Collective Wisdom When to Impeach with an Inconsistent Statement
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Rationalization and Limitation: the Use of Learned Treatises to Impeach Opposing Expert Witnesses
RATIONALIZATION AND LIMITATION: THE USE OF LEARNED TREATISES TO IMPEACH OPPOSING EXPERT WITNESSES Edward J. Imwinkelried* [O]therwise, an ignoramus in a profession might, by an assertion of learning, declare the most absurd theories to be the teachings of the science of which he was a professed expert . –Clark v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W. 740, 744 (Ky. 1901) INTRODUCTION The numbers tell the story of the importance of the topic. To begin with, it has become commonplace for litigators to present expert testimony at trial. In one study of over 500 trials, the researchers found that experts appeared as witnesses in 86% of the hearings.1 On average, there were 3.3 experts per trial.2 Some commentators have asserted that in the United States, trial by jury is evolving into trial by expert.3 If the number of expert witnesses is impressive, the volume of expert literature is awesome. Even apart from the number of published texts and treatises devoted to expert topics, the regular periodicals dealing with such subjects now number in the thousands. The National Institutes of Health’s Library of Medicine covers thousands of biomedical journals dating back to 1948.4 The Library includes Index Medicus, a database indexing domestic as well as international medical literature;5 4,945 journals are currently indexed in Medicus.6 MEDLARS is the Library’s computerized Medical Literature Analysis and Retrieval System.7 The volume of expert literature is not only * Edward J. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law, University of California Davis. Former Chair, Evidence Section, American Association of Law Schools. -
This Opinion Is Subject to Formal Revision Before Publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS No. 13-CF-735 FLOYD E. BROOKS, APPELLANT, v. UNITED STATES, APPELLEE. Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (CF1-24121-09) (Hon. Lynn Leibovitz, Trial Judge) (Argued May 5, 2015 Decided June 4, 2015) Thomas D. Engle, with whom Sharon L. Burka was on the brief, for appellant. John Cummings, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Ronald C. Machen Jr., United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Elizabeth Trosman, John P. Mannarino, and S. Vinet Bryant, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee. Before GLICKMAN and THOMPSON, Associate Judges, and FARRELL, Senior Judge. FARRELL, Senior Judge: A jury found appellant guilty of two counts of armed premeditated murder and related firearms offenses arising from the shooting deaths of brothers Robert and Raymond Williams. Appellant claims error in the 2 trial court’s twofold ruling that allowed the prosecutor (a) to impeach a defense witness, Vernon Parrish, with his prior inconsistent statements to defense counsel and a defense investigator disclosed in appellant’s in limine motion to admit Parrish’s third-party perpetrator testimony under Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1996) (en banc), and (b) to “complete the impeachment” by a stipulation of the parties that Parrish, contrary to his denials on the stand, had made the inconsistent statements to the defense team. -
Impeachment in Florida
Florida State University Law Review Volume 6 Issue 1 Article 1 Winter 1978 Impeachment in Florida Frederick B. Karl Marguerite Davis Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr Part of the President/Executive Department Commons Recommended Citation Frederick B. Karl & Marguerite Davis, Impeachment in Florida, 6 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1 (1978) . https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol6/iss1/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW VOLUME 6 WINTER 1978 NUMBER 1 IMPEACHMENT IN FLORIDA FREDERICK B. KARL AND MARGUERITE DAVIS TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. HISTORY OF IMPEACHMENT AUTHORITY ..... 5 II. EFFECTS OF IMPEACHMENT ................... 9 III. GROUNDS FOR IMPEACHMENT .................. 11 IV. IMPEACHMENT FOR ACTS PRIOR TO PRESENT TERM OF OFFICE .................... 30 V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS 39 VI. IMPEACHMENT PROCEDURE: THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ..................... ........ 43 VII. IMPEACHMENT PROCEDURE: THE SENATE ......... 47 VIII. IMPEACHMENT ALTERNATIVES .................... 51 A. CriminalSanctions .......................... 52 B . Incapacity ........ ... ... ............... 53 C. Ethics Commission ......................... 53 D. Judicial QualificationsCommission ........... 53 E . B ar D iscipline .............................. 54 F. Executive Suspension ........................ 55 IX . C ON CLUSION ................................... 55 X . A PPEN DIX ....... ............................ 59 2 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:1 IMPEACHMENT IN FLORIDA FREDERICK B. KARL* AND MARGUERITE DAVIS** What was the practice before this in cases where the chief Magis- trate rendered himself obnoxious? Why recourse was had to assas- sination in wch. -
The Impeachment and Trial of a Former President
Legal Sidebari The Impeachment and Trial of a Former President January 15, 2021 For the second time in just over a year, the House of Representatives has voted to impeach President Donald J. Trump. The House previously voted to impeach President Trump on December 18, 2019, and the Senate voted to acquit the President on February 5, 2020. Because the timing of this second impeachment vote is so close to the end of the Trump Administration, it is possible that any resulting Senate trial may not occur until after President Trump leaves office on January 20, 2021. This possibility has prompted the question of whether the Senate can try a former President for conduct that occurred while he was in office. The Constitution’s Impeachment Provisions The Constitution grants Congress authority to impeach and remove the President, Vice President, and other federal “civil Officers” for treason, bribery, or “other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” Impeachment is one of the various checks and balances created by the Constitution, and it serves as a powerful tool for holding government officers accountable. The impeachment process entails two distinct proceedings carried out by the separate houses of Congress. First, a simple majority of the House impeaches—or formally approves allegations of wrongdoing amounting to an impeachable offense. The second proceeding is an impeachment trial in the Senate. If the Senate votes to convict with a two-thirds majority, the official is removed from office. The Senate also can disqualify an official upon conviction from holding a federal office in the future; according to Senate practice, this vote follows the vote for conviction. -
Administrative Law and the Regulatory Process
THE COUNCIL ON LICENSURE, ENFORCEMENT & REGULATION Promoting Regulatory Excellence Administrative Law and The Regulatory Process Understanding The Basics The Council on Licensure, Enforcement and Regulation 108 Windhaven Drive, Suite A, Nicholasville, Kentucky 40356 Phone: 859-269-1289 | www.clearhq.org | E-mail: [email protected] All rights reserved. Inquiries for use of any material should be directed to: Executive Director, The Council on Licensure, Enforcement and Regulation This manual is not to be reproduced in any form. Copyright © 2017 The Council on Licensure, Enforcement and Regulation (CLEAR). All Rights Reserved. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE REGULATORY PROCESS UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS Promoting Regulatory Excellence Day One 8:30 – 9:00 a.m. Registration 9:00 – 9:15 a.m. Introduction and Welcome Module I - Fundamentals 9:15 – 11:15 a.m. i. Sources & Functions ii. Purposes of Administrative Agencies iii. The Regulatory Process 11:15 – 12:15 p.m. iv. Limits on Administrative Agencies v. Sufficiency of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings 12:15 – 1:15 p.m. Lunch Module II - The Role of Agency General Counsel 1:15 – 3:00 p.m. i. Principles of Administrative Agencies, Boards and Colleges ii. Role as Board Counsel iii. Rulemaking 3:00 – 3:15 p.m. Break Module III - Adjudication of Administrative Cases 3:15 – 5:00 p.m. i. The Role of the Attorney in Compliance and Discipline ii. Adjudication of Administrative Cases Wednesday, September 13 Module IV - Litigation 9:00 – 10:30 a.m. i. Initiating the Hearing Process as a Disciplinary Prosecutor 10:45 – 11:00 a.m. Break 10:45 – 11:45 a.m. -
Victims Under Attack: North Carolina's Flawed Rule 609 Daniel R
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW Volume 97 | Number 6 Article 2 9-1-2019 Victims Under Attack: North Carolina's Flawed Rule 609 Daniel R. Tilly Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Daniel R. Tilly, Victims Under Attack: North Carolina's Flawed Rule 609, 97 N.C. L. Rev. 1553 (2019). Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol97/iss6/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 97 N.C. L. REV. 1553 (2019) VICTIMS UNDER ATTACK: NORTH CAROLINA’S FLAWED RULE 609* DANIEL R. TILLY** Evidence law in North Carolina senselessly punishes victims of domestic and sexual violence by broadly sanctioning witness impeachment with prior convictions––no matter the implicit prejudice to the witness or how little the conviction bears on credibility. The North Carolina approach is an outlier. Under Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the use of conviction evidence for impeaching witness credibility is confined to felonies and crimes involving dishonest acts or false statements. Their use must also satisfy judicial balancing tests aimed at protecting against unfair prejudice to the witness. The majority of states take a similar or even more restrictive approach. North Carolina’s corresponding rule, however, casts a far wider net. It broadly permits parties to impeach witnesses with an array of convictions, including innocuous misdemeanors, and affords no judicial discretion to protect the witness or weigh the potential for juror misuse. -
EVIDENCE 1. Discuss Whether Bob's Statements to Attorney 1
GRADER’S GUIDE *** QUESTION NO. 1 *** SUBJECT: EVIDENCE 1. Discuss whether Bob’s statements to Attorney 1 will be protected by the rules of attorney/client privilege. 25% “A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client (1) between the client . and the client’s lawyer.” Evidence Rule 503(b). A communication is confidential if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services. Evidence Rule 503(a)(5). For purposes of the rule, a client is a person “who is rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services.” Evidence Rule 503(a)(1). Finally, Evidence Rule 510 mandates that a person who controls a privilege against disclosure waives the privilege if the person “voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant party of the matter or communication.” The party asserting the privilege bears the burden of proving that the contested communication is protected by the privilege. See, e.g., Plate v. State, 925 P.2d 1057, 1066 (Alaska App. 1996) (concerning privileged communications to clergymen). As the Commentary to Evidence Rule 510 notes, [t]he central purpose of most privileges is the promotion of some interest or relationship by endowing it with a supporting secrecy or confidentiality. It is evident that the privilege should terminate when the holder by his own act destroys this confidentiality. -
Impeachment and Removal
Impeachment and Removal Jared P. Cole Legislative Attorney Todd Garvey Legislative Attorney October 29, 2015 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R44260 Impeachment and Removal Summary The impeachment process provides a mechanism for removal of the President, Vice President, and other “civil Officers of the United States” found to have engaged in “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” The Constitution places the responsibility and authority to determine whether to impeach an individual in the hands of the House of Representatives. Should a simple majority of the House approve articles of impeachment specifying the grounds upon which the impeachment is based, the matter is then presented to the Senate, to which the Constitution provides the sole power to try an impeachment. A conviction on any one of the articles of impeachment requires the support of a two-thirds majority of the Senators present. Should a conviction occur, the Senate retains limited authority to determine the appropriate punishment. Under the Constitution, the penalty for conviction on an impeachable offense is limited to either removal from office, or removal and prohibition against holding any future offices of “honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.” Although removal from office would appear to flow automatically from conviction on an article of impeachment, a separate vote is necessary should the Senate deem it appropriate to disqualify the individual convicted from holding future federal offices of public trust. Approval of such a measure requires only the support of a simple majority. Key Takeaways of This Report The Constitution gives Congress the authority to impeach and remove the President, Vice President, and other federal “civil officers” upon a determination that such officers have engaged in treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. -
The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: a Defense
The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense John 0. McGinnist and Michael B. Rappaporttt INTRODUCTION On the first day of the 104th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted a rule that requires a three-fifths majority of those voting to pass an increase in income tax rates.' This three-fifths rule had been publicized during the 1994 congressional elections as part of the House Republicans' Contract with America. In a recent Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, seventeen well-known law professors assert that the rule is unconstitutional.3 They argue that requiring a legislative supermajority to enact bills conflicts with the intent of the Framers. They also contend that the rule conflicts with the Constitution's text, because they believe that the Constitution's specific supermajority requirements, such as the requirement for approval of treaties, indicate that simple majority voting is required for the passage of ordinary legislation.4 t Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School. tt Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. The authors would like to thank Larry Alexander, Akhil Amar, Carl Auerbach, Jay Bybee, David Gray Carlson, Lawrence Cunningham, Neal Devins, John Harrison, Michael Herz, Arthur Jacobson, Gary Lawson, Nelson Lund, Erela Katz Rappaport, Paul Shupack, Stewart Sterk, Eugene Volokh, and Fred Zacharias for their comments and assistance. 1. See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, EFFECTIVE FOR ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS (Jan. 4, 1995) [hereinafter RULES] (House Rule XXI(5)(c)); see also id. House Rule XXI(5)(d) (barring retroactive tax increases). 2. The rule publicized in the Contract with America was actually broader than the one the House enacted. -
The Impeachment of a President
CHAPTER 4 The Politics of Removal: The Impeachment of a President Patrick Horst This contribution takes the current debate about an impeachment of President Donald J. Trump as an inducement to delve deeper into the question under which circumstances and conditions Congress decides to impeach a president—and when it prefers to evade or repudiate the legal and political demands to remove him from office. This tricky problem, an issue of constitutional (legal) principle and political expediency, will be dealt with in a longitudinal historical approach, comparing the philosophi- cal debate at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia with the most intriguing cases of impeachment debates in the 23 decades thereafter. Why did the House of Representatives impeach Andrew Johnson and Bill Clinton, and was willing to impeach Richard Nixon, whereas it tabled attempts to prosecute—among others—Andrew Jackson, John Tyler, Harry Truman, Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush and Barack Obama? And why was the Senate willing to convict Nixon but acquitted Johnson and P. Horst (*) Department of English, American and Celtic Studies, North American Studies Program, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany © The Author(s) 2020 63 M. T. Oswald (ed.), Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8_4 64 P. HORST Clinton? Finally: What can we learn from these precedents with respect to a potential impeachment of the current 45th President of the United States: Could he be impeached—and should he be?1 IMPEACHMENT IN THE US cONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT Impeachment is at the center of the American Revolution and the American republic. -
Evidence for Delaware Criminal Defense Impeachment the Story: Murder Trial • Witness: “At 11 P.M
Evidence for Delaware Criminal Defense Impeachment The Story: Murder Trial • Witness: “At 11 p.m. I saw defendant, 150 feet away, hit the victim over the head.” • At prior codefendant’s trial: “I could see because the moon was full; and directly overhead.” The Potential Impeachment Material • Per the Farmer’s Almanac, the moon was in the first quarter and riding "low" on the horizon at the precise time of the murder. A Preliminary Inquiry: Why Do We Impeach? Impeachment Rationales - 1 • Discredit witness’ ‘live’ version • And/or • Support your version – crediting the prior statement Impeachment Rationales - 2 • Control • Drama • Jury Instruction • Closing Argument Mastering Impeachment 1: Impeachment and Evidence Law • Character Impeachment – the chronic liar: – 608 – 609 • Case-specific Impeachment – liar or mistaken: – 613 – Bias – Capacity – Inconsistent Facts Mastering Impeachment 2: Impeachment and Hearsay • Impeachment only, or • Impeaching and Substantive –801 –803 –807 Mastering Impeachment 3: ExtrinsicEvidence or Intrinsic Law Onlyand TrialExtrinsic Ad Only Intrinsic Bias 608(b) 608 Character Dishonest Acts 609 613*** Capacity Contrary Facts Impeachment and Hearsay • Rule 806 – • Hearsay declarants may be impeached just like live witnesses. Mastering Impeachment 5: The Rest is Style and Practice So, Back to Abe Lincoln • Do you entice the witness to say the moon was full? • Do you impeach on cross? • Do you impeach extrinsically, after he is off the stand? • And does impeachment work if the moon is still shining? What Did Lincoln Do? • Q: How could you see from a distance of a hundred and fifty feet or more without a candle at eleven o'clock at night? • A: The moon was shining real bright. -
CREC-2021-01-13-Pt1-Pgh151-8.Pdf
E PL UR UM IB N U U S Congressional Record United States th of America PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 117 CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION Vol. 167 WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 13, 2021 No. 8 Senate The Senate was not in session today. Its next meeting will be held on Friday, January 15, 2021, at 10 a.m. House of Representatives WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 13, 2021 The House met at 9 a.m. and was We have taken our obligations freely, tempore (Mr. BROWN) at 9 o’clock and called to order by the Speaker pro tem- but we remain beholden to Your guid- 16 minutes a.m. pore (Mr. BROWN). ance. Hold us, then, accountable to f f Your powerful Word. In the strength of Your holy name, PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION DESIGNATION OF THE SPEAKER we pray. OF H. RES. 24, IMPEACHING DON- PRO TEMPORE Amen. ALD JOHN TRUMP, PRESIDENT The SPEAKER pro tempore laid be- f OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR fore the House the following commu- HIGH CRIMES AND MIS- THE JOURNAL nication from the Speaker: DEMEANORS WASHINGTON, DC, The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursu- Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, by di- January 13, 2021. ant to section 5(a)(1)(A) of House Reso- rection of the Committee on Rules, I I hereby appoint the Honorable ANTHONY lution 8, the Journal of the last day’s call up House Resolution 41 and ask for G. BROWN to act as Speaker pro tempore on proceedings is approved. its immediate consideration. this day. f The Clerk read the resolution, as fol- NANCY PELOSI, Speaker of the House of Representatives.