, 125, 198, 326n "Big Ben," 419 . See also Franklin. Bradley, Gen Omar, 685n Big Three Meeting, 43 1 Bradshaw, Capt Harvey D ., 426n Bikini Atoll, 444n, 45 9 Brazil Maru, 777–77 8 Bill, lstLt Josiah W ., 439 Bremen, 747 Biloxi, 49 6 Bremerton, Washington, 418, 42 1 Birmingham, 208 Breton, 95 Bise Saki, 14 0 Bridge House, 754 Bishi Gawa, 67, 100, 112, 116, 15 8 Bridges, 102, 116, 116n, 132, 134–135, 139, 155 , Bishop, Lewis S ., 758–759 203, 219, 231, 233, 276, 283, 302, 304, 307–308 , Bismarck Archipelago, 4 310, 312, 325, 326, 327n, 330, 346, 590, 599 Biwa-ko, 77 9 Brimmer, Cpl Charles, 754–755 Black List, 484, 783 British Broadcasting Corporation, 757

310-224 0 - 69 - 58

900 INDEX

British Carrier Force, 60, 100, 406, 431, 435, Campbell, LtCol William R ., 427 47 9 Camp Elliott, Calif., 442, 680, 682, 705 British Chiefs of Staff, 3n Camp Gillespie, San Diego, Calif., 70 5 British commandos, 707, 707n, 70 8 Camp Lejeune, N . C ., 27, 441, 448, 468–469 , British Commonwealth Occupation Force, 51 4 616, 681, 687, 689–690, 698, 705, 71 4 British expeditionary force, 52 2 Camp Pendleton, Calif ., 27, 442, 448, 468, 512 , British flag, 78 1 616, 625, 631, 642–643, 647, 680, 698, 72 1 British Flagship Group, 438. See also Task Camp Ritchie, Md., 687 Organizations. Canals, 276, 283, 537 . See also Terrain . British forces, 479, 749, 764, 766, 78 1 Cannes-Nice area, 747 British Government, 43 6 Cannibalism, 461–46 2 British Landing Force, 483, 485, 48 7 Canton, 407, 521, 525, 534, 603, 631 British Naval Units, 60, 100, 369, 406, 438, 479 , Cape Esperance, 9 1 649 . See also Task Organizations . Cape Gloucester, 86–87, 676, 686, 696n, 72 0 British observers, 38 2 Cape Gloucester, 424, 428, 428n British Pacific Fleet, 43 1 Cape Torokina, 25, 71 9 British Support Force, 43 8 Cargo . See Supplies and Equipment. Brittain, Commo Thomas B ., 551 Caribbean, 469, 649, 680, 718 Broadcasts, 357, 583 Carlson, Maj Evans F ., 698, 707–710, 710n ; Brodie gear, 66 8 LtCol, 744 Brown, Col Charles C ., 544 Carney, RAdm Robert B ., 483, 487 Brown, Maj Luther A ., 731, 733, 752–753 ; Col , Caroline Islanders, 45 5 732, 732n, 75 1 Caroline Islands, 14, 450, 65 4 Brown, Col Wilburt S ., 116–117, 123, 189, 189n, Casualtie s 194 ; MajGen, 88n, 189n, 194n, 195n, 199n , American, 27, 73, 87–88, 99–100, 104, 109 , 219n, 383n, 613n lln, 114, 118, 126, 128, 134, 138n, 140, 144 – Bruce, MajGen Andrew D ., 62, 91, 96, 104, 166 , 146, 148, 148n, 151–152, 155, 158, 160, 164 , 196, 198, 286 ; LtGen, 142n 166–167, 169, 171, 175, 178–179, 180n, 184 , Brunner, Sgt Frederick J ., 747, 747 n 190, 194, 196, 198, 201–203, 204n, 205, 208 , Buckley, LtCol Edmond J ., 685n, 686 ; Col , 212–213, 219-221, 228–229, 231–232, 234 – n 686 239, 243–245, 249–250, 252–253, 261, 263 , Buckner, LtGen Simon B ., Jr ., 6, 11–12, 12n , 265, 271, 276–277, 278n, 281, 283, 296, 298, 58, 60, 62–68, 71, 73, 76, 82, 83n, 84–86, 90 , 304, 309, 311–312, 316, 320n, 324, 327, 329 , 92, 125, 129, 132, 141n, 159, 164n, 188, 195 – 332–335, 339-342, 344–345, 348, 358, 362, 199, 218, 240–242, 278, 278n, 280–281, 287, 369, 389, 403, 419, 421, 432, 434, 527, 531 , 292, 298, 338, 338n, 347–348, 350, 353–354 , 558, 612–613, 625, 627, 672, 675, 683–684 , 354n, 364, 379, 384, 72 4 699, 704n, 709–710, 728–730, 737, 750, 769 , Bunker Hill, 180, 185, 415–417, 419n, 42 1 776 Bureau of Aeronautics, 41 0 Japanese, 16, 18, 103–104, 120–121, 130, 132 , Burma, 3n, 45, 530, 740, 750, 766–76 8 136, 148, 150, 152, 154-155, 166, 169, 171- Burton, LtCol Custis, Jr ., 216 173, 175–176, 190–191, 194, 205, 208, 210 – Bushido, 367, 788 213, 213n, 221, 228, 230, 234–235, 239, 242 , Butuan Bay, 77 2 244, 247, 254, 266, 282, 289–290, 298, 300 , Byroade, BGen Henry A ., 595 307, 312, 316, 320, 323–324, 330, 345, 356 , Cabanatuan, 743, 769, 778 360n, 368–369, 369n, 380–381, 710, 72 9 Cactus Air Force, 686n, 716, 716 n Casualty Division, HQMC, 75 0 Cairo Conference (SEXTANT), 3 Casualty evacuation . See Medical Activities . Cairo Declaration, 399, 434 Cates, MajGen Clifton B ., 24, 24 n Caldwell, Col Frank C., 707n Catoctin, 551–552, 555, 558–559, 561, 563, 56 9 California, 647, 681, 69 9 CAUSEWAY Operation, 6, 9, 11–12, 12n, 13 , Campbell, BGen Harold D ., 453 57 . See also Planning .

INDEX 901

Caves . See Terrain features . Chilton, 644, 64 7 Ceasefire, 436, 574, 59 4 Chimu, 68, 132, 171, 176, 24 1 Cemeterie s Chimu airfield, 373n, 488, 560 Arlington National, 678, 73 0 Chimu Wan, 66, 162, 16 6 77th Infantry Division, 169n China, 5, 7, 19—20, 31—32, 36—37, 41, 44, 60, 98, Central America, 697, 720 174, 402, 433, 433n, 437, 441, 444, 450, 468— Central Carolines, 449, 463n 470, 500, 505, 517n, 521-522, 524, 526, 528— Central China, 527, 537, 541, 78 3 529, 529n, 530—532, 534-536, 539—540, 543 — Central Pacific, 4, 4n, 5, 14, 20, 24, 26, 410, 412 , 544, 547, 551, 557, 559-561, 566, 569, 572 — 429, 454, 654, 665-668, 672—673, 675, 690 , 573, 573n, 574, 576, 578, 581—582, 584, 586, 718, 720, 72 9 589, 592, 594, 596, 605—607, 610, 613, 617 — Operations, 4n, 74n, 239, 390, 690, 704 624, 628—634, 637, 639—641, 645, 647—648, Central Solomons, 66 6 650, 654, 675, 697, 708, 716, 732, 738, 741 , Centron, 747, 747n 750, 778 Chamberlain, Maj Clair "C," 181 cities, 527, 532, 540 Chamorros, 46 1 coalition government, 573, 601, 632 Chan, 274, 290, 292, 298, 300, 325 coal mines, 541, 574—575, 578, 582, 585—585 , Chandler, QMC1k Paul G., 733—73 4 600, 649 . See also Tangshan mines . Changchun, 530, 584, 63 6 coast, 3, 5—7, 9, 11, 373, 407, 437, 77 8 Chang Chun, Gen, 59 4 communications centers, 43 7 Changkeichuang Field, 538-539, 546, 550, 556 , economy, 531, 58 566, 566n, 584, 599, 618, 624, 63 0 2 Chang-li, 590, 600, 610, 764, 766—76 7 ports, 437, 533, 578 Changtien, 57 7 rail facilities, 533, 536, 578—579, 585—586 , Chaplains, 323, 691, 726-727, 74 2 61 7 Chapman, LtCol Leonard F ., Jr., 8 8 China (Okinawa), 371—37 2 Chapman, LtCol Max C ., 183 China-Burma-India Theater, 401, 528—52 9 Chappell, Col Kenneth B ., 116, 202, 210, 217n China Sea, 97, 10 7 Charts. See Maps and Charts . China Theater, 533, 536, 545, 555, 557, 559 , Chatan, 50, 11 7 568—569, 574, 596-597, 600, 603, 606. Se e Chatan-Futema line, 50 also U. S . Forces, China Theater . Chefoo, 541, 545, 559n, 561, 563—564, 570, 577 , Chinchow, 584, 63 9 601, 603, 63 2 Chin Chung River, 62 7 harbor, 558 Chinen Peninsula, 50—51, 55, 164, 205, 270, 274 , operation, 55 9 278, 281, 287-289, 292-293, 293n . 298, 300 , Cheng Kai Ming, MajGen, 59 4 30 3 Chennault, MajGen Claire, 52 9 Chinen Point, 6 Chen Pao-tsang, LtGen, 56 5 6 Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, 437, 525—529, Chinese, The, 37, 455, 499, 499n, 508, 527, 531 — 531-532, 542, 545, 547, 557, 559, 559n, 565 , 532, 537, 546—547, 556, 580, 607, 619, 75 8 569—572, 579, 584—585, 603, 63 2 Air Force, 528 See also Chines e Chibana, 197, 21 8 Central Government. Nationalists, Kuomintang. 521, 526-527 , Chicago, 479 n 531—533, 541, 543, 561, 565, 569, 571—574 , Chichi Jima, 8, 418, 460—462, 74 5 578, 581, 584, 594, 596, 607—609, 614, 616 , Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 26, 76, 414 , 620, 631—633, 640—642, 644, 649 446, 464, 640, 642, 687 . See also Com- civil war, 437, 521, 532—533, 543-544, 559 , mander in Chief, U . S . Fleet ; Adm King. 568, 570, 573—574, 578, 603, 623, 631, 633 , Chief of Staff, U . S. Army, 11n ; See also Gen 636, 641, 645, 64 8 George C . Marshall . Communists, Communist Party, 437, 521 , Chihfeng, 60 2 525-528, 529n, 532, 542—543, 545, 556, 558 — Chikuto, 314 559, 561, 563—565, 570, 572, 574, 576-580,

902 INDEX

Chinese, The—Continued Chinwangtao, 535–536, 541–542, 545, 547–548 , Communists, Communist Party—Continue d 552, 555–556, 563, 568–570, 575, 585–586 , 582, 585–586, 588, 590–591, 594–596, 602 , 588, 590, 600, 604, 607, 609–610, 615, 617 , 604, 608–610, 612–614, 616–620, 625, 627 – 621, 624, 628, 649, 73 1 628, 630–633, 636, 639–642, 644–645, 647– Chitose, 786 64 9 Chiwa, 31 6 Communist areas, 527, 600–601, 623, 63 6 Cho, MajGen Isamu, 40 ; LtGen, 40, 40n, 48 , Communist forces, 542, 548, 554, 556, 563 , 206, 213, 338n, 367, 37 0 565–567, 569–570, 572, 585, 588, 594–595 , Chocolate Drop Hill, 266–26 7 601, 603, 608–604, 612–613, 617, 623, 627 , Choiseul, 700, 70 6 636–637, 643–644, 647, 75 9 Choshi, 408 Communist New Fourth Army, 75 9 Chou En-Lai, Gen, 547, 558, 59 4 Eighth Route Army, 527, 556, 564, 610 , Christmas Day, 90n, 578 612, 708, 75 9 Chuda, 17 3 53d Communist Regiment, 61 9 Chungking, 528-529, 531–532, 543–544, 546 Road Protecting Battalion, 61 9 548, 569, 57–574, 594–595, 601, 604, 75 5 Communist guerrillas, guerrilla tactics, 527 , Churchill, Prime Minister Winston S ., 3, 432, 542, 556, 570, 603, 609, 708, 75 9 434, 53 1 Communist leaders, 548, 563–564, 594–595 , Chu Teh, Gen, 70 8 602–603, 610, 614n, 623n, 63 3 Cities, 38, 233, 25 7 Communist operations, tactics, 536, 570–571 , Civil affairs, 76–77, 121, 380 . See also Military 584–586, 588–590, 609–610, 612–613, 617 , Government. 622, 625, 628, 630, 632, 638, 643–644, 648 Civil Affairs Handbook for the Ryukyu Islands, Communist propaganda, 609–61 0 7 7 Imperial Government (China), 52 2 Civilians, 77, 78n, 80, 87, 101, 118, 121–122 , Imperial troops, 52 2 131–132, 136, 162, 167, 173, 1'75, 176n, 357 , Military academy, 52 5 357n, 361, 363, 369, 369n, 455, 577, 738 n n Nationalists, Chinese . See also Chines e Clark, Col Saville T ., 498 Central Government, Kuomintang. 437 , Clement, BGen William T ., 438–439, 476, 478– 489n, , 521, 532, 540, 542, 544, 546–547, 559 , 479, 479n, 481, 485, 487–488, 600–601 568, 571, 573–574, 580, 582, 584–586 , 606, 60 8 590–591, 594–597, 601–604, 616, 620 , Coast artillery . See also Artillery, Weapons . 623, 623n, 625, 627–628, 631–633, 640 , American, 183, 688–689, 74 2 642–644, 64 9 Japanese, 65, 483–485 Cobb, RAdm Calvin H ., 62, 37 0 Army, 437, 526–529, 532–535, 542, 544– Colley, LtCol Thomas J ., 64 3 546, 557, 559n, 561, 564–565, 568–569 , Colmer, LtCol Parker R ., 463n 571, 573–574, 578–579, 581, 585–585, 591 , Coln, LtCol Royce W ., 426, 426n, 428, 429 n 594, 597, 601, 604, 607–610, 612, 616– 617, 623, 627–628, 631–632, 639, 641 , Colorado, 26 0 643, 759 Columbia University, 92 Eleventh War Area, 520, 565, 58 0 Combat efficiency, 74, 109, 249, 615, 623, 68 2 Tientsin Garrison Force, 568 n Combat Intelligence School (Camp Lejeune) , 8th CNA, 561, 579, 58 1 68 7 13th CNA, 561, 56 9 Combat readiness, 74, 83, 61 5 52d CNA, 561, 569 Combined Chiefs of Staff, 3n, 7, 9, 399–40 0 92d CNA, 558, 568 CominCh-CinCPac conferences, 7, 12, 11 1 94th CNA, 568, 568n, 570, 616–61 7 Command, commanders 43d Division, 568, 570, 58 8 American, 26, 76, 658, 661, 671, 67 3 puppet soldiers, 543, 564, 579, 590 Japanese, 14, 18–19, 56, 185, 274, 436, 544 , Revolution, 52 4 580 warlords (China), 525–526 Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, 654, 699

INDEX 903

Commandant of the Marine Corps . See als o Commander, Naval Forces, Western Pacific , Generals Cates, Shepherd, Vandegrift . 63 6 12n, 24n, 89n, 136n, 197n, 376, 412, 414 , Commander, Naval Port Facilities, Shanghai , 422, 442, 446–447, 465, 468–469, 551, 592 , 63 8 605–606, 608, 622, 654, 660, 677–680, 682 , Commander, Northern Attack Force, 152n 687–689, 699, 705, 712–713, 721, 736 n Commander, Service Squadron Ten, 242 Commander, Aircraft, Pacific Fleet, 7, 74–75 , Commander, South Pacific Force, 659, 661, 663 , 41 3 68 6 Commander, Air Support Control Unit, 102 , Commander, Support Aircraft, Pacific Fleet , 177, 181–182, 375 67 1 Commander, Amphibious Force, South Pacific , Commander, Truk and Central Carolin e 65 9 Islands, 45 7 Commander, Amphibious Forces, Wester n Command functions, 65 9 Pacific, 63 8 Command posts Commander, Asiatic Fleet, 489n American, 91, 112, 125, 134, 140, 146, 55 6 Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Forces, Pacifi c Japanese, 49, 236, 30 4 Fleet, 673 Commanding General, Army Air Forces , Commander, Fifth Fleet, 6, 62, 493 n Pacific Ocean Areas, 11, 62 Commander, Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, 488 – Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops , 48 9 24n, 66 1 Commander, Ie Shima Attack Group, 16 6 Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forc e Commander in Chief, 8, 431 . See also Presi- Pacific, 365n, 466, 68 8 dent Roosevelt. Commanding General, Marine Barracks , Commander in Chief, Army Forces in the Quantico, 46 8 Pacific, 401, 403, 430–431 . See also Gen- Commanding General, Marine Garrison Forces , eral MacArthur. 14th Naval District, 46 5 Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, 468–46 9 Commanding General, Marine Garrison Forces , Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, 3n, 4, 9 , ' Pacific, 46 5 11–12, 31, 370, 373n, 398–399, 401, 403 , Command relationship , 407, 411, 413, 422, 424, 429n, 430–431, 439 American, 58, 401, 536, 658–660, 67 7 , 450, 452, 459, 462–463, 465–466, 505n, 509 Japanese, 5 8 533–535, 544, 569, 660, 707, 783 . See als o Commencement Bay, 26, 413, 424–42 5 Admiral Nimitz . 8 Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, 4, 6 , Committee of Three, 594–595, 601, 604, 60 31, 58, 62–63, 65, 65n, 76, 240, 280, 347 , Commonwealth of Australia, 439 354n, 373, 399, 401, 430, 436, 439, 449 , Communication s 450n, 783 . See also Admiral Nimitz . American, 91, 117, 136, 175, 182, 184, 195 , Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area , 326, 329, 361, 378, 437, 528, 532, 539 , 3, 3n, 6, 8, 25, 403 . See also General Mac - 564, 568, 575, 595, 600–602, 604, 663, Arthur . 666, 669–671, 71 8 Commander in Chief, U . S. Fleet, 3, 8, 294, equipment, 183, 307, 323, 338, 583, 669 , 411, 413–414, 422, 424, 688, 712–713 . Se e 705, 719, 72 2 also, Chief of Naval Operations ; Admiral radio, 136, 182, 195, 305–306, 375, 534 , King . 583, 591, 595, 599, 601, 612–613, 669 , Commander, Joint Expeditionary Force, 66 1 722, 766, 77 1 Commander, Marianas, 450, 452n wire, 19 5 Commander, Marshalls-Gilberts Area, 45 7 Japanese, 11, 20, 51, 97, 104, 121, 152, 71 0 Commander, Naval Air Bases, Okinawa, 74–7 5 Conical Hill, 233, 236, 244, 263n, 266–270, 274 , Commander, Naval Air Base, Truk, 45 7 277, 28 1 Commander, Naval Facilities, Tsingtao, 61 6 Consort, 64 5 Commander, Naval Forces, Ryukyus, 370 Conte Verde, 734n

904 INDE X

Convoy s Defenses—Continued American, 21, 109, 134, 180, 189, 331, 532 , American—Continued 558-560, 61 2 259–260, 269, 276, 280, 284, 286, 288 , Japanese, 20, 178n, 77 6 298, 315, 318, 335, 337, 346, 356, 358 , Cook, Maj Earl J ., 245 638, 709 Cooke, VAdm Charles M ., Jr ., 6, 604–607 , abatis, 13 4 614n, 616, 623n, 627n, 628, 630n, 633n, 63 7 airfield, 22 8 Cooley, Col Albert D ., 415 antiaircraft, 183, 18 4 Coral, coral reefs, 34, 91, 100, 102, 104, 106 , base, 42 4 106n, 112, 114, 116, 157–158, 167, 176, 207 , beach, 203, 247, 688 209, 231, 260, 305, 324, 346, 66 7 blocking positions, 117, 21 2 Coral Sea, 763 camouflage, 13 2 CORONET Operation, 402, 404, 406, 408, 476 . foxholes, 343 See also, OLYMPIC Operation ; Planning. observation posts, 277, 33 8 Corregidor, 439, 488, 741–743, 771, 786 outposts, 601, 60 8 Corwin, 2dLt Douglas A ., 61 2 perimeter, 135, 139–140, 144, 148n, 161 , Cosgrove, LtCol John J., 699n 171, 276, 287, 341, 358, 609 Courtney, Maj Henry A ., Jr., 237, 244–24 5 reverse slope, 256, 27 1 Cowpens, 479n, 78 1 Japanese, 4, 7, 14, 16–22, 25, 39–41, 45–51 , Craig, BGen Edward A ., 624 54-55, 61, 69, 78–81, 93, 96, 98, 102–103 , Cram, LtCol Jack 373n 107, 116–118, 120, 123, 125, 130–132, 134 , Crawford, RAdm George C ., 638 n 138–140, 142, 145–146, 148, 151, 154 , Crawford, Col William D ., 547 167, 173, 188, 190–194, 204–205, 210, 217 , Crist, BGen William E . 76–7 7 , Croix de Guerre, 747n . See also Awards an d 230–231, 236-237, 239, 239n, 244, 250 Decorations . 252, 256, 269-271, 274, 289, 298, 308 , 312, 323, 363, 393, 441, 455, 485, 530 , CROSSROADS Operation, 45 9 4 Culebra, 654, 65 6 673, 675, 685, 687, 704, 719, 720, 723–72 Cummings, Col Gale T ., 454 antitank obstacles, 49, 102, 121, 125, 127, Cunningham, Cdr Winfield S ., 737, 755 139, 154, 188, 190, 214, 260, 264, 31 8 Cunningham Field (Cherry Point), 68 1 barbed wire, 188 Currin, LtCol Michael S ., 711 barricades, 4 9 Curtis, 37 0 beach, 40, 80, 39 2 Czechoslovakia, 747n blockhouses, 276, 72 3 bunkers, 49, 151, 167, 216n, 361, 718, 720 , Dachau, 74 9 Dailey ; BGen Frank G., 415, 415n, 419 n 72 5 Dai Naichi Maru, 764 camouflage, 79, 154, 167, 192, 31 0 Dairen, 522, 541, 559n, 561, 569 cave, 48–50, 115, 118, 149, 151, 154–155 , Dakeshi, 199, 203, 216, 217n, 220, 222, 231–232 , 167, 169, 173, 190, 193, 201, 204, 212 , 234–236, 238, 259, 261–26 2 214, 216n, 217-219, 221, 230-231, 236 , Dakeshi Ridge, 221–222, 232, 236, 260-261, 72 6 244, 248, 253, 261–263, 267–268, 271, 304 , Dakiton, 330, 34 2 308, 337, 368, 380, 385, 393, 704, 723 , Davao, 769–77 0 725–72 6 Day, Col Karl S ., 545–54 6 coastal, 4 6 Dayton, 479n dummy guns, 11 5 D-Day (Europe), 1 6 fire lanes, 55, 268 Defense battalions, 25, 88-89, 688–692, 712 . fortified positions, 5, 49-50, 53, 116, 152 , See also Marine units . 213, 247, 263, 286, 380, 718, 721, 74 1 Defense s fortified tombs, 162, 169, 212, 260, 267 , American, 24, 58, 86, 129–130, 140, 146, 148 , 276, 296, 337, 72 5 152, 184, 238-239, 245, 247–249, 251, forts, 439, 483–485, 487

INDEX 90 5

Defenses—Continue d Division of Public Relations, HQMC, 67 8 Japanese—Continued Division of Reserve, HQMC, 67 8 gun positions, 135, 151, 154, 202, 237, 248 , Dobbin, LtCol John F ., 427 ; BGen 424n, 425n , 262, 265, 337, 672, 72 6 426n, 427 n minefields, 49, 135, 142, 188, 190, 198, 249 , Dobervich, lstLt Michiel, 770–77 2 251, 306–307, 312, 320, 38 6 Docks, 553, 55 5 observation posts, 54, 111, 125, 138, 197 Documents, Japanese, 78, 191, 285, 312 198, 201, 233, 245, 268, 314, 332, 35 6 Doma Cove, 9 1 outposts, 54, 131, 221, 235, 256, 29 0 Domei news agency, 463 pillboxes, 148, 173, 190, 202, 212, 218–219, Dominion of Canada, 43 9 221, 232, 260–261, 267, 296, 364, 393, Dominion of New Zealand, 43 9 720–721, 72 3 Donne, John, 73 0 reverse slope, 217, 245, 247–248, 263–265, Donohoo, LtCol Malcolm "0", 115, 129, 175 , 267-268, 273, 276, 281, 337, 340, 345– 248–24 9 346, 387, 39 3 Dooley, Maj George E ., 41 6 roadblocks, 132, 135, 139, 362, 56 7 Doolittle, LtGen James H ., 43 0 spider holes, 167 Dorroh, Maj Jefferson D ., 374n trenches, 154-455, 162 DRAGOON Operation, 60 n tunnels, 167, 231, 244, 296, 306, 309, 32 4 Draguignan, 748 del Valle, MajGen Pedro A ., 24, 60, 66, 68, 74 , Dublon, 45 4 86–87, 117, 123, 125–126, 129–130, 173, 195 , Duluth, 479 n 197, 199, 202, 212, 214, 217, 219–221, 234 , Dumps . See Supplies and Equipment . 256–257, 278n, 286, 293, 295, 325, 329–330 , Dunlap, 46 0 339, 362, 387, 390, 392, 397, 397n, 654, 691 ; Durgin, RAdm Calvin T ., 6 9 LtGen, 125n, 337n, 353n, 354n, 655n, 691n , Dutch forces, 74 0 703n, 707 n Dutch military cantonment, 74 0 Demolitions . See also Supplies and Equip- Dutch nationals, 503 ment ; Weapons. Dyess, Capt Acquilla J ., 712 ; LtCol 699n American, 149, 231, 250, 253, 262, 312, 384 , 461, 78 0 Eagle Mountain Lake, Texas, 71 3 Japanese, 139, 169, 172, 207, 257–228, 296 , Easely, BGen Claudius M ., 35 8 315, 498 East Asia, 43 4 Demonstration Group, 95, 347 East Carolines, 449 Denig, LtCol Robert L ., Jr., 114 East China Sea, 18, 21, 34, 99, 188, 315, 325 , Deputy Island Commander, Guam, 454 42 8 Devereux, Maj James P . S ., 737-738, 752, 756– Easter, 96, 10 9 757, 78 1 Eastern Islands, 34, 66, 68, 164, 38 1 Dewey Boulevard, 743 Eastern Islands Attack & Fire Support Group , Deyo, RAdm Morton L ., 60, 60n, 99, 99 n 162, 164 Dickey, Col Ward E ., 9 5 Eastern Manchuria, 530 Dick Hill, 267–26 9 Eastern New Guinea, 66 5 Dilbert Dunker, 425, 42 7 East Station, 547, 59 9 Diplomatic corps, 547, 734n Easy Hill, 32 3 Diplomatic immunity, 73 3 Edenton, N . C ., 713 Disarmed military personnel, 452, 463–46 4 Edson, LtCol Merritt A ., 708–70 9 Division of Aviation, HQMC, 678–679, 713, 71 5 Edson's Ridge, 709 Division of Operations and Training, HQMC , Edwards, VAdm Richard S ., 42 2 67 8 Efate, 71 7 Division of Personnel, HQMC, 67 8 Eichelberger, LtGen Robert L ., 481, 48 7 Division of Plans & Policies, HQMC, 412, 414n , Eighty-Eight Balls, 73 6 631, 678, 691, 700–701 . See also "Pots an d Eisenhower, Gen Dwight D ., 403n Pans." Elbe River, 747

906 INDEX

Eldorado, 182, 225, 375, 644, 647—64 8 Far East, 444, 461, 463-464, 470, 517n, 572 , Eleventh War Area, 59 6 63 3 Ellice Islands, 66 0 Far East War Crimes Tribunal, 739 n Ellis, Maj Earl H ., 654, 666, 69 1 Farrell, BGen Walter G ., 600, 60 6 Ellis, Maj Henry A ., Jr., 416 Fast Carrier Forces, 16, 21—22, 60, 94, 96—100 , Embarkation activities, 95, 391, 59 5 178-181, 185, 192, 280, 404, 406, 411, 415 - Emirau, 25, 88, 71 2 418, 421, 430—431, 438—439, 461, 534, 561 , Endo, Capt, 75 2 566 Engebi, 225, 225n, 230n, 45 9 Fayence, 748 Engineer mine removal operations, 123, 204 , Fegan, MajGen Joseph C ., 70 7 264, 306-307, 311, 322, 34 6 Feldmeier, Maj Allan L ., 135, 293, 33 1 Engineers . See also Army Units ; Marin e Fellows, BGen Joseph H ., 439, 663 n Units ; Seabees . Fengt'ai, 76 0 American, 25, 32n, 71, 86n, 112, 123, 134—135 , Fenton, lstLt Francis I ., Jr., 43 9 149n, 158—159, 176, 223, 242n, 271, 275— Fertig, Col Wendell W ., 77 1 276, 283, 302, 307—308, 310, 333, 379, 467 , Field Manual 31—5, 65 5 551, 558, 576, 585, 599, 624, 643, 663, 692— Fighter-director site, 141n, 38 1 694, 702, 720—721, 726 Fike, Col Charles L ., 452n Japanese, 43—46, 122, 36 3 Filipinos, 740—744, 769, 77 4 England, 708, 746, 746n . See also Great Filipino underground organization, 774 Britain ; United Kingdom . Fink, Maj Gerald, 561 n Eniwetok, 70-71, 88, 225, 242n, 428, 444, 450 , Finschhafen, 70 n 464, 464n Fire coordination, 71 8 Enogai, 711 Fire direction, fire direction system, 193, 385 Enoura Maru, 77 7 Fire direction center, 117, 195, 38 3 Enright, Col William K ., 547n Fire Plan NEGAT, 377, 378 n Enterprise, 98, 41 9 Fire Plan VICTOR, 377, 378 n Entwistle, RAdm Frederick I ., 637, 638n Fire support coordination centers, 383, 670 Equipment . See Supplies and equipment . Fire support operations, 166, 209n, 253-254 , Ercanbrack, CWO Earl B ., 734n, 736, 736n, 287, 30 5 762, 774, 780, 781n First Battle of the Philippine Sea, 4, 1 6 Erskine, MajGen Graves B ., 24 First Joint Training Force, 65 6 Espiritu Santo, 25, 70, 70n, 86, 90, 95, 710, 716 — Flamethrowers . See Weapons . 71 7 Flanagan, PltSgt Cecil J ., 612—61 3 Essex, 26, 415—418 Flat Top Hill, 266-267, 26 9 Estes, 10 2 Fleet landing exercises (FLEXs), 655-656, Eureka, 66 7 662-663, 67 7 Europe, 13, 15, 218, 409, 430, 525, 528, 589 , Fleet Training Publication 167 (FTP-167) , 746—74 7 655, 658, 660 Evacuation activities, 450, 456, 461, 638—640 , FLINTLOCK Operation, 66 1 642, 644—645, 650, 728, 731, 741, 781, 78 6 Florida Islands, 70 8 Ewa, T . H ., 25, 96, 441, 470, 621, 71 6 Flycatchers, 201, 209n, 210, 233 Executions, 459, 741, 745, 76 8 Flying Tigers, 716, 75 8 Executive Headquarters, 594—595, 599, 601 Foley, LtCol Ernest P ., 21 6 605, 610, 612-614, 618, 621—623, 677 Folino, lstLt Fred C., 22 6 Exercises . See Fleet Landing Exercises ; Food . See Supplies and Equipment . Training. Footbridges, 219, 222, 273, 276, 283 . See Expeditionary Force, 677 . See also Task Bridges . organizations . FORAGER Operation, 66 1 Expeditionary Troops, 60, 354, 354n, 558, 661 , Forbidden City, 54 0 674 Foreign concessions (China), 521, 546

INDEX 907

Foreign legations, 524 GALVANIC Operation, 661 Formosa, 3, 5—9, 11, 11n, 12, 12n, 13, 17, 19 , Gard, BGen Robert G ., 189n 21—22, 26, 32, 34, 38-41, 56—57, 69, 84, 97— Gasoline . See Supplies and equipment. 98, 100, 178—179, 400, 416, 427, 437, 463 , Gavutu, 706, 708 522, 744, 750, 768, 772—778, 78 3 Geheime Staats Polizei. See Gestapo . Formosa-first policy, 9, lln Geiger, MajGen Roy S ., 24, 60, 66—68, 71n, 79, Formosa-Luzon Line, 7 84n, 86, 89, 91, 93, 123, 125—126, 129, 159, Formosans, 49 9 175, 195—197, 214, 216, 252, 273, 299, 323 , Formosa operation, 5—6, 8—9, 12—13 . See als o 353, 353n, 354n, 363, 363n, 365, 365n, 373 , Planning . 381—382, 385—389, 397n, 534, 545, 571, 605 ; Formosa Strait, 9 LtGen, 365n, 439, 605n Forrestal, James V ., 3, 72 5 General Order 241, 677 Fortifications . See Defenses . Geneva Convention, 739 n Fort Ord, Calif ., 9 2 Geneva Protocol, 749, 753, 755—756, 76 0 Fort Robinson, Nebr ., 713 Genka, 174 Fort Washington, Md., 71 3 German forces, 731, 749 Forward observers, 117, 25 9 German hospital, 748—749 14th Naval District, 46 5 Germans, 455, 546—547, 563, 748—74 9 Frame, Maj Donald P ., 415 Germany, 12, 18, 522, 527—528, 746, 747 n France, 746, 746n, 747, 747n, 521—52 2 surrender of, 530—53 1 Franklin, 94, 98, 419, 421 . See also "Big Ben ." Gestapo, 747, 747n Fraser, LtCol Angus M ., 138n Ghormley, VAdm Robert L ., 663n Freeny, LtCol Samuel W ., 777 Gilbert Islands, 240, 390, 450, 665, 690, 710 , Freising (Oberbayern), 748 724, 744 French Arsenal, 546, 556, 61 3 Operation, 674—67 5 French coast, 15 Gilbert Islands, 427, 429 French expeditionary force, 52 2 Gilliam, LtCol William M ., 278n French Foreign Legion, 746 Ginowan-Shuri highway, 194, 26 8 French Government, 747 n Gisushi, 303—304, 326n French Indo-China, 2 0 Goettge, LtCol Frank B ., 68 6 French Municipal Bldg ., 516, 55 7 Goettge Patrol, 67 6 French officials, 547, 767 Gormley, LtCol John J ., 171, 260, 556, 556n French underground, 731, 746, 746n, 747—74 8 Grasse, 74 8 Fuel . See Supplies and Equipment. Great Britain, 433—434, 521—522, 572, 747n . Fujioka, LtGen Takeo, 44, 289—29 0 See also England, United Kingdom . Fukada, Sgt, 774 Great Harbor, 540, 563, 580 Fukien Province, 52 2 Great Wall of China, 537, 585, 60 8 Fukuoda, 506n Green, Maj Bernard W ., 134, 144—14 5 Fukuoka, 493, 493n, 499—502, 505, 51 4 Green Island, 25, 96 Fukuoka Base Command, 50 5 Grew, Joseph C ., 43 3 Fukuoka Occupation Force, 501—502, 505—50 6 Griebel, Col John H ., 116, 128n, 212, 217, 257 , Fukuoka Prefecture, 502, 506, 512, 51 4 342, 345, 37 8 Funakoshi, 48 1 Griffith Board, 70 0 Funauki Fortress, 39n Griffith, Maj Samuel B . II, 708 ; LtCol, 699 , Furugen, 117 709 ; Col, 616, 699—70 0 Futema, 54, 68, 125, 206, 206n, 21 4 Griner, MajGen George W ., Jr., 62, 193, 29 8 Futtsu Saki, 483, 48 5 Gripsholm, 734n Guadalcanal, 24, 27, 66, 70, 70n, 74, 86—88, 90 , Gagusuku, 13 8 90n, 91—92, 95—96, 160n, 186, 371, 376, 389 , Gaja, 205, 22 0 391, 410, 412, 517, 656—660, 662, 664, 666 — Gallipoli, 662 667, 667n, 670, 673—676, 685—686, 686n,

908 INDEX

Guadalcanal—Continue d Hamahika Shima, 164, 388 n 687, 690-691, 694, 696, 696n, 702-703, 703n , Hamburg, 74 9 706, 708, 708n, 709-711, 716, 716n, 717 - Hanagusuku, 289 71 9 Hanchos, 76 1 Operation, 659, 664-665, 702, 70 8 Hancock, 128, 421, 479 n Guam, 4, 7, 7n, 23-24, 71, 75, 95n, 97, 97n, 123 , Hangchow, 53 0 123n, 160, 196, 242n, 363n, 372n, 373n, Hangchow Bay, 7, 428 397-398, 412, 428, 441, 444, 448, 452n, 454 , Hanja, 33 0 456-457, 461-464, 468, 470, 478, 488, 509n , Hankow, 52 4 512, 512n, 534-535, 544-545, 551-552, 560 , Hansen, Maj Herman, Jr., 41 6 564-565, 620, 624, 628, 630-631, 638-639 , Hanza, 115, 117, 120 642, 673, 712, 714, 736, 745, 783, 785-78 6 Hara, VAdm Chuichi, 454-45 5 Operation, 88, 67 1 Hara-kiri, 367 Guam Evacuation Unit, 45 0 Harbors, 4, 271n, 299, 460, 522, 54 0 Guantanamo, Cuba, 653 Harmon, LtGen Millard F ., 1 1 Guerrilla Activities, 174, 541, 559, 589, 609 , Harriman, W . Averell, 43 1 746, 759, 771 . See also Tactics . Harris, BGen Field, 41 2 Guidebook for Marines, 756n Harris, LtCol Harold D ., 69 1 Gulf of Chihli, 522, 534, 539, 541, 57 7 Hart, Col John N ., 623, 63 1 Gunfire and Covering Force, 60, 99n, 10 2 Haute Savoie, 746-747 Gushi, 311, 31 4 Haven, 78 6 Gushichan, 29 0 Hawaii, Hawaiian Islands, 24, 66n, 141, 397 - Gushikawa, 12 8 398, 407, 448, 452, 465, 468, 470, 493, 500n , Gustafson, Maj John A ., 116 636, 654, 672, 704, 70 9 Gusuku, 36 0 Hawkins, 1stLt Jack, 770-772 . Gusukuma, 199, 203, 205, 22 0 Hay, John, 52 2 Hayden, LtCol Reynolds H ., 144, 146, 174, 25 3 Hadnot Point, N. C., 705 Heanza Shima, 164, 388 n Hagushi, 51n, 55, 63, 68, 73, 109, 241, 29 8 anchorage, 159, 22 3 Headquarters Marine Corps, 372n, 447-448 , 466-467, 597, 655, 677-679, 681, 688, 69 beaches, 51, 54, 64, 67, 70, 91, 100, 103, 107 , 0 109, 111, 158, 160, 162, 166, 241, 393, 421 , Hedo Misaki, 140-141, 348, 363n, 38 0 551, 68 5 Heinl, Col Robert D ., Jr., 508n, 547n, 67 0 transport area, 135, 179, 233, 34 8 Hemphill, LtCol Bruce T ., 173 ; Col, 254n Haha Jima, 460 Henderson Field, 91, 186, 410, 709, 71 6 Hai Ho River, 539, 542, 546, 550, 552-553, 556, Henderson, LtCol Frederick P ., 189 ; Col, 89n, 62 1 117n, 123n, 186n, 193n, 377, 377n, 378n, Hainan, 416, 78 3 382, 385n ; BGen, 192n, 216n, 383n Haiphong, 56 1 Henderson Group, 18 9 Hai River, 62 1 Hentona, 17 5 Haiti, 65 4 Hermle, BGen Leo, D ., 454 ; LtGen, 454 n Hakata, 499 Heydrich, Reinhard, 747n Halazone, 331 n Higgins, Andrew J ., 667 Half Moon Hill, 244, 247-253, 256, 264, 27 1 Hill, VAdm Harry W., 229n, 242, 370, 372n , Halifax, Lord, 43 6 408, 672, 70 4 Hall, RAdm John L ., Jr., 60, 91-93, 24 1 Hill, LtCol Robert E ., 342n Halmahera group, 45 2 Hill 26, 31 6 Halsey, Adm William F ., 4-5, 97, 229n, 280, Hill 27, 296 431, 476, 479, 479n, 481, 483-484, 484n, Hill 28, 315-31 6 487, 493n, 660, 663, 781 ; FAdm, 403n, 404, Hill 52, 34 3 416, 421, 422n Hill 53, 320, 323

INDEX 909

Hill 55, 257, 257n, 261–262, 264–265, 287, 315– Hollandia, 9 6 31 6 Holomon, LtCol Walter, 327n, 330n Hill 55–1, 31 5 Home Islands (Japan), 4, 15, 17, 19, 31–32 , Hill 55–2, 316 36–37, 40, 57, 100, 178, 206, 368, 370, 372, Hill 57, 257n, 309, 32 5 400–402, 406–407, 409, 418, 430, 438, 455 , Hill 58, 32 0 459, 461, 463, 511, 529, 533, 737, 779, 783 , Hill 59, 257n 78 8 Hill 60, 217, 21 9 Homma, LtGen Masaharu, 741, 76 8 Hill 62, 320–32 1 Honan Province, 44, 54 2 Hill 69, 335, 340, 344–345, 345n, 34 6 Honda Bay, 77 3 Hill 72, 360–36 1 Hong Kong, 19, 407, 416, 522, 603, 609, 645 , Hill 79, 346, 354, 358, 361–364, 37 8 647, 752, 783, 78 6 Hill 80, 360–36 1 Honolulu, 75 2 Hill 81, 354, 358, 361–364, 37 8 Honshu, 5, 7, 31n, 98, 180, 402, 406–408, 430– Hill 85, 36 2 431, 476, 488, 490, 492, 500–501, 736, 760 , Hill 89, 292, 353, 357, 362, 364, 364n, 367–36 8 765, 78 3 Hill 95, 35 1 Honsowetz, Col Russell E ., 117n, 120n Hill 103, 314, 33 0 Hopeh, 537, 541–542, 544–545, 548, 550, 552 , Hill 107, 32 5 564, 570, 574–575, 584–585, 588, 593, 596 , Hill 108, 325, 33 0 599, 609, 614, 616, 620, 622–623, 627, 631 – Hill 153, 356 632, 641, 64 9 Hill 165, 120n, 131, 131n Hopkins, Harry L ., 431, 431n, 43 2 Hill 200, 14 8 Horie, Maj Yoshitaka, 46 1 Hill 210, 148–149, 15 4 Horseshoe Hill, 244, 252–254, 25 6 Hill 220, 5 0 Hospitals. See Medical activities . Hilliard, LtCol Robert C ., 385n, 668n Houston, 739–740, 740n, 750, 76 3 Hillyer, Col Roy N ., 323 Howard, MajGen Archie F ., 581–582, 601–60 2 Himeji, 43, 774 Howard, Col Samuel L ., 744, 768 ; MajGen, 618 , Hinsdale, 10 9 622–623, 625 n Hinunangan Bay, 9 1 Hsin Ho, 618–619, 625, 627, 632, 64 8 Hirado Shima, 50 5 Hudson, Maj John S ., 337n Hirohata, 736, 761–762, 780, 781n Hugh W . Hadley, 224 Hirohito, 436 . See also Emperor of Japan. Huizenga, lstLt Richard M ., 758–75 9 Hiroshima, 433, 436, 780, '78 6 Hull, Cordell, 43 6 Hiroshima Prefecture, 51 4 Hulutao, 561, 569–570 Hiza, 11 6 Humphrey, LtCol Gavin C ., 60 2 Hizaonna, 127, 127n, 13 0 Hunt, Capt George P ., 723, 724n Hobbs Victory, 180 n Hunt, BGen LeRoy P ., 348 ; MajGen, 496, 506 , Hochmuth, LtCol Bruno A ., 112, 154, 174, 254 , 514, 51 7 254n, 31 1 Hunt, LtCol LeRoy P ., Jr., 602 Huntington, LtCol Robert W ., 65 3 Hodge, MajGen John R ., 60, 68, 84, 131, 164n, , 188–189, 192, 194, 204, 270, 330, 352, 387 , Hurley, Ambassador Patrick J ., 546, 555, 563 62 38 9 0 Hurst, LtCol Edward H ., 116, 127, 128n, 130 , Hogback Ridge, 266, 268–270 173, 261 ; Col, 127n Ho-Hsi-Wu, 56 7 Hydrographic conditions, 668 Hokkaido, 31n, 760, 78 1 Hydrographic survey, 37 8 Holcomb, MajGen Thomas, 655n ; LtGen, 660, 660n, 665n, 677, 687–688, 688n, 699 ; Gen, Ibaru Ridge, 358, 360 414, 414n ICEBERG Operation, 13, 31, 57, 60, 63, 63n , Holdahl, Col Theodore A ., 601 64, 69, 71–73, 75, 77, 82–84, 89, 91–92, 94 – Hollandia, 4, 6, 70n 96, 99–100, 103, 117, 128, 135, 141, 159,

910 INDEX

ICEBERG Operation—Continued Indianapolis, 10 0 160n, 178, 183, 207, 224, 229, 240, 242 , Indochina, 26, 103, 41 6 354n, 369, 373, 381, 389-390, 398-399, 68 5 Infantry units. See also Army units ; Marine alternate plan, 65-66, 19 6 units . base development, 58, 70-71, 75, 84, 92, 166 , American, 62, 112, 117, 353, 384, 668, 670 , 372, 37 9 672, 688, 718, 721-72 6 commanders, 166, 28 0 battalion landing teams, 88, 88n, 109n , expeditionary forces, 6, 31, 97, 17 7 552, 635, 638-63 9 expeditionary troops, 6, 58, 94, 10 4 battalions, 112, 114, 131, 479, 555, 628 - floating reserve, 8 6 629, 635, 647, 671, 692-693, 701-702, 71 3 forces, 64, 72, 74, 78, 83, 86, 93, 96, 98, 103 , brigades, 447, 63 5 107, 109, 179, 376, 38 2 companies, 210, 222, 265, 281n, 573, 579 , initial support, 7 1 628-629, 640, 644, 689, 692-693, 695 - Joint Staff Study, 57-58, 63, 77 697, 702, 718-719, 72 3 landing, 63, 72-73, 111, 202, 23 9 divisions, 24, 58, 67-68, 72, 74, 81, 84-86 , operations, 103, 158n, 181, 382 102n, 123, 131, 138n, 383n, 447, 467-468 , phases, 62, 70, 77, 162, 378 533, 579, 635, 656-657, 663, 683, 691 - Plan Baker, 65-6 6 692, 693n, 694, 696, 701-702, 717, 720 , Plan Fox, 63-64, 6 6 72 3 scheme of maneuver ashore, 57, 10 2 fire teams, 265, 693, 697-698, 698n, 700 - support elements, 71, 10 3 701, 72 5 Ichi, 17 4 platoons, 586, 629, 640, 645, 647, 692n, 693, Ichinomaya, 40 8 696-697, 699, 707, 719, 72 8 Idaho, 34 4 regimental combat teams, 86n, 87-88, 88n , Idiot Sticks, 13 0 90, 102n, 109n, 164, 214, 467, 476, 47 8 Ie, 16 7 regiments, 86n, 87-88, 129, 135, 467, 550 , Iegusugu Yama, 166-167 599, 635, 657, 570-671, 692-695, 714, 717 , Ie Shima, 34, 50, 55, 58, 62n, 66, 68-69, 75, 142 , 721-722, 725, 727 142n, 166-167, 169, 169n, 196-197, 226 , rifle squads, 692n, 696, 698-701, 718-72 0 229, 230n, 370, 372n Japanese, 4, 45, 54, 80, 312, 608, 686-687, airfields, 46, 50, 75, 166, 227 733, 78 8 anchorage, 22 3 battalions, 41, 44, 50, 80, 20 7 base development program, 7 5 brigades, 44, 8 0 invasion, 9 1 companies, 44-4 5 Iheya-Aguni landings, 348 divisions, 43-44, 80-8 1 Iheya Retto, 3 4 regiments, 44-45, 80-8 1 Iheya Shima, 347-348, 378n, 38 1 squads, 17 3 Ike Shima, 164, 388 n Inflation, 582, 53 2 Ikibaru, 127, 13 0 Initial Occupation Line, 485, 48 7 Illana Bay, 11n Inland Sea, 419, 76 5 Imadomari, 140 Inoue, LtGen Sadae, 453, 453n Imperial City, 54 0 Inouye, VAdm Seibi, 1 5 Imperial Rescript, 449, 530, 53 2 Inspector General, FMFPac, 58 1 Imperial Russia, 531 Inspector General, U . S . Marine Corps, 63 7 Imperial War Council (Japan), 1 8 Instrument of surrender, 439, 45 4 Imura, H ., 584n Insular Patrol (Guam), 73 4 Inasomi, 280, 303 Intelligenc e Independence, 479 n American, 66, 78, 102, 107, 121, 136, 169, 174 , India, 9 8 191, 329, 369, 381, 532, 543-544, 551 , India Command, 3 n 588, 617, 676, 684, 686, 709-71 0 Indiana, 479n agencies, 31, 78, 176, 565, 686

INDEX 91 1

Intelligence—Continue d Iwo Jima, 8, 11-14, 21–22, 27, 45, 48, 57, 72 , American—Continue d 95–97, 104, 159, 162n, 178, 197n, 240, 242n , estimates, 78, 139, 207, 406, 40 8 257, 308, 391, 393, 398, 417, 429–431, 438 , personnel, 498, 543, 68 6 460, 461n, 503n, 512n, 621, 666, 670, 670n , problems, 685 672, 674–675, 683, 703, 705, 707, 714, 722- sources, 20n, 56 5 725, 729, 74 5 studies, 78–79, 433, 47 9 Izena Shima, 378 n training, 685–68 6 Jajiya, 14 9 Japanese, 53 0 International Concession, 59 9 Jaluit, 450, 455, 46 2 International R'ed Cross, 745, 749–750, 753 – Janiszewski, LtCol George, 703 n 755, 761, 764, 78 1 Japan, 4–8, 11, lln, 13–15, 17–21, 37, 41, 57 , International Settlement, 69 8 63, 67, 75–76, 78n, 93, 98, 178, 226-227 , Interpreter s 357, 370, 386, 398–400, 402–403, 416, 418 , American, 121, 296, 357, 485, 580, 589, 60 3 430, 432, 434, 436–439, 441, 444, 449–450 , Chinese, 54 4 461, 463, 465-469, 475-476, 487–490, 492– Japanese, 580, 77 6 493, 495, 499–500, 500n, 505, 508–509, 511– Intrepid, 419, 71 5 512, 517, 518n, 522, 525–529, 531, 553, 560 , Inubi, 127, 129–13 0 565, 580, 582, 593, 597–598, 607, 641, 654 , Isa, 210 659, 661, 732, 734, 734n, 735, 738n, 739n, Isahaya, 501, 50 6 741, 750, 755, 761, 765, 769, 775, 776n, 778 , Ishihara, Isamu, 752, 738 n 781, 783, 78 6 Ishikawa, 126, 129–130, 132, 134, 17 1 invasion of, 8, 401, 432-433, 576, 763n . Se e Ishikawa Isthmus, 34, 50, 68, 126, 128–129, 132 , also CORONET ; OLYMPIC . 135–136, 155, 166, 171, 174, 38 0 occupation of, 437–438, 454–455, 464, 475 , Ishikawa Take, 17 1 481, 489-490, 493, 496–497, 500–503, 508 , Ishimine, 128n, 30 9 510–511, 518, 533–534, 536, 71 4 Ishimmi, 206, 267–26 8 occupation authorities, 499 Ishimmi Ridge, 268–269 occupation forces, 428, 450, 453, 456, 463 , Island Command 476, 481, 490, 492–493, 497, 499, 501, 502n, Guam, 454, 456, 459, 463n, 47 8 506, 509, 511, 56 0 Okinawa, 6 2 occupation operation, 488, 495, 507, 518 Peleliu, 45 3 occupation tasks, 436, 441, 479, 497, 508-509 , Saipan, 453 511–512, 51 4 Italia n Japanese, 11–12, 31, 103, 106, 151, 452, 455 , concession, 55 6 526, 532, 540, 542, 544, 546–547, 564, 568 , consulate, 54 7 579, 589, 596–597, 607, 648, 675, 709, 745 , embassy, 583 n 75 0 hospital, 74 8 Army-Navy agreement, 14, 2 1 nationals, 50 3 Army-Navy relations, 4 6 Italy, 748 cities, 49 2 Item Pocket, 4 9 civilians, 38, 46–47, 76–77, 106, 172, 251, 452 , 5 Itokazu, 54, 298, 303 456, 557, 565, 567, 580, 584, 608, 763, 77 2 Itoman, 36–38, 290, 312, 315, 318, 325, 326n , economy, 20, 49 . See also Jushin. 330, 332, 332n, 335, 337–338, 345, 35 1 elder statesmen, 15-46 Emperor, 18, 321, 357, 367, 433, 436, 439, 449 , Itomi, 139–140, 142, 146, 148n, 151–152, 154 475, 485, 497, 518, 530, 752 . See also Itomi-Toguchi road, 142, 154 Hirohito . Iwa, 303, 325–328, 33 1 Empire, 3–5, 11, 32, 35, 58, 76, 78, 370, 432 , Iwahig Penal Colony, 77 4 654, 67 5 Iwakuni, 509n forces, demobilization of, 452, 462, 487, 497 , Iwa-Shindawaku ridge, 328 499, 505, 511, 568, 574

912 INDE X

Japanese-Continue d Japanese-Continue d General Staff, 16, 27 4 Army-Continue d government, 16-17, 19-20, 38, 436, 476, 497 , Thirty-second Army, 18, 22, 39-41, 43-51 , 509, 517, 732-733, 755 51n, 53-55, 55n, 106-107, 120, 122, 179 , government officials, 14-15, 484, 495, 743 , 188-192, 197, 205-208, 210-213, 251 , 763, 774, 777 251n, 257, 265-266, 270-272, 274, 280 , Home Minister, Ministry, 38, 498, 51 1 288, 292-293, 295, 297, 304, 316, 330 , industry, 5, 14, 20, 98, 417, 492, 546, 571, 74 4 332, 338n, 340, 350-353, 353n, 357, 362 , intendance service, 40n 364n, 367-368, 379, 386, 393, 67 5 interservice, rivalry, 55 Forty-third Army, 542, 565, 579-58 1 military doctrine, 35 0 Forty-seventh Army, 507n Military Service Act, 47 Fiftieth Army, 507n military system, 14n, 67 6 2d Armored Division, 44 8th Air Division, 21, 10 0 mines, 492, 501, 552 9th Infantry Division, 41, 43, 46, 50, 55 munitions, 569, 58 1 24th Infantry Division, 43-45, 50, 54-55 , Naval Headquarters, 48 7 191, 205-207, 210-213, 220, 268, 289, 292 , operations, 14, 2 0 350-351, 353, 357, 363, 36 8 pirates, 36-3 7 62d Infantry Division, 44, 50, 54-55, 188, ports, 21, 492 190-191, 199, 205, 207, 211-213, 216, schools, 546, 556, 563 217n, 218, 220, 257, 280-281, 289-290 , surrender, 393, 400-402, 427-429, 434, 436 , 292, 350, 35 2 438-439, 441, 449-450, 452, 452n, 454, 457 , 84th Division, 43 459-460, 470, 475-476, 484-485, 487-488 , 97th Division, 50 490, 497, 511, 521, 530, 533-534, 556-558 , 118th Division, 54 2 565, 579, 581, 741, 781, 783, 785-786 63d Brigade, 44, 191 transportation facilities, 51, 492, 502, 502 n 64th Brigade, 44, 236, 257 5th Independent Mixed Brigade, 542, 565 , Japanese Units 58 1 Imperial General Headquarters, 14, 14n, 16- 24th Independent Mixed Brigade, 5 3 22, 39-41, 43, 45, 178, 227, 356-357, 368, 4th Independent Mixed Brigade, 43-45, 50, 392-393, 438-439, 509, 52 9 53, 55, 142, 189, 205, 211, 220, 251-252 , Army, 14, 17-18, 21, 41, 178, 321, 393, 501, 289, 292, 297, 350-35 2 542, 675, 736, 738, 742n, 755, 756n, 760- 1st Specially Established Brigade, 54, 24 7 761, 763 2d Specially Established Brigade, 5 4 General Staff, 14n 5th Artillery Command, 45, 54, 106, 203 , Chinese Expeditionary Army, 44, 529, 53 2 207, 213, 289-290, 35 0 Formosa Army, 1 8 42d Field Artillery Regiment, 4 5 Kwantung Army, 43, 527, 529-53 0 7th Heavy Artillery Regiment, 45, 292, 295 Mongolian Garrison Army, 542 1st Independent Heavy Mortar Regiment , Nakagusuku Wan Fortress, 39 n 45 North China Area Army, 532, 542, 546, 15th Independent Mixed Regiment, 43-44, 557, 56 8 221, 247, 351-35 2 North China Pacification Army, 54 2 Infantry Regiments Southern Area Army, 178n 22d, 43, 191, 205-206, 211, 220, 267-268 , First Army, 54 2 347, 36 3 32d, 43, 206, 211-212, 292-293, 297, 347 , Sixth Air Army, 21, 178 36 3 Twelfth Army, 542 89th, 43, 206, 211, 220, 260, 269, 351, 36 3 Seventeenth Area Army, 53 0 1st Infantry Unit, 43 19th Air Sector Command, 46, 5 4 2d Infantry Unit, 43-44, 49-50, 5 5 Thirty-first Army, 454 1st Medium Artillery Regiment, 4 5

INDEX 913

Japanese—Continue d Japanese—Continue d Army—Continue d Army—Continue d 23d Medium Artillery Regiment, 4 5 Special Guard Engineer Units 24th Reconnaissance Regiment, 35 2 502d, 4 7 23d Shipping Engineer Regiment, 207 , 503d, 4 7 292, 29 5 504th, 4 7 26th Shipping Engineer Regiment, 207 , Navy, 14, 18–19, 21, 31, 81, 99, 191, 252, 290 , 221 321, 393, 400, 73 8 11th Shipping Group Headquarters, 5 4 General Staff, 14 n 1st Specially Established Regiment, 54 , Air Fleet s 108, 120 First, 2 1 27th Tank Regiment, 44–45 Third, 21 24th Transportation Regiment, 289 Fifth, 21–22, 178, 207 81st Field Antiaircraft Battalion, 25 7 Tenth, 2 1 7th Independent Antitank Battalion, 22 1 Combined Fleet, 18, 17 8 First Mobile Fleet, 1 6 100th Independent Heavy Artillery Bat- First Naval District, 48 4 talion, 45 Fourth Fleet, 454 Independent Infantry Battalion s Okinawa Naval Base Force, 46, 54, 55n, 1st, 53, 22 1 220, 242, 290, 321, 507n 2d, 53, 22 1 Sea Raiding Squadrons 3d, 53 26th, 20 7 11th, 4 4 27th, 20 7 12th, 44, 19 1 28th, 20 7 13th, 44, 191, 35 2 29th, 207 14th, 44, 19 1 15th, 44, 25 7 4th Surface Escort Unit, 4 6 . 21st, 44 Special Attack Unit, 100, 106, 177, 227 22d, 44, 265, 290, 292, 29 7 See also Kamikazes ; Kikusui. 23d, 44, 216, 257 Special Naval Landing Party, 489n . 26th, 5 3 Fleet, 4, 11, 16, 22, 63, 654, 67 3 27th, 5 3 Miscellaneous Unit s 28th, 5 3 antitank group, 41, 44–45, 107 29th, 5 3 Boeitai, 47, 53–54, 120, 132, 141, 175, 220 , 272d, 44 350, 357n, 363 273d, 44, 25 7 coast defense, 4 7 14th Independent Machine Battalion, 216 , Giretsu (Act of Heroism) Airborne Raid- 257 ing Force, 227 Infantry Battalion s Imperial Reservists Association, 47 1st Bn, 1st SpecEstabRegt, 120 Iwao Force, 251 n 1/32, 212, 268 labor forces, 53, 122, 191, 530, 77 0 2d Bn, 1st SpecEstabRegt, 120 4 2/22, 19 1 local defense units, 47, 80, 120, 17 2/32, 21 2 midget submarine unit, 4 6 3d Bn, 1st SpecEstabRegt, 120 Nakagusuku Wan Fortress Artillery Unit , 3d Bn, 2d InfUnit, 217n, 22 1 39, 45 1st Light Mortar Battalion, 45, 19 1 Okinawan conscripts, 43, 53, 80, 142, 17 1 2d Light Mortar Battalion, 4 5 shipping engineers, 46, 107n, 122, 209–210 , Special Guard Companie s 35 1 223d, 47 suicide sea-raiding squadrons, 46, 53, 56, 224th, 47 81, 103, 106, 209, 220, 351, 380 n 225th, 47 suicide swimmers, 81

914 INDEX

Japanese—Continue d Kaimon-Dake, 40 8 Miscellaneous Units—Continue d Kakazu, 188, 19 4 Tekketsu (Blood and Iron for the Em- Kakazu Ridge, 190, 193-19 4 peror Duty Units), 4 7 Kakibana, 30 3 Udo Force, 142, 148n, 17 4 Kaluf, Col John, 557n volunteer youth groups, 4 7 Kamikazes, Kamikaze attacks . See also Java, 3n, 739-740, 78 6 Kikusui ; Special Attack Forces. 26, 100 , Jehol Province, 595, 60 2 107, 157, 177, 178n, 179-181, 185-186, 189 - Jessfield Road Jail, 75 4 190, 196, 207-208, 211, 223-224, 227, 229 - Jewell, LtCol Duncan H ., 507n 230, 240-241, 274, 278n, 348, 369n, 370 - Jichaku, 199, 203, 21 2 371, 372n, 374, 383, 406, 415, 419, 421, 427 , Johnson, Col Byron F., 25 ; BGen, 552, 576, 60 0 508n, 665, 671, 673, 67 5 Johnson, Maj John G ., 296 Kaminokawa beach, 40 8 Johnston Island, 46 5 Kamiyama Shima, 106 n Joint Assault Signal Companies, 182 . See also Kamizato, 300, 303 Army units ; Marine units. Kanchanburi, 76 7 Joint Board, 66 4 Kaniku, 188, 194 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3n, 4-7, 9, 13, 31, 57, 63 , Kanoya, 226, 496, 507, 508n 76, 82, 84n, 197, 399-401, 401n, 402-403 , Kantner, Maj George B ., 249 429-430, 432-433, 437, 498, 529, 531, 533 , Kanto Plain, 5, 40 8 561, 572, 596-597, 659 Karadera, 290, 292, 298, 300 Joint Expeditionary Force, 58, 93, 242, 390 , Kase, Toshikazu, 1 6 661. See also Task Organizations . Katchin Peninsula, 125, 127-128, 130, 132, 162 , Joint Logistics Committee, 1 2 172, 17 6 Joint Mobilization plans, 46 7 Katsuren Wan (Bay), 12 5 Joint operations, 481, 48 5 Kawabe, LtGen Torashiro, 178 n Joint planning, 62-63 Kawada, 140-141, 173-17 5 Joint staff planners, 7, 6 2 Kawatana, 501, 50 5 Joint Staff Study LONGTOM, 399 K-Day, 30 3 Joint U . S . Military Advisory Group, 573, 633 , Keisan Sho, 106 n 64 1 Keise Shima, 63-64, 67-68 , 100, 103, 106, 106n, Joint War Plans Committee, 6-7, 9 107n, 111, 388n Jones, Maj James L ., 104, 162, 164, 167, 381 , Kelley, lstLt Alfred E . W ., 439 388n Kelley, Capt John W ., 43 9 Jones, BGen Louis R ., 548, 553, 567, 599, 60 6 Kellum, Maj William C ., 18 1 Jungchen, 57 8 Kenney, Gen George C ., 407, 430 Jungle . See Vegetation . Kerama Retto, 22, 34, 46, 56, 64-67, 73, 91, 96- Jushin, 15-1 6 100, 103-104, 106-107, 122, 164, 166, 177 , 180n, 370, 380, 380n, 40 7 Kadena, 36, 43, 50, 68, 164, 184-18 5 Kerby, Col Kenneth D ., 18 1 Kadena airfield, 46, 50, 54-55, 117, 120, 158 , 158n, 159, 176-177, 184, 190, 228, 274 Kerman, Maj John R ., 316n Kadena Pete, 185, 186 n Kiangsi Province, 52 6 Kagamisui, 302, 30 6 Kiangwang, 738, 75 7 Kagoshima, 406, 408, 427, 493n, 499-500, 507 , Kiaochow Bay, 540, 561, 63 6 507n, 51 4 Kijak, SupSgt Henry, 73 3 Kagoshima Prefecture, 500, 50 7 Kikai Shima, 196, 347, 37 8 Kagoshima Wan, 406, 408, 50 7 Kikusui attacks, 179n, 180, 189, 223, 369n . Se e Kahoolawee Island, 673 also Kamikazes . Kailin Mining Administration, 541, 545, 547 , Kikusui No. 1, 179, 180, 185, 19 0 552, 563, 585, 590, 599-600, 604, 609, 617 , Kikusui No. 2, 18 6 621, 649 Kikusui No . 5, 208

INDEX 915

Kikusui No. 7, 227, 27 4 Krulak, LtCol Victor H ., 283, 700 ; LtGen, Kikusui No . 8, 37 0 658 n Kikusui No . 9, 370 Kuba Saki, 68, 128 Kikusui No . 10, 37 0 Kubiri, 48 1 Kiland, RAdm Ingolf N., 62, 92, 104, 550 Kubo, 126 Kimmu Wan, 130 . See also Chimu Wan . Kuefu Shima, 106n King, RAdm Ernest J ., 664 ; Adm, 5—8, 9n, Kumamoto, 493n, 506-507, 51 4 lln, 12, 12n, 13, 56, 653, 660, 660n, 712 ; Kumamoto Prefecture, 500, 50 6 FAdm, 3, 394, 402, 403n, 411—414, 424 , Kumi Shima, 34, 348, 378n 432—433, 44 6 Kunishi, 290, 338, 340—343, 34 5 Kinkaid, Adm Thomas C ., 534—535, 555—556, Kunishi Ridge, 290, 333, 337, 338n, 340—345 , 558, 559n, 561, 563, 569, 57 4 347, 351, 351n, 354, 356, 358, 362, 388 n Kinney, lstLt John R., 758—759 Kunming, 58 3 Kinsman, Cdr Otto, 41 6 Kuomintang, 525—527, 531, 543, 620 . See also Kitamura, MajGen, 462 n Chinese Nationalists ; Chinese Central Kiyamu, 289—290, 292, 304, 316, 337, 350, 360, Government . 384 Kurawa, 12 6 Kiyamu-Gusuku Ridge, 360—361, 36 8 Kure, 94, 419, 509 n Kiyamu Peninsula 288, 292, 303, 35 0 Kuribayashi, LtGen Tadamichi, 460, 72 5 Kiyan Point, 55 Kurile Islands, 1 7 Klingman, lstLt Robert R., 225 Kuro Shima, 67, 106, 388 n Knob Hill, 263n, 27 6 Kurume, 50 2 Kobakura, 3 6 Kusaie, 455, 46 2 Kobe, 94, 98, 419, 76 0 Kushikino, 40 8 Kochi, 206, 21 1 Kutaka Shima, 164, 388n Koiso, Gen Kuniaki, 1 7 Kuwan, 198, 203, 207, 209—21 0 Kokuba, 36, 274, 276, 283—284, 296—297, 299— Kuwanga-Makabe road, 346 300, 309, 312, 32 5 Kuwanga Ridge, 345—346, 360 Kokuba Channel, 302 Kuyeh, 585, 599, 600, 61 7 Kokuba estuary, 280, 283, 305, 320 Kwajalein, 70n, 242n, 412, 444, 450, 459, 463— Kokuba hills, 283 464, 464n, 667, 674, 715n, 745, 72 1 Kokuba Gawa, 252, 298—299, 314, 325, 32 9 Kwantung, 19, 522 Kokumba River, 29 0 Kwantung Peninsula, 522, 531 Kokumbona, 70 9 Kyoto, 512, 514, 517 Kokura, 433, 51 4 Kyushu, 6, 9, 11, 18, 22, 31n, 32, 34, 36, 43, 57 , Komesu, 340, 356, 360, 36 2 98, 100, 178, 226-227, 371-372, 399-400 , Komesu Ridge, 362, 36 8 402—404, 406—409, 418—419, 421—422, 428 — Korea, 31, 103, 437, 463, 499-500, 505, 530, 534 , 431, 476, 490, 492-493, 493n, 496, 499—501 , 551, 553, 672, 760, 769, 778, 78 3 502n, 505—507, 507n, 508, 508n, 510—511 , Korean 514, 517—518, 783, 778, 785 occupation, 476, 53 3 Kyushu occupation, 492, 51 7 Occupation Force, 476n Kyushu operation, 402—404 civilians and laborers, 104, 455—456, 499 , 499n, 500, 502, 505, 596, 76 3 Laboehan, 740 Koror, 45 3 Lake Geneva, 74 7 Koshiki Retto, 407, 50 7 Lakehurst, N .J., 70 5 Koshiwabaru, 40 8 Lamotrek, 462 Kouri Shima, 173 Lamson-Scribner, Col Frank H ., 631 Kowloon, 522, 56 1 Landing Craft . See also Ships . K-rations, 295, 295n, 326, 32 8 American, 91, 94, 111, 114, 122, 157—158 , Krueger, Gen Walter, 404, 408, 492, 49 6 164, 211, 293, 392, 417, 483, 485, 550,

310-224 0-69 - 59

916 INDE X

Landing Craft—Continued Lingayen Gulf, 12, 26, 64, 77 7 American—Continue d Lin-Shou-Ying, 60 9 551, 553, 555-556, 628, 640, 657, 666- Linsi, 586, 599, 601, 617 668, 724, '786 Lisbon, Portugal, 74 6 LCIs (Landing Craft, Infantry), 104 , Little, MajGen Louis McC ., 655n 104n, 357, 361, 553, 66 8 Little Sugar Loaf, 310-31 1 LCMs (Landing Craft, Mechanized), 111 , Little White House, 70 8 114-115, 305, 555 Litzenberg, LtCol Homer L . Jr., 699n LCSs (Landing Craft, Support), 20 8 Litzenberg Board, 699 LCTs (Landing Craft, Tank), 114, 152 , Liversedge, LtCol Harry S ., '71 0 305, 311, 550, 553 Loading activities . See also Supplies an d LCVPs (Landing Craft Vehicle and Per- Equipment . 27, 95-96, 478, 551, 66 2 sonnel), 667, 781 Logan Victory, 80 n rubber boats, 162, 164, 299, 307, 644, 709 , Logistics, 38, 51, 62, 64, 71-75, 167, 120, 129 - 744 130, 239-240, 293, 295, 302, 304, 343, 378- self-propelled barges, 158, 158n 379, 390-392, 448, 466, 548, 550, 555, 598 , Japanese, 207, 209, 73 9 662, 664-667, 67 4 Landing forces . See also Army units ; Marin e London, 434-435, 658n units. 60, 80-81, 467, 560, 656, 658, 661 , London, 64 5 663-664, 667, 669, 78 1 Longaog, 77 1 Landing signal officer, 54 6 Long Island, 41 8 Langfang, 567, 599 Long March, 52 6 Lantienchang, 599 LONGTOM Operation, 398 Lantienchang Field, 539, 56 6 Loomis, Col Francis B ., Jr., 66, 71n, 30 2 Lantz, LtCol William T ., 479n Loomis Harbor, 30 2 Larkin, MajGen Claude A ., 552, 560, 566 Loudspeakers, 121, 296 Larsen, MajGen Henry L ., 450, 45 4 Louisville, 55 9 Larson, LtCol August C ., 253n, 35 6 Lourenco Marques, 734 n Laureta, Capt Claro, 77 1 Louther, LtCol Karl K ., 253n L-Day, 57, 64, 66-67, 98, 104, 107, 347, 39 1 Love Hill, 266, 269-270 Leaflets, leaflet drops, 436, 59 5 LST 628, 114 League of Nations, 52 6 LST 884, 109 Leahy, FAdm William D ., 400, 403n, 433, 687 Luanhsien, 586, 590 Legation Quarter, 540, 54 7 Legion d'Honneur, 747n Luan River, 590, 59 9 Lei-chuang, 599-600 Lubeck, 749 Lejeune, MajGen John A., 654 Luckey, Col Robert B ., 11 6 Lend-Lease supplies, 528 Ludwig, Capt Verle E., 172n, 332n Levy, 45 7 Lunga Point, 710 Lexington, 479n, 71 6 Lunga River, 709-71 0 Leyte, Leyte operation, 5, 8-9, 11-12, 18, 41 , 70, 72, 81, 84, 84n, 85, 92-93, 96, 178, 223 , Lutai, 599, 61 7 240, 240n, 390, 415, 422, 427, 431 Luzon, Luzon operation, 3, 5-7, 9, 11, 11n, 12 - Leyte Gulf, 8, 18, 91, 9 3 13, 18, 21, 26, 41, 72, 85, 85n, 97, 399, 416 , Liaotung Peninsula, 569 475, 742, 763n, '769, 776-777 Liberation, 773, 787, 789 . See also Recovered Luzon-Formosa controversy, 9n Allied Military Personnel . Lidice, 747n Mabuni, 292, 352, 356-357, 364, 36 8 Li Huang airstrip, 759 MacArthur, General Douglas . See also Com- Lines of communication , mander in Chief, Army Forces in th e American, 169, 548, 584, 594, 603, 607, 608 , Pacific ; Commander in Chief, Southwest 631, 64 9 Pacific Area ; Supreme Commander, Allie d Japanese, 31, 58, 125, 351 Powers. 3, 3n, 4-6, 8-9, 11, 11n, 12-13, 25,

INDEX 917

MacArthur, General Douglas—Continue d Marcus Island Command, 45 2 41, 57, 64, 84, 84n, 177, 372n ; General of Marianas, 4–5, 8, 14, 16–17, 21–22, 26, 39, 56 , the Army, 393, 401–403, 403n, 430, 436 , 74, 85, 93–95, 98, 159, 162, 166, 240, 411 , 438-439, 463, 470, 475, 476n, 481, 483 , 429–430, 448–450, 450n, 463, 493n, 624 , 484n, 485, 487, 497–498, 508, 617, 671 , 639, 666, 672, 690, 722, 724, 78 3 707n, 744, 778, 783 operation, 5–6, 72, 391, 668, 671, 674, 683 , MacGillivray, George C ., 696n, 702 n 70 4 Machisi, 273, 275 Surrender Acceptance and Occupation Com- Machinato, 188, 232, 30 2 mand, 45 0 Airfield, 49, 198, 203, 209, 28 3 Marine Deputy Chief of Staff, Tenth Army, 62 , MacNulty, LtCol William K., 734 83n, 85, 192 Madaira, 173 Marine units Maeda, 198, 205–206, 220 Air Maeda Escarpment, 19 7 Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic , n Mae Shima, 67, 106, 388 469 Maeta Saki, 118 Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 25– Magee, LtCol James C ., Jr., 117, 281, 33 5 26, 74, 228, 372n, 376, 412–413, 441, 448 , Magic Carpet, 46 3 469–470, 488, 509, 552, 600, 605–60 6 Magruder, Commo John H ., Jr., 460 Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Western ., 225, 225n Magruder, LtCol Marion M Pacific, 623, 629-631, 636, 642–64 3 Majiya, 146, 154 Marine Aircraft Wings, Pacific, 412–41 3 Majuro, 26, 441, 450, 45 2 Marine Air Training Command, East Makabe, 290, 340, 352–354, 358, 362–36 5 Coast, 42 4 Makin, 70n, 242n, 710–711, 744–74 5 Marine Fleet Air, West Coast, 26, 414 , Malakal, 45 3 422, 442, 60 6 Malaria, 740, 757, 76 7 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 25, 372n, 441 , Malaya, 11, 750, 76 8 469–470, 535–536, 550–552, 552n, 560 , Malnutrition, 452–453, 455, 459, 740–741, 754, 563–564, 566, 588, 599, 600, 606, 615–616 , 757, 766, 768–76 9 623–624, 629, 716–71 7 Maloelap, 455, 46 2 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, 25, 61, 75, 95 , Manchester, 64 7 365, 373, 373n, 431, 441, 469-470, 566 , Manchu Dynasty, 521–522, 524, 54 0 716, 786 Manchuria, 20, 41, 43–45, 525–526, 530–531 , 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, 25–26, 441, 470 533, 537, 541, 561, 569–572, 574, 579, 584 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, 25–26, 225n , 585, 590, 594–596, 602, 604, 608, 628, 631 230n, 424, 424n, 441, 457, 47 6 633, 636, 639, 649, 750, 769, 78 3 9th Marine Aircraft Wing, 26, 422–423 , Manila, 403, 436, 438, 489n, 497, 533, 743–744 , 44 2 768–769, 773, 775n, 776–778, 783, 786 Marine Carrier Groups, Aircraft, FMF- Manila Bay, 741, 77 5 Pac, 414-415, 42 4 Manila Bay, 715n Marine Aircraft Group 11, 71 6 Manna, 139–142, 152, 15 4 Marine Aircraft Group 12, 566, 588, 595 , Manus, 25, 70n, 9 5 59 9 Mao Tse-tung, 526–527, 532, 609, 632–634, 636 , Marine Aircraft Group 14, 37 1 639, 643–644, 708 Marine Aircraft Group 15, 47 0 Maps and Chart s Marine Aircraft Group 21, 509n, 545, 71 6 American, 61, 78–79, 96, 103, 120n, 332n , Marine Aircraft Group 22, 230, 230n, 370 – 625, 71 9 371, 495, 509 Japanese, 79, 154, 191, 199, 68 6 Marine Aircraft Group 24, 470, 566, 588 , Maquis, 746, 746n, 747. See also French guer- 595, 599, 606, 613, 615, 621, 624, 642 rilla activities. Marine Aircraft Group 25, 25, 535, 558 , Marcus Island, 452–453, 464 566, 576, 583, 595, 605

918 INDE X

Marine Units—Continued Marine Units—Continue d Air—Continue d Air—Continue d Marine Aircraft Group 31, 95, 95n, 136 , VMF-123, 180, 416, 42 1 177, 181, 229, 469-470, 488, 490, 495 , VMF-124, 415-416, 418, 71 6 50 9 VMF-211, 566, 623-624, 630, 635, 642 , Marine Aircraft Group 32, 560-561, 564 , 737-738, 78 7 566, 576, 577, 60 5 VMF-213, 415, 417-41 8 Marine Aircraft Group 33, 93, 95, 136 , VMF-214, 371, 419, 421, 74 5 177, 373, 374n VMF-216, 416, 41 8 Marine Aircraft Group 43, 9 5 VMF-217, 416, 41 8 Marine Aircraft Group 62, 423 VMF-218, 371, 566, 624, 63 0 Marine Aircraft Service Group 48, 41 5 VMF-221, 180, 41 6 Marine Aircraft Service Group 51, 414 - VMF-222, 37 1 41 5 VMF-224, 9 5 Marine Base Defense Aircraft Group 48 , VMF-311, 95, 177 41 4 VMF-312, 95, 152, 154, 22 5 Marine Carrier Aircraft Group 1, 424 , VMF-314, 320n, 364n 426-427 VMF-322, 95, 152, 15 4 Marine Carrier Aircraft Group 2, 42 7 VMF-323, 95, 152, 224n, 364n, 37 4 Marine Carrier Aircraft Group 3, 426, 42 8 VMF-351, 42 8 Marine Carrier Aircraft Group 4, 424, VMF-422, 230n 427-42 8 VMF-441, 95, 186, 264n, 48 8 Marine Carrier Aircraft Group 5, 42 9 VMF-451, 180, 416, 42 1 Marine Carrier Aircraft Group 6, 42 9 VMF-452, 419, 42 1 Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadro n VMF-511, 41 4 7, 64 2 VMF-512, 414 Marine Glider Group 71, 71 3 VMF-513, 41 4 AWSs, 61, 182, 226, 381, 413, 44 8 VMF-514, 41 4 AWS-1, 348 VMF(CVS)-112, 414 AWS-7, 95 VMF(CVS)-321, 429 AWS-8, 9 5 VMF(CVS)-351, 428 AWS-11, 38 1 VMF(CVS)-511, 427 HqSqn-1, 551, 55 8 VMF(CVS)-512, 427 HqSqn-2, 9 5 VMF(CVS)-513, 42 8 HqSqn-3, 2 5 VMF(N)-533, 225, 225n, 230n, 374, 566 , HqSqn-12, 599 62 1 HqSqn-22, 230 n VMF (N) -541, 566, 588, 59 9 HqSqn-24, 58 8 VMF(N)-542, 181, 374 HqSqn-71, 71 3 VMF(N)-543, 96, 181, 37 4 SMS-1, 560 VML-71, 71 3 SMS-22, 230n VMO-2, 376, 376n, 377n SMS-71, 713 VMO-3, 335, 376, 376n, 564, 585, 613, 627 VMB-612, 373, 373n VMO-6, 376, 376n, 564, 577-578, 606, 616 , VMB-621, 42 3 618, 62 1 VMB-622, 423 VMO-7, 89, 335, 37 7 VMB-623, 42 3 VMO-351, 414, 414n VMB-624, 423 VMR-152, 566, 576, 60 5 VMD-254, 577-57 8 VMR-153, 566, 576, 605-606, 673-624 , VMF-112, 180, 414, 42 1 629-630, 636, 63 2 VMF-113, 230n, 495 VMR-353, 509n VMF-115, 566, 608, 621 VMR-952, 509n

INDEX 919

Marine Units—Continue d Marine Units—Continue d Air—Continued Ground—Continue d VMSB—231, 71 6 Marine Supply Service, FMFPac, 39 1 VMSB—244, 560, 57 7 Marine Training and Replacement Com- VMSB—343, 577—578 mand, 441—44 2 VMTB-131, 230n, 331, 331n, 373—37 4 Service Command, FMFPac, 598, 636, 692 VMTB—132, 414 South Pacific Echelon, FMFPac, 39 1 VMTB—134, 560, 577, 599, 715, 715 n Troop Training Command, Amphibious VMTB—143, 41 4 Forces, Atlantic Fleet, 58 1 VMTB—232, 185, 226, 293, 304, 328, 331, I Marine Amphibious Corps, 660, 690, 707, 373—374 709, 71 4 VMTB—233, 41 4 III Amphibious Corps, 24—25, 27, 60, 65— VMTB-234, 41 4 68, 72, 79, 80—81, 83n, 86, 88, 90—91, 93 , VMTB-454, 41 4 95, 103, 103n, 112, 114—118, 126, 129 - VMTB(CVS)—132, 42 8 130, 132, 134-135, 155, 158—160, 160n , VMTB(CVS)—143, 32 7 167, 169, 174—175, 183—184, 188, 195— VMTB(CVS)—144, 42 9 197, 201n, 214, 216, 220, 235—236, 241 , VMTB(CVS)—233, 42 7 252, 266, 271, 273, 277—278, 281, 299— VMTB(CVS)—234, 42 8 300, 302, 302n, 303—305, 330, 345, 350 , VMTB(CVS)—454, 42 9 358, 362—363, 363n, 364-365, 374—376 , CASD—1, 427 382—383, 387, 388n, 391, 397, 39'7n, 398 , CASD—2, 427 408, 441, 449, 476n, 533—534, 534n, 535— CASD-3, 42 8 536, 542—548, 550-552, 553n, 555n, 561 , CASD—4, 428 563, 566—567, 569, 571—573, 575-576, 579, CASD—5, 429 579n, 581—583, 583n, 585—586, 591n, 592— CASD—6, 429 593, 596—598, 600—601, 604-605, 615 , Ground 648-649, 694, 72 5 Fleet Marine Force, 12n, 23—24, 27, 410, V Amphibious Corps, 24—25, 27, 104, 162n , 441—443, 447—448, 450, 464—468, 483, 550 , 398—399, 404, 408—409, 417, 441, 449 , 592, 598, 605, 635, 655—656, 665—667 , 492-493, 493n, 496, 499-500, 500n, 501 - 677, 679—680, 682—683, 687, 698, 700, 705 , 502, 505, 505n, 506—508, 508n, 509, 511 — 707, 712, 729 512, 518, 544, 704—705, 707, 72 1 Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet, 65 6 Department of the Pacific, 453—454, 565, III Corps Artillery, 68, 88—89, 90n, 117 , 123, 136n, 169, 181, 188—189, 199n , 61 8 5 Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, 448, 46 9 216n, 217—218, 249, 377, 382, 397, 53 Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 23-25, 74, III Corps Evacuation Hospital No . 2, 95 n 83, 95, 348, 397, 397n, 398—399, 413, 439 , II Corps Evacuation Hospital No . 3 , 441, 443—444, 444n, 461, 465—466, 468- 20 8 469, 475—476, 489—490, 506, 571, 579, III Corps Service Group, 16 0 598, 605, 620, 637, 647-649, 692, 71 4 III Corps Shore Brigade, 550, 553, 555 , Fleet Marine Force, San Diego Area, 69 9 56 7 Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific, 624 , 1st Marine Division, 24, 49, 60, 63, 66, 68 , 628—631, 635, 637—639, 642—644, 65 0 74, 79—80, 83n, 84n, 86, 86n, 87, 91, 93 , Marine Garrison Forces, 14th Naval Dis - 112, 114—116, 116n, 120—122, 125—126 , trict, 46 5 128, 128n, 130, 132, 141, 158, 172, 174 , Marine Garrison Forces, Pacific, 464n , 183, 194-195, 197—199, 201n, 202, 206— 465—466, 466n, 61 8 207, 210—214, 216, 216n, 218, 218n, 221— Marine Forces, China, 534, 597, 604, 606 , 222, 230—232, 234—235, 238—239, 244 , 616-617, 62 1 247, 256, 262-263, 266, 271—273, 277 , Marine Forces, Tsingtao, 606, 61 6 281—284, 286, 293, 295, 297, 299, 304 , Marine Group, Peiping, 567, 599, 612, 617 314, 325, 328, 328n, 330, 332, 344, 346—

920 INDEX

Marine Units-Continue d Marine Units-Continue d Ground-Continued Ground-Continue d 1st Marine Division-Continued 1st Marines, 68, 91, 116, 130, 195, 199 , 347, 351, 353, 354n, 356, 358, 361, 363, 201-204, 209, 212, 214, 216-218, 218n , 376-377, 380, 383-384, 385n, 386, 389, 220, 220n, 221, 231, 234-235, 239, 257 , 391, 397, 441, 468, 517n, 535, 547, 550- 262, 264, 266, 269, 277, 282, 287, 325- 553, 557, 557n, 560, 564, 567-568, 574- 326, 329, 331-332, 340-343, 368, 388n , 575, 575n, 583-585, 588-589, 596, 599- 550, 556, 558, 567-568, 583, 599, 608 , 600, 605-606, 613-617, 621-625, 627, 612, 617, 621-622, 624, 635, 637, 643 , 631, 635, 642-643, 650, 656, 659-660, 68 3 662-663, 680-682, 686, 686n, 691, 693, 2d Marines, 496, 506-507, 512-514, 51 7 695-696, 701, 703, 706, 708-709, 716, 3d Marines, 635, 637, 640, 642-645, 647 , 718, 720, 723, 725, 72 7 71 1 2d Marine Division, 23-24, 62, 65, 67, 72 , 4th Marines, 68, 88, 112, 115, 117-118, 120 , 74, 84, 88-90, 95, 107, 109, 195-196, 347 - 120n, 126, 129-130, 132, 134-135, 138, 348, 378n, 397, 408-409, 441, 492-493, 141-142, 144, 146, 148-152, 154, 174 , 496, 500-501, 505n, 506-507, 509, 511 - 235, 252-254, 254n, 256n, 271, 273, 275 - 512, 514, 517, 517n, 616, 680, 682 276, 280, 283, 302, 305, 307-308, 310 - 3d Marine Division, 23-24, 398, 408-409, 312, 314-316, 318, 320-321, 356, 358 , 441, 456, 460, 468, 492, 493n, 535, 670 , 360, 360n, 361, 363, 438, 441, 476, 478 , 698, 705-706, 711, 719 478n, 479, 483, 485, 487-488, 489n, 490 , 4th Marine Division, 24, 398, 441, 468, 535 , 543, 565, 593, 598, 606, 608, 616, 618 , 699, 705, 721, 729 711-712, 731, 733-734, 740-741, 744 , 5th Marine Division, 24, 397n, 398, 408- 765, 768, 770, 77 8 409, 4.41, 492-493, 495-497, 499-502 , 5th Marines, 68, 112, 116-117, 125, 128 , 505, 505n, 506, 509, 511, 512n, 705, 70 7 130, 173, 199, 202-203, 211-212, 214 , 6th Marine Division, 24, 27, 60, 66, 68, 74 , 216, 218, 218n, 219-220, 220n, 221, 234 , 79, 79n, 83n, 88, 93, 101, 114-115, 117- 239, 253, 257, 259-260, 262, 264, 266, 118, 120, 126, 128-130, 132, 134, 134n , 277, 282, 284, 286-287, 296-297, 300, 135-136, 138, 138n, 141-142, 149, 151 , 303-304, 326, 326n, 344, 354, 354n, 358 , 154-155, 158, 160, 166, 171-173, 173n, 388n, 550, 558, 567, 599, 617, 622, 624 , 174, 176n, 183, 197, 214, 216, 218, 222, 627, 70 9 223n, 230-231, 233-235, 244, 247, 249 - 6th Marines, 272, 496, 505n, 506, 512 252, 254, 256, 271, 275-276, 280, 284 , 7th Marines, 68, 112, 115-117, 120n, 125 - 296-297, 299-300, 302, 302n, 303-304 , 127, 130, 134, 171, 173-174, 176, 203 , 307-308, 310-311, 318, 320, 323-325 , 210, 212, 214n, 218, 218n, 220, 220n, 221 , 330, 344-346, 356, 357n, 360, 361n, 363 , 231-233, 235-236, 239, 259n, 261, 265n, 368, 376, 380, 384, 385n, 387, 389, 391 , 299, 304, 308, 311, 325-326, 329-333 , 397, 438, 441, 476, 487, 487n, 488-490, 337, 339-344, 347, 351n, 353, 362-363 , 514, 535, 545, 547, 552, 558-561, 563- 388n, 548, 553, 556, 556n, 575-576, 586 , 565, 567-568, 575, 578, 580-581, 584, 592 , 588, 590-591, 600, 610, 617, 621, 647, 696 596, 598-600, 616, 685, 695, 712, 725 8th Marines, 90, 347-348, 353, 353n, 354 , 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, 88, 468- 354n, 358, 360-363, 388n, 397, 506-507 , 469, 469n, 487n, 624, 631, 638-639, 642 , 512, 514, 51 7 71 2 9th Marines, 639-642, 644, 71 1 3d Marine Brigade, 599, 605-606, 616, 71 0 10th Marines, 506, 512, 514 1st Field Service Command, 74 11th Marines, 87, 89, 90n, 116-118, 123 , 2d Field Service Command, 74 125, 189, 189n, 194-195, 195n, 199, 199n, Fleet Landing Force, 438-439, 476 , 481 , 216, 330, 333, 376n, 383, 385n, 550, 556- 485, 487-488 557, 599, 613, 617, 621

INDEX 921

Marine Units-Continued Marine Units-Continue d Ground-Continued Ground-Continued 12th Marines, 89 Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion s 13th Marines, 495, 505, 511-512 2d, 95n, 183, 69 0 5th, 183, 69 0 15th Marines, 88-89, 90n, 117, 136, 149- 8th, 183-184, 69 0 150, 216, 308, 563 9th, 95n, 183, 69 0 21st Marines, 456-457, 460, 468 16th, 18 3 22d Marines, 68, 88, 112, 115, 117-118, Armored Amphibian Battalions 126, 129, 129n, 132, 134, 138, 172, 173n, 1st, 136, 149, 39 7 174, 218-219, 222, 230-231, 234-235, 237, 3d, 21 0 245, 247-249, 252-253, 253n, 254, 276, Barrage Balloon Squadrons 283-284, 296, 299, 304, 311, 314-315, 1st, 71 2 318, 320-321, 323, 344-346, 353, 356, 2d, 712 360, 363n, 388n, 563, 565, 598 3d, 71 2 24th Marines, 699 5th, 71 2 6th, 71 26th Marines, 454, 495, 505, 505n, 506 2 Corps Artillery Battalion s 27th Marines, 495, 512, 683 1st 155mm Howitzer, 188, 21 6 28th Marines, 495, 501, 505-506, 512 3d 155mm Howitzer, 89, 188, 216, 216 n 29th Marines, 68, 91, 115, 117, 129-130, 6th 155mm Howitzer, 89, 188, 21 6 134-135, 138, 138n, 139-142, 144, 146, 7th 155mm Gun, 136n, 149, 21 6 149, 151, 154, 174, 235, 237-238, 247, 249, 8th 155mm Gun, 89, 188, 21 6 251-252, 280, 283-284, 296, 302, 307, 9th 155mm Gun, 188, 21 6 309-310, 312, 314, 318, 320-321, 323, Defense Battalion s 323n, 361, 363, 559-560, 563, 565, 580 1st, 73 7 1st Marine Parachute Regiment, 706 3d, 68 8 6th, 690 1st Marine Raider Regiment, 710-711 51st, 688-689 2d Marine Raider Regiment (Provisional), 52d, 68 8 711, 714 Divisional Artillery Battalions 7th Service Regiment, 550-551, 567, 598, 1/11, 123, 189, 189n, 218n, 385n, 599 , 606, 616, 624-625, 627-628, 630-631 612-61 3 4th Base Depot, 74, 391 1/15, 172, 478 n 2/11, 189, 194, 216n, 218n, 599, 612 , 7th Field Depot, 95n 638, 64 2 5th Field Service Depot, 478 2/15, 144, 57 6 1st Provisional Antiaircraft Artillery 3/10, 50 6 Group, 83-84, 274, 456 3/11, 189, 194, 318n, 600, 62 1 2d Provisional Antiaircraft Artillery 3/12, 61 6 Group, 456 4/11, 189, 62 1 2d Provisional Combat Service Group 4/15, 173, 254n, 598 (Light), 640, 642-64 3 Engineer Battalion s 2d Provisional Field Artillery Group, 89 , 1st Separate, 95n, 598, 60 6 136, 136n, 216, 216 n 6th, 120, 128, 135, 139, 172, 219, 222 - Amphibian Tractor Battalions 223, 223n, 230, 273, 275, 283, 478n 4th, 302n, 47 8 Headquarters Battalion s 9th, 302n FMFPac, 628 Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion FMFWesPac, 64 3 (FMF), 67, 104, 106n, 162, 164, 167, 173 , HQMC, 67 8 303, 378n, 381, 388 IIIAC, 605-60 6

922 INDEX

Marine Units—Continued Marine Units—Continued Ground—Continue d Ground—Continue d Infantry Battalion s Infantry Battalions—Continued 1st Separate, 708, 741 2/5, 128, 128n, 199, 202, 204, 216-217, 1/1, 117, 125, 128, 198, 201—203, 203n , 221, 232, 257, 259—262, 264, 297, 303 — 209—211, 214n, 219-220, 220n, 222 , 304, 326-327, 342, 344-345, 358, 361 - 222n, 238—239, 262, 265, 287, 295, 325 — 364, 567, 599, 708—709 326, 328, 331, 333, 335, 342, 621, 624 , 2/6, 512, 51 6 628 2/7, 116, 120n, 127, 130, 171, 203, 210 , 1/2, 507 214, 214n, 221, 232, 234, 236, 238 , 1/3, 460-461, 468, 643—644, 647, 71 8 239n, 262, 299, 329-330, 332n, 337 , 1/4, 120, 126, 132, 134, 144-146, 148- 339-345, 548, 553, 555, 590-591, 600 , 152, 154, 174, 254, 271, 273, 275—276 , 61 0 280, 283, 305—306, 309, 311, 314, 316 , 2/8, 348, 353, 358 318, 320, 323, 361, 363, 483, 485, 487 , 2/21, 456-457, 460, 46 8 489, 598, 71 1 2/22, 115, 129, 141, 234-235, 237-238 , 1/5, 112, 116, 128, 204, 217, 220—221 , 245, 247, 276, 280, 280n, 283-284, 296 , 257, 264-265, 282, 284, 286-287, 297 , 314-316, 318, 356, 363, 579, 59 8 299, 303-304, 353-354, 358, 361-363 , 2/26, 454, 506, 707 599, 617, 619, 625, 627-628, 708 2/27, 502—503, 51 2 1/6, 51 4 2/28, 49 5 1/7, 120n, 127, 130, 171, 203, 220n, 221 , 2/29, 138-140, 146, 152, 154, 245, 247 , 232-234, 236, 238, 239n, 259—262, 332 — 249-252, 252n, 283, 307, 309-310, 312, 333, 337, 339-340, 343—344, 381, 548, 320, 323, 578, 59 8 552, 556, 556n, 570, 600, 610, 621, 647 , 3/1, 125, 130, 173n, 174, 198, 201-202, 648, 70 9 204, 212, 216-217, 219, 222, 231, 234 - 1/8, 348, 353, 507 235, 239, 257, 262-263, 265-266, 281 1/9, 644 282, 286-287, 293, 325-328, 331, 342, 1/22, 115, 129, 140, 146, 149-152, 154 , 723 173, 173n, 174-175, 218-219, 222, 222n , 3/2, 109, 496, 507 223, 231, 233, 235, 245, 247-249, 251 , 3/3, 68 6 283—284, 296, 308, 315, 318, 330, 345 — 3/4, 112, 118, 120, 126, 134-135, 141- 347 142, 144—146, 149-152, 154, 174—175 , 1/26, 512n 252-254, 254n, 256, 271, 273, 275, 280 , 1/27, 495, 502, 505 283, 307—309, 311-312, 314-315, 318 , 320—321, 323, 356, 360-361, 363, 464 , 1/29, 88, 115, 117-118, 126, 129, 129n, 483, 485, 487-489, 598, 616, 618, 624 , 138-140, 142, 146, 151, 238, 247-250 , 629, 635, 711, 77 5 275—276, 280n, 283—284, 296, 323 , 3/5, 116, 128, 164, 172, 199, 202, 204, 323n, 360—361, 363, 575-576, 588, 599 218, 220, 220n, 221, 232, 252, 257, 273 , 2d Separate, 70 9 275, 284, 299, 303-305, 342, 342n, 345 , 2/1, 117, 125, 128, 174, 203—204, 210 , 358, 361-362, 364, 567 216—217, 219, 231, 234—235, 239, 257 , 3/6, 514 263, 263n, 264-265, 281—282, 295, 328 , 3/7, 116, 127, 127n, 128, 130, 171, 173 , 330—333, 335, 341-342, 599, 624, 629 , 203, 212, 220, 220n, 221, 232, 236, 631, 63 5 260-262, 299, 327n, 328-332, 339, 344- 2/2, 50 7 347, 358, 548, 553, 555, 555n, 590, 70 8 2/4, 68, 115, 132, 134-135, 144—145, 148— 3/8, 348, 353, 35 8 152, 154, 174, 247, 252—253, 256, 271 , 3/22, 129, 140, 142, 144, 146, 154, 174- 273, 275—276, 280, 283, 302, 305—307, 175, 218-219, 222, 233-234, 237, 245 , 312, 315, 318, 320, 323, 360—361, 363, 247—249, 275, 280, 284, 296, 311, 314 - 483-484, 489, 598, 711 316, 318, 320, 345-346, 598

INDEX 92 3

Marine Units-Continue d Marine Units-Continue d Ground-Continued Ground-Continued Infantry Battalions-Continued 3d DUKW Company, 55 1 3/24, 698 Joint Assault Signal Companies, 25, 375, 3/26, 495, 512n 375n, 383, 383n, 657 3/28, 502 Medical companies, 467, 598-599, 692, 72 9 3/29, 138-142, 144-146, 148-150, 152, 11th Military Police Company (Provi- 154, 234-235, 238, 245, 247-250, 283- sional), 453 284, 307, 309-310, 312, 323, 323n Reconnaissance Companie s 7th Separate, 441 1st, 125, 127, 210, 304, 329, 624, 69 4 Medical Battalions, 623-624, 728 6th, 118, 132, 134, 136n, 140, 173, 247 , 3d, 616 272, 275-276, 278, 299, 305, 307, 323 , 6th, 478n, 56 3 360, 388n, 56 3 Military Police Battalions 3d Island Base Headquarters, 453 1st, 550 Landing Force Air Support Control Unit s 1st Provisional, 95n LFASCU-1, 95n, 96, 181, 375, 37 8 5th Provisional, 464 LFASCU-2, 96, 193, 37 5 8th Provisional, 46 4 LFASCU-3, 96, 181, 37 5 Motor Transport Battalions Marine Air Base, Iwakuni, 509 n 6th, 283n, 478n Marine Air Base, Omura, 509, 517n 11th, 550, 598 Marine Barracks Parachute Battalions Guam, 465, 466 n 1st, 698, 705, 708 Kwajalein, 464n, 466n 2d, 700, 705-706 Marcus, 45 3 3d, 706 New River, N . C., 68 0 4th, 70 6 Olongapo, 74 1 Pioneer Battalions Peiping, 547n 1st, 548, 552, 567, 624, 628, 665 Peleliu, 466n 5th, 500 Saipan, 464, 46 6 6th, 4'78n Sangley Point, Philippine Islands, 46 4 Raider Battalions Sumay, Guam, 734 1st, 698, 700, 707n, 708-710 Naval Air Facility, Honolulu, T . H., 466n 2d, 698, 707, 709-711, 744 Naval Air Station s 3d, 710-711 Barber's Point, Oahu, 466n 4th, 71 0 Ford Island, Pearl Harbor, 466 n n 2d Replacement Battalion, 682 Johnston Island, 466 Kahului, Maui, 466n Replacement Drafts Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, 466 n 55th, 345n Naval Ammunition Depot, Oahu, 466 n 57th, 281 Naval Base, Pearl Harbor, 465, 466 n 59th, 281 Naval Operating Base s 62d, 345n Midway Island, 466n 63d, 281 Okinawa, 466 n 12th Service Battalion, 598, 606, 616, 628, Subic Bay, P . I ., 466n 635, 640 Marine Camp, Ainoura, 50 6 Tank Battalions Marine Corps Air Facility, St. Thomas, V .I., 1st, 114, 195, 198, 201, 201n, 259-260, 44 8 339, 621, 693, 703, 703n, 722 Marine Corps Air Stations, 448, 465, 651 5th, 495, 503, 50 6 Cherry Point, N .C., 26, 442, 469-470, 642 , 6th, 114, 126, 222n, 248, 253, 306, 478n 68 1 6th Assault Signal Company, 478n Eagle Mountain Lake, Texas, 71 3

924 INDE X

Marine Corps Air Stations—Continued McBridge, BGen Robert B ., Jr., 50 6 El Centro, Calif ., 26, 421, 429n, 68 1 McCain, VAdm John S ., 96-9 7 El Toro, Calif ., 429n, 68 1 McCaulley, Maj Edwin F ., 733, 734 n Miramar, Calif ., 442 McGovern, Commo John B ., 62 Mojave, Calif ., 26, 424, 429n, 68 1 McLish, LtCol Ernest E ., 77 1 Santa Barbara, Calif ., 415, 424, 681 McMillin, Capt George J ., 73 4 Marine Corps Base Depot, Norfolk, Va ., 441 McMorris, VAdm Charles H ., 373 n Marine Detachments McQueen, Col John C., 323 Commander, Naval Forces, Philippines, 464, Medal of Honor, 371, 707, 712, 716, 729-730, 466n 745 . See also Awards and Decorations . Fita-Fita Guard, Samoa, 466n Medeera, 290, 352, 356-357, 362-363, 36 8 Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, 444n, 466 n Medical Activitie s Truk, 466n American, 23-25, 40, 73, 77, 85, 123, 141 , USS Houston, 739-740, '767-76 8 149n, 150, 160n, 175, 208, 231, 256, 261, USS Missouri, 43 9 271, 273, 297, 304, 309n, 325, 332, 335, 345 , Marine Detachments (Provisional ) 353, 369, 377, 511, 535, 550, 556, 580, 663 , Commander, Philippine Sea Frontier, 444n , 689, 691, 726-729, 737, 76 9 464 Japanese, 49, 290, 292, 363, 556n, 76 0 Eniwetok, 444n, 459, 464 n Medina, 77 1 Peleliu, 454, 46 4 Megee, Col Vernon E ., 62, 181, 375, 375n, 376, Samar, 44n, 464 415, 417 ; Gen, 193 n Truk, 45 7 Meka, 298 Marcus Island, 466 n Meteorological data, 64 Wake, 459, 464n Metzger, BGen Louis, 476n, 481n, 484n, 485n Marine's Hymn, 557, 75 9 Mezado, 339, 344, 345n, 346 Marine Legation Guard, Tientsin, 73 1 Mezado Ridge, 289, 338, 341-343, 345, 351, 353 , Marine Corp Recruit Depot s 356, 388n Parris Island, S . C., 442, 448, 682 Micronesia, 65 4 San Diego, Calif ., 442, 445, 680, 682 Midway, 26, 470, 690, 709, 716, 763 Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va ., 441, 447 , Military government, 58, 76-77, 92, 121-122 , 467, 655, 689, 699-700, 72 4 348, 378-380, 456, 497-498, 507n . See also Marine ships detachments, 23, 439, 447-448 , Civil affairs . 467, 489, 496, 647, 73 9 Military Police, 77, 220n, 464, 500, 565, 663, Marshall, Maj . David E ., 417 692. See also Army units ; Marine Units. Marshall, Gen George C., lln, 402, 432, 508 ; Mille Atoll, 450, 452, 45 5 General of the Army, 573-574, 585, 593-594 , Miller, LtCol John C ., Jr., 116, 172 596-598, 600-606, 608, 614, 616, 618-620, 622 , Miller, Maj Lyle H., 65 4 712 ; Secretary of State, 627n, 632 Millington, LtCol William A ., 415-417 ; BGen , Marshalls, 4, 26, 95, 240, 450, 452, 654, 673 , 416 n 690, 704n, 724, 746 Milne Bay, 70n Marshalls-Gilberts Area, 449-450, 463 Minamata, 40 6 Marshalls Operations, 4n Minami, 18 8 Mason, Col Arthur T ., 217, 217n, 219, 221 , Minami Daito, 9 7 262-263, 282, 282n, 295, 327, 327n, 32 8 Minami-Uebaru foothills, 206 Massachusetts, 479n Minatoga, 51n, 66, 109, 20 5 Matanikau River, 70 9 Minatoga beaches, 51, 54-55, 98, 100, 107, 109 , Matsuzaki, 408 11 2 Maui, 24, 398, 441, 468, 493, 53 5 Mindanao, 4, 6, 9, lln, 441, 535-536, 769, 771- McAlister, LtCol Francis M ., 160n 772 McAlister, lstLt John A., 758-75 9 Mindoro, 773 McBrayer, lstLt James D ., 758-759 Ming Dynasty, 32

INDEX 925

Minna Shima, 388 n Munda, 71 8 Missouri, 438-439, 452, 479, 479n, 483—484 , Munich, 74 9 488, 78 1 Munn, Col John C ., 95, 181, 488 Mitchell, MajGen Ralph J ., 25, 372n, 41 2 Murray, VAdm George D ., 450, 45 4 Mitscher, VAdm Marc A ., 16, 60, 97—98, 415 — Murray, LtCol James C ., Jr., 117, 220 n 419 Myers, Maj Thomas J ., 115, 129, 150, 245 , Mitsushima, 76 5 245n, 699 Miura Peninsula, 438—439, 48 1 Miyagusuku, 198, 201—203 Nagahama, 11 8 n Miyake, Maj Tadao, 4 1 Naganna Shima, 106 Miyako Jima, 45, 197, 378, 39 8 Nagano, MajGen Eiji, 542, 565, 581n, 607, 608 n Miyakonojo, 507 Nagaru Maru, 74 4 Miyazaki, 408, 493n, 501, 507n, 514 Nagasaki, 428, 433, 436, 492—493, 493n, 495 — Miyazaki Prefecture, 500, 507, 51 7 496, 500—501, 503, 506-507, 514, 78 6 Mizell, LtCol Maxwell H ., 602 Nagasaki Prefecture, 500, 505—506 Moen, 455 Nagato, 483, 48 5 Moji, 499, 502, 77 8 Nago, 37, 50, 135, 138—139, 160, 17 3 Mongolia, 53 7 Nago Wan, 136, 142, 172, 184, 24 1 Monterey, 479 n Nagoya, 18, 98, 41 8 n Montford Point, N . C., 689 Nagusuku, 360 Montgomery, Col Edward A ., 371 Naha, 34, 36-39, 46, 50, 75, 96, 106n, 176n, 205 , 207, 232—236, 248, 251, 271, 271n, 274, 276 , Moore, Sgt Balthazar, 75 7 Moore, RAdm Charles J ., 662 278, 280, 284, 292, 296, 299, 305, 307, 309, 38 1 Moore, MajGen James T ., 25, 228, 376, 534 , Naha Canal, 302, 388 n 552n Naha City Command, 283n Moosburg, 749 Naha Estuary, 252, 32 3 Moreau, LtCol Jean W ., 115, 126, 129, 139 , Naha Harbor, 299, 300, 307, 312, 323 146, 248 Naha-Yonabaru highway, 270, 300, 36 8 Moran, LtCol Sherwood F ., 544n Naha-Yonabaru valley, 54, 205, 270, 274, 293n, Mori, VAdm Kunizo, 46 1 298 Morotai, 4, 40, 45 2 Naiki, Lt Hisakichi, 74 5 Mortlake, 45 5 Nakadomori, 126, 129n, 134, 13 6 Moscow, 431 n Nakagusuku Wan, 51, 75, 81, 128, 162, 166 , Motobu Peninsula, 34, 46, 50, 55, 69, 132, 135— 241, 27 0 136, 138-140, 142, 144, 152, 154—155, 166 , Nakama, 132, 188, 218n, 220 n 169, 171-173, 173n, 174—175, 184, 379—380 , Nakama Valley, 35 1 384, 397, 551, 725 Nakanishi, 198, 20 2 Motor transport Nakaoshi, 136, 138, 172—17 3 American, 25, 77, 84n, 123, 159—160, 392 , Nakasoni, 13 9 467, 500, 576, 599, 623—624, 643, 664, 667 , Namoluk, 45 5 692—693, 695 . See also Army units ; Namur, 9 5 Marine units ; Vehicles . Nanashino, 4 3 Japanese, 4 4 Nanking, 526—527, 533, 541, 609, 623n, 629—632 , Moulmein, 766 640, 642, 644—645, 758—75 9 Mou Ting Fang, Gen, 56 8 Nansei Shoto, 18, 31, 34, 37, 39, 39n, 56, 5 8 Mt. McKinley, 493 Nan Yuan Field, 539, 547, 566, 588, 59 9 Mugikura, LtGen Shunsaburo, 45 4 Naoetsu, 78 5 Mukden, 439, 530, 572, 584, 636, 783 Napalm, 26, 148, 154, 167, 201, 218, 260, 263 , Mukue Gawa, 331—332, 332n, 33 3 364n, 374, 417, 703—704, 704n Mulcahy, MajGen Francis P., 25, 60—61, 69, 75, Napunja, 127, 13 0 95, 176, 180—181, 185, 372, 372n Narashido, 13 8 Muncie, LtCol John D ., 117n Nasipit, 772

926 INDE X

Nationalist China, 528, 531-532, 648—649 . Se e Navy Units—Continued also Chinese Central Government . Fleet Air Wing 1, 373, 373n, 639, 64 3 National Security Act of 1947, . 46 6 Transport Divisions, 93, 478, 550-551, 558 , Natives, 121, 173, 348, 361, 378n. See also 560 Chamorros ; Okinawans . Transport Division 60, 47 8 Nauru, 462, 45 5 Amphibious Group 2, 704 Amphibious Group 7, 55 0 Naval Air Base, Marcus, 45 3 Fleet Flagship Group, 43 8 Group Pacific 13, 550, 556, 567, 62 8 Air Station, Lakehurst, N.J., 705 blockades, 20, 32, 81, 400—402, 433, 763 n Mine Group One, 9 8 Acorn 52, 45 6 Forces, Ryukyus, 62 Destroyer Squadron 52, 9 8 gunfire, 32, 39, 55, 57, 60, 63, 65—67, 87, 90— Naval Construction Battalions (Seabees) , 91, 98—100, 102—103, 103n, 104, 106, 109 , 32n, 72, 158, 166, 176, 454, 535, 556, 692 , 111—112, 135—136, 140, 144—147, 152, 152n, 155, 164, 167, 176, 190, 192—193, 202, 211 , 692n, 694 29th, 45 6 213, 216, 218, 220, 222, 231—232, 238, 242 , 32d, 59 9 245, 247, 259—260, 265, 274, 277—278, 296 , 8 305, 311, 326, 341, 343—345, 348, 352, 369 , 58th, 12 96th, 599, 60 6 374, 375n, 377, 382—384, 390, 417, 461 , Transport Squadrons, 90, 93, 493, 495, 56 3 478n, 483, 561, 635, 645, 666, 669—670, 672— 15, 9 5 674, 717, 721, 774 17, 551—552, 555, 56 1 Occupation Force, 53 5 24, 560—56 1 Operating Base, Ryukyus, 378 VC—7, 715n Navy Cross, 707, 729-730, 747n . See also Underwater Demolition Flotilla, 99 Awards and Decorations . Underwater demolition teams, 99, 102, 102n , Navy Department, 60 5 104, 106, 164, 167, 65 7 Annex, 67 8 Group Able, 99—100 Navy Units . See also Task Organizations . Group Baker, 99—10 0 Civil Engineer Corps, 69 1 Nazis, 218, 589, 74 9 Transportation Service, 44 8 Negro Marines, 68 8 Asiatic Fleet, 54 0 Nelson, Capt Albin F ., 603 Atlantic Fleet, 664 Nemoto, LtGen Hiroshi, 54 2 Pacific Fleet, 448 Neuffer, Maj Robert P ., 248, 283n Third Fleet, 229n, 280, 404, 404n, 406—407 , Neuse River, N .C ., 680 409, 415—416, 422, 431, 438, 475—476, 478 — New Britain, 4, 87, 665, 686, 696, 716, 72 0 479, 483—484, 488, 781, 786 operation, 8 6 Fifth Fleet, 16, 57, 60, 64, 114n, 280, 354n , New Caledonia, 65, 71 7 404, 404n, 406—407, 416, 419, 421, 428, 490, New Delhi, 757 492, 78 6 New Georgia, 70n, 88, 410, 489n, 706, 711, 71 9 Seventh Fleet, 533—534, 544, 561, 565, 569, Occupation Force, 71 1 574, 580, 582, 604, 606-607, 614n, 616 , operation, 700, 710, 71 8 623n, 628, 67 3 New Guinea, 4, 659n, 76 3 Support Aircraft, Pacific Fleet, 67 1 New Hebrides, 25, 86, 95 Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, 708 n Amphibious Force, South Pacific, 660 New Ireland, 4, 659 Amphibious Support Force, 99 Newman, 560—56 1 Fleet Naval Landing Force, 48 3 New Navy Building, 67 8 Naval Forces, Western Pacific, 628, 634, 64 8 New Orleans, 277 Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, 20, 9 7 New Orleans, La ., 66 7 Battleship Division 7, 47 6 New River, N . C ., 680—682, 702, 705, 71 3 Carrier Division 27, 441 New York, 188, 277

INDEX 927

New York, N .Y., 76, 94, 421 Ocean, 455, 46 2 New Zealand, 86n, 87, 662—663, 706, 71 9 Oceanside, Calif., 680 Nicaragua, 645, 697—698, 70 8 OCTAGON Conference 9, 400—40 1 Night illumination, 136, 184, 209, 237, 254, 338, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 731, 746 — 590 747, 769 Niigata, 43 3 Ofuna, 74 5 Niland, Calif., 680 Ogasawara Gunto, 46 0 Nimitz, Adm Chester W ., 3n, 4, 6, 8—9, 9n, O'Halloran, LtCol James S ., 183—18 4 11, lln, 12—13, 31, 56—58, 62, 64—65, 76, 82 , Ohka, 186 n 195—196, 354n, 369, 372n, 373n, 399, 401 Oita, 493n, 500, 503, 507n, 51 4 402 ; FAdm, 97, 97n, 403, 403n, 411—414 , Occupation Force, 50 6 430, 436—437, 446, 475—476, 484, 484n, 487, Prefecture, 502, 506, 514, 51 7 533—534, 544, 660n, 707n . See also Com- Okamura, Gen Yasuji, 52 9 mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet ; Com- O'Keefe, lstLt Jerry J., 374 n mander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas . Okinawa, 9, 11—13, 18—19, 21—22, 25, 27, 31—32 , Nimmer, BGen David I ., 89, 102, 123, 216, 38 2 32n, 34, 36—39, 41, 43—46, 48, 56—58, 60—63 , Nishibaru, 19 4 63n, 64—65, 65n, 66—67, 70, 72—73, 75—78 , Nishikoku, 300, 303—30 4 78n, 80—82, 85, 85n, 87—100, 102—104, 106— Nishi Omote-Jima, 39n 107, 109, 117, 123n, 177, 179, 240, 390, 393 , Nitta Maru, 73 8 407, 410, 416, 418, 421, 427—430, 438, 441 , Nobeoka, 40 6 463, 470, 475—476, 484, 487n, 488, 495—496 , Noble, Maj Alfred H ., 655 ; BGen, 618, 62 4 509, 535, 545, 551—552, 558, 560—561, 566 , No Man's Valley, 34 0 576—577, 581, 591, 598, 621, 624, 648, 653 , Nomoi, 455 664—666, 670—675, 683, 685, 691, 694—695 , Norfolk, Va., 441, 517, 61 6 703, 703n, 705, 712, 714—715, 722—725, 783 , Normandy, 15, 60n, 65 3 786, 78 9 North Borneo, 402 agriculture, 36—3 8 North Carolina, 479 n beaches, 72, 80, 8 5 North China, 468, 490, 500, 521—522, 524, 527 , cities, 36—38, 8 7 532—537, 539—546, 550—552, 567—567, 571 — coast, 56, 66, 80, 12 5 572, 574—576, 578—579, 582—583, 588—589 , government, 32, 34, 3 8 592—593, 595, 597—598, 601—602, 604—605 , history, 32, 37—3 8 607—608, 615, 618, 621, 623, 627, 632, 637 — population, 36—37, 43, 53, 77, 87, 121—122, 640, 643, 648—649, 708, 732, 758, 783 141, 164, 172, 175, 251, 312, 50 8 Northeast China Command, 584—585, 58 8 tombs, 233, 262, 267, 273, 29 6 Northern Attack Force, 60, 93—95, 108, 166 . villages, 36—37, 8 7 See also Task Organizations. Okinawa Gunto, 34, 46, 79, 18 5 Northern Solomons, 666, 71 9 Oklahoma City, 479n Northern Tractor Flotilla, 93—9 4 Oldendorf, VAdm Jesse B ., 60n North Korea, 53 0 Olongapo, 77 6 Notogawa, 77 9 OLYMPIC Operation, 399, 402—404, 404n , 406—407, 408n, 409, 429, 429n, 430—432, Noumea, New Caledonia, 660, 686, 706, 708— 476, 502n, 508n, 68 710, 712 5 Omori, 78 1 Oahu, 25, 70, 83, 93, 95, 441, 62 1 Omura, 495, 500, 506, 509, 517, 517 n Obara, Capt Yoshio, 74 5 Omura airfield, 373, 42 8 Oberbayern, 749 Onaga, 206, 21 1 Oboe Hill, 266, 268—269 110 Meter Hill, 263, 263n, 264—265, 268—269 , Observers, 102, 159, 250, 704 281—28 2 Occupation forces, 463, 490, 510, 529n, 561, 58 2 Onna, 132, 134, 169 Truk & Central Caroline Islands, 457 Onna Take, 380

928 INDEX

Ono Yama, 302-303, 305, 307-308, 31 0 Pacific War, 3, 5, 11, 14, 449, 530, 653, 658 , Onslow Beach, N .C., 656 666–667, 670, 674, 676–677, 684, 690, 694 , Open Door Policy, 52 2 717, 723, '725, 730, 744 Operation Plan 712, 654 Pagan, 428, 45 5 Operation Spring-Em, 78 1 Pakanbaru, 76 8 Ora, 135, 138, 141, 17 4 Palaus, 6, 8, 16, 26, 87, 94, 96, 98, 159, 240 , Oradour-sur-Vayres, 74 7 240n, 449–450, 452n, 453-455, 505, 505n , Order of the British Empire, 747n. See als o 654, 690, 72 4 Awards and Decorations. Palau Occupation Unit, 45 0 Order of Battle Palawan, 772–774 American, 23, 71, 207, 478, 594, 608, 639 , Palmyra Island, 465 779, 695–696, 71 7 Pan American Airways, 459 Japanese, 18, 20, 44–47, 50–51, 53–54, 56 , Panamint, 9 1 68–69, 78–81, 90, 97, 107, 121, 125, 130– Parachute troops . See also Marine units . 131, 142, 148, 152, 191, 205, 213, 221, 230 , American, 692–694, 698, 705–707, 709, 71 1 250, 251n, 252, 266, 268, 274, 312, 530, 542– Japanese, 126 543, 675, 685 Parmelee, Col Perry 0 ., 6 1 Ordnance . See Supplies and equipment. Parris Island, S.C ., 680–681, 702, 712–713 . Se e Oroku also Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parri s airfield, 55, 66, 307–30 8 Island . landing, 302n, 303, 305, 31 4 Pasadena, 479 n Mura, 309, 309n, 310, 312, 314, 320–321, 32 3 Patrol s Peninsula, 34, 36, 46, 54-55, 66, 290, 292 , American, 99, 117, 122, 125–126, 129–130 , 299–300, 302–304, 307–308, 310, 312, 314 , 132, 134, 136, 141–142, 146, 149, 151, 154 , 320, 323–325, 330, 344, 350–351, 360, 388 n 171, 174–175, 175n, 192, 198, 201, 204n , Orote Peninsula, 734 219, 222, 233, 271, 273–274, 276, 278, 293 , Ortiz, Maj Peter J ., 746, 746n, 747, 747n, 74 9 298–299, 303, 315, 325, 332, 339–340, 362 , Oryoku Maru, 775–77 6 380–381, 500, 563, 567, 610, 612, 624, 68 6 Osaka, 8, 98, 512, 734, 736, 738n, 760, 765, 779 , Japanese, 128 785–786 Pavuvu, 24, 70, 74, 86–88, 93, 389, 39 7 Osumi, 34, 50 7 Paymaster Department, HQMC, 67 8 Ota, RAdm Minoru, 46, 54–55, 205, 207, 390 , Peale Island, 45 9 292, 297, 310, 312, 314, 316, 321, 33 0 Pearl Harbor, 6, 61n, 63, 66, 80, 92, 94, 96, 97n, Ouki, 188, 19 0 370, 372n, 398, 412, 418, 422, 427–428, 449, Outer Mongolia, 531 528, 577, 600, 605, 647, 658, 673–675, 679 , OVERLORD Operation, 60n 682, 691, 703n, 710, 716, 718, 744, 74 9 Owsley, Maj Roy, 43 9 Conference, 8, 1 2 Oyama, 206–207, 20 9 Peck, Maj DeWitt, 655 ; MajGen, 397n, 551 , Ozark, 47 8 555n, 556, 558n, 567n, 568, 568n, 575n , Ozato, 50, 332–333, 345 n 583n, 584, 584n, 586, 586n, 600, 606, 655n, Ozato Hills, 270, 272, 25 1 659, 660 n Peiping (Peking), 524–527, 532, 536, 539–540 , Pace, Maj Nat M ., 144, 172 ; LtCol, 144n 542–547, 547n, 548, 550, 556, 558, 558n, Pacific Islands, 444, 530, 576, 582, 698 566–568, 572, 575, 575n, 576, 579, 583 , Pacific Ocean, 3n, 7, 11, 13, 15–16, 23–25, 34 , 483n, 585, 588, 591, 594–594, 599–600, 602 – 60, 67, 70–71, 78, 93, 98-99, 188, 441, 443 , 604, 606–609, 612–613, 615, 617, 622, 624 , 475, 653–654, 657, 662, 665–667, 669, 672 , 627, 637, 639, 641, 649, 731–732, 760, 78 3 674–676, 679–680, 686, 691, 698, 702, 707, Peiping-Mukden Railroad, 541–542, 547–548, 713, 716, 78 8 567–568, 570, 574–575, 584–585, 588, 591 , Pacific Ocean Areas, 3n, 6, 60, 84n, 399, 441 , 609 452, 465 Peiping-Tientsin road, 558, 610, 613

INDEX 929

Peiping Union Medical College, 59 5 Portland, 45 4 Peitaiho, 556, 556n, 570, 576, 590, 599—600, 607 , Ports, 70, 72, 75, 406, 499, 540, 545, 553, 569 , 610, 617, 621, 62 8 59 7 Peleliu, 4, 40, 48, 87, 158—159, 242n, 450 , Portugese nationals, 503 453, 464, 505, 512n, 675, 683, 701, 704, 714 , Poshan, 58 2 722—723, 72 7 Post, BGen Elwyn D ., 35 3 Island Command, 452n, 453 Pots and Pans, 678—679, 700 operation, 4n, 5, 8, 63, 72, 86, 89, 232, 232n . See also Divi- sion of Plans and Policies, HQMC . Penglai, 577—57 8 Pentagon, 687 Potsdam, 43 2 Penzoll, LtCol August F ., Jr., 183 Potsdam Conference, 403, 433—43 4 People's Liberation Army, 609 Potsdam Declaration, 434, 436, 462 Pepper, LtCol Robert H ., 688 Powell, lstLt Robert J ., 125, 12 7 Percival, LtGen Arthur E ., 439 President Harrison, 73 1 Perry, Commo Matthew C ., 32, 46 1 Pressley, Col Orin K ., 602 Perth, 739—74 0 Preston, 140 Pescadores, 11, 416, 52 2 Price, MajGen Charles F . B ., 70 7 Pfeiffer, BGen Omar T ., 628, 631 ; MajGen, Princeton University, 9 2 660n, 667 n Prisoner of War Information Bureau, HQMC , Philadelphia, Pa ., 503 750 Philippine Islands, 4—5, 9, 9n, 11n, 12, 17—19 , 25, 41, 45—46, 70, 83—84, 91, 98, 129, 177 — Prisoners of Wa r 178, 178n, 223, 389, 392, 401—402, 407, 422 , Allied, 77—78, 122, 131, 310, 450, 452, 453n, — 429—430, 437, 463, 476, 493, 496, 670, 674 , 461, 492, 502, 518, 533, 566, 686, 731, 733 676, 712, 718, 733, 741, 744, 750, 763n, 734, 736, 736n, 737—738, 738n, 739, 739n , 765, 768—769, 771—773, 775, 778, 788 740—745, 749—755, 756n, 757—758, 760—761 , 9 Philippines operation, 57, 94, 476, 67 1 761n, 762, 764—781, '783, 785—78 Photographs, 78—80, 97, 138. See also Air Australian, 428, 76 3 activities ; Maps and charts . British, 484, 749, 763—764 Picardi, Maj Robert J., 456 Chinese, 49 9 Pickett, BGen Harry K., 46 5 Commonwealth, 78 3 Pingtu, 577—57 8 Corregidor, 742, 744, 769 Dutch, 763 Pioneers, 467, 551, 692, 692n, 694 . See also Filipinos, 770 Marine Units . Guam Marines, 736, 750, 760—762, 765, 779 Pistol Pete, 18 6 Indians, 453 Pittsburgh, 42 1 Indonesians, 76 0 Plannin g Javanese, 453 American, 3—9, 11—14, 21, 24, 31—32, 57, 61n , North China Marines, 731—733, 750—752, 76 0 63—65, 65n, 66, 68—71, 78, 81, 95—96, 100 , Wake prisoners, 737—738, 738n, 750, 78 5 102, 106—107, 114, 131, 158n, 164, 166 , Prisoner of War Camp s 177, 196—197, 244, 298, 338, 347, 399, 460 , American, 454 464, 492, 530, 534, 545, 654, 657, 662, 728 German, 756—75 7 Japanese, 21, 39, 50, 100, 103, 178, 206—107 , Marlag-Milag Nord, 74 7 188, 191, 19 7 Westertimke (Tarmstadt Oest), 747 Point Cruz, 709 Japanese, 175, 439, 484, 492, 503, 547, 734 , Point discharge system, 442, 591—592 . See also 737—739, 743—746, 748, 750, 753—754 , Demobilization . 756, 760, 763—767, 769—770, 773—774 , Political Consultative Conference, 573, 60 1 778—781, 783, 785, 787—78 8 Ponape, 455, 462 Bicycle Camp, 740, 763—76 4 Pontoon bridge, 310 . See also Bridges . Bilibid Prison, 743—744, 769, 775, 778 Port Arthur, 522 Cabanatuan #1, 744, 769

930 INDEX

Prisoner of War Camps—Continued Quartermaster Department, HQMC, 67 8 Japanese—Continued Quebec Conference, 9, 40 0 Cabanatuan #2, 74 4 Quincy, 479 n Cabanatuan #3, 744, 72 2 Qui Nhon, 2 0 Davao, 769–770, 77 5 Quonset huts, 591, 591 n Formosa, 49 9 715–716, 718, 78 1 Hirohata, 761–762, 774 Rabaul, 659n, 665, 676, 745, Radar, 61, 89, 99, 118, 140, 141n, 182–184, 186 , Hokkaido, 760, 78 5 345, , Karenko, 76 8 208, 223, 226, 228, 232, 274, 381, 424 657, 66 8 Kiangwan, 753–758, 76 0 Tokyo, 157, 43 4 Mukden, 769 Radio Radio towers, 284, 29 6 Omori Camp 8, 745, 784 Raider battalions, 660, 694, 698-699, 705, 707 - Osaka Camp 1, 760–762, 77 9 710, 710n, 711 . See also Marine units. Puerto Princesa, 77 2 Santo Tomas, 778 Railroads, 203, 231–232, 249, 259, 296, 300 , 522, 539, 541–542, 547–548, 551, 565–566 , Tarlac, 744 Woosung, 75 1 574, 577, 585-586, 588, 590–591, 599-600, 5 Kilometer, 760 602, 617, 649, 766, 768 Railway 25 Kilometer, 76 6 guards, 567–568, 575–576, 580, 582 584, 586, 588–591, 591n, 609, 614–618, 63 5 26 Kilometer, 76 6 - 30 Kilometer, 76 7 RAMPS (Recovered Allied Military Person 40 Kilometer, 76 6 nel), 484, 488, 490, 492, 496, 779, 781, 786, 789 . See also Prisoners of War . 100 Kilometer, 768 Prisoner of War Randolph, 479 n escapes, escapees, 731, 749, 752n, 755–756 , Rangoon, 766 758–759, 766, 770-771, 774, 77 9 Rations. See Supplies and Equipment. evacuation, 490, 78 6 Rawlings, VAdm Sir H . Bernard, 60, 100, 47 9 rescue, 427, 484n, 767, 779, 78 1 Reconnaissance activities, 80, 85, 100, 102, 104 , guards, 579, 648–649, 740, 757–759, 762, 765- 106, 118, 126, 130, 132, 135, 164, 201, 219 , 767, 769, 773, 775–776, 779, 787 234, 273, 280, 298, 329, 710 . See als o Japanese, 104, 121, 132, 296, 398, 323–324 , Patrols . 357, 357n, 360n, 361, 361n, 368–369, 676 , Reconnaissance unit s 788 American, 91, 126, 127n, 135, 140, 276, 299 , Propaganda, 107, 121, 256, 338, 357n, 54 3 302, 467, 505, 558, 628, 694. See also Arm y Prospective CG, Occupation Forces Truk & units ; Marine units . Central Carolines, 45 5 Japanese, 4 4 Prospective Island Commander, Truk, 45 5 Red Cross, 583, 583n, 753, 757, 772 . See als o Provisional Government of the French Re - International Red Cross. public, 43 9 Reef formations, 67, 234, 241 . See also Cora l Provost Marshal General of the Army, 75 0 Formations. Psychological warfare, 338, 357, 36 1 Rehearsals, 89, 90-91, 93, 389, 719 . See also Puerto Princesa, 741, 772–77 4 Training. Puget Sound, 42 9 Reifsnider, RAdm Lawrence F., 60, 91, 166, Puluwat, 45 5 348 ; VAdm, 152n Pusan, 76 0 Reinforcements Putnam, Maj Paul A., 738 ; BGen, 737 n American, 231, 271, 339, 364, 48 1 Pyle, Ernie, 169 n Japanese, 2 0 Rendova, 642–643 Quantico, Va ., 441, 446, 606, 655, 680-681, 689- Repatriation activities, 450, 452, 456, 461, 463 , 690, 699, 705, 712, 716, 723 . See als o 499–500, 502, 505, 512, 514, 517-518, 533 , Marine Corps Schools . 561, 565, 568, 571–572, 574, 576-577, 579–

INDEX 931

Repatriation activities-Continued Ross, LtCol Richard F ., Jr., 220n, 265, 295 , 582, 584-585, 593, 595-597, 600, 607-608, 326-327 648, 732-733, 734n, 775, 786 Rota, 428, 454-45 5 Replacements Roth, Maj Martin C ., 116 ; LtCol, 202n American, 24, 27, 85-86, 88, 90, 149n, 160, Rowell, MajGen Ross E ., 41 2 219, 237, 281-282, 345, 369, 389-390, 398, Royal Marines, 439, 479, 487, 749 . See als o 409, 450, 468, 511, 517n, 615, 635, 680, 682 - British forces. 684 Rubber pontoons, 30 7 Japanese, 20, 220 Rupertus, MajGen William H ., 720, 723, 723n Repose, 645 Russell Islands, 24, 74, 391, 412, 71 0 Republic of China, 434, 436, 439, 525-526, 594 . Russia . See Soviet Union ; Union of Soviet See also Chinese Central Government . Socialist Republics . Reusser, Capt Kenneth L ., 225 Russian Concession, 55 6 Revolutionary Army, 525-52 6 Russo-Japanese War, 41, 53 1 Rhone Valley, 74 6 Ryukyu Islands, 7, 9, lln, 12-13, 17, 21-22 , Richardson, LtGen Robert C., Jr., 354n 31-32, 34, 37-40, 57-58, 64, 76, 93, 96-99 , Rineer, Capt Francis D ., 220n 177-178, 225n, 280, 347, 371-372, 378 , Risler, Sgt Jack R ., 746-74 7 393, 402, 418, 430, 452, 462, 49 9 Rivers, 68, 219, 222, 235, 271, 273, 275n , Ryukyus Area Command, 369, 37 3 284, 299, 323, 329, 332, 539, 551, 599, 70 9 TAF, Ryukyus Command, 372-373 Rixey, Col Presley M ., 450, 460-462 ; BGen , 461n Sabo], LtCol Stephen V., 117, 173n, 263, 265 n Roads, 36, 72, 86n, 87, 122-123, 126, 129, 134- Sabotage, 172, 176, 559, 764-766 135, 139, 142, 144, 149n, 155, 158, 160 , Saddle & Parker Island groups, 42 8 169, 171, 203, 221-222, 242n, 268-271, 274 , Saga, 493n, 500, 502, 512, 51 4 278, 282, 288-289, 304, 308, 310, 316, 325- Saga Prefecture, 502, 505, 51 2 326,.331, 333, 338, 346, 379, 536-537, 577 , Sagami Wan, 438, 483, 488 59 9 Saidor, 4 Robb, LtCol William O ., .13 9 Saigon, 416, 767-768 Roberts, Maj Edwin S ., Jr ., 416 Saipan, 4, 7, 7n, 16-18, 23-24, 48, 67, 70, 70n, Roberts, Col Harold C ., 253, 253n, 316, 353 , 71-72, 84, 86, 90, 94-95, 95n, 96, 122, 195 , 35 6 240, 242n, 347-348, 376n, 393, 397, 411- Robertson, Walter S ., 594 412, 428, 441, 461, 464, 493, 496, 560, 674- 675, 683, 714, 721-723, 734, 74 5 Robinson, BGen Ray A ., 501-502 operation, 88, 72 9 Rockaway, N .Y . 71 2 Sakaibara, RAdm Shigematsu, 457, 459, 73 8 Rockey, MajGen Keller E ., 24, 55, 397n, 534- Sackett, Maj Paul F., 120 536, 544-546, 550-553, 557-559, 561, 563 , Sakhalin, 53 1 563n, 565, 569-571, 573-574, 576, 578-579, Sakishima Gunto, 34, 97, 100, 197, 371, 398 , - 582-583, 586, 589, 589n, 600, 601n, 604 416, 427 606, 608, 613, 616, 618, 622, 649 ; LtGen Salerno Bay, 57n, 529n, 534n, 535n, 547n, 552n, 553n, 42 9 559n, 569n, 583n, 597n, 616n, 622n Salerno, Italy, 66 9 Rogers, Col Ford 0 ., 25 ; BGen, 450, 453, 452n ; Salzman, Col Elmer H., 55 0 MajGen, 61n, 427n, 452n, 453n Samar, 5 Rogers, BGen William W ., 508n ; MajGen , Samoa, 708, 71 2 493n, 500n, 506 n Samurai, 338n, 356, 367, 370, 581, 78 8 Roi-Namur, 95, 95n, 242n, 713, 721-722 Sanderson, BGen Lawson H . M ., 457, 606, 61 5 Roosevelt, President Franklin D ., 3, 8-9, 12 , San Diego, 483-484, 487 141, 400-402, 403n, 431, 431n, 528-529 , San Diego, Calif., 26, 414, 427-428, 442, 512 , 531, 698, 707-708, 713, 77 9 512n, 628, 648, 680-682, 706, 709, 71 4 Roosevelt, Maj James, 709-71 0 Sandino, Augusto, 69 7

310-224 0 - 69 - 60

932 INDE X

San Fernando, La Unio, 777 Senior Officer Present Afloat, 99n, 24 1 San Fernando, Pampanga, 77 7 Senzaki, 499, 502, 51 4 San Francisco, 6, 12, 518n Seoul, 437, 53 4 Sangamon, 20 8 Serang, 739–740, 763 San Jacinto, 479 n Service and supply activities. See also Arm y San Juan, 484 units; Logistics ; Marine units ; Supply San Pedro, Calif., 647 and Equipment . San Pedro, Bay, Calif., 8 American, 11, 24, 74, 84, 160, 210, 242n, 467 , Santa Barbara, Calif., 415, 429 n 550, 598–599, 616, 621, 624, 636, 657, 692, Santa Cruz Islands, 659n 692n, 693, 69 5 Santa Fe, 94, 98 Japanese, 46, 53, 116, 120–121, 220, 251, 54 2 Santee, Calif., 68 0 Sesoko Island, 173, 388n Santiago, 65 3 Settle, Radm Thomas G . W., 558–55 9 Santo Domingo, 65 4 SEXTANT, 3–4, 7, 9, 40 0 Sasebo, Japan, 493, 493n, 495–496, 499–500, Shana Wan, 140 500n, 501–503, 505, 505n, 506–507, 508n , Shanghai, 32, 399, 428, 526, 530, 533–534, 539– 509, 512, 514, 51 7 541, 543, 545, 552, 561, 566, 572, 574, 576, Naval Air Station, 503 n 582-583, 585, 595, 597, 609, 618, 621-622, Sashiki, 29 3 624, 629–630, 640–642, 644–645, 647, 675 , Satsudo, 3 2 698, 731, 733–734, 738, 740, 750, 752n, 754 – Savo Island, 708 755, 757–758, 778 Savory, Frederick Arthur, 46 1 Shanhaikuan, 570–571, 584 Savory, Nathaniel, 46 1 Shansi, 54 2 SCAJAP (Shipping Control Administration , Shantung, 537, 541-542, 544–545, 547, 560-561 , Japan), 596, 60 7 564, 574–575, 577-578, 582, 584–585, 593 , Scaling operations, 8 5 596, 598, 60, 608, 631–632, 636, 639, 647 , SCAP General Order, No . 1, 436–43 7 75 9 Scheme of maneuver, 67–68, 314, 33 0 Peninsula, 522, 530, 540–541, 546, 564, 577 , Schick, BGen Lawrence E ., 63, 365 63 0 Schilt, BGen Christian F., 453 Province, 522, 75 9 Schmidt, MajGen Harry, 24, 398–399, 408, 493 , University, 56 3 496, 512, 69 9 Shapley, LtCol Alan, 711 ; Col, 112, 115, 118 , Schneider, SSgt Loren 0 ., 733 129, 134–135, 144–145, 174–176, 254, 275 , Schneider, Col Merlin F., 112, 115, 175, 249, 280, 283, 302, 306, 309, 311, 314, 356, 36 0 253n Shawnee, Okla ., 71 3 Schofield Barracks, 66 Sheetz, BGen Josef R ., 189, 189n, 19 4 Scouts, 118, 140, 162, 164, 167, 173, 272, 275– Shelburne, LtCol Charles W ., 112, 28 6 276, 283, 299, 692 . See also Patrols ; Re- Shensi City, 63 2 connaissance activities . Scout-snipers, 694 Shepherd, MajGen Lemuel C., Jr ., 24, 60, 88 , Seabees . See Navy units . 115, 117, 120, 126, 129, 135, 138, 140, 142 , 142n, 144, 154–155, 169, 173, 173n, 214, Seattle, Washington, 39 0 218, 234–236, 247, 252, 256, 273, 275, 283 , Seawalls, 112, 222, 302, 307–308, 315, 33 2 297, 299-300, 302, 314, 320, 323–324, 330 , Sechibara, 50 1 344, 350, 356, 361, 363, 386, 391, 397, 476, Secretary of State, 62 0 559–561, 561n, 563–565, 575-577, 579, 581 , Secretary of the Navy, 3, 394, 410, 442, 447, 581n, 584, 607 ; Gen, 24n, 68, 115, 136n , 615, 622, 653, 688, 72 5 152n, 223n, 245 n Segi Point, 71 1 Sherman, RAdm Forrest P ., 8, 12, 196, 412 , Seitetsu Steel Mills, 73 6 53 4 Senaga Shima, 311, 32 3 Shibushi, 408 Sendai, 404, 406, 408 Shichina, 274, 284, 297, 299

INDEX 933

Shigemitsu, Foreign Minister Mamouri, 43 9 Ships—Continue d Shikoku, 31n, 95, 407, 418, 431, 492, 734, 78 3 American—Continued Shimajiri, 50 LSTs (Landing Ships, Tank), 72–73, 93– Shimizu, 503 94, 96, 104, 111, 114, 114n, 158–159, 162 , , Shimonoseki, 5, 493, 499, 50 2 166, 169, 180n, 239–241, 272, 390, 450 463, 478, 493, 500, 507, 552, 558, 560 , Shimonoseki-Moji Occupation Group, 502 578, 580, 583–584, 596–597, 603, 607 , Shinagawa, 78 1 657, 668, 72 9 Shindawaku, 325–326, 328, 331, 342 LST (H) s (Hospital Landing Ships), 73 , Shinzato, 281, 29 3 158, 72 9 Shipping losse s LSVs (Landing Ships, Vehicle), 47 8 American, 100, 179, 20 8 minelayers, 208 Japanese, 15–1 7 minesweepers, 60, 98, 102n, 104, 162, 208 , Ships . See also Landing Craft . 406, 428, 483, 492, 534, 65 6 American, 13, 21, 46, 57, 64, 70–74, 76–77 , patrol craft, 60, 179, 211, 233–234, 55 3 81, 83, 93–95, 97, 99–100, 104, 109, 135– radar pickets, 99, 177, 179, 181, 186, 208n , 136, 162, 162n, 177–178, 180, 186, 210 , 224, 348, 48 4 224, 240, 240n, 382, 450, 462–463, 479 , repair ships, 668 532–534, 560–561, 569–570, 575, 596 – submarines, 21, 41, 43, 58, 80, 97, 180 , 597, 600, 607, 657, 662, 664–665, 667 , 709–710, 744, 765, 771, 774, 77 8 669, 71 6 tenders, 643 ammunition ships, 25 0 transports, 21, 60, '70–72, 93–96, 103, 109, amphibious command ships, 164, 166, 447 – 123, 157, 162, 179–180, 196, 239, 243 , 448, 561, 648, 657, 669–67 0 347, 390–391, 438, 444, 447–448, 467 , battleships, 16, 94, 104, 111, 192–193, 209 , 478–479, 479n, 484, 488, 493, 495–496, 211, 305, 384, 467, 476, 479, 479n, 674 506, 512, 517, 535, 545, 551–553, 556, 558 , cargo vessels, 72, 95, 123, 158, 162, 180n , 560, 563, 579, 585, 640, 647, 656–657 , 478, 551, 582, 64 0 662, 666, 684, 72 8 carriers, 16, 26–27, 91, 94, 97–98, 100, 128 , tugs, 545 178, 406, 410–419, 421–422, 424, 426– Japanese, 20–21, 53, 58, 64, 94, 97, 107, 180 , 427, 467, 476, 479, 479n, 674 400, 450, 484, 580, 596, 739, 74 1 cruisers, 16, 94, 98, 104, 111, 192–193, 209 , battleships, 180 305, 384, 467, 479, 479n, 483, 496, 534 , cargo vessels, 97, 77 6 647–648 carriers, 16, 2 2 destroyer escorts, 225, 427, 454, 479n, 552, cruisers, 776 560 destroyers, 22, 776 destroyer minesweepers, 9 9 merchant ships, 20, 463, 580, 584, 596 destroyers, 99, 104, 111, 192–193, 208–209 , minesweepers, 483, 50 8 224, 228–229, 305, 384, 483, 495–496 , motor torpedo boats, 56, 10 0 534, 672 submarines, 56, 63–64, 76, 81, 107, 74 5 destroyer transports, 99, 106, 162, 164 , suicide boats, 53, 10 2 167, 228, 488, 493, 495, 640, 78 1 tankers, 46 3 escort carriers, 26, 95, 177, 411, 414–415 , transports, 97, 463, 739–740, 768–769 422–428, 428n, 441, 448, 468, 642, 657 , Ship-to-shore movement, 159, 72 8 67 2 Shisler, LtCol Clair W ., 275, 296, 31 6 hospital ships, 73, 73n, 243, 668, 729, 781 , Shoals, 106n 786 ., 770–772 ; LtCol, 220n, Liberty ships, 493, 59 6 Shofner, Capt Austin C LSDs (landing ships, dock), 111, 47 8 326, 327n, 328, 33 3 LSMs (Landing ships, medium), 72, 93 , Sho-Go operations, 18 104n, 114, 208, 228, 493, 551–553, 555, Shore fire control parties, 375n, 670, 673 . Se e 628, 647 also Air activities ; Naval gunfire .

934 INDE X

Shore party activities . See also Beach party South China, 11, 84, 97, 522, 524, 526-527, 534- activities . 27, 112n, 157-160, 160n, 184 , 535, 544, 603, 64 4 240-241, 389, 478n, 548, 637, 663-664, South China Sea, 18, 41 6 670, 683, 728 South Dakota, 479n Shore-to-shore operations, 12, 69, 304-30 5 Southeast Asia, 3n, 31, 77 9 Short, Commo Edwin T ., 560-561, 56 3 Southeast Asia Command, 35 4 Shuri, 36, 38, 40, 49-51, 54-55, 169, 188-190 , Southern Attack Force, 60, 93, 10 8 194-196, 205, 211-212, 216n, 220, 231- Southern Landing Force, 85, 9 6 234, 238, 240-241, 244, 247, 250, 252- Southern Marianas, 6, 8 254, 256-257, 263-270, 272, 274, 276- Southern Tractor Flotilla, 9 6 278, 280-282, 286-289, 292-293, 293n, South Field, 599, 62 4 297-298, 300, 325, 327, 331, 350, 388, 393 South Korea, 530, 53 4 Castle, 206, 264, 284, 286-287, 293, 295, 42 7 South Pacific, 4, 71, 84-85, 87, 180n, 331, 412 , defense systems, 54, 192, 198, 205, 214, 219 , 659, 665-666, 710, 72 9 230, 232, 236-237, 244, 261, 268, 288- South Pacific Combat Air Transport Com- 290, 293, 384-393 . See also Defenses. mand, 25 . See also MAG-25, Marine Ai r Shutts, Sgt Kenneth A., 128 n Units . Siberia, 530, 541, 608 South Seas Government, 45 5 Silver Star, 729 . See also Awards and deco - South SiakRiver, 768 rations. Southwest Pacific, 5, 20, 60, 71, 42 9 Silverthorn, Col Merwin H ., 66, 66n ; BGen, Southwest Pacific Area, 3n, 9, 12, 401, 430 , 83n, 397n ; LtGen, 354n, 363 n 659, 703, 720 Simpson, Commo Rodger W ., 781 Soviet Far East General Army, 53 0 Soviet occupation, 569, 571, 584, 60 4 Singapore, 439, 764, 767-765, 786 Soviet Union, 431, 434, 436, 525, 531, 569, 584 , Sino-Japanese War, 34, 522, 70 8 603, 632-633. See also Union of Sovie t Siskin, Chaplain Edgar E ., 727 Socialist Republics . Sitkoh Bay, 9 5 Spaatz, Gen Carl A ., 430, 433, 43 6 Smith, Maj Bernard L ., 712 Spaniards, 45 5 Smith, LtCol Harry 0 ., Jr., 183 Spanish-American War, 503, 65 3 Smith, MajGen Holland M ., 656, 664 ; LtGen Special Operations Executive, 746 n 23, 197n, 397n, 412n ; Gen, 24n, 411, 657, Special Weapons Battalion, 692-693, 702 . See 661, 674, 72 1 also Marine units. Smith, lstSgt Nathan A ., 733 Special Weapons Group, 689 . See also Marin e Smith, BGen Oliver P ., 62, 155, 155n, 175n, units. 365, 468 ; Gen, 62, 66-67, 84n, 85, 90, 175n, Speckman, LtCol Peter J ., 183n 259n, 271n, 353, 680n Springfield, 479 n Spruance, Adm Raymond A ., 6, 11, 16, 24, 57- Smoke screens American, 111-112, 179, 182, 201-203, 221- 58, 97, 100, 226, 242, 280, 404, 406, 416 , 222, 236-238, 248, 259, 314, 332, 339, 341 , 419, 421, 492, 493n, 509, 658, 661, 674 354, 358, 36 2 Spurlock, Maj Lyman D ., 699 ; LtCol 45 6 Japanese, 341, 374 Staging areas, 24, 67, 92-93, 662, 70 7 Stalin, Marshal Josef, 399, 431, 431n, 432, 434 , Snedeker, Col Edward W ., 112, 116, 127, 127n , 530-53 1 130, 220, 236, 238, 259, 262, 299, 337, 337n , Star Spangled Banner, 759 338 , ; BGen, 120n, 127n, 130n, 132n, 329n State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 43 3 332n, 340n ; LtGen, 36n, 339n, 351n St . Cezaire, 748 Sobe, 116, 125, 208 Steman, Col Louis H ., 426n Soerabaja, 763n Stent, Col Howard N ., 45 4 Soida, 508 n Stewart, PFC Charles, Jr., 754-755 Solomon Islands, 4, 67, 74, 84n, 93, 129, 410- Stilwell, LtGen Joseph W., 368-369, 373n, 393 , 411, 659n, 665, 667, 690, 711, 716, 718, 763 430, 528-529, 529n, 533 ; Gen, 354, 786

INDEX 935

Stimson, Secretary of War Henry L., 43 2 Supplies and equipment-Continued St . Louis, 52 1 American-Continued St. Nicholas Point, 739, 763n cargo parachutes, 329, 374, 783, 785 Stockades, 118, 121-122, 172, 333, 361, 380 . cargo slings, 489 See also Prisoner of War Camps . clothing, 75, 551-552, 576, 60 1 Stockholm, 434, 436 communications, 595, 70 5 Stolley, MSgt Fred, 765 construction, 157, 166, 31 8 Story, Cpl Jerold, 752n, 754-75 5 dumps and storage, 74, 144, 149n, 157- St . Paul, 647 158, 160, 172, 175, 180n, 184, 192, 208 , Straits of Malacca, 768 240-241, 256, 271-272, 325, 331, 379 , Straits of Shimonoseki, 50 1 541, 551, 567, 576, 618, 625, 627, 664 Strategy early-warning equipment, 20 8 American, 5-9, 11, 17, 70, 39 9 electronic, 22 6 Japanese, 13-14, 17, 20 6 equipment, 72-76, 111, 136, 557, 479, 551 , Stratemeyer, Gen George C., 535, 555-556, 559, 583, 657, 67 8 56 9 explosives, 102, 218, 296, 701, 720, 72 4 Stretcher bearers, 150, 287, 329, 365n . See food and rations, 74, 86n, 128, 130, 196 , also Medical activities. 234, 262, 275, 293, 295, 295n, 304, 326 , Strike Command, Commander Air Solomons, 330-331, 339, 342, 344, 551, 553, 555 , 41 0 591, 601, 742, 761-762, 769, 77 5 St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, 448 fuel and lubricants, 74-75, 103, 158n, 228 , Stuart, LtCol Arthur J., 114, 703 n 241, 379, 419, 426, 541, 551, 555, 565 , Stuart, Ambassador John Leighton, 639-641 606, 703, 71 6 Subic Bay, 740, 776 gas masks, 69 7 Sugar Loaf Hill, 237-238, 244-245, 247-252 , heavy equipment, 55 1 254, 266, 269-270, 725 helmets, 69 7 Sugawara, LtGen Michio, 178n maintenance, 65 n Sulu Sea, 77 3 medical, 234, 275, 293, 331n, 339, 769, 77 7 Sumatra, 3n, 78 6 ordnance, 70 5 Sumay, Guam, 734 sound-ranging equipment, 185n Sunabe, 5 0 spare parts, 71 6 Sunda Straits, 740 stretchers, 15 0 Sun Yat-sen, 524-526 T-6 flotation equipment, 111n, 11 4 Supplies and equipment. See also Ammuni- water, 74, 128, 149n, 150-151, 172, 175, tion; Logistics ; Shore Party Activities . 234, 293, 295, 297, 331n, 74 2 American, 65, 65n, 70-76, 90, 103, 118, 122- Japanese 123, 128, 130-132, 134-135, 141, 149n , ammunition, 152, 288-289, 557 , 581, 63 2 150, 152, 157, 159, 160n, 166, 171, 172n, clothing, 15 2 180n, 231, 234-235, 237, 240-242, 256 , dumps, 139, 152, 174, 193, 231, 251, 503 , 261, 270-275, 277, 282, 293, 295, 297 , 710, 74 4 302-304, 309, 342, 382, 391-392, 481 , equipment, 139, 152, 312, 557, 581, 59 6 512, 528, 551, 553, 555, 560, 565, 567 , food and rations, 152, 709, 743, 76 3 602, 640, 654, 657, 663-664, 678, 723 , fuel and lubricants, 51, 65 762 medical, 28 9 ammunition, 150, 192, 240, 242, 250, 267, ordnance, 15 1 293, 295, 297, 579n, 62 5 signal, 51 1 aviation, 74-75, 70 5 supplies, 53, 65, 98, 139, 289, 312, 557, 59 6 barge cranes, 157-158, 24 1 Support Air Direction net, 383, 671 belts, 69 7 Supreme Commander for the Allied Power s bridging material, 21 9 (SCAP), 393, 436, 439, 488, 490, 492 - cargo, 73, 95, 104, 122, 158-159, 162n, 240 , 493, 497-498, 500, 506, 508, 786. See 240n, 390, 550-551, 555, 558, 560, 576 also Gen MacArthur.

936 INDEX

Surf, 91, 109, 16 4 Tactics-Continue d Suzuki, MajGen Shigeji, 43, 28 9 American-Continued Swatow, 41 6 diversion, 51n, 9 7 Swedish Government, 43 6 double envelopment, 196, 253, 287, 310 Swedish Legation, 78 1 engineer-infantry teams, 38 6 Swedish Minister, 434 feint landing, 64, 67, 90, 107, 109, 259, 347 Swiss Consulate, 75 3 fire and manuever, 142, 199, 32 9 flanking maneuver, 23 6 Swiss diplomatic channels, 732, 75 5 frontal attack, 14 6 Swiss government, 436, 732-733, 739 n harassing and interdiction fire, 68, 189n , Swiss Legation, 78 1 216, 218n, 277-27 8 Swiss nationals, 50 3 infiltration, 33 2 Swordfish, 8 0 jungle warfare, 697-698, 700, 718-72 0 Szechwan Province, 52 8 mopping up, 85, 155, 199n, 210, 231, 247 , 344, 36 2 Tables of Allowance (T/A), 47 8 night attacks, 86, 190, 267, 269, 271, 337 , Tables of Equipment, Marine Corps, 692, 696 , 337n, 338, 341, 387-388, 388 n 701-70 2 penetration, 199, 201, 219, 256, 268, 290 , Tables of Organization, Marine Corps, 470 , 358 478, 635, 663-664, 689, 691-692, 693n, search-and-kill missions, 71 8 694-696, 698, 71 1 skirmish line, 171, 323 D-Series, 693, 695, 702, 717 sniping, 320 E-Series, 693, 695-696, 698, 70 4 supporting arms coordination, 68, 86n, 144 , F-Series, 467, 693-696, 698, 702, 704 151, 182, 238, 249, 259, 261, 265, 267 , G-Series, 353n, 384, 467-468, 598, 693-696, 286, 330, 335, 344, 351-352, 384, 386 , 702, 71 4 669, 673, 719, 721-722, 724-72 6 Air, 606, 71 7 tank-infantry assault, 132, 141, 217, 235- Ground, 444, 635, 688-689, 691, 695-696, 236, 239, 247, 249, 251, 261, 264-265 , 70 0 268, 270, 288, 299, 306, 312, 320, 333 , Tachibana, LtGen Yosio, 460-462 337, 345, 354, 362, 364, 386-388, 718 , Tactics 721-723, 725-72 6 American Japanese airborne operation, 484 airborne attack, 81, 87, 126, 274 amphibious raid, 65, 97, 706, 709-710, 744 , ambush, 125, 138n, 142, 145, 171, 17 4 772 banzai attack, 118, 151, 245, 393 armor, engineer, and infantry teamwork , bayonet charge, 25 0 264 cave warfare, 393, 69 5 armor, infantry, and artillery cooperation , counterattack, 80-81, 98, 150, 197, 204 , 86, 131, 335, 72 1 206-207, 210, 212-213, 220-221, 230 , assault demolition teams, 218, 222, 256n , 234, 238-239, 244-245, 247-248, 250 , 265, 315, 364, 721, 723-72 4 252, 252n, 254, 254n, 265, 270, 272, 274 , assault of a fortified position, 72 4 276-277, 300, 309, 320, 335, 339, 343, base of fire, 697, 70 1 345-347, 352, 356, 393 bayonet assault, 31 2 counterbattery fire, 142 chemical warfare, 663 counterlanding, 207, 209, 23 4 "contact imminent," 719 converging attack, 23 4 delaying, 18, 54-55, 146, 20 7 coordinated attack, 298-29 9 envelopment, 207, 210 "corkscrew and blowtorch," 218, 364, 384 , guerrillas, 47, 86, 121, 148, 169, 171-17 5 72 4 hit-and-run attack, 100, 172 counterbattery fire, 68, 214, 216, 308, 34 3 infiltration, 117, 125-126, 130, 146, 148n, counterguerrilla operations, 175, 697 171, 174, 197-198, 202, 207, 210, 221 ,

INDEX 937

Tactics—Continued Task Organizations . See also Army units ; Japanese—Continue d Marine units; Navy units . infiltration—Continue d Central Pacific Task Forces, 4, 6, 57, 10 9 232, 236, 239n, 252, 277, 282, 303, 308 , TF 31, 229n, 370, 372, 438, 476, 479, 481 , 321, 335, 341, 347, 356, 36 0 483-485, 487-48 8 jungle warfare, 675, 719 TF 35, 43 8 mopping up, 2 3 TF 37, 431, 43 8 night attack, 121, 139, 23 5 TF 38, 94, 96-97, 280, 416, 421, 431, 438-43 9 penetration, 238, 254 TF 40, 40 7 raid, 100, 41 9 TF 50, 57-58, 6 3 sniping, 115, 121, 125, 172, 220, 231, 234 , TF 51, 58, 60, 80, 192, 229n, 242-24 3 236-237, 260, 263, 276, 296-297, 308 , TF 52, 56, 60, 69, 99, 99n, 102, 102n, 103 , 328-329, 340-341, 344, 346, 356, 358 , 192 362 TF 53, 60, 91, 93-9 4 suicide attack, 21-22, 100, 179, 194, 222 , TF 54, 60, 99n, 10 2 380 TF 55, 60 n supporting arms, 44 TF 56, 60, 354, 354 TF 57, 60, 10 0 withdrawal, 121, 152, 29 0 TF 58, 60, 97-100, 178-181, 185, 192, 280 , Tahara, Mr., 774-775 411, 415-418, 42 1 Taian, 57 7 TF 59, 98 Taira, 173-174, 17 6 TF 71, 53 4 Taiwan, 19 7 TF 72, 534, 561, 56 6 Takabanare Shima, 164, 388n TF 78, 534 Takagi, RAdm Sokichi, 1 5 TF 79, 53 5 Takamotoji, 24 8 • 95, 37 3 Takanyuta, 32 9 • 96, 449, 450 n • Able, 476, 478, 48 8 Takao, 777 • 30.2, 438 Takasu, 50 7 • 30 .6, 78 1 Takeo, 50 1 • 31 .2, 42 8 Taku, 533-53 4 • 31 .3, 43 8 Taku Bar, 539, 545, 552, 62 1 • 35 .9, 438 Talienwan, 52 2 • 51 .1, 62 Tanabaru, 20 6 • 51 .2, 62, 9 0 Tanambogo, 70 8 • 51 .3, 62 Tanega Shima, 40 7 • 52.1, 69 Tangku, 535, 539, 541-542, 548, 550-551, 553 , • 94.3, 450 555, 558, 560, 566-568, 575, 584-585, 590 , • 99 .2, 37 3 592, 597-599, 617-619, 622, 625, 628, 641 , • Able, 534 670 TU 32 .1 .3, 427 Tangshan, 547-548, 556, 568, 575, 585-586 , TU 58 .1, 9 7 590-591, 599, 60 2 TU 58 .2, 9 7 Tarawa, 27, 55, 242n, 410-411, 450, 460, 500n , TU 58 .3, 97 658, 661, 666-667, 669, 670, 672-674, 720 - Tateyama Naval Air Station, 48 8 722 Taxis, Col Samuel G ., 507n, BGen, 507n Tarawa, 62 1 Taylor, 2dLt Walter W ., 746-749 Target information centers, 102, 103n, 382- Teeters, Nathan Dan, 755 383, 670 Tengan, 128 Tartar City, 54 0 Tennessee, 15 2 Tasimboko, 686, 709 Tenryu River, 765

938 INDE X

Tentative Landing Operations Manual, 655 , Terrain-Continue d 66 3 river flats, 32 3 Tentative Manual for Landing Operations , rivers, 201, 212, 276, 53 7 655, 663n slopes, 114, 144, 146, 150, 204, 217, 232, 236- Tent Camp #1, New River, N .C ., 680 237, 248, 251, 253, 261-262, 266, 269, 271 , Tera, 300, 303, 325, 326n, 333, 335, 337, 339 277, 282, 312, 337, 346, 356, 363, 39 3 Terabaru, 12 6 soil, 34, 85, 106n, 15 8 Terauchi, Field Marshall Count Hisaichi, 177n streams, 34, 36, 116, 219, 257, 273, 330, 333 , Terrain 53 7 boulders, 112, 36 0 swamps, 307, 719-720, 770-77 1 caves, 49, 116, 128, 148, 203, 247, 252n, 265, valleys and ravines, 36, 50, 118 , 130, 136, 288-290, 295-296, 307, 310, 312, 314-316, 139, 145, 151, 201-203, 247-248, 250-251, 321, 324, 346, 357, 361-362, 364, 367, 377 271-272, 274, 296, 310, 325-326, 335, 337 - cliffs, 34, 36-37, 139, 158, 169, 201, 233, 288- 339, 345, 537, 577, 72 6 289, 360-361, 704, 726 Teton, 9 2 coastal plains, 233, 26 7 Thailand, 750, 767-76 8 creek, 32 6 Thanbyuzayat, 766-767 defiles, 134, 20 3 The North China Marine, 58 3 depressions, 244, 254 The Pinnacle, 343-34 4 description, 32n, 34, 36, 49, 51, 69, 78-79, The Stars and Stripes, 58 3 86-87, 106, 112, 115-116, 118, 120n, 123 , Thomas, Col Gerald C., 690 ; BGen, 196, 412 , 126, 129-132, 134-135, 142, 145, 148, 149n, 631, 635, 637-639, 643 ; Gen, 414n, 638n, 151, 155, 167, 169, 171, 175, 197, 203-204, 688n, 690n, 701n 238, 265, 270, 311, 337, 358, 386, 460, 697 , Ticonderoga, 479n 705, 720, 722-723, 725 Tides, 112, 114, 157, 55 1 draws, 118, 150, 205, 217, 221, 257, 259, 262, Tientsin, 531, 533-536, 539, 541-544, 546-547 , 264-265, 321, 72 6 550-552, 555n, 556-558, 563-564, 566, 568, escarpments, 204, 335, 337, 351, 351n 575n, 576-577, 583-585, 588, 590, 598-599, flatlands, 34, 32 3 602, 607-608, 610, 612-613, 615, 617-618 , gorges, 171, 25 9 622, 627-631, 637, 639, 641, 731, 733, 759 hills, 34, 36-37, 49-50, 111, 116, 121, 128n, Tientsin-Peiping road, 56 7 131, 145, 148, 151, 172, 174, 197-198, 202, Tientsin Race Club, 553n 204, 216-217, 231, 233, 250-253, 263, 265 - Tinian, 4, 71, 95n, 242n, 412, 674, 704, 704n, 72 2 266, 269, 271-272, 281, 284, 287-290, 297- Tobaru, 125 299, 303, 306, 309-310, 312, 321, 324-325, Toguchi, 139-141, 144, 146, 151-152 330, 333, 380, 53 7 Tojo, Gen Hideki, 15-17, 20 isthmus, 3 4 Tokara, 3 4 jungles, 87-88, 697, 719-720, 76 7 Tokashiki Shima, 106, 45 2 marshes, 323, 53 7 Tokuyama Naval Base, 18 0 mountains, 34, 130, 134-135, 138, 146, 162 , Tokyo, 5, 14n, 16, 18, 21-22, 40, 97-98, 207, 171, 174, 406, 537, 541, 546, 564, 60 3 321, 368, 400, 409, 416-418, 428n, 431, 434, mud flats, 53 7 436, 439, 452, 475, 483, 485, 488, 490, 496, 498, 500n, 596, 673, 745, 760, 774, 781n, peninsulas, 126, 135, 138, 154-155, 299-300, 783, 785-786 302, 306, 311, 31 6 Tokyo Bay, 438, 470, 479n, 481, 508, 78 1 plateaus, 36, 166, 260-261, 306, 34 6 Tokyo Plain, 7, 9, 403 . See also Kanto Plain . ridges, 50, 87, 126, 131, 144-146, 162, 171 , 188, 194, 198-199, 202, 205, 216, 222, 232- Toma, 308-309 233, 236, 248-249, 260-263, 265, 267-269, Tomb of the Unknowns, 73 0 273, 276, 286, 289-300, 304, 306, 310-312, Tolman, 5 6 315-316, 318, 326, 328, 330, 332-333, 338- Tomigusuki, 47, 300, 318, 320-32 1 341, 343-345, 358, 360, 393, 709, 725 Tominaga, LtGen Kyoji, 73 2

INDEX 939

Tomui, 29 8 Tsukasan, 40, 55, 290, 297-298, 303-30 4 Tomusu, 290, 32 8 Tsuno, 404, 406, 40 8 Tonachi Shima, 9 9 Tsuwa, 188, 20 7 Tongking, 52 2 Tuberculosis, 754, 75 7 Topeka, 479 n Tulagi, 658, 659n, 706, 707n, 70 8 Tori Shima, 348, 38 1 Tu Li Ming, LtGen, 584, 58 6 Torrey, Col Daniel W ., Jr., 230n, 49 5 Turner, RAdm Richmond K., 659 ; VAdm, 6 , Toshino, 776, 776n, 777 11, 58, 60, 62-64, 65n, 71, 73, 78n, 92, 103 , Totsuka, VAdm, 484, 487 n 109, 118, 140, 158-160, 162, 166, 177, 180 , Tower, VAdm John H., 7-8, 41 2 196, 209n, 225, 229n, 242, 348, 407, 660- Townley, Capt Edward F., Jr., 407n 661, 667n, 67 4 Towns, 38, 120n, 139, 19 9 Tutuila, 707n, 70 8 Townshend, Sir Charles, 65 5 Twining, Gen Merrill B ., 430n Toyama, 30 3 Twining, LtGen Nathan F., 430, 430 n Toya Maru, 43 Toyoda, Adm Soemu, 178-17 9 Uchida, LtGen Ginnosuke, 542, 55 7 Uchima, 199, Trails, 126, 134-135, 171, 175, 325. See als o 203, 21 9 roads . Uchitomari, 20 3 Trainin g Udo, Col Takesiko, 49, 55, 141, 148, 171, 36 2 Uebaru, 18 American, 23, 26-27, 83, 83n, 84-89, 92, 94 , 8 195, 276, 281, 389, 398, 411, 423-425, 466- Uibaru, 314, 316, 320 Ulithi Atoll, 4, 21-22, 60n, 65n, 70n, 71, 467, 579, 590, 592, 615, 623, 630, 635, 650 , 93-95 , 654, 656, 663, 672, 679-684, 686-687, 689- 97-98, 415-419, 421, 427, 450 690, 700, 705-707, 712, 718-721, 72 6 Umezu, Gen Yoshijiro, 439 Unconditional surrender, 43 2 Japanese, 46, 53, 120, 25 1 Transfer lines, 91, 114, 116-117, 15 7 UNION, 746 Transport areas, 99, 104, 108, 111-112, 116 , UNION II, 747, 747n Union o 158, 179, 184, 241, 66 5 of Soviet Socialist Republics. See als Transport quartermasters, 95-96, 391, 447 , Soviet Union . 193, 399, 431, 434, 436, 439, 467, 662, 664. See also Loading operations ; 476, 522, 525-526, 528, 530, 533, 573, '769, Logistics Activities. 781 Treasury Islands, 668 United Kingdom, 434, 436, 43 9 Treaties, 521-522, 531, 569 United Kingdom of the Netherlands, 439 Trilling, Sgt Paul, 128 n United Nations, 600, 63 3 Truce agreement, 594-596, 601, 604, 608, 620 Charter, 572 Truce teams, 595, 601, 603-604, 61 0 Relief & Rehabilitation Administration Truk, 4, 39, 444, 449-450, 454-457, 464, 468- (UNRRA), 600-601, 612, 623 745 United States, 19-20, 26, 39, 70-71, 78, 78n, Truk Occupation Force, 450, 456, 460 87-88, 434, 436, 439, 441, 443, 447-448, Truman, President Harry S ., 400, 402-403, 468, 470, 490, 509, 512, 514, 517, 521-522, 431-434, 436, 498, 532, 572-574, 619-620, 524-528, 531-532, 53'7, 566, 572, 598, 600, 632, 633n 616, 633, 648, 653-654, 656, 658, 662, 665, Tsangkou, 541, 566, 579-580, 623, 629, 636 668, 675, 679-681, 706, 710, 714, 716, 729, Tsangkou Field, 560, 563-564, 575-577, 600, 732-733, 739n, 746, 749, 755, 757, 759, 762 - 608, 616, 618, 623, 627, 638, 643 786 Tsinan, 541-542, 565, 577, 579-580, 623, 63 9 aid programs, 528, 57 4 Tsingtao, 490, 522, 533-534, 536-537, 540-541, Congress, 503, 523n, 592, 623n, 633, 657, 68 7 544, 547, 559-561, 563-566, 568, 575-583 , Consulates, 636.63 9 592-593, 597-598, 600, 602, 604-608, 615- Department of State, 573, 618, 622, 628, 631, 616, 622-623, 627-632, 635-640, 642-644 , 638, 645, 650, 733, 750, 755• 647, 650 Personnel, 546-547, 597, 636, 63 9 Tsugen Shima, 162, 164, 166, 193, 388n Economic missions, 52 8

940 INDEX

United States-Continue d U. S . Strategic Bombing Survey, 68 4 Embassies, 544, 639-64 0 U. S . War Department, 13, 76, 351n, 354n, 655 , Foreign Policy, 532-533, 561, 573-574, 590 , 68 7 64 8 Units of fire, 74, 57 9 Government, 573-574, 75 5 Unjo, 12 5 U . S. Army, 3n, 74-76, 400-401, 407, 484, 497 , Unloading activities, 63, 93, 111, 118, 122-123 , 505, 509, 514, 517, 583, 591, 601, 607 , 125, 135, 155, 157-160, 166, 241, 272 , 655, 667, 703, 712-713, 786 . See also 55 6 Army units . U . S . Army Forces, China, 60 4 Unten-ko, 46, 56, 139, 142 U. S . Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, 354n , Uraga, 481, 48 9 438, 783 Uragashira, 499 U. S . Coast Guard, 664 Uraga Strait, 48 3 U. S. Forces, China Theater, 533, 536, 545 , Urasoe-Mura escarpment, 194, 205, 21 1 555, 557, 559, 568-569, 574, 596-597 , Ushijima, LtGen Mitsuru, 40-41, 43, 46-48 , 600, 603, 606 . See also China Theater . 50-51, 53-55, 97, 103, 107, 120, 177, 194 , U. S . Marine Corps, 12n, 23, 74, 365, 387, 411 , 205, 210-211, 213, 217n, 219-220, 247 , 413, 442-444, 446-449, 466-468, 518, 251, 257, 264, 270, 274, 278, 280-281 , 544, 592, 598, 605, 635, 649, 653-654, 284, 287-290, 292, 298, 321, 338, 338n , 656-658, 662, 666, 670, 675-677, 679- 340, 350-352, 356-357, 364, 367, 370 , 681, 687-688, 691, 695, 697, 699, 701- 386, 392-393, 67 5 702, 705, 707, 711-715, 726, 741, 746, 789 . See also Marine units. Vandegrift, MajGen Alexander A ., 657-660 ; Equipment Board, 60 6 LtGen, 12n, 84n, 196, 412, 412n, 413-414 , Programs 414n, 422, 448 ; Gen, 570n, 589n, 592n , barrage balloon, 71 2 605n, 606n, 615n, 621n, 622n, 624n,' 656 , defense battalion, 68 8 663, 664, 676, 686, 686n, 690, 691, 70 9 demobilization, 442-443, 445, 450, 469- Vegetation, 34-35, 38, 86, 135, 145, 166, 171 , 470, 499, 556, 571, 590-592, 61 5 307, 310, 360, 537, 719 . See also Terrain escort carrier, 64 9 features . FMFPac base roll-up, 445 bamboo, 17 1 glider, 71 3 banana trees, 76 9 mobilization, 689 cereal grains, 53 7 parachute, 707, 71 3 citrus trees, 77 0 personnel procurement, 442, 445-44 6 coconut groves, 86 postwar garrisons, 463 kaoliang, 527, 539, 61 0 Women's Reserve, 23, 67 8 kunai grass, 88 U. S . Naval Station, Olongapo, 74 0 palmetto, 307 U. S . Naval Training Center, Bainbridge, Md., papaya, 77 0 44 3 rice paddies, 38, 139, 204n, 323, 337, 346, 492 , U . S. Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Ill ., 502n, 527, 53 7 44 3 rubber trees, 76 4 U . S. Navy, 3n, 8, 63, 75, 78, 209, 382, 400-401 , sweet potatoes, 38, 455, 49 2 411, 439, 460, 467, 484n, 490, 553, 591n, sugar cane, 38, 210, 323, 70 4 622, 642, 647, 656-658, 660, 667, 707 , V-E Day, 218, 76 7 712 . See also Navy units. Vehicle s Basic Post-War Plan No . 2, 446 American, 74, 111-112, 123, 135, 174, 241 , personnel, 24, 479, 507n, 552, 546, 600, 664 , 270, 293, 325, 333, 551, 555, 560, 612 , 670, 691, 726, 75 5 625, 667, 693, '703, 705 V-12 College Program, 445-44 6 ambulance jeeps, 335, 72 9 U. S. Strategic Air Force in the Pacific, 430 , amphibian tractors, 90, 93, 104, 111-112, 433 114, 116-117, 123, 141, 157-158, 176,

INDEX 941

Vehicles—Continue d Wana Draw, 234, 236, 257, 258-263, 265-266 , American—Continue d 281-282, 287, 293, 296-29 7 amphibian tractors—Continued Wana Ridge, 232, 238-239, 257, 259-266, 287 , 241, 272, 275n, 302, 302n, 304-306, 309- 72 6 310, 315, 330, 551, 667-669, 704, 723 War Area Service Corps (WASC), 583 amphibian trucks, 112, 114, 116, 157-158 , War Crimes Commission, 46 4 303, 305, 667-66 8 War crimes trials, 462, 745, 752, 775n, 78 7 armored amphibian tractors, 86, 104, 111- War crimes tribunals, 45 7 112, 114, 140, 193, 209-210, 218n, 222 , War criminals, 456, 463-464, 498, 499, 75 2 235, 269, 302, 305, 324, 332, 360n, 384- War Criminal Stockade, Guam, 46 4 385, 385n, 70 4 War Dogs, 25, 171, 360n, 695, 713-71 4 automobiles, 612, 742 Ward Road Gaol, 75 5 bulldozers, 134, 325, 392, 551, 72 3 Warm Springs, Ga ., 708 cargo carriers (Weasels), 123, 705 Warner, LtCol Jack F ., 602 jeeps, 123, 259n, 353, 558, 586, 612-613, War Plans Section, Div P&P, HQMC, 68 8 625, 694, 72 7 Washburn, Maj Richard T., 36 4 prime movers, 123, 39 2 Washington, D. C., 5, 9, 13, 56, 431, 437, 448- tractors, 112, 160, 325, 478, 74 2 449, 508, 532, 546, 555, 569, 571-572, trailers, 123, 169, 70 5 547, 604, 621, 623, 627n, 628, 633n, 641 - 612, trucks, 123, 235, 372, 325, 346, 528, 642, 677-678, 70 6 625, 664, 714, 74 2 Wasp, 26, 98, 416, 418-419, 479 n Japanese, 139, 277-278 Watanabe, LtGen Masao, 34-4 0 trucks, 132, 230, 289, 545, 56 3 Vella Lavella, '706 Watson, MajGen Thomas E ., 24, 62, 65-67, 90 , Vella Gulf, 426, 42 8 95, 195, 34 7 Veterans Administration, 50 3 Wavell, General Sir Archibald V., 3 n V-J Day, 441, 445-446, 448-450, 682, 78 5 Weapon s Vladivostok, 52 2 American, 74, 85, 479, 579, 590, 664, 695 , Vogel, MajGen Clayton B ., 699, 70 7 703-704, 720, 724 . See also Ammuni- Volcano Islands, 14, 46 1 tion ; Army units ; Marine units ; Vehicles . Wachtler, Col Walter A., 66, 19 7 antiaircraft guns, 784 n Wada, MajGen Kosuke, 45, 289 assault guns, 217 Wade, LtCol Sidney S., 66 automatic rifles, 697-698, 70 1 Wainwright, LtGen Jonathan M., 439, 744, 768 automatic weapons, 69 7 Wakayama, 492, 78 6 bangalore torpedoes, 72 4 Wake Island, 450, 452, 455, 457, 459, 464, 464n, bayonets, 267, 697, 72 1 690, 733, 737, 737n, 738, 755-756, 758, bazookas, 286, 701-702, 72 3 78 6 BAR's, 692n, 696-700, 72 4 Waldorf, LtCol Harry A., 353 carbines, 184, 696, 70 0 Walker, Maj Anthony, 118, 135, 173, 275-276 , crew-served weapons, 235, 269, 282, 314, 280n, 283, 299 ; LtCol, 136n 364 Wallace, Col Clarence R ., 347, 350, 353n, BGen , 8-inch howitzers, 186n, 189, 193, 211, 249 , 500n 385, 385n, 38 6 Wallace, MajGen Fred C., 62, 160, 378-380 81mm mortars, 74n, 127, 140, 142, 204, 235 , Wallace, LtCol Ricard W ., 12 3 259-260, 333, 341, 343, 387, 692n 695 Wallace, BGen William J., 61, 95, 176-177, 181, 11.75-inch rockets (Tiny Tims), 421, 71 5 183, 226, 24 1 .50 caliber machine guns, 74n, 177n, 184 , Walsh, Capt Kenneth A., 37 1 690 Walt, Col Lewis W., 723 5-inch guns, 104, 68 9 Wana, 203, 231, 234, 236, 238, 256-257, 262 , 5-inch rockets, 340, 348, 364n, 71 5 264, 266 57mm recoilless rifles, 351, 387

942 INDEX

Weapons—Continued Weapons—Continue d American—Continued American—Continue d flamethrowers, 231, 250, 253, 262–263, 258 , rocket launchers, 25, 104n, 154–155, 192 , 312, 361n, 386n, 667, 701–704, 704n, 217, 238, 264, 296, 305, 316, 343, 363 , 720–721, 723–72 4 413, 419, 426, 695, 714–71 5 flamethrowing tanks, 201, 201n, 221, 260 – 7-inch guns, 689 261, 267, 320, 343, 351, 362–364, 384 , 75mm guns, 201n, 385n, 692n, 695, 703 , 386n, 703, 705, 718, 722–723, 72 5 72 3 flat trajectory cannon, 201, 22 2 75mm howitzers, 86, 114, 189n, 193, 216n , 4 .2-inch mortars, 112, 238, 259, 364, 387 , 218, 218n, 267, 385, 385n, 689, 692, 694 , 70 3 72 5 4 .5-inch rocket, 71 4 75mm recoilless rifles, 351n, 387 14-inch rifles, 18 8 200mm guns, 690, 692n, 702 40mm guns, 672, 69 0 240mm howitzers, 38 5 .45 caliber pistols, 18 4 2 .36-inch bazookas, 38 7 grenades, 149–150, 217, 237, 244, 247, 251 , 16-inch guns, 24 9 267, 296, 612, 72 5 60mm mortars, 74n, 320n, 589–590, 692n , grenade launchers, 191, 696, 696n, 697, 70 0 695-696, 71 1 guns, 192, 274, 66 7 submachine guns, 696–698 half-tracks, 236, 384, 384n, 695, 70 2 tank dozers, 134, 306, 318, 340, 345, 360 , howitzers, 116, 192, 384, 387, 66 7 362, 72 3 light tanks, 703–704, 72 2 tanks, 86n, 93, 111–112, 114–115, 120, 126 , Long Toms, 10 6 131–132, 135, 158n, 190, 194, 199–201 , machine guns, 150, 184, 209, 228, 263, 267 , 201n, 203, 204n, 214, 217, 218n, 221 – 277, 590, 613, 619, 689, 692n, 695–696 , 222, 222n, 231–232, 235–238, 247–249 , 700, 720–721, 723 251, 253, 256–257, 259–265, 267, 269 , medium tanks, llln, 201n, 235, 259, 262 , 271–272, 298, 302, 305–306, 308–310 , 264–265, 267–268, 309, 312, 333, 339 314-315, 316n, 318, 320, 324–325, 335 , 340, 354, 358, 503n, 703, 705, 722, 72 5 337, 339–346, 353–354, 357–358, 360 , mines, 62 7 362–363, 384–385, 385n, 386, 386n, 409 , mortars, 146, 201, 209, 216–217, 220, 248 , 503, 551, 558, 579, 675, 703n, 704, 718 , 260, 263, 265, 277, 314, 339, 345, 384– 721–72 5 385, 387, 586, 589–590, 613, 61 9 37mm guns, 236, 264, 305, 308, 311–312 , naval guns, 382 318, 384n, 692n, 695, 696n, 703, 72 3 90mm guns, 183, 184n, 689–690, 692, 71 2 3-inch guns, 68 9 155mm guns, 24, 106, 186n, 189, 211, 385, 12-inch rifles, 17 5 385n, 386, 68 9 20mm cannon, 177n 155mm guns (self-propelled), 385 Japanese, 19, 45, 152, 289, 312, 557, 581 , 155mm howitzers, 74n, 167, 211, 320, 385 , 720, 72 4 385n, 386 antiaircraft guns, 144, 374 105mm guns, 72 5 antipersonnel land mines, 17 2 105mm howitzers, 74n, 114, 144, 167, 189 , antitank guns, 194, 201, 236, 239, 248, 251 , 194, 216n, 262, 267, 320, 355n, 613, 625 , 260, 265, 337, 341, 354, 38 6 629, 635, 668n, 692–69 4 automatic weapons, 45, 232, 237, 248, 251 , 105mm howitzers, self-propelled (M–7s) , 308, 310, 312, 33 0 , 218n, 257, 263–264, 305–306, 309, 311 "Baka" bomb, 18 6 314, 318, 362, 384, 384n, 385, 385n, 695 , bamboo spears, 13 0 725 1 pole charges, 724, 724n bayonets, 130, 22 recoilless rifles, 351n, 387 booby traps, 13 4 rifles, 74n, 184, 696, 696n, 697–698, 700, cannon, 35 0 702, 724–725 depth charges, 51 1

INDEX 94 3

Weapons—Continued Weapons—Continue d Japanese—Continue d Japanese—Continued dual-purpose guns, 484 rockets, 18 6 8-inch guns, 152, 32 4 75mm guns, 44-45, 49, 142, 191, 316, 718 8-inch rockets, 30 8 70mm howitzers, 44, 4 9 81mm mortars, 44, 45, 49, 54 6-inch guns, 142, 142n, 308 field guns, 308 smoke grenades, 254, 262, 27 6 15cm guns, 50, 106, 186n tanks, 82, 206, 212, 278 57mm guns, 45 torpedoes, 51 1 flat-trajectory cannon, 282 13mm antiaircraft guns, 47, 54 14cm guns, 4 7 37mm guns, 44 47mm antitank guns, 44-45, 49, 199, 231 , 320mm spigot mortars, 45, 30 8 259, 296, 34 4 12cm guns, 4 7 grenades, 128, 130, 146, 150, 172, 202, 207 , 20mm cannon, 45, 120, 127, 137, 142, 146 , 227–228, 232, 236–237, 248, 250, 260 , 151, 310-311, 692n 339, 341, 34 3 25mm antiaircraft guns, 5 4 grenade launchers, 49, 120, 150n, 237 , Weapons companies, platoons, 135, 171, 305 , 251n, 262, 30 9 692, 692n, 695–696, 702, 711 . See als o guns, 207, 407, 48 4 Army units ; Marine units . harbor mines, 506 n Weart, MajGen Douglas L., 54 5 howitzers, 20 7 Weather, 36, 64, 66, 78, 90–91, 109, 118, 129 , knee mortars, 150, 150n, 17 2 132, 182, 201, 219, 223, 229, 266, 275, 292– light tanks, 4 5 293, 29 7 machine cannon, 45, 47, 304 climate, 86, 537 machine guns, 44–46, 49, 54, 115, 117–118 , clouds, 79, 109, 22 3 120, 126, 128–129, 131, 138–139, 142 , dust storms, 53 7 144–145, 148, 150, 162, 173, 188, 191 , fog, 118, 22 2 193–194, 201-202, 204, 212, 221–222, gales, 6 4 231, 234–236, 238, 239n, 244, 248–249 , humidity, 12 9 251, 251n, 253, 260, 262–263, 265, 267 , monsoons, 64 273, 281, 284, 309, 335, 350, 393, 511 , rain, 36, 132, 160, 190, 201-202, 218, 229 , 723, 77 3 241n, 265-266, 271, 275, 293, 325 medium tanks, 45 storms, 293 mines, 64, 99–100, 102, 114, 125, 131, 134, temperature, 109, 537 139, 154, 194, 203, 204n, 222n, 236, 265, typhoons, 38, 201, 241n, 483, 503, 560-561 , 275n, 310–311, 318, 324, 344, 346, 511 , 566, 603 726 winds, 64, 109, 560 mortars, 44–45, 111, 114, 117–118, 126- winter, 551, 73 4 128, 131, 139–140, 144–146, 148, 150 – Wedemeyer, MajGen Albert C ., 529 ; LtGen, 151, 162, 164, 173, 188, 193–194, 198 , 437, 533, 535, 544-545, 555, 571-574, 579 , 201, 204, 207, 212, 221, 230–234, 236 – 585-586, 596–597, 603–604, 632–633 ; Gen, 238, 244-245, 248–252, 254, 256, 259 529n 260, 263, 265, 267, 271, 275–276, 281 , Weihaiwei, 522, 544, 564, 578 284, 286, 309, 311, 341, 350–351, 383 , Weihsien, 547, 566, 577, 57 9 48 5 Weiland, Maj Charles P ., 41 9 mountain guns, 148, 150 Weir, Col Kenneth H ., 181, 37 8 90mm mortars, 19 1 Wellington, N .Z., 663, 663n, 710 150mm guns, 451, 350 ., 493, 49 5 105mm howitzers, 45, 142, 247, 35 0 Wensinger, Col Walter W 120mm guns, 47, 30 8 Weser River, 74 7 rifles, 120, 130, 138, 145–146, 150, 248, Western Carolines, 449 251n, 262, 273, 773 Western Islands Attack Group, 92, 104, 178

944 INDEX

Western Manchuria, 532 Yagihara, 50 1 Western Pacific, 3n, 18, 94, 97, 430, 462, 47 0 Yahara, Col Hiromichi, 41, 41n, 51n, 190–191 , Westertimke, 74 9 206–207, 213, 338n, 357, 389 West Field, 59 9 Yaka, 129, 13 4 Westphalia, 541 Yakabi Shima, 10 4 Whaling, Col William J ., 146, 146n, 148n, 151 , Yakada, 129, 134 283, 307, 360, 69 4 Yakamaru, Maj, 51n Whampoa, 525–52 6 Yalta Conference, 399, 432, 530–53 1 Whangpoo River, 642, 644–645, 73 3 Yamadadobaru, 13 8 White House, 40 2 Yamaguchi Prefecture, 493, 500–502, 506, 51 4 White Plains, 9 6 Yamashita, Gen Tomoyuki, 775 n White, Maj Robert 0 ., 18 6 Yamato, 18 0 Wichita, 49 6 Yamazaki, Wieseman, LtCol Frederick L., 628, 63 1 40 8 Wilkes Barre, 479n Yangtze River, 372, 522, 528, 533, 594, 640 , Wilkes Islands, 45 9 642–645, 75 8 Wilkinson, VAdm Theodore S ., 408 Yangtze Valley, 637–638 Window, 185, 185n, 201n, 20 8 Yap, 9, 84n, 449–450, 453, 46 2 Winslow, SgtMaj Robert R ., 785 Yeaton, LtCol Samuel S., 283n Wisconsin, 479n Yeh-Chien-Ying, Gen, 59 4 Woleai Atoll, 450, 455, 462, 463n Yehhsien, 57 7 Woodhouse, LtCol Horatio, C ., Jr., 115, 129 , Yellow List, 783 141, 237, 245, 247, 280, 29 6 Yellow Sea, 534, 56 1 Woodruff, MajGen Roscoe B ., 514, 51 7 Yenan, 526–527, 532, 548, 564, 588, 609–610 , Woods, MajGen Louis E ., 26, 373–373, 376, 430 , 632 566, 576, 578, 608 ; LtGen, 225n, 372n , 373n, 376n, 552n, 566n, 583n, 586n, 591n , Yingkow, 569 686n, 704n, 786n, 78 9 Yofuke, 142, 14 4 Woosung, 734, 734n, 752 Yokohama, 484, 488, 492, 509, 738, 745, 760 , Woosung Prison Camp, 733, 738, 750, 752 – 781, 783 757, 760, 78 1 Yokosuka, 45, 438n 439, 441, 464, 470, 481, 483– World War I, 525, 653, 662, 691, 71 2 485, 487–490, 495, 509, 509n World War II, 39, 573, 653–654, 656, 658, 663 , Air Station, 479, 481, 485, 48 8 667–668, 670, 672, 677–678, 682, 685, 689, Naval Base, 438, 475, 481, 483–484, 489n 693n, 702, 705, 712, 715, 717, 727, 730–731, Occupation Force, 438, 464, 476, 48 4 787–78 8 Yonabaru, 36, 50, 66, 233, 236, 266–270, 272 , Worton, BGen William A., 397n, 465, 534, 544– 290, 293, 29 6 548, 552, 553, 558, 573, 606, 618 ; MajGen , Yonabaru-Naha road, 27 2 465n, 534n, 553n, 554n, 555n Yonai, Adm Mitsumasa, 1 5 Wotje, 455, 462 Yonawa, 272, 27 4 Wright, LtCol Erma A ., 139, 18 9 Yontan airfield, 46, 50, 54–55, 68, 115, Wright, RAdm Jerauld, 2 117, 120 , 6 120n, 123, 126, 128, Wyckoff, Maj Don P ., 239n 129n, 130, 158, 158n , 159, 176–177, 181, 183–184, 227–228, 228n , 230n, 274, 37 9 X-Day, 404, 407–408 Yontan Hill, 12 6 Yabuchi Shima, 13 2 Yorktown, 419, 479 n Yae Take, 142, 142n, 144, 146, 148, 148n, 150 Yoron Shima, 3 4 151, 154, 169, 17 2 Yost, LtCol Donald K., 428, 428n ; BGen, 424n, Yaeju Dake, 351,352 428 n Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment, 28 9 Young, Sir Mark, 75 2 Yagachi Shima, 139, 173, 388n Yunagusuku, 290

INDEX 94 5

Yuan Shih-K'ai, 52 5 Zamboanga, 535, 55 2 Yuza, 331, 333, 33 5 Zampa Misaki, 118, 12 6 Yuza Dake, 335, 337, 351—35 2 Zawa, 330-331, 333 Yuza Dake-Yaeju Dake Escarpment, 333, 351— Zentsuji Prison Camp, 734, 736n, 76 0 35 2 Zillig, Edward, 50 3 Yuza Hill, 333, 335, 342 Zushi area, 48 1

U .S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 0-310-224

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